tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/biological-weapons-33048/articlesBiological weapons – The Conversation2024-01-24T23:42:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218712024-01-24T23:42:25Z2024-01-24T23:42:25ZThe Doomsday Clock is still at 90 seconds to midnight. But what does that mean?<p>Once every year, a select group of nuclear, climate and technology experts assemble to determine where to place the hands of the Doomsday Clock.</p>
<p>Presented by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Doomsday Clock is a visual metaphor for humanity’s proximity to catastrophe. It measures our collective peril in minutes and seconds to midnight, and we don’t want to strike 12.</p>
<p>In 2023, the expert group brought the clock the closest it has ever been to midnight: 90 seconds. On January 23 2024, <a href="https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/">the Doomsday Clock was unveiled again</a>, revealing that the hands remain in the same precarious position.</p>
<p>No change might bring a sigh of relief. But it also points to the continued risk of catastrophe. The question is, how close are we to catastrophe? And if so, why?</p>
<h2>Destroyer of worlds</h2>
<p>The invention of the atomic bomb in 1945 ushered in a new era: the first time humanity had the capability to kill itself.</p>
<p>Later that year, Albert Einstein, along with J. Robert Oppenheimer and other Manhattan Project scientists, established the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in the hope of communicating to the public about the new nuclear age and the threat it posed.</p>
<p>Two years on, the Bulletin, as it came to be known, published its first magazine. And on the cover: a clock, with the minute hand suspended eerily only seven minutes from midnight.</p>
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<span class="caption">Cover of the 1947 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists issue, featuring the Doomsday Clock at seven minutes to midnight.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_Clock#/media/File:Bulletin_Atomic_Scientists_Cover.jpg">Public domain/Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>The artist Martyl Langsdorf sought to communicate the sense of urgency she had felt from scientists who had worked on the bomb, including her physicist husband, Alexander. The placement was, to her, an aesthetic choice: “It seemed the right time on the page … it suited my eye.”</p>
<p>Thereafter, Bulletin editor Eugene Rabinowitch was the gears behind the clock’s hands until his passing in 1973, when the board of experts took over.</p>
<p>The clock has been moved 25 times since, particularly in response to the ebb and flow of military buildups, technological advancement and geopolitical dynamics during the Cold War.</p>
<p>Nuclear risk did not abate after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even as the total number of nuclear weapons shrank. And new threats have emerged that pose catastrophic risk to humanity. The latest setting of the clock attempts to gauge this level of risk.</p>
<h2>A precarious world</h2>
<p>In the words of Bulletin president and chief executive Rachel Bronson:</p>
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<p>Make no mistake: resetting the Clock at 90 seconds to midnight is not an indication that the world is stable. Quite the opposite.</p>
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<p>The Bulletin cited four key sources of risk: nuclear weapons, climate change, biological threats, and advances in artificial intelligence (AI).</p>
<p>Two ongoing conflicts – Russia and Ukraine, and Israel and Palestine – involve nuclear-weapon states. Longstanding bulwarks of nuclear stability, such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia, are barely functional. North Korea and Iran retain their nuclear ambitions. And China is quickly growing and modernising its nuclear arsenal. </p>
<p>The impacts of climate change are worsening, as the world suffers through its hottest years on record. Six of nine planetary boundaries are beyond their safe levels. And we are likely to fall short of the goal set by the Paris climate agreement – keeping temperature increase to no more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Dramatic climatic disruptions are a real possibility.</p>
<p>The COVID pandemic revealed the global impacts of a biological threat. Engineered pandemics, created using synthetic bioengineering (and perhaps soon aided by AI tools), could be more viral and lethal than any natural disease. Add to the challenge the continued presence of biological weapons programs around the world, and the shifting disease risk due to the effects of climate change, and biothreats will be a regular battlefront for many countries.</p>
<p>Finally, the Bulletin recognised the risk that comes with advances in AI. While some AI experts have raised the prospect of AI itself being an existential threat, AI is also a threat multiplier for nuclear or biological weapons. And AI could be a vulnerability multiplier. Through AI-enabled disinformation, democracies might struggle to function, especially when dealing with other catastrophic threats.</p>
<h2>Subjective and imprecise, but does that matter?</h2>
<p>The Doomsday Clock has its detractors. Critics argue that the setting of the clock is based on subjective judgements, not a quantitative or transparent methodology. What’s more, it is not a precise measurement. What does “90 seconds to midnight” actually mean?</p>
<p>With the clock now set at its highest ever level, it naturally brings into question why we face greater risk than, say, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. What would it take to get closer than 90 seconds to midnight?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/doomsday-clock-moves-closer-to-midnight-but-can-we-really-predict-the-end-of-the-world-36632">Doomsday Clock moves closer to midnight, but can we really predict the end of the world?</a>
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<p>Fundamentally, these criticisms are accurate. And there are plenty of ways the clock could be technically improved. The Bulletin should consider them. But the critics also miss the point.</p>
<p>The Doomsday Clock is not a risk assessment. It’s a metaphor. It’s a symbol. It is, for lack of a better term, a vibe.</p>
<h2>A powerful image of nebulous threats</h2>
<p>From the very beginning, when seven minutes to midnight “suited the eye”, the Doomsday Clock was an emotional and visceral response to the nuclear moment. Which is why it has become a powerful image, drawing the eyes of the world every year. </p>
<p>Global catastrophic threats are nebulous and complex and overwhelming. With just four dots and two hands, the Doomsday Clock captures the sense of urgency like few images can.</p>
<p>There are better and more actionable ways to assess risk. A handful of countries, for example, conduct national risk assessments. These are formal and regular processes by which governments assess a range of threats to the country, prioritising them on a quantitative scale and building response plans for the highest risk vectors. More countries should conduct these assessments, and be sure to catalogue global catastrophic threats.</p>
<p>Or take the World Economic Forum’s annual Global Risk Report. Based on a survey of around 1,500 experts from across academia, business, government and civil society, it captures the greatest perceived threats over the following two and ten years. Following a similar method, the United Nations is currently conducting its own survey of global risk.</p>
<p>The Doomsday Clock does not replace efforts to understand and assess the greatest threats we face. If anything, it should inspire them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221871/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rumtin Sepasspour works for Global Shield, a non-profit advocacy organization dedicated to reducing global catastrophic risk. He has previously written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.</span></em></p>The Doomsday Clock is not a precise risk assessment, it’s a flawed but powerful metaphor for the catastrophic risk humanity facesRumtin Sepasspour, Visiting Fellow, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105452023-07-27T20:11:03Z2023-07-27T20:11:03ZOppenheimer’s warning lives on: international laws and treaties are failing to stop a new arms race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539699/original/file-20230727-19-uzzswx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C5184%2C3417&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>J. Robert Oppenheimer – the great nuclear physicist, “father of the atomic bomb”, and now subject of a blockbuster biopic – <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2023/07/26/oppenheimer-pursuit-nuclear-disarmament/">always despaired</a> about the nuclear arms race triggered by his creation.</p>
<p>So the approaching 78th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing invites us to ask how far we’ve come – or haven’t come – since his death in 1967.</p>
<p>The Cold War represented all that Oppenheimer had feared. But at its end, then-US president George H.W. Bush spoke of a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/10/03/making-the-peace-dividend-a-reality/75d4ed2b-2f44-4830-ad87-3d1153913da6/">peace dividend</a>” that would see money saved from reduced defence budgets transferred into more socially productive enterprises.</p>
<p>Long-term benefits and rises in gross domestic product could have been substantial, according to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Economic-Consequences-of-Lower-Military-Spending-Some-Simulation-Results-1176">modelling</a> by the International Monetary Fund, especially for developing nations. Given the cost of global sustainable development – currently <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/">estimated</a> at US$5 trillion to $7 trillion annually – this made perfect sense.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, that peace dividend is disappearing. The world is now spending at least $2.2 trillion annually on weapons and defence. Estimates are far from perfectly accurate, but it appears overall defence spending increased by <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges">3.7% in real terms</a> in 2022.</p>
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<span class="caption">J. Robert Oppenheimer.</span>
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<p>The US alone spent $877 billion on defence in 2022 – 39% of the world total. With Russia ($86.4 billion) and China ($292 billion), the top three spenders account for 56% of global defence spending.</p>
<p>Military expenditure in Europe saw its steepest annual increase in at least 30 years. <a href="https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html">NATO</a> countries and partners are all accelerating towards, or are already past, the 2% of GDP military spending target. The <a href="https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/surge-arms-imports-europe-while-us-dominance-global-arms-trade-increases">global arms bazaar</a> is busier than ever.</p>
<p>Aside from the opportunity cost represented by these alarming figures, weak international law in crucial areas means current military spending is largely immune to effective regulation.</p>
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<h2>The new nuclear arms race</h2>
<p>Although the world’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/">nuclear powers agree</a> “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, there are still about <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB23%2007%20WNF.pdf">12,500 nuclear warheads</a> on the planet. This number is growing, and the power of those bombs is <a href="https://www.icanw.org/how_destructive_are_today_s_nuclear_weapons">infinitely greater</a> than the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.</p>
<p>According to the United Nations’ disarmament chief, the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15250.doc.htm">risk of nuclear war is greater</a> than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The nine nuclear-armed states (Britain, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, as well as the big three) all appear to be modernising their arsenals. Several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapons systems in 2022.</p>
<p>The US is upgrading its “triad” of ground, air and submarine launched nukes, while Russia is reportedly working on submarine delivery of “<a href="https://news.usni.org/2022/07/08/doomsday-submarine-armed-with-nuclear-torpedoes-delivers-to-russian-navy">doomsday</a>” nuclear torpedoes capable of causing destructive tidal waves.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-black-sea-drone-incident-highlights-the-loose-rules-around-avoiding-accidental-war-202030">The Black Sea drone incident highlights the loose rules around avoiding 'accidental' war</a>
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<p>While Russia and the US possess about 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, other countries are expanding quickly. China’s arsenal is projected to grow from 410 warheads in 2023 to maybe <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-01/news/pentagon-chinese-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-400-warheads">1,000</a> by the end of this decade.</p>
<p>Only Russia and the US were subject to bilateral controls over the buildup of such weapons, but Russian president Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/21/putin-russia-halt-participation-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty">suspended</a> the arrangement. Beyond the promise of non-proliferation, the other nuclear-armed countries are not subject to any other international controls, including relatively <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-black-sea-drone-incident-highlights-the-loose-rules-around-avoiding-accidental-war-202030">simple measures</a> to prevent accidental nuclear war.</p>
<p>Other nations – those with hostile, belligerent and nuclear-armed neighbours showing no signs of disarming – must increasingly wonder why they should continue to show restraint and not develop their own nuclear deterrent capacities.</p>
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<h2>The threat of autonomous weaponry</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, other potential military threats are also emerging – arguably with even less scrutiny or regulation than the world’s nuclear arsenals. In particular, artificial intelligence (AI) is sounding alarm bells.</p>
<p>AI is not without its benefits, but it also presents many risks when applied to weapons systems. There have been numerous warnings from developers about the <a href="https://time.com/collection/time100-companies-2023/6284870/openai-disrupters/">unforeseeable consequences</a> and potential <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/02/geoffrey-hinton-godfather-of-ai-quits-google-warns-dangers-of-machine-learning">existential threat</a> posed by true digital intelligence. As the <a href="https://www.safe.ai/statement-on-ai-risk">Centre for AI Safety</a> put it:</p>
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<p>Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-fails-to-agree-on-killer-robot-ban-as-nations-pour-billions-into-autonomous-weapons-research-173616">UN fails to agree on 'killer robot' ban as nations pour billions into autonomous weapons research</a>
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<p>More than 90 countries have <a href="https://automatedresearch.org/state-positions/">called for a legally binding instrument</a> to regulate AI technology, a position supported by the UN Secretary General, the International Committee of the Red Cross and many non-governmental organisations.</p>
<p>But despite at least a decade of <a href="https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-Group_of_Governmental_Experts_on_Lethal_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_(2023)/CCW_GGE1_2023_2_Advance_version.pdf">negotiation and expert input</a>, a treaty governing the development of “lethal autonomous weapons systems” <a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/states-adopt-meaningless-report-after-civil-society-excluded-from-un-discussions-on-autonomous-weapons-systems/">remains elusive</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-accelerates-global-drive-toward-killer-robots-198725">War in Ukraine accelerates global drive toward killer robots</a>
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<h2>Plagues and pathogens</h2>
<p>Similarly, there is a fundamental lack of regulation governing the growing number of laboratories capable of holding or making (accidentally or intentionally) harmful or fatal biological materials.</p>
<p>There are 51 known <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/62fa334a3a6fe8320f5dcf7e/t/6412d3120ee69a4f4efbec1f/1678955285754/KCL0680_BioLabs+Report_Digital.pdf">biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) labs</a> in 27 countries – double the number that existed a decade ago. Another 18 BSL-4 labs are due to open in the next few years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/reporting-all-biosafety-errors-could-improve-labs-worldwide-and-increase-public-trust-in-biological-research-168552">Reporting all biosafety errors could improve labs worldwide – and increase public trust in biological research</a>
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<p>While these labs, and those at the next level down, generally maintain high safety standards, there is no mandatory obligation that they meet international standards or allow routine compliance inspections.</p>
<p>Finally, there are fears the World Health Organization’s new pandemic preparedness treaty, based on lessons from the COVID-19 disaster, is being <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/381/bmj.p1246">watered down</a>.</p>
