tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/carles-puigdemont-44703/articlesCarles Puigdemont – The Conversation2023-11-16T10:35:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177052023-11-16T10:35:24Z2023-11-16T10:35:24ZThe Spanish amnesty law for Catalonia separatists, explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559296/original/file-20231113-29-zf2m1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C0%2C5160%2C3445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A night of pro-independence protests in Barcelona.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/es/image-photo/night-independence-protests-barcelona-catalonia-1533938189">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Spain has undergone a period of great political uncertainty and upheaval since since <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-happening-in-spain-after-the-general-election-and-what-it-means-for-the-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu-210476">general elections</a> delivered an inconclusive result in July. </p>
<p>In order to hold on to power and gain support from regional parties, incumbent Socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez has made deals with various political forces. One of these is the controversial law that grants amnesty for those who faced criminal charges for their role in the Catalan independence <em>procés</em>, specifically with regard to two events: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Catalan_self-determination_referendum">the non-binding consultative referendum held on 9 November 2014</a> and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Catalan_independence_referendum">referendum held on 1 October 2017</a>.</p>
<p>There has been fierce debate in Spain regarding the constitutionality of the amnesty law. Among its beneficiaries is Junts Per Catalunya, the party of hard line separatist politician Carles Puigdemont, who will be able to return from exile as a result of the pardon. It has met with strong opposition from a very large segment of the general public, as well as the rightwing People’s Party and the far-right party Vox. </p>
<p>The law – entitled <a href="https://www.rtve.es/contenidos/documentos/leydeamnistia.pdf">organic amnesty law for institutional, political and social normalisation in Catalonia</a> – is being processed through urgent legislative channels, minimising the ability of parliamentarians to scrutinise it.</p>
<p>Its authors are evidently aware of the intense and sustained opposition to the measure, as they have taken special care to justify its adoption in an extensive <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-amnesty-bill-catalan-separatists-carles-puigdemont/">explanatory memorandum</a>. In this, they explain the law’s precedents, purpose, content and, above all, its constitutionality. </p>
<h2>Public interest or garnering support</h2>
<p>The acts covered by the bill are the following:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The organisation and execution of the 2014 and 2017 referendums.</p></li>
<li><p>Other possible offences connected with the referendums (including those committed before or afterwards). The Explanatory Memorandum mentions preparation for these events as an example.</p></li>
<li><p>Various protest actions in favour of allowing these events to take place, or that opposed the prosecution or conviction of those responsible. </p></li>
<li><p>Attendance, assistance, advising or representation of any kind.</p></li>
<li><p>Providing protection and security for those responsible.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The law grants amnesty for the following crimes, regardless of how or by whom they were committed: usurpation of public functions; embezzlement; acts of disobedience; public disorder; attacks against the authorities, their agents and public officials; misconduct committed with the intention of claiming, promoting or procuring the secession or independence of Catalonia.</p>
<p>The amnesty also applies to actions taken by police officers in attempts to prevent crimes, and for administrative offences linked to either of the referendums or the <em>procés</em> in general. A number of exclusively criminal cases related to very serious crimes are excluded from the amnesty law.</p>
<p>The justification for this exceptional measure – and its fast-tracked passing – is public interest. The law aims to guarantee coexistence between Catalonia and Spain within the rule of law, with a view to stabilising the social, political and institutional situation and guaranteeing a peaceful path forward for both parties. According to this argument, it provides a base from which to overcome a decade of political conflict. However, its detractors state that it is only motivated by the need to obtain investiture votes from pro-independence parliamentary groups. </p>
<p>The explanatory memorandum points out that Spain’s Constitutional Court has previously declared other amnesty rulings to be constitutional. It states that the Constitution does not prohibit amnesty, and that the ruling violates neither the principle of jurisdictional exclusivity nor that of equality among the parties involved. It also says that amnesty exists within various Spanish legal norms to provide grounds for terminating liability. Its critics, however, argue that the bill violates the principles of separation of powers and equality.</p>
<h2>The charges being dropped</h2>
<p>The law stipulates a number of key actions to be taken in criminal and administrative fields.</p>
<p>Amnesty subjects who are currently in prison will be immediately released. In addition, their criminal records will be expunged and arrest warrants – be they national, European or international – will be lifted. Furthermore, when the law enters into force all precautionary measures taken with respect to amnestied acts will be lifted, and the relevant criminal sentences will no longer be enforced.</p>
<p>In terms of administrative issues, the relevant bodies will agree on the definitive closure of any procedure initiated, and precautionary measures will be lifted. In the case of public employees who have been sanctioned or convicted – for example headteachers who allowed their schools to be used as referendum polling stations – their rights and jobs will be reinstated.</p>
<p>The amnesty will also mean that outstanding civil and fiscal liabilities are dropped, with the exception of sentences or penalties that have already been served. It is important to note that the amnesty does not include civil liability for damages suffered by individuals.</p>
<p>Lastly, the amnesty will not entitle anyone to compensation of any kind, nor will it generate any other economic rights. It will also not entitle its subjects to reimbursement of fines that have already been paid.</p>
<h2>A law destined for the constitutional court</h2>
<p>Once the law enters into force, the rulings are expected to be adopted within a maximum of two months, though this is not binding and does not preclude the possibility of further appeals. A limitation period of five years is established for any action related to the recognition of statutory rights.</p>
<p>Debate on the law in Spanish parliament is expected to be tumultuous, with continued street protests anticipated during the proceedings. It is expected to get the majority vote of 176 votes needed to pass in Congress, but it will then undoubtedly be subject to constitutional review. This will come by way of an appeal in the Constitutional Court and questions from judges, and will very possibly lead to a divided verdict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>María Luz Martínez Alarcón no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Pedro Sánchez is offering Catalan separatist Carles Puigdemont amnesty for his role in illegal independence referendums in 2014 and 2017.María Luz Martínez Alarcón, Profesora Titular de Universidad (Derecho Constitucional), Universidad de Castilla-La ManchaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064112018-11-13T12:24:50Z2018-11-13T12:24:50ZCatalonia: a year on, political prisoners go unnoticed by the rest of the world<p>After an unofficial referendum in October 2017, the pro-independence political parties in the Catalan parliament unilaterally declared independence from Spain. In response, the Spanish government invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution which effectively suspended the region’s autonomy.</p>
<p>More than a year on from these events, ousted Catalan leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/carles-puigdemont">Carles Puigdemont</a> remains in exile in Belgium. Another six pro-independence leaders remain in exile, including Clara Ponsati, former education minister in the Catalan government who has returned to her employment as an economics professor at the University of St Andrews, in Scotland. Although not formally charged, like the other exiled leaders, were she to return to Spain she would likely be arrested on charges of rebellion and misuse of public funds. She has been critical of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/clara-ponsati-exiled-catalan-minister-eu-spain-separatist-hostages-a8256466.html">Europe’s leaders for their silence</a> on the Catalan question and has claimed that Catalan political prisoners are being used as pawns to deactivate the pro-independence movement. </p>
<p>Two activists and seven politicians remain in custody. They have been charged by Spain’s attorney general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/catalan-politicians-charged-a-year-after-independence-vote-referendum">with rebellion</a> and misuse of public funds. This ignores an earlier decision by Spain’s solicitor general, who recently downgraded the charge of rebellion <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/11/02/inenglish/1541146388_493726.html">to sedition</a> because the former charge requires the use of violence. The available evidence suggests that violence was not used by any of those in jail. Nevertheless, if the attorney general continues his hardline stance, those in jail could face up to 25 years behind bars. Many will be surprised to hear that Spain’s legal system allows people to be held on precautionary, pre-trial detention for such a long time.</p>
