tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/angela-merkel-1872/articlesAngela Merkel – The Conversation2022-03-04T19:43:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1784852022-03-04T19:43:55Z2022-03-04T19:43:55ZHow Zelenskyy emerged as the antithesis of Putin and proved you don’t need to be a strongman to be a great leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450070/original/file-20220304-25-1ssv2z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C279%2C5158%2C3475&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been lauded for his resistance to the Russian invasion</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-president-volodymyr-zelensky-looks-on-at-a-press-news-photo/1238915224?adppopup=true">Photo by Laurent Van der Stockt for Le Monde/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whatever happens in the coming weeks, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will go down as the face of Ukrainian resilience during the Russian invasion of his country. </p>
<p>His response to the Russian invasion of his country has been widely praised, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/3/ukraines-zelenskyy-a-wartime-statesman-for-the-social-media-age">both at home</a> <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/596036-zelenskyy-emerges-as-global-hero-in-ukraine-battle-against-russia">and abroad</a>. His speech to the European Parliament in early March received a <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/01/european-parliament-gives-standing-ovation-for-ukrainian-president">standing ovation</a>. Western press outlets have referred to him as a “<a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnists/2022/03/02/zelenskyy-proving-heroes-exist-russia-invades-ukraine/9330217002/">hero</a>,” as the “<a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/26/how-volodymyr-zelensky-found-his-roar">voice” of his nation</a>, and as a “focal point” for <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-volodymyr-zelenskyy-ukraine-invasion-20220228-smdukknwwnhidp2a3vvx3mtzmu-story.html">democratic resistance to tyranny</a>. </p>
<p>Some of this acclaim can be explained simply with reference to the fact that Zelenskyy is the president of a beleaguered nation standing up against a <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/02/understanding-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">powerful and belligerent aggressor</a>.</p>
<p>The Russian invasion is widely regarded as a brutal act of violence, cynically clothed in the language of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-claim-to-rid-ukraine-of-nazis-is-especially-absurd-given-its-history-177959">de-Nazification</a>.” Any president who resisted this invasion would likely receive some portion of moral praise. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://phil.washington.edu/people/michael-blake">political philosopher</a>, however, I would argue that something else is at work in the widespread reverence shown to Zelenskyy. </p>
<p>Zelenskyy has demonstrated, during the invasion, a style of political presentation that is the antithesis of that shown by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Matters of political style – the choices made by leaders about the words they use, the jokes they tell, even the clothes they wear – are frequently taken to be unrelated to matters of substantive political justice. The history of thinking about authoritarian politics, however, demonstrates that anti-democratic politics, and a certain sort of <a href="https://www.openculture.com/2018/10/yale-professor-jason-stanley-identifies-three-essential-features-of-fascism.html">personal style</a>, often come together.</p>
<p>Putin demonstrates a tendency toward authoritarianism in both political action and in political style. Zelenskyy, in contrast, presents a more modest and understated vision of political leadership – one more appropriate for democratic institutions, in which the leader is not thought to be morally superior to the governed. If the world is increasingly suspicious of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat">democratic ideals and practices</a>, then Zelenskyy might represent one of the few recent signs that those in favor of democracy have reasons for hope.</p>
<h2>Masculinity and authoritarianism</h2>
<p>There are three key aspects worth noting about Putin’s carefully crafted political image. Putin is particularly concerned to present himself as a traditionally masculine male, frequently appearing <a href="https://www.vox.com/2015/6/17/8796659/vladimir-putin-shirtless-video">shirtless</a> and often competing in – and (improbably) winning – athletic competitions, including both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/may/10/vladimir-putin-hockey-fall-hockey-exhibition">ice hockey</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/18/is-vladimir-putin-a-judo-fraud/">judo</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A shirtless balding man walks through a field clutching a rifle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450093/original/file-20220304-17-1ic5rlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A bare-chested Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaPutinsCranes/c768fa72be2e40849a924a873793b461/photo?Query=putin%20bare%20chest&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=14&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/RIA Novosti, Dmitry Astakhov, Government Press Service</a></span>
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<p>He presents himself as shrewd and contemptuous of his opponents, frequently showing a smirk in response to any showing of weakness. He was, for instance, visibly happy to see German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s discomfort in the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2007/06/14/putin-uses-dog-to-intimidate-merkel/">presence of his dog Konni</a>. This casual cruelty is expressed even toward his own subordinates, as seen in his recent public humiliation of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/feb/22/speak-plainly-putin-tense-exchange-spy-chief-ukraine-video">spy chief Sergei Naryshkin</a>.</p>
<p>He is, finally, keen to present himself as uniquely chosen by history to restore an empire he believes <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/putin-essays/">unjustly dismantled</a> – in particular, the Soviet Union, whose dissolution Putin described as the “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057">greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century</a>.” </p>
<p>Italian philosopher and novelist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/feb/20/umberto-eco-obituary">Umberto Eco</a> noted that traits such as these three may seem superficial – but that they speak of an authoritarian hostility to disagreement, and ultimately to <a href="https://www.pegc.us/archive/Articles/eco_ur-fascism.pdf">democracy itself</a>. </p>
<p>Eco notes that when a leader emerges who promises to use traditional masculinity, and thereby restore the former greatness of the nation or the polity, that leader is inevitably drawn toward the rejection of limits to centralized power. Such limits include, in the end, such notions as democratic accountability and human rights. In Eco’s words: For such a leader, disagreement is treason, and those who are weak deserve nothing but contempt. </p>
<h2>Zelenskyy’s leadership style</h2>
<p>If these arguments are correct, however, then Zelenskyy’s style of leadership represents a symbolic repudiation of Putin’s authoritarianism. Zelenskyy is, to begin with, unconcerned with presenting himself as traditionally masculine. Before his life in politics, for instance, he appeared – in a variety of vaguely comic costumes – on the Ukrainian edition of “<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2022/03/01/watch-war-hero-zelenskys-nimble-dance-moves-on-ukraines-dancing-with-the-stars/">Dancing With the Stars</a>.” He has, as the Russian invasion continues, presented himself <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/03/president-everyman-zelenskys-mastery-direct-appeal/">unshaven and exhausted</a> – as vulnerable, frightened, but nonetheless unbowed. </p>
<p>He is, finally, inclined more often to speak about Ukrainian unity in the present than about any glorious history. As a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/zelensky-ukraine-president-jewish-hero/622945/">Ukrainian of Jewish descent</a>, many of whose relatives were murdered in the Holocaust, he invokes history <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2022/02/25/zelensky-family-jewish-holocaust">more as warning</a> than as aspiration.</p>
<h2>Democracy and the freedom to speak plainly</h2>
<p>In this, Zelenskyy represents an image of not only resistance to authoritarianism, but also how leaders might appear as they engage in such resistance. Eco, who grew up in fascist Italy, describes his surprise at how simple was the speech of those who took over after fascism’s fall. Democracy, Eco marveled, entailed the freedom to speak plainly. It was not only freedom from fascist political institutions, but also <a href="https://www.pegc.us/archive/Articles/eco_ur-fascism.pdf">freedom from rhetoric</a>. </p>
<p>When Zelenskyy is lauded for his resistance to the Russian invasion, it is because he is demonstrating a number of central virtues – including the courage to remain where he is, in the line of Russian fire. But at least some of this praise, I am convinced, is the result of his style of governance, in which he resists not only authoritarian violence, but the authoritarian style of political presentation – including Putin’s assertions that he is unique in both destiny and in masculine strength.</p>
<p>There is, however, some irony at work in the moral symbolism ascribed to Zelenskyy.</p>
<p>The democratic hope ascribed to Zelenskyy reflects the thought that the leader is no better than those who are led; that the president does not have to be uniquely strong, or endowed with a unique historical destiny. He has frankly admitted that he is afraid of dying, afraid of his family’s dying – and that he remains in Kyiv out of duty, rather than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/world/europe/zelensky-ukraine-russia-invasion.html">any desire for glory or for warfare</a>. The president, instead, is a person much like anyone else. </p>
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<p>It is natural for the West to pin a great many hopes on Zelenskyy, in his resistance to the authoritarianism of Putin. The West should, however, not forget the most central lesson of democratic politics – that the leaders are no better, morally speaking, than those they lead. </p>
<p>If Zelenskyy represents a democratic hero, it should nonetheless be remembered that democracy does not need – and should not seek – the sorts of hero worship that authoritarians like Putin demand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Blake receives funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities.</span></em></p>A political philosopher explains the moral symbolism ascribed to Zelenskyy’s ‘heroism’ and why he offers hope to those who hold democracy dear.Michael Blake, Professor of Philosophy, Public Policy and Governance, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1730342021-12-02T13:47:51Z2021-12-02T13:47:51ZGermany: the three biggest issues facing Chancellor Olaf Scholz<p>Olaf Scholz <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/24/world/europe/germany-new-chancellor-olaf-scholz.html">is soon</a> to be sworn in as the new chancellor of Germany after nearly two months of intense negotiations between the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and liberal Free Democrats (FDP). </p>
<p>It is a complex coalition as the three allies had different – at times opposing – priorities ahead of the elections. On taxation, for instance, the Greens and SPD promised to raise taxes on high-earners, while the FDP was strongly opposed. With the SPD receiving six ministries on top of the chancellery and the Greens and FDP on five and four respectively, Scholz must unite them while providing the leadership expected from the chancellor of Europe’s largest economy.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/24/olaf-scholz-replaces-angela-merkel-as-german-chancellor.html">press conference</a> to announce the coalition agreement, there was much discussion about public investment, workers’ rights and of course the COVID-19 pandemic. But while these matters are key and attract widespread media attention in Germany, there are ultimately three issues that will forge the future of the German locomotive – and also the entire EU economy.</p>
<h2>1. Russia and China</h2>
<p>The next German foreign minister will be Annalena Baerbock, the Green co-leader. The Greens repeatedly criticised Angela Merkel for prioritising German commercial interests at the expense of core western values, and much of this related to China and Russia. </p>
<p>For instance, Merkel backed the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, despite <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-57923655">longstanding opposition</a> from the US among others. One objection to the pipeline is that it makes Russia less dependent for supplying Europe via another pipeline that goes through Ukraine, so it enables Putin to squeeze Ukraine’s income from supplying gas for political advantage. </p>
<p>As for China, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-investment-deal-angela-merkel-pushes-finish-line-despite-criticism/">Merkel pushed</a> the EU-China <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-china-agreement/">Comprehensive Agreement on Investment</a> over the finish line in late 2020 despite <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_voa-news-china_critics-raise-alarm-over-eu-china-deal/6203348.html">widespread criticism</a>. The agreement, which gives the two sides better access to one another’s markets, is <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/15/eu-china-investment-deal-still-possible-but-not-before-2023-analyst.html">now on hold</a> and still needs to be ratified. Yet it shows the extent to which Merkel’s government was on good terms with China.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-new-government-what-the-world-can-expect-in-a-post-merkel-era-172548">Germany’s new government: what the world can expect in a post-Merkel era</a>
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<p>The question is to what extent this approach will now change under Scholz and Baerbock, who has said that her objective is a foreign policy “guided by human rights and values”. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a3fa29aa-8072-4b67-95f7-5cc20c56f26b">The language</a> she has used – for instance when stating that territorial disputes in the South China Sea must be resolved according to international maritime law, or when criticising Russia’s suppression of civil rights – calls for significant changes in the relationship between Germany and both nations. </p>
<p>But Germany’s economy is deeply interconnected with both countries, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/17/in-germany-debate-on-trade-with-china-grows-as-merkel-nears-exit#:%7E:text='Change%20through%20trade'&text=Since%202015%2C%20China%20has%20been%20Germany's%20largest%20trading%20partner.,for%20Russia%20Europe%20Asia%20Studies.">especially with China</a>. The position that Scholz will take will define his chancellorship and also inexorably shape the EU’s relationship with these two countries.</p>
<h2>2. Germany’s green transition</h2>
<p>The announced objective of the newly formed coalition is that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1b3de4c-aae3-4095-900e-3596f67e238c">renewables will</a> account for 80% of German electricity by 2030 – a substantial increase from the approximately 45% registered in 2020. In the recent coalition press conference, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/badf3728-b21e-4114-840e-bcab8f86560f">Scholz reiterated that</a> the coalition intends to execute the “biggest industrial modernisation project Germany has undertaken in more than 100 years”.</p>
<p>But this requires gigantic investments in climate protection, and the modernisation of the country’s bureaucracy, digitisation and more. The Greens favour paying for this by changing Germany’s rule that it can only borrow up to 0.35% of its GDP in any given year, but the FDP is opposed and so the debt brake is going to remain. </p>
<p>So, who will pay for the green transition bill? On this crucial question, Scholz and his coalition allies have not really provided any answers. And it is unlikely that additional resources will come from higher growth.</p>
<p>Germany continues to be Europe’s largest economy and was the world’s <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/exports-by-country">third-largest exporter</a> after China and the US in 2020. But increasing international competition, China’s growing inward focus, and growing protectionism may well cap Germany’s growth rate in the coming years. </p>
<h2>3. The EU’s most indebted nations</h2>
<p>The creation of the EU’s €750 billion (£638 billion) <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eus-covid-recovery-fund-gets-unanimous-green-light/">coronavirus recovery fund</a> earlier in 2021 has been seen as a defining moment for the bloc. It means that the member countries have for the first time agreed to raise their common debt to ensure that those most hit by the pandemic will be able to alleviate the negative consequences and invest in recovery plans to allow for higher growth across the region.</p>
<p>Merkel was only able to convince her political allies at home to agree to this by <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6b2d39dc-dfbf-4e74-9407-1c9ed8445dbe">assuring them</a> it was a one-off measure. Yet numerous EU nations such as <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:General_government_debt,_2019_and_2020_(%C2%B9)_(General_government_consolidated_gross_debt,_%25_of_GDP)_Oct_2021.png">Greece, Italy and Portugal</a> had debts that were already verging on unsustainable pre-COVID-19, and the pandemic has further exacerbated their problems. The debate about whether the rest of the EU should bail them out is therefore bound to come to a head sooner or later. </p>
<p>Current FDP leader Christian Lindner is widely seen as a fiscal hawk for his insistence in claiming that Europe (as well as Germany) should go back to the <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/fiscal-rules-european-monetary-union">strict rules</a> on debt that were in place before the pandemic, thus keeping public debt below 60% and public deficits below 3% of GDP. In stark contrast, the Greens favour an expansive fiscal policy in which the EU borrows more to stimulate its economy.</p>
<p>For the moment, at least for Germany, the FDP has set the rules as the debt brake has been confirmed. But will this approach be pushed to EU budgeting as well? We will soon find out. On this very issue, Scholz will set his reputation in Brussels and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niccolò Pisani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Olaf Scholz faces the unfavourable task of uniting a coalition of three parties with very different agendas.Niccolò Pisani, Professor of Strategy and International Business, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721082021-11-18T13:10:53Z2021-11-18T13:10:53ZTrouble on the Belarus-Poland border: What you need to know about the migrant crisis manufactured by Belarus’ leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432493/original/file-20211117-13-lknwzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C19%2C3278%2C2114&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hopes for a better future?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/migrants-aiming-to-cross-into-poland-camp-near-the-bruzgi-news-photo/1236622809?adppopup=true">Maxim Guchek/BELTA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Using migrants as pawns is perhaps nothing new. But rarely do you have a situation in which one country encourages a migrant crisis on its own border for nakedly geopolitical reasons.</em></p>
<p><em>That is what appears to be happening at the Poland-Belarus border, where <a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/11/16/poland-belarus-migrants-border-crisis-chance-intl-ldn-vpx.cnn">violence has broken out</a> between Polish border guards and Middle Eastern migrants who traveled there via Belarus, and who are set on reaching the European Union. Meanwhile, there is growing concern over those <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/world/europe/poland-belarus-border-crisis.html">camped out in freezing conditions</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Tatsiana Kulakevich, a <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">specialist on Eastern European politics at the University of South Florida</a>, to break down how the migrant crisis came about and what the fallout might be.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on at the Belarus-Polish border?</h2>
<p>Images of migrants – many of them families with children – <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2021/11/16/1051199592/photos-belarus-poland-border-migrants">camped at the Belarus-Poland border</a>, trying to force their way into Poland and being <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/poland-uses-water-hoses-on-migrants-condemns-belarus-for-attack">deterred by water hoses</a>, have gained international attention in recent days. On Nov. 18, it was reported that many of the migrants were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/18/world/belarus-poland-border-migrants?partner=slack&smid=sl-share">being moved back from the border</a>, to a government-run facility. But it is not clear what the long-term plan is for those who have gathered in Belarus with no intention of returning to their countries of origin.</p>
<p>The crisis has been months in the making.</p>
<p>The influx of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8">migrants to Belarus from the Middle East began in early summer 2021</a>. But they didn’t come to stay in Belarus. Their ultimate destination was Western Europe. Now, there are thousands of people spending nights near the barbed-wire fence separating Belarus from EU member Poland.</p>
<p>The situation took a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-fears-major-incident-migrants-belarus-head-border-2021-11-08/">dramatic turn on Nov. 8</a> when thousands of new arrivals showed up at the Belarus-Poland border and tried to break through makeshift fences on the border, with the goal to crossing into the European Union.</p>
<p>This migrant crisis has a twist – it appears to be encouraged by Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus’ leader, who’s at the center of the border conflict as part of a ploy to flood the EU members that border Belarus – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – with large numbers of migrants in retaliation for a series of sanctions against the Lukashenko government.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8">denied encouraging migrants</a> into Europe. The evidence suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>Belavia, the Belarus state airline, increased the number of flights from the Middle East – including Iraq, Lebanon and Syria – in recent months to enable more migrants to come. For example, <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/11/12/bilet-v-belorusskii-kontslager">flightradar24.com</a>, which monitors global air traffic, reported 27 flights from Beirut to Minsk from August to November 2021, compared to only five in the whole of 2020.</p>
<p>And according to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/world/middleeast/belarus-migrants-iraq-kurds.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur">some of the migrants from Iraq</a>, Belarusian officials arranged for their stay in hotels and helped them reach the border with Poland. Belarusian border guards, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/59233244">it has been reported</a>, led migrants to a gap which had been cut in the border fence, allowing them to bypass the official checkpoint. Meanwhile, other migrants say they were provided axes and wire cutters by Belarusian border guards to cut through fences.</p>
<p>In response, the Polish government has closed its border with Belarus.</p>
<h2>What is the background to the crisis?</h2>
<p>The actions of the Belarusian government appear to be in retaliation for economic sanctions imposed by the international community in response to Lukashenko’s increasingly autocratic rule.</p>
<p>In August 2020, Belarusian authorities cracked down on protesters demanding the resignation of Lukashenko following a disputed – many say <a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-ap-top-news-europe-72e43a8b9e4c56362d4c1d6393bd54fb">rigged</a> – election. Opposition leaders say as many as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-election-protests/more-than-130-anti-lukashenko-protesters-detained-in-belarus-rights-group-idUSKBN28N0FK">30,000 people were detained</a> in efforts to suppress demonstrations.</p>
<p>The United States and the European Union <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-eu/eu-says-lukashenko-is-not-legitimate-belarus-president-idUSKCN26F0ZE">refused to recognize Lukashenko’s legitimacy</a> as president and, in September 2020, imposed a series of sanctions targeting Belarusian officials with asset freezes and travel bans. </p>
<p>The EU followed that up with two further rounds of sanctions in November and December of that year.</p>
<p>A fourth packet of EU sanctions came after Belarus <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2021/05/23/belarus-intercepts-ryanair-flight-and-detains-journalist-sparking-international-outrage/?sh=6e1a91634e6f">intercepted a Ryanair flight</a> carrying Raman Pratasevich, an opposition journalist and a former editor-in-chief of the Telegram Nexta news channel, along with 132 other passengers in May 2021. Belarusian authorities arrested the journalist and his partner before allowing the plane to continue to its destination. In June 2021, Pratasevich was moved under house arrest.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has sought to suppress any signs of protest activities. Since the beginning of the presidential election campaign in May 2020, the number of political prisoners in Belarus has increased from three to <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">868 as of November 18, 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>Where are these refugees coming from, and why?</h2>
<p>The asylum seekers are mostly Kurds from Iraq, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-11-17/why-iraqi-kurds-are-fleeing-their-peaceful-homeland">fleeing persecution and poverty</a>. But there are also migrants from Lebanon, Syria and Afghanistan. They are trying to cross into EU member states Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.</p>
<p>Previously, Middle Eastern migrants mainly crossed the Turkish border with the EU, and from Africa via the Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>These crossings can be treacherous, so the prospect of flying straight into Belarus instead of risking drowning proved an attractive option.</p>
<p>But now thousands are stuck or hiding along the Belarusian-Polish border, facing freezing temperatures. The cold and lack of humanitarian support have caused multiple cases of hypothermia and at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/16/poland-belarus-border-crisis-eu-refugees">nine deaths</a>.</p>
<h2>What chances are there for a resolution to the crisis?</h2>
<p>Lukashenko is using the border issues as leverage against the EU. He wants the lifting or easing of existing sanctions and recognition that he is the legitimate ruler of Belarus. </p>
