tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/australian-defence-force-2812/articlesAustralian Defence Force – The Conversation2024-03-18T02:57:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256612024-03-18T02:57:58Z2024-03-18T02:57:58ZWill the AUKUS deal survive in the event of a Trump presidency? All signs point to yes<p>A year ago, the AUKUS agreement was formally announced between Australian and UK Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese and Rishi Sunak and US President Joe Biden. The agreement mapped out the “<a href="https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/optimal-pathway">optimal pathway</a>” for Australia, over the next two decades, to acquire between six and eight sub-surface nuclear propulsion boats, or more simply put, nuclear submarines.</p>
<p>The plan to acquire and build them has been the subject of ongoing debate. That’s largely because there’s limited understanding of the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/one-year-along-australias-optimal-pathway-to-nuclear-powered-submarines/">need for Australia</a> to acquire submarines of this kind. </p>
<p>Concerns are also emerging over how committed the US really is to the deal, given doubts about whether it has the industrial capability to manufacture enough subs to meet its own needs. All this has fuelled speculation over the project’s viability. </p>
<p>So what is the US obliged to provide Australia with, in terms of submarines, under AUKUS? When will Australia likely get submarines under this deal? And how much can the domestic political and naval challenges facing the US affect how it meets its AUKUS requirements, particularly if Donald Trump is elected president?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-aukus-is-here-to-stay-despite-looming-roadblocks-213112">Why AUKUS is here to stay, despite looming roadblocks</a>
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<h2>The state of play</h2>
<p>Australia is now heavily invested in making AUKUS work, avoiding further <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-11/albanese-submarine-deal-with-france/101145042">policy U-turns</a>. </p>
<p>Aided by some deft Australian diplomacy, in December 2023 the US Congress passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670">National Defence Authorisation Act</a> which <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-12-15/passage-priority-aukus-submarine-and-export-control-exemption-legislation-united-states-congress">authorised</a> the transfer of three Virginia class submarines to Australia in the 2030s. Given the almost gridlocked US political system, this was once considered inconceivable. </p>
<p>The act also confirmed arrangements for training Australians in US and UK shipyards and, in turn, the maintenance of their submarines in Australia by Australians. </p>
<p>That does not mean, though, that everything is now set on autopilot. Understandably, the US reserves the right to fulfil its own domestic naval needs first. </p>
<p>But fears of the plans being derailed are misplaced, and suggestions Australia reverse course are problematic. Critics referring to the “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-13/us-defence-announcement-raises-questions-on-aukus-anniversary/103578408">profound impact</a>” of any production slowdown have an important political point to make, drawing attention to the need for urgency and acceleration of the program, not cancellation.</p>
<p>Reports that the rate of production of these Virginia class submarines will dip to 1.3 per year has <a href="https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/usn-virginia-submarine-production-shortfall-worsens/">generated some alarm</a>. This belies the fact the dip in production was anticipated and plans are underway to rectify the shortfall. The two US manufacturing companies that make submarines of this type, <a href="https://www.gdeb.com/">Electric Boat</a> and <a href="https://hii.com/">Huntington Ingalls Industries</a>, are taking measures to accelerate the rate of manufacture to 2.3 boats per year. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-deal-will-be-hotly-debated-at-the-alp-national-conference-but-its-real-vulnerabilities-lie-in-america-211504">The AUKUS deal will be hotly debated at the ALP national conference, but its real vulnerabilities lie in America</a>
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<p>Australia’s <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/AUKUS-factsheet.pdf">financial and personnel contributions</a> are helping. Plans are still in place that will enable Australia to purchase its first second-hand, but refurbished, Virginia class submarine in the mid-2030s.</p>
<p>That seems a long way off. To cover the gap, Australia’s existing diesel-electric Collins class submarines will be retained, supplemented by a <a href="https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/submarine-rotational-force-west">Submarine Rotational Force-West</a>, which will include UK and US submarines rotating through the Garden Island Naval Facility in Cockburn Sound, south of Fremantle. </p>
<p>While it doesn’t have the recognition of Pearl Harbor, Cockburn Sound is just as significant. In the Pacific war, about 170 allied submarines were based at Cockburn Sound from 1942 to 1945. From there, they protected Allied shipping and interdicted enemy sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean, as well as the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda straits (in modern-day Indonesia), and across the South China Sea and around Formosa (now Taiwan). </p>
<p>Already, US Navy Virginia class subs have started making routine port calls there. The deterrent effect is already kicking in – and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5f0e31c0-957d-4c4f-a6e3-e597881d8fd9#:%7E:text=Concerns%20about%20the,in%20the%20Pacific.">vociferous criticism of AUKUS</a> suggests that some <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_lady_doth_protest_too_much,_methinks">doth protest too much</a>.</p>
<h2>What if Trump comes to power?</h2>
<p>In the meantime, some worry about what effect Trump’s prospective return to office might have on these plans. </p>
<p>AUKUS is understood to be a game-changer, and political leaders in Washington DC, both Democrat and Republican, understand this. It reflects an enduring overlap of Australian and US interests, not just sentimental attachments. </p>
<p>Australia benefits from US technology in bolstering its military and intelligence capabilities, reducing its “<a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/fear-abandonment">fear of abandonment</a>”.</p>
<p>In turn, the US retains access to facilities in the East Asian hemisphere to monitor security trends and bolster deterrence in ways that suit their <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/188604/united-states-direct-investments-in-the-asia-pacific-region-since-2000/">economic and security interests</a>. This is appreciated by US security <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/05/fact-sheet-u-s-asean-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-one-year-on/">partners in Asia</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, while Trump has been critical of <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/closer-trumps-years-criticizing-nato-defense-spending/story?id=107201586">NATO and other allies</a>, he has broadly avoided criticising Australia. </p>
<p>The overwhelmingly bipartisan December vote in Congress suggests that fears of the agreement losing support in the US are misplaced. There are no indications Trump is set to change that stance, and there are some compelling reasons for the next US administration to stay the course. </p>
<h2>Why do we need new submarines anyway?</h2>
<p>Back home, though, the Australian government’s message on these submarines has been clouded. </p>
<p>Eager to avoid drawing undue attention to the limitations of the current fleet, it has avoided talking up how potent and useful the replacement subs will be. </p>
<p>This is in spite of the fact that no matter how <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/collins-class-submarine-upgrade-will-extend-australias-non-nuclear-boats-to-2048/">well maintained and updated</a> the Collins are, such submarines are no longer viable for long-distance transits required for Australian submarine operations. This is not because of some intrinsic fault with the Australian submarines, but due to their ability to be detected from above.</p>
<p>The surveillance web of persistent and almost saturation <a href="https://spacenews.com/chinas-casic-to-begin-launching-vleo-satellites-in-december/#:%7E:text=The%20very-low%20Earth%20orbit%20%28VLEO%29%20constellation%20is%20to,in%20the%20city%20of%20Wuhan%20earlier%20this%20month.">satellite coverage</a>, coupled with drones and artificial intelligence, makes the wake of the submarine funnels are detectable when they raise their snorkel to recharge batteries. </p>
<p>Much of this surveillance is believed to be operating from <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-18/china-s-new-antarctic-station-qinling-in-antarctica-australia/103464840">Chinese facilities in Antarctica</a>, <a href="https://spacenews.com/south-africa-joins-chinas-moon-base-project/">southern Africa</a> and <a href="https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/">South America</a>. </p>
<p>With stealth of submarines the only real advantage over surface warships, the usefulness of the current fleet on long transits sinks quickly. This leaves nuclear propulsion as the only viable path for countries that must traverse vast ocean distances even to cover their own waters. </p>
<p>For Australia, a transit from any capital city across to Fremantle cannot happen without exposure to detection. In wartime, that presents a catastrophic risk only surmounted by remaining underwater for the duration.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-deal-will-be-hotly-debated-at-the-alp-national-conference-but-its-real-vulnerabilities-lie-in-america-211504">The AUKUS deal will be hotly debated at the ALP national conference, but its real vulnerabilities lie in America</a>
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<p>Beyond recouping stealth, the benefits of the new nuclear submarines are considerable. Australian submarines are intended to help manage vital shipping lanes. </p>
<p>The new vessels can travel faster than the current fleet (about 20 knots on average instead of six-and-a-half knots) and stay on station for longer, bolstering the deterrent effect. </p>
<p>The main constraint is food for the crew. A fleet of up to eight nuclear subs should generate three times the effective deployable time compared with the current Australian fleet because it can deploy faster, loiter longer and remain undetected, without needing to recharge batteries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies and Director of the Australian National University’s (ANU) North America Liaison Office in Washington DC. He is author of a number of works, including Revealing Secrets: An Unofficial History of Australian Signals Intelligence and the Advent of Cyber (UNSWP, 2023, with Clare Birgin).</span></em></p>Amid reports of a dip in US production of nuclear submarines and concerns about the future of the agreement under Donald Trump, some have questioned the viability of AUKUS. But they need not worry.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239802024-02-21T03:28:42Z2024-02-21T03:28:42ZAustralia wants navy boats with lots of weapons, but no crew. Will they run afoul of international law?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576937/original/file-20240221-20-kj0w1z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1043%2C4151%2C2414&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2003326795/">Pierson Hawkins / US Navy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Australian Navy is set to be transformed. On top of existing plans for nuclear submarines, the government yesterday announced a scheme for an “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/independent-analysis-navy-surface-combatant-fleet">enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet</a>” including six new “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/20/australian-navy-warship-surface-combatant-fleet-double-hunter-class-losv">optionally crewed</a>” vessels.</p>
<p>The advantages of these vessels, which can operate with or without a crew, are clear. They can operate for longer, with more stealth, and allow military personnel to avoid hostile environments. </p>
<p>Simple remote-controlled craft have been used since at least the 1920s, but increasingly sophisticated uncrewed vessels are becoming more common. Ukraine has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-uncrewed-boats-are-changing-the-way-wars-are-fought-at-sea-201606">used small uncrewed boats</a> against Russian targets in the Black Sea, the United States plans to <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/01/30/pentagon-puts-out-call-for-swarming-attack-drones-that-could-blunt-a-taiwan-invasion">build a swarm of sea drones</a> to protect Taiwan, and China is <a href="https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/december/13868-edex-2023-china-s-csic-promotes-jari-usv-a-in-egypt.html">developing its own devices</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is so far unclear how these vessels fit within existing international law. Unless their legal status becomes more clear, it may increase the risk of conflict with potentially serious consequences. </p>
<h2>What’s the problem with uncrewed vehicles?</h2>
<p>The key international treaty regulating the ocean – the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> – was negotiated in the 1970s and early 1980s, well before uncrewed vessels of the kind we see today were a realistic concern.</p>
<p>The convention balances the rights of coastal states with those of maritime powers by dividing the ocean into different zones, with different rules about what states can do in each zone. It’s a <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm">complicated system</a>, but in general, states have more control over the use of the ocean closer to their own coasts.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-uncrewed-boats-are-changing-the-way-wars-are-fought-at-sea-201606">Ukraine: how uncrewed boats are changing the way wars are fought at sea</a>
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<p>Under the convention, foreign ships and vessels in waters close to the coasts of other states have certain navigational rights. These rights establish where ships can go in the ocean and what they can do when they are there. </p>
<p>Naval vessels also rely on these navigational rights to operate. In particular, where crucial sea lanes are very close to the coast – such as in the Malacca Strait between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia – ships or other vessels without navigational rights may not have a firm legal footing for passing through. </p>
<p>And in a crisis, it may not be feasible to avoid such waters by finding another route. If states had different views about what actions were permissible, it would increase the risk of conflict.</p>
<h2>What counts as a ‘ship’?</h2>
<p>So what does all this have to do with Australia’s “optionally crewed systems”? </p>
<p>The first problem is that the convention on the law of the sea gives navigational rights to “ships” and “vessels” without defining what they mean. There is an <a href="https://law.uq.edu.au/article/2020/10/international-law-and-uncrewed-maritime-vehicles">ongoing debate</a> about whether these categories include uncrewed devices, or whether having people on board is required to qualify for navigational rights. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photo of a speedboat powering through the water with nobody aboard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vessels without a human crew can legally be ‘ships’, but whether they can be ‘warships’ is less clear.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://images.defence.gov.au/20220524ran8098978_273.jpg">Justin Brown / Commonwealth of Australia / Department of Defence</a></span>
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<p>In <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/3910649/06McKenzie-unpaginated.pdf">my view</a>, the more convincing argument is that uncrewed vessels like the ones Australia plans to purchase should count as ships and vessels. </p>
<p>The convention is designed to be the “constitution of the ocean”, with a very broad scope. This suggests we should also take a broad idea of what counts as a ship or vessel.</p>
<h2>What counts as a ‘warship’?</h2>
<p>However, uncrewed devices may face a more significant problem: can they be “warships”? This is a special legal category for vessels with the right to engage in belligerent activities – that is, engage in warfare and naval blockades. </p>
<p>Again, it is the lack of people on board that may cause issues. Unlike “ship” and “vessel”, the term “warship” is explicitly defined in the convention. </p>
<p>According to Article 29 of the convention, warships must be, among other things, under the command of a commissioned officer and manned by a crew under armed forces discipline. A plain reading of these requirements suggests that a vessel without people on board cannot be a warship and must stay out of conflict.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-has-unveiled-its-navy-of-the-future-will-it-solve-our-current-problems-or-just-create-new-ones-223846">The government has unveiled its Navy of the future. Will it solve our current problems – or just create new ones?</a>
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<p>However, the <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol99/iss1/27/">reason “warship” is defined this way</a> goes back to the 19th century, when states wanted to distinguish their own “warships” from the vessels of privateers. This is why the definition refers to the vessel being under command and with a crew that is part of the armed forces.</p>
<p>The point of the definition is to ensure the warship is controlled by a state. We should understand it as part of the effort by states to keep control of legally authorised violence, not an attempt to restrict certain rights to vessels with crews.</p>
<h2>The future of uncrewed vessels and the law</h2>
<p>How will this legal dilemma be resolved? The neatest solution – a revision to the convention to clarify the situation – is unlikely, because the political prospects of getting all 169 signatory states to agree to such a change are remote.</p>
<p>The stakes are high. The use of uncrewed vessels may plausibly lead to increased risk taking by states. It is easier to imagine the US sending a fleet of uncrewed vessels in a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/06/freedom-of-navigation-operation-china-us-maritime-law/">freedom of navigation operation</a> close to the Chinese coast than risking a crewed fleet. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-military-plans-to-unleash-thousands-of-autonomous-war-robots-over-next-two-years-212444">US military plans to unleash thousands of autonomous war robots over next two years</a>
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<p>What can states do to reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict?</p>
<p>States like Australia that plan to adopt this technology should look to develop international law in other ways. They can do this by putting their views about what uncrewed vessels are permitted to do on the record. </p>
<p>In doing so, they will contribute to the development of customary international law. Making Australia’s position on these devices more transparent will help create a legal regime that can cope with technological change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon McKenzie has received funding from the Australian Government’s Next Generation Technologies Fund through Trusted Autonomous Systems, a Defence Cooperative Research Centre. </span></em></p>The law of the sea says warships must have a crew. What does that mean for naval drones?Simon McKenzie, Lecturer in Law, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093322023-07-17T20:02:35Z2023-07-17T20:02:35ZRecruiting for the modern military: new research examines why people choose to serve and who makes the ideal soldier<p>The recent investigations into alleged war crimes committed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-australian-charged-with-war-crime-of-murder-in-afghanistan-202148">Australian</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-66106980">UK special forces</a> in Afghanistan have raised urgent questions about the conduct of people serving in the military. </p>
<p>As militaries rethink their structures and the complex role they play in society, they also need to examime what types of people they should be recruiting. Who are the modern soldiers, and why do they choose to serve?</p>
<p>Some of these answers can be found in existing research that defence forces have conducted over the last half century. With the end of conscription in many Western nations, volunteer militaries began to commission studies looking at why people enlist. The findings were meant to make <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3100/RR3107/RAND_RR3107.pdf">recruitment campaigns more effective</a>. </p>
<p>We recently conducted a research project funded by the Australian Defence Force that examined these studies through a new lens of behavioural science. </p>
<p>The aim of this study went beyond just increasing recruitment numbers, though. Understanding people’s motivations for enlisting can also reveal a lot about the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609218">suitability of recruits for the military</a>, given the new demands they face in these roles. </p>
<p>We found that in contrast to the usual portrayal of military recruits as Hollywood- inspired, hyper-masculine mercenary types, many people enlist because of the duty of care for others and the value they place in military service. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-defence-force-must-ensure-the-findings-against-ben-roberts-smith-are-not-the-end-of-the-story-206749">Australian Defence Force must ensure the findings against Ben Roberts-Smith are not the end of the story</a>
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<h2>Recruiting for a new model military</h2>
<p>The role of militaries has changed in recent years. Today’s threats are frequently not active conflicts between nations, but rather ethnic strife within nations, terrorism and cyber warfare. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have also become more common than conventional warfare, with military forces frequently involved in disaster relief and recovery efforts. </p>
<p>The lines around the purpose of a military are now increasingly blurred. As a result, public sentiment and the battle for hearts and minds has become even more important, especially as technology and social media allow domestic audiences to be better informed about what happens in the field. </p>
<p>The now-deceased <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2000-05-01/postmodern-military-armed-forces-after-cold-war">sociologist Charles Moskos</a> called this the “postmodern military”. It is much leaner and more professional than the armed forces of the past, tasked with new kinds of missions, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438708000045">oftentimes without widespread public support</a>. </p>
<p>New model armies need new model recruits. So, what drives a person to want to voluntarily enlist?</p>
<p>We found the voluminous evidence can be neatly captured by two separate dimensions: </p>
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<li><p>intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations</p></li>
<li><p>and pro-social versus self-serving motivations. </p></li>
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<h2>Serving for thrills and adventure</h2>
<p><a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2000-13324-007">Intrinsically motivated people</a> do things for their own sake. For example, they might like travelling for the journey itself, rather than to reach a destination. </p>
<p>Independent of outcomes, some recruits are motivated to serve in the military by the idea of service itself. This could include having an inherent interest in the military, learning how to use high-tech machinery and a sense of adventure.</p>
<p><a href="https://amp.abc.net.au/article/11054728">Melbourne University researcher Sara Meger</a> found many foreign fighters have been attracted to international flashpoints like Ukraine because of thrill-seeking. </p>
<p>Some people also sign up for the military out of a personal psychological need for stimulation. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1983.tb00856.x">One military study</a> shows volunteer soldiers have a greater tolerance for risk-taking than non-volunteers. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fit-for-service-why-the-adf-needs-to-move-with-society-to-retain-the-public-trust-159924">'Fit for service': Why the ADF needs to move with society to retain the public trust</a>
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<h2>Service as a means to an end</h2>
<p>On the other end of this spectrum are those who are driven purely by extrinsic motives. This means doing something in the pursuit of a separate goal, such as financial compensation, or recognition earned through medals. </p>
<p>In Meger’s interviews with foreign fighters on both sides of the Ukraine conflict, she found they were often extrinsically driven by ideology. Serving was a way to support a desired political outcome, <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/the-latest-in-a-long-line-ukraines-international-legion-and-a-history-of-foreign-fighters/">such as Ukraine’s self-determination</a>. </p>
<p>Other British and American fighters were <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/the-latest-in-a-long-line-ukraines-international-legion-and-a-history-of-foreign-fighters/">driven</a> by the goal of protecting Ukraine – and the Western world generally – from what they saw as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat to freedom. </p>
<p>These people consider themselves freedom fighters, like <a href="https://www.thecollector.com/che-guevara-freedom-fighter-or-myth/">Che Guevara</a>, and will accept extraordinary risks and hardship. They often have military backgrounds, too.</p>
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<h2>Serving for others vs for oneself</h2>
<p>Some soldiers are driven for a pro-social reason, as in they are serving for others. These people can be motivated by altruistic reasons, such as defending one’s country and loved ones at great risk and cost to themselves. Some serve as a way to provide better support to their families. </p>
<p>On the other end of the scale are those with self-interested motivations to serve. These can include personal advancement, income, training and career opportunities. Escapism is another common motive found – many serve to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article-abstract/153/6/325/4846832?redirectedFrom=fulltext">cope with relationship breakdown or financial or family stress</a>.</p>
<p>Extrinsic motivation and self-interest are <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-00266-003?doi=1">not the same</a>. Freedom fighters, for example, fight for an extrinsic outcome (winning a war), but might do so out of consideration for others (those who win their freedom). </p>
<p>And intrinsic motivations are not always pro-social. Adventure seekers care about fighting rather than winning, for purely selfish reasons. </p>