<p>The group facing charges of rebellion includes two civil society activists Jordi Sanchez, president of the campaign group Catalan National Assembly (ANC), and Jordi Cuixart, president of the campaign group Omnium Cultural. Both are facing up to 17 years in jail. Both have been detained since October 2017 in connection with protests in Barcelona on September 20 and 21 that year. The protests were aimed at obstructing police raids to seize material related to the referendum from Catalan government buildings.</p>
<p>Yet Amnesty International’s director in Europe, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/amnesty-calls-for-immediate-release-of-jordi-sanchez-jailed-catalan-leader">Gauri Van Gulik</a>, noted that “although calling protests to obstruct legitimate police operations can – if proof is produced of their commission – constitute a public order offence, it does not constitute a serious crime such as sedition or rebellion”. Amnesty has called for the immediate release of the “two Jordis”, as they have become known across Catalonia.</p>
<p>Amnesty avoids using the term “political prisoner” as there is no accepted definition in international law. However, <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Juristas-politicos-Espana-inmediata-liberacion_0_710430160.html">over 1,000 legal experts</a> have signed a manifesto arguing that the Catalan leaders in jail are effectively that. They say the accused have not been given time to prepare their defence, making a farce of the legal proceedings. Similarly, <a href="https://www.eleconomista.es/politica/noticias/8800071/12/17/El-53-de-los-catalanes-considera-presos-politicos-a-los-soberanistas-encarcelados.html">53.4% of Catalans</a> consider that those in jail are political prisoners. And 60% feel that the judicial proceedings against them are unjustified. It’s worth noting that that’s a higher percentage than the estimated number of Catalans who support independence. </p>
<p>Others, connected with the <a href="https://malarrassa.cat/2018/10/22/sorganitza-la-solidaritat-amb-en-cesc-del-cdr-terrassa-i-les-altres-encausades-per-laccio-davant-el-tsjc/">Committees for the Defence of the Republic</a> – groups campaigning for the unofficial referendum result to be upheld – were charged with public disorder offences following a protest in Barcelona on February 23 2018. They could face two and a half years in prison.</p>
<p>In their resistance to the Spanish authorities, Catalans are drawing on a long tradition. Today’s political prisoners, whether accurately labelled or not, are the latest in a long line who have fought against the perceived injustices of the Spanish state. Foremost among these is Lluis Companys, the president of the generalitat who was arrested for declaring the Catalan republic on October 6 1934 and was executed by firing squad on October 15 1940. The historic parallel is not lost on the Catalan people. Nor it seems was the parallel lost on the right-wing Popular Party’s spokesperson, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-referendum-independence-spain-jail-carles-puigdemont-threat-leader-latest-a7991191.html">Pablo Casado</a>, who threatened Puigdemont, ahead of the unilateral declaration of independence, with the same fate as Companys.</p>
<p>Spain’s <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/10/25/inenglish/1540464607_998634.html">Supreme Court</a> has ordered that 18 former Catalan leaders stand trial for their role in the unilateral declaration of independence in 2017. The charges against them include rebellion, sedition, the misuse of public funds and disobedience. The trial is likely to take place in early 2019.</p>
<p>The issue of Catalan independence will not be solved by judicial actions. Politics is required. Pedro Sanchez, the socialist prime minister, has certainly taken a softer line than his predecessor, Mariano Rajoy. Nevertheless, the political negotiations necessary to solve the crisis will require a stronger government than the current minority socialist administration. It will also require the Catalan pro-independence parties to present a more united front than is currently the case. And ultimately, it will be hard to have any meaningful negotiations while there are political prisoners. Carla Ponsati’s lawyer in Scotland,<a href="https://www.elnacional.cat/en/politics/anwar-interview-spain-gangster_285804_102.html"> Aamer Anwar</a>, has said that ‘Talking to Spain now is like sitting down with a gangster holding hostages’. A long road lies ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The questions raised by the region’s failed bid for independence remain unanswered. And key figures remain in prison.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/939792018-03-27T11:03:13Z2018-03-27T11:03:13ZArrest of Carles Puigdemont closes another chapter in Catalonia’s bid for independence<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43519438">detention</a> of five leading Catalan pro-independence politicians, followed 48 hours later by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/26/catalan-leader-carles-puigdemont-remanded-in-custody-in-germany">arrest and detention</a> of deposed Catalan President Carles Puigdemont in Germany, brings the extraordinary and tumultuous events of Spain and Catalonia since September 2017 closer to an end point. </p>
<p>Puigdemont had been living in self-imposed exile in Belgium, and was arrested in Germany on his return from a trip to Finland after a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43532217">European Arrest Warrant</a> was reissued for him. German authorities have 60 days to respond to Madrid’s request to extradite him back to Spain, where he and his colleagues are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-court-charges-13-catalan-independence-leaders-rebellion/">charged with</a> rebellion and misuse of public funds. </p>
<p>The attempted unilateral secession of Catalonia from Spain dramatically failed, as Puigdemont was the last remaining figure of significance who still stood by the notion of an independent Catalan Republic <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">declared on October 27, 2017</a>. </p>
<p>The Catalan process for secession, or independence, began in a political sense in 2012, though its root causes are much deeper. The turn in support for independence, reaching polling support as high as <a href="https://www.ara.cat/politica/Centre_d-Estudis_d-Opinio-CEO-independencia-si-no_0_941306030.html">55% in 2013</a>, occurred at the height of Spain’s greatest economic crisis since the death of Francisco Franco in 1975. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-cultural-struggle-against-madrid-goes-back-centuries-89403">Catalonia's cultural struggle against Madrid goes back centuries</a>
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<p>Opinion polls aside, there has never been a majority support for independence in any regional election held since 2012, leading to a questionable legitimacy. This was compounded by Catalonia’s decision to try to break from Spain unilaterally from September 2017, based on the support of <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-separatist-parties-win-the-catalan-election-international-law-doesnt-provide-a-right-to-independence-86900">the 48%</a> of voters for Catalan separatist parties obtained in the election of September 2015.</p>
<p>The Spanish authorities, the main political parties and the government have repeatedly declared that the separation of a part of Spain from the national territory is illegal. Here lie the origins of legal mechanisms being used again now against Puigdemont and his colleagues to confront the independence movement: the state declares independence is “illegal” hence it is simply a matter for the courts. </p>
<p>From 2012 and with more intensity from 2014, Catalan institutions embarked on an intense international lobbying campaign to obtain international support and achieve the aim of becoming a new member state of the European Union. But five months after the proclamation of the independent Catalan Republic in October 2017, not one country in the world has recognised Catalonia’s independence.</p>
<p>These three elements, ambivalent social and political support, a state explicitly hostile to any attempt at separation and a complete absence of international support, have led to the almost complete defeat for Catalan independence. The capture and imprisonment of Puigdemont symbolically closes this phase.</p>
<h2>Independence never an inevitability</h2>
<p>Between 2012 and 2017, the Catalan movement for independence displayed extraordinary capacity for mobilisation, managing to bring a million people onto the streets of Barcelona almost every year. The movement was peaceful, optimistic and celebratory, confident that separation from Spain was eminently achievable and imminent. However, this relentlessly upbeat outlook seemed to prevent recognition of hard political reality. </p>
<p>In spite of the repeated warnings from the Spanish political and legal authorities regarding the impossibility of secession, the movement’s leaders seemed oblivious to it. In spite of public statements from a range of international leaders, including the European Union, supporting the continued unity of Spain, the movement told itself that when the time came, recognition for Catalonia was inevitable.</p>
<p>While arguably it had little choice, the EU has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-the-world-reacted-to-catalan-independence-declaration/">backed Spain</a> in the Catalan dispute. One consequence has been a eurosceptic turn within the Catalan independence movement over perceived betrayal by Brussels.</p>
<p>The Catalan movement for independence, as well as a number of internal and strategic errors, seriously misjudged the interest and willingness of the EU to countenance the break up of Spain. Yet, the EU is an alliance of states. Its <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html">2009 Lisbon Treaty</a> explicitly stated that member states must respect others’ territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The EU has been through repeated crises since 2008 and it seems astonishing that the leaders of Catalan independence thought the bloc might be supportive of further disruption. While accommodation might have been made for Scotland, this was because the British state was prepared to accept the separation of 5m Scots from a Britain of almost 65m should they vote for it in a referendum. Catalonia comprises a much higher proportion of the overall Spanish population (16%), while the Catalan economy is <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-spain-and-the-economic-consequences-of-a-split-85557">almost 20% of Spain’s overall</a> GDP. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-independence-movements-in-scotland-and-elsewhere-are-tongue-tied-over-catalonia-86669">Why independence movements in Scotland and elsewhere are tongue-tied over Catalonia</a>
