tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/wahhabism-35683/articlesWahhabism – The Conversation2022-07-06T19:20:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844182022-07-06T19:20:07Z2022-07-06T19:20:07ZFrom caravans to markets, the hajj pilgrimage has always included a commercial component<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472864/original/file-20220706-24-ndntzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=85%2C24%2C8045%2C5388&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of the Kaaba at the Grand Mosque during the hajj pilgrimage in the Muslim holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia on July 6, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHajj/1ac9b0704ee7470688d0e419c9ed06af/photo?Query=hajj%202022&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=65&currentItemNo=25">AP Photo/Amr Nabil</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early June 2022, <a href="http://www.eumuslims.org/en/media-centre/news/saudi-arabia-western-pilgrims-no-longer-able-book-hajj-travel-agencies">Saudi Arabia announced a hajj “lottery” for Western pilgrims</a> that made it mandatory for people from Europe, the Americas and Australia to apply for visas through a random draw through the <a href="https://www.motawif.com.sa/home/en-eu">Saudi government-backed website</a>. This new website also offered customized and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-hajj-website-crashes-lottery-western-pilgrims-opens">VIP packages</a> while attempting to replace the services that tour agencies had offered for decades. </p>
<p>This year, an estimated 1 million people will perform the hajj, which is considered one of the five pillars in Islam. Under the lottery, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabias-new-hajj-lottery-has-many-muslims-fuming/a-62368626">only 50,000 permits were allowed</a> from these 50 countries, compared with <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/saudi-arabia-hajj-british-muslims-in-uproar-over-travel-chaos-12642092">25,000 for U.K. Muslims</a> alone in previous years.</p>
<p>The resulting chaos left both pilgrims and travel agencies frustrated. Many Muslims who had already made their plans found they could not rebook under the new plan because of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/07/01/motawif-hajj/">malfunctioning websites</a>, among other issues. Several among those who were able to arrive in Saudi Arabia found <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hajj-western-pilgrims-left-no-hotel-room-days-pilgrimage">that the hotel rooms they had paid for were no longer available or were double-booked</a>. </p>
<p>The impact extends beyond individual pilgrims. Tour agencies will potentially lose out on thousands of dollars in revenue per prospective pilgrim. The cost of hajj packages has been rising <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-haj-egypt/higher-living-costs-fees-force-many-egyptians-to-drop-haj-plans-idUSKBN1L21FB">for many years</a> across the globe. For pilgrims leaving from the United States, trips can range between <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-hajj-pilgrims-and-tour-operators-question-lottery-system">US$12,000 and $20,000</a>. <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hajj-lottery-saudi-arabia-decision-devastates-uk-muslims">Cutting out travel agencies</a> that function as middlemen might help reduce these costs. But under the new system, the money will be channeled to the Saudi government, which aims <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/01/tourism-to-replace-oil-economy-in-saudi-arabia.html">to decrease its dependence on oil revenue through an increase in tourism activities</a>. This has reignited an ongoing debate on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/14/mecca-hajj-saudi-arabia">commercialization of the hajj</a> under Saudi Arabia’s influence. </p>
<p>While Saudi Arabia sought to cut out the Western tour agencies reaping profit from hajj, their own offerings outlined “silver,” “gold” and “platinum” packages, boasting of “<a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hajj-lottery-explained-random-draw-western-pilgrims">luxurious services,” five-star stays in Mecca and Medina, and “superior camping spots equipped with excellent facilities and modern furniture</a>.” </p>
<p>The current changes to the hajj system are just one example of centuries of economics mixing with tradition. Generally, pilgrims try to emulate the <a href="http://www.jstor.com/stable/20789596">hajj rituals in the order of the Prophet Muhammad’s own last pilgrimage before his death</a>. Those rituals emphasize the cleansing of the soul, detachment from worldly concerns and rejection of status distinctions among Muslims, symbolized by the donning of the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/life-style/travel-and-tourism/2015/09/22/The-white-robes-of-Hajj-make-all-pilgrims-equal">white garments that all pilgrims wear</a>. Pilgrims continue to wear these robes in the service of these goals, but they also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ed3493baea0c4cb9a81dcb58e2a7cef0_18.jpeg">travel to the various sites</a> in luxurious high-speed trains and buses. </p>
<p>In the past, too, the commercial, technological and secular aspects of the hajj have been a topic of much <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/hajj-saudi-arabia-mecca-pilgrimage-commercialisation-riches-reclaim-worship-a7919606.html">debate</a> about whether they <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43133576">change the spiritual</a> nature of the pilgrimage. <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/spotlight-dr-noor-zaidi/">As a scholar of pilgrimage, ritual and Islam</a>, I know that the focus on commerce and profits has been part of the long history of the hajj. </p>
<h2>Early roots of trade and commerce</h2>
<p>Across religious traditions, pilgrimages have always had a commercial component. From pilgrimage caravans and markets that grow around religious sites to the gifting of relics and souvenirs, <a href="https://durkheim.uchicago.edu/Summaries/forms.html">religion and commerce have been deeply linked</a>. </p>