<p>Put together, these motivations reveal four service archetypes: the volunteer, the freedom fighter, the professional and the mercenary. But the research suggests most people will have a variety of motivations and lie somewhere between the extremes.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536715/original/file-20230711-25-7uc6gy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The four archetypes of soldiers, clockwise from top right: Che Guevara, Roger Moore as Lieutenant Shawn Fynn in Wild Geese, General George S. Patton, Chinese-Australian soldier Billy Sing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>So, who is the ideal soldier?</h2>
<p>How do these insights help the military? Defence forces have much to gain from recruiting volunteers with the right mix of intrinsic and pro-social motivations. </p>
<p>The psychological evidence suggests that people with intrinsic motivations <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2014-03897-001">lead to a better quality of service</a>. They are motivated by discipline, technical proficiency and professionalism, meaning they are more likely to perform in line with what society expects of them. </p>
<p>But the evidence also suggests these motivations can be “crowded out” when excessive rewards are offered. This means providing an extrinsic incentive for something <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-6419.00150">reduces the intrinsic motivation for it</a>. </p>
<p>For instance, British social policy pioneer <a href="https://www.sapiens.org/culture/blood-plasma-donation-gift-commodity/">Richard Titmuss’s</a> well-regarded analysis suggests that paying people for blood donations takes away their opportunity to demonstrate public spiritedness. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/job.322?casa_token=qZfnt-Rns0wAAAAA:oLhi0Z161_W1-P8n6tDKOVMx4PDHMz5Wvz3ZQTEQUxQ8Ojlz49djJ2r7A6ko1ruqkYi2Kxvhm8sknjA8">This was later confirmed in empircal studies</a>.</p>
<p>On the other spectrum, pro-socially oriented people are well-suited for humanitarian missions or in interactions with civilians caught up in conflict.</p>
<p>Multinational companies and organisations are already using this type of behavioural scientific research to find the best candidates for their workforce. As militaries rethink their purpose to keep up with the times, they can learn much from mulitnationals on this front. </p>
<p>In the postmodern military, recruiting isn’t just about filling the ranks anymore, it’s about finding the right fit for an increasingly challenging profession.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Hoffmann receives funding from the Australian Defence Force.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lena Wang receives funding from the Australian Defence Force.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Beamond receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence. </span></em></p>Understanding people’s motivations for enlisting can also reveal a lot about the suitability of recruits for the military, given the new demands they face in these roles.Robert Hoffmann, Professor of Economics, Tasmanian Behavioural Lab, University of TasmaniaLena Wang, Associate Professor in Management, RMIT UniversityMaria Teresa Beamond, Lecturer in Global Human Resources Management, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085702023-06-27T03:28:12Z2023-06-27T03:28:12ZAustralia is not giving Ukraine the military support it needs – sending our retired jets would be a start<p>This week, Australia announced its latest <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-06-26/australia-pledges-further-support-ukraine">package</a> of military and humanitarian support for Ukraine, totalling approximately A$110 million. </p>
<p>The package comprises 70 military vehicles, which include 28 M113 armoured personnel carriers and other support vehicles (trucks, trailers and “special operations vehicles”). </p>
<p>The package also includes a supply of 105mm artillery shells, which are <a href="https://time.com/6264396/eu-ukraine-artillery-shells/">desperately needed</a> by Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian government says it will need one million rounds of ammunition this year.</p>
<p>While this support package was welcomed by the Ukrainian government, it has been <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-provides-an-extra-110-million-in-support-for-ukraine-20230626-p5djhs.html">criticised</a> by some for being too small, tokenistic and not providing the level of equipment and support needed to counter Russia’s invasion.</p>
<h2>Why has this latest package been criticised?</h2>
<p>The primary issue with the package is the supply of the M113 armoured personnel carriers. Ukraine has previously requested Australian designed and built Hawkei armoured vehicles, going so far as to describe the Hawkei as “its new crush”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1645547205158408193"}"></div></p>
<p>However, Australia has so far declined to provide these. The M113 armoured personnel carriers that Australia is sending to Ukraine date back to the Vietnam War. Although the vehicles have undergone a variety of upgrades over the years, they are widely considered to be obsolete in modern warfare. </p>
<p>Australia is in the process of retiring them in favour of a new, <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/project/land-combat-vehicle-system-infantry-fighting-vehicle">modern design</a> of armoured personnel carrier. The Defence Department itself has said the M113 carriers are obsolete: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[they] are no longer able to counter the current and emerging threats presented in our operating environment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In an address to the Indian Ocean Defence and Security Conference in Perth last year, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, the new Australian Army chief, also <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-30/army-fights-to-keep-multi-billion-project-to-replace-obsolete/101383548">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The combined arms fighting system that protects our soldiers today has at its core a 60-year-old armoured personnel carrier. […] We can and we must do better — and we have a plan to do so.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1673174158354841601"}"></div></p>
<h2>Why are we not giving the Ukrainians what they want</h2>
<p>The government is currently unable (or perhaps unwilling) to supply the Hawkei vehicles that Ukraine has requested, on the advice of the Australian Defence Force. As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-26/australia-offers-more-support-to-ukraine/102523690">said</a> this week:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>On Hawkei, I know that has been raised, the advice is that would not be the best way to provide assistance to Ukraine. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Defence has <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/defence-blames-braking-fault-in-hawkei-armoured-vehicles-for-reluctance-to-supply-ukraine/news-story/94436793866cb09891233be142b279e4">reportedly rejected</a> providing Hawkei vehicles to Ukraine due to an unresolved braking issue and a limited supply of spare parts, which it asserts would make the Hawkei currently unsupportable in combat. </p>
<p>However, Ukraine would be well aware of these issues. And its request (and enthusiasm) for this particular vehicle means the government likely sees a need for the Hawkei on the battlefield – one that is unlikely to be met by the M113s.</p>
<p>It is difficult to conclusively determine why Australia has chosen such a military hardware composition for its latest support package and why it is denying Ukraine the assistance it is requesting. </p>
<p>There is still a chance Albanese will offer more support over the coming months, for example, at the upcoming NATO conference he will attend in July.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-cant-the-west-agree-on-how-much-military-support-to-send-to-ukraine-197987">Why can't the West agree on how much military support to send to Ukraine?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>We have other hardware we could offer</h2>
<p>Much has been made recently about the potential for Ukraine’s allies to supply F-16 fighter jets to Kiev. The F-16 would provide Ukraine with a formidable air combat and strike capability that is crucial for pushing back Russian forces. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s air force currently utilises old Soviet-era fighters, predominantly MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-27s, which have been jerry-rigged to deploy Western munitions.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/22/biden-f-16s-ukraine-g7-00098243">dragging its feet</a> for months, the US recently announced it will approve allied exports of F-16 jets to Ukraine. The move was welcomed by countries like Denmark, which maintains a fleet of 40 F-16s, of which about 30 are operational and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65649471">could be supplied to Ukraine</a>.</p>
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<p>However, another option exists for Australia: its retired fleet of F/A-18 classic Hornets. Australia has 41 of these fighter jets in storage, which Ukraine has <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-ambassador-confirms-interest-in-australias-f-a-18-hornets">reportedly been looking into</a>, although has not yet formally requested. Negotiations are <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-08/retired-australian-jets-step-closer-to-joining-ukraine-war/102452394">reportedly underway</a> on a deal.</p>
<p>The F/A-18 has some advantages over the F-16 for Ukraine’s purposes. First, it is a “navalised” fighter, meaning it has a strengthened undercarriage that would allow it to land and take off from rougher airfields (and potentially roads), unlike the F-16 which requires highly maintained airfields. </p>
<p>This would give the Ukrainian air force more flexibility and increase the chances the aircraft would survive longer in combat. In more remote locales, these jets would also be more difficult to detect when not flying.</p>
<p>Australia’s version of the F/A-18, the F/A-18A, has also been <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australias-mothballed-f-a-18-hornets-should-be-given-to-ukraine">heavily upgraded</a>, making its fleet roughly equivalent to the slightly more modern F/A-18C standard. </p>
<p>Further, given Australia’s jets have not been deployed in a naval context (on, say, aircraft carriers) and thus subjected to saltwater environments, they are in good condition.</p>
<p>There are, of course, some issues with Ukraine receiving F/A-18 jets. </p>
<p>First, it would require <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65649471">export approval</a> from the US, which is required for all US military hardware to be resold or re-exported. This, however, would not likely be difficult to obtain. </p>
<p>Perhaps more significantly, it would also require Ukraine’s pilots to be trained on the F/A-18 platform. However, this will be an issue for the F-16, or any other Western fighter jet sent to Ukraine’s air force.</p>
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<h2>Why Australia should do more</h2>
<p>Australia’s distance from the conflict means it isn’t as likely to provide as much support as other states in closer geographic proximity to Russia. </p>
<p>The European Union, for instance, just <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-to-increase-military-aid-fund-for-ukraine-by-35-billion/a-66033077">announced</a> it will increase its military aid fund to Ukraine by a further €3.5 billion (A$5.7 billion).</p>
<p>But as Matthew Sussex, one of Australia’s leading Russia experts, has pointed out, Russia is a <a href="https://twitter.com/matthew_sussex/status/1669188343765274625">strategic competitor to Australia</a> that will increasingly pivot its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. </p>
<p>As such, our geographic distance is no excuse for weak support to a state attempting to counter an illegal and devastating invasion by Russia. We can, and should, be doing considerably more.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-us-built-f-16-fighting-falcon-could-help-kyiv-move-on-to-the-offensive-198942">Ukraine war: how US-built F-16 'Fighting Falcon' could help Kyiv move on to the offensive</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The M113 armoured personnel carriers going to Ukraine date back to the Vietnam War. Australia can – and should – do better.James Dwyer, Associate Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2076152023-06-14T20:09:13Z2023-06-14T20:09:13ZStripping medals from soldiers is murky territory, and must not distract from investigating alleged war crimes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531833/original/file-20230614-29-dxqwmr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dave Hunt/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It could be years before Ben Roberts-Smith and others are stripped of military awards for their service in Afghanistan and face Australian criminal court on war crimes charges, if in fact that ever happens. </p>
<p>Investigations of war crimes are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">difficult and time-consuming</a>. In the meantime, calls for the Defence Department to continue to address the allegations against Australian Defence Force personnel have grown louder. </p>
<p>In the case of Roberts-Smith, the investigation is now being undertaken by a <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/massive-blow-afp-war-crimes-probe-collapses-over-risk-of-tainted-evidence-20230613-p5dg7c.html">joint taskforce</a> from the Office of the Special Investigator and the Australian Federal Police, rather than the AFP on its own. The decision to move the investigation resulted from issues with how evidence that could be used in a criminal case was collected in the Brereton inquiry. Such problems with evidence are difficult for investigation teams and courts that are not specifically designed to deal with war crimes. </p>
<p>Debate has also arisen in Australia over whether commanders as well as direct perpetrators ought to be held <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">responsible</a> for war crimes, and what the leadership failings in Afghanistan were. Such debates are relevant to the issue of individual and unit awards and honours.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Over 26,000 Australian security personnel served in the Afghanistan war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Ellinghausen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Australia’s obligations under the Rome Statute</h2>
<p>The public debate – and even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/09/australias-military-should-be-held-to-account-but-its-the-individual-soldier-who-pulls-the-trigger">expert opinion</a> – has tended to overlook the fact that Australia’s response to the alleged war crimes in Afghanistan is governed primarily by its international obligations. These obligations outweigh any views about war crimes that may be held within the defence community or the general public.</p>
<p>Administrative measures undertaken by Defence cannot substitute for war crimes prosecutions. Australia is a full party to the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">1998 Rome Statute</a>, which is the cornerstone of international war crimes law and is reflected in Australia’s <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/about-us/publications/attorney-generals-department-annual-report-2017-18/appendixes/appendix-3-international-criminal-court">own domestic law</a> covering war crimes. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">Why investigating potential war crimes in Afghanistan just became much harder – and could take years</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Rome Statute requires that Australia fully investigate and punish war crimes committed by its forces, at all ranks. Australia has conducted war crimes trials of enemy combatants <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">in the past</a>, in which it has found direct perpetrators, their local commanders and their senior officers guilty of war crimes and has punished them accordingly. </p>
<p>To fail to comprehensively prosecute alleged war crimes now, because the defendants would be Australian, is a morally and politically untenable position. Comprehensive trials also offer the only path to the public understanding where culpability for war crimes sits along the military chain of command.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1667728361853005826"}"></div></p>
<h2>Removing medals and citations</h2>
<p>The prompt removal of medals and citations, however, would provide Defence with an opportunity to condemn war crimes immediately, rather than waiting until formal trials can be held.</p>
<p>Defence honours and awards in Australia are awarded through an administrative process. Though awards have been revoked in the past for dishonourable conduct, it remains an unusual step. The process of conferring or revoking a high-level award needs the support of the government. </p>
<p>The Australian Defence Force has been criticised for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/mar/01/adf-taking-too-long-to-enact-reforms-after-afghanistan-war-crimes-inquiry-watchdog-warns">moving too slowly</a> to address public concerns over its record in Afghanistan. However, some attempts have been made. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/afghanistan-inquiry">Brereton Report</a>, Chief of the Defence Force General Angus Campbell announced the Special Operations Task Group would be stripped of a Meritorious Unit Citation for conduct in Afghanistan. The announcement caused a media and political uproar, and then Prime Minister Scott Morrison <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-30/defence-says-no-decision-yet-on-meritorious-citation-afghanistan/12935302">reversed</a> the decision. </p>
<p>It has since emerged that at least three <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/breretons-unfinished-business/">senior officers</a>, including <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/defence-chief-angus-campbell-tried-to-hand-back-his-afghanistan-medal-but-was-refused-20230612-p5dfs6.html">Campbell</a>, have attempted to return their own medals, awarded for distinguished command and leadership in action. In all three cases, the Coalition government denied this request. </p>
<p>Campbell has reportedly asked a group of former commanding officers to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/jacqui-lambie-fury-over-defence-chief-letters/102423354">return their medals</a>. In Senate Estimates, he stated such a move would represent a step towards accountability for the command failures in the Afghanistan operation.</p>
<p>The Labor government has appeared <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7997036/defence-chief-cleared-to-strip-medals/">more willing</a> for medals and awards to be handed back or stripped than its Coalition predecessor was. </p>
<p>The problems that Campbell has encountered in attempting to revoke honours, and in trying to hand his own back, highlight the fact that commendations have both military and political significance – which makes any decision to revoke honours particularly difficult.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">ADF chief Angus Campbell has attempted to strip officers of their medals, and to hand back his own, both to no avail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Will the minister strip Roberts-Smith of his VC?</h2>
<p>Ben Roberts-Smith is the public figurehead of Australia’s war crimes saga, so it is no surprise questions have been raised over whether he ought to keep his Victoria Cross. He was awarded the VC for an earlier action that is not connected with allegations of war crimes against him. </p>
<p>No Australian has ever had a VC revoked. </p>
<p>While a number of VCs were revoked in the United Kingdom, mostly during the 19th century, revocation has since been the subject of <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/double-edged-sword/">high-level debate</a>.</p>
<p>In the defamation case, a civil court found on the balance of probabilities that Roberts-Smith had committed war crimes, but these actions do not technically erode the validity of his VC. At the same time, his earlier bravery did not protect him from allegations of war crimes, and there remains a moral and legal obligation for him to face criminal justice.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-defence-force-must-ensure-the-findings-against-ben-roberts-smith-are-not-the-end-of-the-story-206749">Australian Defence Force must ensure the findings against Ben Roberts-Smith are not the end of the story</a>
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<p>At face value, Roberts-Smith and his VC seem to be a different case – the medal was awarded to one soldier, for one action. To some, however, the medal seems also to mark out the recipient as a hero, or at least as a person of superior character. In this light, calls for the VC to be revoked in the wake of the defamation case are understandable.</p>
<p>As Australians reckon with this new and dark chapter of the country’s military history, the public will continue to ask who is most to blame for alleged war crimes committed by Australian forces in Afghanistan, until the question is comprehensively examined in the criminal court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dean Aszkielowicz has previously received funding from the Army Research Scheme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Taucher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The awarding, and revoking, of military medals is more complex than it appears, and is no replacement for the proper investigation of alleged war crimes.Dean Aszkielowicz, Senior Lecturer in History and Politics, Murdoch UniversityPaul Taucher, Lecturer in History, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067492023-06-02T02:53:04Z2023-06-02T02:53:04ZAustralian Defence Force must ensure the findings against Ben Roberts-Smith are not the end of the story<p>On Thursday, Justice Anthony Besanko of the Federal Court dismissed defamation proceedings brought by former Special Air Service soldier Ben Roberts-Smith against several Australian news outlets. </p>
<p>The court found that reporting by Nick McKenzie, Chris Masters and David Wroe had satisfactorily established the truth of several serious imputations against Roberts-Smith. These included claims he committed war crimes during his service in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The judgement is a landmark moment in Australian military history, with implications for the investigation and potential prosecution of other Australians suspected of war crimes. The explosive evidence heard in the case also underlines the need for the Army, the broader defence community and the Australian public to reckon fully with the conduct of Australian forces in the Afghanistan campaign.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-win-for-the-press-a-big-loss-for-ben-roberts-smith-what-does-this-judgment-tell-us-about-defamation-law-206759">A win for the press, a big loss for Ben Roberts-Smith: what does this judgment tell us about defamation law?</a>
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<h2>Standards of proof and evidence</h2>
<p>Roberts-Smith could conceivably face criminal prosecution for the alleged murders at a future war crimes trial. This case was a civil proceeding, meaning the imputations only needed to be proven true on the balance of probabilities, a substantially lower requirement than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which would be required in a criminal trial.</p>
<p>Because of the different standards of proof, it is not certain Roberts-Smith would be found guilty in a war crimes trial, assuming all the same evidence was called. Prosecutors will be concerned, moreover, that the outcome of the high-profile defamation trial might influence a future war crimes proceeding. </p>
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<p>It is likely any criminal trial for Roberts-Smith will be held before a judge, without a jury. It is not unusual for a war crimes trial to be held without a jury; past Australian trials were held before a panel of three to five judges, all of whom were military officers.</p>
<p>Another way to overcome the problem of the defamation outcome poisoning a future criminal trial in Australia would be for the government to hand Roberts-Smith over to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, a court with long experience in dealing with very high profile war crimes cases. However, doing so would probably be deeply unpopular and signal to the world that Australia cannot dispense its own military justice.</p>
<h2>Contextual truth</h2>
<p>Some imputations against Roberts-Smith were not substantiated at the defamation trial. However, Justice Besanko found that these defamatory statements, which concerned threatening a fellow soldier and domestic violence, were nonetheless contextually true. This ruling means the newspapers are not liable for these imputations because the more injurious claims, including war crimes, were found to be true, so the defendant would suffer no further reputational damage.</p>
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<h2>Broader implications</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen what the full reaction to Thursday’s judgement will be. Roberts-Smith still holds the Victoria Cross, the country’s highest military honour. He received financial support for the case from Kerry Stokes – who, from 2015 to 2022, was chair of the Australian War Memorial. Stokes allegedly referred to McKenzie and Masters as “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/seven-billionaire-kerry-stokes-blasts-scumbag-journalists-over-roberts-smith-coverage-20221110-p5bx6g.html">scumbag journalists</a>”. </p>
<p>While the memorial as an institution did not support Roberts-Smith with the case, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/12/kerry-stokes-to-remain-war-memorial-chair-despite-criticism-of-his-support-for-ben-roberts-smith">Stokes remained as chair</a> even after his role was publicly questioned. The interpretation from some quarters that reporting on Roberts-Smith constitutes unfair criticism of a war hero will persist. Others, of course, will see it as exactly the job investigative reporting is meant to do.</p>
<p>The Australian Defence Force has taken the allegations brought forward by journalists and other sources seriously. It commissioned Paul Brereton’s Afghanistan inquiry and appears to accept that the conduct of some Australian personnel was potentially illegal.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">Why investigating potential war crimes in Afghanistan just became much harder – and could take years</a>
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<p>While the findings in the defamation case support the ADF’s position that an inquiry was needed, the case was not a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-defamation-court-proxy-war-crimes-trial-nears-judgement-2023-05-30/">proxy war crimes trial</a>”. It does not deliver justice for alleged war crimes. Only properly convened war crimes trials can answer the questions that hover over Australian conduct in Afghanistan, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">including the role of commanding officers</a>.</p>
<p>War crimes trials, however, take significant institutional momentum to convene and sustain: they are costly, long-running and controversial. The challenge for the ADF now is to continue to support the thorough investigation of alleged war crimes and to pursue criminal prosecution where it is warranted. </p>
<p>Since the second world war, Australia has positioned itself internationally as a champion of the laws and proper conduct of war. Australian forces have been deployed to many difficult conflicts, where they have largely been trusted operators. </p>
