tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/africa-inequality-27731/articlesAfrica inequality – The Conversation2021-11-08T15:10:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1709692021-11-08T15:10:20Z2021-11-08T15:10:20ZKenya’s mega-railway project leaves society more unequal than before<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429909/original/file-20211103-25-cuwbsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A young man watches a Standard Gauge Railway passenger train zoom over his home in Taita Taveta county, south-eastern Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2014, Kenya started to construct a <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/mombasa-nairobi-standard-gauge-railway-project/#:%7E:text=Main%20construction%20works%20on%20the,of%20operation%20in%20February%202020.">new railway</a> to connect the Mombasa Port with the interior and on to landlocked Uganda and Rwanda. Today the Standard Gauge Railway stops abruptly at <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/news/kenya-nairobi-naivasha-rail-line/">Naivasha</a>, 120km northwest of Nairobi. Ultimately it is planned to reach the border with Uganda at Malaba, helping to connect East Africa’s regional transport and trade. </p>
<p>Costing <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/mombasa-nairobi-standard-gauge-railway-project/">US$3.8 billion</a>, 90% of which has been provided by a bilateral loan from the Exim Bank of China to the Government of Kenya, this new passenger and freight railway is the biggest infrastructure project in the history of independent Kenya.</p>
<p>Alongside other large projects such as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (Lapsset) Corridor, the Standard Gauge Railway is central to Kenya’s current national development policy, <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke">“Vision 2030”</a>. The policy frames these mega-projects as key in attracting the sort of private sector interest needed to fuel economic growth, increase exports and alleviate poverty. </p>
<p><a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-08-02/China-s-standard-gauge-railway-makes-strong-impact-on-Kenya-s-economy-IPds2CE4zm/index.html">According to China’s state authorities</a>, the construction of the Standard Gauge Railway has driven Kenya’s economic growth by 1.5%, creating 46,000 jobs for local residents.</p>
<p>The reality, however, is far more complicated than such official narratives acknowledge. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tran.12474">study</a>, I analyse the uneven sociopolitical effects of Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway. In five months of fieldwork research, undertaken during several periods between November 2018 and January 2020 in different urban, peri-urban, and rural locations between Mombasa and Narok, I interviewed over 200 people to understand their experiences of the new railway project. </p>
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<p>I found that, contrary to the government’s promises of prosperity, Kenya’s mega-railway is heading down the wrong track of development. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102459">My research</a> shows that privileged groups, with sufficient access to economic resources, are experiencing several benefits. However, disadvantaged groups, particularly those in remote or historically marginalised regions, have found it more challenging to sustain themselves as a result of large-scale infrastructure development. The railway-related economic growth is not likely to remedy this, as the project planners expect.</p>
<p>In fact, I concluded that, instead of bringing prosperity to people, the railway project is further advancing inequalities in the country. </p>
<h2>The railway and inequalities</h2>
<p>With less than 0.1% (8,300 people) of the population owning more than the bottom 99.9% (more than 44 million people), Kenya is a highly <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/kenya-extreme-inequality-numbers">unequal country</a>. This is as a direct result of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240600671258">British colonialism</a> and <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/nepotism-a-deadly-cancer-that-s-slowly-killing-the-kenyan-dream-3349218">rampant nepotism and corruption</a> since independence.</p>
<p>In rural Kenya, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2020.1743068">access to natural resources, like land,</a> is one of the main determining factors of social mobility. Therefore, land acquisitions for the new railway was a significant development. The National Government paid <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/sci-tech/article/2001292767/taxpayers-to-pay-more-for-sgr-land">US$29 million</a> to acquire over <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2016/03/kenya-railways-uses-sh30bn-in-land-compensation-in-sgr-phase-i/">4,500 hectares of land</a> for the first phase of the new railway.</p>
<p>However, this land acquisition primarily benefited large-scale landowners who have received sizeable financial compensation. As my research shows, many of these individuals have been able to reinvest the money in real estate or diversify their livelihoods by starting businesses. </p>
<p>Smallholders and squatters with no official land titles had to vacate the land they had occupied without any financial compensation. </p>
<p>As in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12484">other contexts</a> across the Global South, large-scale transport infrastructures like the Standard Gauge Railway also advance the mobility of urban middle classes. With the new railway development in Kenya, this is particularly so for those who regularly travel between Mombasa and Nairobi for work, business or leisure. As the new railway is more efficient than long and exhausting bus trips or expensive flights, these groups are directly benefiting from the new railway line. </p>
<p>Rural populations still prefer to use bus and minibus services that offer more flexibility. To them, the railway also presents a number of direct challenges. In many cases, it blocks the existing travel and access routes, sometimes even dividing family land and splitting villages. Many people I interviewed see the Standard Gauge Railway as a government-controlled project that is only useful to people in Nairobi with no relevance to the rural poor. </p>
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<p>The railway developments have also triggered an investment boom in central Kenya. Areas close to Nairobi have witnessed significant changes in real estate. Since 2016, in Maai Mahiu or Suswa, for instance, where new facilities like stations and depots are located, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102459">land value has increased three-fold</a>. Here the construction of hotels, budget accommodation for truck drivers, and housing for other workers has increased to cash in on the emerging transportation economy. </p>
