tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/balkans-5475/articlesBalkans – The Conversation2024-02-27T12:41:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236012024-02-27T12:41:40Z2024-02-27T12:41:40ZRussia: Serbia’s history is key to understanding its close relationship with Moscow<p>Over the past few weeks, international attention has focused on Ukraine in the run-up to the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2024/02/21/russia-ukraine-war-latest/">second anniversary</a> of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. But Ukraine is not the only part of Europe where Russia is seeking to assert its influence and control. </p>
<p>Often overlooked by the international community in a world beset by international crises, Serbia, another aspiring <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en">member of the European Union</a>, finds itself at a crossroads between pursuing its future within the bloc or staying within Moscow’s orbit. </p>
<p>Despite the promise of greater prosperity within the EU, <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-27/closer-to-west-serbias-foreign-policy-after-russian-invasion">many fear</a> that Serbia is moving closer to the Kremlin again. Indeed, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbias-vucic-presents-anti-drone-system-acquired-from-russia/">Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić </a> announced in February that he had purchased an anti-drone system, combat vehicles and infantry equipment from Russia. </p>
<p>The country has been historically <a href="https://www.natoassociation.ca/keys-to-understanding-russias-relationship-with-serbia/">close to Russia</a>. In modern times, this relationship was cemented by Russia backing Serbia’s opposition to Kosovan independence. The Kremlin was against the province becoming an independent nation and suggested this would be a breach of international law.</p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828">remains popular</a> among many Serbs, and the country has refused to follow the rest of Europe in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why-192472">imposing sanctions </a> on its old ally over the Ukraine invasion.</p>
<p>Many non-Serbs in the western Balkans distrust Russia, particularly because of its long-term support for Serbia – and those fears were exacerbated by the full-scale <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-past-and-the-furious-how-russias-revisionism-threatens-bosnia/">invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, before the invasion Russia showed whose side it was on in the Balkans when Moscow wielded its UN Security Council veto in 2015 to prevent a resolution that would have recognised the <a href="https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/bosnia/srebrenica/">Srebrenica massacres</a> as genocide on the 20th anniversary of those atrocities during the Balkan war. Around 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered in Srebrenica.</p>
<p>The narrative of genocide denial in the Russian media was even used to counter accusations of atrocities by Russian forces in Ukraine, notably Bucha. A report on Russian state-controlled <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bosnia-and-herzegovina/euvsdisinfo-russian-media-deny-srebrenica-genocide-deflect-responsibility-bucha_en?s=219">First TV said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Recall that [Srebrenica] has become synonymous with the genocide of the Muslim population, which, according to the west, was committed by the Bosnian Serbs in July 1995. But over time, many facts appeared confirming that a well-planned operation was carried out in Srebrenica, behind which stood western intelligence services.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Russia has long had a role in the western Balkans and sees its partnership with Serbia as a means of countering <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-influence-balkans">western influence in the region</a>. This means Russia pulling Serbia away from forging closer ties with the EU and as former US ambassador to Nato, Kurt Volker, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/why-did-russia-veto-recognizing-srebrenica-as-a-genocide-putin-bosnia/">said at the time</a>: “Moscow wants to make it clear that the Balkans won’t be part of mainstream Europe.”</p>
<p>Recent elections in Serbia, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17327/serbia-did-not-fulfil-its-commitments-to-free-and-fair-elections-say-meps%20European%20Parliament">condemned by EU observers</a> as being “below the expected standards for an EU candidate country”, added to concerns especially when demonstrators were condemned as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/04/serbia-opposition-doubles-down-on-election-claims-as-full-results-released">“thugs”</a> by Vučić , who thanked the Russians for tipping him off in advance that the protests were taking place.</p>
<p>Serbia also refuses to align with the rest of Europe in imposing sanctions on Russia with Vučić <a href="https://www.novinite.com/articles/224314/Serbia+Stands+Firm%3A+Refuses+to+Impose+Sanctions+on+Russia+Despite+Western+Pressure">recently telling Tass</a>, Russia’s state-run news agency: “You have many friends in Europe, but they all imposed sanctions against you. The only country that did not introduce sanctions is little Serbia.” </p>
<p>Vučić has also signed <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/serbia-receives-another-arms-delivery-from-russia-despite-international-sanctions-over-ukraine">cooperation agreements with Moscow</a>. Russia’s soft power remains strong in the country where the population regards Russia as its “greatest friend” and one survey found <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828">63% blame the west</a> for Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>EU and the Balkans</h2>
<p>The EU is at its heart a peace process, first formed from the carnage of the second world war. That peace was shattered by the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the genocide that took place during the conflict, notably during the war in Bosnia. That failure still haunts EU decision makers. </p>
<p>In June 2003 at the EU Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in Greece, European leaders decided to identify the countries of the region, as potential candidates for membership, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163">including Serbia</a>. </p>
<p>In September 2013 a stabilisation and association agreement between Serbia and the EU came into force. A conference in January 2014 signalled the start of the formal <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en">accession process</a>, setting out areas of reform Serbia needed to complete before being accepted as a member.</p>
<p>Serbia’s accession is particularly important for regional stability, given its size and role in past conflicts. If the EU is a project that wants to deliver peace and stability, it is difficult to see this as being successful in the western Balkans without including Serbia. </p>
<p>But talks have been far from smooth. Neighbouring Croatia which was earmarked by the EU as a future member at the same time as Serbia, in 2003, became a full EU member in 2013, but Serbian negotiations to become part of the EU have edged forward slowly. There is also a challenge with 40% of Serbs favouring an <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819#:%7E:text=Serbia%20is%20pursuing%20EU%20membership,its%20leverage%20in%20the%20region">end to membership talks</a>.</p>
<p>Vučić’s efforts to seek favour with Moscow will harm his country’s chances of EU memberships talks <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819#:%7E:text=Serbia%20is%20pursuing%20EU%20membership,its%20leverage%20in%20the%20region">progressing any further</a>. That could have profound regional consequences and weaken efforts to isolate Russia. </p>
<p>In recent years the EU has experienced an awkward partnership with Hungary, whose pro-Kremlin leader Viktor Orbán recently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-threatens-silence-hungary-orban-if-blocks-ukrainian-aid-funds-article-7/">held up EU plans</a> to send aid to Ukraine. Disunity has caused Nato and the EU problems in the face of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/hungarys-ties-to-russia-make-europeans-increasingly-uncomfortable/">Russian aggression</a>. That leaves the EU concerned about having another partner with worryingly close links to Russia. </p>
<p>The looming US election, which could result in a Trump presidency that threatens a US <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html">withdrawal from Nato</a>, could exacerbate those concerns. Conversations are stepping up in European capitals over how to ensure that the EU and other European democracies can work together to ensure stability on the continent in the face of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/european-leaders-call-for-stronger-defence-ties-donald-trump-nato-remarks-russia">Russian aggression</a>. </p>
<p>That work will continue to focus, rightly, on Ukraine. However, as in the past, there are pitfalls in disregarding the challenges in the western Balkans and failing to pay attention to “little Serbia” could have far reaching consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Gethins is affiliated with.
I am a member of the SNP.
I am a founder and member of the Management Board of the Scottish Council on Global Affairs.
I am a Trustee of the John Smith Trust.</span></em></p>Europe should not ignore the importance of Serbia as a Russian ally.Stephen Gethins, Professor of Practice in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2233902024-02-15T16:17:04Z2024-02-15T16:17:04ZKosovo: consolidating its statehood remains an uphill struggle 16 years after independence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575352/original/file-20240213-20-g81uw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5421%2C3715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/flag-kosovo-on-soldiers-arm-collage-1249661251">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia on February 17 2008. It was a day full of joy and hope for a country that <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html">suffered</a> atrocities including ethnic cleansing, genocide and rape at the hands of Serbian forces during the Kosovo War (1998–1999).</p>
<p>The country is now <a href="https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve/">recognised</a> internationally by more than 100 states and has become a member of some international organisations. Kosovo has also established itself as one of the most functional and vibrant <a href="https://www.idea.int/blog/kosovos-democracy-has-come-long-way-it-needs-support">democracies</a> in the Balkans. </p>
<p>But neighbouring Serbia doesn’t recognise Kosovo’s independence and ethnic Serbs living in the country’s north have largely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-kosovos-stand-off-with-serbs-goes-15-years-after-statehood-2023-02-13/">rejected</a> Kosovo’s state authority. So, in 2011, the EU and the US brought the two countries together for talks on normalising relations. </p>
<p>The talks initially yielded some agreements that were hailed as “historic”. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels">Brussels agreement</a> in 2013, for example, defined the conditions for large-scale devolution of northern Kosovo and opened the way to membership of the EU. </p>
<p>But, since then, ambiguous language and a lack of goodwill between Serbia and Kosovo has meant that these intentions haven’t delivered significant changes.</p>
<h2>Accommodating Serbia</h2>
<p>The breakdown in cooperation has been exploited by Serbia to undermine Kosovo’s standing as a sovereign state. Serbia has strengthened its <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/12/07/serbia-strengthening-parallel-structures-kosovo-deputy-pm-says/">parallel structures</a> (a set of Belgrade-run institutions in Kosovo) which are in the country’s Serb-dominated north, lobbied against Kosovo’s bid to join <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/kosovo-fails-in-unesco-membership-bid">Unesco</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-12c2b452f3d644dcabe63bad05040783">Interpol</a>, and orchestrated an aggressive <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/01/05/serbian-president-claims-nine-more-kosovo-recognition-withdrawals/">derecognition</a> campaign against Kosovo.</p>
<p>Instead of normalising relations between Pristina and Belgrade, some people argue that the talks have become a tool for the EU and the US to normalise their relations with Serbia’s president, Alexander Vučić. </p>
<p>Concerned about Serbia’s potential to destabilise the Balkans, Brussels and Washington have adopted a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/14/europe/serbia-vucic-kosovo-balkans-west-intl-cmd/index.html">lenient posture</a> towards Vučić, aiming to pull Serbia away from Russia’s influence. Russia’s war in Ukraine and its potential security implications for the Balkans (where Serbia is considered <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/14047/html/">Moscow’s proxy</a>) has, contrary to any reasonable expectation, amplified this approach.</p>
<p>The Kosovo government’s attempts to extend state control of ethnic Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo, for example, have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/west-kosovo-ban-serbs-dinar/32795252.html">criticised</a> by the EU and US. On February 1, Kosovo’s central bank restricted all cash transactions anywhere in the country to euros, effectively banning the Serbian dinar.</p>
<p>But the EU and US attitude has emboldened Vučić to <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/05/serbs-stage-mass-resignation-from-kosovo-state-institutions/">intensify his efforts</a> to undermine Kosovo. He has used Kosovo Serbs living in the north to stoke tensions and make the country ungovernable. </p>
<p>In June 2023, three Kosovan police officers were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-security-forces-detain-three-kosovo-police-officers-kosovo-official-says-2023-06-14/">detained</a> by Serbian forces who accused them of crossing the border illegally. And tensions boiled over in September when a group of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serbia-radoicic-extradition-impossible/32729208.html">heavily armed men</a> mounted an attack in northern Kosovo, leaving one Kosovan police officer and three gunmen <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66905091">dead</a>. A Kosovan Serb politician called Milan Radoicic has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-release-monastery-attack-radoicic/32622767.html">claimed</a> to be the mastermind of the attack. </p>
<p>The international community condemned the attack and called for further investigations to hold those responsible to account. However, there still hasn’t been any official public assessment of the attack, nor have any sanctions been imposed on Serbia. Meanwhile, the EU has imposed <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/06/14/eu-announces-measures-against-kosovo-over-unrest-in-north/">sanctions on Kosovo</a>, accusing the government of failing to take steps to defuse the crisis in the north.</p>
<h2>Other priorities</h2>
<p>This imbalanced approach to the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is expected continue in 2024. There is <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2024/02/08/ep-adopted-resolution-on-serbia-calling-for-an-investigation-into-december-elections/">growing frustration</a> with Vučić’s autocratic grip in Serbia, but in the view of Brussels and Washington there doesn’t seem to be any better alternative than talking with Belgrade. Vučić is perceived as someone with enough popular legitimacy to sell Serbs a final settlement with Kosovo.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s concerns about the current approach to the dialogue between the two countries are legitimate having seen Serbia’s actions in the past. But it hasn’t much room for manoeuvre.</p>
<p>The stream of countries recognising Kosovo’s independence has stalled. In fact, Israel is the only country to establish <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/02/01/kosovo-establishes-relations-with-israel-breaking-blockade-on-recognitions/">diplomatic ties</a> with Kosovo in the last six years.</p>
<p>Stopping Serbia from sliding further towards autocracy would be the best option for achieving peace, stability and countering Russia’s influence in the Balkans. But that would require time and a total revision of the current dialogue format.</p>
<h2>An uphill struggle</h2>
<p>With a war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict stretching resources and causing political tension, Brussels and Washington will seek to put out any potential flames in the Balkans. The current US and EU administrations are likely to push Kosovo to bend to their demands and give Vučić something that he would be happy to live with.</p>
<p>Pristina has already <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">agreed</a> to some form of self-government for Kosovo Serbs. And, with European Parliament and US elections looming this year, where anti-establishment parties are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/24/anti-european-populists-on-track-for-big-gains-in-eu-elections-says-report">on track for big gains</a>, current leaders may rush to strike an imperfect deal between Kosovo and Serbia.</p>
<p>There’s also a chance that the EU and the US could find themselves being drawn into crisis management elsewhere if war in Ukraine and the Middle East continues to cause ripples way beyond their borders. Kosovo could be caught between meeting the international community’s demands to grant more sovereignty to Kosovo Serbs and a potential abandonment by its western partners if it doesn’t deliver on their requests.</p>
<p>Whichever way Kosovo chooses, the consolidation of its statehood will remain an uphill struggle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Altin Gjeta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kosovo is under pressure from the US and EU to give in to some of Serbia’s demands.Altin Gjeta, PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175172024-01-25T13:18:18Z2024-01-25T13:18:18ZA Western-imposed peace deal in Ukraine risks feeding Russia’s hunger for land – as it did with Serbia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562953/original/file-20231201-26-35fbaf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3808%2C2529&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman with flowers walks past a building fortified with sandbags in the Podil neighborhood of Kyiv, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIX%20Russia%20Ukraine%20War%20Daily%20Life/36cd7048eb8347298d1f560a490b4bd7?Query=ukraine%20daily%20life&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=988&currentItemNo=125">AP Photo/Jae C. Hong</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in Ukraine will soon be heading into its third year with no sign of a ceasefire. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that many in the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">West are growing impatient</a> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-endgame-analysis-1.6911021">with the emerged stalemate</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">reluctant to provide</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">continued military support</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>However, wars do come to an end, often with one side making <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-1-settle-now-all-wars-end-negotiating-table">concessions in exchange for peace</a>. And over the course of the Ukraine war, influential voices in the West – be it those of the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/">Henry Kissinger</a>, former President <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/03/trump-blurts-out-peace-plan-hand-russia-chunks-of-ukraine.html">Donald Trump</a> or high-ranking NATO official <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ukraine-membership-cede-territory-russia/">Stian Jenssen</a>, to name a few – have raised the prospect of Ukraine having to cede land to Russia in exchange for peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://baker.utk.edu/overview/faculty-and-staff/">expert on Western military interventions</a> in transnational ethnic conflicts, I have seen how well-intentioned peace agreements offered to the perceived aggressor can inadvertently plant the seeds for renewed conflict. This is because such agreements can deliver in peace what the aggressor pursues in war: territory. </p>
<p>Rather than resolve the root cause of conflicts, this can reward <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/revanchist-seeking-revengeand-not-just-with-territory-11642775416">revanchism</a> – that is, a state’s policy to reclaim territory it once dominated – and embolden an aggressor to use war to achieve its aim. This is especially true when the West rewards aggression with generous peace agreements. </p>
<p>Take the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>It has been more than 20 years since the end of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-world-and-yugoslavias-wars">the Yugoslav wars</a>, a series of conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. During these wars, Serbia sought to unify large swaths of territories populated by Serbs and non-Serbs into a “Greater Serbia.”</p>
<p>The wars ended with <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-ten-day-war-slovenian-independence.html">military victories for Slovenia</a> <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Croatia.pdf">and Croatia</a> over Serbia, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-bpfy.htm">NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo</a>. In the cases of the latter countries, NATO intervention was followed by numerous Western-imposed peace plans.</p>
<p>But two decades on, the region <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/3/are-kosovo-and-serbia-on-the-brink-of-war">borders on renewed conflict</a> as Serbia insists that its survival is dependent on it ability to solely <a href="https://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/2021/Prilog2-StrategijaNacionalneBezbednostiRS-ENG.pdf">represent and protect</a> all Serbs, wherever they live.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and women hold candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candles for three killed Serbs in the northern Serb-dominated part of the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, Kosovo, Sept. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaShootout/99c7b994087c4ba7ac7543d03e180b4b/photo?Query=armed%20attack%20serbia&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, each war is different, and the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Ukraine are unique.</p>
<p>But I believe the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo show that Western-sponsored treaties, when they sacrifice land for peace, can store up trouble for later – especially when it comes to revanchist nations.</p>
<h2>Russia and Serbia revanchism</h2>
<p>Russian and Serbian revanchism has been evident ever since the countries they once dominated – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively – broke up in the early 1990s.</p>
<p>In 1992, Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/transdniestria-moldova-and-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-pub-87609">seized Transnistria</a>, the Moscow-backed breakaway part of Moldova that borders southwestern Ukraine, under the pretext of securing peace. The same year, Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm">intervened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia</a>, autonomous regions within Georgia populated by pro-Russia but non-Georgian peoples, to “end the ethnic fighting.” In 2008, Russia expanded further into Georgia. The same scenario recurred in 2014 when Russia sent forces to Crimea and the Donbas to “protect” ethnic Russians from “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">Nazi</a>” hordes.</p>
<p>Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has similarly sought to reclaim its dominance of that region. It has done this under various pretexts. Serbia’s decadelong wars began in 1991 and included fighting in Slovenia purportedly to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/28/yugoslav-army-attacks-slovenia-meets-resistance-at-border-posts/bdf68be0-2013-4ba5-98b6-9c22c5699d81/">keep Yugoslavia together</a>”; in Croatia, it was to protect ethnic Serbs from the “<a href="https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/23666/Serbsxasxvictimsx-xgenocidexinxthexrhetoricxofxSlobodanxMilosevic.pdf?sequence=1">fascist</a>” regime; in Bosnia, Serbia claimed to be preventing the founding of an “<a href="https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1751&context=ree">Islamic state</a>”; and in Kosovo, the stated aim was to fight “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/fear-and-loathing-belgrade-what-serbian-state-media-say-about-kosovars">terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>Yet, a quarter of a century on – and despite hopes that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">the fall of former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000 might usher in a more peaceful era – political elites in Serbia continue to pursue the unification of all Serb-populated lands, or at minimum gain the West’s acceptance of a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serb world</a>” – that is, a sphere of Serbian influence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro where Serbia dominates.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in uniform gestures." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kosovo police officer guards a road near the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaTension/c26eccb374754e3db37a3bc2e6a15ce4/photo?Query=serbia%20war&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6098&currentItemNo=46">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Walking the Balkan path</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/">various peace treaties</a> meant to stabilize and bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Kosovo have, to various degrees, failed, due in no small part, I would argue, to the very terms of settlement.</p>
<p>In Bosnia, the U.S.-brokered <a href="https://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Accords of 1995</a> brought the Bosnian War to an end. But it also reorganized the state into two subnational units: the majority-ethnic Serbian Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>
<p>The accords awarded 49% of the recently independent Bosnia’s territory to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-republika-srpska/a-64373205">Republic of Srpska</a> despite Serbs constituting 31% of the general population and having <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/">committed genocide and ethnic cleansing</a> in pursuit of crafting a Serb state within Bosnia.</p>
<p>Now, the Republic of Srpska seeks to secede and contravene the Dayton Accords through the establishment of <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2022_en">parallel institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2022-05-11/top-global-official-bosnian-serbs-are-trying-to-secede">the withdrawal of its members</a> from Western-brokered institutions.</p>
<p>In Kosovo, with each European Union-sponsored peace agreement to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, security threats from Serbia escalate, as evidenced by a recent <a href="https://www.state.gov/condemnation-of-violent-attacks-on-kosovo-police/">armed attack</a> led by Milan Radoičiċ, an associate of Serbia’s president. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, what critics see as Western <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement of Serbia’s revanchism</a> has led to further concessions in regard to Kosovo. In contrast to Bosnia, the Kosovo model involves incremental appeasement through various peace agreements – the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf">Ahtisaari Plan</a>, <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2022">Brussels 1</a> and <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">2 Agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-annex-agreement-path-normalisation-relations-between_en">Ohrid Agreement</a>, and the <a href="https://usercontent.one/wp/www.burimramadani.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/www.burimramadani.com_EU-Draft_Statue_October-2023.pdf">Draft-Statute proposal</a>. These plans offer political concessions to Serbia in exchange for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<h2>The same fate for Ukraine?</h2>
<p>To suggest that a similar fate to Bosnia or Kosovo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/27/why-ukraine-should-not-accept-a-dayton-accords-style-peace">may await Ukraine</a> is not beyond the realms of reality.</p>
<p>Any such solution could be an off-ramp to war, but it would hand Vladimir Putin what he wants: control over Russian-speaking people and key strategic territory in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If the West follows either the Bosnia or Kosovo model for peace for Ukraine, the result would likely be the same: First, it would result in the reorganization of Ukraine into two political-administrative units, one under control of a pro-Western government in Kyiv, the other under the influence or direct control of Moscow. Second, it would see the promotion of complex political arrangements, such as ethnic veto powers, dual sovereignty and international representation, that yield institutional dysfunction and political instability. And third, there would be no robust security deployments or guarantees from the U.S. or NATO to deter future Russian aggression.</p>
<h2>From Kosovo to Kyiv</h2>
<p>The current <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">Western support</a> for Ukraine’s defense will likely lead to its heavy involvement in any peace negotiations. </p>
<p>But ultimately, the implications of a Western-imposed peace in Ukraine may, if the past is any indicator, do little to appease Russian revanchism and may, in fact, encourage Russian elites to pursue a similar policy in Estonia and Latvia – states where Russians make up a quarter of the population. </p>
<p>The West may hope that a plan based on land for peace helps Ukraine by stopping the bloodshed, while at the same time appeases Russia and solves a geopolitical problem for the EU and the U.S. </p>
<p>But if the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo are anything to go by, it could on the contrary only whet Russia’s appetite for more territorial claims, and leave Ukraine feeling betrayed.</p>