<p>The judgement in this case ought to have minimal impact on Australian forces who are deployed overseas, as following the rules of war is assumed to be part of any mission they undertake. If the case does come as a wake-up call to some, then the ADF will have to further assess its training on the laws of war, its leadership, and its culture. </p>
<p>The Roberts-Smith case, the finding against him and the graphic detail in the publicly available evidence made headlines around the world. If public faith in the ADF is to be restored, together with its international reputation, there must now be an exhaustive process of investigation and prosecution of any war crimes committed in Afghanistan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dean Aszkielowicz has previously received funding from The Army Research Scheme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Taucher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The explosive evidence heard in the case also underscores the need for the Army and the Australian public to reckon fully with the conduct of Australian forces in the Afghanistan campaign.Dean Aszkielowicz, Lecturer, Murdoch UniversityPaul Taucher, Lecturer, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047482023-05-01T05:56:30Z2023-05-01T05:56:30ZWhy Australia would be smart to recruit soldiers in the Pacific – a Fijian who served in the British Army explains<p>Fiji has a track record of service to the British crown. Travel to Hereford, where the Special Air Service is based, and you will find a statue of Sergeant Talaiasi Labalaba, who was one of the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/fijis-military-ethos-212-soldiers-for-the-queen/">212 Fijians</a> who joined the British Army in 1961 and gave his all in the 1972 Battle of Mirbat in Oman. </p>
<p>When you arrive at Nadi International Airport in Fiji, there is another <a href="https://fijisun.com.fj/2018/10/26/prince-harry-and-meghan-in-fiji-statue-unveils-emotions-for-labalaba-family/">statue</a> honouring his sacrifice.</p>
<p>Opposition defence spokesperson <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-radical-proposal-to-recruit-foreigners-to-fight-for-australia-20230427-p5d3p7.html">Andrew Hastie’s call</a> for foreigners, including from the Pacific, to enlist in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), is therefore neither new, nor necessarily unwelcome, in parts of the Pacific. </p>
<p>If Australia wanted to recruit Fijians into the ADF tomorrow, it would have no problem raising a battalion in one day. </p>
<p>Fiji has what is called a “<a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/pacific/youth-fiji-solomon-islands">youth bulge</a>”, which occurs when a country’s youth population is particularly large compared with other age ranges. Unemployment is a challenge, and recruits might see enlisting in the ADF as one of their few routes to economic opportunity – and eventual Australian citizenship.</p>
<p>The challenge will be finding the ideal recruits that meet the standards for the required roles needed for the ADF. Therefore, strict criteria for entry should be considered, given there will be no shortage of volunteers.</p>
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<h2>Why I chose to join the British Army</h2>
<p>Since 1998, thousands of young Fijian men and women have travelled to the United Kingdom to fill in the gaps of the British armed forces. I was one of them. I served in the 1st Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regiment (now Royal Yorkshire Regiment) with multiple tours to Iraq.</p>
<p>No one joins the British Army with the hope of going to war. The September 11 attacks changed everything and new theatres opened up in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fijian men and women served in these wars, and some paid with their lives. There is nothing unique about this. It is the cost for taking the queen’s shilling. Fijians in the British Army understand they are not special, and should not be given any special treatment because of where they have travelled from.</p>
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<p>When I joined the British Army in 2001, I was 19 attending the University of the South Pacific with a full scholarship, studying chemistry. I made a calculated decision to join given what was going on in the country at the time. The 2000 coup had recently taken place and I was concerned for my future. Like any young person, the opportunity to travel and see the world through the army appealed.</p>
<p>Observers may question whether recruiting Fijians or other Pacific citizens constitutes exploitation. But Fijians who join the British Army do not feel exploited; they see it as an honourable duty that comes with economic benefits to improve their own welfare and those of their families. There have been hundreds of Fijian soldiers completing their 22 years of service in the British Army from last year. They are entitled to retire with a full pension after this length of service. </p>
<p>Australia should consider targeting these Fijians first if they are serious about recruitment and wish to test the idea.</p>
<p>If not, consider recruiting those who are still serving with the British Army. Fijians would prefer to be closer to home with the same economic value they get out of the UK forces. They would have already been vetted from a security standpoint, too. </p>
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<span class="caption">A statue of Talaiasi Labalaba at Nadi International Airport in Fiji.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<h2>Developing trust in the Pacific</h2>
<p>Recruitment from the Pacific Islands should also be considered a smart security strategy for Australia. This kind of policy change goes beyond any memorandum of understanding or government security agreement. </p>
<p>In Fiji, households that have sent their sons and daughters to serve in the British armed forces develop a close connection with the United Kingdom. Fijian servicemen and women are remembered in the prayers in the households of these families. </p>
<p>Australia has already developed this kind of trust by helping Fiji during natural disasters. Former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama’s government softened its tone with Canberra after Australia provided critical support in the aftermath Cyclone Winston in 2016. The sight of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/hmas-to-the-rescue-in-fiji/">HMAS Canberra</a> arriving in Fiji was a welcome one. </p>
<p>Australian tourists have also been coming to Fiji for decades contributing to Fiji’s economic growth, so the close relationship with Fiji is already there. And then there is our nations’ shared love of rugby. </p>
<p>The currency of meaningful relationships is valued in the Pacific Islands region. Get this right, and you have trust.</p>
<p>If I had the opportunity to join the Australian Army back in 2001, I would have been outside a recruitment centre in record time. An opportunity is presenting itself here which will simultaneously be a step towards fulfilling Australia’s security needs, while also helping Fiji.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/penny-wong-said-this-week-national-power-comes-from-our-people-are-we-ignoring-this-most-vital-resource-203145">Penny Wong said this week national power comes from 'our people'. Are we ignoring this most vital resource?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Waqavakatoga served in the British Army. </span></em></p>Many Pacific islanders would likely not feel exploited serving in a foreign army; they would see it as an honourable duty that comes with economic benefits to improve their lives.William Waqavakatoga, PhD candidate, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000702023-04-24T09:29:22Z2023-04-24T09:29:22ZThe most significant defence review in 40 years positions Australia for complex threats in a changing region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522518/original/file-20230424-24-l2hfz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=133%2C19%2C3158%2C2171&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Petty Officer 3rd Class Isaak Martinez/Australian Defence Force/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Before today’s release of the government’s defence strategic review, Defence Minister Richard Marles <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/kick-in-the-guts-for-army-landmark-defence-review-to-create-winners-and-losers-20230423-p5d2mt.html">said</a> it would be the most important examination of Australia’s defence capabilities since the 1986 “Dibb Report” authored by Professor Paul Dibb. </p>
<p>As such, direct comparisons of the two documents were <a href="https://defense.info/re-shaping-defense-security/2022/10/the-australian-defence-strategic-review-lessons-from-the-past/">already being made before today’s release</a>. </p>
<p>The Dibb Report told a compelling story. It began by stating unequivocally that Australia was “<a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2242156">one of the most secure countries in the world</a>” and argued we should adopt a “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2017.1278743">strategy of denial</a>”, which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/feb/26/australias-defence-force-faces-once-in-a-generation-shake-up-but-to-what-purpose">would</a> </p>
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<p>allow our geography to impose long lines of communication on an adversary and force an aggressor to consider the ultimate prospect of fighting on unfamiliar and generally inhospitable terrain.</p>
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<p>The Dibb Report maintained the sea and air gap to Australia’s north could be made impassable if the Australian Defence Force (ADF) leveraged its technological edge in naval, air and surveillance capabilities. In turn, the demonstrated ability of the ADF to sink or shoot down any enemy units attempting to cross the moat would deter other countries from deciding to attack. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, the Australian army saw itself as the big loser in the Dibb Report, being relegated to collecting any stray enemy forces that washed ashore across Australia’s northern coastline.</p>
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<h2>Three different schools of thought on defence</h2>
<p>Today’s defence strategic review begins by outlining the fundamental geopolitical changes that have occurred in Australia’s region over the past few decades. The review is significant in openly stating the US no longer enjoys hegemony in the region, with China now being a great power peer and competitor. </p>
<p>In my book, <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/australias-defence-strategy-paperback-softback">Australia’s Defence Strategy</a>, I identify several different traditions within Australian defence policy. </p>
<p>The first is that defence of the continent should be Australia’s preeminent strategic objective. There is some disagreement within this school of thought about whether Australia requires the capability to stop an opponent outright as it crosses the sea, air or cyber gap to attack Australia. </p>
<p>Or, as defence expert <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/how-defend-australia">Hugh White</a> tends to argue, simply making it too risky and costly for an enemy is sufficient to deter an attack. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-much-anticipated-defence-review-is-here-so-what-does-it-say-and-what-does-it-mean-for-australia-204267">The much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?</a>
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<p>Another school of thought, which I call the “status quo defence policy” tradition, maintains that as long as there’s a favourable balance of power in our region, Australia will remain relatively secure. </p>
<p>This logic was once tied to imperial defence – as long as Britain ruled the waves, Australia would be relatively safe from attack. </p>
<p>Later, this thinking was redirected toward American primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. This viewpoint argued Australia’s defence was maintained by throwing our weight behind our great power security guarantor, even if it meant fighting far from our shores. </p>
<p>Finally, there is a tradition that argues defence thinking has been too focused on traditional threats from other nations. Defence policy should be treated as “national security”, which would better capture threats emerging from non-state actors such as terrorists, failed states, infectious diseases and climate change.</p>
<h2>A convergence of the three traditions</h2>
<p>We can clearly see the influence of all three of these traditions in the new defence strategic review.</p>
<p>First, the “strategy of denial” returns to the centre of Australia’s defence posture. Consequently, there is a strong emphasis on the security of the waters around Australia and our ability to prevent enemies from operating here. </p>
<p>The army sees itself being sidelined again and is less than pleased. Retired Major General Mick Ryan, for example, describes the government’s planned cut of infantry fighting vehicles from 450 to 129 as “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/kick-in-the-guts-for-army-landmark-defence-review-to-create-winners-and-losers-20230423-p5d2mt.html">a kick in the guts to the army</a>”. </p>
<p>Although the defence strategic review means the army will be asked to head in a very different direction from the one it had hoped to follow, it should not believe it is once again being relegated to Australia’s strategic goalkeeper.</p>
<p>The review argues for the accelerated acquisition of medium- and heavy-landing craft and the US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket (HIMARS) system currently being used to great effect by Ukraine’s army against Russian forces. This would give Australia unprecedented long-range missile strike capability from land. </p>
<p>The intention is clearly to send the army forward to deny the sea, air and land to opponents far from Australia’s own coastline. My research team and I have previously analysed the geostrategic importance of <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/soundings-35">Manus Island for such a role</a>.</p>
<p>This reflects <a href="https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/">similar thinking</a> in the US Marine Corps, under its Force Design 2030 restructuring plan, which will see land forces being deployed in maritime environments armed with long-range precision strike capabilities to restrict an opponent’s ability to manoeuvre. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522544/original/file-20230424-20-6v72bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A HIMARS missile being launched during a joint military drill between the Philippines and the US in March.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Favila/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Doubling down on the American alliance</h2>
<p>The defence strategic review also doubles down on Australia’s alliance with the US. </p>
<p>The 1986 Dibb Report argued the US was a global power with global interests and, consequently, Australia would be wise to emphasise “self-reliance” for all potential low- and medium-level conflicts. </p>
<p>The assumption in the current strategic review is that China is the greatest geopolitical challenge facing both Washington and Canberra, and this convergence of strategic interests and focus will result in a closer alliance between the two. </p>
<p>This section of the document reflects the “status-quo defence policy” tradition within Australian strategic thinking – if American power alone cannot maintain a favourable balance of power in the region, then Australia, Japan, India and other like-minded nations should throw their weight onto the scales.</p>
<h2>A new threat: climate change</h2>
<p>Finally, one of the most striking features of the review is the amount of time devoted to the impacts of climate change on the Australian Defence Force. </p>
<p>Although previous defence white papers have mentioned climate change, these references have generally only been made in passing. The review delves into far more depth and even advocates for defence procurement to move away from fossil fuels, which could have both positive operational and environment effects.</p>
<p>This follows the final school of thought on the importance of recognising non-traditional threats to our security, such as climate change.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-poses-a-direct-threat-to-australias-national-security-it-must-be-a-political-priority-123264">Climate change poses a 'direct threat' to Australia's national security. It must be a political priority</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Why the review is happening now</h2>
<p>Overall, the defence strategic review had extremely ambitious objectives and was produced on a very tight timeline.</p>
<p>A comparison with the Dibb Report allows for some strengths and weaknesses to be identified in the current review. Ironically, these strengthens and weaknesses can be seen as different sides of the same coin. </p>
<p>The review’s main strength is combining the main traditions of Australian strategic thought into one document. Its key weakness is that some of these traditions pull in different directions. The kind of capabilities Canberra would probably need to defend the Australian continent would not be best suited to contributing to US-led multinational coalitions across the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>1986 was a simpler time. The defence strategic review makes clear that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2015.1105461">a newly multipolar Asia</a> will require a more nuanced and sophisticated defence posture.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lockyer has received funding from the Australian Department of Defence's Strategic Policy Grants Program. He is also a non-resident fellow at the Sea Power Centre - Australia. </span></em></p>Australia will once again focus on defending its coastline, while also doubling down on its alliance with the US and recognising the threats posed by climate change.Adam Lockyer, Associate Professor in Strategic Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2042672023-04-24T06:52:22Z2023-04-24T06:52:22ZThe much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?<p>The Albanese government on Monday released a declassified version of the much-anticipated <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">defence strategic review</a>, authored by former defence chief Angus Houston and former defence minister Stephen Smith.</p>
<p>The report looks at Australia’s defence equipment and resourcing, but it also looks beyond just acquisitions.</p>
<p>So what’s in the report? What were some of the political drivers of the decisions taken, and what does it tell us about Australian defence strategy in the mid-2020s?</p>
<h2>Increasing risks</h2>
<p>The review builds on the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update">Defence Strategic Update of 2020</a>, which stressed the time we’d have to prepare for a potential conflict is reducing.</p>
<p>It highlights a shift from describing the defence of Australia in narrow, conventional military terms to a broader approach that requires a “whole-of-nation effort”.</p>
<p>It describes Australia’s strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific as one that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels – economic, military, strategic and diplomatic – all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.</p>
<p>A large-scale conventional and non-conventional military build-up without strategic reassurance is contributing to the most challenging circumstances in our region for decades.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It adds that “the risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising”.</p>
<p>It mentions that climate change complicates our challenges further. It also notes that “economic coercion” and “other actions that fall short of kinetic conflict” are impinging upon the ability of “countries to exercise their own agency and decide their own destinies”. </p>
<p>In response, the paper declares “we must sharpen our focus on what our interests are, and how to uphold them”. It focuses on the need for Australia to develop long-range strike capabilities, notably with longer-range missiles (it says we’re in the “missile age”) and advanced nuclear-powered submarines.</p>
<p>The ADF has long focused on maintaining a “balanced force” for three concentric circles: defending the continent, regional engagement, and contributions further afield as a “good global citizen”. </p>
<p>But the focus in this review shifts. It emphasises what it calls a “focused force”, with five tasks: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>defence of the nation</p></li>
<li><p>deterrence through denial (that is, deterring adversaries by reducing any possible benefits of engaging in an attack)</p></li>
<li><p>protection of economic connections</p></li>
<li><p>working with regional partners </p></li>
<li><p>and supporting the so-called rules based global order.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Four of these five tasks involve acting well beyond Australia’s shores. That’s a significant shift. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1635758223511699458"}"></div></p>
<h2>6 priorities going forward</h2>
<p>The report lists six priorities, and 62 recommendations, for defence acquisitions. </p>
<p>The first priority is acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, of which Australia already has a plan following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS announcement in March</a>. The government recognises conventional diesel-electric submarines are now vulnerable to detection, due to advances in surveillance. Nuclear-powered subs are less likely to be spotted as they don’t have to come up for a “snort” to refuel.</p>
<p>Second is improving our precision strike capability. Guided weapons and explosives are in short supply, in part thanks to the war in Ukraine, but also because we’ve tended not to develop large stockpiles. The government also plans to invest in developing the ability to manufacture advanced munitions onshore, especially long-range guided weapons. Officials privately advise that they expect we will produce licensed versions of United States’-sourced weapons systems to equip the ADF.</p>
<p>The third priority is about supporting the second pillar of the AUKUS (the first pillar is the submarines). This focuses on acceleration of technology such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and longer-range precision guided munitions.</p>
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<p>Fourth is the redevelopment of Australia’s northern bases, from Cocos (Keeling) Islands ranging to the air bases and other defence infrastructure across northern Australia.</p>
<p>Fifth is investment in recruitment and retention of ADF personnel. The previous federal government <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-10/defence-workforce-growing-2040-national-security/100896902">projected a nearly 20,000 increase in uniformed defence personnel</a>. The current government committed to follow through on that, with an increase of 5% per year, but there was little to show for any further surge.</p>
<p>Sixth is an emphasis on improving relations with the region, with a particular focus on Pacific Island nations.</p>
<h2>Significant adjustments</h2>
<p>The review does not abandon the army. But it significantly cuts back its planned acquisition of infantry fighting vehicles intended to replace its Vietnam War-era armoured personnel carriers. It reduces the planned acquisition from 450 to 129 vehicles.</p>
<p>What’s more, the review says Australia must cancel the planned acquisition of addition mobile (or “self-propelled”) artillery. It advocates for weapons with a longer range instead, such as “HIMARS” (high mobility artillery rocket systems), which is currently being used by Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. </p>
<p>So the army will need to make some significant adjustments.</p>
<p>The report also calls for a review into the navy surface combat fleet. Australia has been planning to construct 12 offshore patrol vessels and nine Hunter-class frigates for the coming years, but there’s expectations both numbers will be rejigged. The challenge is to get this smaller naval review done quickly. Australia’s naval shipbuilding capability atrophies quickly if left dormant and delays have already seen the naval shipbuilding industry under stress.</p>
<p>The thinking now is not just about air, land and sea forces, but also cyber and space. The report emphasises a robust cyber capability. The Australian Signals Directorate’s cyber program, called REDSPICE, is part of the mix.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-lashes-albanese-government-over-aukus-calling-it-labors-biggest-failure-since-ww1-201866">Paul Keating lashes Albanese government over AUKUS, calling it Labor's biggest failure since WW1</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The review is largely internally coherent, but there’s a dissonance between the rhetoric and the substance – noting the absence of substantial additional resource allocation. Perhaps this reflects the political headwinds faced by the Albanese government.</p>
<p>With the left wing of the ALP spooked by former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s aggressive teardown of AUKUS and defence policy writ large, coupled with calls for great expenditure on health, education and welfare, the government is reluctant to spell out how the increases in budget forecast in the review will come to fruition.</p>
<p>But it seems clear the Albanese cabinet has an acute appreciation of the security challenges butting up against the mood of a more sanguine political base.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>‘The risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising’, according to the long-awaited report.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2026072023-03-29T03:15:46Z2023-03-29T03:15:46ZFears AUKUS will undermine Australia’s defence sovereignty are misplaced<p>The AUKUS submarine announcement earlier this month reignited a long-running debate about how to best preserve Australia’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>The announcement addressed some key concerns. For example, the United States will sell (rather than lease) Australia its Virginia class submarines so Australia can keep these boats. The submarine commanders and crew will be Australian. The rotational deployments of US and UK submarines through Perth won’t become a foreign base. And Australia will ultimately build its own AUKUS class nuclear-powered submarines, likely in Adelaide.</p>
<p>Even so, the AUKUS announcement was met with sharp criticism. For <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/aukus-subs-deal-binds-us-to-a-country-that-can-change-its-mind-on-whim-20230316-p5cskq.html">some</a> commentators, AUKUS is the last nail in the coffin of Australian <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/this-outrageously-expensive-subs-deal-simply-caters-to-the-us-again-20230322-p5cu8n">independence</a> from the US. </p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/malcolm-turnbull-says-labor-has-failed-to-answer-if-aukus-deal-compromises-australian-sovereignty">concerns</a> about the reliance on others for technology and skills, especially regarding the nuclear reactors. Also, the massive investment allocated to the submarines may undermine a more <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/the-balance-sheet-of-the-nuclear-subs-deal-20230315-p5csgi">balanced defence force</a> needed for defending the continent.</p>
<p>What’s more, some analysts have questioned whether Australia can maintain independent <a href="https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2023/03/25/paul-keating-has-point-aukus">military decision-making in future conflicts</a>. For example, would Australia’s submarines be used to support the US in a war with China?</p>
