tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/african-security-16764/articlesAfrican security – The Conversation2022-08-19T13:19:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868432022-08-19T13:19:32Z2022-08-19T13:19:32ZThe African Union has had a shaky two decades but problems can be solved<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477885/original/file-20220805-29611-thzafi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi making a speech at the AU headquarters.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 9 September 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">Organisation of African Unity</a> issued the Sirte declaration calling for the establishment of an <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">African Union</a> (AU). </p>
<p>Their mission was to accelerate the process of integration on the continent while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems. The AU was founded in May 2001 and officially launched on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. </p>
<p>Its 20th anniversary is a useful moment to examine how far the AU has progressed towards meeting its core objectives. There is no dearth of <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/02/12/the-african-union-is-less-effective-at-20-than-it-was-at-two">criticism</a> of the union from scholars, analysts and journalists. </p>
<p>Some of the criticism is about <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190604/aga-platform-raises-concerns-over-weak-governance-trends">poor governance</a>, implementation problems and rising security issues. It seems, too, that citizens of member states lack trust in the AU. </p>
<p>Most of these criticisms are fair, given that the AU was expected to carry Africa in to the future through the ideals of African renaissance and Pan Africanism. The <a href="https://au.int/en/about/vision">mission statement</a> spoke of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena”. </p>
<p>Based on my previously <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767503">published research</a>, the commitment of African leaders remains the most pressing obstacle to African renaissance and development. </p>
<p>Governance of the AU is as good as its leadership. Therefore, the type of governance within member countries, especially among the regional leaders, affects the governance of the union. </p>
<p>The differences between the hope inspired by the union at inception and the reality of dashed hopes 20 years later can be partly linked to the quality of leadership in countries that championed the current AU. </p>
<h2>Progress</h2>
<p>Despite the governance problem, the AU has made some progress in peacekeeping across the continent by establishing the African Standby Force in December 2003. </p>
<p>To ensure effective operation, the force is decentralised and coordinated at a regional level. It is expected to manage <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932">insurgency-related conflicts</a> in various countries. The Standby Force is yet to start full operation, however.</p>
<p>Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the AU has elevated the <a href="https://africacdc.org/">Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention</a> from a specialised technical institution to a public health agency with regional collaboration centres. This action is an improvement. It will help in tackling future epidemics and will support member states’ public health in general. </p>
<p>In 2015, the Heads of State and Government created <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a> with 20 priority goals. The initiative is supposed to be based on lessons of past experiences and the understanding that globalisation can provide new development opportunities for the continent.</p>
<p>The Agenda has highlighted important areas that would accelerate the development of member states. For example, it led to the launch of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa in 2020. The goal of the programme is to intensify regional economic integration, which has been held back by a poor transport network. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-some-reason-to-cheer-but-lots-of-work-ahead-183651">The African Union at 20: some reason to cheer, but lots of work ahead</a>
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<h2>Disappointments</h2>
<p>The regional peacekeeping process has not translated into regional economic integration and a socio-economic framework for development. </p>
<p>Economic development remains the AU’s weakest area. The <a href="https://www.nepad.org/">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> was supposed to develop a homegrown policy framework for sustainable economic development. Its goals include eradicating poverty, promoting growth and integrating Africa into the world economy. </p>
<p>The AU has also been criticised for its lack of consultation with member states’ civil society stakeholders. Consultation of civil society would contribute to accountability and provide a sense of ownership for the citizens of member states.</p>
<p>The AU’s inability to implement its economic development framework remains an obstacle to achieving its goals. The importance of regional integration cannot be exaggerated given the low proportion of inter-African trade when compared with other regions. The <a href="https://www.scielo.br/j/cint/a/kjGF6hQVNj9v4jfm8kXJwKQ/?lang=en&format=pdf">volume of trade</a> among countries of the continent is around 15% of total trade, while in Europe, North America, and Latin America, rates are 68%, 37% and 20% respectively. </p>