<p>The EU, meanwhile, has announced plans for more sanctions against Belarus. But it has also held out the possibility of negotiations on resolving the migration crisis.</p>
<p>Lukashenko and Germany’s acting Chancellor, Angela Merkel, have held <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/germanys-merkel-belarus-lukashenko-hold-another-phone-call-belta">two phone calls</a> since the escalation of the border crisis on Nov. 8. They represented Lukashenko’s first conversations with a European leader since the 2020 presidential election. </p>
<p>The phone calls happened after Russian President Vladimir Putin, an ally of Lukashenko and the Belarusian regime, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-merkel-hold-2nd-phone-talk-in-2-days-about-migration-crisis-on-belarusian-polish-border/2418512">called on EU leaders</a> to talk directly with Lukashenko. </p>
<h2>What could be the fallout?</h2>
<p>The EU, the U.S. and NATO have strongly condemned <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-23/belarus-accused-of-using-migrants-in-hybrid-attack-against-eu">Lukashenko’s ushering</a> migrants to the EU border. The EU recently announced plans for a fifth round of sanctions against Belarus, targeting airlines, travel agencies and individuals believed to be facilitating the push of migrants. </p>
<p>Lukashenko, in turn, has threatened to retaliate against further sanctions, including <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/belarus-threaten-europe-gas/2021/11/11/970c725c-42df-11ec-9404-50a28a88b9cd_story.html">cutting off natural gas transit</a> from Russia to EU countries through Belarus.</p>
<p>Setting the stage for this, on Nov. 17, Belarus <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/17/belarus-limits-oil-flow-to-poland-due-to-pipeline-repairs-amid-growing-tensions-on-border/">restricted the pumping of oil</a> through the Druzhba pipeline to Poland, saying it was the result of “unscheduled repair work” that would last approximately three days. </p>
<p>[<em>More than 140,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p>
<p>But cutting off the gas supply to Europe would likely only be a short-term measure for Lukashenko. Anything more than a few days would go against Russia’s interests and could cause a rift with Putin – and keeping Putin on his side is crucial for Lukashenko.</p>
<p>Moscow has provided a financial lifeline to Lukashenko’s regime and promised to protect Belarus from external military threats. As long as Lukashenko retains Putin’s support, he will be able to continue to suppress dissent internally and ignore international pressure to respect borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172108/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belarus has created a migrant crisis at its border in an apparent move to punish the European Union for its opposition to the country’s leader.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of Instruction at SIGS, Research Fellow, Affiliate Faculty at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1716842021-11-11T16:04:37Z2021-11-11T16:04:37ZBelarus: whether or not Putin is behind the border crisis, it plays into Kremlin hands<p>The migrant crisis on Belarus’s western border has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59231136">escalated rapidly in recent days</a>, forcing Poland and Lithuania to declare a state of emergency and <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/poland-lithuania-close-borders-with-belarus-lavrov-suggests-eu-pay-belarus-to-keep-refugees-226479/">close the borders with their neighbour</a>. With 15,000 Polish border security personnel on one side of the barbed wire fence and an estimated 4,000 migrants desperately trying to get through into the west, there are fears the situation could <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-belarus-border-migrants-military-crisis-defence-leaders-europe/">spiral into violent confrontation</a>.</p>
<p>The escalation follows the promise by Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, in May 2021 to “<a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/952979/belarus-dictator-threatens-flood-eu-with-drugs-migrants-avoid-sanctions">flood Europe with drugs and migrants</a>”. This came in retaliation for the EU’s sanctions imposed following the forced landing of a commercial plane and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kidnapping-of-roman-protasevich-will-force-pariah-belarus-more-firmly-into-russias-orbit-161678">detention of two of the passengers</a>, opposition journalist Roman Protasevich and his partner, Russian national Sofia Sapega, by Belarusian authorities in May 2021.</p>
<p>The Belarusian military has reportedly flown in large numbers of people, many fleeing conflicts in the Middle East, and escorted them to the border with Poland where they are now trapped between Polish border defences and the Belarus military. </p>
<p>The situation plays into Russia’s hands, as it will inevitably cement Lukashenko’s dependence on the Kremlin. It will also potentially increase Moscow’s leverage in negotiations with Berlin over fast-tracking the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as the outgoing German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-poland-border-migrants/31554609.html">called on Russia</a> to de-escalate the crisis.</p>
<p>The Polish government estimates that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-10/poland-seeks-emergency-eu-summit-on-belarus-border-crisis?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&cmpId=google&sref=HYGcXWrx">approximately 4,000 migrants</a> may be gathered along its border with Belarus with more on the way, reportedly escorted by Belarusian military personnel. With Polish guards reported to be increasingly resorting to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-08/poland-warns-large-migrant-group-may-try-to-enter-from-belarus?sref=HYGcXWrx">more violent measures</a>, the situation risks a serious escalation. </p>
<p>But while the possibility of armed conflict on the border should not be entirely ruled out, it is currently highly unlikely, as such conflict threatens to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-belarus-border-migrants-military-crisis-defence-leaders-europe/">bring in Nato and Russia</a>. Lukashenko himself highlighted that <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/we-won-t-start-a-war-lukashenko-on-tensions-with-poland-over-migrants-1.4724592">he does not seek war</a>.</p>
<p>The prospects of an immediate de-escalation seem unlikely at present, given that the EU agreed this week to broaden the scope of the current sanctions against Belarus – the very thing that triggered retaliation from Lukashenko in the first place. As such, with the adoption of a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-09/eu-backs-poland-as-migrant-crisis-on-belarus-border-escalates?sref=HYGcXWrx">new sanctions package</a> likely to occur on November 25, the current crisis could well extend into December and on to 2022.</p>
<h2>Putin as puppetmaster?</h2>
<p>The crisis has also brought Russia’s role and interests into a sharp focus, with leaders in Poland <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59226226">directly accusing Putin</a> of orchestrating it. It is unclear to what extent the Kremlin is directly involved in promoting the current crisis, but the situation nevertheless plays into Russia’s hands. It will inevitably push Lukashenko further under Moscow’s influence – something that the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/belarusalert/why-putin-dare-not-abandon-belarus-dictator-lukashenka/">Kremlin ultimately seeks</a>.</p>
<p>Notably, on November 4, Russia and Belarus finally signed the long-anticipated so-called union programmes – or <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2021/11/04/putin-and-lukashenko-approve-28-union-programs-for-integrating-russia-and-belarus">road maps for integration</a>. These documents ultimately seek to bring the two states closer together by integrating their economic and administrative systems. </p>
<p>While the details of the documents are not public, available information suggests that they have been <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85749">significantly watered down</a>. Nevertheless, the fact that this has taken place after years of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/12/why-fears-of-a-russia-belarus-merger-never-come-true-a73871">stalling by Lukashenko</a> underlines Russia’s growing leverage over Belarus.</p>
<p>The escalation of the crisis comes amid renewed reports of another <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-belarus-border-migrants-military-crisis-defence-leaders-europe/">massing of Russian troops on its border with Ukraine</a>. With the west preoccupied with the migrant crisis and Kyiv also sending troops and increasing border forces to prevent any potential spill overs, the Kremlin could take advantage of the situation to provoke further destabilisation in Ukraine. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/04/europe/russia-ukraine-military-buildup-intl-cmd/index.html">reports of this most recent build-up</a> strongly indicate that it is considerably smaller than the last movement of Russian troops between March and April 2021, with Kyiv itself stating that <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/11/02/ukraine-denies-russian-military-buildup-on-border-as-defense-minister-quits-a75462">no major or new deployments have been confirmed</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional faultlines</h2>
<p>These renewed border tensions come hot on the heels of the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/10/20/us-defence-secretary-underlines-support-for-eastern-europe">visit by US secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin</a>, to the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, to reiterate Washington’s support. In the past, such events and expressions of support for Ukraine’s membership in Nato have prompted <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-military-buildup-around-ukraine-routine-seasonal-maneuvers/">a strong backlash from Russia</a>. </p>
<p>Moscow sees Ukraine and other post-Soviet states as being under its sphere of influence. As such, an escalation of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia remains unlikely – but the developments serve as a reminder about the potential for a quick escalation, especially given concerns over the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/world-news-russia-government-and-politics-crimea-ukraine-e6e8d6c0792517f753fc774713d1fe44">amount of military equipment that Russia left behind</a> on its border with eastern Ukraine when it pulled back in April.</p>
<p>The evolving migrant crisis on the Belarusian border represent the most serious escalation in regional tensions between Belarus and Europe in years. Moreover, with the EU only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-eu-close-deal-new-round-belarus-sanctions-diplomats-say-2021-11-09/">set to expand sanctions against Minsk</a>, it remains the most likely scenario that Lukashenko will continue to pursue the current strategy of retaliation. </p>
<p>As such, the humanitarian situation in the area will also continue to deteriorate, especially amid dropping temperatures ahead of winter and reports that aid workers are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59231136">unable to enter the area</a>, risking a full-blown humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>Additionally, while Russia’s direct involvement in the current crisis is unclear, it seems that the Kremlin’s leverage over Lukashenko may be the most immediate and clear way to diffuse the crisis. To that end, Berlin’s calls on Putin for assistance also highlight the importance of Russia’s influence in the situation. Any help from Russia in resolving the Belarusian crisis is likely to come at a price.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171684/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liana Semchuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is Russia masterminding the buildup of international migrants on the Poland-Belarus border?Liana Semchuk, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680392021-10-19T16:42:24Z2021-10-19T16:42:24ZThe antidote to Trump: how ‘anti-celebrity’ politicians can still thrive in a world driven by stardom<p>Celebrity met statesmanship in the form of Arnold “the Governator” Schwarzenegger, and more recently, in the presidency of former reality star Donald Trump.</p>
<p>Celebrities entering politics is an international pasttime. Brazilian footballer-turned-senator <a href="https://cris.brighton.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/360777/Rom%C3%A1rio+and+Football+Politics+in+Brazil+-+Final+Submission.pdf">Romário de Souza Faria</a>, singer <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55689665">Bobi Wine</a> as runner-up in the (contested) Ugandan presidential elections, and comedian <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Volodymyr-Zelensky">Volodymyr Zelensky</a> as Ukrainian president are all examples.</p>
<p>The ceaseless struggle for media attention in our modern political environment has given rise to another phenomenon: politicians who become celebrities themselves. These politicians style themselves as appealing public personae, and constantly seek publicity through social appearances and proactive engagement with media.</p>
<p>The charismatic Barack Obama and <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-fails-the-showman-to-statesman-test-in-party-conference-speech-169150">clownesque Boris Johnson</a> have both successfully converted the resulting media attention into political power. US congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez regularly goes viral on social media, and recently attempted to promote progressive policymaking by flaunting a “Tax the Rich” dress at the Met Gala.</p>
<p>Amid the Trumps and Johnsons of the world, can “traditional” politicians still compete for power? This is where the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392397.2021.1968918">anti-celebrity politician</a> comes in. Dressing and behaving inconspicuously, and ostensibly lacking media savviness, the anti-celebrity politician embodies the opposite qualities to celebrity stardom. He or she avoids the limelight, and flourishes when fatigue with celebrity figures sets in.</p>
<p>The recent German election gives us two examples. The Social Democratic election winner <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/world/europe/olaf-scholz-merkel-germany-election.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article">Olaf Scholz</a> displayed an uncharismatic and technocratic air that earned him the nickname “Scholz machine”. </p>
<p>Scholz carefully copied the image of stability projected by Chancellor <a href="https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658075996">Angela Merkel</a> – the quintessential anti-celebrity. Merkel’s politics appeared nonstaged and she was known for her apparent sincerity, neutral appearance, avoidance of media show and controversy, and lack of emotion and impulsiveness.</p>
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<p>The histories of celebrity politicians and their anti-celebrity counterparts are intertwined. Anti-celebrity politics only appeals in contrast to celebrity politics. </p>
<p>Celebrity culture, in which media showcase public figures’ personalities and private lives to an expanding consumerist audience of “fans”, emerged in the late eighteenth century. Politicians like the first American president <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Invention+of+Celebrity-p-9781509508747">George Washington</a> bolstered their popularity by avoiding celebrity stardom, seeking strategic publicity instead. </p>
<p>A century later, the emerging modern press industrialised this culture, with stories about celebrities now reaching a mass audience. Photography and film meant that this audience could now “see” these celebrities, making the relationship between idol and fan more intimate. </p>
<p>This translated to politics as well. International newspapers heralded Paul Kruger, president of the South African Republic during the Boer War, as a simple, devout and traditional man – in stark contrast to the obsession with a new “modernity” around 1900. This was in comparison to his British celebrity nemeses, the colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain and mining magnate Cecil Rhodes. </p>
<p>In the 20th century, new forms of mass media such as radio, television and the internet further bolstered celebrity politics. However, this reinforcement also contributed to a saturation with celebrity politicians, and demand for “authentic” alternatives. </p>
<h2>Comparisons and contrasts</h2>
<p>Anti-celebrity politicians are often defined in contrast to their predecessors and contemporaries. Following the media frenzy surrounding <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.898.4068&rep=rep1&type=pdf">Nicolas Sarkozy</a>, the mediagenic and attention-seeking French president, the public welcomed his dull successor François Hollande as a return to normality (though he quickly became <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/francois-hollande-most-unpopular-president">incredibly unpopular</a>).</p>
<p>This also occurs in international politics. John F. Kennedy’s glamorous “Camelot” presidency enabled Hồ Chí Minh to adopt the role of the anti-celebrity leader during the Vietnam War. Merkel has appeared favourably in media in contrast with both her celebrity predecessor <a href="https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658075996">Gerhard Schröder</a> within Germany, and her contemporary Donald Trump on the world stage.</p>
<p>The effect of anti-celebrity politics depends on the local political and media system. In a presidential system with a highly commercialised media market, like the US, there is a strong focus on individual politicians and celebrity culture. While this situation initially favours celebrity politicians, it can also create a backlash and consequent demand for anti-celebrities. </p>
<p>Media loved the saxophone-playing Bill Clinton, but their overexposure of his scandals paved the way for George W. Bush, who, despite his well-known family name, constituted a rather nondescript politician. </p>
<p>In a parliamentary system with a more regulated media environment, like the UK, the public votes for a party rather than an individual, and broadcasters must adhere to stricter regulations on political coverage. This system enables the less showy to climb the political ranks relatively protected from a commercial media logic. </p>
<p>The British system thus enabled the uncharismatic Gordon Brown to take over the premiership from the celebrity Tony Blair in 2007 through the “internal route” of winning the Labour Party leadership. Brown admired the anti-celebrity prime minister Clement Attlee, who succeeded the larger-than-life Winston Churchill. However, Brown’s lack of media appeal prevented him from winning a second term in the 2010 general election. </p>
<h2>Rising stars</h2>
<p>Recent weeks have brought the fall of one celebrity politician and the rise of another. Austrian Chancellor <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/17/world/europe/austria-sebastian-kurz-scandal-chancellor.html?searchResultPosition=2">Sebastian Kurz</a> resigned following allegations that he financed his media glitz with tax money. Meanwhile, French writer and pundit <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/europe/eric-zemmour-macron-france-election.html">Éric Zemmour has surged</a> in the polls, fashioning himself as a Trump-like outsider who may trade TV stardom for a presidency. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eric-zemmour-the-far-right-polemicists-ideas-have-a-long-history-in-france-169430">Éric Zemmour: the far-right polemicist’s ideas have a long history in France</a>
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<p>The anti-celebrity image offers traditional politicians an attractive path to power amid the media savvy methods of many populists. Yet constructing and maintaining this image actually requires great media skill, navigating carefully measured media exposure to claim political successes and avoid publicity of failures.</p>
<p>Aided by a loyal team of PR advisors, Merkel sustained her anti-celebrity reputation for 16 years, but will her successor? And rather than a glitzy Kurz or Zemmour, another anti-celebrity might yet shake up the Austrian and French elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Betto van Waarden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Anti-celebrity politicians succeed by styling themselves as authentic alternatives to more showy statesmen.Betto van Waarden, Historian of media and politics, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687172021-09-27T18:03:30Z2021-09-27T18:03:30ZGerman election sees centre-left eke out a slim victory over Angela Merkel’s party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423364/original/file-20210927-13-1s7jqcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8640%2C5057&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The German national flag waves from the top of the Reichstag building in Berlin, Germany.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Sohn) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The best part of every German election actually occurs after the election. Results are tabulated very quickly once polls close at 6 p.m. local time.</p>
<p>By 8:15 p.m., following the evening news on ARD Channel 1, the nationally televised Elefantenrunde — elephant round, in English — brings together all of the parties’ candidates for a round-table discussion on what just happened.</p>
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<p>When <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23742711">Angela Merkel won the popular vote in 2005</a> but fell short of a majority in Germany’s parliament — the Bundestag — she had to contend with a rather irritated and incoherent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/05/world/europe/schrder-is-pressed-on-yielding-his-office.html">Chancellor Gerhard Schröder claiming he would remain in power</a>. </p>
<p>People were shocked at Schröder’s gall. Merkel’s centre-right CDU/CSU had won 40.6 per cent of the vote compared to Schröder’s centre-left SPD’s 38.4 per cent. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing glasses speaks with a CDU sign behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423367/original/file-20210927-23-1gerykk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Armin Laschet, candidate for German chancellor, briefs the media the morning after Germany’s federal election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Martin Meissner)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sixteen years later and the tables have turned: <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2021-09-26-BT-DE/index.shtml">the latest results</a> show the SPD with 25.7 per cent of the vote versus 24.1 per cent for the CDU/CSU. </p>
<p>So it was ironic to hear Armin Laschet, the CDU/CSU’s candidate for chancellor, say during the Elefantenrunde that this wasn’t about arithmetic — he would try to form a government despite his second-place showing. </p>
<p>Olaf Scholz, the SPD candidate, is also insisting he’ll be the next chancellor. </p>
<h2>Seeking coalition partners</h2>
<p>Neither of the two leading parties can do it on their own, and will have to find coalition partners. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-explained-why-is-it-always-so-hard-to-form-a-government-168040">German election explained: why is it always so hard to form a government?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Options are few: no one wants to work with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201">far-right AfD</a> (Alternative for Germany), nor with the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/23/germany-s-far-left-party-eager-to-join-coalition-while-others-steer-clear">far-left Die Linke</a> (Left) party, which almost lost its parliamentary presence entirely this election. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit and tie leaves a TV studio at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423368/original/file-20210927-3349-1axblji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Christian Lindner, FDP party leader, leaves after attending the Elefantenrunde on the parliamentary elections in Berlin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Probst)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That leaves the Greens and the FDP (centre-right liberals), who would both have to enter into a coalition with either of the leading parties. FDP Leader Christian Lindner would prefer to form a coalition with the CDU/CSU to initiate tax cuts. Yet <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-coalition-talks-collapse-the-press-verdict/a-41453143">he lost a lot of credibility</a> when in 2017 he walked away from just such a coalition at the last minute, insisting that “we’d rather not govern than govern incorrectly.”</p>
<p>The Greens have even more leverage. Now the third-largest party in the Bundestag, they know Germans want concrete action on climate change. They’re leaning towards the SPD in order to advance another mainstay of their platform, a commitment to social services.</p>
<p>The other option would be for the SPD and CDU/CSU to enter once again into a grand coalition, though neither party has much appetite for that. Ironically, exit polls indicated that voters wouldn’t be happy with any coalition, but the coalition they disliked the least was a government formed by the SPD and CDU/CSU.</p>
<h2>Merkel remains popular</h2>
<p>All of the leaders at the Elefantenrunde agreed that Germany needs to move forward and the electorate wants change. But if the electorate had had its way, it would have re-elected Merkel, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/22/merkel-will-end-her-tenure-in-office-as-a-leader-who-was-internationally-popular-during-tumultuous-times/">who remains by far the most popular German politician</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Angela Merkel sips on a beer." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423373/original/file-20210927-13-sm9vr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Angela Merkel drinks beer during the election campaign in Munich, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Matthias Schrader)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This despite the fact that <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2021-09-26-BT-DE/umfrage-aktuellethemen.shtml">exit polls showed</a> that the majority of voters were dissatisfied with the performance of her grand coalition government. </p>
<p>Does this mean that Germans don’t know what they want? Perhaps not, but the Elefantenrunde demonstrated that the leaders aren’t completely out of touch with their citizens. They all acknowledged that the coalition negotiations need to proceed much more quickly <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171120-german-coalition-talks-collapse-fdp-walks-out-merkel">than the difficult 2017 discussions</a>. It took four months in 2017 for Merkel to arrive where she started: another grand coalition. </p>
<h2>Highlights of an odd election</h2>
<p>While Laschet and Scholz will spend the next days and weeks wrangling and cajoling one another, the FDP and the Greens, the rest of us can ponder other consequences of this strange election:</p>
<ul>
<li>If there’s a need for any further evidence that Merkel’s personal popularity isn’t wearing off on the CDU/CSU, just look at the results from her own riding. Her political rivals, the SPD, picked up the seat.</li>
<li>Four years ago, the resurgent SPD was convinced being part of the grand coalition was ruining their chances to win a federal election. They might not be thinking that now.</li>