<p>The hajj is no different. As F.E. Peters, an eminent scholar of Islamic studies, noted in his 1994 <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=EK5MqskDYC0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=commerce&f=false">significant study</a> on the hajj, the Quran itself acknowledges that Muslims were permitted to indulge in commerce around the pilgrimage: Verse <a href="https://quran.com/2/198">2:198</a> in the Quran says, “There is no blame on you for seeking the bounty of your Lord during this journey.” Quranic commentaries have explained this verse to mean that Islam <a href="https://aboutislam.net/counseling/ask-the-scholar/hajj/can-i-engage-in-business-during-hajj/">allows commercial activity</a> before and after the days of hajj rituals. </p>
<p>As Islam spread, so did the commerce. While the narrow set of ritual acts of hajj remained, the total pilgrimage experience was shaped by business. For centuries, <a href="https://www.arabnews.pk/sites/default/files/userimages/20/routes-to-makkah-map.jpg">major overland caravan routes</a> traveled through Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad, with merchants attaching themselves to these caravans. </p>
<p>Traders targeted the pilgrims as consumers, and many pilgrims themselves <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2pwuAh0ujPMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">engaged in trade</a> to pay their way. As traveling overland for the hajj journey could take <a href="https://doi.org/10.21832/9781845416157-015">up to two years</a>, pilgrims traded fruits, wines, silk, carpets and other items. They purchased goods such as coffee and pearls for <a href="http://www.uplbooks.com/book/pious-passengers-hajj-earlier-times">their return journey</a>. </p>
<h2>A changing world, a changing hajj</h2>
<p>The evolution of technology and means of travel inevitably brought new economic considerations into the organization of the hajj. The invention of the steamship was central to the development of mass pilgrimage to Mecca in the 19th century – the total number of pilgrims per year rose from an estimated 112,000 participants in 1831 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30069613">to some 300,000 in 1910</a>. </p>
<p>European liner companies <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4125193">controlled major</a> pilgrim sea routes, linking hajj to imperial business opportunities. In 1886, the British government called in the famed Thomas Cook & Son, the original package holiday entrepreneurs, to become <a href="https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/package-tour-to-mecca-how-the-hajj-became-an-essential-part-of-the-british-calendar">official travel agents of the hajj</a>. </p>
<p>The use of a for-profit tourism company to regulate the hajj may have seemed a new development, but agents and intermediaries had been central to the process for centuries. The “mutawwifin,” the hereditary guilds of pilgrimage guides, provided pilgrims with guidance in carrying out the rituals of the hajj and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30069613">were central to Mecca’s government and its economy</a>.</p>
<p>Over the centuries, these local guides would develop contacts in foreign lands, encouraging Muslims to perform the pilgrimage. In addition to linguistic and ritual guidance, the mutawwifin would also arrange meals, lodgings and tents – acting in ways that were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4125193">similar to modern-day tour operators</a>.</p>
<h2>The modern era</h2>
<p>The steamship was just one technological innovation that altered the hajj landscape into a more commercial venture. At the turn of the 20th century, Sultan Abdul Hamid II of the Ottoman Empire was an adamant promoter of the construction of the <a href="https://books.openedition.org/ifpo/docannexe/image/5005/img-1.jpg">Hejaz Railway</a>, meant to establish a connection between Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. </p>
<p>Proponents of the railway argued that it would both significantly improve conditions for pilgrims on the overland routes and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=EK5MqskDYC0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=al-Munir&f=false">help the establishment of commerce and trade</a>. </p>
<p>The establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and the eventual replacement of shipping and rail with air transport transformed the nature of the hajj further. The new Saudi state adhered to the doctrine of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Wahhabi">Wahhabism</a>, an Islamic reform movement originating in the 1700s that rejected all forms of innovations outside of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad in his time. </p>
<p>Yet despite this condemnation of innovation, the Saudi government has overseen decades of commercial development of the hajj, encouraging the <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/v2030/vrps/pep/">tourism atmosphere</a> and deriving <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/is-saudi-arabia-unfairly-profiting-from-its-holy-sites-28899">significant profits</a> from the obligatory pilgrimage. </p>
<h2>Commerce or politics?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men dressed in loose white garments sitting on top of a hill, while multitudes of people are gathered below." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472867/original/file-20220706-4568-h7xf2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Muslim pilgrims pray on a rocky hill called the Mountain of Mercy near the holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastSaudiHajjPhotoEssay/67c1fda03dba48fc9df73c7b07ba7c9e/photo?Query=hajj%20%20&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3237&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Amr Nabil</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the hajj has historically been linked to commerce, pilgrims of late have <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188182221.pdf">expressed dissatisfaction</a> with the overt emphasis on the touristic experience and the sense that it is now diminishing the spiritual nature of the pilgrimage. </p>