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<p>With Spain hostile, any separation of Catalonia could only be highly destabilising, with potential knock on effects in a Europe gradually recovering from the financial crisis. </p>
<p>Since the autumn of 2017, there has been a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2018-02-05/why-spanish-nationalism-rise">dramatic resurgence</a> of Spanish nationalist sentiment in both Catalonia and Spain and a receding possibility of reforms of the 1978 Spanish constitution to adopt real federalism. </p>
<p>The Catalan independence movement is deeply divided between pragmatists and idealists and the optimism inherent in the movement since 2012 has been shattered. However, the grievances that produced the turn to secession in Catalonia have not even begun to be addressed and no meaningful resolution of the Catalan question will occur until the Madrid government recognises that it is a political problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dowling does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former president of Catalonia is in a German prison, awaiting possible extradition to Spain where he faces charges of rebellion.Andrew Dowling, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907112018-01-26T16:47:50Z2018-01-26T16:47:50ZWith an exiled president Skyping from Brussels, where now for Catalan independence?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203539/original/file-20180126-100929-38uo5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/barcelona-spain-october-21-2017-500000-739211284">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can a self-exiled leader remotely control the politics of a region, effectively ruling by Skype? That is what the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-leader-carles-puigdemont-left-spain-brussels-rebellion-charges-eu-independence-latest-a8027366.html">ousted</a> Catalan president, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/world/europe/in-catalonia-independence-referendum.html">Carles Puigdemont</a>, is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKlcEgTaJ1U">trying to do</a> from Brussels, where he escaped in October 2017 after an <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/09/economist-explains-17">illegal referendum</a> and a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41780116">unilateral declaration of independence</a>. </p>
<p>Following the ambivalent declaration of October 27, the Spanish prime minister <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-12-19/profile-mariano-rajoy-brey-video">Mariano Rajoy</a> proceeded to <a href="https://www.independent.ie/world-news/spanish-pm-sacks-catalan-government-after-independence-vote-36266140.html">sack</a> the Catalan premier, disband parliament and call for snap elections on December 21 2017. Spain’s supreme court decided to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">imprison</a> several Catalan politicians and civic leaders, who face charges of misuse of public funds, rebellion and sedition – a crime punishable by up to 30 years in prison.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Exiled Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont.</span>
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<p>With 47.5% of the vote, the diverse secessionist coalition of Puigdemont did not win the popular vote on December 21, but they regained an absolute majority of seats, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/08/will-catalonias-separatists-win-in-december-the-voting-system-is-stacked-in-their-favor/?utm_term=.049e394fd741">assisted</a> by a rural bias in the election law. They could go ahead and form a government again, but the problem is that Puigdemont cannot be invested as head of the regional executive on January 31, when the Catalan parliament is expected to hold a first vote on his candidacy – Spanish authorities insist he will be arrested the moment he sets foot on Spanish soil.</p>
<p>The reason for his escape to Brussels was to allow the wannabe “Skype president” to maintain a voice (which the imprisoned Catalan politicians have lost) and internationalise the Catalan conflict for global audiences.</p>
<p>The strategy of internationalisation characterised the so-called “Catalan process” – a movement of civil society and government mobilisations aimed at holding a vote on Catalonia’s relationship with Spain. However, the strategy that began in 2012 has been unsuccessful – because domestic politics and international politics work very differently.</p>
<p>As we argue in a recent <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/secession_and_counter_secession_an_international_relations_perspective">report</a>, secessionist movements tend to focus on domestic politics and neglect the power play that distinguishes international affairs. This is surprising, as these movements want to be recognised as independent states, a status that can only be conferred by recognition from the international community.</p>
<h2>Big power play</h2>
<p>When it comes to constituting sovereign statehood, aspiring states need to pay significant attention to the calculations of interest-driven big powers. And a <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/secession_and_counter_secession/what_s_law_got_to_do_with_it_democracy_realism_and_the_tina_turner_theory_of_referendums">study</a> of 34 successful referendums on independence since the 1990s by referenda expert Matt Qvortrup has suggested that the countries that matter most for supporting or opposing the birth of a new state are three of the permanent members of the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/">UN Security Council</a>: the USA, France and the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>China would never take the lead because of its own secessionist troubles in Tibet. Russia on the other hand might be supportive to legitimise its separatist machinations in Crimea and to weaken the European Union, but has been on the receiving end of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12274023">secessionist aspirations</a> in the Caucasus. In any case Russian support would not be sufficient, barring the consent of Western powers.</p>
<p>In the absence of a universal legal right to secession under international or domestic law, there is no clear guidance for sorting out which nations merit statehood and which do not. Realpolitik, not ideals, ends up deciding who becomes a sovereign state.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/259374893?src=PlpSg4ZV5QmxLVPkXhTKZw-1-78&size=huge_jpg">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Catalan secessionists did not get the international recognition they were craving. And it was not for a lack of trying. Catalonia <a href="http://thediplomatinspain.com/en/government-closes-catalan-embassies-except-brussels/">opened</a> several “embassies” in European capitals and in New York, whose main purpose was to gather support for Catalan independence aspirations. To no avail. International politicians increasingly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/02/catalan-government-emergency-meeting-spain-independence">shunned</a> Catalan leaders and did not grant them photo opportunities. </p>
<p>Secessionist movements within Europe face a different environment than those outside the EU when it comes to international recognition. The 2004 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-eu/spooked-by-catalonia-eu-rallies-behind-madrid-but-warily-idUSKCN1BW1OC">Prodi doctrine</a> (named after former EU Commission president Romano Prodi) holds that any territory that breaks away from an EU member state would be outside the union and would need to re-apply for membership – a process that normally takes many years, even in the absence of vetoes from member countries.</p>
<p>The theoretical <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2016.1149993">threat of EU exclusion</a> – brushed aside by secessionists during their campaign – has been enough to prompt more than <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/firms-quit-catalonia-amid-its-political-upheaval-2017-12?IR=T">3,000 companies to move</a> their headquarters out of Catalonia since the illegal referendum of October 1. The economic rationale for remaining in the EU as part of Spain has proved to be a powerful argument for unionist forces in Catalonia. On the other hand, the fiscal gains that separatists promised if the relatively rich Catalonia broke away look increasingly dubious.</p>
<p>When it comes to EU membership, bilateral agreements are more successful than unilateral steps. In the case of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), a Catalan application to the EU would be vetoed by the Spanish executive. Other member states that may also want to discourage claims to self-determination in their own territories, such as France (Corsica), Italy (Lega Nord) and Belgium (Flanders), could also oppose it.</p>
<p>The exception to this rule would be provided by the Scottish case, which held a binding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/10/scottish-independence-guide-referendum-uk-yes-no">referendum</a> agreed with the UK. The Westminster government pledged not to veto Scotland’s accession to the EU, if there was a pro-independence majority in the 2014 plebiscite.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Catalonia faces fierce opposition over independence from Spain’s unionists.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/725539885?size=huge_jpg&src=lb-59856941&sort=newestFirst&offset=10">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>The realpolitik</h2>
<p>Puigdemont’s nomination as regional president will not attract international support. His unilateral power-play has seemingly run its course, and it is only a matter of time before he returns to Catalonia to face legal proceedings. </p>