<p>As with every potential future threat, it seems, international law and regulation are left scrambling to catch up with the march of technology – to govern what <a href="https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/key-documents/oppenheimers-farewell-speech/">Oppenheimer called</a> “the relations between science and common sense”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lack of effective regulation means the risk of nuclear war is greater than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Other potentially existential military threats remain similarly uncontrolled.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1791592022-03-14T12:21:02Z2022-03-14T12:21:02ZRussia’s false claims about biological weapons in Ukraine demonstrate the dangers of disinformation and how hard it is to counter – 4 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451666/original/file-20220311-28-1kd1bst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C24%2C5414%2C3582&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian disinformation, amplified by China, is raising fears that the war in Ukraine could escalate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarBiolabClaims/527539296f334863b392d4fd298ee7ec/photo">AP Photo/Vincent Yu</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On March 11, 2022, Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s U.N. ambassador, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/11/un-council-ukraine-russia-chemical-weapons-zelensky/">told the U.N. Security Council</a> that Russia had discovered evidence of U.S.-funded biological weapons research in Ukraine. U.S. officials denied the claims, accused Russia of <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/security-council-hear-russian-claim-us-labs-ukraine-83383215">using the U.N. to spread disinformation</a>, and warned that Russia’s accusations could be a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/10/us/politics/russia-ukraine-china-bioweapons.html">prelude to it using biological weapons</a>.</p>
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<span class="caption">Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian echoed unsupported claims by Russian officials that the U.S. is engaged in illegal chemical weapons development in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarBioLabClaims/ad5706d5fd5b49a6bb111aa0dd347403/photo">AP Photo</a></span>
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<p>The statements followed several days of Russian officials making the claim, and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-covid-health-biological-weapons-china-39eeee023efdf7ea59c4a20b7e018169">Chinese officials echoing it</a>. Several prominent right-wing figures in the U.S. amplified the claims by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/us/politics/us-bioweapons-ukraine-misinformation.html">mischaracterizing Senate testimony</a> from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland about U.S. support for biological research in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia’s claims are part of a strategy of spreading disinformation before and during the invasion of Ukraine. The disinformation aims to bolster support for the war within Russia, undermine Ukrainian morale and sow confusion and discord in the U.S. and Europe. The biological warfare claims show how pernicious disinformation can be: difficult to counter and highly consequential. </p>
<p>Here are four articles from our archive to help you understand how Russia used disinformation to justify the invasion, how disinformation fits into Russia’s use of technology in warfare, what makes disinformation so challenging, and how targets of Russia’s disinformation have learned to respond.</p>
<h2>1. False flags, provocations and disinformation</h2>
<p>In the run-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials warned that Russia was preparing false flag attacks, that is attacks on its own forces to create the appearance of aggression by Ukraine. University of Washington’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=kRZXqz4AAAAJ&hl=en">Scott Radnitz</a> explains the long history of false flag attacks and how difficult they are to pull off in the age of satellites, smart phones and the internet.</p>
<p>Radnitz also <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-did-russia-stage-any-to-claim-justification-for-invading-ukraine-177879">explains that false flag attacks are just one of many tools</a> in Russia’s propaganda toolkit. Ubiquitous information technologies are fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. “With the prevalence of disinformation campaigns, manufacturing a justification for war doesn’t require the expense or risk of a false flag – let alone an actual attack,” he writes.</p>
<p>“At the start of its incursion into Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin used ‘active measures,’ including disinformation and deception, to prevent Ukrainian resistance and secure domestic approval,” he writes. “Russia and other post-Soviet states are also prone to claim a ‘provocation,’ which frames any military action as a justified response rather than a first move.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-did-russia-stage-any-to-claim-justification-for-invading-ukraine-177879">What are false flag attacks – and did Russia stage any to claim justification for invading Ukraine?</a>
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<h2>2. Information warfare</h2>
<p>Disinformation campaigns are part of a constellation of Russian high-tech warfare methods, including intelligence gathering, information warfare, cyberwarfare and electronic warfare. Rochester Institute of Technology’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=nNlgxmMAAAAJ&hl=en">Justin Pelletier</a> explains how these overlapping modes of warfare work and how Russia is using them in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Disinformation is <a href="https://theconversation.com/intelligence-information-warfare-cyber-warfare-electronic-warfare-what-they-are-and-how-russia-is-using-them-in-ukraine-177899">part of Russia’s information warfare strategy</a>. “There is an ongoing contest to control the narrative about what is happening in Ukraine,” he writes.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="five men carry a pregnant woman on a stretcher across a plaza strewn with tree limbs with smoke and bomb blasted buildings in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Russian government is using disinformation to deflect responsibility for shelling a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine. This pregnant woman, wounded in the shelling, and her baby later died, according to a report from the AP.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ADVANCERussiaUkraineWarAirpower/8fd70792482249e69c8d97d32d37bd30/photo">AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka</a></span>
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<p>There is a flood of information about Ukraine on social media, and much of it is neither verified nor debunked. “This underscores how difficult it is to be certain of the truth with a high volume of fast-changing information in an emotionally charged, high-stakes situation like warfare,” he writes.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/intelligence-information-warfare-cyber-warfare-electronic-warfare-what-they-are-and-how-russia-is-using-them-in-ukraine-177899">Intelligence, information warfare, cyber warfare, electronic warfare – what they are and how Russia is using them in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>3. The murky nature of disinformation</h2>
<p>This difficulty in determining the truth is by design, explains University of Washington’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=C6KSF5gAAAAJ&hl=en">Kate Starbird</a>. Disinformation campaigns are blends of truth, lies and beliefs that can have particular strategic aims but are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/disinformation-campaigns-are-murky-blends-of-truth-lies-and-sincere-beliefs-lessons-from-the-pandemic-140677">designed to undermine democratic societies</a>, she writes.</p>
<p>“The notion of disinformation often brings to mind easy-to-spot propaganda peddled by totalitarian states, but the reality is much more complex,” she writes. “Though disinformation does serve an agenda, it is often camouflaged in facts and advanced by innocent and often well-meaning individuals.”</p>
<p>“Disinformation has its roots in the practice of dezinformatsiya used by the Soviet Union’s intelligence agencies to attempt to change how people understood and interpreted events in the world,” she writes. “It’s useful to think of disinformation not as a single piece of information or even a single narrative, but as a campaign, a set of actions and narratives produced and spread to deceive for political purpose.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disinformation-campaigns-are-murky-blends-of-truth-lies-and-sincere-beliefs-lessons-from-the-pandemic-140677">Disinformation campaigns are murky blends of truth, lies and sincere beliefs – lessons from the pandemic</a>
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<h2>4. Baltic elves</h2>
<p>Disinformation is difficult but not impossible to counter. Decades of Russian disinformation campaigns have given its targets experience in responding. <a href="https://sais.jhu.edu/users/tthomp83">Terry Thompson</a> of Johns Hopkins University describes how the Baltic states <a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">have defended themselves</a> in recent years.</p>
<p>Latvia is home to the Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, a NATO organization that counters Russian influence, including by publishing reports on Russian disinformation activities. The people of the Baltics have also taken up the cause. “‘Baltic elves’ – volunteers who monitor the internet for Russian disinformation – became active in 2015 after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement">Maidan Square events</a> in Ukraine,” Thompson writes. </p>
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<p>“Disinformation is a key part of Russia’s overall effort to undermine Western governments. As a result, the battle is ever-changing, with Russians constantly trying new angles of attack and target countries like the Baltic nations identifying and thwarting those efforts,” he writes. “The most effective responses will involve coordination between governments, commercial technology companies and the news industry and social media platforms to identify and address disinformation.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">Countering Russian disinformation the Baltic nations' way</a>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Russian government used disinformation to fabricate a justification for invading Ukraine. A new campaign focused on biowarfare claims threatens to escalate the conflict.Eric Smalley, Science + Technology EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1732442021-12-09T04:07:24Z2021-12-09T04:07:24ZWill self-replicating ‘xenobots’ cure diseases, yield new bioweapons, or simply turn the whole world into grey goo?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436545/original/file-20211209-133881-1fa2aow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C142%2C97&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kriegman et al./PNAS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2020, scientists made global headlines by creating “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15265161.2020.1746102?journalCode=uajb20">xenobots</a>” – tiny “<a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/117/4/1853?gclid=CI3tjNrggrACFQgJRQodfSvtEQ///////">programmable</a>” living things made of several thousand frog stem cells.</p>
<p>These pioneer xenobots could move around in fluids, and scientists claimed they could be useful for monitoring radioactivity, pollutants, drugs or diseases. Early xenobots survived for up to ten days.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/not-bot-not-beast-scientists-create-first-ever-living-programmable-organism-129980">Not bot, not beast: scientists create first ever living, programmable organism</a>
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<p>A <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/scirobotics.abf1571">second wave of xenobots</a>, created in early 2021, showed unexpected new properties. These included self-healing and longer life. They also showed a capacity to cooperate in swarms, for example by massing into groups.</p>
<p>Last week, the same team of biology, robotics and computer scientists <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/118/49/e2112672118.full.pdf">unveiled</a> a new kind of xenobot. Like previous xenobots, they were created using artificial intelligence to virtually test billions of prototypes, sidestepping the lengthy trial-and-error process in the lab. But the latest xenobots have a crucial difference: this time, they can self-replicate.</p>
<h2>Hang on, what? They can self-replicate?!</h2>
<p>The new xenobots are a bit like Pac-Man – as they swim around they can gobble up other frog stem cells and assemble new xenobots just like themselves. They can sustain this process for several generations.</p>
<p>But they don’t reproduce in a traditional biological sense. Instead, they fashion the groups of frog cells into the right shape, using their “mouths”. Ironically, the recently extinct Australian <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/resurrecting-the-extinct-frog-with-a-stomach-for-a-womb">gastric-brooding frog</a> uniquely gave birth to babies through its mouth.</p>
<p>The latest advance brings scientists a step closer to creating organisms that can self-replicate indefinitely. Is this as much of a Pandora’s Box as it sounds?</p>
<p>Conceptually, human-designed self-replication is not new. In 1966, the influential mathematician John Von Neumann discussed “<a href="https://archive.org/details/theoryofselfrepr00vonn_0">self-reproducing automata</a>”. </p>
<p>Famously, Eric Drexler, the US engineer credited with founding the field of “nanotechnology”, referred to the potential of “grey goo” in his 1986 book <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140810022659/http://www1.appstate.edu/dept/physics/nanotech/EnginesofCreation2_8803267.pdf">Engines of Creation</a>. He envisaged nanobots that replicated incessantly and devoured their surroundings, transforming everything into a sludge made of themselves.</p>
<p>Although Drexler subsequently regretted coining the term, his thought experiment has frequently been used to <a href="https://www.elsevier.com/books/biomedical-ethics-for-engineers/vallero/978-0-7506-8227-5">warn</a> about the risks of developing new biological matter.</p>
<p>In 2002, without the help of AI, an <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12114528/">artificial polio virus</a> created from tailor-made DNA sequences became capable of self-replication. Although the synthetic virus was confined to a lab, it was able to infect and kill mice.</p>
<h2>Possibilities and benefits</h2>
<p>The researchers who created the new xenobots say their main value is in demonstrating advances in biology, AI and robotics.</p>
<p>Future robots made from organic materials might be more eco-friendly, because they could be designed to decompose rather than persist. They might help address health problems in humans, animals and the environment. They might contribute to regenerative medicine or cancer therapy.</p>
<p>Xenobots could also inspire art and new perspectives on life. Strangely, xenobot “offspring” are made in their parents’ image, but are not made <em>of</em> or <em>from</em> them. As such, they replicate without truly reproducing in the biological sense. </p>
<p>Perhaps there are alien life forms that assemble their “children” from objects in the world around them, rather than from their own bodies?</p>
<h2>What are the risks?</h2>
<p>It might be natural to have instinctive reservations about xenobot research. One xenobot <a href="https://www.techeblog.com/xenobots-self-replication-robot-biology/">researcher</a> said there is a “moral imperative” to study these self-replicating systems, yet the research team also recognises legal and ethical concerns with their work. </p>
<p>Centuries ago, English philosopher Francis Bacon raised the idea that some research is too dangerous to do. While we don’t believe that’s the case for current xenobots, it may be so for future developments.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Soldiers wearing gas masks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436553/original/file-20211209-25-j9ttkd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Using xenobots as biological weapons would be banned by several UN treaties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Soldiers_from_the_newly_formed_Joint_NBC_unit.jpg">James Elmer/UK Defence Imagery</a></span>
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<p>Any hostile use of xenobots, or the use of AI to design DNA sequences that would give rise to deliberately dangerous synthetic organisms, is banned by the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons">United Nations’ Biological Weapons Convention</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/chemical/">1925 Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention</a>. </p>
<p>However, the use of these creations <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/law/humanitarian-law/new-war-technologies-and-international-law-legal-limits-weaponising-nanomaterials">outside of warfare is less clearly regulated</a>. </p>
<p>The interdisciplinary nature of these advances, including AI, robotics and biology, makes them hard to regulate. But it is still <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15265161.2020.1746102?journalCode=uajb20">important</a> to consider <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/disarmament-what-is-it-good-for">potentially dangerous</a> uses.</p>
<p>There is a useful precedent here. In 2017, the US national academies of science and medicine published a <a href="https://www.nap.edu/read/24623/chapter/3">joint report</a> on the burgeoning science of human genome editing.</p>
<p>It outlined conditions under which scientists should be allowed to edit human genes in ways that allow the changes to be passed on to subsequent generations. It advised this work should be limited to “compelling purposes of treating or preventing serious disease or disability”, and even then only with stringent oversight. </p>