<p><em>Drita Perezic, a security sector expert with the <a href="https://balkansgroup.org/en/about-us-2/">Balkans Policy Research Group</a>, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elis Vllasi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fragility of peace settlements in the Balkans provides a cautionary tale. US and EU policymakers may inadvertently make matters worse by acceding to the aggressor’s territorial ambitions.Elis Vllasi, Senior Research Associate & Lecturer in National Security & Foreign Affairs, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2150382023-10-20T12:17:39Z2023-10-20T12:17:39ZKosovo and Serbia in crisis talks as regional tension escalates thanks to Russian meddling<p>Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, and Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/17/kosovo-serbia-leaders-talks-diplomacy?CMP=share_btn_tw%20%22%22">scheduled to meet this weekend</a> for the first time since Nato decided to send about 600 more <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reinforcements-arrive-in-kosovo-for-nato-peacekeeping-mission">peacekeeping troops</a> into the Balkans early in October to mitigate some of the region’s growing tensions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/29/kosovo-serbian-troops-buildup-us-uk">US has already urged Serbia</a> to withdraw its military presence along the border with Kosovo to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/us/politics/white-house-serbia-kosovo.html">de-escalate tensions</a>. On October 18 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0437_EN.html">the EU parliament</a> passed a resolution that also condemned the Serbian army’s military build-up at the border with Kosovo and urged Vučić to avoid any further action.</p>
<p>The meeting follows a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62382069">deadly attack on Kosovo’s</a> police and security force by a paramilitary group of more than 30 heavily armed nationalist <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/serbia-releases-kosovo-serb-politician-detained-over-kosovo-shootout-/7296196.html">militants</a> on September 24.</p>
<p>The attack in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/kosovo-serbia-police-attack-albin-kurti-banjska-vjosa-osmani/">Banjska</a> in northern Kosovo, was led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">Milan Radoicic</a> of the Serbian List, an ethnic Serbian minority political party in Kosovo with close ties to Vučić. The attack raised tensions in the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-spectre-of-a-second-war-in-europe-looms-large-with-tensions-extraordinarily-high-in-kosovo-12978280">western Balkans</a> to an unprecedented level.</p>
<p>Fearing that the latest tensions could lead to complete destabilisation of the region, EU and Nato officials have put together a meeting on October 21 hoping to get Serbia and Kosovo to agree a deal.</p>
<p>Vučić met with Russian president <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/vucic-has-friendly-meeting-with-putin-in-china/">Vladimir Putin</a> on the margins of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a> forum in Beijing on October 18, when he also signed a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-and-china-sign-free-trade-deal/">free trade agreement</a> with Chinese president Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>Vučić’s meetings with <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/vucic-has-friendly-meeting-with-putin-in-china/">Putin</a> and <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-signs-free-trade-deal-with-china/">Xi</a> have sparked further concerns that Serbia is moving away from seeking EU membership and closer to <a href="https://chinaobservers.eu/why-serbia-refuses-to-stick-to-the-eus-line-on-china/">China</a> and Russia. </p>
<h2>Putin’s influence in the western Balkans</h2>
<p>Vučić has not imposed <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/03/10/vucic-cant-swear-serbia-will-not-join-sanctions-on-russia/">sanctions on Russia</a> following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine – something that all other countries in the Balkans have done. Meanwhile, Putin has courted support in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89600#:%7E:text=Russia's%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20has,to%20join%20anti%2DRussian%20sanctions.">region</a> to counterbalance the influence of the EU and Nato, particularly since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>Shortly after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">Radoicic</a> took responsibility for carrying out the deadly attack in north Kosovo, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-troops-buildup-russia-ukraine/32619334.html">Russian broadcasters</a> reported on the event saying that Serbia was “taking back” its land and comparing Serbian paramilitary actions with Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. In addition, some <a href="https://x.com/RussianEmbassyC/status/1707865742413009369?s=20">Russian embassy officials</a> said on their X/Twitter accounts that “Kosovo is Serbia”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of western Balkans" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tension: the western Balkans region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">StringerAL/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s close political allies in the western Balkans, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/14/europe/serbia-vucic-kosovo-balkans-west-intl-cmd/index.html">Vučić</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-meets-bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-hails-rise-trade-2023-05-23/">Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik</a> appear to have encouraged the regional friction.</p>
<p>In July 2023, the US treasury department announced it was imposing sanctions on Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). The treasury’s announcement alleged that Vulin was using his official position as the country’s top spy and links with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Serbian-Paramilitaries-and-the-Breakup-of-Yugoslavia-State-Connections/Vukusic/p/book/9781032044453">paramilitary groups</a> and nationalist militants to carry out <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/07/11/treasury-sanctions-serbia-spy-chief-00105637">destabilisation efforts</a> on behalf of Russia</p>
<p>Meanwhile, it has recently been reported that Russia is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/russia-recruits-serbs-in-drive-to-replenish-military-forces-in-ukraine#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20accounts%20provided%20by,nationals%20to%20bolster%20the%20army.">recruiting</a> ethnic Serbs and their <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Serbian-Paramilitaries-and-the-Breakup-of-Yugoslavia-State-Connections/Vukusic/p/book/9781032044453">paramilitary groups</a> to join its military in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Rocky road to agreement</h2>
<p>In March, Vučić and Kurti agreed to implement an <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-eu-proposal-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">agreement on a pathway to normalisation of relations</a> between the two countries at a meeting in Ohrid, North Macedonia, set up by the EU. But <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-wants-normalise-ties-with-kosovo-will-not-sign-any-agreement-2023-03-19/">Vučić subsequently refused to sign it</a>, saying that: “I don’t want to sign any international legally binding documents with Kosovo because Serbia does not recognise its independence.”</p>
<p><a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">Vučić’s</a> public narrative about Kosovo since March has increasingly used military terminology. Across Serbia, increasing numbers of murals have appeared bearing the Russian and Serbian flag colours have been painted with the phrases “<a href="https://x.com/fbieber/status/1709842190820856045?s=20">When the army returns to Kosovo</a>” and with “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-ethnic-serbs-z-symbol-russia/32437410.html">Z</a>” symbol, which have come to represent Russia’s war in Ukraine</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Normalisation-between-Serbia-and-Kosovo-must-come-from-within%7E527b3c">Ohrid agreement</a>, endorsed by the EU and the US, which they hope Serbia and Kosovo will finally sign this weekend, falls short of what either country seeks. For example, the agreement makes no reference to when Serbia will be able to join the EU. Similarly, it makes no reference of when the five <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C17/">EU member states</a> (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) who have yet to recognise Kosovo’s independence, will do so and open the path for Kosovo to integrate into the EU and Nato.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">agreement</a> essentially throws a lot of money at Kosovo and Serbia to persuade them to end their conflict by offering substantial investments from the EU and US in both countries. Given Serbia’s recent free-trade agreement with China, there are fewer incentives for Vučić to sign the agreement in its current form.</p>
<p>To stop these recurring crises between Serbia and Kosovo, the current version of the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">agreement</a> must be redrafted. First and foremost, the EU must state when Serbia and Kosovo might join the EU. Membership is a powerful incentive for a peace deal. Secondly, to be regarded as a reliable ally in the western Balkans, the EU needs to come up with a common position on Kosovo. </p>
<p>The refusal of the five EU countries <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-European-Union-and-Everyday-Statebuilding-The-Case-of-Kosovo/Ilazi/p/book/9781032360621">to recognise Kosovo</a> indirectly advances both the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/violence-in-north-kosovo-how-the-eu-and-the-us-can-break-the-cycle/">cycle of violence</a> and Putin’s goal of destabilising the western Balkans.</p>
<p>This weekend’s meeting could not be more important in trying to settle the long-standing tension between Kosovo and Serbia, but the likelihood of success presently remains distant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A key meeting is being held in the Balkans as the EU and US seek to resolve regional tension, partly stoked by pro-Russian forces.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151052023-10-16T22:13:29Z2023-10-16T22:13:29ZHow Serbia-Kosovo tensions hang like a spectre over the European Union<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/how-serbia-kosovo-tensions-hang-like-a-spectre-over-the-european-union" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/one-police-officer-killed-another-injured-kosovo-gunfire-pm-kurti-2023-09-24/">An armed band of Serb militants</a> recently ambushed police in Kosovo. In the resulting firefight and retreat, four people — including a police officer — died from their wounds. </p>
<p>The incident sparked official recriminations from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0p1s8gZCnI">both Kosovo</a> <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/blaming-serbia-is-always-easier-vucic-says-about-kosovo-terrorist-attack/">and Serbia</a>, culminating in Serbia <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/30/europe/kosovo-tensions-military-buid-up-explainer-intl/index.html">moving its armed forces</a> towards the countries’ shared border only to subsequently withdraw them due to pressure from the United States.</p>
<p>Tensions between the two countries are nothing new. Serbia and Kosovo were previously united under Yugoslavia. The collapse of the country in the 1990s, however, caused Kosovo to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/kosovo-eyes-independence">push for independence</a>. </p>
<p>Kosovar forces, backed by NATO, expelled the remnants of the Yugoslav army in 1999. Kosovo, however, remains central to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/why-kosovo-central-serb-national-epic">Serbian national identity</a> and Serbia has never truly reconciled itself to Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<p>While Serbia’s withdrawal of military forces from the Kosovo border has seemingly solved the crisis for now, it still has the potential to escalate. </p>
<p>Despite European Union and American pressure, Serbia <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/europe/serbia-releases-from-custody-a-kosovo-serb-leader-suspected-of-a-role-in-ambush-of/article_6f84a87e-f8b0-50ed-a21d-7dbb39810d24.html">subsequently released</a> one of the alleged organizers of the attacks. Serbia, in other words, is indirectly condoning the action of the Serb militants.</p>
<h2>Failure to act</h2>
<p>Serbia’s ability to do so directly speaks to the EU’s failure in the Balkans. The U.S. and the EU have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-eu-must-join-us-in-renewed-western-balkans-talks/a-50373495">largely neglected</a> the region, hoping that the allure of EU integration would be enough to placate Serbia and other countries.</p>
<p>It has not, and this failure now threatens to undermine the EU.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-north-macedonia-is-the-european-unions-latest-self-inflicted-wound-186898">Why North Macedonia is the European Union's latest self-inflicted wound</a>
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<p>In the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict">1999 war in Kosovo</a>, EU leadership hoped Serbian politicians would abandon their nationalist policies of the 1990s.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">overthrow of former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000, and the EU identifying Serbia as a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163">candidate for expansion to join the union</a> in 2003, provided Serbian politicians with an alternative policy to the nationalism of the past.</p>
<p>Serbia officially submitted its <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/serbia/">application to ascend to EU member status</a> in 2009. Unfortunately, Serbia’s progress towards that goal has been painfully slow. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17846376">Slovenia</a> <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/croatia_en">and Croatia</a>, two other former Yugoslav states, ascended to the EU in 2004 and 2013, respectively. From formal submission to full member status took each country 10 years or less. </p>
<p>Serbia’s application, now in its 14th year, shows no sign of being formally processed as it <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Serbia%20Report%202022.pdf">fails to meet</a> many of the judicial, economic and political standards the EU requires for membership.</p>
<p>Serbia has made several gestures towards achieving EU membership. Most notably, it <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/serbia-kosovo-agree-on-implementation-of-eu-plan-to-normalize-relations">agreed to a plan</a> to normalize relations with Kosovo. For many Serb nationalists, the question of Kosovo’s independence <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819">elicits visceral reactions</a> due to Kosovo’s prominence in Serb nationalist identity.</p>
<h2>Fast-tracked</h2>
<p>Neither the EU nor the international community should ignore the need for Serbia to continue to reform in order to meet those requirements.</p>
<p>The EU, however, has a long tradition of sidestepping requirements when it sees long-term benefits from rapid integration.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/world/europe/greece-admits-faking-data-to-join-europe.html">Greece</a>, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eur510022006en.pdf">Estonia</a> and other countries were admitted to the EU despite arguably failing to meet its standards. That’s because the EU has admitted nations due to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/07/26/how-exactly-do-countries-join-the-eu/">ideological reasons</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/why-is-greece-in-the-eu-grexit/">perceived political benefits</a> of admitting them.</p>
<p>In Serbia, EU membership remains a distant possibility that will probably only benefit future generations. Today, Serbians are seeking alternate ideologies that promise more immediate returns. </p>
<p>Given the EU’s association with liberal democracy and globalism, some Serbs are embracing populism and <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819">anti-western nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>It’s important to note that this isn’t the same type of nationalism embraced by Serbs in the 1980s and 1990s. The current strain of Serb nationalism, instead, has been fuelled by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-election-ultranationalists-idUSKCN0XF0LR">EU demands</a> on Serbia and the slow pace of ascension.</p>
<p>Serbia’s current leader, President Aleksandar Vučić, vividly illustrates the failure of EU policies towards Serbia. A former minister under Milosević, Vučič branded himself <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2014/07/11/serbia-comes-in-from-the-cold-with-eu-ambitions.html">pro-European</a> in the early 2010s.</p>
<p>During Vučić’s leadership, he has consistently advanced pro-EU reforms and <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/4/washington-agreement-between-kosovo-and-serbia">strengthening ties with Kosovo</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the EU hasn’t reciprocated Vučić’s gestures beyond vague encouragement. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eeb179ae-9c13-11ea-871b-edeb99a20c6e">Neglect by the EU</a> has, in turn, made Serbia and Vučić less susceptible to international pressure. This has been obvious when observing the EU’s relations with Serbia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<h2>EU’s failure to focus on Serbia</h2>
<p>EU policymakers hoped Serbia would <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-europe-serbia-european-union-6deaa57230993b02e7a67f57693bf7f2">join the sanctions</a> against Russia. Instead, Serbia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-says-agreed-3-year-gas-supply-contract-with-putin-2022-05-29/">reached an agreement</a> with Russian energy giant Gazprom in May 2022 to meet domestic Serbian needs.</p>
<p>EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell is now threatening Serbia with punitive measures if it <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-slams-kosovo-serbia-for-not-taking-steps-to-lower-tensions/2995335">does not stop</a> provocations over Kosovo.</p>
<p>The problem with such threats, however, is that they lack substance. The EU, with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/05/world/europe/poland-eu-rule-of-law-judicial-overhaul.html">larger internal</a> <a href="https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/index_en">and international</a> concerns, is limited in its ability to apply pressure. </p>
<p>The recent outbreak of war between <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-10-10-23/index.html">Israel and Hamas</a> will only make the EU’s ability to focus on Serbia more difficult.</p>
<p>Likewise, there is no positive incentive for Serbian politicians to adhere to EU requirements. Serbian politicians want the EU to accelerate talks about Serbia’s entry into the union. The EU, however, has demonstrated that the chance of real progress on this matter is remote. </p>
<p>This reality has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-vucic-davos-world-economic-forum-european-union-membership/">dampened enthusiasm</a> from Serbians about the prospect of joining the EU.</p>
<h2>Hungary backs Serbia</h2>
<p>The EU’s problem is that its domestic and international problems not only limit the ability to deal with Serbia, but Serbia-Kosovo tensions magnify the EU’s own issues. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, for example, has already stated his country — an EU member — would <a href="https://www.timeturk.com/en/hungary-s-premier-rules-out-eu-sanctions-on-serbia/news-84102">veto any sanctions</a> against Serbia.</p>
<p>Serbia’s provocations against Kosovo also provide Russia with a potential wedge issue in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/6/putin-says-ukraine-would-last-a-week-if-western-military-support-stops">its efforts to divide</a> the EU, as demonstrated by Orban’s statement.</p>
<p>EU support for Ukraine is already facing challenges from <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-president-caputova-says-no-military-package-ukraine-aid-after-elections-results/">members like Slovakia</a>. The EU’s failure to deal with Serbia in the past will only stoke such challenges, and further inhibit the organization’s ability to respond to crises like Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The U.S. and the EU have neglected the Balkans, hoping that the allure of EU integration would be enough to placate Serbia and other countries. It was not.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134292023-09-13T16:12:02Z2023-09-13T16:12:02ZThe signs that the EU has completely changed its perspective on adding new members since Russia invaded Ukraine<p>In her annual address on the state of the European Union, Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has given her strongest signal yet of the intention to add Ukraine and other nations as member states. Her speech was the latest sign that Brussels is thinking completely differently about EU enlargement since the start of the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The way in which von der Leyen has changed her tone on the addition of new EU member states also reflects the shift away from emphasising only the economic or legal roles of the EU. Replicating the practices of more established democracies, the annual state of the union speeches, which began in 2010, have increasingly invoked notions of the EU as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2022.2149177">state-like, federal entity</a>.</p>
<p>In her first years as president of the Commission, von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655">said little</a> in her <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701">annual speeches</a> about adding new members. This reflected a certain accession fatigue that came following the admittance of a large number of eastern European states that ended up being <a href="https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/831226/a569592c0a71b7c5c2494f6acace6a75/mL/2020-04-eu-haushalt-finanzierung-data.pdf">the net beneficiaries of the EU budget</a> after the 2007/2008 economic crash. </p>
<p>There was also reticence about renegotiating <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05147/SN05147.pdf">the Lisbon Treaty</a>, which forms the constitutional basis of the EU. That would be a protracted and politically difficult process requiring unanimity among member states. Such a change might be necessary to bring in new member states.</p>
<p>Von der Leyen signalled her “strong commitment” to adding new members in the past but this only pertained to the potential membership of Albania and North Macedonia. And she certainly did not frame this commitment as paramount to European democracy or unity. Nor was there any explicit reference to the accession of post-Soviet states.</p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought a change. That same year, von der Leyen <a href="https://state-of-the-union.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/SOTEU_2022_Address_EN.pdf">spoke of the conflict</a> as a showdown between “autocracy and democracy”. She explicitly stated that the western Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are “part of our family” and that their “future is in our union”.</p>
<p>Even then, however, the emphasis was on economic support and access to the single market and its perks, such as EU roaming. This is in line with the policies and rhetoric of most EU leaders through the 2010s, many of whom advocated for a multi-speed EU and promised these countries <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html">everything</a> <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html">but</a> <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html">EU membership</a>.</p>
<h2>A geopolitical union</h2>
<p>Now, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4_eRV7r5QI">in 2023</a>, even further change is afoot. Von der Leyen is overtly presenting the EU as a geopolitical union that will take a proactive approach to adding new members rather than allowing debates to rattle on without direction. </p>
<p>The “merit-based” principle of EU accession will continue to apply but there is a key shift in perspective. Von der Leyen is now positioning further enlargement as a “catalyst for success” for the EU itself, rather than focusing on the benefit it brings to new member states. She now envisions a “union complete with over 500 million people living in a free, democratic and prosperous” EU.</p>
<p>Von der Leyen has a <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/09/12/ursula-von-der-leyen-s-three-tiers-of-challenges-pub-90530">long-term ambition</a> to move away from the idea that bringing in more member states must come at a cost to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2016.1264083">depth of integration</a> between nations. In this year’s state of the union she drew parallels to the 2004 big boom enlargement, which brought in 10 new member states at once, including Poland and Slovenia. </p>
<p>She reminded her audience that this had been called the “European Day of Welcome” and called on them to look ahead to the next set of of such days. She even insisted that the bloc cannot afford to wait for EU treaty change to become a “team” of more than 30 nations, urging her audience to think about how enlargement can be achieved without this <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/revision-of-eu-treaties.html">lengthy process</a> being fully completed. </p>
<p>Signalling Europe’s readiness to “once again think big and write our own destiny”, she introduced a “series of pre-enlargement policy reviews” – a significant shift from previous practice.</p>
<p>It is also worth noting how this discussion is now playing out in far more emotional terms than it has in the past. This was perhaps most apparent in von der Leyen’s articulation of her vision itself but was evident in the run up to her speech, which saw <a href="https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4305963/eu-enlargement-what-think-tanks-are-thinking/5116171/">much excitement</a> build around what she might have to say on enlargement. </p>
<p>In May 2023, she had <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_299">talked of</a> the EU taking “responsibility to bring the aspiring members … closer”. And now, in September, she invoked the personal story of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/ukrainian-author-victoria-amelina-critically-injured-in-kramatorsk-strike">Victoria Amelina</a>, a Ukrainian author killed in an airstrike. This highly charged moment created a sense of European ethos and became the zenith of her speech, triggering a standing ovation by members of the European Parliament.</p>
<h2>A sea change</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine has prompted a re-evaluation of von der Leyen’s original approach to EU enlargement. During the course of 2022, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Moldova have all become EU candidates, and negotiations about accession began with Albania and North Macedonia at a pace that was unimaginable prior to the outbreak of the conflict.</p>
<p>This year’s state of the union is another significant step in this respect. It was the first to frame Ukraine as a genuine candidate country for membership. Enlargement is no longer framed as a secondary, distant and primarily economic objective but an urgent political act of justice and solidarity and a necessary step to restore the security of the EU and even that of Europe more broadly.</p>
<p>Others have made moves to present the EU as a political rather than economic union in the past but have met with limited success. Von der Leyen’s words on the “call of history” to expand the EU due to geopolitical imperatives were met this time with applause rather than scepticism.</p>
<p>After years of effective hiatus, enlargement policy is back on the EU’s agenda. The addition of new member states is no longer a distant dream but a salient and current aspiration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s 2023 state of the union speech saw her press for expansion for the union’s own good.Nora Siklodi, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of PortsmouthNándor Révész, Lecturer in Politics, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036302023-04-19T11:22:09Z2023-04-19T11:22:09ZWar crimes trial of Hashim Thaçi, the ‘George Washington of Kosovo’, will do little to reduce tensions in the Balkans<p>Hashim Thaçi, the former president of Kosovo and a founding member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), has been described as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35984823">“one of the key figures”</a> in the country’s recent history. He was elected as prime minister in January 2008 and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1830796.html">declared Kosovo’s independence</a> a month later. </p>
<p>Joe Biden, as US vice-president, referred to Thaçi as <a href="https://kryeministri.rks-gov.net/en/blog/vice-president-joseph-biden-hashim-thaci-is-kosovos-george-washington/">“Kosovo’s George Washington”</a> when he visited the White House in 2010. Fast forward to April 2023 and Thaçi – with three other former KLA leaders (<a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/11/kosovo-guerrilla-turned-politician-pleads-not-guilty-to-war-crimes/">Rexhep Selimi</a>, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/tag/kadri-veseli-05-18-2017/">Kadri Veseli</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/tag/jakup-krasniqi/">Jakup Krasniqi</a>) – is standing trial in a special court in The Hague. He is the most senior member of the KLA to be prosecuted.</p>
<h2>The charges</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.scp-ks.org/en">Specialist Kosovo Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office</a> were created in 2015 by an international agreement, ratified by the Kosovo Assembly, as a hybrid instrument of justice with international judges, prosecutors and court staff operating within the framework of Kosovo law. They have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes under Kosovo law during the period from January 1 1998 to December 31 2000.</p>
