tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/al-qaida-38867/articlesAl-Qaida – The Conversation2023-10-24T23:11:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163172023-10-24T23:11:48Z2023-10-24T23:11:48ZIsraeli invasion of Gaza likely to resemble past difficult battles in Iraq and Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555661/original/file-20231024-29-q1jiq8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C12%2C8256%2C5475&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armored Israeli military vehicles maneuver near Israel's border with Gaza.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-military-armoured-vehicles-and-tanks-deploy-along-news-photo/1742240506">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel appears to be preparing for the next phase of its military operation: a ground campaign to “<a href="https://chicago.suntimes.com/2023/10/11/23913488/israel-hamas-attack-gaza-netanyahu-middle-east-war-netanyahu">crush and destroy</a>” Hamas, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has put it. </p>
<p>Israel has signaled that it might be <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/24/israel-hostages-delay-invasion-gaza-hamas">willing to delay an invasion</a> – but not call it off entirely – if Hamas releases more hostages. But that means an invasion is still very likely, which raises questions about how Hamas has prepared for a ground invasion and whether Israel is prepared for what could be a long, drawn-out fight.</p>
<p>Prior ground attacks from Israel into the Gaza Strip have been dangerous, deadly and costly for both sides. </p>
<p>The most recent significant ground campaign, known in Israel as <a href="https://imeu.org/article/operation-cast-lead">Operation Cast Lead</a>, occurred over a three-week period from December 2008 to January 2009. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-cast-lead/">According to the Israeli military</a>, that operation was launched to strike the Hamas infrastructure that enabled its terrorist and rocket attacks against Israel. In that battle, thousands of Israeli troops fought Hamas fighters, with an Israeli cease-fire declared on Jan. 17, 2009. <a href="https://time.com/3035937/gaza-israel-hamas-palestinian-casualties/">According to some accounts</a>, losses in that operation totaled at least 13 Israeli military fatalities, 600 to 700 Hamas deaths and over 1,400 dead Palestinian civilians in Gaza.</p>
<p>Since that conflict, up until the horrific Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties">Israeli operations in Gaza</a> have mostly involved airstrikes against Hamas, hitting targets in the Gaza Strip. In the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel has stepped up airstrikes, but also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/israels-ground-war-against-hamas-what-know">massed troops, tanks and other equipment</a> on its border with Gaza. </p>
<p>The international community also expects a ground invasion. Former <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/23/obama-israeli-operation-in-gaza-may-backfire-if-civilians-arent-protected">U.S. President Barack Obama has said an Israeli ground operation could “backfire”</a> if civilians aren’t adequately protected. </p>
<p>Hamas has been guarded about its own details, but says it has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">prepared, with Iranian support</a>, not only for the Oct. 7 attacks but also to respond to an Israeli ground campaign – including taking action outside the Gaza Strip if there is an invasion.</p>
<p>As a former U.S. government intelligence and counterterrorism senior official, who now <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">teaches about those topics and national security</a>, I expect that once combat begins, fighting will be intense. The conflict will likely resemble heavy urban fighting similar to other battles over the past 20 years elsewhere in the Middle East against Iraqi militants and the Islamic State group – and very different from the more limited engagements Israel has attempted in Gaza up until now.</p>
<p>Combat operations in densely packed urban environments are <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-eight-rules-of-urban-warfare-and-why-we-must-work-to-change-them/">among the most complex</a> for military planners and the troops who have to fight in them for a variety of reasons. The physical space is dense, with above-ground structures or subterranean networks that provide ample environments for fighters to attack, remain concealed or move without detection. There are narrow channels like alleyways or roads that military units have to navigate through. Large numbers of noncombatant civilians are also around. These factors can <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/defending-the-city-an-overview-of-defensive-tactics-from-the-modern-history-of-urban-warfare/">complicate the ability of even the best-trained troops</a> to accomplish their objectives while also minimizing their risk. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers in camouflage move through a cityscape." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Marines try to push into the center of Fallujah, Iraq, in November 2004, in what became known as the second battle of Fallujah.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IRAQFALLUJAH/a20dca3eade4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">AP Photo/Anja Niedringhaus</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Nowhere for Hamas to go</h2>
<p>Though Israel estimates having killed more than <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hamas-fighters-bodies-israel-toll-gaza-ground-invasion-rcna119640">1,500 fighters</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/hamas-prepared-for-a-long-war-with-israel-as-concerns-for-hostages-in-gaza-grow">during and in the days immediately following</a> the Oct. 7 attacks, its military estimates that Hamas probably <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-idf-commander-says-hamas-has-7000-rockets-dozens-of-drones/">has tens of thousands more</a> well-armed fighters in Gaza. </p>
<p>Hamas fighters have nowhere to fall back to in the face of an attack by Israel. The strip’s borders with Israel remain sealed, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/desperately-needed-aid-trickles-into-besieged-gaza-as-egypts-border-crossing-opens">with only limited openings at the Rafah crossing</a> with Egypt to allow for humanitarian aid to enter. Recently, Cindy McCain, head of the United Nations World Food Program, warned that the continued Israeli blockade around Gaza has pushed the civilian population there <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gaza-humanitarian-catastrophe-united-nations-warn-israel-prepare-ground-invasion/">into a grave humanitarian crisis</a>. But Egypt has been <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/13/middleeast/egypt-rafah-crossing-gaza-palestinians-mime-intl/index.html">reluctant to allow people through</a>, citing both <a href="https://apnews.com/article/palestinian-jordan-egypt-israel-refugee-502c06d004767d4b64848d878b66bd3d">humanitarian and foreign policy concerns</a>.</p>
<p>With nowhere to go, it is highly possible that Hamas will decide to stand and fight an Israeli invasion. At that point, Hamas will likely use suicide attackers and the weapons it has and can make – some combination of roadside bombs, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-north-korea-weapons-703e33663ea299f920d0d14039adfbb8">rocket-propelled grenades</a>, automatic weapons, mortars and snipers.</p>
<p>In addition, Hamas has built an <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/15/middleeast/hamas-tunnels-gaza-intl/index.html">extensive network of as many as 300 miles of underground tunnels</a> throughout Gaza, which its fighters will use to hide and travel in. The Israeli air campaign since Oct. 7 will also help Hamas, because it has destroyed buildings and created piles of rubble that have not yet been removed, making above-ground travel of Israeli forces difficult.</p>
<p>Israel will face further political and humanitarian risks because Hamas kidnapped <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-do-we-now-about-hamas-hostages-2023-10-19/">dozens of hostages</a> on Oct. 7, and their locations are unknown. Even if some are released before an invasion, Israeli attacks could injure or kill any who remain. And rescue operations would require precise intelligence and careful military planning to work in a very small physical area with widespread fighting. </p>
<p>Israeli forces have not faced these conditions often or for very long in the past, but other nations’ militaries have.</p>
<h2>The battles of Fallujah</h2>
<p>In 2004 and 2005, <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah">thousands of U.S. Marines and troops</a> from other nations in an international coalition <a href="https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/11/28/the-second-battle-of-fallujah-15-years-later/">fought Iraqi insurgents and members of al-Qaida in Iraq</a> in Fallujah, Iraq.</p>
<p>While they inflicted significant losses on those adversaries, U.S. and allied troops also took heavy casualties. </p>
<p><a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah/">In the first battle of Fallujah</a> in early 2004, 38 U.S. troops were killed and at least 90 injured, with at least 200 al-Qaida or Iraqi insurgents killed and an unknown number of civilians killed or injured. <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-7-second-battle-of-fallujah/">In the second battle of Fallujah, later in 2004</a>, U.S. troops suffered 38 fatalities and 275 injured, with upward of 1,000 to 1,500 insurgents killed and another 1,500 injured. Combined, these were the two biggest urban battles for U.S. forces during the Iraq War.</p>
<p>In addition, much of the <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/rebuilding-fallujah/">city of Fallujah, which once had a population of 250,000, was destroyed</a>, and required significant reconstruction efforts before residents could move back in – <a href="https://apnews.com/6c044247f6284a7d847ec8e846e82dc2">only to be displaced again</a> when the Islamic State group emerged and also fought there against the Iraqi government in the mid-2010s.</p>
<p>A decade later, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi military took on fighters from the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, commonly known as ISIS, in cities like <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/23/middleeast/isis-caliphate-end-intl/index.html">Baghouz</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/17/558271646/isis-makes-last-stand-at-a-stadium-in-raqqa-its-doomed-capital">Raaqa</a>, Syria, and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-makes-bloody-last-stand-in-remaining-mosul-neighborhoods-under-its-control/">Mosul</a>, Iraq. Those fights resulted in <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/07/15/american-isis-podcast/">tens of thousands of ISIS fighters killed or captured</a>. The survivors, having lost control of any territory, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/04/1192245987/where-is-isis-today">went into hiding</a>.</p>
<p>In these urban ground offensives against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the losses for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/world/middleeast/iraq-tal-afar-isis-battle.html">Iraqi military</a> and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201112020634/https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/1200-isis-fighters-neutralized-raqqa-65-city-seized-kurdish-forces/">the Syrian Democratic Forces</a> were heavy, totaling over 1,000 for each of these forces. And just like in the battles in Fallujah, <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/feature/mosul-largest-battle-decade-future-of-war/">civilian deaths and injuries</a> also occurred in high numbers due to the intensity of the urban combat and its proximity to regular people trying to live their lives. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People gather at the collapsed corner of a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraqis search through the rubble of a house destroyed in fighting in Fallujah in May 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IRAQ/c148ac9560e4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">AP Photo/Muhammed Muheisen</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Lessons for Israel?</h2>
<p>In late October 2023, the Pentagon dispatched <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-sends-senior-army-officers-to-israel-to-advise-idf-on-gaza-ground-operation-plans/">Marine Lt. Gen. James Glynn</a> and other military advisers to Israel to consult on plans for a ground operation in Gaza. </p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-iran-navy-gaza-1a906598be5baccc614897768b1824a8">Glynn fought in Fallujah</a> and <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/23/israel-gaza-war-marine-general-ground-operation">advised the Iraqi military</a> in its fight against the Islamic State group in Mosul. He was expected to offer advice based on his experience in protracted urban combat, including <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-iran-navy-gaza-1a906598be5baccc614897768b1824a8">ways to minimize civilian casualties</a>.</p>
<p>No one knows precisely how events will unfold in the coming days. If Israel does indeed mount a ground campaign, the resulting fight between the Israeli military and Hamas will almost certainly be violent and difficult. </p>
<p>Casualties on all sides of the conflict will be high, and will include innocent Palestinians who have not left the northern part of Gaza for the southern end of the strip, where <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-aid-be-available-south-gaza-does-not-elaborate-2023-10-18/">humanitarian aid and relief</a> is beginning to arrive. The ensuing urban battles may resemble those in Fallujah in the mid-2000s or ISIS stand-offs a decade ago.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hamas and the international community expect Israel to invade the Gaza Strip. The battle will probably be more like recent Middle Eastern combat than Israel’s past fights with Palestinians.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116232023-09-19T12:14:56Z2023-09-19T12:14:56ZUS policy of ‘pragmatic engagement’ in Afghanistan risks legitimatizing Taliban rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548369/original/file-20230914-15-hde5rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C29%2C4911%2C3257&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters celebrate the second anniversary of Taliban rule on Aug. 15, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/taliban-supporters-parade-through-the-streets-of-kabul-on-news-photo/1601157436?adppopup=true">Nava Jamshidi/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For two decades, the conflict in Afghanistan <a href="https://theconversation.com/calculating-the-costs-of-the-afghanistan-war-in-lives-dollars-and-years-164588">occupied international attention and U.S. resources</a>. But ever since <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2573268/biden-announces-full-us-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-sept-11/">American troops withdrew</a> in 2021, the conflict has seemingly been viewed in Washington more as a concern <a href="https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/afghanistan-after-us-withdrawal-five-conclusions/">localized to the region of Central and South Asia</a>.</p>
<p>This is due in large part to <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/shifting-priorities-the-us-and-the-middle-east-in-a-multipolar-world/">the U.S.’s shifting global priorities</a>. The invasion in Ukraine and Chinese ambitions in the Pacific have meant that Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the U.S. administration.</p>
<p>Naturally, the U.S.’s exit from Afghanistan has left the Biden administration with weaker leverage in the country. Indeed, some observers are now <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/23/afghanistan-biden-taliban-akhundzada-haqqani/">calling for the U.S. to diplomatically recognize</a> the Taliban government – something the Biden administration has stated it has <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/">yet to make a decision on</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">expert on international relations and Afghanistan</a>, I would argue recognizing the Taliban without pushing for a political road map and guarantees from them would be a mistake. As a partner in the Doha agreement – the peace deal <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">signed by the U.S. and the Taliban in 2020</a> leading to American troop withdrawal – Washington has an obligation to hold the Taliban to account over its side of the bargain: Preventing terrorists from operating in Afghanistan and engaging in intra-Afghan talks to end decades of conflict.</p>
<p>Yet over the past two years, the U.S.’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/">policy of “pragmatic engagement</a>” in Afghanistan – which amounts to working with the Taliban on limited security concerns while urging a course correction on human rights – has done little to discourage Taliban policies that have <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/">degraded the rights of Afghan citizens</a>. Nor has it pushed the Taliban to long-promised talks with other factions and parties in Afghanistan aimed at ending decades of turmoil.</p>
<h2>Evolving US interests</h2>
<p>America was drawn into Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack on the U.S mainland. Its goal was to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">dismantle and destroy al-Qaida</a> and its affiliate groups. But at the same time, it was considered to be in the U.S.’s interest to also assist Afghans in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/17/bush-on-nation-building-and-afghanistan/">creating a more equal and just political system</a> after decades of civil war and instability. The vision was for a government that respected human rights, guaranteed access to education for all and promoted democracy. </p>
<p>Some of those ideals made it into the Doha agreement and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-16/afghanistan-taliban-spokesperson-says-they-respect-women/100298394">public statements by the Taliban delegation before the deal was signed</a>. Yet, more than three years after the agreement was inked in the Qatari capital, the Taliban appears to show no intention of following through on its promises. It has <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/afghanistan-un-experts-say-20-years-progress-women-and-girls-rights-erased">restricted the rights of women and girls</a> to education and <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202308317600">rejected the idea of an inclusive government</a> with input from other Afghans. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/">U.S. government’s policy of pragmatic engagement</a> amounts to combating terrorism through an “<a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/over-the-horizon-counterterrorism-new-name-same-old-challenges/">over-the-horizon” strategy</a> directed from outside the country and intervening in Afghan affairs only through the Taliban itself, an unconventional partner for the U.S. in this effort.</p>
<p>In July 2023, President Biden implied that working with the Taliban in counterterrorism efforts <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/30/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-on-the-administrations-student-debt-relief-program/">had borne fruit</a>: “I said al-Qaida would not be there. I said it wouldn’t be there. I said we’d get help from the Taliban.”</p>
<h2>Taliban failing on pledges</h2>
<p>Yet, after <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf">vowing in the Doha agreement</a> to send a “clear message” to groups such as al-Qaida that “threaten the security of the United States and its allies,” the Taliban <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-after-the-fall-of-kabul-talibans-false-commitments-on-terrorism-have-been-fully-exposed-188132">has yet to publicly sever ties</a> with the group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">or banish militants</a> from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The Taliban has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65382277">killed a few individuals</a> identified as being threats to the U.S., notably by targeting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">terrorist group ISIS-K</a>. But it has been less helpful in cracking down on al-Qaida members. Indeed, <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri</a> was hiding out in Kabul – something that couldn’t have happened without the involvement of high-ranking Taliban officials – until a U.S. operation in July 2022 killed him.</p>
<p>In maintaining contacts with the Taliban for counterterrorism goals without pressuring the group on human rights issues, the U.S. might serve to legitimatize the Taliban’s leadership of the country at times when the group <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/25/taliban-dissolves-afghanistan-election-commission">still lacks an internal mandate</a>.</p>
<p>Despite these concerns, the U.S. is seemingly pushing ahead with this policy of “pragmatic engagement.”</p>
<p>In July 2023, A U.S. delegation led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West and Rina Amir, the special envoy for Afghan women, girls and human rights, <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">met with the Taliban</a> foreign minister in Doha. A State Department press release <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">framed the meeting</a> as a confidence-building exercise, noting positive developments such as growth in trade, a “decrease in large-scale terrorist attacks” and a “reduction in opium cultivation.”</p>
<p>Mention was made of the U.S. urging the Taliban to “reverse policies responsible for deteriorating human rights.” But as <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-meeting-with-taliban-puts-high-gloss-on-dismal-conditions-in-afghanistan/ar-AA1eJzbi?ocid=entnewsntp&pc=U531&cvid=a3af02c159b04490a661e7cb28c5ba85&ei=268">one critic noted</a>, such language “fall(s) atrociously short of describing the Taliban’s vast inhumanity toward Afghans.”</p>
<h2>Lack of regional consensus</h2>
<p>The void left by the U.S. is being <a href="https://www.mei.edu/events/iran-russia-and-china-post-us-withdrawal-afghan-landscape">filled by regional powers and countries that share a border</a> with Afghanistan: China, India, Russia, Pakistan and Iran.</p>
<p>But every one of these countries has its own interests in Afghanistan. Sometimes these are directly conflicting, such as with Pakistan and India, which have <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/01/india-pakistan-rivalry-afghanistan">long been suspicious</a> of the other’s influence in Afghanistan. Historically, all border countries have <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/game-old-empire-return-proxy-wars-afghanistan">looked upon warring Afghan factions as proxies</a> to further their own aims – a tactic that has only added to the instability of the country.</p>
<p>The result is a lack of coordination between regional players on Afghanistan’s path forward and little pressure on the Taliban to continue down the political road map as set out by the Doha agreement.</p>
<h2>Repeating past mistakes</h2>
<p>This failure to hold the Taliban accountable risks repeating past mistakes in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In the 50 years since the last <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/18/archives/afghan-king-overthrown-a-republic-is-proclaimed-afghanistan-king-is.html">Afghan monarch was dethroned in 1973</a>, the country has been ruled by a succession of single-party governments that have excluded other political groups. In 2001, the international community excluded the Taliban from the <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/693627/a-review-of-the-2001-bonn-conference-and-application-to-the-road-ahead-in-afgha/">Bonn Conference</a>, which set the pathway to governance for the country after the U.S. invasion.</p>
<p>Masoom Stanekzai, a former chief peace negotiator for the Afghan government, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/missteps-and-missed-opportunities-peace-afghanistan">called the exclusion of the Taliban</a> “a strategic mistake” – and for good reason, I believe: History has shown that excluding factions in Afghanistan has led only to civil strife.</p>
<p>Since 2021, the Taliban has been allowed to continue Afghanistan down this path of single-party governance. As Andrew Watkins, senior expert on Afghanistan for the U.S. Institute of Peace, noted, the Taliban <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/one-year-later-taliban-reprise-repressive-rule-struggle-build-state">has shown in its governance one intent</a>: “To establish uncontested and unquestioned authority over Afghanistan’s state and society.”</p>
<p>With such ambitions, the Taliban leaves little room for the intra-Afghan dialogue needed for Afghanistan to move forward. </p>
<h2>The US role</h2>
<p>By signing the 2020 deal with the Taliban, the U.S took on joint responsibility for the delivery of promises made in the agreement. The pledge by Washington to withdraw forces has been fulfilled. But two years on from that, the Taliban has yet to deliver on its commitments. </p>
<p>This leaves the Biden administration with a choice: Try to keep the Doha deal alive by pressuring the Taliban into intra-Afghan talks, or accept that the deal is now dead. Either way, “pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban has shown itself to be wanting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sher Jan Ahmadzai is affiliated with Afghan-American Foundation. </span></em></p>The Biden administration has not ruled out diplomatic recognition of the Taliban. Doing so risks legitimizing the group’s rule without holding it accountable.Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881322022-08-15T12:38:00Z2022-08-15T12:38:00ZA year after the fall of Kabul, Taliban’s false commitments on terrorism have been fully exposed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478925/original/file-20220812-6128-xe8uwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C48%2C5377%2C3531&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Taliban's success in taking control in Afghanistan has encouraged other militant groups.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-july-8-2022-shows-taliban-fighters-news-photo/1241790455?adppopup=true">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Taliban <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">returned to power in Afghanistan</a> on Aug. 15, 2021, there were faint hopes that this time would be different.</p>
<p>The Taliban promised to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/afghanistan-taliban-women-school-1.6219358">respect girls’ education and women’s rights</a>, and to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-17/taliban-say-women-can-work-shifting-from-stance-before-9-11">not allow the country to become a breeding ground</a> for terrorism, <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm">as it had been</a> in the Taliban’s previous stint in government before the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/key-dates-us-involvement-afghanistan-since-911-2021-07-02/">2001 U.S. intervention</a>.</p>
<p>But a year after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban has failed to deliver on these promises and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-taliban-one-year-on/">gradually become more repressive</a> as it tries to consolidate power in the country.</p>
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<p>Its <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122892">record on women’s rights</a> has been abysmal, as has its <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/afghanistan-kabul-residents-complain-about-unfair-distribution-of-humanitarian-aid-articleshow.html">distribution of much-needed humanitarian aid</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the view that the Taliban could meaningfully mitigate the counterterrorism concerns of the West has only grown more absurd since it first <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">made such promises</a> as part of 2020’s Doha agreement to secure a U.S. exit. The Taliban’s leading political ranks remain dominated by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/haqqanis-afghanistan-taliban/2021/09/10/71f82620-123b-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html">wanted terrorists</a>, including members of the influential terrorist group the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html">Haqqani Network</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=IpUS-O4AAAAJ&hl=en">scholars who monitor</a> <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">extremist groups in the region</a>, we believe terrorists in Afghanistan have only become more emboldened in the first year of Taliban rule. And despite isolated successful operations by the U.S., including the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">drone strike</a> that killed al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahri, we are still concerned that U.S.’s current counterterrorism policies are insufficient to contain the growing threat.</p>
<h2>False promises</h2>
<p>Taliban statements both before they took power and after suggested that the group – publicly, at least – was shunning <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-claim-unaware-al-qaida-leader-afghanistan-87919025">terrorist groups</a> and <a href="https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-tells-members-to-avoid-recruiting-foreign-fighters/31119080.html">foreign fighters</a>.</p>
<p>But the most recent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/333/77/PDF/N2233377.pdf?OpenElement">United Nations security monitoring reports warned</a> that the Taliban are simply relocating some terrorist groups and individuals to make them more inconspicuous. Moreover, the Taliban are allowing the continued functioning of terrorist training camps, and potentially even awarding citizenship to some foreign fighters, the <a href="http://theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/03/al-qaida-enjoying-a-haven-in-afghanistan-under-taliban-un-warns">monitoring team reported in May 2022</a>. Their assessments suggests that al-Qaida “has a safe haven under the Taliban” while casting doubt over the Taliban’s intent to restrain other terrorist groups, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K, an offshoot of the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s disdain for its Doha commitment not to allow “individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies” was exposed most recently in the case of al-Zawahri. Prior to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">terrorist leader’s death</a>, al-Zawahri was residing in downtown Kabul apparently under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/08/02/what-ayman-al-zawahris-death-says-about-terrorism-in-taliban-run-afghanistan/">permission, invitation and protection</a> of top Taliban officials.</p>
<p>The accommodation of al-Qaida is not isolated. The Taliban has similarly been reluctant to crack down on the <a href="https://southasianvoices.org/the-untenable-ttp-pakistan-negotiations">Tehrik–e-Taliban Pakistan</a>, the Afghan Taliban’s deadly terrorist ally in Pakistan that has increased cross-border attacks on Pakistan following the U.S. withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Sheltering terrorists</h2>
<p>The circumstances of al-Zawahri’s death have <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/">left many unknowns</a>. It is not clear who among the Taliban was aware of al-Zawahiri’s presence – the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-claim-unaware-al-qaida-leader-afghanistan-87919025">group’s initial statement</a> on the U.S. strike suggested that it had “no knowledge of his arrival and residence.” Nor is it immediately apparent how the targeted killing <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/al-qaeda-leader-killed-in-kabul-what-might-be-the-repercussions-for-the-taleban-and-afghanistan/">will affect</a> intra-Taliban dynamics, including for <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/after-al-zawahiris-killing-whats-next-us-afghanistan">younger</a> and more hard-line members who may push senior leadership to respond aggressively.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A still from a video shows the bearded former al-Qaida leader dressed in white address the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahri was found sheltering in Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-still-image-obtained-september-10-2012-from-news-photo/151856346?adppopup=true">IntelCenter/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Counterterrorism experts have also voiced concerns over <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/02/zawahris-death-and-afghanistans-future-00049239">which other</a> al-Qaida members the Taliban might be sheltering.</p>
