tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/al-sisi-9553/articlesal-Sisi – The Conversation2024-02-22T18:01:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242062024-02-22T18:01:32Z2024-02-22T18:01:32ZGaza update: Biden ups the pressure on Israel as deadline for Rafah assault approaches<p>Joe Biden’s most senior Middle East adviser, Brett McGurk, has arrived in Israel to push for a deal to halt the war in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. McGurk has served each successive president since joining George W. Bush’s national security team in 2005, and his presence in the region at this increasingly crucial time, as Israel prepares for a ground assault on the overcrowded southern Gaza city of Rafah, is an indication of the urgency with which the Biden administration views the situation.</p>
<p>Thus far, intransigence on both sides has scuppered various initiatives aimed at securing a ceasefire. Last week, after Benjamin Netanyahu pulled Israeli negotiators out of talks in Egypt, blaming Hamas for refusing to budge on what he called its “ludicrous” demands, Israel’s prime minister pledged to press ahead with the Rafah offensive. However, his war cabinet member Benny Gantz said this week that a deal might still be possible.</p>
<p>Failing that, the prospect of an all-out assault on Rafah, where more than a million Palestinians from across the Gaza Strip have taken refuge, on March 10 – the start of Ramadan – is very real. Casualties are likely to be enormous, unless people are given somewhere to escape to.</p>
<p>Biden has repeatedly urged Netanyahu to rethink the assault on Rafah, calling for a “credible and executable plan” for protecting and supporting the Palestinians sheltering there. And as Paul Rogers, an internationally respected expert in Middle East security issues at the University of Bradford, notes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">there is a precedent</a>.</p>
<p>In 1982, during the war between Israel and Lebanon, the then-US president Ronald Reagan telephoned Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to demand he call off the 11-hour bombardment of West Beirut, where thousands of fighters from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were sheltering. “Menachem, this is a holocaust,” Reagan is reported to have said. Begin duly called off his bombers.</p>
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<img alt="Ronald and Nancy Reagan with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and his daughter Matt Milo in the White House, Setpember 1981." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Friends in high places: Ronald and Nancy Reagan hosting a state dinner for Menachem Begin and his daughter, Matti Milo, in September 1981.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Collection</span></span>
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<p>Rogers highlights the long and close association between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In a country where pretty much anyone who is anyone has served in Israel’s military, this counts for a lot. Perhaps, he writes, the IDF could put extra pressure on Netanyahu to reconsider. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">Gaza war: will Israel respond to US pressure to tread carefully in Rafah? There is a precedent</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, satellite images and video footage have revealed that Egypt is building what appears to be a large concrete enclosure on its side of the Rafah crossing. Analysts believe this is being prepared as a contingency for dealing with what could be hundreds of thousands of displaced persons pushed out of Gaza into the Sinai peninsula.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Gillian Kennedy, an Egypt specialist at the University of Southampton, has been considering what <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">such an exodus would mean</a> for Egypt’s strongman president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. </p>
<p>Sisi is not popular at home. He may have won an election last year with 89% of the vote, but given the lack of opposition candidates, this was hardly surprising. Egypt’s economy is in a parlous state, with rampant inflation and stubbornly high unemployment, so having to host a huge influx of refugees is not something Sisi will be anticipating with much relish.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Egypt building a large concrete structure on its side of the Rafah crossing.</span></figcaption>
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<p>And the close relations between supporters of Hamas and Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood – Sisi’s implacable foes – make this prospect all the more unpalatable, Kennedy concludes. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">As Israel's assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees</a>
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<h2>Grim in Gaza</h2>
<p>For Palestinians trapped in Gaza, meanwhile, there is the spectre of starvation. The world’s major authority on food insecurity, the IPC Famine Review Committee, estimates that 90% of Gazans are facing acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>Yara M. Asi, a food security expert at the University of Central Florida, writes that people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">resorting to eating cattle feed and grass</a>. They are hunting cats for food. And things are likely to get worse, Asi observes. The UN agency responsible for coordinating aid in Gaza, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), says it will have to cease operations in March after many of its funders withdrew over Israeli allegations that UNRWA staff had taken part in the October 7 Hamas attacks. </p>
<p>And, making matters worse, Israeli bombing has destroyed bakeries, food production facilities and grocery stores. It is now estimated that, of the people facing imminent starvation in the world today, 95% are in Gaza.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<p>Of course, food production facilities and shops aren’t the only things that have been reduced to rubble by the IDF during its relentless four-month assault. For decades, the people of Gaza had become used to a cycle of destruction and rebuilding writes Yousif Al-Daffaie, a researcher in the field of cultural heritage and post-war countries at Nottingham Trent University. But this time around, the devastation has been so complete that there is almost nothing left to rebuild.</p>
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<p>Most importantly for the soul of Gaza, nearly 200 sites of cultural importance have been wrecked, including an ancient harbour dating back to 800BC, a mosque that was home to rare manuscripts, and one of the world’s oldest Christian monasteries. This act of what Al-Daffaie calls <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">“urbicide”</a> includes Palestine Square in Gaza City, a popular meeting place, and Gaza’s only public library on Omar Al-Mukhtar Street, one of Gaza City’s two main streets, which has been totally destroyed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">The destruction of Gazaʼs historic buildings is an act of 'urbicide'</a>
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<h2>Israel: hurt, angry and isolated</h2>
<p>All the while, the world is watching. What has become clear since the vicious Hamas attack on October 7 sparked Israel’s brutal military response is the massive disconnect between how most Israelis and much of the rest of the world see this current episode. </p>
<p>Eyal Mayroz, a senior lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, says that while the outside world sees daily reports of death and suffering in Gaza, in Israel much of the media <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">remains focused</a> on the pain of the attack by Hamas and the plight of the 130 remaining hostages and their families.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">Why do Israelis and the rest of the world view the Gaza conflict so differently? And can this disconnect be overcome?</a>
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<p>Ilan Zvi Baron of Durham University and Ilai Z. Saltzman of the University of Maryland highlight the pain and anger of most Israelis since October 7. They write that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">reaction of some on the progressive left</a>, some of whom celebrated the Hamas attack as an act of anti-colonial resistance, is not understood in Israel. This, they say, is a problem for Israel’s peace movement, which now feels more isolated than ever and unable to pressure their government to work harder for a peaceful solution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">Gaza war: blaming Israel for October 7 Hamas attack makes peace less – not more – likely</a>
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<h2>Listen up: peace polling</h2>
<p>Finally, regular readers may recall <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">an article we published</a> by Colin Irwin, a researcher at the University of Liverpool whose work with “peace polling” played a key role in the negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland. Irwin noted that he was set to reprise his role when Barack Obama won the US presidency in 2008, but a lack of political will and Netanyahu’s refusal to include Hamas put paid to any chance of peace talks succeeding at that stage.</p>
<p>In this week’s episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, Irwin explains how peace polling emerged from his work among Canada’s Inuit minority, and has been used from Sri Lanka to Cyprus.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">Israel-Gaza: how opinion polls used in Northern Ireland could pave a way to peace</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict in Gaza from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240202024-02-22T10:48:31Z2024-02-22T10:48:31ZAs Israel’s assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees<p>Satellite imagery and video footage <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/egypt-building-walled-enclosure-in-sinai-for-rafah-refugees-videos-suggest">have emerged</a> suggesting that Egypt is building what appears to be a large, concrete-walled enclosure which observers believe will be used to manage a major influx of Palestinian refugees flooding out of Gaza via the Rafah crossng on its eastern border. </p>
<p>As Israel’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">planned military assault</a> on the city of Rafah edges ever closer, it presents the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, with a potentially serious problem. The displacement into his country of potentially hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the afflicted enclave could seriously destabilise what is an extremely fragile political environment.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vbsYURUu_Jo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">To keep Palestinians out, or welcome them into Egypt?</span></figcaption>
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<p>For Egyptians, the potential for spillover of the Gazan conflict is a major concern. Plagued with Islamist groups <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/insurgency-in-sinai-challenges-and-prospects/">mounting regular attacks</a> on Egyptian military instalments in the Sinai Peninsula since 2013, the last thing Sisi needs are enormous numbers of displaced and traumatised refugees. </p>
<p>Yet, with the Palestinian death toll <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-death-toll-rises-29313-rafah-residents-killed-strike-2024-02-21/">now approaching 30,000</a> – approximately 70% of whom are reported to be women and children – and Israel planning on invading Rafah, where upwards of a million Palestinians are huddled, the prospect of refugees spilling into the Sinai looks more and more likely. </p>
<p>Sisi has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-778521">roundly condemned</a> Israel’s military assault on Gaza, and is fully aware of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding just across the border. But two key issues are deterring him from making any hasty altruistic decisions in support of desperate Gazans fleeing hostilities.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Israel, Egypt and Jordan showing Gaza." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Egypt fears that an assault on Rafah will force hundreds of thousands of Palestinians across the border into its Sinai peninsula.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/part-southern-district-israel-political-map-2373692837">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>For a start, Egypt is in no position to absorb large numbers of Palestinian refugees. Besides dealing with a decade-long insurgency in the very border areas that would have to host the refugees, the strong presence of Islamist groups ideologically close to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood would be very dangerous, given his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/06/as-hunger-bites-is-egypt-ready-to-turn-its-back-on-its-president">unpopularity at home</a>. Despite <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/19/egypt-2023-presidential-election-results-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-wins-no-challengers">winning the election in December 2023</a> with a reported 90% of votes, the ballot was widely seen as the most flawed to date. Opposition leaders were arrested and anyone criticising Sisi faced censure. </p>
<p>Accepting an influx of Palestinians, many of whom would be supportive of Hamas, could be hazardous for Sisi. Especially so given his <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood</a> since the 2013 military coup which ousted the then-president and Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohamed Morsi. </p>
<p>Compounding this is Egypt’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-stumbling-economy-faces-new-pressures-gaza-crisis-2023-11-10/">broken economic model</a>. It is now the second-largest debtor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is currently in talks to increase its loans. </p>
<p>Unemployment has <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/130398/Egypt-s-unemployment-rate-reaches-record-low-of-6-9#">sat at 7%</a> for nearly a decade and as of the end of 2023, inflation was a <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/inflation-cpi">staggering 38%</a>. Egypt has neither the political will nor the economic capacity to handle a mass displacement of Gazan refugees across its border.</p>
<h2>Egypt can help</h2>
<p>But it is possible that, with enough international support, Egypt could be persuaded to offer sanctuary, whether short term or for a longer period, to displaced people from Gaza. It has done similar before in a different context – last year, in return for €21 million (£18 million) in funding from the European Union, Egypt <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-egypt-sudan-pledges-millions-refugee-flow">took in 200,000 people</a> fleeing violence in Sudan. The deal aimed to prevent migrant flows reaching Europe.</p>
<p>Sisi could secure a deal on a similar premise, using the Gaza conflict in return for help from Europe or the US to deal with Egypt’s deteriorating economic situation. But this is not a sustainable solution. </p>
<p>Temporarily, more refugee camps could be provided. But given the damage to Gaza after Israel’s ground assault, the permanent settlement of these displaced people would need to be considered. It’s highly unlikely that Sisi would be prepared to accept this.</p>
<h2>The ‘day after’</h2>
<p>Sisi is not the only leader thinking of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-what-gaza-might-look-like-the-day-after-the-war-217323">“day after”</a> – although, as the Rafah invasion presently scheduled for Ramadan edges ever closer, the problem looms ever larger. The US president, Joe Biden, has spoken about the need for the Palestinian Authority <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-palestinian-authority-should-ultimately-govern-gaza-west-bank-2023-11-18/">to be revitalised</a>, in order to facilitate negotiations for a new two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.</p>
<p>Although it’s difficult to foresee amid the trauma and violence among both populations, this long-term plan is something that Egypt could play an instrumental role in. Its intelligence services are known to have <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/palestine-strange-resurrection-two-state-solution-indyk">significant knowledge</a> of the Hamas tunnel system, and it <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/fix-middle-east-united-states?check_logged_in=1">has been reported</a> that many Egyptian army personnel are involved in the smuggling economy in Gaza.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Egypt’s longstanding position on Palestinian statehood, its decades-long normalisation of relations with Israel, and its more recent reset of relations with pro-Brotherhood states such as Qatar (host of much of the Hamas leadership) puts it in a unique position to foster a plan for a two-state solution. </p>
<p>In December, Egypt and Qatar collaborated to develop a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/25/egypt-sets-out-plan-to-end-gaza-war-free-all-hostages">plan for a ceasefire</a>, contingent on phased hostage releases and prisoner exchanges. While this plan broke down fairly quickly through Israeli intransigence, it could be a model to build on for an eventual end to the conflict.</p>
<p>If there is no sustainable ceasefire, Egypt faces the prospect of having to take on the responsibility of hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians. The Egyptian public, which is largely sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians, is likely to accept refugees on a temporary basis to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe getting worse than it already is. </p>
<p>But Sisi will need to make some serious decisions for the long term, or the bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict could have dire consequences for his own country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gillian Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt would be seriously destabilised by hundreds of thousands of people fleeing Gaza.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/534612016-01-25T06:19:38Z2016-01-25T06:19:38ZFive years on, the spirit of Tahrir Square has been all but crushed<p>Five years ago, the chant “El‑sha’ab, yureed, isqat el‑nizam!" ("the people want the fall of the regime!”) resounded through the streets of Cairo, marking the start of a popular uprising that saw one of the region’s longest-standing dictators deposed in just 18 days. </p>
<p>The so-called Egyptian revolution of 2011, part of the wider trend of the Arab Springs or <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/general/2011/04/20114483425914466.html">Arab Awakening</a>, was seen by many as being as significant as the fall of the Berlin Wall because of its potential implications for both the country and the region. However, five years on, it seems as if little has changed in Egypt – and the country’s proud revolutionary spirit has been almost completely wiped out. </p>
<p>The demands made by Tahrir Square’s revolutionaries haven’t been met – and in some cases they have been downright betrayed.</p>
<p>The uprising was only in part triggered by the first spasm of the Arab Awakenings, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-years-on-tunisias-jasmine-revolution-continues-from-the-ground-up-52848">Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution</a>. Rather, it was an outburst of popular grievances that had been building up for decades in a country with a long history of both military authoritarianism and “street politics”. </p>
<p>Hosni Mubarak’s regime was an exemplary case of durable authoritarianism, allowing its citizens just enough political space to keep direct threats to the regime at bay. But this admittedly very limited space nonetheless made the country’s population extremely competent with the practice of politics and dissent in the street. Essentially, a strong regime was <a href="http://stealthishijab.com/2011/05/31/the-praxis-of-the-egyptian-revolution/">deposed by an even stronger society</a>. </p>
<p>This can be seen in the fact that in January 2011, Egyptians were not just calling for the fall of the regime: louder than all the other chants was <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2015/01/25/Freedom-bread-dignity-Has-Egypt-answered-Jan-25-demands-.html">the call</a> for “bread, freedom, and (human) dignity”. It was estimated at the time that about 40% of Egyptians lived below the poverty line; even higher percentages <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110201013309/http://www.france24.com/en/20110125-egypt-braces-nationwide-protests">had to rely on subsidised goods</a> and 2.5m aged 20-24 <a href="http://cliodynamics.ru/download/Korotayev_Zinkina_Egyptian_Revolution_MESOJ_2011.pdf">were unemployed</a>. </p>