<p>Besides, the European Union has repeatedly stressed the need for strict adherence to the rule of law. It is apprehensive about a possible <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/is-selfdetermination-contagious-a-spatial-analysis-of-the-spread-of-selfdetermination-claims/84F1FDF9EB18EB98F902C85C0E05C2B4">contagion effect</a> if Catalonia succeeds in declaring independence without first seeking an agreement with Spain.</p>
<p>However, merely rallying the consent of fellow nation states and engaging in a purely legalistic discourse at home as the Spanish government has done might not be sustainable in the long run, either. The grievances of a large part of the Catalan population are real and will remain a problem if they are allowed to fester.</p>
<p>Rather than insisting on recentralisation or offering Catalonia more autonomy, Spain will need to find a more positive political and national narrative. The way out might be more <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/federalism">federalism</a> that gives regions a real say in Madrid.</p>
<p>When it comes to international recognition of new states, secessionist movements need to expand the domestic support base and convince international powers that secession will not affect them negatively. It is unclear how a Skype president with scant regard for legal norms can help Catalonia become a full member of the international community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the most recent elections, Catalonia’s secessionist coalition is free to form a government. But their president is still exiled in Belgium.Diego Muro, Lecturer in International Relations, University of St AndrewsEckart Woertz, Senior research fellow, Barcelona Centre of International Affairs (CIDOB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/895472017-12-22T16:04:20Z2017-12-22T16:04:20ZCatalonia’s snap election: how to understand a confusing result<p>It wasn’t supposed to turn out like this. When the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, dismissed the Catalan government in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">October</a> and called a snap election, he anticipated that anti-independence parties would obtain a majority. The plan was to return Catalonia – and Spain – to “normality”.</p>
<p>Given that several prominent pro-independence figures, including former president Carles Puigdemont, spent the campaign in self-imposed exile or in prison (the former deputy prime minister Oriol Junqueras remains behind bars) the gamble appeared justified. Instead, the pro-independence bloc retains its overall majority, obtaining 70 of the regional parliament’s 135 seats – only two fewer than in the last regional election in 2015.</p>
<p>Puigdemont and Junqueras decided at the start of the campaign not to repeat their 2015 alliance Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes). This now appears shrewd. Their total number of seats increased by four to 66. The weak link in the pro-independence chain was the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy – CUP), the uncompromising anti-capitalist party which has enjoyed considerable influence during its five-year existence. It now has just four representatives, six fewer than in 2015.</p>
<p>Rajoy’s Popular Party (PP) obtained its worst result in Catalonia, losing eight of the 11 seats obtained in 2015 and haemorrhaging more than 165,000 votes.</p>
<p>However, the anti-independence Ciudadanos (Citizens), led by <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/22/ines-arrimadas-darling-catalonias-silent-majority/">Inés Arrimadas</a> was the party that actually fared best. The centre-right party obtained more seats (37) and votes (1,100,000) than any other party, having benefited most from the collapse in PP support. Arrimadas’s presidential hopes were only dashed by the relative failure of the other parties opposed to independence. The Catalan Socialists (PSC) won a disappointing 17 seats (one more than in 2015).</p>
<p>Podemos’s Catalan variant, Catalunya en Comú–Podem (Catalunya in Common - We Can), was punished for an ambiguous position on independence which verged on cognitive dissonance. Its calculation that it could be a power broker after the election seems to have been misguided as the party retained just eight of its 13 seats. A geographical divide within Catalonia was also reaffirmed as support for independence was much lower in Barcelona than in the region’s other three provinces.</p>
<h2>A leader in exile</h2>
<p>Shortly after the results were announced, Puigdemont, speaking in Brussels, claimed – with some justification – that Rajoy had designed the election to take place in such a way as to assist the anti-independence cause. Instead, the overall majority in favour of independence has been reaffirmed.</p>
<p>Puigdemont’s own position in the aftermath of the election will now be the focus of speculation. He might understandably regard himself as the obvious candidate to be Catalan president but he is likely to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-a-lawyer-explains-the-charges-brought-against-carles-puigdemont-86715">arrested</a> should he return to Spain. Another key issue is the continued application of Article 155 of Spain’s constitution, suspending devolved powers. Whether it remains in force until the formation of a government in Barcelona remains to be seen.</p>
<p>Arrimadas has reminded her pro-independence opponents that her party actually won the election and indicated that she would strive to form a pro-unionist coalition. She nevertheless conceded that the electoral arithmetic meant that such a coalition would be difficult to achieve. The anti-independence bloc will nevertheless be relieved that its opponents once again fell short of 50% of the vote despite a remarkably high turnout of just under 82%.</p>
<h2>Rajoy’s next move</h2>
<p>Given the blow dealt to his credibility, Rajoy may now even consider bringing forward a general election – which is not officially due until mid-2020. The campaign would inevitably be dominated by the Catalan question and, beyond Catalonia, Rajoy’s uncompromising stance has been popular. An early vote would also provide him and those in favour of maintaining Catalonia’s status within Spain with a mandate from the electorate.</p>
<p>But early elections are not without risk. The shift from Rajoy’s Popular Party to Ciudadanos in Catalonia may spread to Spain. It might be argued that Catalonia was never a stronghold for the Popular Party in the first place, but the scale of the party’s collapse at the hands of Ciudadanos raises questions about Rajoy’s credentials. Is he really the figure best-placed to solve the constitutional crisis in the long term?</p>
<p>A further concern for Rajoy is that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-european-unions-hands-are-tied-over-catalonia-85661">European Union</a> might even begin to reconsider its stance on Catalonia in the light of the election result. Thus far, the EU has unambiguously backed his anti-independence stance. The fact that those parties wishing to break free from Spain undeniably attract significant support may cause as much unease in Brussels as it does in Madrid.</p>
<p>For the pro-independence bloc, there is solace in the fact that it won most seats even if it failed to break through the crucial 50% threshold across the region. Within the anti-independence ranks, Ciudadanos obtained more than a quarter of the vote and more seats than any other party. Arrimadas has established herself as a key political figure who is more capable of attracting support in the region than the Popular Party, the Catalan Socialists, or the Catalan branch of Podemos, all of whom have been left with much to ponder.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, no party or bloc can claim outright victory. Whereas Rajoy hoped that the election would ultimately serve to catch the independence bloc on the wrong foot, he has instead entrenched further division. The absence of a clear way forward is of concern. Catalonia and Spain remain in crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The single biggest party was anti-independence but together, the pro-independence bloc is stronger.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathDavid Cutts, Professor of Political Science, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866692017-11-03T16:51:04Z2017-11-03T16:51:04ZWhy independence movements in Scotland and elsewhere are tongue-tied over Catalonia<p>Catalonia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">unilateral declaration of independence</a> already seems so long ago. It’s hard to believe it is only a week since the provocative move by Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont unleashed a chain of events including Madrid resuming direct rule of the region, Puigdemont retreating to Belgium and Spanish premier Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-the-prospect-of-an-election-has-everyone-nervous-86631">calling</a> snap Catalan elections for December. </p>
<p>Whether the ringleaders of the UDI will be allowed to stand is unclear at the time of writing: eight <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">have been jailed</a> by a Madrid court pending an investigation over charges of sedition, rebellion and misuse of public funds. An international arrest warrant has been issued against Puigdemont to extradite him from Brussels. </p>
<p>Leaders of Europe’s other independence and autonomy movements, particularly in Scotland but also in Corsica, Flanders and the Basque Country, are doubtless following every twist and turn. So how are these events likely to impact on their ambitions? </p>
<p>At the outset, it is worth remembering these separatist surges tend to have roots in common. They are often less about nationalism for its own sake than part of the anti-establishment insurgency following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/six-charts-that-show-how-much-the-world-has-changed-since-the-2007-08-financial-crisis-83477">financial crash of 2007/08</a>. Even though Spain has been caught in a perfect storm that included the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17549970">eurozone crisis</a>, radical and populist parties on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemos-revolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics">left</a> and <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/05/15/meet-ciudadanos-the-party-dreaming-of-a-spanish-remake-of-macrons-success">right</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-corruption-pp-rajoy-never-ending-problem-graft-ignacio-gonzalez/">corruption scandals</a> and high youth unemployment, there are sufficient parallels with movements elsewhere to make events in Catalonia seem of much broader importance. </p>