<li>Both the CDU/CSU and the Linke party <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2021-09-26-BT-DE/analyse-wanderung.shtml">bled voters to the SPD</a>.</li>
<li>The SPD may have regained its footing, but both it and the CDU/CSU are shadows of their former selves. Four other parties claimed 40 per cent of the vote in total.</li>
<li>Even though their vote share declined by two per cent, the AfD demonstrated that their 2017 debut in the Bundestag wasn’t a one-off. As a result, the party’s <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/02/24/afde-f24.html">Desiderius-Erasmus Foundation will gain access to millions of Euros</a> that it can use to advance its agenda through targeted university scholarships. </li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt=" A woman smiling in a blazer, glasses and pearls." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423371/original/file-20210927-17-104lfxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) party Alice Weidel arrives for a news conference in Berlin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Matthias Schrader)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I couldn’t have been the only person who almost fell off my chair when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201">AfD’s candidate, Alice Weidel</a>, told the Elefantenrunde that the party <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37337927">wasn’t “völkisch”</a> — a term that echoes the xenophobic nationalism of the Nazis. </p>
<p>Some people just don’t realize when they’re being ironic. Weidel needs to read her party’s election platform. </p>
<p>Scores of observers have wistfully remarked that this election marks the end of the Merkel era. Everyone will miss her talent for building consensus in the four governments she has led. We shouldn’t forget, however, that three of those were grand coalitions of the CDU/CSU and SPD.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James M. Skidmore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Following the German election, all of the country’s major party leaders agreed that Germany needs to move forward. But if the electorate had had its way, it would have re-elected Angela Merkel.James M. Skidmore, Director, Waterloo Centre for German Studies, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687902021-09-27T15:23:14Z2021-09-27T15:23:14ZGermany election: Olaf Scholz’s social democrats come out on top but smaller parties hold the key to government<p>Election night in Germany proved inconclusive. There were some clear winners and losers, but not such that we can be sure of the shape of the next German government.</p>
<p>The social democratic SPD <a href="https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse.html">came out on top</a>, crowning a remarkable turnaround in its fortunes. In 2017, it bagged the worst result in its history, in 2019 the European elections were even worse, it was riven with internal division. Now the party looks united and hungry for power, with Olaf Scholz laying claim to the chancellorship (and clearly favoured for the role in opinion polls).</p>
<p>The Greens were also winners, gaining ground, but will also be thinking about what might have been. Prior to COVID, they looked to be in a battle with the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) for first place but now find themselves a distant third. Party figures on election night were honest that results had not met their expectations.</p>
<p>Perhaps the broadest smile of the night was that of liberal (FDP) leader Christian Lindner. His party was up, and appeared to have been forgiven for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-preliminary-coalition-talks-collapse-after-fdp-walks-out/a-41445987">walking out of coalition talks in 2017</a> – a move most Germans considered rather irresponsible at the time. Lindner’s satisfaction came not just out of gains of votes and seats, but rather the return to the FDP’s traditional role of kingmaker. He and his team will play a key role in choosing which of the larger parties would govern Germany.</p>
<p>The biggest loser was the CDU/CSU under Armin Laschet. Perhaps there was slight relief that the party seemed to pick up some support in the final days of the campaign, and the gap with the SPD was lower than polls had predicted. But the result was widely acknowledged to be a disaster, and Laschet’s suggestions on election night that the party had a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-cdus-laschet-vows-try-build-conservative-led-government-2021-09-26/">mandate to lead the government</a> were slapped down by other party figures.</p>
<p>Two other losers were the Left Party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The Left Party came perilously close to losing its Bundestag representation. It failed to meet the 5% threshold for representation, but did get its quota of 4.9% of MPs as it won three seats directly. The party is set for a period of soul-searching and possible division.</p>
<p>The performance of the AfD was more nuanced: the party lost ground nationally, but performed strongly in eastern Germany (winning 19.2% compared to 8.1% in the west), and even coming first in two eastern states. The AfD will not get anywhere near government, but seems to have established itself as <a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-continuing-popularity-of-far-right-afd-has-roots-in-east-west-divide-167844">part of the political landscape</a>.</p>
<h2>Who will form a government?</h2>
<p>By far the two most likely options for a coalition are a “traffic light” arrangement between the SPD, Greens and FDP, and a “Jamaica” coalition of CDU/CSU, Greens and FDP. The Greens have made it clear they lean towards the former. </p>
<p>Messages from the FDP have been mixed. In terms of policy, an alliance with the CDU/CSU is more easily formed, but they know that rehabilitating the CDU/CSU, with or without Laschet, after such a bruising defeat, would be difficult. </p>
<p>An SPD/Green/Left Party coalition would not have a majority, so that is no longer a serious option for Scholz. That leaves Lindner with significantly more leverage than he might have expected as a potential coalition partner. </p>
<p>Unusually, Lindner declared he would seek exploratory talks with the Greens, to understand common ground and, by implication, to form a view on whether a traffic light or Jamaica alliance should be favoured, and under what terms. Lindner’s price will probably be control of the federal finance ministry, and he appeared to offer the Greens the opportunity to lead on climate and the environment. </p>
<p>While the numbers stack up for an SPD-CDU/CSU alliance, there is little appetite in either party for such an arrangement. Becoming junior partner would be hard for the CDU/CSU to stomach, and SPD members are heartily fed up with “grand coalitions”.</p>
<p>In the coming weeks, exploratory talks will be held. In this period, the Greens and FDP will be keen to drive a very hard bargain with, most likely, the SPD.</p>
<p>Once this phase has concluded, formal coalition negotiations begin. The morning after the election, Scholz <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nkFQ683sSM">emphasised his desire</a> to see a new government in place by Christmas.</p>
<p>The manoeuvres will make for an exciting spectacle. It will be challenging to decode whether party statements are sincere, or part of elaborate games of brinksmanship. Finding the truth in Lindner’s cheerful expressions will be the hardest task of all. </p>
<p>Only when coalition talks start will we have a clear sense of the way forward, and even then agreement is not assured. The final paradox of Angela Merkel’s term of office, successful for the CDU and stable for Germany, is that as she leaves the stage the CDU is in disarray and the future government so uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. </span></em></p>After beating the formerly biggest party to top the poll, the social democrats will enter complex coalition talks with potential partners, including the Greens and the liberal FDP.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687442021-09-27T05:05:31Z2021-09-27T05:05:31ZGermans have voted for Angela Merkel’s replacement – here are 7 ways to understand the results so far<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423270/original/file-20210927-124938-17wakg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C0%2C5620%2C3622&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martin Meissner/AP/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Sunday, Germans went to the polls to decide who will succeed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/26/what-is-the-legacy-of-the-angela-merkel-era">retiring Angela Merkel</a> as chancellor. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-madchen-to-mutti-as-angela-merkel-departs-she-leaves-a-great-legacy-of-leadership-168187">From 'Mädchen' to 'Mutti': as Angela Merkel departs, she leaves a great legacy of leadership</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With a very close result as counting continues, it could be weeks or even months before a government is formed. This is what we know so far: </p>
<h2><strong>1. Progressive parties were the big winners</strong></h2>
<p>Both the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens added more than 5% to their <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2021-09-26-BT-DE/index.shtml">vote</a>. </p>
<p>It looks like the CDU has ended up with their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/26/germany-election-worst-ever-result-momentarily-silences-cdu">worst performance</a> of the post-war period, scoring just 24.1% of the popular vote. This means that the SPD, currently on 25.8%, will have the right to try and form a government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="SPD candidate for chancellor Olaf Scholz addressing supporters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">SPD candidate for chancellor, Olaf Scholz had a good election but now faces tough negotiations to get a result in his favour.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Sohn/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Few would have suggested 12 months ago the SPD under Olaf Scholz would be in a position to build a government. Having endured a long, grinding period as the junior party in a “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/impatient-dissatisfied-divided-germans-at-the-end-of-merkels-grand-coalition/av-59185068">grand coalition</a>” with Merkel’s centre-Right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), pundits (including <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-she-prepares-to-leave-politics-germanys-angela-merkel-has-left-her-mark-at-home-and-abroad-105957">myself</a>) had wondered whether the SPD could survive the serious challenge to their base from the German Greens and a more centrist CDU. </p>
<p>This weekend’s election has shown the party’s resilience in a fragmenting electoral landscape. </p>
<h2>2. The CDU paid dearly for fumbling their post-Merkel succession plan</h2>
<p>Merkel announced her retirement <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46020745">in 2018</a>, so the CDU had plenty of time to think about succession. </p>
<p>In the last few years, the party had experimented with two Merkel-style centrists. The first, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, quit the leadership in 2020 after a state election in Thuringia saw her party court far-right votes. </p>
<p>After another destabilising party ballot, Armin Laschet — the pick of party apparatchiks — was chosen as leader. Many CDU voters would have preferred the Bavarian state premier <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-markus-s%C3%B6der-bavarias-premier/a-53525147">Markus Söder</a>, who pulled out of the leadership race in April. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Armin Laschet and other CDU leaders on Sunday." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The election result has left the CDU reeling.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carsten Koal/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Laschet’s avuncular style of politics <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-laschet-disaster-the-slow-motion-collapse-of-merkel-s-cdu-a-ba70b3c4-ba87-4ee0-8d11-e5ae0d851df2">failed to gain traction</a> during the campaign, while the deadpan gravitas of the SPD’s Scholz and the urgent politics of the Greens seemed to have struck a chord in sombre times. </p>
<h2>3. Even the winners didn’t get what they wanted.</h2>
<p>Talk of SPD “triumph” and CDU “failure” is all relative. In reality, the two parties are less than 2% apart and between them only hold about 50% of the national vote — scarcely enough for another grand coalition. </p>
<p>In the last televised debate before the election, Scholz made it clear if he had the chance to build a coalition government, he would prefer to do that <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/triell-bundestagswahl-2021-olaf-scholz-und-annalena-baerbock-gegen-arminlaschet-a-252f8898-76f9-4bd7-bc93-96bbe61d422e">with the Greens</a>. </p>
<p>But the SPD won’t be able to form government with the Greens alone. They will need a third party.</p>
<h2>4. Coalition-forming talks will be tricky</h2>
<p>While coalition governments are the norm in Germany, forming a government won’t be straightforward. There are a number of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-a-guide-to-possible-coalitions-for-the-new-government/a-38756817">coalition possibilities</a> with names that often stem from the colours associated with the parties. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-explained-why-is-it-always-so-hard-to-form-a-government-168040">German election explained: why is it always so hard to form a government?</a>
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<p>These include another “grand coalition” of the two biggest parties, the SPD and the CDU, “Kenya” (SPD, CDU, and Green) or, perhaps less likely, “Jamaica” (CDU, Green and the free marketeer Free Democratic Party (FDP)). A “traffic light” coalition (SPD, Green, and FDP) is also possible. </p>
<p>Some had tipped that the socialist Left Party (Die Linke) might have been brought into a ruling coalition of left-wing parties for the first time at the federal level, a so-called “Red-Red-Green” coalition. Even with them, however, Scholz still wouldn’t have enough seats to govern.</p>
<p>Coalition talks have already begun behind the scenes. The main parties also began declaring their conditions for joining a ruling coalition during the election coverage on Sunday night. </p>
<h2>5. The minor players remain minor</h2>
<p>In the last coalition discussions of 2017, the free marketeer FDP infamously chose to preserve their doctrinal purity rather than take up a role as a junior partner in government. </p>
<p>It would be unsurprising to see them do the same again, with their leader already seeming to have <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/mit-der-fdp-wird-es-keinen-linksruck-geben-lindner-zweifelt-an-einer-ampelkoalition-mit-der-spd/27619274.html">ruled out</a> a so-called “traffic light” coalition with the SPD and the Greens because it wouldn’t deliver the tax cuts the FDP want. </p>
<p>Meanwhile the Left Party had a horror night, losing almost half of their votes, and relying on complicated electoral rules to be able to sit in the German parliament with fewer than the normal 5% of votes required. </p>
<h2>6. The far-right vote slipped overall</h2>
<p>But at 10.5% nationally, it is worryingly high in some areas, particularly the eastern states of Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. The far-right Alternative for Germany party are the greatest threat to German democracy, and their voters are not, as some imagine, pensioners who remember the certainties of the old Communist regime fondly. Rather, they are young and middle-aged East Germans who have voted against migration, anti-COVID measures and “the system”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-continuing-popularity-of-far-right-afd-has-roots-in-east-west-divide-167844">German election: continuing popularity of far-right AfD has roots in east-west divide</a>
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<p>All other parties have completely ruled out political cooperation with this pariah party, an encouraging sign after the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-everyone-in-germany-talking-about-thuringia-and-afd/a-52277013">debacle in Thuringia</a> in 2020, which saw the CDU and FDP flirt with making use of Alternative for Germany votes to support them in state government. </p>
<h2>7. Green politics is mainstream</h2>
<p>At one stage, the Greens had entertained hopes of winning the election. Even thought they fell well short of this with 14.6% of the vote, the election was fought on their territory, with all of the parties forced to explain their plan for taking Germany to net zero emissions and a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-annalena-baerbock-calls-for-a-climate-protection-government/a-59232468">green economy</a>. </p>
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<img alt="Greens supporters dancing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Greens supporters danced in response to the election result on Sunday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jens Schlueter/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Their success on the weekend means Germany seems set to continue its support of these goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Fitzpatrick receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC). </span></em></p>With a very close result as counting continues, it could be weeks or even months before a government is formed. But Sunday’s election has already delivered some significant results.Matt Fitzpatrick, Professor in International History, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1683792021-09-23T20:04:54Z2021-09-23T20:04:54ZGerman election: the race to replace Angela Merkel and why it matters to New Zealand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422788/original/file-20210923-19-147cx5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=18%2C0%2C6211%2C4147&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From a distance, the big news about Germany’s coming election on September 26 is the end of Angela Merkel’s reign after 16 years of leadership in Germany and Europe. Closer up, with no clear front-runner to take Merkel’s place, the picture is far more complex.</p>
<p>Seemingly on track for a clear victory until February, the prospects of Merkel’s centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) have waned, as first the Greens and then the Social Democrats (SPD) narrowly topped the surprisingly volatile polls.</p>
<p>Merkel’s successor will be determined by the politics of coalition formation in an arrangement familiar to New Zealanders — Germany having provided the model for our own MMP system.</p>
<p>With another CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition ruled out, the most likely outcome will see one of those parties leading a government comprising the Greens and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) in a so-called “Jamaica” or “traffic light” coalition (named for the party colours).</p>
<h2>A large undecided vote</h2>
<p>But nothing is clear cut. In an unpredictable campaign dominated by missteps rather than policies, the fortunes of those battling for the chancellery – the CDU/CSU’s Armin Laschet, the SPD’s Olaf Scholz and the Greens’ Annalena Baerbock – have ebbed and flowed.</p>
<p>Caught guffawing during the German president’s remarks to victims of the July floods, alongside <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-chancellor-candidate-laschet-admits-to-plagiarism-mistakes/a-58708559">accusations of plagiarism</a> (a problem to which the German political establishment seems particularly prone), Laschet has seen his party’s support plummet to the lowest-ever polled.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-gentle-persuasion-in-an-age-of-populism-167777">Angela Merkel: gentle persuasion in an age of populism</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, Baerbock’s aggressive response to her own charges of plagiarism, combined with a failure to declare income, have raised concerns about her personal credibility and seen her party slump from their surprise lead in April.</p>
<p>In contrast stands Scholz. The only candidate with federal executive experience, including currently as minister of finance and vice-chancellor in the CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition, Scholz was initially welcomed with little fanfare.</p>
<p>However, his leadership during the pandemic (dispensing billions of euros in support), coupled with the absence of gaffes, has seen his personal popularity rise. In <a href="https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2021/september-ii/">preferred chancellor polls</a>, Scholz now leads on 40%, with Laschet on 19% and Baerbock on 13%. Somewhat soberingly this close to the election, 28% of respondents still “don’t know”.</p>
<h2>Business as usual?</h2>
<p>In an election devoid of real policy debate, it is difficult to say how the result will change Germany.</p>
<p>The answer may be “probably not much” if Laschet or Scholz gain the chancellery, with both in various ways casting themselves as continuity candidates (Scholz even going so far as to adopt Merkel’s patented <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210916-the-merkel-rhombus-how-a-hand-gesture-became-a-brand">rhombus hand gesture</a>). But a strengthened Greens voice in any coalition – likely on current polling – will have an impact.</p>
<p>From a New Zealand perspective, there are three areas of interest: European integration, foreign policy and climate change. One way or another, each will affect the world beyond Germany’s borders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-madchen-to-mutti-as-angela-merkel-departs-she-leaves-a-great-legacy-of-leadership-168187">From 'Mädchen' to 'Mutti': as Angela Merkel departs, she leaves a great legacy of leadership</a>
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<h2>European integration</h2>
<p>Germany is at the heart of the European project, and Merkel’s time as chancellor has been important to the union. </p>
<p>Taking office during the disarray following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics">collapse</a> of the EU’s constitutional project, Merkel’s approach to integration was shorn of grand ambition. Instead, she has focused on stability and incremental reform in the face of subsequent crises (the Eurozone debt crisis, the European refugee crisis).</p>
<p>But the EU requires more than ad hoc incrementalism. It is increasingly difficult to reconcile the union’s significant economic footprint with its lack of foreign policy clout. In times of great power competition, the two are irrevocably interconnected. The role of the new chancellor in shaping European integration cannot be underestimated.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/auf-wiedersehen-mutti-how-angela-merkels-centrist-politics-shaped-germany-and-europe-153447">Auf Wiedersehen, 'Mutti': How Angela Merkel’s centrist politics shaped Germany and Europe</a>
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<p>Aside from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), all parties standing are pro-European and all envision reforms to strengthen integration. For New Zealand, with US-China tensions threatening to spill over in unpredictable ways, a strong EU is essential to maintaining a stable and rules-based international order.</p>
<p>This is particularly significant for a small trading power, dependent on the predictability and enforceability of global rules. Any moves to make the EU more consistent, understandable and responsive will benefit New Zealand.</p>
<h2>Climate change</h2>
<p>The climate crisis will be at the core of policy, regardless of which coalition comes to power. All parties have been forced to address the issue, a priority driven home by the July floods.</p>
<p>Carbon neutrality is central to the platforms of the main parties, though differences exist on how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Germany’s approach will cause ripples beyond its borders, playing as it does a key role in defining EU policy, including the union’s expectations of trading partners such as New Zealand.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-germanys-green-party-took-on-the-far-right-to-become-a-major-political-force-117927">How Germany's Green party took on the far right to become a major political force</a>
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<h2>Foreign policy</h2>
<p>There is also significant pressure for Germany to play a stronger global role to match its economic weight. This includes a more robust approach to powers such as China, something Merkel avoided.</p>
<p>Trade relations under Merkel were a priority. Separated from more contentious issues, it was an approach that pleased her Chinese counterparts. But complications darken the horizon: the EU has defined China as a “systemic rival”, and there have been calls for Germany to more actively confront Chinese assertiveness.</p>
<p>Developments in the Indo-Pacific are critical to New Zealand, which this week was surprised by the announcement of the formation of the AUKUS alliance between Australia, the US and UK. A more engaged Germany would be welcomed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/state-of-the-eu-tech-and-defence-challenges-cloud-covid-success-168004">State of the EU: tech and defence challenges cloud COVID success</a>
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<p>A CDU-CSU victory is unlikely to see significant change, however. The party continues to prioritise trade in its international relationships, and Laschet has made some dubious foreign policy statements, raising questions as to what he would bring to the global stage.</p>
<p>The SPD also holds a conservative view of international engagement, aiming to avoid foreign conflicts. An emphasis on economic and trade policy is important for New Zealand, as negotiations for a free trade agreement with the EU near their end.</p>
<p>With only a few days until Germans cast their votes, the election remains anyone’s to win. Regardless of the outcome, New Zealand should continue to count Germany as an important friend in the EU. With Britain’s withdrawal in 2020, the relationship with Germany is more valuable than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathew Doidge receives funding from the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Serena Kelly receives funding from the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union. She is affiliated with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs and the European Studies Association of Australia and New Zealand. </span></em></p>Germany’s imminent election may seem far away, but in an inter-connected world threatened by political and climate instability, the outcome will affect New Zealand in significant ways.Mathew Doidge, Senior Research Fellow, University of CanterburySerena Kelly, Senior Lecturer, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1683652021-09-23T20:03:26Z2021-09-23T20:03:26ZAngela Merkel’s career shows why we need more scientists in politics<p>For 16 years, German chancellor Angela Merkel has guided her country through wave after wave of uncertainty, from the 2008 global financial crisis to Brexit, the imperative to drop fossil fuels, and of course the COVID pandemic. Her leadership of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/angela-merkel/?sh=60300a8b22dd">European Union’s largest economy</a> has been described as one of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42AFn6s3nPU">assurance and sure-handedness</a> and an <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/germany-s-long-serving-angela-merkel-prepares-to-step-down-1.5570650">anchor amid stormy times</a>, and she has been called “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/angela-merkel/?sh=60300a8b22dd">the de facto leader of Europe</a>”.</p>