<p>More trade among African countries would improve manufacturing, reduce dependency on natural resources and expand the African market.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-african-integration-has-made-progress-but-needs-a-change-of-mindset-183541">Pan-African integration has made progress but needs a change of mindset</a>
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<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The introduction of <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a> as a development framework is the first step forward. To avoid a repeat of the discarded <a href="https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/14129">Lagos Plan of Action</a> it is important that the AU aligns the agenda with its values of self-reliance and inclusiveness. </p>
<p>To achieve this, the Agenda 2063 agency needs to expand its consultation with civil society and stakeholders of member states. This would increase participation by member state citizens, improve the sharing of information and tighten up accountability. </p>
<p>Funding for projects is one of the biggest challenges facing the AU. It still depends on external funding for its own operations. A solution would be a binding institutional arrangement where members have to contribute funds and there are penalties for not doing so. </p>
<p>The AU has had a shaky two decades burdened with intertwined problems of governance, external dependence and poor capacity. But these problems are not insurmountable. A prosperous and united Africa is within reach if the AU addresses its core problems and fosters more participation of member state citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Agupusi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The commitment of African leaders remains the greatest obstacle to African renaissance and development. Consultation with citizens is also called for.Patricia Agupusi, Professorial Lecturer, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/604112016-08-04T19:39:10Z2016-08-04T19:39:10ZPastoralists fleeing Boko Haram face new challenges in Cameroon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130183/original/image-20160712-9307-1hkdobv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pastoralist refugee in Cameroon. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mouadjamou Ahmadou</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Boko Haram has been terrorising villagers in northeast Nigeria for many years. Until 2012, the group focused its attacks on cities, where it robbed banks, and villages, where it kidnapped people to work for it or used them as <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/4/570f9eef6/nigerian-boys-tell-boko-haram-abduction.html">soldiers</a>. </p>
<p>But since 2013 Boko Haram has started targeting pastoralists living in the bush, taking herds of cattle and slaughtering herders. It is likely that cattle are a major <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/boko-haram-back-foot">source of income</a> for the group and not <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/opinion/the-ivory-funded-terrorism-myth.html">ivory</a>, as has been suggested. </p>
<p>Last year thousands of pastoralists fled northeast Nigeria to save their lives and livestock. Many found refuge in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BeBU3AWECR0">Logone Floodplain</a> of Cameroon. In February and March 2016 our research team – consisting of faculty and students in visual anthropology from the <a href="https://www.uni-maroua.com">University of Maroua</a> in
Cameroon – went into the field and interviewed pastoralists about the hardships of their flight from Nigeria and their situation as refugees in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Last year’s flight was part of a pattern that has begun to emerge over the past three years as thousands of pastoralists have fled Boko Haram’s terror in northeastern Nigeria.</p>
<p>What makes this forced migration different is its scale. In normal years, some pastoralists deliberately change their seasonal movements to stay in Cameroon during the rainy season in search of better pastures. In the past few years, thousands of pastoralists either deliberately stayed in Cameroon after the dry season ended to avoid Boko Haram or ran from Boko Haram’s terror in northeast Nigeria. The sudden and forced migration has left them vulnerable to exploitation by local populations and authorities in Cameroon, their new host country.</p>
<h2>Pastoralists in the Chad Basin</h2>
<p>For pastoralists, livestock do not only provide a living, they are also way of life. In the dry lands of the <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/lake-chad-basin">Chad Basin</a>, which encompasses parts of Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon, Fulani and Arab pastoralists make seasonal movements in search of water and food for their livestock. Their movements take them across national borders. Many spend the rainy season (June to September) in Nigeria and the dry season (October to May) in Cameroon. </p>
<p>This movement across borders has been a way of life for centuries. Anthropologist <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=vx8t8M2Px9YC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false">Derrick Stenning</a> described in detail the movement patterns of pastoralists in northeastern Nigeria in the 1950s, explaining how they used their previous experiences, social networks and scouting trips to find the best pastures for their animals. They did not migrate into areas they did not know. </p>
<p>One would therefore expect pastoralist refugees to adapt quickly in their new host country because they are used to moving with their herds and households. Many of them already regularly spent the dry season in the Logone Floodplain of Cameroon. </p>