<p>These concerns deserve serious consideration.</p>
<p>But many <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-submarines-will-strengthen-australias-sovereignty/">Australian</a> <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/far-from-breaking-with-the-past-aukus-advances-australias-commitment-to-collective-defence/">strategists</a> reject them. For them, AUKUS is less revolution than evolution, merely the logical <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/15/those-worried-about-australias-sovereignty-under-aukus-miss-the-point-that-ship-has-sailed">extension</a> of Australia’s robust defence cooperation with the US over many decades.</p>
<p>The AUKUS submarine plan represents a new shade of the dependency that Australia has always had on the US for advanced capabilities, and with which Australia has always been comfortable. So long as Australia is able to use these tools as it sees fit, the argument goes, then sovereignty is ensured. This is the way of the alliance.</p>
<p>We haven’t yet sacrificed our defence sovereignty or sovereign industrial capabilities on the altar of AUKUS.</p>
<p>Here’s why.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What are Australia’s defence sovereignty objectives?</h2>
<p>Many critiques of AUKUS go far beyond the specific issue of whether the proposed submarine pathway compromises Australia’s defence sovereignty. Instead, they touch on deeper questions of Australia’s strategic alignment with the US and the UK, and our national decision-making writ large.</p>
<p>For example, the most headline-grabbing critique is that AUKUS has deprived Australia of its freedom to choose what to do in a possible military contingency over Taiwan. But this hinges on a hypothetical future scenario, the answer to which cannot be known today.</p>
<p>We simply don’t know if Australia is now more locked into a potential US-China conflict than was already the case before September 2021, when AUKUS was first announced.</p>
<p>Answering that question involves far more than an assessment of just our submarine industrial capability.</p>
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<p>We should instead judge the submarine announcement, and whether it undermines Australia’s sovereignty, against the actual procurement objectives that lay behind the need to replace the retiring Collins class submarines.</p>
<p>Will the submarine plan help Australia enhance its “defence sovereignty”? And will it help Australia build a “sovereign industrial capability” that gives future governments credible military options at a time of their choosing?</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/business-industry/capability-plans/defence-industrial-capability-plan">2018 Defence Industrial Capability Plan</a> defined “defence sovereignty” as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the ability to independently employ Defence capability or force when and where required to produce the desired military effect.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If the Virginia class or AUKUS class submarines couldn’t be independently operated and needed US commanders or nuclear technicians, this would undermine our defence sovereignty. But this isn’t the case.</p>
<p>Similarly, if a future Australian prime minister wished to send a submarine on a mission and could only do so with US and UK approval and technical support, that would also suggest the government didn’t have full defence sovereignty. But this isn’t the case either.</p>
<h2>A century of partnerships with others</h2>
<p>The same 2018 capability plan defined a “sovereign industrial capability” as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>when Australia assesses it is strategically critical and must therefore have access to, or control over, the essential skills, technology, intellectual property, financial resources and infrastructure as and when required.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, Australia’s domestic defence industrial base has focused on controlling key elements of a capability, rather than manufacturing everything onshore. On the submarines, those will be the components to operate and sustain the boats from Australian shipyards.</p>
<p>Australia has, therefore, chosen to largely equip its defence force with the most advanced capabilities available from abroad – it’s the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2022#:%7E:text=The%20%EF%AC%81ve%20largest%20arms%20importers,%2C%20France%2C%20China%20and%20Germany.&text=for%20future%20supplier%E2%80%93recipient%20arms%20trade%20relations%20globally.">fourth</a> largest arms importer for a reason. </p>
<p>It’s worth remembering Australia has never had a truly sovereign <a href="https://www.submarineinstitute.com/submarines-in-australia/Between-the-wars.html">submarine industrial capability</a>. The cancelled program with France was but the latest in a century of partnership with others.</p>
<p>This has included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>jointly crewed boats with the UK before the first world war</p></li>
<li><p>dependence on the US submarine fleet operating from our ports during the second world war</p></li>
<li><p>British-built Oberon submarines in the Cold War</p></li>
<li><p>and Swedish-designed Collins class submarines in the 1990s, incorporating a US combat system and French sensors and radars.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In this sense, AUKUS isn’t a “Brave New World”. It’s more “Back to the Future” for Australia’s shipbuilding aspirations.</p>
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<h2>AUKUS is a sovereign choice</h2>
<p>The dream of an entirely self-sufficient defence industry is inherently appealing. There’s something unsettling about relying on others for capabilities to defend oneself.</p>
<p>But Australia’s entry into AUKUS doesn’t only entail sovereign risks for Canberra. The US is also making a big bet putting its most closely-guarded nuclear reactor technology and boats in Australian hands at a time when it <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/exclusive-reed-inhofe-warn-biden-aukus-risks-becoming-zero-sum-game-for-us-navy/">needs them most</a>.</p>
<p>So what does the US get out of this deal? In 2021, US officials were at pains to reassure us there was no <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austin-australian-foreign-minister-marise-payne-and-australian-defence-minister-peter-dutton-at-a-joint-press-availability/#:%7E:text=SECRETARY%20AUSTIN%3A%C2%A0%C2%A0Yeah,that%20you%20mentioned%20earlier.">quid-pro-quo</a> to the deal. But even if there were such a request, there’s nothing about AUKUS that locks Australia into actions future governments cannot withdraw from.</p>
<p>The UK received nuclear propulsion technology from the US in <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en/heritage/dreadnought-submarine">1958</a> but stayed out of the Vietnam War.</p>
<p><a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA437607">Canada</a> was also offered nuclear-powered submarines in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/28/reagan-canada-can-buy-sub-reactors/46af5081-d70b-4c1b-993e-142b74fbd734/">1988</a>, but chose not to pursue the offer due to budget constraints and public opposition. That backtrack didn’t doom US-Canada relations.</p>
<p>Every day for the next half century, Australia’s leaders will wake up each morning and be free to make a choice about the future of the AUKUS partnership.</p>
<p>So, too, will the Australian people, who at each election will be able to vote for political parties who might offer different visions for the future of AUKUS. That is what it means to be sovereign.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Foreign Policy and Defence Program where Peter K. Lee works receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence as well as corporate support from Northrop Grumman Australia and Thales Australia. Peter Lee also receives funding as a Korea Foundation research fellow, part of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the University of Melbourne. </span></em></p>There’s nothing about the deal that locks Australia into actions future governments cannot withdraw from.Peter K. Lee, Research Fellow, Foreign Policy and Defence Program, USSC, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2020402023-03-23T19:05:49Z2023-03-23T19:05:49ZTime to grow up: Australia’s national security dilemma demands a mature debate<p>There’s been a lot of recent shouting about Australia’s national security policy. </p>
<p>It began with the Nine newspapers’ “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/topic/Red-Alert-6fuw">Red Alert</a>” extravaganza, spread over multiple articles. Featuring a graphic of warplanes <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/red-alert-20230306-p5cpt8.html">approaching ominously</a> from Red China, it predicted Australia could be at war in three years, and speculated about Chinese missiles and cyberattacks pummelling Australian infrastructure. It then cheerily recommended some hackneyed solutions for Australia’s security woes – including bringing back conscription, and hosting US nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, former prime minister Paul Keating returned fire, branding the recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/15/the-worst-deal-in-history-and-an-albanese-snub-paul-keatings-most-memorable-calls-at-the-press-club">decision</a> to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines under the AUKUS agreement as “the worst deal in all history”, that marked <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/former-colonial-master-paul-keating-launches-astonishing-attack-on-labor-aukus-deal/we38qsi9s">Australia’s</a> “return to our former colonial master”.</p>
<p>Few were spared Keating’s rhetorical cudgel. The list included Foreign Minister Penny Wong, whom he <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/keating-may-be-isolated-on-china-but-he-s-kicked-a-hornets-nest-20230315-p5cs86">described</a> as “running around the Pacific with a lei around your neck”; Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-16/albanese-rebukes-keating-on-aukus-marles-wong-remarks/102105808">Richard Marles</a> (“seriously unwise”); and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, whom Keating <a href="http://www.paulkeating.net.au/shop/item/aukus-statement-by-pj-keating-the-national-press-club-wednesday-15-march-2023">ridiculed</a> for spending “less than 24 hours” deciding whether to support the AUKUS pact.</p>
<p>Keating saved his most stinging critique for Peter Hartcher, the lead journalist on the Red Alert series, whom he branded a “<a href="https://www.mediaweek.com.au/nine-responds-to-paul-keating-over-national-press-club-comments/">psychopath</a>”.</p>
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<p>All this could be treated as superficially entertaining, or ignored as unimportant tantrums. </p>
<p>But in reality, it’s damaging. For external observers – including hostile ones – it suggests Australian commentators cannot escape knee-jerk reactions when confronted with serious choices. This, in turn, implies we can be prodded and provoked into hypermasculine chest-thumping or panicked pacifism. </p>
<p>That should be worrying. So, too, should the fact that Australians remain ambivalent about it all. In a recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/mar/21/guardian-essential-poll-support-for-aukus-and-indigenous-voice-declines">poll</a>, 67% of respondents saw China as a complex relationship to manage, rather than a threat to be confronted (20%) or a positive opportunity (13%).</p>
<p>On the question of Australian nuclear-powered submarines, only 26% of respondents saw them as necessary and value-for-money. In contrast, some 27% of respondents thought they were necessary but not worth the $368 billion price tag, while 28% of respondents thought they weren’t necessary at all. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>A failure to communicate</h2>
<p>How has this come about? A major problem has been that successive governments have shied away from serious discussions about national security. Instead, they’ve preferred to employ vague <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/former-prime-minister-scott-morrison-makes-aukus-plea/news-story/9c9ca737662c7eb87f6eba5b115ea0bc">motherhood statements</a> about values, or word salad about <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/marles-says-adf-must-quickly-develop-greater-range-and-lethality/">deterrence</a>. </p>
<p>These are no longer sufficient. Not explaining why governments make the choices they do implies they don’t trust the people who elected them to make informed decisions. </p>
<p>Above all, any national security policy entails risk, and each choice is a calculated bet. And while the much-anticipated <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">Defence Strategic Review</a> may address some of these issues, it’s worth considering the basic contours of our security landscape.</p>
<p>Australia’s strategic geography is both a blessing and a vulnerability. Being a maritime trading state means our economic prosperity depends on unhindered access to a region where a huge proportion of <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">global sea-borne trade</a> transits.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1638301318161870848"}"></div></p>
<p>Australia is physically too big (and demographically too small) to win a war against a large and determined adversary, or an attempt to deny us access to the sea.</p>
<p>So, if Australia wants security, it needs to be underpinned by a stronger ally (or a network of them) with abiding interests in upholding its sovereignty. </p>
<p>As a result, Australian strategic policy has revolved around being a security <em>provider</em> – sometimes in conflicts where we have had few obvious interests – in case we need to be a security <em>consumer</em>.</p>
<p>Australia can develop its military capabilities and security resilience so challenging its interests isn’t worth the bother (otherwise known as “deterrence by denial”). There are no two ways about this: it will be costly and time-consuming.</p>
<p>Australia’s strategic environment is becoming the locus for competition between our main trading partner and our main security ally. One is an authoritarian state that seeks to supplant the existing order we benefit from. The other is a democracy that seeks to preserve it.</p>
<p>In national security there are no guarantees:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>we cannot guarantee competition between the US and China will remain peaceful </p></li>
<li><p>nor can we guarantee that future shifts in the US political climate or its power will not lead to a reduction in America’s willingness to uphold order in our region</p></li>
<li><p>and we cannot guarantee China won’t seek to establish a trading system based on tribute instead of open markets.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>During contests between big powers, smaller countries have the option of picking a side, or hiding. If you pick a side, you might end up on the losing one. If you hide, you’re unlikely to reap any rewards from victor, and equally run the risk of being punished by them.</p>
<h2>Where does AUKUS fit?</h2>
<p>How does the AUKUS agreement (of which nuclear-powered submarines are just one component) fit into our strategic calculus? As Australian defence expert <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/helping-aukus-last-distance">Peter Layton</a> has noted, we need to recognise there are good arguments across the spectrum of views in the debate. </p>
<p>Above all, there needs to be a clearer explanation about why the decision was taken.</p>
<p>Certainly, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will result in an <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aukus-pillars-hercules">enhanced deterrent</a> capacity. They will be best-in-class, able to stay on station for long periods of time, and highly survivable. Full disclosure: I’m cautiously supportive.</p>
<p>But a number of questions still await detailed answers. Here are a few of the more pressing ones:</p>
<p><strong>Type of deterrent effect sought</strong></p>
<p>Is the purpose of Australian nuclear submarines to have the ability to attack mainland targets in China, and/or Chinese naval assets close to its territory, together with US forces?</p>
<p>In other words, does our acquisition of nuclear submarines lock us into a <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf">deterrence-by-punishment</a> approach? If so, what is the rationale for doing so?</p>
<p><strong>Political risk</strong></p>
<p>What’s the likelihood of AUKUS parties reneging on the deal, on the grounds of technology transfer rules and the need to retain sovereign capabilities (the US); shipbuilding capacity (the UK); or cost (Australia)?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/18-million-a-job-the-aukus-subs-plan-will-cost-australia-way-more-than-that-202026">$18 million a job? The AUKUS subs plan will cost Australia way more than that</a>
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<p><strong>Crewing</strong></p>
<p>Nuclear submarines require a highly educated and skilled workforce. Will Australia be able to crew and perform basic maintenance on them by the time the first US Virginia class vessel is delivered in the early 2030s?</p>
<p><strong>Timelines</strong></p>
<p>Australia is (optimistically) slated to receive its <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/eight-submarines-three-decades-up-to-368-billion-australia-s-historic-aukus-plan-at-a-glance-20230314-p5crto.html">first</a> AUKUS-class submarine in 2042. By this time, the main questions about strategic competition in the region may already have been resolved. Shouldn’t we be looking to build our capabilities sooner than that?</p>
<p><strong>Treaty compliance and waste disposal</strong></p>
<p>How does Australia navigate its commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty if it is to be operating highly enriched weapons-grade uranium in submarine reactors? And how does it propose to deal with the waste once the Virginia class submarines reach end-of-life?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-hasnt-figured-out-low-level-nuclear-waste-storage-yet-let-alone-high-level-waste-from-submarines-201781">Australia hasn't figured out low-level nuclear waste storage yet – let alone high-level waste from submarines</a>
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<p><strong>Economies of scale</strong></p>
<p>By 2042, Australia will be operating small numbers of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/15/nuclear-submarines-uncertain-delivery-date-means-ageing-collins-class-could-be-in-use-until-2050">three different types</a> of submarines: the ageing Collins class; between three and five ex-US Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines; and the new AUKUS class nuclear-powered submarine. Is the cost of doing so sensible?</p>
<h2>Time to grow up</h2>
<p>An informed debate on national security isn’t only healthy, it’s overdue. At such an important time, Australians deserve better than dubious scare campaigns. More than that, they deserve a mature national security discussion that treats opposing views with respect rather than ridicule. Achieving that is fundamental to democracy, which draws its greatest strength from the open contest of ideas. </p>
<p>Holding that debate might finally mark Australia’s coming-of-age on questions of national security. In the past, Australia’s rich tradition of commentary on how we view ourselves in the world has typically played on tensions between our geography and our identity, producing depictions that mark us as either <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-29844752">lucky</a> or <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/is-australia-becoming-the-lonely-country">lonely</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/There-Goes-Neighbourhood-Australia-Rise/dp/1742232728">immature</a> or <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/the-adolescent-country/">adolescent</a>. </p>
<p>It’s high time we grew up and left that behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute, and various Australian government agencies.</span></em></p>Successive governments have shied away from serious discussions about national security.Matthew Sussex, Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2021232023-03-21T19:12:28Z2023-03-21T19:12:28ZWhy is Australia buying hundreds of missiles?<p>Flying under the radar of last week’s AUKUS submarine announcement was the revelation that the United States had agreed to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/tomahawk-guided-missile-us-sale-to-australia-approved/102109084">sell Australia up to 220 Tomahawk cruise missiles</a>.</p>
<p>This follows Australia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jan/05/australian-defence-force-to-spend-1bn-acquiring-naval-strike-missiles-and-army-rocket-systems">purchase in January</a> of “high mobility artillery rocket systems”, known as HIMARS, which have been used by Ukraine on the battlefield in response to Russia’s invasion.</p>
<p>And in 2020, the US approved the sale of <a href="https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-long-range-anti-ship-missiles-lrasms#:%7E:text=This%20is%20Australia's%20first%20purchase,Lockheed%20Martin%2C%20Orlando%2C%20Florida.">up to 200 long-range anti-shipping missiles</a> (LRASM) to Australia.</p>
<p>But what are these missiles, and what purpose do they serve?</p>
<p>Do they contribute to an evolving arms race within the Indo-Pacific?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
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<h2>What are these missiles?</h2>
<p><strong>Tomahawks</strong></p>
<p>Tomahawks are long range, subsonic (that is, slower than the speed of sound) cruise missiles. They’re designed to strike targets on land at long-range, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/14/the-us-navy-has-an-upgraded-tomahawk-heres-5-things-you-should-know/">around 1,600km</a>.</p>
<p>Newer Tomahawk variants, such as those being purchased by Australia, can also <a href="https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/naval-warfare/advanced-strike-weapons/tomahawk-cruise-missile">strike moving targets at sea</a>. These missiles have been used in combat over <a href="https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/what-we-do/naval-warfare/advanced-strike-weapons/tomahawk-cruise-missile">2,300 times</a>.</p>
<p>They will be deployed on three Australian warships, known as <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australia-cleared-to-gain-tomahawk-cruise-missile-capability">Hobart class destroyers</a>. These ships are primarily designed to defend the navy from aerial threats such as aircraft and missiles, but adding Tomahawks would allow them to strike targets on land or sea.</p>
<p>What’s more, the Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines Australia is purchasing from the US under the AUKUS agreement are also capable of launching Tomahawks. It’s safe to assume Australia’s future AUKUS class nuclear-powered submarines will also be able to deploy Tomahawks.</p>
<p>This would provide Australia with a potent deterrent. It would mean Australia could conduct long-range precision strikes against potential adversaries, using a stealthy platform that would be extremely difficult to detect.</p>
<p><strong>LRASM</strong></p>
<p>Australia’s purchase of long range anti-shipping missiles (LRASM) is intended to increase the strike range of two types of Australia’s fighter jets. This would allow Australia to accurately strike hostile shipping at long range.</p>
<p>They will replace Australia’s ageing Harpoon anti-shipping missile. They have a range of about 560km, which is approximately <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/10/05/lockheed-anti-ship-missile-himars/">four times greater than the Harpoon</a>.</p>
<p>This capability is highly desirable given that, in the event of a regional conflict, the greatest threat to Australia is a blockade of its key trade routes.</p>
<p><strong>HIMARS</strong></p>
<p>Unlike the two missiles discussed above, high-mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS) are artillery systems for battlefield use. They use rockets instead of shells.</p>
<p>The advantage of rocket artillery such as HIMARS is threefold:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>It can provide greater range than “conventional” artillery, which generally speaking maxes out around <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/16/new-army-artillery-doubles-attack-range-outguns-russian-equivalent.html">20-30km</a>. It can strike targets ranging from 70km-300km away from the launch point, depending on the munition used.</p></li>
<li><p>It’s precise, minimising collateral damage.</p></li>
<li><p>It’s highly mobile. Troops can quickly fire its munitions, and then promptly relocate, which decreases an opponent’s ability to hit it with counterfire.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Why does Australia need them?</h2>
<p>Australia has had a gap in long-range strike capabilities, arguably since it retired the F-111 long range strike aircraft in 2010.</p>
<p>The F-111 could fly <a href="https://www.boeing.com.au/resources/en-au/pdf/RAAF-100-Years/F-111-PC.pdf">up to about 6,000km</a>, but the aircraft brought in to replace the F-111 have significantly lower ranges. The F/A-18F has a range of <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/aircraft/18f-super-hornet">2,700km</a>, while the F-35A is even worse off, with a range of only <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/projecting-power-with-the-f-35-part-1-how-far-can-it-go/">2,200km</a>.</p>
<p>What’s more, these are the ranges aircraft can fly in a non-combat environment (for example, cruising in a straight line). Their range is far lower in a combat scenario.</p>
<p>So the addition of long range, precision strike missiles allow these platforms to pack greater punch at longer distances.</p>
<p>In particular, the Tomahawks and LRASM allow aircraft and warships to launch the missiles further from potential danger. This is particularly important as countries such as China are heavily investing in military systems <a href="https://www.thedefencehorizon.org/post/china-a2ad-strategy">designed to prevent access</a> and freedom of operation in contested waters such as the South China Sea, a strategy referred to as Anti-Access/Area Denial, or “A2AD”.</p>
<p>Crucially, these missiles (within the broader context of other defence procurements) offer Australia two things. Firstly, they provide an increased deterrent in an increasingly turbulent region.</p>
<p>If Australia can hold key targets under threat, then a potential adversary is less likely to undertake a hostile action, or at the very least think more carefully before doing so.</p>
<p>It also facilitates what’s called “interoperability” with key allies such as the US, so Australian and US forces can operate more easily in a joint manner if need be.</p>
<p>Secondly, these platforms allow Australia to have our own “A2AD” capabilities. While an invasion of Australia is extraordinarily unlikely, it’s possible an adversary may try to block shipping routes to prevent our people and/or goods from free navigation (a naval blockade). Or, they may attempt to close strategic chokepoints and navigation routes to Australia’s north, such as the Malacca Strait.</p>
<p>Having the ability to strike targets at long range holds those undertaking such actions under threat, increasing the difficulty in sustaining a blockade, or making it unappealing to attempt to do so due to high potential costs.</p>