<p>But looking at the statistics today, it’s clear that levels of poverty and unemployment have drastically worsened since 2011 – and especially since president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s dictatorial regime took the reins.</p>
<h2>Bread, freedom and dignity</h2>
<p>When the uprising began, the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square were quick to issue an <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/egyptian-activists-action-plan-translated/70388/">official statement containing their main demands</a>. They called for the removal of the Mubarak government and the abolition of the notorious Emergency Law, freedom, justice, the formation of a new, non-military government and the constructive administration of all of Egypt’s resources. </p>
<p>The popular struggle for dignity and a removal of an ancient and discriminatory status quo seemed to succeed at first. Mubarak was deposed on February 11 2011, and the square resounded with euphoric chants: “Lift your head up, you are an Egyptian”, and, “We can breathe fresh air, we can feel our freedom”.</p>
<p>But the elation was short lived. Five years on and one <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">coup d’état</a> later, Egypt is still very much in the grip of a military dictatorship, while most of the six demands put forward by the revolutionaries have yet to be met.</p>
<p>The need for “bread, freedom, and (human) dignity” has arguably never been more urgent. Youth unemployment rates <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/08/11/26-3-of-youth-unemployed-51-2-suffer-poverty/">rose to 26.3%</a> in 2015, while more than a quarter of Egypt’s 85m-odd people still live below the poverty line. </p>
<p>As for “the formation of a new, non-military government with the interest of the Egyptian people at heart”, the regime of al-Sisi is firmly in the country’s tradition of military dictatorships. Most of his cabinet members and ministers <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/egypt-sisi-swears-government-150919132205044.html">hold the same posts they did under Mubarak</a>. Al-Sisi has arguably even succeeded in creating a regime even more repressive and brutal than his predecessor’s. Mubarak’s “deep state” has not only endured, but in fact seems reinvigorated, while Egypt’s former president has also been released from jail despite the fact that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23802342">he is still facing charges of corruption and murder</a>.</p>
<h2>Cracking down</h2>
<p>The saga of the Emergency Law is equally bleak. After it expired on May 31 2012, it was briefly re-imposed by the acting president Adly Mansour; it has since been substituted by the controversial Assembly Law of 2013, which also tightly restricts freedom of all sorts. </p>
<p>It not only heavily limits freedom of assembly, but also gives authorities the power to disperse any meeting of “public nature” of more than ten people in a public space, allows police to forcibly disperse any public meeting or protest, and sets heavy prison sentences for vague offences such as “<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law">attempting to influence the course of justice</a>”.</p>
<p>Freedom of speech and expression have never been so tightly policed. In the aftermath of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/verdict-in-al-jazeera-trial-shows-regimes-contempt-for-press-freedom-in-egypt-28349">trial of three al-Jazeera journalists</a>, Egypt was recently named the world’s <a href="http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/briefings/11123-the-never-ending-story-of-egypt-al-sisi-and-the-military-legacy">third deadliest country for journalists</a>, just behind Syria and Iraq. The authorities have detained, charged, or sentenced at least 41,000 people between July 2013 and May 2014 alone. Hundreds more have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/egypt-year-abuses-under-al-sisi">sentenced to death</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/im-one-of-hundreds-sentenced-to-death-in-egypt-the-us-is-concerned-thats-not-enough-42561">tried in absentia</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, the demand for better public administration has been left unaddressed; al-Sisi’s celebrated US$6 billion renovation of the Suez Canal has been almost entirely funded with tax payers’ money, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/egypt-suez-canal-corridor-project-development.html#">redirecting funds</a> originally earmarked for social services and healthcare.</p>
<p>The ultimate result of all the relentless brutality and pressure from the authorities since 2011 is that Egypt’s proud revolutionary spirit has been almost entirely wiped out. The return to military authoritarianism has in fact left many Egyptians apathetic towards the political state of their own country, a sad comedown from the sentiment behind the original Tahrir Square protests. </p>
<p>In December 2015, al-Sisi responded to rumours of another “Day of Rage” on the fifth anniversary of January 25 by saying: “Why am I hearing calls for another revolution? Why do you want to ruin Egypt? I came by your will and your choice and not despite it” – <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/fury-egypt-mubarak-refuses-to-leave">an eerie echo of Mubarak’s own words before he was removed in 2011</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the phrase “El‑sha’ab, yureed, isqat el‑nizam!”.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>The demands of the Tahrir Square protests could scarcely have been clearer – and the crackdown since 2011 could hardly have been more galling.Lucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/502822015-11-06T16:16:08Z2015-11-06T16:16:08ZEgypt’s al-Sisi in London: visit provides glimpse of a bitterly divided nation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100958/original/image-20151105-16255-12ifslk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno </span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>You couldn’t say there was a warm welcome for Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi when he <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/hundreds-protest-at-david-camerons-welcome-of-egyptian-president">visited London to meet prime minister David Cameron</a>. Hundreds turned out, despite miserable weather – some to hail their hero, but many others to denounce a despot and a “butcher”. Police kept the peace – just – but when I went to talk to these demonstrators what I found was evidence of a bitterly unhappy and deeply divided nation.</p>
<p>The visit has drawn criticism from campaigners and some politicians – Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, said Cameron’s decision to host Sisi showed “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-says-david-camerons-plans-to-invite-egyptian-president-fatah-al-sisi-to-uk-threatens-a6720791.html">contempt for human and democratic rights</a>”. This opinion was vociferously debated by the crowd which was split between those opposed to what they see as Sisi’s manipulative, repressive and anti-democratic regime and those who came to sing the Egyptian president’s praises.</p>
<p>This febrile atmosphere was only heightened by the security situation in Sinai after the downing of a Russian airliner days before, which had taken off from the Egyptian resort of Sharm el Sheikh and which many, Cameron included, suspect <a href="https://theconversation.com/sinai-crash-what-do-we-really-know-50262">may have had a bomb on board</a>. </p>
<h2>One man’s saviour</h2>
<p>Sisi <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/al-sisi">came to power in 2013</a> after ousting the democratically elected president, Muhammad Morsi in what many have called a “military coup” in which hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters of the deposed president were killed and many thousands more arrested. Egypt’s jails are now filled with dissenters, many of whom have been sentenced to death, including Morsi himself. Sisi’s crackdown has also involved the detention of journalists and academics amounting to a direct attack on free speech.</p>
<p>While downplaying the repressive nature of his regime, Sisi has relied on the “politics of magnificence” – the inauguration of a new branch of the Suez Canal, for example to project an image of himself as the natural successor to Gamal Abdel Nasser. This is a comparison which he hopes will highlight both his focus on “national unity” and his desire to provide a politic of spectacle, which is dressed up as a solution for Egypt’s economic malaise. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100981/original/image-20151105-16231-1xkzj96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Heavy police presence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Certainly the pride of the spectacle provided by Sisi was on the mind of one woman I spoke to who was effusive in her support for the Egyptian president: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>You see what al-Sisi has done with the Suez Canal? In one year! … He will do better than Gamal Abdel Nasser, just give him time. He works 24 hours a day.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For another man, also there to support the Egyptian president, economic growth would inevitably lead to political stability:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Al-Sisi is offering housing to lower-income people … If we manage to eradicate poverty and provide jobs, the country will be stable.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101095/original/image-20151106-16249-kwsnb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WP Pro Al-Sisi massive presence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Theories show us,instead, that the connection between growth and stability/security is not straightforward. </p>
<p>For these people the presence of anti-Sisi protesters was evidence of the insidious influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, who – said some – were offering people money to turn up and oppose their president.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You see those persons (the Muslim Brotherhood faction) they are not Muslims. They are terrorists. (..) A friend of mine told me – she swore to me – that the Muslim Brotherhood offered a friend of her from 250 to 300 pounds to join the protest.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100962/original/image-20151105-16277-1fhd7b3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WP Pro Muslim Brotherhood presence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Is another’s butcher …</h2>
<p>Across the other side of a police cordon from the banners declaring: “We love you Sisi!” were some Muslim Brotherhood supporters who held banners denouncing Sisi as a “dictator” and “butcher”. Since 2013 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/egypt-year-abuses-under-al-sisi">have highlighted abuses</a> committed by Sisi’s security forces, particularly against Muslim Brotherhood members and opponents who languish in jail in their thousands in violation of <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf">article 60 of the 2014 constitution</a>. </p>
<p>But it is Sisi’s rhetoric about security which has won him the support of a significant portion of the Egyptian people as well as a receptive ear in Downing Street. Sisi’s visit to the UK has been promoted in this way – and, of course, the downing of the Russian airliner flying out of the resort town of Sharm el Sheikh lent weight to that narrative. </p>
<p>British sales to Egypt of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/revealed-uk-sells-tear-gas-and-rubber-bullets-to-regimes-on-foreign-office-blacklist-10094650.html">tear gas and other weapons of repression</a> are not trumpeted – security and Egypt’s part in the fight against jihadism remain the ostensible reasons for the UK’s support for Sisi’s regime. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100966/original/image-20151105-16277-17zuild.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WP Pro.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But Maha Azzam from the Egyptian Revolutionary Council, who was in Downing Street to protest the visit, sees things differently. For her, Sisi’s visit is all about the president’s attempt to present himself and his regime to Western states as democratic and inclusive – something which flies in the face of the executive’s absolute refusal to deal with Freedom and Justice party which gained the majority of seats in the parliamentary elections of 2014. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100973/original/image-20151105-16268-j8es58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">WP Pro Al-Sisi is seen as stabilising influence and much is due to his speeches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections provides little reason to hope for change. At the moment there is neither a religious or secular opposition in Egypt and restrictions imposed on protest and fiercely enforced by the military are making protest – peaceful or otherwise – virtually impossible. </p>
<h2>Revolutionary road</h2>
<p>Standing apart from both from the pro-Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood protesters, the revolutionaries demanded an end to both religious and military fascism, calling for a continuation of the January 25 2011 revolution and the implementation of social justice and dignity. They see this position as representative of the majority of Egyptians who today keep a very low profile, fearing jail and even torture. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100980/original/image-20151105-16263-1yl151d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egypt’s revolutionaries make their presence felt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maria Gloria Polimeno</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This enduring fear was summed up by one woman stood with the revolutionaries who denounced both Muslim Brotherhood and al-Sisi’s supporters as “liars” before insisting that the will of the people for reform could not be killed off, even in the face of repression.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are there [in Cairo] but we cannot talk. I tell you one thing, the revolution will continue, I can tell you that. But not now.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Gloria Polimeno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the ‘Arab street’ came to Downing Street, passions ran high and fear and loathing were in the air.Maria Gloria Polimeno, PhD Researcher , City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/501482015-11-04T11:30:24Z2015-11-04T11:30:24ZWhy the Sinai Peninsula is so dangerous – and why the rest of us should care<p>While the cause of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34692132">Russian airliner crash</a> in Egypt remains unknown, the incident has re-focused the world’s attention on the Sinai Peninsula – site of a number of popular tourist resorts, and host to a long-running security crisis with regional and international implications that cannot be ignored.</p>
<p>Unrest in the Sinai is nothing new. During the political and civil unrest that followed Egypt’s revolution in 2011, the Sinai Peninsula became a base for <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2013-1e35/november-2013-1d99/sinai-cbc6">militant activity</a>. Armed groups took advantage of the security vacuum there, using weapons smuggled from Libya to begin enforcing their jihadist ideology. Insurgent activity further intensified in 2013 after a military coup <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsis-authority-ebbed-away-but-egypt-is-dangerously-divided-15774">ousted President Mohamed Morsi</a> and the subsequent crackdown on Islamists by the current Egyptian president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/chief-prosecutor-killed-by-car-bomb-as-egypt-marks-two-years-of-al-sisi-43570">Abdel Fattah al-Sisi</a>.</p>
<p>But even though the Sinai crisis has been underway for years, the rest of the world has only really begun to pay attention in the last year or so. </p>
<p>In November 2014, the Sinai-based jihadist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) (since renamed Sinai Province) <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29993183">pledged its allegiance to Islamic State</a> (IS). Since then, both the frequency and sophistication of attacks, most against Egyptian military and police targets, have increased, with hundreds killed in <a href="http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ESW-June15.pdf">over 700 attacks</a> in the first half of 2015 alone. </p>
<p>Then, on July 1, near simultaneous <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33340458">attacks</a> were launched on over a dozen military and police targets near Sheikh Zuweid in the northern Sinai, resulting in unprecedented clashes that left more than 100 dead.</p>
<h2>Tourist dollars</h2>
<p>The situation has only been compounded by Egypt’s failing short-term counter-terrorism measures, combined with problematic economic policies and political oppression. In the short term, Sisi’s harsh crackdown on all Islamists, not just jihadists, has <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/uk-egypt-militants-sisi-idUKKCN0PI1ID20150708">only spurred more radicals</a> to take up arms against the state. Likewise, the decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-death-sentences-for-muslim-brotherhood-complete-the-counter-revolution-in-egypt-24742">outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood</a> opened a space for more extremist groups such as Sinai Province.</p>
<p>In the Sinai especially, political grievances are combined with social and economic disparities, with development in the northern part of the peninsula essentially <a href="http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/commentary/sinai-insurgency-threatens-egypt-and-region">neglected</a> even as the popular tourist resorts in the south – most of all Sharm al-Sheikh – rode a wave of state investment and tourist dollars. </p>
<p>The economy that radical groups depend on has also been dramatically squeezed since the Egyptian government cracked down on the <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.664336">smuggling tunnels</a> between the Sinai and Gaza. (While <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/02/scapegoating-hamas-sinai-problems-150204054906350.html">Hamas</a> in Gaza denies any direct association with Sinai Province, and has in fact been at odds with IS, both groups relied on the flow of goods through the tunnels and benefited from the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/israel-gaza-hamas-is-sinai-smuggling-weapons-blockade-egypt.html">smuggling economy</a>.) </p>
<p>Now, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/egypt-sinai-tribal-leaders-lose-local-support.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+%5BEnglish%5D&utm_campaign=e60545e3f1-January_9_20141_8_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_28264b27a0-e60545e3f1-102316957">local leaders</a> are finding it harder to maintain legitimacy and assert authority, and are losing more of their influence to groups providing direct economic or political incentives. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Egypt’s military has been unable to gain any tactical advantage in the mountainous <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.664336">desert landscape</a>, which the insurgents are very able to use to their advantage.</p>
<h2>Spilling over</h2>
<p>Stability in the Sinai is obviously a key priority for Egypt. The whole premis of Sisi’s rule is his promise to stop terrorists and ensure stability. But ever since he came to power, Egypt has suffered numerous attacks not only in the Sinai, but also in <a href="https://theconversation.com/cairo-bomb-al-sisis-egpyt-is-less-secure-than-ever-46427">Cairo</a> and in an attempted attack in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33077862">Luxor</a>. These incidents have further damaged Egypt’s already struggling tourism industry, with revenues from ancient sites <a href="http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-11-02/egypts-tourist-industry-takes-another-blow">down 95%</a> since 2011.</p>
<p>Instability in Egypt in general and the Sinai in particular is also a major concern for Israel. </p>
<p>The two states’ counterterrorism and intelligence co-operation is reportedly <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/improved-egypt-israel-relations-through-sinai-crisis-will-they-last">strong</a>, with Israel continuing to assist Egypt’s Sinai campaign and approve its deployments there, essentially overlooking the demilitarisation mandates from the 1979 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david">Camp David Accords</a>. But the relationship is risky for both states; collaboration with Israel is unpopular in Egypt and easily can be turned into propaganda by extremist groups, while Israel has to deal with an unstable border while it waits for Egyptian forces to stabilise the peninsula.</p>