<p>Indeed, commercial revenues from the hajj remain a contested and even a political topic. In 2018, Yusuf al Qaradawi, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood cleric based in Qatar, issued a fatwa calling for limiting spending on pilgrimage. “Seeing Muslims feeding the hungry, treating the sick and sheltering the homeless are better viewed by Allah than spending money on the hajj and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/discover/umrah-islamic-religious-pilgrimage-explained-mecca-saudi-arabia">umrah</a> every year,” he declared. This statement was viewed as an attempt <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2018/08/23/Qaradawi-fatwa-about-hajj-draws-Muslim-ire">to undermine Saudi Arabia</a> by discouraging Muslims from performing the pilgrimage, as the revenues go to the government. </p>
<p>Al Qaradawi’s fatwa drew ire from certain circles, as all Muslims who are financially and physically capable must attempt to complete the hajj, regardless of any geopolitical sentiment toward Saudi Arabia. Yet there is no doubt that the current hajj has refocused attention on whether the business of hajj remains in line with the original allowance to “seek bounty” during the pilgrimage to Islam’s holiest sites.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noorzehra Zaidi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The start of the hajj is reigniting debates around its commercialization, but pilgrimages are also a time for seeking business opportunities, writes a scholar of Islam.Noorzehra Zaidi, Assistant Professor of HIstory, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893802018-01-10T13:57:46Z2018-01-10T13:57:46ZWhy the sartorial choices of Salafi clerics sparked a debate on morality in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201146/original/file-20180108-83559-1l8pf5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslims pray at the Kofar Mata Central Mosque in Kano, Northern Nigeria. Liberal and fundamentalist Islam are in a contest of legitimacy in the region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The innocuous <a href="http://www.hutudole.com/2017/11/waazin-malaman-izala-kasashen-turaishin.html">photos</a> of two Nigerian Islamic clerics shopping and relaxing in London sparked a fierce debate on social media platforms in northern Nigeria in early December 2017. The photos were quite unremarkable. One showed the two men sitting on a park bench; another showed them in a clothing store wearing cowboy hats. In both, they were dressed in suits. And they were wearing gloves and scarves to protect themselves from London’s cold, wet weather. </p>
<p>The pictures caused a fierce online debate about piety, hypocrisy, morality, the sartorial prescriptions of Islam, and the tyranny of religious authorities in Muslim-majority northern Nigeria. The violent Islamist group, Boko Haram, is <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-explaining-nigerias-boko-haram-and-its-violent-insurgency/">active in the region</a>, which has become a hotbed of <a href="http://time.com/3712517/boko-haram-history/">extremism</a>. </p>
<p>So, why were these ordinary images so controversial? Why did they spark heated debates among educated northern Nigerian Muslim men and women? </p>
<p>The answer is simple. The two men are <a href="https://tif.ssrc.org/2017/04/11/salafism-in-nigeria/">Salafi</a> clerics, members of a clerical order that has come to wield <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Salafism-Nigeria-Preaching-Politics-International/dp/1107157439/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1515432356&sr=8-1&keywords=salafism+in+Nigeria">outsized influence</a> over Muslims in northern Nigeria. The clerics act as enforcers of an increasingly puritan Islamic order. They are uncompromising in defining what is moral and permissible and what is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wh10ZpnI2Cw">haram or sacreligious</a>. They often equate Muslims’ engagements with modernity and Western ways of life with immorality and sinful innovation or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52LRSiRbKAI">bid'ah</a>. </p>
<p>This leaves them open to charges of hypocrisy when they appear to make choices seen as contradicting their teachings. And this is what happened in London. The two clerics were wearing what in northern Nigeria is considered western dress. This touched off debates between two camps of young Muslims: those who resent the growing intrusion of the clerics into their lives and are eager to criticise their adventures in a Western city, and those who continue to look on the religious figures as revered exemplars of piety. </p>
<h2>Wahhabism and the roots of Salafi Puritanism</h2>
<p>The Islamic sect to which the two clerics belong heightened the controversy. Sheikh Kabiru Gombe and his mentor, Sheikh Bala Lau, are prominent clerics of the <a href="http://www.bigsas.uni-bayreuth.de/en/Alumni_c_research_p/the_izala_ben_amara/index.html">Izala sect</a>, the most visible face of a growing community of Nigerian <a href="http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255">Salafism</a>, a branch of Sunni Islam which holds to a strict, uncompromising doctrine. </p>
<p>Leaders of the sect are gaining popularity and displacing mainstream <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/116410/pub989.pdf">Sufi</a> clerics in the region. They accuse traditional Sufi Muslims of hobnobbing with modernity and failing to practice Islam in its pure form. Sufis are vulnerable to these accusations because their creed focuses on individual mystical paths to God rather than on outward, political and authoritarian expressions of piety.</p>
<p>This difference has led to an increasingly intense contest between the two sides. The photographs of the two clerics catapulted the contest onto social media, blogs and web forums. </p>
<p>The personalities and profiles of the two clerics contributed to the intensity of the debates.</p>