<p>The difference, of course, is that previous migrations were planned and followed the ebb and flow of the seasons. The pastoralists now flooding into Cameroon have been forced to do so because they fear for their lives and livelihoods. As refugees they have moved into unknown areas where they have no existing networks. This has dramatically affected their ability to cope.</p>
<h2>The effects</h2>
<p>The sudden and unplanned migration into an unknown area has led many pastoralists to suffer considerable economic losses due to their livestock suffering from exhaustion and diseases. Their livestock are not habituated to the new pastures and have been losing more weight – and value – than usual. </p>
<p>In addition, pastoralists are finding it difficult to sell their livestock, which is their main source of income and means of buying provisions for their families. This is because prices have plummeted as local markets have been flooded with livestock. This has happened due to a combination of factors, including a massive influx of livestock from Nigeria and the closing of markets and borders by Chadian and Cameroonian governments to control Boko Haram attacks.</p>
<p>On top of this, local authorities in the Logone Floodplain have begun to view pastoralist refugees and their livestock as a welcome source of income. They increased taxes for refugee pastoralists last year from 10,000 CFA francs to 70,000 CFA francs (about US$17 to $120) per herd. In addition, local populations have been stealing livestock from the refugees, who are too traumatised to fight back. One told us:</p>
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<p>We have become just food for them.</p>
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<h2>No official support</h2>
<p>Pastoralists receive no support through the official channels – either from the United Nations Refugee Agency or from the Cameroonian government. They are “invisible” because they move with their livestock to pastures in the bush, bypassing the <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/region.php?id=73&country=502">refugee camps and entry points</a> that are managed by the refugee agency and the government. While regular attacks on villages by Boko Haram are reported by the media and authorities, few of the attacks on pastoralists in the bush that we documented in our interviews can be found in <a href="http://www.acleddata.com">news reports</a>.</p>
<p>The only thing that pastoralist refugees want is to be left in peace in the bush. They seek no help from governments: safety and open access to pastures is enough. </p>
<p>They have had enough of the problems in Cameroon and hope to return to their rainy season range-lands in Nigeria when Boko Haram is defeated and it is safe for them to do so. They wax nostalgically about northeastern Nigeria, before Boko Haram, as a pastoral paradise, without farms, field chiefs, taxes or theft – just the bush and the freedom to move in peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Moritz receives funding from the National Science Foundation (DEB-1015908, BCS-1600221, BCS-1546061, BCS-1211986, BCS-0748594).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mouadjamou Ahmadou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The marked increase in the number of Nigerian pastoralists fleeing Boko Haram terror in northeastern Nigeria last year reflects a trend that started three years ago.Mark Moritz, Associate Professor of Anthropology, The Ohio State UniversityMouadjamou Ahmadou, Lecturer in Visual AnthropologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/430732015-06-18T13:46:11Z2015-06-18T13:46:11ZWhy the UK doesn’t mind if aid boosts military spending<p>Former coalition defence minister Gerald Howarth has expressed concern that “the UK is effectively subsidising the defence budgets” of its <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11654852/British-aid-billions-subsidising-third-world-defence-budgets.html">aid recipients</a>.</p>
<p>Drawing on research undertaken by the House of Commons Library, Howarth highlighted that as Britain has increased the aid sent to a range of recipients, including Tanzania and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the same countries’ defence budgets have swollen. </p>
<p>This was born out by analyses charting defence spending increases since 2012/13. Rises from $330m to $400m in Tanzania and from $430m to $460m in DRC did indeed coincide with injections of <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/foreign-and-defence/articles/story/former-minister-aid-spending-effectively-subsidising-defence">UK aid funds</a> into those states. Picking up the story, the media announced with horror that British aid is “<a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article4462323.ece">paying for foreign armies</a>”. But Howarth’s “discovery” is rather less revelatory than it seems. </p>
<h2>Pragmatism</h2>
<p>As any student of international development knows, all aid is “fungible” –- that is, if you put money into a state, it frees up cash for that state’s government to spend elsewhere. </p>
<p>An international non-governmental organisation that builds a school or hospital in a remote province might well believe it’s to be far removed from the grubby business of funding corrupt or authoritarian regimes. </p>
<p>Their actions, however, mean that these regimes have one less school or hospital to build themselves as few regimes can survive without providing any services to their populations. That releases space in the budget for other items, such as paying soldiers’ wages or purchasing helicopters. </p>