<p>Merkel has outlasted seven Australian prime ministers, and there can be no single explanation for her long stretch of success. However, her career and training as <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/04/angela-merkel-germany-coronavirus-pandemic/610225/">a scientist</a> presents useful insights. </p>
<p>As Merkel declines a fifth term and leaves her office this month, world politics loses another scientist. In Australia we find ourselves wondering, yet again: “Across all our politics – where are the scientists?”</p>
<h2>The scientist and the leader</h2>
<p>Globally, there have been shining examples of scientists who have entered the world of politics to great success. What are the qualities of scientists that might make them powerful and effective leaders?</p>
<p>Merkel retained many traits that are common among scientists throughout her long political career. She is patient and discerning. She has vision and strategy, and understands the value of planning for the long term. She is rational and empirical. And she builds collaboration and cooperation. </p>
<p>Finally, Merkel is known for <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/04/angela-merkel-germany-coronavirus-pandemic/610225/">drawing a clear boundary around what is known</a>. She does not overstate the facts but, rather, promotes the temporary embrace of uncertainty until <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-germany-merkel-sci-idUKKBN27I1PR">the data can be gathered to inform a decision</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-madchen-to-mutti-as-angela-merkel-departs-she-leaves-a-great-legacy-of-leadership-168187">From 'Mädchen' to 'Mutti': as Angela Merkel departs, she leaves a great legacy of leadership</a>
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<p>Merkel earned her doctorate in the field of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Angela-Merkel">quantum chemistry</a> a specialisation within the broad field of quantum mechanics. Widely known for the macabre “Schrödingers cat” thought experiment, quantum mechanics is guiding scientists to discover and manipulate the characteristics of atoms and sub-atomic particles. </p>
<p>For many, Schrödinger’s cat mystifies more than it enlightens, but the counterintuitive nature of quantum mechanics in fact reveals the strength of science. By collecting data and developing theory, by following the trail of irreconcilable observations, scientists develop and test models of the world. </p>
<p>And like the greatest scientific models, quantum mechanics predicts more than we can immediately explain. It is a tool that moves past our human shortcomings, of emotion-driven bias and impulse, and allows us to pry at greater truths.</p>
<p>Amid pandemics of viruses and misinformation, a distrust of authority and erosion of meaning, Australia has never had greater need of the tools of science and the qualities of its scientists.</p>
<h2>Where are Australia’s science-trained political leaders?</h2>
<p>Just <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/43rdParl#_Toc368474618">17 of the 227 members</a> of Australia’s federal parliament have training in scientific, technical, medical or engineering (STEM) fields. That’s only 7%.</p>
<p>Australia faces grave threats from many of the world’s most pressing challenges: <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/factsheets/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Regional_Fact_Sheet_Australasia.pdf">climate change</a>, <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.abg9225">the biodiversity crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2021/214/11/surveillance-sars-cov-2-variants-concern-australian-context">pandemic variants</a>, <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/reports-and-statistics/acsc-annual-cyber-threat-report-2020-21">cybersecurity</a> and <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/June%202021/document/australias-ai-action-plan.pdf">AI challenges</a>, and <a href="https://www.publish.csiro.au/AH/AH16238">antibiotic resistance</a>. </p>
<p>To meet these challenges, our national decision-makers need to objectively assess complex information, discern fact from fiction, and build collaboration and approaches that will take years, or decades, to fully come into their own. </p>
<p>We also need just and bold leadership with the confidence to adopt and rapidly deploy new technologies to reduce carbon emissions, build new economic sectors, and keep Australia’s digital assets safe.</p>
<h2>What would a science-led Australia look like?</h2>
<p>Can you imagine how things might be different if there were more scientists in Australia’s federal parliament? We can.</p>
<p>Australia would have responded to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://unric.org/en/guterres-the-ipcc-report-is-a-code-red-for-humanity/#:%7E:text=UN%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20Ant%C3%B3nio%20Guterres,%E2%80%9Ccode%20red%20for%20humanity.%E2%80%9D&text=However%2C%20strong%20and%20sustained%20reductions,gases%20would%20limit%20climate%20change.">“Code Red” report</a> by introducing more ambitious carbon emissions targets, and an infrastructure investment plan to achieve them.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-approach-to-science-helps-define-the-political-centre-33021">How an approach to science helps define the political centre</a>
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<p>It would have secured Australia’s place as a <a href="https://www.atse.org.au/research-and-policy/publications/publication/australias-digital-future-a-nation-of-users-or-leaders/">world-class digital economy</a>, growing jobs and wealth and improving equity of access to work, schools and health care for all citizens.</p>
<p>The government would be taking a strong, bold and evidence-informed approach to building our economy, by strengthening investment in research and development. It would provide incentives for others to do the same, generating strong GDP returns and lifting Australia from the <a href="https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm">bottom of the OECD rankings for government investment in research and development</a>.</p>
<p>Australia would be rapidly building the manufacturing, energy and data infrastructure to fast-track a transition to an economy <a href="https://www.atse.org.au/research-and-policy/publications/publication/towards-a-waste-free-future/">that generates no waste</a>.</p>
<h2>Scientists of Australia, we need you</h2>
<p>That science and politics go “hand-in-lab-glove” is no coincidence. Both seek order in a world of frightening complexity. The challenges of the 21st century – from COVID-19 to global warming – appear to be consuming us from the inside out, our national unity deteriorated by misinformation. How can a scientist make change in politics?</p>
<p>Angela Merkel has said her strategy was to take “<a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/germany-s-long-serving-angela-merkel-prepares-to-step-down-1.5570650">many small steps</a>” and avoid extreme reforms.</p>
<p>Progress can be made by invoking the rhythms of science (where decades-long projects are commonplace), by making decisions on the best available evidence, by establishing cause and consequence, and by developing and testing our models time and time again. In this way we can benefit from the steady accumulation of increasingly detailed and reliable knowledge.</p>
<p>In just 16 years Angela Merkel transitioned Germany from <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/05/06/the-reason-renewables-cant-power-modern-civilization-is-because-they-were-never-meant-to/?sh=6197b04aea2b">a 10% renewable energy mix</a> to the world’s <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/germany-s-economy-3306346">first major renewable energy economy</a>. She established a net zero emission target by 2045 while making the German economy the fourth-largest in the world by GDP. This is one of many evidence-based changes implemented by her chancellorship and one of the many features of her legacy.</p>
<p>Science arose through necessity, as “a candle in the dark” from the dark ages. We have enjoyed the enlightenment in which science played a major role. </p>
<p>And as new shadows encroach on the world, science can help keep the flame alight. Australia’s scientists: we need you.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/doctor-doctor-why-so-few-scientists-in-top-government-jobs-5561">Doctor, doctor: why so few scientists in top government jobs?</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Emma Johnston is the Dean of Science at the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kylie Walker is CEO at the Australian Academy of Technology and Engineering.</span></em></p>Only 7% of Australia’s federal MPs have backgrounds in science. What would it look like if they were a majority?Emma Johnston, Professor and Dean of Science, UNSW SydneyKylie Walker, Visiting Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680402021-09-23T16:13:57Z2021-09-23T16:13:57ZGerman election explained: why is it always so hard to form a government?<p>It is quite unusual for the two largest parties in a given country to form a coalition. In the UK, it took the second world war to bring such a grand coalition about.</p>
<p>Grand coalitions promise extreme stability, given that they provide an overwhelming majority. In parliament, it is easy to ignore the fringe voices within the governing parties, as their votes are not needed to pass legislation.</p>
<p>But it is not a good look for a democracy if the government is held to account by a pathetically small opposition. And yet the grand coalition of centre left and centre right has become the norm in 21st-century Germany. A grand coalition governed between 2005 and 2009 and another came into power in 2013, governing ever since.</p>
<p>It’s a setup that should worry Germans more than it seems to. The big-tent parties – the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative CDU/CSU – have haemorrhaged votes over several decades and the big question for the 2021 election will be whether this aberration can be at least put on hold.</p>
<p>A time traveller from the early 2000s would marvel at the idea that the SPD is pleased with its projected 25% in the 2021 election polls and laugh that this puts them ahead of the CDU. To the time traveller, 25% would seem devastatingly low. Social democrats and conservatives are in free fall – but falling just a bit slower than the other side will do for now.</p>
<p>To understand this long-term dynamic, we need to look back much further at how the federal republic was designed to avoid a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545621?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Weimar-style fragmentation</a>. A new class of German politicians – as well as the western allies – running the show had influenced the outcome of this design but, ironically, there was no clear winner. The result was a compromise between two competing schools of thought: majoritarian (winner takes it all) v proportional representation (percentage of vote share). Hence, citizens have two votes: one for their local representative (winner takes it all) and the other for a party (proportional representation benefitting smaller parties). A 5% threshold was introduced to stop the second vote from ushering in too many small parties.</p>
<p>In the first federal election in 1949, the threshold was only introduced at state level, meaning that if a party gained 5% of the vote in any state, it would make it into the Bundestag. This still allowed for a very diverse first Bundestag (1949-53) with eleven parties, including the separatist Bayernpartei. But the ruling conservatives expressed concern that Weimarian fragmentation was being carried into the federal republic. For the 1953 election, a national 5% threshold was put in place.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, the Bundestag stopped being messy and confusing. Between 1957 and 1983, an orderly three-party system operated in parliament, featuring the centre-right CDU/CSU, centre-left SPD and the fully centrist Free Democratic Party (FDP).</p>
<p>These three parties would provide sufficient drama. The small FDP was the only coalition partner available for both giants. The FDP could threaten to join forces with the other side if not given enough power in a coalition government. It was therefore important for the two big parties to keep the FDP out of government at least once to put it in its place. The result was a short-lived grand coalition in the late 1960s, which turned out to be a disaster. Apart from this three-year cameo, the 20th century saw stable coalition governments between one big party (usually conservative) and one small party (almost always the FDP).</p>
<h2>1980s: the rise of smaller parties</h2>
<p>The three-party system was broken when the Greens made it into parliament in the 1980s. To the surprise of many, they established themselves as a permanent fixture, which signalled the beginning of ever-increasing diversity in the Bundestag.</p>
<p>Soon, the left was further split with the introduction of the Party of Democratic Socialism (the predecessor of <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/09/18/what-to-make-of-die-linke">Die Linke</a>) into the Bundestag.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, on the far right, the fledgling party Alternative for Germany (AfD) established itself even faster. Five percent threshold? No problem. It had already benefited from the shrinking of the two big-tent parties. Their inability to take the environmental movement seriously and the lightning speed of neoliberal reform in East Germany had taken its toll. A simple two-party coalition became increasingly difficult to pull off. The era of the grand coalition had dawned.</p>
<p>Merkel has been in power for four terms – three of them in a grand coalition. She shined in the glow of an economy booming against all odds while the SPD floundered. The stable economy and a Merkel-friendly media environment helped the savvy chancellor to succeed at each and every federal election. Merkel is seen as a steady hand at the wheel despite erratic U-turns. She most famously experimented with a hardline message in response to the refugee crisis before abruptly changing course after the tragic picture of a drowned child on a beach infuriated Christian groups. Then she changed course again, paying Turkey billions of euros to deal with the problem within its own borders.</p>
<p>For the radical right, it has become much easier to criticise the allegedly overly left-wing chancellor as she sits in charge of a grand coalition with her party’s arch enemy, the SPD. The AfD can claim the established parties are all the same, that politics is just a big show and that an alternative is desperately needed.</p>
<p>The once high vote share of parties narrowly failing the 5% threshold used to increase the number of MPs among the established parties. But with an ever-growing number of parties jumping over the once challenging 5% threshold, it is becoming increasingly hard to avoid a grand coalition or a complicated three-party coalition as the 5% threshold. A system originally designed to bring stability has become a straightjacket.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alim Baluch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Grand coalitions and fragile alliances have become standard procedure in the Bundestag.Alim Baluch, Lecturer in German Politics and Society, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1685032021-09-23T14:00:41Z2021-09-23T14:00:41ZMerkel’s caution has made Germany the great economic underachiever of our times<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422910/original/file-20210923-25-q7r047.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Angela Merkel 2015 portrait by Colin Davidson.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-london-uk-19th-jan-2016-painting-titled-portrait-of-angela-merkel-93403007.html?pv=1&stamp=2&imageid=92028807-03E2-47D8-9032-3A49EFA77E62&p=280223&n=0&orientation=0&pn=1&searchtype=0&IsFromSearch=1&srch=foo%3dbar%26st%3d0%26pn%3d1%26ps%3d100%26sortby%3d2%26resultview%3dsortbyPopular%26npgs%3d0%26qt%3dangela%2520merkel%26qt_raw%3dangela%2520merkel%26lic%3d3%26mr%3d0%26pr%3d0%26ot%3d0%26creative%3d%26ag%3d0%26hc%3d0%26pc%3d%26blackwhite%3d%26cutout%3d%26tbar%3d1%26et%3d0x000000000000000000000%26vp%3d0%26loc%3d0%26imgt%3d0%26dtfr%3d%26dtto%3d%26size%3d0xFF%26archive%3d1%26groupid%3d%26pseudoid%3d29263%26a%3d%26cdid%3d%26cdsrt%3d%26name%3d%26qn%3d%26apalib%3d%26apalic%3d%26lightbox%3d%26gname%3d%26gtype%3d%26xstx%3d0%26simid%3d%26saveQry%3d%26editorial%3d%26nu%3d%26t%3d%26edoptin%3d%26customgeoip%3dGB%26cap%3d1%26cbstore%3d1%26vd%3d0%26lb%3d%26fi%3d2%26edrf%3d%26ispremium%3d1%26flip%3d0%26pl%3d">Raymong Tang</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Germans are taking to the polls on September 26 to elect the members for the 20th Bundestag. For the first time in 16 years, there will be a new chancellor as Angela Merkel steps down. Germany has been through some enormous challenges during her tenure, including the global financial crisis, European sovereign debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, and many commentators have praised her <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-gentle-persuasion-in-an-age-of-populism-167777">quiet efficiency</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/">The polls</a> are predicting gains for the Social Democrats (SPD), who have been the junior coalition partner to Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) since 2013, but no party is expected to achieve a landslide victory. The SPD’s Olaf Scholz is the most likely successor to Merkel. He is already finance minister and vice chancellor in the outgoing administration, so the German political landscape looks unlikely to change drastically. </p>
<p>Yet the Germans would arguably benefit from changing their approach to running the economy, because it has not fared brilliantly under Merkel – and this would apply regardless of how the election turns out. The chart below, which shows what has happened to key indicators like growth, inflation and unemployment during her tenure, shows a very mixed picture. </p>
<p><strong>Germany’s economy under Merkel</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart showing Germany's economic performance under Merkel" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422610/original/file-20210922-27-5jpma9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Notes: current account and budget surplus/deficit are both as % of GDP; unemployment is a % of working population; GDP growth and inflation are quarter on quarter; inflation is consumer price index.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">OECD, ECB, Bundesbank</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the one hand, the fact that prices have been so static and most people have been in work are signs of a well run economy. Yet GDP growth has been quite low – and surely lower than it could have been given that Germany has been running large trade surpluses and also either surpluses in the public finances or small deficits. In other words, Germany could have spent more to encourage consumption and investment. </p>
<p>But Germany is famous for its determination to always balance its books. Under Merkel (and previous chancellors) the nation locked itself into a <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2011/12/10/tie-your-hands-please">fiscal straitjacket</a> variously known as <em>schuldenbremse</em> (“the debt brake”), <em>schwarze null</em> (“black zero”) or the balanced budget rule. It all boils down to German federal and state governments not being allowed to run budget deficits. </p>
<p>At the same time, German households are the thriftiest in the G7, boasting the <a href="https://data.oecd.org/natincome/saving-rate.htm">highest savings rate</a>. German household spending has consistently declined, from 56.4% as a percentage of their disposable income in 2009 to 51.9% in 2019, and obviously, COVID-19 dragged it further down to 50.7% in 2020.</p>
<p><strong>GDP growth across G7, 2010-20</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing GDP growth by G7 nation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422907/original/file-20210923-15-13zn9i9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&start=1971&view=chart">World Bank</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both public and private fixed investment in Germany has been <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/2018/06/understanding-the-lack-of-german-public-investment/">declining for decades</a> as a percentage of GDP, despite all the money generated by the huge trade surplus. Lack of investment has started to weigh on the German economy, as manifested in the poor growth numbers. </p>
<p>Germany was showing 0% growth in the final quarter of 2019 even before the COVID-19 nosedive. So despite Germany’s fiscal prudence and gigantic trade surplus, the period between the global financial crisis and COVID-19 cannot be seen as a success story. It has been a period of long-term stagnation.</p>
<h2>The pandemic era</h2>
<p>In the era before the pandemic, Germany’s large trade surplus was causing international ructions, with the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/57f104d2-e742-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539">US branding</a> the Germans currency manipulators. Yet neither the surplus nor the stagnation vanished under Merkel. As usual, Germany’s fascination with fiscal prudence came out on top. </p>
<p>Germany’s great strength in exports has been somewhat immune to COVID. The country’s trade balance did deteriorate a bit in 2020 as international demand for German goods was affected by the pandemic. But now that its major trading partners have lifted the worst of their COVID restrictions, German exports have bounced back to levels last seen three years ago, with a <a href="https://www.bundesbank.de/dynamic/action/en/statistics/time-series-databases/time-series-databases/759784/759784?listId=www_s201_zb_qezb_13_w1">trade surplus</a> of €110 billion (£95 billion) in the first half of 2021. This confirms that the competitiveness of the German economy is the last thing anyone needs to worry about. </p>
<p>Germany did put its fiscal prudence <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dacd2ac6-6b5f-11ea-89df-41bea055720b">on hold</a> to deal with the pandemic, condoning a budget deficit of around 6% in its efforts to support citizens and businesses. In parallel, German households have drawn down on their savings during the pandemic, though only marginally. </p>
<p>The saving rate dropped from 10% of GDP in 2019 to 7.7% of GDP in 2020. But knowing German fiscal conservatism at both the national and household levels, business as usual is likely to be <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/640d084b-7b13-4555-ba00-734f6daed078">resumed shortly</a>. </p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>The two most pressing issues for the new chancellor are be economic recovery from COVID and reaching net zero carbon emissions. Earlier this year, <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/05/05/germany-raises-ambition-net-zero-2045-landmark-court-ruling/">Merkel raised</a> Germany’s targeted date for reaching net zero from 2050 to 2045 after the German constitutional court <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/06/germany-to-bring-forward-climate-goals-net-zero-after-constitutional-court-ruling">found that</a> the government was violating the freedoms of young people by delaying too much of its emissions reduction until after 2030. When the nation was hit by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/aug/23/climate-crisis-made-deadly-german-floods-up-to-nine-times-more-likely">terrible floods</a> in the summer, it highlighted both the urgency of responding to climate change and also the <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/climate-change-becomes-bigger-priority-german-voters-following-floods-survey">public appetite</a> for urgent action. </p>
<p>Yet maintaining prosperity while making such huge cuts to carbon emissions is going to be a monumental challenge, not always made easier by other political decisions: for example, part of Germany’s climate plan involves phasing out coal power by 2038, but this is complicated by also phasing out nuclear power <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-atomic-phaseout-how-to-dismantle-a-nuclear-power-plant/a-47823766">by 2022</a>. </p>
<p>In sum, the new chancellor will have to maintain a very tight balance between these environmental ambitions and economic recovery and growth after COVID. Another major issue that will only make this harder is Germany’s <a href="https://arc.aarpinternational.org/countries/germany#:%7E:text=Germany's%20population%20age%2065%20and,about%2041%20million%20by%202050.">ageing population</a>. </p>
<p>Merkel <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/german-panel-suggests-pension-age-68-politicians-78146921">has lately</a> been coming under pressure to raise the state pension age to 68, having already raised it from 65 to 67 from 2029. But she has left the decision to her successor, and Scholz has ruled out such a move, insisting it is unnecessary. </p>
<p>One obvious priority should be to revisit the nation’s addiction to stagnation-inducing surpluses. By moving away from <em>schwarze null</em> to run deficits closer to the 3% permitted under the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en">EU Stability and Growth Pact</a>, the new chancellor could create a little more space to make COVID recovery and the environmental transition easier. After the cautious Merkel years, the time is ripe for the Germans to try something different.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Ali Nasir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Germany was steady under its longstanding chancellor, but also stagnant.Muhammad Ali Nasir, Associate Professor in Economics and Finance, University of HuddersfieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1677772021-09-21T11:27:31Z2021-09-21T11:27:31ZAngela Merkel: gentle persuasion in an age of populism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420636/original/file-20210912-13-v2xg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C110%2C1978%2C1537&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Now she is all alone.” Former president Barack Obama slightly squinted and bit his lip in characteristic fashion as he spoke these words to his adviser. Obama had spent three hours alone with Angela Merkel in Hotel Adelon in Berlin. It was late November 2016. Donald Trump had just been elected the 45th president of the United States and his soon-to-be predecessor was worried as he prepared to leave office. Only one individual, thought Obama, could keep the liberal world order alive while America was taking leave of its geopolitical senses. And that person was the German chancellor.</p>
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<p>But – and this worried the 44th president – Merkel had decided not to seek another term after the German federal elections in September 2017. Obama was in the German capital to make her change her mind. He succeeded. Merkel was persuaded that it was her duty to carry on the baton of liberal internationalism, free trade and democracy. At least for the next four years.</p>
