tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/australia-indonesia-18684/articlesAustralia-Indonesia – The Conversation2023-10-30T19:10:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163482023-10-30T19:10:35Z2023-10-30T19:10:35ZThe number of Australian students learning Indonesian keeps dropping. How do we fix this worrying decline?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556495/original/file-20231030-29-q4pcps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C40%2C6679%2C4426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/woman-using-a-laptop-with-headphones-7283630/">Karolina Grabowska/Pexels </a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s Year 12 students are in the middle of making important decisions about their futures. For many, this will involve choosing a university course and the subjects within that. </p>
<p>But if trends are anything to go by, Indonesia won’t figure in these decisions at all, despite its <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/suspicious-minds-will-closer-australia-indonesia-engagement-yield-greater-trust">enormous</a> economic, strategic and political importance to Australia. </p>
<p>Many politicians have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/radionational-breakfast/3856606">spruiked</a> the importance of learning Indonesian. But to borrow the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/costello-all-tip-no-iceberg-20070306-ge4cy8.html">words</a> of former Prime Minister Paul Keating, this is “all tip and no iceberg”. </p>
<p>In fact, you’d have to go back <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-advanced-australia-faring-asian-century">to the Keating era</a> to find a concerted government effort to understand Asia. </p>
<p>As Indonesia researchers, many of us got our start in that era. But since then, we’ve watched Australia’s Indonesia literacy – our knowledge of our neighbours’ language and culture – slowly die of neglect. </p>
<p>So, what’s happening? What does Australia get wrong? And is there anything we can do about it? </p>
<h2>Australia’s declining Indonesia literacy</h2>
<p>This semester, Sharyn had fewer than ten students in her introductory Indonesian course at Monash University. This course is for students without any prior knowledge on Indonesian. The intermediate Indonesian class - which includes former Year 12 students entering university - had 13 students. </p>
<p>This low number of enrolments isn’t a blip, it is part of a national trend.</p>
<p>In 1992, there were 22 Australian universities teaching Indonesian. By 2022, this number <a href="https://asiasociety.org/australia/indonesia-and-great-unrealised-opportunity-deep-partnership">was down to 12</a>. </p>
<p>There has also been a huge drop in students studying Indonesian to the end of high school. The number of Victorian high school students taking Indonesian in Year 12 has <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/202303519_LP-Deck-2022_VIC_FULL-DECK.pdf">fallen</a> from 1,061 in 2002 to 387 in 2022. In New South Wales the figure <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/20230111_LP-Deck-2023_NSW_FULL-DECK.pdf">slumped</a> from 306 to 90 over the same period. </p>
<p>There are some bright spots. Since 2014, young Australians have travelled to Indonesia under the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/new-colombo-plan">New Colombo Plan</a>. For example, this year, about 400 first-year Monash students will go to Indonesia for two weeks. However most of the trip will take place in English. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/only-0-34-of-year-12s-study-indonesian-here-are-3-steps-we-can-take-towards-knowing-our-neighbour-better-184638">Only 0.34% of year 12s study Indonesian. Here are 3 steps we can take towards knowing our neighbour better</a>
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<h2>What Australia gets wrong about language</h2>
<p>A key part of the problem is previous Australian and Indonesian government campaigns to encourage Australians to learn Indonesian have missed the mark. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="https://www.melbourneasiareview.edu.au/invigorating-indonesian-studies-in-australia-through-collaborative-online-education-practices/">has found</a> campaigns that focus on the <a href="https://aiya.org.au/2014/11/19/monolingual-australia-and-the-language-of-justification/">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-indonesia-towards-a-durable-partnership/">strategic importance</a> of Indonesia rarely resonate with students. </p>
<p>This is because these narratives are too esoteric and future-based for teenagers, who are often more swayed by youth and popular culture. For example, since 1998 more than 1,000 students per year <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/202303519_LP-Deck-2022_VIC_FULL-DECK.pdf">have studied</a> Japanese in Victorian high schools, in part driven by wider interest in Japanese pop culture.</p>
<h2>A monolingual mindset</h2>
<p>We also know Australia has a “<a href="https://www.languageonthemove.com/monolingual-mindset-in-the-lucky-country/">monolingual mindest</a>”. There is an attitude Australians don’t need to learn other languages. Former Prime Minister John Howard typifies this attitude, <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/english-the-lingua-franca-of-asia-says-howard-20201119-p56g3l">arguing</a> English is the lingua franca – or common language – in Asia. </p>
<p>According to the 2018 <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/pisa_19963777">PISA results</a> (which compare 15-year-olds’ academic progress across countries), Australia <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/language-learning-and-contact-with-people-from-other-countries_a6bff0fa-en">ranked</a> second to last among OECD countries for foreign language learning. </p>
<p>The study also found 64% of Australian 15-year-olds said learning a foreign language was not part of their lives, compared to an overall OECD average of 12%. </p>
<h2>Meanwhile, China is learning Indonesian</h2>
<p>But while Australia’s Indonesian literacy is declining, China’s Indonesian literacy is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3191922/can-chinese-students-learning-indonesian-help-bridge-cultural-gap">on the rise</a>. In China, there are now <a href="https://www.bjreview.com/Lifestyle/202304/t20230424_800329300.html">19 universities</a> teaching Indonesian.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s Chinese literacy is also <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/08/23/once-banned-mandarin-learning-in-indonesia-on-the-rise-amid-improving-ties-with-china/">on the rise</a>. There is significant <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/08/23/once-banned-mandarin-learning-in-indonesia-on-the-rise-amid-improving-ties-with-china/">anecdotal evidence</a> Indonesians are starting to learn (once-banned) Mandarin as the Indonesian government seeks to improve ties with China. </p>
<p>At the same time, Indonesia has begun pushing <a href="https://badanbahasa.kemdikbud.go.id/berita-detail/3986/deklarasi-bahasa-indonesia-mendunia"><em>menduniakan bahasa Indonesia</em></a> or “to elevate Indonesian to a global status”. This means some Indonesians want to have their language widely spoken and understood globally, especially <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-reject-malaysia-proposal-second-asean-language-2608796">in Asia</a>.</p>
<h2>Australia will fall behind</h2>
<p>Australians may continue to speak to a segment of Indonesian society through English. But if they do so, more and more conversations will take place without them. </p>
<p>It can be hard to find exact numbers on English speakers in Indonesia and how well English is spoken. There are some estimates of up to 30% – often promoted by the <a href="https://blog.cudy.co/english-proficiency-in-asia/#:%7E:text=Indonesia%3A%2030.8%25%20of%20Indonesians%20can,English%20well%20or%20very%20well.">English tutoring and teaching industry</a>. However, some academic sources <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118791882.ch3#:%7E:text=The%20latest%20government%20statistics%20for,%2C%20and%2044.3%25%20of%20Indians.">suggest</a> only 5% of Indonesians have “a functional command of English”.</p>
<p>Research <a href="https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1067936">also suggests</a> English-only speakers are at a disadvantage during discussions with non-native English speakers. </p>
<p>In business meetings, native speakers <a href="https://www.multilingual-matters.com/page/detail/Reconceptualizing-English-for-International-Business-Contexts/?k=9781800415997">are less likely</a> to accommodate or understand what is happening in non-native English interactions and more likely to interrupt. </p>
<h2>We need <em>pelangi</em> or rainbow thinking</h2>
<p>Fixing this issue will need a range of approaches, or what we have been calling <em>pelangi</em> (rainbow) thinking. </p>
<p>First, we need to revisit government investment. The high point for Indonesian studies in Australia was the mid-1990s when Keating invested significant funding into Indonesian language learning. The number of Indonesian language learners in Victoria <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/202303519_LP-Deck-2022_VIC_FULL-DECK.pdf">doubled</a> from 493 in 1995 to 1,044 in 2001. </p>
<p>Second, some of this funding should be dedicated to more innovative and sustainable approaches to language. For example, the US government funds the <a href="https://www.startalk.info">STARTALK program</a>, which provides grants for school students to study “critical need” languages, including Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian and Russian. </p>
<p>This program seeks to better understand the motivations and barriers to learning less commonly taught languages and then designing curricula to meet the needs of teachers and students. </p>
<p>We have <a href="https://www.melbourneasiareview.edu.au/invigorating-indonesian-studies-in-australia-through-collaborative-online-education-practices/">previously</a> argued a similar program could be successful and sustainable in Australia. But it needs adequate funding. </p>
<p>Third, Indonesian needs a proper champion. The Korean government’s <a href="https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5723/contents.do">Academy for Korean Studies</a> provides significant overseas investment in research and education in Korean language and culture. The <a href="https://www.alliancefrancaise.com.au/about/fondation-af/">Alliance Française</a> has 31 branches across Australia. </p>
<p>Indonesian has not yet made a similar, robust investment. </p>
<p>In the last few decades, it’s been hard to avoid government and business officials talking about the importance of Indonesia. But it’s much harder to find a well-resourced person or organisation actually doing something about it. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-boats-beef-and-bali-albaneses-unfinished-business-with-indonesia-184547">Beyond boats, beef and Bali: Albanese's unfinished business with Indonesia</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Researchers are watching Australians’ knowledge of Indonesian language and culture slowly die of neglect.Howard Manns, Senior Lecturer in Linguistics, Monash UniversityJessica Kruk, Lecturer in Indonesian Studies and Linguistics, The University of Western AustraliaMichael C Ewing, Associate professor, The University of MelbourneSharyn Graham Davies, Director, Herb Feith Indonesian Engagement Centre, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2091252023-07-06T00:22:28Z2023-07-06T00:22:28ZWhy Indonesia wants Australia’s help to supply the world with electric vehicles and batteries<p>Australia and Indonesia are forging closer economic ties built on what each country can offer the other in the transition to clean energy. Indonesia is emerging as a maker of electric vehicles and the batteries that power them. Australia has the lithium reserves Indonesia needs to do this.</p>
<p>Visiting Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-communique-australia-indonesia-annual-leaders-meeting">committed</a> to working more closely together on the energy transition. </p>
<p>The leaders’ <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-communique-australia-indonesia-annual-leaders-meeting">joint communique</a> on Tuesday specifically noted Indonesia’s efforts to develop its electric vehicle production. Widodo <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-07-02/indonesia-australia-electric-vehicle-partnerships/102541226">is seeking</a> to enlist Australia’s help to achieve Indonesia’s goal of becoming a global electric vehicle and battery manufacturing hub. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-could-need-6-times-more-of-the-minerals-used-for-renewables-and-batteries-how-can-we-avoid-a-huge-increase-in-mining-impacts-206864">We could need 6 times more of the minerals used for renewables and batteries. How can we avoid a huge increase in mining impacts?</a>
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<h2>What are Indonesia’s goals?</h2>
<p>In line with its commitment to the Paris Agreement, Indonesia has set an ambitious target for its vehicle industry. By 2025 it wants at least 20% of the cars it produces to be electric vehicles. That equates to about 400,000 cars. </p>
<p>Indonesian government programs such as the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120306234305/http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/cheap-and-green-cars-coming-to-indonesian-roads/502397">Low-Cost Green Car</a> incentives and <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1597121/industry-ministry-nedo-collaborate-in-electric-vehicle-development">Low-Carbon-Emission Vehicle</a> regulations are driving this transition. </p>
<p>Most vehicles made in Indonesia involve joint ventures with foreign manufacturers. To produce electric vehicles, Indonesia established joint ventures with Korea’s Hyundai and China’s SGMW. </p>
<p>The government’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/what-is-the-indonesia-battery-corporation/">goal</a> is for the Indonesia Battery Corporation (IBC) to become a hub of electric vehicle battery manufacturing. This would take advantage of Indonesia’s rich nickel deposits. However, the country lacks other ingredients to make these batteries, most notably lithium.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-indonesia-could-get-to-zero-emission-in-its-energy-sector-by-2050-170291">Here’s how Indonesia could get to zero emission in its energy sector by 2050</a>
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<h2>Why does Indonesia want Australian lithium?</h2>
<p>Indonesia aims to be in the world’s top five electric vehicle battery producers by 2040. To achieve this, it needs to secure access to other minerals, including lithium. Australian mines supply around <a href="https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/king/media-releases/australias-lithium-powering-global-energy-transition">half of the world’s lithium</a>. </p>
<p>Other <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-25-years-of-lithium-production-by-country/">important suppliers</a> include Chile (24%) and China (16%). But being close to Indonesia makes Australia the most attractive supplier. </p>
<p>So far most of Australia’s lithium exports have gone to China. Given changing geopolitics (for example, Chile <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chiles-boric-announces-plan-nationalize-lithium-industry-2023-04-21/">plans to nationalise</a> its lithium industry) and global supply-chain disruptions (the Russia-Ukraine war, the China-US tension), Australia would benefit from exporting lithium to Indonesia as well.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/batteries-are-the-environmental-achilles-heel-of-electric-vehicles-unless-we-repair-reuse-and-recycle-them-205404">Batteries are the environmental Achilles heel of electric vehicles – unless we repair, reuse and recycle them</a>
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<h2>Australia lacks capacity to refine all its lithium</h2>
<p>Australia is the world’s largest producer of <a href="https://geology.com/minerals/spodumene.shtml">spodumene</a>. This mineral is rich in lithium. </p>
<p>However, Australia has <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/australias-potential-in-the-lithium-market">limited capacity</a> to refine all that spodumene into the lithium hydroxide used to make lithium-based batteries. It makes sense, then, to exploit this resource as part of the global supply chain, by linking with battery and car industries in Indonesia and other countries.</p>
<p>Australia is a small player in global manufacturing trade. However, its share of the global production network has been increasing. </p>
<p>Australia has a distinct <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/twec.12495">competitive edge</a> in specialised components. These include parts for aircraft and associated equipment, vehicles, earth-moving and mineral-processing machines, and finished products such as medical and surgical equipment. </p>
<p>However, Australia’s geographical location puts it at a disadvantage as an exporter. It costs more to export to distant major markets. </p>
<p>Specialising in high value-to-weight components helps to overcome this “tyranny of distance”. Exporting raw materials (including lithium) and importing the derivatives back to produce high-value goods is better for Australia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-rich-deposits-of-critical-minerals-for-green-technology-but-we-are-not-making-the-most-of-them-yet-182331">Australia has rich deposits of critical minerals for green technology. But we are not making the most of them ... yet</a>
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<h2>What would an agreement on lithium achieve?</h2>
<p>In February 2023 the Western Australian government and Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/273426/kadin-w-australia-agree-on-critical-mineral-cooperation">signed</a> a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to explore partnership opportunities. The focus is on supplying critical minerals for the battery industry. Widodo and WA Premier Roger Cook signed a follow-up <a href="https://www.wa.gov.au/government/media-statements/Cook-Labor-Government/Action-plan-powers-critical-minerals-investment-and-opportunity-for-WA-and-Indonesia-20230704">plan of action</a> this week.</p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia are expected to sign an MOU that will accelerate co-operation on the global battery and electric vehicle sector. Tuesday’s <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-communique-australia-indonesia-annual-leaders-meeting">joint communique</a> included a commitment to pursue this goal.</p>
<p>As both countries begin to decarbonise, they should exploit the complementary aspects of their economies. Both are embarking on the journey of energy transition to deal with the challenges of climate change. </p>
<p>It is important, however, not to limit this to a two-country endeavour. For a start, an EV battery needs much more than just nickel and lithium. Many of its components need to be sourced from other countries. And an EV battery industry should be integrated with an automotive industry supplying global markets.</p>
<p>The joint ventures may also extend to mineral processing. In Indonesia, electricity from coal powers most smelters. Collaboration on the energy transition should include a shift to clean wind, hydro and solar power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209125/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arianto Patunru is affiliated with ANU Indonesia Project and Center for Indonesian Policy Studies. </span></em></p>The Indonesian president’s visit to Australia could lead to closer co-operation on the energy transition, with Australia supplying lithium for Indonesia’s electric vehicle and battery production.Arianto Patunru, Fellow, The Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1846382022-06-09T20:10:33Z2022-06-09T20:10:33ZOnly 0.34% of year 12s study Indonesian. Here are 3 steps we can take towards knowing our neighbour better<p>Visiting Jakarta this week, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-06/anthony-albanese-will-attend-g20-despite-vladimir-putin-going/101129706">said</a> Australia and Indonesia are linked not just by geography, but by choice. </p>
<p>Choosing to know Indonesia makes good sense for Australia. Not only is Indonesia our largest neighbour, it is a regional heavyweight and an emerging global power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-great-albanese-is-in-indonesia-but-australia-needs-to-do-a-lot-more-to-reset-relations-here-are-5-ways-to-start-184446">It's great Albanese is in Indonesia, but Australia needs to do a lot more to reset relations. Here are 5 ways to start</a>
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<p>Indonesia has a <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/gdp-growth-annual">fast-growing economy</a> and a young <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/indonesia-population">population</a> more than ten times that of Australia. Creativity and innovation are hot – like the bamboo bicycle our PM rode while meeting Indonesian President Jokowi. </p>
<p>Although using bamboo for bikes was common in the 19th century, they quickly went out of fashion in favour of metal. With the emergence of the green movement in Indonesia, bamboo was considered again. With its combination of durability and high flex, bamboo is great for bikes. These bikes are produced locally and aim to empower villages as sustainable producers. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s growing creativity in digital and social innovation does not just stop at bikes. There are all sorts of future opportunities for collaboration with young Australians in business, in caring for the environment and in creating popular culture. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-have-all-you-australians-gone-australias-shrinking-role-in-cultural-diplomacy-181485">'Where have all you Australians gone?' Australia's shrinking role in cultural diplomacy</a>
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<h2>Young Australians aren’t learning about Indonesia</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, most young Australians may not benefit from such opportunities to work together with our largest neighbour because they have little chance to learn anything about Indonesia at school. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.acara.edu.au/reporting/national-report-on-schooling-in-australia/national-report-on-schooling-in-australia-data-portal/year-12-subject-enrolments#dataset">Only 755</a> students across Australia studied Indonesian language in year 12 in 2019. That’s 0.35% of year 12 students, or one in every 290. In comparison almost 4,000 students studied French that year. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.asiaeducation.edu.au/docs/default-source/why-indonesia-matters-in-our-schools/mkholer_lit-review_design_v2.pdf?sfvrsn=2">2021 report</a>, Indonesian Language Education in Australia: Patterns of Provision and Contending Ideologies, found:</p>
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<p>“Currently, there is no national policy for language education, Asian or otherwise, no reporting requirements, and no centrally collected data. In effect, the data currently available about the teaching of languages including Indonesian is in a more parlous state than it was a decade ago. In the case of Studies of Asia, even less is currently known as there is no data collected on this aspect of education.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/closure-of-indonesian-language-programs-in-australian-universities-will-weaken-ties-between-the-two-countries-158894">Closure of Indonesian language programs in Australian universities will weaken ties between the two countries</a>
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<p>Recent <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342945911_Indonesian_language_education_in_Australia_Patterns_of_provision_and_contending_ideologies">research</a> on the state of Indonesian in our schools points to declining numbers as a result of xenophobia. This stems from limited understanding and negative perceptions of Indonesia among Australians. </p>
<p>We urgently need to rethink what we teach our young people about Indonesia. </p>
<p>In the 1970s Australia was a world leader in teaching Indonesian in schools and universities. There was a resurgence of interest in the mid-1990s, as a result of the federal Labor government’s investment in a national strategy for Asian languages and studies. Ever since then Indonesian language learning in schools and Indonesian <a href="https://theconversation.com/closure-of-indonesian-language-programs-in-australian-universities-will-weaken-ties-between-the-two-countries-158894">studies in universities</a> have been going backwards.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/axing-protection-for-national-strategic-languages-is-no-way-to-build-ties-with-asia-154555">Axing protection for national strategic languages is no way to build ties with Asia</a>
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<p>After a decade of neglect by the Coalition government, beyond the numbers of students studying Indonesian in year 12, we have no data on how many Australian students study Indonesian at school. This means we do not know how bad the situation is. </p>
<p>It’s not just about language. Integrating studies of Indonesia into history, geography, literature and the arts is possible in the Australian Curriculum through the cross-curriculum priority of <a href="https://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/cross-curriculum-priorities/asia-and-australia-s-engagement-with-asia/">Asia and Australia’s engagement with Asia</a>. So it’s not a case of asking schools and teachers to add yet another new thing to the curriculum. </p>
<p>For example, for students of geography and science, Indonesia’s rich biodiversity means it is a “megadiverse” country. It’s home to <a href="https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/?country=id">16-17%</a> of the world’s reptile and bird species. </p>
<p>And Indonesia’s location on the Pacific <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/ring-fire">Ring of Fire</a> makes it a hotspot for volcanoes and earthquakes. Instead of learning about Mt Etna or Vesuvius, Australian children could be learning about Mt Tambora and Merapi. </p>