<p>Other regions of the country, such as Mombasa, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-s-coast-devolution-disappointed">historically neglected</a> by the central government, are experiencing <a href="https://www.aborne.net/afrigos-african-governance-and-space/2018/12/17/killing-mombasa">a decline</a> in business opportunities. The old port’s customs clearing facilities are being shipped to the new Inland Container Depot close to Nairobi. With it, smaller scale business operations, whether in freight handling services, commerce, or hospitality, are also <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/news/article/2001341988/mombasa-loses-sh17b-in-revenue-after-sgr-order">leaving Mombasa</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, many local business people in my study describe Mombasa as a “dying city that will soon be <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/opinion/2019-08-23-mombasa-dying-a-slow-and-painful-death/">a ghost town</a>”. According to them, Mombasa was busy before the railway construction. It was common to get stuck in traffic for hours when large ships arrived. Now “it is emptier by the day, leaving young men idle, roaming the streets looking for work”.</p>
<h2>The role of China</h2>
<p>Besides funding the new railway, China also has a strong influence in the development of the project. China Road and Bridge Corporation, a Chinese state-owned company, was the main contractor.</p>
<p>To get quicker access to the areas allocated for the development, the corporation directly compensated individual households to vacate land. According to several company managers that I interviewed, the corporation paid US$10 million to meet the project delivery targets on time.</p>
<p>This directly undermines the work of Kenya’s National Land Commission that is mandated to regulate land compensation. Without direct supervision of an official state authority, some people have been able to negotiate better financial deals than others. As my interviews show, some lost out in the process. </p>
<p>Kenya’s government has been criticised by <a href="http://www.okoamombasa.org/show-us-the-contracts/">local civil society</a> for ignoring regulations on project development and instead prioritising short-term stimulus effects over long-term social impacts.</p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>The plan to extend the line from Naivasha to Malaba was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2019/04/govt-halts-plan-to-extend-sgr-to-kisumu-over-funding-hitch/">put on hold</a> in April 2019. The Exim Bank reversed its funding, <a href="http://www.chinagoabroad.com/en/article/china-exim-bank-cuts-322-million-standard-gauge-railway-funds">citing the high number of court cases against the project</a>. Other rail projects in the region, such as Tanzania’s, provide alternative options to connect East Africa’s interior with the Indian Ocean. </p>
<p>There is no indication when funding might be made available to extend Kenya railway farther inland. In the meantime, Kenya is <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/payments-for-sgr-loans-than-double-to-sh97bn-3390740">paying through the teeth</a> for the infrastructure project it once promoted as a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zfhzlt2018/eng/zfgx_4/jmhz/t1727335.htm">“game changer”</a>. It remains to be seen whether it will ever live up to the lofty promises.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gediminas Lesutis receives funding from the UK Research and Innovation’s Global Challenges Research Fund (Grant Number: ES/P011500/1), The Development Corridors Partnership.</span></em></p>Contrary to the government’s promises of prosperity, Kenya’s mega-railway is heading down the wrong track of development.Gediminas Lesutis, Marie Curie Fellow, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1578302021-03-25T18:55:54Z2021-03-25T18:55:54ZCan social housing help South Africa overcome its legacy of apartheid?<p>South African cities are among the most unequal and segregated in the world. In an effort to address chronic housing shortages, the government has delivered more than 3.5 million free homes since 1994. While the programme has been successful, it has also perpetuated spatial divisions because of the peripheral location of most projects. </p>
<p>To reverse this trend, the government launched a social-housing policy in 2006 to boost affordable rental accommodations in well-located urban areas. In a study financed by European Commission, we evaluated some of the impacts of this programme, revealing mixed results.</p>
<h2>Post-apartheid housing policy</h2>
<p>Housing was a cornerstone of South Africa’s post-apartheid efforts to redress the legacies of racial discrimination and segregation. The <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">Reconstruction and Development</a> (RDP, 1994) and <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/sustainable-human-settlements-breaking-new-ground">Breaking New Ground</a> (2004) programmes provided more than 3.5 million houses for poor black households. However, the focus on free-standing, individually owned units resulted in most new developments taking place on the urban periphery, far from economic and social opportunities. </p>
<p>The policy tended to reinforce spatial divides and economic inequalities. Some beneficiaries sold their houses and decided to rent closer to central cities, even if it meant living in poorer quality, unsanitary buildings or <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-january-2015/backyard-schaks-and-urban-housing-crisis">“backyard shacks”</a>. Moreover, despite this massive construction of public housing, supply has fallen far short of demand. Thus, in large metro areas such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Ekurhuleni, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11241">one out of five</a> inhabitants lives in precarious accommodation.</p>
<h2>Renewed hope with social rental housing</h2>
<p>While the focus of South Africa’s housing policy was on homeownership, social rental housing programmes began as early as 1995. The government made subsidies available to third-sector organisations to build and manage affordable rental accommodation. At the same time, private property developers recovered abandoned, sometimes squatted, buildings, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/12/06/a-la-reconquete-du-centre-ville-de-johannesburg_5393519_3210.html">especially in Johannesburg</a>, and converted them into inexpensive rental apartments. From these early initiatives emerged a new social housing policy in 2006, which tied subsidies to the delivery of medium-density rental units in <a href="http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Social_Housing.pdf">“restructuring zones”</a>, similar to <a href="https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1521317">“urban free zones”</a> in France. The goal was to bring working-class black citizens closer to areas with access to economic and social opportunities.</p>
<p>The programme delivered fewer than 2,500 units in its first phase (2008 to 2014) but then accelerated to more than 12,800 units constructed by the end of 2018. This was a considerable improvement, but the number was still below the target of 27,000. Today there are only about 35,000 social-rental units despite huge demand. Among the factors constraining production were subsidies that did not keep pace with inflation, lack of investment in capacity-building of social housing organisations, and weak support across government. Changes in 2017 corrected some of these shortcomings and brought renewed energy and investment to the sector.</p>