<p>Sheikh Gombe is known in the region for his ultra-radical Salafi theological <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Va7xl74UqlI">positions</a> and pronouncements. He has made his voice heard in local and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4j2Q_Csmz08">foreign</a> settings, capturing the imagination of some young Muslims in northern Nigeria. He presents an argument that being a pure Muslim means eschewing association with Western modernity. He is against modern and Western institutions such as secular film making, mixed gender socialisation and goods such as Western clothes. All, he argues, can pollute the piety of Muslims.</p>
<p>In my ongoing research on the historical roots of <a href="http://time.com/3712517/boko-haram-history/">Boko Haram</a> in northern Nigeria I call the rise of this branch of Islam the Salafi Islamic wave. Tracing its roots, I have found that it began with the slow but well-funded arrival of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html">Wahhabism</a> in northern Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s. Wahhabism is the puritan strain of Sunni Islam birthed in Saudi Arabia by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. </p>
<p>The Wahhabi-Salafi’s most dominant organisational umbrella was – and still is – the <a href="http://www.bigsas.uni-bayreuth.de/en/Alumni_c_research_p/the_izala_ben_amara/index.html">Izala sect</a>, which was founded in 1978 in Jos, Nigeria, by followers of the late Sheikh Abubakar <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-sheikh-abubakar-mahmud-gumi-1551628.html">Gumi</a>. </p>
<p>At the time Gumi was travelling throughout the Muslim world and spending time in Saudi Arabia as a member of both the Supreme Council of the Islamic University in Medina and the Legal Committee of the Muslim World League. He returned to Nigeria in 1986 and was recognised as the spiritual leader of the Izala anti-Sufi reform movement. The movement’s following expanded dramatically under him. </p>
<p>The Izala group set up schools and the best graduates were sent – on generous Saudi Arabian scholarships – to the University of Medina to study Islam under a Wahhabi curriculum with a tinge of ultra-radical Salafism. They returned in the 1990s and inaugurated a new Salafi era in northern Nigerian Islam. </p>
<p>In the 2000s, Medina-trained Salafi clerics, backed by Saudi money and patronage, succeeded in upstaging the old Izala clerical order through a mix of youthful charisma, theological novelty and populism. They began entrenching their strict moral code conforming, according to them, to the Islamic Sharia law. </p>
<h2>Beyond photos and suits</h2>
<p>Western culture and lifestyle dominate popular culture in Nigeria. For many young Muslims in northern Nigeria, Salafism’s prescriptions and prohibitions are suffocating, particularly for those who want a more pragmatic engagement with a Western lifestyle. Many believe they can pursue these lifestyle choices and still practice their religion. </p>
<p>But Salafi clerics and their followers see no acceptable compromise. They are increasingly making themselves custodians of public morality. They routinely condemn conduct that they associate with decadent, permissive western modernity. For example, they dictate what northern Nigerian <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2017/01/salafism-physical-appearances/">Muslims can and can’t wear</a>. </p>
<p>The debate around the two clerics was therefore not a trivial conversation about the dress and the recreational choices of two Salafi clerics. The photos were loaded with symbolism and contradictions. Participants in the online debate used the opportunity to criticise – or excuse – the perceived tyranny and hypocrisy of a powerful Salafi establishment. And to express personal anxieties and fears. </p>
<p>The debate about modernity, Islam, and morality has migrated to online platforms because the internet is relatively anonymous. This has given both sides greater freedom to express their views. The debate encapsulates the ongoing ideological struggle in northern Nigerian Islam between those who live and defend a modern lifestyle, and those suspicious of Western modernity and the unmediated influence of Western education and culture.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89380/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moses E. Ochonu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The debate around photos of two Nigerian Salafi clerics taken in London wasn’t a trivial conversation about dress and recreational choices. It was loaded with symbolism.Moses E. Ochonu, Professor of African History, Vanderbilt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/730982017-02-23T02:02:09Z2017-02-23T02:02:09ZWho exactly are ‘radical’ Muslims?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157752/original/image-20170221-18633-1v598vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indian Muslim woman Shagufta Sayyd prays in Mumbai, India.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Trump administration has been using the phrase “radical Islam” when discussing the “war on terror.” From his inauguration address to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/02/06/trump-warns-anew-against-attacks-by-radical-islamic-terrorists-as-he-visits-centcom/?utm_term=.a07b8e15e91e">remarks to military leaders</a>, President Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/black-site-prisons-cia-terrorist.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1">has been warning</a> against “Islamic terrorists.” </p>