<p>We owe it to our young people to know Indonesia. Picture a better future where our scientists, engineers, artists and entrepreneurs can open the door to dynamic collaboration on climate change, sustainability, peace and prosperity in our part of the world. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mutual-respect-and-genuine-partnership-how-a-labor-government-could-revamp-our-relationship-with-indonesia-183116">'Mutual respect and genuine partnership': how a Labor government could revamp our relationship with Indonesia</a>
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<h2>What can the government do to build this relationship?</h2>
<p>Here are three choices the new federal government could make right now to make this future a reality:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Expand the extraordinary possibilities of digitally connecting young Indonesians and Australians in years 8-10. They could work collaboratively on projects of mutual and global importance including democracy, sustainability, youth culture, technology, mental health and well-being. Engaging students will support studies of Indonesia and Indonesian language – especially at this point in schooling where most students drop out of studying Indonesian. </p></li>
<li><p>Convene an urgent national summit to generate solutions to the Indonesian language crisis in Australian schools. There hasn’t been national co-operation on languages education in schools for ten years. </p></li>
<li><p>Support school leaders to better understand the importance of Indonesia and Australia’s relationship. The commitment of school leaders is essential if studies of Indonesia and Indonesian language are to grow in our schools. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>Australia and Indonesia can do and learn so much together to create a shared future. Let’s make the choice to do that now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Star works for the Asia Education Foundation. This article draws on ‘Why Indonesia Matters in Our Schools. A Rationale for Indonesian Language and Studies in Australian Education’ developed by Asia Education Foundation in 2021 with funding from the Australia Indonesia Institute. </span></em></p>Australia has to reverse the decline in the study of Indonesian so that students understand the emerging power in our region and the opportunities a closer relationship offers.Jennifer Star, Deputy Director, Asia Education Foundation, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1845472022-06-07T05:53:35Z2022-06-07T05:53:35ZBeyond boats, beef and Bali: Albanese’s unfinished business with Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467340/original/file-20220607-14-2z3iaq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">original</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia may be the world’s fourth most populous nation – with more than 270 million people – but Australian news coverage of it typically involves three things: beef, boats and Bali. </p>
<p>Anthony Albanese’s visit to Indonesia in his third week as prime minister is an important sign the relationship can’t be defined by domestic concerns about asylum seekers, live cattle exports and drug smuggling.</p>
<p>Accompanied by Foreign Minister Penny Wong (who speaks Bahasa) and Science and Innovation Minister Ed Husic (whose Muslim faith was of interest to the Indonesian press), Albanese has made it clear Indonesia is of utmost diplomatic importance to Australia.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mutual-respect-and-genuine-partnership-how-a-labor-government-could-revamp-our-relationship-with-indonesia-183116">'Mutual respect and genuine partnership': how a Labor government could revamp our relationship with Indonesia</a>
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<h2>Calling on Jakarta first</h2>
<p>Albanese has followed a recent tradition of Australian prime ministers heading to Jakarta early, before London or Washington. His predecessor, Scott Morrison, visited Indonesia in September 2018 as his first port of call. So too did Malcolm Turnbull and Paul Keating.</p>
<p>Indonesia is perhaps the Australian continent’s first trading partner. </p>
<p>Evidence from the 1600s shows the indigenous fishers of Arnhem land traded sea cucumber and other goods with counterparts from Makassar – on the island now known as Sulawesi – which the Makassarese then sold to Chinese merchants. Makassar remains an important port, which Albanese visited after meeting Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo at his presidential palace.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/long-before-europeans-traders-came-here-from-the-north-and-art-tells-the-story-69032">Long before Europeans, traders came here from the north and art tells the story</a>
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<h2>Supportive from the beginning</h2>
<p>Australia’s interest in close ties with Indonesia were established immediately after the second world war.</p>
<p>Future President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta issued their Proclamation of Indonesian Independence on August 17 1945, six weeks after the surrender of the occupying Japanese. </p>
<p>By November 1945, an Australian diplomatic mission headed by William MacMahon Ball was in Jakarta (then still called Batavia) to meet with them and other independence officials.</p>
<p>Economist Joe Isaac, who would go on to become deputy president of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and deputy chancellor of Monash University, was part of the delegation. He later recalled the meetings with Sukarno:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Mac [MacMahon Ball] outlined the purpose of his mission […] and that Australia was sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Indonesians; and he canvassed Sukarno’s reaction to the despatch by the Australian Government of a boat load of medical supplies. No doubt thinking of the action of the Australian waterside workers (who refused to load Dutch ships hostile to Indonesian independence) Sukarno expressed gratitude for the support of the Australian people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This support was a big deal at the time (the Netherlands only gave up attempts to reassert its colonial control in 1949). According to Isaac, the action of the waterside workers against Dutch ships as well as Australia’s support for Indonesian independence in the UN Security Council were instrumental in shaping a positive view of Australia in Indonesia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A newspaper report from September 29 1945 about a rally in Sydney in support of Indonesian independence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467354/original/file-20220607-24-4au0cn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A newspaper report from September 29 1945 about a rally in Sydney in support of Indonesian independence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://img.jakpost.net/c/2020/09/09/2020_09_09_103946_1599629997._medium.jpg">Daily Telegraph/ivens.nl</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Recent economic assistance</h2>
<p>Australia’s desire for close relations with Indonesia has been challenging – in particular over Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua in 1969 and of East Timor in 1975.</p>
<p>But in recent decades there have been some great occasions of economic co-operation.</p>
<p>During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, Australia went into bat for Indonesia against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Clinton administration, which both wanted to impose severe fiscal austerity measures. </p>
<p>Australia favoured more expansionary policies – partly informed by Reserve Bank deputy governor Stephen Grenville, who had been a diplomat in Indonesia and understood the Indonesian economy. </p>
<p>The Australian view prevailed, and the Indonesian economy fared much better as a result, avoiding the pitfalls of the developing economies subject to the IMF prescription.</p>
<h2>Room to grow</h2>
<p>As of 2020, Indonesia is Australia’s <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement#:%7E:text=Indonesia%20has%20been%20a%20growing,our%2013th%20largest%20trading%20partner.">13th biggest trading partner</a>, worth A$17.8 billion in two-way trade.</p>
<p>Almost <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/characteristics-australian-exporters/latest-release">2,500 Australian businesses</a> export goods to Indonesia.</p>
<p>But in many ways Indonesia is still underdone as an economic partner – not just when compared with China and India, and our longstanding partners in Japan and South Korea, but also with southeast Asian neighbours Singapore and Thailand.</p>
<p>More Australian small and medium sized companies export goods to Fiji than Indonesia. And despite Indonesia’s massive population, just <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/characteristics-australian-exporters/latest-release">250 Australian companies</a> have a presence in Indonesia. This compares to more than 3,000 in China. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-great-albanese-is-in-indonesia-but-australia-needs-to-do-a-lot-more-to-reset-relations-here-are-5-ways-to-start-184446">It's great Albanese is in Indonesia, but Australia needs to do a lot more to reset relations. Here are 5 ways to start</a>
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<p>Indonesia hasn’t attracted manufacturers looking for low-cost opportunities like China, Vietnam and Bangladesh. Foreign companies have mainly gone there for its massive domestic consumer market, especially the urban middle class in cities like Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. </p>
<p>So, there’s still a great potential for Australian trade and foreign investment to help build capacity way beyond boats, beef and Bali.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Harcourt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s new prime minister has made it clear Indonesia is of utmost diplomatic importance to Australia.Tim Harcourt, Industry Professor and Chief Economist, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844462022-06-06T06:58:34Z2022-06-06T06:58:34ZIt’s great Albanese is in Indonesia, but Australia needs to do a lot more to reset relations. Here are 5 ways to start<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467132/original/file-20220606-20-n84ka2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesian President Joko Widowi takes Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for a tour of Bogor Palace in West Java. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Ellinghausen/SMH pool via AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A new Australian prime minister flying to Indonesia to “reset” relations is now so routine it would probably raise hackles in Jakarta if it didn’t happen. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s determination to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/jun/06/anthony-albanese-vows-to-strengthen-australias-ties-on-official-indonesia-visit">go there as quickly as he could</a> is therefore laudable – and necessary – if he wants to do better than the outgoing government in dealing with Indonesia.</p>
<p>But the visit is so essential because most previous “resets” have not lasted. The government-to-government relationship between Australia and Indonesia is a fragile one, easily broken when tensions arise. There are many differences – from history, religion, ethnicity, and language, to legal systems, political systems, global alliances, and strategic interests.</p>
<p>In fact, very few Australian governments in recent years have made it to the end of their term without a bust-up with Indonesia of some kind. This is not all Australia’s fault. Like Albanese, most Australian leaders since Paul Keating have accepted a strong relationship with Indonesia is critically important to our foreign policy.</p>
<p>But Indonesia is much less concerned about its neighbours – its relations with Singapore and Malaysia are equally bumpy – and that is unlikely to change any time soon.</p>
<h2>Indonesia does not need Australia</h2>
<p>Indonesia is a huge country of more than 270 million people and has the world’s largest Muslim population. It dominates ASEAN and this year is chair of the G20. If it returns to its pre-COVID levels of 5% annual economic growth, it will be back on track to be a <a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/research-insights/economy/the-world-in-2050.html">top five economy by 2050</a>. It is located across key air and sea lanes and will be strategically vital if conflict breaks out in the South China Sea.</p>
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<p>Rightly or wrongly, this means Indonesians now see their country as a rising global player that can go it alone. Many will tell you that they don’t see why Australia deserves their attention. They see us as a low-ranked trade and investment partner more focused on the United States and United Kingdom than Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>And why wouldn’t they? Australia does not rank within Indonesia’s top ten trading partners. Moreover, the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">AUKUS agreement</a> only served to reinforce the view in Indonesia that Australia will always put its relations with Anglophone countries ahead of those with its closest neighbours.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mutual-respect-and-genuine-partnership-how-a-labor-government-could-revamp-our-relationship-with-indonesia-183116">'Mutual respect and genuine partnership': how a Labor government could revamp our relationship with Indonesia</a>
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<p>That is why the ritual reset visit by Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong will not be enough to get Indonesia’s attention and build deep engagement between our countries. </p>
<p>Albanese is right to say he wants the relationship to be about <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/anthony-albanese-arrives-in-jakarta-for-key-talks-with-indonesias-president/3gs79qh0f">more than symbolism</a> and his <a href="https://7news.com.au/politics/albanese-holds-leader-talks-in-indonesia-c-7069066">announcement</a> he will attend the G20 summit in Bali in November was a smart move. But rhetoric is not enough: everyone has heard it before and it rings hollow without action, and that means expenditure.</p>
<p>The prime minister’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-06/albanese-heads-to-indonesia-on-first-bilateral-visit/101127598">new A$200 million</a> “climate and infrastructure partnership” with Indonesia is good start – improving Indonesia’s patchy infrastructure is a project close to Jokowi’s heart. </p>
<p>Climate change is also a pressing concern for Indonesia. However, its record on efforts to reduce deforestation and emissions means there will be challenges. For example, in 2021, Indonesia terminated <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2021/09/indonesia-terminates-agreement-with-norway-on-1b-redd-scheme/">a US$1 billion (A$1.4 billion) deal with Norway</a> aimed at preserving its forests. </p>
<h2>What Albanese should do now</h2>
<p>But there are other ways Australia can make meaningful investments in the bilateral relationship. There are plenty of proposals that have been kicked about for years and are well known to policymakers in Canberra. They need to be acted on now. Here are just five:</p>
<p><strong>1. Increase aid to Indonesia</strong> </p>
<p>Indonesia is understandably hostile to any attempts to use aid as leverage, but the once-generous programs we ran in Indonesia did provide us with extraordinary access and respect in Jakarta. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Albanese and Jokowi holding talks at Bogor Palace." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467138/original/file-20220606-26-61byy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Albanese and Widodo have a drink after a bike ride around Bogor Palace.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Ellinghausen/SMH pool via AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This has been diminished by <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-a-40-cut-in-australian-aid-affect-indonesia-41753">savage cuts</a> over the past decade. And there is real need. Indonesia may be an emerging middle-class country but it has tens of millions still living in poverty, an inadequate social safety net, and a struggling health system. While the amount of aid Australia can offer will always be tiny compared to Indonesia’s budgets, our aid can help Indonesia test new approaches, and ensure its most marginalised communities are not left behind. </p>
<p>The new Labor government has promised an extra <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/albanese-to-take-south-east-asia-package-to-quad-meeting-if-elected-20220516-p5alst.html">$470 million of aid</a> over four years for South East Asia. A significant portion of this needs to be committed to Indonesia.</p>
<p><strong>2. Focus on soft diplomacy</strong></p>
<p>Despite the occasional problems in the government-to-government relationship, there are strong people-to-people links in the arts, education, academic, and community sectors that create cohesion in the relationship. They need to be increased ten-fold or more up to have real impact, and that will mean returning the funding stripped out of soft diplomacy over the last decade, tripling it and then some.</p>
<p><strong>3. Open an Australia Centre</strong></p>
<p>The Australian embassy in Jakarta is a fortress, closed to the public. Australia needs an accessible place where we can showcase our arts and culture, with theatres, cafes, libraries, and where Indonesians can get information about education and business in Australia in a casual, welcoming environment. European countries on the other side of the globe like Germany and the Netherlands have set these up in Jakarta – it is crazy that we have not.</p>
<p><strong>4. Make it easier for Indonesians to visit</strong> </p>
<p>Australians can get a visa on arrival in Indonesia but even Indonesians wanting to visit Australia on a tourist visa face an expensive, complicated and demeaning application process. This means few make it here. We need easy-access, cheap visas for Indonesians, including for working holidays. </p>
<p>And as we try to wean our education sector off China, we need to make it much easier for Indonesians to study here. We already offer scholarships to study in our universities, and Albanese’s announcement of ten more is good news, but it is a drop in the ocean.</p>
<p><strong>5. Start funding Indonesian studies again</strong></p>
<p>Much has been written about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/closure-of-indonesian-language-programs-in-australian-universities-will-weaken-ties-between-the-two-countries-158894">collapse of Indonesian studies</a> in schools and universities in Australia. The number of Australians with language skills and deep knowledge of the country is now tiny, even though we need a pool of Indonesia expertise to engage effectively. </p>
<p>The lessons of the Keating and Rudd programs on Asian languages in schools are clear: only funding support can revive Indonesian studies. Keating did it with the equivalent of about $100 million annually, but Rudd’s $20 million per year was <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/education/rudd-boost-fails-to-stop-slide-in-study-of-asian-languages-20100526-webw.html">not enough</a>. </p>
<p>Albanese has announced support for the <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/programs/">The Australian Consortium for ‘In-Country’ Indonesian Studies </a> – a program that gives Australian university students chances to study and complete short courses in Indonesia. But that is nowhere near enough to fix the lack of language expertise. Albanese must dig deeper.</p>
<h2>The free trade agreement</h2>
<p>A longer-term challenge is implementing the long-awaited <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-more-than-a-free-trade-agreement-but-what-exactly-have-australia-and-indonesia-signed-112853">free trade agreement with Indonesia</a>, the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which Albanese has made a focus of his visit, bringing with him a large delegation of Australian business leaders and Trade Minister Don Farrell. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Anthony Albanese has a breakfast meeting with Australian business leaders in Jakarta on Monday." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467120/original/file-20220606-20-8gkbxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Anthony Albanese has a breakfast meeting with Australian business leaders in Jakarta on Monday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are no quick fixes here. Australian businesses are very nervous about investing in Indonesia. Although big profits are possible, setting up in Indonesia is complex and expensive, and they don’t trust the Indonesian legal system to protect them, especially against Indonesia’s powerful oligarchs. </p>
<p>While Australian businesses are perhaps too cautious, Indonesia also has a lot of work to do its reform its systems before it can expect Australian businesses to help it meet its ambitious and elusive foreign investment targets. The free trade agreements needs to be a priority for both countries.</p>
<p>So, while Albanese and Wong’s meetings in Jakarta matter, they are just the start of the work needed for deeper engagement with Indonesia. And without a real budget commitment to back that up, we can expect things to revert to the usual stalemate soon enough – at least until the next new prime minister gets on the plane to Jakarta again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184446/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Mann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit is so essential because most previous ‘resets’ have not lasted. The government-to-government relationship between Australia and Indonesia is a fragile one.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneTim Mann, Associate Director, Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1831162022-05-23T02:33:29Z2022-05-23T02:33:29Z‘Mutual respect and genuine partnership’: how a Labor government could revamp our relationship with Indonesia<p>During the election campaign, Anthony Albanese <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Australia-election/Australia-s-allies-congratulate-Albanese-with-all-eyes-on-China">singled out</a> Indonesia as a key regional partner.</p>
<p>The new prime minister made a point of declaring he intended his <a href="https://anthonyalbanese.com.au/media-centre/abc-insiders-federal-election-cost-of-living">first overseas visit</a> as head of a Labor government would be to Indonesia.</p>
<p>His first overseas visit as <a href="https://anthonyalbanese.com.au/transcript-of-press-conference-jakarta-indonesia-monday-26-august-2019">Labor leader was also to Indonesia</a> in 2019, as was his first trip as a minister in 2007.</p>
<p>Albanese is not the first newly-minted prime minister to prioritise a trip to Jakarta as Scott Morrison’s first overseas visit as leader was also to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Instead, Albanese has had to travel to Tokyo for a pre-planned <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-albanese-heads-to-the-quad-what-are-the-security-challenges-facing-australias-new-government-183435">meeting of Quad nations</a> (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States). </p>
<p>Nevertheless, judging by the campaign, and a bit of recent history, we can expect to see a Labor government pay more attention than their predecessors to Indonesia – and Southeast Asia in general.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-will-take-a-big-step-on-the-global-stage-this-year-are-australians-paying-enough-attention-174866">Indonesia will take a big step on the global stage this year – are Australians paying enough attention?</a>
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<h2>From a rollercoaster to a plateau</h2>
<p>Both major parties say they recognise the “<a href="https://alp.org.au/media/2594/2021-alp-national-platform-final-endorsed-platform.pdf">vital importance</a>” of the Australia-Indonesia relationship.</p>
<p>Despite this, ties between the neighbours have often been described as a <a href="https://research.monash.edu/en/publications/australia-indonesia-relations-how-to-stop-the-roller-coaster">“rollercoaster”</a>. Unpredictability and insensitivity have often clouded the relationship, no matter who is in power.</p>
<p>Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard government’s snap ban on live cattle exports to Indonesia in 2011 caused tensions with Indonesia. Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott came to power in 2013 promising “more Jakarta, less Geneva”, only to quickly abandon it as the government <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-foreign-policy-be-freed-from-populist-%5Blink%20text%5D(https://theconversation.com/bali-nine-response-must-manage-power-shift-in-indonesian-relations-40848)%20politicking-47688">repeatedly damaged</a> relations with Indonesia. Tensions emerged over boat <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/asylum-seeker-turnback-indonesia-conflicted-on-abbotts-hardline-policy">turn-backs</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/19/tony-abbott-no-apology-explanation-indonesia-spying">bugging</a> and spying allegations, and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/bali-nine-response-must-manage-power-shift-in-indonesian-relations-40848">death penalty</a>.</p>
<p>Perhaps relations never fully recovered after Australia, under the Howard government, led a multinational force in East Timor in 1999.</p>
<p>But in recent years, Indonesia has barely rated a mention in Australian foreign policy discussions. </p>
<p>Rather than a rollercoaster, the relationship has plateaued.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463487/original/file-20220517-23-d81zjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former prime minister Tony Abbott came to power in 2013 promising ‘More Jakarta, less Geneva’ but relations soon suffered.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Rob Griffith</span></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-well-has-the-morrison-government-handled-relations-with-southeast-asia-181958">How well has the Morrison government handled relations with Southeast Asia?</a>
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<h2>Personal ties matter</h2>