<h2>Spatial drift of projects</h2>
<p>We developed a unique database comprising all social rental housing projects in the country, which we analysed for the seven largest metros. Our study, <a href="https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/role-social-housing-reducing-inequality-south-african-cities">“The role of social housing in reducing inequality in South African cities”</a>, reveals a spatial drift of projects toward peripheral locations. Between 1995 and 2005, most pilot projects were located within city centres. After the new scheme of 2006, more than half of the projects were still located within city centres or inner suburbs. However, from 2011 onward, a growing number of projects were moving to the outskirts and even to townships, including those where the black population was relegated during apartheid.</p>
<p>The map below shows the distribution of social housing projects in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni and the periods when they were constructed.</p>
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<span class="caption">Social housing projects distribution in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andreas Scheba, Ivan Turok, Justin Paul Visagie</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Several factors were behind this spatial drift. The first was the <a href="https://ideas4development.org/financiarisation-immobilier-tri-social/">rise of real estate values</a> within the private property market. This meant that social housing institutions could no longer find central land at affordable prices. The second was the stagnation of government subsidies. The third was that very few public land parcels were made available for social housing projects.</p>
<h2>Do tenants experience upward mobility?</h2>
<p>Social housing aims to promote social and racial mixing by targeting households that earn between R1,500 and R15,000 per month. A <a href="https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/social-housing-and-upward-mobility-south-africa">survey of 10 social housing projects</a> showed that a quarter of the tenants received less than R2,500 per person per month which is close to the poverty line. Rent level are distributed according to income levels, but inflation and rising utility costs make them increasingly unaffordable to poor households, heightening the risk of evictions. </p>
<p>Most tenants in the surveyed projects previously lived within a 5km radius of the project, suggesting that urban restructuring and racial integration have been limited (see graph). Greater racial mixing has been difficult to achieve because of neighbourhood segregation, and was not a major expectation for residents, according to <a href="https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/social-cohesion-and-inequality-south-africa">opinion surveys</a>. Social integration, as measured by income, was also modest.</p>
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<span class="caption">Racial mix before and after moving to the social housing project (SHIP).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andreas Scheba, Ivan Turok, Justin Paul Visagie. SHRA 2019, Census 2011</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Interviewed tenants benefited from the lower rental charges, which can be much less than the private market. Another benefit is the perception of better safety in the generally secure and institutionally managed complexes. The buildings are often equipped with protection systems and monitored by a guard. Collective facilities are set up such as computer facilities, childcare or secure playgrounds for children (photo). Social development programmes such as healthcare and professional training are also offered. The feeling of safety usually stops at the exit and does not continue into the immediate neighbourhood.</p>
<p>While social housing has impacted positively on households, benefits related to employment, education and access to opportunities appear to be modest rather than transformative. Considerable differences exist between projects depending on their location and the social housing organisation managing the complex. </p>
<p>As South Africa’s social housing policy has arguably ambitious objectives, monitoring and regular impact assessments are needed to develop a stronger evidence base about the impact of projects on household mobility. Specific attention should be paid to adequate financing and making well-located land available, including reforming “restructuring zones”, which have tended to cover the whole metropolitan area.</p>
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<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children’s playground on the roof of a social-housing complex, Johannesburg (2016).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Irène Salenson</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157830/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is the result of a research programme on inequalities, led by the French Development Agency and funded by the European Commission (DEVCO).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreas Scheba receives funding from the European Commission through a research facility on Inequalities. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivan Turok receives funding from the European Commission through a research facility on Inequalities.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Visagie Ivan receives funding from the European Commission through a research facility on Inequalities.</span></em></p>Despite millions of free homes built since 1994, spatial inequality in South Africa remains high. A study evaluating a programme to boost rentals in well-located areas found mixed results, however.Irène Salenson, PhD, chargée de recherches, Agence française de développement (AFD)Andreas Scheba, Senior Researcher in the Inclusive Economic Development Programme, Human Sciences Research CouncilIvan Turok, Executive Director, Human Sciences Research CouncilJustin Visagie, Research Specialist: Human Sciences Research Council, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757052017-04-23T10:20:57Z2017-04-23T10:20:57ZStability in the DRC: a look beyond political agreements<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166082/original/file-20170420-20071-1dek9hj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The DRC has extraordinary potential for socioeconomic advancement.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Dai Kurokawa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Once again, the cycle of instability and political uncertainty has the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on <a href="https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/democratic-republic-of-the-congo">high alert</a> and <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/drc-011717.html">agreements</a> between prominent political actors have done little to stem the tide of violence.</p>
<p>The situation has become so dire that Congolese nationals at home and abroad have raised concerns about the safety of civilians. These were <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12772.doc.htm">echoed</a> by the United Nations during a recent Security Council meeting.</p>