<p>Many different kinds of individuals and movements get collapsed into this category of radical Islam. A common one that is increasingly being used by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/elections-france-security-170215090123247.html">politicians</a> and <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/6073/what-is-salafism-and-should-we-be-worried-by-it">journalists</a> both in Europe and the U.S. to equate with “radical Islam” is the Salafist tradition. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2016/01/transcript-michael-flynn-160104174144334.html">Michael Flynn</a>, who recently resigned as national security advisor, was clear that what unites terrorists is their belief in the “ideology” of Salafism. Sebastian Gorka, deputy assistant to the president, <a href="http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-26/why-al-qaeda-just-wont-die">also describes Salafism as a “fundamental understanding of Islam”</a> that <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/02/03/513213042/trump-assistant-on-presidents-foreign-policy">justifies terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>France and Germany are targeting this movement, vowing to “clean up” or <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/german-vice-chancellor-sigmar-gabriel-calls-for-ban-on-islamist-mosques/a-37036379">shut down Salafist mosques</a>, since several <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKBN15G3OY">arrested and suspected terrorists</a> had spent time in these communities.</p>
<p>As a scholar of religion and politics, I have done <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/politicizing-islam-9780190225247?cc=us&lang=en&">research in Salafi communities</a>, specifically in France and India, two countries where Muslims are the largest religious minorities. </p>
<p>Salafists constitute a minority of the Muslim population. For example, in France, estimates range from <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/03/30/01016-20120330ARTFIG00624-entre-5000et-10000-salafistes-en-france.php">5,000</a> to <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31911/MWP_2014_13.pdf">20,000</a> – out of a Muslim population of over 4 million. Security experts estimate a worldwide number of <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Wimhurst_IPSP.pdf">50 million</a> out of 1.6 billion Muslims. </p>
<p>But there’s not much understanding of Salafism, its history and its diversity. In fact, Muslims themselves often have different definitions of what it means to be a Salafist. </p>
<p>So, who are Salafists?</p>
<h2>Origins of Salafism</h2>
<p>The Arabic term salaf means “ancestors.” It refers technically to the first three generations of Muslims who surrounded the Prophet Muhammad. Because they had direct experience with the original Islamic teachings and practices, they are generally respected across the Muslim world. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157753/original/image-20170221-18624-16m3tdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reaching Kaaba, a building at the center of Islam’s most sacred mosque, Al-Masjid al-Haram, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/blankqo/26512561856/in/photolist-GoPNXs-pW14oD-6ZaDHV-hvKbx-jRt5E-jRt6y-PG1uV-jRt4L-D4ZTvs-CyBaKL-533wx1-3dqdFx-PwSSo-9eaf3Z-9edjsA-9edj9A-9eaeLH-9ediY1-jCMXT-sg9Yh-pGJeXv-darE1-8q13id-fSnrrR-fSnqSp-fSkXJM-ToF8-2fD7F-yxzVTe-cArVN-8Z4vzm-4rdmfY-y7fr1-qHU3e-qJ4FT-7k9fo8-fSkZYr-fSnpzK-fSnoHK-52ucDd-52q41K-52udpS-52uic1-52pXhD-52q1dc-52uguh-52pYE6-52ufLf-52pYvn-52ucYf">Farid Iqbal Ibrahim</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Self-identified Salafists tend to believe they are simply trying to emulate the path of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This might include an array of practices from dress to culinary habits as well as ethical teachings and commitment to faith.</p>
<p>Salafism as a movement is believed to have originated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some historians claim it started as a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-salafism-9780199326280?cc=us&lang=en&">theological reform movement</a> within <a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6572670">Sunni Islam</a>. The impetus was to return to the original teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quran – a consequence, in part, of social changes and Western colonialism.</p>
<p>They specifically cite the works of Egyptian, Persian and Syrian intellectuals from the 19th century as shaping Salafist movements. One recent study, however, argues that these intellectuals from the past <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-making-of-salafism/9780231175500">never even used the term Salafism</a>. In other words, there is no authoritative account of how or when exactly this movement originated.</p>
<p>Finally, it is also open to debate as to which Islamic groups, schools of thought and practices may be considered Salafist. This is because groups and individuals who are labeled Salafist do not always view themselves this way. And they <a href="http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255">disagree amongst each other</a> over what defines authentic Salafist practice. </p>
<h2>Here’s what my research shows</h2>
<p>The vast majority of people who loosely affiliate with Salafism, however, are either <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31911/MWP_2014_13.pdf">simply nonpolitical or actively reject politics</a> as morally corrupt. From 2005-2014, I spent a total of two years as an ethnographic researcher in the cities of Lyon, in southeastern France, and in Hyderabad, in south India. I clearly observed this among these two communities. </p>
<p>Every week I participated in mosque lessons and Islamic study circles among dozens of Salafist women. These communities maintain strict separation between men and women, but I was able to interact with and interview a few men as well. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157754/original/image-20170221-18657-1tk11do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Who are Salafist women?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/pdenker/10094075635/in/photolist-gnYM1P-icVS6P-4DJqG-8NEWEG-4DWzqi-ptkhwn-9osD3P-ouBR41-49iQxS-qP81pM-3k8kR-6w8PRz-7i3G4x-cbeUJq-raGDVa-6KufRr-bbPwBc-dNubS-B1k938-2EE5tK-Avq4J-85xzWZ-wSA1AE-7rPQxu-axYJRS-6fDoNG-znfxhw-85HC1e-5pKoFm-7xQeWx-odkfuL-fPxGqz-ahr3KF-bRpiQ6-64qbTH-58nCDE-9dAToy-qHghDF-rnFBuJ-92gu5k-kKA5EN-5xfHJT-6fDoNC-5qBSwv-qdG7RJ-8kQRRf-84WVsy-aZnQgD-a9ny1x-quQp7">Patrick Denker</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Based on conversations and observation, I learned that they actually avoided politics. They did not attend protests or do advocacy, and in Lyon many did not vote in elections. </p>