<p>Thaçi and his three co-defendants are each charged with <a href="https://www.scp-ks.org/en/opening-trial-hashim-thaci-kadri-veseli-rexhep-selimi-and-jakup-krasniqi-kosovo-specialist-chambers">six counts of crimes against humanity</a> (including persecution, torture and murder) and four counts of war crimes (including illegal and arbitrary arrest and detention, cruel treatment and murder).</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://repository.scp-ks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e980e32167&doc_type=stl_filing_annex&lang=eng">operative indictment</a> against the four men, they were part of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and “shared the common purpose to gain and exercise control over all of Kosovo by means including unlawfully intimidating, mistreating, committing violence against, and removing those deemed to be opponents”. </p>
<p>These “opponents” allegedly included ethnic minorities (Serbs, Roma and others), as well as ethnic Albanians who did not support the KLA. The operative indictment also refers to the defendants’ <a href="https://repository.scp-ks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e980e32167&doc_type=stl_filing_annex&lang=eng">superior responsibility</a>, by virtue of their senior leadership positions within the KLA, for crimes committed by persons under their control and members of the JCE.</p>
<h2>Organ trafficking allegations</h2>
<p>Thaçi has pleaded not guilty and stated that he <a href="https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-65142903">expects to be acquitted</a> of all charges. His fellow defendants have also <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/10/senior-kosovo-politician-denies-war-crimes-at-hague-court/">denied any guilt</a> in what Krasniqi said was “a joint liberation enterprise and state-forming enterprise”. Selimi told the court that he “fought against the Serbian occupier who only brought evil to my country – murder, displacement, humiliation and genocide”. Veseli has <a href="https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/war-crimes-trial-kosovo-ex-030654513.html">also denied the charges</a>.</p>
<p>One of the accusations against Thaçi and his co-defendants is that they were involved in the trafficking of human organs. But the indictment against Thaçi and his co-defendants does not include any <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/hashim-thaci-war-crimes-tribunal-hague-kla-commander-kosovo">reference to this</a>.</p>
<p>The organ trafficking claims were first made in 2008 and investigated by <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo_organ_trafficking_thaci/2250583.html">Dick Marty</a>, a Swiss politician and former prosecutor. Marty’s <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12608/html#_TOC_N0EA39C88N088F3B5C">report for the Council of Europe</a>, published in January 2011, challenged “the much-touted image of the KLA as a guerrilla army that fought valiantly to defend the right of its people to inhabit the territory of Kosovo”. </p>
<p>It also found evidence of a “subset of captives” who were “taken into central Albania to be murdered immediately before having their kidneys removed in a makeshift operating clinic”. </p>
<h2>Reactions to the trial</h2>
<p>There is predictably strong opposition to the trial among Kosovo Albanians. Thousands of protesters have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-protesters-come-out-support-thaci-war-crimes/32346153.html">taken to the streets of Priština</a>, holding placards with the images of the men and slogans such as “Freedom has a name” and “Don’t equate victims with criminals”. Demonstrators have also gathered <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/04/03/albanians-rally-for-liberators-outside-hague-war-crimes-court/">in front of the courtroom</a> in The Hague.</p>
<p>According to a senior legal advisor at the Kosovo Law Institute, it is important that the trial is understood as a case “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ex-kosovo-guerrilla-chief-president-thaci-faces-war-crimes-trial-monday-2023-03-31/">against a few individuals</a> of the former KLA and not a trial against the KLA or the values that the people of Kosovo represent”. Many Kosovo Albanians, however, are unlikely to make this distinction, instead viewing the trial as an indictment of the entire Kosovo Albanian war effort. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-croatia-protests-warcrimes-idUSTRE73F18A20110416">protests erupted in Croatia</a> in 2011 against the international trial and conviction (overturned on appeal in 2012) of the former Croatian war generals <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/cis/en/cis_gotovina_al_en.pdf">Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač</a> at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (created by the UN security council in 1993).</p>
<h2>Witness fears</h2>
<p>The fact that Thaçi and his co-accused enjoy huge support and popularity could deter some witnesses from giving evidence against them. In his opening statement at the trial, acting specialist prosecutor <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWI9OK17_Qs">Alex Whiting pointed out</a> that “most of the victims of the accused were fellow Kosovar Albanians”. </p>
<p>Previous experience suggests it might be hard to get witnesses to come forward. The 2008 ICTY <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/cis/en/cis_haradinaj_al_en.pdf">trial judgement</a> against <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/case/haradinaj">three other former members of the KLA</a> (Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj) reported “significant difficulties in securing the testimony of a large number of witnesses”. It added that “many witnesses cited fear as a prominent reason for not wishing to appear before the Trial Chamber to give evidence”.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12608/html#_TOC_N0EA39C88N088F3B5C">Council of Europe report by Dick Marty</a> referred to the relevance of Kosovo Albanian society being “still very much clan-orientated”. It also emphasised the “fear, often to the point of genuine terror, which we observed in some of our informants as soon as the subject of our inquiry was broached”.</p>
<p>The trial of Thaçi and his co-defendants is expected to last for <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/03/20/prosecution-case-in-kosovo-ex-guerrillas-trial-could-take-six-years/">up to six years</a>. More than 20 years after the alleged crimes were committed, there is the possibility, at least for some of the KLA’s victims, of some sort of resolution – however tardy, imperfect and incomplete. </p>
<p>But even if the accused are ultimately found guilty, it is safe to say that any conviction will have little impact on how these men are widely viewed in Kosovo and neighbouring Albania. </p>
<p>Evidence given at the trial may well provide a fuller picture of these historic events, but it will not dislodge existing narratives. Competing interpretations of the past are – and will remain – one of the long-term legacies of the war in Kosovo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janine Natalya Clark previously received funding from the European Research Council (2017-2022).</span></em></p>The trial of the former Kosovan president and several others highlights the sharp and enduring divisions and differing interpretations of history.Janine Natalya Clark, Professor of Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976292023-01-17T18:34:03Z2023-01-17T18:34:03ZKosovo: ethnic tensions have created a political ‘volcano’ that could erupt anytime<p>After US state department counsellor Derek Chollet recently visited Kosovo in a bid to calm tensions flaring in the north of the country, he said Washington’s priority was to prevent <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/404b3e47-b9fe-4b52-926d-10ad8244e02e">“violence metastasising”</a> (spreading) between Serbs and Albanians.</p>
<p>“The last thing any of us wants right now is a crisis in this part of the world given that we have the biggest crisis since the second world war not too far away,” Chollet told journalists. He added that: “We don’t want to be in a crisis diplomacy. First, licence plates, then barricades, we don’t want something else next week.”</p>
<p>The US diplomat was referring to a crisis late last year over <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63711841">car license plates</a> in north Kosovo, which borders Serbia. More than a decade after Kosovo – formerly an autonomous province of Serbia – unilaterally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia-idUSHAM53437920080217">declared independence</a>, Serbia has never recognised Kosovo as a sovereign state. </p>
<p>Serbs living in the north of Kosovo, similarly, do not acknowledge Kosovo’s independence and overwhelmingly regard themselves as part of the Republic of Serbia. Many have therefore continued to use car license plates issued in Belgrade. Last November, the Kosovo government began the implementation of a plan to outlaw these license plates, triggering the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/22/number-plate-row-in-kosovo-threatens-to-spark-civil-unrest-serbia">mass resignation</a> of Serbs from state jobs.</p>
<p>Although Serbia and Kosovo subsequently <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-reach-deal-license-plate-dispute/32146641.html">reached an EU-mediated agreement</a>, the situation flared up again following the arrest on December 10 of Dejan Pantić, a former Serb police officer, who was charged with organising a “<a href="https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/kosovski-ministar-policije-bivsi-policajac-kp-pantic-uhapsen-jer-je-ucestvovao-u-napadima-na-prostorije-cik/">terrorist act”</a> against the Central Election Commission (CIK) and Kosovo Police. Kosovo authorities claimed that Pantić had attacked CIK officials and police. Serbs responded by <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serb-roadblocks-protests/32195430.html">erecting barricades</a> and blocking several main roads.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, called on Nato forces stationed in the country to remove the <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=27&nav_id=115134">“warlike barricades”</a> and insisted that Kosovo authorities would dismantle them if Nato failed to do so. Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, put Serbia’s armed forces on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/27/serbia-puts-troops-on-high-alert-as-tensions-with-kosovo-rise">highest state of alert</a>, maintaining that this was necessary to “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kosovo-serbia-roadblocks-mitrovica-kfor-aleksandar-vucic-b2252058.html">protect our people</a> [in Kosovo] and preserve Serbia.” </p>
<p>The crisis was defused after Kosovo authorities agreed on December 28 to <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=28&nav_id=115142">release Pantić</a> from prison and gave assurances that Serb protesters <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/north-kosovo-joint-statement-spokesperson-eu-high-representative-and-us-state-department_en">would not be prosecuted</a>. Vučić responded by calling on Serbs in the north to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-urges-serbs-kosovo-remove-barricades-official-2022-12-28/">remove the barricades</a>, which they agreed to do.</p>
<h2>Exploiting the crisis</h2>
<p>While the situation in the north was certainly volatile, the risk of outright conflict was arguably small – and remains so, despite sporadic acts of violence. Serbia is an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm">EU candidate</a> and Kosovo <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm">wants to follow suit</a>. Neither country has anything to gain from renewed bloodshed. </p>
<p>But this hasn’t stopped leaders on both sides ramping up tensions for their own ends.</p>
<p>Serbia’s prime minister, Ana Brnabić, told the Serbian parliament on December 21: “We are on the <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=21&nav_id=115103">brink of an armed conflict</a> thanks to [Kosovo’s capital] Priština’s unilateral moves.” </p>
<p>She also called on civil society organisations to “speak out about <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=21&nav_id=115103">the torture</a> experienced by Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija”. After Serbs in the north agreed to take down the barricades, Brnabić thanked both them and Vučić for “finding the strength to respond to <a href="https://www.vreme.com/vesti/pocelo-uklanjanje-barikada-na-kosovu-svi-su-pobedili/">brutal terror and aggression</a>.”</p>
<p>Vučić has referred to Kurti as a “<a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=01&nav_id=114974">terrorist scumbag</a>” and warned: “If the <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=29&nav_id=115147">terror continues</a>, we will close the north of Kosovo forever to the institutions of Priština.” </p>
<p>Meanwhile political leaders in Kosovo frequently misrepresent Serbs in the north as “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serb-roadblocks-protests/32195430.html">criminal persons/groups</a>.” Extremist elements have been active in the north, including members of the <a href="https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/svijet/eskalacija-napetosti-ultradesnicari-uzvikuju-kosovo-je-srce-srbije-kfor-podigao-bodljikavu-zicu-152874">Narodne Patrole</a>, a Serb nationalist organisation with connections to the <a href="https://www.danas.rs/svet/region/vagnerovci-pozvali-patriote-iz-srbije-crne-gore-i-republike-srpske-idemo-da-oslobodimo-jarinje-ne-dozvolimo-da-braca-i-sestre-ostanu-sami/">Russian mercenary Wagner Group</a> which is fighting in the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>But focusing only on extremists ignores the valid concerns of Kosovo Serbs in the north, who have little trust in the government in Priština to protect their rights. Moreover, men and women of all ages have taken part in recent protests, as <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbs-protest-northern-kosovo/32189515.html">video footage</a> shows, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aIUpbx_YYnk">thousands of Kosovo Serb women have called for calm</a>.</p>
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<p>Political leaders in Kosovo have also been keen to stress Vučić’s relationship with Putin to argue that Russia is behind the recent crisis in northern Kosovo and has an “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/20/kosovo-pm-albin-kurti-says-russia-is-inflaming-serbia-tensions-as-ukraine-war-falters">interest in spillover</a>”. </p>
<p>This is unlikely. For one, Putin has his hands more than full in Ukraine. Furthermore, the instability in Kosovo goes back decades to the late 1980s when Kosovo’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2019/mar/20/how-milosevic-stripped-kosovos-autonomy-archive-1989">autonomous status was revoked</a>. This ultimately led to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. </p>
<p>Kurti’s assertion that Russia has “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/20/kosovo-pm-albin-kurti-says-russia-is-inflaming-serbia-tensions-as-ukraine-war-falters">a client who’s in Belgrade</a>” is also wide of the mark. It misrepresents the Serbian leadership as Putin’s lackeys and ignores the fact that Vučić has his own interests with respect to Kosovo and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/23745118.2022.2058755?needAccess=true&role=button">politically benefits</a> from instability there. Tensions in Kosovo help Vučić to win political points in Serbia and he frequently argues that <a href="https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/sonja-biserko-srbi-ce-se-vratiti-u-kosovske-institucije-vucic-manipulise/">Germany and Britain</a> are behind everything that Kurti does. </p>
<h2>The way forward?</h2>
<p>Kurti has used the war in Ukraine to try and accelerate Kosovo’s EU membership, and Kosovo formally submitted a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-submits-eu-membership-application-2022-12-15/">request to join the EU</a> on December 15. But the issue of Kosovo’s (and Serbia’s) membership of the EU cannot begin to be resolved until northern Kosovo is stabilised. </p>
<p>This will mean respecting the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue_en">Belgrade-Priština Dialogue</a> process, established as part of the 2013 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels">Brussels agreement</a>. Under this, Kosovo and Serbia agreed to create an <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/text-leaked-copy-serbia-kosovo-agreement-brussels/24963542.html">association of Serb majority municipalities</a> as a mechanism to protect the rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo. Ten years on, this has still not been formed. </p>
<p>No doubt with Kosovo’s membership application in mind, the EU’s high representative, Josep Borrell, recently called on Kosovo to “<a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/kosovoserbia-statement-high-representative-recent-developments_en?s=51">start immediately</a>” the process of establishing the association. This is to be welcomed. Without a progressive dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, and a solution to the issues in northern Kosovo in particular, the hostilities between the two countries will continue to simmer and Kosovo will remain like a volcano at risk of politically erupting every few years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janine Natalya Clark's most recent research (focused on resilience and conflict-related sexual violence) was funded by the European Research Council under grant number 724518. </span></em></p>Leaders on both sides are ramping up hostility for their own ends.Janine Natalya Clark, Professor of Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973722023-01-13T16:17:12Z2023-01-13T16:17:12ZSerbia and Kosovo: why the EU is intent on resolving border tension stoked by the Ukraine war<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine serves as a sombre reminder that Europe’s unresolved issues can reignite. Given the rising tension in the Balkans, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/10/10/belgrade-pristina-confirm-german-french-proposal-for-kosovo-deal/">Germany and France</a> have made settling the unresolved problems between <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/us-favors-eu-plan-for-kosovo-serbia-supported-by-france-germany-state-department/2786393">Serbia and Kosovo</a> a top priority for 2023. </p>
<p>This is particularly important after a confrontation in December 2022 over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/22/number-plate-row-in-kosovo-threatens-to-spark-civil-unrest-serbia">licence plates in northern Kosovo</a> stoked fears of a renewed conflict in the Balkans. Some ethnic Serbs do not acknowledge Kosovo’s independence, and therefore thousands of residents in northern Kosovo refuse to use Kosovan licence plates. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict">Kosovo</a> declared its independence in 2008, but Serbia continues to claim the territory.</p>
<p>The necessity of finding a lasting settlement in 2023 that may result in mutual recognition between the two states has, however, generated significant concerns due to the worries of another bloody war in Europe. Russian president Vladimir Putin has attempted to escalate tensions <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-stoking-serbia-kosovo-tensions-distract-from-ukraine-pristina-besnik-bislimi/">between Serbia and Kosovo</a> to draw attention away from his war in Ukraine, and to solidify his relationship with Serbia. </p>
<p>In December 2022, for example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/world/europe/serbia-vucic-russia.html">Serbian president</a> (and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87959">Putin’s proxy in the Balkans</a>) Aleksandar Vučić openly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/kosovo-ap-serbia-aleksandar-vucic-balkans-b2252927.html">endorsed roadblocks</a> near the main border crossing between Kosovo and Serbia, which was ironically <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64117730">blocked by trucks</a> gifted by the EU.</p>
<p>At the end of 2022, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue">France and Germany</a> appointed their own special envoys to engage with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/01/serbia-must-choose-between-eu-and-russia-says-germany">Serbia and Kosovo</a> and they are leading the EU-facilitated dialogue to resolve the dispute between the two countries. The <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/10/10/belgrade-pristina-confirm-german-french-proposal-for-kosovo-deal/">Franco-German</a> proposed agreement has <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/leak-franco-german-plan-to-resolve-the-kosovo-serbia-dispute/">nine articles</a> and is based on a document known as the <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34477/EUDO_CIT_2015_03-Kosovo.pdf;sequence=1">basic agreement</a> from 1972. This was influenced by the German experience in resolving sensitive border issues following the second world war.</p>
<p>German chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Emmanuel Macron believe that the French and German experiences in resolving highly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-german-reunification-can-teach-kosovo/">sensitive issues after WWII</a> can help <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/09/06/macron-and-scholz-wrote-to-vucic-speed-up-dialogue-between-kosovo-and-serbia/">Serbia and Kosovo</a> normalise relations. They have proposed that Serbia and Kosovo set up <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/leak-franco-german-plan-to-resolve-the-kosovo-serbia-dispute/">permanent missions</a>, which are like embassies but operate at a lower level, as a starting point. </p>
<p>The most important part of the Franco-German proposal is that “<a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/closing-the-gap-why-kosovo-and-serbia-should-view-political-cooperation-as-an-opportunity/">Kosovo and Serbia</a> must foster good neighbourly ties with each other based on equal rights”. This puts all sides on an equal footing. The <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/leak-franco-german-plan-to-resolve-the-kosovo-serbia-dispute/">Franco-German</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-apply-eu-membership-by-year-end-president-2022-12-06/">proposal</a> offers <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-prospect-of-eu-membership-in-exchange-for-giving-up-kosovo/">financial rewards</a> with a deadline of spring 2023 and guarantees that France and Germany will strive for both Serbia and Kosovo’s entrance to the EU.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/politics/shasha-franco-german-plan-closer-kosovos-views-12-12-2022">Kosovo</a> has so far been more receptive to the Franco-German approach since it removes a roadblock to membership of the Council of Europe, the <a href="https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=153002">UN</a> and the EU by allowing <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/kurti-hails-franco-german-plan-says-serbia-wants-to-sabotage-it/">Kosovo</a> to be recognised by five EU countries. Although the Franco-German proposal provides major EU investment in Serbia and the possibility of a quick entrance to the EU, Serbia has been less receptive.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why-192472">Ukraine war: Serbia is shifting closer to Russia – here's why</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-france-germany-kosovo-eu-entry/32071236.html">President Vučić of Serbia</a> opposed the Franco-German proposal as it implies that Serbia will eventually have to <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-prospect-of-eu-membership-in-exchange-for-giving-up-kosovo/">recognise Kosovo’s independence</a>. It contradicts the foundation of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/how-aleksandar-vucic-became-europes-favorite-autocrat/">his political career</a>, when <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-france-germany-kosovo-eu-entry/32071236.html">he stated opposition to</a> Kosovo’s independence. A recent poll found that a majority of Serbs are <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/22/for-first-time-a-majority-of-serbs-are-against-joining-the-eu-poll">against joining the EU</a>.</p>
<p>The French and Germans are betting on showering Serbia with money in exchange for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/apr/21/serbia-sliding-towards-autocracy-as-president-secures-second-term">President Vučić</a> not threatening another border conflict or war in Europe.</p>
<h2>The conflict’s history</h2>
<p>Since Serbia’s brutal <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline.shtml">war in Kosovo in 1998-1999</a> and Kosovo’s 2008 proclamation of <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141">independence from Serbia</a>, which had the support of the US and EU, the relations between the two countries have remained strained. Since 2011, when the EU tried to start <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Foreign+Affairs+Review/22.4/EERR2017039">a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo</a>, little concrete progress has been <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-kosovo-serbia-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-lead/">made</a> between the two countries. In exchange for mutual recognition, the EU has suggested that both countries become <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/conditions-for-peace-the-eus-role-in-the-dialogue-process-between-kosovo-and-serbia/">members of the union</a>.</p>
<p>One stumbling block is that most EU nations are opposed to further EU <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/20/what-has-stopped-eu-enlargement-in-western-balkans-pub-87348">enlargement in the Balkans</a>, and <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/the-explainer-the-eus-kosovo-refuseniks/">five EU members do not recognise Kosovo</a>: Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/way-out-balkans-morass-restoring-us-and-eu-leverage-serbia-kosovo-dialogue">EU’s ability</a> to act as a credible mediator between Serbia and Kosovo has been weakened because there is <a href="https://www.europeanforum.net/headlines/eu-summit-offers-no-clear-accession-timeline-for-western-balkan">no detailed timeline</a> for <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2022/the-eu-as-a-promoter-of-democracy-or-stabilitocracy/3-stabilitocracy-formation-in-practice-lessons-from-the-western-balkans/">the two countries to join</a>.</p>
<p>The EU has lost its some of its <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee25d408-91e7-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271">credibility</a> in the Balkans, due to its broken promises to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/35a61deb-3c65-4442-b6eb-942677a179f8">North Macedonia</a>. The EU originally said it would begin accession negotiations in 2018 but did not do so until 2022, and then only as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Ukraine war has refocused EU attention on the Balkans generally, but in reaching for <a href="https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies">more stability in the region</a> it must not abandon agreements on the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-020-00148-w">rule of law, human rights, and democracy</a>. This would only serve to empower <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejcl/8/4/article-p271_271.xml">autocrats in the Balkans</a> like Serbia’s leader.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197372/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s backing of Serbia during the Ukraine war is aggravating tensions with its neighbour Kosovo.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1940032022-11-11T15:58:33Z2022-11-11T15:58:33ZAlbania’s ghost towns: the crisis that caused the exodus<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494717/original/file-20221110-21-yd03jv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some Albanians towns have lost a lot of their younger population.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Mayovskyy/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Albania has a population of <a href="http://www.instat.gov.al/en/statistical-literacy/the-population-of-albania/">2.8 million people</a>, according to data published at the start of 2021. Since the fall of communism in 1991 <a href="https://albaniandailynews.com/news/albania-s-population-will-end-up-as-in-1960-un-finds">nearly 40% of Albania’s</a> population has left the country.</p>
<p>Most <a href="https://germin.org/international-migrants-day-albanian-diaspora-day-2021/">Albanians</a> who left in the 1990s and 2000s headed for Greece, Italy, Germany, the Nordic countries, the UK and the US. However, since 2020 Albania has <a href="https://www.monitor.al/alarmi-i-emigracionit-lufta-e-heshtur-e-shqiperise/">experienced</a> a new <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92092-0_3">wave of migration</a>. What makes this more challenging to explain is that there is no <a href="https://www.monitor.al/alarmi-i-emigracionit-lufta-e-heshtur-e-shqiperise/">reliable data</a> on the number of citizens who have moved away.</p>
<p>One significant reason is the <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/eroded-democracy-western-balkans-ocindex/">COVID-19 pandemic</a>, which had a massive effect on people’s welfare, employment and savings. The government offered very little support for people who <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/albania-second-worst-regionally-for-covid-and-inflation-support/">were struggling</a>, and the <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/previous/Global_POVEQ_ALB.pdf">World Bank</a> estimated that during the pandemic, about 22% of Albania’s population were below the <a href="https://ndiqparate.al/?p=17298&lang=en">poverty line</a>. Local media <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKwl6sOfDiw">suggest it will</a> soon be more than 30% as the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/publication/western-balkans-regular-economic-report">World Bank</a> predicts rising costs and inflation, particularly with respect to food which represents the largest form of expenditure for most Albanians.</p>