<p>There were some early successes in the Morrison era, including the two countries signing a new <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/joint-declaration-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-between-the-commonwealth-of-australia-and-republic-of-indonesia">Comprehensive Strategic Partnership</a> in August 2018 that promised to deepen ties and cooperation.</p>
<p>The following year, both countries signed the “<a href="https://www.trademinister.gov.au/minister/simon-birmingham/media-release/australias-free-trade-agreement-indonesia-provide-export-boost">landmark</a>” Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA).</p>
<p>But these two early successes built on the work of previous governments.</p>
<p>The IA-CEPA deal had been in the works for <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/free-trade-agreement-between-australia-indonesia-only-one-page-long-20180830-p500le.html">over a decade</a>.</p>
<p>Morrison’s predecessor Malcolm Turnbull carefully cultivated a strong personal relationship with his Indonesian counterpart, Joko Widodo. Turnbull’s 2015 Jakarta visit involved one of Widodo’s “<a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/indonesiaaustralia-free-trade-negotiations-done-ahead-of-pms-overseas-debut-20180828-h14mlc">blusukans</a>” - an impromptu visit to a market. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and her Indonesian counterpart, Retno Marsudi, also had a reportedly strong relationship.</p>
<p>This personal touch has not quite been replicated under the Morrison government.</p>
<h2>Areas of friction</h2>
<p>A low point was a surprise announcement by Morrison during the 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/morrison-government-courts-controversy-on-jerusalem-ahead-of-wentworth-byelection-105038">Wentworth byelection</a>. Unexpectedly, Morrison said he’d consider moving the Australian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, following similar moves from then-US President Donald Trump.</p>
<p>This wasn’t well received in Muslim-majority Indonesia. The optics were not good – it suggested a tendency on Morrison government’s part to privilege electoral ambitions ahead of the national interest.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-19/indonesia-defence-cooperation-with-australia-reviewed/10393950">reported</a> text message exchange, Marsudi purportedly told Payne the embassy issue “will slap Indonesia’s face [and] affect bilateral relations”.</p>
<p>There have been other areas of friction. Indonesia <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-03/foreign-minister-marise-payne-in-se-asia-to-rally-aukus-support/100589452">initially</a> <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-03/foreign-minister-marise-payne-in-se-asia-to-rally-aukus-support/100589452">responded critically</a> to Australia’s AUKUS deal, which reflected concerns about how Australia acquisition of nuclear powered submarines might affect regional security, the arms race and non-proliferation.</p>
<p>Following the announcement, Morrison’s <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/morrison-and-jokowi-meeting-called-off-before-australian-submarines-announcement-20210917-p58slj.html">plan to stop over in Jakarta</a> from a US visit was called off when Widodo opted to visit provinces outside Jakarta instead.</p>
<p>The impression was that the Coalition looks to Australia’s “great and powerful friends” in the US and the UK for security, while Labor prioritises regional relationships.</p>
<p>This difference was on display in the pre-election foreign ministers debate between Marise Payne and Penny Wong. </p>
<p>While Payne talked up the Quad and AUKUS (both which don’t include Indonesia), Wong focused on the Pacific and Southeast Asia. However, Indonesia was barely mentioned by either. </p>
<h2>How might Australia-Indonesia relations change under Labor?</h2>
<p>Labor’s election campaign <a href="https://alp.org.au/media/2594/2021-alp-national-platform-final-endorsed-platform.pdf">rhetoric</a> emphasised regional engagement based on “mutual respect and a sense of genuine partnership”. It announced a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/albanese-to-take-south-east-asia-package-to-quad-meeting-if-elected-20220516-p5alst.html">Southeast Asia policy</a>, including A$470 million over four years in foreign aid and the creation of a Southeast Asia office in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. </p>
<p>Despite the lack of specific attention to Indonesia during the campaign, there are some positive signs, though. Labor advocates a First Nations foreign policy, which could be appealing to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia already cooperate fruitfully on shared interests in maritime security, <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-and-australia-are-sleeping-ocean-superpowers-69886">marine science</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-marine-industries-deliver-80b-a-year-but-without-more-scientists-the-blue-economy-is-at-risk-170113">blue economy</a>. This is likely to continue regardless of who is in power. </p>
<p>Most importantly, Labor’s <a href="https://www.alp.org.au/policies/national-security">national security plan</a> highlights climate security as an area of cooperation, promising a A$200 million climate and infrastructure partnership with Indonesia.</p>
<p>But more needs to be done. Labor should focus more on bolstering <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/16/cutting-asian-language-courses-at-australian-universities-hurting-students-job-prospects-experts-say">Asian studies and languages</a> in secondary schools and universities, particularly Bahasa Indonesia. </p>
<p>The new government also needs to listen to Southeast Asian perspectives.</p>
<p>States like Indonesia don’t want to be forced to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/strategic-divergence-australia-s-southeast-asia-challenge">make a choice</a> between US and China. </p>
<p>Engaging with Indonesia requires creative, nuanced and modulated diplomacy. Sensitivity around sovereignty, autonomy and regional security is key.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Strating receives external funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, United States Department of State, the UK High Commission in Australia, and Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. </span></em></p>Judging by the campaign, and a bit of recent history, we can expect to see a Labor government pay more attention than their predecessors did to Indonesia – and Southeast Asia in general.Rebecca Strating, Director, La Trobe Asia and Associate Professor, La Trobe University, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1748662022-01-19T23:49:40Z2022-01-19T23:49:40ZIndonesia will take a big step on the global stage this year – are Australians paying enough attention?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441441/original/file-20220119-27-w1awo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=340%2C235%2C2913%2C2163&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tracey Nearmy/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many Australians are probably unaware that neighbouring <a href="https://g20.org/g20-presidency-of-indonesia/">Indonesia has assumed the G20 presidency</a> and will host the crucial meeting of the world’s largest economies for the first time in October. </p>
<p>The theme for the summit in Bali will be “Recover Together, Recover Stronger”. We can all hope this will more closely match global realities by then. </p>
<p>Indonesia is well-positioned to ensure the world focuses on the gap in the global pandemic response between developed and lower-income countries, which threatens to prolong the crisis. Its overall growth trajectory has earned it international respect, and it has made solid efforts to <a href="https://www.unodc.org/indonesia/en/issues/terrorism-prevention.html">combat extremism</a> and <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/indonesia/democracy-human-rights-and-governance">maintain a vibrant democracy at home</a>. </p>
<p>Jakarta has also showed diplomatic skill on the international stage, for example, in mustering <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-rcep-can-tell-us-about-geopolitics-asia">ASEAN support for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a> – a free-trade agreement among more than a dozen countries in the Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>And it has carved out a potentially influential role in the region by maintaining constructive relations with both China and the United States.</p>
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<h2>Public disengagement</h2>
<p>But this isn’t the way Australians tend to think about their next-door neighbour. Australians seem little engaged in what is generally considered a very important relationship for the country. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/about">Lowy Institute’s poll of Australian attitudes</a> to the world reveals limited knowledge about Indonesia’s system of government and national experience. <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/views-of-indonesia/">Recent annual surveys</a> indicate only 39% of Australians agree that Indonesia is a democracy, and just 37% believe its government has worked hard to fight terrorism. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jokowis-visit-shows-the-australia-indonesia-relationship-is-strong-but-faultlines-remain-131463">Jokowi’s visit shows the Australia-Indonesia relationship is strong, but faultlines remain</a>
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<p>Another sign of this disengagement is the <a href="https://asaa.asn.au/the-state-of-indonesian-language-in-australian-universities-the-past-20-years/">steady decline in Indonesian language enrolments in Australian universities</a>. Only 178 university students were undertaking Indonesian language studies in 2019, down 63% from a peak of 503 in 1992. </p>
<p>Australian businesses also lack interest or capability when it comes to Indonesia. There has been little evidence of change since an Asialink business report in 2017 <a href="https://asialinkbusiness.com.au/research-resources/match-fit-shaping-asia-capable-leaders">found</a> 90% of the top Australian public companies were not adequately equipped to do business in Asia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/survey-reveals-what-indonesians-really-think-of-australia/">Australia isn’t front of mind for many Indonesians</a>, either. They are naturally more focused on the pressing challenges and opportunities in the rest of Asia, specifically Southeast Asia and China. </p>
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<h2>Bipartisan efforts to prioritise the relationship</h2>
<p>It wasn’t always like this. Enthusiasm for Bahasa Indonesia <a href="https://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/languages/indonesian/context-statement/">grew rapidly in the early 1990s</a> when it became the third-most studied language in Australian schools. </p>
<p>Its <a href="https://asaa.asn.au/the-state-of-indonesian-language-in-australian-universities-the-past-20-years/">rise was spurred by a national languages policy</a> introduced by the Hawke government, which highlighted the importance of Indonesian. The establishment of the <a href="https://www.deakin.edu.au/about-deakin/news-and-media-releases/articles/new-colombo-plan-helps-australians-engage-with-the-indo-pacific">New Colombo Plan</a> by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop provided fresh momentum after 2013, supporting significant numbers of Australians to study Indonesian and other regional languages while extending their studies abroad. </p>
<p>Governments can clearly play a role in stimulating public interest. </p>
<p>Successive Australian administrations have certainly prioritised the official relationship between the countries, with both the Keating and Howard governments signing security agreements with Indonesia in <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9596/96rp25">1995</a> and <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/agreement-between-the-republic-of-indonesia-and-australia-on-the-framework-for-security-cooperation">2006</a>, respectively. </p>
<p>The Morrison government has joined its predecessors in prioritising Jakarta as a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-09/australia-indonesia-boost-defence-ties-meeting-jakarta/100448662">destination for ministerial travel</a>. During a <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7424287/payne-dutton-in-jakarta-security-talks/">recent visit</a> by Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton to Jakarta last September, the two countries agreed to collaborate more closely on defence training and efforts to combat terrorism and cybercrime.</p>
<p>And a new trade agreement, called the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement">Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement</a>, came into force in mid-2020, which built on a range of important economic and security arrangements between the countries. </p>
<p>By reducing barriers to trade, this agreement provides the framework to boost bilateral trading links – if business is willing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-more-than-a-free-trade-agreement-but-what-exactly-have-australia-and-indonesia-signed-112853">It's more than a free trade agreement. But what exactly have Australia and Indonesia signed?</a>
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<h2>Fresh opportunities for trade</h2>
<p>Despite these efforts, the two countries are still “<a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/strangers-next-door-9781509918171/">strangers next door</a>.” Australians stand to lose most if the two countries remain this way.</p>
<p>Indonesia is <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability">projected</a> by some to be the world’s fifth-largest economy by 2030, and fourth-largest soon after that. It is already host to many mega-cities and a thriving digital economy. In fact, a number of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanburgos/2021/12/14/indonesias-tech-unicorns-are-leading-the-countrys-ipo-rush/?sh=2a2d3e11f3d4">tech “unicorn” companies</a> are developing relationships with the largest global tech platforms. </p>
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<p>There are other areas <a href="https://australiaindonesiacentre.org/trade/a-closer-look-at-australia-indonesia-trade-potential/">of growth potential in the trade relationship</a>, including textiles, fashion, food processing, healthcare services and infrastructure development. </p>
<p>But, overall, bilateral trade remains too skewed towards “traditional” items, such as petroleum, minerals and live animals. The economic relationship is under-performing as a result. </p>
<p>In fact, trade between the two countries has declined to the point where <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias-goods-and-services-by-top-15-partners-2020.pdf">Indonesia is now Australia’s 14th largest trading partner</a>, behind Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia. This cannot be fully explained by the pandemic’s impact on the tourism and education markets. </p>
<p>Indonesia should be factored into any Australian strategy to diversify its trading links away from China. But Australians will be poorly positioned to take advantage of these opportunities unless something is done to address the lack of knowledge about Indonesia’s language, culture and governance.</p>
<h2>Greater public awareness is what’s needed</h2>
<p>A truly mature relationship requires high levels of public participation and awareness, and this needs work. </p>
<p>The challenge is for Australians to stay informed about what Indonesia is becoming. This involves understanding the effort it has made to put its security challenges in the past, while also recognising there are some areas where we may differ. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesians-support-for-the-death-penalty-declines-with-more-rigorous-survey-methods-167123">death penalty</a> is an obvious case in point, and a really strong relationship should allow for frank discussion on this and other human rights concerns.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesians-support-for-the-death-penalty-declines-with-more-rigorous-survey-methods-167123">Indonesians' support for the death penalty declines with more rigorous survey methods</a>
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<p>While there’s a lot of ground to make up, there are some positive ingredients to work with. The <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/trust-in-global-powers">2021 Lowy Institute poll</a> indicates Australian trust in Indonesia as a nation has lifted recently, even if Australian knowledge of the country and trust in its leaders remain low. </p>
<p>Science and technology ties remain strong, with some exciting joint research projects by Australian and Indonesian universities underway through the <a href="https://pair.australiaindonesiacentre.org/">Partnership for Australia-Indonesia Research</a>. And programs such as the <a href="https://aiya.org.au/">Australia-Indonesia Youth Association</a> indicate growing interest by young people in both countries to learn more about each other. </p>
<p>Before the last Australian federal election in 2019, there were <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-indonesia-towards-a-durable-partnership/">calls for any incoming government to stimulate fresh community understanding and awareness</a> of this important relationship. This case remains strong. Indonesia is changing, and Australians need to keep up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Kemish is a director of the Australia-Indonesia Centre and a senior adviser with Bower Group Asia. He is also a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute and an adjunct professor at the University of Queensland. He is a former Australian diplomat who served as Head of DFAT's Southeast Asia Division, as Head of the Prime Minister's International Division, and as an Ambassador in both the Asia Pacific and Europe. After leaving government service he worked for several years as a member of the leadership team at Newcrest Mining Limited, which had operational interests in eastern Indonesia.</span></em></p>A truly mature relationship requires high levels of public participation and awareness, and this is what needs work with our northern neighbour.Ian Kemish AM, Former Ambassador and Adjunct Professor, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1317562020-02-13T05:30:42Z2020-02-13T05:30:42ZAustralia and Indonesia: how to collaborate like the Avengers<p>Can Australia and Indonesia collaborate like the Avengers? On Monday, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YnetrtC73M">President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo said</a>: </p>
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<p>When the forces of good unite, the Avengers assemble, then the common enemy can be defeated. When Indonesia and Australia continue to collaborate then intolerance, protectionism, the fear of poverty and the threat of climate change can be overcome. </p>
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<p>While the last item might not get much traction in Australia, both national leaders seem confident about the collaboration between both countries and see a bright future ahead.</p>
<p>Partnership and collaboration are becoming more common approaches to some of our most pressing challenges; from <a href="https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/organization/crs/research-initiatives/team-science-field-guide">cancer research</a>, to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263786315000411">large infrastructure projects</a>, even to <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300">achieving the Sustainable Development Goals</a>.</p>
<p>However, you could say that in many instances collaboration itself turns out to be one of these big challenges. Even though Australians and Indonesians are both friendly and easy-going, systemic boundaries – lack of resources, institutional underpinnings, and inequitable collaborative processes – can slow down the process. </p>
<p>Through our work for the Australia-Indonesia Centre, we helped to link hundreds of researchers, government departments, business partners and other stakeholders in a variety of collaborative partnerships across both nations. </p>
<p>Through extensive evaluation of our work, we learned many valuable lessons on the key requirements to set up successful collaborative endeavours. </p>
<p>Here are some starting points that are often overlooked in dealing with systemic boundaries.</p>
<h2>Establish a level playing field</h2>
<p>Innovative partnerships and new collaborations typically generate a lot of energy and enthusiasm. </p>
<p>But systemic barriers can result in projects and ventures being delayed and people becoming demotivated and disengaged. For example, when there is a delay in data exchange between the countries people tend to blame their counterparts and get annoyed, rather than noticing the absence of an agreement that allows for the exchange of data. </p>
<p>This response relies on the “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=3aAwmlgC7YMC&lpg=PA191&ots=3Rg7W19nhE&dq=attribution%20in%20distributed%20work%20groups&lr&pg=PA191#v=onepage&q=attribution%20in%20distributed%20work%20groups&f=false">fundamental attribution error</a>” by which we attribute things that don’t go well to people’s personality, rather than considering the situational constraints. </p>
<p>That is a shame, as most people are very willing to collaborate and give it their best.</p>
<p>Contributions in terms of money, effort, time or ideas require careful consideration. They do not have to be equal in absolute terms but <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.001245">have to be equitable to fully engage everyone once they start collaborating</a>. </p>
<p>This sounds simple in theory. But differences in legal and bureaucratic environments can affect partners’ autonomy and timing of projects. </p>
<p>Both Indonesia and Australia are on different bureaucratic cycles. This means, for example, that budget decisions and allocations do often not align. </p>
<p>Because of the differences in bureaucratic decision-making, extra time might be required to get the desired result. The contracts and agreements that underpin the collaboration, therefore, require careful planning and consideration to prevent later misunderstandings and delays.</p>
<h2>Ensure equitable participation</h2>
<p>Once the playing field is established we should work on systemic barriers between people on the same team. </p>
<p>To get Australians and Indonesians on the same page and to ensure equitable participation, it is essential to have everyone participate straight from the very early stages. Shaping projects collaboratively drives equal representation of ideas and ownership, as well as achieving team commitment to outcomes. </p>
<p>Stimulating a “shared mental model” about who is on the team (and who is not), what the team will do, why, and how they will go about it <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2000-15247-010">can support collaboration</a>. </p>
<p>Having a shared understanding of these aspects of teamwork can overcome differences in national culture and create a culture that is unique to a team. A shared goal can anchor the collaboration and guide energy.</p>
<p><a href="https://cebp.aacrjournals.org/content/26/11/1581">Skilful facilitation</a> at these early stages can unite people who speak different languages (including jargon) and come from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343516300033">different cultures and fields of expertise</a>.</p>
<p>For example, at first instance, Indonesians often tend to talk less and listen more in meetings. Australians are happy to fill the gaps. As a result, the Australian voice can overpower the Indonesian. A facilitator can help here to accommodate these cultural differences and ensure equal input and influence.</p>
<h2>Avengers, assemble!</h2>
<p>Australia and Indonesia have had a working relationship <a href="http://guides.naa.gov.au/near-neighbours/chapter1/index.aspx">since the early days of Indonesian independence</a>. This relationship has had its fair share of challenges, as most strong relationships have. </p>
<p>President Jokowi voiced a strong intention for Australia and Indonesia to become partners in the development of the Pacific region. This vision would be a departure from the current strong bilateral relationship into multilateral collaboration. </p>
<p>As challenges become more complex, collaboration becomes more complex, but potentially also more interesting and rewarding. Whether it is combating bushfires, stimulating equality through trade, or supporting development of the Pacific region, we’ll need an epic team-up that ensures results.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=222&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=222&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=222&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/315163/original/file-20200213-41683-u18lbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>The Australia-Indonesia Centre supports The Conversation Indonesia as strategic partner.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131756/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martijn van der Kamp works with The Australia-Indonesia Centre as their Team Science Fellow.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugene Sebastian tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Even though Australians and Indonesians are both friendly and easy-going, systemic boundaries can slow down the process of collaboration.Martijn van der Kamp, Team Science Fellow, Australia-Indonesia CentreEugene Sebastian, Executive Director, Australia-Indonesia Centre, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314632020-02-10T10:59:48Z2020-02-10T10:59:48ZJokowi’s visit shows the Australia-Indonesia relationship is strong, but faultlines remain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314431/original/file-20200210-109891-9a8fqx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Rick Rycroft</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesian President Joko Widodo - Jokowi – has shown himself to be generally less interested in international affairs than his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). He has also been less committed to the Indonesia-Australia relationship. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, Australia’s invitation to Jokowi to address the parliament, and his acceptance of that invitation, suggests the bilateral relationship is strong, at least at the governmental level.</p>
