tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/china-us-relations-33231/articlesChina-US relations – The Conversation2024-03-21T17:53:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
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<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
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<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
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<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
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<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257492024-03-15T15:15:16Z2024-03-15T15:15:16ZIs TikTok’s parent company an agent of the Chinese state? In China Inc., it’s a little more complicated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582050/original/file-20240314-28-369bin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C5%2C3553%2C2358&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some U.S. lawmakers have grown concerned about TikTok.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-walk-past-an-advertisement-featuring-the-tiktok-logo-news-photo/2075608549?adppopup=true">Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does the Chinese government have officials inside TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, pulling the strings? And does the storing of data from the popular social media app outside of China protect Americans?</p>
<p>These questions appear to dominate the current thinking in the U.S. over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/technology/tiktok-ban-house-vote.html">whether to ban TikTok</a> if its owner, Chinese technology giant ByteDance, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/14/tiktok-ban-china-would-block-sale-of-short-video-app.html">refuses to sell the platform</a>.</p>
<p>But in my opinion – forged through <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXeBa0kAAAAJ&hl=en">40 years as a scholar of China, its political economy and business</a> – both questions obscure a more interesting point. What’s more, they suggest a crucial misunderstanding of the relationship between state and private enterprise in China.</p>
<p>Simply put, there’s no clear line between the state and society in China in the same way that there is in democracies. The Chinese Communist Party – which is synonymous with the Chinese state – both owns and is the nation. And that goes for private enterprises, too. They operate like joint ventures in which the government is both a partner and the ultimate boss. Both sides know that – even if that relationship isn’t expressly codified and recognizable to outside onlookers.</p>
<h2>ByteDance under the microscope</h2>
<p>Take ByteDance. The company has become the focus of scrutiny in the U.S. largely due to the outsized influence that its subsidiary <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/02/22/how-u-s-adults-use-tiktok/">plays in the lives of young Americans</a>. Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-house-vote-force-bytedance-divest-tiktok-or-face-ban-2024-03-13/">170 million Americans</a> are TikTok users, and U.S. politicians fear their data has a direct route back to the Chinese state via ByteDance, which has its head offices in Beijing.</p>
<p>Location aside, concerned voices in the U.S. cite the evidence of former ByteDance employees who suggest <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-china-bytedance-user-data-d257d98125f69ac80f983e6067a84911">interference from the Chinese government</a>, and reports that the state has quietly <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/beijing-tightens-grip-on-bytedance-by-quietly-taking-stake-china-board-seat">taken a direct stake and a board seat</a> at Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd., ByteDance’s Chinese subsidiary.</p>
<p>Grilled by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in March 2023, TikTok’s Singaporean CEO Shou Zi Chew <a href="https://apnews.com/article/tiktok-ban-ceo-congressional-hearing-bytedance-china-44d948c5b0ba18e2a714e0fa62d52779">said unequivocally</a> that ByteDance was not “an agent of China or any other country.”</p>
<p>The history of the Chinese government’s dealings with private companies suggests something more subtle, however.</p>
<h2>The rise of China Inc.</h2>
<p>Over its century-long history, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to exercise control over all aspects of the country, including its economy. In its early days, this control took the form of a heavy-handed <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/command-economy.asp">command economy</a> in which everything was produced and consumed according to government planning.</p>
<p>China took a step in a more capitalist direction in the latter half of the 20th century after the death of Mao Zedong, founder of the People’s Republic of China. But even the <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/chinas-post-1978-economic-development-entry-global-trading-system">reforms of Deng Xiaoping</a> in the late 1970s and 1980s – credited for opening up China’s economy – were in the service of party goals. Because China’s economy was in ruins, the party’s emphasis was on economic development, and it loosened its grip on power to encourage that. The continuation of party control was still paramount – it just needed to reform the economy to ensure that goal.</p>
<p>That didn’t mean the party wanted pluralism. After decades of economic growth, and with a GDP surpassing that of the U.S. when <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3085501/china-overtakes-us-no-1-buying-power-still-clings-developing">measured by purchasing power parity</a>, the Chinese government once again started to shift its focus to a comprehensive control of China.</p>