<p>Israel aside, the Sinai is also key to broader regional stability. Strategically located on the edge of the Levant, the Gulf, and North Africa, its position would make it the ideal bypass area for militant groups and arms smuggling – a threat to the stability of the entire Middle East.</p>
<p>There is no quick-fix to the situation, which is precisely why the Egyptian government’s whack-a-mole response to insurgent activity has been ineffective. Groups such as Sinai Province are taking advantage of long-term political and economic grievances exacerbated by the Sisi government to gain leverage, and mass arrests, death sentences, and military operations by the Egyptian state against all Islamists are only fuelling jihadists’ efforts.</p>
<p>Of course, most inhabitants of the Sinai do not actively support Sinai Province or any other jihadist group; Sinai Province itself is only estimated to have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504">between 1,000 and 1,500 active members</a>. But in the absence of secure local leadership or economic development, it’s not difficult for such groups to gain a foothold. </p>
<p>Egypt urgently needs to stop focusing on short-term military crackdowns and instead come up with proper long-term social, political, and economic strategies. If it doesn’t, an already festering situation could become one of the Middle East’s biggest liabilities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever caused the crash of a Russian airliner over the northern Sinai, it’s finally brought the world’s attention back to a critical security crisis.Julie M Norman, Research Fellow in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/464272015-08-21T11:54:23Z2015-08-21T11:54:23ZCairo bomb: al-Sisi’s Egpyt is less secure than ever<p>When a car bomb detonated outside a security building in Cairo on August 20 it marked a new turn in the long-running series of violent attacks on the Egyptian capital. The explosion wounded <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/explosion-heard-in-cairo-casualties">approximately 27 people, six of whom are policemen</a>, but there appear to have been no deaths. </p>
<p>The attack has been claimed by a group calling itself the Sinai Province (SP) which is affiliated to Islamic State (IS). SP has stated that the bomb was in response to the execution of six of its members <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/11813511/Huge-bomb-blast-rocks-Cairo.html">accused of a similar attack in Cairo last year</a>. Though there were no deaths this time, the quickening rate of such attacks shows that al-Sisi’s measures against terrorism have been grossly ineffective.</p>
<p>This bomb is in fact the latest of a long series of violent attacks that focus particularly on Egyptian police and security forces, which since 2013 have gradually moved from the Sinai province to the country’s capital. </p>
<p>Most of these recent blasts have been claimed by the Islamist militant group <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/explosion-heard-in-cairo-casualties">Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis</a> based in the Sinai desert, which also identifies itself as a branch of IS under the name <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-islamic-state-is-moving-its-egyptian-battle-from-sinai-to-cairo-46439">Sinai Peninsula</a> (SP). </p>
<p>This unprecedented attack speaks to the explosive growth of Egypt’s array of insurgent forces and their violent opposition to al-Sisi, which the state’s authoritarian security measures have failed to curb.</p>
<h2>Point of no return</h2>
<p>This latest attack comes within a week of a new anti-terrorism law, which itself followed the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/world/middleeast/car-bomb-explodes-near-a-security-building-in-cairo.html">assassination of Egypt’s top prosecutor</a>. The new law has been strongly criticised by international organisations and observers for being “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/19/egypt-counterterrorism-law-erodes-basic-rights">so broadly worded it could encompass civil disobedience</a>” – therefore further enabling the regime’s already unprecedented brutality and unfettered policing power.</p>
<p>Overall, the attacks and the authoritarian response both betray a deep insecurity that is tearing through Egypt, defying the regime’s attempts to crush all opposition with the security services. </p>
<p>The growing insurgency forces seem to be emerging as the winners in al-Sisi’s battle against Islamist militants and are therefore chipping away at the regime’s claims of conducting a successful campaign against its opponents. </p>
<p>As far as many ordinary Egyptians are concerned, the country is <a href="http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/briefings/11123-the-never-ending-story-of-egypt-al-sisi-and-the-military-legacy">less secure now</a> that it was before the 2013 coup. Despite the government’s extravagant projects of political repression, internal instability and dissent are at an all-time high. In his obsessive race to control and secure everything, al-Sisi appears to have lost what little popular support he had; the country’s international reputation is now critically damaged and hurtling towards the point of no return. </p>
<h2>State of emergency</h2>
<p>The appeal of the IS brand has now been firmly established across not just the Middle East, but North Africa. <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/">In recent months</a>, swaths of territory in Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sinai have been “annexed” by IS, and <em>wilayats</em> (“provinces”) set up in these areas. Many of these wilayats were pre-existing groups that had already made a tactic of violence, including Ansar Beit al-Maqdis – the group that has since become SP. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/20/us-egypt-blast-idUSKCN0QP00G20150820">statement</a> the group apparently posted on Twitter in the aftermath of the attack was flavoured with furious retribution: “Let the apostates of the police and army, the followers of Jews, know we are a people who do not forget our revenge.”</p>
<p>But the statement has implications far beyond revenge. It sends a stark message not only to those in targeted states, but also to anyone thinking of visiting them – a serious problem for states that depend upon tourism for their economy. Tunisia, in particular, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-progress-tunisias-problems-go-much-deeper-than-security-44051">already feeling the heat</a> on that front. </p>
<p>While the increasingly unstable Sinai has long been a cause of great concern for Israel, this latest incident brings the situation much closer to home for al-Sisi and his lieutenants. </p>
<p>They can simply no longer pretend that their iron-fisted approach is working – and the new anti-terrorism bill doesn’t help their case. Intended to hobble any new opposition groups before they can gather momentum, it also places Egypt in a seemingly constant state of emergency reminiscent of Mubarak’s Emergency Law. More than anything, it betrays what may well be a growing panic at the very top of the regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46427/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Authoritarianism has failed to keep Egypt stable and secure, but General al-Sisi’s government is nonetheless doubling down.Lucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversitySimon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/464392015-08-21T05:34:09Z2015-08-21T05:34:09ZHow Islamic State is moving its Egyptian battle from Sinai to Cairo<p>Islamic State (IS) has claimed responsibility for a powerful car bomb detonated outside a state security building in northern Cairo which injured 29 people, including six policemen. The Egyptian ministry <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33998536">claimed</a> that: “A man suddenly stopped his car in front of the state security building, jumped out of it and fled on a motorbike that followed the car”.</p>
<p>The car bomb came just days after the Egyptian president, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/egypt-makes-it-illegal-for-journalists-to-contradict-official-account-of-terror-attacks-10460409.html">approved new counter-terrorism laws</a> which aim to counter the growing jihadist insurgency in Egypt by granting more power to the police, restricting human rights and limiting press freedom.</p>
<p>IS immediately took credit for the attack. In an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/massive-blast-targets-security-forces-near-cairo/2015/08/19/ef6a074b-cf6a-448a-bc63-c313b687811d_story.html">online message</a>, it said its “soldiers of the caliphate were able to strike the state security building in the area of Shubra al-Kheima with a car full of explosives.”</p>
<p>This attack is an attempt to take the battle to the capital and to pose a more direct threat to the Egyptian security establishment – an effort that so far has been largely confined to the Sinai Peninsula.</p>
<h2>On the march</h2>
<p>IS’s presence in Egypt has so far been limited to a Sinai-based affiliate group, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504">Sinai Province</a> (SP), which first emerged on the peninsula in 2011 under the name of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem). It changed its name to SP after it pledged allegiance to IS in November 2014.</p>
<p>When SP initially emerged, its main priority was to attack Israel with rockets. But after Muhammad Morsi was ousted from power in 2013 and the police began a massive crackdown on his supporters, the group shifted its focus to Egypt’s security services.</p>
<p>SP retaliated with a series of attacks on the police and assorted high-level assassination attempts. It claimed responsibility for <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23971239">one such attempt</a> on the interior minister, Muhammad Ibrahim, in September 2013. In June 2015, Egypt’s top public prosecutor was <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/us-egypt-violence-idUSKCN0P90UA20150630">killed by a car bomb attack</a> on his convoy, making him the most senior state official to die at the hands of militants since the Morsi government was toppled. </p>
<p>All the while, SP has been growing. No longer a small urban terrorist group, it has morphed into an effective insurgency with about 1,000-1,500 active members. It has access to anti-aircraft surface-to-air guided missiles with which to shoot down helicopters, anti-tank guided missiles, various improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and heavy machine guns, which have been proudly displayed in propaganda videos. </p>
<p>SP aims to take over the Sinai and turn it into part of IS’s self-proclaimed caliphate – and its increasingly complex and sophisticated attacks imply that it is co-ordinating closely with the IS leadership. SP attacks have involved suicide bombers supported by direct and indirect fire – tactics widely used by IS in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>Although Egypt has battled Islamic militants for decades, never has a group been able to retain territory or obtain weapons on this scale, nor to use them to such effect. On July 1, SP executed its <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33340458">most sophisticated wave of attacks yet</a>, targeting 15 military and security posts. In the course of this campaign, 300 SP militants briefly occupied the town of Sheikh Zuweid. </p>
<h2>Upping the ante</h2>
<p>Egypt’s military operations in the Northern Sinai have yet to show much promise. More than 5,000 homes situated along Egypt’s border with the Gaza Strip were <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-begins-doubling-sinai-buffer-zone-along-gaza-border/">destroyed</a> to create a buffer zone, but this was interpreted as a collective punishment for families of suspects. </p>
<p>Instead of working with residents who had already been marginalised for years, the military has treated them as potential collaborators with SP, something that has been met with understandable <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33905477">resentment</a>. The upshot is that the military has unintentionally transformed what was once a small and limited security problem into a strong insurgency with close ties to IS.</p>
<p>A few weeks before the attack in Cairo, SP kidnapped and decapitated a Croatian national, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-executes-croatian-hostage-tomislav-salopek-in-egypt-after-demands-deadline-passes-10451526.html">Tomislav Salopek</a>, who had been working in Cairo at the time. Salopek was the first Westerner that SP had ever kidnapped from the capital – and, of course, attacks on Westerners generally <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33905477">draw more international attention</a> than attacks on Egyptians.</p>
<p>If IS is redirecting its operations to focus on Cairo it will greatly up the ante. Until now, the majority of SP and IS attacks on Eyptian security forces took place on the coastal road between el-Arish and Rafah in the north-east of the Sinai.</p>
<p>Despite the lack of actual deaths in Thursday’s car bombings (or none that have been reported so far) the attack illustrates that the Egyptian security establishment’s anti-terror strategy desperately needs to be reformed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46439/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State’s Egyptian affiliate has been terrorising the Sinai Peninsula for months – and now it’s upping the ante.Natasha Lindstaedt, Senior Lecturer, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/435702015-06-30T12:38:59Z2015-06-30T12:38:59ZChief prosecutor killed by car bomb as Egypt marks two years of al-Sisi<p>Hisham Barakat, Egypt’s most senior prosecutor, has been <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-egypt-violence-idUSKCN0P90UA20150629">killed</a> by a car bomb that hit his motorcade in Cairo. The attack came just a month after Islamic State (IS) <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/uk-egypt-judges-militants-idUKKBN0O52NY20150520">urged</a> its followers to attack Egypt’s judges and its “<a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/egypt-in-crisis/the-deep-state-how-egypts-shadow-state-won-out/">deep state</a>” in revenge for their jailing <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30532889">scores of Islamists</a>.</p>
<p>The attack, which also wounded six of Barakat’s security detail as well as two drivers and a passer-by, has been claimed by an obscure group calling itself the Popular Resistance Front of Giza. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned the killing – nonetheless accusing Barakat of “<a href="http://egyptianstreets.com/2015/06/29/muslim-brotherhood-says-without-justice-violence-will-continue/">legalising violence</a>”. The chief prosecutor was widely hated by Egypt’s disparate opposition groups as a figurehead for the savage crackdown on dissent which has marked the two-year rule of military strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. </p>
<p>Barakat oversaw the jailing of thousands of opposition supporters – among them Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, who has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsi-death-penalty-completes-military-takeover-of-egypt-41948">sentenced to death</a> along with hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<p>Morsi’s death sentence was not just a red flag to jihadists and Islamic fundamentalists; it was proof that al-Sisi has fully abandoned the ideas animating the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf">2014 constitution</a>, which was expected to be firmly inclined towards the respect of human rights and freedom of thought.</p>
<p>Significantly, Barakat’s assassination comes almost exactly two years after the start of the June 30 coup that ousted Morsi and brought al-Sisi to power.</p>
<h2>Control freakery</h2>
<p>Al-Sisi’s rhetoric may be peppered with the language of “freedom”, but his style of rule is more indicative of a will to power – and there’s no better measure of that than his political sway over the country’s Islamic authorities.</p>
<p>The Sharia court system is not as dominant in Egypt as in Saudi Arabia, but it is clearly entwined with the state legal system, even though the two are supposedly constitutionally separate entities. The lack of proof or witnesses in Morsi’s trial was expected to technically and doctrinally stop the Grand Mufti from confirming his sentence. Instead, he apparently validated it without raising any questions – confirming al-Sisi’s genuine power over the Sharia court system. </p>
<p>Al-Sisi has long tried to present himself as a pious Muslim proponent of a moderate, mainstream Islam, to counter terrorism. But the Morsi verdict proved he has incorporated the juridical system into his pursuit of far more basic political goals: to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to placate Egypt’s vital foreign donor, the UAE, and strategic regional fellow, <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.545682">Israel</a>.</p>
<p>Al-Sisi increasingly depends on the Israelis for tactical support, and for now at least, Israel is looking to Egypt as its best hope for regional stability. The two countries’ leaders are singing from the same hymn sheet when it comes to dealing with radical Islamism. Even though both al-Sisi and Benjamin Netanyahu have worked hard to garner the support of some of the most conservative factions and lobbies in their respective countries, they are looking to each other as partners in the fight against Islamic terrorism. </p>
<p>Egypt also counts on support from Gulf Countries, as following the coup it started searching for new allies. In spite of this, the strategic role Israel plays remains crucial in light of the political interests al-Sisi and Benjamin Netanyahu share when referred both to the closure of Rafah border and the fight of jihadi groups Sinai peninsula. </p>
<p>The Egypt-Israel relationship is built around a common fight against Islamic terrorism – above all against Hamas, the historic right wing of the Muslim Brotherhood – and through energetic trade.</p>
<p>However, in spite of ambitious <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/03/egypt-international-investment-150313190909962.html">summits</a> in Sharm El-Sheikh meant to attract foreign investments, doing business in Egypt is still considered difficult, and the Egyptian economy is still shaky. The country’s public debt hit record levels in 2014, and it is expected to keep increasing. </p>
<p>Unless Egypt readdresses its security situation, the investments it needs will never materialise. And the terrorists targeting the regime know that all too well.</p>
<h2>Gear shift</h2>
<p>The attack that killed Bakarat was just the latest attempt to shatter the stability al-Sisi is desperately trying to maintain. These attempts are coming not from the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been subject to a crackdown and hundreds of whose members have been jailed; instead, they are the work of minor Islamist groups and individual fighters. </p>
<p>That much was made clear on June 19, when the Muslim Brotherhood was expected to gather in Tahrir square for a mass protest in spite of the 2013 <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/egypt-interim-president-anti-protest-law">anti-protest law</a>. Violent rallies were expected, but Brotherhood members instead kept a low profile, perhaps fearing jail. </p>
<p>It seems unlikely the Brotherhood will directly stage any violent protests in the months to come; instead, it will keep campaigning through its main online presence, <a href="http://www.ikhwanweb.com/">Ikhwanweb</a>, while Egypt’s Islamist youths fall ever more into the orbit of more radical groups. </p>
<p>Instead, the random attacks to come will be the work of isolated “jihadi” cells, some officially affiliated to IS (such as Wilaya Sinai,<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504">formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</a>), or individuals from Egypt or nearby countries such as Tunisia and Libya. These groups are not especially co-ordinated, but their aim is the same: to exploit Egypt’s social and political disorder and target the economic apparatus on which al-Sisi’s regime depends. They are trying to unpick Egypt’s social fabric by violently challenging its political elites.</p>