<p>Both Morrison and Jokowi referred in their parliamentary addresses to the fact this year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and Indonesia. Morrison reflected backwards, noting Australia had been an early supporter of Indonesian independence, and had been chosen by Indonesia to represent its interests on a UN committee involved with the Indonesia-Dutch dispute then underway.</p>
<p>Jokowi chose to look forward, to 2050 and the 100th anniversary of the start of diplomatic relations. He identified four major steps he suggested the two countries should take together to strengthen their bilateral relationship, and to contribute to regional peace and security.</p>
<p>Two of these steps were fairly predictable recitations of established policy.</p>
<p>The first was cooperation in furthering democracy, respect for human rights, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation strategies. He spoke against identity politics, disputing the idea it was cultural clashes that divided the world. Implementation of these principles remains fraught with difficulties, but the parameters of the problems are well-known in Jakarta and Canberra.</p>
<p>Second, Jokowi argued for free and fair trade, both bilaterally and regionally, in the face of increasing protectionism. Here he welcomed the conclusion of the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">Indonesia Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement</a>, which he described as opening opportunities for economic growth in both countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-more-than-a-free-trade-agreement-but-what-exactly-have-australia-and-indonesia-signed-112853">It's more than a free trade agreement. But what exactly have Australia and Indonesia signed?</a>
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<p>But there were two other steps Jokowi wanted the two countries to take, which were perhaps different from what might have been expected.</p>
<p>First, he called for collaboration on protection of the environment. Some of his remarks were predictable, such as protection of forests and rivers. But he also argued for collaboration on lowering carbon emissions and handling climate change. </p>
<p>Jokowi did not explain what he had in mind with joint action to lower carbon emissions, or managing climate change. Indonesia is a major exporter of coal, and annual forest fires have substantially reduced forest cover. Its political and business leaders are even more divided than those in Australia on climate-related issues and how to deal with them.</p>
<p>What Australia and Indonesia seem to share, it might cynically be suggested, is internal disagreement over the nature of the problem being faced, and steps that might be taken to address it. </p>
<p>Second, Jokowi called for Australia and Indonesia to be “anchors for development programs” in the Pacific region.</p>
<p>Like Australia, Indonesia has recently been paying increased attention to the nations of the South Pacific. Last October, it established the <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-launches-212m-international-development-aid-fund">Indonesian Agency for International Development</a>, with a focus on the South Pacific. Speaking at the launch of the agency, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi noted assistance had already been provided to Tuvalu, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Fiji, as well as Myanmar and the Philippines.</p>
<p>Australia’s renewed interest in the South Pacific is linked to the increased Chinese presence in the region. But Indonesia’s concern is less with China than with the status of its easternmost provinces of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-world-failed-west-papua-in-its-campaign-for-independence-129623">West Papua</a> and Papua. The movement seeking the independence of this region from Indonesia has its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/03/indonesia-accuses-vanuatu-of-inexcusable-support-for-west-papua">greatest support in the south Pacific</a>, particularly in Vanuatu, though support has also come from Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-scott-morrison-deliver-on-climate-change-in-tuvalu-or-is-his-pacific-step-up-doomed-121501">Can Scott Morrison deliver on climate change in Tuvalu – or is his Pacific 'step up' doomed?</a>
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<p>Indonesia has <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-aid-agency-fund-pacific-nations-papua-independence-12023670">formally denied the establishment of the agency</a> was aimed at countering international criticism of Indonesia’s position in Papua. But the suspicion there is a link will be hard to shake off.</p>
<p>Australia’s formal position on the Papuan provinces is made clear in the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2008/3.html">2006 Lombok Treaty</a>, which committed each party to supporting the territorial integrity of the other, and not providing support to separatist movements. There is, though, considerable support for Papuan separatism in the Australian community, reflected in the parliament particularly by the Greens. The Greens’ new leader, Adam Bandt, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2020/feb/10/nationals-coalition-liberals-queensland-morrison-politics-live?page=with:block-5e40cc448f08e13324740425#block-5e40cc448f08e13324740425">is reported to have told Jokowi</a>, after his address: </p>
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<p>Thank you for your speech, thanks for your comments on climate change, now please get something done on West Papua.</p>
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<p>There is nothing new in the dilemma facing the Australian government on Papua, but the increased Indonesian focus on the Pacific region could well provide more opportunities for the two countries to differ than to work together effectively.</p>
<p>Finally, Jokowi’s speech was notable for what he did not say.</p>
<p>There was no mention of China’s increasingly activist foreign and defence policy position, especially in the South China Sea. However, given the issue was explicitly considered in the <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-0">joint statement</a> of the two leaders, the president may have deemed that sufficient.</p>
<p>The other significant omission was any mention of easing conditions for the issuing of visas to Indonesians to visit Australia. This had been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-08/indonesia-s-jokowi-to-urge-visa-rule-easing-on-australia-visit">widely discussed in Indonesia</a> before the president left for Australia. Scott Morrison <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-10/joko-widodo-indonesian-president-addresses-australian-parliament/11948604">did commit to reviewing the visa situation</a>, but Jokowi would be well advised not to hold his breath.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Brown is affiliated with the Australia Indonesia Business Council. This article does not reflect the views of the AIBC.</span></em></p>The Indonesian president outlined four major steps to improve the relationship, two of which were quite unexpected.Colin Brown, Adjunct Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1091012018-12-21T05:54:55Z2018-12-21T05:54:55ZAustralia not moving embassy to Jerusalem. Will Oz-Indo relations improve?<p>After protests from the Indonesian government over Australia’s plan to move their embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Australia’s prime minister Scott Morrison recently announced <a href="https://theconversation.com/government-hopes-jerusalem-compromise-will-smooth-indonesian-trade-deal-108880">they will not move the embassy</a>. </p>
<p>Morrison said Australia recognised West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but will wait for a peace settlement between Israel and Palestine before deciding on their embassy plans. </p>
<p>This may reduce the tension between Australia and Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim majority and a supporter of Palestinian independence. </p>
<p>Australia is an important strategic partner for Indonesia. In fact, the two countries have planned to sign a bilateral free trade deal. But this has been delayed, allegedly due to Indonesia’s objection over Australia’s plan to move its embassy in Israel. Indonesia’s foreign minister Retno Marsudi has told Australia’s foreign minister Marisa Payne that the plan to move the embassy would “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/indonesian-anger-over-jerusalem-revealed-in-whatsapp-exchange-20181017-p50a6y.html">slap Indonesia’s face on the Palestine issue</a>”.</p>
<h2>Why Indonesia got upset</h2>
<p>Indonesia and Australia have always had a fluctuating relationship. This episode rattled Indonesia because recognition of Palestine is one of the key foreign policy values of Indonesia. This value <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/119688/news-focus--indonesia-will-always-fight-for-and-be-with-palestine">can be traced back to 1962</a> during the presidency of Sukarno, where the president himself asserted that Indonesia would always support the Palestinian struggle for independence by opposing Israel.</p>
<p>Embassies hold not only functional purpose, but also symbolic. Therefore, relocating the Australian embassy to Jerusalem might imply a symbolic support for Israel as the sole authority to control Jerusalem. </p>
<p>Both Israel and Palestine regard Jerusalem as their capital. According to the 1947 Partition Plan, the city should be designated as a <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-trump-take-note-how-jerusalem-went-from-hosting-16-embassies-to-zero-1.5627682">“corpus separatum”</a> (a separate entity) which does not belong to any state under the legal United Nations designation. </p>
<p>The international community has been quite cautious with Jerusalem. Most countries that recognise Israel station their embassies in Tel Aviv, the largest city in Israel. Locating embassies in such a contested area is a practice which is considerably frowned upon by the <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/amp/middle-east-news/u-s-embassy-gaza-protests-and-nakba-day-live-updates-1.6078190">United Nations resolution</a> proponents that believe Jerusalem should always be a neutral zone.</p>
<p>Currently, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/as-criticism-for-israel-mounts-guatemala-opens-its-embassy-in-jerusalem/2018/05/16/17d5054a-5908-11e8-8836-a4a123c359ab_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ce10ca1b0547">there are only two states</a> which host their embassies in Jerusalem: the United States and Guatemala. </p>
<p>Both countries moved their embassies in May, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-guatemala/guatemala-opens-embassy-in-jerusalem-two-days-after-u-s-move-idUSKCN1IH0Q7">inciting condemnation from the international community</a> which regards such a move as potentially hindering prospects for peace between Israel and Palestine.</p>
<h2>Will it define the Indonesian presidential elections?</h2>
<p>As Indonesia prepares for its presidential election next year, it seems that any issue can either boost or decrease the electability of all candidates. At the moment, both candidates seem to have slightly different takes on how Indonesia should approach Australia regarding this issue. </p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/incumbent-jokowi-versus-prabowo-who-will-win-indonesias-presidential-election-108338">Incumbent Jokowi versus Prabowo – who will win Indonesia's presidential election?</a>
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<p>Joko Widodo, the incumbent candidate who is running for his second term, takes an idealistic approach toward the plan. He <a href="http://setkab.go.id/en/statement-by-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-h-e-joko-widodo-at-the-opening-of-the-5th-extraordinary-organisation-of-islamic-cooperation-oic-summit-on-palestine-and-al-quds-al-sharif-jak/">asserts</a> that Palestinian independence is the priority of Indonesia. </p>
<p>The Indonesian president has also reportedly <a href="https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/australia-akan-geser-kedubes-ke-yerusalem-jokowi-telepon-pm-morrison-1539683665122089606">called</a> Morrison to relay his concerns about Australia’s plan. Widodo, who is trying to gain more support from conservative Islamic constituents, will see this issue as a chance to align himself more closely with such groups.</p>
<p>On the contrary, the former general Prabowo Subianto, who is currently running for his second candidacy, highlights the importance of respecting Australia’s choice. While acknowledging Indonesia is a <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/923692/jk-responds-to-prabowos-statement-on-australian-embassy/full&view=ok">supporter</a> of Palestinian independence, Subianto also believes Australia is a <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/25/on-ozs-jerusalem-debate-prabowo-says-why-not-maruf-says-no.html">sovereign state which deserves respect</a> in their decisions. </p>
<p>At the moment, it remains to be seen how the development of this incident may affect the campaign of both candidates. During the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/28/new-president-should-prioritize-palestine-alwi.html">2014 presidential election debates</a> Palestinian independence was among the key topics discussed.</p>
<h2>Next chapter in the relationship</h2>
<p>Last November, Australia and Indonesia were expected to approve a bilateral free trade deal at the East Asian Summit in Singapore. It was intended as a conclusion of the eight year negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement started in 2010. The deal would include vocational training and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-31/australia-and-indonesia-pledge-closer-ties/10189458">greater access to live cattle, dairy, and horticulture</a>. But the signing has now been held back for an unspecified period of time.</p>
<p>Simon Birmingham, the Australian Trade Minister claims the delay was largely caused by a problem with translations. Yet, SBS also reported <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/translation-issues-not-embassy-move-behind-delay-in-trade-deal-with-indonesia">some Indonesian ministers publicly said the deal is on hold</a> until Australia clarifies whether they will shift their Israeli embassy to Jerusalem.</p>
<p>So Australia’s decision to delay their plan to move their embassy will maintain the status quo. Suspicions might persist as Morrison’s recognition of West Jerusalem as the Israeli capital city remains unchanged. Responding to the uncertain conditions, Australia issued a <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/australia-warns-citizens-ahead-of-expected-jerusalem-move">warning</a> for their citizens to “exercise a high degree of caution” while travelling in Indonesia. </p>
<p>We now have to wait and see if Australia’s compromise really eased the tension and will eventually warm the Australia-Indonesia relationship, expediting the signing of the trade deal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ario Bimo Utomo tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Did Australia’s compromise really ease the tension with Indonesia?Ario Bimo Utomo, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional "Veteran" Jawa TimurLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1051732018-10-23T04:22:15Z2018-10-23T04:22:15ZHow will Australia’s plan to move its embassy to Jerusalem affect relations with Indonesia?<p>Australia’s suggestion that it might move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/am/indonesia-australia-relations-rocked-by-pms-jerusalem-statement/10394828">upset</a> Indonesia. </p>
<p>Indonesia is not happy with Australia’s proposal as it indicates strong political support for Israel. Indonesia, the world’s biggest Muslim country, has long expressed <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-launches-solidarity-week-for-palestine-to-support-independence-struggle/">solidarity</a> with the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. </p>
<p>Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/10/16/indonesia-questions-merit-of-australias-possible-embassy-move-to-jerusalem.html">warned</a> Australia that the move would harm their bilateral relationship. </p>
<p>Despite the tensions between Canberra and Jakarta, Australia Prime Minister Scott Morrison said the Jerusalem issue <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/pm-insists-indonesia-trade-deal-on-track-despite-jerusalem-embassy-tensions">would not affect</a> the ongoing discussion on the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA).</p>
<p>However, as Indonesia is nearing general and presidential elections next year, suspension of the IA-CEPA deal is still possible as religion has become a hot commodity for politicians to win votes.</p>
<p>A delay will not only create a loss for the Australian and Indonesian economies but will also change foreign policy dynamics between the two countries.</p>
<h2>Suspension is still possible</h2>
<p>During Morrison’s recent visit to Jakarta, Australia and Indonesia <a href="http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/09/02/309921290/Indonesia-Australia-Reach-Agreement-on-IA-CEPA">reached</a> an agreement to finalise IA-CEPA. However, this agreement is not yet sealed and is still waiting for completion of the full-text draft. </p>
<p>So, things still can change should Australia follow through with it Jerusalem plan at the height of <a href="https://australiaindonesiacentre.org/guide-to-the-2019-indonesian-elections-path-to-the-presidency/">elections in Indonesia</a> next year.</p>
<p>In recent years, Indonesian politicians have used religion to lure voters. Before he was elected in 2014, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo promoted pluralism in his campaign. He had to endure campaigns by his opponent Prabowo Subianto that painted him as <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservative-turn-will-continue-in-indonesian-presidential-election-next-year-101032">un-Islamic</a>. Jokowi narrowly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28205787">won the election</a>. </p>
<p>From this experience, Jokowi, seeking re-election in another race with Prabowo, now uses the <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservative-turn-will-continue-in-indonesian-presidential-election-next-year-101032">Islam card</a> to win voters.</p>
<p>Jokowi has named hard-line Muslim cleric <a href="https://theconversation.com/political-compromise-behind-indonesias-vice-presidential-nominees-experts-respond-101382">Ma'ruf Amin</a> as his running mate to gain votes from Muslim conservatives. It’s possible that Jokowi will hold up the trade deal in response to Australia’s Jerusalem plan to appease these voters. </p>
<p>In his 2014 presidential campaign, Joko Widodo declared his <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/2616209/sikap-jokowi-dukung-kemerdekaan-palestina-terus-banjir-pujian">full support</a> for Palestinian freedom.</p>
<h2>Economic losses – reversing progress</h2>
<p>Indonesia and Australia will miss out on many economic opportunities should the deal be put on hold. </p>
<p>Under the IA-CEPA, Indonesia will enjoy <a href="https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/ditargetkan-rampung-november-ini-keuntungan-perjanjian-ia-cepa-bagi-indonesia">0% tariffs</a> for all export commodities. These include automotive products, herbicides, pesticides, electronic equipment, machinery, rubber, wood, coffee, chocolate and paper. The removal of several tariff barriers will also allow Indonesia to expand palm oil exports.</p>
<p>For Australia, this agreement will <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/Documents/iae-cepa-key-outcomes.pdf">enhance</a> its steel and agricultural exports to Indonesia. It will also allow Australian universities to establish branches in Indonesia. </p>
<p>This is a good opportunity for these universities to unlock the benefits of extending their market to Australia’s closest neighbour. This investment opportunity will also enable Indonesia to improve its education system.</p>
<h2>Trade as a foreign policy tool</h2>
<p>Suspension of the IA-CEPA deal would impact relations between Australia and Indonesia beyond economic issues. </p>
<p>Australia might have seen the IA-CEPA deal only in economic terms. But the Jerusalem case has shown that the trade deal is also related to both countries’ overall foreign policy.</p>
<p>In these circumstances, the Jerusalem brouhaha may give Indonesia leverage to enhance its bargaining position in its deal. If necessary, Indonesia can revisit the list of its <a href="https://kumparan.com/@kumparanbisnis/daftar-barang-yang-diekspor-ri-ke-australia-sesuai-kesepakatan-ia-cepa-1536303040587442073">sensitive sectors</a> to ensure Australian exports will not harm Indonesia’s import-competing industries. Investment in higher education can also be reassessed to get a fairer go, given recent <a href="https://tirto.id/aptisi-tolak-izin-perguruan-tinggi-asing-beroperasi-di-indonesia-cDZ7">opposition</a> from Indonesian private universities.</p>
<p>Indonesia also may include a wider agenda – for example, support for Palestine – in the trade negotiation. It’s common to put non-economic agendas into free trade negotiations. For example, the European Union recently <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-trade-deal-paris-climate-change-accord-agreement-cecilia-malmstr-m-a8206806.html">refused trade deals</a> with countries that do not ratify the Paris Accord. The United States is facing calls to raise concerns about <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-official-seeks-to-sanction-chinese-leaders-on-human-rights-concerns/2018/06/28/e965c414-7a37-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.52b9e9f3e4e1">human rights violations in China</a> in negotiations on a free trade deal with China. </p>
<h2>The future relations</h2>
<p>The bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia depends on who holds power in Australia. In the past, people assumed that under Labor Party governments Australia would be a nicer neighbour than when governed by Liberal-National Coalition governments. </p>
<p>This is due to Australian governments’ historical Anglophile policy that supports the interest of Western countries and undermines regional engagement. This stereotype of the Liberal Party has <a href="https://theconversation.com/views-from-abroad-how-is-the-world-seeing-australias-election-60859">weakened</a> over time as both the Labor and Liberal parties <a href="https://blogs.griffith.edu.au/asiainsights/how-deep-is-australias-foreign-policy-bipartisanship/">share a common foreign policy to Indonesia</a>.</p>
<p>However, Morrison’s plan to move Australia’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem may revive such a stereotype. </p>
<p>Australia has followed <a href="http://time.com/5174043/us-embassy-jerusalem-may/">US Israel policy</a> under Donald Trump. This indicates that, despite a largely bipartisan foreign policy, each party has a distinctive foreign policy <a href="https://www.oup.com.au/books/higher-education/social-sciences-and-humanities/9780195525632-australian-foreign-policy">tradition</a>. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the future of Indonesia-Australia relations remains promising. History has shown repeatedly that the relationship prevails despite some <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=ppNVDwAAQBAJ&dq">ups and downs</a>. </p>
<p>Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono once <a href="https://www.kemlu.go.id/canberra/en/arsip/pidato/Pages/Speech-By-H.E.-DR.-Susilo-Bambang-Yudhoyono-President-Republic-Of-Indonesia-Before-The-Australian-Pa.aspx">suggested</a> Australia and Indonesia relations should go beyond being friends and neighbours. To have a great future together, he recommended that Indonesia and Australia should see each other as a strategic partner. The two countries should continue to work to play active roles as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2016.1238870?journalCode=cajp20">middle powers</a> in global politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hangga Fathana tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>If their trade deal is delayed, this will not only create a huge loss for the Australian and Indonesian economies but also change foreign policy dynamics between the two countries.Hangga Fathana, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/946352018-05-03T09:05:55Z2018-05-03T09:05:55ZIndonesia has far more than enough pumped hydro storage sites to support a 100% renewable electricity grid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215370/original/file-20180418-163966-1lke2st.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hydro-power-plant-370005596?src=H7pQkFxJtNxAT9ZqC8igMA-1-3">Maxim Burkovskiy/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the support of the <a href="http://australiaindonesiacentre.org/">Australia Indonesia Centre</a> we have identified 657 <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-pushing-water-uphill-can-solve-our-renewable-energy-issues-28196">potential sites across Bali for pumped hydro energy storage (PHES)</a>, with a combined potential storage capacity of 2,300 Gigawatt-hours. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-pushing-water-uphill-can-solve-our-renewable-energy-issues-28196">Pumped hydro energy storage</a> is a technique to store energy produced by electricity generation. Using electricity generated from renewable energy such as solar power and wind, the potential sites for PHES that we identified in Bali would be enough to support a 100% renewable Indonesian electricity grid and more. </p>
<p>Solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind are now the leading electricity generation technologies <a href="https://theconversation.com/tenaga-surya-kini-sumber-listrik-terpopuler-di-dunia-84307">being installed worldwide each year</a>. Gas and coal are in third and fourth spots respectively. <a href="https://theconversation.com/solar-pv-and-wind-are-on-track-to-replace-all-coal-oil-and-gas-within-two-decades-94033">PV is accelerating away from other energy generation technologies</a> because it’s cheaper, scalable and produces no greenhouse gas emissions, and because there is vast availability of sunshine. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213680/original/file-20180408-5578-qx69l7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Net new generation capacity installed worldwide in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indonesia has large solar potential because of its tropical location. Much less than 1% of Indonesian land would be required to produce all of the nation’s electricity using PV. About half of the panels would be on the roofs of buildings. Although Indonesia has only a small amount of PV at present, exponential growth can change this quickly - as happened in Australia, China and many other countries.</p>