<p>In recent years, under the increasingly <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_1--CCP_Decision-Making_and_Xi_Jinpings_Centralization_of_Authority.pdf">centralized control of Xi Jinping</a>, the Chinese government has evidently opted to run the entire country as a <a href="http://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-12-2019-1103">giant corporation</a>, with the ruling party as its management.</p>
<h2>A party with unusual power</h2>
<p>Unlike political parties in democracies, which people freely join and leave, the Chinese Communist Party resembles a secret society. <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf">To join</a>, you need to be introduced by two party members and tested for an extended period, and then pledge to die for the party’s cause. Quitting it also <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-02/05/c_1120413145.htm">needs approval by the party</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12023">Orders are implicit</a>, and protecting one’s superior is crucial. </p>
<p>People who don’t cooperate face serious consequences. In 2022, an official warned a resident who disobeyed the official’s order in COVID-19 testing that three generations of the resident’s descendants <a href="https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/generation-05122022062839.html">would be adversely affected</a> if he were uncooperative. The same is true of businesses: Ride-sharing company Didi incurred the party’s displeasure by listing its stocks in the U.S., and was harshly punished and forced to delist as a result – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-fines-didi-global-12-bln-violating-data-security-laws-2022-07-21/">losing more than 80% of its value</a>. </p>
<p>Since those who disobey the party are weeded out or are punished and seen to have learned their lessons, all surviving and successful private businesses are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-ma-makes-ant-offer-to-placate-chinese-regulators-11608479629?page=1">party supporters</a> – either voluntarily or otherwise.</p>
<p>The rapid emergence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076210">China Inc.</a> has caught even seasoned Chinese entrepreneurs off guard. Consider the case of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/28/1021651586/chinese-billionaire-sun-dawu-is-sentenced-to-18-years-for-provoking-trouble">Sun Dawu</a>, a successful agricultural entrepreneur known for advocating for rural reform and the rights of farmers. That offended the party, and in 2020, authorities confiscated all his assets and sentenced him to 18 years in prison.</p>
<p>As if that weren’t enough, China’s National Intelligence Law granted broad powers to the country’s spy agencies and obligates companies to assist with intelligence efforts. That’s why some American lawmakers are concerned that ByteDance could be <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-the-us-crack-down-on-tiktok-six-questions-and-expert-answers-about-the-bill-in-congress/">forced to hand over Americans’ private data</a> to the Chinese state. <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-au/the-truth-about-tiktok">TikTok denies</a> this is the case. However, recently <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/leaked-hacking-files-show-chinese-spying-on-citizens-and-foreigners-alike">leaked files</a> of I-Soon, a Chinese hacking firm, reveal public-private collusion in data sharing is common in China.</p>
<p>That’s why I’m not convinced by TikTok’s argument that American users’ data is safe because it’s stored <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/tiktok-facts-how-we-secure-personal-information-and-store-data">outside of China</a>, in the U.S., Malaysia and Singapore. I also don’t think it’s relevant whether the party has members on the ByteDance board or gives explicit orders to TikTok.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether ByteDance has formal ties with the party, there will be the tacit understanding that the management is working for two bosses: the investors of the company and – more importantly – their political overseers that represent the party. But most importantly, when the interests of the two bosses conflict, the party trumps.</p>
<p>As such, as long as ByteDance owns TikTok, I believe ByteDance will use TikTok to support the party – not just for its own business survival, but for the safety of the personnel of ByteDance and TikTok, and their families.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaomin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In China, ‘private’ businesses aren’t entirely private and the ultimate boss is the CCP, not the CEO.Shaomin Li, Eminent Scholar and Professor of International Business, Old Dominion UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242952024-03-01T11:49:59Z2024-03-01T11:49:59ZPanda diplomacy: what China’s decision to send bears to the US reveals about its economy<p>A <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-send-new-pandas-san-diego-zoo-rcna139926">deal was signed</a> between San Diego Zoo and China’s Wildlife Conservation Association in February 2024 that paved the way for Chinese giant pandas to return to the US by the end of the summer. </p>
<p>But this is far more than just a deal between two zoos. It suggests a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3252870/chinas-envoys-friendship-return-us-zoo-beijing-restarts-panda-diplomacy">warming of relations</a> between the US and China, and a bid by China to help repair <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/27/economy/china-economy-challenges-2024-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20Chinese%20economy%20was%20expected,(IMF)%2C%20among%20others.">its struggling economy</a>.</p>
<p>For decades, China has used <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/panda-diplomacy/">panda diplomacy</a>, where Beijing gave or loaned its pandas as a sign of friendship or to strengthen national ties, to establish a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/panda-diplomacy-exit-from-edinburgh-zoo-may-signal-end-of-era#:%7E:text=As%20the%20UK's%20only%20giant,be%20coming%20to%20an%20end.">good long-term relationship with other countries</a>. However, in 2023, when China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/us/politics/panda-zoo-china.html">withdrew its giant pandas</a> from the Smithsonian zoo in Washington DC, this seemed to symbolise how rocky the China-US relationship had become. </p>