<p>Both the United States and United Kingdom now allow human gene editing under <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/feb/01/human-embryo-genetic-modify-regulator-green-light-research">specific circumstances</a>. But creating new organisms that could perpetuate themselves was far beyond the scope of these reports.</p>
<h2>Looking into the future</h2>
<p>Although xenobots are not currently made from human embryos or stem cells, it is conceivable they could be. Their creation raises similar questions about creating and modifying ongoing life forms that require regulation.</p>
<p>At present, xenobots do not live long and only replicate for a few generations. Still, as the <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/scirobotics.abf1571">researchers</a> say, living matter can behave in unforeseen ways, and these will not necessarily be benign.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-fresh-opportunity-to-get-regulation-and-engagement-right-the-case-of-synthetic-biology-102190">A fresh opportunity to get regulation and engagement right – the case of synthetic biology</a>
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<p>We should also consider potential impacts on the non-human world. Human, animal and environmental health are intimately <a href="https://onehealthoutlook.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s42522-021-00053-8">linked</a>, and organisms introduced by humans can wreak inadvertent havoc on ecosystems.</p>
<p>What limits should we place on science to avoid a real-life “grey goo” scenario? It’s too early to be completely prescriptive. But regulators, scientists and society should carefully weigh up the risks and rewards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scientists have created tiny self-replicating organisms made from frog stem cells. So is this as much of a Pandora’s Box as it sounds? Not yet, but we should carefully weigh the risks and rewards.Simon Coghlan, Senior Research Fellow in Digital Ethics, Centre for AI and Digital Ethics, School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of MelbourneKobi Leins, Honorary Senior Fellow, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1634722021-07-19T12:07:04Z2021-07-19T12:07:04ZBioweapons research is banned by an international treaty – but nobody is checking for violations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410440/original/file-20210708-15-1j917yr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C985%2C655&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A global treaty bans research or stockpiling of biological weapons — but allows bioweapon defense planning.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/169940/technician-course-prepares-chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-uncertainty">US Dept. of Defense via DVIDS</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Scientists are making dramatic progress with techniques for “gene splicing” – modifying the genetic makeup of organisms. </p>
<p>This work includes bioengineering pathogens for medical research, techniques that also can be used to create deadly biological weapons. <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-gene-editing-tools-such-as-crispr-be-used-as-a-biological-weapon-82187">It’s an overlap</a> that’s helped <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2021/05/the-origin-of-covid-did-people-or-nature-open-pandoras-box-at-wuhan">fuel speculation</a> that the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus was bioengineered at China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology and that it subsequently “escaped” through a lab accident to produce the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>The world already has <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1089%2Fhs.2017.0082">a legal foundation</a> to prevent gene splicing for warfare: <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/">the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention</a>. Unfortunately, nations have been unable to agree on how to strengthen the treaty. <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/07/soviet_bw/">Some countries</a> have also pursued bioweapons research <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9244334/">and stockpiling</a> in violation of it.</p>
<p>As a member of President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council from 1996 to 2001, I had <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/facultyguide/person.html?emplid=45b03f10247276eeaf30fadbc8afc2261b06795d">a firsthand view</a> of the failure to strengthen the convention. From 2009 to 2013, as President Barack Obama’s White House coordinator for weapons of mass destruction, I led <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-05/pursuing-prague-agenda-interview-white-house-coordinator-gary-samore">a team that grappled with</a> the challenges of regulating potentially dangerous biological research in the absence of strong international rules and regulations. </p>
<p>The history of the Biological Weapons Convention <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/06/the-biological-weapons-convention-at-a-crossroad/">reveals the limits</a> of international attempts to control research and development of biological agents. </p>
<h2>1960s-1970s: International negotiations to outlaw biowarfare</h2>
<p>The United Kingdom <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340211407400">first proposed</a> a <a href="https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/brandeis-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3300058">global biological weapons ban</a> in 1968. </p>
<p>Reasoning that bioweapons had no useful military or strategic purpose given the awesome power of nuclear weapons, the U.K. had <a href="http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C14396">ended its offensive bioweapons program</a> in 1956. But the risk remained that other countries might consider developing bioweapons as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509049">poor man’s atomic bomb</a>. </p>
<p>In the original British proposal, countries would have to identify facilities and activities with potential bioweapons applications. They would also need to accept on-site inspections by an international agency to verify these facilities were being used for peaceful purposes.</p>
<p>These negotiations gained steam in 1969 when <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092154">the Nixon administration ended</a> America’s offensive biological weapons program and supported the British proposal. <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpdpsbbtwd/cpdpsbbtwd.html">In 1971, the Soviet Union announced its support</a> – but only with the verification provisions stripped out. Since it was essential to get the USSR on board, the U.S. and U.K. agreed to drop those requirements. </p>
<p>In 1972 the treaty was finalized. After gaining the required signatures, it took effect in 1975. </p>
<p>Under <a href="https://treaties.unoda.org/t/bwc">the convention</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/about/membership-and-regional-groups">183 nations have</a> agreed not to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” biological materials that could be used as weapons. They also agreed not to stockpile or develop any “means of delivery” for using them. The treaty allows “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful” research and development – including medical research. </p>
<p>However, the treaty lacks any mechanism to verify that countries are complying with these obligations.</p>
<h2>1990s: Revelations of treaty violations</h2>
<p>This absence of verification was exposed as <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2019/11/the-biological-weapons-convention-protocol-should-be-revisited/">the convention’s fundamental flaw</a> two decades later, when it turned out that the Soviets had a great deal to hide. </p>
<p>In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed the Soviet Union’s massive <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/07/soviet_bw/">biological weapons program</a>. Some of <a href="https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674045132-007">the program’s reported experiments</a> involved making viruses and bacteria more lethal and resistant to treatment. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065260">The Soviets also</a> weaponized and mass-produced a number of dangerous naturally occurring viruses, including the anthrax and smallpox viruses, as well as the plague-causing <em>Yersinia pestis</em> bacterium. </p>
<p>Yeltsin in 1992 <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-09-15-mn-859-story.html">ordered the program’s end</a> and the destruction of all its materials. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/">But doubts remain</a> whether this was fully carried out. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/sciencenow/0401/02-hist-08.html">Another treaty violation</a> came to light after the U.S. defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. United Nations inspectors discovered <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9244334/">an Iraqi bioweapons stockpile</a>, including 1,560 gallons (6,000 liters) of anthrax spores and 3,120 gallons (12,000 liters) of botulinum toxin. Both had been loaded into aerial bombs, rockets and missile warheads, although Iraq never used these weapons.</p>
<p>In the mid-1990s, during South Africa’s transition to majority rule, evidence emerged of <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/project-coast-apartheids-chemical-and-biological-warfare-programme">the former apartheid regime’s chemical and biological weapons program</a>. As revealed by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/">the program</a> focused on assassination. Techniques included infecting cigarettes and chocolates with anthrax spores, sugar with salmonella and chocolates with botulinum toxin. </p>
<p>In response to these revelations, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0002930000030098">as well as suspicions</a> that North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria were also violating the treaty, the U.S. began urging other nations to close the verification gap. But despite 24 meetings over seven years, a specially formed group of international negotiators <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/414675a">failed to reach agreement on how to do it</a>. The problems were both practical and political.</p>
<h2>Monitoring biological agents</h2>
<p>Several factors make verification of the bioweapons treaty difficult.</p>
<p>First, the types of facilities that research and produce biological agents, <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-medical-innovations-fueled-by-covid-19-that-will-outlast-the-pandemic-156464">such as vaccines</a>, antibiotics, vitamins, <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-random-bits-of-dna-lead-to-safe-new-antibiotics-and-herbicides-83550">biological pesticides</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/moving-beyond-pro-con-debates-over-genetically-engineered-crops-59564">certain foods</a>, can also produce biological weapons. Some pathogens with legitimate medical and industrial uses can also be used for bioweapons.</p>
<p>Further, large quantities of certain biological weapons can be produced quickly, by few personnel and in relatively small facilities. Hence, biological weapons programs are more difficult for international inspectors to detect than nuclear or chemical programs, which typically require large facilities, numerous personnel and years of operation.</p>
<p>So an effective bioweapons verification process would require nations to identify a large number of civilian facilities. Inspectors would need to monitor them regularly. The monitoring would need to be intrusive, allowing inspectors to demand “challenge inspections,” meaning access on short notice to both known and suspected facilities. </p>
<p>Finally, developing <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pandemic-and-americas-response-to-future-bioweapons/">bioweapons defenses</a> – as permitted under the treaty – typically requires working with dangerous pathogens and toxins, and even delivery systems. So distinguishing <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/enhancing-biological-weapons-defense">legitimate biodefense programs</a> from illegal bioweapons activities often comes down to intent – and intent is hard to verify.</p>
<p>Because of these inherent difficulties, verification faced stiff opposition.</p>
<h2>Political opposition to bioweapons verification</h2>
<p>As the White House official responsible for coordinating the U.S. negotiating position, I often heard concerns and objections from important government agencies. </p>
<p>The Pentagon expressed fears that inspections of biodefense installations would compromise national security or lead to false accusations of treaty violations. The Commerce Department opposed intrusive international inspections on behalf of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Such inspections might compromise trade secrets, officials contended, or interfere with medical research or industrial production. </p>
<p>Germany and Japan, which also have large pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, raised similar objections. China, Pakistan, Russia and others opposed nearly all on-site inspections. Since the rules under which the negotiation group operated required consensus, any single country could block agreement. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>In January 1998, seeking to break the deadlock, <a href="https://fas.org/nuke/control/bwc/news/98022001_ppo.html">the Clinton administration proposed</a> reduced verification requirements. Nations could limit their declarations to facilities “especially suitable” for bioweapons uses, such as vaccine production facilities. Random or routine inspections of these facilities would instead be “voluntary” visits or limited challenge inspections – but only if approved by the executive council of a to-be-created international agency monitoring the bioweapons treaty. </p>
<p>But even this failed to achieve consensus among the international negotiators.</p>
<p>Finally, in July 2001, the George W. Bush administration <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/cbwcb53-Pearson.pdf">rejected the Clinton proposal</a> – ironically, on the grounds that it was not strong enough to detect cheating. With that, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/world/conference-on-biological-weapons-breaks-down-over-divisions.html">the negotiations collapsed</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, nations have made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/world/09biowar.html">no serious effort to establish a verification system</a> for the Biological Weapons Convention. </p>
<p>Even with the amazing advances scientists have made in genetic engineering since the 1970s, there are few signs that countries are interested in taking up the problem again. </p>
<p>This is especially true in today’s climate of accusations against China, and China’s refusal to fully cooperate to determine the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gary Samore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sketchy history of international efforts to control bioweapons suggests that nations will resist cooperative monitoring of gene hacking for medical research.Gary Samore, Professor of the Practice of Politics and Crown Family Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1359842020-05-18T11:12:50Z2020-05-18T11:12:50ZCoronavirus is not a bioweapon — but bioterrorism is a real future threat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332962/original/file-20200506-49573-raf82y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C0%2C5160%2C3445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The global disruption caused the the coronavirus pandemic contains lessons in combatting bioterrorism.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has far-reaching implications as Canadians face unemployment, diminishing returns on their purchasing power and <a href="https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/global-economy-already-in-recession-on-coronavirus-devastation">the prospect of an ensuing recession</a>. </p>
<p>These challenges will be faced in the coming year despite <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2020/03/18/canada-unveils-massive-82-billion-stimulus-package-to-combat-coronavirus-extends-travel-ban-to-us.html">stimulus packages announced by the Canadian government</a> to mitigate the downturn. Unsurprisingly, comparisons with the <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/health-pmn/imf-chief-says-pandemic-will-unleash-worst-recession-since-great-depression">Great Depression</a> and the <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6707118/coronavirus-spanish-flu-comparison/">1918 flu pandemic</a> have drawn parallels to receding markets and the pandemic.</p>
<p>Concerns over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/russian-media-spreading-covid-19-disinformation">coronavirus being a bioweapon have flourished</a>, despite being a novel, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0820-9">naturally occurring pathogen</a> dispersed globally though free trade and international travel. </p>
<p>However, an equally dangerous incident involving bioterrorism should not be ignored. </p>
<p>The pandemic’s effect on the world isn’t a conventional attack on government targets or the military. Rather, it’s a widespread and indiscriminate attack on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225">global citizens and the economy</a>. This outbreak has directly impacted the lives of billions of people, making it the most effective model for future terrorist activities and a new model for circumventing the conventions of modern warfare.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lWOYj8hjjjM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A discussion between biowarfare experts on COVID-19.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Striking at international vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>An act of bioterrorism could have the same effect on our lives and the economy. Terrorist organizations actively seek to cripple a target economy through the employment of simple technologies in coordinated and sophisticated attacks on key infrastructure. This has normally ranged between simple targeted shootings and improvised explosives but can also include biochemical weapons such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/chemical-weapons-found-in-mosul-in-isis-lab-say-iraqi-forces">mustard gas</a>. </p>