<p>Cities, towns and villages are experiencing a constant exodus, and there are now “<a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/271859/0/Ghost+villages.pdf/14bca444-e0a4-918a-7f19-f46dae67622a?version=1.0&t=1610362974805">ghost towns</a>” across the country. <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/19/uk-drug-gangs-recruit-in-albanias-remote-north/">Kukësi</a> in the north of Albania has seen more than 53% of its citizens leave. The cities of Shkodra, Fieri, Durrësi and Vlorë have each lost more than 15% of their <a href="https://www.monitor.al/anketa-ne-dekaden-e-fundit-kane-emigruar-360-mije-persona-largohen-nga-vendi-gati-7-e-familjeve-rekord-tirana/">population</a> in the past ten years. Several villages have seen massive numbers leave, from Narta in the south of the country to Zogaj in the north. </p>
<p>Many of these places used to be bustling industrial towns with economies based on fishing or mining. But following the collapse of communism, a lack of government investment to invest in alternative industries has left many people without jobs and pushed the <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/14/the-clock-ticks-for-albanias-demographic-dividend/">younger generation to emigrate</a>.</p>
<p>The most common method of migration is for <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0927537112000954">men to leave first</a>. Later, when they have extra money and can provide housing, they bring their partners and children out to join them.</p>
<p>Albania has yet to assess all causes of the recent wave of migration. According to newly published information from the European Commission’s department for statistics, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Enlargement_countries_-_statistics_on_migration,_residence_permits,_citizenship_and_asylum&oldid=485831">Eurostat</a>, and Albania’s own institute of statistics, between <a href="https://albaniandailynews.com/news/700-000-albanians-received-eu-residence-permit-in-last-decade">2008 and 2020, around 700,000 Albanians migrated</a> to EU countries and now hold citizenship in an EU nation. The number who migrated elsewhere, or do not have citizenship, is not as clear.</p>
<h2>Financial implications</h2>
<p><a href="https://remittancesreview.com/article/v6i1.965/68909/">Remittances</a> (sending money home) from those who moved abroad have accounted for at least 31% of Albania’s <a href="https://www.worldeconomics.com/National-Statistics/Informal-Economy/Albania.aspx#:%7E:text=An%20informal%20economy%20(informal%20sector,billion%20at%20GDP%20PPP%20levels.%22%22)%20in%20some%20years,%20and%20help%20around%20a%20%5Bquarter%20of%20Albanians%5D(https://www.bankofalbania.org/rc/doc/Remitancat_Revista_eng_12103.pdf)%20with%20their%20bills.%20Remittances%20can%20help%20fund%20food,%20clothing,%20healthcare,%20medicine%20and%20unemployment%20benefits%20for%20those%20back%20home.%20This%20year,%20remittances%20to%20Albania%20amounted%20to%20%E2%82%AC184.12%20million%20(%C2%A3161%20million)%20in%20the%20first%20quarter%20of%202022,%20%5Band%20%E2%82%AC192.03%20million%20(%C2%A3168%20million)%5D(https://tradingeconomics.com/albania/remittances">GDP</a> in the second quarter.</p>
<p>Mass migration has a significant upside for the Albanian economy. For political leaders this is a win-win situation as there is no accountability, since the <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/02/25/albania-breaks-pledge-to-ensure-diaspora-can-vote-in-election/">diaspora cannot vote</a> and there are fewer people to persuade during elections.</p>
<p>According to a recent Balkan Barometer survey by the <a href="https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/home">Regional Cooperation Council</a>, around <a href="https://exit.al/en/2020/06/27/49-of-albanians-are-actively-planning-to-leave-the-country/">83% of Albanians want to leave and nearly 50%</a> are looking into or applying for jobs abroad. The main justification given by citizens is that life in Albania is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19448953.2011.593335?journalCode=cjsb20">unaffordable</a>.</p>
<p>The average monthly wage in Albania, according to the Institute of Statistics, is between <a href="https://albaniandailynews.com/news/albania-s-average-salary-increased-in-last-4-months">56,000 and 60,666 Albanian lek (ALL)</a> (£425-£460). But some studies suggest it is less than <a href="https://worldsalaries.com/average-salary-in-albania/">ALL30,000 (£221)</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, the cost of living is quite high. The average Albanian spends roughly <a href="https://exit.al/en/2022/03/22/albanians-spend-almost-half-their-income-on-food-and-drink/">42% of their income on food</a>, 20% of their daily income on diesel or fuel and the rest on electricity, water and clothing. The country is ranked 17th in the world for fuel prices and has one of the highest <a href="https://albaniandailynews.com/news/albania-has-most-expensive-fuel-in-europe">oil costs in Europe</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/10052.pdf">Property rights</a> in Albania are extremely precarious. After the collapse of communism, the state gave most of the country’s land to the citizens for their use but does not fully <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)049-e">recognise their ownership</a>. Through legal loopholes or political connections, the state can take the land back or destroy any investment in the land without much notice, which has caused numerous <a href="https://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/03/feature-an-albanian-womans-struggle-to-claim-her-property-rights">social and economic issues</a> in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26396565#metadata_info_tab_contents">post-communist</a> era.</p>
<p>This leads to people having to pay bribes to keep their property and has also allowed <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/organised-crime-threat-assessment-for-albania/">organised crime</a>, corruption and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/22/albanian-loans-sharks-profit-from-banks-stringent-conditions/">loan sharking </a> to flourish. Many European companies say they will not invest in Albania because of the legal ambiguity surrounding the <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-10/AL%20IPA%202020%20EU%20For%20Property%20Rights.pdf">status of the land</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A digger tackling rubble caused by an earthquake." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494846/original/file-20221111-12-a06vkm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An earthquake in 2019 left thousands of Albanians homeless.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ajdin Kamber/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-Anti-Corruption-Report-A-Reflexive-Governance-Approach/Hoxhaj/p/book/9781032087627">Corruption</a> is widespread in Albania and has made several official institutions dysfunctional. <a href="http://dspace.epoka.edu.al/bitstream/handle/1/1671/M.Sc%20in%20BUS-Esmir%20Demaj.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Nepotism</a> is common, and most public employment is based on <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/16/albania-prosecutors-investigate-over-socialist-party-big-brother/">patronage</a> rather than competence. Major political roles are often linked to <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2015/12/18/albania-adopts-decriminalization-of-politics-law-12-18-2015/">corruption or nepotism</a>.</p>
<p>The EU has said Albania must tackle <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-020-00148-w">corruption</a> before becoming a member. But most political parties lack the political will to reduce corruption and strengthen the <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejcl/8/4/article-p271_271.xml">rule of law</a>, according to the <a href="https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/NewsItem.aspx?nid=16103">European Court of Auditors</a>.</p>
<p>Another factor that may have provoked migration is the devastation caused by a major <a href="https://undp.medium.com/european-union-helps-albania-rebuild-after-devastating-earthquake-f8e3d49e3a5f">earthquake</a> <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10518-021-01062-8">in November 2019</a>. It left more than 12,200 people without a home. Hundreds of people were injured and killed across five different municipalities. Overall, the earthquake affected about 10% of the population and many are still homeless.</p>
<h2>EU optimism</h2>
<p>Before 2020, many <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/albanians-trust-in-eu-took-hit-in-2021/">Albanians were optimistic</a> that joining the EU would lead to better living conditions, as it did in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221030-croatia-prepares-for-euro-switch-amid-soaring-inflation">Croatia</a>, where the average monthly pay is now about €2,000 (£1,750).</p>
<p>However, the EU has dragged out the accession process with Albania for decades. It only began negotiations in the summer of <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/19/intergovernmental-conference-at-ministerial-level-on-the-accession-of-albania/">2022</a> after it became clear that having Albania closer to the EU was in its geopolitical interest, following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-influence-in-the-balkans-is-growing-just-as-the-regions-fragile-peace-is-threatened-185345">war in Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why-192472">Putin’s strong influence in the Balkans</a>.</p>
<p>All of this may have improved Albania’s position as a reliable ally for the EU and Nato, but as yet there has been no improvement in the country’s economy. More EU support could transform Albania into a healthier <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/nations-transit/2022">liberal democracy</a>, rather than a country with many ghost towns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194003/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Levels of poverty shot up in Albania during COVID when there was little governmental support.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924722022-11-07T10:07:56Z2022-11-07T10:07:56ZUkraine war: Serbia is shifting closer to Russia – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493485/original/file-20221104-21-em1yo3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladmir Putin is very popular in Serbia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sasa Dzambic Photography</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-20/serbia-s-friendship-with-russia-gets-awkward-as-putin-escalates-war-in-ukraine">Putin is the world leader</a> that Serbs admire the most and 95% of Serbs see Russia as a true ally, compared to only 11% who see the EU that way, despite the <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/49.3/LEIE2022015">EU being Serbia’s major financial supporter</a>, according to a recent poll. </p>
<p>And 68% of Serbs said in the same poll that they believed Nato, not Vladimir Putin, had started the war in Ukraine, with 82% against the sanctions imposed on Russia. </p>
<p>While much of Europe is backing Ukraine in the current war, Serbia is taking a very different position. In Serbia, the government and the public both display high levels of support for Putin and Russia.</p>
<p>For example, Serbia has not <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/30/the-war-is-forcing-russias-balkan-friends-to-recalibrate">imposed sanctions on Russia</a> or distanced itself from <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/07/06/eu-parliament-calls-for-serbia-to-change-its-stance-on-russia">Putin</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, Serbia has signed an agreement with Russia to “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/serbia-ap-russia-new-york-aleksandar-vucic-b2174618.html">consult</a>” each other on foreign policy issues. Putin and the Serb president Aleksandar Vučić also have signed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-says-agreed-3-year-gas-supply-contract-with-putin-2022-05-29/">new gas agreement</a>, and the state-controlled Air Serbia airline has doubled its flights from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/mar/11/wealthy-russians-using-air-serbia-loophole-to-avoid-eu-flights-ban">Belgrade to Moscow</a>. </p>
<p>All this runs counter to the EU’s foreign policy decision to sever some of its ties with Putin over Ukraine. Serbia, as an <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejcl/8/4/article-p271_271.xml">EU candidate state</a>, is expected to do the same. </p>
<p>After Putin invaded Ukraine, he had strong support in Serbia, where <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-russia-serbs-march-belgrade-country-treads-ever-finer-line-between-east-west-2022-03-04/">multiple rallies</a> were held in his honour. Graffiti on walls in Belgrade, Serbia’s capital, also included the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/z-makes-ukrainians-feel-unsafe-in-serbia-ambassador-says/">“Z” symbol</a>, which has come to represent public <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/07/why-has-the-letter-z-become-the-symbol-of-war-for-russia">support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Since the war in Ukraine began, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-russia-ukraine-graffiti-war/31955728.html">a mural depicting Putin</a> with the flags of Russia and Serbia and the word “<a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/10/06/the-war-in-ukraine-has-awakened-memories-in-the-balkans">brother</a>” were seen in Belgrade. Billboards featuring a picture of Putin and the words “<a href="https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/birthday-message-to-putin-on-belgrade-billboards/">happy birthday to President Putin from Serb brothers</a>” with the letter Z printed much larger than the others were put up to mark Putin’s 70th birthday.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-recap-russias-modern-siege-tactics-fail-to-break-the-peoples-will-to-resist-193898">Ukraine recap: Russia's 'modern siege tactics' fail to break the people's will to resist</a>
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<p>Serbia and Russia have a long <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220309-brothers-forever-many-in-serbia-back-russia-amid-global-outcry">history of close ties</a> due to their shared Slavic and Orthodox heritage. The Serbian language is also closely connected to Russian. </p>
<p>Since sanctions on Russia were put in place following Putin’s attack on Ukraine, Serbia has emerged as the top location for Russian <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/nearly-300-russian-owned-firms-registered-in-serbia-since-ukraine-invasion/">businesses</a> and highly qualified individuals, particularly in the tech industry, to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-race-to-lure-russian-talent-and-capital-serbia-emerges-as-front-runner-11666793707">relocate</a> to in order to escape sanctions.</p>
<p>The most recent political alliance between <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/06/russia-s-game-in-balkans-pub-78235">Serbia and Russia</a> is founded on a deep sense of resentment toward Nato for its role in the establishment of new republics that were a part of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, namely <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/03/serbia-kosovo-russia-eu-tensions/">Kosovo</a> and <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-Valur-RussKosovo.pdf">Ukraine</a>. Putin and Vučić argue that Serbia and Russia have been wrongly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-serbia-russia.html">portrayed as aggressors</a> when they are only trying to protect their ethnic brothers.</p>
<p>The main driving force behind the recent increase in support for Putin is Serbia’s hopes that a Putin victory in Ukraine will somehow enable them to regain control of parts of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-04/could-kosovo-and-serbia-get-into-a-mini-version-of-the-ukraine-war">Kosovo</a> and other parts of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-herzegovina-dodik-secession-ukraine/31886186.html">Balkans</a>. Recently, Vučić has gone so far as to suggest that <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-warns-nato-over-safety-of-kosovo-serbs/a-62882004">Serbia</a> might interfere in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/37d30041-99d2-4228-a134-b0776da77a2a">Kosovo</a> to defend its Serbian minority.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Coloured map of the Balkans." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>His threats were made in part as a result of pressure that Putin applied on Vučić to threaten an armed incursion into Kosovo and to destabilise the Balkans and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/01/western-balkans-kosovo-ukraine/">draw attention away</a> from Russia’s war in Ukraine. But neither Putin’s actual influence in the Balkans nor Serbia’s facilitation of Russia’s geopolitical goals in the region are being taken seriously by the <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/08/25/latest-kosovo-serbia-tensions-reveal-eu-s-diplomatic-limits-pub-87755">EU</a>.</p>
<p>Since Vučić came to power ten years ago, Serbia has maintained a facade of <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/bound-to-russia-serbias-disruptive-neutrality/">neutrality between Russia and the EU</a>. He has done a good job of playing the two sides against one another to increase Serbia’s bargaining power on issues like energy, security, EU membership, and prolong the recognition of <a href="https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Kosovos-EU-candidate-status-a-goal-within-reach%7E20a56c">Kosovo by five EU member states</a>. Meanwhile, Serbia’s adherence to EU foreign policy has significantly decreased from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2022_en">64% in 2020 to 45% in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>This strategy has been successful for the interests of Serbia, which is the primary recipient of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/eu-representative-serbia-may-receive-10-times-more-money-after-joining-eu/">EU funding in the Balkans</a> and is considered a <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/01/19/is-serbia-still-on-course-to-join-the-european-union">frontrunner</a> to join the EU by <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-france-germany-kosovo-eu-entry/32071236.html">2025</a>.</p>
<p>The main source of Putin’s influence in the Balkans is Serbia, and as part of cementing that Vučić has welcomed a Russian military installation <a href="https://lseideas.medium.com/from-russia-with-love-serbias-lukewarm-reception-of-russian-aid-and-its-geopolitical-implications-a911b3ec09a7">into Serbia</a>. According to Nato, the facility acts as a hub for Russian <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-outpost/3902402.html">espionage operations</a>. </p>
<p>Putin uses the Balkans, particularly Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a bargaining chip in his dealings with Nato and the EU. He has even sought to use <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/03/putin-ukraine-russia-nato-kosovo/">Nato intervention in former Yugoslavia</a> in 1990s to support his attack on Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Putin backs Balkan politicians</h2>
<p>Putin has also been effective in endorsing or backing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-62897570">political candidates and parties</a> that can enhance its reputation and weaken the influence of Nato and the EU across the Balkans. The conservative <a href="https://euronews.al/en/albania/2022/09/14/lulzim-basha-reacts-to-claims-that-russia-secretly-funded-dp-back-in-2017/">Democratic party of Albania</a> received close to US$500,000 (£443,000) during the 2017 parliamentary elections, according to a recent declassified <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/13/russia-foreign-election-interference-state-department">US intelligence report</a>. Some lawmakers in Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina also received funding from Russia.</p>
<p>The rest of Europe has not fully recognised Russia’s influence in the Balkans and Serbia’s role in advancing Putin’s geopolitical objectives. Some members of the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/09/25/Serbia-s-foreign-minister-defends-deal-with-Russia">European Parliament have suggested</a> that the EU needs to reevaluate Serbia’s membership. </p>
<p>The EU states, in particular Germany and France, are still divided over Putin’s considerable influence in the Balkans, and have only expressed their “<a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/accelerated-candidacy-ukraine-s-possible-eu-accession-not-universally-welcome-a-b7504043-0cb7-4d38-b7f5-a963fb195429">disappointment</a>” with Vučić’s decisions.</p>
<p>Putin’s influence in the Balkans shouldn’t be ignored and since Serbia has made it obvious that it wants to deepen its ties with Russia, the EU shouldn’t be duped by the facade of neutrality that Vučić’s has skilfully maintained over the years. </p>
<p>If the EU cautions Serbia that a EU candidate state’s relations with Russia cannot be “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87959">business as usual</a>” then it may have to rethink its pro-Russia policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>European leaders have failed to notice how much support Serbia is providing to Russia, an expert says.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883982022-09-07T18:09:15Z2022-09-07T18:09:15ZWar in Ukraine: has the time for EU enlargement arrived?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483042/original/file-20220906-20-s21moc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C1%2C1024%2C616&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, eastern France.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ludovic Marin/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has upended the European order as we know it, and that was even before the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/02/energy/nord-stream-1-pipeline-turned-off/index.html">cut off</a>. While the bloc gets down to grappling with the unfolding energy crisis, the question of consolidating its flanks by speeding up the enlargement process has also come back into focus.</p>
<h2>A crowded waiting room</h2>
<p>In a critical meeting on <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/23/european-council-conclusions-on-ukraine-the-membership-applications-of-ukraine-the-republic-of-moldova-and-georgia-western-balkans-and-external-relations-23-june-2022">23-24 June</a>, the European Сouncil granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and recognised the “European perspective” of Georgia – a nod acknowledging the country’s future belonged within the European Union.</p>
<p>Less than a month later, Brussels brought to an end the respectively 8- and 17-year-long waits for Albania and North Macedonia by allowing them into the foray of accession negotiations.</p>
<p>This leaves us with two groups of countries aspiring to join the union: on the one hand, the six Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) who began their journey in 2003 at the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_03_860">EU summit held in Thessaloniki, Greece</a>, and now find themselves at different accession stages. On the other, the three countries Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which submitted applications to join the bloc following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine earlier this year.</p>
<h2>Laborious accession criteria</h2>
<p>Such an unruly patchwork makes clear the need for a quicker and more effective accession process. Indeed, countries currently aspiring to join the bloc must prove they are able to meet the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/accession-criteria-copenhagen-criteria.html">Copenhagen criteria</a> established by the EU Council in 1993 in Denmark’s capital. These include the provision of sound democratic institutions, a respect for the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities. Would-be EU member states must also show they are equipped with a functioning market economy and the institutional and administrative capacity to implement the set of EU legislation and rules imposed on member states, or <em>acquis</em>.</p>
<p>Once these conditions are met, every one of the 27 member states of the European Council must vote the accession of new members, according to a <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/unanimity.html">unanimity vote system</a>.</p>
<p>So, might the war finally bring the EU round to enlarging, if not reforming its accession criteria?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men speak at the EU parliament" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483257/original/file-20220907-938-8bouab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Bulgaria’s prime minister Kiril Petkov (L) speaks with Germany’s chancellor Olaf Scholz (C) and Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban (R) during the EU-Western Balkans leaders’ meeting in Brussels on June 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ludovic Marin/AFP</span></span>
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<h2>Scholz’s diplomatic blitz</h2>
<p>There are signs some want to break the deadlock. Take German chancellor Olaf Scholz, who has spent a good part of the summer lobbying for an acceleration of the accession negotiations for the Western Balkans. On 10-11 June he conducted a whistle-stop tour in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria during which he reiterated the region’s strategic importance for Germany and reprimanded Bulgaria for blocking North Macedonia’s access over language and historical disagreements. On 29 August, Scholz again urged the union to expand at a lecture in Prague: The “centre of Europe is moving eastward,” he said.</p>
<p>Greece has joined the ranks. Writing in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/balkans-europe-enlargement-track/">Politico Europe on 10 June</a>, prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, stressed the “existential importance of integrating this region in the European family” by 2033 – “an ambitious but achievable timeline”. Fulfilling this promise would spare aspiring countries from disillusionment, but also a “vacuum for hostile actors” such as Russia or China from developing.</p>
<p>When it comes to an enhanced enlargement process, EU member states such as Austria, Italy, Poland and Slovenia have consistently expressed their support for welcoming the Western Balkans.</p>
<h2>Unanimity vs. majority vote</h2>
<p>Many agree it is high time to streamline the accession procedure, notably by reforming the bloc’s unanimity voting system. In Prague, Scholz stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Where unanimity is required today, the risk of an individual country using its veto and preventing all the others from forging ahead increases with each additional member state.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The chancellor went on to announce he had “proposed a gradual transition to majority voting in common foreign policy, but also in other areas, such as tax policy – knowing full well that this would also have repercussions for Germany”.</p>
<p>In this regard, Scholz confirms its alignment with France, which has repeatedly criticised unanimity.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 80,000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues</em>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/fr/newsletters/la-newsletter-quotidienne-5?utm_source=inline-70ksignup">Sign up now</a>]</p>
<p>This is sensible. The excesses of certain states’ bargaining power were largely demonstrated by the case of North Macedonia, which was vetoed twice: first by Greece in 2018 on the grounds of the country’s name, and then by Bulgaria since 2020 over language issues and the country’s Bulgarian ethnic minority rights. At a time of rising populism, majority voting would also prevent outsized egos of throwing spanners into the EU works.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483035/original/file-20220906-14-yhthhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lawmakers in the Parliament building, in Skopje, North Macedonia, wave Macedonian and EU flags on 16 July after voting the EU accession Negotiation Framework proposed by the French presidency.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Robert Atanasovski/AFP</span></span>
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<p>Any talk of reform is bound to require heavy lifting before it can materialise, with <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/11/explained-why-eu-countries-are-at-odds-over-treaty-changes">many opposed</a> to treaty changes. Hungary, which has been lobbying for an inclusion of the Western Balkans into the EU for years, is one of them. At a council meeting in 2020, foreign minister Péter Szijjártó <a href="https://hungarytoday.hu/olaf-scholz-and-viktor-orban-agree-on-eu-enlargement/">described</a> the “proposal that the EU should no longer give unanimous consent to its foreign policy decisions” as “dangerous and completely contrary to EU treaties”.</p>
<h2>A promising compromise? Macron’s two-tier Europe</h2>
<p>Awaiting substantial treaty changes, which would take years of negotiations, one solution could be to adopt a differentiated integration along the lines proposed by French president Emmanuel Macron. Speaking at a <a href="https://theconversation.com/debate-what-european-political-community-do-we-need-now-183380">conference on the future of Europe</a> on 9 May in Strasbourg, he articulated the concept of a European forum that would be separate from the European Union, a “European political community”. Inspired by François Mitterrand’s (1981-1995) initial idea of a European confederation, the community would offer European neighbours a “new space for cooperation on politics, security, energy, transport, infrastructure investments and the movement of people, especially the young”.</p>
<p>The idea needs refining, however, with the questions of who could join the community, the scope of collaboration, and decision-making procedure still up for debate. It is also unclear whether the forum would serve as an alternative to actual enlargement or as an antechamber for it.</p>
<p>But regardless of the form of EU enlargement, it is clear Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has brought together members states around it like never before in the last two decades. Reservations over the majority vote, which in the end come down to hesitations over trade-offs between EU unity and national sovereignty, will require significant leadership in order to be overcome. Rather than fear and confrontation, member states must now look to their sense of community and responsibility for the EU to act like the global player ought to be – with urgency and unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188398/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Valon MURTEZAJ served as Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Kosovo (2016-2017).