<p>In Scotland, there’s an additional similarity. The rise of the Ciudadanos party in Catalonia was partly due to its anti-independence stance – much like the revival of the Scottish Conservatives under Ruth Davidson. On the other hand, the Basque Country may share all the Spanish context but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/europe/spain-catalonia-basque-independence.html">was weary</a> of separatism at the time of the crash after decades of division over the issue. In that part of Spain it was the anti-establishment pro-Madrid Podemos that won the most votes in the last national election.</p>
<h2>Bullets or ballots?</h2>
<p>The non-violent tactics of the Catalan separatists are among the most notable characteristics of the crisis. They contrast sharply, of course, with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11183574">separatist terrorism</a> in the Basque Country before ETA gave up arms <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/basque-separatist-eta-historic-weapons-mariano-rajoy">in 2014</a>. This has probably helped the Catalan separatists to win more sympathetic coverage in the international media. </p>
<p>Puigdemont, a former journalist, is generally considered to have played a subtler and more reasonable game than Rajoy – particularly after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/catalonia-tensions-rise-as-strikes-held-over-police-violence-during-referendum">obstructive actions and violence shown by</a> the Guardia Civil on October 1, the day of the independence referendum. Appealing over the heads of EU leaders, repeatedly making statements in English to the international media, has not been a bad strategy when trust in the political establishment is at an all-time low.</p>
<p>If this is <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/catalan-threat-to-unleash-mass-civil-disobedience-8vgf9w65b">followed by</a> successful use of peaceful mass civil <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-civil-disobedience-and-where-the-secession-movement-goes-now-86425">disobedience</a> in the wake of Spain revoking Catalonia’s autonomy, it could inspire other independence movements. Such tactics were famously effective in the US against racial discrimination <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/nonviolencekey-to-civil-rights-movement/1737280.html">in the 1960s</a>, albeit Catalans neither appear to have the law on their side nor the ability to shame the government to intervene on their behalf. Whether this ultimately means such disobedience would fail, however, is far from certain. </p>
<h2>Europe snub</h2>
<p>The EU presents opportunities and challenges for its minority nations. Like the Catalans, Scotland’s SNP is deeply wedded as a party to the EU – even if some of its supporters <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14950013.36__of_SNP_and_Labour_supporters_backed_Brexit__finds_survey/">are not</a>. But with the EU broadly seen to be siding with Spain against the Catalans, it could be increasingly difficult for the party to maintain its current policy. </p>
<p>If the price of independence is for Catalans to be ejected from the EU, for example, where does this leave the SNP strategy of pursuing independence inside the EU? And where does it leave the Flemish nationalists’ aim of increasing the powers of Flanders within Belgium until it is independent?</p>
<p>These fault lines have already been visible since the Catalan UDI. Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon and her government have been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nicola-sturgeon-snp-catalonia-the-scottish-nationalists-catalan-dilemma/">careful to</a> call for dialogue rather than for the declaration of independence to be recognised. Perhaps fearful of Spain blocking a potential bid for EU membership by an independent Scotland in years to come, the Scottish government has left it to a group of members of the parliament <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/msps-call-for-independent-republic-of-catalonia-to-be-recognised-1-4601309">to welcome</a> the declaration instead. Contrast this with the president of the Corsican assembly <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-28/corsican-assembly-president-hails-birth-of-catalan-republic">welcoming</a> the birth of a new republic, for instance. </p>
<p>Meanwhile in Belgium the Flemish nationalist party N-VA, which is part of the ruling coalition, has been put in an awkward position with the arrest warrant. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-28/belgium-s-nationalists-keep-their-distance-from-catalan-campaign">So far</a>, at a national level, the party line <a href="https://sceptr.net/2017/11/catalaanse-ministers-gevangenis-vlaamse-n-va-ministers-ontzet/">has been that</a> this is a legal, not a political, matter and that it is inappropriate to intervene. In contrast, at a regional level Geert Bourgeois, minister-president of Flanders, has <a href="https://sceptr.net/2017/11/catalaanse-ministers-gevangenis-vlaamse-n-va-ministers-ontzet/">condemned</a> the Spanish government and has been tweeting in opposition to the latest moves by the Spanish courts. </p>
<h2>Events, dear boy</h2>
<p>Overall, the Catalonia crisis may lead to a rise in minority nationalism around Europe in the short-term. But what happens in the longer term is likely to depend on how events in Spain play out. A peaceful and prosperous Republic of Catalonia within the EU would greatly encourage other minority nations to assert themselves – just like the independence of the Baltic states did in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Equally a descent into chaos would have the opposite effect, as would a decisive victory by pro-Spanish parties in the Catalan election on December 21. In this scenario, the analogy would be the break-up of the former Yugoslavia <a href="https://www.petergeoghegan.com/2014/09/02/what-scotland-can-learn-from-balkanisation/">putting independence movements</a> on the defensive about the dangers of nationalism. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Forward march!</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/madrid-spain-october-7-2017-manifestation-731383261?src=1wNqzlk6wRxCRjH390l0TQ-1-45">Lord Kuernyus</a></span>
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<p>A sobering and crushing defeat for Catalan separatists would reinforce the view in the SNP that they should tread carefully. It would perhaps convince the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/happened-catalonia-happen-scotland-171030134957987.html">Flemish</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/europe/spain-catalonia-basque-independence.html">Basque</a> separatists that their gradualist approaches are the right ones. </p>
<p>Despite this uncertainty around the lessons from Catalonia, central governments in London, Paris and Madrid will be in no doubt about the challenge facing them. They have to find a way of rebuilding support for their centralised countries while continuing to retrench their welfare states. Whatever happens in Catalonia, that looks like being one of the key conundrums for decades to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Barcelona has become the test case for separatists Europe over.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/867152017-11-02T14:41:40Z2017-11-02T14:41:40ZCatalonia: a lawyer explains the charges brought against Carles Puigdemont<p>For many weeks the situation in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">Catalonia</a> had been extremely delicate. The Catalan government took the nuclear option when it issued a <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">unilateral declaration of independence</a>. For the Spanish government the retaliation was simple: using the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">constitution</a> to take direct control of some competences of the Catalan government and parliament – usually devolved from Madrid. Cold war logic might have suggested that the potential reciprocal damage that each party could inflict on the other would lead them to avoid using either nuclear option. But this did not happen. Keep weapons out of reach of children.</p>
<p>Now, the Catalan authorities who issued the unilateral declaration of independence face criminal charges in Spain – adding another layer of uncertainty and confusion.</p>
<p>The Spanish public prosecutor has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/spanish-prosecutor-calls-for-rebellion-charges-against-catalan-leaders">filed a lawsuit</a> before the Supreme Court and the Audiencia Nacional (a Spanish high court) against members of the former Catalan government and parliament. The charges are the crimes of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement.</p>
<p>Several Catalan parliamentarians have attended court in Madrid to hear the charges but ousted president Carles Puigdemont has not so far been among them. He is believed to be in Brussels. The president of the supreme court has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">warned</a> that an arrest warrant could be issued to bring Puigdemont in. </p>
<p>The first two of the above mentioned charges are particularly important. They are the most politically charged matters. The offence of rebellion refers to the act of violently and publicly uprising with the aim of fully or partially repealing, suspending or amending the constitution, or of declaring independence on behalf of part of the national territory. The maximum punishment for this offence is 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>The unilateral declaration of independence of the Catalan Parliament is the core element of the claimed offence in this case. This was clearly a public uprising to declare independence for part of the territory.</p>
<h2>Jail time</h2>
<p>The only question is whether this particular uprising could be described as “violent”. Whether or not this was an offence of rebellion hinges on that point. That’s why the Spanish public prosecutor also accused the former Catalan authorities of the offence of sedition. That refers to those individuals not covered by the felony of rebellion who rise up tumultuously to prevent the application of laws. </p>