<p>What is apparent is that at least some high-ranking Taliban felt <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/opinion/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaeda-afghanistan.html">comfortable enough</a>, despite public commitments, to host a terrorist leader who continued to incite violence against the West until his death.</p>
<p>The repercussions of this decision could further hamper the stability and well-being of Afghanistan. If the Taliban continue to fail on their commitments to steer clear of harboring militants, the country is likely to remain an international <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban.html?smid=tw-share">pariah</a>, which will only worsen its rampant problems and potentially steer Afghanistan toward <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/afghanistans-future-after-the-taliban-takeover/">another civil war</a>.</p>
<h2>Resistance to Taliban rule</h2>
<p>Despite their seemingly rapid takeover of the country in August 2021, the Taliban have yet to exert full control over all of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>In addition to the <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/state-afghanistans-economy-and-private-sector#:%7E:text=Afghanistan's%20economy%20and%20people%20have,of%20Afghan%20foreign%20exchange%20reserves.">severe economic crisis</a>, pockets of resistance persist, and in some areas appear to be growing. Reports suggest that by spring 2022, the number of armed groups challenging the Taliban’s authority had <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-fighting-season-ushers-in-new-anti-taliban-groups/6542148.html">grown significantly</a>. Among them is a breakaway Taliban faction led by an ethnic Hazara commander named <a href="https://8am.af/eng/mawlawi-mehdi-coherences-his-forces-in-balkhab-sar-e-pol/">Mawlawi Mehdi</a> and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/08/afghanistan-panjshir-valley-taliban-resistance/">National Resistance Front</a> led by the son of Ahmad Shah Mahsud, the deceased former leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>The Taliban have since deployed tens of thousands of their fighters to suppress <a href="https://8am.af/eng/taliban-deploys-30000-special-fighters-in-panjshir-baghlan-and-takhar/">both</a> <a href="https://8am.af/eng/mawlawi-mehdi-coherences-his-forces-in-balkhab-sar-e-pol/">groups</a>.</p>
<p>What’s more, in May 2022, dozens of exiled warlords who fled the country rallied together to form the High Council of National Resistance. The <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/14/afghanistan-warlords-taliban-authority-comeback/">leaders of the council are demanding</a> a stake in their country’s future or else, in the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/exiled-afghan-warlord-organising-group-in-turkey-against-taliban-481388">words</a> of the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, “Afghanistan will experience civil war once again.”</p>
<p>And then there is the challenge posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a>. We <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/governance/smaller-and-smarter-defining-a-narrower-u-s-counterterrorism-mission-in-the-afghanistan-pakistan-region/">warned</a> back in February 2021 and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">again</a> in October that American drones and the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-rivalry">Taliban’s animosity</a> for ISIS-K wouldn’t be enough to stop the group’s revival and violence. Indeed, in January 2022, we <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">traced</a> ISIS-K’s resurgence under its <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-new-leader-islamic-state-khorasan-province">new leader</a>, from its depletion following years of <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Broken-but-Not-Defeated.pdf">personnel and territorial losses</a> due to military operations, to the revived threat that the group poses today. The deadly consequences of that resurgence were seen on Aug. 26, 2021, in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">attack that left at least 100 people dead</a>, including 13 U.S. troops.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A Taliban fighter holding a gun stands in front of a fence. On the floor is bloodstained clothing and debris." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter stands guard at the site of a 2021 ISIS-K suicide bombing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/taliban-fighter-stands-guard-at-the-site-of-the-august-26-news-photo/1234889168?adppopup=true">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At present, ISIS-K is in the middle of two key campaigns. The first is aimed at building a wide militant base that draws on <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/ISK-poses-indigenous-threat-to-Afghan-Taliban">local populations</a> and <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">regional militant groups</a>. The second is a campaign to delegitimize the Taliban through attacks and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">propaganda designed to highlight</a> Taliban incompetence, and <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/iskp-criticizes-talibans-acceptance?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email">frame the Taliban government</a> as illegitimate. </p>
<p>Over time – and with the backing of the core <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html">Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria</a> and other resistance groups draining the Taliban’s resources – we believe ISIS-K has the potential to chip away at the Taliban’s governance while expanding its own influence.</p>
<h2>A global threat?</h2>
<p>Emboldened militant groups in Afghanistan pose a threat not just to the country itself, but also to the region and potentially the global community.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s success in retaking Afghanistan encouraged an already-resurgent <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan">Pakistani Taliban</a> to pursue a campaign of violence and push for <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/five-things-watch-islamabad-pakistani-taliban-talks">political concessions</a> from the Pakistani government. </p>
<p>Similarly, al-Qaida’s global network of affiliates has drawn inspiration from the Taliban’s victory. And despite the symbolic blow of <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">al-Zawahri’s death</a>, many of those affiliates in the Middle East and Africa <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">remain operationally unaffected</a> by any fallout from the U.S. strike.</p>
<p>In spite of the success of that operation, <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/over-the-horizon-counterterrorism-new-name-same-old-challenges/">debate continues</a> over the effectiveness of the United States’ <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/">over-the-horizon counterterrorism strategy</a>, which involves the launching of surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside the country.</p>
<p>The al-Zawahri operation demonstrated that sound intelligence can result in effective targeting of high-profile terrorists. But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/05/politics/us-counterrorism-afghanistan/index.html">counterterrorism experts</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410">including ourselves</a> remain concerned over whether such strikes can be effective in targeting less prominent militants who nevertheless play a critical role in the day-to-day operations.</p>
<p>To bolster the strategy, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/">the U.S.</a> could seek out more robust relationships with resistance groups hostile to the Taliban, as well as with neighboring <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/21/us-central-asia-counterterrorism/">Central Asian countries</a>, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in order to bolster the intelligence needed to conduct over-the-horizon strikes. But such partnerships would not come without their downsides, including further isolating the Taliban. </p>
<p>International diplomatic efforts and U.S. counterterrorism operations, along with internal pressure from resistance groups and jihadist rivalries, may encourage the Taliban to reform its ways.</p>
<p>But if the second year of Taliban rule fails to produce meaningful changes, the outlook for the country and its citizens will likely only turn for the worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Taliban promised not to allow Afghanistan to be used by groups seeking to attack the US, yet terrorist groups have only become more emboldened under its rule.Andrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883162022-08-05T16:44:40Z2022-08-05T16:44:40ZBladed ‘Ninja’ missile used to kill al-Qaida leader is part of a scary new generation of unregulated weapons<p>The recent killing of al-Qaida leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-assassination-of-al-qaida-chief-reveals-tensions-at-the-top-of-the-taliban-188133">Ayman al-Zawahiri </a> by CIA drone strike was the latest <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/08/01/remarks-by-president-biden-on-a-successful-counterterrorism-operation-in-afghanistan/">US response to 9/11</a>. Politically, it amplified existing distrust between US leaders and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The killing also exposed compromises in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-51689443">2020 Doha peace agreement</a> between the US and the Taliban.</p>
<p>But another story is emerging with wider implications: the speed and nature of international weapons development. Take the weapon reportedly used to kill al-Zawahiri: the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/08/03/ayman-al-zawahiri-s-death-what-is-the-hellfire-r9x-missile-that-the-americans-purportedly-used_5992310_4.html">Hellfire R9X “Ninja” missile</a>.</p>
<p>The Hellfire missile was originally conceived in the 1970s and 80s to destroy Soviet tanks. Rapid improvements from the 1990s onwards have <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/03/22/agm-114-hellfire-missile/">resulted in multiple variations</a> with different capabilities. They can be launched from helicopters or Reaper drones. Their <a href="https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/hellfire-family-of-missiles/">different explosive payloads</a> can be set off in different ways: on impact or before impact.</p>
<p>Then there is the Hellfire R9X “Ninja”. It is not new, though it has remained largely in the shadows for five years. It was reportedly used in 2017 in Syria to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-u-s-missile-aims-to-kill-only-terrorists-not-nearby-civilians-11557403411">kill the deputy al-Qaida leader</a>, Abu Khayr al-Masri.</p>
<p>The Ninja missile does not rely on an explosive warhead to destroy or kill its target. It uses the speed, accuracy and kinetic energy of a 100-pound missile fired from up to 20,000 feet, armed with <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/03/22/agm-114-hellfire-missile/">six blades</a> which deploy in the last moments before impact.</p>
<h2>‘Super weapons’</h2>
<p>The Ninja missile is the ultimate attempt – thus far – to accurately target and kill a single person. No explosion, no widespread destruction, and no deaths of bystanders. </p>
<p>But other weapon developments will also affect the way we live and how wars are fought or deterred. Russia has <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military-technology-russia/03-putins-super-weapons">invested heavily</a> in these so-called super-weapons, building on older technologies. They aim to reduce or eliminate technological advantages enjoyed by the United States or Nato. </p>
<p>Rusia’s hypersonic missile development aims are highly ambitious. The <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military-technology-russia/03-putins-super-weapons">Avangard</a> missile, for example, won’t need to fly outside the earth’s atmosphere. It will remain within the upper atmosphere instead, giving it the ability to manoeuvre. </p>
<p>Such manoeuvrability will make it harder to detect or intercept. China’s <a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/china-flashes-rare-footage-of-hypersonic-missile-army-day/">DF-17 hypersonic ballistic missile</a> is similarly intended to evade US missile defences.</p>
<h2>The autonomous era</h2>
<p>At a smaller scale, <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2021/10/14/lethal-robot-dogs-now-have-assault-rifles-attached-to-their-backs-15420004/">robot dogs with mounted machine guns</a> are emerging on the weapons market. The weapon development company <a href="https://sword-int.com/the-sword-story/">Sword International</a> took a Ghost Robotics quadrupedal unmanned ground vehicle – or dog robot – and mounted an assault rifle on it. It was one of three robot dogs on <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/tv/editors-picks/robot-dog-rifle-black-mirror-vf8b11fde">display at a US army trade show</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1449342876408713220"}"></div></p>
<p>Turkey, meanwhile, is claiming it has developed <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/a-series-of-autonomous-drones-gives-turkey-a-military-edge-47201">four types of autonomous drones</a>, which can identify and kill people, all without input from a human operator, or GPS guidance. According to a <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/037/72/PDF/N2103772.pdf?OpenElement">UN report</a> from March 2021, such an autonomous weapon system has been used already in Libya against a logistics convoy affiliated with the Khalifa Haftar armed group.</p>
<p>Autonomous weapons that don’t need GPS guidance are particularly significant. In a future war between major powers, the satellites which provide GPS navigation can expect to be shot down. So any military system or aircraft which relies on GPS signals for navigation or targeting would be rendered ineffective. </p>
<p><a href="https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/">China</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-59299101">Russia</a>, India and the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-59299101">USA</a> have developed weapons to destroy satellites which provide global positioning for car sat-nav systems and civilian aircraft guidance. </p>
<p>The real nightmare scenario is combining these, and many more, weapon systems with artificial intelligence. </p>
<h2>New rules of war</h2>
<p>Are new laws or treaties needed to limit these futuristic weapons? In short, yes but they don’t look likely. The US has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/18/us-to-end-anti-satellite-asat-testing-calls-for-global-agreement.html">called for</a> a global agreement to stop anti-satellite missile testing – but there has been no uptake. </p>
<p>The closest to an agreement is the signing of <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html">NASA’s Artemis Accords</a>. These are principles to promotes peaceful use of space exploration. But they only apply to “<a href="https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf">civil space activities conducted by the civil space agencies</a>” of the signatory countries. In other words, the agreement does not extend to military space activities or terrestrial battlefields. </p>
<p>In contrast, the US <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty/#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20officially,the%20nations%20involved%20could%20pursue.">has withdrawn</a> from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This is part of a long-term <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/nuclear-treaty-trump/index.html">pattern of withdrawal from global agreements</a> by US administrations. </p>
<p>Lethal autonomous weapon systems are a special class of emerging weapon system. They incorporate machine learning and other types of AI so that they can make their own decisions and act without direct human input. In 2014 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014">brought experts together</a> to identify issues raised by autonomous weapon systems. </p>
<p>In 2020 the ICRC and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute went further, bringing together international experts to identify what <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-and-icrc-report-identifies-necessary-controls-autonomous-weapons">controls on autonomous weapon systems </a> would be needed.</p>
<p>In 2022, discussions are ongoing between countries <a href="https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/ccw-gge-2019/">the UN first brought together</a> in 2017. This group of governmental experts continues to debate the development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. However, there has still been no international agreement on a new law or treaty to limit their use.</p>
<h2>New rules for autonomous weapon systems</h2>
<p>The campaign group, Stop the Killer Robots, has called throughout this period for an <a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/">international ban</a> on lethal autonomous weapon systems. Not only has that not happened, there is an undeclared <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/15/introducing-guiding-principles-for-the-development-and-use-of-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/">stalemate in the UN’s discussions</a> on autonomous weapons in Geneva. </p>
<p>Australia, Israel, Russia, South Korea and the US have <a href="https://una.org.uk/news/minority-states-block-progress-regulating-killer-robots">opposed a new treaty</a> or political declaration. Opposing them at the same talks, 125 member states of the Non-Aligned Movement are calling for <a href="https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NAM.pdf">legally binding restrictions</a> on lethal autonomous weapon systems. With Russia, China, US, UK and France all having a UN Security Council veto, they can prevent such a binding law on autonomous weapons.</p>
<p>Outside these international talks and campaigning organisations, independent experts are proposing alternatives. For example, in 2019 ethicist, Deane-Peter Baker brought together the Canberra Group of independent international. The group produced <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/15/guiding-principles-for-the-development-and-use-of-laws-version-1-0/">a report</a>, Guiding Principles for the Development and Use of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.</p>
<p>These principles don’t solve the political impasse between superpowers. But if autonomous weapons are here to stay then it is an early attempt to understand what new rules will be needed.</p>
<p>When Pandora’s mythical box was opened, untold horrors were unleashed on the world. Emerging weapon systems are all too real. Like Pandora, all we are left with is hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New weapons will require new rules of war – but there is little appetite for regulation.Peter Lee, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director, Security and Risk Research, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1771802022-02-21T14:49:27Z2022-02-21T14:49:27ZIslamic State: death of leader is big step towards becoming a different kind of terrorist organisation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447556/original/file-20220221-14-12sct3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5463%2C3063&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dream of a caliphate as an Islamist homeland is receding.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohammad Bash via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A “<a href="https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/en/publications/violence-and-gender-politics-in-forming-the-proto-state-islamic-s">proto-state</a>”, a “<a href="http://theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980">socio-political movement</a>, the ”<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2347798916681319?casa_token=BDAGq4h7mlcAAAAA%3AlrDg2WhmK90h59zwFU8M1PzWOz3UTR4EUMYKjNaNEFxodKPCvo_q7Un_iomWz8obJAghNL1qmMDDj8c&">beast</a>“ – all names given to a single group that, at its height, seemed to embody the west’s worst nightmare. </p>
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<p>Islamic State appeared to be a motivated, well-led insurgency group dedicated to building its own "caliphate” in conquered areas across the Middle East. Now, the recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-60246129">violent death</a> of its leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi, in northern Syria, has left analysts wondering whether the group has largely been neutralised. But that’s doubtful, as IS has been able to change over the years to suit its circumstances.</p>
<p>The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, aka ISIS, emerged as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2347798916681319?casa_token=BDAGq4h7mlcAAAAA:lrDg2WhmK90h59zwFU8M1PzWOz3UTR4EUMYKjNaNEFxodKPCvo_q7Un_iomWz8obJAghNL1qmMDDj8c">an al-Qaida splinter group</a> in 1999 and achieved the peak of its international notoriety in 2014, following the conquest of the city of Mosul in northern Iraq.</p>
<p>Although its ideology is not especially innovative – grounded, as it is, in a mixture of the offshoot Islamic creeds of Salafism, Qutbism, Wahabism and Takfirism – IS embodies a significant evolution in jihadi terror organisations. It’s different to al-Qaida – and more ambitious – in several key ways. Osama bin Laden and his disciples never called for the establishment of a global caliphate. They were more focused on taking the fight against the western infidels.</p>
<p>IS dared to go much further, creating a “pseudo-state” with more than 30,000 fighters and a sophisticated authoritarian system of government. As militants joined the group from all over the world, IS expanded across northern Iraq and Syria. By doing this, it was able to seize control of considerable natural resources – principally oil – to give it financial independence.</p>
<p>Former IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s bold declaration of a “caliphate” on June 29 2014 was a spur for many to join the cause. But, as American journalist <a href="https://academic.oup.com/socrel/article-abstract/79/1/20/4641802?login=false">Graeme Wood</a> noted, IS had a broad appeal to everyone from “Sunni Arab pragmatists to foreign soldiers of fortune”. This suggests the group wanted to appeal to a diverse membership, not all of whom were motivated by religion. It has been reported that copies of Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lifestyle-middle-east-africa-europe-religion-9f94ff7f1e294118956b049a51548b33">were circulated</a> among the group’s foreign fighters to give them an idea of the ideology they were fighting for.</p>
<p>IS rhetoric on social justice and a sense of revenge against a corrupt and unjust western establishment were very appealing for many who decided to join the group. Through its sophisticated propaganda distributed on social media, the IS communication department continues to disseminate <em>ad hoc</em> messages and videos with Hollywood-style effects. These don’t only focus on violence, but also touch on the welfare and care IS insists it will provide to all members. The IS-affiliated Al Hayat Media Center generates media content <a href="http://connections-qj.org/article/my-brothers-west-thematic-analysis-videos-produced-islamic-states-al-hayat-media-center">aimed specifically</a> at non-Arabic speakers – particularly younger audiences, who represent a core recruitment pool for the organisation. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Aerial photograph of several buildings destroyed by a bombing raid in Syria." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C3994%2C2520&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446546/original/file-20220215-4191-104lmve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Aftermath: aerial view of the site of a US military operation against Islamic State fighters in Idlib province, Syria, February 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UPI/Alamy Stock Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-60246129">Al-Qurayshi’s death</a> – he killed himself and his wife and children during a raid by US troops in northern Syria – is unlikely to shift the loyalty of many members or lessen the appeal of the group. And he and his family will, for many, be seen as martyrs in an ongoing war.</p>
<h2>Shape-shifting terror group</h2>
<p>Since 2017, IS has <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-after-the-caliphate-0">lost 98%</a> of its territories. It has accordingly shifted its strategy from becoming a quasi state to a decentralised ideology focused on encouraging solo attacks around the world. The loss of territory and the capture and killing of its leaders is unlikely to damage the group’s appeal or its emotional significance for those who have joined the cause and those who would still like to.</p>
<p>IS has been <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-and-the-Caliphate-Why-the-Group-is-Still-Appealing-to-Muslims/Orofino/p/book/9780367784577">home for</a> many second-generation Muslims and a safe place for disenfranchised individuals. IS has been able to able to fill the void in the lives of thousands of young people who dream of joining a greater cause and fighting against any form of oppression they have encountered in their apparently “comfortable” western lives. </p>
<p>So IS has evolved into a “post-territorial” group which represents a sort of wide resistance against the establishment – depicted as former colonial western powers. Touching on different social, economic, political and religious grievances, IS has managed to gather individuals from various backgrounds and unite them under the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Jihad.svg"><em>shahada</em> flag</a> (which proclaims a faith in Islam). It might have lost most of its territory and suffered the deaths of successive leaders but the ideological ground and the grievances the group rests upon remain undiminished. It is likely that the terror group will continue attracting supporters and followers for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Efforts to prevent this should focus on what the founder of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (<a href="https://icsr.info/">ICSR</a>), Peter Neumann, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/manchester-attack-isis-al-qaeda-radicalisation-risk-factors-a7753451.html">refers to as</a> “everything that happens before the bomb goes off”. This is the radicalisation process: when individuals are attracted to a certain set of ideas but have not yet engaged and acted upon them. More research should focus on the variety of non-violent but vocal extremist groups whose ideological assumptions appear similar to some terror groups but who do not espouse violence as a viable methodology. </p>
<p>Al-Qurayshi’s death may be forgotten over time, but the group he led still represents a considerable danger. While the actual territorial presence of Islamic State has been annihilated, for those people (and their children) who called the caliphate home, the “proto-state” exists in the massive diaspora who dreamed of what the caliphate could fulfil. The danger for the west is that the strength of IS doesn’t depend on its leader but on the emotional significance it has for its supporters. Until this is addressed there will always be a “beast” threatening the west.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elisa Orofino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The caliphate has no territory, but plenty of hearts and minds.Elisa Orofino, Academic Lead for Extremism and Counter-Terrorism, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1752582022-01-25T11:31:08Z2022-01-25T11:31:08ZLes djihadistes du Sahel ne gouvernent pas de la même manière: le contexte est déterminant<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441478/original/file-20220119-25-2uxe4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C926%2C576&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Un groupe de soldats nigériens en patrouille</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hama/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>La région du Sahel, une zone composée de pays en grande partie semi-arides situés sous le Sahara, ne cesse de subir les attaques des insurgés djihadistes d’affiliations diverses.</p>
<p>Les « insurgés djihadistes », <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/147/1/36/27181/Jihadi-Rebels-in-Civil-War">définis</a> au sens large, s'appuient sur la rhétorique religieuse pour mobiliser sur le plan politique et utilisent la violence pour atteindre leurs objectifs.</p>
<p>Des groupes, tels que Boko Haram et la Province d'Afrique de l'Ouest de l'État islamique, ont prouvé leur capacité de résistance au Nigeria et dans certaines régions du Niger. D’autres groupes, comme Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin et l'État islamique dans le Grand Sahara, continuent de se mobiliser au Mali, au Burkina Faso et au Niger.</p>
<p>Ces groupes retiennent l'attention de la communauté internationale en raison de leur violence. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/08/armed-islamists-latest-sahel-massacre-targets-burkina-faso">Environ 500 civils</a> ont été tués par des présumés jihadistes, au Sahel en 2021. Parmi les exemples récents, il y a les massacres perpétrés au <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/11/niger-surging-atrocities-armed-islamist-groups">Niger</a> et au <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr60/4249/2021/en/">Burkina Faso</a>. </p>
<p>Mais cette violence occulte un autre aspect de ces groupes: ils conçoivent d’autres formes de gouvernance locale dans les zones rurales. Et la façon dont ils gouvernent varie, d’un groupe à l’autre et au sein des groupes, même s'ils adhèrent à une <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-wave-of-jihadist-insurgency-in-west-africa_eb95c0a9-en">idéologie salafiste djihadiste</a> répandue.</p>
<p>Il n'existe que des recherches académiques éparpillées sur le sujet. Par conséquent, dans le cadre d'une <a href="https://www.nupi.no/en/About-NUPI/Projects-centers/Jihadist-Governance-in-the-Sahel">étude</a> plus vaste portant sur le Mali, le Burkina Faso, le Niger et le Nigeria, <a href="https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Reviewing-Jihadist-Governance-in-the-Sahel">nous avons passé en revue</a> les recherches existantes afin d'examiner la manière dont les djihadistes gouvernent dans la région et les raisons pour lesquelles leur gouvernance diffère.</p>
<p>Nous avons constaté qu'ils ne suivent pas de modèles idéologiques stricts pour imposer leur domination. Ils ne s'appuient pas non plus uniquement sur le recours à une violence spectaculaire. Ils adaptent sans cesse leur manière de gouverner en fonction de la dynamique interne des factions et de la pression des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques tout ayant du répondant par rapport à la politique locale.</p>
<h2>Comment les djihadistes gouvernent</h2>
<p>Les insurgés djihadistes, comme les autres insurgés, gouvernent par la force. Mais cette violence peut varier selon la proportion avec laquelle ils décident de frapper leurs cibles de manière sélective ou sans discernement. Des sous-groupes de la Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin affiliée à Al-Qaïda, ont <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-between-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/">généralement</a> pris pour cible les personnes qui ne collaborent pas avec eux, les autorités gouvernementales et les forces internationales, principalement au Mali. L'État islamique dans le Grand Sahara a, en revanche, attaqué des civils <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/478/123/5897266">sans discernement</a>. </p>
<p>Les groupes djihadistes imposent parfois leur interprétation de la charia (loi religieuse) au niveau local par le biais de <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/">châtiments sévères</a>. Ces mêmes groupes peuvent faire preuve de retenue ailleurs pour éviter de s'aliéner les communautés locales. Leurs engagements idéologiques transnationaux peuvent être incompatibles avec les normes locales et les intérêts des détenteurs du pouvoir en place. </p>
<p>Les élites locales, à savoir les chefs religieux et les chefs de village, peuvent jouer un rôle important dans la manière dont les groupes djihadistes exercent leur autorité. À titre d’exemple, le groupe Ansar Dine dans la région de Kidal au Mali <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898954">a conservé les juges locaux de la charia</a> (qadis), qui ont limité l'application stricte de la charia par le groupe.