<p>Because of its equatorial location solar energy does not vary much throughout the year, unlike in higher latitudes. PV (and wind) are now economically competitive with new-build coal and gas in Indonesia. </p>
<p>The Australian and Indonesian electricity systems are of similar size. In Australia, effectively all new generation capacity is PV and wind, and no new coal power stations are ever likely to be built. PV and wind are replacing old coal power stations as these are retired. About 4.5 Gigawatts of new PV and wind will be installed in Australia in 2018, compared with peak demand of 35 Gigawatts.</p>
<p>Although PV and wind are variable energy resources that depend on the local weather, the approaches to support them to achieve a reliable 100% renewable electricity grid are straightforward: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>provide energy storage in the form of pumped hydro energy storage (PHES) and batteries, coupled with <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/demand-management-4872">demand management</a></p></li>
<li><p>provide strong interconnection of the electricity grid between regions using high-voltage power lines spanning long distances. This smooths out adverse local weather, greatly reducing the amount of storage needed.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>PHES accounts for <a href="http://www.energystorageexchange.org/projects/data_visualization">97% of energy storage worldwide</a> because it is the cheapest form of large-scale storage, with an operational lifetime of 50 years or more. Most existing PHES systems are located in river valleys and are associated with hydroelectric systems. However, off-river PHES has larger potential because of the much larger number of potential sites away from rivers.</p>
<p>Annual water requirements of a PHES-supported 100% renewable electricity grid would be much less than the current fossil fuel system, because wind and PV do not require cooling water. PHES, batteries and demand management are all likely to have prominent roles as the Indonesian grid transitions to 100% renewable energy.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong><em>Read more: <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-pushing-water-uphill-can-solve-our-renewable-energy-issues-28196">How pushing water uphill can solve our renewable energy issues</a></em></strong> </p>
<hr>
<p>Off-river PHES requires pairs of modestly sized reservoirs at different altitudes, typically with an area of 100 hectares. The reservoirs are joined by a pipe with a pump and turbine. Water is pumped uphill on windy and sunny days when electricity is plentiful; then, when generation tails off, electricity can be dispatched on demand by releasing the stored water downhill through the turbine. </p>
<p>Off-river PHES typically delivers maximum power for <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544217309568">between five and 25 hours</a>, depending on the size of the reservoirs. </p>
<p>Indonesia has enormous pumped hydro storage potential. PHES can readily be developed to balance the electricity grid with any amount of solar and wind power, all the way up to 100%. Figure 2 shows the location of prospective areas – the red areas are highly prospective.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213683/original/file-20180408-5578-1cf9kn9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Prospective areas of Indonesia that are suitable for pumped hydro. Areas coloured red are highly prospective.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most of the 657 potential PHES sites we have identified in Bali are off-river. Of course, there is also large potential on other islands. We will soon undertake further Indonesian site searching, and expect to find <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-energy-storage-here-are-22-000-sites-for-pumped-hydro-across-australia-84275">as many sites as in Australia</a> (where we found 22,000 good sites). </p>
<p>The locations of the Bali upper reservoir sites (blue dots) are shown in Figure 3 below. Each site has between 1 gigawatt-hour (GWh) and 100 GWh of storage potential. </p>
<p>To put this in perspective, Indonesia probably needs less than 1,000 GWh of storage spread across a few dozen sites within the archipelago to support a 100% renewable electricity system. Developers can afford to be choosy with this large oversupply of sites. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213681/original/file-20180408-5578-1jadixl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 3: Upper reservoir pumped hydro sites in Bali.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Figure 4 below show a synthetic Google Earth image for some of the potential upper reservoirs in Bali (more details on the site search are <a href="http://re100.eng.anu.edu.au/research/phes/">available here</a>). The larger reservoirs shown in each image are of such a scale that only one or two would be required to stabilise a 100% renewable electricity system for Bali.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213682/original/file-20180408-5603-frrz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 4: At most, one or two of the sites shown would be developed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Detailed information about the Bali sites is available <a href="http://re100.eng.anu.edu.au/research/re/for/indonesia.php">here</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94635/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Blakers receives funding from the Australia Indonesia Centre and the Australian Renewable Energy Agency.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Stocks receives funding from ARENA for an Atlas of Pumped Hydro Storage. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bin Lu tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Annual water requirements of a PHES-supported 100% renewable electricity grid would be much less than the current fossil fuel system, because wind and PV do not require cooling water.Andrew Blakers, Professor of Engineering, Australian National UniversityBin Lu, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityMatthew Stocks, Research Fellow, ANU College of Engineering and Computer Science, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/845142017-10-26T10:09:35Z2017-10-26T10:09:35ZCan Australia and Indonesia work together on challenges in the South China Sea?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191790/original/file-20171025-25551-pyoxn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia and Indonesia are official non-claimants of the South China Sea.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China is inching closer to its objective of <em>de facto</em> control of the South China Sea. The US has responded by regularly sending warships and helicopters. Yet, this seems unlikely to deter China’s incursions in the South China Sea and might continue to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/let-be-clear-china-would-call-america-s-bluff-south-china-se">increase tensions between the US and China</a>.</p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia have shared interests in seeing peace and security in the South China Sea, as their prosperity is tied to its trade lanes. But to minimise the risks of conflict, the two middle powers should focus on challenges <em>arising</em> from this maritime region, like illegal fishing.</p>
<h2>Middle power co-operation?</h2>
<p>Australian and Indonesian scholars have long debated how the two countries should react, respectively, to South China Sea disputes. But, recently, there has been discussion on how middle powers, including Australia and Indonesia, can play constructive roles in addressing such challenges <em>together</em>.</p>
<p>Middle powers are often vaguely defined as countries that are “neither large nor small” in geopolitical and economic weight. They’re often multilaterally oriented coalition builders working under international law to limit great power ambitions. They also strengthen the influence of smaller powers through the construction of international regimes and organisations.</p>
<p>The idea that middle powers should form a community to tackle the region’s woes is not new. <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/07/21/time-for-the-middle-powers-to-step-up/">Former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans</a> has called for renewed activism among Asian middle powers to mediate great power relations. Strategists, including <a href="http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2016-10/cog_27_web_v3.pdf">Brendan Taylor and William Tow</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/south-china-sea/sinoamerican-rivalry-in-the-south-china-sea-is-it-time-to-form-a-maritime-middle-power-cooperative/0AF9CBB61DD79F38B6469BABEA34D15B">Sukjoon Yoon and C.J. Jenner</a>, have called for a community of middle powers to help mediate the South China Sea disputes and encourage co-operation in responding to related security challenges.</p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia (and sometimes South Korea) have often been singled out as the middle powers that should lead such a community. They possess relative strategic and economic weight, are official non-claimants in the South China Sea territorial disputes, and have shared security outlooks. They also advocate a rules-based international order to constrain the ambitions of great powers that impinge on the preferences of smaller states.</p>
<h2>Viable areas of co-operation?</h2>
<p>But could Australia and Indonesia effectively mediate great power tensions together? And is there space for co-operation between the two middle powers to address South China Seas challenges?</p>
<p>Mediation, as <a href="https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/nassp-pdf/6.4,%20Middle%20Powers%20and%20the%20South%20China%20Sea.pdf">Professor Andrew O’Neil has argued</a>, may prove difficult as Canberra and Jakarta are constrained by different strategic challenges.</p>
<p>Australia is too closely aligned with the US to become a “neutral party”. And Indonesia is considered an <em>unofficial</em> claimant in the disputes, as there is an overlap between China’s Nine-Dash Line (a vague demarcation line drawn by China) and the North Natuna Sea. </p>
<p>These factors limit the ability of the two countries to play meaningful roles in mediating tensions in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, there could be room for middle-power co-operation in addressing specific challenges and sources of conflict.</p>
<p>For a start, they can focus on non-traditional maritime security issues, such as illegal fishing and piracy. These have the potential to ignite conflict between states as well.</p>
<p>There is specific need to act on overfishing and illegal fishing in the South China Sea. As discussed <a href="http://theconversation.com/fishing-not-oil-is-at-the-heart-of-the-south-china-sea-dispute-63580">in The Conversation</a> last year, the depletion of over-exploited fishery resources has pushed the region’s fishermen further out to sea. Clashes between fishermen and coast guards have become frequent and have the potential to rile up nationalist sentiments in countries involved.</p>
<p>A regional regime has to be constructed to manage the issue of over-fishing. It should ensure sustainable management of fishery resources and the legality of fishing in the high seas. </p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia can play important roles in advocating such a regime. Under President Joko Widodo, Indonesia has placed a priority on addressing illegal fishing. Australia, with its experience and expertise in marine and fisheries management, can offer assistance in capacity-building. </p>
<p>Next year’s inaugural Australia-ASEAN Leaders’ Summit is a great place to initiate conversation on a framework for fisheries management.</p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia should also rejuvenate existing security forums, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+ and the ASEAN Regional Forum. These get flak for being messy “talk shops”. Scholars and policymakers are also often divided over whether to have more or less security forums. </p>
<p>But these forums provide an important opportunity for interaction among policymakers. Australia and Indonesia have been active in promoting discussions on maritime security issues in these forums. It is necessary to continue this trend.</p>
<p>Middle powers may be inferior in military and economic capabilities compared to great powers. But they can curtail great power ambitions when they co-operate. </p>
<p>What is most necessary from the leadership of middle powers is strong political will. A secure, peaceful region will benefit the national interests of all countries. Thus, all parties should invest their political wills to maintain it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gatra Priyandita is affiliated with the Australian National University. He is a scholarship recipient of the Indonesian Education Endowment Fund.</span></em></p>Australia and Indonesia should collaborate to address challenges in the South China Sea and help de-escalate great power tensions.Gatra Priyandita, PhD candidate in International Relations, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/842842017-10-03T09:24:15Z2017-10-03T09:24:15ZAustralia tries to unlock the benefits of proximity with Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187262/original/file-20170924-17262-aldk2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It is difficult to find two G20 neighbours which trade and invest in each other as little as Australia and Indonesia do.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia is one of Australia’s closest neighbours. But surprisingly the two <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20">G20</a> countries trade and invest very little between each other. In fact, it is difficult to find two G20 neighbours that trade and invest in each other as little as Australia and Indonesia do. </p>
<p>If you look at the <a href="http://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/d76593b9-a160-4474-8172-5b4a87a32c18/PUAC-Power-of-Proximity-AIWG-Sept2017.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU">numbers</a>, Indonesia ranks as Australia’s 14th largest trade partner and Australia takes 10th place in Indonesia. The value of two-way trade stands at US$8.6 billion. </p>
<p>Compare these numbers to a couple other G20 neighbours in the table below. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187261/original/file-20170924-15786-1e3xg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Examples of bilateral trade among G20 economies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://wits.worldbank.org/analyticaldata/analyticaldata.aspx">Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution Analytical Data (2017)</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The investment numbers are even more disappointing. The total Australian investment in Indonesia is less than 1% of Australia’s total outbound investment. </p>
<p>These numbers certainly do not reflect Indonesia’s rising economic importance and that it is predicted to become the fourth largest economy by 2050. Even if this prediction, based on a <a href="http://www.pwc.com/world2050">forward-looking report by PwC</a> turns out to be too optimistic, Indonesia’s <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/07/12/demographic-bonus-and-ageing-the-mixed-blessing-of-family-planning.html">demographic dividend</a> will still propel Indonesia’s economic growth over the next 25 years. </p>
<p>This narrative justifies a renewed effort on behalf of Australia to try and fix limping economic relations. </p>
<h2>More than Indonesia’s investment risk</h2>
<p>In July 2017 a group of Australian and Indonesian experts gathered in Perth, organised by the Perth USAsia Centre, to examine the causes behind weak economic relations and what can be done to improve them. In <a href="http://perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/the-power-of-proximity">a report outlining their findings</a>, the Perth USAsia Centre’s Working Group on Australia – Indonesia relations observed that both economies might not be complementary. Because of their reliance on natural resource exports Indonesia and Australia are actually competitors rather than collaborators. </p>
<p>In the report, the Working Group recognised Australian companies find it difficult to navigate Indonesia’s business climate. Foreign ownership rules and other regulations render attractive investments unappealing. Unable to withstand higher risk, Australian businesses move on to other opportunities. </p>
<p>But low risk tolerance cannot explain everything. Australian businesses have worked and thrived in complicated business environments elsewhere. Take China for example. With its lack of government transparency, shaky property rights, and bureaucratic corruption, it actually falls rather close to Indonesia on the <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings">World Bank’s ease of doing business index</a>. </p>
<p>What Australia does have is a narrative China’s economic rise and how it has benefited directly from it. Driven by demand from China, Australia’s <a href="https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2014/dec/pdf/bu-1214-3.pdf">mining exports</a> more than tripled within 10 years. This gave Australia’s per capita disposable income a prosperous boost. </p>
<h2>Indo-Pacific shared narrative</h2>
<p>Rather than perception of risk and uncertainty, the working group explained that Australia simply has yet to see Indonesia as an opportunity. </p>
<p>There is yet a narrative of Indonesia’s rise and what it could mean for Australian businesses. The working group recommended Australia and Indonesia to craft a shared “Indo-Pacific” narrative. Instead of perceiving each other as a threat, they should choose to see each other as an opportunity. </p>
<p>There are signs of change in the way Australia thinks about Indonesia. Australia <a href="http://indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jakt/MR17_062.html">opened a new consulate in Surabaya</a> in September to focus on commercial engagement and expanding Australia’s diplomatic footprint in the country. Four Australian states have trade and investment representatives based in Jakarta. </p>
<p>The state of Western Australia this year appointed its first minister for Asian Engagement, Bill Johnston. With his portfolio comes a mandate to promote trade, investment, cultural links, and government-to-government ties. Minister Johnston is making <a href="https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/McGowan/2017/09/Minister-Johnston-visits-Indonesia-to-advance-opportunities.aspx">his first visit</a> to Indonesia in September.</p>
<p>On the business side, there are plenty of success stories. Interflour Group, an Australian joint venture with Indonesia’s Salim Group built flour mills in South Sulawesi and West Java and supplied them with Australian wheat. </p>
<p>To underscore the proximity advantage that Australia and Indonesia have, it takes a grain ship only nine days to travel from the grain terminal in Western Australia to sail to Makassar and back. A comparable trip to ports in southern China would take about 10 days one way. </p>
<h2>IA-CEPA: substantive starting point</h2>
<p>Currently under negotiation, the Indonesia – Australia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA), might be a substantive starting point to revive Australia and Indonesia economic relations. </p>
<p>If finalised, the IA-CEPA would be Indonesia’s second substantive bilateral trade and investment deal, after its <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/joint0807.html">agreement with Japan</a> went into force in 2008. </p>
<p>Now the IA-CEPA has completed its sixth round of negotiations. Both governments have committed to <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/iacepa/Pages/eighth-round-of-ia-cepa-negotiations.aspx">conclude the agreement</a> before the end of 2017. The working group sees this goal critical to solving the tepid trade and investment climate. </p>
<p>Indonesia and Australia find themselves locked together by geography in the midst of the most economically dynamic regions in the world. The choice is simple: work together and prosper or ignore one another and miss out on the benefits their proximity offers. With IA-CEPA and an earnest Australian strategy to engage with Indonesia, it looks like both countries are on the right track.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84284/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Springer tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Trade and investment between Indonesia and Australia is very little despite their proximity. But there are signs of change in the way Australia thinks about Indonesia.Kyle Springer, Program Manager at the Perth USAsia Centre, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/736652017-02-26T23:57:18Z2017-02-26T23:57:18ZTrade, security ties and engaging the Indonesian diaspora – what you need to know about Widodo’s Australia visit<p>Officials from both Canberra and Jakarta must have been privately relieved last night. The first official visit to Australia by Indonesian President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) had finally taken place, and gone off without a hitch.</p>
<p>Jokowi is nearly half way through his five year term of office, yet has only now made the relatively short journey to Australia. He was due to visit in November last year, but called it off at the last minute due to political unrest at home. This was of course related to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/jakarta-christian-governor-to-face-blasphemy-trial-over-islam-insult-claim">blasphemy allegations</a> against his former deputy as Jakarta’s governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or “Ahok”.</p>
<p>Malcolm Turnbull, by contrast, visited Jakarta in November 2015, just two months after coming to office. This tends to reinforce the standard narrative: Indonesia is more important to us than we are to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Jokowi’s recent visit was a good deal shorter than the one planned for last year. It was shorter too than the visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that immediately preceded it. </p>
<p>Jokowi’s timetable also omitted several of the high-profile events planned for the earlier visit, including an address to Parliament. But the visit did highlight several important issues in the bilateral relationship.</p>
<h2>Trade ties</h2>
<p>One is the low level of <a href="http://theconversation.com/australia-must-act-now-to-secure-economic-ties-with-a-rising-indonesia-61755">trade and investment flows</a> between the two countries. Currently two-way trade is worth <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/indo.pdf">around A$11.2 billion a year</a>; neither country ranks within the other’s top ten trading partners.</p>
<p>Even if some of the more optimistic assessments of Indonesia’s economic prospects turn out to be exaggerated, there is little doubt the country’s economy will <a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf">continue to grow</a> at a considerably faster rate than Australia’s for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>At a time when Australia has successfully negotiated free trade agreements (FTA) with many of its Asian neighbours, efforts to conclude a similar deal with Indonesia have lagged.</p>
<p>Negotiations for an <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement</a> (CEPA) between the two countries started nearly a decade ago. They stalled in 2013, and were only re-started in March 2016. The current target for signing off on the Agreement is the end of this year.</p>
<p>Jokowi signalled his support for the agreement by focusing on it as a key point of discussion. His visit follows directly on from the sixth round of bilateral negotiations in Canberra, attended by a senior Indonesian delegation.</p>
<p>However, broader Indonesian political and community commitment to free trade principles is not as evident. The <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/iacepa/Documents/ia-bpg-position-paper.pdf">Indonesia-Australia Business Partnership Group</a> noted in a 2016 report “there is a general cynicism towards FTAs, CEPAs and an open economy in Indonesia”.</p>
<p>Even Jokowi himself has not been averse to <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_59.pdf">adopting measures</a> that look more like economic nationalism than free trade.</p>
<p>Moreover, many of the real barriers to trade between the two countries, and to Australian investment in Indonesia, lie not so much in formal regulations as in informal practices. Opaque regulatory mechanisms, weak legal protection and corruption in Indonesia all hinder trade and investment. </p>
<p>Indonesia is making progress in many of these areas, but <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/%7E/media/wbg/doingbusiness/documents/profiles/country/idn.pdf">overall still ranks</a> below the regional average in ease of doing business.</p>
<h2>Security co-operation</h2>
<p>A second issue highlighted for discussion was security, including counter-terrorism and the problems posed to each country by returning former ISIS fighters. It <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-26/indonesia-and-australia-restore-military-cooperation-after-talks/8304514">was agreed</a> that full ties between the two militaries would be restored, after <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-04/indonesia-suspends-all-military-cooperation-with-australia/8161362">minor disruptions</a> two months ago, in relation to training materials at an Australian base that were seen as insulting by Indonesia.</p>
<p>There was also speculation on the possibility of joint Australia-Indonesia patrols in the South China Sea. Both countries <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/02/26/australia-indonesia-restore-defence-ties">reportedly emphasised</a> the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.</p>