<p>In case the courts consider that the unilateral declaration of independence did not exactly fit the requirements for the application of the felony of rebellion, it is very likely that they will consider that at least an offence of sedition took place. Those who commit sedition can be punished with up 15 years of imprisonment. This adds to the potential offence of embezzlement, punished with up to eight years of imprisonment and the temporary deprivation of the exercise of the right of passive suffrage – the right to stand as a candidate in elections. </p>
<p>All this will probably add more trauma to the trauma. The idea of independence has already polarised Catalan society to dramatic levels. The potential imprisonment of the former Catalan authorities might further fuel that division. </p>
<p>The trial might also play a prominent role in the Catalan elections to be held on December 21. The political framing of the judicial proceedings will be among the major topics for political discussion during the campaign, and it’s unclear whether the former Catalan authorities now facing charges will choose to stand as candidates in the elections. If they are found guilty by a court after they have been elected, they will automatically lose their seats in parliament.</p>
<p>All of these are major political issues, but ones that courts are not expected to take into account. The judicial logic, strictly speaking, is one of application of law to the case, ideally without regard to political considerations. And from a legal perspective it’s very difficult to argue that the unilateral declaration of independence did not involve any criminal offence – be it either rebellion or sedition. The shocking result is that we might soon see a former president of the Catalan government facing a jail sentence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pablo José Castillo Ortiz is currently funded by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Sheffield to carry out a Strategic Secondment at Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid. </span></em></p>After declaring independence, regional leaders stand accused of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement. But what does that mean?Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, Lecturer in Spanish Law, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866312017-10-31T14:23:21Z2017-10-31T14:23:21ZCatalonia: the prospect of an election has everyone nervous<p>Mariano Rajoy, the prime minister of Spain, has called a potentially explosive regional election in Catalonia on December 21. This follows his decision to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">direct rule</a> over Catalonia, dissolving its parliament in the process.</p>
<p>Catalan leaders rejected the validity of this move and, by association, the election itself. They argue that Madrid has no right to intervene in their declaration of independence from Spain in the wake of a disputed referendum on October 1. </p>
<h2>Rajoy’s gamble</h2>
<p>Rajoy’s decision to send Catalan voters back to the polls is not without risk. His own political fate is now inextricably linked to the Catalan standoff.</p>
<p>He may have calculated that in calling an election, he is presenting supporters of independence with a dilemma. If they participate in the vote, are they tacitly acknowledging his right to trigger Article 155 in the first place? Just as those opposed to Catalan independence chose to boycott the unofficial referendum on the grounds that their participation would lend it further legitimacy, some pro-independence activists may similarly wish to stay at home on December 21. Splits within the Catalan independence camp will be worth looking out for in the run up to the election. </p>
<p>Rajoy must also be carrying out a risk assessment. A clear majority for pro-independence parties in December would perhaps make his position untenable. Alternatively, his authority will be reinforced should those parties opposed to independence emerge victorious. </p>
<p>Now ousted Catalan president Carles Puigdemont’s centre-right Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT) and former deputy president Oriol Junqueras’s Republican Left (ERC) have, for now, indicated that they will take part in the election. However, Puigdemont’s parliamentary majority also depended on support from ten representatives of the far-left, anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP). The CUP has been uncompromising in its support of independence and it has played an influential role in ensuring that Puigdemont was not tempted to backslide towards a more pragmatic stance on the matter by entering into negotiations with Madrid.</p>
<p>The CUP also played a key role in forcing the resignation of Artur Mas, Puigdemont’s predecessor as president. Given its rejection of the central government’s authority, it is by no means certain that the CUP will put forward candidates for the December elections.</p>
<p>One of the central government’s concerns is that the shift towards independence witnessed in Catalonia since 2012 has served to weaken the more moderate, centre-right PDeCAT. The party dominated Catalan regional politics for the greater part of four decades. Seeking to retain popularity during a time of severe austerity and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/former-catalan-president-jordi-pujol-to-be-stripped-of-his-titles-after-admitting-to-more-than-30-9636343.html">corruption scandals</a>, the PDeCAT has found the reductionist narrative of Madrid “robbing” Catalonia politically useful.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the PDeCAT has struggled with the dilemmas inherent in its belated adoption of a pro-independence stance. Prior to its shift towards advocating outright independence in 2012, the party, in its previous incarnation as Convergence and Union (CiU), found a subtler approach towards Madrid to be more productive. It may fear that elements within its middle-class support base will be horrified by the current crisis.</p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20151116/business-leader-says-1000-firms-have-left-catalonia-over-separatist-drive">1,000 companies</a> are moving their headquarters out of Catalonia amid the recent instability, which may also further dent support for the avowedly pro-business PDeCAT. It’s possible that its radical left bedfellows the ERC will emerge as the dominant pro-independence force in the December election.</p>
<h2>The pro-Spain camp</h2>
<p>The parties in favour of Catalonia remaining within Spain are confronting their own set of dilemmas. Rajoy’s Popular Party (PP) has always struggled in Catalonia, where moderate, centre-right voters have instead been drawn to the CiU/PDeCAT. The Catalan branch of the Socialist Party, the PSC, has experienced its own quandaries on the issue of independence.</p>
<p>And Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias has recently had to <a href="https://www.thespainreport.com/articles/1250-171030121434-pablo-iglesias-orders-take-over-of-podemos-catalonia-after-anticapitalist-sector-recognises-catalan-republic">admonish</a> leading figures within the Catalan incarnation of his party for flouting the agreed party line by unambiguously supporting independence. Podemos supports Catalalonia’s right to hold a legal referendum but does not want it to break away from Spain. Iglesias did not back Puigdemont’s unilateral declaration of independence and has called for further dialogue between the two sides. He is in a difficult position in that his party may lose support in the region to the unambiguously pro-independence CUP, whose clarity on the issue throws into relief the uncomfortable hedging which has characterised Podemos’s position. </p>
<p>Albert Rivera’s centre-right Ciutadans (Citizens), whose raison d’être is opposition to Catalan independence, has the luxury of an unambiguous stance on the issue and may be well-placed to do well in December.</p>
<h2>Keeping it calm</h2>
<p>It is to be hoped that the election campaign will be a peaceful one. Madrid is at least aware that repeating the scenes of police violence which marred the October referendum would play into the hands of Puigdemont and attract yet more international consternation.</p>
<p>Whatever the result of the election, though, it’s unlikely to put an end to Spain’s worst political crisis in four decades. For that, what may be needed is reform of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-referendum/541611/">Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute</a>, which may enable Catalonia to obtain a more favourable financial settlement akin to that enjoyed by the Basque Country. An imaginative re-writing of the 1978 constitution may even be necessary. Only then can Catalan grievances be addressed and some degree of normality be re-established.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An ousted leader, a divided electorate and the risk of further violence pile on the tension ahead of the December vote.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864892017-10-27T15:19:14Z2017-10-27T15:19:14ZCatalonia declares independence – and Spain enters uncharted territory<p>Shortly after Catalonia’s parliament in Barcelona voted to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41780116">declare independence</a> from Spain on October 27, the senate in Madrid voted to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, removing Catalonia’s autonomy. </p>
<p>In his speech to the senate requesting that deputies approve the proposal, the Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20171027/breaking-catalan-parliament-passes-resolution-declaring-independence">justified his request</a> in the face of “a continuous process of anti-democratic decisions” in Catalonia. </p>
<p>One of the first measures required by Article 155 will be the sacking of the Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, which would pave the way for Rajoy to call elections within six months. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the Catalan parliament, parliamentarians voted in secret on a proposal from the ruling coalition Junts Pel Sí (Together for Yes) and the far-left Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) to begin a constituent process in order to proclaim the independent Republic of Catalonia. The final vote in the 135-seat chamber was 70 deputies in favour, 10 against and two abstentions. Dozens of deputies from the opposition Catalan Popular Party, the Catalan Socialist party (PSC) and the Ciudadanos party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">abandoned the plenary session</a> ahead of the vote.</p>