Des chercheurs ont souligné la façon dont les gouverneurs rebelles mettent parfois en place des <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rebel-governance-in-civil-war/C40247AED4FA30DC2704EB64EA5CFFD5">administrations</a> élaborées, mais les insurgés djihadistes du Sahel semblent avoir développé des institutions locales plus fluides, moins formelles, pour maintenir le contrôle social sur les populations locales. </p>
<p>Des groupes comme la <a href="https://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Local-Drivers-of-Violent-Extremism-in-Central-Mali">Katiba Macina</a> et <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833567">l’État islamique dans le Grand Sahara</a> ont mis en place des tribunaux mobiles pour rendre la justice au niveau local, là où ils ne pouvaient pas être présents en permanence. Certains groupes ont collecté la zakat (impôt islamique) auprès des populations locales. Toutefois, d'après les rares recherches existantes, les services publics fournis par les djihadistes en retour semblent assez limités. </p>
<p>Bien que ces groupes puissent soutenir des <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-wave-of-jihadist-insurgency-in-west-africa_eb95c0a9-en">objectifs régionaux ou mondiaux</a>, ils ont tendance à positionner leurs projets de gouvernance en fonction <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Africa_s_Insurgents_Navigating_an_Evolving_Landscape">des conflits</a> et des clivages en cours. Les djihadistes cherchent à avoir une emprise sur les communautés locales en s'alliant à certains groupes dans les conflits existants. Certains ont tenté, par exemple, de recruter des bergers peuls en leur promettant un accès à des ressources comme les pâturages. Ils sont également intervenus pour <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2018.1474457">régler</a> des conflits, afin de proposer un type de justice plus efficace que celui de l'État. </p>
<h2>L’explication des différents styles</h2>
<p>Le rôle joué par l'État et les acteurs non étatiques, tels que les milices, les groupes d'autodéfense et les groupes rivaux, constitue l'un des facteurs qui permettent d'expliquer les différences de style de gouvernance entre les groupes jihadistes. Les opérations anti-insurrectionnelles peuvent, entre autres, empêcher les djihadistes de mettre en place des institutions, les confinant à un style de gouvernance plus opaque. Par ailleurs, les groupes djihadistes rivaux peuvent adapter leur style de gouvernanceen s'adonnant à la surenchère pour continuer à bénéficier du soutien des communautés. </p>
<p>Une autre explication réside dans la structure organisationnelle. Les groupes djihadistes diffèrent en ce qui concerne leur cohésion et leur degré de centralisation. La dynamique dans les <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/jihadists-of-north-africa-and-the-sahel/C1C391EC226A65858CCF45322879ED1B">factions peut</a> entraîner des différences de gouvernance. Il se peut que les dirigeants ne soient pas toujours en mesure de discipliner les sous-commandants pour s'assurer que leur vision soit appliquée au niveau local. </p>
<p>Les divergences dans leur engagement idéologique peuvent fournir des indices sur ce que l'on peut attendre de la gouvernance djihadiste. Cependant, il n'existe pas de modèles prêts à l’emploi pour une « vraie » gouvernance islamique. Les commandants et les membres des groupes interprètent l'idéologie tout en étant eux-mêmes influencés par les traditions et les exigences locales. </p>
<p>Enfin, la politique et les conflits locaux influencent considérablement la gouvernance djihadiste. L'exploitation des divisions et des griefs sociaux peut permettre à un groupe d'imposer de nouveaux systèmes sans recourir uniquement à la violence. Les relations sociales que le groupe entretient avec la population locale, notamment les affinités ethniques et les liens claniques ou tribaux, influent sur leurs actions éventuelles. Les acteurs locaux peuvent également organiser une <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066120976790">résistance collective</a> qui remet en question les projets de gouvernance djihadistes.</p>
<h2>Labels mondiaux, gouvernance localisée</h2>
<p>Ces conclusions préliminaires sont riches d'enseignements pour les décideurs politiques. Coller une étiquette de djihadisme salafiste ne renseigne pas sur la manière de gouverner d'un groupe. Il faut plutôt étudier ces divers groupes en tant qu'organisations politiques complexes émanant de contextes sociopolitiques et économiques locaux. Le soutien apporté aux jihadistes provient souvent des couches qui s'estiment lésées et qui y voient un moyen d'améliorer leurs conditions sociales. Leur essor au niveau local ne se résume pas à une question d'attrait religieux.</p>
<p>La résolution des conflits djihadistes au Sahel nécessitera l'doption d'une approche tendant à les traiter non seulement comme des terroristes ou des criminels, mais aussi comme des acteurs politiques qui cherchent à proposer une autre forme de gouvernance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasja Rupesinghe reçoit des financement du Conseil norvégien de la recherche</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pour résoudre les conflits djihadistes au Sahel, il faut aussi traiter les djihadistes comme des acteurs politiques qui cherchent à proposer une gouvernance alternative.Natasja Rupesinghe, Research Fellow and PhD Candidate at University of Oxford, Norwegian Institute of International AffairsMikael Hiberg Naghizadeh, DPhil-Candidate in International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692882021-10-13T19:17:19Z2021-10-13T19:17:19ZHow jihadism could thrive under the Taliban in Afghanistan<p>The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/extremists-celebrate-taliban-takeover-of-afghanistan-on-social-media-11629192600">celebrated by jihadists</a> around the world. The Middle East Institute think tank in Washington has described their victory following the US withdrawal as <a href="https://www.mei.edu/blog/taliban-victory-would-be-major-win-global-jihadist-movement">“major win”</a> for jihadi groups, including al-Qaida and Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p>The Taliban’s links to al-Qaida have never been severed, their struggle with IS is far from straightforward, and several other regional jihadist groups can stand to gain from their recent victory.</p>
<p>This is why <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-and-taliban-prospective-partners">Moscow</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/18/world/asia/china-afghanistan-taliban-usa.html">Beijing</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-takeover-threatens-to-raise-india-pakistan-tensions-11630502420">New Delhi</a>, and even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-05/pakistan-s-spy-chief-visits-kabul-for-meeting-with-taliban">Islamabad</a> have serious concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Al-Qaida</h2>
<p>In a statement, al-Qaida <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/07/al-qaeda-taliban-complex-relationship-509519">has said</a> that the Taliban’s takeover is a proof that “the Way of Jihad is the only way that leads to victory”.</p>
<p>The Afghan Taliban maintains links with <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/06/04/al-qaeda-is-still-in-afghanistan/">al-Qaida</a>, which is <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-august-20/">still active</a> throughout the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In a strident demonstration of this fact, Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, recently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/26/taliban-bin-laden/?utm_campaign=wp_main&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=IwAR3o4b6U1-xrMuUl_mEuer7jTX_zOETWobMNd7NpGv9JWxK4jBZvFBasZT0">denied</a> that Osama bin Laden was responsible for 9/11.</p>
<p>Analysts believe that the Taliban will continue to provide <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210816-taliban-to-give-al-qaeda-covert-not-overt-support-analysts">covert</a> support to al-Qaida now it is once again in power. But it could also use the presence of al-Qaida as an asset to enhance its interests against the Islamic State, as well as a bargaining chip on the regional and global scene, putting security pressure on different countries to obtain much-needed <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1102802">international assistance</a>.</p>
<h2>Islamic State</h2>
<p>The Taliban claim they <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/taliban-says-we-can-control-terrorism-blames-kabul-airport-attack-u-s-1626445">can</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-cabinets-taliban-militant-groups-3652ae786079637a56a4edff5063fe5f">will</a> control IS terror cells in the country. But can they, and will they?</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58333533">presence of active IS cells in Kabul and Kandahar</a> shows their ability to evolve in a country where their movement did not originate, despite their rivalry with the Taliban. The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-france-evacuations-kabul-9e457201e5bbe75a4eb1901fedeee7a1">August 26 attack</a> on Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, which killed at least 183 people, demonstrates their powerful ability to strike in the capital. IS terror attacks have continued since the US withdrawl, in <a href="https://text.npr.org/1042830210">Kabul</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/08/deadly-bomb-attack-hits-shia-mosque-in-afghan-city-of-kunduz">Kunduz</a>.</p>
<p>IS is also active in the provinces of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210831-afghanistan-do-islamic-state-group-jihadists-pose-a-real-challenge-to-the-taliban">Nangarhar and Kunar</a> on the border with Pakistan’s Waziristan province and the Federally Administered Tribal Area. This entire region is a stronghold of jihadism and arms trafficking, and was instrumental to the success of the Taliban themselves. IS is also present in the Pakistani province of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-islamic-state-group-77b22ce4d5ee60333473c78bef0c7fdf">Baluchistan</a>.</p>
<p>The IS endgame is to replace the Taliban and take over Afghanistan as their <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">new sanctuary</a>. It is even using the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/islamic-state-uses-talibans-own-tactics-attack-afghanistans-new-rulers-2021-09-23/">same guerilla tactics</a> the Taliban did to attack the US during its occupation.</p>
<p>Fighters from the former Afghan National Army may be tempted to reinforce IS after being chased out by the Taliban. This process <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/features/2014/06/26/In-Iraq-former-militia-program-eyed-for-new-fight">occurred</a> in Iraq, with the national army and the Sahwa, a Sunni militia, both disbanded and sent home, contributing to the appearance of al-Qaida and the Islamic State respectively.</p>
<p>The Taliban follow the <a href="https://theconversation.com/talibans-religious-ideology-deobandi-islam-has-roots-in-colonial-india-166323">Deobandi</a> form of Islam, which originated in India, and IS are Salafists. They are in competition, but nevertheless compatible. They have interconnected networks; employ similar violent methods; have matching enemies; and even maintain indirect contacts through the militant Haqqani group.</p>
<p>Responsible for numerous <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/363#cite34">attacks</a> in Afghanistan, “including the use of death squads for public executions, as well as videos of mass beheadings and brutal assassinations”, the Haqqani group <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/26/afghanistan-kabul-airport-attack-taliban-islamic-state/">bridges</a> the Taliban and al-Qaida, but also IS. Its leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, has recently been appointed interior minister of Afghanistan.</p>
<p>If the Taliban adopt a collaborative strategy against IS with foreign powers, they will be seen as weak rulers collaborating with the enemies. In the radical Islamist world, this equates to the ultimate discredit, and might favour jihadi recruitment, financing, and direct action.</p>
<p>On the other hand, if the Taliban choose to become closer with IS to avoid attacks on their soil, the Islamic State will be more or less in al-Qaida’s position before 2001. IS could then use Afghanistan as a base, rule it from behind the scenes, or take it over entirely.</p>
<h2>Other regional groups</h2>
<p>The new situation in Afghanistan favours radical Sunni organisations in Pakistan.</p>
<p>One such group is <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-revival-of-the-pakistani-taliban/">Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan</a> (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban. Recently, it absorbed a faction of the Lashkar-e-Janghvi terrorist organisation; the localist <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/hizb-ul-ahrar-pakistans-cross-border-taliban-problem-remains-critical/">group</a> Hizb-ul-Ahrar, which carried out numerous <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=40837">attacks</a> in 2019; the Hakimullah Mehsud Group, a cell from the Federally Administered Tribal Area <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/146935.pdf">linked</a> to Al-Qaeda; and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/world/asia/hard-line-splinter-group-galvanized-by-isis-emerges-from-pakistani-taliban.html">Jamaat-ul-Ahrar</a>, which was affiliated to the Islamic State.</p>
<p>The TTP also recently <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistans-discursive-shift-from-global-jihadist-rhetoric-to-pashtun-centric-narratives/">integrated</a> two sub-groups from al-Qaida in the Indian Sub-continent.</p>
<p>The Pakistani Taliban is thus bringing together forces from both IS and al-Qaida. Intimately allied to the Afghan Taliban, the TTP is refocusing its dynamics on Pakistan rather than calling for a global jihad, but former connections to the two major jiadhi organisations are strong.</p>
<p>In Central Asia, both <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement-uzbekistan#highlight_text_10187">IS-affiliated</a> and <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-faction-emerges-after-groups-collapse.php">Taliban-aligned</a> factions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan might also enjoy Afghanistan as a rear base to prepare attacks in the region.</p>
<p>Finally, the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/chinas-foreign-fighters-problem/">Turkestan Islamic Party</a>, which runs from Chinese Xinjiang to Syria’s Idleb province might realistically prosper under the new regime in Afghanistan, more or less covertly, as a new pivot between Central Asia, Southern Asia and the Middle East.</p>
<p>The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan to the Taliban is certainly a strategic defeat, for the region, but it is also a full doctrinal setback for counterterrorism. At the centre of Asia, this new platform for regional and global jihadi groups leaves the international community without any reliable solution to prevent the foreseeable fallout of this broader security threat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Théron ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The Taliban say they won’t allow jihadi groups to flourish under their rule. But there is good reason to believe that al-Qaida, IS and other regional groups will benefit from the takeover.Julien Théron, Lecturer, Conflict and Security Studies, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1685392021-09-24T14:57:02Z2021-09-24T14:57:02ZMapping the contours of Jihadist groups in the Sahel<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423129/original/file-20210924-19-1u0aoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mauritanian soldiers stand guard near the border with Mali in the fight against jihadists in Africa's Sahel region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Thomas Samson/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Sahel region, an area covering 3 million sq km, has been a hotbed of Islamic Jihadi groups in recent years. </p>
<p>Today, the region has no fewer than seven insurgent groups scattered in six countries. The area <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/speeches/25397-sp-psc-rpt-terrorism-nairobi-2-09-2014-pdf_0.pdf">stretches</a> from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and encompasses a dozen countries. These include Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. </p>
<p>Jihadi groups have taken advantage of a number of underlying conditions, which fuel local grievances across the Sahel. These include endemic poverty, inequality, high unemployment levels, illiteracy, ethnic divisions and poor governance. </p>
<p>The groups have made inroads by stepping the vast ungoverned spaces where governments have been largely absent. Here they have helped resolve land tenancy issues, protected cattle from theft and prosecuted thieves. They have also provided social welfare, distributing food and medicine, offering cash incentives, and delivering some forms of government services.</p>
<p>But they are also responsible for atrocities in which thousands have died. Such as mass kidnappings, attacks on civilians in villages, schools, as well as attacks on military bases.</p>
<p>Since 2015, the entry into the Sahel of <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">Islamic State in Syria and Iraq</a>, also known as Daesh, have led to the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-expanding-its-threat-and-reach-in-the-sahel/">loss of thousands of lives</a>. This followed the creation of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara by al-Sahrawi which pledged allegiance to ISIS. In the same year, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. This led to the creation of its breakaway faction -Islamic State West Africa Province.</p>
<p>Islamic State in West Africa Province and Islamic State in Greater Sahara, are known to have attacked military bases in Nigeria, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The two groups are also known for kidnapping civilians for ransom. This is in spite of the killing of some key commanders within the groups. Many of these deaths have been attributed to France following <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20991719">military intervention</a> in Mali in 2013. </p>
<p>Recent reports point to the fate of two key leaders. Reports that the leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/16/france-says-it-has-killed-islamic-state-leader-in-greater-sahara-adnan-abu-walid-al-sahrawi">killed</a> have been confirmed. However <a href="https://dailytrust.com/vicious-iswap-leader-al-barnawi-killed">reports</a> of the death of the leader of the Islamic State West Africa Province, Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, have not been. </p>
<p>Jihadist groups have soldiered on despite repeated losses before. In the light of recent developments it’s worth assessing how big the presence is of <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state">Islamic State in Syria and Iraq</a> the Sahel region.</p>
<h2>Origins of entry into the Sahel region</h2>
<p>Prior to creating the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, al-Sahrawi had been a member of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a> in Western Sahara, which was fighting for independence from Morocco. In 2012, he joined al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib and would later co-lead a Malian Islamist group, <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/mujao">Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</a>. </p>
<p>He later rose to become a senior commander in <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-mourabitoun">al-Mourabitoun</a>, another group affiliated to al-Qaeda, and which is currently part of <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin">Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin </a>(Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). </p>
<p>His pledge to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq was rejected by the leader of al-Mourabitoun, Mokthar Belmokthar, as a way of maintaining the group’s allegiance to al-Qaeda. This led to al-Sahrawi’s defection and the formal establishment of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-greater-sahara-isgs">October 2016</a>.</p>
<p>The leadership of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq Core formally accept Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-greater-sahara">April 2019</a>.</p>
<p>In 2018 it was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/19/politics/africa-isis-al-qaeda-threat/index.html">estimated</a> that the al-Barnawi-led Islamic State West Africa Province had 3,500 fighters. It operates mostly in parts of north-eastern Nigeria such as Borno state, which is the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency, and the Lake Chad Basin area, which includes Cameroun, Chad and Niger. </p>
<p>In the same year it was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/19/politics/africa-isis-al-qaeda-threat/index.html">estimated</a> that the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara had 300 fighters. It operates mostly along the Liptako-Gourma region and in other parts of Mali and Niger. The group’s relationship with <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ansaroul-islam-the-rise-and-decline-of-a-militant-islamist-group-in-the-sahel/">Ansaroul Islam</a>, a Burkina Faso based Jihadi group has increased the number of its fighters, as well as defections by former Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin fighters. </p>
<p>In more recent times, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-between-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/">expanded</a> its operations to include areas in Mali such as the Mopti, Gao, and Ménaka regions, the East regions of Burkina Faso and the Tillabery and Tahoua regions of Niger. The goal of both groups remains the establishment of a Salafi-jihadist caliphate in the Sahel, under Sharia law.</p>
<p>Despite the death of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-dead.html">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, the leader of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43948181">ISIS Core</a>, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Islamic State West Africa Province have continued to perpetuate attacks. The death of al-Shawari and the unconfirmed death of al-Barnawi, is unlikely to make much of a difference in the operations of these groups across the Sahel. </p>
<h2>Defeating ISIS in the Sahel</h2>
<p>Jihadist groups have over the years demonstrated their ability to put in place internal governance structures that allow for continuity in the event of unforeseen contingencies such as the death of a leader or commander. The recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/taliban-afghanistan">takeover</a> of the Taliban in Afghanistan serves to further embolden these groups. </p>
<p>While domestic and international security forces continually attempt to degrade, dismantle, and defeat these groups through the capture or killing of high value targets, a more result-oriented approach would be to address the underlying political and socio-economic factors that fuel their activities in the region. In addition, more efforts aimed at discrediting the influence of these groups must be prioritised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jihadi groups take advantage of endemic poverty, inequality, high unemployment levels, illiteracy, ethnic divisions, and poor governance to spread their campaign of violence in the Sahel region.Folahanmi Aina, Doctoral Candidate in Leadership Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1669982021-09-14T16:13:12Z2021-09-14T16:13:12ZThe Sahel’s jihadists don’t all govern alike: context matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420838/original/file-20210913-19-1rmbkdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A group of Niger soldiers on patrol </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/niger-security-forces-patrol-in-the-kour%C3%A9-giraffe-reserve-news-photo/1228404301?adppopup=true">Boureima Hama/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Sahel region, a belt of largely semi-arid countries below the Sahara, continues to be confronted by jihadist insurgents with various affiliations. </p>
<p>“Jihadist insurgents”, broadly <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/147/1/36/27181/Jihadi-Rebels-in-Civil-War">defined</a>, rely on religious rhetoric for political mobilisation and use violence in pursuit of their goals. </p>
<p>Groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province have demonstrated their resilience in Nigeria and parts of Niger. Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara continue to mobilise in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.</p>
<p>Such groups often receive international attention because of their violence. An <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/08/armed-islamists-latest-sahel-massacre-targets-burkina-faso">estimated 500 civilians</a> have been killed, allegedly by jihadists, in the Sahel in 2021. Recent examples include massacres in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/11/niger-surging-atrocities-armed-islamist-groups">Niger</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr60/4249/2021/en/">Burkina Faso</a>. </p>
<p>But such violence obscures another dimension of these groups: they develop alternative forms of local governance in rural areas. And the way they govern varies, both among and within groups, even though they are affiliated with a broad <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-wave-of-jihadist-insurgency-in-west-africa_eb95c0a9-en">Salafi-jihadist ideology</a>.</p>
<p>There is only scattered academic research on this. Consequently, as part of a broader <a href="https://www.nupi.no/en/About-NUPI/Projects-centers/Jihadist-Governance-in-the-Sahel">study</a> on Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria, <a href="https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Reviewing-Jihadist-Governance-in-the-Sahel">we reviewed</a> existing research to explore how jihadists govern in the region. Also, why their governance differs. </p>
<p>We found that they do not follow strict ideological templates for imposing their rule. Nor do they rely only on the use of spectacular violence. They continuously adapt the manner in which they govern in response to internal factional dynamics and pressure from state and non-state actors. They also respond to local politics. </p>
<h2>How jihadists govern</h2>
<p>Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgents, govern through force. But this violence can vary in the degree to which it is selective or indiscriminate. Sub-groups of the Al Qa’ida-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin have <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-between-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/">typically</a> targeted non-collaborators, government authorities and international forces, primarily in Mali. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has, in contrast, attacked civilians <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/478/123/5897266">indiscriminately</a>. </p>
<p>Jihadist groups sometimes impose their interpretation of sharia (religious law) locally through <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/">harsh punishments</a>. The same group can exercise restraint elsewhere to avoid alienating local communities. Their transnational ideological commitments may be incongruous with local norms and the interests of existing power brokers. </p>
<p>Local elites such as religious leaders and village chiefs can play an important role in determining how jihadist groups exercise authority. For example, the Ansar Dine group in the Kidal area of Mali <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898954">retained local sharia judges</a> (qadis) who constrained the group’s harsh implementation of sharia.</p>
<p>Scholars have highlighted how rebel governors sometimes develop elaborate <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rebel-governance-in-civil-war/C40247AED4FA30DC2704EB64EA5CFFD5">bureaucracies</a>, but jihadist insurgents in the Sahel appear to have developed more fluid, less formal local institutions, to maintain social control over local populations. </p>
<p>Groups like the <a href="https://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Local-Drivers-of-Violent-Extremism-in-Central-Mali">Katiba Macina</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833567">Islamic State in the Greater Sahara</a> developed mobile courts to provide local justice where they could not establish a permanent presence. Some groups have gathered zakat (Islamic tax) from local people. But, from the little research that exists, the public services provided by jihadists in return appear quite limited.</p>
<p>While these groups may espouse regional or <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-wave-of-jihadist-insurgency-in-west-africa_eb95c0a9-en">global goals</a>, they tend to position their governance projects within <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Africa_s_Insurgents_Navigating_an_Evolving_Landscape">existing conflicts and cleavages</a>. Jihadists seek to gain a grip over local communities by allying with certain groups in existing conflicts. For example, some have sought to recruit Fulani herders by promising access to resources like pasture. They have also intervened to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2018.1474457">adjudicate</a> conflicts. This, in a bid to provide a more efficient type of justice than the state does.</p>
<h2>Explaining different styles</h2>
<p>One factor in explaining why groups differ in governance style is the role of the state and non-state actors like militias, self-defence groups and rivals for control. For example, counter-insurgent operations can constrain jihadists from building institutions, confining them to a more shadowy style of governance. Also, rival jihadist groups may adapt their governance styles to outbid each other to maintain support from communities. </p>
<p>Another explanation is organisational structure. Jihadist groups differ in terms of their cohesiveness and degree of centralisation. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/jihadists-of-north-africa-and-the-sahel/C1C391EC226A65858CCF45322879ED1B">Factional dynamics</a> can lead to differences in governance. The leadership may not always be able to discipline sub-commanders to ensure that their vision is carried out locally. </p>
<p>Differences in ideological commitment can provide clues about what to expect from jihadist governance. But there are no ready-made blueprints for “true” Islamic governance. Commanders and group members interpret ideology and are themselves influenced by local traditions and demands. </p>
<p>Lastly, local politics and conflicts strongly influence jihadist governance. Exploiting social divides and grievances can enable a group to impose new systems without relying solely on violence. The group’s existing social relations with locals, such as ethnic affinity, clan or tribal connections, influence what they can do. Local actors can also mount organised <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066120976790">collective resistance</a> which challenges jihadist governance projects.</p>
<h2>Global labels, localised governance</h2>
<p>These preliminary findings hold important lessons for policymakers. The label of Salafi jihadism won’t tell us how a group will govern. Rather, they must be studied as complex political organisations emerging from local socio-political and economic contexts. Jihadists’ support often comes from aggrieved groups seeing an opportunity for advancement. Their local momentum is not only a question of religious appeal.</p>