<p>Until the end of 2016, the insecurity was limited to the country’s eastern Ituri region but violence is now being reported in <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56152#.WO-KAPnyuUk">Kasai</a> in the central region of the country. </p>
<p>Lives are lost daily and there have been reports of increasing <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252881.pdf">human rights abuses</a>. As a result, the International Criminal Court is <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/04/01/ICC-prosecutor-says-violence-in-Congo-could-be-war-crimes/6571491079500/">following the situation</a> closely.</p>
<p>The renewed instability is partially a consequence of the failure by the Congolese government to organise the general elections in 2016, as per the country’s constitution. </p>
<p>This is considered by some as a deliberate political move orchestrated by the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201509211333.html">“Majorite Presidentielle”</a> ruling coalition. In response, frustrated local communities have used violent protests to send a strong, clear <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/drc-opposition-protests-banned/a-38368338">message of dissent</a> to the government. Of course, these protests are also politically motivated and maintained. </p>
<p>In the face of this persistent insecurity, violence and political instability, scholars and policymakers have not been able to map out a viable peace plan. Peace talks alone are proving to be ineffective because the problems are structural. <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20-%202013-2017%20-%20Country%20Strategy%20Paper.pdf">Institutional crisis</a>, <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/COD.pdf">poverty</a>, <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-03-27/income-inequality-congo-tale-two-cities">inequality</a>, individualistic leadership – and lack of political will to resolve these – are all key factors in the ongoing conflict. These need to be addressed if the DRC is ever to break the cycle of insecurity it’s caught up in.</p>
<h2>Struggle for legitimacy</h2>
<p>Ever since the 2016 elections were postponed, parliament, the senate and other executive institutions have been operating “off mandate”. Officials within the executive and legislative branches of government will continue to perform their functions until fresh elections are held.</p>
<p>This is in line with the constitutional court’s <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/10/17/drc-s-constitutional-court-rules-that-elections-be-postponed//">interpretation of the constitution</a>. But this doesn’t address the issue of legitimacy. </p>
<p>Legitimacy must be socially as well as legally recognised. Recent protests suggest that the current government isn’t perceived as legitimate by the people of the DRC. And they are likely to continue until a legitimate government is installed. </p>
<p>Institutional legitimacy is key to the stability and security of the DRC. This legitimacy can only be rebuilt through fair and inclusive elections. Failure to follow this route will result in a cycle of violence and instability. </p>
<h2>Addressing social and economic inequality</h2>
<p>While institutional illegitimacy is a major hurdle to peace and stability in the DRC, the violence is also <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2016/12/12/hungry-for-change-the-economics-underlying-dr-congos-political-crisis/">anchored</a> in poverty and economic inequality.</p>
<p>The UN’s latest <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/COD.pdf">Multidimensional Poverty Index</a> reports that 77.1% of the Congolese population live below the poverty line. Therefore, any peace plan that doesn’t take a proper look at the social and economic factors that feed conflict will be meaningless. </p>
<p>The more people are deprived of basic human needs, the greater the chance of violent protest. Conversely, poverty alleviation and access to economic opportunities would reduce violence in the DRC. </p>
<p>To raise the majority of the country out of poverty the government must invest in initiatives that promote economic and financial <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15280.pdf">inclusion</a> from the ground up.
Change in the DRC will only occur if it’s <a href="https://www.cordaid.org/media/medialibrary/2014/09/Cordaid-Social_Entrepreneurship-HR.pdf">nurtured from the grassroots</a>.</p>
<h2>Good governance and leadership</h2>
<p>The stability of any country also depends on its ability to transition peacefully from one leader to another. If the DRC had invested in a mechanism for the peaceful transition of power the country wouldn’t be in turmoil today.</p>
<p>With more than half of its population being under the age of 24, the country has extraordinary potential for <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-reese/5-ways-to-drive-youth-inc_b_12138190.html">socioeconomic advancement</a>. But this can only be achieved if the political class includes the youth in decision-making processes with a view to entrenching a culture of transferable leadership. </p>
<p>This would require fundamental changes in the leadership approach and a shift towards ethical, humanistic and inclusive practices. Political actors must put aside their own individualistic interests and ambitions for the benefit of the national interest. </p>
<p>For institutional reform, economic restructuring and the peaceful transfer of power to happen, politicians and policymakers must act in good faith. The history of the DRC suggests that there’s no political will for change. But the new wave of young leaders who are hungry for change may be able to put enough pressure on government to effect it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvan Yenda Ilunga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Political agreements between major political actors aren’t enough to ensure stability in the DRC. Structural changes are needed as is a new approach towards governance.Yvan Yenda Ilunga, PhD Candidate, The Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763652017-04-23T10:20:43Z2017-04-23T10:20:43ZIt’s time to lift the ideological haze in debates about Africa’s middle class<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166142/original/file-20170420-20050-7nf56g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The middle classes in the Global South gained growing attention since the turn of the century, mainly through their rapid ascendancy in the Asian emerging economies. A side effect of the economic growth during these ‘fat years’ was a relative increase of monetary income for a growing number of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/world-bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-first-time-major-hurdles-remain-in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030">households</a>.</p>
<p>This also benefited some lower income groups in resource-rich African economies. Many among these crossed the defined poverty levels, which were raised in late 2015 from US$ 1.25 a person a day to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/01/global-poverty-is-worse-than-you-think-could-you-live-on-190-a-day">US$ 1.90</a>. As some economists had suggested, from as little as US$2 they were considered as entering the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4013/WPS4816.pdf">“middle class”</a>. </p>