<p>“I noticed a tear in her eye as we left,” Obama’s speechwriter Ben Rhodes later noted when he recounted the rendezvous between the two leaders. At least, that is the story as told in a <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.de/leseprobe/Machtverfall/leseprobe_9783827501417.pdf">fly-on-the-wall account</a> by the editor of the German newspaper Die Welt. In the next four years, it was Merkel who sought to salvage the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40441143">Paris climate accord</a>, and it was she who maintained the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-vladimir-putin-moscow-russia-alexei-navalny/">geopolitical pressure</a> on Vladimir Putin when Trump did the opposite.</p>
<p>If anything is Merkel’s legacy, it is her custodianship of the liberal world order. Angela Dorthea Merkel (née Kastler) is above all a pragmatic foreign politician. Whereas her immediate predecessors – her mentor, the Christian democrat Helmut Kohl (1982-98) and the social democrat Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) are primarily remembered for domestic policies, Merkel was a foreign-policy politician. Kohl presided over German unification and Schröder reformed the welfare state. Merkel’s legacy, now that she really is standing down, has been international.</p>
<h2>Evidence, deliberation, experts</h2>
<p>Merkel used state intervention on a massive scale to rescue the world economy after the 2008 financial crash. She embraced anti-austerity policies to save the euro. She was always pragmatic. As she told me in 2008: “I want as much market economics as possible, with as much state intervention as necessary.” When reminded that this was reminiscent of socialist politics from the 1960s, she just smiled and shrugged, “Yes, and, so what, if it works.”</p>
<p>That things just must work – or <em>funktioneren</em> (in German) – is her mantra in most things. If any politician was wedded to the idea of evidence-based policymaking, it is her. As a scientist with a doctorate in quantum physics, she is unique in a country where most politicians are lawyers or economists.</p>
<p>When she had to choose a cabinet minister for the Kanzleramt – her executive office – she opted for Helge Braun, a medical doctor. This was because she knew he would focus on facts. It turned out to be an inspired choice. Braun had a special interest in infectious diseases, and his work, alongside a well-functioning public health system, meant that Germany was ahead of many other countries when COVID-19 hit the world in early 2020.</p>
<p>Because of her preference for facts and evidence, Merkel has been called the “master of procrastination” – <em>Die Zauderkünstlerin</em>. Whereas as most other world leaders are “men of action” who go off like proverbial firecrackers when crises emerge, Merkel preferred to do her homework, and then, at the last minute, make a decision based on facts. The Germans even invented a word for it, <em>Merkeln</em> – “to merkel” – means to mull over a decision before action is taken.</p>
<h2>We didn’t need another hero</h2>
<p>People often search for exceptional individuals. It is a popular view that history is shaped by exceptional men and women. Certainly there is a place for this “great man theory of history” as it was called in the gendered language of the Victorian age. If we are tempted by this trope, we should note that but for Merkel, the fate of the world economy, the euro, and the over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/30/angela-merkel-great-migrant-gamble-paid-off">one million refugees that were allowed into Germany</a> during the height of the migrant crisis would have been very different. And yet, she was not a successful politician because she was uniquely wise or prescient. She got results because she was willing to collaborate and find common ground.</p>
<p>At a time when so many strong men are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/the-evolution-of-the-strongman/">seeking dictatorial powers</a> around the world, it provides food for thought that the most successful democratic politician of the past few decades – and perhaps even the modern era – is a woman who believed in consensus. Merkel shows that politics should be focused on solving problems rather than on winning the arguments. </p>
<p>“Who do you ring when you want to call Europe?” asked Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state. The answer for the past 16 years has been Angela Merkel. She will be missed. There are no politicians who can fill her shoes. But her successor – whoever he or she turns out to be – will still be the person to call. Germany, due to its size, speaks for Europe. That Obama wanted Merkel to stay on during what he foresaw would be a chaotic period under Trump was not only due to her formidable skills – it was also a sign that Germany is the European power. </p>
<p>The brute fact is that international politics is determined by institutions and established rules more than it is governed by individuals. Merkel’s legacy is not so much what she did but how she defended this rule-based international order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>A new edition of Professor Matthew Qvortrup's book Angela Merkel: Europe's Most Influential Leader will be published on 21st October.</span></em></p>How many other world leaders can claim to have become a verb?Matt Qvortrup, Chair of Applied Political Science, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1681872021-09-21T03:45:47Z2021-09-21T03:45:47ZFrom ‘Mädchen’ to ‘Mutti’: as Angela Merkel departs, she leaves a great legacy of leadership<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422021/original/file-20210920-48404-y6zvfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Focke Strangmann</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With Chancellor Angela Merkel departing as one of the most significant politicians in a generation, the German elections of September 26 will be very closely watched. This is the first time since 2005 that national elections will take place without her.</p>
<p>This first female German chancellor has served a record four terms in government. While she has her critics, she has overall been a source of stability, coherence and consultation. She has also become a role model of how to deal with controversy and crisis. </p>
<h2>Standing down on her own terms</h2>
<p>Merkel is now dedicated to making space for the future generation as Germany, the EU and the world face accelerating challenges. These range from the pandemic and climate change, relations with the US, Russia, China, and beyond. The geo-political and geo-strategic landscape is shifting. Merkel played a crucial role in pursuing EU-style multilateralism as a vector of peace and stability. </p>
<p>Some believe Merkel missed some important opportunities that can now be picked up or reinforced. Among those are bringing other European Union nations, such as France, even closer to taking on more EU leadership, an ambition strengthened when French President Emmanuel Macron was elected. Macron, the fourth French president elected during Merkel’s time as chancellor, was seen as liberal, pro-European and reformist. But his ideas on financial integration and a multi-speed model for Europe did not meet the expected enthusiasm, including in Germany, while he was struggling with reforms internally. </p>
<p>In her 16 years as leader, Merkel has seen many international counterparts come and go. She has worked with eight Japanese prime ministers, seven Italian prime ministers, five UK prime ministers, and four US presidents – not to mention six changes of prime minister in Australia. </p>
<p>Many leaders dramatically underestimated her, judging wrongly from her early nickname of “das Mädchen” (the girl) that she might be a political neophyte. She soon proved to be a role model for reliability and responsibility, and the impact of female leadership.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/auf-wiedersehen-mutti-how-angela-merkels-centrist-politics-shaped-germany-and-europe-153447">Auf Wiedersehen, 'Mutti': How Angela Merkel’s centrist politics shaped Germany and Europe</a>
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<h2>Merkel’s place in history</h2>
<p>Merkel is the first German chancellor to stand down on her own terms and timeline without the political pressures known by her predecessors. Importantly, she also does not have an obvious successor. This makes this election less than predictable. Neither the centre-right’s (CDU) Armin Laschet – Merkel’s party colleague – nor the centre-left’s (SPD) Olaf Scholz (currently finance minister), nor the Green Party’s Annalena Baerbock are seen as charismatic or convincing. </p>
<p>This leads to the question where the “Merkel voters” will head with their votes. During her tenure, women voters, economic centrists and ethnic minority voters in particular voted for her party in support of her, rather than for the CDU’s policies. </p>
<p>This also raises the question of what legacy she will leave. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/angela-merkel/?sh=3c08e18822dd">have called</a> Merkel one of the most influential world leaders of the modern era. Others <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/angela-merkel-forbes-powerful-women-list-2020-b1767961.html">recognise her</a> as extraordinary in various ways, at times with critique.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422024/original/file-20210920-47336-zq07zq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Merkel was never afraid to fight for what she thought was right, as shown in this famous photo of her staring down former US President Donald Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/ Jesco Denzel</span></span>
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<p>Merkel has modernised Germany and, to some extent, liberalised a very conservative system, always with Germany’s economic interests at its centre. She became known to leverage Germany’s strong post-second world war values-driven perspective (very much embedded in the promise that history should never repeat itself). In doing so, she advanced and modernised the values of democracy, human rights, equality, diversity and the value of partner-level engagement to solve challenges and find solutions, together.</p>
<p>Merkel’s place in history is also symbolic. Raised in East Germany during the period it was split from the West and aligned to the Soviet regime, she entered politics during the era of reunification. Untarnished by the East’s past, she is a highly educated, humble woman with a doctorate in quantum chemistry who made it through a career marked by a range of roles. As she has <a href="https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/das-find-ich-schon-schwer-auf-der-theaterbuehne-in-duesseldorf-wird-merkel-so-persoenlich-wie-selten_id_20931085.html">also revealed</a> she has not been thwarted by misogyny in politics or life in general. </p>
<p>She became chancellor at a time when Germany struggled to find cohesion between the former east and west. She brought same sex marriage, and radical policy shifts such as on nuclear policy after the Fukushima disaster. She has advanced a very environmentally conscious society to move toward a carbon-neutral economy, with Germany aiming to be carbon neutral by 2045 (the EU target is 2050). Her welcoming “we can do this” <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-germany-refugees/a-54769229">attitude to refugees and asylum seekers</a> was noted around the world.</p>
<p>Under Merkel, Germany wielded the strongest political influence in the EU, though it took this role rather reluctantly, becoming its leading integrating force and its leading economy.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422023/original/file-20210920-25-1oy7mzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">‘Goodbye Mum’: a sign farewells Merkel, who after 16 years as German leader leaves a huge legacy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Michael Sohn</span></span>
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<h2>Symmetry and strength</h2>
<p>Merkel’s leadership has not been without its hiccups, such as when saving the Euro currency during the Euro-crisis and Global Financial Crisis. Merkel <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/merkel-calls-for-political-union-to-save-the-euro/">brokered deals</a> during endless discussion to keep Greece in the EU and maintain European solidarity. </p>
<p>She also played a key role in negotiating a stable transition through Brexit. There were times when she pushed through ideas that contradicted the general consensus on an issue within Germany and among her voters, such as in her <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-will-germanys-foreign-policy-be-after-angela-merkel/a-56722717">moderate stance on China</a>. </p>
<p>But one of the ways she will be remembered is for standing tall when her values were challenged. The most notable example of this is her decision to keep open Germany’s borders to refugees, after much consideration. This depth of thought brought the term <em>merkeln</em> into the German language, expressing long reflective periods in decision-making. It also brought her the nickname “Mutti” (mother) to reflect her caring, empathetic and decisive approach. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-angela-merkel-has-become-and-remains-one-of-the-worlds-most-successful-political-leaders-80389">How Angela Merkel has become – and remains – one of the world's most successful political leaders</a>
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<p>She has often been criticised in Germany for leading without communicating a larger vision. But her ability to learn and thrive during challenges while maintaining integrity, stability and responsible engagement shapes her legacy in Germany and beyond. </p>
<p>Merkel has been much praised, especially internationally, for her broader crisis management and her outstanding ability to maintain engagement. It is this legacy, combined with the ongoing importance of European and international collaboration, that remains front of mind for German voters as they elect their next leader.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriele Suder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is no clear frontrunner to replace Merkel as next German chancellor after this weekend’s election, but whoever succeeds her will have huge shoes to fill.Gabriele Suder, Professor. Dean, New Business Acceleration, Federation University AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1676582021-09-13T10:14:35Z2021-09-13T10:14:35ZGerman election: what to expect in the race to replace Angela Merkel<p>Germany is shortly to hold its first ever federal election in which the sitting chancellor is not running. The departure of Angela Merkel means that, for the first time since 1949, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-to-step-aside-heres-what-it-means-for-germany-and-what-to-expect-next-105875">change is inevitable</a>. </p>
<p>For most of the past four years, the most likely outcome of this vote appeared to be a government led by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), probably in coalition with the Green Party. For a time, the Greens were almost level-pegging with the CDU/CSU, but fell behind during the pandemic when governing parties across Europe <a href="https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12401">gained ground</a>.</p>
<p>Few rated the chances of the social democratic SPD – currently Merkel’s reluctant junior coalition partner. The party had its <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1037985/cdu-and-spd-vote-share-by-election/">worst result ever in 2017</a>, plumbed new depths in the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-spd-reels-from-double-defeat-in-eu-and-regional-vote/">2019 European election</a>, and gave an impression of severe internal division. </p>
<p>Its leader, Andrea Nahles, was forced from office after the European election debacle, and Vice-Chancellor and Federal Finance Minister Olaf Scholz lost a ballot among party members for the leadership to two largely unknown, left-wing contenders. He was selected as the SPD’s candidate for chancellor but, at the time, this seemed largely a face-saving move.</p>
<p>Roll the clock forward to September 2021, and the social democrats can barely believe their luck. They are <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm">polling</a> well ahead of the CDU at around 25% – quite an achievement in a highly fragmented, six-party system. Meanwhile, the CDU/CSU is in crisis, in some <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/forsa.htm">polls</a> even falling below 20%.</p>
<h2>CDU on the rocks</h2>
<p>The current situation owes as much to the other parties’ faltering campaigns as it does the SPD’s strength. The CDU/CSU selected Armin Laschet to be chancellor candidate ahead of Bavarian Minister President Markus Söder, despite polling evidence that this was a big risk.</p>
<p>Laschet has had a torrid time in the campaign. Most damaging was his reaction to the terrible floods in western Germany, including his home state of North Rhine Westphalia. His crisis management was questionable, but worse was the clip of him laughing and joking with party colleagues while the federal president made a solemn speech <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-successor-criticized-for-laughing-during-flood-visit/a-58305436">commemorating victims</a>.</p>
<p>Laschet apologised, but the damage was done. His performance in the pandemic had been the subject of criticism, and the whole episode confirmed German voters’ doubts. Add in allegations of plagiarism, a TV interview where he struggled to name three things a CDU-led government would do, and barbed comments from Söder (who demonstratively <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-csu-markus-soeder-schaut-aufs-handy-armin-laschet-patzt-in-deutscher-geschichte-a-350717ba-b97b-42c0-a725-0522f8b188a2">played with his phone</a> during Laschet’s speech at the campaign launch), and the CDU seems determined to test how low its support can fall.</p>
<p>The Greens have also found the extra scrutiny associated with the final stages of the campaign a challenge. Candidate <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-greens-leader-baerbock-self-critical-in-plagiarism-debate/">Annalena Baerbock</a> has been variously criticised for apparent plagiarism (such a common pattern – can a university offer some courses in footnotes?), failing to declare income and embellishing her CV.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Scholz has edged up in the polls, as the German public considers more deeply what qualities it would like in a chancellor ahead of casting votes. His dry, sober manner of presentation, coupled with centrist politics, is (quite deliberately) reminiscent of Merkel, and has a <a href="https://politik.watson.de/deutschland/exklusiv/925962569-umfrage-olaf-scholz-ist-bei-juengsten-waehlern-der-beliebteste-kanzlerkandidat">strong appeal</a>, especially to older voters. </p>
<h2>Who could end up in government?</h2>
<p>On election night, we will know who has topped the poll. There is no guarantee that the candidate of the largest party will lead the government, but there is a fair degree of expectation on the part of the German public this will happen. However, the next puzzle will be how to build a coalition.</p>
<p>Scholz would love to lead an SPD-Green coalition, but although things are shifting in that direction, the odds are against them having a majority.</p>
<p>The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is out of the picture but one option could be SPD-Green-Left Party – and this has not been ruled out by the SPD or Greens. On domestic policy, such a coalition would be doable, but on foreign policy, there is a gaping chasm in views (with the Left Party pressing to disband NATO and replace it with an alliance involving Russia).</p>
<p>Partnering with the Greens and the Left Party would also leave Scholz rather less room to resist policy demands from the SPD’s left, running counter to his more centrist instincts. The most likely scenario is a “traffic light” coalition of SPD, Greens and the liberal FDP, but the latter will play hard to get, and there are major policy differences between the FDP and its potential partners, especially in the key areas of climate and fiscal policy.</p>
<p>Given all this uncertainty, multiple coalition formulations may well be possible. On election night, we may get some hints. There will then be exploratory talks among potential partners over a few weeks, which will resolve key issues. Will the FDP be open to compromise with the SPD and Greens? Will the Left Party spring a surprise and jettison its foreign policy platform? </p>
<p>Only after these initial talks will we know which combination will embark on formal coalition negotiations. And as we saw in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nejo.12310">2017</a>, there is no guarantee of success: talks might fail, or the outcome might be voted down by party members or delegates. </p>
<p>Germany will be in a period of hiatus, with just an acting government, for a period of several weeks if not months. Readers across Europe, and beyond should stay tuned: we are set for an exciting ride.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167658/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) which has supported his work on various party projects. He has undertaken occasional consultancy for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.</span></em></p>After a rocky start, the social democrats are on the up as polling day approaches.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1594752021-04-21T13:18:34Z2021-04-21T13:18:34ZArmin Laschet: who is the man chosen to replace Angela Merkel?<p>After months of uncertainty, Germany’s Christian Democrats have finally chosen the man who will stand in September’s election to replace Angela Merkel as chancellor. </p>
<p>Armin Laschet is currently minister president (the head of government) of North Rhine Westphalia and has been leader of one of the two Christian Democratic parties - the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) - since Merkel stepped down from that role in January. </p>
<p>He was picked ahead of Markus Söder, who is head of the CDU’s sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) and also Bavarian minister president. Söder had won support from a number of CDU heavyweights and pointed to numerous opinion polls showing that he had far greater public support than Laschet. </p>
<p>Indeed, just a few days before the decision was made, only 29% of Germans <a href="https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/politbarometer-k-frage-union-soeder-laschet-100.html">polled</a> saw Laschet as suited to being chancellor. Söder had support from 63% of people in the same poll. Another <a href="https://www.rtl.de/cms/laschet-sieg-spaltet-union-bundestagsabgeordnete-bangen-um-ihren-job-4743677.html">survey</a> suggested Laschet’s nomination could cost the party 98 seats. But given Laschet will be leading the party that has provided the chancellor for all but 20 years since 1949, he must surely be the front-runner to succeed Merkel.</p>
<h2>Who is Laschet?</h2>
<p>The 60-year-old Laschet has been consistently underestimated throughout his career, an experience he shares with Angela Merkel and even Helmut Kohl, both of whom overtook more highly-fancied colleagues for Germany’s top job.</p>
<p>In 2017, Laschet scored a surprise victory over a popular incumbent to become minister president of North Rhine Westphalia, the largest German state, and home to the industrial centre of the Ruhr, as well as major urban conurbations around Cologne and Düsseldorf. A former MEP, Laschet is avowedly pro-European and casts himself as a centrist, very much in the Merkelian mould. This was his successful pitch to the CDU when he was narrowly elected as party leader in January ahead of hardliner Friedrich Merz.</p>
<p>With his soft Rhinish regional accent, Laschet comes across as genial, if perhaps more a small-town mayor than a national leader. He has, however, proved a master of party management in the leadership contest, apparently contacting middle-ranking party officers individually to shore up support (something Kohl was famed for in his day).</p>
<p>Laschet can have a harder edge too. He takes a tough line on law and order issues in his home state and he clumsily blamed Bulgarians and Romanians for local <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nrws-laschet-walks-back-romanians-and-bulgarians-coronavirus-comment/a-53865563">outbreaks of COVID</a>. In 2020, he consistently pushed for <a href="https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/lockerung-der-coronavirus-massnahmen-laschet-cdu-mir-sagen.868.de.html?dram:article_id=474970">swifter relaxation of COVID restrictions</a>, positioning himself against Merkel, and found himself criticised by her in March of this year for not implementing restrictions with sufficient rigour.</p>
<p>Laschet has also drawn criticism for foreign policy statements questioning Russia’s responsibility for the Salisbury attacks and supporting <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3f000fc3-7e88-4a2d-ac36-b3717a41d1a2">Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria</a>. That said, foreign affairs has not yet been a major plank of Laschet’s political career and he is likely to pivot to the European mainstream if he takes on the role of national leader.</p>
<h2>Why him?</h2>
<p>The choice of Laschet over Söder is partly explained by the complex and sometimes challenging relationship between the CDU and the CSU. The CSU is the Bavarian wing of German Christian democracy and has been a forthright advocate for the interests of Bavaria – something that does not play well outside the state. On the two previous occasions (in 1980 and 2002) when the CSU has fielded the chancellor candidate, the party was defeated – something Laschet’s advocates often pointed out.</p>
<p>The two wings of German Christian democracy have also, most recently, clashed over migration policy. Back in 2018, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/02/germany-interior-minister-drops-threat-quit-border-controls-horst-seehofer">very public dispute</a> played out between Merkel and Horst Seehofer, the then leader of the CSU and interior minister in her government, over the former’s open borders policy. The crisis blew over, and, interestingly, led to Söder becoming the CSU’s public face. From his new position, he pivoted towards a more centrist stance and was keen to emphasise his environmental credentials.</p>
<p>However, this was not enough to persuade the majority of the CDU’s executive body to endorse Söder as chancellor candidate. A sometimes-chaotic virtual meeting eventually saw 31 members vote for Laschet in a secret ballot. There were nine votes for Söder and six abstentions – so a good win for Laschet, if not a ringing endorsement.</p>
<p>Söder accepted the outcome rather begrudgingly the next day, with the CSU’s general secretary stating that Söder was still “the chancellor candidate of our hearts”. Some heavyweights had rowed in behind Söder – notably Reiner Haseloff, the minister president of eastern Saxony-Anhalt – but far more endorsed Laschet. There may have been concern about Söder’s rather dismissive, almost populist approach to party bodies (members of the CDU’s Präsidium, or core executive, were not amused to be compared to a smoke-filled room).</p>
<h2>Will he make it to the top?</h2>
<p>With only a few months to go before the election, the big question is now whether Laschet can win enough public support to become chancellor. The first poll after his nomination saw the Greens with a sudden, <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/wahlumfrage-buendnis-90-die-gruenen-ziehen-an-cdu-csu-vorbei-a-a0bb7d41-b561-46c5-94e9-76eff934f1cc">seven-point lead</a>. The poll suggested that even if the CDU/CSU came first, there would be options that might see it cut out of government (a coalition between the Greens and multiple other parties could make up a bigger bloc).</p>