<p>If al-Sisi continues to rely solely on authoritarianism to keep Egypt together, he will fail. The resulting backlash will worsen Egypt’s security crisis, both preventing its growth and and antagonising its Islamist discontents. And the murder of the country’s top prosecutor shows this process is already underway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Gloria Polimeno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt’s Islamist discontents are incensed at the abuse of the judicial system – and hellbent on sabotaging the country’s stability.Maria Gloria Polimeno, Doctoral Researcher , City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/433072015-06-16T16:09:30Z2015-06-16T16:09:30ZYou think there is no alternative to Sisi’s regime in Egypt? Think again<p>The notion held by many in the West that Egypt’s current president, the military strongman, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is the only available option to lead the country is as erroneous as it is dangerous. The current regime’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/im-one-of-hundreds-sentenced-to-death-in-egypt-the-us-is-concerned-thats-not-enough-42561">repressive policies</a> are stifling the public sphere, preventing the emergence of any political leadership and are leading to radicalisation and counter-violence. There are better scenarios.</p>
<p>Washington and Brussels seem to have accepted that there is no alternative to Sisi’s regime and the West must support Egypt economically. Once again they have got it wrong. This is exactly the faulty policy advice they gave for Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Mubarak’s Egypt before the massive popular uprisings that overthrew them both. </p>
<p>Following the July 3 military coup in Egypt in 2013, Western diplomats and parliamentarians urged opponents to the coup to accept the new reality and move on. If not, as I was told by visiting British parliamentarians, then “you are inviting a civil war.” When I asked: what about our vote in free and clean elections? And what are the guarantees that a military strongman does not overthrow an elected government whenever he pleases in future? The response I got was: “Accept the reality first – and then we can work something out.”</p>
<h2>No flower shall bloom</h2>
<p>Since Sisi’s military coup, he has been eliminating any viable alternative. He has massacred, imprisoned and exiled opponents to pre-empt the emergence of rivals. There are plenty of public figures in Egyptian jails or in foreign exile that are capable of forming governments and providing an alternative to Sisi’s regime. </p>
<p>Some important names, including <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/liberals-marginalised-egypt-stability-revolution">Mohamed ElBaradei</a>, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-interview-ayman-nour-2075911407">Ayman Nour</a>, <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/public-outcry-over-death-sentence-former-minister-bassem-ouda-649027994">Bassem Ouda</a>, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/egypt-prisoner-renounce-nationality-jail-sentence.html">Mohamed Mahsoub</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-egypt-protests-beltagi-idUSBRE97S0QE20130829">Mohamed El-Beltagi</a>, <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/109434.aspx">Abul El Ela Madi</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/6711-last-statement-by-essam-sultan-before-his-detention">Isam Sultan</a>, and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25484064">Ahmed Maher</a>, among others, immediately come to mind. </p>
<p>Even Sisi’s military colleagues have been suppressed, starting with an assassination attempt against former director of intelligence Omar Suleiman in 2011 and disqualifying him from the presidential race in 2013. Former chief of staff <a href="http://www.tahrirnews.com/news/details.php?ID=420087">Sami Anan was placed under house arrest</a>, and <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/19176-egypt-stops-ahmed-shafik-interview-from-being-aired">Ahmad Shafiq was prevented from returning to Egypt</a> to campaign for the presidency.</p>
<h2>No elections, no alternatives</h2>
<p>Alternatives come out of a functioning political process and tolerant society. This was one of the accomplishments of the revolution which started on January 25, 2011 that – once Mubarak and his tight grip on the reins of power had been removed – generated a new stratum of leaders, many of them young. Change was in the air; <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17859639">13 presidential candidates</a> emerged with different programmes and visions, and Egypt then had alternatives. </p>
<p>Since the military coup, Sisi has reverted to the practice of <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-sisi-wins-landslide-victory-as-flawed-election-returns-battered-egypt-to-military-rule-27355">manipulated elections</a>, winning last year by 97.3% of the votes. He postponed parliamentary elections – and it doesn’t look as if there will be local elections any time soon. He stifled civil society, fiercely cracking down on NGOs and promoting a monotone propaganda media machine. He closed Tahrir and other squares and arrested thousands of activists under his anti-protest law. </p>
<p>The military regime has been purging state institutions and universities of anyone whose loyalty is in question. Sisi reintroduced the system (abolished after the revoution) whereby government <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/104697.aspx">directly appoints university deans</a> and has stuffed state institutions with military personnel. This is an environment that suffocates any alternative.</p>
<h2>‘Me or terrorism’</h2>
<p>The repressive and extralegal measures of the current Egyptian regime are leading to radicalisation and are fomenting violence. Certainly, this is not a viable alternative and is forcing Egypt into a <a href="http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/?marker=12">low-intensity civil war</a>. Since July 2013 more than 3,000 Egyptians have lost their lives. Meanwhile, since coming to power, Sisi has repeatedly rejected any possibility for national reconciliation and insisted on polarisation and escalation. </p>
<p>Similar to Mubarak and other autocrats, Sisi presents Egyptians with a tough choice – and a fallacious one: choose him or choose terrorism and insecurity. He is de-politicising society and making it impossible for any effective political process to emerge. This closing down of open avenues for expression and participation, will – inevitably and depressingly – create the conditions for popular violence to emerge as a way to counter violence by the state.</p>
<h2>Three alternatives</h2>
<p>By surrendering to the “no alternative” thesis – and by not demanding change in Egypt that opens up the political process, the release of all political prisoners and the guarantee of human rights – US and EU policymakers are rendering invaluable service to the tyranny of the Sisi regime. It makes the “no alternative” thesis a self-fulfilling prophecy that will haunt Egypt for decades to come.</p>
<p>One can see three scenarios. Let’s start with the least likely: Sisi reverses his repressive policies and opens up the political process. The only way to imagine this would be if Sisi, facing mounting international criticism of his failure to restore a secure society and a stable economy effectively admits defeat. This flies in the face of Sisi’s projection of himself, at home and abroad, as a strongman who is capable of eradicating terrorism and providing security for his people.</p>
<p>In the second scenario, the military establishment decides to take a few steps back and hand over power to a civilian government which then adopts a power-sharing formula. This would be the possible result of a massive popular uprising that blames the military for the country’s economic and political failures. Of course, the only way for the military to allow this to happen would be for it to secure its own interests and admit that it can go back to its original purpose which is to guard but not govern.</p>
<p>The most likely scenario is that the military establishment, facing humiliation over a collapse of national security (<a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-sinai-islamic-state-offshoot-wins-hearts-minds-egypts-crackdown-backfires-1503813">Sinai has been declared an IS province</a>), mounting insecurity and the growing prospect that Egypt is becoming a failed state, decides to scapegoat Sisi. In this scenario the army hands over power to someone (former military or civilian) who understands the country’s economic and political interests while being able to make a new beginning and start a process of national reconciliation and political reconstruction. This new figure would lead a brief transitional period in which effective political institutions and avenues of participation can be rebuilt. </p>
<p>Any one of these scenarios offers better prospects than the current unsustainable reality. Egypt needs to go back to normal politics, social healing and proper institution building. The “Sisi option” is not going to give us any of these things any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43307/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emad El-Din Shahin is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is the editor-in-chief of The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. He was sentenced to death in absentia by an Egyptian court after being charged in 2014 with "grand espionage". He denies the charge.</span></em></p>There are plenty of alternatives to rule by the military strongman that is destroying Egypt. But most of the viable leaders are in exile or jail.Emad Shahin, Visiting professor, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/425612015-06-01T05:17:56Z2015-06-01T05:17:56ZI’m one of hundreds sentenced to death in Egypt. The US is ‘concerned’. That’s not enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/83367/original/image-20150529-15228-1ovpwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emad Shahin: under sentence of death.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On May 16, an Egyptian court sentenced me to death in absentia in a highly politicised case, along with more than 120 other defendants, <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsi-death-penalty-completes-military-takeover-of-egypt-41948">including the former president, Mohamed Morsi</a>. The US and EU have expressed their “grave concern” regarding these recent mass death sentences in Egypt. This is good. But it is not enough. </p>
<p>The Middle East is witnessing the undoing of the popular uprisings of 2011 and the dashing of hopes for free and democratic societies that those events promised. Some states are plunging into civil wars, counter-revolutions, and disintegration. The region is morphing rapidly and reverting to primitive affiliations. Once nation states, they are now turning into sectarian, tribal, or ethnic entities fighting each other. This situation is not in the interest of any power, local, regional or international. It is a breeding space for extremism, “ISISisation” and barbarity.</p>
<p>Though many seem “concerned”, no one has offered a vision, a solution or an answer. The optimistic democratic narrative of 2011 has given way to the severe discourse of security. The rhetoric has reintroduced the false dilemma of security and stability versus democracy and principles. The fallacy behind this dichotomy consists in perceiving security and democracy as mutually exclusive rather than complementary. </p>
<p>Dictatorship and tyranny do not produce security. The preference for security at the expense of genuinely promoting democracy and democratic values in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the past 60 years has not prevented the emergence of al-Qaeda, 9/11, and now Islamic State. Nor has it made the United States more secure.</p>
<p>The US and EU foreign policy in the MENA region should relinquish the old formula of siding with authoritarianism to achieve security and embrace a new one that sees democracy, not autocracy, as the basis for stability. As some pivotal states have been disintegrating politically and socially (Syria, Iraq, Libya Yemen), the need for national reintegration and reconstruction are more urgent than ever. The only formula to achieve reintegration and inclusion of more elements of society is the genuine embrace of democracy, not authoritarianism.</p>
<h2>As the world watched…</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-death-sentences-for-muslim-brotherhood-complete-the-counter-revolution-in-egypt-24742">latest death sentences</a> in Egypt came as an astounding shock to many. The indecisiveness of the US and the EU, their inability to resolve their “democracy versus security” dilemma, are part of the problem, not the solution, to the ongoing mess. Specifically, they have made three serious mistakes. The first is not calling a military coup a coup. They attempted to pressure a duly elected civilian president to accept the coup as a <em>de facto</em> reality, when they should have taken a firm stand against the side that thwarted the democratic process and committed unprecedented massacres in the early days of the coup.</p>
<p>The second is acting as an accomplice to the coup leaders by accepting a phoney road map for restoring the political process in Egypt. General Sisi’s road map included undertaking constitutional amendments, parliamentary elections to precede presidential ones, inclusion and a code of ethics for the media. The EU and the US validated a skewed constitutional drafting process and recognised the fake election of the coup leader who claimed victory with 97% of the vote. </p>
<p>Top western diplomats, including US secretary of state John Kerry have <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-kerry-arrives-in-egypt-on-unannounced-visit-1403426551">repeatedly praised Sisi</a> for “restoring democracy” in Egypt – this despite the general’s crimes against humanity, including killing and injuring thousands of protesters, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/07/egypt-anniversary-morsi-ousting/">arresting more than 40,000 dissidents</a> and acquiescing in the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/12/egypt-police-rape-dissidents-crackdown-16000-arrested">rape of female university students</a>.</p>
<h1>… democracy was crushed</h1>
<p>Almost two years after the coup, Sisi has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/egypt-parliamentary-elections-to-be-postponed-by-new-legal-setback">postponed the parliamentary elections</a> and has been <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/22/egypts-sisi-is-getting-pretty-good-at-being-a-dictator/">issuing laws as decrees</a>. The <a href="http://www.rcssmideast.org/En/Article/95/Egypts-Media-Code-of-Ethics-Stirs-Controversy-#.VWg5T1VViko">media code of ethics</a> has yet to see the light of day and, more alarmingly, Sisi has been pursuing an exclusionary approach, eradicating his opponents and <a href="https://theconversation.com/opinions-are-dangerous-as-egypt-cracks-down-on-dissent-24039">crushing any dissent</a>. For this, Sisi was even rewarded recently when the Obama administration <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/lifts-arms-embargo-egypt-150401003510492.html%20">lifted the arms freeze</a> that had been in place for two years.</p>
<p>Finally, the US and the EU failed to extend adequate and much needed support for Tunisia and Egypt during their initial, rough transitions. Washington did not show as much enthusiasm for the new democratically-elected governments as it has for the old authoritarian regimes. </p>
<p>The US tolerated the dictators Mubarak and Ben Ali for many decades and is tolerating Sisi’s repressive and autocratic regime in Egypt. Contrast this with the speed with which Washington’s patience wore thin with Morsi – who, let’s not forget, was the first democratically and freely elected president in Egypt’s history. Neither Tunisia nor Egypt received any special financial packages that could help them stem the economic deterioration during their bumpy transition.</p>
<h2>New approach needed</h2>
<p>As the repression, bloodshed, and crimes against humanity continue unabated, expressing concern is not enough. The US and the EU should have a new vision and a consistent policy for the promotion of democracy and securing stability in the region. Sisi’s crushing of democracy and the mass death sentences against political opponents vindicate the extremist narrative: democracy is futile and violence is the only viable way to meet “state terror” and resist its violence. </p>
<p>Sisi’s <em>raison d'être</em> has been based on eradicating his political opponents and undoing the January 25 (2011) revolution. Instead of allowing room for national reconciliation and a political opening, he insists on polarisation, dehumanisation and escalation of violence, thus radicalising large segments of disgruntled and alienated youth and eventually undermining the West’s efforts to fight IS and radicalism.</p>
<p>The US and the EU need to consider a new approach to this born-again authoritarianism in Egypt. It is not too late to call the coup a coup, boldly treat it as such, and make the coup leaders pay a price for subverting democracy and violating human rights. This, and not appeasement, will provide an incentive to Egypt’s military establishment to reform itself and take a step back from direct control.</p>
<p>The US and EU should not reward the coup leaders – neither with rhetoric, nor with financial or military aid. The US cannot have it both ways: arm repression and advocate democracy. It must make up its mind and either admit its support of Sisi and like-minded autocrats or support democracy, human rights, and rule of law.</p>
<p>The US and EU need to also accept the fact that the reality of demography will bring new democratic forces to power in Egypt and throughout the region – and Western policymakers have to deal with this new reality no matter how unpredictable or risky it might seem. </p>
<p>If they don’t, the price to be paid will be heavy – the proliferation of yet more IS-like groups, with possibly decades of civil wars, terrorism, and instability. This dark scenario is not a fantasy. It is already becoming a reality. This will affect not only the Middle East but the world.</p>
<p>As for me, I am in a better position than thousands of Egyptians who are languishing in Sisi’s jails and are being exposed to torture and rape. I’m <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/death-sentence-egypt-emad-shahin/393590/">currently living in the United States</a> where I research and teach and have embraced new hope in exile. But I will continue to strive for the just cause of democracy and rule of law in Egypt. </p>
<p><em>The Conversation is partnering with Index on Censorship for its special edition on academic freedom. Read more <a href="https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/06/magazine-summer-2015-is-academic-freedom-being-eroded/">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42561/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emad El-Din Shahin is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is the editor-in-chief of The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. He was sentenced to death in absentia by an Egyptian court after being charged in 2014 with "grand espionage". He denies the charge.</span></em></p>The West has stood by and watched as democracy was stifled in Egypt. It will reap the whirlwind.Emad Shahin, Visiting professor, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419482015-05-18T13:46:22Z2015-05-18T13:46:22ZMorsi death penalty completes military takeover of Egypt<p>In shocking but not exactly surprising news, Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected president of Egypt has been sentenced to death for his role in a 2011 prison break, which occurred during the protests that ultimately led to the toppling of Hosni Mubarak.</p>
<p>While it is rare for Amnesty International, the US and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to agree on anything, all quickly expressed outrage at Morsi’s sentence. The US expressed “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">deep concern</a>”, Erdogan <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/expresses-deep-concern-morsi-death-sentence-150517064527019.html">decried the use of the death penalty</a> and Amnesty called the trial a “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/press-releases/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">charade</a>”. </p>
<p>On the night of January 28 2011, two days after their arrest, 34 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Mohammed Morsi, <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptMarketNews/idAFLDE70T06S20110130">fled the Wadi Natrum prison</a>, along with several thousand other prisoners. While some accounts suggest that the guards at the prison fled their posts in the face of chaos on the streets, the official Sisi regime line is that Hamas and Hezbollah were involved in facilitating the prison break. </p>
<p>Morsi was not the only person to be sentenced to death for these crimes – 104 others were also sentenced for the same crime (a large number of them in absentia, as allowed under the newly reformed Penal Code). In the courtroom, Morsi and his fellow defendants were defiant as charges were read out, chanting “down with military rule”. </p>