<p>In response to the Catalan parliament’s vote, Rajoy went on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/marianorajoy/status/923904575509327872">to ask all Spaniards</a> for calm and to note that the rule of law would be restored in Catalonia.</p>
<p>The vote closed down the one conciliatory amendment which had been proposed by the Socialists in the Madrid senate to freeze the triggering of Article 155 if elections were called in Catalonia. Instead, the vote in favour of independence was seen as a slap in the face for dialogue. </p>
<p>There was little in the way of conciliation present in the senate. Various deputies from Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP) jubilantly applauded parts of the premier’s speech in a manner that seemed overly triumphal and expressly designed to trample upon Catalan sentiment. Rajoy repeatedly criticised Puigdemont for appearing to turn down any offer of dialogue with the Spanish government. Puigdemont, on the other hand, had viewed the request to appear before the senate less as a desire for negotiation and more as an imposition.</p>
<h2>What the people think</h2>
<p>As the two elected assemblies went head-to-head, the rallying cry <em>No nos representan</em> “they don’t represent us” seems as relevant today as when it became the defining <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/15/spain-15-m-movement-activism">cry of the indignant movement</a>, or 15-M movement, which erupted in Spain in 2011 in a challenge to the political status quo. </p>
<p>While the political elites in both Catalonia and Madrid have both been calling the shots, it is not clear what support they have behind them to do so. The Catalan referendum on October 1 was not an accurate representation of the support for a declaration of independence. At 42%, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/dozens-injured-as-riot-police-storm-catalan-ref-polling-stations">turnout was suppressed</a> – in part because of a heavy police presence and the best efforts of the Spanish government to disrupt the vote. But also because only those in favour of independence were likely to turn out to vote. </p>
<p>Nor was there any time for a proper campaign before the referendum in which the arguments for and against independence could properly be aired and discussed. </p>
<p>There was barely a month between the Catalan parliament <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41177428">passing a law</a> to approve the referendum and the vote itself. It is therefore hard to gauge either the level of public support for independence or the level of public understanding which might underpin such a move.</p>
<p>The most recent elections in both Catalonia and Spain are also an unreliable indicator of public sentiment on the independence question. Rather, they lay bare the divisions which exist in Catalonia and Spain on a whole variety of issues. The June 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-is-a-third-election-in-a-year-on-the-horizon-63681">general election</a> – a re-run of December 2015’s election – reaffirmed the reluctance of voters to give any party an absolute majority. Although Rajoy’s PP strengthened its position <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36632276">with 33% of the vote and 137 seats</a>, this was still short of the 176 seats needed for an absolute majority.</p>
<p>The picture is also fragmented in Catalonia where the ruling coalition Junts pel Sí fell short of an absolute majority in the 2015 elections. Gaining 62 seats with 39.6% of the vote, it was forced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/catalan-separatists-win-election-and-claim-it-as-yes-vote-for-breakaway">form a minority government</a> with the CUP lending confidence and supplying support. Together these separatist political formations garnered 44.3% of the popular vote.</p>
<p>In both Catalonia and across Spain, voters did not give any political party the mandate to govern with an absolute majority. This is a message that politicians should have heeded. It denotes an electorate which wants compromise and negotiation between parties rather than the adoption of maximalist positions by any single political formation.</p>
<p>In all political processes, choices are made at the mass level as well as the elite level. Elite figures should take their cue from voters and the behaviour of groups in civil society who in turn often adapt their behaviour and choices in light of the actions of elites. </p>
<p>The ability to find a negotiated solution to the crisis in Catalonia then depends on both the elites and the general population. While Catalan leaders obviously felt they were fulfilling their historic duty in the face of protesters calling for independence outside the Catalan parliament, those cheering the loudest should not be confused with the views of all in Catalonia. </p>
<p>Although already weary of voting, it is likely that the electorate could once again be called to the polls in Catalonia as one way out of this current impasse. It is time all of the people had their say.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley has previously received funding from the British Academy and a Santander mobility grant.</span></em></p>Move by the senate in Madrid came just after the Catalan parliament voted for independence.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855702017-10-12T10:38:56Z2017-10-12T10:38:56ZQ+A: what happens now in Catalonia?<p>Spanish president Mariano Rajoy is calling for clarification from the government of Catalonia over whether it is or isn’t declaring independence in the wake of a disputed referendum on October 1. The two administrations are locked in impasse. So where do we go from here?</p>
<p><strong>Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont says he has a mandate to push forward with independence but will not do so immediately. What does this mean in practice?</strong></p>
<p>Most significantly, it means that Puigdemont has stepped back from the brink by not pressing ahead with an unambiguous unilateral declaration of independence. He has bought some breathing space to engage in dialogue within the pro-independence camp, leaving open the possibility of talks with the Spanish government.</p>
<p>Puigdemont will now be under intense pressure from his pro-independence partners, most notably the anti-capitalist CUP (Popular Unity Candidacy), and to a lesser extent, ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia) to stick to his guns and unambiguously opt for a unilateral declaration of independence.</p>
<p><strong>Spanish leader Mariano Rajoy has indicated that he is prepared to impose direct rule unless Puigdemont “respects the rule of law”. What does he mean?</strong></p>
<p>I believe it means engaging in the kind of dialogue which has been almost entirely absent over recent years. As far as the Spanish government is concerned, independence is out of the question. It remains to be seen whether there might be the possibility of a revision to the <a href="https://www.nationalia.info/new/9216/spanish-constitutional-court-cuts-back-catalan-statute-of-autonomy">Catalan Statute</a>, or even an amendment to the constitution itself so as to facilitate Catalonia remaining within Spain, with the possibility of there being an official referendum on Catalonia’s status within Spain at some indeterminate point in the future. Whether this is realistic depends largely on Puigdemont’s capacity to resist the more extreme voices within the pro-independence camp whose strategy appears to be one of upping the ante and pushing both sides into further confrontation.</p>
<p><strong>Rajoy says he remains prepared to invoke Article 155 of the constitution. What would happen then?</strong></p>
<p>Spain would essentially take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the Catalan authorities comply with their legal obligations in accordance with the Spanish constitution. It would mean that Catalan regional institutions fall under the control of Madrid. This is a serious step as it would force Catalans into making a decision as to which side they are on: Madrid or Catalonia. It’s likely that Madrid would also dissolve the Catalan regional assembly and call fresh regional elections. </p>
<p>Article 155 should be viewed as the nuclear option, though. Rajoy will hope that threatening to use it will be enough to persuade Puigdemont to take a decisive step back. He will now wait for Puigdemont’s response.</p>
<p><strong>What does “no deal” look like for Catalonia?</strong></p>
<p>If Puigdemont insists on pressing on with independence, I fear Article 155 will be implemented and there will be a ratcheting up of an already explosive situation.</p>
<p>Independence will have to be removed from the agenda. That said, Madrid can choose to respond to Catalan demands without having to agree to outright independence. </p>
<p><strong>Is there any way to resolve this situation that could placate both sides?</strong></p>
<p>Incredibly, both sides have been guilty of rejecting dialogue, which is, after all, the only way to resolve the situation. This would require flexibility and compromise from both sides. The rapid advance towards confrontation must be reversed; time must be given to enable negotiations to take place. It may not be possible to find a solution that entirely satisfies either side, but one which both sides find at least acceptable is. The 1978 Spanish constitution is proof that this can be done. By no means perfect, the Constitution was acceptable to people of practically every shade of opinion. </p>
<p><strong>What is the current state of popular opinion on this issue?</strong></p>