He was awarded the Officer of National Order of Merit by President of French Republic.</span></em></p>The war in Ukraine has added new momentum to the argument of expanding the EU eastward. However, institutional and political obstacles to making this dream reality abound.Valon Murtezaj, Professor of international negotiation and diplomacy, IÉSEG School of ManagementLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1874912022-07-21T17:47:42Z2022-07-21T17:47:42ZUkraine Recap: Putin goes in search of friends while his ministers threaten his enemies<p>It’s childish, I realise, but I experienced a frisson of amused pleasure on watching the video of Vladimir Putin pacing up and down for nearly a minute while waiting for the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to show up for their photo opportunity when the two leaders were visiting Tehran this week.</p>
<p>The Russian president was in the Iranian capital to pursue closer relations between the two countries – the visit followed hot on the heels of news that Iran plans to supply hundreds of armed drones to bolster Russia’s depleted war machine – and he took the opportunity to also discuss the situation in Syria.</p>
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<p>But, as Scott Lucas – an international security expert based at the University of Birmingham – writes here, the meeting felt like a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-and-irans-growing-friendship-shows-their-weakness-not-their-strength-187404">pact of the isolated</a>”. Both Iran and Russia are labouring under punitive economic sanctions imposed by the international community, and it was a meeting more concerned with the optics of a new “anti-west axis” than an actual alliance. Lucas believes it’s a convergence driven not by strength but by weakness.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-and-irans-growing-friendship-shows-their-weakness-not-their-strength-187404">Russia and Iran's growing friendship shows their weakness not their strength</a>
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<p>One region where Russian influence is on the rise is the Balkans, where separatist Serbian leaders are showing support for Putin’s war in Ukraine as well as talking up plans to establish a new army dedicated to splitting Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishing Republika Srpska as a Serbian state in its own right. This would almost certainly lead to a new outbreak of conflict in this deeply troubled region.</p>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
<em>The Conversation, a not-for-profit newsgroup, works with a wide range of academics across its global network to produce evidence-based analysis. Get these recaps in your inbox every Thursday. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapTop">Subscribe here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Andi Hoxhaj, a fellow in European Union law at the University of Warwick, believes that the EU is <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-influence-in-the-balkans-is-growing-just-as-the-regions-fragile-peace-is-threatened-185345">not helping matters</a> with its delays to extending membership to various countries in the region including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. This could drive some countries nervous about security issues to seek closer ties to Russia, he writes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-influence-in-the-balkans-is-growing-just-as-the-regions-fragile-peace-is-threatened-185345">Russia's influence in the Balkans is growing just as the region's fragile peace is threatened</a>
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<h2>Gas tap back on – for now</h2>
<p>One rare bit of good news surfaced yesterday with the announcement that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which had been down for ten days, had resumed pumping gas from Russia to western Europe via Germany. While the volume of gas now being pumped is far below the pipeline’s total capacity, it had been feared that Russia might decide to shut it down for the duration, leaving European countries scrambling to look for alternatives before winter hits in a few short months.</p>
<p>Western Europe is still scrambling to secure its energy supplies. But – <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-hope-for-the-best-prepare-for-the-worst-europe-sweats-over-the-future-of-russias-gas-supply-187390">writes Francesca Batzella</a>, who specialises in the politics of energy in Europe – their efforts to heat and light the long dark nights ahead will put pressure on the EU decarbonisation plans. Coal and nuclear power will come back on to the agenda rather moving strongly towards the development of renewables.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-hope-for-the-best-prepare-for-the-worst-europe-sweats-over-the-future-of-russias-gas-supply-187390">Ukraine war: hope for the best, prepare for the worst – Europe sweats over the future of Russia's gas supply</a>
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<h2>Battlefield: Crimea</h2>
<p>While Putin was on the road with the purpose of winning friends and influencing people, his ally – former president Dmitry Medvedev – was busily playing bad cop. Responding to the prospect of Ukraine using US-supplied HIMARS artillery to target military targets in the Crimea – which is where Russia’s Black Sea fleet is stationed. Medvedev promised “judgement day” if this were to occur – something he didn’t elaborate on, but which in his previous pronouncements has included the threat of a nuclear response.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1549907554045673473"}"></div></p>
<p>Stefan Wolff, professor of international security at the University of Birmingham and Tatyana Malyarenko, professor of international relations at the National University Odesa in Ukraine, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-moscow-could-go-nuclear-over-kyivs-threats-to-crimea-187188">spell out here</a> the dangers that a renewed focus on Crimea could quickly spin out of control.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-moscow-could-go-nuclear-over-kyivs-threats-to-crimea-187188">Ukraine war: why Moscow could go nuclear over Kyiv's 'threats' to Crimea</a>
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<h2>Crimes of war</h2>
<p>Amid the growing evidence that rape is being used as a tactic of war in Ukraine, representatives of 45 countries gathered recently in The Hague for the Ukraine Accountability Conference. As you would hope, the conference condemned the use of sexual violence in war. It also underlined the need for specialised support and treatment for survivors.</p>
<p>Valerie Oosterveld, professor of international law at Western University in Canada, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-ensure-justice-for-the-survivors-of-wartime-sexual-violence-in-ukraine-181690">outlines the challenges</a> facing those who are tasked with investigating allegations of sexual violence in Ukraine, not least that many of the crime scenes are still in conflict zones or occupied by Russian troops. But she believes a coordinated response acting on principles established by similar investigations in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in Sierra Leone and elsewhere will have the best chance of bringing justice to victims in this brutal conflict.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-ensure-justice-for-the-survivors-of-wartime-sexual-violence-in-ukraine-181690">How to ensure justice for the survivors of wartime sexual violence in Ukraine</a>
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<p>Another form of war crime outlined by US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, recently has been the systematic kidnapping of what is believed to be between 900,000 and 1.6 million Ukrainians who have been forcibly removed to Russia. This could include as many as 260,000 orphans or children separated form their parents during the fighting. </p>
<p>Alexander Hinton, professor of anthropology and specialist in the study of genocide at Rutgers University in Newark, says this is “<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-mass-kidnappings-of-ukrainians-are-a-page-out-of-a-wartime-playbook-and-evidence-of-genocide-187065">straight out of Russia’s playbook</a>” from other conflicts dating back more than 100 years. But this time, he writes, there is a far better chance that investigations by the Ukrainian authorities and the International Criminal Court could result in Russia being held to account.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-mass-kidnappings-of-ukrainians-are-a-page-out-of-a-wartime-playbook-and-evidence-of-genocide-187065">Russia’s mass kidnappings of Ukrainians are a page out of a wartime playbook – and evidence of genocide</a>
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<h2>Hearts and minds</h2>
<p>A fortnight ago I mentioned a story from our colleagues in Australia about a Russian propaganda movie depicting Ukrainians in the country’s east as bloodthirsty right-wing skinheads intent on brutalising ethnic Russians living in the region. This week the author of that story, film expert Greg Dolgopolov from the University of New South Wales in Sydney, has written about a Ukrainian movie, U311 Cherkasy, made in 2019. The minesweeper U311, <a href="https://theconversation.com/u311-cherkasy-the-little-minesweeper-of-a-ukrainian-film-that-gave-the-finger-to-the-russian-navy-186559">he writes</a>, “took on the might of the Russian navy and gave them the proverbial finger” when Crimea was annexed in 2014. </p>
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<p>As we know, giving the Russian navy the finger now resonates with the Ukrainian resistance after the defenders of Snake Island south of Crimea did the same thing to an invading Russian warship on the day the invasion began. The U311 held out against overwhelming odds for three weeks before defiantly singing national songs even as Russian special forces eventually overran the ship. Their resistance became a national touchstone for Ukrainians. Unsurprisingly it remains a box office hit in Ukraine to this day. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/u311-cherkasy-the-little-minesweeper-of-a-ukrainian-film-that-gave-the-finger-to-the-russian-navy-186559">U311 Cherkasy, the little minesweeper of a Ukrainian film that gave the finger to the Russian Navy</a>
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A digest of the week’s coverage of the war against Ukraine.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868982022-07-19T15:28:13Z2022-07-19T15:28:13ZWhy North Macedonia is the European Union’s latest self-inflicted wound<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474645/original/file-20220718-77396-tkzugi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3726%2C2367&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Levica party march on a government building during a protest in Skopje, North Macedonia, on July 6, 2022. Thousands of people marched for several nights after French President Emmanuel Macron announced a proposal to enable the country's admission into the EU that many North Macedonians find controversial.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Boris Grdanoski)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-north-macedonia-is-the-european-union-s-latest-self-inflicted-wound" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The European Union has faced multiple policy crises during the first half 2022. These crises range from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-tells-hungary-poland-step-up-their-democracy-game-2022-07-13/">internal matters</a> to the foreign policy quagmire that is <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1621705/european-union-members-russia-ukraine-latest-news-ont">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>The EU seeks to address these issues primarily through <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/05/24/the-russia-ukraine-war-must-be-the-impetus-for-a-new-eu-enlargement-and-neighbourhood-policy/">its continued expansion</a>. Unfortunately for the EU, one of the 19th century’s foreign policy complications is threatening to undo this work. It’s known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Macedonian-Question">Macedonian Question</a>.</p>
<p>The Macedonian Question — in essence, the debate over what constitutes Macedonian identity — was allegedly solved in 2019 with <a href="https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/news/local/ratification-of-prespes-agreement-terminated-an-unnecessary-conflict-anastasiades-says/">the Prespes Agreement</a> between North Macedonia and Greece that ended the ongoing dispute between the countries.</p>
<p>Greek politicians claimed for decades that their northern neighbour, by calling itself Macedonia, was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444327519.ch27">appropriating the legacy of Alexander the Great, which they consider part of their cultural heritage</a>. In exchange for North Macedonia adding the word “north” to its name, Greece ended its diplomatic blockade against the country. </p>
<p>North Macedonia’s path to EU membership seemed assured until an old irritant in the Macedonian Question re-emerged: Bulgaria.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Several blue and white flags frame a statue of Alexander the Great." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474687/original/file-20220718-76291-f2znn7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A statue of Alexander the Great is seen among Greek flags during a rally in northern Greece in 2018 to demand the Greek government take a tough stance with Macedonia over the latter country’s name.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Giannis Papanikos)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The role of Bulgaria</h2>
<p>Greece may have ended its political embargo of North Macedonia, but it’s not the only country involved in the Macedonian Question. Since Bulgaria became a country in 1878, it has regarded <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/10/06/bulgaria-tells-north-macedonia-to-stop-erasing-bulgarians/">ethnic Macedonians as Bulgarian</a>. Nevertheless, when what became <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Macedonia/Independence">North Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991</a>, relations between Macedonians and Bulgarians were, if not warm, at least functional.</p>
<p>The international community, in fact, frequently <a href="https://mk.usembassy.gov/bulgaria-macedonia-sign-treaty-friendship/">trumpeted Bulgaria’s approach to relations with North Macedonia</a> as an example of how differences between neighbours can be resolved peacefully.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, Bulgaria was only able to take such a stance due to Greece’s refusal to recognize a Macedonian identity. So long as Greece, a member of the European Union, opposed North Macedonia’s entry into the EU, Bulgaria could pursue normal relations with the country because EU membership requires unanimity among its members. Once Greece and North Macedonia resolved their issues, however, Bulgaria lost its Greek shield.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A bald man in a dark suit with a blue tie." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474653/original/file-20220718-76232-l5lav4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bulgarian President Rumen Radev arrives for the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manu Fernandez)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After the Prespes Agreement, Bulgaria <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/bulgaria-blocks-eu-membership-talks-with-north-macedonia/a-55641332">initially blocked</a> North Macedonia’s progress towards EU membership unless it conceded that <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/biden-macedonia-bulgaria-identity-putin-nationalism/">before 1944, its history was Bulgarian</a>. Bulgaria’s president, known <a href="https://www.txtreport.com/news/2022-05-13-the-two-faces-of-rumen-radev---politics.S1gIFbh8c.html">Russian sympathizer</a> Rumen Radev, is at the forefront of these demands.</p>
<p>The EU has magnified Bulgaria’s refusal to budge on the issue. The president of France, Emmanuel Macron, inserted himself into the debate by proposing a solution that would require North Macedonia to change its constitution to <a href="https://euronews.al/en/balkans/2022/06/24/bulgaria-gives-green-light-to-macron-proposal-for-solution-with-n-macedonia/">recognize a Bulgarian minority within the country</a>. </p>
<p>Macron’s suggestion, however, demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge regarding Macedonian affairs.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A grey-haired man in sunglasses holds up the Macedonian flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474637/original/file-20220718-77437-3iovre.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man holds the old national Macedonia flag during a protest in front of the parliament building in Skopje, North Macedonia, on July 16, 2022. North Macedonia parliament’s majority-backed French proposal raises the country’s hopes of eventually joining the European Union amid a dispute with Bulgaria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Boris Grdanoski)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rallying the Macedonian base</h2>
<p>Of the 120 seats in the Macedonian Assembly, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/north-macedonia-local-elections-offer-test-government-80889425">44 are held</a> by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and its allies. </p>
<p>VMRO-DPMNE has actively opposed prior agreements with Bulgaria, as well as the Prespes Agreement. It is unforeseeable that VMRO-DPMNE would accede to Macron’s proposal, and the party is using Bulgarian demands to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/thousands-protest-north-macedonia-readies-125046418.html">rally its base</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A man in glasses wearing a T-shirt marches in the street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474640/original/file-20220718-76959-a63wtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hristijan Mickoski, centre, the leader of North Macedonia’s biggest opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, is surrounded by supporters during a protest in Skopje, North Macedonia, on July 6, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Boris Grdanoski)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Macedonian nationalists form the basis of the resistance to the French proposal, they are not alone. North Macedonia has made substantial efforts to be accepted by the international community, reaching deals — including the Prespes Agreement — that other countries would probably not tolerate due to sovereignty concerns.</p>
<p><a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/11/anger-over-french-proposal-fails-to-shake-north-macedonias-ethnic-peace/">Frustration on the part of North Macedonians of all political stripes is reaching a boiling point</a>. Unless the issue is resolved soon, the EU faces the real possibility of losing a potential member. In that case, it’s possible North Macedonia will turn to Russia.</p>
<p>This development could not occur at a worse time for the EU. The EU has sought to present a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220209-eu-leaders-present-united-front-after-talks-on-ukraine-crisis">united front</a> in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Not only are EU leaders pressing for harmony among their fellow states — a challenging proposition in the best of times — but efforts are underway to accelerate the ascension of Europe’s non-EU states <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-russia-eu-brussels-1718397">to the organization</a>. Such moves, EU leaders hope, will help deter future Russian aggression.</p>
<h2>Serbia serving as an example</h2>
<p>Neighbouring Serbia demonstrates the potential problems of delaying EU ascension, and how Macron’s proposal could work against the organization’s interests.</p>
<p>Serbia, when it emerged from the rule of Slobodan Milosević and the disastrous wars of the 1990s, sought <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/13/world/europe/serbia-moves-a-step-closer-to-the-european-union.html">to join the EU</a> as a means of economic recovery and a way forward. The process, however, has not been smooth, with constant delays on the part of the EU.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A woman with short dark hair speaks into a microphone. The word Serbia is seen in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474655/original/file-20220718-4540-b3l0d1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic speaks during a news conference after talks with her counterpart from Montenegro in Belgrade, Serbia, in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Darko Vojinovic)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Serbian politicians, rightfully or wrongly, have viewed the EU as deliberately delaying their ascension. Now, as the EU seeks to unify the continent against Russia, Serbia is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/01/europe/serbia-russian-gas-eu-analysis-intl-cmd/index.html">actively opposed</a> to its efforts. Relations between Serbia and Russia, in fact, have improved since the start of the war. </p>
<p>Russia will likely leverage Serbian discontent against the EU. In Serbia, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-russia-serbs-march-belgrade-country-treads-ever-finer-line-between-east-west-2022-03-04/">large-scale protests in favour of Russia</a> demonstrate both the support that Russia has in the country, as well as resentment within Serbia over the EU’s treatment of their country.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bosnia-herzegovina-could-be-the-next-site-of-russian-fuelled-conflict-180745">Bosnia-Herzegovina could be the next site of Russian-fuelled conflict</a>
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<p>There’s no guarantee North Macedonia will follow the same path as Serbia. The EU, however, is creating conditions that make such a development possible.</p>
<p>Self-inflicted wounds are not new to the EU — the history of the organization, in fact, <a href="https://www.guelphmercury.com/news-story/6076406-self-inflicted-wounds-dog-eu-moves-to-manage-migrant-crisis/">is rife with them</a>. But this wound in the midst of the Russia-Ukraine war only serves to benefit Russia in its efforts to undermine the EU.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The EU is creating resentment in North Macedonia over its feud with Bulgaria. In the midst of the Russia-Ukraine war, it will only serve to benefit Russia in its efforts to undermine the EU.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1571592021-05-10T16:58:39Z2021-05-10T16:58:39ZSmall countries and Covid-19 vaccination: the example of Serbia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399184/original/file-20210506-14-1vbhxlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C2%2C1500%2C994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In Belgrade, Serbia, residents and visitors queue to be vaccinated against the Covid-19 virus (March 28, 2021). </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Oliver Bunic/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the development of a wide range of Covid-19 vaccines, countries large and small have been accelerating their vaccination efforts. <a href="https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/166398/mass-vaccination-in-serbia-starts-today.php">Serbia launched its campaign</a> on January 19, and has since positioned itself as the <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations">eighth globally and third in Europe</a> for the share of population that has received at least one dose, reaching nearly one third of its citizens. The country also has the highest fully vaccinated population share in Europe, 20%.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397920/original/file-20210429-14-1mvt5n6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Serbia positions itself among the leading countries for the fully vaccinated share of the total population.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Our WorldinData</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As with other countries, fluctuating infection numbers continue to shadow Serbia’s efforts. At the start of the immunisation process, the average daily number of new Covid-19 cases was 1,500. It rose to <a href="https://covid19.rs/">more than 5,000</a> in March and has since dropped to average of 2,500 in April. Some of the responsibility goes to the country’s desire to open up its economy. While most of its European neighbours were in lock-down this winter, Serbian ski resorts received record numbers of visitors. Even as late as March 22, restaurants and coffee shops <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/13/are-rising-cases-in-vaccination-leading-serbia-a-warning-to-the-uk">continued to welcome the public</a> without restrictions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392057/original/file-20210327-13-1k4lxqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cable car crowds at the Kopaonik ski resort, which received unprecedented number of guests this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Goran Vesic/official Facebook page</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Serbia’s Covid-19 infection rate continues to be worrisome, the country has shown the ability to vaccinate a higher proportion of its population than many other European nations. This article examines some of the factors in their success.</p>
<h2>Securing a diversified vaccine portfolio</h2>
<p>Key challenge for any country in this challenging moment is to secure sufficient quantity of vaccines. Rich nations such as UK or Canada have an upper hand in vaccine procurement, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-ways-to-vaccinate-the-world-and-make-sure-everyone-benefits-rich-and-poor-155943">November 2020 study</a> showed: “Just over half of the 7.48 billion ordered doses will go to the 14% of the world’s population who live in high-income countries”.</p>
<p>Serbia approach from the start was to pursue a highly diversified vaccine portfolio, relying on its global trade relations and diplomatic ties. The country has so far received vaccines from <a href="https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/kineska-vakcina-dominantna-u-srbiji/31163198.html">four different suppliers</a>: Pfizer-BioNTech (United States), Sinopharm (China), Sputnik V (Russia) and Oxford-AstraZeneca (United Kingdom). </p>
<p>Serbian foreign policy has traditionally been characterized by its balancing position between the West and the East. On one hand, Serbia is the EU member candidate and remains <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55931864">strategically committed to the EU accession</a>. In addition, the bloc is its leading investor and largest trading partner, and the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/why-serbia-embraced-chinas-covid-19-vaccine/">majority of the donations</a> in the Serbian health care over the past years originated from the EU.</p>
<p>However, with the rising number of coronavirus cases and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/left-out-by-eu-western-balkans-go-to-russia-china-for-vaccines">no clear timeline</a> on when vaccines from the COVAX system and EU procurement scheme would be available for the non-EU members, Serbia used its traditionally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/19/coronavirus-vaccine-diplomacy-west-falling-behind-russia-china-race-influence">warm relations with Moscow and Beijing</a> to secure vaccines.</p>
<p>This is how it became the first European nation to allow the use China’s Sinopharm vaccine – 1 million doses arrived at Belgrade airport on <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/why-serbia-embraced-chinas-covid-19-vaccine/">January 16</a>. Since then, the country was supplied with 2.5 million doses in total and a new order for additional 2 million <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/china-to-send-more-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-serbia/2157428">has been confirmed</a>.</p>
<p>Similar approach on a lower scale was evident with Russia’s vaccine. Serbia has so far received nearly <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/europe/serbia-receives-100000-doses-of-russian-vaccine.html">400,000 doses of Sputnik V</a>, with the latest contingent of 100,000 doses delivered on <a href="https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/169735/100000-more-doses-of-sputnik-v-vaccine-arrive.php">March 23rd</a>.</p>
<h2>Vaccine diplomacy – what risks?</h2>
<p>Needless to say, China and Russia aren’t neutral sources for vaccines. The two countries seized the opportunity to practice <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/2021/04/vaccine-diplomacy-soft-power-lessons-from-china-and-russia/">“vaccine diplomacy”</a> in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and even stirred things up among the EU members. Slovakian prime minister Igor Matovic and several members of his cabinet resigned in March due to the revelation of a <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/28/slovakia-s-prime-minister-to-step-down-amid-sputnik-v-vaccine-scandal">secret deal</a> to buy 2 million doses of Sputnik V vaccine, which is not yet authorized in the EU.</p>
<p>The growing Chinese and Russian influence in the Western Balkans during the pandemic has also initiated some <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/bring-western-balkans-back-on-the-agenda-urge-nine-eu-member-states/">calls to action from the EU</a>. Nine EU foreign ministers urged the union to <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/2021/04/vaccine-diplomacy-soft-power-lessons-from-china-and-russia/">“take a strategic look at the Western Balkans”</a>. In a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/letter-to-hrvp-borrell-on-western-balkans/">letter</a> addressed to Joseph Borrell, high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, they indicated that “the pandemic had exacerbated existing trends, with their geopolitical implications”. The ministers also suggested that “other actors are ready to step into regional affairs, often at our expense”.</p>