<p>Of course, these systems also come with significant costs. The purchase of approximately 220 Tomahawks will cost <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/tomahawk-guided-missile-us-sale-to-australia-approved/102109084">A$1.3 billion</a>, while 20 HIMARS launchers and missiles attracts a bill of <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/joint/australia-purchases-himars">$558 million</a>. About 200 LRASMs costs a further <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/strike-air-combat/5557-us-approves-multi-million-australian-lrasm-acquisition-request">$1.47 billion</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-military-might-is-much-closer-to-the-us-than-you-probably-think-124487">China's military might is much closer to the US than you probably think</a>
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<h2>Contributing to an arms race?</h2>
<p>There is a question about whether these purchases contribute to a regional arms race. There’s no doubt China is rapidly building its military capabilities, and this is making other countries in the region apprehensive about the long-term purpose of such an arms build-up.</p>
<p>Even if China held no hostile intentions within the region, it’s prudent for states such as Australia to be able to defend themselves and their interests, just in case.</p>
<p>While many are decrying the enormous outlay for submarine procurement under AUKUS, and others are criticising Australia for being subservient to US interests or “warmongering”, the reality is that all states maintain offensive and defensive capabilities just in case the worst happens. In other words, we hope for the best, but plan for the worst. </p>
<p>Deterrence is a foundational concept of international relations, and these purchases are Australia maintaining its ability to deter potential adversaries. It’s not about warmongering, but about being ready just in case the worst occurs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One key reason is to provide an increased deterrent in an increasingly turbulent region.James Dwyer, Associate Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2021482023-03-20T06:39:51Z2023-03-20T06:39:51ZFirst Australian charged with war crime of murder in Afghanistan<p>The first arrest has been made following the Brereton inquiry into allegations that Australians committed war crimes in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Former SAS soldier, Oliver Schulz, 41, has been remanded in custody after his arrest by police in regional NSW. </p>
<p>He is expected to appear in Downing Centre Local Court. </p>
<p>The arrest follows a joint investigation between the Office of the Special Investigator and the Australian Federal Police. </p>
<p>The man is charged with the war crime of murder under the Criminal Code Act. In a joint statement the OSI and the AFP said: “It will be alleged he murdered an Afghan man while deployed in Afghanistan with the Australian Defence Force.” The maximum penalty is life in prison. </p>
<p>The OSI was set up in 2021 as part of the response to the Brereton report. The OSI and the police are jointly investigating allegations of criminal offences by Australian soldiers in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016. </p>
<p>The Brereton inquiry into Australian Special Forces’ misconduct in Afghanistan reported in 2020. It found “credible information” of 23 incidents in which one or more non-combatants or prisoners of war “were unlawfully killed by or at the direction of members of the Special Operations Task Group, in circumstances which, if accepted by a jury, would be the war crime of murder”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The arrest follows a joint investigation between the Office of the Special Investigator and the Australian Federal PoliceMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1985112023-02-07T19:04:15Z2023-02-07T19:04:15ZTwo major announcements about Australia’s defence force are imminent. Here’s what to expect<p>The United States’ <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-05/biden-says-us-is-going-to-take-care-of-chinese-balloon/101932232">shooting down of a Chinese spy balloon</a> off the coast of South Carolina over the weekend points to international security affairs being on a knife edge.</p>
<p>It follows a <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/5458-potential-flashpoints-in-the-2020s-overlapping-contestation-governance-environmental-crises">surge in crises and tensions</a> over the past few years, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prompting the Albanese government to commission an accelerated Defence Strategic Review in August 2022. This is expected to be handed to the government as early as this week, and the government’s response to the review is <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/dday-approaches-for-urgent-defence-strategic-review/news-story/e9ed1715e0a213ef299ee807c39c0c6a">expected in March</a>. </p>
<p>Albanese is also <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-02/joe-biden-tipped-to-host-aukus-announcement-albanese/101922328">scheduled</a> to meet with US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in the US next month to deliver the much anticipated AUKUS announcement, detailing Australia’s submarine plans. A US Congressman has recently suggested it could provide Australia with a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-01-24/congressman-suggests-send-jointly-operated-us-sub-australia/101883546">jointly-operated submarine</a> while we wait for the eventual acquisition of nuclear-powered subs.</p>
<p>So how did we get here, and what can we expect from these upcoming announcements?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1622446713570230273"}"></div></p>
<h2>How did we get here?</h2>
<p>In 2007, Kevin Rudd, sensing the need to bolster Australia’s defence, initiated the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/DefendAust/2009">Defence White Paper, which was published in 2009</a>. This called for replacement submarines, but the Global Financial Crisis derailed the plan.</p>
<p>Another White Paper <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/defence-white-paper">was released in 2016</a> under Tony Abbott, then again in 2020 <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update">under Scott Morrison</a>.</p>
<p>By then, the rhetoric was sharper-edged and more regionally focused, recognising “<a href="https://theforge.defence.gov.au/perry-group-papers/grey-zone">grey zone</a>” competition in the air, sea and land, as well in <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/about-us/defence-space-command">space</a> and <a href="https://defence.gov.au/jcg/iwd.asp">online</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hybrid-warfare-nord-stream-attacks-show-how-war-is-evolving-191764">'Hybrid warfare': Nord Stream attacks show how war is evolving</a>
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<p>Yet for all that, Australia has little to show for it, with no new submarines and a <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/australia-has-a-boutique-defence-force-that-needs-more-reach/video/7127ea44cb0ab2a2ce8d4b5de3834015">boutique defence force</a> that looks much like that retained over the preceding half century.</p>
<p>The Department of Defence appears to have had little sense of urgency to muscle up, belying the rhetoric of official <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-30/australia-unveils-10-year-defence-strategy/12408232">pronouncements on increased defence spending</a>. Some acquisitions have occurred, but essentially they’ve replaced like for like, with only incremental increases.</p>
<p>The assumption has long been that there’s no real threat to Australia within the next ten years. Failing this, Australia would look after itself and its immediate neighbourhood and make only <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/niche-wars">niche and carefully calibrated force contributions</a> to calls for support further afield. </p>
<p>But this thinking <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-05/defence-expert-paul-dibb-china-threat-australia-defence/101302104#:%7E:text=%22In%20four%20years%20flat%2C%20they%20went%20from%20being,high-intensity%20conflict%20in%20our%20own%20immediate%20strategic%20environment.">is now being challenged</a>. There’s growing recognition of the need for urgency to <a href="https://jimmolan.com/national-security-strategy/">prepare for potential threats</a> in a dynamic and more uncertain security environment. </p>
<h2>Accepting the Morrison legacy</h2>
<p>The federal government has accepted the defence legacy of the Morrison government, including</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/development-assistance/development-assistance-in-the-pacific">Pacific Step-up</a>, increasing Australia’s diplomatic presence in the region</p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad">Quadrilateral network</a> (“the Quad”), which involves India, Japan, Australia and the US collaborating in tackling security, economic and health issues, and contesting China’s regional dominance</p></li>
<li><p>and <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-09/AUKUS-Factsheet.pdf">AUKUS</a>, a technical agreement between Australia, the US and UK to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/aukus-is-not-just-about-subs-its-about-advanced-technology/">other hi-tech military systems</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Advanced surveillance technology has meant diesel electric submarines can no longer undertake long transits without being detected. A partial surfacing for a “snort” to recharge batteries is unavoidable, even for transits between Australian ports, but is now detectable. Without stealth, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nuclear-submarines-are-a-smart-military-move-for-australia-and-could-deter-china-further-168064">a submarine is redundant</a>. That’s why there’s a push for nuclear-powered subs, which can operate underwater for far longer than their diesel electric counterparts.</p>
<p>The Albanese government accepts the rationale for these initiatives. But it’s had to recover from the collateral damage caused by Morrison’s blunt implementation of AUKUS and the Pacific Step Up that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/aug/16/revealed-fierce-pacific-forum-meeting-almost-collapsed-over-climate-crisis">downplayed regional environmental concerns</a>, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-frances-anger-aukus-should-be-taken-seriously-194084">offended France</a>, <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/foreign-minister-marise-payne-squaring-regional-engagement-aukus/">upset Indonesia</a>, and <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/asia/china-leaks-dossier-of-14-disputes-with-australia-as-tensions-increase/news-story/fede40932a193a049b116382be3ed85b">infuriated China</a>.</p>
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<h2>Confronting China and Russia</h2>
<p>While the new Labor government has adopted a less antagonistic tone, it remains wary of China’s <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/china-unleashes-brutal-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-on-australia/">aggression</a> and its “no limits” <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/23/the-limits-to-russia-and-chinas-no-limits-friendship/">friendship with Russia</a>.</p>
<p>The rationale for the Defence Strategic Review was reinforced by events including </p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/event/assessment-russias-2022-invasion-ukraine-one-year">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a></li>
<li>a fiery <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/world/asia/china-exercises-taiwan.html">display of Chinese military might around Taiwan</a></li>
<li>a series of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56518998">ballistic missile firings from North Korea</a></li>
<li>ongoing <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-67648-7">Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea</a></li>
<li>a surprise <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/solomon-islands-pm-says-security-pact-with-china-wont-undermine-regional-peace-2022-04-19/#:%7E:text=SYDNEY%2C%20April%2020%20%28Reuters%29%20-%20A%20security%20pact,States%20and%20its%20allies%20about%20China%27s%20growing%20influence.">China-Solomon Islands security pact</a></li>
<li>and a series of cyber attacks targeting Australia’s <a href="https://australiancybersecuritymagazine.com.au/cyberattacks-on-australian-healthcare-doubles/">industries</a>, <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/cyber-attack-australian-parliament-lessons-learned/">government entities</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-56554641">media</a>, <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-who-and-why-explaining-the-cyberattacks-against-australia/">civil society</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jun/04/australian-national-university-hit-by-huge-data-breach">educational institutions</a>.<br></li>
</ul>
<p>Chinese President Xi Jinping’s rhetoric <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/09/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-army-to-focus-on-preparation-for-war">calling for preparations for war over Taiwan</a> suggests his patience is wearing thin.</p>
<p>Though its assertive displays of power doesn’t mean it wants war, at <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">least not yet</a>. Its approach seems inspired by notions of “<a href="https://www.amazon.com.au/Unrestricted-Warfare-Chinas-Destroy-America/dp/1626543054/ref=sr_1_1?adgrpid=1225955783453265&hvadid=76622401154882&hvbmt=be&hvdev=c&hvlocphy=122769&hvnetw=o&hvqmt=e&hvtargid=kwd-76622479705306%3Aloc-9&hydadcr=15786_408286&keywords=unrestricted+warfare&qid=1675487365&sr=8-1">unrestricted warfare</a>”, referring to media, political and legal warfare (perhaps best described as “unrestricted competition”), as opposed to conventional military battle. </p>
<p>Its reminiscent of ideas espoused by ancient <a href="https://suntzusaid.com/">Chinese strategist Sun Tzu</a>, who said “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">China does not want war, at least not yet. It's playing the long game</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Defence’s acquisition stasis</h2>
<p>In light of these challenges, the Albanese government is right to make the Defence Strategic Review a priority. The key questions are, of course: what will it recommend, how quickly will it be enacted, and how much will it cost?</p>
<p>Defence industry insiders have suggested to me privately that the Department of Defence is in stasis, waiting for the report to be endorsed by government before proceeding – a process which may take years. </p>
<p>Few <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jan/24/we-dont-have-limitless-resources-australian-government-prepared-to-scale-back-defence-projects">expect a dramatic surge in funding</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, plans to acquire <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7682864/morrison-govt-cancels-countrys-only-armed-drones-project/">armed drones</a> and <a href="https://min.news/en/military/d9baf306ab4eed5f1d185d0a21808205.html">armoured vehicles</a> have been cancelled or delayed rather than accelerated. </p>
<p>There seems to be a <a href="https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/is-the-defence-strategic-review-a-plot-to-kill-australian-industry/">freeze on purchasing decisions</a> in anticipation of the results of the review. The problem is reinforced by issues with Defence’s <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/who-we-are/organisation-structure/capability-acquisition-sustainment-group">acquisition arm</a>, which <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/151447-no-wonder-the-msp-model-hasnt-delivered-for-casg/">struggles</a> to deliver efficient, effective and timely projects.</p>
<p>The recently announced purchase of <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-01-18/black-hawk-helicopters-defence">new Blackhawk helicopters</a> and <a href="https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/australia-purchases-himars/">high mobility artillery rocket systems</a> suggest otherwise, but <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-10/australia-dumps-troubled-mrh-90-taipan-helicopters/100688550#:%7E:text=The%20Australian%20Defence%20Force%20will%20ditch%20its%20entire,47%20European-designed%20Taipans%20used%20by%20Army%20and%20Navy">they were decisions</a> <a href="https://adbr.com.au/australia-approved-to-buy-himars-long-range-fires/">that effectively predate the review</a>. </p>
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<p>Meanwhile, the Australian ship building industry faces a “valley of death” <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/getting-real-about-the-schedule-for-australias-future-frigates/">experience</a>. Australia has planned to build nine new warships in South Australia as part of the future frigates program, but the industry is waiting for a not-yet finalised design to materialise.</p>
<p>Major multinational corporations can sustain this process. But Australian-owned small to medium enterprises, so critical for a sustainable defence industry, are <a href="https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/is-the-defence-strategic-review-a-plot-to-kill-australian-industry/">buffeted by the uncertainty and delays</a>.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The Defence Strategic Review is expected to emphasise the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines as a priority, along with <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/project/guided-weapons-and-explosive-ordnance-enterprise">guided weapons and explosives</a>. </p>
<p>As the government weights up its options, it should consider all aspects of national security, including <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4651-a-geostrategic-swot-analysis-for-australia">climate change and governance problems</a>. It should also consider mounting a national and community service scheme to <a href="https://www.policyforum.net/its-time-for-an-australian-national-and-community-service-scheme/">more inclusively engage a broad element of society in response</a> to the suite of emerging challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland has previously received funding from the Australian Signals Directorate in the Defence portfolio for an official history, but that was cancelled in 2020. </span></em></p>The long-awaited plan for Australia to get nuclear-powered submarines is expected next month, as are recommendations from a major strategic review into our defence force.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942522022-11-10T04:22:30Z2022-11-10T04:22:30ZAustralia is investigating whether ex-defence personnel provided military training to China. Would it matter if they did?<p>This week, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2022-11-09/statement-efforts-recruit-former-adf-pilots">announced</a> he had directed the Department of Defence to investigate reports “that ex-Australian Defence Force personnel may have been approached to provide military related training to China”.</p>
<p>This announcement comes just weeks after the British Ministry of Defence <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/top-guns-for-hire-british-pilots-training-chinese-military-slammed-as-morally-repugnant-20221019-p5bqvx.html">revealed</a> around 30 of their former military pilots had been delivering flight training services to members of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through a company based in South Africa.</p>
<p>Marles has <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2022-11-09/press-conference-parliament-house">committed</a> to conducting a</p>
<blockquote>
<p>detailed examination [of] the policies and procedures that apply to our former Defence personnel, and particularly those who come into possession of our nation’s secrets.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He explained there’s a “clear and unambiguous” obligation on current and former Commonwealth officials to “maintain [government] secrets beyond their employment with, or their engagement with, the Commonwealth”.</p>
<p>Australia’s highly trained defence personnel are a huge asset to us, as much as our cutting-edge physical assets and technologies. As far as possible, we should ensure these assets are protected. There should also be clear guidelines around how and when privileged information can be employed.</p>
<h2>Impending investigation</h2>
<p>According to Britain’s Minister for Armed Forces and Veterans James Heappey, their authorities had <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/top-guns-for-hire-british-pilots-training-chinese-military-slammed-as-morally-repugnant-20221019-p5bqvx.html">been aware of the situation for several years</a>. None of the pilots had broken existing British law.</p>
<p>The BBC <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-63293582">reported</a> the British government issued this “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/oct/18/uk-officials-threat-alert-china-attempts-to-recruit-raf-pilots">threat alert</a>” to deter other would-be trainers from taking up similar offers. There’s also an updated National Security Bill currently before the House of Commons, which seeks to “create additional tools” to address security challenges like this one.</p>
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<p>By comparison, it’s unclear whether any ex-Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel took up Chinese offers to train the PLA, or whether such an action would be considered a violation of the secrecy of information provisions of the Australian Criminal Code.</p>
<p>Marles <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2022-11-09/press-conference-parliament-house">explained</a> the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce is “currently investigating a number of cases” identified by the department’s initial inquiries.</p>
<p>This investigation will also seek to determine whether current policies and procedures are fit for purpose when it comes to former defence personnel and the protection of official secrets.</p>
<p>Taking such measures has bipartisan support. Opposition Leader Peter Dutton <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/politics/peter-dutton-calls-on-albanese-government-to-tighten-up-laws-to-prevent-adf-personnel-spreading-australian-secrets/news-story/37ee6dc4c585922f7abf98edcc51b7b6">has indicated</a> “if there is a hole in the legislation now, the Coalition will support a change which will tighten it up”. He added that Australia “can’t allow our secrets and our methodologies to be handed over to another country, and particularly not China under President Xi”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/marles-shifts-tone-on-china-at-defence-summit-but-the-early-days-of-government-are-easiest-185032">Marles shifts tone on China at defence summit – but the early days of government are easiest</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Exposing our tactics</h2>
<p>Dutton’s comments highlight an important distinction: while the training of PLA (or any foreign) pilots by ex-ADF personnel may not necessarily constitute a disclosure of official secrets, it still risks exposing the ways in which the ADF is trained to fight to a potential adversary – what are referred to as its tactics, techniques and procedures.</p>
<p>There are many exchange personnel from overseas embedded in the ADF (and vice versa). But given the sensitivities involved, these positions are typically restricted to close partners such as the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand or Canada. One of the benefits of close cooperation between militaries is that they can then operate more effectively alongside each other in the event of a conflict. </p>
<p>But if ex-ADF personnel train the armed forces of potential adversaries, those opponents may be able to use this knowledge to better develop methods of their own to erode Australia’s military advantages.</p>
<p>Professor <a href="https://twitter.com/alessionaval/status/1582232133086892032">Alessio Patalano</a> of King’s College London points out that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>skilled personnel are valued capabilities and this know-how is a national security resource, and for the same reason a potential vulnerability.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He further <a href="https://twitter.com/alessionaval/status/1582230651834548224">explained</a> the “reverse engineering of professional skills” has a long historical tradition. That is, personnel undergoing this training would improve their skills, but could also work backwards from the instruction they receive to draw further insights into how the other state might operate in the event of war.</p>
<p>For example, in the so-called “<a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2019/december/jump-starting-japanese-naval-aviation">Sempill Mission</a>” of British aviators to Japan in the 1920s, British personnel provided detailed instruction to their Japanese counterparts on how to conduct and train for aircraft carrier operations – at the time a brand new and rapidly emerging form of naval warfare. This training mission contributed significantly to the Imperial Japanese Navy’s prowess in aircraft carrier operations displayed in 1941.</p>
<p>While foreign governments and intelligence services are always looking for opportunities to obtain classified information about Australia and its partners, the converse is also true.</p>
<p>The Daily Express <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1686465/RAF-news-china-uk-nato-raf-pilots-british-security-agencies">claimed</a> British intelligence services used their knowledge of these recent activities as an opportunity for some pilots to obtain information on the current state of the PLA.</p>
<p>The pilots allegedly had first-hand experience flying China’s frontline combat aircraft, and relayed the information to British authorities on their return.</p>
<h2>Protecting our assets</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, despite the “clear and unambiguous” obligation for former Commonwealth officials “to maintain [Australia’s] secrets”, ex-ADF personnel have been engaged in training foreign militaries for many years. In an interview with the ABC, former Secretary of Defence Dennis Richardson noted his <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-09/ex-defence-secretary-dennis-richardson-adf-members-china/101635972">surprise</a> “at some of the positions that some former ADF officers have occupied in other countries” and expressed his hope the government’s review “goes beyond China”.</p>
<p>The most prominent of these figures is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-14/former-australian-soldiers-caught-up-in-yemen-civil-war/7087566">Major General (Ret’d) Mike Hindmarsh</a>, a former Commander of Australia’s Special Operations Command who was subsequently appointed as the Commander of the United Arab Emirates’ Presidential Guard.</p>
<p>Australia already has <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/business-industry/export/controls/export-controls/export">export control</a> regulations, which limits the physical export and intangible transfer of controlled military and dual-use goods and technologies. Also, stringent <a href="https://www.afr.com/work-and-careers/education/o-neil-alters-ministerial-sign-off-for-postgrad-students-20220630-p5axwq">limitations</a> on international students undertaking postgraduate research in Australia on critical technologies were legislated in the last Parliament. However, these measures aren’t being currently being implemented until the government can more clearly define the relevant list of critical technologies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Andrews has not personally received funding from any relevant bodies. However, his work at the ANU National Security College includes projects funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Home Affairs.