<p>But no details on any joint patrols have yet been released, probably because the idea is still rather undefined. It was raised by Indonesia’s defence minister Ryamizard Ryacudu during the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-01/south-china-sea-bishop-considers-joint-patrols-with-indonesia/7982600">joint meeting</a> of foreign and defence ministers in Bali in October 2016. Julie Bishop cautiously responded that Australia agreed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to explore options to increase maritime cooperation and of course that would include coordinated activities in the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>When Jokowi was asked about the idea before leaving Jakarta, he was also cautious. Such patrols, he said, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/jokowi-to-raise-joint-patrols-in-south-china-sea/news-story/9e7eb2c67704260bed03d582aa2d2deb">would be “very important”</a> as long as they did not raise tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine joint patrols in the South China Sea not raising tension with China – unless they were conducted wholly outside the waters claimed by China.</p>
<p>The patrols, of course, need not be naval. Vessels of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and the Australian Border Force already <a href="http://www.afma.gov.au/joint-australiaindonesia-illegal-fishing-patrol-success/">conduct joint patrols</a> with their Indonesian counterparts to counter illegal fishing in waters north of Australia.</p>
<p>Even so, Australia-Indonesia patrols – joint or coordinated, civil or military – in the South China Sea do not seem imminent.</p>
<h2>Indonesian community</h2>
<p>A third aspect of the visit has attracted little attention but is probably of considerable long-term significance to Jokowi. This was his meeting with members of the Indonesian community at Darling Harbour – fairly standard activity for visiting heads of government. </p>
<p>But such meetings have taken on significance for Indonesia in recent years as it develops the concept of what it calls the Indonesian diaspora, through the <a href="http://www.diasporaindonesia.org/index.php/about/diaspora">Indonesian Diaspora Network</a>.</p>
<p>Jakarta asserts there are some eight million members of this diaspora globally, albeit using a generous interpretation of the term. Looking to other national diasporas – especially the Chinese and Indian – Jakarta is hoping Indonesia’s will contribute to the country’s development at home, and the promotion of Indonesia overseas.</p>
<p>This is one of Indonesia’s most visible <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2781814">second-track (unofficial) diplomacy</a> initiatives. Its significance to Jakarta is indicated by the fact the founder of the network – and the chair of its advisory board – is Dino Patti Djalal. He is a former Indonesian ambassador to the United States.</p>
<p>Jokowi is looking to the diaspora in Australia to contribute to the network’s overall goals. As <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/02/26/australia-indonesia-restore-defence-ties">he put it</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>to return their knowledge and expertise back home, and contribute to the development of Indonesia. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In all, the visit was nothing particularly dramatic or surprising. It was just a friendly one – which is how Jakarta and Canberra want it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Brown does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jokowi’s visit was a good deal shorter than the one planned for last year. But it did highlight several important issues in the bilateral relationship.Colin Brown, Adjunct Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698862016-12-15T04:41:32Z2016-12-15T04:41:32ZIndonesia and Australia are sleeping ocean superpowers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149683/original/image-20161212-26074-t0t6ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C0%2C4573%2C3449&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a great opportunity and imperative for Australia and Indonesia to join forces to solve critical challenges facing the ocean and coastal regions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lkzz/www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In many ways, Australia and Indonesia represent ocean superpowers. The two neighbouring countries share huge marine resources and opportunities. At the same time both face increasing challenges to their oceans and coastal regions brought about by climate change and over-exploitation. </p>
<p>Recently, marine scientists from Australia and Indonesia identified possible areas of collaboration for their countries to solve these challenges. </p>
<p>The scientists came together at the inaugural <a href="http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/aiss/about-the-science-symposium">Australia Indonesia Science Symposium</a> organised by the Australian and Indonesian scientific academies. We were conveners for the two-day discussion between the Australian and Indonesian marine experts. </p>
<p>The scientists highlighted at least eight potential areas of collaboration on marine science and climate change: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>Scientists from both countries believe it’s important for Australia and Indonesia to work together to understand the impact of climate change on marine resources, and to create solutions. Climate change is causing rising sea levels and surface temperatures as well as ocean acidification. These have resulted in the bleaching of corals and mortality that affect livelihoods in both countries. Both scientific communities urge their governments to do more to rapidly reduce greenhouse gases.</p></li>
<li><p>They pointed out that Australia and Indonesia should look into developing a strategy to reduce CO₂ and other emissions by maximising their coastal ecosystems and oceans as carbon sinks. </p></li>
<li><p>The scientists recommended the two countries explore ways to increase cooperation and knowledge sharing in new technologies for the rapid monitoring of key marine resources. Many breakthroughs in technologies, such as image recognition, neural networks and machine learning, are set to rapidly reduce the time and costs of detailed reef monitoring. </p></li>
<li><p>The two scientific communities also suggested the countries work together to advance the sciences to better manage migratory species such as turtles, sharks and other megafauna. </p></li>
<li><p>They recommended a holistic approach to developing coastal fisheries. These fisheries require the development of whole-of-system thinking, with integrated management/governance that recognises the multiple uses and activities across space and time. </p></li>
<li><p>They noted that development of national parks has been successful to a substantial extent in both countries. But more work must be done in both countries. Baseline datasets need to be developed in order to detect and respond to present and future impacts. </p></li>
<li><p>The scientists see a need for Indonesia and Australia to develop greater cooperation on research, innovation and business development. The links between science and innovation and the blue economy need to be strengthened and reinforced.</p></li>
<li><p>They identified a need and interest to develop a regional partnership to collaborate on problem solving in the ocean space and to develop databases that readily available to multiple cultural and language groups.</p></li>
</ol>
<h1>Why is this important?</h1>
<p>Both Australia and Indonesia are heavily dependent on their extensive coastal regions and oceans for their food, income and well-being. The ocean holds enormous economic potential, which runs into <a href="http://www.marinescience.net.au/blue-economy/">billions of dollars each year</a>.</p>
<p>Australia’s ocean spans over 13 million square kilometres – an area twice that of Australia’s landmass. Indonesia’s ocean stretches across almost 2 million square kilometres and the country is endowed with one of the longest coastlines of the world – almost 100,000km long!</p>
<p>An estimated 70% of Indonesia’s population, or around 180 million people, lives on this coastline. Similarly, 85% of Australia’s population lives within 50km of the coast.</p>
<p>But marine ecosystems of both countries are facing threats of over-exploitation and destruction.</p>
<p>Pollution from chemicals and plastics has begun to choke entire coastlines, destroying ecosystems and opportunity. At the same time, ocean ecosystems such as coral reefs, kelp forests and mangroves are disappearing at rates up to 2% per year from many coastal areas.</p>
<p>Most fisheries are under-performing. According to the FAO, 80% of the fish stocks are fully exploited or are collapsing. That is, we are getting much less than the sustainable yield should give us.</p>
<p>On top of this, ocean ecosystems and fisheries are severely threatened by climate change – through ocean warming and acidification. These impacts – from the deepest sea to our coasts – are threatening to foreclose on our future ocean wealth and opportunity.</p>
<h2>The blue economy</h2>
<p>The World Wildlife Fund recently estimated the <a href="http://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/ocean-assets-valued-at-24-trillion-but-dwindling-fast">asset value of the ocean</a> to be US$24 trillion – which if it were a country would be the seventh-largest economy on the planet. This oceanic “wealth” fund delivers US$2.5 trillion in benefits to humanity each year – an economic activity associated with the marine economy that is growing three times faster than Australia’s GDP.</p>
<p>Increasingly, countries and businesses are turning to the ocean to generate novel industries and opportunities for food and income. Termed the “blue economy”, there is increasing focus on better using ocean resources to feed our hungry world. </p>
<p>By 2050 the world’s population will have added 3 billion people and will reach 9 billion. To feed those extra 3 billion people the Food and Agriculture Organisation has indicated that food production must <a href="http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pdf">increase by 70%</a>. </p>
<p>The FAO has said that 80% of the required production increases will have to come from increases in crop yields, with only 20% coming from new farmlands. </p>
<p>But the stark reality is that the rate of growth in yields of the major cereal crops has been steadily declining – from about <a href="http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pdf">3.2% per year in 1960 to 1.5% today</a>. Consequently, we must find another alternative or risk ecological disaster as we turn more and more parts of the world’s crucial ecosystems into food production systems.</p>
<p>And it is much more than a matter of simply finding more food. </p>
<p>For industries, such as tourism, new fisheries, energy production and the development of new pharmaceuticals, the blue economy represents an enormous untapped potential.</p>
<h2>Tackling the future as Marine Team Indonesia and Australia</h2>
<p>It is critical to strike a balance between harvesting the economic potential of our ocean and safeguarding its longer-term health and well-being. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, despite the economic value of these opportunities, the marine resources of Australia and Indonesia are at serious risk of being degraded before we develop these opportunities.</p>
<p>There is a great opportunity and imperative for Australia and Indonesia to join forces to solve these critical challenges. </p>
<p>But to solve the problems, we need greater knowledge about our ocean wealth. We also need to build the capacity to understand and sensibly exploit these ocean resources.</p>
<p>All this means more people and infrastructure. We also need to promote greater regional knowledge and regional information exchange. We need to come together much more regularly to swap ideas and develop new solutions and approaches.</p>
<p>And if we do, then the power of our respective oceans will be unleashed for the greater good.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Hoegh-Guldberg undertakes research on coral reef ecosystems and their response to rapid environmental change, which is supported primarily by the Australian Research Council (Canberra), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Washington, D.C.), Catlin Group (London), and Great Barrier Reef Foundation (Brisbane). He works at the University of Queensland and did not receive salary for writing this article.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jamaluddin Jompa receives research funding from the Government of Indonesia and USAID. He is affiliated with Hasanuddin University and Indonesian Young Academy of Science. </span></em></p>The two countries share huge marine resources and opportunities. At the same time both face increasing challenges to their oceans and coastal regions from climate change and over-exploitation.Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Director, Global Change Institute, The University of QueenslandJamaluddin Jompa, Professor and Dean of Marine Science and Fisheries, Universitas HasanuddinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/646142016-09-08T00:31:57Z2016-09-08T00:31:57ZTo improve their relationship, Australia and Indonesia should focus on shared geopolitical interests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136569/original/image-20160905-15466-1frjddh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3502%2C2473&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On major strategic questions facing the region Australia and Indonesia are in broad agreement.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>To mark the <a href="http://causindy.org/">CAUSINDY (Conference of Australian and Indonesian Youth)</a> held in Bali this week, The Conversation is running a series on issues pertaining to the two countries.</em></strong> </p>
<hr>
<p>Relations between Australia and Indonesia in recent years have largely floundered. Both governments have focused more on their bilateral dynamics, which amid differing values have resulted in an unstable relationship that blows hot and cold. </p>
<p>This narrow focus has made Australia and Indonesia neglect that they actually share many similar priorities in the regional context.</p>
<p>On issues such as asylum seekers and capital punishment, Australia and Indonesia may be at odds. But on major strategic questions facing the region, the two nations are in broad agreement. </p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia should gradually reframe the relationship by giving further weight to their shared interests within the broader regional context. Refocusing away from bilateral differences and towards regional similarities is one of the best paths toward a more stable and resilient Australia-Indonesia relationship.</p>
<h2>Shared regional concerns</h2>
<p>For the last half-century, Australia and Indonesia have had the same approach to most of the region’s major geopolitical issues. </p>
<p>Since Indonesia’s anti-communist turn in the mid-1960s, both Jakarta and Canberra have continued to favour the regional order that emerged after the US’ rapprochement with China.</p>
<p>While its formal non-aligned status precludes it from openly saying so, Indonesia broadly maintains a preference for something akin to the current order in East Asia, resting on US primacy. </p>
<p>Despite initial protestations at not being consulted beforehand, Indonesia has indicated that it is untroubled by the basing of <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/darwin-the-origin-of-new-species-of-talks-20120702-21d4a">US marines in Darwin</a> and the general <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific">strategic rebalancing to Asia-Pacific</a> undertaken by the Obama administration. This aligns with the geopolitical preferences of US-ally Australia. </p>
<p>With China’s growing regional heft and continuing belligerence in the South China Sea, Australia and Indonesia share a similar concern on the challenge China poses to peace and stability in region. </p>
<p>Australia and Indonesia have both welcomed China’s increasing role in regional trade and investment. China is the major trading partner of each country and both were quick to sign up as founding members to China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-aiib-helps-resolve-asias-soaring-infrastructure-needs-40518">Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank</a>, despite Japanese and US reluctance. </p>
<p>But Australia and Indonesia are anxious about China’s recent behaviour in the South China Sea. The rising power’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea-2016.html?_r=0">artificial-island-building</a> and expansive claims, recently ruled invalid by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/12/c_135507764.htm">only to be dismissed by Beijing</a>, are a shared concern.</p>
<p>The two countries also support the region’s open trade regime, deeming it vital for economic development. Canberra and Jakarta have declared support for both the Chinese-favoured, ASEAN-led <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a> trade agreement and the US-favoured Trans-Pacific Partnership.</p>
<p>Inclusive regional institutions are also a point of convergence for Australia and Indonesia. Both countries see them as important to maintaining regional peace and security. Jakarta was one of the key supporters of expanding the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/eas/pages/east-asia-summit-eas.aspx">East Asia Summit</a>, now the region’s premier international forum, to include Australia.</p>
<p>When it comes to the threat of jihadist terrorism, Australia and Indonesia are both committed to the fight. Jakarta has been very active and successful in destroying regional terrorist networks based on Indonesian soil. As a target of these networks, Australia has welcomed Indonesia’s activism in fighting regional terrorism.</p>
<p>As democratic middle powers that have enjoyed the security and prosperity of the existing regional order, Canberra and Jakarta have a shared interest in seeing peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific that is based on respect for international law and well-established norms of behaviour. </p>
<h2>A path forward for the relationship</h2>
<p>Reframing the relationship toward these shared regional concerns offers a path forward.</p>
<p>Creating a greater mutual understanding of how Australia and Indonesia share complementary priorities will help bolster a relationship in need of greater resilience against the inevitable bilateral waxes and wanes. Fortunately, this has become increasingly recognised by leaders in both countries.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in his <a href="http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2016-lowy-lecture-prime-minister-australia-malcolm-turnbull">lecture at the Lowy Institute</a> in March, declared that the Australia-Indonesia relationship is: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… increasingly defined by similarities and complementarities more than differences.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He then followed by immediately pivoting to the region: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Now the greatest run of peace and prosperity this planet has ever known — centred right here in our Indo-Pacific region — was all made possible by the system of rules and institutions which the United States and its allies built from the ashes of world war two.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These sentiments were echoed only a month later by former Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in a <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-strategic-outlook-the-view-from-indonesia/">speech</a> addressing this year’s Australian Defence White Paper: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Both Jakarta and Canberra are seeing more and more of their interests converging: in economics, regional security, combating terrorism, and others.</p>
<p>There is plenty of space to build a stronger partnership between us. Indonesia and Australia can work together to promote a rules based world order.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, demonstrative of the neglect the two countries’ geopolitical context receives, Yudhoyono’s speech <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-indonesias-apathetic-neighbour/">was poorly attended</a>, with no senior politicians in the audience. </p>
<p>Turnbull has made a start in the right direction. But without a broader recognition of the shared strategic priorities between the two nations, the relationship risks being run off the rails by the next asylum seeker boat or execution.</p>
<p>Reframing the way the relationship is thought about toward a greater recognition of shared geopolitical interests is the best way for these two neighbours to forge a stronger and more resilient relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64614/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Willis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia and Indonesia should gradually re-frame their relationship by considering shared interests within the broader regional context.David Willis, PhD Candidate in International Relations, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640022016-09-07T01:21:21Z2016-09-07T01:21:21ZHow can we fix Australia’s Indonesia anxiety?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136522/original/image-20160905-31641-nkqyk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5000%2C2986&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesia is the neighbour that makes Australians feel uneasy but also want to get on with.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Coinciding with the <a href="http://causindy.org/">CAUSINDY (Conference of Australian and Indonesian Youth)</a> in Bali this week, The Conversation is running a series on issues pertaining to the two countries.</em></strong> </p>
<hr>
<p>Australians have long been ambivalent towards Indonesia. They want a good relationship with Indonesia and disapprove when the government fails to maintain this. But they are also wary and often anxious about Indonesia. Only a small minority of Australians feel close to or knowledgeable about the country. </p>
<p>Tackling this ambivalence is seemingly becoming harder due to changes in both nations. Within Australia, Indonesian literacy is falling. Fewer Australians learn Indonesian than probably at any time in the past half-century. And there is little Indonesian content in the general school curriculum. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Indonesia is growing faster than Australia and is likely to surpass Australian on many economic indicators in the next decade or so. Prior Australian notions of their country being more important in the bilateral relationship and the world will be less credible.</p>
<p>So how is Australia to face these issues of anxiety, hoped-for amity, and the shifting balance between the two countries? </p>
<h2>Indonesia overshadowing Australia?</h2>
<p>Most Australians have deemed their country more significant than Indonesia. Australia is wealthier and has a larger economy, with much higher GDP per capita. It has superior military forces and has, at least until recently, enjoyed a higher international profile. </p>
<p>That Australia gave large sums of development aid to Indonesia probably fixed in the minds of many ordinary Australians that their neighbour was a poor and needy country. Whether these indicators really did mean Australia was more important to Indonesia than Indonesia was to Australia has been a matter of historical debate among scholars and commentators.</p>
<p>But Indonesia’s rapid economic growth over the past decade, at around 5% per year, and its prospects for rising prosperity <a href="https://knoema.com/yubthm/indonesia-gdp-growth-forecast-2013-2015-and-up-to-2060-data-and-charts">in the coming decades</a>, mean Indonesia is likely to draw near to or overtake Australia on many of the measures on which Australia previously enjoyed a commanding lead. </p>
<p>Many Indonesians are increasingly confident of <a href="http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/03/02/13350501/Duduk.di.Antara.Obama.dan.Putin.Jokowi.Ingin.Tunjukkan.Indonesia.Negara.Besar">their country’s future significance</a>, not only regionally but globally. They view Australia as a neighbour that their country will soon overshadow.</p>
<h2>CAUSINDY</h2>
<p>How Australians respond to this reversal of fortune will be one of the issues discussed at the CAUSINDY conference.</p>
<p>The annual <a href="http://2016.causindy.org/">CAUSINDY (Conference of Australian and Indonesian Youth)</a> is being held in Bali this week (where I will be a speaker). It is an initiative aimed at tackling the complexities of the bilateral relationship outside of a formal government context. </p>
<p>The conference brings together 30 young leaders from Australia and Indonesia who have a good knowledge of each other’s countries. Most of the Australians have good Indonesian and the Indonesians good English. A wide range of issues, from politics, to the environment, to culture, will be discussed during the conference. Differences of opinion are welcomed and respected. </p>
<p>What ties the Australian and Indonesian conference delegates together is a shared desire for warm relations and the deepest possible mutual understanding. </p>
<h2>Anxiety towards Indonesia</h2>
<p>Evidence of high levels of popular mistrust of Indonesia has long been evident in Australian media reporting and commentary. </p>
<p>But two recent surveys on bilateral perceptions released by the <a href="http://australiaindonesiacentre.org/">Australia-Indonesia Centre</a> (AIC) provide a more detailed picture of Australian (and Indonesian) attitudes. One of the surveys examines <a href="https://aicperceptionsreport.com/Documents/AIC%20Perceptions%20Report.pdf">current attitudes</a>; the other looks at historical opinion polling <a href="http://australiaindonesiacentre.org/app/uploads/2015/12/Australia-Indonesia-Attitudes-Impact-Study-%E2%80%93-Historical.pdf">going back to the late 1940s</a>. </p>
<p>For the contemporary survey, respondents confessed to feeling “confronted” by Indonesia’s size and rising economic prospects. They are wary of Australia becoming “reliant” on its neighbour, though keen to extract “benefit” from the relationship. Many expressed their “emotional distance” from Indonesia. More expressed an unfavourable attitude to Indonesia (47%) than a favourable one (43%).</p>
<p>Islam and terrorism were particular sources of negativity for those surveyed. At the top of the list of word associations with Indonesia was “religion”, and respondents linked Indonesian Islam to extremism and the Middle East. Some 42% said they were not interested in learning more about the country. </p>