<h2>Produce your own vaccines</h2>
<p>One of the ways how low- and middle-income countries can secure sufficient doses is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-ways-to-vaccinate-the-world-and-make-sure-everyone-benefits-rich-and-poor-155943">produce their own Covid-19 vaccines</a>.</p>
<p>Serbia’s ambitious plans to produce both Chinese and Russian vaccines have recently been announced. By taking part in a joint Greenfield partnership with the UAE and China, Serbia will build a production site for China’s Sinopharm vaccine. The factory is expected to be operational from mid-October and roll out <a href="https://seenews.com/news/serbia-to-produce-24-mln-doses-of-chinas-sinopharm-vaccine-annually-deputy-pm-734789">24 million shots annually</a> to cater to the needs of the Serbian population, as well as regional countries.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the launch of the <a href="https://www.ekapija.com/en/news/3203937/popovic-serbia-to-produce-four-million-doses-of-sputnik-v-vaccine-in">local production of the Sputnik V</a> vaccine in Serbia by the Torlak Insitute is anticipated in June, with estimated production capacity of 4 million doses in the first phase. So far, there has been no official reaction from the EU on these announcements.</p>
<p>If these plans come to life, this will not only allow vaccine self-sufficiency for the country, but will also enable Serbia to exercise its own <a href="https://theconversation.com/vaccine-diplomacy-how-some-countries-are-using-covid-to-enhance-their-soft-power-155697">“vaccine diplomacy”</a>. The country has already donated vaccines to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-serbia-coronavirus-pandemic-northmacedonia-aleksandar-vucic-92093d27112edad3cc7e7faa427e11ad">North Macedonia</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-serbia-bosnia/serbia-donates-covid-19-vaccines-to-bosnias-bosniak-croat-federation-idUSL2N2L00ZU">Bosnia and Herzegovina</a>, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/serbia-secures-5000-vaccines-for-republika-srpska-postpones-donation-to-north-macedonia/">Republika Srpska</a> and <a href="https://seenews.com/news/montenegro-receives-2000-doses-of-sputnik-v-vaccine-from-serbia-731699">Montenegro</a>. However, as with Russian and China’s “vaccine diplomacy”, Serbian generosity in Covid-19 vaccines <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/01/serbias-vaccine-diplomacy-isnt-as-benign-as-it-looks/">may not be as benign as it seems</a> – that its real ambition is to extend its influence in the region.</p>
<h2>Ease of access</h2>
<p>To ensure mass roll-out of the vaccination campaign in Serbia, it was essential to <a href="https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/serbia/news/news/2021/3/serbias-covid-19-vaccination-campaign-off-to-a-strong-start">create simple and easy access to vaccines</a> and facilitate vaccine distribution.</p>
<p>Thanks to a <a href="https://euprava.gov.rs/usluge/6224">digital platform</a>, all stakeholders in the immunization circle – citizens, call-center and medical staff, warehouse and supply-chain workers – have access to the necessary information. Using the platform, Serbian as well as <a href="https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/170035/vaccination-of-foreign-citizens-to-start-tomorrow.php">foreign nationals</a> can express their interest in vaccination by filling out a <a href="https://imunizacija.euprava.gov.rs/#novaprijava">questionnaire</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/392058/original/file-20210327-13-14q6cg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Foreign nationals with or without residency in Serbia can get vaccinated, providing they book an appointment via Serbia’s portal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">BBC</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So far, Serbia is the only European country where people can <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/24/which-vaccine-should-i-choose-serbia-gives-citizens-choice-of-four-coronavirus-jabs">choose the vaccine</a> they wish to receive.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the form collects information on current medical condition (if any), and whether there are medical conditions that do not permit the person to leave their home. The input is then integrated in the system and made available to relevant stakeholders in the vaccination process, who consequently organize and manage different stages – from registration of the immunization, issuing vaccination certificates, vaccine procurement and distribution, management of the vaccination sites and staff, to reporting and monitoring. The vaccination appointments are <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/markminevich/2021/02/05/serbia-and-key-international-sovereigns-lead-with-data-and-ai-to-become-vaccination-champions/?sh=4e2d46c97a1f">scheduled automatically by an algorithm</a> several days in advance.</p>
<p>Another element is availability of sufficient number of vaccination sites. Since February, the vaccination is organized in <a href="https://b92.tv/video/vesti.php?yyyy=2021&mm=02&dd=05&nav_id=1806697">more than 400 sites</a> throughout the country. While the health care institutions are central to the process, event venues are also being used, allowing vaccination to progress relatively quickly. The government has also put in place <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/05/serbia-in-world-first-as-citizens-offered-25-to-have-covid-vaccine">financial incentives</a> for citizens to be vaccinated: those 16 or older who has received at least one dose or who will have their first shot by May 31 will receive an equivalent of 25 euros.</p>
<p>Given that Serbia is actively working to build significant vaccine production capacity and allows foreigners to be vaccinated, this has opened door for a new form of “medical tourism”. By the end of March, <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/if-you-want-to-get-a-vaccine-right-away-go-to-serbia/">more than 22,000 foreign nationals</a>, mostly from the region, visited Serbia in order to be vaccinated.</p>
<h2>In short…</h2>
<p>While Serbia has shown resourcefulness in procurement and management of the vaccination process, its efforts in keeping the pandemic under control are more debatable. Finding the right balance between health and economy has proven to be difficult even for developed and far richer nations, let alone a small middle-income country.</p>
<p>As with other nations, Serbia’s ambition is to vaccinate enough of its population to reach the elusive <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/herd-immunity-lockdowns-and-covid-19">“herd immunity”</a>. Until then, the main challenges are keeping up the momentum of the immunization while simultaneously managing the virus’ spread. Failure to do so risks undercutting the excellent head start it has in the vaccination race.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jovana Stanisljevic ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>While Serbia’s Covid-19 infection rate continues to be worrisome, the country has shown the ability to vaccinate a higher proportion of its population than EU nations.Jovana Stanisljevic, Professor in International Business, Department People, Organization, Society, Grenoble École de Management (GEM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572882021-03-26T12:26:12Z2021-03-26T12:26:12ZMontenegro was a success story in troubled Balkan region – now its democracy is in danger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391222/original/file-20210323-22-m8nlbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C2986%2C2038&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Celebrating Montenegrin independence on May 21, 2006. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/podgorica-serbia-and-montenegro-a-supporter-of-montenegrin-news-photo/71003303?adppopup=true">Diminar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tiny Montenegro has long been different from its neighbors in the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>After a decade of bloody civil wars that included <a href="https://theconversation.com/srebrenica-25-years-later-lessons-from-the-massacre-that-ended-the-bosnian-conflict-and-unmasked-a-genocide-141177">ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide</a>, Yugoslavia in the 1990s split violently along ethnic lines into six different independent republics. But Montenegro escaped the worst of the war and for years remained with Serbia – its dominant, Russian-allied neighbor – as part of the “<a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0504/04022.html">rump Yugoslavia</a>.” </p>
<p>In 2006, Montenegrins <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/22/balkans1">voted for independence</a> and separated from Serbia peacefully. Montenegro became a <a href="http://en.unesco.org/creativity/cdis/profiles/montenegro">stable and inclusive democracy</a>. It is a mountainous, postage-stamp sized country of 640,000 on the eastern Adriatic Sea. </p>
<p><iframe id="1hZ3s" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/1hZ3s/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Rather than maintain the Slavic ethnic identity of Serbia, Montenegro made room for all kinds of people. It was home to Montenegrins – who are Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic and atheist – yes, but also Bosniaks, Albanians, Roman-Catholic Croats and Serbs. <a href="https://eurojewcong.org/communities/montenegro/">Montenegro also has a Jewish community</a>.</p>
<p>Montenegro’s post-independence leaders in the socialist party worked to build a broad civil society that <a href="https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/viewFile/9561/9219">recognized the many identities of its citizens</a>. Many refugees from the Balkan wars sought <a href="https://borgenproject.org/10-facts-about-refugees-in-montenegro/">safety in Montenegro</a>. </p>
<p>Its political system favored neither majorities nor minorities, a value system inherited from Yugoslavia. In 2017, Montenegro joined NATO, the transatlantic security alliance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-an-alleged-coup-and-montenegros-bid-for-nato-membership-74795">against Russia’s wishes</a>. It <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/01/montenegro-wants-to-join-the-eu-but-will-brussels-have-it">wants to join the European Union</a>. </p>
<p>Montenegro’s Balkan success story – and its very national identity – is now in danger after a right-wing coalition aligned with <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-malign-influence-montenegro">Serbia and Russia</a> <a href="https://www.total-montenegro-news.com/politics/5837-djukanovic-s-dps-goes-to-opposition-branches-after-31-years">took power in December</a>. </p>
<h2>A language grows and struggles</h2>
<p>A fight over the Montenegrin language is symbolic of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-montenegro-government-idUKKBN26T2B7">broader political fight playing out in Montenegro</a>.</p>
<p>All the former Yugoslavian republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia – share a mutually intelligible language, previously called Serbo-Croatian. The differences among them are comparable to the varieties of English spoken by Americans, Australians, British and South Africans. </p>
<p>Since Yugoslavia broke up, each new Balkan nation has used language to <a href="http://hdl.handle.net/1808/10248">create a common political and cultural identity</a> for itself, establishing each language with its distinctive style and standardizing its usage. </p>
<p>As my <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=m6EZq4IAAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/language-and-identity-in-the-balkans-9780199208753">others’</a> show, some were more successful in that effort than others. Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are now well established as national languages, used in schools, the press, business and government. </p>
<p>Montenegrin, however, remains contested. </p>
<p>It is embraced by citizens who stand for an inclusive, multi-ethnic Montenegrin society. But those who view Montenegro as fundamentally an extension of the Serbian state consider Montenegrin merely a dialect of Serbian. According to a leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church, “<a href="https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crnogorski_jezik_amfilohije/2276351.html">Montenegrin does not exist</a>.” </p>
<p>Montenegro’s new coalition government seems to side with the Serbs on the language question. </p>
<p>In March the new minister of education, science, culture and sports, Vesna Bratić – <a href="https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/484387/bratic-vrijedjala-dezulovica-kontekstom-brani-stav-da-je-dezulovic-djubre-ustasko">who identifies as a Serbian nationalist</a> – threatened to close the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Literature in the old royal capital of Cetinje and has <a href="https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/odbor-o-fakultetu-za-crnogorski-jezik-i-knjizevnost">blocked its funding since January</a>. The institute has led efforts to standardize the Montenegrin language and foster scholarship about Montenegrin literature and culture. </p>
<p>In a young country still forging its national identity, erasing the Montenegrin language that has bound its people together is akin to eliminating the Montenegrin identity. </p>
<h2>A nation falls apart</h2>
<p>Multi-ethnic Montenegro has so far achieved stability through a balancing act that recalled how Yugoslavian premiere Josip Broz Tito <a href="https://europe.unc.edu/background-titos-yugoslavia">ran multi-ethnic Yugoslavia for much of the last century</a>. </p>
<p>Yugoslavia, founded in 1918, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/european-history-after-1450/short-history-yugoslav-peoples?format=PB">was dominated by Slavic-speaking Serbs</a>, Croats and Slovenes but was home to many Hungarians and Albanians, among other non-Slavic minorities. It was also divided religiously, between Roman Catholicism – the faith of Slovenians and Croatians – and the Eastern Orthodox Christianity of Serbians, Montenegrins and Macedonians.</p>
<p>After the Second World War, Marshal Tito and his Partisans – having driven out Nazi occupiers – led Yugoslavia under socialist rule. For four decades, Tito maintained order and quelled rivalry within Yugoslavia with an iron fist and by careful balancing of conflicting claims for cultural dominance. </p>
<p>From the Yugoslavian capital, Belgrade, Tito promoted <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-macedonia-to-america-civics-lessons-from-the-former-yugoslavia-143322">a one-party system and ideology</a> fostering “brotherhood and unity” among Yugoslavia’s many disparate traditions and communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black-and-white image of a very elderly Churchill sitting and laughing with a younger Tito" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Wartime leaders Tito, right, and Winston Churchill, in Split, Yugoslavia, in 1960.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/winston-churchill-et-le-maréchal-tito-lors-de-leur-entrevue-news-photo/953407732?adppopup=true">Keystone France/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That delicate balance broke down after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1980/05/05/archives/tito-dies-at-87-last-of-wartime-leaders-a-rotating-leadership-took.html">Tito’s death in 1980</a>. </p>
<p>Wars erupted in Yugoslavia along national, ethnic and religious lines. Serbian and Croatian paramilitaries seeking to carve out ethnically pure states carried out <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/yugo-hist4.htm">ethnic cleansing operations against their rivals in each others’ territories</a> and elsewhere. Bosnia and Herzegovina – fragmented among Catholics, Muslims and Eastern Orthodox – witnessed <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-court-upholds-srebrenica-massacre-verdicts-37003">the gravest atrocities</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People walk on a mountainous road, wearing backpacks and carrying language; there is snow on the ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugees from Kosovo cross the mountains on foot to reach Montenegro in 1999.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/refugees-from-pec-cross-the-mountains-on-foot-to-arrive-in-news-photo/540011190?adppopup=true">David Brauchli/Sygma via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>History repeats itself</h2>
<p>Montenegro now seems to be at risk of a similar unraveling with its long-ruling Democratic Party of Socialists out of power. While rhetorically supporting Montenegro’s NATO and EU membership, Montenegro’s new political leadership is ideologically aligned with Serbia and Russia.</p>
<p>Many Montenegrins are appalled by their young democracy’s unexpected <a href="https://youtu.be/29jwDywtTmc">twist of fate</a>. They fear Serbian cultural hegemony will negate their progress in nation-building and move Montenegro away from European values – <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-s-balkan-insecurities/">and toward Russia</a>. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin is watching the struggle over Montenegro’s future closely. Russia has traditional <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-montenegro-putin-idUKKBN1HI2CB">cultural and religious</a> ties to Montenegro, and having Montenegro in Putin’s “portfolio” would give <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/stop-giving-putin-a-free-pass-to-europes-backyard-opinion/ar-BB1eBcdS">Russia access to a Mediterranean port</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Putin and another man in a suit look at each other intensely, flanked by two other serious-looking men, against a gilded backdrop" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C37%2C5064%2C3327&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Montenegro’s ambassador to Russia meets Vladimir Putin in 2018. The two countries have longstanding ties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russias-foreign-minister-sergei-lavrov-and-russian-news-photo/944781460?adppopup=true">Alexei Druzhinin\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some Montenegrins even worry that violent ethnic conflict could begin again anew. For them, the Balkan wars are still a fresh memory. And they’ve seen several <a href="https://theconversation.com/europes-illiberal-states-why-hungary-and-poland-are-turning-away-from-constitutional-democracy-89622">democracies in Eastern Europe</a> – Poland and Hungary chief among them – come under autocratic rule. </p>
<p>The West learned the hard way 25 years ago that conflict in the former Balkans can end in tragedy. Will this history repeat itself in Montenegro?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc L. Greenberg has served as a volunteer expert international advisor to the Democratic Alliance of Montenegro, a political group.</span></em></p>Western leaders learned the hard way 25 years ago that conflict in the Balkans can become ethnic cleansing. Add Russia into the mix, and Montenegro’s new problems are US and European problems, too.Marc L. Greenberg, Professor of Slavic Languages & Literatures, University of KansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1557402021-02-23T00:46:02Z2021-02-23T00:46:02ZHow did NASA’s Martian rover come to land in a crater named after a tiny Balkan village?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385668/original/file-20210222-23-1w5mj8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C10%2C6947%2C5155&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world was excited by the news last week that NASA’s Perseverance rover had <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/18/world/mars-perseverance-rover-landing-scn-trnd/index.html">successfully landed</a> in a Martian crater. The rover will now set about collecting samples from what scientists say was an ancient lake fed by a river. The name of this exotic Martian crater is <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars2020/mission/science/landing-site/">Jezero</a>.</p>
<p>As a South Slavic linguist, I immediately recognised the word. In several former Yugoslav countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, “jezero” (pronounced “yeh-zeh-ro”, with the stress on the first syllable) means lake. Fair enough — but why a Balkan lake on Mars?</p>
<p>The task of providing names for places of interest on Mars falls to the International Astronomical Union (<a href="https://www.iau.org/">IAU</a>). They apparently named the Martian crater Jezero in 2007, well before earthlings had paid any attention.</p>
<p>I later discovered the name was not, in fact, intended simply as a generic “lake”, but refers to a specific village called Jezero. With a population around 500, it is located in western Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is very near a river-fed lake called Veliko Plivsko Jezero, or Great Plivsko Lake.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/irbigpycU8w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">First views of the Jezero crater from NASA’s Perseverance rover.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Famous on Mars</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/">Balkan Insight</a> news service, the mayor of Jezero first learned of NASA’s plans in a letter from the US ambassador in Bosnia and Herzegovina, informing her the village and its name were to be honoured by the spacecraft landing in the Jezero crater.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Lake in Bosnia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385673/original/file-20210222-23-19sbp1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Veliko Plivsko Lake.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The villagers apparently first <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/02/17/mars-landing-leaves-humble-bosnian-town-feeling-starstruck/">dismissed this as fake news</a>. But, to their later amazement, people all over the world have now been learning to pronounce Jezero properly.</p>
<p>The landing was broadcast live at the village’s only school, with the Balkan Insight reporter describing the villagers as “star-struck” and justifiably proud of their connection to the mission. </p>
<p>There was also cautious optimism about the prosperity that might flow from tourists discovering their sleepy hamlet (at least after the pandemic). Famous on Mars, might Jezero be celebrated on Earth as well?</p>
<h2>Earthly tensions</h2>
<p>The alternative to be avoided, one hopes, is that a minor Balkan conflict breaks out over language and designated names. Every one of the former Yugoslav countries can claim the word “jezero” in their respective dictionaries. And any traveller to the Balkans knows the region is rich with lakes.</p>
<p>But only one village carries this generic word as its name. Was it politically advisable for one village in the Serb-dominated entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be singled out? For many, this part of the country is still associated with the nationalism and ethnic cleansing of the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/04/20-years-since-the-bosnian-war/100278/">Bosnian war</a> in the 1990s.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/7-minutes-of-terror-a-look-at-the-technology-perseverance-will-need-to-survive-landing-on-mars-155046">'7 minutes of terror': a look at the technology Perseverance will need to survive landing on Mars</a>
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</em>
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<hr>
<p>How would the members of other communities in the country — Bosniaks (the country’s Muslim population) and Croats — respond? Could they support the Serbs of Jezero receiving such positive media coverage? </p>
<p>As my book about the <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208753.001.0001/acprof-9780199208753">break-up of the Serbo-Croatian language</a> explored, language rifts in the Balkans are endemic and have long been both a symptom of ethnic animosity and a cause for inflaming it.</p>
<p>Will people quibble over whether the crater is named for the village or for its nearby lake, or any lake within the region? Or should all who say “jezero” feel proud the word is now in the global lexicon?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Martian crater" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385671/original/file-20210222-19-156ikig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jezero crater on Mars, showing a possible route the Perseverance rover could take as it investigates several ancient environments.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nasa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Space and time</h2>
<p>During the time of Tito’s rule in Yugoslavia, such matters would not have been as contentious, since many people believed the dominant common language of the country was Serbo-Croatian.</p>
<p>Ethno-nationalism was forbidden and people mostly got along. However, since the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, people in the newly independent states now speak separate languages: Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-srebrenica-more-than-20-years-on-99122">Remembering Srebrenica, more than 20 years on</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Over the years, speakers of the four languages have slowly drifted apart, but they all agree a lake is called “jezero”. Further complications arise with peoples and governments even further afield. The Slovenes and Czechs also say “jezero”, and the Macedonian and Bulgarian form is the almost identical “ezero”.</p>
<p>Any similarity between the landscape around Jezero in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the crater with the same name on Mars may end with the name. And I doubt the scientists at NASA or the IAU ever considered the potential implications of using a common word shared by so many nations to name an important site on Mars. </p>
<p>But, as we know, words have power. It would be a shame if a distant, silent crater on another planet caused envy and resentment here on Earth. So far, however, the political situation in the Balkans remains almost as calm as that on Mars, and that is cause for hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Greenberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Named after a village in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NASA’s Martian landing spot is a distant reminder of less peaceful times on Earth.Robert Greenberg, Dean of Arts, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1348622020-03-27T14:03:41Z2020-03-27T14:03:41ZKosovo’s government just fell – but it’s down to US meddling rather than coronavirus<p>When the government of Kosovo fell on March 25 after losing a no-confidence vote, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-25/pandemic-response-fells-first-european-government-in-kosovo?cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business">some reports</a> suggested it was prompted by the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. This is simply not true. Instead, it was driven by domestic forces desperate to block change, and the US administration’s determination to remove a government unwilling to comply with its demands. </p>
<p>After the October 2019 general election, left-wing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49955689">Vetevendosje emerged</a> as the largest party in Kosovo’s parliament. Vetevendosje’s popularity is built on its agenda for change, including commitments to reduce unemployment and social deprivation, and, most particularly, tackle the corruption which has plagued Kosovo for decades. </p>
<p>Since the end of the conflict with Serbia in June 1999, Kosovo’s two traditionally largest parties – the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) – have engaged in widespread corruption and nepotism. As a result, Kosovo suffers from chronic unemployment and dysfunctional education and healthcare systems. </p>
<p>Kosovo’s powerful Western allies tolerated the corruption so long as the criminal elite, both inside and outside government, obeyed their commands and maintained a semblance of order. This “order” has been narrowly understood as preserving a cold peace with Serbia – thereby enabling the West to present its intervention in Kosovo as a <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539">success</a>. Vetevendosje’s victory threatened this symbiotic relationship. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kosovos-controversial-insurgent-party-worries-the-west-so-much-81229">Why Kosovo's controversial insurgent party worries the West so much</a>
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<h2>Barriers to change</h2>
<p>Although it became the largest party in October, Vetevendosje didn’t enter into coalition government with the LDK until February 2020. This delay was caused by the reluctance of an older faction within the LDK – widely linked to corruption within Kosovo – to accept Vetevendosje’s radical agenda. While LDK’s more progressive wing eventually prevailed, powerful figures in the party – including its leader – were never fully supportive of the coalition. </p>
<p>An additional barrier to the realisation of Vetevendosje’s agenda was Kosovo’s president, Hashim Thaci. Thaci, who is from the PDK, was aghast at the prospect of a government committed to tackling corruption with Vetevendosje’s Albin Kurti as prime minister. In 2010, Thaci was accused of being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/14/kosovo-prime-minister-llike-mafia-boss?INTCMP=SRCH">a powerful figure within Kosovo’s criminal network</a>, something the government at the time <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11996255">denied</a>. </p>
<p>The Vetevendosje-led government was further undermined by the external context. The EU’s credibility within Kosovo has decreased in recent years, owing to the lack of progress on both <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/western-balkans-dateless-accession-perspective/">membership talks</a> and <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/protestors-impose-visa-on-european-commissioner-hahn/">visa liberalisation</a>. As a result, many – most prominently Thaci – called for the US to assume a greater role in brokering a deal with Serbia, seen as key to resolving Kosovo’s disputed international status. </p>