<p>The verdict comes less than a month after <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/21/egypts-ex-president-mohamed-morsi-jailed-protest-deaths-muslim-brotherhood">Morsi was sentenced to 20 years in prison</a> after being found guilty of inciting violence and the illegal detention and torture of protesters while occupying the office of the president. </p>
<p>Senior Brotherhood officials are rejecting the legitimacy of the judicial process, a sentiment <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/news/us-deeply-concerned-morsi-death-sentence-egypt">echoed by senior figures in the US State Department</a>, who suggest that this decision is “inconsistent with Egypt’s international obligations and the rule of law”. </p>
<h2>Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood</h2>
<p>This appears to be the latest step in the almost two-year long crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which began with the coup d’etat against the Morsi government in July 2013. </p>
<p>The sentence now has to be confirmed by the Egyptian grand mufti, whose decision will likely be instrumental in determining whether chaos is to envelop Egypt once again. Coming from Egypt’s highest religious figure, the mufti’s pronouncement is not legally binding but nevertheless necessary to carry out a death sentence, as the final verdict cannot be issued until that is known. The mufti’s decision will also be indicative of the real state of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, as the religious figure has sided with the Islamist organisation in the past. </p>
<p>In August 2014, Egypt’s highest legal official in fact <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/uk-egypt-courts-badie-idUKKBN0G70Y620140807">refused to approve the death sentence of Mohamed Badie</a> (the Brotherhood’s general guide) and of another 13 Brotherhood members – which is seen in some quarters as setting a precedent for what might happen next. </p>
<p>Whatever the mufti’s final decision, chaos is likely to break out in the country once again, from either “betrayed” Brotherhood supporters or angered governmental officials, depending on which side the religious authority chooses to support. Only hours after the verdict, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/three-egyptian-judges-shot-dead-in-sinai-hours-after-mohamed-morsi-sentenced-to-death-10255067.html">three Egyptian judges were killed in Sinai</a>, a reflection of the levels of discontent and growing unrest within Egypt.</p>
<p>Regardless of the final verdict, the increasing number of death sentences is indicative of the deteriorating state of what little democracy was established after the 2011 uprisings. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/01/egypt-parliamentary-elections-to-be-postponed-by-new-legal-setback">endless postponement of the parliamentary elections</a> is a clear sign of al-Sisi’s unwillingness to be held accountable by anyone outside of his circle of supporters. </p>
<p>Sisi’s administration is characterised by a steady decrease of democratic practices and civil liberties, as the president attempts to reinforce its authority by propagating levels of brutality and repression that are unmatched in the country’s history. </p>
<p>Another element that is indicative of the current state of affairs in Egypt is the decision to <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2014/12/1/a_dark_moment_in_egypts_history">drop all criminal charges against previous dictator Hosni Mubarak and his sons</a>, which further underlines the continuation of the military’s deep state despite the events of 2011. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, daily human rights abuses are quickly leading the country to breaking point once again. The <a href="http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/egypt">steady deterioration of human rights and democratic practices</a> in Egypt can be directly traced to al-Sisi’s <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/news/president-amends-law-include-life-sentence-receiving-funds-arms">amendments to the Penal Code</a>, which allow civilians to be tried in absentia in military courts without the right of even consulting with a lawyer. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence will not only be another blow to Egypt’s already fragile democracy, but is also further diminishing al-Sisi’s volatile international credibility.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">As we argued previously</a>, Morsi’s trial can be seen as the culmination of the military’s quest to regain its ruling power and to reinstate the status quo that was interrupted by the 2011 uprisings. Similarly, such events are also a continuation of the previous Egyptian governments’ decades long practice of branding Islamists as scapegoats. </p>
<p>Morsi’s sentence can still be appealed – as a second court date has been set for June 2 – meanwhile Egypt awaits the grand mufti’s decision. But until then, the country remains on the verge of explosive popular discontent and chaos, which al-Sisi’s unprecedented security measures are failing to contain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years after the ousting of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, military rule is now firmly entrenched.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/377182015-02-18T16:20:45Z2015-02-18T16:20:45ZGeneral Sisi fights on all fronts to secure Egypt’s borders<p>On February 16, Egypt <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/egypt-air-strikes-target-isis-weapons-stockpiles-libya">bombed Islamic State (IS) targets</a> in the militant-controlled Libyan city of Derna, in response to the beheading of 21 Egyptian workers. The speed with which this unprecedented military intervention was mounted across the Libyan border reflects the increasingly tense situation between the two countries – a problem that has preoccupied the government of <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19256730">Abdul Fattah al-Sisi</a> for a long time.</p>
<p>It also shows how, in a climate of suspicion and fear, al-Sisi is prepared to do almost anything to stave off the nightmare of cross-border Islamic terrorism.</p>
<h2>Stability at all costs</h2>
<p>Above all else, al-Sisi’s priorities are territorial integrity, anti-Islamism, and anti-militancy. He has been threatening military intervention in Libya for months, concerned that the violence there could spill over into Egypt. There have already been hundreds of attacks on Egyptian border security forces. The strikes targeted militant camps, training grounds and weapons-storage facilities in Libya, where the <a href="https://theconversation.com/debunking-three-dangerous-myths-about-the-conflict-in-libya-36521">lack of a strong government and institutions</a> has opened up fertile ground for the proliferation of Islamist insurgent groups. </p>
<p>This is a major challenge for al-Sisi, a former chief of Egypt’s armed forces who seized control of the country in one of its most chaotic moments. His domestic concerns – dealing with the threats of Islamism, terrorism and instability – are closely tied to his foreign policy, which is both following trends that have held for decades and adapting as demanded by circumstances.</p>
<p>Since the Arab Spring, US-Egypt relations have been strained to say the least. That means al-Sisi has had to lean more heavily on other Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for financial and military support. Those countries are also fighting long battles against both Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots and they need Egypt to succeed along with them. </p>
<p>As a result, al-Sisi’s “doctrine” has morphed into a fierce dedication to regional stability and the status quo.</p>
<h2>All of the above</h2>
<p>Egypt’s modern foreign policy has also been marked by a consistent hostility towards Hamas and an openness to working with Israel. There are reasons for that: apart from the brief interlude of Morsi’s presidency, Egyptian politics have always had an anti-Islamist bent. </p>
<p>Successive Egyptian governments have seen Hamas as directly responsible for Egypt’s instability and insecurity, as it is after all a direct offshoot of the long-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>Now, in what seems to have become a recurring theme, recent events and attacks on Egyptian security forces in the Sinai desert – allegedly carried out by Islamist groups affiliated to IS – have provoked yet another unprecedented foreign policy decision from al-Sisi’s government: the closure of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/01/gaza-border-rafa-egypt-hostility-hamas-political-islam">Rafah border crossing</a>.</p>
<p>The crossing has historically served as a passage for both weapons and militants into Gaza. It is now to be permanently shut and replaced with a military buffer zone 1km wide and 13km long. This decision has caused the forced evacuation of more than 2,000 Egyptian families from the area. </p>
<p>That hard-line approach reflects al-Sisi’s concern over insecurity spilling over the borders and confirms Egypt’s regional role as one of Israel’s closest allies – even as Cairo’s ties with other Gulf nations are being strengthened.</p>
<p>Since al-Sisi’s supporters and enemies alike agree that security in Egypt is worryingly poor, the fate of efforts to stabilise the borders could have substantial repercussions on the country’s domestic politics. The same effect is apparent in recent decisions on how to tackle IS. </p>
<p>As he tries to stabilise and protect his country, al-Sisi is distancing himself both from historical sectarian allies and from the Sunni-Shia geopolitical agenda that has animated the Middle East for decades. Instead, he is demonstrating a commitment to the conservation of regional stability that overrides old sectarian allegiances, simultaneously pursuing diplomatic co-operation both with Egypt’s long-standing rival Iran and its allies in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>At the same time, he is not afraid to take the lead where he deems it necessary: he has now <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31500382">called for a UN resolution</a> allowing international military intervention in Libya and has <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/16/France-signs-deal-with-Egypt-for-first-export-of-Rafale-jets.html">purchased 24 advanced fighter jets from France</a>. </p>
<p>Ultimately, al-Sisi’s commitment to securing Egypt’s borders is turning the country into a remarkably innovative and assertive foreign policy presence. Whether it will do anything to stabilise an increasingly unbalanced and chaotic Middle East, to say nothing of Egypt’s own restive domestic politics, remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>On February 16, Egypt bombed Islamic State (IS) targets in the militant-controlled Libyan city of Derna, in response to the beheading of 21 Egyptian workers. The speed with which this unprecedented military…Lucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/357992014-12-30T10:41:13Z2014-12-30T10:41:13ZEgypt’s counter-revolution won out in a year of epochal change<p>It was a year of huge transition for Egypt. Gone was the Muslim Brotherhood, in both word and deed, while the military regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi strengthened its control across the state. </p>
<p>Despite facing numerous challenges – political, economic, secessionist and security related – al-Sisi’s regime has ostensibly emerged from 2014 in a much stronger domestic position, promising to deliver increased security and stability to the Egyptian population. </p>
<p>What that really means is not that Egypt is safer, but that the political space and opposition movements across Egypt are now as heavily restricted as ever.</p>
<h2>Distant memory</h2>
<p>This was the year that the military counter-revolution was completed. Al-Sisi’s election as president with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-presidential-election-vote-egypt">96% of the vote</a>, albeit on a low turnout, made the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak seem like a distant memory. </p>
<p>A clampdown on members of the Muslim Brotherhood (and all others opposed to al-Sisi’s rule) was followed by the arrest and prosecution of many Brotherhood members and supporters. </p>
<p>Then came <a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-mubarak-free-will-galvanise-egyptians-against-hated-sisi-34890">Mubarak’s acquittal</a> for the manslaughter of 900 protesters during 2011, which further cemented the image of a failed revolution.</p>
<p>Despite al-Sisi’s clampdown, for many Egyptians he remains a popular leader, offering protection and stability where previously there had been only insecurity and chaos. And while security problems across Egypt remain serious – highlighted by a general reluctance among women to leave the house on their own – al-Sisi’s regime is still broadly seen as a solution to the country’s big problems, not a problem in itself.</p>
<h2>The price of security</h2>
<p>But that doesn’t mean all is well. Since gaining power after the July 2013 coup d’etat, al-Sisi has sought to consolidate his rule by whatever means necessary – and the means he has chosen are starting to deepen domestic and international unease.</p>
<p>The government has dialled up its authoritarianism and passed various new laws that restrict Egyptians’ human rights. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/18/egypt-constitution-yes-vote-mohamed-morsi">new constitution</a>, devoted to a “war against terrorism”, defines terrorism as an “act” that might obstruct the work of public officials, embassies or institutions and therefore includes anyone who joins peaceful protests or takes part in a strike. Prison sentences of up to ten years can be given to anyone who is part of a group that “<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/egypt-painting-terrorism-very-broad-brush">harms national unity or social peace</a>”. </p>
<p>As a consequence, an estimated 41,163 Egyptians were <a href="http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/briefings/11123-the-never-ending-story-of-egypt-al-sisi-and-the-military-legacy">arrested</a> in the period between July 3, 2013 and May 15, 2014, including 36,478 detained during political events and a further 3,048 arrested as members of the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>These numbers are unmatched in Egyptian history, and they show just how restricted and security-minded Egypt’s politics have become. </p>
<p>Together with the re-issuing of Mubarak’s much criticised State of Emergency Law and of the <a href="http://www.ishr.ch/news/egypt-end-systematic-misuse-assembly-laws-against-peaceful-protestors-and-release-women-human">Assembly Law</a>, which gives the security forces the right to forcibly disperse any public meeting of more than ten people, this is another clear sign of a regime trying to retain power by utterly dominating the political sphere.</p>
<h2>Return of the tourists?</h2>
<p>Much of the Egyptian economy is driven by tourism, which stagnated in the three years following Mubarak’s overthrow. Tourists were increasingly cautious about visiting Egypt, the land of revolution and instability, which led to a drop in revenue gained from tourism from £250m to £10.5m <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/egypt-tourism-revenue-falls-95-percent">in three years</a>. </p>
<p>Yet in the third quarter of 2014, tourism <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f87f378-72ff-11e4-a257-00144feabdc0.html%23axzz3Mj3Dmx5c">rose 70%</a> from the same period in 2013 and in September alone, the increase from 2013 was 193%. This suggests that international perceptions about stability in Egypt have shifted, despite conditions on the ground.</p>
<h2>Declining power</h2>
<p>The year also saw a transition in Egypt’s regional relations. Given its unique transnational and geopolitical position Egypt could have acted as a balance in the deteriorating situation in both Gaza and Libya – but the country’s borders are instead growing increasingly insecure. </p>
<p>Al–Sisi’s direct involvement as a mediator between Israel and Gaza across 2014 showed how much he wants to restore Egypt’s old role as a regional leader, but his alliance with Jerusalem provoked both regional and domestic criticism. </p>
<p>In negotiating with Netanyahu and stopping wounded civilians and humanitarian aid from crossing the Rafah border for most of Israel’s Gaza offensive, al–Sisi was seen to be effectively siding with Israel and the US and against other regional powers. This <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/13465-egypt-refuses-to-let-gazas-wounded-travel-turkish-plane-uses-tel-aviv-airport">badly damaged his country’s popularity</a> in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the state’s struggle to effectively secure its borders has left Egypt open to the violence engulfing its blighted neighbourhood and has caused problems of its own. </p>
<p>The violent Rafah crossing was closed after <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/egypt-clear-residents-from-gaza-border-2014102941345405677.html">deadly attacks on security forces in the Sinai</a>. A 13km-long buffer zone created along the border there threatened to cause <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/rafah-egypt-army-destruction-houses-residents-compensation.html#">mass displacement</a>. Meanwhile, rumours of a <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/08/Egypt-libya-border-chaos-military-intervention.html">possible intervention in Libya</a> to stop Islamic insurgencies there only draw attention to the worry that the Libyan chaos might spill over. </p>
<h2>The next year and beyond</h2>
<p>Despite al-Sisi’s largely successful consolidation of raw power, the overall outlook at the end of 2014 is far from positive or stable. While the military government managed to cement its rule via the election, the continuation of Mubarak’s “deep state” shows that popular attempts to gain dignity and secure fair representation for all Egyptians have failed.</p>
<p>The increasing brutality and authoritarianism displayed by the Egyptian government are symptoms of undying domestic discontent, and coupled with growing insecurity at the country’s borders, this all speaks to Egypt’s declining regional influence. </p>
<p>While it is hard to foresee what 2015 might have in store, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-mubarak-free-will-galvanise-egyptians-against-hated-sisi-34890">brewing renewal of the revolutionary movement</a> is an undeniable sign that not all Egyptians have lost hope, and will not accept yet another military dictatorship. </p>
<p>But as long as al-Sisi’s stunningly effective attempts to lock out any formal opposition from politics pay off, they will have little hope of success. For now, it seems, Egypt is doomed to repeat its history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It was a year of huge transition for Egypt. Gone was the Muslim Brotherhood, in both word and deed, while the military regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi strengthened its control across the state. Despite facing…Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/334232014-10-28T10:19:57Z2014-10-28T10:19:57ZViolent crackdown on students engulfs Egyptian universities<p>Egypt’s new academic year started in early October amid unprecedented repressive measures by the state against students. On October 11, the morning of the first day of university, police <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/14/egypt-release-arrested-university-students">carried out a massive wave of arrests</a> – mostly students taken from their homes as they were preparing for their first day of classes. More arrests followed the next morning. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201410230276.html">number of students arrested</a>, allegedly belonging to a student movement called “<a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/19/sac-promise-student-uprising-due-increased-campus-security/">Students Against the Coup</a>”, is now <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/26/students-stage-protests-violations/">more than 200</a> according to the civil society group, Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. No charges have been pressed against the students, who are now being kept in custody pending trial. </p>
<p>The student movement has long had a political role in Egypt and played a <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uFPoWgTLq0EC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=egypt+student+movement+1930&source=bl&ots=UasZfXvUf0&sig=hmo2Bv0JapZALYQVL7lCohjXX3s&hl=en&sa=X&ei=kBlOVMjKEKHC7AaW7IDICw&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=egypt%20student%20movement%201930&f=false">vital part in the national struggle</a> against the British and against the corrupt monarchy during the 1930s and 1940s. Since independence in 1952 the student movement has continued to play a leading role in the struggle against repression and social injustice during successive regimes. </p>
<h2>Beefed-up security</h2>
<p>Now a new wave of government repression is in full swing.