<p>People in Catalonia and throughout the rest of Spain are aghast that tensions have risen to crisis point in this manner. There is a feeling of real concern at the escalation of events over recent weeks, with a fear that the more extreme viewpoints on both sides have sidelined moderate voices advocating compromise and dialogue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After threatening to declare independence, Carles Puigdemont has stepped back from the brink. But that has caused confusion.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/850852017-10-11T23:38:32Z2017-10-11T23:38:32ZThe hypocrisy of the European Union on the Catalan referendum<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189682/original/file-20171010-17684-fctmed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C282%2C3730%2C2059&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Spanish National Police block people trying to reach a polling station in Barcelona, Spain, on Oct. 1. Catalan leaders accused Spanish police of brutality and repression. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After days of political upheaval following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/oct/01/catalan-independence-referendum-spain-catalonia-vote-live">Oct. 1 referendum</a> on independence from Spain, the president of Catalunya, Carles Puigdemont, spoke in the Catalan parliament this week.</p>
<p>The radical parties in parliament had been pushing for an immediate unilateral declaration of independence.</p>
<p>But with corporations beginning to <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/06/investing/catalonia-independence-banks-companies-spain/index.html">threaten they’d leave</a>, it made sense for Puigdemont to recount all the reasons why Catalunya is entitled to consider separation, but then announce that the independence declaration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10/catalan-government-suspends-declaration-of-independence">would be put on hold</a> for “several weeks” until a mediator is found.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189689/original/file-20171010-7420-122mypi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Catalan regional President Carles Puigdemont signs an independence declaration after a parliamentary session in Barcelona on Oct. 10. Puigdemont says he has a mandate to declare independence but is waiting a few weeks in order to facilitate a dialogue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manu Fernandez)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.dw.com/en/catalan-independence-spain-rejects-calls-for-mediation-by-catalan-president-carles-puigdemont/a-40809000">Mediation is widely supported</a> in Barcelona, the capital of Catalunya, by the leading newspaper, the bar association, the economists’ association, the chambers of commerce and a long list of civic leaders.</p>
<p>But the Spanish government has continued to repeat that there is no dialogue with law-breakers and that the referendum was illegal. </p>
<p>It was indeed illegal, but how the “illegal” label was generated would likely be mocked by international constitutional law experts.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, only Barcelona’s news outlets seem to know the background. They have tried to explain that in 2006 a referendum was actually held to approve the basic law governing Madrid-Barcelona relations (<a href="https://www.parlament.cat/document/cataleg/150259.pdf">the “Estatut.”</a>)</p>
<p>If it had been upheld, this long-awaited compromise law would have put an end to the independence movement. What the vast majority of Catalan people wanted (and probably would still want, if it were in the cards) was federalism, as it exists in Canada, Germany and other countries.</p>
<h2>Court stacked with centralists</h2>
<p>But the Constitutional Court, which had been carefully packed with strong centralists (in Spain judges belong to political parties and their affiliation is publicly known), unilaterally gutted the “Estatut” in 2010. When the same Constitutional Court declares the Barcelona government to be “anti-democratic” in 2017, one can appreciate why the labels “anti-democratic” and “illegal” have little purchase. Madrid unilaterally, and conveniently, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/10/europe/catalonia-how-we-got-here/index.html">deemed it so.</a></p>
<p>Prior to the Oct. 1 vote, Madrid sent tens of thousands of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/01/europe/catalonia-spain-independence-referendum-vote/index.html">heavily armed national police</a>, including the paramilitary Guardia Civil, to keep people from voting. </p>
<p>Clearly the thousands of riot police, who destroyed polling stations, beat up almost 900 voters, made off with ballots and ballot boxes and shot rubber bullets into crowds, had not only permission but encouragement from on high. They were unsuccessful, as it turned out, since more than two million people voted.</p>
<p>On Oct. 3, just after a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/general-strike-grinds-catalonia-halt-171003093537481.html">massive general strike</a> was held throughout Catalunya to protest the police actions, Spain’s King Felipe went on national TV. Instead of easing tensions, Felipe proceeded to use his position as sovereign <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/europe/catalonia-general-strike-protests-barcelona/index.html">to lambaste the government of Catalunya.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189687/original/file-20171010-19989-1s2mi2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Catalan regional police officers stand between protesters and national police headquarters during a one-day strike in Barcelona on Oct. 3 to protest alleged brutality by police during the referendum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Santi Palacios)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If Felipe had said “a few bad apples” among police had become overzealous, as would have happened in many democracies, that might have calmed things down. But the massive police violence went totally unmentioned, as if Felipe did not have a television set in his palace.</p>
<p>So where are things now? </p>
<p>Barcelona is still hoping for mediation, and has not gone through with independence declarations despite pressure from the radical left-separatist party CUP. Madrid has not yet sent in the tanks; but it has refused to pull the <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/europe/spain/police-block-public-access-to-catalan-parliament-1.2103665">national police and paramilitary forces</a> out of Catalunya. </p>
<p>And the government continues to refuse to negotiate at all, either directly or through international mediators, including “The Elders,” the group founded by Nelson Mandela that has made a <a href="http://theelders.org/article/elders-call-dialogue-and-restraint-over-catalonia-crisis">sensible call for dialogue</a> and would no doubt be available to mediate.</p>
<p>In all of this, the people of Catalunya keep asking: Where is the European Union? What is the point of having a European Parliament and a European Commission if they are AWOL during the worst political crisis in recent European history?</p>
<p>As a Barcelona-raised scholar of urban law and governance, I can attest that being European is important to all Catalans. </p>
<p>Those who favour independence flood the streets every Sept. 11 (the Catalan national day), waving both Catalan independence flags and EU flags. But those who are against independence also wave the EU flag. During the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/08/catalonia-spain-prime-minister-refuses-rule-out-suspending-autonomy">huge anti-independence demonstration</a> held Oct. 8 in Barcelona, people carried Spanish flags, EU flags and the official pre-independence flag of Catalunya, often with the three sewn together.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189684/original/file-20171010-17673-18j3wsa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators carrying flags march to protest the Catalan government’s push for secession from the rest of Spain in downtown Barcelona, Spain, on Oct. 8.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Francisco Seco)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The EU flag is just about the only thing both sides have in common. Even the famed Futbol Club Barcelona, usually the object of widespread and non-partisan adoration in Catalonia, took sides, not quite pro-independence but in favour of the referendum.</p>
<p>During the afternoon of Oct. 1, with European televisions and smartphone screens rife with photos of brazen police violence, a rumour circulated on social media about Angela Merkel phoning the Madrid Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, to tell him <a href="http://www.elnacional.cat/en/news/merkel-calls-rajoy-explanations-catalan-referendum_197541_102.html">to call off the dogs</a> – but it was only a rumour.</p>
<p>On referendum day, Oct. 1, one of the thousands of local crowds hoping to vote carried a large banner saying “Europe, help us” in English. That appeal, which in prior weeks was imbued with hope, became a cry of desperation.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"915189492394467328"}"></div></p>
<p>My sister Teresa, who was able to vote without violence (she lives in a very small town, one forgotten by the national police), told me that her fellow townspeople, who know of her Canadian connections, were asking, only half jokingly, whether Catalunya might become a province of Canada, since the EU clearly didn’t care about it.</p>
<p>What’s transpired in Spain over the past two weeks raises serious questions about why the West views it as acceptable that a European prime minister has completely disregarded every European Union norm about civility, dialogue, pluralism, police oversight and basic human rights.</p>
<p>When Venezuela stacks the constitutional court to ensure that democracy movements are labelled illegal, the EU cries foul. When the same thing happens in Madrid? Silence.</p>
<p>If Madrid wanted to secede from the EU economy, like Great Britain, an uproar would no doubt ensue. But Madrid has managed to secede from the legal, political and ethical norms and laws that European leaders insist countries like Russia, Turkey and Venezuela adhere to. </p>
<p>And nobody seems to care.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariana Valverde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The European Union is quick to condemn countries like Venezuela and Turkey when they engage in anti-democratic tactics. So why is it so silent on Spain’s treatment of the Catalan?Mariana Valverde, Urban law and governance, infrastructure researcher; professor of criminology, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.