<p>The ominous term was rising like a phoenix from the ashes to characterise this trend. It added another label to the packaging of a <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2013/11/neoliberal-discourse-learning/">neo-liberal discourse</a>. By emphasising the free market paradigm as creating the best opportunities for all, it suggests that everyone benefits from a <a href="https://global.britannica.com/topic/neoliberalism">laissez-faire economy</a>.</p>
<p>But the middle class concept remained vague and limited to number crunching. The minimum threshold for entering a so-called middle class in monetary terms was critically vulnerable to a setback into impoverishment. After all, one sixth of the world’s population has to make a fragile living on US$ 2 to 3 a day.</p>
<p>The African Development Bank played a defining role in promoting the debate. Using the US$2 benchmark, it declared some 300 million Africans (about a third of the continent’s population) as <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf">being middle class</a> in 2011. A year later it expanded its guesstimates to 300 million to 500 million. It also set them up as being very important.</p>
<p>Such monetary acrobatics aside, the analytical deficit which characterises such classification is seriously problematic. The so-called middle class appears to be a “muddling class”. Rigorously explored differentiation remained largely absent – not to mention any substantial class analysis. Professional activities, social status, cultural, ethnic or religious affinities or lifestyle as well as political orientations were hardly (if at all) considered.</p>
<p>But lived experiences matter if one is in search of how to define a middle class as an array of collective identities. Such necessary debate has in the meantime arrived in <a href="https://globalmiddleclasses.wordpress.com/2017/01/11/the-middle-class-in-africa-comparative-perspectives-and-lived-experiences/#more-259">African studies</a>. And the claim to ownership is also reflected in a just published <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/%20and%20https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">volume</a> that documents the need to deconstruct the mystification of the middle class being declared as the torchbearers of progress and development.</p>
<h2>Politics, economic growth and the middle class</h2>
<p>As alerted in a paper by <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2014-101.pdf">UNU-WIDER</a>, a new middle class as a meaningful social actor does require a collective identity in pursuance of common interests. Once upon a time this was called <a href="http://study.com/academy/lesson/karl-marx-theory-of-class-consciousness-and-false-consciousness.html">class-consciousness</a>, based on a “class in itself” while acting as a “class for itself”. After all, which “middle” is occupied by an African “middle class”, if this is not positioned also in terms of class awareness and behaviour?</p>
<p>Politically such middle classes seem not as democratic as many of those singing their praises assume. Middle classes have shown ambiguities - ranging from politically progressive engagement to a status-quo oriented, conservative approach to policies (if being political at all). African realities are not different.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the only consistency of the black middle class in historical perspective is its political inconsistency, as political scientist Roger Southall has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0022278X14000445">suggested</a>. They are no more likely to hold democratic values than other black South Africans. In fact, they are more likely to want government to secure higher order needs such as proper service delivery, infrastructure and rule of law according to their <a href="https://theconversation.com/survey-sheds-light-on-who-marched-against-president-zuma-and-why-76271">living circumstances</a> rather than basic, survival needs.</p>
<p>It remains dubious that middle classes in Africa by their sheer existence promote economic growth. Their increase was mainly a limited result of the trickle down effects of the resource based economic growth rates during the first decade of the 21st century since then in decline. This had hardly economic potential stimulating productive investment that contributes towards sustainable economic growth.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Doubt shrouds claims that a growing middle class benefits the poor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There’s also little evidence of any correlation between economic growth and social progress, as a working paper of the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1353.pdf">concludes</a>. While during the “fat years” the poor partly became a little less poor, the rich got much richer. Even the African Development Bank admits that the income discrepancies as measured by the Gini-coefficient have increased, while six among the ten most unequal countries in the world <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADER%202012%20(En).pdf">are in Africa</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cgdev.org/expert/nancy-birdsall">Nancy Birdsall</a>, president emeritus of the Centre for Global Development, is among the most prominent advocates and protagonists of the middle class. She argues in support of a middle class rather than a pro-poor developmental orientation. But even she concedes that a sensible political economy analysis needs to differentiate between the rich with political leverage and <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/9a5242004ce34374a4d9bf271348019a/Africa%E2%80%99s-rising-middle-class:-time-to-sort-out-fact-from-fiction-20162505">the rest</a>.</p>
<p>She remains nevertheless adamant that the middle class is an ingredient for good governance. This is based on her assumption that continued economic growth reduces inequalities. She further hypothesises that a growing middle class has a greater interest in an accountable government and supports a social contract, which taxes it as an investment into collective public goods to the benefit of <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/full/ejdr20153a.html">also the poor</a>. <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/pdf/ejdr20153a.pdf">Dream on</a>!</p>
<h2>Time to lift the ideological haze</h2>
<p>It remains necessary to put the record straight and lift the ideological haze. Already the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report">2013 report</a>, which also promoted the <a href="http://d-nb.info/1045939153/34">middle class hype</a>, predicted that 80% of middle classes would come from the global South by 2030, but only 2% from Sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Recent assessments claim that it’s not the middle of African societies which expands, but the lower and higher social groups.</p>
<p>According to a report by the <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/08/a-global-middle-class-is-more-promise-than-reality/">Pew Research Centre</a> only a few African countries had a meaningful increase of those in the middle-income category. </p>