<p>The appointment of Richard Grenell as a US special envoy to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue in February 2020, was therefore <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/20/trump-moves-grenell-from-balkans-to-national-intelligence/">welcomed by Thaci and his supporters</a> as evidence of a new US commitment. Grenell wasted little time in issuing a series of blunt demands, including that to ensure continued US support, Kurti’s government must <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/02/04/grenell-urges-new-kosovo-government-to-abolish-tariffs-as-soon-as-possible/">immediately remove the 100% tariffs</a> imposed by the previous government on Serbian goods exported to Kosovo. </p>
<p>Kurti agreed to remove the tariffs but in a phased manner and only if Serbia discontinued its campaign to persuade countries to <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/how-can-kosovo-respond-to-serbias-derecognition-campaign/">withdraw their recognition</a> of Kosovo. Kurti also stated that negotiations with Serbia should be led by the government of Kosovo rather than the president, as stipulated by Kosovo’s constitution, and that any future deal should exclude the exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia, a proposal both Thaci and Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/world/europe/kosovo-serbia.html">have intimated their willingness to support</a>. </p>
<p>In response, various political figures in the US – <a href="https://twitter.com/DonaldJTrumpJr/status/1237361127513784322">including Donald Trump’s son</a>, Donald Trump Junior – threatened to discontinue US support for Kosovo and <a href="https://twitter.com/sendavidperdue/status/1237198479056830467">pull US troops out of the NATO-led peacekeeping mission</a> stationed there. These threats frightened Vetevendosje’s coalition partners the LDK, and Thaci, who appealed for compliance with the American demands, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/HashimThaciOfficial/">warning</a> that Kurti was a “devilish … dangerous … liar”.</p>
<h2>Coronavirus response</h2>
<p>The coronavirus pandemic provided those determined to oust Vetevendosje with the opportunity to do so. Despite the government’s implementation of a series of swift measures to deal with the crisis, including school and restaurant closures and curfews, Thaci unilaterally declared that Kosovo should be placed in a state of emergency. In such a situation, <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/political-crisis-deepens-as-mustafa-issues-ultimatum/">the government’s powers shift to Kosovo’s security council</a>, which is chaired by Thaci. </p>
<p>The government rejected this and issued its own set of emergency measures which increased restrictions on people’s movement without transferring power to the president. Thaci then called on the public to ignore the government’s decree. </p>
<p>When Kurti fired an LDK minister who backed the president, the LDK’s old guard demanded that Kurti reinstate the sacked minister and immediately accede to all the American demands or face a vote of no-confidence. The US ambassador to Kosovo <a href="https://twitter.com/USAmbKosovo/status/1242532549206904832">tweeted his support for the motion of no-confidence</a> and Vetevendosje lost the vote when the majority of LDK MPs voted with the opposition. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1242532549206904832"}"></div></p>
<p>Now that the government has fallen, Kosovo enters a period of <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/the-governments-downfall-leaves-kosovo-politics-i-nturmoil/">great uncertainty</a>, although it’s likely that Kurti will continue in a caretaker role until new elections can be held.</p>
<h2>A photo opportunity</h2>
<p>For those in Kosovo whose wealth and power depends upon the maintenance of the status quo – such as the old guard in the LDK, opposition parties, and Thaci – the need to remove Vetevendosje was obvious. For the US, the impetus was different, though equally mendacious. </p>
<p>At the root of the current American interest in Kosovo is the looming US presidential election. Although neither Trump nor his administration have previously shown any interest in Kosovo, a deal between Serbia and Kosovo brokered by his administration is attractive because of the PR value a photo opportunity with Trump, Thaci and Vučić would represent. Hence the US determination to force Kosovo to accept Serbia’s conditions on talks. </p>
<p>The removal of Vetevendosje may make reaching a deal between Kosovo and Serbia more achievable, but <a href="https://www.peacefare.net/2020/03/13/a-bad-deal/?fbclid=IwAR2Qm_JQh8Z8Q4_qDGbr-gn9NbxiBNL_LzPEkosKKID5dzx6FuHd3cR4_Rg">the proposed deal</a> will likely have dire consequences for Kosovo, and the wider region. The vast majority of experts have consistently warned that an exchange of territory on the basis of ethnicity will have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/17/kosovo-serbia-land-swap-ethnic-cleansing">profoundly negative repercussions for peace and stability throughout the Balkans</a>. This warning, however, has evidently been ignored by those both inside and outside of Kosovo, who are desperate to pursue their own narrow self-interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The collapse of the government in Kosovo is a victory for reactionary forces within Kosovo and the self-seeking agenda of the Trump administration.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1281432019-12-04T17:29:16Z2019-12-04T17:29:16ZNATO meeting: solidarity reinforced despite uncomfortable time for alliance to be in the spotlight<p>Anniversaries are meant to be a celebration. They represent a moment of reflection – a marker, a milestone, a time to look back. And therein lies their biggest problem. For anniversaries have that unfortunate effect of turning any subject – be it a past event, a married couple, or indeed an international institution – into an object of intense scrutiny. For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrating its 70th anniversary in London on December 3-4, that scrutiny has come at an unfortunate time.</p>
<p>Founded in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO at 70 represents one the longest-standing and arguably most successful political and military alliances in history. Yet NATO’s evolution, longevity and very survival continues to draw debate for academics, practitioners and world leaders alike. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s <em>raison d’etre</em> has been constantly criticised, with many seeing it as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cartoon/2014/sep/05/martin-rowson-cartoon-isis-nato-coalition-obama-syria">dinosaur</a> of a bygone era. </p>
<p>Yet Russia’s resurgent efforts to disturb and disrupt the North Atlantic region since the 2014 annexation of Crimea has also seen a renewed impetus for NATO as a security alliance. And new threats are looming, as my own <a href="https://www.stir.ac.uk/research/hub/publication/516391">research</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-war-gamed-an-escalation-of-the-ukraine-russia-crisis-heres-what-it-taught-us-about-the-real-world-113802">teaching</a> on international negotiation has examined.</p>
<p>NATO in 2019 in fact faces an unenviable agenda and a political environment increasingly unconducive to building a consensus. NATO’s core geopolitical challenges not only include a resurgent Russia amid <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-war-russia-europe/">claims</a> of a “New Cold War”, but an increasingly <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315666167">influential</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03932729.2016.1224491">encroaching</a> China. China was on the agenda of this leaders’ meeting <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/20/nato-leaders-discuss-security-threats-china-first-time-says/">for the first time</a>. </p>
<p>The alliance must also address new hybrid threats ranging from cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, to public disinformation. Arms control is again a top agenda item for the alliance, not only over nuclear and chemical weapons, but now also addressing <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/nato-braces-for-the-new-space-age/">space</a> as a new operational domain. <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_168058.htm?">Climate change</a> and migration have also become hot topics for NATO. </p>
<p>NATO’s security environment has therefore become something of a multi-headed hydra, with each head representing a new challenge that only a strong and united NATO can ultimately meet. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/space-may-soon-become-a-war-zone-heres-how-that-would-work-125460">Space may soon become a war zone – here's how that would work</a>
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<h2>Fraying solidarity a NATO hallmark</h2>
<p>Fraying solidarity has nevertheless become a hallmark for the alliance. The Syrian crisis has involved the US and Turkey both undertaking unilateral action without consulting with NATO allies. That <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-tensions-undermine-its-role-in-nato/">action</a> has been further exacerbated by Turkey’s growing ties with Russia, including the purchase of the S-400 missile system. </p>
<p>The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has also challenged the cohesion of the 29-nation alliance by emphasising his own preference for a strong European security architecture, independent of the US and citing NATO’s “<a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead">brain-death</a>”. Macron’s comments were sharply challenged by both Germany’s chancellor, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-condemns-macrons-drastic-words-on-nato/a-5115458">Angela Merkel</a> and US president, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50641403">Donald Trump</a>.</p>
<p>Amid it all, political contentions continue to fester within NATO over <a href="http://journal-iostudies.org/sites/journal-iostudies.org/files/JIOS_Fall2016_Zyla-NATO.pdf">burden-sharing</a>, and the US push for all 29 nations to meet their spending obligations to <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/170608-ELN-Issues-Brief-Defence-Spending.pdf">spend 2% of GDP</a> on defence.</p>
<p>All this would seem to suggest that NATO’s anniversary really has come at the worst possible juncture for an ageing, somewhat challenged, alliance. As the London NATO leader’s meeting has highlighted, forced family gatherings can be fuelled by squabbling and the airing of past and current grievances rather than affection and unity. While anniversary gatherings are intended to celebrate, they also shine a spotlight on the cracks that fester. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-and-the-eu-a-short-history-of-an-uneasy-relationship-126710">NATO and the EU: a short history of an uneasy relationship</a>
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<h2>Introverted, yet successful</h2>
<p>For a naturally introverted NATO that <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/NATO.html?id=C7ruAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">operates most effectively</a> as a military alliance away from the political spotlight, the London anniversary meeting must have been gruelling. It is only when you remove the spotlight and political grandstanding of this 70th anniversary that NATO’s truest successes come to the fore. </p>
<p>For the success of NATO is its longevity, its adaptation, its ability to look out and seek to address the risks of an ever-changing security environment and its ability to maintain the ties that bind among its growing family. As NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg <a href="https://twitter.com/MunSecConf/status/1201842996792168448?s=20">remarked</a> at a conference the day before the leaders met, in contrast to most politicians who are criticised for being good on rhetoric but bad on substance, NATO is the opposite – it is “bad on rhetoric but good on substance”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1201842996792168448"}"></div></p>
<p>For all of the cracks that this 70th anniversary has revealed, it has provided a moment for reflection. As the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm#utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=natosg&utm_campaign=191204%2Bmeeting">declaration</a> published after the three-hour meeting of leaders identifies, what is now needed is a “forward-looking reflection process.”</p>
<p>NATO’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-70-is-nato-still-important-5-essential-reads-128267">70-year history</a> is itself testimony of the organisation’s ongoing self-reflection, coupled with a willingness to adapt. But this meeting has provided just such a time for deep reflection on the alliance’s future as both a political and military organisation. </p>
<p>In tackling the challenges facing NATO today, that reflective process must consider NATO’s institutional procedures, decision-making and political structures under a soon-to-be 30-nation alliance, with North Macedonia <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/03/spanish-hold-up-delays-north-macedonias-full-nato-membership/">set to join</a> in 2020. A focus on consultation will also be critical in ensuring the cohesion of the alliance and maintaining <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/02/nato-needs-solidarity-for-its-70th-birthday-trump/">solidarity</a>.</p>
<p>Moving beyond this anniversary, NATO has much to do and hard questions to answer. But take away the spotlight and NATO will continue to work away quietly on the substance over the rhetoric … at least until its 80th.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Megan Dee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO had its 70th birthday party in London at an awkward moment.Megan Dee, Lecturer in International Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1279462019-12-02T14:31:09Z2019-12-02T14:31:09ZCan one earthquake cause a cascade of more?<p>Europe isn’t a region well known for intense seismic activity, but large earthquakes do happen. In 1953, a devastating 6.8 magnitude quake struck the Greek Ionian Islands. Though these large events tend to be the exception rather than the rule, a flurry of significant earthquakes struck the Balkans on November 27 2019, with epicentres in Bosnia, Albania and Crete. Geologists are worried that these events might gain momentum, with larger and more destructive events imminent.</p>
<p>Should residents be worried? The Balkans – a region stretching from Croatia to mainland Greece, and the Greek islands to the south – has a very <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexandre_Kounov/publication/272621620_Tectonic_map_of_the_Balkan_Peninsula/data/59615d7c458515a3572441f9/Balkan-map-2017.pdf">complex geology</a>. The whole region is tectonically active due to compression of the Earth’s crust further north and subduction – when one tectonic plate moves under another – to the south. Each process plagues this part of the world with frequent, though usually small, tremors.</p>
<p>Aftershocks are common after large earthquakes, as the region’s geology readjusts to the new tectonic arrangement. This means the recent quakes in south-eastern Europe aren’t unusual, but they may not have released all the pent up seismic energy in the region. Numerous laws of geology say that these shocks gradually subside in magnitude and frequency as time unwinds after the main earthquake. Although poorly understood and believed to be quite rare, earthquakes, instead of petering out into smaller and smaller tremors, can sometimes cause a cascade of further violent quakes. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nepal-earthquake-such-huge-aftershocks-are-rare-41833">Nepal earthquake: such huge aftershocks are rare</a>
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<p>Perhaps the most extreme episode of cascading earthquakes in recent history happened in New Zealand in 2010. In September that year, New Zealand’s second city, Christchurch, suffered a 7.1 magnitude earthquake, which occurred to the west and shook the city violently. But afterwards, residents and scientists alike felt relieved that they had a lucky escape. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304685/original/file-20191202-67017-fx6i24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Medway footbridge in Christchurch was twisted out of shape by the earthquake.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Canterbury_earthquake#/media/File:Medway_Bridge_76.jpg">Schwede66/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Tragically, this was a prelude to a destructive earthquake in February 2011 which struck right beneath the city itself, killing 185 people and causing widespread devastation. The downtown area was largely condemned, along with vast swathes of the city’s suburbs. Following the first event in September 2010, more than 10,000 aftershocks followed. </p>
<p>So while geologists often expect aftershocks to be smaller and less destructive than the first, this isn’t always the case. Aftershocks may bring down buildings that were weakened by the first quake, or hinder rescue attempts of those trapped in buildings by the first one. Anyone responsible for managing the hazards that come with earthquakes must be aware that cascades of further destruction can follow.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304695/original/file-20191202-67028-1mbvbho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Corinth Canal in Greece connects the Gulf of Corinth with the Saronic Gulf in the Aegean Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/passing-through-corinth-canal-by-yacht-1506495587?src=49b2a77a-3838-4680-89c2-112fe08a8d7e-1-12">Victoria Kurylo/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Geologists are particularly worried about the Gulf of Corinth in Greece, an inlet of the Mediterranean that effectively splits the Greek mainland in two. Here, a process called <a href="https://esoexp381corinthactiveriftdevelopment.wordpress.com/2017/11/20/why-are-we-here-plate-tectonics-and-the-gulf-of-corinth/">continental rifting</a> is forcing the Greek mainland apart at an average rate of <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/12/091222105215.htm">15mm per year</a>. This rifting process isn’t smooth – stresses can build up and once they reach a certain threshold, rocks can fracture and an earthquake can follow. </p>
<p>Within the Balkans, there have been <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2014JB011765">17 earthquakes</a> with magnitudes greater than 6.0 since the 18th century, each with many aftershocks recorded in the days following. Models have suggested that these cycles of earthquakes and shocks are <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2014JB011765">set to continue</a>. So it’s not uncommon for one earthquake to cause another, and another, and another. Armed with this knowledge, people should be wary that when an earthquake strikes, it may not be an isolated event.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Blackett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Post-earthquake aftershocks are often assumed to be less violent, but that’s not always the case.Matthew Blackett, Senior Lecturer in Physical Geography and Natural Hazards, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1173442019-06-05T19:13:33Z2019-06-05T19:13:33ZWhat’s next for the Western Balkans?<p>For the first time since 1999, the two most powerful leaders in the European Union, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, displayed a united leadership concerning the future of the Western Balkans. It is the first major attempt in many years to ease tense relations between Serbia and Kosovo.</p>
<p>On April 29 in Berlin, the Franco-German duo <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/168/the-western-balkans">pledged their support to the region</a> through the reinforcement of the rule of law, security and migration assistance, socio-economic development, and peace and reconciliation efforts. Further talks will take place at the <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/06/03/german-french-diplomats-today-pristina-preparations-paris-summit/">Paris summit on July 1</a>.</p>
<p>The Western Balkans, racked by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399">war and tragedies</a> throughout the 1990s, has recently seen a surge of significant political, social and economic progress. Yet the need for reforms and transformation is still crucial.</p>
<p>This is why heads of state and government from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia, as well as the EU’s foreign policy high representative Federica Mogherini, gathered with Merkel and Macron in Berlin. One of the central subjects at the extraordinary summit will be discussing the road ahead for Kosovo and Serbia and the possibility of their <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-kosovo-agree-to-talks-following-berlin-summit/a-48541196">normalising their relations</a>.</p>
<h2>Kosovo and Serbia at the crossroads</h2>
<p>This summit came at a time of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/macron-and-merkel-try-to-resurrect-serbia-kosovo-talks-at-berlin-summit/">tensions between Kosovo and Serbia</a>. Relations between the two countries collapsed again last year after an initial attempt of a EU-led dialogue for normalisation. One of the main issues at stake has been a possible adhesion of the two countries to the European Union.</p>
<p>Despite an agreement by the two countries to not undermine each other’s prospects to integrate the EU, Serbia has lead continuous campaign against Kosovo’s international recognition, most recently against a bid by the country to <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/11/20/kosovo-s-bid-to-join-interpol-fails-11-20-2018/">join Interpol</a> in November 2018. In retaliation, <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/Kosovo-Serbia-the-normalization-of-relations-depends-on-the-dialogue">Kosovo imposed a 100% tax on goods coming from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina</a>.</p>
<h2>A demonstration of Franco-German diplomacy</h2>
<p>The complex nature of European integration requires leadership and the ability to negotiate agreements, solve disputes, and bring people and countries together.</p>
<p>Chancellor Merkel talking about the summit stated that it was not meant to make decisions but as “an open discussion”, while President Macron <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/30/balkan-leader-summit-in-berlin-aims-to-break-kosovo-serbia-deadlock">stressed the importance</a> of “security and stability in the region, and progress on reforms”.</p>
<p>The meeting was led by Merkel and Macron with the aim of breaking the deadlock in the region. Taking the initiative showed true leadership, and it has been evident that in recent years that both Germany and France are actively engaged into shaping EU policy, and together are becoming a powerful force in global diplomacy.</p>
<p>Among many examples, they <a href="http://theconversation.com/the-un-security-council-in-a-post-brexit-world-france-and-germany-take-the-lead-113078">jointly led the UN Security Council</a>, recently signed a new cooperation treaty in <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/01/08/signature-nouveau-traite-franco-allemand-aix-la-chapelle">Aachen</a> and displayed a shared diplomatic stance on the <a href="https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/ger-fra-situation-ukraine/2213496">Ukraine-Russian tensions</a>.</p>
<h2>A future in the EU?</h2>
<p>The Western Balkan countries believe that their future lies in the European Union – even if the Union is itself entangled in a number of issues such as immigration, security or <a href="http://theconversation.com/the-shadow-of-nationalism-in-the-new-populist-proposals-in-europe-117127">populist movements</a>. To the Balkan countries, it is literally a question of war and peace.</p>
<p>As European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-france-juncker-balkans/western-balkans-need-eu-path-to-prevent-new-wars-juncker-idUSKBN1HO15C">stated on April 17</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“If we don’t succeed in making the Western Balkans new member states, we will again experience the same problems we saw in the 1990s.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As Junker <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en">stated in February 2018</a>: “The Western Balkan countries now have a historic window of opportunity to firmly and unequivocally bind their future to the European Union” and that their integration “is an investment in the EU’s security, economic growth and influence and in its ability to protect its citizens”.</p>
<p>However, an integration also means to meet the goals and agenda set by EU strategies, as he recalls:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“For the countries to meet all membership conditions and strengthen their democracies, comprehensive and convincing reforms are still required in crucial areas, notably on the rule of law, competitiveness, and regional cooperation and reconciliation.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>When peace is threatened by foreign interests</h2>
<p>The ongoing conflict-resolution effort in the region will also contribute to peace and security in Europe. For countries such as Russia, China and Turkey that are working to spread and assert their power, the Western Balkans occupy a strategic space, with a range of opportunities, stiff competition and potential clashes.</p>
<p>Russia’s involvement in the region was particularly pointed out. A May trial revealed the implication of Kremlin military intelligence agents in a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegrin-coup-verdict-a-wakeup-call-to-eu-on-russia-s-rising-role-in-balkan-instability/29933787.html">coup attempt in Montenegro</a> that could endanger the Balkans stability.</p>
<p>In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnic tensions remain the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/29/bosnia-europe-econmy-ethnic-nationalist">main vulnerabilities</a>, a situation that could serve <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-election-complex-ethnic-problems-dodik/29529200.html">foreign agendas</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ethnic distribution in the western Balkans, 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://picryl.com/media/ethnic-distribution-in-the-western-balkans-2008">CIA Cartography Centre/Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The question of Kosovo’s independence shows how foreign states have divergent visions: it is recognised by <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-countries-recognize-kosovo-as-a-country.html">more than 113 countries</a>, including the United States, Germany, France, the UK and Italy, while Russia, China and Serbia, among others, oppose such recognition.</p>
<p>Looking back on the 1990s, the role of an EU–United States alliance to bringing peace in the region was vital. According to observers, it is perhaps <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/04/15/hahn-us-supportive-eu-western-balkans/">as crucial today as ever</a>.</p>
<h2>Starting afresh: the road to Paris</h2>
<p>The Western Balkans summit in Berlin ended with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-kosovo-agree-to-talks-following-berlin-summit/a-48541196">Kosovo and Serbia agreeing to work together</a>. Though the meeting itself was not meant to come up with substantial, concrete results, it sent important messages.</p>
<p>Furthermore, in midst of the debate about the idea for land swap between Kosovo and Serbia – an ethnically based proposition – Angela Merkel torpedoed the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/21/serbia-needs-kosovos-respect-not-its-land/">partition plan</a>. The message conveyed to the summit was that in a free-market region, no ethnic border changes should happen. Multi-ethnic societies are a value to the entire region, as Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative asserted, not a liability.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1122982569295982599"}"></div></p>
<p>Calling the Balkans summit “a courageous step”, Christian Schwarz-Schilling – a former German minister and EU High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina – <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-berlin-balkan-conference-a-surprising-breakthrough-in-the-cards/a-48536697">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Now, the people of the Western Balkans are waiting for their chance to join the European Union as well.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite some changes in the EU parliament after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/27/five-things-we-have-learned-from-the-election-results-across-europe">2019 elections</a>, the pro-European forces will continue to be the majority. However, it is clear that the key word in the coming period is <em>negotiation</em>. Discussions among the political groups in the European Parliament will determine many aspects of the European vision, including the Union’s enlargement question.</p>
<p>Even if the people of the Western Balkans show a strong desire to join the EU, how and when the concrete integration would happen remains an open question. Which path will be chosen, how trust will be built and which actions will follow will much clearer after the <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/2019/04/30/sommet-des-balkans-pousses-par-macron-et-merkel-la-serbie-et-le-kosovo-prets-a-discuter-6030588-4803.php">July 1 meeting in Paris</a>. Should such a vision fail, the Western Balkans will probably remain just a geographical and historical term with a tragic history and identity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117344/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Valon MURTEZAJ served as Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo (2016-2017).