A private company, Falcon Security, which specialises in anti-protest and riot measures, <a href="http://www.albawaba.com/news/egypt-raises-security-presence-top-universities-614609">has started operating</a> on nine campuses nationwide. The company adopted tight and sometimes violent tactics from day one, with students waiting in long queues to be personally searched before being admitted to their schools through poorly constructed magnetic tin corridors. Instances of verbal violence and harassment were widely reported during the first few days of school.</p>
<p>Hostels at a number of universities refused to receive students, under the pretext that renovation work was still in progress, but no specific dates were announced for their opening. The start of the school year (scheduled according to university law to start the third Saturday of September) had <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140917130415310">already been postponed</a> under the pretext that maintenance work in the dorms had not finished. But it was not difficult to see that the reason was mainly for the authorities to finish implementing a tighter security system both in the dorms and on campuses. </p>
<h2>Power-grab over university management</h2>
<p>In the midst of all this, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who – in the <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/110800/Egypt/Politics-/Preparations-for-Egypts-parliamentary-elections-to.aspx">absence of a legislative council</a> – has assumed the power of tabling legislation (with his cabinet) issued an <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/10/13/cairo-university-professors-protest-amendments-university-laws/">amendment on October 13</a> of the controversial Law for the Regulation of Universities. </p>
<p>Those amendments cancel one of the very few positive changes that had taken place after January 2011, when the academic community <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/10/03/faculty-deans-elections-prove-mb-unpopular-at-public-universities/">managed to reinstate elections</a> for university high officials. This had replaced a system of direct appointment, meaning that officials were both subject to selection according to security measures and responsible to answer to ministers rather than to the large academic community that had elected them. Egypt has now returned to this state control of academia. </p>
<p>Like anywhere else in Egypt, universities are shot through with political strife. Students belonging to the now-banned Muslim Brotherhood have cause for complaint against the Sisi regime, which they accuse of deposing “their” democratically elected president and initiating a wave of indiscriminate persecution against the Brotherhood. </p>
<p>But Muslim Brotherhood students are not alone. Various other political and social forces on the ground are asking for a more egalitarian public sphere where they can voice their opinions, criticise the regime and protest peacefully. This has been categorically denied to them by the current regime under the pretext of curbing the “terrorism” of the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<h2>Violence on campus</h2>
<p>According to another recent amendment of university regulations, university rectors now have the power to call in police forces, armed with tear gas, birdshot and live ammunition, as well as heavy trucks, to raid university campuses when student “riots” break out. During the first week of school, police forces raided at least three university campuses nationwide. </p>
<p>In the face of these restrictions, it was only natural that students would raise their voices and student protests (mainly calling for the release of their detained colleagues) erupted at Alexandria University where the rector called in armed police forces on campus to confront protesting students. Police stormed the campus under a thick cloud of tear gas, while <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201410220692.html">a law student sustained bullet injuries</a> in the neck and head and later died in hospital.</p>
<p>The authorities are blaming the violence on students. Yet photos and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyiwAx-efjg">video clips</a> as well as student testimonies collected by individual faculty members that I’ve seen testify that in an unprecedented move, the police actually stormed into lecture halls – and were at times firing birdshot at students. </p>
<p>On October 23, the Egyptian minister of higher education appeared in a televised press conference indirectly blaming the dead student by saying that as a law student he had no business being at the faculty of engineering where he was shot. In an obvious attempt to clear the police of any responsibility, even though investigation is still underway, the minister also alluded to the possibility that the student might have been shot by his fellow students in an attempt to frame the police.</p>
<h2>Wider clampdown</h2>
<p>As an academic in Egypt, it is not difficult to see the clamping down on universities as part of a more general policy that the new regime is trying to establish: an iron fist over civil liberties and a stifling of dissent on all levels, no matter whether it is Islamist or otherwise. </p>
<p>State-controlled media is launching a fierce campaign against activists, establishing a narrative that the January 25, 2011 revolution was a conspiracy concocted by enemies of the state that was corrected by the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/04/egypt-coup-military-morsi-democracy">military’s soft coup</a> of July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular – and Islamist politics in general – are projected as the enemy, seeking to dismantle the state. Any rejection of that narrative of events is seen as suspicious if not downright subversive. </p>
<p>In that context, it is not surprising to see that the student movement erupt with little fear of the possibly violent consequences. The clashes and repression that have already taken place have inflicted considerable damage on student life and on the educational process in Egypt. But in a broader sense they reflect the subtle negotiations that continue between an emerging authoritarian regime and a strong and determined student movement. This academic year looks like it will be a decisive one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Randa Aboubakr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt’s new academic year started in early October amid unprecedented repressive measures by the state against students. On October 11, the morning of the first day of university, police carried out a…Randa Aboubakr, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, Cairo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/293552014-07-18T05:30:28Z2014-07-18T05:30:28ZAfter eight years under siege, Hamas is fighting to stave off a slow death<p>After days of oscillation over an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has escalated into a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28359582">full-on Israeli ground offensive in Gaza</a>. According to authorities in Gaza, 258 Palestinians have been killed since the start of the latest hostilities – which now show no sign of slowing.</p>
<p>By the time Israel’s forces rolled in, reports of Mahmoud Abbas’s meeting <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/july17/israel-seeks-ceasefire-restore-abbas-authority-hamas">with General al-Sisi in Cairo</a> had already exposed just how low Hamas’s relations with its most important former ally have sunk, with Egypt reportedly seeking a deal that would place Gaza back under Abbas’s control.</p>
<p>Predictably, Hamas’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/egypt-no-negotiations-gaza-ceasefire-israel-hamas">rejection of Egypt’s ceasefire plan</a> has been subject to widespread misunderstanding and distortion – and superficial western commentary has failed to take into account the critically important political context that has shaped the Hamas response.</p>
<p>Historically, Egypt’s intelligence services were the main channel through which Hamas and Israel mediated their disputes. These services had intensive contact and dialogue with both their Israeli and Hamas counterparts during the conflicts in 2008/2009 and 2012, and these mediations led to the successful brokering of ceasefires on both occasions – hence the frequent current references to the 2012 ceasefire.</p>
<p>But that channel has now closed. This time around, while Israel was reportedly consulted on the main points of the Egyptian ceasefire initiative, Hamas’s leaders <a href="http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=713161">say they were not part of the negotiations</a> that constituted the Egyptian initiative. In fact, they claim to have heard about about it through media reports, rather than from any diplomatic source. </p>
<p>This is a major shift from the way Egypt has dealt with Hamas during previous conflicts with Israel – and it is largely a consequence of the Arab Spring uprisings.</p>
<h2>Allies no more</h2>
<p>As a close ally of the the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most influential religious organisations in the Muslim world, Hamas has made strategic choices that have been very damaging to its regional ties, and especially to its relationship with Egypt. Hamas has aligned itself with softly-leaning Islamist governments in <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/10/14/Turkey-s-relationship-with-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.html">Turkey</a> and <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0418/Behind-Qatar-s-bet-on-the-Muslim-Brotherhood">Qatar</a>; in the process, it has shifted its allegiances away from former close supporters like <a href="http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=9335">Iran and Syria</a>.</p>
<p>This is why in 2012, when the Israeli-Hamas fighting broke out, Morsi’s Brotherhood-ruled Egypt was able to play a pivotal role in mediating a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?pagewanted=all">ceasefire agreement</a>. Morsi in fact threatened that Egypt would not remain neutral in the fight, and <a href="http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/09/26/263717/morsi-bashes-israel-over-iran-war-threats/">condemned Israel’s Gaza policy at the UN</a>.</p>
<p>But since the ouster of Morsi just over a year ago, the new administration in Cairo has pursued a scorched earth policy of elimination against the Muslim Brotherhood, <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-anniversary-morsi-ousting-2014-07-02">arresting thousands of brotherhood members</a> as well as Morsi himself. </p>
<p>Hamas now stands accused of assisting the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, supporting the deposed Morsi government, and helping foment uprisings against the new Egyptian rulers. </p>
<p>In particular, it is accused of assisting in attacks against Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai – but no evidence has been publicly produced to confirm the accusations that Hamas committed or assisted in terrorist activities on Egyptian soil.</p>
<p>Still, ever since Morsi’s removal, the military-led regime has waged a war against Hamas, largely through economic means. In particular, it has <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/21/314793/gazans-suffer-as-egypt-continues-to-destroy-tunnels/">destroyed more than 90% of the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt</a>, which used to serve as the principal lifeline for Gaza in terms of goods and services, food, petroleum, and arms. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/business/2012/02/smugglers-fed-up-with-hamas-taxe.html">Taxing these imports</a> was crucial for subsidising the running of Gaza, providing millions of dollars in vital income.</p>
<h2>Double siege</h2>
<p>The destruction of the Rafah tunnels is especially important given that, over the past eight years, Israel has consistently besieged Gaza from land, air and sea, keeping it isolated and cut off. David Cameron <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/27/david-cameron-israel-gaza-comments">drew fire for suggesting</a> in 2010 that Gaza’s current situation is analogous to that of a gigantic “prison camp”, but he is hardly alone in that assessment.</p>
<p>What has changed in the last year and a half is that Gaza is now besieged by both Israel and Egypt. The Egyptian siege has been particularly painful; fully cutting off Gaza from the outside world, it has left Hamas bleeding to death.</p>
<p>The current violence therefore reflects a measure of desperation on the part of the Hamas leadership. Hamas’s military and governance capacity has been hugely damaged, and before the current violence broke out, it had tried to reconcile with President Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah – an acknowledgement of its extremely fragile position.</p>
<p>Hamas had hoped that reconciling with the more secular nationalist movement in the West Bank would provide salaries for its tens of thousands of workers, and allow it to hold on against the two-pronged Israeli-Egyptian seige. This hope was never realised, and with thousands of unpaid workers on its hands, Hamas’ existential crisis continues – while the standard of everyday life for the residents of Gaza has steadily deteriorated. </p>
<p>This was the context for the event that sparked the current crisis: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/murder-of-three-teenagers-sends-israel-into-security-overdrive-28679">kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers</a> followed by the murder a Palestinian youth.</p>
<h2>The spark</h2>
<p>Israel has provided no concrete evidence implicating Hamas in the murders, and the crime is not typical of Hamas’s methods; they would have been much more likely to use the teenagers to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners. But Israel has nonetheless started a major crackdown in response to the murder, arresting not only hundreds of pro-Palestinian activists but also <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/18/palestinians-freed-2001-gilad-shalit-custody">more than 50 former prisoners</a> who had been released for the return of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.</p>
<p>Ironically, neither Israel nor Hamas wants an all-out confrontation. Yet their calculated and limited escalation has spiralled out of control – as has the number of <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/why-doesnt-israel-publish-figures-and-details-of-gaza-casualties/">Palestinian casualties</a>.</p>
<p>When Israel started bombing Gaza, the silence of the international community was deafening. As has happened so many times before, Israel’s allies give a yellow light, if not a green one, framing its actions as an assertions of Israel’s right “to defend its citizens, towns, and cities”. </p>
<p>For their part, Israeli experts and strategists have long framed their periodic engagements in Gaza as “<a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1120/Israelis-ponder-alternatives-to-mowing-the-lawn-in-Gaza-video">mowing the lawn</a>,” which is meant to degrade Hamas’s military capability and try to break its will, as well as to destroy its capacity to govern, by keeping in in a state of constant attrition and scarcity.</p>
<p>But after a few days of aerial bombing, mounting casualties triggered the moral conscience of the world – particularly due to the rising number of <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/israel-warns-gaza-strip-residents-evacuate-article-1.1868604">children</a> killed. </p>
<p>In contrast to his predecessors, Egypt’s leader General al-Sisi made no major statements in support of the Palestinian side. The foreign ministry placed blame on <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ap-interview-egypt-gaza-cease-fire-bid-alive-24594832">both sides</a>, and called on them to cease hostilities. </p>
<p>The dilemma facing Israel is that it does not have the capacity to break the will of Hamas, and it knows that its ground invasion will be extremely politically costly.</p>
<h2>Core concerns</h2>
<p>The Egyptian ceasefire initiative did not address Hamas’s core concerns; ending the eight-year siege and opening the Rafah crossing to allow supplies and revenue back into Gaza. Even though the recent ceasefire said this could be discussed afterwards – that was what the 2012 ceasefire promised and did not deliver. It is unlikely Hamas would once again accept the 2012 terms, because they can no longer depend on the Egyptian lifeline which has been withdrawn.</p>
<p>Hamas is not waging all-out war against Israel; in fact, its political leaders have made it clear they would like to translate this round of violence into concrete political gains. It has a limited set of demands; it principally wants to stop the bleeding and the war of starvation waged against it by Egypt and Israel, and find a way out of its existential crisis. </p>
<p>Despite the foolishness and absurdity of its rocket attacks, Hamas is not a messianic movement that wants to die fighting; it is a movement battling for survival. The current Hamas strategy, then, is a limited military one of seeking leverage to bargain for relief from the ongoing siege of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Bargaining</h2>
<p>Both camps have been trying to maximise their bargaining position. <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Abbas-to-meet-Egypts-Sisi-over-Gaza-crisis-20140717">Abbas is in Egypt</a>, as are some Hamas allies, particularly Islamic Jihad; there are no reports of any Hamas leaders from Gaza or exile (for instance, in Qatar) coming to Egypt.</p>
<p>Hamas and Egypt are currently testing each other’s nerve. Hamas wants to engage the Egyptian government and press the point that they have nothing to do with the Islamist insurgency there, in an effort to get the border crossings open and re-engage with the new al-Sissi administration.</p>
<p>But regardless of whether this round of conflict is resolved sooner rather than later, or whether Egypt softens its stance on Hamas, the fundamental challenge facing both Palestinians and Israelis remains the same: to reach a political settlement for a viable Palestinian state where both Palestinians and Israelis can live in peace and security. </p>
<p>As things stand with now, with Israel’s ongoing and thickening settlements on the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem and its strangulation and now ground invasion of of Gaza, Palestinians feel a sense of hopelessness and despair. </p>
<p>As things stand, there seems to be no light at the end of this tunnel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/29355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fawaz Gerges does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After days of oscillation over an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has escalated into a full-on Israeli ground offensive in Gaza. According to authorities in Gaza, 258…Fawaz Gerges, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/283492014-06-23T22:29:22Z2014-06-23T22:29:22ZVerdict in Al Jazeera trial shows regime’s contempt for press freedom in Egypt<p>Three Al Jazeera English journalists have been convicted in the Cairo Criminal Court of spreading false news, threatening national security and aiding the Muslim Brotherhood – previously Egypt’s first democratically elected government now deemed a terrorist organisation. </p>