<p>And the Economist, which earlier shifted its doomsday visions of a “Hopeless Continent” towards <a href="https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/how-the-economist-changed-its-tune-on-africa/">“Africa Rising”</a> and the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august">“Continent of Hope”</a>, now concludes that Africans are mainly <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21676774-africans-are-mainly-rich-or-poor-not-middle-class-should-worry">rich or poor but not middle class</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, the debate has created sufficient awareness among scholars to explore the fact and fiction of the assumed <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/africas-new-middle-class">transformative power</a> of a middle class. This also includes the need to be sensitive towards ideological smokescreens which try to make us believe that a middle class is the cure. In reality, little has changed when it comes to leverage and control over social and political affairs. </p>
<p>The current engagement with the African middle class phenomenon is nevertheless anything but obsolete. Independent of their numbers, middle class members signify modified social relations. These deserve attention and analysis with the emphasis on social relations. </p>
<p>Cambridge Economist <a href="https://newleftreview.org/II/78/goran-therborn-class-in-the-21st-century">Göran Therborn</a> stresses that discourse on class is always of social relevance. The boom of the middle class debate is therefore a remarkable symptom of our decade. Social class will remain a category of central importance, and bringing the class back in can do no harm.</p>
<p><em>Henning Melber is the author of <a href="https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The middle class concept in Africa has remained vague and limited to number crunching. The minimum threshold for entering it in monetary terms was critically vulnerable to a setback into poverty.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/648332016-09-08T20:45:36Z2016-09-08T20:45:36ZTransforming higher education: first comes knowledge, then curriculum<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136711/original/image-20160906-6121-c0ej3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ancient fermentation techniques are an example of African chemistry in action.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">James Akena/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you want to learn about Africa, there’s no need to go to Algeria, Mali, Zambia or anywhere else on the continent. </p>
<p>Instead, you’ll need to visit – at great cost – institutions in the global north like Johns Hopkins or the School of Oriental and African Studies. Places like these host a wealth of <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-3147532381/supporting-capacity-building-for-archives-in-africa">African knowledge databases</a>. They’re also home to scores of useful <a href="http://library.ifla.org/1269/1/080-simon-en.pdf">archives</a>, artefacts and records. This begs the question: what does Africa know about itself if most of its vital data sources are held away from its shores?</p>
<p>This and similar questions have been given fresh impetus by recent student movements like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/16/the-real-meaning-of-rhodes-must-fall">#RhodesMustFall</a>. Students want the curriculum at universities in the global south to be decolonised. But such demands are not new. Some of Africa’s brightest minds – among them <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/chinua-achebe-20617665">Chinua Achebe</a>, <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/wole-soyinka-9489566">Wole Soyinka</a>, <a href="http://www.ngugiwathiongo.com/">Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/20/ali-mazrui">Ali Mazrui</a> and <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mesaas/faculty/directory/mamdani.html">Mahmood Mamdani</a> – have fought hard down the decades for decolonisation: of knowledge, of the curriculum and of the mind.</p>
<p>With all this energy and focus, why hasn’t decolonisation happened? Why have various generations failed to decolonise or transform the curriculum? My own struggle and failure to transform a course about the archaeology of farming communities in southern Africa has been instructive. </p>
<p>It’s convinced me that no full and meaningful curriculum transformation is possible without first transforming the knowledge that is taught. </p>
<h2>Knowledge is power</h2>
<p>The old saying states that knowledge is power. If you own it, you can control those without it. Since so much knowledge about Africa doesn’t sit on the continent, it’s apparent that Africa lacks power in this regard.</p>
<p>Most of the best archives and research facilities are located in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/oct/26/africa-produces-just-11-of-global-scientific-knowledge">the global north</a>. There, research budgets are more than generous. Comparatively, Africa’s research budgets are <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/9214011e.pdf?expires=1473080089&id=id&accname=ocid56029661&checksum=FEC8C2D34BCE9EE17AAAFF5FB7BF7341">chronically low</a>; research and development makes up a <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?view=map">tiny portion</a> of countries’ GDPs.</p>
<p>It would be utopian, then, to think that African researchers are best placed to produce knowledge about the continent. They may have the will, but they lack the money and institutional support.</p>
<p>This paucity of knowledge production is also <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-redraw-the-worlds-very-unequal-knowledge-map-44206">visible in academic journals</a>. Many of the world’s <a href="http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/africa-and-poverty-knowledge-production">most influential works</a> on Africa are written by those from and or working in the global north with access to good databases and generous research funds. The editors of influential journals appear to be most influenced by and interested in topics that are of interest to a western audience with deep pockets. </p>
<p>So their journals become stronger and stronger. Africa’s become poorer and poorer. Many African academics actively frown on journals from the continent, focusing their efforts on publishing in international, supposedly “superior” titles that will earn them promotion.</p>
<p>This lack of control or power over knowledge production explains why even though Africa is very much affected by poverty, conflict and drought it relies on specialists from the global north to tackle these wicked problems. Such specialists ultimately set the agenda.</p>
<p>Sometimes, grant awarding bodies – mostly based in the north – only provide funding to address <a href="http://www.whitaker.org/">specific issues</a> that they, and not us in Africa, deem important. This creates misaligned expectations. African organisations or institutions accept funds that don’t contribute much to changing local circumstances.</p>
<h2>Making knowledge address Africa’s challenges</h2>