<p>Resolving jihadist conflicts in the Sahel will require an approach which treats them not only as terrorists or criminals, but also as political actors who seek to provide an alternative form of governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasja Rupesinghe receives funding from the Research Council of Norway. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Resolving jihadist conflicts in the Sahel requires treating jihadists not as terrorists only but also as political actors who seek to provide an alternative form of governance to the status quo.Natasja Rupesinghe, Research Fellow and PhD Candidate at University of Oxford, Norwegian Institute of International AffairsMikael Hiberg Naghizadeh, DPhil-Candidate in International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659052021-09-10T14:29:32Z2021-09-10T14:29:32Z9/11 twenty years on: al-Qaida is defeated – but jihadism is here to stay<p>Twenty years ago, the terrorist group al-Qaida carried out the deadliest attack on US soil the world had ever seen. Overnight, al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden became the most notorious terrorist to date. </p>
<p>Inspired by pan-Islamist ambitions and outraged by US foreign presence and intervention in the Middle East, this was the highlight of al-Qaida’s campaign to shatter the notion of US hegemony and invincibility. Their ultimate aim was to bring back the <em>umma</em>, the community of all Muslims once united by a political authority. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida first appeared on the terrorism radar in 1998 when it carried out <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings">simultaneous bombings</a> on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding more than 4,000. In October 2000, al-Qaida rammed a small boat filled with explosives into the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/uss-cole-bombing">killing 17</a> US navy personnel.</p>
<p>Following the strike on 9/11, so they reckoned, the US would withdraw their military forces from Muslim lands and end their support for its autocratic rulers, ushering in a modern day caliphate.</p>
<p>“I have only a few words for America and its people,” <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success">bin Laden declared</a> in the aftermath of the attack. “Neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed.” </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s expectations turned out to be a serious miscalculation. Instead of withdrawing military forces, the then US president, George W. Bush, moved swiftly to declare a global “war on terror”, calling on world leaders to join the US in its response. </p>
<p>In October 2001, when a US-led coalition went into Afghanistan to hunt down al-Qaida and oust the Taliban, who had allowed the organisation to operate in the country since 1996, bin Laden was caught off-guard. There was no strategy in place to ensure al-Qaida’s survival.</p>
<h2>Evolution of al-Qaida</h2>
<p>The 9/11 attacks turned out to be a short-lived victory for al-Qaida. Within weeks of the Taliban’s collapse, the majority of its leaders and fighters were captured or killed. Those who managed to escape, including bin Laden, went into hiding in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, an autonomous area bordering Afghanistan. </p>
<p>For ten years, until he was killed by US special forces on May 2, 2011, bin Laden tried but failed to revive al-Qaida and influence its legacy. </p>
<p>The next phase (and arguably the biggest mistake) of the “war on terror” was the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The ousting of the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, who had viewed jihadist activity with disdain, led to a political vacuum allowing al-Qaida to rise under terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Upon his death in a US bomb strike in June 2006, al-Qaida in Iraq would become the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and ultimately merge into the Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p>The highly publicised creation of al-Qaida “franchises” in Iraq and elsewhere including Egypt, North Africa and Yemen, among others, seemed to indicate the revival of al-Qaida. </p>
<p>These franchise leaders, all deeply involved in their respective local disputes, had much to gain from acquiring the infamous brand of al-Qaida. The appearance of the black al-Qaida flag in diverse corners of the world sent shockwaves to Washington. Terrorism experts in the west speculated about the <a href="http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/26305/">reemergence of the group</a> and the severity of its threat with precious little agreement amongst them. </p>
<p>Hidden away, bin Laden and the senior leaders of al-Qaida had little influence over the running of the new franchises. This is evident in terrorism researcher Nelly Lahoud’s careful reading of the “Abottabad letters”, files of internal communications recovered by US special operations forces during their raid on bin Laden’s compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. In the letters, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success">bin Laden lamented</a> his “brothers” had become a “liability” for global jihad during the last year of his life. The new generation of jihadis, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success">he concluded</a>, had lost their way.</p>
<p>Upon bin Laden’s death in 2011, senior members of al-Qaida vowed to continue the global jihad, promising the <a href="http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/24701/">worst attacks</a> the world had ever seen.</p>
<p>While the vocal threats put al-Qaida back on the international terrorism radar, action never followed. The group formally continued to operate under the command of its new leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, it it had no influence over IS, which was beginning to operate with impunity in areas across Iraq and Syria, and orchestrate suicide attacks in Europe.</p>
<p>By 2014, IS – under the lead of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – had replaced al-Qaida as the terrorist group most worrying to the west. Within five years, on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-50224939">October 27 2019</a> al-Baghdadi was also killed in a US military operation. IS was assumed to be, at least temporarily, defeated. It reemerged spectacularly on 26 August 2021 when IS-K, a local affiliate, claimed responsibility for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58333533">the Kabul airport attack</a> that claimed the lives of up to 170 people including 13 US service members – the deadliest incident for US troops in Afghanistan in a decade.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-58279900">On August 30 2021</a> the US completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, marking the end of America’s longest war. Less than a week later, the Taliban announced a new government and declared it an “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-58279900">Islamic emirate</a>”. Sarajuddin Haqqani, a US “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-58279900">most wanted terrorist</a>” is the new acting interior minister.</p>
<p>On the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks al-Qaida might be defeated, but it is clear that jihadism and the ambition to (re)create a caliphate are here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christina Hellmich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorist group behind the 9/11 attacks has been replaced by other jihadist threats.Christina Hellmich, Associate Professor in International Relations and Middle East Studies, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673882021-09-10T10:47:03Z2021-09-10T10:47:03Z9/11 did not change the world – it was already on the path to decades of conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420281/original/file-20210909-27-1jala06.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C0%2C5614%2C3740&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/9-11-1414">September 11 attacks</a> in New York and Washington were visceral in their impact. In less than three hours, the twin towers of the World Trade Center were reduced to a mountain of twisted metal and rubble, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html">killing more than 2,700 people</a>, while hundreds more were killed at the Pentagon. All three were destroyed by men armed with nothing more than parcel knives hijacking fuel-laden passenger aircraft.</p>
<p>America was under attack. It came not long after after George W. Bush had formed his new administration with highly influential neoconservatives and assertive realists at the Pentagon and State Department, as well as in the White House itself. All were determined to see the vision of a “<a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/01/new-american-century-1997-2006-and-the-post-cold-war-neoconservative-moment/">new American century</a>” fulfilled – a neoliberal free market world rooted in US experience and guided by its post-cold war progress as the world’s sole economic and military superpower.</p>
<p>At the time, commentators <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/44242/pdf">compared the attack to Pearl Harbor</a>, but the effect of 9/11 was much greater. Pearl Harbor had been an attack by the naval forces of a state already in great tension with the United States. It was against a military base in the pre-television age and away from the continental United States. The 9/11 attack was a much greater shock, and if war with Japan was a consequence of Pearl Harbor, then there would be war after 9/11 even if the perpetrators and those behind them were scarcely known to the American public. </p>
<p>The vision of the new American century had to be secured and force of arms was the way to do it, initially against al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>A few people <a href="https://files.ethz.ch/isn/22208/0109%20sept11briefing.pdf">argued against war at the time</a>, seeing it as a trap to suck the US into an Afghanistan occupation instead of treating 9/11 as an act of appalling mass criminality, but their voices did not count. </p>
<p>The first “war on terror” – against al-Qaida and the Taliban – started within a month, lasted barely two months and seemed an immediate success. It was followed by Bush’s <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html">State of the Union address</a> in January 2002 declaring an extended war against what Bush referred to as an “<a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/29/bush-axis-of-evil-2002-1127725">axis of evil</a>” of rogue states intent on supporting terror and developing weapons of mass destruction. </p>
<p>Iraq was the priority, with Iran and North Korea in the frame. The Iraq War started in March 2003 and was apparently over by May 1, when Bush gave his “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviatemin/2021/07/20/its-not-over-until-its-over-the-perils-of-declaring-victory-in-crisis-too-soon/?sh=76675210513c">mission accomplished</a>” speech from the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. </p>
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<p>That was the high point of the entire US-led “war on terror”. Afghanistan was the first disaster, with the Taliban moving back into rural areas within two to three years and going on to fight the US and its allies for 20 years before taking back control last month.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghan-government-collapses-taliban-seize-control-5-essential-reads-166131">Afghan government collapses, Taliban seize control: 5 essential reads</a>
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<p>In Iraq, even though the insurgents appeared defeated by 2009 and the US could withdraw its forces two years later, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state">Islamic State (IS) rose</a> phoenix-like from the ashes. That led to the third conflict, the intense <a href="https://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-CJTF-OIR/">2014-18 air war</a> across northern Iraq and Syria, fought by the US, the UK, France and others, <a href="https://airwars.org/conflict/coalition-in-iraq-and-syria/">killing</a> tens of thousands of IS supporters and several thousand civilians.</p>
<p>Even after the collapse of its caliphate in Iraq and Syria, IS arose once again like the proverbial phoenix, spreading its influence as far afield as the Saharan Sahel, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bangladesh, southern Thailand, the Philippines, back in Iraq and Syria once more and even Afghanistan. The spread across the Sahel was aided by the collapse of security in Libya, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24585876">the 2011 NATO-led intervention</a> being the fourth of the west’s failed wars in barely 20 years.</p>
<p>In the face of these bitter failures, we have two linked questions: was 9/11 the beginning of decades of a new world disorder? And where do we go from here?</p>
<h2>9/11 in context</h2>
<p>It is natural to see the single event of 9/11 as turning traditional military postures on their heads, but that is misleading. There were already changes afoot, as two very different events in February 1993, eight years before the attacks, had shown all too well.</p>
<p>First, incoming US president, Bill Clinton, had <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/103296.pdf">appointed James Woolsey</a> as the new director of the CIA. Asked at his Senate confirmation hearing how he would characterise the end of the cold war, he replied that the US had slain the dragon (the Soviet Union) but now faced a jungle full of poisonous snakes.</p>
<p>During the 1990s, and very much in line with Woolsey’s phrase, the US military moved from a cold war posture to preparing for small wars in far-off places. There was more emphasis on long-range air strike systems, amphibious forces, carrier battle groups and special forces. By the time Bush was elected in November 2000, the US was far more prepared to tame the jungle.</p>
<p>Second, the US military and most analysts around the world missed the significance of a new phenomenon, the rapidly improving ability of the weak to take up arms against the strong. Yet the signs were already there. On February 26 1993, not long after Woolsey had talked of a jungle full of snakes, an Islamist paramilitary group attempted to <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/world-trade-center-bombing-1993">destroy the World Trade Center</a> with a massive truck bomb placed in the underground car park of the North Tower. The plan was to collapse it over the adjoining Vista Hotel and the South Tower, destroying the entire complex and killing upwards of 30,000 people.</p>
<p>The attack failed – though six people died – and the significance of the attack was largely missed even though there were many other indicators of weakness in the 1990s. In December 1994, an Algerian paramilitary group tried to <a href="https://www.military.com/video/operations-and-strategy/terrorism/air-france-flight-8969-hijacking-gign-raid/1222870300001">crash an Airbus passenger jet on Paris</a>, an attack foiled by French special forces during a refuelling stop at Marseilles. A month later a bombing by the LTTE of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab608.html">Central Bank in Colombo</a>, Sri Lanka devastated much of the central business district of Colombo, killing over 80 and injuring more than 1,400 people.</p>
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<p>A decade before the first World Trade Center attacks, 241 Marines <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-embassy-in-beirut-hit-by-massive-car-bomb">had been killed</a> in a single bombing in Beirut (another 58 French paratroopers were killed by a second bomb in their barrack) and between 1993 and 2001 there were attacks in the Middle East and East Africa including the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/06/21/remembering-the-khobar-towers-bombing/">Khobar Towers</a> bombing in Saudi Arabia, an attack on the <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/uss-cole-bombing">USS Cole</a> in Aden Harbour and the bombing of <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings">US diplomatic missions</a> in Tanzania and Kenya.</p>
<p>The 9/11 attacks did not change the world. They were further steps along a well-signed path leading to two decades of conflict, four failed wars and no clear end in sight.</p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>That long path, though, has from the start had within it one fundamental flaw. If we are to make sense of wider global trends in insecurity, we have to recognise that in all the analysis around the 9/11 anniversary there lies the belief that the main security concern must be with an extreme version of Islam. It may seem a reasonable mistake, given the impact of the wars, but it still misses the point. The war on terror is better seen as one part of a global trend which goes well beyond a single religious tradition – a slow but steady move towards revolts from the margins.</p>
<p>In writing my book, <a href="https://www.worldofbooks.com/en-gb/books/paul-rogers/losing-control/9780745316796?gclid=Cj0KCQjw-NaJBhDsARIsAAja6dP0sLsR_GV30zO4uOHN8A9a2H90wa9XetReSuP9H6CWsER-oJghb7EaAqbeEALw_wcB">Losing Control</a>, in the late 1990s – a couple of years before 9/11 – I put it this way:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What should be expected is that new social movements will develop that are essentially anti-elite in nature and will draw their support from people, especially men, on the margins. In different contexts and circumstances, they may have their roots in political ideologies, religious beliefs, ethnic, nationalist or cultural identities, or a complex combination of several of these. </p>
<p>They may be focused on individuals or groups, but the most common feature is an opposition to existing centres of power … What can be said is that, on present trends, anti-elite action will be a core feature of the next 30 years – not so much a clash of civilisations, more an age of insurgencies. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This stemmed from the view that the primary factors in global insecurity were a combination of increasing socioeconomic divisions and environmental limits to growth coupled with a security strategy rooted in preserving the status quo. Woolsey’s “jungle full of snakes” could be seen as a consequence of this, but there would be military responses available to keep the lid on problems – “<a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-liddism-towards-real-global-security/">liddism</a>” in short. </p>
<p>More than two decades down the road, socioeconomic divisions have worsened, the concentration of wealth has reached levels best <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ab30d301-351b-4387-b212-12fed904324b">described as obscene</a> and has even increased dramatically during the COVID-19 pandemic, itself leading to food shortages and increased poverty.</p>
<p>Meanwhile climate change is now with us, is accelerating towards climate breakdown with, once again, the <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/report-inequalities-exacerbate-climate-impacts-on-poor/">greatest impact on marginalised societies</a>. It therefore makes sense to see 9/11 primarily as an early and grievous manifestation of the weak taking up arms against the strong, and that military response in the current global security environment woefully misses the point. </p>
<p>At the very least there is an urgent need to rethink what we mean by security, and time is getting short to do that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers is a Council member of Rethinking Security and a sponsor of the Peace and Justice Project. The fourth edition of his book, "Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century", has just been published. </span></em></p>It was the day the US realised it was fighting a different kind of war.Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1668082021-09-03T12:36:20Z2021-09-03T12:36:20ZAl-Qaida, Islamic State group struggle for recruits<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418733/original/file-20210831-25-jkbd75.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C19%2C3165%2C2342&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In 2014, the Islamic State group could draw crowds of supporters, like these in Mosul, Iraq. But actual fighting recruits have been harder to come by.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Iraq/f15b627c445b4d5ca1949944c72f5462/photo">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Al-Qaida was planning two sets of terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. On Sept. 11, 2021, as Americans commemorate and mourn the lives lost that Tuesday morning 20 years ago, it is important to remember the second plot as well – the attacks that didn’t happen.</p>
<p>Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the organizer of the 9/11 operation, originally envisioned simultaneous attacks on the East Coast and the West Coast of the United States. He <a href="https://archive.org/details/mastermindsofter0000fawd/page/114/">bragged about having had dozens of recruits</a> to choose from.</p>
<p>But the numbers were smaller than he expected. Several people dropped out of the plot and could not be replaced. Ultimately al-Qaida could find only 19 sufficiently trained militants who were willing to die for the cause. As a result, the <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060209-4.html">West Coast plot had to be canceled</a>.</p>
<p>As strange as it may sound, revolutionary Islamist groups suffer from recruitment problems as any other organization does. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=riNVcLgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">My</a> <a href="https://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-terrorism/">research</a> on Islamist terrorism has found that al-Qaida and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.2870/271061">rival offshoot</a>, the Islamic State group, have long had chronic difficulties replenishing their ranks.</p>
<p>These groups complain about their recruitment problems frequently. “We are most amazed that the community of Islam is still asleep and heedless while its children are being wiped out and killed everywhere and its land is being diminished every day,” al-Qaida wrote in one of its online publications in 2004. It is a sentiment that the group has repeated over many years.</p>
<p>The Islamic State group has also expressed disappointment in Muslims’ lack of militancy. In June 2017, for example, it published an article in an online magazine criticizing Muslims who “drag the tail of shame” by remaining “safe in your homes, secure with your families and wealth” instead of joining the revolutionary movement. The problem, according to a November 2017 article in the Islamic State’s online daily newspaper, is “love of life and hatred of death,” a “disease of weakness whose final result will be the supremacy of the enemy over the Muslims.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people push through a wide street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418739/original/file-20210831-15-s3j99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Arab Spring movement in 2011 was just one of a long line of pro-democracy movements in Islamic societies through the centuries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ArabSpringADecadeLater/346b74d8eb2d46f1b47b5002d32bd242/photo">AP Photo/Ben Curtis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Democracy, not revolution</h2>
<p>Love of life is only one of the militants’ recruitment problems. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190907976.001.0001/oso-9780190907976-chapter-4">social science surveys</a>, the bulk of the world’s <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/05/the-changing-global-religious-landscape/">1.8 billion Muslims</a> find these groups abhorrent. Most Muslims support policies that encourage or enforce Islamic piety, but they don’t support revolutionary violence. A large majority of Muslims support democratic elections, which the revolutionaries consider un-Islamic.</p>
<p>Democratic thought has deep roots in Islamic tradition, including the “<a href="https://kurzman.unc.edu/modernist-islam/">nahda</a>” renaissance of Arab intellectuals in the 19th century, <a href="https://kurzman.unc.edu/democracy-denied/">mass pro-democracy moments</a> in the early 20th century in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, and the <a href="https://meridian.allenpress.com/mobilization/issue/17/4">Arab Spring</a> movement that started in late 2010.</p>
<p>Islamist militants such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State group view democratic efforts as a threat and have repeatedly targeted pro-democracy Muslim scholars and activists for assassination. For instance, Muhammad Nu'man Fazli, a cleric in Afghanistan, was among the recent victims of this sort of violence. His mosque outside Kabul was bombed by the Islamic State group in May 2021 during a cease-fire between the Taliban and the Afghan government, <a href="https://kyleorton.co.uk/2021/05/22/islamic-state-gaza-war-jerusalem-afghanistan-pakistan-kashmir-india-africa/">specifically because of his support of democracy</a>, according to a statement in the Islamic State group’s newspaper.</p>
<p>The world’s governments have made it very hard for people to find and join militant groups. There are few safe places for training, and the ones that do exist are typically in <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2021/655">remote areas that are hard to reach</a>, such as the mountains of northwest Pakistan, the deserts of eastern Mali, the forests of the Lake Chad basin and northern Mozambique, and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-defeats-the-islamic-state-remains-unbroken-and-defiant-around-the-world-128971">islands of the southern Philippines</a>.</p>
<p>Even online, militants must constantly seek new methods to avoid detection. Every message they send or receive <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/3834325/how-police-hunted-ontario-terror-suspect-isis-anonymous/">risks exposing them to arrest</a> or <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI+Release+on+CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+Hostilities.PDF">drone attack</a>.</p>
<h2>Competing for recruits</h2>
<p>Nationalist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban are also trying to <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190907976.001.0001/oso-9780190907976-chapter-3">recruit Islamic extremists</a>. Like al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, these movements also aim to impose an austere version of Islamic law, at least partly through force of arms. But their ambitions are primarily local, as opposed to the global agendas of al-Qaida and the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>The nationalists and globalists may cooperate at times – most notably, the tense alliance between the Taliban and al-Qaida in the years leading up to 9/11. Still, they are fundamentally rivals when it comes to recruitment, and the nationalists are far more successful in drawing on trusted local networks. </p>
<p>In Afghanistan today, the Taliban have <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-01-30qr-section3-security.pdf">tens of thousands of militants</a> among their recruits, according to U.S. government estimates. The Islamic State group’s regional branch, often referred to as ISIS-K, has <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/">approximately 1,000 fighters</a>, and al-Qaida has <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/11/analysis-us-military-grossly-underestimates-taliban-al-qaeda-force-levels-in-afghanistan.php">fewer than 1,000</a>.</p>
<p>Twenty years after 9/11, al-Qaida has never found enough recruits to carry out its second wave of mass-casualty attacks on America. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, <a href="https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf">only a dozen people</a> in the United States were convicted in the years after 9/11 for links with al-Qaida, and none were involved in large-scale plots. </p>
<p>The Islamic State group has <a href="https://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/annual-report">organized or inspired several dozen attacks</a> in the United States, but the numbers fell off sharply in the middle of 2015, when the Turkish government closed its border with Syria. And those were do-it-yourself operations involving <a href="https://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/annual-report">small arms, homemade explosives, vehicles and knives</a>, averaging 14 fatalities per year. The Islamic State group has never mobilized enough militants in the West to “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161107092054/https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2015/03/13/so-they-kill-and-are-killed-audio-statement-by-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami/">destroy the White House, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower</a>, by Allah’s permission,” as it threatened to do in 2015.</p>
<p>Al-Qaida and the Islamic State group remain serious about targeting the United States. But the good news for Americans, on this anniversary of 9/11, is that militants face a recruitment bottleneck – a mundane organizational problem that afflicts these very unconventional organizations.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166808/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Kurzman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A second plot was planned on 9/11, but there were too few terrorists to carry it off. Twenty years later, al-Qaida and its offshoot the Islamic State group still have trouble attracting recruits.Charles Kurzman, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1664192021-08-24T14:15:31Z2021-08-24T14:15:31ZMali’s roadmap for lasting peace has laudable goals: but it doesn’t go far enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417556/original/file-20210824-23-10j7w8v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the M5 opposition movement show their support for the military junta, calling for a new and inclusive Mali in Bamako in June.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Hadama Diakite</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prior to the military coup in 2012, Mali was praised for <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230604636">its transition to democracy in West Africa</a>. That is no longer the case. </p>
<p>Malians are caught between the stubborn legacies of a colonial past, a global political economy that has left them impoverished, a dysfunctional government, violent inter-ethnic conflicts, and attacks from terrorists and their own armed forces. It is considered the epicentre of violence in a violent region. It is, therefore, no wonder that <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/central-mali-populations-caught-between-terrorism-and-anti-terrorism">the prognosis for peace and human security for Mali has become so dire</a>. </p>
<p>In 2020 as jihadist and inter-ethnic violence escalated, support for Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita had plummeted. This was despite the fact that he had been elected by a large majority in 2013 and re-elected five years later. By August 2020, as elections were approaching, he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/19/malis-keita-resigns-as-president-after-military-coup">resigned</a> after being detained in a military-led coup. </p>
<p>Then, by May 2021, the country experienced its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/29/what-next-after-malis-coup">second coup</a> in nine months, this time by some members of the transitional leadership itself on the grounds that the transitional government wasn’t following its own charter. Weeks earlier, a former rebel leader who had been part of the peace process was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/13/mali-ex-rebels-say-prominent-leader-shot-dead">assassinated</a>. </p>
<p>Violent groups, including those linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State, frequently unleash attacks in north, central and eastern Mali, and their presence <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/6/25/its-time-for-a-reality-check-in-mali">is spreading</a> into the country’s south and across borders.</p>