He was awarded the Officer of National Order of Merit by President of French Republic.</span></em></p>What can be the road ahead for Kosovo and Serbia under the EU patronage?Valon Murtezaj, Professor of international negotiation and diplomacy, IÉSEG School of ManagementLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/984232018-08-06T08:52:42Z2018-08-06T08:52:42ZColombia’s troubled peace process and the lessons of Bosnia-Herzegovina<p>Colombia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">recent presidential election</a> proved that the polarisation that marked the 2016 referendum on the peace agreement with the FARC is still at work. As they did in the plebiscite, the country’s left and right-wing politicians respectively asked the electorate to accept or reject the agreement – and the ultimate winner was a right-wing sceptic of the deal, Ivan Duque.</p>
<p>Throughout the campaign and since his victory, Duque has insisted he will try to adjust the peace agreement in accordance with the No campaign’s platform in the 2016 plebiscite. Among his pledges are to make sure that crimes related to drug trafficking will not be given amnesty, to revise the transitional justice arrangements to primarily focus on guerrilla members responsible for atrocities, and to keep guerrilla members from participating in politics before serving time in jail. He has also suggested that members of the armed forces be exempt from the transitional justice system.</p>
<p>Duque’s victory was therefore greeted with worry around the world. People <a href="https://www.dur.ac.uk/sgia/about/events/?eventno=38711">were – and are – concerned</a> about what his presidency might mean, not just for the peace accords, but for Colombia’s long-term future. But this is not an unprecedented problem; states and societies transitioning from conflict to peace very often face deep political challenges.</p>
<p>The questions Colombia faces today also confronted Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s after the end of a devastating war that claimed thousands of lives. In the <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/13615?download=true">first elections after the accords</a>, the population voted for the former wartime leaders, further entrenching ethnic segregation; in the end, the Dayton Accords ended up institutionalising ethnic division as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2012.655614">part of the constitution</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, many members of the elites who helped drive the war were not prosecuted, and have continued to run businesses <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27800359.pdf?casa_token=zLHpCqn76vEAAAAA:3FtY69YXriA_n-e1bNIS0clIlyzbQAGX5P382EXJc3ZnfeWNudHvXJynOKK8kUjimQY2suz4DPeGhFoNzfDIf4R8DavxahLwn1s6lTMyyC0cv4ukZDCb">from privileged positions of authority</a>. This approach to the transition from war to peace has essentially frozen the structures of war rather than breaking them down – and plenty of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Peacebuilding-and-Spatial-Transformation-Peace-Space-and-Place/Bjorkdahl-Kappler-Galtung/p/book/9781138924154">deep geographical and political segregation</a> persists to this day.</p>
<p>While Colombia’s 50-year conflict was not divided along ethnic lines, the parallels between these two troubled peace processes are uncomfortably close. Just as in the Bosnian case, the structures of separation that underpinned Colombia’s conflict for five decades might outlast the war’s official end. If Duque is serious in his intentions, the process might be narrowed to focus principally on atrocities committed by guerrilla forces, with crimes associated with the state and its allies taken off the agenda.</p>
<h2>Fear and failure</h2>
<p>Post-conflict transitions are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533310802485617">often driven by people’s fears</a> of losing rights, jobs or physical security. It is these very fears that may lead people to vote in favour of ethnic leaders or actors, more generally, who claim to prioritise security over other concerns. When peace agreements are not able to allay such fears, they risk being rejected, undermining hopes for a future where people’s identities as “victims” and “perpetrators” can start to be be broken down.</p>
<p>The effect on victims can be severe. When the general mood is focused on stabilising the logics and structures that underpin a conflict, there is no space to discuss compensation. Restorative justice tends to sink down the agenda, and those affected most by violence and trauma are often the last to be heard. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this meant that <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bosnia-war-reparations/bosnian-war-victims-despair-at-court-fines-over-reparations-claims-idUKKCN1GE0VB">some never received reparations</a>, and many who did only received them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/bosnia-victims-compensation-landmark-ruling">decades after the crimes were committed</a>.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Colombia will be able to handle this challenge differently. Its Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition has been designed as a restorative justice mechanism, tasked with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Truth-Justice-and-Reconciliation-in-Colombia-Transitioning-from-Violence/Diaz-Pabon/p/book/9781857438659">attending to the needs of victims</a>. By focusing on reparation, it purports to empower the victims of the conflict.</p>
<p>This approach has been praised for specifically giving attention to women and ethnic minorities, facilitating their representation in the transitional justice process. Thanks to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/colombia-peace-deal-cannot-be-modified-for-12-years-court-rules-idUSKBN1CH0BQ">recent ruling</a> by Colombia’s Constitutional Court, making any substantive changes to the terms of the Havana Accords will be difficult. But there are still plenty of ways for those in power to throw the transitional justice process off balance, whether by delaying its implementation or simply limiting the supply of funds.</p>
<p>As in the Bosnian case, Colombia faces the risk that its hard-won peace mechanisms could be co-opted for political ends. If that happens, the country’s political and economic polarisation will only become deeper entrenched – and the needs of its civilians will never be fully met.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefanie Kappler receives funding from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and the Swedish Research Council. She has previously received funding from the ESRC, the AHRC and the British Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis Monroy-Santander has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)</span></em></p>Post-conflict processes are often slowed down or even halted by fear. Can Colombia buck the trend?Stefanie Kappler, Associate Professor in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building, Durham UniversityLouis Monroy-Santander, Teaching Fellow in Defence, Development and Diplomacy, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/934082018-03-19T12:58:42Z2018-03-19T12:58:42ZBritain’s role in the Balkans – why Boris Johnson is about to turn pro-EU<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210514/original/file-20180315-104676-drf5g0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Neil Hall</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Here’s a paradox from Brexit Britain. This summer, at a summit meeting in London organised by the UK’s Foreign Office, a hard Brexiteer – the foreign secretary Boris Johnson – will be the designated advocate of EU membership for the Western Balkan states. A country preparing to leave the EU will preach the accession of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/bosnia-10925">Bosnia-Herzegovina</a>, Albania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro to the European Union. A country seeking to “take back control” from the heavy-handedness of Brussels will advise others to relinquish their sovereignty to that same superstate. What’s going on here?</p>
<p>The London summit in July will host the leaders of the six Western Balkan states and those of Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Austria. It’s part of the so-called <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=berlin+process+balkans&oq=berlin+process+balkans&aqs=chrome..69i57.4952j1j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">Berlin Process</a>, an intergovernmental initiative introduced by Angela Merkel in 2014 whose goal was to help the development of the Western Balkans by focusing on investment, connectivity, infrastructure and regional cooperation, with the ultimate aim of their <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-balkans/eu-opens-door-to-balkans-with-2025-target-for-membership-idUKKBN1FQ1X4">joining the EU</a>.</p>
<p>So far, as part of the process, a <a href="http://www.rycowb.org/">Regional Youth Cooperation Office</a> has been established to “promote the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between the youth in the region through youth exchange programmes”. An <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/policy-highlights/regional-cooperation/20150828_chairmans_conclusions_western_balkans_summit.pdf">agreement</a> has also been signed for the settlement of bilateral disputes. There is also talk of a Western Balkans Economic Area, where goods, services, investments and skilled workers would be able to move without obstacles. </p>
<p>The Berlin Process includes, from the EU side, the five strongest and most prominent member states. Every summer, the leaders of these countries meet with the leaders from the six Western Balkan countries to reaffirm their commitment to the region’s European integration. They also aim to attract pledges for investment and take a family photo during a highly publicised summit.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Delegates arrive at the 2017 summit in Trieste.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, following a commitment made in 2014, it’s Britain’s turn to be the host of that summit. The 2018 meeting is an opportunity for the UK to show that it has something substantial to offer to European affairs despite Brexit. After all, every host so far has shaped the agenda by including their own expertise. In Vienna, three years ago it was civil society engagement, in Paris, two years ago, it was climate change. Last year’s summit in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/news/2017-07-12-western-balkans-summit-2017-delivering-region_en">Trieste</a> dealt with the rule of law and the fight against corruption.</p>
<h2>Delicate balance</h2>
<p>Despite its imminent departure from the EU, Britain does still have a useful role to play in the Berlin Process. That might include its security expertise as a strong military nation that remains an enthusiastic member of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nato-786">NATO</a>. With geopolitics becoming increasingly significant for Europe’s foreign policy, the Western Balkans is one of the most vulnerable regions of the continent. From a security perspective, the region is highly exposed to risks on the periphery of Europe. </p>
<p>The security risks in the region include a generic fear of return to the wars of the 1990s among some post-Yugoslav states, the threat of <a href="https://theconversation.com/radicalisation-in-bosnia-old-wounds-reopened-by-an-emerging-problem-63534">Islamic fundamentalism</a>, the rise of organised crime, geopolitical and geo-economic competition from China, Russia, or Turkey.</p>
<p>Then there are the existing bilateral disputes among post-Yugoslav states. All have unresolved border issues – some of them subject to international arbitration. And all these disputes affect stability. None of the states have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve these issues, but any security assistance from abroad to one country may be seen to antagonise the interests of the neighbouring country.</p>
<p>Focusing so heavily on the issue of security can also actually harm political progress. People in the region increasingly experience a backsliding of democracy. </p>
<p>As a recent House of Lords <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/53/53.pdf">report</a> noted, there is “serious concern that gains made towards good governance and the rule of law are in danger of being lost as countries in the region turn to authoritarian leadership, nationalistic politics and state capture”. And a recent <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/balkan-countries-still-facing-old-human-rights-issues-01-18-2018">report</a> by Human Rights Watch found that most countries in the region still face serious challenges in upholding human rights standards.</p>
<p>Because the primary concern has, for so long, been security in the Western Balkans, such anxieties have, for the most part, fallen on deaf ears in Western capitals. Geopolitical concerns have allowed local leaders and governments to enjoy lax political conditionality for the sake of security and stability – what has been labelled “stabilitocracy”. As a result, liberal politics have deteriorated and advances made during the 2000s have eroded.</p>
<p>It’s important that any security agenda embraces democracy, human rights, and rule of law – the “holy trinity” of political transformation, which itself is a necessary condition for security and stability in the region. That should be the common goal of both the Berlin Process and the European Commission, the latter having recently adopted a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf">new enlargement strategy</a> for the Western Balkan candidate states. The biggest challenge for Johnson and the Foreign Office, on this particular occasion, is to find ways to cooperate effectively with the European Union, aiming at the inclusion of the Western Balkan countries in the European family, at a time when the UK is excluding itself from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adis Merdzanovic receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Othon Anastasakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The foreign secretary will host a summit in London this summer on helping Balkan states join the EU.Othon Anastasakis, Program Director and Senior Research Fellow in South East European Studies, St Antony's College, University of OxfordAdis Merdzanovic, Postdoctoral Researcher, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/918562018-03-09T15:38:36Z2018-03-09T15:38:36ZHow the war in Iraq unintentionally helped stabilise Bosnia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208332/original/file-20180228-36677-1cka32w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An American soldier on a training exercise with a soldier from the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/01/20/the-armed-forces-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-the-role-of-nato/">U.S. Army Europe</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Back in March 2003, George W Bush’s “coalition of the willing” launched an invasion of Iraq, the consequences of which reverberate to this day. The now-ubiquitous US military presence in the Middle East began in earnest following the invasion, and it could be <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1353c1d8-4298-11e6-b22f-79eb4891c97d">argued</a> that much of the current instability in the region can be traced back to the war that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/25/tony-blair-is-right-without-the-iraq-war-there-would-be-no-isis">followed</a>. But new <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2017.1414734">research</a> shows that the conflict had another, very different effect: it was the most significant step in stabilising the Balkans since the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/ratko-mladic-orchestrator-of-the-brutal-siege-of-sarajevo-87969">1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina</a> was brought to an end by the Dayton Agreement, which not only halted the conflict, but also laid the foundations of the post-war Bosnian state. In an arrangement that’s been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government">described</a> as “the world’s most complicated system of government”, the country was divided into two entities, the Republika Srpska, which is predominantly Bosnian Serb, and the Federation, which is mostly administered by Bosnian Croats and Muslims (Bosniaks). The central government had little authority; most power, including control of the armed forces, was delegated to the entities and other local governments.</p>
<p>While Dayton was a complex agreement, its overwhelming priority was the cessation of hostilities, meaning many key issues were purposefully disregarded or left ambiguous. One such issue was the future of the three armies – the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Army of Republika Srpska, and the Croatian Defence Council – which fought each other in the war: as Dayton made no real stipulations about their future, they simply remained in place. </p>
<p>Richard Holbrooke, a key American mediator in the peace negotiations, <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/title/to-end-a-war/oclc/936664917&referer=brief_results">later lamented</a> that “the most serious flaw in the Dayton Peace Agreement was that it left two opposing armies in one country”. The Peace Implementation Council, the international body responsible for overseeing post-war Bosnia, <a href="http://www.ohr.int/?p=54101">warned</a> of “the instability that is inherent in having two – and in practice three – armies present in one country”. </p>
<p>Yet despite the evident risks, the armies were left largely untouched, and they continued undermining the authority and legitimacy of the Bosnian state – until the prelude to the invasion of Iraq. </p>
<h2>Forcing the issue</h2>
<p>In September 2002, as hundreds of coalition planes <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061210040821/http:/www.newstatesman.com/200505300013">bombed Iraqi air defences</a> in preparation for the US-led invasion, details began to emerge from the US embassy in Sarajevo that a Bosnian company, the Orao (Eagle) Aviation Institute, was suspected of breaching the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iraq">13-year arms embargo</a>, sparking a scandal known as the “Orao Affair”. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US tanks parked under the Hands of Victory in Ceremony Square, Baghdad, 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Technical Sergeant John L Houghton, Jr, United States Air Force</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Cold War, Iraq and Yugoslavia had developed a range of bilateral agreements, ranging from the construction of infrastructure and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1507652/Inside-50m-nuclear-bunker-that-couldnt-save-Saddam.html">bunkers</a> in Iraq to the maintenance of Iraqi Migs (Soviet-designed fighter jets) in Yugoslavia. It emerged that the leadership of rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had quietly continued the relationship with Saddam Hussein, and had facilitated a deal worth US$8.5m in which Orao engineers had <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2017.1414734">travelled to Iraq</a> to “get the damaged fleet of Migs back to the heavens”. </p>
<p>The ensuing investigation implicated much of the Bosnian Serb leadership in the trade, and unveiled numerous attempted cover-ups. With evidence mounting, the potential for Bosnia to face economic sanctions became a real possibility, leading international officials to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518046.2017.1414734?journalCode=fslv20">state</a> that Bosnia was facing its “most severe crisis since the war”.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bosnian troops in Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vanessa Vilarreal, USFOR-A Public Affairs</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As US forces entered Baghdad in 2003, the fallout from the Orao Affair was taking its toll. The Bosnian Serb member of the presidency, the Minister of Defence of Republika Srpska, the Chief of Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and numerous other officials, ministers, and generals were all removed from their positions. 17 of them were prosecuted. International observers and Bosnian citizens alike demanded reform, and just a week after the invasion of Iraq was declared over, a Defence Reform Commission was <a href="http://www.ohr.int/?p=65835&print=pdf">established</a>. It recommended a complete restructuring of Bosnia’s armed forces, which was duly implemented by the Bosnian parliament.</p>
<p>The result was the demobilisation of a considerable number of soldiers, and the creation of a unified Bosnian army. The largest multi-ethnic institution in the country, it benefited from a clear chain of command, which led all the way up to the presidency via a single Ministry of Defence. The new military was modernised and professionalised with external assistance, and in 2006 it joined NATO’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_50349.htm">Partnership for Peace</a>. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have since been deployed in numerous peace-support roles across the world including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/19/iraq">Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>Post-Dayton Bosnia was a fragile and unstable country brimming with soldiers and weapons, and to some extent, it still is – but it’s nonetheless a much more stable and secure state than it was after the peace in 1995. Strange to think that it owes much of its improvement to something as destabilising as the Iraq War.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elliot Short receives funding from the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies and the University of East Anglia </span></em></p>The revelation that a Bosnian company had broken the arms embargo on Iraq unified three armies which had been fighting each other a decade before.Elliot Short, PhD Candidate and Associate Tutor in Modern History, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/918692018-02-16T09:36:21Z2018-02-16T09:36:21ZKosovo is still locked out of the EU ten years after declaring independence – why?<p>As Kosovo prepared to celebrate the ten-year anniversary of its declaration of independence, it was hit with a bitter blow: on February 6, the EU Commission released its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-commission-european-parliament-council-european-economic-and-social-committee-a-0">strategy</a> for the accession of the Western Balkans, which made it clear that Kosovo’s prospects of joining the EU are remote. Reeling from high unemployment, perennial corruption and a series of recent crises, the people of Kosovo badly needed a boost – instead the EU’s strategy delivered a slap in the face.</p>
<p>Given Kosovo is a small, landlocked country with limited natural resources, membership of the EU has naturally always been one of its top priorities. In its 2008 <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249677.stm">declaration of independence</a>, Kosovo expressed its wish “to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies” and “our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union”. </p>
<p>Kosovo’s population is the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-balkan-membership-new-strategy-tough-love/">most keen to join the EU</a> of any in the the Western Balkans, with 90% in favour; in Serbia, only 26% support membership. Kosovars are also exceptionally hopeful about membership, with 37% convinced their country will probably join the EU by 2020. Yet despite its people’s high hopes, the country’s chances of joining have not improved since 2008.</p>
<p>At the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, the EU <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm">reiterated</a> “its unequivocal support” to the Western Balkans, and declared: “The future of the Balkans is within the European Union.” But, since then, only Croatia has joined. The commission’s recent <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-commission-european-parliament-council-european-economic-and-social-committee-a-0">report</a> on the region suggests that Serbia and Montenegro may be ready to join in 2025 and it is encouraging but decidedly vague about the prospects of Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo, it says: “has an opportunity for sustainable progress through implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and to advance on its European path once objective circumstances allow”. Those opaque words will raise few people’s spirits.</p>
<h2>Jumping through hoops</h2>
<p>One of the major barriers to Kosovo’s membership is the intransigence of other European states. Five EU members still do not recognise Kosovo’s independence: Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and Romania show no sign of softening – and Spain’s opposition has <a href="https://euobserver.com/enlargement/140771">hardened</a> thanks to recent events in Catalonia.</p>
<p>Full membership would also demand that Kosovo accede to various unwelcome demands from abroad. These include a new <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fjona-krasniqi/kosovo-montenegro-border-agreement-what-you-need-to-know">border demarcation with Montenegro</a>, a <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-serbia-normalization-agreement-key-benchmark-eu-accession/">normalisation agreement</a> with Serbia and, at the behest of Kosovo’s five powerful Western sponsors – the so-called <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/west-warns-kosovo-against-undermining-war-court-01-05-2018">Quint</a> – its co-operation with the <a href="https://www.scp-ks.org/en">Specialist Chambers</a> established to investigate criminality perpetrated by the KLA during the conflict with Serbia. </p>
<p>It feels to many like <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/decade-shattered-dreams/">Kosovo is being asked to jump through hoops</a> just to facilitate the membership ambitions of its neighbours and the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539">self-image</a> of its external patrons. The fact that Kosovo is the only Western Balkan nation whose citizens <a href="http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=444">still require a visa</a> to travel to the Schengen area is a particularly acute source of frustration.</p>
<p>All told, Kosovo’s celebrations of a decade of independence are tinged with ambivalence, if not <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/sow-eats-farrow/">despair</a>. To be fair, the news isn’t all bad: since 2008, there has been notable progress on a <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/small-moments-victory-kosovo/">range of social issues</a>, and the country’s civil society is developing fast. Kosovo has joined the World Bank and the IMF – and earlier this month finally got to use its own <a href="https://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2017/02/06/kosovo-begins-using-new-dialling-code/">telephone dialling code</a>. Kosovo has also been admitted to UEFA, FIFA and the International Olympic Committee. </p>
<p>But its bids to join Interpol and UNESCO both failed and its application to debut at the 2018 Eurovision Song Contest was also <a href="https://eurovoix.com/2017/09/28/kosovo-not-debut-eurovision-2018/">refused</a>. International recognition of Kosovo has also seemed to be going into reverse of late; Serbia is <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=01&dd=08&nav_id=103213">trumpeting</a> mixed signals from a number of states – among them Guinea-Bissau, Suriname and Egypt – as evidence that the tide is turning in Belgrade’s favour. Even the vice-chancellor of Austria, which does currently recognise Kosovo, recently <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02&dd=12&nav_id=103466">suggested</a> that this is “a matter for Serbia alone”.</p>
<h2>Who’s to blame?</h2>
<p>Kosovo declared independence from Serbia unilaterally and, as such, its independence has always been contentious. It is also hardly a model EU candidate state – it suffers from endemic corruption, cronyism and organised crime and, for all the emphasis on “multi-ethnicity” in the 2008 constitution, it remains sharply divided along ethnic lines. The education system is notably <a href="https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2015-results-in-focus.pdf">poor</a> and, according to the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo/overview">World Bank</a>, while Kosovo’s economic growth has outperformed its neighbours: “the current growth model relies heavily on remittances to fuel domestic consumption”.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s assorted problems are by no means unique. But even though Kosovo has been afforded an unparalleled degree of support by Western states – and indeed the EU – since Belgrade’s rule was suspended in mid-1999, it simply has not made the progress its external supporters promised. </p>
<p>Kosovo itself is not to blame for this. Its key sponsors – the very states who actively encouraged it to unilaterally declare independence – have for too long tolerated, and at times facilitated, the activities of a corrupt elite. They have periodically engaged in their own brand of <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/un-promises-community-assistance-no-compensation-poisoned-roma-kosovo/">mismanagement</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/judge-quits-eu-kosovo-mission-alleging-corruption/">corruption</a>, and made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/02/kosovans-blair-true-hero">promises</a> they were in no position to keep. </p>
<p>Kosovo’s current predicament is therefore an indictment of the Western powers who have intervened to “help” it. And the costs of their failures are now being borne by Kosovars themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Europe’s youngest state badly wants into the EU, but the hurdles in place are high.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.