<p>While there are a number of methodological concerns about this AIC survey, it nonetheless indicates the broad parameters of Australian thinking towards Indonesia.</p>
<p>The historical survey shows a consistent perception of threat towards Indonesia for most of the 71 years of the bilateral relationship. Australians have worried about Indonesia’s perceived expansionist tendencies, its political instability and large Muslim population. It also found a recurring desire among respondents to “build a closer relationship” with Indonesia.</p>
<h2>Australia’s bleak mood</h2>
<p>Australia is a disconcerted nation at present. Over the past few years growth rates have been low, social tensions have risen and political uncertainty is arguably at its highest since the mid-1970s. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly opinion surveys are finding pessimism and apprehension commonplace in Australian society. </p>
<p>This somewhat bleak mood has consequences for how Australians see Indonesia. </p>
<p>Do they view Indonesia, with its growing economy and international role, as an even greater threat to Australia? Or do they view it as presenting opportunities? Do Australians continue to be anxious about and somewhat disengaged from Indonesia, or do they seek to understand and embrace their neighbour? </p>
<p>On present indications, Australians, in general, will continue being ambivalent and wary.</p>
<p>Past programs for mass education in Indonesian language and studies have proved largely unsuccessful. Targeted activities that focus on Australians and Indonesians with a high commitment to improving bilateral understanding and engagement might have better prospects. </p>
<p>The virtue of CAUSINDY is that it provides a forum for discussing and addressing these long-standing mixed feelings in the bilateral relationship. It may not have a large impact on general public attitudes, but it will hopefully undergird relationships among people who may well become opinion leaders and decision makers of the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Fealy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The annual Conference of Australian and Indonesian Youth (CAUSINDY) to be held in Bali this week is an initiative that can help change negative attitudes towards Indonesia.Greg Fealy, Associate Professor and Senior Fellow, Indonesian Politics, Department of Political and Social Change, Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641272016-09-01T00:13:53Z2016-09-01T00:13:53ZBetween perceptions and realities of Australian-Indonesian attitudes: a view from Indonesia<p>According to a new <a href="https://aicperceptionsreport.com/Documents/AIC%20Perceptions%20Report.pdf">survey of Australian and Indonesian perceptions</a>, Indonesians feel they understand Australia quite well, while few Australians feel they have good knowledge about Indonesia. </p>
<p>The recent survey by research firm EY Sweeney on behalf of the <a href="http://australiaindonesiacentre.org/">Australia-Indonesia Centre</a> (AIC) shows 74% of Indonesian respondents feel they have good or moderate understanding of Australia. Additionally, 87% feel favourable towards Australia. </p>
<p>In contrast, only 53% of Australian respondents feel they have good or moderate knowledge about Indonesia. Only 43% of Australians feel favourable towards Indonesia. </p>
<p>The AIC noted the survey results point to an attitude divide between Australians and Indonesians. This gap needs to be bridged if the two countries are to achieve the improvement in the relationship they need to progress together. </p>
<p>However, it’s equally important for us to think about the gap between what Australians and Indonesians reportedly perceive and the realities on the ground. </p>
<h2>How Indonesians view Australia</h2>
<p>The survey results paint Indonesians as open-minded and warm towards Australia. Nearly 90% of Indonesian respondents feel favourable towards Australia, 74% claim to have good or moderate knowledge about Australia. And 65% still feel they need to be more knowledgeable about Australia. </p>
<p>But examined further, the last response still ranked second-lowest among 17 statements surveyed to measure how Indonesians perceive the relationship with Australia. At the top of Indonesians’ minds are the questions of how the Australian government can facilitate Indonesians studying (88%) and working (87%) in Australia. </p>
<p>Australia is very attractive for Indonesians pursuing higher education and jobs abroad. Indonesians recognise Australia as a Western developed economy that’s closest to them on the map. </p>
<p>Indonesians’ interest in taking holidays, conducting business and getting an education in Australia shows a growing desire for increased mobility to Australia. But this does not necessarily mean that most Indonesians are eager to learn about Australia comprehensively. In fact, the report shows that Australian history, culture and politics ranked as the least-interesting aspects for Indonesians to learn about Australia.</p>
<p>Perhaps, the media are partly to blame. Despite its close proximity, Indonesian media do not treat Australia as a priority for news coverage. The latest Australian election was <a href="http://news.metrotvnews.com/topic/1292">reported only once a week</a>, whereas the US election received <a href="http://news.metrotvnews.com/more/topic/4339">daily coverage in Indonesian media</a>. </p>
<p>Indonesians’ perception of their knowledge about Australia and their interest in knowing more about Australia also do not match the realities of Indonesia’s higher education sector. Dedicated research centres for Australian studies are few and far between. Professors with expertise and background in this area of interest are also quite hard to find. </p>
<p>Indonesian universities often have resource centres for foreign studies. Universitas Gadjah Mada, for example, has research centres for German, Japanese and European studies, but doesn’t have a centre for Australian studies. </p>
<p>Australian studies can only be found in Indonesian universities through a specific course on Australian politics or foreign policy. It is taught at only 63 out of <a href="http://forlap.ristekdikti.go.id/perguruantinggi/homegraphpt">4,300 higher education institutions</a> in the country. Lecturers also face problems in delivering these courses, as most of the materials are at times irrelevant or out of date.</p>
<p>As the relationship between the countries often faces rough patches, knowledge on these aspects is very useful to help Indonesians understand the political, social and cultural context of Australian government policymaking. </p>
<h2>How Australians view Indonesia</h2>
<p>On the Australian side, the survey shows Australians have negative attitudes towards Indonesia. This not a real surprise as in the past few years many Australian universities have dropped Asian language programs, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/21/indonesian-language-study-headed-for-extinction-at-australian-universities">particularly Indonesian</a>. The recent teaching staff cuts in Indonesian studies <a href="http://asaa.asn.au/staff-cuts-threaten-anus-international-reputation/">at the Australian National University</a> may also exacerbate the decrease in interest in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Classical stereotyping remains strong as most Australians think Indonesia is religious. This does not mean the finding is untrue, but it does not provide a complete picture of Indonesia. </p>
<p>Australians’ strong interest in increasing trade with Indonesia reflects an awareness of Indonesia’s economic prospects. But only 28% of them agree that improved media coverage is important to help Australians understand Indonesia better. </p>
<p>This means existing stereotypes will prevail and Australians associations with Indonesia may continue to be limited to boat people, executions, the live cattle trade and terrorism. </p>
<p>Yet the survey finding on Australians’ level of interest in Indonesia should not be overgeneralised. There are pockets of Australia that are showing deep interest in understanding Indonesia better. The Australian government’s <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/new-colombo-plan/pages/new-colombo-plan.aspx">New Colombo Plan</a>, for example, has contributed to growing interest among young Australians in visiting and studying in Indonesia. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>The AIC report aims to spur a debate about ways to improve awareness and understanding. The finding that Indonesians are eager to learn more about Australia should be seen as an opportunity for Indonesia to improve Australian studies in the country.</p>
<p>To shape better relations, interest in Australia should go beyond “holiday destinations”, “jobs” and “university degrees”. </p>
<p>Australia should also find ways to learn more about Indonesia. The existing interests of Australians in Indonesian culture, history and economy are good starting points to improve the relationship. </p>
<p>Australians should also move away from rigid stereotypes of Indonesia. This will not be easy if Australian media continue to focus on negative and sensationalist issues as headline news about Indonesia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64127/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hangga Fathana does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An Indonesian expert in Australian studies weighs in on the recent survey of Australian-Indonesian perceptions.Hangga Fathana, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641612016-08-22T09:30:58Z2016-08-22T09:30:58ZAustralia continues to be shamefully silent on Indonesia’s human rights abuses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134923/original/image-20160822-18731-1xaq61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">George Brandis (centre) was 'the guest' of the co-ordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs, Wiranto (right), during a recent visit to Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Matius Murib</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Here’s the glaring omission in Australian Attorney-General George Brandis’ <a href="https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2016/ThirdQuarter/Meeting-with-President-Widodo-culmination-of-visit-to-Indonesia.aspx">list of issues</a> raised with Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo in Jakarta this month: human rights.</p>
<p>Brandis touted their discussion on “counter-terrorism issues” and “information sharing between our law enforcement and intelligence agencies”. Human rights either wasn’t on the agenda or didn’t rate mention in Brandis’ trip report.</p>
<p>That omission was more than just a failure by Australia’s top judicial official to voice Australia’s support for universal rights and freedoms. It is a betrayal of Indonesian human rights victims in dire need of international support.</p>
<p>Australia has a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/australia">solid record of protecting civil and political rights at home</a>, with robust institutions and a vibrant press and civil society that act as a check on government power. However, the government’s failure to respect international standards for asylum seekers and refugees continues to take a heavy human toll.</p>
<p>Australia has also adopted extensive and overly broad counter-terrorism laws in response to the threat of “homegrown terrorism”, and has done too little to address Indigenous rights and disability rights. </p>
<p>Brandis’ blind eye to human rights while in Indonesia is an unfortunate reflection of the Australian government’s tendency to rarely raise concerns publicly about human rights violations in countries with which it co-operates on border protection matters or has significant trade relationships. </p>
<h2>A visit to Papua</h2>
<p>Brandis didn’t lack an opportunity to raise human rights concerns. His visit began in Indonesia’s restive province of Papua, where impunity for human rights abuses is routine. </p>
<p>In the past five years, Human Rights Watch has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/10/something-hide/indonesias-restrictions-media-freedom-and-rights-monitoring-papua#_ftn20">documented</a> dozens of cases in which Indonesian security forces have used unnecessary or excessive force when dealing with Papuans exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and association. Authorities frequently <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/09/indonesia-free-all-political-prisoners">arrest and prosecute Papuan protesters</a> peacefully advocating independence or other political change. </p>
<p>A total of <a href="http://www.papuansbehindbars.org/?page_id=17">37 Papuan activists are in prison</a> on charges of treason for “crimes” including public display of the Papuan Morning Star flag, a symbol of the independence movement. </p>
<p>Indonesian authorities also continue to restrict access by foreign journalists and rights monitors <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/10/indonesia-end-access-restrictions-papua">to Papua</a>. This raises serious concerns about the government’s commitment to media freedom. </p>
<p>Brandis’ <a href="https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2016/ThirdQuarter/Visit-To-Papua-Province.aspx">Papua trip report</a> references visits to “border facilities and a traditional market” and reiterates Australia’s recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over Papua, but makes zero mention of human rights.</p>
<h2>Guest of a controversial host</h2>
<p>Brandis may have been reticent to raise human rights issues due to his status <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/marnicordell/brandis-all-smiles-as-he-dines-with-alleged-war-criminal">as “the guest”</a> of the co-ordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs, Wiranto. The former general is Indonesia’s poster child for impunity for grave abuses. </p>
<p>Wiranto was chief of Indonesia’s armed forces in 1999 when the Indonesian army and military-backed militias carried out atrocities against the East Timorese after they voted for independence. </p>
<p>In February 2003, the United-Nations-sponsored Special Panels for Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/28/indonesia-indicted-general-unfit-cabinet-post">indicted him for crimes against humanity</a>. The charges are so serious that in 2004 the US placed Wiranto and five others accused of crimes in East Timor on a <a href="http://jawawa.id/index.php/newsitem/wiranto-shrugs-off-us-visa-ban-calls-it-baseless-1447893297">visa watch list</a> that could bar them from entering the country. </p>
<p>Brandis’ decision to engage with Wiranto as a credible representative of the Indonesian government rather than as a war crimes suspect makes his failure to raise rights issues even more reprehensible. </p>
<p>Brandis also failed to raise the issue of the Indonesian government’s commitment to an <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/20/dispatches-indonesias-step-toward-accountability-1965-massacres">official accountability process</a> for past <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/14/reconciliation-should-not-sideline-justice.html">gross human rights abuses</a>. These include the government-orchestrated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/12/indonesia/us-seek-justice-1965-66-mass-killings">massacres of 1965-66</a> that resulted in up to one million deaths. </p>
<p>Jokowi had assigned Wiranto’s predecessor, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, to oversee that process. Jokowi’s move last month to replace Pandjaitan with Wiranto, for whom accountability for rights abuses constitutes an existential threat, raises doubts about the future of the accountability process. </p>
<h2>Speak out against impunity</h2>
<p>Brandis should have pressed Jokowi on the need for redress for past rights abuses as a means of justice for victims and their survivors, as well as to challenge the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/indonesia">culture of impunity</a> spawned by the lack of official accountability for those abuses.</p>
<p>Brandis should also have lent his voice in support of the rights of Indonesia’s increasingly beleaguered LGBT community, which has come under <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/10/indonesia-lgbt-crisis-exposed-official-bias">unprecedented attack</a> in recent months from a government-led campaign. </p>
<p>That campaign has included a torrent of abuse and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/dispatches-lgbt-backlash-indonesia">hateful rhetoric</a>, discriminatory edicts and the police use of unnecessary force against peaceful protesters.</p>
<p>The day before Brandis’ August 12 meeting with Jokowi, the president’s spokesman, Johan Budi, responded to a Human Rights Watch report on these abuses by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/no-room-in-indonesia-for-gay-rights-says-president-spokesman">saying</a> there was “no room” for LGBT rights activism in Indonesia. </p>
<p>There is no indication Brandis took exception to that unacceptable comment – or even raised the issue of LGBT rights with Jokowi.</p>
<p>Australian campaigners against Indonesia’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/30/why-did-indonesia-just-execute-eight-people-drug-crimes">use of the death penalty</a> might have been struck by Brandis’ silence on that issue. His visit was just three weeks after Indonesia <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/asia/indonesia-drug-executions/">executed four convicted drug traffickers</a>, the first group of 30 death penalty prisoners who <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-will-indonesia-execute-next-in-its-war-on-drugs/">face execution in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>That silence was particularly incongruous given the vociferous <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/australia-indonesia-relations-after-the-executions/">Australian government opposition</a> to Indonesia’s execution of two Australian nationals in April 2015. </p>
<p>Brandis should have raised Australia’s opposition to the death penalty as part of a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/20/australia-adopt-new-strategy-end-death-penalty-abroad">policy</a> of consistent public and private diplomatic pressure to end this cruel practice, showing how the death penalty <a href="http://www.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/reports/summer06/capitalpunish">has failed</a> to deter crime and been unjustly applied. There is no indication he did so.</p>
<p>Brandis squandered a valuable opportunity to engage meaningfully with the Indonesian government on key human rights issues. It’s up to those Australian officials who make official visits to Indonesia in future to ensure his failure is not repeated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64161/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phelim Kine is deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.</span></em></p>Here’s the glaring omission in George Brandis’ list of issues raised recently with Indonesian President Joko Widodo: human rights.Phelim Kine, Adjunct Professor, Roosevelt Public Policy Institute at Hunter College, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/617552016-07-07T02:17:38Z2016-07-07T02:17:38ZAustralia must act now to secure economic ties with a rising Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128944/original/image-20160701-30652-nbwwid.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia must start the job of ensuring Indonesian investment flows south.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Bagus Indahono</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-25/asylum-seeker-influx-coincided-with-live-ex-halt-joyce-suggests/7446456">remarks</a> during the recently concluded federal election campaign that suggested a link between asylum seekers and live exports was an unfortunate reminder of the diplomatic and political sensitivities that have long vexed Australia-Indonesia relations.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2016/election-2016-malcolm-turnbull-steps-in-on-debate-over-barnaby-joyces-asylum-seekers-and-live-exports-comments-20160526-gp470z.html">defusing the issue</a>, Australia’s two major party leaders, Malcolm Turnbull and Bill Shorten, both praised Indonesian President Joko Widodo and emphasised the need for greater Australia-Indonesia co-operation.</p>
<p>Much of this increased co-operation must begin by strengthening supply and value chains and investment ties between the two countries.</p>
<h2>State of play</h2>
<p>Negotiations for the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/iacepa/pages/indonesia-australia-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement</a> (IA-CEPA) were revived recently after a three-year hiatus. </p>
<p>Together with government-to-government negotiations, the proposed agreement’s main mechanism for business engagement, the Indonesia-Australia Business Partnership Group (IA-BPG), has also restarted consultations, including a recent session in Perth. This is a unique bilateral business forum to provide both governments with proposals for the agreement to drive a fundamental change in the economic relationship between the countries. </p>
<p>The resumption of negotiations presents the opportunity to bring the countries’ economies closer together to enhance trade and improve access to each other’s markets. </p>
<p>But the truly significant economic outcome the agreement could achieve would be to enhance Australian investment in Indonesia and, most importantly, encourage long-term Indonesian investment flows into Australia. This investment will ultimately be crucial to Australia’s ongoing economic prosperity.</p>
<p>To achieve that, Australia and Indonesia must start now to make mutual investment the hallmark of their economic relationship.</p>
<h2>Beyond free-trade agreements</h2>
<p>To achieve such investment we cannot simply adopt provisions of free-trade agreements that have gone before, however high quality they may be. As talks on the IA-CEPA resume, negotiators should not simply pick up where they left off three years ago.</p>
<p>The strategic and economic ground has shifted over that time. There are new, fast-developing trade and investment links centred on the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>In Asia, trade in services is <a href="http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Trade%20Insights%20-%20Services%20LDC%20-%20Issue%20No.%2013%20REVISED.pdf">growing faster</a> than trade in goods. Goods and services are being traded within single, complex products. Global supply and value chains, where value is added to goods and services at multiple locations before being delivered to customers, make up the newest, <a href="http://reports.weforum.org/manufacturing-growth/why-the-world-suddenly-cares-about-global-supply-chains/">fastest-growing mode</a> of trade and investment. </p>
<p>The trade landscape in the Indo-Pacific is a complex web of old and new trade agreements and economic groupings: the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a> (RCEP), the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/pages/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp.aspx">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP), the <a href="http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/">ASEAN Economic Community</a> (AEC), Australia’s free-trade agreements with <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/jaepa/pages/japan-australia-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx">Japan</a>, <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/kafta/pages/korea-australia-fta.aspx">South Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/Australian/Export/Free-Trade-Agreements/chafta">China</a>, and <a href="http://www.apec.org/">APEC</a>. </p>
<p>Some, like the TPP and AEC, are known for their broad scope and for tackling difficult issues in agriculture and human movement.</p>
<p>Other agreements have focused principally on the old trade agenda – lowering or abolishing tariffs and tackling non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services. And others have such broad membership that it is uncertain what real outcomes will be achieved.</p>
<p>By the mid-point of this century, Indonesia will be the <a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf">fourth-largest economy in the world</a> after the US, China and India. Australia’s North Asian partners are already active in Indonesia, laying the groundwork for future Indonesian investment flow to North Asia. </p>
<p>Australia must start the job of ensuring Indonesian investment also flows south. A modest investment by Indonesia now, from Australia’s perspective, opens up the opportunity for collaboration in a whole range of areas – not just for one-off projects but for decades to come.</p>
<p>IA-CEPA therefore needs to address the building of transborder industries, supply and value chains to other markets, co-operation in energy, natural resources and infrastructure, working together on skills formation and capability-building, transferring knowledge and technology, and enabling movement of students, professionals and tourists between our countries. </p>
<p>This is a major task for Australia. The agreement’s scope and depth should focus on how we can turn the Indonesia relationship into a substantial investment opportunity for prosperity into the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Smith is a member of the ALP.</span></em></p>Much of the increased co-operation between Australia and Indonesia must begin by strengthening supply and value chains and investment ties between the two countries.Stephen Smith, Winthrop Professor of Law, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/502452015-11-11T04:01:38Z2015-11-11T04:01:38ZTurnbull’s visit needs to restore Australia’s strained relationship with Indonesia<p>As Indonesia prepares to welcome Malcolm Turnbull to Jakarta on Thursday, many hope that Australia’s new prime minister can reset the terms of the relationship, which was strained during Tony Abbott’s time in office.</p>
<h2>A love/hate relationship</h2>
<p>Australia’s relationship with Indonesia is often coloured by love and hate dimensions.</p>
<p>Australia played a significant role in Indonesia gaining independence. Australia was the only Western country that supported Indonesia’s <a href="http://moadoph.gov.au/blog/merdeka-indonesia-s-independence-70th-anniversary">fight for independence</a> against the Dutch. Since then, the relationship has largely been based on mutual respect and understanding.</p>
<p>However, the relationship was particularly bad under Abbott’s prime ministership. Abbott’s foreign policy slogan was “less Geneva, more Jakarta”, but his actions did not reflect this. </p>