<p>At the start of the year, a CDU/CSU-Green coalition was felt a racing certainty, but Germany’s faltering vaccination programme, a scandal over <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/germanys-cdu-attempts-damage-control-in-mask-scandal/">corrupt procurement</a> hitting CDU/CSU MPs, and Christian Democracy’s internal woes have badly affected its standing. Yet the climate is febrile, and the CDU/CSU may well gain ground back by September, especially if vaccination really takes off. German politics remains well worth watching, and it may just provide another understated, often-underestimated, centrist as the most important politician in the EU.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159475/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner has received funding from the German Academic Exchange Service and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.</span></em></p>After a prolonged campaign, Germany’s biggest coalition has chosen the man who will lead it into September’s general election.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1558882021-02-23T18:05:24Z2021-02-23T18:05:24ZBiden, Macron, Merkel… Who will frame the future of Europe? The citizens’ view<p>At the start of 2021, the future of Europe is subject to questions regarding the impact of a series of transformations and traumas – the post-Brexit era, the redefinition of transatlantic relations under a new US administration, some leaders’ loss of legitimacy because of their management of the sanitary crisis or the challenges to democracy and rule of law created by authoritarian-leaning governments.</p>
<h2>A survey conducted in eight countries</h2>
<p>The preliminary findings of a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/project/GOODGOD-The-good-and-the-god-in-European-affairs-How-values-and-religion-impact-attitudes-and-identities-towards-the-EU-polity-and-politics">research project</a> exploring the cultural and normative foundations of the European multilevel governance provide some insights.</p>
<p>Citizens of eight European countries, including the largest (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, UK) and most controversial (Hungary) ones were asked “how influential will be [some] political actors on the future of Europe in the years to come”. Respondents were asked to evaluate a range of leaders on the continent and beyond: Emmanuel Macron (France), Angela Merkel (Germany), Boris Johnson (United Kingdom), Viktor Orbán (Hungary), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey), Joe Biden (United States) and Vladimir Putin (Russia), as well as Pope Francis.</p>
<p>A first glance at the results of the survey confirms that Europeans do not totally see their fate in the hands of their leaders. Angela Merkel is the key player, while Emmanuel Macron is ranked in the third place between two non-Europeans, US president Joe Biden and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. As a reminder that secularisation does not exclude religious influence, Pope Francis outranks “strongmen” such as Orbán and Erdogan. With the exception of Putin, authoritarian leaders do not fare that well, suggesting that despite their rhetoric, they do not hold the keys of continental affairs in the eyes of the public.</p>
<p>National rulers are most often not credited with more influence in their own country, and often the reverse. Citizens from other countries are more enthusiastic than the Germans regarding the role of Angela Merkel, while Eastern Europeans see Boris Johnson as much more influential than UK citizens do.</p>
<h2>Contrasting perceptions</h2>
<p>Shifting from the perspectives of leaders to those by country, two findings are significant. Five out of eight leaders are granted their highest level of influence in Italy, and two others in Romania. With due caution, it may be interpreted as the usual reliance of two weak states on European multilevel governance (both supranational and transnational) as an answer to dissatisfaction toward national institutions. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the British grant to all leaders without exception less than their average European scores, and in many cases their worst level of all countries. France is also severe, and this may be a reflection of the reluctance of citizens from former global powers to defer to foreign powers. This phenomenon is much less observed in Germany. And if a representative for European trends overall can be identified, it would be Spain, which provided answers close to the averages of all countries.</p>
<p>The takeaways of this snapshot of European public opinions are that Europe is still an archipelago of national societies crossed by common trends but keeping their longstanding distinct frameworks of interpretations. National rulers are frequently not seen as determining the future in their own country, while globalisation is perceived as shaping European destinies. Still, contested narratives such as religion or democracy show their resilience through the prominence given to those who incarnate them.</p>
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<p><em>The data are the outcome of a survey carried out by <a href="https://www.bilendi.be/">Billendi</a> in December 2020 on behalf of the Cevipol-Institute of European Studies, ULB, with the support of the FNRS.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>François Foret received funding from the Belgian FNRS.</span></em></p>A recent survey conducted in eight European countries provides a snapshot of citizens’ views of their own countries’ leaders as well as those who influence the future of the EU.François Foret, Professeur de science politique, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1534472021-01-25T18:53:26Z2021-01-25T18:53:26ZAuf Wiedersehen, ‘Mutti’: How Angela Merkel’s centrist politics shaped Germany and Europe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380104/original/file-20210122-19-1fkzs9k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Filip Singer/pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since 2005, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel has been one of the most stable and enduring of political forces, both in Europe and on the global stage. During her 16 years as leader, she has won four elections for her conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU), faced the European refugee crisis, the global coronavirus pandemic, the threat of European populism, and challenging leaders such as US President Donald Trump and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>In September 2021, when the German elections will be held, one of the longest serving leaders of postwar Europe will leave office. She does so having steered Germany <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/30/angela-merkels-final-year/">from being a “sick man of Europe” </a> to becoming the world’s fourth largest economy.</p>
<p>She leaves her country and Europe with her own singular brand of “Merkelism”: the pragmatic politics of the centre marked by managing alliances and eliminating rivals; a considered pro-Europeanism and a belief in transatlantic relations; and a specific form of at times <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/30/angela-merkels-final-year/">indecisive incrementalism</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-angela-merkel-has-become-and-remains-one-of-the-worlds-most-successful-political-leaders-80389">How Angela Merkel has become – and remains – one of the world's most successful political leaders</a>
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<h2>She ‘waits and waits’</h2>
<p>For sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v38/n07/wolfgang-streeck/scenario-for-a-wonderful-tomorrow">Merkel is</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a postmodern politician with a premodern, Machiavellian contempt for both causes and people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Educated in the communist former East Germany (DDR), she mastered the art, <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/angela-merkel-profile">claimed</a> biographer and Der Spiegel deputy editor-in-chief Dirk Kurbjuweit, of governing by silence, being cautious, and at times inscrutable, with her words:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>She waits and waits to see where the train is going and then she jumps on the train. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2003, she pushed her conservative party into the choppy waters of deregulation and neo-liberal economics, a move that almost lost her the election to the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, another market “reformer” who arguably set the conditions she would thrive in. After becoming chancellor, she proceeded to clean the party stables of neo-liberals and become a key centrist, with the assistance of the Grand Coalition comprising the remains of the Social Democratic Party (SDP).</p>
<p>In domestic policy, she abolished military conscription, accepted, <a href="https://qz.com/1018983/in-a-nod-to-angela-merkels-political-genius-germany-votes-yes-to-gay-marriage/">after initial reservation</a>, single-sex marriage, and supported the introduction of a minimum wage in 2015. In approaching COVID-19, she demonstrated enviable skills in crisis management, leading to <a href="https://www.dw.com/de/deutschland-trend-wer-kommt-nach-angela-merkel/a-56160732">approval ratings of 72%</a>.</p>
<p>Crisis management also marked her European policy, notably in saving the euro during the global financial crisis of 2009. But this came with its costs, with Merkel devoted to balancing the books and maintaining tight budgets to preserve the monetary union. Indebted countries such as Greece risked bankruptcy and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31457991">a possible exit from the Eurozone</a>.</p>
<p>Merkel, through her stern Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, insisted on austerity measures in bailout negotiations. Greece would eventually be aided at the expense of its financial sovereignty.</p>
<h2>Merkel’s ability to morph has served her well</h2>
<p>Throughout her chancellorship, Merkel has been able to change course abruptly to suit the political mood. Having convinced the Bundestag that phasing out nuclear energy born from the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red%E2%80%93green_alliance">Red-Green coalition </a>of 2001 was bad (an extension of operating times by eight to 14 years was proposed), Merkel proceeded, in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-nuclear-phaseout-explained/a-39171204">order the closure</a> of eight of the country’s 17 nuclear plants with a despot’s urgency.</p>
<p>This became the prelude to the policy of <a href="https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/energy-and-the-environment/energiewende.aspx"><em>Energiewende</em></a>, the “energy transition” aimed at phasing out all nuclear power plants by 2022 and a sharp shift towards decarbonising the economy.</p>
<p>Merkel the shape-changer was again on show during Europe’s refugee crisis. She showed much initial enthusiasm in 2015 for new arrivals, ignoring both German and EU law mandating registration in the first country of entry into the EU before seeking resettlement within the zone. Refugees gathered in Budapest <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-phrase-that-haunts-angela-merkel/">were invited into Germany</a> as part of “showing a friendly face in an emergency”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380118/original/file-20210122-17-vryvw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Merkel’s ‘friendly face’ towards refugees in 2015 did not last long.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Sebastian Kahnert</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This friendly face did not last long. A <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35231046">riot</a> marked by rampant sexual assault at Cologne Central Station on New Year’s Eve in 2015, a good deal of it captured on smart phones, served to harden her approach to the new arrivals. She promised more deportations and reining in family reunification rules. </p>
<h2>Germany’s place in the world</h2>
<p>In various areas of foreign policy, Merkel has also left her centrist, and at times inconsistent, mark. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 led to her persuading the EU to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-ukraine/merkel-will-only-lift-russia-sanctions-if-ukraines-sovereignty-restored-idUSKCN1TJ1H2">impose sanctions</a> on Moscow. She has also been a critic of Putin’s human rights record, notably towards dissident and opposition figures. But such human rights criticism comes with limits. The controversial <a href="https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/">Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline</a>, which will increase German dependence on Russian energy, has not been stopped.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-not-so-grand-coalition-may-cause-ripple-effects-on-european-refugee-policy-94098">Germany’s (not so) grand coalition may cause ripple effects on European refugee policy</a>
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<p>Towards China, the chancellor has also taken divergent, at times eyebrow-raising approaches. The security risks of Chinese 5G telecommunications have been rebuffed, with Germany <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/german-chancellor-merkel-gives-nod-to-huawei-5g-deal-despite-opposition-120121700287_1.html">making an agreement with Huawei</a> to build 5G networks in the country subject to safeguards. Merkel was also instrumental in pushing through an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-and-china-approve-major-investment-deal/a-56096589">EU-China investment deal</a>, despite criticism of Beijing’s human rights record towards Hong Kong protestors and the long-suffering Uighur minority. As Judy Dempsey <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/01/19/will-angela-merkel-s-ambiguous-legacy-last-pub-83681">observes</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Merkel’s support for human rights and the rule of law doesn’t square with her policy towards China.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Like Merkel’s mentor Helmut Kohl was to discover, staying power is never eternal. Kohl lasted eight years as chancellor of West Germany before leading a united Germany for another eight. It is worth recalling who laid the final, cleansing blow to Kohl’s leadership in the wake of the <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/hintergrund-die-cdu-schwarzgeldaffaere-in-hessen/1053004.html">anonymous donations scandal</a> known as the <em>Schwarzgeldaffäre</em>: a certain Angela Merkel’s December 1999 <a href="http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/deu/Chapter10_doc_7.pdf">contribution</a> to the <em>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</em> calling for her former patron’s resignation and political banishment. “I brought my killer,” <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/merkel-the-amazing-political-journey-of-the-worlds-most-powerful-woman-2014-11">reflected</a> Kohl ruefully. “I put the snake on my arm.” </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380117/original/file-20210122-23-64u7dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An undated photo of Merkel, then women and youth minister, beside Chancellor Helmut Kohl.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Merkel has also found that power, in time, wears out those who wield it. Critics, such as Friedrich Merz, former leader of the chancellor’s parliamentary caucus, and Roland Koch, former minister president of Hesse, became bolder. Interior Minister Horst Seehofer <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/horst-seehofer-bavarias-man-in-berlin-pushes-angela-merkel-to-brink-on-migration-policy/">was particularly critical</a> of Merkel’s refugee policies. </p>
<p>The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) now has a foothold in all 16 regional parliaments. The Greens have been polling strongly, while the Left Party and Free Democrats have doggedly maintained their presence. The day after the poor showing in the state elections in Hesse, Merkel announced she would not be seeking re-election as leader of the Christian Democrats. Nor would she be running again as chancellor in 2021. </p>
<p>Now, the CDU has another leader, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/16/germany-cdu-vote-successor-to-angela-merkel">Armin Laschet</a>, who is very much committed to the centrist brand of politics Merkel made famous. Whether he becomes the next chancellor <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fcd6f7f6-9f06-42ba-b792-b7be05eb983d">is far from assured</a>. Markus Söder, the Bavarian premier, is far more popular. </p>
<p>However, Laschet’s presence suggests that Merkelism, despite the departure of the leader many Germans call <em>Mutti</em> (mother), will continue in some form.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Binoy Kampmark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As her 16-year reign as German Chancellor comes to an end, Merkel will be remembered for her staunch centrism and her willingness to wait to sense the political mood - sometimes then changing course.Binoy Kampmark, Senior Lecturer in Global Studies, Social Science & Planning, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1516402020-12-09T19:01:06Z2020-12-09T19:01:06ZAs Trump fades, the EU and US find common cause in facing up to China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/373371/original/file-20201207-15-s8fg92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C67%2C4992%2C2926&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel, connected via video with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hold a news conference after a virtual summit with China's President in Brussels on September 14, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yves Herman/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On October 23, a new transatlantic coordination mechanism, the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/87472/euus-joint-press-release-eeas-and-department-state-phone-call-between-jborrell-and-mpompeo_en">“EU-US Dialogue on China”</a> was officially launched. The European Union and the United States worked for four months to establish it after <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/pompeo-says-us-ready-to-team-up-on-china-but-eu-eyes-a-post-trump-world/">confirming</a> each other’s willingness at the end of June. </p>
<p>The process was complicated by the arduous transatlantic relations and the numerous disagreements that accumulated between the EU and the US under the Trump administration. While the relations between Brussels and Washington were anything but easy over the past four years, the new dialogue did finally come to fruition. When it comes to China, at least, the two shores of the Atlantic have come to recognise the importance of their coordination and cooperation.</p>
<h2>Convoluted triangle: EU-US under Trump-Xi’s China</h2>
<p>For Washington-Beijing relations, this set of bilateral relations turned sour in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/49c4c5fc-5fc8-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895">mid-2017</a>. The Trump administration identified Xi’s party-state as <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf">“strategic competitor”</a> in the National Security Strategy, and phrases like US-China <a href="https://theconversation.com/global/topics/us-china-trade-war-72804">“trade war”</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Inside-the-US-campaign-to-cut-China-out-of-the-tech-supply-chain">“tech war”</a> and even <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/17/avoiding-a-new-cold-war-between-the-us-and-china/">“new Cold War”</a> have often hit headlines on news and analytical pieces.</p>
<p>A shift in EU’s strategic thinking took place in recent years. In March 2019, the European Commission and EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf">indicated</a> that China is not only a “cooperative or negotiating partner”, but also an “economic competitor” and a “systematic rival”. The COVID-19 pandemic further made EU and its <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_special_report_covid-19_china_europe_2020.pdf">member states</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_new_china_consensus_how_europe_is_growing_wary_of_beijing/">realise</a> the ambition of Xi Jinping’s China on which they are over-dependent. </p>
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<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-lessons-from-chinas-public-diplomacy-in-the-eu-140890">Covid-19: Lessons from China's public diplomacy in the EU</a>
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<p>In October this year, the 27 EU heads of state or government officially <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/01/european-council-conclusions-on-external-relations-1-october-2020/">endorsed</a> the strategy on Beijing set out in March 2019.</p>
<p>The EU-US-China triangle, therefore, has been complicated by the explicit rivalry between the United States and China, the bumpy transatlantic relations, and the awakening EU, which found itself with an <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/International/josep-borrel-le-chef-de-la-diplomatie-europeenne-avec-la-chine-nous-avons-ete-un-peu-naifs-3965872">naïve</a> or even <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/europes-pushback-china-intention-policy-paper.pdf">inexact understanding of China</a> over the past decades.</p>
<h2>EU’s direction ahead: autonomous but closer to Washington</h2>
<p>In response to the dilemma, the EU’s Josep Borrell <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/80854/rougher-seas-eu%E2%80%99s-own-interests-and-values-should-be-our-compass_en">expressed</a> that the EU opted to be its own captain – navigated by the union’s values and interests – and move forward <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/how-will-the-eu-answer-chinas-turn-toward-xi-jinping-thought-on-diplomacy/">together</a> after the EU-China Strategic Dialogue in mid-June.</p>
<p>In September, some expressions from the <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/chine-les-elements-dun-front-uni-europeen">EU side</a> on EU-US-China trilateral relations were heard for the first time. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>China’s support for “multilateralism” is, in fact, selective and incoherent.</p></li>
<li><p>It was incorrect to assume that political openness in China would naturally follow economic openness.</p></li>
<li><p>The Chinese Communist Party actually controls the state as illustrated by the end of the “high degree of autonomy” in <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-la-fin-du-principe-un-pays-deux-systemes-139280">Hong Kong</a> and ongoing cases of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/asia/china-and-tibet">human right violations</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The last two coincided the <a href="https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/">discourses</a> often made by the United States under Trump in regard to Xi’s China.</p>
<p>The paramount element but one not so much discussed in the media or analyses in the past three months is that Josep Borrell <a href="https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2024.pdf">made it perspicuous</a>: even if not choosing sides, the EU is still closer with Washington than with Beijing. With this short but straight-forward sentence, it provides the light at the end of the tunnel. The EU is still clear in mind that the US albeit being an impolite partner or even a cavalier competitor under Trump for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/26/europe-is-thinking-harder-about-divorcing-america-macron-merkel-trump/">leaders</a> in Brussels and some national capitals, Washington is at least not a systematic rival that is promoting an alternative model of governance.</p>
<p>On the Chinese side, the “United Front” tactic has been in the blood of the ruling body of the state – the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/73/5/1597/216194">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP) – since <a href="https://protorp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/magicweaponsanne-mariebradyseptember162017.pdf">Mao’s era</a>. One main principle and spirit of such a tactic is to build an alliance – including working with the secondary enemy – to <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/sw-in-pdf/sw-flp-1965-v2.pdf">fight against the primary enemy</a>. The iconic <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/259678">example</a> was CCP’s collaboration with the Nationalist Party (<em>Kuomintang</em>) during the war of resistance against Japan before the CCP turned to fight against <em>Kuomintang</em> and later against the government of Taiwan hitherto.</p>
<p>Under Trump, it is not hard to see China’s endeavours to align itself with the EU by <a href="http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zywj/zywd/t1623330.htm">stating</a> the two sides’ “common” aspiration to multilateralism and creating the “win-win” fashion of comprehensive strategic partnership. Leaders of both sides of the Atlantic would <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1485323?journalCode=rwaq20">not want to</a> get trapped by Beijing’s tactic. The key is to look into Beijing’s real actions – particularly the honouring of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1648">commitments</a> – rather than the façade shown or the words provided.</p>
<h2>EU-US partnership remains critical for engaging Beijing</h2>
<p>A crucial distinction in interpretation has to be made when understanding EU’s aim to <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/80854/rougher-seas-eu%E2%80%99s-own-interests-and-values-should-be-our-compass_en">follow its own way</a> among the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. It may be understood that the EU decides not to align fully with the US in its approach of interacting with China – even under the incoming <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/03/biden-trump-europeans-united-states-election/">Biden administration</a>.</p>
<p>There are voices calling for EU-US <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-us-eu-renewed-transatlantic-cooperation/">“renewed cooperation”</a> with Washington’s leadership from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. At the same time, some other founding EU capitals set their sights on a more “European approach”. For example, French President Macron has recently <a href="https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2020/11/16/macron/">reiterated</a> the urge for the EU to pursue its sovereignty under the contemporary context of international political arena. Furthermore, <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/WP01_2020_wkr_FG7.pdf">Berlin</a> and <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/promoting-european-china-policy-france-and-germany-together?&extc=6dcBVz2">Paris</a> have also started their systematic and constructive exchanges on the making of an up-to-date EU-as-a-whole policy on China which stresses the need to work with the US while maintaining EU’s strategic autonomy.</p>