<p>It is the case that there are Muslim women, including many converts, who actively embrace Salafism. They take up strict forms of veiling and work hard to practice their religion every day. </p>
<p>Let’s take Amal, a 22-year-old woman who grew up in a working-class neighborhood in southeastern France. I met her during my time as an ethnographic researcher on Muslim minorities in France. Amal identifies with the Salafist tradition in Islam. And if we go by the definitions being floated around, she would be considered a “radical Muslim”: She prayed five times daily, fasted all 30 days of Ramadan, and wore the “jilbab,” a loose, full-body garment that covers everything but the face. Steadfast in her religiosity, she also studied the Quran regularly and attended local mosques in the area. </p>
<p>She worked hard to live her life in accordance with the ethical teachings of Islam. This included spending part of her week tutoring Muslim girls in the neighborhood who homeschooled. Amal worried a great deal about their futures in France, since <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/The-Republic-Unsettled/">anti-veiling legislation</a> had constrained their opportunities. She also quietly worried about the future of Islam, believing it is under siege both by governments and by the ungodly and destructive work of the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Religious does not mean radical</h2>
<p>As anthropologists of religion have shown, Salafi women <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-making-of-a-salafi-muslim-woman-9780190611675?cc=us&lang=en&">are not passive adherents</a>. Nor are they forced into strict practices by their husbands. Still, this doesn’t mean they’re all the same.</p>
<p>Among the French Salafist women I knew, most were the daughters and granddaughters of immigrants from the former French North African colonies. Almost a third were converts to Islam that chose specifically the Salafist tradition as opposed to mainstream currents of Islam. They were drawn to the clear expectations, rigorous routines and <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11133-011-9192-2">teachings about trusting God</a>. </p>
<p>While some of the women were raised in religious families, many broke away from their Muslim families or earned the wrath of their parents for turning to Salafism. Because the parents practiced a cultural form of Islam, or did not practice at all, they did not want their daughters to wear the jilbab. Despite this disapproval, the women focused a great deal on what it meant to have faith in God, and they emphasized that they had to continually struggle to strengthen that faith. </p>
<p>These struggles included various ethical behaviors including not talking too much, suppressing one’s ego and respecting people’s privacy. Along the way, some committed “sins,” like smoking or lying, and deviated from the teachings by not praying or fasting. Some even <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20566093.2016.1085245">doubted their faith</a>, which they considered normal and acceptable.</p>
<p>In my research, non-Muslims as well as other Muslims claimed Salafists were judgmental of those who did not believe or practice like them. In my observation, the contrary was the case: Salafis emphasized that one’s faith and piety were deeply private matters that no one but God had the right to judge.</p>
<h2>Diverse views</h2>
<p>However, like any movement or tradition, Salafism is profoundly diverse and encompasses a number of debates and struggles for legitimacy.</p>
<p>So, there are those self-identified Salafists around the world who join political organizations or participate in political debates. These include, for example, <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/20/salafis-and-sufis-in-egypt/8fj4">several political parties in Egypt</a> and the <a href="http://ahlehadees.org/">Ahl-i-Hadees</a> in India.</p>
<p>A small minority, <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Wimhurst_IPSP.pdf">estimated to be 250,000 in number by security experts</a>, <a href="http://fathomjournal.org/fathom-forum-shiraz-maher-mapping-contemporary-salafi-jihadism/">rejects nation-states and embraces political violence</a>. They span continents but are centered in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<h2>Different from Wahhabism</h2>
<p>In today’s climate, however, it has become a political term. This is partly because of its connection to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Salafism is sometimes referred to as Wahhabism, the Saudi Arabian variant of the movement that is intimately tied to the Saudi regime. They share some intellectual roots and theological emphases, but they also differ, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-salafism-9780199326280?cc=us&lang=en&">especially in how they approach Islamic jurisprudence</a>. While Wahhabis follow one of the main Sunni orthodox schools of law, Salafis tend to think through legal questions independently. So equating the two is a mistake. </p>
<p>For some Salafists, labeling them as Wahhabi is a way to dismiss their faith or even insult them. Identifying with Salafism does not mean one supports the politics of the Saudi state. In my research, in both India and France, people sometimes noted concerns about the Saudi government’s political corruption or human rights record. </p>
<p>Yet outwardly, practices might overlap. For example, many Salafist women wear the niqab (that covers the face). <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/13326/review_21.pdf?sequence=1">Saudi intellectual centers and sheikhs</a> provide literature and training in numerous countries. They circulate lectures as well as money for building mosques and schools. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157896/original/image-20170222-6426-1g5e1w9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mecca, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/71925103@N00/279803013/in/photolist-qJ4FT-7k9fo8-fSkZYr-fSnpzK-fSnrrR-fSnoHK-fSnqSp-fSkXJM-52ucDd-52q41K-52udpS-52pXhD-52q1dc-52uic1-52uguh-52pYE6-52ufLf-52pYvn-52ucYf-52ueiL-52pZtM-52pZ98-52q3Kn-52q3k6-52ufUs-52ud77-52ugKG-52ugkL-52uiy1-52q4gZ-52ug3q-52ugDm-52uePN-52ugSm-52q3sK-52q3zM-52pYYH-52uhVW-52ueEJ-52q4o8-52q2ee-52pYPM-52q3d2-52q1uV-52q4BB-52pZXi-52q17K-52pYdB-52ucvG-52q2XM">Camera Eye</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And of course, Mecca and Medina are the spiritual centers for Muslims more broadly. In this way there is a transfer of intellectual and spiritual resources from Saudi Arabia that supports Salafist communities around the globe.</p>