<p>It is against this background that Malian prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/31/malian-pm-choguel-kokalla-maiga-presents-2021-2022-action-plan//">announced</a> a government action plan to the governing National Transitional Council to prepare for presidential and legislative elections in February and March 2022. The plan was approved quickly by the governing council.</p>
<p>The plan includes the contributions of 25 ministerial departments under the chairmanship of the prime minister, with the <a href="https://www.ml.undp.org/content/mali/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2021/journees-d-evaluation-du-plan-d-action-du-gouvernement-avec-l-ap.html">support of the United Nations Development Program</a>. </p>
<p>The basic components of the plan fall into four categories – strengthening national security, driving institutional reforms, holding elections and promoting good governance. These are the key areas that must be addressed to increase trust in the peace process set in motion by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/EN-ML_150620_Accord-pour-la-paix-et-la-reconciliation-au-Mali_Issu-du-Processus-d'Alger.pdf">2015 Algiers Peace Accords</a> which brought a partial ceasefire to parts of the country.</p>
<p>In my view, it is unlikely that the plan will reduce armed conflict and reform political institutions enough to achieve its goals. It will not lead to a more sustainable peace unless it is more inclusive and can connect what a professor of conflict resolution, Pamina Firchow, describes as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/reclaiming-everyday-peace/BEB6532292D692933AABC68EFFF9ACB3">everyday peace at the local level</a> with measures to ensure national security.</p>
<p>But that doesn’t mean the plan should be ignored or opposed. Rather, it means that more needs to be done to achieve its goals.</p>
<h2>Strengthening national security</h2>
<p>This is the central component of the plan. The prime minister praised the peacekeeping efforts of the Malian Armed Forces and emphasised the need to respond to terrorist attacks, especially in the northern and central regions of the country. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the plan calls for better military training and equipment. At the same time, there is a commitment to demilitarise the country, to reorganise economic production away from military purposes, and to reintegrate former state and non-state armed combatants into the civilian economy by providing vocational training and job opportunities. </p>
<p>To carry out these security plans, the government promises to make the 2015 Algiers Peace Accords <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire">more inclusive</a>. </p>
<p>One way to do this would be to integrate some of the non-state armed forces into the national army to better protect local communities from criminal violence and intransigent insurgents. This would create the kind of everyday peace in the markets, schools and neighbourhoods that is now lacking. </p>
<p>Yet the plan does not go this far.</p>
<h2>Political and institutional reforms</h2>
<p>There have been a number of meetings in recent years for this purpose. Based on the recommendations that have come out of these forums, the plan calls for a series of national meetings that will give voice, without censorship, to all citizens from the local to the national level.</p>
<p>The prime minister gave the assurance that the recommendations resulting from these meetings will be enforceable during the remaining six months of the transition period and afterwards.</p>
<p>According to the prime minister, there is an</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…urgent need for reforms to renovate not only the political framework and adapt the fundamental texts of the Republic, but also endow our country with strong and legitimate institutions that will allow lasting political stability and social peace.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But this language alone is unconvincing coming from him. He has shown very little interest in democracy, local or national, throughout his career, beginning with his early association with the former authoritarian leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/world/africa/moussa-traore-dead.html">Moussa Traore</a>.</p>
<h2>A general election</h2>
<p>The action plan calls for “transparent, credible and inclusive general elections” to lead Mali’s return to a “normal constitutional order”. It stresses, in particular, the inclusion of refugees and displaced people. To this end, a single election management body will be established to ensure free and fair elections.</p>
<p>While a highly desirable goal, the mechanisms for conducting such elections do not exist. And it is unrealistic to think they could be created in such a short time. </p>
<p>One might even ask whether the president and prime minister are simply setting things up for an extension of the 18-month charter for the transitional government and their own leadership roles within it.</p>
<h2>Good governance and a stability pact</h2>
<p>To root out corruption, the plan calls for a “social conference” that will produce a new “social stability pact”. This will be the basis for a new social contract between citizens and the government that will “improve the living conditions of the populations and ensure a fair distribution of national wealth”.</p>
<p>Through negotiations and compromise, the conference will address the root causes of violence and inequality, not merely their symptoms. Ample funds will be provided for “basic social services” such as health and education, and bring civil service salaries into “harmony”.</p>
<p>This too, albeit vague, is a laudable goal. But it ignores the way in which heavy reliance on foreign aid can short circuit the relationship between citizens and the state, replacing political loyalty with clientelism. </p>
<p>Another telling silence is the absence of any mention of the work of the Malian Commission for Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, which has been interviewing refugees and displaced people for the last five years to prepare the ground for reparations. </p>
<p>I have been involved in the peacebuilding process, working with Malian teachers, artists and activists since 2004 to develop university-level peace-building courses and community programmes in the country. Since 2016 our team has worked with the commission to disseminate information on the causes and effects of armed violence in Mali, and creating materials to prepare citizens for local peace-building dialogues. </p>
<p>At a minimum, the plan should have referenced the work of the commission, especially its involvement with refugees and internally displaced persons.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Even though confidence in the 2015 peace agreement and in the 2020 provisional government has faltered, many Malians <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad386-malians_eager_for_change_still_look_to_democracy-afrobarometer_dispatch-25aug20.pdf">still prefer</a> democracy over one-party and military rule. This is an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>There is much that needs to be done before a new government can be elected, however. The action plan’s generalities may buy the president and prime minister a prolongation of the transition, but that may be all. New elections under the current circumstances might only heighten political frustration, and lead to more inter-ethnic violence and an increased terrorist presence in the region, with Mali as its epicentre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen L. Esquith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever its flaws, it doesn’t mean the government action plan should be ignored or opposed. Rather, more needs to be done to achieve its goals.Stephen L. Esquith, Professor of political theory and global ethics, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1663562021-08-18T16:05:13Z2021-08-18T16:05:13ZAfghanistan: assessing the terror threat in the west as the Taliban returns<p>There is no other way to put it. The west’s failure in Afghanistan will be remembered as one of epic proportions. Not only has the coalition of nations that entered the country 20 years ago failed to export their values – they have failed to bring any stability to local governments or security to local people. In the process of retreating, Washington has arguably paved the way for other international actors, namely Beijing, to fill the void.</p>
<p>Now, as the Taliban hunts for those who collaborated with the west and prepare to crack down on basic freedoms, many fear the country will revert to being a haven for terrorists – with dire consequences for the west itself.</p>
<p>The Taliban still boasts strong ties with al-Qaida and has seized US weaponry. Footage shows how it has been <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/watch-afghan-prisoners-isis-al-qaeda-fighters-freed-by-taliban-2021-8?r=US&IR=T">freeing incarcerated jihadists</a> as its members move across the country.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1426871856645160961"}"></div></p>
<p>The Taliban can use its victory against the Afghan government and the west as an incredible force multiplier in terms of recruiting and radicalising wannabe jihadists around the globe. George Robertson, former head of NATO, stated that the Taliban’s return has already facilitated the arrival of a “whole host of jihadists” from other nations – who could plan and execute terrorist attacks inside and outside the region. </p>
<h2>Terrorism fears</h2>
<p>Back in May, terrorism experts <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/leaving-afghanistan-will-make-america-less-safe/">Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware</a> were already warning about the dangers of withdrawing from Afghanistan. They suggested al-Qaida would be the ultimate beneficiary if the west underestimated the threat posed by the return of the Taliban. And with progressively thin counter-terrorism resources, America is likely to be less safe.</p>
<p>Mark Milley, US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, echoed precisely this fear about <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/15/politics/mark-milley-afghanistan-terror-groups/index.html">terrorist groups reforming</a> in the country in the days before Kabul fell to the Taliban. The former head of MI6 <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/terror-threat-to-britain-will-grow-if-west-neglects-afghanistan-ex-spymaster-warns-12348573">warned</a> the terror threat in the UK would also increase with the Taliban in power.</p>
<p>A former extremist from East London told me that “vulnerable youngsters from marginalised neighbourhoods who already feel alienated could be galvanised by the Taliban’s victory and orchestrate attacks”. Even my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18335330.2020.1775276">research</a> in Italy, a country that is not normally associated with jihadist extremism, shows support for terrorist groups is higher than envisioned. </p>
<p>From Milan to Naples, those who sided with al-Qaida expressly mentioned Afghanistan and other theatres of violent jihad. “If you invade our lands, who’s is going to save us? Only al-Qaida and other true brothers will come help you,” revealed one respondent.</p>
<p>So on top of concern that the Taliban’s victory attract jihadists to Afghanistan, we must be aware that it could also inspire individuals back in the west. </p>
<h2>The counter point</h2>
<p>These views are not universally shared, however. I spoke to a high-ranking Afghan officer now hiding in Kabul who is confident there will not be terrorism. If anything, he believes, there might be clashes between the Taliban and Islamic State (also known as ISIS or Daesh). The two groups are traditionally at odds, as Islamic State considers the Taliban apostates for negotiating with the Americans. </p>
<p>Noor Dahri, executive director of the Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism (ITCT) UK agreed. “ISIS and the Taliban are against one another,” he told me. “Hence, I don’t really see them uniting and I don’t see the Taliban offering their country so that Daesh can attack international targets”. The point, for Dahri, is that the Taliban “are in need of international recognition and they wish to maintain power”. In this view, holding on to Afghanistan is more important than playing host to a global jihad. </p>
<p>We do know that the Taliban enjoys popular support among many Afghans, who often see the group as less corrupt than the government. They may value power and hearts and minds more than friendships with al-Qaida and global jihad. And, having left Afghanistan to be overtaken, the west may have few other options than to wait and see which path the Taliban chooses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michele Groppi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The group has long standing ties with terror groups – but it also wants political legitimacy.Michele Groppi, Teaching Fellow in Challenges to the International Order, Defence Studies Department, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1662562021-08-17T18:24:37Z2021-08-17T18:24:37ZAfghanistan only the latest US war to be driven by deceit and delusion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416513/original/file-20210817-23-5jd92s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C6%2C4013%2C2673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Aug. 16, 2021, thousands of Afghans trapped by the sudden Taliban takeover rushed the Kabul airport tarmac.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXAfghanistan/fc21a8d017e442fa909ff86d38c1fa5f/photo?Query=afghanistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=73239&currentItemNo=35">AP Photo/Shekib Rahmani</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-army-police/">American hubris</a> – the United States’ <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/">capacity for self-delusion</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-vietnam-to-afghanistan-all-us-governments-lie-128695">official lying</a> – has struck once again, as it has repeatedly for the last 60 years. </p>
<p>This weakness-masquerading-as-strength has repeatedly led the country into failed foreign interventions. The pattern first became clear to me when I learned on Nov. 11, 1963, that the U.S. embassy and intelligence agencies <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/vietnam/2020-11-01/new-light-dark-corner-evidence-diem-coup-november-1963">had been directly involved in planning a coup to depose the president of South Vietnam</a> and his brother, leading to their executions. </p>
<p>I was a Fulbright Fellow, <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/gadams.cfm">starting a long career in national security policymaking</a> and teaching, studying in Europe. On that day, I was in a bus on a tour of the battlefields of Ypres, Belgium, led by a French history professor. </p>
<p>As I watched the grave markers sweep by, I was reading a report in Le Monde exposing <a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/diem-coup">this U.S. effort to overthrow another government</a> and I thought, “This is a bad idea; my country should not be doing this.” And the war, in which the <a href="https://history.army.mil/html/books/091/91-1/CMH_Pub_91-1-B.pdf">U.S. was directly involved for 20 years</a>, marched on. </p>
<p>The American people were told we had no hand in that coup. We did not know that was a lie until <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pentagon-Papers">The New York Times and Washington Post published the Pentagon Papers in 1971</a>. By then, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War">58,000 Americans and possibly as many as 3.5 million Vietnamese soldiers and civilians had died</a> – and the goal of preventing the unification of Vietnam had died as well. </p>
<p>For 15 years, the American foreign policy establishment struggled to overcome what it called the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/22/its-called-the-vietnam-syndrome-and-its-back/">Vietnam Syndrome</a>” – the rational reluctance of the American people to invade and try to remake another country. </p>
<p>American hubris reemerged, this time as “<a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm">the global war on terror</a>.” Afghanistan is now the poster child for the sense that the U.S. can remake the world. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people surrounds a swimming pool while a helicopter flies overhead" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416394/original/file-20210816-23-iw4am9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 1975, helicopters evacuated Americans and Vietnamese people from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/crowds-of-vietnamese-and-western-evacuees-wait-around-the-news-photo/523984154">Nik Wheeler/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘A sea of righteous retribution’</h2>
<p><a href="https://qz.com/2047556/a-timeline-of-us-involvement-in-afghanistan/">Osama bin Laden gave American interventionists</a> eager for the next fight a huge justification – an attack on the U.S., which washed the Vietnam Syndrome away in a sea of righteous retribution against al-Qaida. </p>
<p>The al-Qaida attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon also <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31715.html">gave interventionists the opening to invade Iraq</a>, as an extension of the war on terror. We built on the terrorism lie – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552281">Saddam Hussein was no friend of the 9/11 terrorists</a> – by arguing that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-or-white-house-spin/">he had weapons of mass destruction</a>. American hubris ran the full course as we invaded another country, overthrew its government and aimed to build a new nation, all of which have kept American troops in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">a dysfunctional Iraq for 18 years</a>. </p>
<p>And the truth, which insisted on penetrating the American delusion, was that the war meant <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2019/direct-war-death-toll-2001-801000">the deaths of 8,500 American troops and civilians and at least 300,000 Iraqis as well</a>. No modern, rebuilt Iraqi nation has emerged.</p>
<p>And now the country faces the dark at the end of the tunnel in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">where lying and self-delusion have continued for 20 years</a>. </p>
<p>An initial mission intended to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">remove the Taliban and close the al-Qaida training camps succeeded</a>, though Osama bin Laden slipped away for another 10 years. But <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/07/08/panel-u-s-began-afghanistan-war-with-unrealistic-expectations">hubris kept the U.S. from stopping there</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg82115/html/CHRG-107shrg82115.htm">The mission expanded</a>: create a modern democracy, a modern society and, <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/easier-get-war-get-out-case-afghanistan#toc-4-0-0">above all, a modern military</a> in a <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/as-the-taliban-rise-again-afghanistans-past-threatens-its-present">country with little history of any</a> of those things. </p>
<p>A new generation of U.S. officials in uniform and policymaker suits and dresses <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/afghan-security-forces-capabilities/2021/08/15/052a45e2-fdc7-11eb-a664-4f6de3e17ff0_story.html">fooled the American people and themselves</a> by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/">lying about how well the effort was going</a>. </p>
<p>The failure was actually there to see, this time, <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/">well documented by the systematic auditing and reporting</a> of the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, John Sopko. But government officials and the media blew by those truths, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/19/americans-are-not-unanimously-war-weary-on-afghanistan/">giving voice instead to the lies out of more visible officials’ mouths</a>. The human price tag of hubris grew – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-afghanistan-43d8f53b35e80ec18c130cd683e1a38f">6,300 U.S. military and civilian deaths</a>, and an <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghans-lives-and-livelihoods-upended-even-more-as-us-occupation-ends-165059">understated estimate of 100,000 Afghan deaths</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man on a ladder covers a statue's face with a U.S. flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416396/original/file-20210816-13-12cm9xs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. soldiers cover the face of a statue of Saddam Hussein before pulling the statue down in Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastIraqUnendingWar/a330bac33b214abfaa0ffea704fba353/photo">AP Photo/Jerome Delay</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three strikes and you’re out</h2>
<p>Three times now this country has been lied to and the media deluded as America marched stolidly over the cliff into failure.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/15/us/politics/afghanistan-collapse-politics.html">Recriminations are flying back and forth</a> – who lost Afghanistan is the latest version of who lost Vietnam, Iraq and, for those with long memories, all the way back to 1949 and “<a href="https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/who-lost-china">who lost China</a>.” What America has lost is, I believe, the capacity to learn, to learn from history and from our own experience.</p>
<p>I’d argue that no one who was paying attention should be <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">surprised that the Taliban swept back into Kabul in a nanosecond</a>. Or that a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse-taliban/">failed enterprise like the Afghan national army collapsed</a>. Army and special operator trainers who went there <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/afghan-security-forces-capabilities/2021/08/15/052a45e2-fdc7-11eb-a664-4f6de3e17ff0_story.html">could see the corruption, the personnel who left in the night</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-business-lifestyle-b34e8480c8a0d80072fb2b4414914156">disdain for corrupt political authorities in that army</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/06/21/elite-afghan-troops-were-left-die-battle-taliban-officials-say.html">Many brave, honorable Afghans fought there</a>, but the cohesion and commitment, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/world/asia/afghanistan-rapid-military-collapse.html">the belief in their mission, was not there</a>. </p>
<p>By contrast, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/books/review/carter-malkasian-the-american-war-in-afghanistan-craig-whitlock-the-afghanistan-papers.html">the Taliban were organized, dedicated and coherent</a>, and armed and trained for the actual combat taking place, not for European-style trench and tank warfare. The Taliban clearly had a plan that worked for that country, as the speed of the takeover shows. It succeeded; the U.S. and the Kabul regime failed in what became mission impossible.</p>
<p>The fall of Kabul was inevitable. Washington, once again, deluded itself into thinking otherwise. The secretary of state said, “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/15/this-is-not-saigon-blinken-defends-us-evacuations-from-kabul">This is not Saigon</a>.” </p>
<p>It is Saigon. It is Baghdad. It is Kabul. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 110,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166256/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Adams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the US Afghanistan pullout is not a repeat of failures in other recent wars. “This is not Saigon,” he said. A seasoned foreign policy expert disagrees.Gordon Adams, Professor Emeritus, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661312021-08-15T15:03:10Z2021-08-15T15:03:10ZAfghan government collapses, Taliban seize control: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416187/original/file-20210815-6755-osweke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4932%2C3329&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Personnel were evacuated from the U.S. embassy in Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021, as Taliban insurgents broke through the capital city's defensive line.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Afghanistan/519e42dfe6464de3ad1ca95e8861dc22/photo?Query=Afghanistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=72958&currentItemNo=40">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Panic and turmoil grip Afghanistan after Taliban insurgents <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/12/world/asia/kandahar-afghanistan-taliban.html">captured the capital city of Kabul</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">the president fled on Aug. 15, 2021</a>.</p>
<p>There would be “no transitional government in Afghanistan,” <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-officials-there-will-be-no-transitional-government-afghanistan-2021-08-15/">Taliban officials told Reuters</a> news service. The insurgent group “expects a complete handover of power” – though <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/countries-should-not-recognise-taliban-afghan-government-says-uks-johnson-2021-08-15/">many nations may not recognize</a> a Taliban government that took power through armed struggle rather than by continuing the now-failed internationally mediated peace negotiations.</p>
<p>Fearful citizens aiming to escape the rule of radical Islamic fighters were “lining up at cash machines to withdraw their life savings,” <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">according to the Associated Press</a>, and overrunning the Kabul airport’s tarmac as U.S. military evacuation flights tried to take off.</p>
<p>The fall of Afghanistan came just three months after the U.S. began to withdraw its troops from the country following a 20-year war that <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-08-14/costs-of-the-afghanistan-war-in-lives-and-dollars">killed 2,448 U.S. service members, 3,846 U.S. military contractors and some 66,000 Afghan national military and police</a>. </p>
<p>For Afghans and international observers of a certain age, history is repeating itself in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The Taliban – which means “the students” in Pashto – seized control of Afghanistan in 1996 after capturing Kabul in the Afghan civil war. They established a government based on their extreme interpretation of Islamic Sharia law and ruled for five years. The Taliban regime was then toppled in 2001 by the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Six armed men in head coverings with beards stand by a road with mountains in background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban fighters at a roadside checkpoint in Afghanistan in 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/taliban-fighters-at-checkpoint-on-road-leading-to-radical-islamic-picture-id50437124">Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Here, Afghanistan experts offer insight into the Taliban – then and now – and explain the United States’ role in Afghanistan’s collapse. </p>
<h2>1. The Taliban regime</h2>
<p>Have the Taliban changed since 2001? </p>
<p>That’s the question <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">Sher Jan Ahmadzai</a>, director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, set out to answer in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-the-taliban-speak-more-moderately-but-their-extremist-rule-hasnt-evolved-in-20-years-164221">July 2021 story on the Taliban</a>. </p>
<p>Ahmadzai, who is from Afghanistan, explained that, “During the Taliban’s five-year rule, women were prohibited from working, attending school or leaving home without a male relative. Men had to grow beards and wear a cap or turban.” </p>
<p>Anyone not abiding by this code could be lashed, beaten or humiliated. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A street hairdresser in Kabul cuts a man's beard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Getting a trim in Kabul after the Taliban’s ouster, November 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/119720452">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rhetoric of the Taliban has moderated since 2001, Ahmadzai wrote, but their extremist beliefs have not changed.</p>
<p>“All evidence suggests the Taliban still believe in restoring their old system of emirate, in which an unelected religious leader, or emir, was the ultimate decision-maker,” given authority from God.</p>
<p>Already, in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan, Ahmadzai wrote, Taliban have rulers “have asked families to marry off one girl per family to their fighters; said women should not leave home without a male relative; and ordered men to pray in mosques and grow beards.” </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-the-taliban-speak-more-moderately-but-their-extremist-rule-hasnt-evolved-in-20-years-164221">Afghanistan after the US withdrawal: The Taliban speak more moderately but their extremist rule hasn't evolved in 20 years</a>
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<h2>2. Women under ‘fundamentalist’ rule</h2>
<p>Afghan women may have the most to fear from the Taliban’s victory.</p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/homa-hoodfar-449678">Homa Hoodfar</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pRDRavYAAAAJ&hl=en">Mona Tajali</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-has-not-changed-say-women-facing-subjugation-in-areas-of-afghanistan-under-its-extremist-rule-164760">interviewed 15 Afghan women activists, community leaders and politicians</a> over the past year. Few of them felt the Taliban believed in gender equality.</p>
<p>“Reform of the Taliban is not really possible. Their core ideology is fundamentalist, particularly towards women,” one 40-year-old women’s rights activist from Kabul told Hoodfar and Tajali. </p>
<p>In international meetings and on social media, Taliban leaders suggest only that women have rights “according to Islam.” </p>
<p>A schoolteacher in northern Afghanistan told the researchers, “In the beginning, when we saw the Taliban interviews on TV, we hoped for peace, as if the Taliban had changed. But when I saw the Taliban up close, they have not changed at all.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women in purple burqas walk amid a ruined city street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Women in traditional burqas in wartorn Kabul, in 1996, as the Taliban fought to take control of Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/women-wear-traditional-burqas-october-21-1996-in-kabul-afghanistan-picture-id744218">Roger Lemoyne/Liaison/Getty Images</a></span>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-has-not-changed-say-women-facing-subjugation-in-areas-of-afghanistan-under-its-extremist-rule-164760">Taliban 'has not changed,' say women facing subjugation in areas of Afghanistan under its extremist rule</a>
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<h2>3. A ‘moral tragedy’</h2>
<p>The United States <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-wont-be-able-to-shirk-moral-responsibility-in-leaving-afghanistan-164474">cannot shirk moral responsibility</a> for the human rights abuses and violence that Afghans will likely face under Taliban rule, according to University of Washington philosopher <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Mm14TeMAAAAJ&hl=en">Michael Blake</a>.</p>
<p>“This ought to trouble the politicians who defend the withdrawal, and those voters who gave power to those politicians,” he says.</p>