<p>Locally, we are aware that Canada’s economy is especially vulnerable to sudden global shockwaves. This is largely because of our subsistence on resource development projects like oil and natural gas, and our <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/house-speaker-pelosi-announces-agreement-on-north-american-trade-pact-to-replace-nafta">bottle-necked relationships with the United States</a>. </p>
<p>A little less than 10 per cent of Canada’s economy is dependent on mining, agriculture and <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610043403">resource extraction</a>, combined with another 10 per cent contributed by manufacturing. A strike to any of these industries would ripple insecurities across the country and hurt a fifth of Canada’s GDP. </p>
<p>For instance, a key infrastructure in Canada is the rail corridor that operates from coast-to-coast. The corridor is already overburdened with the transport of crude oil and mired in <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/rail-slow-down-impact-1.5457262">rail derailments</a> that cause disruptions to the national economy. The combined price drop in oil and the Canadian National Rail blockades initiated by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51550821">Wet’suwet’en solidarity movement</a> against the Coastal GasLink Pipeline created <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tasker-teck-frontier-future-oilsands-1.5475658">market volatility</a> and invariably shutdown Canada’s ability to transport goods, causing <a href="https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/business/reuters/canada-loses-record-2-million-jobs-temporary-layoffs-add-more-pain-447387/">temporary layoffs</a> and concern from <a href="https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/choke-point-how-the-blockade-movement-has-sent-tremors-across-canadas-economy-and-beyond">foreign investors</a> developing the project. </p>
<p>Although the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rail-blockades-economic-impact-1.5497236">economic impact</a> of the blockades was low compared to the pandemic, the effect of disruption is important. It demonstrates the ease with which foreign and domestic terrorists can operate to undermine Canadian sovereignty and stability by targeting a few, important Canadian industries. </p>
<p>The effect of the blockades stalling trade and forcing <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/cn-employees-heading-back-to-work-after-temporary-layoffs-as-blockades-wind-down-1.4836665">temporary layoffs</a> is similar in consequence to the imposed self-isolation preventing Canadians from working, generating income and consuming commodities.</p>
<p>Consistent <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/coronavirus-plunges-canadas-economy-into-the-abyss/">unemployment</a> and spending reductions in Canada can also produce a snowball effect that inches towards recession. Regardless of its size, a targeted attack can disrupt a nation enough to create instability and panic, which is the intent of terrorist groups that cannot compete equally with industrially backed, modern militaries.</p>
<h2>Opportunity and expertise</h2>
<p>The feasibility of designing and dispersing biological weapons varies in difficulty depending on the biological agent in question. For instance, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/index.html"><em>Bacillus anthracis</em></a>, an exceptionally deadly and versatile pathogenic bacterium that causes the disease anthrax, is naturally occurring in the environment and can infect humans and animals. Anthrax has recently emerged from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/09/reindeer-to-be-culled-in-russias-far-north-due-to-anthrax-outbreak">thawing permafrost due to the effects of climate change</a>, and manages to persist in harsh climates and environments demonstrating its versatility. </p>
<p>Acquiring anthrax is relatively easy and its highly infectious spores can enter the body through inhalation of aerosols or ingestion via contaminated water supplies. Consequently, anthrax is considered one of the leading <a href="https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321030#Bioterrorism:-Modern-concerns">potential bioweapons</a>. In 2001, five people in the United States died after receiving mail contaminated with anthrax — <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded">no one was caught or charged</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332970/original/file-20200506-49546-1nh3dl7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A petri dish culture of anthrax.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flickr.com/photos/agrilifetoday/5572287792/in/photolist-9upr2s-5kRz8-Wk27gW-5kRJ3-5kRxh-5kRDV-5kRPD-5kRAq-5kRFW-5kRKu-5kRGR-5kREP-5kRCu-5kRyn-5kRtD-5kRug-5kRv2-5kRMp-5kRBw-5kRwf-erjMB-cYAYg-pHUJ6X-o7JvJg-6HBYEX-o7Jvyg-6HBYEF-nNsNny-o3UYR9-nNsZVn-o3UYWQ-o5QNay-o7JvsV-nNtLNr-o3UZ6C-o5XsRR-o7Jvzt-o3UYTJ-6HBYF6-6HBYFc-6HBYFv-aDSq1a-61Nmq2-aDWhNW-KaEYay-dQfZ5-aDWhQJ-aDWhKA-aDSpPk-aDSpTX">(Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory/flickr)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Conversely, the employment of synthetic biology to engineer novel bioweapons from pre-existing pathogens using <a href="https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/synthetic-biology/Synthetic-biology-enable-bioweapons-development/96/i26">CRISPR or DNA synthesis</a> is far more demanding in terms of laboratory requirements and expertise. </p>
<p>The manipulation and handling of these agents have been made more accessible by biotechnology companies competing aggressively for the attention of academic, corporate and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/21/3d-printing-offer-developing-savings-replica-kit">government funding</a>. </p>
<p>With strict deadlines and finite resources, researchers value methods that provide reproducible and reliable results. This has been especially encouraging for the development of new technologies like <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/mail-order-crispr-kits-allow-absolutely-anyone-to-hack-dna/">CRISPR</a>, whose competitive market has made gene-editing accessible and cost effective. </p>
<p>Researchers have also supplemented their laboratories <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07853-5">3D-printed equipment</a>, making complex instruments that were once costly and out-of-reach easily accessible to anyone interested in biotechnology. This allows the convenient development of weapons to occur anywhere from stringent, regulated laboratories to remote facilities and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/fernandezelizabeth/2019/09/19/yes-people-can-edit-the-genome-in-their-garage-can-they-be-regulated/#7ff06edd768b">even in one’s own garage</a>. </p>
<p>While countries like the U.S. and <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/biological/">Russia</a> inherited advanced biological weapons programmes from the Cold War, rogue nations like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/science/north-korea-biological-weapons.html">North Korea</a> and terrorist organisations like <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26369585">al-Qaida</a> are actively seeking to develop programs and infrastructure for their own use and deterrence against foreign interference. With easily obtainable and simple technologies, the ability to invest in an underground bioweapons program is widely available. </p>
<p>All that is necessary to bridge the gap is talent. </p>
<p>A common myth appears to exemplify terrorist members as being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/islamic-state-recruits-world-bank-study-education-boko-haram">uneducated individuals</a>. However, at its peak, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) recruited a variety of educated professionals ranging from <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/why-do-so-many-jihadis-have-engineering-degrees/">engineers</a> to <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/recruiting-professionals-doctors-join-the-isis-fight-1.2295241">medical doctors</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jan/29/bureaucracy-evil-isis-run-city-mosul">ISIS operated</a> in the Middle East as any nation state would, with municipal bureaucracies, tax collection, road-building, infrastructural developments and hospitals. </p>
<p>Terrorist organizations tend to have the same infrastructural and scientific capabilities as modern industrial nations, allowing them to potentially develop biochemical arsenals. The infrastructure requirements for biological weapons programs are also made easier by being <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/03/thank-goodness-nukes-expensive-complicated/">comparatively cheaper and more versatile than a nuclear arsenal</a>. This is largely because they can be masked by developments in medical industry, health and <a href="https://cosmosmagazine.com/biology/researchers-fear-us-agricultural-research-masks-bioweapons-development">agricultural research</a>. </p>
<h2>United against future threats of bioterrorism</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, the threat of bioterrorism requires countries to work together proactively and develop collective strategies to thwart the next deliberate — or even unintended — outbreak. The challenge wouldn’t just be about ensuring global compliance with the <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention/">United Nations Biological Weapons Convention</a>. Rather, nations will need to re-evaluate how they manage the business of biotechnologies to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands. This would involve a tough foreign policy and trust-based relationships with allies to share data on potential insecurities and risk personnel. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, governments and international agencies will need to work collaboratively on medical research science, since we’ve learned from our shared experience with coronavirus that outbreaks don’t just affect one nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trushar R. Patel receives funding from the Canada Research Chair Program. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Hilary D'Souza receives funding from Canada Research Chair Program in conjunction with Trushar Patel. </span></em></p>As the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates global economic and health insecurities, opportunities to emulate the pandemic’s effects with bioweapons affords terrorists a new model.Trushar R. Patel, Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair, Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University of LethbridgeMichael Hilary D'Souza, Masters Student, Biomolecular Interactions and Biophysical Modelling of RNA viruses, University of LethbridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1208792019-07-26T13:03:48Z2019-07-26T13:03:48ZNo, Lyme disease is not an escaped military bioweapon, despite what conspiracy theorists say<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285644/original/file-20190724-110195-7h3jyk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=382%2C48%2C3206%2C2344&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ticks could spread weaponized bacteria – but _B. burgdorferi_ that causes Lyme isn't one of them.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kelvin Ma/Tufts University</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Could Lyme disease in the U.S. be the result of an accidental release from a secret bioweapons experiment? Could the military have specifically engineered the Lyme disease bacterium to be more insidious and destructive – and then let it somehow escape the lab and spread in nature? </p>
<p>Is this why <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/lyme/stats/humancases.html">300,000 Americans are diagnosed annually</a> with this potentially debilitating disease?</p>
<p>It’s an old conspiracy theory currently enjoying a resurgence with lots of sensational <a href="https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/House-orders-Lyme-disease-investigation-14109717.php">headlines</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/SITSSHOW/status/1153998823011823616">tweets</a>. Even Congress has ordered that the <a href="https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/house-orders-pentagon-report-whether-weaponized-ticks">Pentagon must reveal whether it weaponized ticks</a>.</p>
<p>And it’s not true.</p>
<p>Ticks can indeed carry infectious agents that could be used as biological weapons. Military research has long <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a221956.pdf">focused on ticks</a>. Sites around Long Island Sound, near the military’s Plum Island research lab, were some of the first places where the American Lyme disease epidemic was identified.</p>
<p>But there was no release of the Lyme disease agent or any other onto American soil, accidental or otherwise, by the military.</p>
<p>I started working on Lyme disease in 1985. As part of my doctoral thesis, I investigated whether museum specimens of ticks and mice contained evidence of infection with the bacterial agent of Lyme disease prior to the first known American human cases in the mid 1970s. </p>
<p>Working with microbiologist <a href="http://www.cepheid.com/us/about-us/news-events/events/18-site-pages-us/about-us/14-board-of-directors">David Persing</a>, we found that ticks from the South Fork of Long Island <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.2402635">collected in 1945 were infected</a>. Subsequent studies found that mice from Cape Cod, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/170.4.1027">collected in 1896, were infected</a>.</p>
<p>So decades before Lyme was identified – and before military scientists could have altered or weaponized it – the bacterium that causes it was living in the wild. That alone is proof that the conspiracy theory is wrong. But there are plenty of other lines of evidence that show why Lyme disease did not require the human hand changing something Mother Nature had nurtured.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285750/original/file-20190725-136749-1gpzbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ticks and the diseases they spread can do just fine without being altered in the lab as weapons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Thriving-Ticks/38cfe58d17fc4edeba3199c45ada7609/1/0">AP Photo/Robert F. Bukaty</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lyme is an unlikely bioweapon</h2>
<p>I teach a graduate course in biodefense. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.embor.embor849">Biowarfare</a>, the use of biological agents to cause harm, was once an interest of the U.S. military and that of many other countries.</p>
<p>One of the most important characteristics of a biowarfare agent is its ability to quickly disable target soldiers. The bacteria that cause Lyme disease are not in this category.</p>
<p>Many of the agents that biowarfare research has focused on are transmitted by ticks, mosquitoes, or other arthropods: plague, tularemia, Q fever, Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, Eastern equine encephalitis or Russian spring summer encephalitis. In all of them, the early disease is very debilitating, and the fatality rate can be great; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciy923">30% of Eastern equine encephalitis cases die</a>. <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Rats-Lice-and-History/Zinsser/p/book/9781412806725">Epidemic typhus killed 3 million people</a> during World War I.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nrdp.2016.90">Lyme disease</a> does make some people very sick but many have just a flu-like illness that their immune system fends off. Untreated cases may subsequently develop arthritis or neurological issues. The disease is rarely lethal. Lyme has a weeklong incubation period – too slow for an effective bioweapon.</p>
<p>And, even though <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/archderm.1962.01590100024007">European physicians had described cases</a> of Lyme disease in the first half of the 20th century, the cause had not been identified. There was no way the military could have manipulated it because they did not know what “it” was. None of us knew – until 1981, when the late <a href="https://irp.nih.gov/blog/post/2015/02/the-great-willy-burgdorfer-1925-2014">Willy Burgdorfer, a medical entomologist</a>, made his serendipitous discovery.</p>
<h2>Burgdorfer’s discovery of the Lyme bacterium</h2>
<p>Burgdorfer had done his graduate studies in Switzerland in the late 1940s, investigating the biology of <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/relapsing-fever/index.html">tick-borne relapsing fever</a>, a bacterial disease that can spread from animals to people. During the course of that work, he developed new methods to detect infection in ticks and to infect ticks with specific doses of a pathogen. Those methods are still used today by people like me.</p>
<p>Eventually, Burgdorfer moved to the Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Montana, an outpost of the U.S. Public Health Service and National Institutes of Health – at the time, the <a href="https://archive.org/stream/rockymountainspo00hard/rockymountainspo00hard_djvu.txt">world center for tick research</a></p>
<p>Burgdorfer’s unique expertise was studying how microbial agents were adapted to the internal tissues of their tick hosts, using experimental infections and microscopy. Until Lyme disease came along, his reputation was as the world’s expert on the life cycle of <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/rmsf/index.html">Rocky Mountain spotted fever</a> (RMSF).</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285636/original/file-20190724-110195-fbytw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Burgdorfer at the microscope.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/historyatnih/33713226946">NIH</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was RMSF that led Burgdorfer to the cause of Lyme disease. He had been working to better understand RMSF on Long Island in New York. Why were dog ticks, the acknowledged vector, uninfected even in areas where people were getting sick? He knew that a new tick, the deer tick, had recently become common on Long Island and been incriminated as a disease vector.</p>