<p>The UK has also directly funded foreign militaries in a range of African states for some time. In recent years, it’s made major contributions to United Nations-sanctioned operations in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19001644">Somalia</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30830883">DRC</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/facts.shtml">South Sudan</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21955839">Mali</a> and elsewhere, providing training, logistical support and sometimes considerably more. </p>
<p>It has also long provided training to many African militaries, police and security services – a strategy Whitehall views (perhaps somewhat optimistically) as a pragmatic attempt to foster professionalism and stability in some of the continent’s most conflict-ridden and violent regions. </p>
<p>Clearly, there are no guarantees in such a complex and risky arena. Given he served as a minister for international security strategy in a department that funds many of these operations, though, Howarth’s outrage at the indirect “subsidising” of militaries by other UK ministries was perhaps somewhat disingenuous. </p>
<h2>Security and prosperity</h2>
<p>What is perhaps most interesting about this particular controversy was the response provided to Howarth’s critique by the UK’s development arm. The Department for International Development’s spokesperson argued that UK international development investment “helps create more stable, secure and prosperous countries” and that more economically prosperous countries tend to spend more on their militaries. </p>
<p>On the face of it, that’s a slightly strange response. In the cases highlighted in the House of Commons Library research, we can see a rise in defence spending, but rarely a rise in the percentage of GDP spent on defence. Between 2012-2014, the latter has remained constant in DRC, Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivoire and has fallen in Nigeria. In Tanzania, meanwhile, a 20% net rise in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11654852/British-aid-billions-subsidising-third-world-defence-budgets.html">defence spending</a> means that now 1.1% of the country’s GDP goes on defence rather than 1%. (By comparison, the UK spends <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/12/defence-spending-mps-vote-in-favour-of-keeping-budget-at-2-of-gdp">2% of GDP</a> on defence.)</p>
<p>But of course, “stable, secure and prosperous” states are not necessarily democratic, transparent and accountable. </p>
<p>Many of Africa’s more stable, secure, and economically prosperous countries also trend towards authoritarianism. Many of these states are also major recipients of UK assistance for both developmental and defence, and in several of them, one party has held power for decades. These include Uganda (since 1986), Rwanda (since 1994), Ethiopia (since 1991) and Mozambique (since 1975). </p>
<p>Whether this is coincidental or not is an open question, but plenty of scholars (including me) have argued that it isn’t. Over several decades, a range of semi-authoritarian <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_08_Fisher_Anderson_0.pdf">African states</a> have successfully managed their relationships with Western governments and bureaucracies to their advantage over several decades. That has won them the support and resources they needed to construct the decidedly illiberal structures of rule they now preside over.</p>
<p>The difficult question here is not so much whether Whitehall is aware of its role in all this – it is – but whether it cares. </p>
<p>Over the past decade, the focus of British diplomacy and development policy has moved decisively away from promoting democracy, peace, political space and transparency in Africa and towards <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32960/bsos-july-11.pdf">stabilisation and security</a>. These days, London’s objective is to help nurture African states that won’t cause populations in the UK too many problems, whether in the form of <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-shabaab-is-failing-in-somalia-but-kenyas-chaotic-response-could-keep-it-alive-35208">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-thousands-of-asylum-seekers-are-fleeing-eritrea-and-risking-their-lives-in-the-mediterranean-40969">migration</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ebola">disease</a>. </p>
<p>In one sense, this is only fair; it is after all a government’s job to protect its citizens from harm as far as possible. But doing so at the expense of political freedoms abroad conflicts with some of the fundamental values of British political culture – and authoritarian states make unreliable and unpredictable allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43073/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Fisher has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He also held an Honorary Research Fellowship in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Africa Directorate between 2013-2014. </span></em></p>It’s not a surprise that development aid frees up money for countries to spend on defence budgets. Why is the UK so shocked by its own policies?Jonathan Fisher, Lecturer in International Development, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/416402015-05-21T17:24:50Z2015-05-21T17:24:50ZCentral African Republic takes a small step towards peace – but a leap is what’s needed<p>The <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201505180723.html">signing of a major peace agreement</a> by ten rebel groups in the Central African Republic is a welcome step towards peace after years of violent chaos.</p>