<p>The trial judge, Mohamed Nagy, handed Australian journalist, Peter Greste, and his Egyptian-Canadian colleague, Mohamad Fadel Fahmy, seven-year sentences in a maximum security prison. Egyptian Al Jazeera journalist Baher Mohamad was given an additional three years for being in possession of a spent bullet casing he picked up. </p>
<p>The “Al Jazeera Three” were tried with 20 other defendants – some of whom were students thought to be members of the Brotherhood – and other foreign correspondents, including the Dutch journalist Rena Netjes and British journalists Sue Turton and Dominic Kane, who were all tried in absentia and received ten-year sentences. </p>
<p>The international community has expressed its shock and outrage. Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, <a href="https://theconversation.com/appalled-abbott-government-will-try-to-intervene-for-journalist-peter-greste-28359">remarked on the appalling severity of the verdict</a> while in the UK, both foreign minister, William Hague, and the prime minister, David Cameron, said they were “appalled” by the verdict. The EU has said it is “extremely concerned” and the US secretary of state, John Kerry, called the verdict “chilling and draconian”. Several Western countries have summoned Egyptian ambassadors. Amnesty International’s director, Steve Crawshaw, called the sentence “Outrageous … [an] absolute affront to justice.”</p>
<h2>No credible evidence</h2>
<p>The prosecution lacked any credible evidence in the case, producing an array of elements as evidentiary support ranging from the dubious to the surreal, including the playing of inaudible recordings in court, showing clips from networks other than Al Jazeera, and even a pop video by Gotye, an Australian singer. </p>
<p>These judgments are part of the new Egyptian government’s strategy to <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-qatar-and-the-battle-over-al-jazeera-thats-landed-three-journalists-in-jail-28363">marginalise the influence of Qatar</a> at the behest of the new Egyptian regime’s Saudi allies. Qatar, where Al Jazeera is headquartered, supports the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>But the sentences also serve as a stark reminder of the intimidation experienced by journalists on the ground – whether foreign or Egyptian – and the dismal environment in which political dissent and opposition navigate <a href="https://theconversation.com/egyptian-regimes-charges-against-me-are-baseless-and-politically-motivated-22334">at great personal risk</a>. The judiciary has in recent months sentenced more than 1,000 Brotherhood supporters to death, including, just last week, Muslim Brotherhood’s general guide, Mohamad Badie, and at least 182 of the organisation’s supporters. </p>
<h2>No due process</h2>
<p>The verdicts will still go through an appeals process, but given they came the day after Kerry’s personal meeting with Egypt’s recently elected president, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, the Egyptian regime seems to have been callously heedless of guaranteeing due process in the trial. </p>
<p>Sisi has led a crackdown on any political dissent since Mohamad Morsi’s ousting by the military in July 2013. Islamists and Brotherhood supporters, prominent human rights advocates and protestors have all come under attack with an estimated 41,000 arrested since the military takeover. The al Jazeera verdicts surely highlight the reality of the current state of media freedom in Egypt and the grim continuation of the regime’s crackdown. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf">Article 70 of Egypt’s new constitution</a> guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the press. However, prior to being elected Egypt’s president, Sisi made a statement to the editors of the nation’s primary newspapers that freedom of the press should be balanced with national security. Al Jazeera, in particular, has come under attack by the Egyptian regime for its supposed sympathies with the Muslim Brotherhood. This trial is a clear message that opposition voices, including journalists, may also fall victim to the state’s arbitrary security measures. Despite scant evidence, the judiciary appears all too willing to issue politically useful but legally nonsensical verdicts at the expense of any semblance of human rights or the rule of law.</p>
<p>These verdicts send a chilling message to all journalists, and particularly to Egyptian journalists trying to do their job, who cannot rely on the attention of the international media or the support of foreign governments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28349/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti is affiliated with the European Centre for International Affairs. He receives funding from the Carnegie Trust for Universities of Scotland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Hynek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three Al Jazeera English journalists have been convicted in the Cairo Criminal Court of spreading false news, threatening national security and aiding the Muslim Brotherhood – previously Egypt’s first…Sarah Hynek, Postgraduate researcher, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Director, Centre for Global Security and Governance, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/283632014-06-23T19:38:21Z2014-06-23T19:38:21ZEgypt, Qatar and the battle over Al Jazeera that has landed three journalists in jail<p>The guilty verdict for three Al Jazeera journalists, who have been handed sentences of between seven and ten years for “aiding the Muslim Brotherhood and reporting false news” has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/appalled-abbott-government-will-try-to-intervene-for-journalist-peter-greste-28359">widely condemned</a> as a blow against press freedom in the region. The move is being seen as the action of a repressive government hell bent on stifling all dissent.</p>
<p>Peter Greste, Mohamed Fahmy, and Baher Mohamed were arrested in Cairo last December as they covered the turmoil that followed the army’s removal of Mohamed Morsi from the presidency in July.</p>
<p>Once praised for providing an alternative voice to Western networks, Al Jazeera is now regarded by many Egyptians as the mouthpiece, not just of the Muslim Brotherhood, officially labelled a terrorist group, but also of the enemy of Egypt’s military rulers, Qatar.</p>
<p>After the toppling of Morsi’s rule, the offices of Al Jazeera and the Egyptian media outlets linked to Islamic movements were shut down and Al Jazeera’s journalists in Doha were banned from entering Egypt. </p>
<p>The fallout and diplomatic rift between Egypt and Qatar has <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bbd82882-e94d-11e2-bf03-00144feabdc0.html#axzz35U0BzjZ3">escalated in the media domain</a> and culminated in the long prison sentences handed down to the three journalists, who were working for Al Jazeera English. The channel had been <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/broadcast/2011/12/arab-channel-jazeera-qatar">celebrated for its pivotal role during the Egyptian revolution</a> in 2011.</p>
<p>But the tension between Egypt and Qatar over Al Jazeera’s coverage has been brewing for some time. During its extensive coverage of the Gaza conflict in 2009, the channel criticised the Egyptian government for reluctance to open its border with Gaza Strip and allow humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. Al Jazeera then gave a platform to Arab critics to accuse then president Hosni Mubarak of complicity with Israel. In response, Egyptian state and independent television channels waged a <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/content/egypt-offensive-after-critical-al-jazeera-coverage/8070">wave of criticism against al Jazeera</a> accusing it of engaging in a media war against Egypt. Mubarak, did not conceal <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-jazeeras-troubled-history-in-egypt-23504">his view of Qatar and Al Jazeera</a>. When Morsi was elected in 2012, Qatar had supported him and the Muslim Brotherhood. But the win damaged Egypt’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which had been fervent supporters of Mubarak.</p>
<h2>Rift deepens</h2>
<p>Since the end of Morsi’s rule in July 2013, the rift between Egypt and Qatar has deepened. Many journalists <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/media/2013/08/21/How-Al-Jazeera-skews-its-coverage-of-Egypt.html">condemned Al Jazeera’s coverage</a> of the Egyptian affairs. </p>
<p>Journalists affiliated with the station’s Egyptian outlet, Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr (Egypt Live), <a href="http://www.aawsat.net/2013/07/article55309195">resigned</a> over what they called prejudiced coverage. Fatima Nabeel, one of the journalists who resigned, said she felt the <a href="http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7282.htm">channel was partisan</a> in favour of political Islam and that “selectivity was excercised in broadcasting”. </p>
<p>Then, journalists discovered to be working for al Jazeera faced persecution. In May, Rasha al Sayyed Abdo, a female freelance journalist, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27636127">was arrested</a> in Port Said for working with Al Jazeera Mubashir Misr.</p>
<p>In fact, Al Jazeera has long been accused by some of serving the Islamists’ agenda since its inception in mid-1990s. The channel was accused of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/alqaida/page/0,12643,839823,00.html">forging links with al-Qaeda</a>. It had journalists <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/jul/17/guantanamo-bay-al-jazeera">imprisoned in Guantánamo Bay</a> and put under house arrest. </p>
<p>The channel was also seen by critics as a platform for controversial Islamic clerics such as Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, one of the former leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was stripped of his Egyptian citizenship in the 1970s, forcing him to take Qatar as his new home. Qatar was also the refuge of the political leadership of Hamas, and it hosted the Taliban’s first official overseas office in 2013. For many Egyptian commentators, Qatar’s paradox is that it accommodates <a href="http://www.el-balad.com/934059">controversial Islamists</a> while hosting one of the biggest US military bases in the region. </p>
<p>The Egyptian veteran journalist Adel Hammouda devotes a weekly programme on the independent television Annahar to scrutinise Qatar arguing that it possibly has a desire to take a leading role in the region and using Al Jazeera as a PR tool. <a href="http://new.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?nwsId=553304&secid=18&vid=2#">Hammouda alleged</a> that the former emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, possibly suffered from “size complex” and he therefore supported the US agenda in dividing the Arab countries into tiny states like Qatar. </p>
<p>While the sentencing of Al Jazeera’s journalists has been condemned by western media organisations as well as governments, Egyptian persecutors demanded the maximum penalty for all journalists regarded as serving as a mouthpiece for the Brotherhood. Yehia al Gamal, former deputy Prime Minister in 2011, <a href="http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/382672">told al Watan newspaper when the trial began</a> that he supported the maximum penalty for the journalists while accusing Al Jazeera of implementing a US-led agenda. The trial and verdict come at a time when Egyptian officials and commentators call for Egypt to end its dependency on the US – and the West.</p>
<p>Amid reports regarding insufficient evidence and an inadequate trial, there may still be a slight chance for the verdict to be overturned on appeal. Even so, the case still marks one of the biggest challenges for the exercise of freedom of speech in Egypt since the end of the Brotherhood’s rule. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28363/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noha Mellor has previously received research funding. This article was not financially supported by external funding.</span></em></p>The guilty verdict for three Al Jazeera journalists, who have been handed sentences of between seven and ten years for “aiding the Muslim Brotherhood and reporting false news” has been widely condemned…Noha Mellor, Professor, Research Institute for Media, Arts and Performance, University of BedfordshireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/274662014-06-02T12:20:58Z2014-06-02T12:20:58ZBeatings, embarrassments and bad luck bedevil African leaders
<p>It has been an interesting month for leaders across Africa. Goodluck Jonathan finally declared a “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/29/goodluck-jonathan-nigeria-war-against-terrorists_n_5408989.html">total war</a>” against Boko Haram despite not having the means to wage one, and after a puzzlingly sluggish response time (“Lightning Jonathan” might well become his new ironic nickname). He was taken for a total lightweight by the assembled world leaders at May’s Paris summit, who came away muttering that they were less than impressed by Nigeria’s <a href="http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2014/may/272.html">accidental</a>, lacklustre and luck-free president.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, South Africa’s re-elected Jacob Zuma gave a <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=17419">victory speech</a> that crowed at his defeated opposition, while including nothing but platitudes about the state of his country and its people and what he would do for them. But he also finally did something genuinely symbolic: he appointed the first openly gay cabinet minister in the continent of Africa, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/26/south-africa-appoints-gay-minister-lynne-brown">Lynne Brown</a>. </p>
<p>This was of course in keeping with the South African constitution, which remains the most advanced in the world on the measure of guaranteed equality for all groups and persuasions. If it was meant to send a signal to a seemingly homophobic continent, it still did nothing to stop the inauguration of Ugandan foreign minister <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/01/uganda-anti-gay-minister-human-rights-kutesa">Sam Kutesa</a> as head of the UN General Assembly. </p>
<p>That was an ill-starred appointment indeed. Kutesa supported the Ugandan legislation that proscribed homosexuality and set terrifyingly harsh penalties for its practice, and said himself that Africa abhorred homosexuality. The Ugandan gay community has shown much defiant resistance. It held a <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/second-annual-gay-pride-parade-held-in-uganda/1723313.html">gay pride march</a> on August 4 2013, which was mercifully unmarked by violence. But the climate of Ugandan politics and the new legislation make a repeat highly unlikely.</p>
<p>The same cannot be said for the Zimbabwean riot police, sent into Harare’s Budriro township to warn the <a href="http://www.thezimmail.co.zw/2014/05/30/multimedia-violence-erupts-at-johane-masowe-shrine-in-budiriro-2/">Johane Masowe Chishanu Apostolic sect</a> against their controversial behaviour. Clad in their white robes, the sect confronted the riot police and beat them to a pulp. </p>
<p>Members of the opposition MDC, often beaten to a pulp themselves by the same riot police, might take some pleasure in videos of the spectacle and the hip-hop soundtrack that has been married to the footage in <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2014/05/31/budiriro-mapostori-remix/">viral videos</a>. </p>
<p>But the sect was targeted after accusations of abuse against women and children, and that reflects one thing that has gone right in Zimbabwe: the adoption last year of a strange new constitution. It is studded with “exceptional” clauses that allow the ruling ZANU-PF party to behave exactly as it wishes to for the next ten years – but it is also <a href="http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/01/24/fight-womens-rights-far/">very strong on gender rights</a>. So here we have the riot police going in to enforce gender rights and taking a beating which, from the footage, appeared comprehensive. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the north of the continent, Egyptian military leader Abdufattah al-Sisi turned the clock back to the days of Mubarak, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27614776">using elections as a tool</a>; in neighbouring Libya, rogue general <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/101718068">Khalifa Hafta</a> similarly set about crushing Islamic militias on the pretext of maintaing stability, while a fractious and useless civilian leadership fumed and continued to argue with itself. “Wait until elections,” cried the Libyan leaders – but in such a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-must-take-responsibility-for-spiralling-violence-in-libya-27050">mismanaged</a> country, elections will not solve anything for now.</p>
<p>Nor will they solve anything in Malawi, where the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/035f6a4c-e968-11e3-bbc1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33Tk5blI6">election of Peter Mutharika</a> restablished another old order after the blip of Joyce Banda’s presidency. Brother of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17636393">Bingu</a>, the late president whom Banda succeeded, Mutharika defeated the second-placed candidate, Lazarus Chakwera, who himself represented an even older order – that of Hastings Banda, and the shadow of his <a href="http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/05/02/mcp-brutal-past-forgiven-but-not-forgotten/">totalitarianism</a>. </p>
<p>Joyce Banda came a poor third, victim of her own appalling <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/malawian-president-joyce-banda-faces-electoral-humiliation-possibly-jail">inability to govern</a> or recognise what good government might mean. Those who follow her might not know either – but it is a sorry shame for Africa’s first female president south of the equator.</p>
<p>All in all, May 2014 hardly presented a spectacle of brilliant, wise, perceptive, forward-looking, strategically-informed, democratically-committed, well-advised African leaders with both a common touch and common sense. It has all been fodder for Afro-pessimists, and for those who delight, even if for the wrong reasons, in the spectacle of Zimbabwean bully boys finally getting their comeuppance in a flurry of white robes, shepherd staves and vengeful, pent-up fury. </p>
<p>And unless they learn to lead their people to something resembling a better future, similar explosions of fury may yet engulf many other lacklustre and misguided African leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
It has been an interesting month for leaders across Africa. Goodluck Jonathan finally declared a “total war” against Boko Haram despite not having the means to wage one, and after a puzzlingly sluggish…Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/273552014-05-30T05:16:48Z2014-05-30T05:16:48ZAl-Sisi wins landslide victory as flawed election returns battered Egypt to military rule<p>As supporters of Egypt’s former military chief turned president-elect, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, took to the streets of Cairo to celebrate his <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-sweeps-victory-egyptian-election">overwhelming election victory</a>, lighting fireworks in the iconic Tahrir Square, it soon became clear that, in the eyes of his supporters at least, the former field-marshall had won a sweeping mandate after more than a year of turmoil.</p>