<p>So Burgdorfer asked his colleague <a href="https://renaissance.stonybrookmedicine.edu/mgm/program/faculty/benach">Jorge Benach at Stony Brook University</a> for some deer ticks to test for the presence of RMSF bacteria. Benach happened to have some from nearby Shelter Island that he sent along.</p>
<p>In testing the “blood” of the deer ticks, Burgdorfer did not find RMSF bacteria. But he did <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6516454">find spiral-shaped bacteria</a> called spirochetes. The spirochetes were very similar to what he had studied as a graduate student: the cause of relapsing fever. If spirochetes caused relapsing fever, perhaps other spirochetes were responsible for the mysterious new Lyme arthritis for which a cause was not known.</p>
<p>This ah-ha moment led to the landmark 1982 paper in Science with a question for a title: “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7043737">Lyme disease – a tick-borne spirochetosis?</a>”</p>
<h2>Conspiracy theory can’t account for the facts</h2>
<p>Some have overanalyzed the fact that Lyme disease spirochetes were first found in ticks from New York’s Shelter Island, right next to Plum Island, an isolated facility used as a military research lab <a href="https://dmna.ny.gov/forts/fortsT_Z/terryFort.htm">until 1954</a>.</p>
<p>But it was just a coincidence that Benach’s Shelter Island ticks were the ones in which Burgdorfer made his serendipitous finding. By 1984, once researchers knew what to look for, Lyme disease spirochetes were found in ticks from coastal <a href="https://doi.org/10.4269/ajtmh.1983.32.818">Connecticut</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.6710158">New Jersey</a> and even <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2590008/">California</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285752/original/file-20190725-136759-11tsqq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The research center on Plum Island focuses on animal diseases that could damage the agroeconomy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-Domestic-News-New-York-United-/4fa54deae2e6da11af9f0014c2589dfb/2/0">AP Photo/Ed Betz</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But let’s pretend the military started working immediately on the newly found agent of Lyme disease in 1981. That’s long after Fort Terry on Plum Island was repurposed in 1954 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/plum-island-animal-disease-center">study exotic animal diseases</a>. It’s also after President <a href="https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm-35.pdf">Richard Nixon outlawed biowarfare research</a> in 1969. If the bacteria was manipulated, it had to have been done after 1981 – so the conspiracy theory’s timeline just doesn’t work. </p>
<p>The real nail in the coffin for the idea that Lyme disease in the U.S. was somehow accidentally released from military bioweapons research is to be found in the fact that the first American case of Lyme disease turns out not to have been from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/art.1780200102">Old Lyme, Connecticut, in the early 1970s</a>. In 1969, a physician identified <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/asrchderm.1970.04000070106017">a case in Spooner, Wisconsin</a>, in a patient who had never traveled out of that area. And Lyme disease was found infecting people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/archderm.1978.01640140071018">in 1978 in northern California</a>. </p>
<p>How could an accidental release take place over three distant locations? It couldn’t.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1128/AEM.01704-09">Population genetics research on <em>Borrelia burgdorferi</em></a>, the bacterial agent of Lyme disease, suggest that the northeastern, Midwestern and Californian bacteria are separated by geographical barriers that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01001.x">prevent these populations from mixing</a>. Had there been a lab strain, particularly one engineered to be more transmissible, that escaped within the last 50 years, there <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-017-0282-8">would be greater genetic similarity</a> between these three geographic populations. There is no evidence for a recent single source – such as a release from a lab – for Lyme disease spirochetes.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jipm/pmx024">real reasons for the epidemic</a> becoming so burdensome include reforestation, suburbanization and a failure to manage deer herds.</p>
<p>Conspiracy thinkers make much of the military’s interest in tick-borne infections and how it influenced top researchers. Until Lyme disease came along, the number of tick laboratories in the world could be counted on both hands. As an acknowledged expert on ticks and the infections they transmit, it’s surely possible that Willy Burgdorfer received funding from the military, undertook studies for them, or was consulted by them. They were one of the few sources of research funds for tick projects in the period from 1950 to 1980. The overarching <a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/afpmb/aboutus.html">goal of such applied work</a> would have been understanding the tick-related risks American soldiers faced while deployed, and how to protect them.</p>
<p>That Burgdorfer alluded to biowarfare or biodefense programs in interviews toward the end of his life should not be construed as an admission of participation in top-secret work. I met Burgdorfer several times and was struck by his wry sense of humor. It’s my guess that his hints that there was a bigger story to what he did for the military was a prankster’s way to toy with the interviewer.</p>
<figure>
<iframe src="https://player.vimeo.com/video/337357253" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" webkitallowfullscreen="" mozallowfullscreen="" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Sam Telford provides tips on avoiding tick-borne infections.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As someone who has worked for more than three decades to understand the epidemiology and ecology of Lyme disease in order to reduce the risk of Americans getting infected, I am appalled that this conspiracy theory is taken so seriously that Congress is now involved. The idea that Lyme disease is due to bioweapons research gone wrong is easily disproven. Our legislators could better spend their time fighting for efforts to prevent disease instead of investigating a far-fetched story that’s based on misinterpretation and innuendo.</p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=thanksforreading">Thanks for reading! We can send you The Conversation’s stories every day in an informative email. Sign up today.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120879/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Telford is currently supported by research funding from the National Institutes of Health and from the Rainwater Foundation. He consults for diverse companies on tick-borne disease diagnostics and prevention. The opinions expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect those who provide support for his research, nor of those for whom he consults. He has been a registered Republican voter for many years.</span></em></p>Scientists know the bacterium that causes Lyme disease has been out in the wild since long before any biological weapons research could have focused on it. And that’s just for starters.Sam Telford, Professor of Infectious Disease and Global Health, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1206382019-07-22T16:03:40Z2019-07-22T16:03:40ZThe US has a history of testing biological weapons on the public – were infected ticks used too?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285099/original/file-20190722-11339-juoof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lyme disease: beware what bites you this summer. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU2MzgxNjE5MiwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfNTM3NTE4NDIyIiwiayI6InBob3RvLzUzNzUxODQyMi9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJnUTJKd0sxRFNTQmlZM3VXekpkSzMxbmdjbTQiXQ%2Fshutterstock_537518422.jpg&ir=true&pi=33421636&m=537518422&src=y4ydMMXvbg4kDuYXj3RjTA-1-7">AnastasiaKopa/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The House of Representatives <a href="https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_lyme_ig_amendment.pdf">has instructed the Pentagon</a> to disclose whether it used ticks to infect the American public with Lyme disease between 1950 and 1975. The allegation comes from <a href="https://chrissmith.house.gov/">Chris Smith</a>, the Republican representative for New Jersey. A long-standing campaigner on Lyme disease, Smith says the claims are from a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Bitten.html?id=lqxsDwAAQBAJ&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">new book</a> about the illness and the man who discovered it – a bioweapons scientist called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/health/willy-burgdorfer-who-found-bacteria-that-cause-lyme-disease-is-dead-at-89.html">Willy Burgdofer</a>.</p>
<p>There are issues with these allegations – not least that Burgdofer didn’t discover Lyme disease until 1982, almost a decade after it’s claimed the ticks may have been used. Other scientists have <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/lyme-bacterium-predates-us-labs-conspiracists-say-unleashed-ticks-public">dismissed the claims</a>, and there is no proof that they are true. </p>
<p>But the US does have a history of testing biological weapons on the public. </p>
<h2>A history of testing</h2>
<p>The US biological weapons programme started during World War II. But the first real public test didn’t happen until 1949, when scientists put harmless bacteria in the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/weapon-secret-testing/">air conditioning system at the Pentagon</a> to see what a biological weapon might look like.</p>
<p>A year later, the US Navy carried out <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003703226697496080">Operation Sea-Spray</a>. The coast of San Francisco in California was sprayed with two types of bacteria, <em>Bacillus globigii</em> and <em>Serratia marcesens</em>. These bacteria are supposed to be safe, but <em>Bacillus globigii</em> is now listed as a pathogen, causes food poisoning, and can hurt anyone with a weak immune system. As for <em>Serratia marcesens</em>, 11 people were admitted to hospital with serious bacterial infections after the San Francisco test. One of them – Edward Nevin – <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/1950-us-released-bioweapon-san-francisco-180955819/">died</a> three weeks later.</p>
<p>In 1951, tests were also carried out at the <a href="https://www.navsup.navy.mil/public/navsup/flcn/">Norfolk Naval Supply Center</a> in Virginia – a massive base that equips the US Navy. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/25/opinion/the-worry-germ-warfare-the-target-us.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=80649ED0E6CE7FAF2BE5E21074A947FB&gwt=pay">Fungal spores were dispersed</a> to see how they would infect workers unpacking crates there. Most of the workers were African-American and the scientists wanted to test a theory that they were more susceptible to fungal disease than Caucasians. </p>
<p>In 1997, the National Research Council revealed that the US also <a href="http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=5739">used chemicals</a> to test the potential of biological weapons in the 1950s. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK233494/">Zinc cadmium sulphide was dispersed</a> by plane and sprayed over a number of cities, including St Louis in Missouri and Minneapolis in Minnesota. These cites were chosen because they were similar to Soviet targets such as Moscow in terms of terrain, weather and population. The council concluded that no one was hurt and that the level of chemical used was not harmful, but in 2012, sociology professor Lisa Martino-Taylor <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/army-sprayed-st-louis-with-toxic-dust-2012-10?r=US&IR=T">claimed</a> that there was a spike in cancer rates that could be connected back to the chemicals, which she alleges were radioactive. Nothing has since emerged to back up her claims. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285105/original/file-20190722-11314-1hl70w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Planes were used to disperse chemicals over parts of the US in the 1950s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fairchild_C-119B_of_the_314th_Troop_Carrier_Group_in_flight,_1952_(021001-O-9999G-016).jpg">US Air Force via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As well as open air testing, the US military also has a record of weaponising infected insects. In 1954, for example, scientists carried out <a href="http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/biological/bigitch.pdf">Operation Big Itch</a>. The test was designed to find out if fleas could be loaded into bombs (they could). The tests happened just a few years after the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/7811949/Did-the-US-wage-germ-warfare-in-Korea.html">Soviets accused the US</a> of dropping canisters full of insects infected with chorea and the plague in Korea and China during the Korean War. This is something the US military denies as a “disinformation campaign”.</p>
<h2>Project 112</h2>
<p>There was a massive increase in testing in 1962 when then US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, authorised <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-410">Project 112</a>. The project expanded bioweapons testing and pumped new funds into research.</p>
<p>One of the more controversial tests took place in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/04/22/army-report-details-germ-war-exercise-in-ny-subway-in-66/70772a8b-8223-47de-99b4-876d5e57dd9c/?utm_term=.685b2d628f00">1966 on the New York subway</a>. Scientists filled light bulbs with <em>Bacillus globigii</em> bacteria and then smashed them open on the tracks. The bacteria travelled for miles around the subway system, being breathed in by thousands of civilians and covering their clothes.</p>
<p>In 2008, the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-366">US Government Accountability Office</a> acknowledged that tens of thousands of civilians might have been exposed to biological agents thanks to Project 112 and other tests. </p>
<p>The same report noted that, since 2003, the US defence department has been trying to identify which civilians had been exposed during Project 112 to let them know. The military denies this exposure involved any harmful disease, but many of those who have been identified allege they now suffer from <a href="https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=8399208&itype=NGPSID">long-term medical conditions</a>.</p>
<p>Whether the ongoing Congressional investigation reveals that there were infected ticks remains to be seen. Either way, it could shed some much-needed light on a secret programme that we still don’t know much about. It may also reveal more about the extent to which the American public was tested on without their knowledge and consent. Because while infected ticks may sound like something out of science fiction, if it were proven to be true, it wouldn’t be the first time the US did something like this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Bentley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Pentagon has been instructed by the House of Representatives to investigate whether ticks were infected with Lyme disease by the US military.Michelle Bentley, Reader in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/984172018-06-27T10:42:52Z2018-06-27T10:42:52ZSonic attacks: How a medical mystery can sow distrust in foreign governments<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224801/original/file-20180625-19399-1nx4p0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A sound vibration. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/vibrancy-572294320?src=jrrmJvBq7V0bLJ3otZy0Vg-1-4">By Steffen Ebert/shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent evacuation of a group of U.S. diplomatic personnel stationed in Guangzhou, China, revived concerns over an “attack” that originated in Havana in mid-2016. At that time, several U.S. individuals working at the American Embassy in Cuba became ill after hearing sounds in their residences similar to cicadas or being in a car with the windows rolled down. <a href="http://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.1742">The bizarre noises were accompanied by dizziness, headaches, hearing problems, visual focusing issues and cognitive impairments such as memory loss</a> and difficulty concentrating on their daily routines. </p>
<p>After the initial episode in Cuba, the U.S. Department of State, fearing that its personnel had been victims of some kind of “sonic attack,” sent the approximately 80 embassy employees for evaluation to the University of Miami. After the initial examinations, 24 were referred to the University of Pennsylvania Center for Brain Injury for further assessment. The symptoms related to the auditory functions were suspected to be the consequence of neurological damage. The Guangzhou-based Americans were also referred to this same center.</p>
<p>Around the same time as the Americans sought help, Canadian diplomats reporting similar symptoms also requested medical attention at their embassy in Cuba. The Canadian authorities did not immediately characterize the events as “attacks” or warn their citizens about traveling to Cuba. But in April 2018, the Canadian government ordered their diplomatic personnel stationed in Cuba to leave their families at home. A similar policy for diplomats’ families applies to service in Afghanistan and other countries classified as highly dangerous.</p>