<h2>Avoiding stereotypes, assumptions</h2>
<p>Why is it important to recognize the complexity and diversity of the Salafist movement? </p>
<p>It is true that as one part of the global Islamic revival, <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656189-islams-most-conservative-adherents-are-finding-politics-hard-it-beats">it appears to be growing</a>. And it likely will remain part of the social landscape in a number of cities for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>But, it is important not to assume that people’s religious faith and practices are the same as terrorist violence. It fuels fear and hatred – like the kind that inspired the recent <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-mosque-shooting-toll-idUSKBN15E0F6">shootings at the mosque in Quebec</a> or the arson attack that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-mosque-idUSKBN15N2P6">burned down a mosque in Texas</a>. </p>
<p>So, from my perspective, when we hear politicians warn us of the “global Salafi threat,” or if we see a woman like Amal walking down the street in her jilbab, it’s vital to remember the dangers of simplistic (and mistaken) stereotypes of “radical Muslims.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Z. Fareen Parvez received funding from the New Directions in the Study of Prayer at the Social Science Research Council; the National Science Foundation; the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; and the University of California at Berkeley’s Center for Race and Gender, Center
for Middle Eastern Studies, and Institute of International Studies.</span></em></p>Muslims from the Salafist tradition can often be seen as ‘radical.’ There is not much understanding of Salafism, its history and its diversity. Here’s what it means to be a Salafist.Z. Fareen Parvez, Assistant Professor of Sociology, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/726362017-02-09T15:12:53Z2017-02-09T15:12:53ZFaith and money from the Middle East fuelling tensions in the Horn of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156015/original/image-20170208-9117-1gb0cd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A squadron of UAE Mirage fighter planes such as this one at the Dubai Airshow are stationed in Eritrea for Yemeni operations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Caren Firouz </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula go back centuries, with trade playing a key component in binding their people
together. Religion has also played a part. The expansion of <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudi-arabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism">Wahhabism</a> – the interpretation of Islam propagated by Saudi Arabia – has been funded by the massive oil wealth of the kingdom.</p>
<p>Mosques, Koranic schools and Imams have been provided with support over many years. Gradually this authoritarian form of Islam <a href="http://africacenter.org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/">began to take hold</a> in the Horn. While some embraced it, others didn’t.</p>
<p>Somalia is an example. While most Somalis practised a moderate form of Suffi Islam, the Islamic fundamentalists of al-Shabaab didn’t. Soon after taking control of parts of central and southern Somalia in 2009 they began imposing a much more severe form of the faith. Mosques were destroyed and the shrines of revered Suffi leaders were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8077725.stm">desecrated</a>. </p>
<p>The export of faith has been followed by arms. Today the Saudis and their allies in the United Arab Emirates are exerting <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20161224-uae-discreet-yet-powerful-player-horn-africa">increasing military influence</a> in the region. </p>
<p>But Saudi Arabia and other Arabian gulf states aren’t the only Muslim countries that have sought influence in the region. Iran, for example, has also been an active player. In the case of Eritrea, a struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran has played out over the past few years. This has also been true in neighbouring Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.</p>
<p>These are troubled times in the Horn of Africa. The instability that’s resulted from Islamic fundamentalism, of which al-Shabaab are the best known proponents, have left the region open to outside influences. The French have traditionally had a base in Djibouti, but they have now been joined by the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-attractions-djibouti-15533">Americans</a> and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690">Chinese</a>.</p>
<p>The growing Arab military, political and religious influence is only the latest example of an external force taking hold in the region.</p>
<h2>New powerful forces in the region</h2>