<p>Calling the collapse of Afghanistan “morally tragic,” Blake says the U.S. may have an obligation to provide refuge to Afghans who bear particular risks because they were part of the United States war effort. That includes Afghan translators, who have been targeted by the Taliban for their work with the U.S. military.</p>
<p>The Biden administration in July 2021 authorized a US$100 million “urgent” expansion of the special visa program that could get <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/02/biden-visa-program-afghan-interpreters-502085">up to 20,000 Afghans affiliated with the U.S. war effort out of Afghanistan</a> and resettled abroad. </p>
<p>But it is difficult if not impossible now for those people to flee a country under Taliban rule. And translators are far from the only Afghans at risk of retaliation by the Taliban.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Crowds of Afghans trying to take money out of the bank in Kabul." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Afghans wait for hours to try to withdraw money from Kabul Bank, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Sunday, Aug. 15, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Afghanistan/639280f1107448f0981a1e1c397c55c9?Query=kabul&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=31447&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-wont-be-able-to-shirk-moral-responsibility-in-leaving-afghanistan-164474">Why the US won't be able to shirk moral responsibility in leaving Afghanistan</a>
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<hr>
<h2>4. Global terror threat</h2>
<p>The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan is also a victory for the terrorist organization al-Qaida, <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-taliban-surges-across-afghanistan-al-qaeda-is-poised-for-a-swift-return-164314">according to Greg Barton, chair in global Islamic politics at Deakin University in Australia</a>.</p>
<p>“Afghanistan was the birthplace of al-Qaida in 1988. The group gave rise to terrorist networks around the world, including…al-Qaida in Iraq, which morphed into the Islamic State,” writes Barton.</p>
<p>The U.S. originally invaded Afghanistan to hunt down and destroy al-Qaida after the group attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001. Afghanistan had become a haven for terrorists under Taliban rule. </p>
<p>With the Taliban’s return to power, international terrorist organizations could – sooner than anticipated – begin openly operating out of the country again, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/afghanistan-taliban-us-troops-intl-08-15-21/index.html">said Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley on Aug. 15, 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>5. Could US forces return to Afghanistan?</h2>
<p>When former President Donald Trump made a deal with the Taliban to end the U.S. war in Aghanistan, acceding to a longstanding Taliban demand, public opinion polls indicated widespread support for the decision. </p>
<p>That gave President Joe Biden license to follow through on Trump’s decision, says <a href="https://as.vanderbilt.edu/history/bio/thomas-schwartz">Thomas Alan Schwartz</a>, a history professor at Vanderbilt University.</p>
<p>But a “rapid takeover of the country by the Taliban, with the subsequent persecution of women and domestic opponents of the regime, may well produce a backlash among millions of Americans,” Schwartz <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-afghanistan-the-us-again-gets-to-choose-how-it-stops-fighting-165058">wrote on Aug. 13, 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Schwarz notes that “the brutality of Islamic State executions led U.S. forces back into Iraq” after President George W. Bush had declared victory there. Similarly, the “repression and carnage involved in a Taliban triumph” could make Biden rethink a full U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that would “cast a profound and damaging shadow over the entire Biden presidency.”</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-afghanistan-the-us-again-gets-to-choose-how-it-stops-fighting-165058">In Afghanistan, the US again gets to choose how it stops fighting</a>
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<p><em>This story has been updated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Taliban ‘expect a complete handover of power.’ Experts explain who the Taliban are, what life is like under their rule and how the US may bear responsibility for Afghanistan’s collapse.Catesby Holmes, International Editor | Politics Editor, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642212021-07-22T12:07:18Z2021-07-22T12:07:18ZAfghanistan after the US withdrawal: The Taliban speak more moderately but their extremist rule hasn’t evolved in 20 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411284/original/file-20210714-13-1i7h63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C1911%2C1279&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In early 2021, some Taliban fighters surrendered their weapons to support peace talks with the Afghan government. Today the Islamic extremist group is battling government forces to control the country. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/taliban-fighters?agreements=pa%253A91269&family=editorial&page=2&phrase=Taliban%2520fighters&sort=newest">Xinhua/Emran Waak via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Taliban are rapidly gaining territory in Afghanistan as the United States withdraws its forces from the war-torn country. The militant group now <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/06/taliban-takes-control-of-30-districts-in-past-six-weeks.php">holds at least one-third of Afghanistan’s 364 districts</a>. </p>
<p>For two decades the Afghan government has relied heavily on American military power to defend against the bloody insurgency of the Taliban, a radical Islamic organization that seized control of the country in 1996. </p>
<p>During the Taliban’s five-year rule – which was almost universally shunned by other governments but supported <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm">militarily and politically by Pakistan</a> – women were prohibited from working, attending school or leaving home without a male relative. Men were forced to grow beards and wear a cap or turban. Music and other entertainment was banned. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A street hairdresser in Kabul cuts a man's beard in November 2001." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Getting a trim in Kabul, November 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/119720452">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Anyone not abiding by this code risked being publicly lashed, beaten or humiliated. Women who disobeyed these rules were <a href="http://rawa.org/beating.htm">sometimes killed</a>.</p>
<p>Twenty years have passed since the 2001 United States invasion that quickly toppled the Taliban regime. Most Taliban fighters today are under 30. Some weren’t even born in 2001. </p>
<p>What does the group stand for today?</p>
<h2>The Taliban then and now</h2>
<p>The 2001 Taliban defeat was celebrated by Afghans inside and outside of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Children started to fly kites and to play games – both previously banned. Couples played music at their weddings, and women left their homes for work without fear of being beaten by Taliban enforcers. Many men shaved their beards. Afghanistan opened to the world. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ac3UA_48Va0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Kite-flying resurged in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Neither the Taliban nor violence disappeared as the climate of fear dispersed, but Afghans resumed some semblance of normal life. </p>
<p>Today, younger members of the Taliban, a group once known for eschewing technology, have adopted social media, TV and radios to promote their extremist version of Islamic law. The rhetoric of their older leaders has changed since 2001, too – at least on the international stage. </p>
<p>During peace negotiations and on visits abroad, the Taliban’s leadership has expressed both a belief that women have <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taliban-say-islamic-system-only-way-to-afghan-peace-womens-rights/ar-AALet6z">rights under Islamic laws</a> and a desire to reduce violence in Afghanistan. The group has also pledged to protect <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-taliban-offers-protect-infrastructure-projects-142805475.html">such public infrastructure as government buildings, roads and schools</a>, which it has often attacked. </p>
<p>In very few areas of Afghanistan that the Taliban have controlled for many years, local members of the group have allowed girls to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/why-the-taliban-agreed-to-let-more-girls-in-afghanistan-go-to-school/ar-BB1cwf4I">go to school after community leaders negotiated with local Taliban leaders</a>.</p>
<h2>A new emirate</h2>
<p>But in newly captured areas their policies are more hard line. </p>
<p>According to various reports by the Afghan stations Radio Liberty and Radio Salam Watandar, Taliban rulers in Afghanistan’s North and Northeast have asked families to <a href="https://swn.af/taliban-in-takhar-every-family-brings-a-girl-to-our-marriage/">marry off one girl per family to their fighters</a>; said women should not <a href="https://da.azadiradio.com/a/31350025.html">leave home without a male relative</a>; and ordered men to pray in mosques and grow beards. </p>
<p>The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, an Afghan government agency, says <a href="https://bakhtarnews.af/taliban-destroyed-public-infrastructures-in-116-districts-nadery/">public infrastructure has been destroyed</a> and social services halted in many Taliban-controlled areas, leaving 13 million people without public services. </p>
<p>All evidence suggests the <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/have-the-taliban-changed/">Taliban still believe</a> in restoring their old system of emirate, in which an unelected religious leader, or emir, was the ultimate decision-maker. No one could challenge his verdicts because he was believed to have a divine authority from God.</p>
<p>“What has changed? Absolutely nothing,” Ahmad Rashid, a Pakistani journalist who <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ahmed-rashid-afghanistan-chaos-will-suck-in-neighboring-countries/a-58163020?maca=en-Twitter-sharing">has covered Afghanistan for 20 years</a>, told Germany’s Deutsche Welle newspaper in July 2021. “The Taliban don’t believe in democracy. They just want the collapse of the government so they can reconquer Afghanistan and reimpose their system.”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded men in white robes and head coverings walk closely together in a hotel-like setting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Taliban co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar, center, after signing the Taliban’s accord with the U.S. in Qatar in February 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/1204139101">Giuseppe Cacace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>A dubious negotiating partner</h2>
<p>The U.S. troop withdrawal follows a controversial February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord initiated by former President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>In the deal, the U.S. agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan – fulfilling a long-standing Taliban goal – if the Taliban ceased violence against American forces, severed ties with al-Qaida and other terror groups and entered <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-peace-talks-begin-but-will-the-taliban-hold-up-their-end-of-the-deal-146081">peace talks with the Afghan government</a>. </p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/08/1014178656/as-u-s-troops-leave-afghanistan-biden-is-set-to-explain-what-happens-now">defended his decision to leave Afghanistan</a>, but there is good reason to doubt the Taliban’s commitment to peace. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/surge-civilian-casualties-following-afghanistan-peace-negotiations-start-un-report">recent United Nations report</a>, 5,459 Afghans have been killed since the 2020 U.S.-Taliban deal was signed, and the Taliban were responsible for 62% of those deaths. </p>
<p>In my decades of first working for the Afghan government and then <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">studying Afghanistan as an academic</a>, I have found no reliable historical evidence of the group’s abiding by any domestic agreement it signed with any party in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>It has <a href="http://www.hazara.net/mazari/mazari.html">killed opponents</a> at meetings allegedly called to discuss a truce and denied schooling to girls after committing to educate them. </p>
<p>The Taliban have so far kept their promise to the U.S. not to attack withdrawing American forces. But ongoing talks with the Afghan government have not resulted in a cease-fire or power-sharing agreement for Afghanistan.</p>
<p>“Why were the Taliban going to compromise once the [U.S. troop] exit date was given?” asked Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan at a July 2021 conference on <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1635387">security in Central and South Asia</a> I attended. </p>
<p>“Why would they listen to us when they are sensing victory?”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A dozen or more men with large weapons stand in front of a home with arched windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Armed men gather in Herat to support Afghanistan security forces fighting the Taliban on July 9, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/afghan-militia-gather-with-their-weapons-to-support-afghanistan-picture-id1233885751">Hoshang Hashimi / AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Terror connections</h2>
<p>Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan hosted many terrorists who perpetrated attacks on American interests worldwide. </p>
<p>The terrorists included al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, who planned <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghan-taliban#text_block_16833">the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania</a> and the Sept. 11, 2001, World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in his home <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/135908383/osama-bin-laden-dead">in Pakistan in 2011</a>, but al-Qaida cells <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-qaida-is-still-strong-17-years-after-9-11-102966">continue to operate in Southwest Asia and beyond</a>. </p>
<p>And the Taliban <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/why-us-pullout-from-afghanistan-has-indian-security-forces-worried-about-kashmir/696519/">still associate with the group</a> – a violation of their 2020 accord with the U.S. According to a May 2021 U.S. government report, the Taliban <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/18/2002654296/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20FREEDOM'S%20SENTINEL.PDF">“maintain close ties” with al-Qaida</a>. </p>
<p>Recent reports from <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/paks-terror-groups-join-taliban-war-india-wary-101625942135382.html">Indian security agencies</a> say Pakistan-based terrorist groups are partnering with the Taliban to fight Afghan forces inside Afghanistan, too.</p>
<p>Journalist Ahmad Rashid says with the U.S. gone, the Taliban won’t likely strike a deal as long as the Pakistani military continues to give <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ahmed-rashid-afghanistan-chaos-will-suck-in-neighboring-countries/a-58163020?maca=en-Twitter-sharing">their leaders and their families refuge in Pakistan</a>. The Taliban top brass is safe, while young Taliban fighters wage their insurgency in Afghanistan.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sher Jan Ahmadzai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two decades have passed since the US invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban’s Islamic extremist regime. Despite efforts to update its image, the group still holds hard-line views.Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1643002021-07-15T12:26:05Z2021-07-15T12:26:05ZThe US withdraws from Afghanistan after 20 years of war: 4 questions about this historic moment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411330/original/file-20210714-23-1rxk4ch.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3773%2C2515&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, center, greets Gen. Scott Miller, the former top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, upon Miller's July 14, 2021, return to the U.S. at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austin-greets-gen-scott-miller-news-photo/1233974983?adppopup=true">Alex Brandon - Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Mark R. Jacobson, a foreign policy expert at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, served in Afghanistan as a reserve officer in 2006 and then returned in a civilian role, working as a foreign policy adviser to Gen. Stanley McChrystal and later as the deputy NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan.</em> </p>
<p><em>As both a scholar and practitioner of foreign policy and national security, Jacobson in the interview below offers both personal and professional perspectives on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.</em></p>
<h2>As an Afghanistan veteran, what do you think at this turning point as the U.S. withdraws from the country?</h2>
<p>I’m saddened by the policy decision to completely withdraw. I think it’s a poor choice and I believe that both President Trump’s and President Biden’s assessment of the issue was based on their belief in a false choice between a so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/politics/presidential-war-powers.html">“endless war” and full withdrawal</a>. </p>
<p>But I can live with lousy policy decisions. I’m more concerned about my former Afghan colleagues and their families and whether we can do our part to make sure they can evacuate safely if the need arises. What gives me hope is that the Biden administration is taking this issue seriously and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/14/biden-afghan-interpreters-evacuation-499625">working through a process to get former interpreters, advisers and their families to the U.S.</a> under the special immigrant visa program. </p>
<p>Each time I served in Afghanistan had a significant impact on me, and each in particular ways. I had a colleague address this issue the other day by saying “I’m just trying to absorb the fact of being on the losing side in a war.” </p>
<p>I don’t feel that way at all and, in fact, rigid conceptions of winning and losing are what created the misunderstanding about what we had to do to succeed in Afghanistan. We focused too much on military victory – defeating the terrorists, defeating the insurgency. What happens on the battlefield is a sideshow. There’s no victory or peace until there’s a political settlement and that can’t be imposed by the United States – it will only come when the intra-Afghan peace talks – between the Taliban and the Afghan government – succeed. </p>
<p>Likewise, I don’t feel most veterans of Afghanistan or Iraq carry the burden that U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War had to struggle with, in terms of a <a href="https://www.history.com/news/vietnam-war-veterans-treatment">population that resented their service</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there a story you tell colleagues that epitomizes your time in the country?</h2>
<p>As an academic, I’ve come to understand my time as a series of stories that, when taken together, show the dissonance that a war like Afghanistan brought to some of us who served. </p>
<p>I had an incredible job during my tour there as an intelligence officer in 2006. Some evenings I’d be at a formal dinner at an Afghan official’s home or a foreign embassy, and then after midnight I’d be in combat gear out on a mission, going after a high-value target with NATO Special Operations Forces. </p>
<p>I spent a lot of time on my own or with a small group, and my nights were busier than my days. Like many others, I left a part of me there that I’ll never get back. But it was worth it, especially when thinking about how our intervention not only protected the United States, but also encompassed what we did for the children in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>I spent a lot of time each week at an orphanage outside of Kabul. I went there after missions or just to see the kids and play with them and practice my rudimentary Dari. I arranged with some Navy vets in the U.S. to send soccer balls for the kids, and one time some friends of mine helped arrange a fundraiser in Washington, D.C., for the orphanage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier hikes up to begin an overwatch shift on a hilltop observation post in Afghanistan's mountainous Kunar province." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pfc. Bryan Corteal, 22, on Sept. 12, 2011, hikes up to begin his shift on a hilltop observation post at Combat Outpost Monti in Kunar Province, Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NATOAfghanistan/5681a881a28c48ce8eb8b1f8b3b3bb00">AP Photo/David Goldman</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Everyone wanted to come with me to the orphanage – folks from my unit, colleagues from the U.S. Embassy – even a Hollywood star who was in-country came to love the place. This was my own pet project, not a formal mission, but I loved it – it reminded me what I was fighting for, to help the children of Afghanistan have a future. </p>
<p>That may not be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghan-whitepaper-sb/text-new-u-s-strategy-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan-idUSTRE52Q42Z20090327">“disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-Qaida mission</a> that U.S. presidents would like to have had, but one that reflects that in the end, wars are about people. And frankly, it was the most meaningful. </p>
<h2>What are the three most important things America has achieved in Afghanistan over the past 20 years?</h2>
<p>Certainly, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45122.pdf">American intervention has prevented terrorists</a> from using Afghanistan as a base for terrorist attacks against the U.S. and our allies. This was, after all, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/afghanistan-war-photos/">the rationale for the invasion of October 2001</a>, to eliminate the al-Qaida haven and topple their Taliban hosts. </p>
<p>This achievement may be fleeting, however, as the withdrawal of U.S. forces will diminish the capacity to identify and take action against future threats. After all, the threat of international terrorism based in Afghanistan is not over for good. Groups such as the Islamic State still use the country as a base, and it’s unclear whether or not the Taliban will give up support for an al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, especially during the surge of 2009 to 2011, created greater Afghan military capability and destroyed some Taliban capability. This put the Afghan government in a better position to sit down at the table and find a peaceful way forward. </p>
<p>The challenge is, whether this work by the U.S. military was enough so that the Afghan National Security Forces can handle the Taliban on their own. Other than Afghan Special Operations Forces, their record of tactical success against the Taliban is mixed, and that is cause for concern.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman applies makeup on a customer at a beauty Salon in Kabul, Afghanistan." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sultana Karimi applies makeup on a customer at a salon in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 25, 2021. Kabul’s young working women say they fear their dreams may be short-lived if the Taliban return to Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AfghanistanWomen/7336d00c3a6648418928205a099ee4ef">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most importantly, American and NATO intervention took the people of Afghanistan back toward a more free and open society that many had not experienced since the 1960s and 1970s. There are millions of girls in school. Women now own businesses and are actors, singers and activists. There are <a href="https://www.ndi.org/afghan_women_seated_in_parliament">68 women in the Afghan Parliament</a>, or 27% of the total, something impossible under Taliban rule, where there was an almost complete ban on female employment.</p>
<p>Likewise, <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fgwh.2021.610578/full">maternal mortality has been cut in half</a>, the <a href="https://uil.unesco.org/interview-literacy-rate-afghanistan-increased-43-cent">literacy rate in Afghanistan</a> is higher, and more than 67% of Afghans <a href="https://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/wash-water-sanitation-and-hygiene">have access to clean water</a>. </p>
<h2>President Biden has said, “It’s the right and the responsibility of Afghan people alone to decide their future and how they want to run their country.” What are some of the challenges Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his people face?</h2>
<p>The lack of a U.S. military presence fundamentally changes the security dynamics in Afghanistan, reducing the leverage necessary to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, especially with the loss of U.S. air power.</p>
<p>Additionally, security is a precondition to development, and it’s unclear how long the <a href="https://ngo.gov.af/en/">international development community</a>, which has had a large presence in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, will be able to work, or whether Afghan nationals will be safe implementing these projects. </p>
<p>A political solution is the only way this war ends – and not one imposed by the United States, but one agreed to by Afghan parties. This was one of the great failures of <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/afghanistan-bonnagreement2001">the agreement on interim governance for Afghanistan</a> negotiated in Bonn in December 2001 – not having a seat at the table for the Taliban.</p>
<p>Additionally, while the U.S. and the Taliban <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-taliban-truce-begins-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">reached an agreement in February 2020</a> – albeit one the Taliban are not living up to – the so-called “intra-Afghan” peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban underway in Doha <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistans-peace-process-is-stalled-can-the-taliban-be-trusted-to-hold-up-their-end-of-the-deal-144335">are not yet complete</a>.</p>
<p>President Ghani must get the Taliban to the table to discuss a permanent cease-fire and a political settlement. I worry, however, this will be tough to do with the Taliban once again growing in power. In the end, it may be the U.S. withdrawal that, ironically, prevents the Afghan people from deciding their future.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164300/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark R. Jacobson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar and practitioner of foreign policy and national security offers personal and professional perspectives on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.Mark R. Jacobson, Assistant Dean of the Maxwell School of Citzenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1529052021-01-17T08:50:59Z2021-01-17T08:50:59ZNiger’s democratic transition is good news, but the threat of insurgency remains high<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377994/original/file-20210111-19-gud2rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Following an inconclusive election in December 2020, Niger's Independent National Electoral Commission is set for a runoff in February. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">twin problems</a> – poverty and insecurity – that have faced Niger in the past few decades, <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/africaga2016/documents/niger-he-mr-mahamadou-issoufou-president">President Mahamadou Issoufou</a> successfully completed his two-term tenure. In December 2020, the country held the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/01/07/nigerien-president-mahamadou-issoufou-set-to-exit-power//">first election</a> to transfer power from one civilian regime to another since independence from France in <a href="https://face2faceafrica.com/article/niger-gained-independence-from-france-on-this-day-in-1960-but-had-to-wait-much-longer-for-freedom">1960</a>. </p>
<p>The 27 December <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3633/">election</a> was inconclusive as no candidate got the constitutionally mandated 50% of the vote to emerge as president. A <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210102-niger-s-presidential-election-set-for-february-runoff">runoff</a> is now scheduled for 21 February. </p>
<p>When President Issoufou <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/niger-election-tandja-issoufou-chatelot">assumed power</a> in 2011 (a year after a coup d’etat which led to the removal of Mamadou Tandja), the country was overwhelmed by widespread poverty and insecurity. Persistent agitations came from the Tuareg ethnic groups, stemming from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266590?seq=1">perceived marginalisation and oppression</a>. Issoufou’s first step towards stabilising the country was to appoint Brigi Rafini, a Tuareg leader from Agadez, as <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/nigers-new-leader-appoints-tuareg-as-pm-20110407">prime minister</a>.</p>
<p>Many rebel leaders were appeased with political positions, a gesture which helped stabilise the country and reduce <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">calls for secession</a>. Another boost to the country’s democracy was Issoufou’s decision not to seek a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201012-i-won-t-be-seeking-a-third-term-niger-s-president-issoufou-confirms">third term </a> but instead organise a free and fair election. </p>
<p>The increase in the number of African incumbent presidents extending or ignoring term limits has been described as <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796">reversing democracy</a>.</p>
<p>In addition to achieving relative political stability and entrenching democracy, Niger has grown its GDP during Issoufou’s tenure. GDP grew from <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/niger/gdp">$8.7 billion to $12.9 billion</a> between 2011 and 2019, and by <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview#1">6.3%</a> in 2019. This was achieved through investment in agriculture, which represents about 40% of GDP, as well as the prevention of internal conflicts. </p>
<p>One of the key issues which plagued Niger was trafficking (weapons, humans and drugs). Although this still constitutes a menace, Niger has benefited financially from the European Union in its quest to reduce trafficking. It has been awarded over <a href="https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/community/2018/05/21/funders-must-recognize-refugees-have-assets-not-just-needs">$840 million</a> since 2011 to help curb the flow of migrants from Africa to Europe through the Sahara. This has helped the country combat trafficking through upgrading security infrastructure. </p>
<h2>Landlocked nation surrounded by problematic countries</h2>