David is a member of the Australian Labor Party.</span></em></p>Australia’s highly-trained personnel are as much an asset as physical technology.David Andrews, Senior Policy Advisor, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1885792022-08-12T07:14:40Z2022-08-12T07:14:40ZRoyal commission delivers damning interim report on defence and veteran suicide. Here’s what happens next<p>The Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide has released its interim <a href="https://defenceveteransuicide.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2022-08/interim-report.pdf">report</a> after more than 1,900 submissions and 194 witnesses.</p>
<p>It includes recommendations considered so urgent the royal commission is making them now (it still has two years left to run).</p>
<p>After years of lobbying efforts by the veteran community, the government finally relented and established the royal commission in 2021. The evidence presented and initial findings justify how important it is. </p>
<p>The interim report is a good start and we hope the problem of independence and accountability for the effects of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) culture and systems will be addressed. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/one-veteran-on-average-dies-by-suicide-every-2-weeks-this-is-what-a-royal-commission-needs-to-look-at-157582">One veteran on average dies by suicide every 2 weeks. This is what a royal commission needs to look at</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<h2>A culture of tribalism and exclusion</h2>
<p>Defence and veteran suicide is predominantly understood as a mental health issue. But an overemphasis on mental health neglects the impact institutional cultures and systems have on the wellbeing of service personnel.</p>
<p>Institutional abuse is a significant issue in the ADF. The hierarchical and closed character of the military provides environments where service personnel can harass and bully each other. </p>
<p>Cohesion and a sense of pride and loyalty in each unit are central to military effectiveness. But this can create the conditions for abuse.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://defenceveteransuicide.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2022-08/interim-report.pdf">we told the royal commission</a>, there’s often a culture of tribalism and exclusion in military settings. This is created by factors including hyper-masculinity, intense stigma against acknowledging injuries (physical or psychological), and the total authority commanders have over military life.</p>
<p>The military justice system permits commanders to use their discretion to discipline their subordinates, which can result in administrative violence. This refers to commanders using their authority arbitrarily to make the life of a subordinate unbearable.</p>
<p>From our own research into <a href="https://www.opendoorveteran.com/institutional-abuse-and-organisational-reform-in-the-adf">institutional abuse in the ADF</a>, the effects of a closed system that perpetrates administrative violence against members can be a contributing factor in veterans self-harming. </p>
<p>We also consistently heard how these processes were used to further traumatise victimised members. We call this the second assault.</p>
<h2>Moving from military to civilian</h2>
<p>The royal commission recognises the importance of the transition from military to civilian life. Moving from the closed military institution to the open civilian world is a significant upheaval, with service personnel losing their sense of identity, purpose and belonging.</p>
<p>The ADF is very effective at socialising civilians into the military – it needs to direct that expertise to transitioning them safely out. </p>
<p>Another key focus of the interim report is the management of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) and the claims system. When veterans leave the service the DVA manages their injuries. </p>
<p>The royal commission noted the DVA had yet to determine more than 62,000 claims as of June 2022. It recommends urgent and immediate action to clear the backlog of claims, as claim delays can significantly worsen veterans’ mental health. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-many-military-veterans-leaving-the-force-is-the-biggest-battle-157774">For many military veterans, leaving the force is the biggest battle</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Unable to change</h2>
<p>The royal commission is right to ask why it has taken so long for the ADF to change, despite decades of scrutiny.</p>
<p>It identified over 50 previous reports, with 750 recommendations since 2000. The commissioners say: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have been dismayed to come to understand the limited ways that Australian Governments have responded to these previous inquiries and reports. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>We recently concluded an Australian Research Council Discovery grant on <a href="https://www.opendoorveteran.com/institutional-abuse-and-organisational-reform-in-the-adf">institutional abuse in the ADF</a>. We conducted nearly 70 interviews with survivors and assessed the ADF’s inquiries and policy attempts to reform military culture. Our yet-to-be-published research extends back to 1969 – when the same culture of bullying was identified, followed by institutional cover-up and victim blaming.</p>
<p>The ADF has undertaken many inquiries into these problems yet has been unable to effect meaningful change. </p>
<h2>Independent scrutiny is crucial</h2>
<p>The royal commission flagged there’s a “compelling case” for an independent body to oversee the implementation of recommendations from inquiries and reviews. The commission will explore this further over its final two years.</p>
<p>We think the development of an independent body that sits outside the chain of command is urgent. The entity should also be able to address member grievances. </p>
<p>At the institutional level, Defence has been unable to reform itself and needs to be subject to independent scrutiny.</p>
<p>But this isn’t the first time such an entity has been flagged. In 2005, the Senate Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries/2004-07/miljustice/report/index">Australian Military Justice System</a> recommended something similar, called the Australian Defence Force Administrative Review Board. It was vetoed by Defence and the federal government. </p>
<p>This highlights a fundamental tension for the ADF – between keeping things in house and continuing the legacies of abuse, or empowering an external body that protects the rights of service personnel. The problem is such an entity will inevitably come into conflict with the ADF command. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-royal-commission-must-find-ways-to-keep-veterans-out-of-jail-176880">The royal commission must find ways to keep veterans out of jail</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The royal commission must seek more answers from the leaders and commanders of the ADF and DVA. Their leadership is the key site of institutional dysfunction that disempowers members, veterans and their families, and perpetuates the systems of abuse.</p>
<p>The royal commission must stand up to this power in order to recognise and support those who serve their country.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call the following support services:</em></p>
<p><em>Suicide Call Back Service: 1300 659 467 (phone and online counselling)</em></p>
<p><em>Defence Member and Family Helpline: 1800 628 036</em></p>
<p><em>Lifeline Australia: 13 11 14 or text 0477 13 11 14 (24-hour crisis support)</em></p>
<p><em>ADF Mental Health All-hours Support Line: 1800 628 036</em></p>
<p><em>1800RESPECT: 1800 737 732 - 24-hour counselling service for sexual assault, family and domestic violence</em></p>
<p><em>Men’s Referral Service - 1300 766 491 (for men concerned about their own use of violence, or abuse)</em></p>
<p><em>Open Arms: 1800 624 608 (free and confidential, 24/7 national counselling service for Australian veterans and their families, provided through the Department of Veterans’ Affairs)</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188579/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Wadham received funding from the Australian Research Council for research on institutional abuse and organisational reform in the ADF. He also received funding from the Department of Veterans Affairs on veterans and higher education pathways, as well as Veteran wellbeing measures and Veteran in Corrections. Ben also received funding from the Freemasons Male Health and Wellbeing Research Centre and Flinders Foundation to research male veteran suicide. Ben also received funding from the Hospital Research Foundation for research on female veteran experiences of military to civil transition. Ben also is funded by the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Sucide.
Ben is a member of the Defence Force Welfare Association (DFWA), the Royal Australian Regiment Association (SA), the Australian Peacekeepers and Peacekeeping Veteran's Association and the Military Police Association of Australia. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Connor receives funding from the Australian Research Council for research on institutional abuse and organisational reform in the ADF. James is also funded by the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.</span></em></p>The evidence presented and initial findings show how important the royal commission is.Ben Wadham, Director, Open Door: Understanding and Supporting Service Personnel and their Families, Flinders UniversityJames Connor, Associate professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1809472022-08-04T03:51:49Z2022-08-04T03:51:49ZIs it ethical to allow soldiers to take performance enhancing drugs such as steroids?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472660/original/file-20220705-23-xb41r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3537%2C2476&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/tsm2.186">long history and growing evidence base</a> that the use of performance enhancing drugs such as anabolic-androgenic steroids to build muscle mass and strength is common in the armed forces, including in Australia. </p>
<p>This isn’t surprising considering the pressures soldiers face to complete missions successfully, achieve elite levels of fitness, and deal with the physical and mental stresses of their profession.</p>
<p>The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is also constantly looking for ways to amplify the performance of soldiers, which includes the <a href="https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/flwr_web_b5_final.pdf">consideration of technologies</a> both “in” (such as drugs) and “on” (for example exoskeletons) soldiers.</p>
<p>In 2016, the Department of Defence also created the <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/partner-with-us/university/human-performance-research-network-hprnet">Human Performance Research Network</a>, which is focused on enhancing the physical and cognitive performance of military personnel.</p>
<p>At the same time, the ADF has <a href="https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/anti-doping-sport-and-human-enhancing-technologies-army">adopted</a> parts of the World Anti-Doping Code – a code developed to govern drug use in sport – to manage the governance of human enhancing drugs within the military. Under the code, using steroids isn’t allowed.</p>
<p>But considering the military is constantly looking for means to create “super soldiers”, should we consider allowing the use of steroids and other enhancement drugs?</p>
<p>The answer to this question isn’t clear cut. But there’s no reason to believe the use of enhancement drugs such as steroids by soldiers is, in and of itself, unethical. </p>
<h2>Are the ethics of using steroids on the battlefield the same as those in sport?</h2>
<p>In sport, critics of drug use are concerned with the integrity of the contest. Many consider a level playing field in sport to be an essential element of the fairness of a contest.</p>
<p>But there’s a fundamental difference of purpose between a drug policy designed to protect the integrity of sport and one to protect the integrity of armed forces.</p>
<p>The thought that one side in a battle shouldn’t employ technologies unavailable to their opponents is irrelevant to the conduct of war.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/steroids-in-sport-zero-tolerance-to-testosterone-needs-to-change-48774">Steroids in sport: zero tolerance to testosterone needs to change</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Two things matter for the integrity of a military conflict, according to traditional “just war theory”. Firstly, that the cause is just, or fair. Within just war theory, self-defence is generally regarded as one such just cause.</p>
<p>And second, that the means employed to wage war discriminate between innocents and genuine combatants, and are proportionate.</p>
<p>The use of performance enhancing drugs therefore does not, as such, affect whether a war is fair, at least according to the just war theory.</p>
<h2>Risks and benefits</h2>
<p>The use of steroids is a serious issue when considering the health of soldiers. There’s evidence people who use steroids have a higher risk of various <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edrv/article/35/3/341/2354633">physical and psychological harms</a>, including cardiovascular disease and steroid dependence. </p>
<p>However, there are several issues with using such a simple dichotomy. First of all, life is generally full of risks, and simply avoiding them would mean we would live very sheltered and restricted lives.</p>
<p>Second, it has been well-established that many people use illicit drugs (including steroids) for <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17728122/">pleasurable</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2211266918300707">functional</a> reasons without necessarily experiencing serious harms. For these people, the benefits of using illicit substances outweigh their potential harms.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1130217812721512448"}"></div></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ipedinfo.co.uk/resources/downloads/2016%20National%20IPED%20Info%20Survey%20report%20FINAL.pdf">benefits of steroids</a> are obvious. Their use is associated with an increase in muscle strength and mass, reduced risk of injuries, and quicker recovery from injuries.</p>
<p>The use of battlefield medicine and technological developments (such as armour) have long sought to protect the physical and mental health of soldiers. For example, the prescription drug Modafinil, a drug licensed for the treatment of narcolepsy, <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020-11-11-pharma-enhancement-military-goodley_0.pdf">is approved for use</a> by the Republic of Singapore Air Force, and has been tested for military application in both the US and the UK.</p>
<p>Individuals who are sleep deprived have decreased psychological and physical capabilities. Soldiers often operate over long hours and are deprived of sleep. So using <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22764609/">stimulants like Modafinil</a> can support maintaining alertness, cognitive function, judgement, and situation awareness in sleep-deprived soldiers.</p>
<p>In a similar manner, steroids could potentially prove useful in protecting the bodies of soldiers.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/doping-soldiers-so-they-fight-better-is-it-ethical-117236">Doping soldiers so they fight better – is it ethical?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Having said this, special consideration needs to be given to the link between steroid use and aggression.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33745011/">study</a> published in 2021 provides evidence of an increase, although small, in self-reported aggression in healthy males following steroid use. However, the relationship between aggression and steroid use is complex, and there are generally other mediating factors (such as other substance use and personality traits).</p>
<p>Regardless, the fact that steroid use may increase aggression when split-second decisions are required on the battlefield can be morally significant given these are often matters of life and death.</p>
<h2>Consent and coercion</h2>
<p>On the one hand, steroid use is a matter of personal and individual choice.</p>
<p>But on the other, there are tremendous social and cultural pressures to perform and succeed.</p>
<p>Competitive environments particularly, such as the military, have the potential to become highly stressful. As such, soldiers might well feel coerced by their peers and their superiors to undertake bodily or performance enhancement.</p>
<p>If steroids were to be allowed in the military, this would require informed consent.</p>
<p>But considering these pressures, satisfying the requirements of voluntary and informed consent for the use of illicit enhancement drugs within the military might well be challenging.</p>
<p>Such consent will often be undermined due to the pressures on soldiers to perform and succeed within the military.</p>
<h2>Not unethical, but studies needed</h2>
<p>There’s no reason to believe the use of enhancement drugs such as steroids is, in and of itself, unethical.</p>
<p>But there are concerns, such as the long-term health of soldiers, and any possible effects these drugs might have upon the behaviour of soldiers when in combat situations and when they return to society.</p>
<p>What’s required are robust empirical studies to determine the extent of the dangers.</p>
<p>Our list of such concerns isn’t intended to be exhaustive, but rather represents a list of issues that need to be addressed when developing any regulatory frameworks for the use of enhancement drugs in a military context.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Just like armour protects soldiers’ bodies, steroids do too. There’s no reason to believe steroid use by the military is unethical, but further studies are needed.Katinka van de Ven, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Rural Criminology, HASSE, University of New England & Visiting Fellow, Drug Policy Modelling Program, SPRC, University of New South Wales, University of New EnglandAdrian Walsh, Professor of Philosophy and Political Theory, University of New EnglandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1793122022-03-17T19:03:01Z2022-03-17T19:03:01ZA bigger defence force will affect more military families’ children – their well-being must be protected<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452359/original/file-20220316-23-1c3cnju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C32%2C1200%2C799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://images.defence.gov.au/assets/Home/Search?Query=20210603ran8112562_0211.jpg&Type=Filename">Department of Defence/Commonwealth of Australia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is about to get a lot bigger. Defence Minister Peter Dutton has <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/media-releases/defence-workforce-grow-above-100000">announced plans to expand the ADF</a> by 18,000 members by 2040. This nearly 30% increase, the largest since the Vietnam War, will require not only a renewed focus on recruitment, but also on retaining current sailors, soldiers and aviators. </p>
<p>Families of these uniformed personnel will be crucial to the success of these efforts. The families of defence personnel, especially those with children, experience significant impacts as a result of their service. Our research has highlighted the <a href="https://rune.une.edu.au/web/handle/1959.11/27661">experiences of young children</a> and the <a href="https://acquire.cqu.edu.au/articles/thesis/Inside_and_outside_An_investigation_of_social_media_use_by_Australian_Defence_Force_partners/13447994">pressures on defence families</a>. </p>
<p>The increase in ADF personnel will require a major rethink of policies and procedures to <a href="https://ecdefenceprograms.com/">protect the well-being and education of children in defence families</a>. The ADF needs to become an employer of choice to retain these families as well as attract recruits with families. Our research findings offer some ideas that could inform the policy changes needed to achieve this boost to defence numbers.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/government-announces-long-term-boost-to-australias-defence-numbers-178929">Government announces long-term boost to Australia's defence numbers</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Slaves to two greedy masters</h2>
<p>Recruitment is challenging because the military is a “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327X8601300101?journalCode=afsa">greedy institution</a>” demanding <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/children-australia/article/abs/narrative-acculturation-and-ritual-themes-from-a-socioecological-study-of-australian-defence-force-families-experiencing-parental-deployment/11358F65CB70E9336EE595999BDE8F41">great sacrifice</a> from personnel and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/children-australia/article/abs/narrative-acculturation-and-ritual-themes-from-a-socioecological-study-of-australian-defence-force-families-experiencing-parental-deployment/11358F65CB70E9336EE595999BDE8F41">their families</a>. Likewise, families are also “greedy institutions”, demanding enormous sacrifices from parents. </p>
<p>Defence families’ efforts to satisfy each master are doomed from the start and many personnel list “<a href="https://bridges.monash.edu/articles/thesis/_Military_people_won_t_ask_for_help_experiences_of_deployment_of_Australian_Defence_Force_personnel_their_families_and_implications_for_social_work/4546051">family reasons</a>” when they leave.</p>
<p>Dutton <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/transcripts/press-conference-hon-scott-morrison-mp-enoggera-qld?fbclid=IwAR0c7cfelr76AS2ppTN2T7tiB_XLfBQhqwjtyZavHg87l_9no9sArQsw2bs">acknowledged these issues</a> last week: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[W]e lose people at way too young an age after we’ve invested an enormous amount in them. I am very conscious of people being posted for two years, and their children being dragged from school to school. I’m conscious of the impact on predominantly mothers, wives, in that arrangement […]”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fit-for-service-why-the-adf-needs-to-move-with-society-to-retain-the-public-trust-159924">'Fit for service': Why the ADF needs to move with society to retain the public trust</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The kids are not alright</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Child holds a bear wearing an army camouflage uniform" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452360/original/file-20220316-27-1wkgnd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Omeo boy reads the card attached to a Legacy bear presented to him by staff of the Latchford Barracks Relief Centre on January 21 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://images.defence.gov.au/assets/Home/Search?Query=20200121adf8561311_009.jpg&Type=Filename">Department of Defence/Commonwealth of Australia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Key aspects of military life, like deployments and relocations, <a href="http://artinearlychildhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ARTEC_2019_Research_Journal_1_Article_3_Rogers_Bird_Sims.pdf">have a big impact</a> on children. It can seem like children’s well-being, education and special needs are sacrificed to ADF members’ career needs. This includes compromising secure relationships with their early childhood educators and peers. </p>
<p>The impacts on children’s learning are severe because quality early education relies on interactions within secure relationships with educators. </p>
<p>Young children <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-support-children-whose-parent-works-away-for-long-periods-125641">can struggle to understand</a> the changes at home when they relocate, or a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244017706711">parent goes away</a> on deployment or extended training. The trouble children have in understanding the demands of military service is clear in this exchange between two-year-old Emily, one of our <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/27661">research participants</a>, and her mother:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“But where’s Dad?”</p>
<p>“Daddy’s gone on the plane, darling. Remember, we took Dad to the airport yesterday.” (Emily starts crying and throws herself on the ground.)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While deployment is challenging, <a href="https://ecdefenceprograms.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Resilient-families.pdf">reintegrating defence parents</a> back into the family can be harder. In the <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/27661">same study</a>, one mother said her coping strategy was to have a very relaxed style of parenting when her partner deployed. They ate when they were hungry and her son went to bed in front of the TV. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I go to pieces in the last month again. We have to sort of prepare for him
coming home. […] Paul is like a military man. You know, routines. There are
mealtimes, he says what we are watching when the TV is on. […] There are bedtimes. So I say to Jack, ‘You know what we do now is just our thing. When Daddy gets home we have to do it his way.’ ”</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Sailor hugging family members after deployment ends" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=742&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=742&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=742&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452357/original/file-20220316-15-1cg62qi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sailor hugs family members after his deployment ends.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://images.defence.gov.au/assets/">Department of Defence/Commonwealth of Australia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Relocation and a parent coming and going from the house for lengthy training sessions and deployments mean many transitions for the household. During these times, children can <a href="https://theconversation.com/birthdays-holidays-christmas-without-mum-or-dad-how-to-support-kids-with-a-parent-away-fighting-fires-146317">experience regressions</a> in learning and social, emotional and physical skills. This also increases parent’s fatigue and their ability to cope.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Bethany (four years old) has […] trouble sleeping. She has slept in our bed every night except two, when Ule (sibling) came in. It is really tiring. She was fine before deployment.”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-support-children-whose-parent-works-away-for-long-periods-125641">How to support children whose parent works away for long periods</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As they move between schools and states, school-aged children can miss whole units of learning, putting them on the back foot. This often leads to children acting out as they struggle to keep up and make friends. Rates of behavioural and emotional difficulties <a href="https://jmvfh.utpjournals.press/doi/full/10.3138/jmvfh.2019-0014">are higher</a> in children from military families. </p>
<p>Children also suffer from disrupted <a href="https://jmvfh.utpjournals.press/doi/full/10.3138/jmvfh.2019-0014">social networks</a> as a result of relocations. They lose their <a href="https://theconversation.com/closed-facebook-groups-offer-respite-for-stressed-out-women-but-running-them-involves-yet-more-unseen-labour-168075">connection with community groups</a> and miss out on extracurricular activities.</p>