<p>Observers in Washington <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/06/biden-china-trump-election/">expect</a> that the Biden administration will continue the hard-line strategy toward Beijing but will accentuate and step up efforts to work with allies on issues related to Beijing. Biden’s appointment of Antony Blinken as the designate Secretary of State may be a good reason to expect such scenario. Blinken has <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Transcript%20--%20Dialogues%20on%20American%20Foreign%20Policy%20and%20World%20Affairs%20--%20A%20Conversation%20with%20Former%20Deputy%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20Blinken.pdf">already emphasized</a> the importance of the US taking Europe as a “vital partner” in facing global challenges and to team up with allies on linking shared values – in competition with Beijing’s – to the strategy toward China.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, two EU documents in progress were <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-extends-a-hand-or-two-to-joe-biden/">reported</a> to advocate reuniting the transatlantic alliance to cope with global challenges, including <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e8e5cf90-7448-459e-8b9f-6f34f03ab77a">Beijing</a>. Moreover, other <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-plans-two-summits-with-us-next-year-aiming-to-forge-new-alliance-in-face-of-china/">news sources</a> also covered the invitation by the EU side to President-elect Biden for 2 direct dialogues in the first six months of 2021.</p>
<p>Therefore, it does not mean that EU-US coordination and cooperation on issues concerning China will not take place or work out. In reality, Brussels and national capitals as well as Washington <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/mike-pompeo-on-nous-a-accuses-de-nous-retirer-du-monde-c-est-l-exact-contraire-20201116">need each other</a> more than ever before to face Xi’s China that is <a href="https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2024.pdf">“more assertive, expansionist and authoritarian”</a>.</p>
<h2>United in Specificity: partners with non-identical interests or resources</h2>
<p>Two shores of the Atlantic might not adopt fully identical approaches to interacting with Beijing because they possess <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/26/the-future-of-trans-atlantic-collaboration-on-china-what-the-eu-china-summit-showed/">non-homogeneous interests or resources</a>. Yet, it also means that the EU and the US own respective comparative advantages which, if coordination shall augment, can lead to the most vigorous effect on China.</p>
<p>Fair trade and reciprocal investment practices, geo-strategy in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, capabilities and standards regarding cutting-edge technologies, commitments to work together on the fight against coronavirus pandemic as well as the protection of Planet Earth, and strengthening the alliance of the democratic system of governance are all prime examples in need for transatlantic joint efforts when engaging Beijing.</p>
<p>No matter whether it is Trump in the White House in the past 4 years or the forthcoming Biden presidency, on issues related to Xi’s China, it remains critical for the EU and the US to be “united in specificity” as a force for good, together with other <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/83644/china-united-states-and-us_en">like-minded partners</a> in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Earl Wang ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The October launch of the “EU-US Dialogue on China” shows that the two shores of the Atlantic have come to recognise the importance of coordination and cooperation when facing up to Xi Jinping.Earl Wang, Doctoral Researcher in Political Science, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1480102020-10-16T13:35:20Z2020-10-16T13:35:20ZThe media have muted the voices of women during COVID-19: can the tide be turned?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363691/original/file-20201015-17-s0bqdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Journalists need to be sensitised to the need for gender representation in media content. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 has distressed societies to the core. Among the fault lines it has exposed is the fact that gender bias remains rampant in news coverage. </p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.iwmf.org/women-in-covid19-news/">special report</a> – The Missing Perspectives of Women in COVID-19 News – shows that too few women experts have been quoted on the pandemic in the media. The study looked at South Africa, Kenya, India, Nigeria, the US and the UK.</p>
<p>Put together by the <a href="https://www.iwmf.org/women-in-covid19-news/">International Women’s Media Foundation</a> and commissioned by the <a href="https://www.gatesfoundation.org/">Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation</a>, the report found that even when a woman’s voice is heard in the news on COVID-19, it is drowned out by the voices of men. And that when women are given a platform in stories about the pandemic, it is seldom as authoritative experts or as empowered individuals. Rather they appear as victims of the disease. </p>
<p>The findings are consistent with studies conducted before the pandemic. For example, one showed that women only <a href="http://whomakesthenews.org/gmmp/gmmp-reports/gmmp-2015-reports">made up 24%</a> of people featured in the media as experts on various subjects. </p>
<p>The media foundation report locates the problem within a broader social and economic frame in each of the countries. One metric it used was the fact that women were in the background of leadership. This was a reflection of the fact that there were <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures">too few women in political leadership</a> roles. Not even women leaders like Angela Merkel (Germany), Jacinta Adern (New Zealand) and Tsai Ing-wen (Taiwan), who have shown <a href="https://www.explain.co.za/2020/05/13/women-presidents-are-leading-like-bosses-during-covid-19/">great leadership</a> in handling the COVID-19 outbreak, prompted the news media to give more attention to women experts.</p>
<p>The report paints a bleak picture of how bad the situation is in each of the five countries. Among the developing countries, Nigeria and India fare the worst. Only 24% of the 25 most frequently featured protagonists in gender equality coverage in Nigeria are women, while it is 28% in India. On these measures South Africa has better women representation at 56%.</p>
<p>Muting of women’s voices when reporting the COVID-19 crisis, even though they <a href="https://interactive.unwomen.org/multimedia/explainer/covid19/en/index.html?gclid=CjwKCAjwq_D7BRADEiwAVMDdHmn2pzORTqWbf5HetUmZ74ML1eMJ0ylfXYxzHj-j9nPh5C3yeDHjdxoChFMQAvD_BwE">bear the brunt of the pandemic</a>, further marginalises women.</p>
<p>The findings are important because the media have an important role to play in achieving gender equality in societies. They can do this by creating gender-sensitive and gender-transformative content and <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/the-crucial-role-of-media-in-achieving-gender-equality/?gclid=CjwKCAjwq_D7BRADEiwAVMDdHgjDfyfX08cOp9-3fQDIvBOnGHvz8nAFQO7SGIR38rVAWhSHjoTCOhoCohkQAvD_BwE">breaking gender stereotypes</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sexism-is-rife-in-the-nigerian-kenyan-and-south-african-press-and-its-left-unchecked-143358">Sexism is rife in the Nigerian, Kenyan and South African press. And it's left unchecked</a>
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<p>The report makes a range of recommendations that can help rectify the situation. For example, newsrooms should ensure that women are featured prominently as sources of information. In addition, media organisations should factor in <a href="https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/how-a-culture-of-listening-strengthens-reporting-and-relationships/single-page/">hiring more women</a> to ensure a better gender balance in newsrooms. </p>
<p>The report also points to the role that universities that offer media courses can play. Curricular integration of a gender awareness module into journalism studies will result in journalist who are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2016.1270420">gender-responsive</a>. There is a lot of scope for improvement in South African institutions offering courses in journalism.</p>
<h2>Plugging the gaps</h2>
<p>In the age of abundant digital communications technologies and consequent <a href="https://www.lexico.com/definition/infodemic">infodemic</a> (excessive amounts of information about an issue, often unreliable), journalism schools are working to equip their graduates with relevant expertise.</p>
<p>This includes making sure they can design webpages, are well-versed in multiple forms of software and are alert to fake news and disinformation. </p>
<p>What is missing is a firm grounding in the need for gender representation in media content. </p>
<p>One possible answer would be to make gender representation a compulsory seminar course where trainees deliberate on issues of gender equality in news. </p>
<p>The module could also cover how to use non-discriminatory and gender-sensitive language. Also included should be ethical reporting on gender-sensitive issues, gender-based violence as well as gender portrayal in advertising. </p>
<p>The United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation’s <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/gender-sensitive-indicators-for-media-framework-of-indicators-to-gauge-gender-sensitivity-in-media-operations-and-content/">Gender-Sensitive Indicators for Media</a> – developed in collaboration with the International Federation of Journalists – should form part of journalism training. </p>
<p>Worthy of note, Rongo University in Kenya, recently <a href="https://en.unesco.org/news/varsity-reviews-journalism-communication-and-media-studies-curricular">reviewed</a> its Communications and Media studies curriculum by adopting the UNESCO model. This is worth emulating.</p>
<p>Educators should also ensure that practical sessions or project work reflect gender sensitivity. Gender responsiveness must also be integral to assessment criteria of courses.</p>
<p>Besides this, educational institutions can promote gender equality in media through research. Empirical evidence could highlight prejudices and insensitivity in journalistic practices.</p>
<p>Journalism educators can also collaborate with media organisations and provide refresher courses on gender-sensitive reporting.</p>
<h2>Tackling the problem</h2>
<p>Notable collaborations between academia and industry have resulted in databases like <a href="https://www.shesource.com/">SheSource</a> and <a href="https://www.womenalsoknowstuff.com/">WomenAlsoKnowStuff</a>. SheSource is a multi-field database with more than 1300 women experts available to journalists for free. </p>
<p>Women Also Know Stuff was initiated by political scientist <a href="https://sgpp.arizona.edu/people/samara-klar">Samara Klar</a> and is run by women academics in the US. They maintain an expanding database of women experts in political science sub-fields. The database contains about <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90401548/theres-a-gender-crisis-in-media-and-its-threatening-our-democracy">2000 women experts</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-personal-journey-sheds-light-on-why-there-are-so-few-black-women-in-science-91165">A personal journey sheds light on why there are so few black women in science</a>
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<p>In South Africa, the <a href="https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=ccom_papers#:%7E:text=Women%20in%20South%20Africa%20may,Africa%20than%20in%20other%20countries">under-representation</a> of women as news sources prompted communications strategist Kathy Magrobi to start <a href="https://quotethiswoman.org.za/">Quote This Woman+</a>, with the mentorship of Wits University’s Media Accelerator Project Journalism and Media Lab. </p>
<p>The non-profit initiative aims to create a comprehensive database of women experts and thought leaders in varied fields. The database is made available as a resource for journalists and journalism students through a website, newsletter, WhatsApp and social media.</p>
<p>At the early stages of the outbreak of COVID-19 in South Africa, Quote This Woman+ circulated the contact details of eight COVID-19 women experts. This had grown to 90, and had been used <a href="https://quotethiswoman.org.za/">900 times</a> by journalists and content producers worldwide, at the time of writing. </p>
<p>These efforts are laudable. But more still needs to be done to minimise the gender gap in news sourcing. Gender-sensitivity has been identified as vital to <a href="https://www.peterlang.com/view/title/23208">sustaining</a> the journalism profession itself. Publishing stories that reflect a diversity of constituencies helps ensure the media remain relevant to society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theodora Dame Adjin-Tettey receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The media’s muting of women’s voices when reporting the COVID-19 crisis keeps women on the margins.Theodora Dame Adjin-Tettey, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1448092020-08-28T10:37:58Z2020-08-28T10:37:58ZAre women leaders really doing better on coronavirus? The data backs it up<p>Over the last few months, there has been much discussion of leadership during the pandemic. What constitutes good leadership? Who has performed better and which countries have been worse? One pattern that emerged early on was that female leaders were seen to have handled the crisis remarkably well. Whether it has been New Zealand under Jacinda Ardern or Taiwan under the presidency of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/98503350-9f67-11ea-b65d-489c67b0d85d">Tsai Ing-Wen</a> or Germany under Angela Merkel, female-led countries have been held up as examples of how to manage a pandemic.</p>
<p>We decided to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3617953">investigate</a> whether this anecdotal perception stands up to more systematic scrutiny. To do this, we analysed how leaders around the world reacted to the early days of the pandemic to see whether differences in performance can be explained by differences in policy measures adopted by male and female leaders.</p>
<p>Two qualifications need to be kept in mind: first, we are only at the start of the pandemic and much could change in the next few months. Second, the quality of data currently available is limited. Inadequate testing means that case numbers are probably an underestimate. The way deaths are registered also varies across countries. </p>
<p>There are far fewer female-led countries in the world when compared to male-led. Just 10% in our sample of 194 countries have women as national leaders. Given the small number of female-led countries, the most appropriate way to consider their performance is to match them with “similar” male-led countries. We did this by matching countries with similar profiles for the <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/socioeconomic-determinants-covid-19-infections-and-mortality">socio-demographic and economic characteristics</a> that have been seen as important in the transmission of COVID-19. </p>
<p>In the first instance, we compared countries with similar GDP per capita, population, population density and population over 65 years. We then extended our matching variables to include three other characteristics: annual health expenditure per capita, number of tourists entering the country and gender equality. </p>
<p>These comparisons threw up clear differences between female-led and similar male-led countries during the first quarter of the pandemic (up to mid-May).</p>
<p>Hong Kong, which is led by a woman, recorded 1,056 cases and four deaths while Singapore, which has a similar economy and comparable demographic characteristics, but is led by a man, recorded 28,794 cases and 22 deaths in the same period. Similarly, Norway, led by a woman, had 8,257 cases and 233 deaths, while Ireland, led by a man, recorded 24,200 cases and 1,547 deaths. Taiwan recorded 440 cases and seven deaths while South Korea had 11,078 cases and 263 deaths. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Comparing cases across similar countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Constructed by authors from various sources Worldometer, UNDP, and the World Bank.</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Data showing covid cases in different countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355275/original/file-20200828-15-6qzm8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-led and M-led countries matched using GDP/pc, Pop, Pop Density and Pop over 65.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Constructed by authors from various sources Worldometer, UNDP, and the World Bank.</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Countries led by women have performed better, especially in terms of deaths and this is true whether we consider the nearest comparable nation, the nearest two, three or even five. Belgium is an outlier, having appeared to perform badly on cases and deaths while led by a woman. But despite its inclusion, the overall results regarding women-led countries stands.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355276/original/file-20200828-22-1nqwwdz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Comparing Covid deaths across similar nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Constructed by authors from various sources Worldometer, UNDP, and the World Bank.</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, Finland was better than Sweden, Austria and France in terms of both cases and deaths. Germany was better than France and the UK. Bangladesh fared better than the Phillippines and Pakistan in terms of deaths. </p>
<h2>Taking risks</h2>
<p>Analysing what might cause this differential performance, we find that the female-led countries locked down significantly earlier than the male-led countries. Female-led countries like New Zealand and Germany locked down much more quickly and decisively than male-led ones like the UK. On average, they had 22 deaths fewer at lockdown when compared to their male counterparts. </p>
<p>We considered whether these results might imply that women leaders are more risk averse. <a href="https://bit.ly/2FT98VJ">Literature on</a> attitudes to risk and uncertainty suggests that women – even those in leadership roles – appear to be more averse to risk <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268111001521">than men</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, in the current crisis, several incidents of risky behaviour by male leaders have been reported. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro dismissed COVID-19 as <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3594342">“a little flu or a bit of a cold”</a> and UK prime minister Boris Johnson said he “shook hands with everybody” on a hospital visit. Both men subsequently contracted the virus.</p>
<p>However, this is a simplistic explanation. While women leaders were risk averse with regard to lives, they have clearly been prepared to take significant and early risks with their economies by locking down early. So women leaders seem to have been significantly more risk averse in the domain of human life, but more risk taking in the domain of the economy.</p>
<p>We find some support for this idea in studies that examine risk-taking behaviour when lotteries are framed as losses. Men are found to be more risk averse than women when lotteries are framed as <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/aer.89.2.381">financial losses rather than gains</a>. It could well be that the relatively late lockdown decisions by male leaders may reflect male risk aversion to anticipated losses from locking down the economy.</p>
<h2>Leadership style</h2>
<p>Another explanation of gender differences in response to the pandemic is to be found in the leadership styles of men and women. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27403973_Gender_and_Leadership_Style_A_Meta-Analysis">Studies suggest</a> that men are likely to lead in a “task-oriented” style and women in an “interpersonally-oriented” manner. Women therefore tend to adopt a more democratic and participative style and tend to have better communications skills. </p>
<p>This has been in evidence during this crisis in the decisive and clear communication styles adopted by several female leaders, whether it be Norway’s prime minister Erna Solberg <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/51962307">speaking directly to children</a> or Ardern checking in with her citizens through <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/coronavirus/122445029/coronavirus-prime-minister-jacinda-arderns-facebook-live-use-gets-thumbs-up-in-british-study">Facebook lives</a>.</p>
<p>Our findings show that COVID-outcomes in the early stages of the pandemic were systematically and significantly better in countries led by women. This, to some extent, may be explained by the proactive policy responses they adopted. Even accounting for institutional context and other controls, being female-led has provided countries with an advantage in the current crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Supriya Garikipati received funding from an internal UoL grant to carry out this work. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Uma S Kambhampati is a member of the Labour Party. </span></em></p>Fewer cases, fewer deaths and earlier lockdowns were in evidence across nations with female figureheads.Supriya Garikipati, Associate Professor of Development Economics, University of LiverpoolUma S Kambhampati, Professor of Economics; Head of School, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1414142020-06-29T13:50:20Z2020-06-29T13:50:20ZWomen leaders and coronavirus: look beyond stereotypes to find the secret to their success<p>Jacinda Ardern of New Zealand, Tsai Ing-Wen of Taiwan and Angela Merkel of Germany <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/avivahwittenbergcox/2020/04/13/what-do-countries-with-the-best-coronavirus-reponses-have-in-common-women-leaders/#2f916d443dec">have all been singled out</a> for the way they have handled the coronavirus pandemic. They’ve been praised for demonstrating care, empathy and a collaborative approach. These skills – stereotypically described as “feminine” – have enabled them to listen to scientific expertise, work with local authorities and communicate effectively with the public. It has made them come across as transparent and accountable at a time of mass confusion. </p>
<p>In stark contrast, male leaders in some of the worst performing countries – the UK, the US and Brazil – have adopted a leadership style of belligerent rhetoric. They’ve taken guidance from entourages of confidantes, often instead of experts. Their inconsistent, unclear communications have been compared to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?next_url=https%253a%252f%252fwww.washingtonpost.com%252foutlook%252f2020%252f05%252f27%252fboris-johnson-dominic-cummings%252f">“gaslighting”</a>. Their tendency to follow this path perhaps isn’t surprising. After all, the “hyper-masculine” style – a maverick leader who establishes authoritative power by aggressively rejecting “feminine” traits like collaboration, empathy and respect for due process – proved a successful electoral strategy for these leaders.</p>
<p>There are many men of course who are not like that – just as there are women who don’t consider themselves particularly empathetic or collaborative. So, while it is wonderful to see women leaders and feminine leadership being praised so widely during the pandemic, emphasising the stereotypical characteristics of the leaders themselves may reinforce the gendered thinking that helps put macho populist leaders in power.</p>
<h2>Breaking the mould</h2>
<p>To understand the success of these women leaders in handling COVID-19, the focus should be on the political culture and institutions which allowed women who adopt a “feminine” approach to leadership to come to power. More representative systems create styles of leadership which inherently involve compromise and collaboration rather than aggression and domination. This can create a political culture in which femininity and power are not in contradiction.</p>
<p>We can see the perpetuation of stereotypes in the way that women leaders have been praised for their management of the COVID-19 pandemic. But, beyond that, we can also see how these women are breaking the mould.</p>
<p>Ardern is only the second premier in the world to <a href="https://qz.com/1311054/new-zealand-pm-jacinda-ardern-is-the-first-leader-to-give-birth-in-office-in-almost-30-years/">give birth while in office</a>. She has placed empathy and care at the centre of her personal style of authority. This, in itself, is a breakthrough, but it is notable that when she exhibits the traits of strength, decisiveness and military command, which have also been prominent in her management of the crisis, these too are seen through a maternal lens. One religious leader accused her of implementing a <a href="https://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/news/national/brian-tamaki-to-defy-nanny-state-government-decision-on-churches-says-he-will-hold-sunday-service/">“nanny state”, being an “overly controlling parent”</a> and even BBC Newsnight described her as “putting the entire nation on the naughty step”.</p>
<p>Merkel is not a mother herself, but she is known in Germany as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-election-angela-merkel-journey-from-madchen-to-mutti/"><em>“mutti”</em> – the “mummy” of the nation</a>. Her route to power is a study in the discourses which frame the way women in politics are seen. Her mentor Helmut Kohl famously nicknamed her his “<em>Mädchen</em>” – his girl – and she demonstrates her economic credentials by evoking the thrifty <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/17/angela-merkel-austerity-swabian-housewives">“<em>schwäbische hausfrau</em>”</a> (Swabian housewife). It has come to the fore in this pandemic, however, that she also has a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/04/angela-merkel-germany-coronavirus-pandemic/610225/">PhD in quantum chemistry</a>.</p>
<p>Tsai, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/tsai-ing-wen-former-professor-on-course-to-be-most-powerful-woman-in-chinese-speaking-world">who also has a PhD</a>, has been praised for her swift action to protect citizens’ health during the pandemic. She has also sent humanitarian aid to other countries, including the US. However, while similar action by Ardern was attributed to her compassion, Tsai’s response is more consistent with her strong assertion of Taiwanese independence. There were fears that if the virus spread, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/16/taiwan-china-fear-coronavirus-success/">China would be able to take geopolitical advantage</a>.</p>
<h2>Checks and balances produce great leaders</h2>
<p>These women are good leaders because they are highly skilled, qualified and experienced. Crucially, though, they have come through political systems in which their kind of skills can be valued, which are explicitly designed to keep strong-man populist leaders at bay. New Zealand, Taiwan and Germany all have multiple institutionalised checks and balances on executive power. They have strong local institutions of governance which favour local participation in politics, rather than a top-down approach.</p>
<p>These nations also have electoral and party-political systems which adopt elements of proportional representation. Such systems frequently give rise to coalition governments and hence necessitate collaborative leadership. To counter perception-biases in voter choice, electoral systems in these countries use party lists, where votes are cast for a party and positions are allocated proportionately to listed individuals. This is how Tsai, Merkel and Ardern were all first elected.</p>
<p>Of course, these systems are not perfect, but the coronavirus pandemic has highlighted both the dangers of systems that promote mavericks and the need for strong institutions to check their whims. </p>