<p>Based on the headline figures it seems as if al-Sisi has gained a landslide, securing 96.2% of the 21m cast votes and therefore – surely – claiming the support of the wide majority of the Egyptian population. His only opponent, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/24/sisi-president-elections-hamdeen-sabahi">secular liberal Hamdeen Sabahi</a>, barely figured in the calculations, gaining just 700,000 votes – or 3%. Taken on these numbers alone, one could conclude that the Egyptian population is finally unified in its presidential choice and that such an unprecedented support means that al-Sisi has a prosperous and relatively peaceful political career ahead. </p>
<p>But looks beyond these numerical results and you will get a considerably less optimistic picture of events. Even if al-Sisi has gained 96% of the votes, that does not mean that the majority of Egyptians gave him their support. Interestingly enough, the majority of Egyptians did not vote at all. In fact it appears that only 24m of the 54m Egyptians registered to vote actually turned out to cast their ballots – and there have been many <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/26/the-power-to-condemn-elections/?wprss=rss_politics&clsrd">claims that the elections were flawed and heavily manipulated</a>. </p>
<p>Turn-out only accounts to 44% of the population. This is significantly down from the 52% who voted when Mohammed Morsi was elected president in 2012. This lack of political involvement clearly demonstrates that al Sisi does not enjoy as much support as he would like everyone to believe – and that the democratic process he claims to be enacting is already flawed. </p>
<p>Even if the low turn-out can partially be blamed on the <a href="http://thecairopost.com/news/112257/news/nasl-calls-for-boycott-of-election-day-two">voting boycott</a> called by various political actors, such as the liberal and secular groups as well as the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood (a lot of whom have been arrested) it still looks as if nearly 10 months of continuous political campaigning in favour of the former army chief still didn’t rouse mass support from the Egyptian people. And when you think that the electoral commission made the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/egypt-extends-voting-in-presidential-election-to-third-day/2014/05/27/6a599d71-5911-4900-bb28-067e479f1eee_story.html">unprecedented decision to extend voting for a third day</a> and a national holiday was called especially for the occasion – which gave people free time to vote – polling stations remained empty. Anyone following the election on Twitter will have seen photos of deserted schools and offices. </p>
<p>The electoral commission even urged citizens to vote by claiming that the “terrorist” Muslim Brotherhood would come back and take their revenge on al Sisi should they not vote. They went as far as t<a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/27/fining-abstainers-law-will-implemented-mehleb/">hreatening to persecute all abstainers</a>. But largely without success.</p>
<h2>Back to the future with al-Sisi</h2>
<p>So, in fact, political apathy appears to be the real winner of these presidential elections. This comes with a whole set of dangerous implications. It could be argued that the lack of citizens’ participation is in part due to the widespread assumption that al-Sisi was always going to win – but it also reveals high levels of discontent and opposition. There are many within the Egyptian public who are strongly critical of the former army chief’s lack of clear policy plans. There are also many who <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10853999/Mubaraks-old-guard-stand-behind-Sisi-in-run-for-Egypts-presidency.html">see in his victory the inevitable return to Mubarak’s “deep state”</a>. And sitting behind that seeming apathy is fear and apprehension about standing against or supporting a candidate standing against someone who has, frankly, been set to be Egypt’s new ruler since the army staged a coup d’etat on July 3 last year. </p>
<p>International observers such as Human Rights Watch <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/marwa-fikry-abdel-samei/el-sisis-tainted-legitimacy">have also declared</a> that the violent crackdown over the month following the Muslim Brotherhood’s deposition also negatively impacted on the perceived and actual fairness of these presidential elections. So it looks like not much has changed in the country in the past three years and that Egypt is heading back to a military dictatorship that will once again take hold of the country.</p>
<p>Despite all these irregularities, al-Sisi’s sweeping victory remains unchallenged and the former field marshall is set to rule the country for the foreseeable future. It’s not hard to imagine that at least some of the popular support for al-Sisi might be based on many Egyptians’ belief that, despite what looks like a return to the sort of quasi-military rule that they kicked out in 2011, some degree of much longed stability and security will come out of al Sisi’s election. This is something Egypt has not enjoyed in more than five years. </p>
<p>But we should keep in mind that, as the BBC’s Middle East correspondent, Kevin Connolly, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-27522490">clearly puts it</a>: “Mr Sisi’s appeal is to those Egyptians who would accept a little less freedom for a little more stability – a dangerous but tempting trade-off in a time of chaos.”. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>As supporters of Egypt’s former military chief turned president-elect, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, took to the streets of Cairo to celebrate his overwhelming election victory, lighting fireworks in the iconic…Lucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/271442014-05-27T05:14:22Z2014-05-27T05:14:22ZEgypt prepares to hail former army chief as president – once the election is out of the way<p>In May 2012, Egypt’s <a href="http://www.european-centre.org/ecia-briefings/egypts-preside-elections/">first democratic presidential election</a> set an important precedent in a troubled transition process. At the time, there was no constitution, no clarity on the president’s powers, no process of transitional justice, no security sector reform, and no economic reform. Key demands of the revolution such as inclusive economic growth and social justice were a chimera. </p>
<p>There was, however, plenty of political participation: for all its flaws, with the presidential election the transitions process finally gave signs of life in the free election of the land’s most powerful office.</p>
<p>The election itself was a surprisingly close-run affair: the top four candidates in the first round were all within 7% of each other, and the first two candidates separated by a mere 3.5% in the run-off. While the victor, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi, could only <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-egypt-election-idUSBRE85G01U20120624">claim a slender margin of victory</a>, Egyptians hopeful of a transition towards democracy could take heart from the process itself.</p>
<p>However, instead of a full transitional process, what ordinary Egyptians got was a return of the ancien regime. Core elements of the old order – particularly the armed forces and businessmen – regrouped, and focused on stalling transition and undermining the opposition.</p>
<h2>Bread, freedom and social justice</h2>
<p>The Brotherhood was no exception to this process. Like all post-Mubarak governments, it failed to tackle Egypt’s core problems: the economy is <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/meast/egypt-presidential-candidates-economy/">still in dire straits</a>, inequality is increasing, and ordinary people are increasingly frustrated. Bread, freedom and social justice are still a distant dream.</p>
<p>Instead of confronting Egypt’s deep-seated economic, social and political problems, successive governments responded with a toxic mix of hyper-nationalism and repression of any political dissent, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn in power was no exception. This combination of political disenfranchisement and economic impoverishment led to increased instability.</p>
<p>Tension reached a peak when the <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/andrea-teti-gennaro-gervasio/army%E2%80%99s-coup-in-egypt-for-people-or-against-people">army</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/tears-and-terror-as-egypt-slides-towards-civil-war-17077">removed Morsi in July 2013</a>. The <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/andrea-teti-vivienne-matthies-boon-gennaro-gervasio/revolution-continues-morsi%E2%80%99s-miscalculations-and">Brotherhood’s miscalculation of popular discontent</a> with its rule brought about a groundswell of mobilisation against Morsi, which the army took advantage of, stepping in and removing him. What has followed since then is a concerted effort by the army and other sections of the “old guard” to effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738">eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood</a> as a political actor. </p>
<p>Under the banner of “Egypt’s war on terror”, thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-death-sentences-for-muslim-brotherhood-complete-the-counter-revolution-in-egypt-24742">Brotherhood activists have been arrested and often tortured</a>, its leadership is in prison or in exile, and hundreds of anti-coup demonstrators – many but not all Brotherhood supporters – have been killed by the security forces. Security has become a political mantra and authorities view dissent as akin to treason.</p>
<p>Nor has the assault been limited to the Brotherhood. Riding – and stoking – a wave of hyper-nationalism rivalled only during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 1967 defeat to Israel, or the “October War” of 1973, this assault has aimed at pro-democracy groups such as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/egypt-outlaws-anti-mubarak-april-6-movement-20144281135421761.html">April 6th</a>. Activists and even iconic opposition figures like <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/18/alaa-abdel-fattah-fined-request-bench-recusal-denied/">Alaa Abdel Fattah</a> and April 6th co-founder Ahmed Maher have been arrested under draconian new anti-protest legislation, and often tortured. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the new regime struck back. <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/content/mubarak-mansions">Mubarak and his cronies</a> received lighter sentences for corruption than pro-democracy activists on trumped-up charges received for dissenting, and General al-Sisi, paladin of <a href="http://www.dw.de/egypts-army-expands-economic-power/a-17611602">the Army’s financial and political interests</a> and already head of Intelligence, was promoted Field Marshal and “responded” to “popular demands” that he run for office. Al-Sisi has also become the object of a spasmodic <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/04/egypts-personality-beatification.html">cult of personality</a> by his admirers, producing a baffling range of “Sisi” (or “CC”) items, <a href="http://sisifetish.tumblr.com">from chocolate cakes to underwear</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, the context for the coming presidential elections couldn’t contrast more with 2012: for all the faults of those elections, they were conducted in a markedly more open political landscape. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that al-Sisi will “win” these elections – the only doubt is by how much. Nor is there any doubt what an al-Sisi presidency will mean both politically and economically: like his military, Islamist, and “civilian” predecessors, he has given no sign of tolerating dissent, nor has he formulated any economic policies that might have a chance of addressing Egypt’s deep structural problems. Al-Sisi might be preparing to celebrate, but Egypt is unlikely to have much to cheer about in the long run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti is Senior Fellow at the European Centre for International Affairs.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Hynek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In May 2012, Egypt’s first democratic presidential election set an important precedent in a troubled transition process. At the time, there was no constitution, no clarity on the president’s powers, no…Andrea Teti, Director, Centre for Global Security and Governance, University of AberdeenSarah Hynek, Postgraduate researcher, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/247422014-03-25T14:28:10Z2014-03-25T14:28:10ZMass death sentences for Muslim Brotherhood complete the counter-revolution in Egypt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/44580/original/qntv8xhx-1395676151.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Court of public opinion.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/35079081@N07/12309259985/in/photolist-jKJb9r-jKHHoa-jKJYfH">Sebastian Horndasch</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26712124">529 death sentences</a> handed down to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood represent the largest number issued collectively in living memory in the country. That these sentences were delivered after a two-day trial, without benefit of defence testimony, has sparked international outrage - yet many in Egypt have greeted the move positively.</p>
<p>It signals the completion of a counter revolution, the wheels of which have been turning since mass protests, supported by the army, <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsis-authority-ebbed-away-but-egypt-is-dangerously-divided-15774">ousted the legitimate but unpopular Islamist president Mohammed Morsi</a> last July. </p>
<p>Morsi had been in power for only 12 months but the unpopularity of his political decisions built a massive groundswell of opposition which spilled onto the streets, giving the military its opportunity to force events.</p>
<h2>Army takes control</h2>
<p>The past nine months have seen the military, headed by Field Marshall Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">consolidate its power</a>. Now it appears al-Sisi will run for the presidency. </p>
<p>The announcement of the death penalties came just one day after police entered al-Azhar University in Cairo to disperse anti-government protesters. Students, academics and opposition journalists <a href="https://theconversation.com/opinions-are-dangerous-as-egypt-cracks-down-on-dissent-24039">have been a sustained target</a> for the counter-revolution since July 4. </p>
<p>The speed at which the trial proceeded – it was adjourned after one session on Saturday and the death sentences were announced on Monday – highlights the way military power is <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/04/egypt-s-draft-constitution-rewards-military-and-judiciary/gvc8">now operating hand-in-glove with a compliant judiciary</a> within the Egyptian state. This is a stark demonstration of the “deep state”, that’s roots can be traced back to the time of Nasser. </p>
<p>The new Egyptian constitution approved in January 2014 is a prime example of this privileged – yet not unprecedented – relationship between military and judiciary. It grants considerable autonomy to the state institutions, particularly those concerned with security, which have aligned together against the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/03/24/2014-egyptian-constitutionwithout-accountability-checks-balances/">new constitution</a> also outlaws the participation in politics of religious parties, something that existed at the time of Nasser.</p>
<h2>Brotherhood going underground</h2>
<p>At a stroke, the Muslim Brotherhood is once again an illegal organisation. Some 16,000 members have been arrested or killed. The Brotherhood, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-failed-in-egypt-because-it-was-inept-incompetent-and-out-of-touch-23738">which experienced political authority for the first time in 2012</a>, is now forced to once again seek answers to many of the questions it has previously engaged with over the legitimate use of violence. </p>
<p>While the Brotherhood’s spokesman in London declares that this sentence is just a further proof of Egypt’s descent into yet another dictatorship, there is the palpable danger of the Brotherhood resorting to violent means and re-organising itself in a quasi-militia movement to protect its members, as a consequence of repression and daily discrimination.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the recent resignations of the cabinet and prime minister seemingly pave the way to al-Sisi’s run to presidency, which would mark Egypt’s <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egyptian-cabinet-resigns-in-surprise-move/2014/02/24/0968ac0e-9d51-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html">return to a military autocracy</a>. It is as yet unclear how the mass of Egypt’s populace will react to this. Will it result in yet another eruption of protest or will it instead be tacitly accepted in favour of some long-sought stability?</p>
<p>Either way, it will add to the list of grievances that fuel the rage of the Egyptian people, which is arguably not lost but just suppressed. Egypt’s quest for dignity is not dead but has rather been drowned in violence, meaning that even if the population seems today to be coming to terms with the way the freedoms they thought they had won in 2011 have been clawed back by the Deep State, discontent is likely to keep bubbling away under the surface until it eventually explodes again. Once again, such development would not be unprecedented but a demonstration of Egypt’s cyclic history.</p>
<p>What must be remembered is that what is happening in Egypt is not new but can be traced back to several previous periods in recent history. This cycle of Islamist engagement within politics followed by violent repression also <a href="http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00091523/00646">occurred under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak</a>. </p>
<p>What is clear is that the Muslim Brotherhood faces the most severe challenge to its long-term stability since the time of Nasser. In the aftermath of being a democratically elected party, the Brotherhood faces serious external and internal pressures that it must overcome in order to continue as a prominent actor within Egyptian politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucia Ardovini receives funding from ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 529 death sentences handed down to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood represent the largest number issued collectively in living memory in the country. That these sentences were delivered after a…Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLucia Ardovini, ESRC PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.