<p>We study ethical, legal and political issues in medicine in Asia, Europe and Latin America and have followed the mystery of these “sonic attacks” closely. Based on our research, we recognize this incident as another example of a mysterious disease used to stir tensions between countries. </p>
<h2>‘Concussion without concussion’</h2>
<p>During their examinations, the Penn physicians found that those evacuated from Cuba had symptoms consistent with a mild cranial trauma or a “brain concussion.” In the words of one of the Penn physicians, Douglas Smith, <a href="https://www.medpagetoday.com/neurology/generalneurology/71180">“This is really concussion without concussion.”</a> In <a href="http://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.1742">a paper published in March 2018</a> in the Journal of the American Medical Association, the Penn physicians downplayed hypotheses that the symptoms were caused by a poison or were the results of <a href="http://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.1751">mass hysteria.</a> </p>
<p>They left open the possibility that some new and previously unknown weapon may have targeted the affected individuals and caused this unexpected collection of symptoms. <a href="http://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.1780">An editorial in JAMA</a> that accompanied the Penn authors’ paper was more skeptical. The Trump administration’s statements have been unhelpful at best, and the FBI’s investigators have questioned the notion of “sonic attacks” and think the injuries were induced <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/us-claims-workers-cuba-may-have-been-attacked-virus-if-not-sonic-weapons-776429">by a virus</a>, though none were detected in the examinations conducted by the Miami or Penn physicians. And that was before the reports from China.</p>
<p>A joint technical <a href="https://spqr.eecs.umich.edu/papers/YanFuXu-Cuba-CSE-TR-001-18.pdf">report</a> in March 2018 from the University of Michigan Computer Science and Engineering Department and the Zhejiang University Department of Science and Engineering reported that they had “reverse engineered” the odd sounds described by the U.S. personnel. The engineers experimented with several ultrasound devices that produced ultrasonic signals at different frequencies – signals that interfered with each other and could have produced the sounds associated with the symptoms experienced by the U.S. personnel. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=627&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224800/original/file-20180625-19421-10bwj0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The large round black disk mounted on the police vehicle in NYC is a Long Range Acoustic Device that is louder than a bullhorn and used for crowd control. The manufacturer says it is not a weapon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Were the embassy personnel and their families the unintended victims of <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-sound-be-used-as-a-weapon-4-questions-answered-83627">eavesdropping artifacts</a>? The engineers’ report doesn’t conclude that the attack was deliberate, but it is no secret that embassy personnel with sensitive jobs are targets of routine eavesdropping. In this case, the injurious results could have been accidental even if the spying was deliberate, with one spy agency unaware of what the other was doing, resulting in the sonic wave crossovers that the engineers were able to reproduce. </p>
<h2>Medical mysteries and political conflict</h2>
<p>These anomalous medical symptoms occurred in countries that continue to have a contentious relationship with the United States. Further ambiguities arise because these unexplained maladies require assessment by experts from different disciplines, which generates varied viewpoints. The ambiguous nature of the symptoms can result in findings that are inconclusive – sparking distrust between all the parties. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, the Cuban government dismissed allegations that these incidents involved deliberate attacks, noting the lack of scientific evidence of such actions. Through Granma, a Cuban newspaper (all newspapers circulating in Cuba are official organs of the Cuban government), <a href="http://www.granma.cu/mundo/2018-03-02/diez-razones-por-las-que-estados-unidos-deberia-normalizar-su-embajada-en-la-habana-02-03-2018-20-03-09">the Cuban government accused the U.S. administration</a> of using these alleged incidents as an excuse not to comply with a previous agreements that would allow 20,000 immigrant visas annually for Cubans willing to live in the U.S., reversing the approach initiated by the Obama administration. Chinese officials have said that they will respect their treaty obligations to protect diplomats if the United States requests their assistance. </p>
<p>All this takes place when international relations are in a delicate state. The allegations of “sonic attacks” on U.S. personnel in Cuba and now China present a perfect opportunity for governments to inflate unsubstantiated hypotheses to further their own political goals. </p>
<h2>Public health and propaganda</h2>
<p>Leaders have long been willing to exploit suspicions of dishonorable war mongering, especially when it was indeed possible that their adversaries were using biological tactics to harm national interests and undermine morale. Historically the principal examples were biological agents, often through crude means. George Washington suspected the British of unleashing smallpox on Boston during the Revolutionary War, helping to justify mass inoculation of his troops and fanning contempt for the crown. </p>
<p>During the Korean War, the Communist Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai charged that the United States dropped bombs with fleas infected with <em>Pasteurella pestis</em>, the bacteria that transmit the <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4334133-ISC-Full-Report-Pub-Copy.html">bubonic plague</a>. </p>
<p>Because the actual causes and sources of such alleged attacks are unclear and trigger fear and stigma, it is easy to use the threat of pandemic diseases and biowarfare as propaganda against enemies. In the 1980s, Soviet sources <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/us/politics/russian-disinformation-aids-fake-news.html">claimed</a> that the HIV/AIDS epidemic was a CIA plot. Fidel Castro also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/06/world/epidemic-in-cuba-sets-off-dispute-with-us.html">blamed the CIA</a> when, in 1981, an <a href="http://en.cubadebate.cu/news/2016/02/01/study-confirms-that-us-introduced-dengue-fever-cuba-1981/">outbreak of hemorrhagic dengue</a> in Cuba affected more than 30,000 individuals and killed about 150 people, mostly children. </p>
<p>Even under the best of circumstances governments may manipulate public perceptions of threats. But in the current political environment, with an administration that has shown disdain for science and the scientific method, leaving key science <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/scientists-facts-trump_us_58a6618ae4b045cd34c03260">adviser</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/climate/trump-administration-science.html">positions unfilled</a> – and a president who once <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en">described</a> climate change as a Chinese hoax and vaccination as <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/02/16/donald-trump-autism-vaccines/">causing autism</a> – the American public should be wary of what this administration says about these incidents, who perpetrated them, and why.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sergio Litewka received funding from Fogarty International Center; U.S. National Institutes of Health( FIC NIH )( 2008-2014) and from the U.S. Office of Research Integrity ( 2016-2017)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan D Moreno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A mystery disease that struck US personnel in Cuba and China triggered fears of a sonic weapon. But two experts argue that this is just about leveraging a medical mystery for political gain.Jonathan D Moreno, Professor of Ethics, University of PennsylvaniaSergio Litewka, Professor of Bioethics and Health Policy, University of MiamiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/957382018-05-23T09:54:39Z2018-05-23T09:54:39ZHow chemical weapons became taboo – and why they still are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220004/original/file-20180522-51091-1ik37l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">German troops near the front in 1915.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-R52907,_Mannschaft_mit_Gasmasken_am_Fla-MG.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world has witnessed two very different chemical weapons attacks in the last two months: in March, the assassination attempt against <a href="https://theconversation.com/sergei-skripal-and-the-long-history-of-assassination-attempts-abroad-93021">Sergei Skripal</a> in the British town of Salisbury, and then the Assad regime’s latest <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-latest-chemical-massacre-demands-a-global-response-94668">chemical strike</a> in Syria. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/novichok-the-deadly-story-behind-the-nerve-agent-in-sergei-skripal-spy-attack-93562">weapons</a> used in both cases are prohibited under international law, and their use indicates the breaking of a “taboo” which has provoked a swift and forceful response from the international community. </p>
<p>But why is this taboo still so powerful? After all, the Skripal poisoning was an assassination attempt, not a mass casualty attack, and fatalities in chemical attacks make up only a small proportion of the towering death toll in Syria’s calamitous eight-year-old civil war. Why does the use of chemical weapons provoke such a profound international reaction – and when did these weapons become “special”? </p>
<p>Chemicals have been used in various forms for centuries. They are not just deadly, but often invisible; they stand out due to the means in which they cause harm, the sheer scale on which they can be used, and their potential to cause long-term destruction and suffering.</p>
<p>Along with biological and nuclear weapons, chemical weapons have been labelled weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since 1946. The three types of WMD are perceived as a single distinct category of weapons by virtue of their ability to create lasting and indiscriminate harm. Labelling them as distinctively appalling has proved an effective device to galvanise international action to prevent their future use and proliferation.</p>
<p>But if this principle has held true for WMD in general, it was a new, modern opprobrium attached to chemical weapons that paved the way for the powerful stigma now attached to other weapons. Chemical warfare first began to attract a special moral condemnation during <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/chemical-weapons-warfare-remembrance-day-poison-mustard-gas-first-world-war-ypres-isis-a7005416.html">World War I</a>, when the world saw the horrendous effects of battlefield gas attacks. Immediately, chemical warfare was singled out as something new and different that demanded action.</p>
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<span class="caption">Soldiers drill in their gas masks during World War I.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:StateLibQld_2_202023_Soldiers_drill_in_their_gas_masks_during_World_War_I.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>Between the two wars, <a href="http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000313.pdf">scientific research</a> identified that chemical and bacteriological weapons had the potential to cause irreversible destruction on a scale not previously seen. At the time, mass-casualty bacteriological weapons (later termed biological weapons) remained largely hypothetical, but the potential use of pathogens as weapons was nonetheless deeply feared.</p>
<p>Both chemical and biological weapons can be used to target populations beyond the battlefield, thus highlighting their indiscriminate nature. Governments feared that technological innovation could lead to even more deadly methods of warfare. They were prohibited in 1925 by the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/">Geneva Protocol</a>, specifically the “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”.</p>
<h2>Never again?</h2>
<p>When nuclear weapons arrived on the world stage with the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, their horrendous effects were publicised around the world. Suddenly, millions of people were living in fear of mass casualty weapons.</p>
<p>Throughout the cold war years, the fear that nuclear war might <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FjgBBQFmGs">lead to the end of humankind</a> provoked international action to prevent their further development and use. But even though the nuclear threat was the dominant theme of the cold war, chemical and biological weapons never lost their stigma; it seems the fear of nuclear weapons in fact reinforced the fear of chemical and biological weapons.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, it became clear that the international proscription of chemical weapons had not succeeded. The world was subjected to nightmarish images from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War of people suffering from the effects of mustard gas, sarin and tabun. When Iraq used gas to massacre thousands of civilians at <a href="https://theconversation.com/haunted-by-the-smell-of-apples-28-years-on-kurds-weep-over-halabja-massacre-55979">Halabja</a> in 1988, the ensuing horror and moral outrage spurred the creation of the 1992 <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-century-after-wwi-gas-attacks-scientists-must-unite-against-chemical-weapons-40521">Convention on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons</a>. And once again, the norm that all WMD are different from other weapons was reinforced.</p>
<p>This is the history behind the international reaction towards the chemical attacks of recent months and years. Since the first gas attacks in Europe during World War I, every use of chemical weapons has immediately met with outrage – but it’s also tested the durability of the stigma these weapons bear. Of the three weapons categorised as WMD, chemical weapons are the most accessible. Should attacks become normalised as just another feature of warfare, there is the possibility that the stigma keeping their use in check will start to fade.</p>
<p>And should technological innovation produce some new category of weapon with the potential to create destruction over and above that of existing WMD, then perhaps the chemical warfare stigma will be eclipsed. But for the time being, the WMD we’ve come to fear remain in a class of their own – and that’s where they belong.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95738/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Shamai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The spectacle of thousands of soldiers gassed to death in France announced to the world that a new class of weapons had arrived.Patricia Shamai, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/912882018-02-07T00:03:26Z2018-02-07T00:03:26ZHow bombardier beetles survive being eaten – and other amazing animal defence mechanisms<p>In Disney’s film version of Pinnochio, the boy-puppet rescues his creator Geppetto by lighting a fire inside Monstro the whale, who has swallowed them both. The fire causes the whale to sneeze, freeing Pinnochio and Geppetto from their gastric prison.</p>
<p>Before you dismiss this getaway as incredible fantasy, consider that new research shows that a kind of fire in the belly can actually be an effective strategy for escaping predators in the real world. In fact, the animal kingdom is full of amazing examples of unusual defence mechanisms that help small creatures avoid a nasty fate.</p>
<p>In a new paper <a href="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rsbl.2017.0647">in Biology Letters</a>, scientists at Kobe University in Japan describe how bombardier beetles can survive being eaten by a toad by releasing a hot chemical spray that makes the hungry amphibian vomit.</p>
<p>Bombardier beetles are so-named because, when threatened, they emit a boiling, irritating substance from their backsides <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/422599.stm">with remarkable accuracy</a>, to deter potential predators. They produce the caustic mixture by <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/05/absurd-creature-of-the-week-bombardier-beetle/">combining hydrogen peroxide, hydroquinones and chemical catalysts</a> in a specially reinforced chamber at the base of their abdomen, which shields the beetle’s own organs from the resulting explosive reaction.</p>
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<p><a href="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rsbl.2017.0647">The Japanese researchers</a> fed two different species of bombardier beetles to captive toads. They were then able to confirm that the beetles used their weapon inside the toads by listening carefully for the explosive pop that accompanies each discharge. </p>
<p>Toads are ambush predators, quite used to swallowing first and asking questions later. When they start to feel a dose of diner’s remorse, they can literally turn <a href="https://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/how-to-heave-your-guts/">their stomachs inside out and scrape out the contents</a>, rather than suffering meekly from indigestion. Many of the toads in this experiment did just that, disgorging the beetles up to 107 minutes after ingestion. Remarkably, the ejected beetles all survived.</p>
<p>In a further experiment, the researchers poked beetles with forceps to deplete their spray reserves. Compared to those with full tanks of fuel, the exhausted beetles were much less likely to be ejected. This showed that it really was their chemical arsenals that saved them, rather than just their taste or behaviour in the gut.</p>
<figure> <img src="https://media.giphy.com/media/26DN4S3rQgsgvzEY0/giphy.gif"><figcaption>“I guess I’ll die another day.” Sugiura & Sato, Kobe University</figcaption></figure>