<p>In 2013, when revelations from US government contractor Edward Snowden revealed that Australia had spied on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his inner circle, Abbott <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-refuses-to-apologise-for-indonesian-spying-program-20131119-2xsn4.html">refused to apologise</a>. On asylum seeker issues, Abbott did not give a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-14/abbott-dodges-questions-again-about-boat-turn-back-claims/6544558">clear answer</a> regarding alleged payment by Australian officials to people smugglers to return asylum seekers to Indonesia. </p>
<p>Australians were angry over Indonesia’s refusal to pardon Bali Nine duo Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, who were on death row for drug smuggling. But Abbott’s statement that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/tony-abbott-indonesia-reciprocate-tsunami-aid-sparing-bali-nine-pair">linked</a> Australian aid during the 2004 tsunami to pressure the Indonesian government to spare the men’s lives made the situation worse. </p>
<p>Abbott’s comments raised nationalistic sentiment in Indonesia, which shifted the debate from the question of death penalty to the question of national sovereignty. </p>
<p>When Chan and Sukumaran were executed in April, Abbott recalled Australia’s ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Grigson, in protest. Experts argued <a href="https://theconversation.com/ambassadors-return-to-indonesia-shows-his-recall-was-futile-43119">the decision was pointless</a>. And a majority of Australians surveyed by the <a href="http://www.lowyinstitute.org/news-and-media/press-releases/new-lowy-institute-poll-australians-cautious-about-damaging-australias-relationship-indonesia">Lowy Institute</a> disagreed with the decision.</p>
<p>But even though the most of the Australian public are against Indonesia’s policy on the death penalty, many are also worried about their government’s harsh policy towards Indonesia. </p>
<h2>Turnbull’s task</h2>
<p>Given the ups and downs of Indonesia’s relationship with Australia under Abbott, Turnbull faces an uphill battle to restore the relationship. </p>
<p>Many Indonesians hope that Turnbull’s public-speaking ability will make him more tactful in his comments than his predecessor. Indonesians are cautious in the knowledge that Turnbull comes from the same party as Abbott. However, they seem encouraged by the perception that Turnbull is not as conservative as Abbott. </p>
<p>Indonesia hopes that, under Turnbull’s leadership, Australia will view Indonesia as a good old friend rather than a foe.</p>
<p>The signs are positive so far. Last month, Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, came to Indonesia for the ministerial meeting of the <a href="http://www.iora.net/com.aspx">Indian Ocean Rim Association</a>. This week, the two countries are resuming joint military training. The Indonesian and Australian navies are carrying out a four-day maritime security exercise in the Java Sea. </p>
<p>In addition, Australia’s trade minister, Andrew Robb, is slated to visit Indonesia later this month with a delegation of 259 businesspeople. And in December, the defence and foreign ministers of the two countries are scheduled to meet. </p>
<h2>Eye on economic co-operation</h2>
<p>There are two potential agenda items for Turnbull’s visit to Jakarta. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, to restore the relationship between Indonesia and Australia.</p></li>
<li><p>Second, to enhance economic co-operation between the two countries.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>With his background as a businessman, Turnbull seems to be eyeing improved economic co-operation. </p>
<p>On this visit, Turnbull will likely renegotiate with the Indonesian government about Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/barnaby-joyce-faces-new-battle-after-indonesia-knock-to-live-cattle-trade-44667">live cattle exports</a> to end uncertainty for Australian farmers and exporters. But this area of business will not be Australia’s sole focus. </p>
<p>The planned visit of 259 businesspeople – the largest in the bilateral relationship’s history – is an important sign that Australia will take economic co-operation with Indonesia seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Indriana Kartini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many in Indonesia hope that Malcolm Turnbull can reset the strained Australia-Indonesia relationship – a legacy of Tony Abbott’s time in office.Indriana Kartini, Researcher at Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/461942015-09-02T05:00:14Z2015-09-02T05:00:14ZMovement looks to emulate Australia’s fun schools in Indonesia<p>Schools in Indonesia often make students feel stressed and tired, draining them of motivation. A group of Indonesian scholars, which I lead, is creating a movement to make schools in Indonesia a fun place to learn, in collaboration with primary school teachers from Australia.</p>
<p>We named our initiative the <a href="http://www.sekolahmenyenangkan.org/">Fun School Movement</a>. We have been working with <a href="http://www.claytonnorthps.vic.edu.au/">Clayton North Primary School</a>, a state school in Victoria. They sent five teachers to Indonesia to share whole-school teaching methods with 40 teachers and 30 pre-service teachers for elementary schools in Yogyakarta in 2014 and 2015. </p>
<p>With the support of the University of Ahmad Dahlan, we facilitated workshops. Teachers in Indonesia can learn from Australian teachers’ experience to develop a new approach that provides a joyful and positive learning environment for students. </p>
<p>Currently, some schools in Magelang and Klaten in Central Java, Aceh and Bandung are interested in joining the movement because they are attracted by the bottom-up approach we provided for the teacher capacity building. </p>
<h2>Australia’s fun primary education</h2>
<p>I was inspired to start this movement after seeing how the Australian education system worked through my daughters’ experiences. </p>
<p>In 2009, I moved to Melbourne with my family for my PhD at Monash University. I enrolled my children in Clayton North Primary School. </p>
<p>Every time I pick up my children they are happy and keen to tell me what they had done at school. They even like to go to the school during the weekends. </p>
<p>In contrast, when they went to school in Indonesia they were tired and overwhelmed by the amount of work they had to do in each subject. </p>
<p>Children in Indonesian schools have a mountain of homework. Many parents have to help children complete their homework for hours because they worry the children cannot complete all the tasks. </p>
<p>Schools in Indonesia focus on transferring as much knowledge as possible, even when the materials may not be relevant to students’ needs and their developmental stage.</p>
<p>The Indonesian government had attempted to reduce the overload of materials in 2013. The government introduced a new curriculum that integrated subjects into a theme and promoted character building and creativity. </p>
<p>But this approach failed as many teachers were not ready to implement the new curriculum due to lack of skills. Character building and creativity were also taught only in theory and assessed in a final test. The <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/07/anies-nixes-much-maligned-2013-curriculum.html">curriculum has since been terminated</a> by Indonesia’s minister of education and culture, Anies Baswedan. </p>
<p>I found a different teaching style and school model in Australia. Schooling in Australia is based on a framework designed by the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), a federal educational body. </p>
<p>ACARA requires schools throughout Australia to make children happy, healthy and feel empowered to contribute to the society. Schools strive to ensure every child has a positive learning environment. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93513/original/image-20150901-13415-uz0bn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian schools are encouraged to make learning enjoyable for students.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">bikeriderlondon/www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I want to see more Indonesian children having a joyful school experience. </p>
<h2>Happy students</h2>
<p>Australian students are not the best performers in PISA, the global tests that assess 15-year-old students in maths, science and reading. But <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/family/43570328.pdf">Australian students rank high on educational wellbeing</a> compared to OECD countries. Australia ranks higher than the UK and US, as well as Germany and France.</p>
<p>For PISA, Australia has performed equal 10th in reading, equal 8th in science and equal 17th in mathematics. These results saw Australian students’ rankings slipping from previous years. But they still did better than average compared to students from other OECD countries.</p>
<p>With all the stress and pressure students in Indonesia face, they performed much worse in the PISA tests. Students from Indonesia <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/06/pisa-2013-lessons-indonesia.html">scored the second-lowest</a> out of 65 countries. </p>
<p>Some experts doubt if PISA is a good standard to test quality of education in countries. They argue PISA results are <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-04/buckingham-pisa-panic/5133364">not a reflection of education policies</a> in countries. </p>
<p>Experts argue that student wellbeing has significant impacts on students’ learning habits, motivation and positive outlook or behaviour, as this <a href="http://epubs.scu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=ccyp_pubs">study</a> shows. </p>
<h2>School life at Clayton North</h2>
<p>At Clayton North, my children were welcomed and included as new students. The school has a “buddy program” to help new (junior) students feel safe, valued and connected to the school community.</p>
<p>Clayton North also engages parents to support children’s learning. The school runs a program called “reading together”, where parents are invited to assist children to read in class every day before the class begins.</p>
<p>To build respect in diversity, Clayton North has a “harmony day”. All members of the school community come on that day to celebrate and represent their heritage. </p>
<p>The school uses <a href="https://www.kidsmatter.edu.au/primary">KidsMatter</a>, a flexible program that uses a whole-school approach to promote mental health and wellbeing for children. The school has a “creative play space”, where children can express their ideas and make something new. They are supervised to work together to learn and practise real-world learning. This effectively helps them in building social and emotional wellbeing. </p>
<h2>Indonesia’s students’ park (Taman Siswa)</h2>
<p>The Australian primary education system’s emphasis on creating joyful and inclusive schools is similar to what Indonesia’s father of modern Indonesian education, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ki_Hajar_Dewantara">Ki Hadjar Dewantoro</a>, suggested. </p>
<p>In 1922, Dewantoro set up an inclusive school called “Taman Siswa”, or students’ park. This was during the Dutch colonial rule and formal education was available only for the Dutch and local royalties. In Taman Siswa, children of ordinary people could enrol and were given a joyful and stimulating environment. </p>
<p>Dewantoro later became Indonesia’s first education minister. According to Dewantoro, schools should be a fun place. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, it’s difficult to find Taman-like schools today that make learning a fun activity in Indonesia. </p>
<p>By collaborating with teachers from Australia, I want to bring “Taman” back to Indonesian children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Nur Rizal is the founder of Gerakan Sekolah Menyenangkan (Fun School Movement). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Novi Poespita Chandra is board of research in Gerakan Sekolah Menyenangkan (Fun School Movement). </span></em></p>Australian primary school teachers are involved in a social movement to make schools in Indonesia a fun place to learn.Muhammad Nur Rizal, Lecturer in Information Technology, Universitas Gadjah Mada Novi Poespita Candra, Lecturer in Psychology, Universitas Gadjah Mada Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/455132015-08-04T04:29:12Z2015-08-04T04:29:12ZAustralia-Indonesia relationship is back to ‘normal’, meaning fragile as ever<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90670/original/image-20150803-15159-1q3avxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julie Bishop recently claimed that the Australia-Indonesia relationship is 'very strong and very good'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Johannes Christo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop is <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tensions-ease-julie-bishop-to-meet-indonesias-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-next-week-20150730-ginrsg.html">due to meet</a> her Indonesian counterpart, Retno Marsudi, on the sidelines of an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur later this week. This will be the first face-to-face meeting of Australian and Indonesian ministers since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/bali-nine-poor-political-leadership-creates-lasting-bilateral-problems-37753">execution</a> of Bali Nine duo Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran in April. </p>
<p>The meeting would seem to confirm Bishop’s <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/peak-body-lashes-abbott-government-our-business-interests-in-indonesia-harmed-by-bad-diplomacy-20150714-gic4zj.html">recent assertion</a> that the overall Australia-Indonesia relationship was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… very strong and very good.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It stands in contrast, however, with observations made by two other seasoned observers of the relationship: former Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa and Australia Indonesia Business Council chair Debnath Guharoy.</p>
<p>Natalegawa argued at a meeting in Canberra in June that relations were at a “key juncture”. Acknowledging that he was no longer privy to details of the relationship, he nonetheless <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australiaindonesia-relationship-at-a-key-juncture-dialogue-needed-on-boats-says-marty-natalegawa-20150629-gi0e90.html">expressed the hope</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… there is somewhere some kind of intensified communications. We cannot afford to let the relationship degenerate into a lower point.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Natalegawa <a href="http://theconversation.com/turnbacks-remain-an-irritant-in-australia-indonesia-relations-former-foreign-minister-natalegawa-44043">asserted</a> that asylum-seeker boat turnbacks were the prime irritant in the relationship. He argued they were unilateral and placed the burden of handling the refugee issue on Indonesia.</p>
<p>Speaking shortly after Indonesia had announced that its import quota of Australian live cattle had been slashed, Guharoy <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/peak-body-lashes-abbott-government-our-business-interests-in-indonesia-harmed-by-bad-diplomacy-20150714-gic4zj.html">painted</a> a similarly bleak picture of the relationship. Criticising what he called Australia’s “megaphone diplomacy”, he reported that from his communications with Indonesian government agencies it was clear that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… they are unhappy with Australia. They are not happy with the way we are conducting our diplomacy. The megaphone is not working … the fact that we make decisions unilaterally without consultation and tell them to just deal with the consequences, we just have to conduct our diplomacy better than we have been.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So should we be positive about the relationship, a la Bishop, or critical, alongside Natalegawa and Guharoy?</p>
<p>A bit of both, really. </p>
<h2>Reading the comments in context</h2>
<p>Bishop is clearly correct in pointing to the restoration of high-level contacts as a positive development. The relationship was going nowhere so long as ministers were not talking to each other. And the Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Grigson, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/recalled-ambassador-paul-grigson-returns-to-indonesia-20150609-ghk84i.html">returned to Jakarta</a> in early June.</p>
<p>But these developments, positive though they were, at most simply brought the relationship back to where it had been before the executions. In fact it is probably still behind where it had been then. The forthright way in which the Australian government responded to the executions is likely to be remembered in Jakarta for some time.</p>
<p>Natalegawa’s comments also reflect a reality in Jakarta: that the Australian government’s turnback policy is seen as disrespectful of Indonesia’s national interests.</p>
<p>Jakarta might quietly see some value in the policy. After all, if it became clear that asylum seekers could not use Indonesia as a jumping-off point for Australia, presumably fewer of them would come to Indonesia in the first place. </p>
<p>But, once again, the public announcement of this policy, and the confrontational way in which Indonesia’s interests were dealt with by Canberra, meant that Jakarta saw no option other than to reject the policy. Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-does-not-deny-australia-paid-people-smugglers-to-turn-back-asylum-seeker-boats-20150611-ghm5ru">refusal</a> to confirm or deny reports that crews of asylum seeker boats had been bribed to return to Indonesia only confirmed Jakarta’s position.</p>
<p>Interestingly, there seems to have been very little public attention paid in Indonesia to Labor’s adoption of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/shorten-reveals-suite-of-asylum-seeker-measures-45209">turnback option</a> last month. The Indonesian embassy in Canberra must have reported this development back to Jakarta, so the government must have been aware of it. The main news outlets, though, seem to have passed it by.</p>
<p>However, Natalegawa’s comments also need to be read in the context of his role as foreign minister in former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration – one which was seen in Australia at least as being sympathetic to Australia’s interests and concerns. Last year Natalegawa seemed to be making a pitch to <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/is-indonesias-next-marty-natalegawa-marty-natalegawa/">continue in office</a> after the presidential elections. If so, he was disappointed, with incoming president Joko Widodo showing <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/09/19/Indonesias-diplomatic-corps.aspx">no interest</a> in appointing him. </p>
<p>There could thus be an element of sour grapes in Natalegawa’s remarks.</p>
<p>Guharoy’s comments reflect that the Australian style of political diplomacy does not go down well in Indonesia. The whole confrontational approach to politics of Australia’s leaders runs counter to how most Indonesian politicians like to represent their political style. </p>
<p>But, in practice, Indonesia is not beyond indulging in unilateralism and non-communication on policy issues. The decision to execute Chan and Sukumaran was obviously unilateral, and Widodo was <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/bali-nine-joko-widodo-too-busy-to-talk-to-tony-abbott-about-pair-on-death-row-20150326-1m8cgp">less than communicative</a> with Australia on the issue. And Jakarta’s decision to <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/indonesia-dramatically-cuts-live-cattle-imports-to-only-50000/story-e6frg6nf-1227440856986">cut</a> the live cattle quota was taken unilaterally and with, so far as we can tell, no consultation with Australia. </p>
<p>On balance, it seems that the relationship is more or less back to its usual setting – where “usual setting” means “fragile”.</p>
<p>Peter Varghese, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, last week <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2015/07/31/role-business-indonesian-ties">regretted</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have not yet built the broader constituencies that would give the [Australia-Indonesia] relationship genuine resilience. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Outside government and academic circles, Varghese said, there needed to be stronger business and community links to give the relationship:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the ballast it needs to cope with momentary political crises or differences in policy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>True enough. But it has been true for years, at least since 1988 when then-foreign minister Gareth Evans first used the term “ballast” in this context in a speech to a meeting of the Australia Indonesia Business Co-operation Committee in Bali. Evans <a href="http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1988/241088_fm_relations_singapore.pdf">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… I look forward to the day when the interests of Australia and Indonesia are so varied and so important that we no longer talk of “the relationship” as though it were a patient of precarious health, sometimes sick, sometimes healthy, but always needing the worried supervision of diplomatic doctors.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Have we moved substantially forward in the relationship since then? Apparently not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Brown is a member of the Australia Indonesia Business Council.</span></em></p>On balance, it seems that the Australia-Indonesia relationship is more or less back to its usual setting – where “usual setting” means “fragile”.Colin Brown, Adjunct Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/446582015-07-16T00:11:18Z2015-07-16T00:11:18ZAustralia should prepare for lower beef export quotas: the view from Indonesia<p>Indonesia’s decision to <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/indonesia-dramatically-cuts-live-cattle-imports-to-only-50000/story-e6frg6nf-1227440856986">slash the import quota</a> for Australian beef cattle to 50,000 for the third quarter has little to do with the tense relationship between the two countries. </p>
<p>Anticipating high demand for beef for Ramadan and the Eid festival in June and July, Indonesia stocked up by increasing the import quota from Australia in the second quarter. As a result, Indonesia’s Agriculture Ministry is confident that supply for beef is assured for up to five days after Eid, when demand for beef will decrease again. </p>
<h2>Beef self-sufficiency</h2>
<p>Restrictions on imports by means of quotas are part of the Indonesian government’s policy to reach self-sufficiency in beef production. Indonesia has long wanted to to be self-sufficient for beef but has repeatedly missed its targets in 2010 and in 2014. </p>
<p>Agriculture Minister Amran Sulaiman <a href="http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2015/03/30/201258726/Dua.Tahun.ke.Depan.Indonesia.Tak.Impor.Daging.Sapi.">said</a> in March this year that Indonesia might no longer import beef cattle in a year or two. </p>
<p>According to the Indonesian government, the goal of being self-sufficient will be met when local farmers are able to meet 90% of national beef consumption. Indonesia’s cattle farmers currently supply nearly 80% of beef consumed in Indonesia. </p>
<p>The government feels the need to be self-sufficient because of a growing national demand for beef. Between 1999 and 2010 beef consumption increased by 4.66% per year. Meanwhile, domestic production rose by only 3.2% per year. Indonesia’s beef imports increased by 21.58% annually to meet national demand. </p>
<p>Australia has been the main supplier of imported beef cattle, but Indonesia regards being dependent on imports as risky. Prices of beef can surge uncontrollably whenever the rupiah is weak against the Australian dollar or when import tariffs rise.</p>
<p>Besides import quotas, the Indonesian government provides production subsidies for cattle farmers. The government also helps farmers use technology in breeding cattle using artificial insemination. </p>
<p>In 2011, more than 90% of cattle farmers in Indonesia, or around 5.7 million of them, were traditional small-scale farmers, with an average of three cows per farm. Indonesia had only 234 large-scale farms, with an average of 734 cows per farm.</p>
<p>Recent technological improvements must have achieved some success in increasing domestic production. Indonesian Trade Minister Rahmat Gobel, responding to questions about import quota cuts, <a href="http://portalkbr.com/nasional/07-2015/kemendag_evaluasi_kebutuhan_sapi/73653.html">said</a> cattle farmers in West Nusa Tenggara have unsold livestock while Indonesia imports cattle from Australia. </p>
<h2>Diversification of cattle imports</h2>
<p>Indonesia is also thinking about diversifying its sources of cattle imports. Indonesia allows cattle imports only from countries that are certified free from mouth and foot disease. This bars cattle from countries such as India from entering its market. </p>
<p>However, Indonesia imports sausages from Malaysian producers that use beef from India. Local processed meat producers in Indonesia <a href="http://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20150708160453-92-65227/produsen-sosis-lokal-ingin-gunakan-daging-sapi-asal-india/">have been lobbying the government</a> to allow cheaper imports from India to enter Indonesia. </p>
<p>Political tension between Indonesia and Australia does not factor in Indonesia’s decision to cut the cattle import quota. It is based on national interest in achieving food security and finding importers that give the best price. </p>
<p>As Indonesia aims for self-sufficiency in beef and looks to diversify its sources of imports, Australia should prepare for a decline in cattle exports to Indonesia in the coming years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44658/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rina Oktaviani receives funding from Australia Centre of International Agriculture Research. </span></em></p>Restriction on import quotas is part of Indonesian government’s policy to reach beef self-sufficiency.Rina Oktaviani, Professor of Agricultural Economics, IPB UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.