<p>But despite the efforts of the Nigerien government to attain political stability, economic growth and security, conflict in neighbouring countries has hindered development. Islamist or terrorist groups operate in six of the seven countries that surround Niger (Algeria, Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali). Benin is the exception.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17308138">Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb</a> – which was formed after the Algerian civil war in the late 1990s – operates along the northern border of Niger with Algeria. The war in Libya also polarised parts of the country’s north-eastern border where <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/178-how-islamic-state-rose-fell-and-could-rise-again-maghreb">Islamic State</a> operates. Boko Haram, formed in Nigeria, operates along Niger’s south-eastern border between Chad and Nigeria. The group claimed responsibility for the massacre of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080062">28 civilians</a> in the town of Toumour in December 2020. </p>
<p>Since 2018, the western parts of the country have also witnessed sporadic attacks orchestrated by <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-greater-sahara-isgs">Islamic State in the Greater Sahara</a>. This group is an affiliate of Islamic State which was formed in Mali but operates in Burkina Faso and along the border with Niger. As the results of the presidential election were being released, terrorists attacked two villages, killing over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/02/at-least-70-killed-in-suspected-islamist-attacks-in-niger">100 people</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Data</a> from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project reveal that insurgent activities have increased in Niger in the past few years. A total of 167 conflict related events resulting in 506 fatalities were recorded in 2018. The numbers grew to 476 conflict related events resulting in 1046 fatalities in 2020. Most events happened around the borders of the country. <a href="https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2019/01/ACLED_Country-and-Time-Period-coverage_updDecember2020.pdf">These data</a> reveal the impact of insecurity on the stability of Niger.</p>
<h2>The elections and challenges ahead</h2>
<p>Although 30 candidates contested the presidential elections, there are believed to be two front runners. Mohamed Bazoum, the former head of Niger’s interior and foreign ministries, is one. The other is Mahamane Ousmane, Niger’s fourth president, who held office between 1993 and 1996 before being removed in a military coup. Since no candidate was able to garner 50% of the votes in the first round of elections (<a href="https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard">Bazoum got 39.33% and Ousmane got 17%</a>), runoff elections have been scheduled for February 2021.</p>
<p>The three key issues which have dominated the presidential campaigns are insecurity, poverty and corruption. Despite the progress recorded by the incumbent president in the past nine years, the World Bank states that poverty remains high: <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">41.4% </a> of the population lived in extreme poverty in 2019. </p>
<p>Since the runoff elections will be between two popular figures in the country, intense political calculations are expected.</p>
<p>One key issue which is likely to be prominent in the build up to the runoff election is the ability of the candidates to sustain the balance of power. This has been essential in keeping Niger relatively stable since 2011.</p>
<p>While the prospect of a peaceful democratic transition in Niger is welcome in the country and across the region, the eventual winner faces an uphill task to surmount the twin problems of insecurity and poverty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although Niger’s quest for entrenching democracy is a good development, poverty and insecurity are obstacles.Olayinka Ajala, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1363402020-05-04T13:27:01Z2020-05-04T13:27:01ZIslamic State could be about to hit back – and the world is paying little attention<p>In the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic the crises of tomorrow can fester. A resurgence of Islamic State (IS) is likely to be one of them. </p>
<p>In recent weeks, IS has carried out <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/is-attacks-iraq-coronavirus-lockdown.html">a spate of attacks</a> on security forces in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-52514370">Iraq</a> and different <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/syria-east-deser-islamic-state-attacks-regime-iran.html">areas of Syria</a>. There are striking similarities between these current developments and events that happened in 2013-14 as IS seized huge swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>The threat of a resurgent IS is mounting and governments around the world could be about to make the same mistake again of missing it and reacting too late. Based on <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/eis/research/intel/intel-research-project">my ongoing research</a> investigating why the rise of IS in 2013 came as a strategic surprise to European governments, I’ve identified the seven most eye-catching parallels between 2013 and today. </p>
<h2>1. Declared dead prematurely</h2>
<p>After the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, the various branches of al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel and Maghreb refocused more locally. The remaining leadership directly addressed grievances against their respective local governments. Al-Qaida seemed to be on the defensive and leaders in Europe and the US <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university">expected</a> it to stop posing a national threat. </p>
<p>Similarly to today, it was misleading to hope that IS would <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/435402-16-times-trump-declared-or-predicted-the-demise-of-isis">decline</a> after its leader <a href="https://time.com/5711828/al-baghdadi-dead-isis-future/">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> was killed in October 2019 in a US special forces raid. Like when it emerged out of al-Qaida in Iraq, IS might very well resurge under its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/isis-leader-confirmed-amir-mohammed-abdul-rahman-al-mawli-al-salbi">new leader</a>, Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-baghdadis-death-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-leader-of-islamic-state-125947">Al-Baghdadi's death: the rise and fall of the leader of Islamic State</a>
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<h2>2. Risk of prison breaks</h2>
<p>One of IS’s most successful operations was its 2012-13 prison escape campaign <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/inside-the-rise-of-isis/">Breaking the Walls</a> to free veteran fighters. The campaign was remarkable due to its length and level of organisation, including the major break of Abu Ghraib, Iraq in July 2013 in which more than 500 prisoners escaped.</p>
<p>The IS prisons in northern Syria are currently run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the primarily Kurdish militia that defeated IS with the support of the west. Overcrowded and understaffed, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/living-hell-for-isis-suspects-trapped-in-legal-limbo-8klj0npg3">the SDF has called</a> these prisons a ticking time bomb. </p>
<p>According to Iraqi intelligence, IS has been preparing a prison break campaign, which it calls <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7702493/ISIS-chiefs-hiding-Turkey-vast-sums-money-plotting-jailbreaks-Syria-Iraq.html">Break Down the Fences</a>. A systematic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/30/islamic-state-prisoners-escape-from-syrian-jail-after-militants-riot">prison break campaign</a> similar to Breaking the Walls could pave the way for a resurgence of IS in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<h2>3. Car bombs and insurgency attacks</h2>
<p>In 2013 more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/middleeast/us-sends-arms-to-aid-iraq-fight-with-extremists.html">8,000 Iraqis were killed</a> by IS, mainly through choreographed suicide bombings. Today, IS is again launching increasingly sophisticated <a href="https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/100420201">insurgent attacks</a> in Syria and Iraq. This type of violence might be a prelude to a more forceful military return of IS in northern Iraq. </p>
<p>Concentrated in areas beyond the reach of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, in January a <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2020/53">UN report warned</a> that IS is preparing for a steady and gradual return.</p>
<h2>4. Western fatigue</h2>
<p>The coalition against IS <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-47678157">proclaimed that the group</a> had been defeated in March 2019 when it liberated Baghuz, the last city under control of the group. Should IS surge again, the coalition’s efforts would have been in vain. Military action would have to be continued, the SDF further reinforced, and the Iraqi security forces strengthened – not what western governments were hoping for.</p>
<p>In 2013, US and UK <a href="https://www1.essex.ac.uk/news/event.aspx?e_id=5115">public opinion</a> was very negative about the Iraq war, which was largely considered a failure. This resulting “war fatigue” and the desire to militarily leave the Middle East <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/british-public-opinion-after-a-decade-of-war-attitudes-to-iraq-and-afghanistan/">affected</a> the UK’s decision not to intervene in Syria in 2013. </p>
<p>Today’s politicians are wary of contributing resources once again to the fight against this never-ending Jihadi whack-a-mole. The Iraqi parliament’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iraqi-parliament-calls-expulsion-foreign-troops-200105150709628.html">non-binding resolution</a> to expel US troops after the American assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in January has added <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-troops-military-conflict-iraq-iran-trump-a9460496.html">another layer of complication</a>.</p>
<h2>5. Risk of a power vacuum in Iraq</h2>
<p>In a difference to 2013, the highly polarised sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq – one of the root causes of IS’s appeal to frustrated Iraqi Sunnis – seems to have <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria">faded</a>. Yet, Iraq still has a very <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/widespread-protests-point-iraqs-cycle-social-crisis">fragile government</a> and a newly designated prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who faces <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51930601">huge challenges</a>. </p>
<p>For the time being the government is holding, although further protests like <a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-crackdown-against-iraq-protests-exposes-fallacy-of-the-countrys-democracy-124830">those which began in October 2019</a>, a lack of reforms, and a weakening economy might destabilise the country. Another round of chaos caused by a collapsing government would quickly be exploited by IS to recruit disenchanted citizens. </p>
<h2>6. Risk of a power vacuum in Syria</h2>
<p>One element that helped IS gain strength in 2013-14 was the ongoing war in Syria, which created a power vacuum that was filled by IS. Other factors that contributed to the group’s success included the departure of US troops from Iraq <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawal/last-u-s-troops-leave-iraq-ending-war-idUSTRE7BH03320111218">in late 2011</a>; and Turkey’s subsequent policy to relax its border controls with Syria, which allowed foreign fighters to join IS. </p>
<p>Today, the Syrian civil war and foreign actors might facilitate an IS revival. <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/02/16/isil-back-us-troop-withdrawal-warn-kurds/">American disengagement</a> from northern Syria and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49956698?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp7r8vgl2y7t/kurds&link_location=live-reporting-story">Turkey’s</a> military campaign in the country that started in October 2019 forced the SDF to redirect its forces towards the north-east. The SDF therefore has fewer resources to devote to the sustained efforts that are needed to prevent IS from resurging. </p>
<p>In early March 2020, a Turkish-Russian <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51763926">deal</a> was concluded, which among others agreed to stop the fighting in Idlib in Syria’s north west. Yet, given the strategic and symbolic importance of <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-syrias-idlib-turkey-is-trying-to-play-middle-man-between-russia-and-the-us-with-little-success-131852">Idlib for those involved in the conflict</a>, experts fear that the deal <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/russian-turkish-patrols-syrias-m4-highway-bumpy-start">might not last</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the SDF’s redeployment of forces to defend Kurdish regions against the Turkish incursion has already opened the door for IS to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/has-turkeys-incursion-into-syria-opened-the-door-for-an-islamic-state-comeback/">regain footholds</a> in the Deir Ezzor area, IS’s last stronghold before its territorial defeat in March 2019.</p>
<h2>7. Foreign fighters and a global presence</h2>
<p>In 2013 and 2014, IS was able to attract large numbers of foreign fighters, at the time estimated at <a href="https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf">11,000 from 74 nations</a>.</p>
<p>While the flow of foreign fighters coming to Iraq and Syria has now nearly halted, IS still maintains a strong propaganda machinery. Groups around the <a href="https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/10/baghdadi-leaves-behind-global-isis.html">world</a> have kept affiliations with IS, such as in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province">west Africa</a> and <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10604.pdf">south-east Asia</a>, and IS still has the capacity to prepare or inspire terrorist attacks around the world. </p>
<p>Given these elements, it seems highly probable that IS will regroup, gain territories, and pose a global threat once again. With <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=796e075ba2-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_09_05_07_56_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-796e075ba2-359936305">coronavirus now clouding the picture</a>, governments around the world have neither payed attention, nor devoted enough resources to prevent a possible IS surge. </p>
<p>The international community would be wise to learn from 2013 and tackle each of these different warning signals now. Addressing them individually is much more feasible and could prevent IS from rising again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The article is from research conducted as part of a project on intelligence, strategic surprise, and learning in European foreign policy (INTEL). The author gratefully acknowledges funding for this project by the UK’s ESRC. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to anyone else.</span></em></p>Seven striking similarities between developments regarding Islamic State today and the period before its surge in 2013-14.Aviva Guttmann, Research Associate in Intelligence and International Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1292162020-01-24T13:38:00Z2020-01-24T13:38:00ZIn the terrorism fight, Trump has continued a key Obama policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310348/original/file-20200115-134789-10ozqvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C1952%2C1392&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. special operations troops are a crucial element of the fight against terrorism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/EA-AP-I-AFG-XWS101-AFGHANISTAN-US-FORCES/f4e88254cbe0da11af9f0014c2589dfb/193/0">AP Photo/Wally Santana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump has rescinded, reversed or otherwise ended many of former President Barack Obama’s signature policies – but not a prominent one. </p>
<p>When it comes to fighting terrorism, the current commander-in-chief has upheld, and even extended, his predecessor’s linchpin strategy: using U.S. military special operations forces and targeted killings on a grand global scale. </p>
<p>This strategy is highlighted by Trump’s recent orders for the military to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/politics/hamza-bin-laden-al-qaeda-dead/index.html">kill or capture al-Qaida leader Hamza bin Laden</a> in September 2019 and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-dead.html">Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> in October 2019 – and in January 2020, for a drone strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=684&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310349/original/file-20200115-134814-lbxrow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thomas Knowlton depicted at the battle of Bunker Hill.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thomas_Knowlton_(The_Death_of_General_Warren_at_the_Battle_of_Bunker%27s_Hill_cropped).jpg">John Trumbull, Museum of Fine Arts/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>The tactic of sending specially trained operatives into hostile territories dates back to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/george-washingtons-commandos-special-ops-during-the-american-11572">America’s Colonial days</a>. In September 1776, Lieut.-Col. <a href="http://www.americanwars.org/ct-american-revolution/knowltons-rangers-1776.htm">Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers</a> carried out one of the first U.S. reconnaissance missions, identifying enemy positions around what today is Manhattan. They quickly found themselves engaged in a firefight with the British. </p>
<h2>Increasingly called upon</h2>
<p>In the mid-20th century, America developed groups of <a href="https://sofrep.com/news/rare-footage-of-lrrps-in-vietnam/">covert combatants</a>, including units that preceded <a href="https://www.navysealmuseum.org/about-navy-seals/seal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-storyseal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-story/seal-history-underwater-demolition-teams-in-the-korean-war">the Navy SEALs</a>, to operate in parallel with larger conventional military forces. For instance, during the Korean War, U.S. Underwater Demolition Teams accomplished what only specially trained troops could do consistently and effectively – <a href="https://www.navysealmuseum.org/about-navy-seals/seal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-storyseal-history-the-naval-special-warfare-story/seal-history-underwater-demolition-teams-in-the-korean-war">destroying bridges and railroad tunnels</a>.</p>
<p>The rise of international terrorism in the 1970s led President Jimmy Carter to establish the Army’s <a href="https://www.military.com/special-operations/delta-force.html">1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta</a>, better known as Delta Force.</p>
<p>Obama, however, transformed special forces from an auxiliary arm into the tip – and at times, the whole – of America’s counterterrorism spear. He boosted special operations forces <a href="https://time.com/5042700/inside-new-american-way-of-war/">by 15,000 troops and support staff, bumped their budget 12% to US$10.4 billion</a>, and deployed them much farther and wider – <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176048/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_a_secret_war_in_135_countries">more than doubling their geographical footprint from 60 to 135 countries</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has eagerly embraced this strategy, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005450516/special-ops-war-on-terror.html">deploying 8,000 special operations personnel to 80 countries</a>. Today, they operate in predictable places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as <a href="https://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176060/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_success,_failure,_and_the_%22finest_warriors_who_ever_went_into_combat%22/">surprising settings such as South America’s Andes Mountains and Africa’s Sahel region</a>.</p>
<p>It took me 10 years of research to fully grasp Obama and Trump’s shared approach. In 2017, I co-produced “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000005450516/special-ops-war-on-terror.html">How Special Ops Became Central to the War on Terror</a>” with Retro Report for the New York Times. PBS recently aired a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/video/retro-report-on-pbs-season-1-episode-7-how-us-came-rely-special-ops-forces/">shorter version</a>. I’m also directing “<a href="https://news.psu.edu/video/603135/2020/01/07/research/penn-state-professor-holocaust-survivor-documentary">Cojot</a>,” which tells the little-known story of a hostage who played a key role in the first special operations rescue mission in a hostile country – the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/25/entebbe-raid-40-years-on-israel-palestine-binyamin-netanyahu-jonathan-freedland">1976 Operation Thunderbolt</a>, better known as Israel’s daring Entebbe raid.</p>
<p>My conclusion is that this strategy offers significant benefits, often in terms of speed and competency, but brings along severe risks, as well – such as lack of transparency and accountability, and potentially conflicting national priorities.</p>
<iframe width="100%" height="332" src="https://player.pbs.org/viralplayer/3034688767/" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" seamless="" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<h2>Clear advantages</h2>
<p>Using a select group of elite troops and choosing very specific targets can be a highly efficient way for presidents to advance military and foreign policy goals that otherwise might take countless years, hundreds of billions of dollars, massive deployments, intense debates with Congress and thorny international entanglements. </p>
<p>Imagine, for instance, if President George W. Bush had simply sent special operations troops to kill Iraqi president Saddam Hussein rather than getting mired in an endless war in that country. Trump recently offered an example, albeit on a smaller scale, of how this approach works: Shortly after announcing the pullout of U.S. troops from northern Syria, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/27/isis-islamic-state-leader-baghdadi-killed/">he successfully deployed Delta Force to take out al-Baghdadi</a>.</p>
<p>This strategy is also relatively inexpensive: Special operations spending in the 2020 federal budget amounts to <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf">US$13.8 billion</a> – an enormous sum that is nevertheless just 1.87% of the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/21/trump-signs-738-billion-defense-bill.html">$738 billion overall defense budget</a>. </p>
<p>And high-profile successes can boost presidents’ public approval ratings. Obama’s climbed from <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/147437/obama-approval-rallies-six-points-bin-laden-death.aspx">46% to 52%</a> after Osama bin Laden’s killing, and Trump’s rose from <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_trump_job_approval-6179.html">41% to 45%</a> after al-Baghdadi and Soleimani’s deaths.</p>
<p>Using small dedicated groups can also fill gaps in intelligence-gathering left by <a href="https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/04/22/technology-has-changed-intelligence-gathering.aspx">satellites, drones and technological spying</a>. Special operations soldiers can track leads on the ground, interrogate suspects and flesh out information needed to make sound decisions and execute complex missions. Zeroing in on specific marks can minimize harm to civilians who might live or work nearby – rather than destroying a village to kill one man, commandos can just attack that individual in his home. </p>
<p>With this approach, the United States uses force more in line with its opponents. Unlike the skyjackers of the 1960s and 1970s, today’s ideological killers do not negotiate. They tend to be extremists, like religious fanatics or white supremacists, rather than attention-seeking secular political activists. They play by different rules, and so do special operations forces. </p>
<p>Unlike conventional forces, special operators do not have to constantly answer to the public, face media scrutiny or become a political punching bag. In fact, the American people have rarely demanded to know more about exactly what special operations forces are up to. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310353/original/file-20200115-134768-1q7mtul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Special operations forces can function in ways regular troops don’t.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/f469ceeec9cb49a0a6a251ee80741376/102/0">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Serious drawbacks</h2>
<p>One of the problems with the dependence on special operations forces is that it exhausts the very people on whom it relies.</p>
<p>“The force has been stretched to the max,” <a href="http://javadc.org/news/press-release/wade-ishimoto-inducted-as-distinguished-member-of-the-special-forces-regiment/">former Delta Force intelligence officer Wade Ishimoto</a> says in my co-production with Retro Report, “How Special Ops Became Central to the War on Terror.” </p>
<p>“Special operations should not be the panacea for every kind of difficulty,” he continues.</p>
<p>Ishimoto warns that special operations soldiers are bound to burn out because there are too few of them to handle all the assignments in far-flung locations. Indeed, in recent years, they have experienced an increase in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/179/3/301/4160774">alcohol abuse</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/suicides-nearly-triple-among-elite-forces-1315810">suicides</a>.</p>
<p>Yet Americans are often in the dark about their special operations. With specialized, clandestine forces, presidents likely find it easier to wage war without consulting Congress and without clear strategic plans. </p>
<p>The recently released <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/">Afghanistan Papers</a> show presidents can <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-nation-building/">keep significant</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-strategy/">secrets</a> about wars, such as the 18-years-and-counting Afghanistan conflict. </p>
<p>The most obvious downside is that special operations missions can fail miserably. In April 1980, when Delta Force tried to rescue the American hostages held in Iran, the troops <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/">never made it past their initial rendezvous point</a> in the desert. In 2017, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/u-s-soldiers-niger-were-pursuing-isis-recruiter-when-ambushed-n813746">al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists in Niger ambushed U.S. special forces soldiers</a>, killing four of them. </p>
<p>The enigmatic nature of the operations means it is possible some special forces deaths never make the nightly news or morning papers. </p>
<p>Still, I doubt this strategy will change in any significant way, regardless of who wins the November 2020 presidential election. It’s not just that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks – it’s that, to many people, <a href="https://www.strategy-business.com/article/09403?gko=c6aca">there is no better alternative</a>. If there were, Trump would probably be quite happy to scrap yet another Obama policy.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Boaz Dvir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending specially trained operatives into hostile territories dates back to Colonial days. In the past decade, special operations forces have become central to America’s counterterrorism efforts.Boaz Dvir, Assistant Professor in Journalism, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1177182019-07-01T10:53:20Z2019-07-01T10:53:20ZAl-Qaida is stronger today than it was on 9/11<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281190/original/file-20190625-81766-1dhs77f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yemen's al-Qaida branch, called al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, is the most dangerous and sophisticated offshoot of the terror group Osama bin Laden founded in Afghanistan in 1988. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-France-Attack-Yemen/cf65ce1632c946e9b5de026158f30171/2/0">AP Photo/Hani Mohammed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Al-Qaida has recruited an estimated <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection">40,000 fighters</a> since Sept. 11, 2001, when the Osama bin Laden-led extremist group attacked the United States, according to the not-for-profit Council on Foreign Relations.</p>
<p>Despite a United States-led global “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/sept-15-2001-president-declares-war-terror-10877347">war on terror</a>” that has <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/research/2018/59-trillion-spent-and-obligated-post-911-wars">cost US$5.9 trillion</a>, killed an estimated <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Human%20Costs%2C%20Nov%208%202018%20CoW.pdf">480,000 to 507,000 people</a> and assassinated bin Laden, al-Qaida has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">grown and spread</a> since 9/11, expanding from rural Afghanistan into <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/12/world/12aqmap.html?_r=0">North Africa, East Africa, the Sahel, the Gulf States, the Middle East and Central Asia</a>. </p>
<p>In those places, al-Qaida has developed new political influence – in some areas even supplanting the local government.</p>
<p>So how does a religious extremist group with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">fewer than a hundred members</a> in September 2001 become a transnational terror organization, even as the world’s biggest military has targeted it for elimination? </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.warzone.cc/current-projects/">my dissertation research on the resiliency of al-Qaida</a> and the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">work of other scholars</a>, the U.S. “war on terror” was the catalyst for al-Qaida’s growth.</p>
<h2>Bin Laden and the ‘war on terror’</h2>
<p>Al-Qaida was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida">founded in Pakistan in 1988</a> in response to the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan. </p>
<p>For decades, it was a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">small, weak and uninspiring movement</a>. Bin Laden sought to raise an Islamic coalition of forces to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/06/what-does-al-qaeda-want/">establish a caliphate</a> – an Islamic state governed with strict Islamic law – across the Muslim world. But as late as 1996 he had <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">just 30 fighters</a> willing to die for the cause.</p>
<p>For years, bin Laden <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">tried to merge</a> with such extremist groups as Egypt’s Ibn al-Khattab and the Libyan Islamic Fighting group, hoping to create a global Islamist movement.</p>
<p>These organizations rejected bin Laden’s overtures. These disparate groups lacked a common enemy that could unite them in al-Qaida’s fight for an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/06/what-does-al-qaeda-want/">Islamic caliphate</a>.</p>
<p>So bin Laden <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">shifted his strategy</a>. He decided to make the United States – a country most Islamic extremist groups see as the enemy of Islam – his main target. </p>
<p>In 1998 al-Qaida waged successful <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/index.html">attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya</a>. In 2000, it bombed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/index.html">the USS Cole</a>, a military ship refueling in a Yemen harbor, killing 17 sailors. </p>