<p>The bombardier beetle is of course not the only animal escape artist. The diverse getaway tactics of animals are a testament to the fascinating creativity of evolution. Subject to millions of years of abuse and exploitation by predators, natural selection has shaped an array of ingenious strategies for cheating death in the face of would-be devourers.</p>
<h2>Animal Houdinis</h2>
<p>Some examples are probably familiar to most people. For instance, many lizards drop their tails to distract a predator or <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/59/8/728/256547">escape from its venom</a>. But others are more exotic. Sea cucumbers don’t have tails so they <a href="http://echinoblog.blogspot.ca/2012/01/sea-cucumber-evisceration-defense.html">eject and regenerate their internal organs instead</a>. Loud sounds (<a href="http://thatslifesci.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/2016-12-26-How-Pistol-Shrimp-Kill-With-Bubbles-AStrauss/">such as the “gunshots” of snapping shrimp</a>) and bright colours (as on <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/ebook.php?isbn=9780520952461">banded wing grasshoppers</a>) are also effective means of <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5742/afd010a4e1b889d1097f28f6f5741f10d33e.pdf">startling predators</a>. Mantid insects unite movement, sound and colour in an elaborate display that can stop an attack or at least give them a chance to escape.</p>
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<p>Some animals fight back, such as the frogs that can <a href="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/4/355">erect sharp bony splinters</a> from their claws that <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13991-horror-frog-breaks-own-bones-to-produce-claws/">pierce their own skin</a>, like X-Men’s Wolverine. Other animals, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098%252Frspb.2001.1708">the mimic octopus</a>, prefer to pretend to be being dangerous, <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/accumulating-glitches/the_mimic_octopus_master_of">adopting the appearance of more deadly prey</a> when threatened.</p>
<p>The stunning variety of defensive mechanisms would be impressive even if we only counted variations of chemical warfare, similar to the bombardier beetle’s steam treatment. There are the defensive toxins in <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/fish/group/pufferfish/">pufferfish</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150422-the-worlds-most-poisonous-animal">poison arrow frogs</a>, the nauseating <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12717282-900-science-the-seven-deadly-smells-of-a-skunk/">odours of skunks</a>, the charmingly named but actually revolting <a href="http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150623-millipedes-use-chemical-weapons">repugnatorial glands of some millipedes</a>, and the <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/vomit-bird-throws-defense-predators-eurasian-roller-nestlings-emit-foul-smelling-fluid-protection-article-1.1037423">projectile vomiting</a> and <a href="https://wildfowl.wwt.org.uk/index.php/wildfowl/article/view/562">faecal egg decorating</a> of some birds.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205061/original/file-20180206-14107-1lzimnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">I wouldn’t eat me if I were you.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/strawberry-poison-dart-frog-dendrobates-pumilio-110478725?src=wsqFvxedepyW5_6CPNI-NQ-1-3">Maiquez/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Why should nature have created such an impressive array of defensive tactics? One possible explanation can be summarised as the <a href="http://evosophos.com/life-dinner-principle/">life-dinner principle</a>, articulated by biologists <a href="http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/205/1161/489">Richard Dawkins and John Krebs in the late 1970s</a>. The argument is that predator and prey often face asymmetrical selection pressures, meaning that the stakes are different for the two competitors. If a predator fails to capture its target, it loses dinner, but if the prey fails to escape, it loses its life. Because the stakes are greater for prey, we shouldn’t be surprised they have developed so many impressive defences.</p>
<p>Understanding nature’s tremendous capacity to adapt should make us be careful. Humans interact with other organisms all the time, and usually we’re the predators. When we try to take action against other creatures to stop them spreading disease or eating crops, we should be mindful that evolutionary innovation can produce remarkable adaptations. For example, our widespread use of <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/lifestyle/2018/february-3rd/high-levels-of-antibiotic-resistance-found-worldwide-who.php">antibiotics</a> and <a href="https://guardian.ng/features/malaria-cases-rise-as-insecticide-resistance-spreads/">pesticides</a> has spurred the evolution of organisms that are resistant to these methods.</p>
<p>Only by having a healthy respect for the relentless power of evolution can we hope to generate sustainable solutions to these kinds of problems. If we grow complacent and inattentive, we may some day soon find ourselves facing newly evasive diseases and pests, sputtering to breathe and dyspeptic amid all the fire and smoke in our bellies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luc Bussiere does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Meet the brawny bug with a concoction so caustic it’ll make a toad vomit.Luc Bussiere, Lecturer in Biological Sciences, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/821872017-08-31T09:58:20Z2017-08-31T09:58:20ZCould gene editing tools such as CRISPR be used as a biological weapon?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181518/original/file-20170809-11491-1e8qgqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bioterrorism exercise.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Oregon National Guard/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The gene editing technique CRISPR has been in the limelight after scientists reported they had <a href="https://theconversation.com/scientists-edit-human-embryos-to-safely-remove-disease-for-the-first-time-heres-how-they-did-it-81925">used it to safely remove disease</a> in human embryos for the first time. This follows a “<a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/341/6148/833">CRISPR craze</a>” over the last couple of years, with the number of academic publications on the topic growing steadily.</p>
<p>There are good reasons for the widespread attention to CRISPR. The technique allows scientists to “cut and paste” DNA more <a href="https://www.labor-spiez.ch/pdf/en/Report_on_the_second_workshop-5-9_September_2016.pdf">easily</a> than in the past. It is being applied to a number of different peaceful areas, ranging from cancer therapies to the control of disease carrying insects. </p>
<p>Some of these applications – such as the engineering of mosquitoes to resist the parasite that causes malaria – effectively involve tinkering with ecosystems. CRISPR has therefore generated a number of ethical and safety concerns. Some also worry that applications being explored by <a href="https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-09-07">defence organisations</a> that involve “responsible innovation in gene editing” may send worrying signals to other states.</p>
<p>Concerns are also mounting that gene editing could be used in the development of biological weapons. In 2016, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/18/bill-gates-warns-tens-of-millions-could-be-killed-by-bio-terrorism">Bill Gates remarked</a> that “the next epidemic could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist intent on using genetic engineering to create a synthetic version of the smallpox virus”. More recently, in July 2017, John Sotos, of Intel Health & Life Sciences, stated that gene editing research could “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jul/31/bioweapons-cancer-moonshot-gene-editing">open up the potential for bioweapons of unimaginable destructive potential</a>”.</p>
<p>An annual <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/600774/top-us-intelligence-official-calls-gene-editing-a-wmd-threat/">worldwide threat assessment report</a> of the US intelligence community in February 2016 argued that the broad availability and low cost of the basic ingredients of technologies like CRISPR makes it particularly concerning.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184169/original/file-20170831-22629-158eog3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=570&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smallpox virus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CDC/ Fred Murphy</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, one has to be careful with the hype surrounding new technologies and, at present, the security implications of CRISPR are <a href="https://www.labor-spiez.ch/pdf/en/Report_on_the_second_workshop-5-9_September_2016.pdf">probably modest</a>. There are easier, cruder methods of creating terror. CRISPR would only get aspiring biological terrorists so far. Other steps, such as growing and disseminating biological weapons agents, would typically be required for it to become an effective weapon. This would require additional skills and places CRISPR-based biological weapons beyond the reach of most terrorist groups. At least for the time being. </p>
<p>This does not mean that the hostile exploitation of CRISPR by non-state actors can be ignored. Nor can one ignore the <a href="https://www.labor-spiez.ch/pdf/en/Report_on_the_second_workshop-5-9_September_2016.pdf">likely role</a> of CRISPR in any future state biological weapons programme.</p>
<h2>International efforts</h2>
<p>Fortunately, most states around the world regard biological warfare with particular abhorrence. There are already measures in place to prohibit and prevent the development of biological weapons. At the international level, this includes the <a href="https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument">Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</a>. Under this convention, states have agreed “never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons”. </p>
<p>This convention is imperfect and lacks a way to ensure that states are compliant. Moreover, it has not been adequately “tended to” by its member states recently, with the last major meeting unable to agree a further programme of work. Yet it remains the cornerstone of an international regime against the hostile use of biology. All 178 state parties <a href="https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/19831FF45AE88E89C12580D80038951C/$file/BWCCONF.VIII4+English+.pdf">declared in December of 2016</a> their continued determination “to exclude completely the possibility of the use of (biological) weapons, and their conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind”.</p>
<p>These states therefore need to address the hostile potential of CRISPR. Moreover, they need to do so collectively. Unilateral national measures, such as reasonable biological security procedures, are important. However, preventing the hostile exploitation of CRISPR is not something that can be achieved by any single state acting alone. </p>
<p>As such, when states party to the convention meet later this year, it will be important to agree to a more systematic and regular review of science and technology. Such reviews can help with identifying and managing the security risks of technologies such as CRISPR, as well as allowing an international exchange of information on some of the potential benefits of such technologies. </p>
<p>Most states supported the principle of enhanced reviews of science and technology under the convention at the last major meeting. But they now need to seize the opportunity and agree on the practicalities of such reviews in order to prevent the convention being left behind by developments in science and technology. </p>
<p>Biological warfare is not an inevitable consequence of advances in the life sciences. The development and use of such weapons requires agency. It requires countries making the decision to steer the direction of life science research and development away from hostile purposes. An imperfect convention cannot guarantee that these states will always decide against the hostile exploitation of biology. Yet it can influence such decisions by shaping an environment in which the disadvantages of pursuing such weapons outweigh the advantages.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Revill received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for his work on the Strategic Governance of Science and Technology (ES/K011324/1) and Science and Technology Reviews under the Biological Weapons Convention (RES-062-23-1192)</span></em></p>With rapid advances in gene editing, states signed up to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention need to do more to prevent CRISPR from becoming a dangerous weapon.James Revill, Associate Fellow, SPRU, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/754842017-04-10T13:19:01Z2017-04-10T13:19:01ZWhy efforts to secure a deal on banning all nuclear weapons are so important<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163308/original/image-20170330-4557-1ggub4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week negotiations to ban nuclear weapons started in <a href="http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/negotiations/">New York</a>. The talks came as a result of United Nations General Assembly <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/258">resolution</a> adopted in December last year.</p>
<p>The resolution takes forward multilateral negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament. </p>
<p>States started negotiations on <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-united-states-presents-the-baruch-plan">nuclear disarmament</a> in 1946, a year after the atom bombs were <a href="http://zazenlife.com/2011/12/29/the-after-effects-of-the-atomic-bombs-on-hiroshima-nagasaki/">dropped on Japan</a>. But the talks faltered as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-cold-war-anxieties-still-shape-our-world-today-65612">Cold War</a> <a href="http://www.dummies.com/education/history/american-history/warming-up-after-the-cold-war/">warmed up</a>. </p>
<p>Fearing that the spread of nuclear weapons would make those states that had them even more reluctant to give them up, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Weapons</a> was negotiated and entered into force in 1970. </p>
<p>The treaty was the first building bloc on the road to a world without nuclear weapons. It prevented states that didn’t have nuclear weapons before 1968 from acquiring them. And it prohibited states that had nuclear weapons from providing other states with them.</p>
<p>The non-proliferation obligation of the treaty has been exceptionally successful. Nuclear weapons have spread to only four other states since its inception. Today there are <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/01/06/nine-nations-possess-nuclear-weapns/78350588/">nine states with nuclear weapons</a>: the original five, namely the US, Russia, the UK, France and China. The other nuclear armed states are India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. They are not members of the nonproliferation treaty.</p>
<p>The non-proliferation obligation of the treaty should be seen in the context of <a href="http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html">Article VI</a> of that treaty, requiring all its members – including the five original nuclear weapon states – to negotiate in good faith general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, in other words, to negotiate a world without nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>This is the disarmament obligation of the treaty. Unfortunately, it stated no deadline for these negotiations. This legal loophole has been used by the nuclear weapon states to delay giving up their arsenals. </p>
<p>In fact, the treaty is disingenuously interpreted to suggest that the five original nuclear weapon states should be allowed to have these weapons, but not any other states. India has referred to this situation as <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1998-09-01/against-nuclear-apartheid">“nuclear apartheid” </a> and therefore refused to join the treaty.</p>
<p>For the first decade and a half after the treaty entered into force, the number and size of nuclear weapons in the arsenals, particularly the US’s and Russia’s, spiked to irrational levels. In the event of a <a href="http://www.globalzero.org/blog/how-many-nukes-would-it-take-render-earth-uninhabitable">nuclear war</a> they could destroy the world several times over </p>
<p>The end of the Cold War saw a decline in nuclear weapons, but there are still an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat">15 000</a> around and, worryingly, plans to modernise them. </p>
<p>As a co-sponsor of the resolution, South Africa is playing a key role in the negotiations. <strong>The country holds the moral high ground because it was the only country to voluntarily give up</strong> its <a href="http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html">nuclear weapons</a>. </p>
<h2>The Nuclear Ban Treaty</h2>
<p>Since 2010 states, civil society and individuals working for nuclear abolition engaged in what has come to be labelled the <a href="http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=2214">humanitarian initiative</a>. This aims to shift the focus from which states are “responsible” enough to have nuclear weapons to the fact that nuclear weapons are inhumane and illegitimate no matter who has them.</p>
<p>The International Committee of the Red Cross has been outspoken about the unspeakable <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/human-cost-nuclear-weapons">suffering and destruction</a> that a nuclear detonation by intent or accident would have.</p>
<p>Because nuclear fallout and radiation cannot be contained within the borders of a country, or for that matter a generation, nuclear disarmament is a matter for humanity at large.</p>
<p>Several precedents for banning inhumane weapons already exist, such as conventions banning <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/chemical/">chemical</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/">biological weapons</a> as well as the <a href="https://www.apminebanconvention.org/">antipersonnel mine ban treaty</a>.</p>