<p>Much of this thinking, research and theory finds its way into African universities. These institutions favour material from international journals, mostly produced by international experts. The language is often very esoteric; it cannot be easily understood by common men and women who should be served by this knowledge. </p>
<p>My grandmother, a potter, was very excited to discover that I teach about pottery in a university’s archaeology department. But she was taken aback when I started talking about <a href="http://www.theory.org.uk/giddens2.htm">Giddens’ structuration theory</a> and others drawn from the global North.</p>
<p>And this sort of disconnect doesn’t just happen in my discipline: economics professors often use Germany’s post-first-world-war economy to illustrate the concept of hyper inflation. Why not look to Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.rt.com/business/267244-zimbabwe-currency-compensation-hyperinflation/">hyperinflation crisis</a>, which is closer to home and defied all imagination?</p>
<p>These external theories must be domesticated. This will make them meaningful to African situations and, more importantly, contribute towards solving local challenges.</p>
<p>Some of my colleagues have complained that chemistry and similar sciences can’t be decolonised. But there are numerous examples of African chemistry. Southern African communities produced beer by fermenting sorghum, millet and rapoko powder. They created distillation techniques. </p>
<p>In colonial Southern Africa a company that’s now owned by the global giant SAB-Miller started making a beer called <a href="http://www.delta.co.zw/trad/chibuku">chibuku</a> – a Shona word for “small book”. Today chibuku is sold all over southern Africa.</p>
<p>The problem right now is that it’s difficult to transform knowledge produced using benchmarks developed for non-African needs. It is difficult to produce a curriculum that responds to local needs without local examples and experiences.</p>
<p>In my view, this explains why despite so much talk about the need to transform the curriculum, not much happens in practice. It is one thing to talk about decolonising the curriculum with the right content at hand. But how can decolonisation really occur without the right, relevant content?</p>
<p>Without transforming knowledge, African universities cannot transform – let alone decolonise – the curriculum. </p>
<h2>Towards decolonised knowledge</h2>
<p>How can knowledge be decolonised? First, it is a process that must happen while discussions continue about curriculum change. Debating the curriculum will feed into the desired knowledge which must be created to solve contemporary challenges. </p>
<p>African countries also need to start directing funding towards research that answers the continent’s needs and challenges. This is happening elsewhere in the world, such as in China, and is bearing <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/science-major-plank-china-s-new-spending-plan">tremendous fruit</a> for those nations.</p>
<p>Finally, it’s crucial to understand that African knowledge systems can’t exist in isolation from others. This might sound contradictory but it is idealistic to ever think that we can return to an Africa that’s uninfluenced by the rest of the world. Rather, the knowledge revision project and its sibling curriculum reform must be anchored on the need to teach and produce knowledge that serves the continent. </p>
<p>If this work succeeds, Africa will be equipped to solve its own problems, intellectual and otherwise. The continent can start to produce homegrown development specialists, water experts, chemists and many others. </p>
<p>Now is the time to seriously consider knowledge production change as a catalytic factor in the much desired curriculum change. Africa urgently needs knowledge that addresses its challenges. This will then spill over into a transformed, decolonised curriculum.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shadreck Chirikure receives funding from the University of Cape Town Research Office's Africa Knowledge Project and the National Research Foundation of South Africa. </span></em></p>Knowledge is power. If you own it, you can control those without it. Since so much knowledge about Africa doesn’t sit on the continent, it’s apparent that Africa lacks power in this regard.Shadreck Chirikure, Associate Professor in Archaeology, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/597972016-05-24T13:04:39Z2016-05-24T13:04:39ZAfrica’s rising middle class: time to sort out fact from fiction<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123755/original/image-20160524-19272-1qkqve7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A street trader looks out from his store in Cape Town, South Africa. Defining people who earn US$2 a day as middle class doesn't make sense.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the turn of the century the middle classes of the global South have taken centre stage in economic policy circles. Animated by diversification of some countries’ economies, a handful of economists from international agencies and think-tanks began a discourse that then entered African and development studies.</p>
<p>This in turn led to calls for policies to be redirected. Countries were urged to strengthen their middle classes. The leading proponents were the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) followed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The OECD’s view is evident in its <a href="http://www.oecd.org/site/devpgd2012/49067954.pdf">Global Development Perspectives 2012</a> report and the UNDP’s in its <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report">2013</a> Human Development Report.</p>
<p>The main economists behind this push included World Bank chief economist <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4013/WPS4816.pdf">Martin Ravallion</a>, his former colleague, <a href="https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/34_easterly_middleclassconsensus_prp.pdf">William Easterly</a>, Nancy Birdsall from the <a href="http://www.cgdev.org/publication/indispensable-middle-class-developing-countries-or-rich-and-rest-not-poor-and-rest">Centre for Global Development in Washington</a>, and Homi Kharas from the <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/01/global-consumers-khraras">OECD Development Centre</a>.</p>
<p>They define middle class as a group of people with a minimum of anything from US$2 to $10 monetary income/expenditure a day.</p>
<p>But such a reduced approach misses much of what is required for a proper analysis of a class – its character, and its positioning in and impact on society. Rather, the discovery of the middle class was linked to its anticipated role in promoting social change to which those in the “business of development” could pin their hopes.</p>
<p>This, however, shifts the debate away from the critical assessment of obstacles to development. It thereby gets in the way of a proper diagnosis of the real challenges to promoting more social equality and justice in some of the most unequal societies in our world. </p>
<h2>The problem with the definition</h2>
<p>Defining the middle class as a group of people with a minimum of anything from $2 to $10 monetary income/expenditure a day is itself fuzzy. </p>