<p>Bin Laden hoped the U.S. would respond with a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">military invasion</a> into Muslim majority territory, triggering a holy war that would put al-Qaida at the forefront of the fight against these unholy invaders. </p>
<p>After al-Qaida operatives flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html">killing 2,977 people</a>, bin Laden got his wish. The United States <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">invaded Afghanistan</a> on Oct. 7, 2001. Eighteen months later, it invaded Iraq. </p>
<h2>How al-Qaida grew</h2>
<p>Islamic groups and individual extremists <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21?highlight=al+qaeda">flocked to bin Laden’s cause</a> after 9/11. Al-Qaida became the nucleus of a global violent Islamist movement, with affiliates across the Middle East and Africa swearing their allegiance.</p>
<p>At the same time, the war in Afghanistan was decimating al-Qaida’s core operations. </p>
<p>Leaders were killed by drone strikes or driven into <a href="https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/fearlait.pdf">hiding</a>. The Bush administration claimed <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jun/7/20050607-121910-3725r/">killing 75%</a> of al-Qaida leadership. Bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders sought refuge in places like the <a href="https://arizona.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/drone-warfare-in-yemen-fostering-emirates-through-counterterroris">Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan</a> and Yemen – remote areas <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28717532/The_Global_and_the_Local_Al-Qaeda_and_Yemen_s_Tribes_2017_">outside the easy reach of U.S. ground forces</a>.</p>
<p>To evade U.S. detection, al-Qaida had to <a href="https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/MEI%20Policy%20Paper_Kendall_7.pdf">limit communication</a> between its newly decentralized fronts. That meant the group’s global leadership had to have autonomy to operate relatively independently. </p>
<p>Bin Laden expected al-Qaida affiliates to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-isis-madness-lies-extremism-islamic-state-terrorist-groups-compete-a7526271.html">adhere to certain core values, strategies</a> and, of course, pursue the objective of establishing an Islamic caliphate.</p>
<p>But newly minted regional al-Qaida leaders – people like <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Ahmed Abdi Godane</a> in Somalia and <a href="https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/MEI%20Policy%20Paper_Kendall_7.pdf">Nasir al-Wuhayshi in Yemen</a> – enjoyed enough autonomy to pursue their own agendas in these unstable places. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida Iraq, al-Shabaab and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, as their groups came to be known, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf">embedded themselves in the local political scene</a>. They began building credibility, establishing alliances and recruiting fighters.</p>
<p>By 2015, when bin Laden was killed, al-Qaida was a network of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/world/africa/al-shabaab-explainer/index.html">regional caliphates</a>. Today its territory <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21?highlight=al+qaeda">spans from Afghanistan and Pakistan to North Africa, the Middle East and beyond</a>.</p>
<h2>Manipulation of a sectarian divide</h2>
<p>Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, headquartered in Yemen, is a case study in how the group now wields its power more locally. </p>
<p>Yemen has been in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44466574">civil war</a> since 2015, when a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Houthi Shiite armed group</a> declared war against the country’s Sunni Muslim government.</p>
<p>Although this conflict appears sectarian in nature, the Yemen scholar Marieke Brandt argues it is largely about political power – namely, the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28717532/The_Global_and_the_Local_Al-Qaeda_and_Yemen_s_Tribes_2017_">Yemeni government’s longstanding neglect of the Houthi</a> minority, who come from northern Yemen.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, al-Qaida – a Sunni terror group – saw political opportunity in Yemen’s civil war. </p>
<p>The group has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base">played up religious divisions in the civil war</a>. Using its <a href="https://www.academia.edu/15757466/Al-Qaida_and_Islamic_State_in_Yemen_A_Battle_for_Local_Audiences">Arabic magazine, martyrdom videos, poetry and popular songs</a>, al-Qaida has endeared itself to the local Sunni people and Yemen’s powerful Sunni tribal leaders. It has also ingratiated itself to Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-backed government and <a href="https://www.academia.edu/15757466/Al-Qaida_and_Islamic_State_in_Yemen_A_Battle_for_Local_Audiences">fought alongside Sunni tribal militias to battle the Houthi incursion</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy has been remarkably effective for al-Qaida. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had <a href="https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Dawsari_FINAL_180201.pdf">hundreds of fighters</a> at its founding in 2009. It now has about <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?%20symbol=S/2018/705&referer=/english/&Lang=E">7,000 fighters in Yemen</a>, most of them Sunnis recruited from territory the Houthis have attempted to take over. </p>
<p>It has planted <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/07/06/feature/as-a-u-s-shadow-war-intensifies-in-yemen-al-qaeda-is-down-but-not-out/?utm_term=.addac74fd4e5">landmines</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/suicide-bombing-in-yemen-kills-scores-at-military-parade-rehearsal/2012/05/21/gIQA3Ug2eU_story.html?utm_term=.a588e03182dc">bombs</a> across Yemen that have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/30/world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-us-terrorism.html">killed hundreds</a>, held <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/family-of-american-held-hostage-in-yemen-pleads-for-his-safe-release-1417806069">journalists hostage</a> and, in 2015, orchestrated the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237">massacre at the offices of the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. government considers al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to be the <a href="https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Dawsari_FINAL_180201.pdf">most sophisticated and threatening branch</a> of al-Qaida.</p>
<h2>Adapt the tactic, keep the mission</h2>
<p>In adapting its methods to Yemeni culture, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has made some missteps. </p>
<p>In 2011, the group attempted to impose extremely strict <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base">Islamic rule</a> over two areas it controlled in south Yemen. Al-Qaida instituted rigid punishments of the sort common in Afghanistan, such as cutting off the hands of a thief and banning the chewed stimulant plant called khat. </p>
<p>These extreme rules got al-Qaida <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/9779-ansar-al-sharia-and-governance-in-southern-yemen">run out of town</a> by Sunni tribal militias. </p>
<p>The next time al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula asserted its political power over parts of Yemen left ungoverned in the chaos of civil war, in 2015, it did not rule directly over these territories. Rather, it allowed a local council to govern according their own norms and customs. And it <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/9779-ansar-al-sharia-and-governance-in-southern-yemen">kept the khat</a> market open. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida also paid for long-neglected public services like schools, water and electricity – effectively becoming the state.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base">International Crisis Group</a>, a humanitarian organization, this softer stance <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rebel-Governance-Civil-War-Arjona/dp/1107102227">helped garner the acceptance of the local population</a>. That, in turn, ensured al-Qaida could keep using Yemen as a regional headquarters.</p>
<p>A similar <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28717532/The_Global_and_the_Local_Al-Qaeda_and_Yemen_s_Tribes_2017_">shift from global to local</a> has occurred in al-Qaida affiliates in <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">Somalia, Iraq and Syria</a>. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida is no longer a hierarchical organization taking orders from its famous, charismatic leader, as it was on 9/11. </p>
<p>But it is stronger and more resilient than it was under bin Laden. And the “war on terror” has helped, not hurt it.</p>
<p><em>This story has been updated to correct an error introduced during editing. Al-Qaida was founded in Peshawar, Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was not founded in Afghanistan.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Taylor is affiliated with Warzone Initiatives, a nonprofit organization working to address conflicts involving non-state armed groups. </span></em></p>Bin Laden’s extremist group had less than a hundred members in September 2001. Today it’s a transnational terror organization with 40,000 fighters across the Middle East, Africa and beyond.Christian Taylor, Doctoral Student, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1160492019-05-09T10:38:20Z2019-05-09T10:38:20ZUS ‘foreign terrorist’ designation is more punishment than threat detector<p>The Trump administration in April designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, a branch of Iran’s military and intelligence services, as a <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/hp644.aspx">terrorist group</a>. Any groups designated this way are cut off from potential U.S. funding, communications with Americans, travel to the U.S. and other American “material support.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization-73576">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, an Egyptian political party founded on Islamic ideals, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1">may be next</a>.</p>
<p>The IRGC is the first government agency to receive such a designation, which calls attention to the political purposes that often prompts additions and removals from the list. Since its creation in 1997, the State Department’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm">Foreign Terrorist Organizations</a> list has been used to punish enemies, appease allies and advance discrete U.S. foreign policy interests. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://genius.com/Us-department-of-state-us-foreign-terrorist-watchlist-annotated">annotated version</a> of this list exposes the quirks, inconsistencies and strategic logic behind the “terrorist” designation, revealing why it’s hardly a master directory of the militant groups most likely to target Americans. </p>
<p><strong><em>This document was edited using <a href="https://genius.com/a/news-genius">Genius</a>. To see an annotation, click or tap the gray-highlighted part of the transcript. <a href="https://genius.com/Us-department-of-state-us-foreign-terrorist-watchlist-annotated">Go here</a> to view the annotations – or add your own – on the Genius website. Common spellings of group names are in parentheses.</em></strong></p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-387" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/387/38a9b06eebac6cd3b3bd47efa9e146afc25522fc/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Fleury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A terrorism expert exposes the quirks, inconsistencies and foreign policy strategy behind the State Department’s terrorist watchlist.Eric Fleury, Visiting Assistant Professor, College of the Holy CrossLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1159152019-04-25T01:13:01Z2019-04-25T01:13:01ZIslamic State has claimed responsibility for the Sri Lanka terror attack. Here’s what that means<p>In the wake of any tragedy, it should be enough to grieve and stand in solidarity with those who mourn. With a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/death-toll-rises-to-359-in-sri-lanka-bombings-more-arrested-1.5108536">massive toll</a> – about 250 dead, according to revised government figures – it feels disrespectful to the people of Sri Lanka to be dissecting what went wrong even as the dead are being buried. </p>
<p>But the reality is that most, if not all, of these lives need not have been taken. We owe it to them and their loved ones to make sense of what happened and work towards doing all that can be done to ensure it does not happen again.</p>
<p>The Easter attacks represent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/22/sri-lanka-terrorist-attacks-among-worst-world-911">one of the most lethal and serious terrorist operations</a> since the September 11 attacks in the US, outside of attacks within active conflict zones. And this in a now peaceful country, which for all its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict">history of civil war</a> and ethno-nationalist terrorism in decades past has never had a problem with jihadi radical Islamist terrorism.</p>
<h2>A return to deadlier, more coordinated strikes</h2>
<p>The long-anticipated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/23/sri-lanka-bombings-first-burials-take-place-on-day-of-mourning">claim of responsibility</a> for the attacks was made by the Islamic State (IS) on Tuesday night. This could help explain how one local cell based around a single extended family circle of hateful extremists not previously known for terrorism could execute such a massive attack. It was larger even than IS’s previous truck-bomb attacks in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The attacks follow a familiar, if now rarely seen, IS operandi of coordinated suicide bombings. The targeting of Catholic churches, which made little sense initially in the context of the domestic social issues at the heart of the country’s recent civil war, fit an all-too-familiar <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/content/isiss-persecution-religions">pattern of IS attacks on Christians</a>, along with fellow Muslims.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-sri-lankas-christians-115799">Who are Sri Lanka's Christians?</a>
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<p>The fact that 40 or more Sri Lankans travelled to Syria to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/23/sri-lanka-attack-is-the-wave-of-the-future-isis-terrorism-returnees/">fight with IS</a> could help explain how the terror network was able to build vital personal links in the very small community of Sri Lankan Islamist extremists so it could subcontract its attack plans to them. At this point, the precise involvement of returnees from Syria and foreign IS supporters in the bombings remains under investigation.</p>
<p>The Easter weekend attacks more resemble the <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4677978/ns/world_news-hunt_for_al_qaida/t/al-qaida-timeline-plots-attacks/#.XMD6aJMzYWo">al-Qaeda attacks of the 2000s</a> than they do recent attacks of IS. Like the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/index.html">2000 attack of the USS Cole in Yemen</a>, the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/09/911-the-day-of-the-attacks/100143/">September attacks in New York and Washington</a>, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138">2002 bombings in Bali</a>, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/16/world/20-in-istanbul-die-in-bombings-at-synagogues.html">2003 truck bombs in Istanbul</a>, the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fast-facts/index.html">2004 train bombings in Madrid</a>, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598">2005 tube and bus bombings in London</a>, the Sri Lanka bombings involved multiple attackers acting in concert. With the exception of September 11, all of these also involved improvised explosive devices (IEDs). </p>
<p>The Sri Lanka bombings exceeded all but the September 11 attacks in sophistication and deadliness, despite the fact the perpetrators were previously known only for acts of hateful vandalism.</p>
<p>Over the past decade, al-Qaeda has been unable to carry out significant attacks outside of conflict zones. It has also become increasingly focused on “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/isis-strategy-paris-attacks/416016/">reputation management</a>” and has tended to avoid indiscriminate mass killings, all the whilst growing its global network of affiliates.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/out-of-the-ashes-of-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-rise-and-rise-of-islamic-state-55437">Out of the ashes of Afghanistan and Iraq: the rise and rise of Islamic State</a>
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<p>The emergence of IS saw the tempo and scale of terrorist attacks transformed. Most attacks took place in conflict zones (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, southern Philippines). </p>
<p>A number of significant attacks were conducted well beyond the battlefield. There were at least four such attacks in 2014, 16 in 2015, 22 in 2016, 18 in 2017, and 10 in 2018. The vast majority of these attacks were conducted by lone actors. </p>
<p>Why was it that, outside of conflict zones, not just al-Qaeda but even IS at the height of its powers focused largely on <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-draws-lone-wolves-to-the-islamic-state-86746">lone-actor attacks</a>? </p>
<p>It is probably not for want of trying. The reason is that most larger, more ambitious plots were tripped-up by intelligence intercepts. This is especially the case in stable democracies, including our neighbours Indonesia and Malaysia.</p>
<h2>Why Sri Lanka?</h2>
<p>The other big question is how one of the deadliest terrorist attacks ever was able to be executed in Sri Lanka? </p>
<p>Sri Lanka was a soft target. Having successfully defeated the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/11/2008112019115851343.html">Tamil Tiger rebel group</a> a decade ago through military might, Sri Lanka has become complacent. It has not seen a pressing need to develop police and non-military intelligence capacity to counter terrorism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-is-over-but-not-sri-lankas-climate-of-violence-and-threats-29033">War is over, but not Sri Lanka's climate of violence and threats</a>
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<p>At the same time, it has struggled with good governance and political stability. Just six months ago, it faced a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sri-lankas-prime-minister-reinstated-ending-political-crisis/2018/12/16/28e00486-0077-11e9-a17e-162b712e8fc2_story.html?utm_term=.fe4e3c3207e4">major constitutional crisis</a> when President Maithripala Sirisena sacked his deputy, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, and attempted to replace him with the former prime minister and president Mahinda Rajapaksa. </p>
<p>The attempt failed, but in the stand-off that ensued, Wickremesinghe, and ministers loyal to him, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-blasts-politics/sri-lanka-pm-not-alerted-to-warning-of-attack-because-of-feud-minister-idUSKCN1RY15D">were excluded from intelligence briefings</a>. In particular, they say that they were left unaware of the multiple warnings issued by the Indian intelligence service, RAW, to the authorities in Colombo about the extremist figures who played a key role in the Easter attacks.</p>
<p>Thus, despite several discoveries earlier this year of large amounts of explosives stored in remote rural locations on the island, and multiple warnings from the Indians, <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/sri-lanka-attack-india-warned-sri-lanka-of-threat-2-hours-before-suicide-attacks-report-2027552">including final alerts just hours before Sunday’s attacks</a>, the government and security community were left distracted and caught off-guard. </p>
<p>Between “fighting the last war” and fighting each other, they deluded themselves that there was no imminent terrorist threat.</p>
<h2>What other countries are vulnerable?</h2>
<p>If the massive attacks in Sri Lanka over Easter serve to remind us that IS is very far from being a spent force, the question is where this energetic and well-resourced network will strike next.</p>
<p>For all that it achieved in Sri Lanka, IS is unlikely to be able to build an enduring presence there. So long as the Sri Lankan government and people emerge from this trauma with renewed commitment to unity – and with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/sri-lankas-presidential-elections-progress-regression-or-paralysis/">elections at the end of the year</a>, this is far from certain – the “perfect storm” conditions exploited by IS are unlikely to be repeated.</p>
<p>So where else is IS likely to find opportunity? India and Bangladesh continue to present opportunities, as does much of Central Asia. In our region, it is Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines that we should be most worried about. </p>
<p>Malaysia has emerged stronger and more stable from its swing-back to democracy but continues to be worryingly in denial about the extent to which it is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, downplaying the <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/kl-says-foreign-militants-eyeing-malaysia-as-safe-haven">very good work</a> done over many years by the Special Branch of the Royal National Malaysian Police. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/defeated-in-syria-and-iraq-the-islamic-state-is-rebuilding-in-countries-like-indonesia-96724">Defeated in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is rebuilding in countries like Indonesia</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/05/24/terrorists-in-southern-thailand-go-on-a-bombing-spree">Thailand</a> and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/terrorism-suspected-in-fatal-philippines-church-bombings-20190127-p50ty7.html">the Philippines</a> remain less politically stable, and rather more brittle than they care too acknowledge. And both tend to delude themselves into thinking that the problems of their southern extremes will never manifest in a terror attack in Bangkok or Manila, respectively. </p>
<p>The people of Sri Lanka have paid far too high price for the lessons of the Easter weekend attacks to be ignored or forgotten.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.
</span></em></p>The deadly Sri Lanka attacks show a return to the coordinated, sophisticated strikes employed by al-Qaeda in the 2000s, focusing on soft targets with vulnerable institutions.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148072019-04-14T14:23:02Z2019-04-14T14:23:02ZThe rout of ISIS gives the world an opportunity to defeat its ideology<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268821/original/file-20190411-44818-6l4p5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S.-backed Syrian soldier reacts as an airstrike hits territory held by Islamic State militants outside Baghouz, Syria, in February 2019. The Islamic State group has been reduced from its self-proclaimed caliphate that once spread across much of Syria and Iraq at its height in 2014 to a speck of land on the countries' shared border. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Felipe Dana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Islamic State (ISIS) <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/23/middleeast/isis-caliphate-end-intl/index.html">has been defeated</a> in Syria. This brings an end to the world’s most feared terrorist group and their control of physical territory over the past five years. However, despite the defeat of the “Caliphate,” the global jihadist movement is alive and well.</p>
<p>A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated there were approximately <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">230,000 terrorist fighters</a> across the globe supporting jihadist ideologies (ISIS and al Qaida) in 2018. That’s an increase of 400 per cent since 2001. </p>
<p>The number of countries affected by this type of ideologically inspired violence has increased across the board.</p>
<p>Consider that ISIS has expanded and is present <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/the-fight-is-not-over-fears-of-isis-resurgence-in-philippines">in the Philippines</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/isis-afghanistan-nangarhar-1.5044622">Afghanistan</a>, Egypt, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/libyas-political-instability-makes-room-for-isis-to-regroup">Libya</a> and West Africa. Al Qaida has become entrenched in Yemen and has an arm <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190305-terror-attacks-rise-mali-un">in Mali</a> that is fighting a United Nations peacekeeping mission and causing chaos across the <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/12/jihadists-are-trying-to-take-over-the-sahel">wider Sahel</a>. </p>
<p>Boko Haram has morphed into a regional security threat in West Africa, destabilizing <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/africa/nigeria-gov-boko-haram-attack-intl/index.html">Nigeria</a>, Cameroon and Chad in particular. In the Horn of Africa, the militant group <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190323-al-shabaab-gunmen-somalia-suicide-car-bombing-terrorists">al Shabaab</a> continues to carry out frequent attacks against civilians in Somalia and Kenya. A new jihadist group has recently emerged and carried out <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/suspected-jihadists-kill-12-in-northern-mozambique-20190114">attacks in northern Mozambique</a>.</p>
<h2>The danger of underestimating jihadists</h2>
<p>The international approach to counter these groups has not been the success many would like us to believe, and underestimating the ongoing threat of jihadist ideologies to global security would be a grave mistake.</p>
<p>These groups are unified in their opposition to democracy, multiculturalism, pluralism, diversity, freedom of religion and freedom of expression, women’s rights and those of sexual minorities. They want to impose a mono-religious culture on others, and their violent acts have resulted in massive human rights violations, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/09/yazidis-isis-only-bones-remain-fear-returning-home">including genocide</a> and crimes against humanity. </p>
<p>ISIS in particular has had a negative impact on the West, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/berlin-christmas-market-attack-terrorism-terrorist-refugees-far-right-neo-nazi-extremes-reciprocal-a7489946.html">fuelling</a> far-right groups and populism, contributing to anti-immigrant sentiments and fostering a general fear and hatred of Muslims.</p>
<p>Are we, the international community, truly ready to discuss what these terrorist groups are trying to do? Are we prepared to confront the ideology that drives their actions and political objectives?</p>
<h2>‘Ideology matters’</h2>
<p>Writing in <em>The Atlantic</em>, journalist Graeme Wood <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/ideology-was-behind-christchurch-tragedy/585856/">commented</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A funny thing happened after the tragedy of Christchurch: Everyone discovered, all at once, that ideology matters. Four years ago, commentators were contorting themselves to attribute jihadism to politics, social conditions, abnormal psychology —anything but the spread of wicked beliefs that lead, more or less directly, to violence.”</p>
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<p>Indeed, decision-makers across the globe hear from experts who argue the drivers of ISIS-inspired terrorism are climate change, mental health issues, the internet and/or poverty. More often than not, they ignore the elephant in the room — ideology.</p>
<p>The real battlefront is on the ideological level. Like it or not, we must engage in this battle of ideas. Only by having rational discussions about the ideas that drive modern-day terrorist groups’ behaviour and actions will we be able to adopt and implement a global strategy to prevent and contain the problem at hand.</p>
<p>With the collapse of ISIS’s stronghold in Syria, the international community now has a historic opportunity that it cannot let pass.</p>
<p>Instead of drone attacks and assassinating ISIS members and other extremists, we should pursue justice and end impunity. Western countries in particular must bolster its democratic institutions and follow the rule of law.</p>
<p>The Kurds are now holding thousands of ISIS fighters in northern Syria and have called for the international community to set up an <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/kurdish-administration-calls-for-tribunal-for-isis-detainees-1.3839251">international tribunal</a> to prosecute them. <a href="http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/6287f546-0d2c-40b4-b46a-9505d9ede6c2">Germany</a>, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5030128/sweden-international-tribunal-isis-fighters/">Sweden</a>, <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-austria-security-islamic-state/austria-wants-islamic-state-fighters-to-be-tried-in-un-style-tribunals-idUKKCN1RM1MR">Austria</a> and a few other countries have publicly supported this initiative. Most Western countries however have been <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/02/18/695831550/european-leaders-reluctant-to-meet-trumps-demands-to-take-back-captive-isis-figh">reluctant to repatriate their citizens</a> who joined ISIS, or prosecute them in domestic courts.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In this 2016 photo, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and commanders overlook Islamic State group positions during heavy fighting in Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Felipe Dana, File)</span></span>
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<p>The Kurdish call to bring ISIS to justice is an idea worth pursuing. </p>
<p>It is imperative that a new global strategy in countering terrorism focus on prosecuting ISIS and their leaders for crimes that are enshrined in international human rights law, while also exposing how the group was created, funded and supported.</p>
<p>Nobel Peace Prize laureate Nadia Murad recently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/04/i-am-survivor-islamic-state-violence-dont-forget-us/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.08e6dea8ad2a">pronounced:</a> </p>
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<p>“International actors must help preserve evidence of the Yazidi genocide and other Islamic State attacks, including mass graves, documents and the testimonies of survivors. We are ready to face our captors and rapists in local and international courts, and even participate in a truth and reconciliation committee. Do not let our stories and our bravery go to waste.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-canada-must-prosecute-returning-isis-fighters-105198">Why Canada must prosecute returning ISIS fighters</a>
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<p>Only by prosecuting these extremists will the world be able to marginalize those who carry out violent acts and those who give credence to their ideas. </p>
<p>By holding the perpetrators to account and exposing what they have done, the world will send an important signal that all countries, cultures and religions stand united against these extremists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Matthews is affiliated with the Global Diplomacy Lab and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. </span></em></p>Only by prosecuting extremists will the world be able to marginalize those who carry out violent acts and those who give credence to their ideas.Kyle Matthews, Executive Director, The Montréal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.