<p>Things really began to get out of hand when a December 2012 coup brought together a handful of northern rebel groups into a loose group known as the Séléka (the coalition). Previously rivals, they grouped together to overthrow president <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/un-slaps-sanctions-car-ex-president-2014510194156845667.html">François Bozizé</a> and install <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21938297">Michael Djotodia</a> in his place in March 2013. </p>
<p>This led to an escalating series of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2013/12/escalating-bloodshed-and-reported-revenge-killings-central-african-republic/">reprisal killings</a> in the capital, Bangui, by “anti-Balaka” self-defence militias.</p>
<p>The Séléka itself was not religiously motivated, but its members were disproportionately Muslim. Unfortunately, as with many loose confederations of armed groups, they proved impossible to control: Djotodia lost his grip on them almost immediately following the coup, and the Séléka <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/10/central-african-republic-rampant-abuses-after-coup">looted</a> the capital. </p>
<p>The anti-Balaka groups, however, explicitly described themselves as Christians and portrayed the conflict as a religious one, escalating the crisis beyond the initial political coup. The spread of violence between the two factions resulted in a religious schism that has <a href="https://theconversation.com/only-regional-intervention-can-break-cycle-of-violence-in-central-african-republic-22725">killed 5,000</a>, made almost 300,000 people refugees and displaced a million more. </p>
<h2>Faint hope</h2>
<p>The peace agreement must give hope to the thousands of victims caught up in the disaster, as must the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/15/central-african-republic-child-soldiers-released-un-deal-armed-groups">release of 357 kidnapped children</a> in the town of Bambari, about 200km north-east of Bangui. It is estimated that around <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/car-armed-factions-free-350-child-slaves-150514153621836.html">6,000-10,000 children</a> are currently working as slaves for the militia groups.</p>
<p>The head of the UN’s integrated stabilisation mission, <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sga1415.doc.htm">Babacar Gaye</a>, stated that “on the path towards peace, the step made today is a very important one.” But the situation of the victims is still dire, and this has to be a step towards a lasting peace, not just a lull in the fighting.</p>
<p>The terms of the peace agreement itself make provision for a process of disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and repatriation (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/10/us-centralafrica-politics-idUSKBN0NV0U020150510">DDRR</a>), as well as “the initiation of a reconciliation process in which those found responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity will be prosecuted.” </p>
<p>Such agreements are undoubtedly a critical first step, and in this case it has been reinforced by the repatriation of the 357 children. But without long-term external support for the state, the peace agreement is likely to fail. And the country could return to the cycle of political crises that have seen <a href="http://eisa.org.za/WEP/car1993results2.htm">only one peaceful transition of power</a> (1993) since independence.</p>
<p>The militias themselves are a symptom of an old problem with the Central African Republic (CAR): the depths of dysfunction that beset the central state, which is barely even there. The International Crisis Group has long ranked the country as a “<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/136-central-african-republic-anatomy-of-a-phantom-state.aspx">phantom state</a>”, and in fact worse than a failed state. It has lacked any meaningful institutional capacity since the <a href="http://podbay.fm/show/339986758/e/1411368540?autostart=1">fall of Jean-Bédel Bokassa</a> in 1979, and prosperity has never been enjoyed by any but a few at the very top. </p>
<p>With all this history weighing heavy, the recent peace agreement is welcome, but it has to be treated with extreme circumspection. The CAR’s terribly poor institutional capacity has led to endless breakdowns of previous efforts to construct peace. In fact, the roots of the current conflict lie in the failures of previous peace agreements – and explicitly stem from the state’s failure to adequately implement their conditions.</p>
<h2>Good neighbours</h2>
<p>The most prominent group within the Séléka is the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), which was included in the <a href="http://peacemaker.un.org/car-birao-accord2007">2007 Birao Peace Agreement</a>. That agreement ended the CAR Bush War, which broke out in response to Bozizé’s 2003 ascent to power. It was followed by the <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43724#.VVn9d9NViko">Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreements of 2008</a>, which laid out an amnesty programme for rebel forces alongside a DDRR plan. </p>
<p>Many argue that the amnesty conditions that resulted actually provided an incentive for the creation of new rebel groups. Alongside the express intention of being subject to a generous amnesty, seen as being preferable to suffering within a desperate economy.</p>
<p>The agreement in the CAR faces several critical challenges, not least the liquid nature of the armed groups themselves and their lack of boundaries or stability. At the same time, any DDRR process will require significant resources, training and monitoring. The UN has announced a 10,000 strong <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47541#.VVn99tNViko">peacekeeping force</a>, but it remains unclear whether this will be sufficient. </p>