<p>The Eritreans had been <a href="http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/yemen_african_dimension_0">close to Iran</a> and supported their Houthi allies in the Yemeni conflict. This was of deep concern to the Saudis, who are locked in conflict with Tehran. This is a battle for influence that pits Iranian Shias against Saudi Sunnis. Eritrea is just one of the fields on which it’s being played out.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ASMARA33_a.html">US cable</a> leaked to Wikileaks put it in 2010, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Saudi ambassador to Eritrea is concerned about Iranian influence, says Iran has supplied materiel to the Eritrean navy, and recently ran into an Iranian delegation visiting Asmara. He claims Yemeni Houthi rebels were present in Eritrea in 2009 (but is not sure if they still are), and reported that the Isaias regime this week arrested six Eritrean employees of the Saudi embassy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since then Eritrea has switched sides. Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki paid a <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/president-isaias-pay-state-visit-to-saudi-arabia/">state visit to Saudi Arabia</a> in April 2015. Not long afterwards Eritrea signed a 30-year lease on the port of Assab with the Saudis and their allies in the Emirates. The port has become a base from which to prosecute the war in Yemen. The United Nations <a href="http://untribune.com/un-report-uae-saudi-leasing-eritean-port-using-eritrean-land-sea-airspace-and-possibly-troops-in-yemen-battle/">reported</a> that 400 Eritrean troops were now in Yemen supporting the Saudi alliance.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates has constructed a <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/analysis-uae-military-base-assab-eritrea/">major base</a> in Assab – complete with tanks, helicopters and barracks. In November 2016 it was reported that a squadron of nine UAE Mirage fighter planes were <a href="http://www.defenseworld.net/news/17633/UAE_Deploys_Mirage_2000_Jets_To_Support_Yemen_Ops#.WJhh8xCKSMk">deployed to Eritrea</a> from where they could attack Houthi targets on the other side of the Red Sea. In return the Gulf states <a href="http://www.madote.com/2015/05/djibouti-uae-diplomatic-crisis-brings.html">agreed</a> to modernise Asmara International Airport, increase fuel supplies to Eritrea and provide President Isaias with further funding.</p>
<p>Since then the United Arab Emirates has announced its intention to increase its military presence in the Horn. In January it signed an agreement to manage the Somaliland port of Berbera for 30 years. It also sought permission to have a naval base, Somaliland foreign minister Sa’ad Ali Shire <a href="https://www.alleastafrica.com/2017/01/11/uae-seeks-to-open-military-base-in-somaliland/">told reporters</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s true that the United Arab Emirates has submitted a formal request seeking permission to open a military base in Somaliland</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The UAE are also <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/">active</a> in the neighbouring Puntland. They have been paying for and training anti-piracy forces for years, while also financing and training its intelligence services. </p>
<p>They are a powerful force in the region, projecting an Arab influence as far as Madagascar and the Seychelles. It’s not surprising that the United Arab Emirates was labelled <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/15/3-ways-the-u-a-e-is-the-sparta-of-the-modern-day-middle-east/?utm_term=.d353884f8103">“Little Sparta”</a> by General James Mattis – now President Donald Trump’s Secretary of Defence.</p>
<h2>Ethiopian concerns</h2>
<p>These are worrying times for the Ethiopian foreign ministry. Once the dominant force in the region, its influence over the Horn is now in question.</p>
<p>To its north the Eritreans remain implacable foes, as they have been since the <a href="http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2492&context=faculty_publications">border war</a> of 1998-2000 that left these neighbours in a cold no-war, no-peace confrontation. </p>
<p>Addis Ababa is concerned that Eritrea’s hand has become stronger in recent years. Its mining sector is looking <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-approves-social-and-environmental-impact-assessment-for-colluli-potash-project/">increasingly attractive</a> with Canadian based firms now joined by Australian and Chinese companies. </p>
<p>Asmara’s role in the ongoing war in Yemen has allowed Eritrea to escape diplomatic isolation. The government in Asmara is now benefiting from funds and weapons, <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/eritrea-yemen-un-idINKBN12Z2JQ">despite UN sanctions</a> designed to prevent this from taking place. </p>
<p>To Ethiopia’s west lies Sudan, which is also now involved in the war in Yemen, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/400-more-sudanese-troops-arrive-yemen-1210506015">providing troops</a> to the Saudi and United Arab Emirates backed government. These ties are said to have been cemented after the Saudis pumped a billion dollars into the Sudanese central bank. In return the Sudanese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/sudan-siding-with-saudi-arabia-long-term-ally-iran">turned their backs</a> on their former Iranian allies.</p>
<p>To Ethiopia’s east the situation in Somalia is also of concern. No Ethiopian minister can forget the <a href="http://www.coldwar.org/articles/70s/SomaliaEthiopiaandTheOgadenWar1977.asp">invasion of the Ogaden</a> under President Siad Barre in 1977, when Somalia attempted to re-capture the lands lost to their neighbours during the expansionist policies of Emperor Menelik II in the nineteenth century. Siad Barre may be <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/obituaries/somalia-s-overthrown-dictator-mohammed-siad-barre-is-dead.html">long gone</a> but Ethiopian policy since the invasion has been to keep Somalia as weak and fragmented as possible.</p>
<p>Ethiopia has intervened repeatedly in Somalia to hold al-Shabaab at bay as well as to maintain the security of its eastern region. Addis Ababa’s policy of encouraging the inherent fragmentary tendencies of the Somalis has paid dividends: the country is <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-s-regions-slowly-evolve-into-federal-states-/2558-2833956-snxq7e/index.html">now a federation</a> of states and regions. Some of these only nominally recognise the authority of the government in Mogadishu. Somaliland, in the north is close to being recognised as an independent nation. Others, like Jubaland along the Kenyan border, are under Nairobi’s influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the Royal African Society</span></em></p>The growing Arab military, political and religious influence is only the latest example of an external force taking hold in the Horn of Africa.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.