<p>With reference to the $2 threshold, the <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf">African Development Bank</a> declared one-third – 300 million – of the continent’s population as middle class in 2011. A year later it adjusted its size up to 500 million. It considered this a key factor for development.</p>
<p>It takes quite some fantasy to imagine how, based on the living costs in Africa’s urban centres, a $2-a-day threshold catapults someone from the $1.99 margin as criteria for poor into a middle-class existence. And then into playing a pioneering role in the continent’s future transformation. It seems, therefore, that all those not starving are nowadays considered “middle class”.</p>
<p>Limiting the debate to purely monetary categories also ignores a range of other important aspects. These include employment or social status, sources of income, lifestyle-related attributes, cultural norms, and religious or ethnic identities as contributing factors. </p>
<p>Rigorously explored differentiations – not to mention any substantial class analysis – have been largely absent. This turns the “middle class” into a “muddling class”, devoid of any true meaning in terms of social analysis that seeks to identify a social agenda and the role members of society can play in transforming societies. </p>
<p>The new demand for supporting the middle classes within developmental policy therefore remains a vague appeal. Who, after all, should be supported for what purpose? </p>
<p>African studies have more recently offered much more nuanced assessments from the point of view of <a href="http://www.ifeas.uni-mainz.de/Dateien/AP_161.pdf">social anthropology </a> and <a href="http://www.bayreuth-academy.uni-bayreuth.de/resources/Academy-Reflects-1-Neubert-Stoll-fin.pdf">cultural studies</a>, <a href="http://www.afd.fr/jahia/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RECHERCHE/Scientifiques/Documents-de-travail/118-document-travail-VA.pdf">political science</a> and <a href="http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/Siakeu/African_Lions_Sceptical.pdf">economics</a>. </p>
<p>These offer a better diagnosis of how certain segments within societies change, adapt and adjust. And how a higher income, combined with other factors, might have an impact on policy orientations and social positions. </p>
<h2>Misplaced expectations</h2>
<p>A closer look at the widely held assumption that middle classes by definition play a positive – meaning socially progressive – role <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/pdf/ejdr20153a.pdf">is not convincing</a>. History suggests a rather mixed balance, if not mainly opportunistic behaviour, of middle class members. They usually do not tend to bite the hand that feeds them.</p>
<p>The new Chinese middle class is anything but known for its opposition towards an authoritarian state. The Chilean middle class of the early 1970s in its majority did not side with Salvador Allende, but supported the military coup by General Augusto Pinochet.</p>
<p>Politically, middle classes seem not as democratic as many of those singing their praises believe. According to a recent Afrobarometer <a href="https://www.rienner.com/uploads/50ec61134634c.pdf">survey</a>, a majority of those with higher education argue that the less educated should not have the same say in democratic elections, as they would not know what is best for their country.</p>
<p>In South Africa the black middle class is no more likely to hold democratic values than other black South Africans. But it is more likely to want government to secure higher-order <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/Afropaperno151.pdf">survival needs</a> over basic ones.</p>
<p>It is also dubious that African middle classes by their sheer existence promote economic growth. Their increase was mainly a limited result of the trickle-down effects of the resource-based economic growth rates during the early years of this century. Their position and role in society hardly has the economic potential and dynamics to induce further productive investment that contributes to sustainable economic growth.</p>
<p>And there is also little evidence of any correlation between economic growth and social progress, as even a working paper of the International Monetary Fund <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1353.pdf">admits</a>. </p>
<p>Even the African Development Bank concedes that income discrepancies as measured by the Gini-coefficient have <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADER%202012%20%28En%29.pdf">increased</a>, while six among the ten most unequal countries in the world are in Africa. Real sociopolitical influence is hardly owned by a growing middle class.</p>
<p>While the poor partly became a little bit less poor, the rich got much richer.</p>
<h2>Myth of Africa’s growing middle class</h2>
<p>The celebrated growth of the African middle class(es) is also questionable. The UNDP’s 2013 Human Development <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report">Report</a> predicted that by 2030 80% of middle classes would come from the global South, but only 2% would be from sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Recent assessments suggest that it is not the middle of African societies that expands, but the lower and higher social groups. According to a report by the <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/08/a-global-middle-class-is-more-promise-than-reality/">Pew Research Centre</a> only a few African countries had a meaningful increase of those in the middle-income category. </p>
<p>Multinationals in the retail and consumption sector have already reacted to the dwindling purchasing power of the middle class. They have reversed earlier investments. The world’s biggest food producer, Nestlé, has reduced its presence in Africa by <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-10-27-18-million-thats-the-size-of-africas-middle-classand-with-chinas-woes-it-could-just-be-wiped-out">15% of its employees</a>. </p>
<h2>Debate shows signs of shifting</h2>
<p>Fortunately the discussions following the middle-class hype have created sufficient awareness to trigger a debate separating fact from fiction in the assumed transformative <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/africas-new-middle-class">power of a middle class</a>.</p>
<p>This includes challenging the myth that <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/R/bo25073345.html">a middle class is the cure</a> for the social woes of countries considered “less developed” and affected by massive poverty. Rather, its variety of members will most likely continue to act in their own best interests. </p>
<p>Deconstructing and demystifying the trendy discourse, and thereby dismantling the proclaimed middle-class torch bearers, brings back the sobering need to properly analyse and assess social structures. The aim would be to offer a more realistic diagnosis of where the dividing lines between a policy for the rich and one for the poor should or could be drawn.</p>
<p>If we are serious about the need for social change and transformation, we should be as serious about class analysis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some economists have touted the rising middle class as a panacea for Africa’s challenges. But a more realistic diagnosis of what makes up a middle class is needed.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.