<p>At the same time, even if the international community was to provide the resources, DDRR requires two basic things that the CAR lacks: an economy for those who wish to make the transition from combatant to civilian; and state structures for military and leadership to integrate in to.</p>
<h2>Is it enough?</h2>
<p>Even if the CAR had these things in place, moving on from the conflict would be no easy feat. In the medium term, reconciliation has proved difficult even in countries with strong and capable institutions and governments. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">truth and reconciliation model</a> was famously adopted by post-Apartheid South Africa, but its success was heavily qualified – a pattern that <a href="https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/international-review/review-862-truth-reconciliation-commissions/index.jsp">has also dogged</a> subsequent truth commissions. Rwanda used an alternative grassroots model of “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18490348">gacaca</a>” (justice on the grass), built around decentralised community courts, to try 2m people after the 1994 genocide – but that too was not without serious problems such as access to qualified lawyers. </p>
<p>But even these models could only be carried out because there was significant state capacity and political will. That is conspicuously lacking in the CAR. </p>
<p>In order for this peace process to succeed where so many previous attempts have failed, the CAR government must be able to project its power beyond Bangui into the areas where the country’s militias recruit. </p>
<p>This in turn can only be done with significant state-building support from outside the country – and that has been made far more politically difficult by recent allegations that French troops <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-peacekeeper-abuse-scandal-fits-an-old-pattern-of-impunity-40991">sexually abused</a> local boys – allegations that the UN was apparently aware of, but did not initially relay to France.</p>
<p>So a step in the right direction the agreement may be, but as with many DDRR agreements, it remains a small one. And in isolation, it will not bring peace to many of the people who need it most.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Jackson receives funding from the ESRC, the European Union and the Swedish Government.</span></em></p>The CAR is a phantom state that has barely existed for years. Even with a ten-way peace deal now signed, what future does it have?Paul Jackson, Professor of Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/413942015-05-13T04:31:31Z2015-05-13T04:31:31ZThe African Union lacks a coherent plan to fight terrorism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80809/original/image-20150507-1210-xll253.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Nigerians have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Terrorism is on the increase in Africa. Between 1995 and 2001, the continent was the <a href="http://www.cips.up.ac.za/files/pdf/uafspublications/TERRORISM%2520IN%2520AFRICA.pdf">fifth most-targeted</a> region after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East for acts of terrorism. Since then things have taken a sharp turn for the worse. </p>
<p>In West Africa, terrorist activities have intensified following escalation of the <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/scholar?q=Niger+Delta+conflict+2006&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart&sa=X&ei=MC1KVYJmg53uBpn-gGA&ved=0CBkQgQMwAA">Niger Delta conflict</a> in 2006 and the resurgence of the Islamist sect <a href="http://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-explaining-nigerias-boko-haram-and-its-violent-insurgency/">Boko Haram</a> in 2009. Since then, Boko Haram has been responsible for a long list of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/boko-haram-timeline-nigeria">violent attacks</a> aimed at establishing an Islamic state in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria. </p>
<p>In East Africa, parts of rural Somalia are still under the control of the militant – and al Qaeda-linked – <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Shabaab-militants-shoot-government-official-dead-in-Mogadishu-20150506">al-Shabaab group</a>, known also for its violent attacks in neighbouring states such as Uganda and Kenya. Along the coasts of both these regions, commercial shipping vessels have to battle armed modern-day pirates who are scornful of the law enforcement abilities of the coastal states.</p>
<p>State failure of the kind seen in Somalia creates the ideal conditions for these types of terrorist activity. When a government loses control over its territory and the institutions of governance, security implodes and criminal conduct becomes endemic. </p>
<p>This is what is now happening in Libya, due in part to the international community’s failure to invest in post-conflict peace-building after the NATO-backed ousting of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15390980">Muammar Gaddafi</a>. But were it not for the tragic deaths at sea of large numbers of refugees trying to escape the mayhem, Libya might have remained an essentially African problem. </p>
<p>Another example of weak governance is the slow reaction by the Nigerian government to the April 2014 abduction of more than 200 hundred schoolgirls in the northeastern part of <a href="http://time.com/3839035/nigeria-boko-haram-girls-rescue/">Nigeria</a> by Boko Haram. Close to a year after the event, the government has taken no decisive action in finding the girls or tracking down those responsible. </p>