<p>A lack of understanding among children’s peers and the general community can also be harmful. One participant’s older sibling had been teased at school when the class found out her parent had deployed, which increased fears for the parent’s safety: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Your Dad’s gonna get shot! Ha ha!”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>Drawing on research, <a href="https://articlegateway.com/index.php/JMPP/issue/view/294">this report</a> recommends policies that safeguard families. One recommendation is that families with children only be relocated up to three times until their youngest child is 18. </p>
<p>Also recommended is a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Brandon-Pincombe/publication/261027989_Scoping_a_flexible_deployment_framework_using_adversarial_scenario_analysis/links/00b7d5330fd7823aed000000/Scoping-a-flexible-deployment-framework-using-adversarial-scenario-analysis.pdf">flexible model for deployment</a>, with longer, less frequent deployments. That way, training episodes of the military personnel can be built into deployment to reduce disruptive transitions at home.</p>
<p>These recommendations would provide more opportunities for children and their families to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244017706711">plug into protective supports</a>. <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244017706711">Sources of support</a> include <a href="https://ecdefenceprograms.com/index.php/resources-for-educators/">educators</a>, extended family, community and defence friends, <a href="https://www.openarms.gov.au/">counselling</a>, health and family workers, <a href="https://militarylife.com.au/">social media groups</a> and <a href="https://defence.gov.au/members-families/">ADF supports</a>. They could then create a buffer to help families during rough times. </p>
<p>Parents and educators have complained about the <a href="https://jmvfh.utpjournals.press/doi/full/10.3138/jmvfh-2019-0022">lack of resources</a> to support young children from military families, and their educators. Recent funding has meant free <a href="https://ecdefenceprograms.com/">research-based resources</a> are now available to build resilience. These also include resources to assist children whose parents have <a href="https://thesector.com.au/2021/03/16/new-resources-aim-to-help-children-from-adf-families-understand-health-challenges/">sacrificed their health</a> in service, and their <a href="https://www.legacy.com.au/how-we-help/who-we-help/young-families-children/">family workers</a>.</p>
<p>Acknowledging and respecting the incredible resilience and contribution of children and partners in defence families should be the starting point for the policy changes needed to boost defence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marg Rogers receives funding from The Ian Potter Foundation, University of New England and The Association of Graduates in Early Childhood Studies for the Early Childhood Defence Program project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Johnson receives funding from The Ian Potter Foundation, University of New England and The Association of Graduates in Early Childhood Studies for the Early Childhood Defence Program project. She has lived experience as a member of the ADF Reserves and the spouse of an ADF veteran. </span></em></p>Many personnel leave for family reasons. The increases in retention and recruitment needed to boost ADF numbers by 30% require drastic policy changes to limit the impacts on children’s lives.Marg Rogers, Senior Lecturer, Early Childhood Education, University of New EnglandAmy Johnson, Lecturer, School of Education and the Arts, CQUniversity AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1789292022-03-09T12:06:10Z2022-03-09T12:06:10ZGovernment announces long-term boost to Australia’s defence numbers<p>In his second big defence announcement in under a week, Scott Morrison on Thursday will outline plans for a major expansion of Australia’s defence workforce to more than 101,000 by 2040. </p>
<p>This will be an increase of about 18,500 over the baseline growth previously agreed to. It includes predominantly uniformed personnel but also public servants. </p>
<p>The expansion covers army, navy, airforce, and those working in the areas of space, information and cyber, as well as in defence science, education, logistics and health. </p>
<p>The government says the commitment represents the biggest step up in four decades. </p>
<p>The number of Australian Defence Force personnel will increase by about 30%, taking the total number of permanent ADF personnel to nearly 80,000. </p>
<p>The government puts the estimated cost of the expansion at some $38 billion. </p>
<p>The ramping up will start from 2024-25, and a large component – estimated at about 6000 people – will be for the development of the nuclear-powered submarine capability. </p>
<p>In the short term, over the four years to 2024 the defence workforce is being increased by 800 ADF personnel, 250 public servants and a number of extra staff for the Australian Signals Directorate. </p>
<p>As the government casts national security as a major theme of its election campaigning, Morrison announced at the weekend plans to build a new submarine base on the east cost, with three sites – Port Kembla, Newcastle and Brisbane – being considered for its location. </p>
<p>In a statement with Defence Minister Peter Dutton announcing the personnel expansion, Morrison says there was never a more important time to be increasing Australia’s defence forces. </p>
<p>“Our world is becoming increasingly uncertain so it’s important we take steps now to protect our people and our national interest over the coming decades.</p>
<p>"You can’t flick a switch to increase your army, navy and air force overnight. Growing the type of people and skills we need to face the threats of the future takes time, so we must start now so
critical skills can be taught and experience gained.”</p>
<p>Morrison says ADF personnel will be increased in every state and territory. There will be a particular focus on capabilities
associated with Australia’s security partnership with the United Kingdom and United States (AUKUS), and on air, sea, land, space and cyber.</p>
<p>Dutton says: “Defence operates with a highly integrated workforce spanning the Australian Defence Force, civilians and industry providers, with each bringing specialised skills and expertise.</p>
<p>"This growth in workforce and expertise will enable us to deliver our nuclear powered submarines, ships, aircraft and advanced weapons. </p>
<p>"It will mean we can build war fighting capabilities in the
domains of space, and information and cyber.”</p>
<p>The bigger defence force was flagged as part of the 2020 Force Structure plan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178929/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In his second big defence announcement in under a week, Scott Morrison on Thursday will outline plans for a major expansion of Australia’s defence workforce to more than 101,000 by 2040.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768802022-02-14T05:21:49Z2022-02-14T05:21:49ZThe royal commission must find ways to keep veterans out of jail<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446152/original/file-20220214-21-1uh3ltu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dave Hunt/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://defenceveteransuicide.royalcommission.gov.au">royal commission</a> into veteran suicide returned for its second session of hearings on Monday. </p>
<p>With one veteran dying by suicide every <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-veteran-on-average-dies-by-suicide-every-2-weeks-this-is-what-a-royal-commission-needs-to-look-at-157582">two weeks in Australia</a> and evidence veterans have <a href="https://theconversation.com/veterans-have-poorer-mental-health-than-australians-overall-we-could-be-serving-them-better-119525">poorer mental health</a> than Australians overall, this work is urgent and important. </p>
<p>But as the royal commission investigates the risk factors around veterans’ mental health, it is missing a key part of the puzzle: contact with the criminal justice system. </p>
<h1>Prison, veterans and mental health</h1>
<p>A key part of minimising the risk of veteran suicide is keeping veterans out of jail. </p>
<p>Time in prison is itself associated with a <a href="https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/2e92f007-453d-48a1-9c6b-4c9531cf0371/aihw-phe-246.pdf.aspx?inline=true">higher risk of suicide</a>. There is also some evidence <a href="https://www.dva.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-11/Rapid%20Evidence%20Assessment.pdf">veterans are over-represented</a> in Australia’s jail system compared to other occupations. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/life-just-went-to-crap-why-army-veterans-are-twice-as-likely-to-end-up-in-prison-128129">'Life just went to crap': why army veterans are twice as likely to end up in prison</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nationally, it has been <a href="https://www.dva.gov.au/sites/default/files/twrp_mhpr.pdf">estimated </a> nearly 3% of defence force personnel are arrested within a few years of finishing their military service. About 5% of those who have left full-time military service are reported as being arrested or imprisoned. </p>
<p>We know many veterans have complex mental health disorders - such as PTSD - as a result of their military service, and this can lead to criminal conduct and time in prison.</p>
<p>In Australia, the mental health of veterans who have been in prison is not well understood. Prison and military service separately increase the chance of suicide, and this tends to indicate that veterans who have been in jail have a significantly <a href="https://www.dva.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-11/Rapid%20Evidence%20Assessment.pdf">increased risk of suicide</a>. </p>
<h2>Recognition is not enough on its own</h2>
<p>Military service - including training and deployment - can of course be traumatic and dangerous. It is also done on behalf of Australia. Because of this, veterans are owed a particular debt by government and society. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Sign showing the way to the royal commission hearing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446146/original/file-20220214-17-wfe1zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The royal commission held its first session in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jono Searle/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2019, <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/176880/edit">new federal legislation </a> recognised the need to support veterans and their families. But this was largely a symbolic act. We need proper investigations into the complex, continuing, and uncomfortable consequences of military service on veterans’ health and welfare. </p>
<p>The key issue is how society can best support veterans returning to civilian life. This includes strategies to prevent veterans ending up in the criminal justice system, but also offer specialised support to those who do.</p>
<h2>Specialist veterans courts</h2>
<p>This sort of support already exists in the United Kingdom and United States. In the US, for example, eligible veteran defendants have a specialist pathway out of the criminal justice system through veterans’ treatment courts. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/one-veteran-on-average-dies-by-suicide-every-2-weeks-this-is-what-a-royal-commission-needs-to-look-at-157582">One veteran on average dies by suicide every 2 weeks. This is what a royal commission needs to look at</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In general, these courts provide treatment to veterans who have committed nonviolent crimes and are suffering mental health disorders related to military service. A growing <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318635845_A_National_Study_of_Veterans_Treatment_Court_Participants_Who_Benefits_and_Who_Recidivates">body of evidence</a> suggests these courts are more successful at preventing re-offending than jail time, and also improve the health and well-being of participants.</p>
<h2>Could this work in Australia?</h2>
<p>There are several similar models in operation in Australia, including the <a href="https://www.drugcourt.nsw.gov.au/">NSW drug court</a> and mental health courts for other at-risk groups such as those with drug addictions and serious mental illnesses.</p>
<p>A veterans’ court would be a problem-solving court, with an emphasis on rehabilitation, allowing service providers and veteran peers to work with veterans to move away from criminal conduct. </p>
<p>Individuals participating in veterans’ court processes may have their sentence suspended or their sentencing hearing deferred while they complete a drug treatment program or other treatment option. On successful completion of the program, the individual may even avoid a prison term. </p>
<h2>What next for the royal commission</h2>
<p>The royal commission will provide an interim report by August 11 2022 and a final report by June 15 2023 – so there is still time for a thorough consideration of veterans’ contact with the criminal justice system. </p>
<p>This is relevant under the <a href="https://defenceveteransuicide.royalcommission.gov.au/about/terms-reference">terms of reference</a>. While they do not specifically mention the courts or criminal justice system, they do include “systemic issues and any common themes among defence and veteran deaths by suicide”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-studied-50-years-of-royal-commissions-heres-how-they-make-a-difference-159231">We studied 50 years of royal commissions — here's how they make a difference</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Further work with veterans’ bodies in Australia will be necessary to determine the feasibility of and demand for veterans’ courts. But once this work is done, such courts could provide a practical, evidenced-based way to help those who have served our country. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>If you or anyone you know needs help or is having suicidal thoughts, contact Lifeline on 131 114 or beyondblue on 1300 22 46 36.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the royal commission investigates the risk factors around veterans’ mental health it needs to look at contact with the criminal justice system.Arlie Loughnan, Professor of Criminal Law, University of SydneyClare Davidson, Research fellow, The University of Western AustraliaSarah Murray, Professor specialising in public law and less-adversarial justice, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1765712022-02-07T07:50:46Z2022-02-07T07:50:46ZAustralia opens border on February 21, beckoning tourists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444752/original/file-20220207-27-1hzr2h4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Scott Morrison has announced Australia’s international border will finally open on February 21 and is deploying up to 1700 Australian Defence Force personnel to help with the aged care crisis, as he prepares for a torrid parliamentary sitting.</p>
<p>Nearly two years after the border was shut, tourists and other visa holders will now be able to come to Australia.</p>
<p>They will need to be double vaxxed - but not triple vaxxed, as is being recommended for Australians locally. Anyone not fully vaccinated will need a valid travel exemption, and will have to meet state and territory quarantine requirements.</p>
<p>The restrictions have been recently lifted for some entrants to Australia, including students, but the tourist industry has continued to suffer from visitors not being allowed to come.</p>
<p>The deployment of defence personnel into aged care will include clinical support teams, and general support help as well as logistical and planning assistance.</p>
<p>Four quick response teams, consisting of nurses and general support staff, will be deployed this week. This will expand to ten teams from next week.</p>
<p>Defence is preparing specialist teams of 50 personnel in the four states under greatest pressure - Queensland, NSW, Victoria and South Australia. It will expand this up to 200 people in each state and territory, or up to 1700 personnel, if needed.</p>
<p>Over the weekend, ADF personnel undertook training for the deployment and joined civilian staff in aged care facilities.</p>
<p>Some of the work they will do includes screening people coming into facilities, providing companionship to residents, helping with meals, and other duties to take pressure off qualified aged care workers and medical staff. They will assist with medical duties where they are qualified.</p>
<p>Morrison, who has repeatedly said the ADF is not a shadow aged care workforce, stressed that this was “a very targeted bespoke effort”. He pointed out that aged care was an industry where there were 285,000 workers.</p>
<p>The sector is being hit with acute staff shortages as workers are off duty because they have COVID or are furloughed because they are close contacts. The result has been diminished care for many residents. In some facilities, residents have been in effective lockdown because of COVID outbreaks, unable to see their families.</p>
<p>The announcements came ahead of parliament’s resumption on Tuesday, when the government will be under attack over a range of issues including the aged care crisis and leaked text messages attacking the prime minister’s character.</p>
<p>The government is also struggling with internal division over its religious discrimination legislation, which it had hoped to have passed this week. The legislation is due to be debated in the House of Representatives on Tuesday.</p>
<p>A number of moderate Liberals are critical of the legislation. Bridget Archer, who holds the highly marginal seat of Bass in Tasmania, on Monday threatened to cross the floor.</p>
<p>“I’m not sure that there’s any way to bridge the divide between the
bill as it currently looks like and my concerns.”</p>
<p>“So as it is I’m not sure how I can support it”, Archer told the ABC.</p>
<p>Archer said she was concerned about the legislation overriding
Tasmanian anti-discrimination laws.</p>
<p>As he tries to placate moderate critics, Morrison has promised separate legislation that would ban schools from expelling students on the basis of their sexuality.</p>
<p>Morrison told a news conference on Monday that the religious discrimination legislation was “an important bill”.</p>
<p>He said Labor had put measures into the sex discrimination act that meant children could be expelled because of their sexuality. He was proposing to put forward an amendment to this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prime minister has also announced that defence force personnel will be used to support the crisis in aged care.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1683742021-09-23T02:38:30Z2021-09-23T02:38:30ZAfter AUKUS, Russia sees a potential threat — and an opportunity to market its own submarines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422798/original/file-20210923-23-1889tqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=190%2C33%2C2660%2C2052&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Druzhinin/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The global opinions on the new AUKUS security pact between Australia, the US and the UK have been decidedly mixed. China and France immediately blasted the deal, while others, such as Japan and the Philippines, were more welcoming.</p>
<p>Russia, one of the other few nations armed with nuclear-powered submarines, was more low-key and cautious in its initial reaction.</p>
<p>The Kremlin limited its <a href="https://iz.ru/1222495/2021-09-16/v-kremle-vyskazalis-ob-alianse-ssha-velikobritanii-i-avstralii">official commentary</a> to a carefully crafted statement that said,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Before forming a position, we must understand the goals, objectives, means. These questions need to be answered first. There is little information so far.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some Russian diplomatic officials joined their <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-16/aukus-china-foreign-ministry-condemns-agreement-abbott-rudd/100468900">Chinese counterparts</a> in expressing their concerns that Australia’s development of nuclear-powered submarines (with American and British help) would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and “<a href="https://tass.com/world/1339043">speed up an arms race</a>” in the region. </p>
<p>They suggested the construction of the nuclear submarine fleet would need to be <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1339095">overseen</a> by the International Atomic Energy Agency — a proposition unlikely to be acceptable to Canberra. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nuclear-submarines-are-a-smart-military-move-for-australia-and-could-deter-china-further-168064">Why nuclear submarines are a smart military move for Australia — and could deter China further</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>‘Prototype of an Asian NATO’</h2>
<p>As more became known about the new security pact, the rhetoric of Kremlin officials began to shift. </p>
<p>For instance, former Australian ambassador to the US, Joe Hockey, <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/hockey-aukus-a-gamechanger-against-china-russias-increasing-capabilities/video/b3e6af09203e4d47d76be02f8b1037dd">boldly declared</a> AUKUS was intended to counter not only China’s power in the Indo-Pacific region, but Russia’s, too.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1440366714860998656"}"></div></p>
<p>Soon after, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, was <a href="https://aif.ru/politics/russia/cepnaya_reakciya_haosa_nikolay_patrushev_o_chuzhdyh_rossii_soyuzah_i_cennostyah">calling the pact</a> a “prototype of an Asian NATO”. He added, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Washington will try to involve other countries in this organisation, chiefly in order to pursue anti-China and anti-Russia policies</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This change of rhetoric should not come as a surprise to Canberra. Russia has <a href="https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029">long considered</a> any change to regional security — the creation of new alliances, for instance, or the deployment of new weapons systems — a military risk that would require a response. </p>
<h2>Marketing its own nuclear submarines</h2>
<p>So, what possible options could Russia entertain as part of its response?</p>
<p>Since Moscow’s view of AUKUS is more of a political and military risk, but not yet a threat, its immediate responses are likely to be limited to political manoeuvring and opportunity grabbing. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-not-so-much-a-re-rising-superpower-as-a-skilled-strategic-spoiler-90916">Russia not so much a (re)rising superpower as a skilled strategic spoiler</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Perhaps most notably, Russia may see the AUKUS submarine deal as setting a precedent, allowing it to promote its own nuclear-submarine technology to interested parties in the region. This is not merely hypothetical — it has been suggested by <a href="https://www.mk.ru/politics/2021/09/17/ssha-otkryli-yashhik-pandory-na-rynke-atomnykh-podlodok.html">defence experts</a> with close links to Russia’s Ministry of Defence. </p>
<p>Historically, Russia has held back from sharing its nuclear submarine technology, which is considered among the best in the world, certainly superior to China’s nascent capabilities.</p>
<p>Thus far, Moscow has only entered into leasing arrangements with <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-the-us-won-t-give-india-nuclear-submarines-1854818-2021-09-20">India</a>, allowing its navy to operate Soviet- and Russian-made nuclear-powered attack submarines since 1987. But this has not entailed the transfer of technology to India.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1439522533896855554"}"></div></p>
<p>Should Russia decide to market its nuclear-powered submarines to other nations, it would have no shortage of interested buyers. As one military expert <a href="https://www.mk.ru/politics/2021/09/17/ssha-otkryli-yashhik-pandory-na-rynke-atomnykh-podlodok.html">suggested</a>, Vietnam or Algeria are potential markets — but there could be others. As he put it,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Literally before our eyes, a new market for nuclear powered submarines is being created. […] Now we can safely offer a number of our strategic partners. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Expanding its submarine force in the Pacific</h2>
<p>In the longer run, Russia will also not disregard the obvious: the new pact unites two nuclear-armed nations (the US and UK) and a soon-to-be-nuclear-capable Australia. </p>
<p>The expanded endurance and range of Australia’s future submarines could see them operating in the western and northwestern Pacific, areas of regular activity for Russia’s naval force. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A Russian Navy destroyer visiting the Philippines." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422803/original/file-20210923-15-1gz5zb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Russian Navy destroyer visiting the Philippines in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bullit Marquez/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Should the strike systems on board these submarines have the Russian far east or parts of Siberia within their range, it would be a game-changer for Moscow.</p>
<p>As a nuclear superpower, Russia will need to factor this into its strategic planning. And this means Australia must keep a close watch on Russia’s military activities in the Pacific in the coming years.</p>
<p>Over the next 12 months, for instance, the Russian Pacific Fleet is expected to receive at least three nuclear-powered submarines. </p>
<p>Two of these fourth-generation submarines (the Yasen-M class) are <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/bad-news-russia-and-china-have-submarines-nearly-good-navy-190524">technologically superior</a> to similar vessels currently being built by the Chinese and are believed to be <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/08/how-russias-yasen-m-submarine-compares-to-the-u-s-navys-block-v-virginia/">almost comparable</a> to the American nuclear submarines being considered an option for Australia. </p>
<p>The third is a 30,000-tonne, modified Oscar II class <a href="https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2021/april/9946-belgorod-submarine-with-status-6-poseidon-will-be-a-part-of-pacific-fleet.html">Belgorod</a> submarine converted to carry several nuclear super-torpedos <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a36110992/russia-poseidon-apocalypse-torpedo-updates/">capable</a> of destroying major naval bases. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1120688968792723456"}"></div></p>
<p>By 2028, I estimate Russia’s navy will have a force of at least 14 nuclear-powered submarines and six conventional attack submarines in the Pacific. </p>
<p>Should Russia start considering AUKUS a military threat, we could expect more to arrive. Their area of operations could also be expanded to the South China Sea, and beyond. </p>
<h2>Deepening naval ties with China</h2>
<p>In the most dramatic scenario, Russia and China could form a loose maritime coalition to counter the combined military power of the AUKUS pact.</p>