<p>The pandemic has also placed in sharp relief the need to <a href="https://wbg.org.uk/analysis/reports/crises-collide-women-and-covid-19/">invest in care and social infrastructure</a> - “feminine” areas of the economy that have been overlooked for too long. The experience of women leaders who have reinvented both political leadership and femininity and the institutional contexts which have allowed them to get to the top, can help reimagine inclusive political processes in the wake of the crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141414/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Maclean has received funding from the Developmental Leadership Program, the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy.</span></em></p>Germany, New Zealand and Taiwan share a common trait beyond having women in the top job.Kate Maclean, Professor of International Development, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1402832020-06-12T11:01:24Z2020-06-12T11:01:24ZPlaying hardball with China works – the west is right to move to a ‘constrainment’ strategy<p>Global attitudes towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-risks-imperial-overstretch-with-post-pandemic-aggression">hardening</a>. In 2019, the European Union declared the PRC a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-slams-china-as-systemic-rival-as-trade-tension-rises/">“systemic rival”</a> amid rising trade tensions. </p>
<p>In May 2020, the White House published <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf">a paper</a> that described the US’s competitive approach to the PRC based on “principled realism”. One of the report’s key passages stated that the US government will: “Respond in kind to Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof.” </p>
<p>And on June 5, the <a href="https://time.com/5848808/inter-parliamentary-alliance-china/">Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)</a> was formed. Lawmakers from 11 countries, including the US, UK, Australia, Japan and Canada are <a href="https://www.ipac.global">now working</a> “towards reform on how democratic countries approach China”. They seek to safeguard the rules-based international order, uphold human rights, promote trade fairness, strengthen security and protect national integrity. </p>
<p>All of these developments suggest that western China policy is rapidly changing. What remains unclear, however, is what exact form it will take. </p>
<p>In the past, western policy towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was informed by <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/447443/summary">two opposing camps</a>. One group called for engagement with China, typified by German chancellor Angela Merkel. She has argued for <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/merkel-says-eu-has-strategic-interest-in-working-with-china">continued dialogue and cooperation</a>, regardless of President Xi Jinping’s increasingly totalitarian approach to governance. </p>
<p>The other group demanded China containment. The former Trump adviser Steve Bannon, for example, has called for the <a href="https://www.mediaite.com/politics/steve-bannon-compares-china-to-nazi-regime-on-fox-calls-for-people-to-overthrow-chinese-communist-party/">overthrow of the CCP</a>. </p>
<p>But foreign and security policy regarding China should not be reduced to such overly binary and reductionist choices.</p>
<h2>Constrainment</h2>
<p>In the mid-1990s, the renowned international relations expert Gerald Segal suggested an alternative. He called it “<a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/447425">constrainment</a>”. Segal described this as a policy aimed at constraining the CCP, which intended to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tell China that the outside world has interests that will be defended by means of incentives for good behaviour, deterrence of bad behaviour, and punishment when deterrence fails. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Segal’s sound advice wasn’t heeded. Instead, western politicians and strategists naively believed in modernisation theory. By becoming economically more prosperous, they thought, mainland China’s society <a href="https://www.gppi.net/2018/03/15/china-is-the-most-difficult-strategic-challenge-the-west-has-faced-to-date">would also become more open</a>. The CCP’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a8366500-2271-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b">hard authoritarian turn under President Xi Jinping</a> has revealed how unrealistic this expectation was. </p>
<p>At first sight, constraining authoritarian excesses of the CCP may appear rather difficult. It certainly requires western politicians to accept considerable political risks. Roland Paris, former foreign policy adviser to the prime minister of Canada, has rightly <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/disunited-democracies-cannot-face-challenge-china">pointed out</a> that while maintaining cooperation with Beijing in areas of mutual interest and “pushing back” at the same time is a “tricky policy to manage”, there is “no other choice”. </p>
<p>As the following examples show, constrainment of the CCP is not merely a theoretical possibility. The US and UK seem to have belatedly caught up with Segal’s proposed foreign policy path. </p>
<h2>Playing hardball</h2>
<p>When Beijing <a href="https://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/China-blocks-US-airlines-from-resuming-flights">prohibited American airlines to fly to China</a>, the Trump administration <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/u-s-suspends-chinese-airline-flights-to-u-s-as-relations-fray">responded in kind</a>: Chinese airlines would no longer be able to fly to the US. Playing hardball worked and the CCP immediately <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/us-scraps-plan-to-ban-chinese-airlines-after-beijing-permits-foreign-carriers.html">reversed its initial decision</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pressure works.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">adike via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The position of the British government on Hong Kong is another case of constrainment in action. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab have long <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/05/22/why-is-the-uk-so-silent-as-beijing-trashes-the-hong-kong-handover-agreement/">kept mum</a> on the suppression of Hong Kong’s democracy movement. Yet once China’s rubber-stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/28/china-vote-npc-national-security-laws-hong-kong-us-protest">passed the controversial National Security Law for Hong Kong</a>, the British government took decisive action. </p>
<p>Johnson made a generous <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868859749/u-k-willing-to-admit-nearly-3-million-from-hong-kong-if-china-adopts-security-la">offer for a possible 3 million Hongkongers to relocate to the UK</a> should the controversial law come into effect in Hong Kong. Raab also made clear that the government <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/uk-prepared-to-sacrifice-free-trade-deal-with-china-to-protect-people-of-hong-kong-raab-says-11999873">would not sacrifice Hong Kong</a> for a possible trade deal with China. </p>
<p>This UK government policy shift is risky, for two reasons: it has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/china-accuses-uk-of-gross-interference-over-hong-kong-citizenship-offer">incurred the wrath of the CCP</a>, and mass migration from Hong Kong may not be supported by British voters. But a recent public opinion survey indicated that the British public <a href="https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/widespread-support-for-welcoming-hong-kong-bnos-even-as-immigration-attitudes-remain-hardened/">stood behind Johnson’s decision</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-does-british-offer-of-citizenship-to-hongkongers-violate-thatchers-deal-with-china-139413">Hong Kong: does British offer of citizenship to Hongkongers violate Thatcher's deal with China?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>United front</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus209224653/Totalitarismus-Das-eigentliche-Problem-ist-Merkels-China-Politik.html">case of Germany</a> can serve as a warning of what happens when western liberal democracies remain stuck in an outdated China engagement paradigm. Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas, <a href="https://foref-europe.org/blog/2020/06/07/germany-heiko-maas-german-foreign-minister-embarrasses-germany-by-soft-pedaling-on-hongkong-joshua-wong/">claimed</a> in early June that Germany is too small a country to face up to a new superpower China. Maas also appeared sceptical about the chances of developing a new European China strategy. </p>
<p>The German government remains <a href="https://www.rusi.org/commentary/germanys-china-policy-change-through-trade-has-failed">oblivious to its own considerable power and leverage</a> over the CCP. And yet in its search for a more assertive China policy, the EU is being <a href="https://www.change.org/p/politicians-europe-can-no-longer-afford-germany-s-failed-china-policy-of-change-through-trade">held back by Germany</a>. It is not without irony that the UK outside the EU could become the European country which will take the lead on taking a tougher stance against China. </p>
<p>For China’s constrainment to work, like-minded countries have to develop a liberal-democratic united front. This means overcoming self-limiting debates about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/16/westlessness-is-the-west-really-in-a-state-of-peril">“westlessness”</a> and the decline of the west. Without such an alliance among liberal democracies, the CCP will continue to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3084684/china-trying-divide-and-rule-europe-eu-foreign-policy-chief">divide and rule</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreas Fulda has previously received funding from the European Union, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Geneva Global and the Ford Foundation.</span></em></p>Why a new Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China of MPs from 11 countries is a step in the right direction.Andreas Fulda, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1400132020-06-07T08:37:19Z2020-06-07T08:37:19ZWhat sets good and bad leaders apart in the coronavirus era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339832/original/file-20200604-67383-1y06bk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa and German chancellor Angela Merkel have shown good leadership in the fight against COVID-19. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Crises bring out the best and worst of politicians and populations. Folly, fear and fortitude are on display everywhere. In the main, democracies have fared better than non-democracies in handling the coronavirus <a href="https://theconversation.com/unravelling-why-some-democracies-but-not-all-are-better-at-fighting-pandemics-136267">pandemic</a>.</p>
<p>But the record is very varied indeed. What explains this? What can be done about it?</p>
<p>Among democratic regimes, at the one extreme we have seen denialism, the denigration of scientific advice and an obsession with putting the economy before lives. This is especially evident in the United States and Brazil. At the other we have witnessed the organised, prudent, empathetic responses of countries such as South Korea, New Zealand, and Finland. South African president <a href="https://theconversation.com/all-world-leaders-face-mega-covid-19-crises-how-ramaphosa-is-stacking-up-134682">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> initially did very well, but some subsequent decisions might damage his good record.</p>
<p>These two extremes of leadership style were evident even before COVID-19.</p>
<p>The USA and Brazilian responses to the pandemic, led by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/12/trump-is-making-america-an-obstacle-in-the-global-fight-against-covid-19">President Donald Trump</a> and President <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-jair-bolsonaros-strategy-of-chaos-hinders-coronavirus-response-136590">Jair Bolsonaro</a>, have been characterised by secretive, narcissistic, paranoid, hubristic and impulsive decision-making. These actions have endangered the lives and livelihoods of their residents, over which they have a duty of <a href="https://criticalsouth.blog/2019/04/10/what-is-an-ethics-of-care-and-why-is-it-important/">care</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/">data</a> bears this out well. Despite having arrived on their shores relatively late, the pandemic has ripped through their populations, with no sign of abating. They lead in infections and deaths. </p>
<p>At the other extreme, a common denominator has been a firm attempt by political leaders to “follow the science” and control the spread of the virus and fake news from the outset. A combination of transparency, prudence, empathy, timing and courage has produced excellent <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/">results</a> in South Korea, New Zealand and Finland.</p>
<p>South Africa’s response has been <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/world-health-organisation-south-africa-praise-covid-19-2020/">lauded</a>, though it is beginning to attract criticism for <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-has-moved-centre-stage-in-lockdown-what-it-is-and-why-it-matters-139045">heavy-handed policing</a> and some <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2020/184.pdf">inexplicable decisions</a>.</p>
<h2>Democracy and leadership</h2>
<p>What becomes clear is that in these fast-moving and life-defining times in democracies a great deal depends on the quality of the elected leadership. Democracies that happen to have leaders who simultaneously engage empathetically with those they govern and are informed by good science are best able to deal with the crisis. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pasha-60-the-challenges-facing-african-countries-testing-for-covid-19-135342">Pasha 60: The challenges facing African countries testing for COVID-19</a>
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<p>They gather clear-eyed knowledge of their countries’ particular circumstances, and display courage and timing in making critical and sometimes unpopular decisions. They are able to overcome many of the challenges that the pandemic throws up. </p>
<p>Democracy helps, but it is not the deciding factor. What matters most is what kind of leader is in place, where his or her priorities lie: the well-being of the populace or the interests of a small group.</p>
<p>Four of the top five performing countries in terms of lives saved and control of the spread of the virus have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/world/coronavirus-women-leaders.html">women leaders</a>: New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2020/may/19/new-zealand-pm-jacinda-arderns-popularity-shoots-up-over-covid-19-crisis-management-2145372.html">Jacinda Ardern</a>, <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/339076/finland-authorities-ease-covid-19-restrictions-as-of-june-1-update-6">Finland’s Sanna Marin</a>, Germany’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-latest-angela-merkel-says-germany-has-passed-covid-19-test-so-far/a-53625312">Angela Merkel</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3085041/why-tsai-ing-wens-success-containing-taiwans-coronavirus-outbreak">Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen</a>. These women display empathy and firm focus on the well-being of their populations.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339834/original/file-20200604-67399-u1mzeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Brazilian and American presidents, Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump, mishandled the COVID-19 crisis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span>
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<p>Politicians judge best when they listen to their populations and learn from the science. That is why democracy is uniquely placed to engender good judgements, as the Indian economist <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1998/sen/biographical/">Amartya Sen</a> argued with regard to <a href="https://www.prismaweb.org/nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Poverty-and-famines%E2%94%82Amartya-Sen%E2%94%821981.pdf">famines</a>, and I have argued <a href="https://criticalsouth.blog/2019/04/03/what-is-the-point-of-political-theory/">elsewhere</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, it would be mistaken to think that democracy guarantees good judgement. If the purveyors of conspiracy theories and exemplars of prejudice are also your democratic leaders, democracy itself cannot resolve things. It only gives citizens the power to remove those leaders at the next election.</p>
<h2>Bread, circuses and crises</h2>
<p>In the current crisis, Ramaphosa has done a much better job than Trump and Bolsonaro.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa got off to a great start. He acted firmly, quickly, with clear justification and impressive results. South Africans have just emerged from one of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-extension-coronavirus-covid-19-lockdown-end-april-9-apr-2020-0000">most severe lockdowns</a> imposed anywhere in the world. This kept the infection rate nearly as low as that of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/south-korea/">South Korea</a>, though it is now shooting up.</p>
<p>During this period, however, there have been at least two problematic decisions that undermine public trust and thus how people may behave. </p>
<p>The first is the decision to ban the sale of tobacco. Even if we could distinguish sharply between basic needs and other needs – something I <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Political-Philosophy-Needs-Lawrence-Hamilton/dp/0521034043">dispute</a> – the idea that addiction to smoking falls into the latter category, and that, along with the fact that COVID-19 is a respiratory disease, justifies the ban, is misguided. For an addict, the need for a cigarette <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5800589/">may often trump even the need for vital nutrition</a>. </p>
<p>The second is the decision to allow <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-05-26-places-of-worship-may-reopen-ramaphosa/">religious gatherings</a> to resume under <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/disaster-management-act-regulations-alert-level-3-during-coronavirus-covid-19-lockdown-28">lockdown level 3</a>. Having spent so long restricting gatherings, to now allow larger gatherings seems like folly. It is well known – cases abound from <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-03-20-entire-church-congregation-being-traced-in-response-to-coronavirus-in-free-state/">South Africa</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51701039">South Korea</a> – that, like funerals, large religious gatherings are super-spreading events.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-lockdown-a-great-start-but-then-a-misreading-of-how-society-works-139789">South Africa's lockdown: a great start, but then a misreading of how society works</a>
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<p>Along with the ban on tobacco products and the incorrect assumption that the state could directly meet the basic nutritional needs of the population via the delivery of <a href="https://theconversation.com/food-aid-parcels-in-south-africa-could-do-with-a-better-nutritional-balance-136417">food parcels</a>, the response to the religious lobby is reminiscent of Juvenal’s comment under imperial Rome some two thousand years ago that all the people really want is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4343001?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">“bread and circuses”</a>. This is not what people want or need. They require the power to express their actual needs and interests and the democratic means to ensure that government responds to these.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s good leadership has been undermined by a <a href="https://criticalsouth.blog/2020/06/04/south-africa-in-lockdown-covid-19-information-and-its-inconsistencies/">paternalistic attitude</a> to people’s needs and seeming deference to South Africa’s powerful religious lobby.</p>
<h2>Lessons to be learnt</h2>
<p>Two things can be learnt from the varied responses to the coronavirus crisis.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339837/original/file-20200604-67364-1x0ubql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern successfully saw her country through the COVOD-19 crisis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span>
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<p>First, we must use it to find a roadmap for how we can properly make the health and well-being of a state’s population the raison d’être of its government. The first thing to identify is that health is not the <a href="https://policynetwork.org/opinions/blogs/follow-the-science/">“absence of disease”</a> but the status we each have when our ever-changing needs are optimally satisfied. For this, we need a politics that allows us to express and assess our needs, and determine who is best placed to represent us in responding to these needs, all in non-dominating <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Freedom-Power-Political-Representation-Contemporary/dp/1107062969">conditions</a>.</p>
<p>Second, given that it is no accident that those leaders who have responded worst to this crisis have also been the main sources of countless conspiracy theories and misinformation, we must learn to keep oligarchs away from political power. Under representative democracy, bar outright revolution, we do not have the power to affect the everyday decisions of our representatives, but we can keep those with exclusive social and economic interests out of positions of political power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lawrence Hamilton receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the British Academy. </span></em></p>It is no accident that those leaders who have responded worst to this crisis have also been the main sources of countless conspiracy theories and misinformation.Lawrence Hamilton, SARChI/Newton Research Professor in Political Theory, Wits and Cambridge, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1374272020-05-22T10:32:36Z2020-05-22T10:32:36ZHow politicians talk about coronavirus in Germany, where war metaphors are avoided<p>Many political leaders around the world have reached for the imagery of conflict to describe the coronavirus pandemic. In France, President Emmanuel Macron said his nation was at war with an invisible enemy. Over in the US, President Donald Trump positively revels in the idea of being a “wartime president”. In the UK, Prime Minister Johnson has spoken of the virus as an “enemy” and even said that “we must act like any wartime government” to protect the economy. </p>
<p>But in Germany this kind of language is not circulating. The virus is not an “enemy”, and the process of containing it is not a war. Perhaps there’s a tendency among German politicians to avoid war metaphors for historical reasons. There may be a feeling that it does not go down well nationally and internationally if German political leaders speak about war, even metaphorically. </p>
<p>This is particularly the case because the far-right AfD party has been trying to expand the limits of what is acceptable in Germany. One of its leaders recently lamented Germany’s loss of territory after the second world war – a position that has been condemned by many, including the <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afd-gauland-kritik-101.html">Central Council of Jews in Germany</a>.</p>
<p>So German chancellor Angela Merkel does not use war imagery when talking about the coronavirus. In fact, she hardly uses any metaphors at all. Her first major public interaction during the crisis was a televised address on March 18. Merkel’s words to describe the crisis were simple and straightforward. She spoke of “this situation”, “a historical task”, and a “great challenge” ahead.</p>
<p>When Merkel alluded to the past, it was to express a desire not to return to it. She referred to her own history growing up in the GDR when emphasising that the decision to curtail democratic freedoms had not been taken lightly.</p>
<p>In a speech to the German parliament on April 23, Merkel again used few metaphors. She called the current situation a “real test”, “serious times”, a “dramatic crisis”, a “gigantic challenge”. The only figurative expressions she used were “thin ice” and “long-distance run”. These metaphors evoke challenge, but not combat.</p>
<p>It’s true that drastic words and passionate statements were never Merkel’s style, but other German politicians have taken a similar approach. Among the 16 regional leaders, two have been especially prominent in the debate about the coronavirus: Bavarian leader Markus Söder and Armin Laschet, of North Rhine-Westphalia.</p>
<p>Like the chancellor, Söder mostly uses straightforward vocabulary to describe the virus: it’s “an exponential development”, a “crisis”, and a “task”. </p>
<p>Laschet, too, has been been vocal in the debates about the coronavirus, possibly because he aspires to be Merkel’s successor as chancellor and may therefore feel the need to make his mark. He used rather more dramatic language but still stops short of going to war. He speaks of an “adversary” (but not an “enemy”) and has warned that people have to make sacrifices. By the end of April, he also had gone back to more neutral expressions: the “situation”, the “event”.</p>
<p>While speeches by German politicians have mostly been easy to follow and unambiguous, there has been some confusion, too. Different states across the country’s federal structure decided on different rules at the beginning of the lockdown. For example, when Lower Saxony closed DIY stores in March, there was an exodus of people to neighbouring states where they were still open, causing Lower Saxony to backtrack. </p>
<h2>Low death rate</h2>
<p>Overall it looks like Germany has done comparatively well so far. The German government imposed containment measures on March 17, at a fairly early stage in the pandemic. At the time of writing, there were 179,000 cases and 8,300 deaths in Germany, which is far fewer than in many other European countries. </p>
<p>The response from the German public has been mostly positive. Approval ratings for Merkel and her party, the centre-right CDU, <a href="https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1185/umfrage/sonntagsfrage-zur-bundestagswahl-zdf-politbarometer/">went up in recent weeks</a>.</p>
<p>However, a small but vocal minority of protesters has been demanding an end to the measures. Paradoxically, they are gaining traction at the moment, now that the lockdown has been relaxed, and although the measures in Germany were fairly mild compared to Spain, Italy, or France.</p>
<p>The protesters are a rather strange alliance – some are worried about their democratic rights or about the economy, but others are members of the extreme right, conspiracy theorists, anti-vaxxers, and anti-Semites. The financial crisis of 2008 had in all probability contributed to the rise of the AfD. Now, with another massive economic slump on the horizon, the threat of right-wing extremism is likely to increase.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137427/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dagmar Paulus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For Germans, this is not a battle, it’s a ‘long distance run’.Dagmar Paulus, Senior Teaching Fellow in German Studies, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.