<p>For these reasons 113 states voted for the UN resolution to negotiate a nuclear weapons ban <a href="http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/voting-on-un-resolution-for-nuclear-ban-treaty/">last December</a>. Some observers are worried about the fact that 35 states voted against the resolution and <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/leads-boycott-talks-nuclear-weapons-ban-170327191952287.html">13 abstained</a>. Although 130 states joined the talks, more than 40 states, including those with nuclear weapons, are boycotting the negotiations.</p>
<h2>Important first step</h2>
<p>Some fear the boycott will mean that the ban treaty is a nonstarter. </p>
<p>But the ban treaty should be seen as an interim step to global denuclearisation. It’s the second building block towards a world free of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>It will create the political space to stigmatise nuclear weapons. Those who have them will come to feel increasingly isolated and on the wrong side of morality.</p>
<p>The aim of the ban treaty shouldn’t be to force nuclear armed states to give up their nuclear weapons. Rather, it should be to create an atmosphere in which they themselves understand that there’s no prestige, security or power in having these weapons.</p>
<p>Moreover, the ban will strengthen the so-called nuclear taboo that’s kept states from using nuclear weapons since 1945. </p>
<p>As an interim step, the nuclear ban treaty need not be a complicated legal document outlining the technicalities of, for example, verification measures.</p>
<p>For now the nonproliferation treaty provides a sufficient foundation for the nuclear ban treaty to draw on. The technical work would be the job of the third building bloc, a convention on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be negotiated with the nuclear armed states on board.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s activist position</h2>
<p>South Africa joined the nonproliferation treaty late. Given its international isolation under apartheid, it developed <a href="http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html">nuclear weapons</a> to blackmail western states to come to the regime’s rescue in case of an attack by the Soviet Union, which supported the armed struggle against apartheid.</p>
<p>Towards the closing years of apartheid, President FW de Klerk decided to dismantle South Africa’s nuclear weapons. Some observers argue that this was a racist move to ensure that nuclear weapons weren’t left in the hands of a black government. But the African National Congress came into power with a longstanding policy <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2012000200008">against nuclear weapons</a>, intent on using nuclear power for peaceful purposes only.</p>
<p>This policy was informed by an African and Non-Aligned Movement <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2011-2c64/nuclear-politics-and-the-non-aligned-movement-fce1">perspective </a>. South Africa therefore holds a special place in the nuclear order because it was the first state to voluntarily give up nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>The country’s nuclear diplomats built on this moral high ground and have worked tirelessly for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament since 1994, while ensuring access to peaceful nuclear technology. </p>
<p>The fact that the ban treaty negotiations are taking place despite opposition from the permanent members of the UN Security Council may even suggest a democratic turn in <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/04/a-transformational-moment-in-nuclear-international-affairs/">UN politics</a>. South Africa is working with like minded states and civil society on the front line to make this next step toward a world without nuclear weapons a reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joelien Pretorius receives funding from National Research Foundation. She is a member of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, an international civil society organisation working for arms control and world peace. </span></em></p>The treaty to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been exceptionally successful. Only nine states have them. Now, efforts are underway to completely rid the world of them.Joelien Pretorius, Associate Professor in Political Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/683372016-11-15T19:08:06Z2016-11-15T19:08:06ZAs the world pushes for a ban on nuclear weapons, Australia votes to stay on the wrong side of history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144977/original/image-20161108-4715-1i1447e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 70 years after the Hiroshima bombing, a majority of countries are pushing for a legally-binding treaty against nuclear weapons.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tim Wright/ICAN/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early December, the nations of the world are poised to take an historic step forward on nuclear weapons. Yet most Australians still haven’t heard about what’s happening, even though Australia is an important part of this story – which is set to get even bigger in the months ahead.</p>
<p>On October 27 2016, I watched as countries from around the world met in New York and <a href="http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/resolutions/L41.pdf">resolved</a> through the United Nations’ <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/">General Assembly First Committee</a> to negotiate a new legally binding treaty to “prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination”. It was carried by a <a href="http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/results/">majority of 123 to 38</a>, with 16 abstentions. Australia was among the minority to <a href="http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/eov/L41_Poland-etal.pdf">vote “no”</a>.</p>
<p>Given that overwhelming majority, it is almost certain that resolution will be formally ratified in early December at a full UN general assembly meeting. </p>
<p>After it’s ratified, international negotiating meetings will take place <a href="http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/resolutions/L41.pdf">in March and June-July 2017</a>. Those meetings will be open to all states, and will reflect a majority view: crucially, no government or group of governments (including <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/">UN Security Council members</a>) will have a veto. International and civil society organisations will also have a seat at the table.</p>
<p>This is the best opportunity to kickstart nuclear disarmament since the end of the Cold War a quarter of a century ago. And it’s crucial that we act now, amid a <a href="http://lab.arstubiedriba.lv/WMJ/vol62/3-october-2016/#page=8">growing threat of nuclear war</a> (as we discuss in the latest edition of the <a href="http://lab.arstubiedriba.lv/WMJ/vol62/3-october-2016/#page=1">World Medical Association’s journal</a>). </p>
<p>But the resolution was bitterly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/un-votes-to-start-negotiating-treaty-to-ban-nuclear-weapons">opposed</a> by most nuclear-armed states, including the United States and Russia. Those claiming “protection” from US nuclear weapons – members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization <a href="http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/">(NATO)</a>, and Japan, South Korea and Australia – also opposed the ban. This is because the treaty to be negotiated will fill the legal gap that has left nuclear weapons as the only weapon of mass destruction not yet explicitly banned by international treaty.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144982/original/image-20161108-4698-1vneo4n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">About 90% of the world’s nuclear warheads are owned by Russia and the United States.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 'Status of World Nuclear Forces', Federation of American Scientists. A regularly updated version of this is available here: http://bit.ly/2fz9ONt</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like the treaties that ban <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/">biological</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/chemical/">chemical</a> weapons, <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/aplc/">landmines</a> and <a href="http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F27A2B84309E0C5AC12574F70036F176?OpenDocument">cluster munitions</a>, a treaty banning nuclear weapons would make it clear that these weapons are unacceptable, and that their possession, threat and use cannot be justified under any circumstances. </p>
<p>It would codify in international law what UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said: “There are no right hands for the wrong weapons.”</p>
<h2>Why treaties are worthwhile – even when some refuse to join</h2>
<p>Of course, prohibiting unacceptable weapons is not the same as eliminating them entirely. So why bother? </p>
<p>Experience shows us that weapons treaties <em>can</em> make a difference – even when some countries refuse to sign, as we would expect (at least initially) with a treaty banning nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>For example, more than 80% of the world’s nations have signed on to the <a href="http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-in-detail/treaty-text.aspx">landmines ban treaty</a>. Even though the US is not among the signatories, it has still proudly declared itself to essentially be in compliance with the landmines treaty (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/statement-nsc-spokesperson-caitlin-hayden-anti-personnel-landmine-policy">except in the Korean Peninsula</a>) and plans to cease its production of cluster munitions. </p>
<p>Back in 1999, when the landmines ban first came into force, there were about 25 landmine casualties being reported every day around the world. According to the most <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2152583/Landmine-Monitor-2015_finalpdf.pdf">recent Landmine Monitor report</a>, those devastating landmines injuries and deaths have been reduced by 60%, to about 10 a day in 2014.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144980/original/image-20161108-4694-1tezoss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Since the landmine treaty came into force, fewer people are being killed or maimed by landmines.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iloasiapacific/8394370033/in/photolist-2iK7FR-hm8TUc-63Gsyf-2FqkrQ-c728iQ-2uWzv-jogn8-krjSZ-nH9RcQ-2iPvyG-2uWzn-63CcNB-2iPrbh-63GrYW-63CcHz-63GstL-2hNmDj-2uWoW-2uWiE-c72ads-2uWwD-hiTFjK-cGUtTj-9Nkxs-2uWwu-2uWwf-dMMkKP-2uWnA-6c5J7G-2uWni-2uWA2-hjU7Au-4HNoMV-as64SU-hjcMHE-2uWy8-reoy3-nx1zfP-6c1zta-2Tvx7j-2uWyU-hiTBVk-c72dwW-56gFNY-2uWwH-2uWz8-hiWT9m-4TaTxY-2uWnp-2TvweN">ILO in Asia and the Pacific/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Biological weapons haven’t been used by any government since the second world war. All countries except for North Korea have stopped nuclear test explosions, even though the <a href="http://www.state.gov/t/avc/c42328.htm">Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty</a> has not yet entered into force because key nuclear-capable countries have not yet signed up. </p>
<p>And when use of chemical weapons in Syria was confirmed by a UN investigation, Russia and the US forced the Syrian regime to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syria-talks.html">join the Chemical Weapons Convention</a>. Most – though tragically not yet all – of Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons has been destroyed. </p>
<h2>Australia’s role in fighting a nuclear weapon ban</h2>
<p>In voting “no”, Australia stuck out like a sore thumb among Asia-Pacific nations in at October’s UN committee meeting. All of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (<a href="http://asean.org/">ASEAN</a>) <a href="http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/">members</a> – including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand – as well as New Zealand and ten out of 12 Pacific island countries <a href="http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/results/">voted yes</a>.</p>
<p>Australia is signatory to all the key international treaties banning or controlling weapons. On some, like the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/chemical/">Chemical Weapons Convention</a>, Australia was a leader. Australia’s active opposition and efforts to undermine moves towards a treaty banning nuclear weapons stand in stark contrast. </p>
<p>Australia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/un-votes-to-start-negotiating-treaty-to-ban-nuclear-weapons">stated arguments</a> for opposing a ban treaty have varied, including that there are no “shortcuts” to disarmament; that only measures with the support of the nuclear-armed states are worthwhile; that a ban would damage the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, causing instability and deepening divisions between states with and without nuclear weapons; that it wouldn’t address North Korea’s threatening behaviour; and that it does not take account of today’s security challenges.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most extraordinary justification of Australia’s position came from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s first assistant secretary, Richard Sadleir, <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/aa4f0e69-697b-4d56-ad2a-ef0c34f8251d/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2016_10_20_4504.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/aa4f0e69-697b-4d56-ad2a-ef0c34f8251d/0000%22">who said</a> at a Senate estimates hearing on October 20, 2016:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is not an auspicious time to be pushing for a treaty of this sort. Indeed, in order to be able to effectively carry forward disarmament, you need to have a world in which there is not a threat of nuclear weapons and people feel safe and secure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Can anyone seriously imagine Australian officials arguing that we need to keep stockpiles of sarin nerve gas, plague bacteria, smallpox virus, or botulism toxin for deterrence, just in case, because we live in an uncertain world? </p>
<p>Yet that is what Australia continues to argue about nuclear weapons. Sadleir is saying that disarmament is only possible after it has happened, when we live in an impossibly perfect world. It’s a nonsensical argument that puts off nuclear disarmament indefinitely. </p>
<p>As revealed in <a href="http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FOI-DFAT-Sept2015.pdf">Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade internal documents</a>, released through a Freedom of Information request, the real reason that Australia opposes a ban treaty is that it would jeopardise our <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/australia-isolated-in-its-hesitation-to-sign-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons">reliance on US nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>How Australia can help with disarmament</h2>
<p>It’s 71 years since the Hiroshima bombing, and 46 years since the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">nuclear non-proliferation treaty</a> came into force, committing all governments to bring about nuclear disarmament. But that treaty is too weak: no disarmament negotiations are underway or planned. </p>
<p>Instead, every nuclear armed state is <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/nuclear-arsenals-current-developments-trends-and-capabilities?language=en">investing massively</a> in keeping and modernising their nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future. The US alone has said it plans to spend about <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49870">US$348 billion over the next decade</a> on its nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>Nations like Australia cannot eliminate weapons they don’t own. But they can prohibit them, by international treaty and in domestic law. And they can push other nations to do more to reduce threats to humanity – just as Australia has done with every other weapon of mass destruction.</p>
<p>An overwhelming majority of Australians have said in the past that they support a treaty banning nuclear weapons: 84% according to a <a href="http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NielsenPoll.pdf">2014 Nielsen poll</a> commissioned by the <a href="http://www.icanw.org/">International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons</a>, with only 3% opposed. </p>
<p>This is an issue that should be above party politics. In 2015, the Labor Party adopted a new national policy platform committing to support the negotiation of a global treaty banning nuclear weapons. At a public meeting in Perth last month, Bill Shorten said that a Labor government would support the UN resolution for a ban treaty.</p>
<p>In October 2016, our government let us down by voting to be counted on the wrong side of history. Thankfully, we can still expect to see the United Nations ratify the move towards a new treaty banning nuclear weapons in December, with negotiations set to begin in March 2017 in New York. It’s still not too late for Australia to change its vote, and participate constructively in the negotiations next year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68337/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tilman Ruff is a co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. He is also founding chair and current International Steering Group and Australian Committee member of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
</span></em></p>In early December, the nations of the world are poised to take an historic step on nuclear weapons. Yet Australia sticks out like a sore thumb among Asia-Pacific nations in arguing against change.Tilman Ruff, Associate Professor, International Education and Learning Unit, Nossal Institute for Global Health, School of Population and Global Health, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.