<p>Given the deepening state of <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/adc/publications/ajdss/documents/volume3-number1/strategic-reality-check-russia-china-defence-cooperation-alexey-muraviev.pdf">Russia-China defence relations</a>, particularly in the naval sphere, this does not seem unrealistic.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-strategic-blind-spot-chinas-newfound-intimacy-with-once-rival-russia-142385">Australia's strategic blind spot: China's newfound intimacy with once-rival Russia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>This possible coalition is unlikely to become an actual maritime alliance, let alone the basis for larger <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/quad-nations-to-kick-off-4-day-malabar-naval-war-games-with-eye-on-china/articleshow/85649928.cms">bloc</a> involving other countries. Still, if Russia and China were to coordinate their naval activities, that would be bad news for the AUKUS. </p>
<p>Should tensions escalate, Moscow and Beijing could see Australia as the weakest link of the pact. In its typical bombastic language, China’s <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234460.shtml">Global Times</a> newspaper has already referred to Australia as a “potential target for a nuclear strike”. </p>
<p>This might be a far-fetched scenario, but by entering the nuclear submarine race in the Indo-Pacific, Australia would become part of an elite club, some of whom would be adversaries. And there is the potential for this to lead to a naval Cold War of sorts in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>Sceptics may say Moscow is likely to be all talk but no action and the risks posed by Russia to Australia are minimal. Let’s hope this is correct.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexey D Muraviev does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While all eyes are on China’s response to the new AUKUS security pact, Russia matters, too. After all, it has its own nuclear submarines that could now be marketed all over the region.Alexey D Muraviev, Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1664292021-09-08T20:13:18Z2021-09-08T20:13:18ZIt’s time for Australia to develop its own guided missiles — otherwise, we’ll need to keep asking for the codes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420132/original/file-20210909-16-6xtngj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1161%2C592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Prime Minister's Office</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Step by step, Australia is inching its way towards more autonomy in defence.</p>
<p>On Wednesday, Defence Minister Peter Dutton was reported to have signalled greater access to US <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/peter-duttons-us-missile-memo-share-your-knowhow/news-story/23e242f84d0ee776063ac1ec6c88915c">missile technology</a> will be a key test of the US-Australia alliance at a closed meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia.</p>
<p>In March Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the defence department would select an <a href="https://www1.defence.gov.au/project/sovereign-guided-weapons-and-explosive-ordnance-enterprise">industry partner</a> to develop a A$1 billion <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/sovereign-guided-weapons-manufacturing">guided weapons</a> manufacturing capability.</p>
<p>But, more than in earlier times, it’s the details that will matter.</p>
<p>The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Peter Jennings says a key lesson from the collapse of the US operation in Afghanistan is that its allies can no longer assume it will be just “<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/lessons-afghanistan">over the horizon ready to defend our strategic interests</a>”.</p>
<p>It was, he said, “a tough message for Australia, which has become habituated to think that defence spending at a little over 2% of gross domestic product and a defence force about two-thirds the size of a Melbourne Cricket Ground crowd is enough to defend the country”.</p>
<p><a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Afghanistan-turmoil/Chaotic-Afghan-exit-compels-Japan-to-rethink-reliance-on-US-security">Japan</a> seems to be also rethinking its strategy.</p>
<h2>Four options: the best is expensive</h2>
<p>There are four options for improving self-reliance in guided weapons. </p>
<p>The first is simply to buy more of what we currently have. It isn’t bad as a short-term approach, but we can’t guarantee we will have what we need, when we need it. Weapons can date and we can slip down the queue for replenishment — just think of COVID-19 vaccine supply. </p>
<p>The second option is to assemble in Australia, rather than simply import. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-one-thing-to-build-war-fighting-capability-its-another-to-build-industrial-capability-135640">It's one thing to build war fighting capability, it's another to build industrial capability</a>
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<p>This is better than the first option, and would create jobs. But jobs are hardly going to be the most pressing issue when the firing starts. And we are unlikely to get all of the intellectual property (the knowledge about how to build and repair) we might need to upgrade when circumstances change.</p>
<p>The third option is to use Australian industry to improve and replace some capabilities of current weapons with locally-developed alternatives. </p>
<p>Targeting software and counter-counter-measure software could be examples. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-plan-for-manufacturing-missiles-to-be-accelerated-158160">Australia's plan for manufacturing missiles to be accelerated</a>
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<p>This option is better than the previous two options, but still relies on us having access to foreign (often US) intellectual property, which might be problematic.</p>
<p>The best option is to design and build our own guided weapons. This would be expensive, and it would require significant time, but it would actually make us self-reliant. We would own the intellectual property and own the codes.</p>
<p>We would be able to upgrade to take account of developments in technology and to account for changes in the adversary. We wouldn’t have to wait in line to be given an upgrade. </p>
<h2>We will probably need all four options</h2>
<p>This is not to suggest we need to develop every type of guided weapon type we would use. There are some where the integration issues would be profound if not close to impossible (the joint strike fighter is an example). </p>
<p>It isn’t that we need sovereignty in guided weapons, what is that we need smart sovereignty — smart in the sense that we focus our efforts and our money where we can get the most useful sovereignty.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1213&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1213&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419943/original/file-20210908-21-il9i33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1213&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Holden was the first car Australia made, rather than assembled.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Library Victoria</span></span>
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<p>In some cases the sensible thing will be to buy and/or fabricate, just as Australia buys foreign cars and in the early days of manufacturing assembled foreign cars.</p>
<p>In others cases it will be to develop additional weapons locally. Each approach will be the best in different circumstances. We will probably need some of each, simultaneously.</p>
<p>But we need to take charge of our own destiny where we can, rather than just rely on a helping hand that may or may not come when we need it, or in the way we will need it.</p>
<p>We certainly can’t go toe-to-toe with our most likely regional adversary on our own. We don’t have anything like the capability. </p>
<p>But what we can do is target the development of local weapons to those that are likely to be of the most use against that adversary. Deployable, mobile, hypersonic anti-access/area denial guided weapons are among those that would help. </p>
<h2>Waiting might leave us unable to choose</h2>
<p>Irrespective of the option we choose, we will need to test the guided weapons we use domestically. This means developing in parallel a domestic capability for the modelling, simulation and analysis that will be critical to success.</p>
<p>Australian industry has the capability, but time is running short. The pandemic has shown us that the money can be found where the need is critical. </p>
<p>The future might not be kind to us but at the moment we still have time to choose the path to take. Later, that path might be dictated for us.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Dunk works for Shoal Group, a company that could be involved in the development of guided weapons in Australia. </span></em></p>The collapse of the US operation in Afghanistan means the day might come when Australia needs access to the design of the weapons it uses.Graeme Dunk, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1622472021-06-07T04:15:11Z2021-06-07T04:15:11ZCalling in the army for the vaccine rollout and every other emergency shows how ill-prepared we are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404721/original/file-20210607-50508-1imyw2b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C33%2C5568%2C3667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/LUKAS COCH</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>News the army’s Lieutenant General John “JJ” Frewen has been <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7284387/covid-vaccines-to-become-available-to-all-australians-over-40/">picked to lead a new COVID-19 vaccination task force</a> has prompted fresh discussion of the defence force’s role in Australia.</p>
<p>Frewen, already the commander of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) COVID-19 task force, will now also direct a “military-style scale up phase of the beleaguered vaccination rollout”, as one media <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7284387/covid-vaccines-to-become-available-to-all-australians-over-40/">report</a> put it.</p>
<p>As someone whose life’s work has been the study of the ADF, my first thought when hearing the news was: Frewen is a good pick, in many ways. He is an exceptionally capable officer, and I have no doubt he will get the job done. </p>
<p>But I have broader concerns about Australia’s growing tendency to call in the defence force to deal with crises outside its usual remit. These are crises that could or should be dealt with by well-resourced civilian government agencies and institutions.</p>
<p>It risks stretching even thinner the already constrained capacity of our relatively small army. It also speaks to a failure to set up Australian society to respond robustly for the likely challenges of the future. </p>
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<h2>A good pick, but is this the job of the defence force?</h2>
<p>Frewen has considerable operational and managerial experience in the context of defence. He had a leading role as part of the police-led, multi-agency <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/australian-army-from-whitlam-to-howard/CD3EBEDBAA8378093E7A7D888ACFC3F9">intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003</a>, he helped pick up the pieces in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, and he has commanded a combat brigade in Darwin and our deployed operational forces in the Middle East. He has also been, for a while, the acting director general of the Australian Signals Directorate. </p>
<p>He is a man for all seasons; talented, capable, urbane, personable, smart and hard not to like. So it is completely understandable if the prime minister has thought, “I like this guy and I think he’d do a good job.” </p>
<p>And he’s right. Frewen will get on with the job and will make it work.</p>
<p>But is this what we should do with our defence force? Isn’t a vaccine rollout something we should be resourcing our state-based emergency response agencies to do better?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-latest-military-commitment-should-spark-assessment-of-how-well-we-use-our-defence-forces-122207">Australia's latest military commitment should spark assessment of how well we use our defence forces</a>
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<p>In recent years, we have expected the defence force to respond to crisis after crisis, rather than properly resourcing civilian-led government or community agencies to perform these tasks.</p>
<p>The federal government has defaulted to the one federal implement it completely controls, which generally exercises its agency with political aplomb. (Yes, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/allegations-of-murder-and-blooding-in-brereton-report-now-face-many-obstacles-to-prosecution-145703">Brereton report</a> revealed problems but, by and large, the defence force remains very well regarded in the community.)</p>
<p>We keep telling ourselves this latest crisis is an aberration. But it’s the new normal. That’s my concern. If it’s not pandemics, it’s fires, floods, pestilence — or all of the above concurrently. </p>
<p>And if what pundits are saying is correct, these challenges are not going away, as I’ve argued in a recent <a href="http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2019-06/cog_49_swot_analysis_web.pdf">Geostrategic SWOT analysis for Australia</a> (SWOT stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats). </p>
<p>We may be able to lean on the defence force to help manage these challenges consecutively. But what happens when, as predicted, they start to happen at the same time?</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People line up for vaccination at a Sydney hub." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404724/original/file-20210607-17-aac5sn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A new vaccination taskforce has been announced.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Joel Carrett</span></span>
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<h2>A comparatively small force taking on more and more</h2>
<p>The ADF is, in reality, a boutique force. It’s smaller than many realise — and very expensive to run. It’s only a fraction the size of the defence force in Indonesia — let alone China, India and South Korea. Comparatively, it is tiny, yet it is being asked to take on more and more.</p>
<p>It is structured for the days when the US was in charge of international affairs and only ever needed <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/niche-wars">niche contributions from Australia</a>.</p>
<p>But now, the ADF is being expected to respond to large and complex disasters which are overlapping more than ever.</p>
<p>We are increasingly getting the defence force to focus on environmental issues (a pandemic counts as one), which leaves less time for what it’s actually meant to do — prepare and conduct operations offshore in defence of Australia and its interests.</p>
<p>And in the meantime, we are not properly resourcing agencies like the Australian Border Force, Australian aid, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, health agencies, the state emergency services, the rural fire services, state and federal police and so on to respond to issues of regional significance. These include pandemics, natural disasters, people smuggling and terrorism. </p>
<h2>Brilliant at logistics but we must plan better</h2>
<p>It is true, as some have <a href="https://iview.abc.net.au/video/NC2109V018S00">pointed out</a>, the defence force is excellent at logistics. But so are a number of commercial companies and they may be able to help in something like a vaccine rollout at a fraction of the price (the defence force is surprisingly expensive).</p>
<p>For now, we may not have any really viable alternatives to do the vaccine rollout quickly. And I’m not saying the ADF’s involvement is a terrible idea. But we should have been thinking about this before now.</p>
<p>One idea would be to establish a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26910348?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">scheme for national and community service</a>, incentivising young Australians to volunteer in local, state and federal agency crisis responses.</p>
<p>The selection of Frewen to head this ramped-up vaccine rollout is, in many ways, no surprise. But as respectable, capable, honourable and competent as he is, his selection speaks to a lack of thinking about the longer term, corrosive ramifications of expecting the defence force to do ever more.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/should-the-adf-take-a-bigger-role-in-bushfires-and-other-domestic-emergencies-the-answer-isnt-so-easy-147188">Should the ADF take a bigger role in bushfires and other domestic emergencies? The answer isn't so easy</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162247/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland and John Frewen were undergraduate students together at the Royal Military College at Duntroon. Frewen features in John Blaxland's book The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, Cambridge University Press, 2014. </span></em></p>Australia’s growing tendency to call in the defence force to deal with crises outside its usual remit is cause for concern. Shouldn’t we be better prepared to respond to disasters?John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1599242021-05-05T20:06:28Z2021-05-05T20:06:28Z‘Fit for service’: Why the ADF needs to move with society to retain the public trust<p>The Australian Defence Force has faced a reckoning in the past few months. First came the shocking <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anzac-legend-has-blinded-australia-to-its-war-atrocities-its-time-for-a-reckoning-151022">Brereton report</a> exposing alleged war crimes committed in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Then, in recent weeks, other critical issues have surfaced requiring urgent attention, from the royal commission investigating <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-veteran-on-average-dies-by-suicide-every-2-weeks-this-is-what-a-royal-commission-needs-to-look-at-157582">veteran suicides</a> to a vigorous debate over the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-14/military-reminded-lethal-violence-defend-australian-values/100066796">very function of the ADF itself</a> in today’s society.</p>
<p>As we prepare to <a href="https://theconversation.com/incomplete-strategy-and-niche-contributions-australia-leaves-afghanistan-after-20-years-159045">withdraw our forces</a> from the Afghan conflict without any consensus on the war’s outcomes, the ADF is potentially at a crossroads. </p>
<p>Not only are questions being raised about its culture, there appears to be a struggle underway about its identity and purpose, as well.</p>
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<h2>How the ADF has changed</h2>
<p>A century ago, war correspondent and historian Charles Bean <a href="https://rslqld.org/news/latest-news/the-meaning-of-anzac">gave form to the idea</a> that:</p>
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<p>Anzac stood, and still stands, for reckless valour in a good cause, for enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship, and endurance that will never own defeat.</p>
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<p>It has been a useful myth, and one that Australian soldiers continue to draw on in terms of their self-awareness and self-identity. It has also promoted civilian understanding of the potential sacrifice that lies at the heart of the ADF’s service ethos. </p>
<p>But it has clear limitations in the modern context of war fighting, among them:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>no awareness of the highly technical realities of modern warfare</p></li>
<li><p>little recognition of women, whose technical and counterintelligence capabilities are of equal or greater importance than men in some specific military roles</p></li>
<li><p>an emphasis on the mythic bonds of (primarily Anglo-Celtic) mateship forged through combat, turning men into marble statues devoid of human frailty.</p></li>
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<h2>An opportunity to rethink core values</h2>
<p>The Brereton report has provided an opportunity for the ADF to rethink its core values and what it stands for. And it must keep in mind that in the age of social media, it is hard to hide — or forgive — a shadowy side of any institution which holds public trust. </p>
<p>Chief of Defence General Angus Campbell showed in his <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-19/defence-chief-angus-campbell-afghanistan-apology-transcript/12899854">pained response</a> to Brereton that our military is no different to any other institution in this regard. It needs social trust — including the trust of those young people who are the only source of its future human capital. </p>
<p>This doesn’t mean the military needs <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-14/military-reminded-lethal-violence-defend-australian-values/100066796">to be more “woke”</a>, to borrow a phrase from Liberal backbencher and former soldier Phillip Thompson. It means corporate, political and educational leaders ignore changing social expectations at their peril. </p>
<p>Behaviour once able to be brushed under the carpet or brushed off as a joke is now a potential “career killer”, as social trust (and economic capital) flows away from institutions and their leaders who are deemed to be out of step with social mores.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">Why Australian commanders need to be held responsible for alleged war crimes in Afghanistan</a>
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<p>Young Australians may still come out for ANZAC Day marches, but they are equally — if not more — passionate about the “Black Lives Matter” movement and the struggle for gender equality. And they’ll judge the military by how responsive it is to these and other social issues. </p>
<p>As Assistant Defence Minister Andrew Hastie reminded us last month, the military’s core task is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-14/military-reminded-lethal-violence-defend-australian-values/100066796">using lethal violence</a> in the national interest. Hastie’s emphasis on the application of lethal violence should not be discounted: it represents the sharp end of military capability. </p>
<p>In the end, though, the ADF’s greatest asset is its people. For the best and brightest to be attracted to military service, the application of “lethal violence” must also be lawful and the ethical case for using such violence well understood. </p>
<p>The public also sees the role of the ADF as going beyond war fighting. Here, recent contributions made by defence personnel in the <a href="https://www1.defence.gov.au/about/covid-19">pandemic</a>, alongside <a href="https://news.defence.gov.au/national/operation-bushfire-assist-2019-2020">bushfire</a> and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/these-are-battlefield-tasks-defence-force-on-the-ground-for-flood-recovery-20210401-p57g08.html">flood</a> recoveries, have promoted productive layers of community engagement. </p>
<p>As the ADF has drawn on the wide skill set offered by part-time, reserve personnel — supported by defence logistics and command structure — civilians have seen the military working on the ground as engineers, doctors, nurses and in other professions ranging from arborists to veterinarians. </p>
<h2>Why reviews can bring lasting change</h2>
<p>Successive reviews of military culture make clear the challenges. To ensure its capability, the ADF needs to stay focused, relevant and off the front pages of the papers by addressing poor cultural practice. </p>
<p>It seems reasonable to assume the ADF – perhaps our most valued national “brand” – has the capacity to take the lead in good cultural practice. It did so in owning and then building on the recommendations of the <a href="https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/review-treatment-women-australian-defence-force">Broderick reviews</a> into the treatment of women in the military.</p>
<p>While far from uniformly popular among service personnel, this put the ADF ahead of society at a time when it threatened to fall badly behind. </p>
<p>Indeed, one of the unresolved questions from the Broderick reviews - the extent to which the Australian Defence Force Academy reflected university culture in terms of its treatment of women - fostered a conversation that led, indirectly, to the Australian Human Rights Commission’s “<a href="https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/AHRC_2017_ChangeTheCourse_UniversityReport.pdf">Change the Course</a>” report on sexual harassment on campus. </p>
<p>Vice chancellors and generals alike now find themselves accountable for ensuring a respectful culture for women across the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/changing-the-culture-of-our-sas-forces-is-no-easy-fix-instead-we-need-to-face-the-true-costs-of-war-150058">Changing the culture of our SAS forces is no easy fix. Instead, we need to face the true costs of war</a>
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<p>There is no reason why defence cannot lead future discussions on good practice in all its facets, from war fighting to leadership training. </p>
<p>The Brereton report showed the ADF is willing to subject itself to public scrutiny, and to be judged by the standards it demands of our men and women in uniform. With proper sensitivity towards the effects on our service personnel, we need an honest, open discussion, leading to honest conclusions, about our military conduct in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>We must also examine what we need to do better to train, support and supervise our troops.</p>
<h2>The goodwill of the nation depends on it</h2>
<p>For the ADF to focus on its primary mission of war fighting, it needs strong morale among its troops. For that, it needs the goodwill of the nation. </p>
<p>Any misalignment of defence values with societal expectations could lead to an eventual dead end – in promoting, recruiting and maintaining a cultural identity without parallel in Australian society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/crowds-at-dawn-services-have-plummeted-in-recent-years-its-time-to-reinvent-anzac-day-157313">Crowds at dawn services have plummeted in recent years. It's time to reinvent Anzac Day</a>
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<p>Some years ago, when addressing a group of ADFA recruits, I was challenged by an officer cadet who claimed the Broderick review team risked turning the Army into the “boy scouts”. </p>
<p>His inference, I assume, was that by addressing a toxic culture in which women were at times objectified and mistreated, we ran the risk of destroying a culture of masculine aggression and fraternity needed in combat. </p>
<p>My response was, above all, that Australia needed its defence forces to maintain their war-fighting capability. To do that, the country needed a great deal of trust, and clarity, around what is required — morally and culturally – of those who are tasked with carrying out lawful violence in our name. </p>
<p>In an age in which individualism is so highly promoted and prized, clarity of expectation and role within the ADF is more important than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damian Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Brereton report is providing an opportunity for the ADF to rethink its core values. It ignores changing social expectations at its peril.Damian Powell, Historian and Principal, Janet Clarke Hall, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.