<p>Protest action in response to the government’s inaction spread to various parts of the country. This was followed by an international outcry. Eventually the US government offered assistance and the Nigerian government reluctantly agreed. </p>
<h2>Where has the African Union been?</h2>
<p>The African Union (AU) has remained on the sidelines. Only when Boko Haram became a trans-boundary threat, affecting neighbouring Chad and Cameroon, did the AU authorise a multinational force to deal with it.</p>
<p>These and several other instances of inaction or belated action by the AU in response to crises in Africa should attract greater attention. </p>
<p>The continental framework for counter-terrorism is largely made up of the 1999 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/OAU-english.pdf">Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism</a>, supplemented in 2004 by a protocol, the AU <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_OAU_CONVENTION_ON_THE_PREVENTION_COMBATING_TERRORISM.pdf">Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism</a>, and the mandate of the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Co-operation – which was appointed in <a href="http://europafrica.net/2010/10/08/au-appoints-special-representative-in-charge-of-counter-terrorism-cooperation/">2010</a>. </p>
<p>The OAU convention, which is ratified by 41 African states, deals with counter-terrorism measures at state level and the need for inter-state cooperation to combat terrorism. The 2004 supplementary protocol, which has only 15 ratifications, assigns certain responsibilities to the AU <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/38-peace-and-security-council">Peace and Security Council</a>.</p>
<p>These are limited and relate to information gathering, the exchange of information, reports to the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/organs/assembly">Assembly of Heads of State and Government</a> on terrorist activities and establishment of information networks. </p>
<p>The plan of action adds some more substance by invoking Article 7 of the Peace and Security Council’s <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">protocol</a>, which deals with the powers of the Peace and Security Council. </p>
<p>According to Article 7(i), the Peace and Security Council must ensure the implementation of the OAU convention at the regional and continental levels. The Plan of Action also refers to the provisions of the AU’s <a href="http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act">Constitutive Act</a>, particularly the principles enunciated in Article 4. </p>
<p>It is there that we find the AU’s extraordinary power to intervene, even with military force, in a member state in response to serious violations of human rights. These can take the form of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. </p>
<p>The kind of intervention foreseen in Article 4 will normally occur when the member state is unwilling or unable to come to the rescue of its citizens. Under different circumstances, the AU may consider a variety of measures. But inaction is certainly not one of them if the organisation wants to demonstrate that it takes its peace and security mandate seriously.</p>
<p>Another barrier to action by the AU is the almost unconditional claims member states make regarding sovereignty and independence. This is even so in cases where these qualities of statehood are absent. State measures remain the main instrument in the combating of terrorism.</p>
<p>But the argument cannot stop with a state-centred view. There is the plight of the victims and the issue of human security no government and no regional or international organisation can ignore. </p>
<p>In light of this, the AU’s failures raise serious questions about when to deploy its security apparatus in general and the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> in particular.</p>
<p>In 2013, these issues became the subject of a report by a panel of experts appointed by the AU Commission. It had the mandate to assess the African Standby Force and to report on a plan of action for achieving full operational capability by 2015. </p>
<p>The AU has kept the report secret, but it has still reached <a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184350">a wider audience</a>. It finds that full operational capability will not be achieved in 2015 given the current pace and scope of the AU’s efforts. This is despite the African Standby Force being established in 2003 to provide a quick reaction capacity that would enable African institutions to respond swiftly to crises.</p>
<p>The report lists a number of reasons for this failure. Three can be singled out. These are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the unpredictability of pledges made by member states; </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of support due to gaps in procurement, human resources and experience with mission support systems; and </p></li>
<li><p>a failure to develop the African Standby Force’s own resources, including financial resources. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>It is also no secret that only a fraction of the AU’s budget is funded by member states. This speaks volumes about the interest African states have in the body.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hennie Strydom receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The failures of the African Union raise serious questions about when to deploy its security apparatus in general and the Africa Standby Force in particular.Hennie Strydom, Professor in International Law, NRF Research Chair in International Law , University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.