<p>Two pandas were given as a gift to the US after President Richard Nixon <a href="https://nationalzoo.si.edu/animals/history-giant-pandas-zoo">visited China in 1972</a>, and this was seen as a major breakthrough in modern US-China relations. From the 1990s onwards panda diplomacy was transformed into a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/6387">long-term programme</a> involving conservation and scientific study.</p>
<p>Panda diplomacy is part of what is called <a href="https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/tools-foreign-policy/what-soft-power">“soft power”</a>, how nations use their culture or heritage to influence <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/hjd/8/1/article-p49_3.xml?language=en">another country’s foreign policy</a>. Pandas are <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/L/bo3631069.html">soft and cuddly</a>, and have what it takes to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01292986.2020.1725075">win hearts and minds</a>. So, the pandas became part of an attractive part of <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/hjd/8/1/article-p49_3.xml">China’s international image</a>. </p>
<p>By sending these pandas to the US, Beijing intends to woo the American public, but also more specifically, California, the home of the US technology industry.</p>
<p>One reason for this is that Beijing needs to jump start its ailing economy. Foreign investment in China was <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-investment-in-China-turns-negative-for-first-time">lacklustre</a> in 2022. But between July and September 2023 things got a lot <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-investment-in-China-turns-negative-for-first-time">worse</a>, as foreign direct investment leaving the country outweighed that coming in. This had not happened since 1998.</p>
<p>A main reason for this drop in foreign investment stems from <a href="https://time.com/6324619/us-biden-ai-chips-china/">US restrictions</a> on exports of semiconductor technology to China. This is related to US concerns that the chips could be used by China for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/11/15/will-xi-and-biden-mend-us-china-relations-at-the-apec-summit#:%7E:text=With%20the%20Chinese%20economy%20slowing,speech%20at%20the%20business%20dinner.">military objectives</a>. To turn the economic tide, China needs to repair its trade relationship with the US, and possibly get the US government to change its policy.</p>
<p>The two giant pandas are headed for California, home to both the Silicon Valley and San Francisco, currently the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/07/ai-start-ups-are-booming-in-san-francisco-s-cerebral-valley_6408847_4.html#:%7E:text=%22San%20Francisco%20is%20the%20AI,of%20more%20than%20three%20years.">world’s centres for artificial intelligence</a> development. </p>
<p>The potential of this technology is important for China. As well as the potential to add <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/quantumblack/our-insights/the-next-frontier-for-ai-in-china-could-add-600-billion-to-its-economy">$600 billion</a> (£474 billion) to the Chinese economy by 2030, it could provide <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/696206/EPRS_ATA(2021)696206_EN.pdf">an edge</a> for China’s powerful <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2980879/artificial-intelligence-technology-and-chinas-defense-system/">military</a>.</p>
<p>To become a world leader of artificial intelligence by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/10/china-s-ai-regulations-and-how-they-get-made-pub-90117#:%7E:text=The%202017%20New%20Generation%20AI,China's%20economy%20and%20national%20power.">2030</a>, China needs talent and technological know-how. But China’s ability to enhance its artificial intelligence capacity through domestic talent is constrained by an education system steeped in <a href="https://innovationmatters.economist.com/beijing/education-artificial-intelligence">rote learning</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing’s redeployment of pandas dials up the diplomatic goodwill several notches, signalling Beijing’s seriousness in improving links with Washington. After all, the pandas represent China’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/environmental-practice/article/abs/environmental-reviews-and-case-studies-diplomats-and-refugees-panda-diplomacy-soft-cuddly-power-and-the-new-trajectory-in-panda-conservation/A23238335C47C1717417060B7AAB05AF">seal of approval</a> towards a foreign nation, and this move typically <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/environmental-practice/article/abs/environmental-reviews-and-case-studies-diplomats-and-refugees-panda-diplomacy-soft-cuddly-power-and-the-new-trajectory-in-panda-conservation/A23238335C47C1717417060B7AAB05AF">signals</a> a plan to build a long, prosperous working relationship.</p>
<h2>What’s the history?</h2>
<p>The Smithsonian’s zoo, arguably the birthplace of panda diplomacy in the west, had been home to giant pandas since <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/08/world/panda-diplomacy-us-china/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20Smithsonian%20National%20Zoo%20was,say%20whether%20it%20will%20continue.">1972</a>. It was from November 8, 2023, that the zoo lost its giant pandas for the first time in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/08/world/panda-diplomacy-us-china/index.html#:%7E:text=(CNN)%20%E2%80%93%20Three%20giant%20pandas,being%20housed%20at%20the%20zoo.">more than 50 years</a>, when Mei Xiang, Tian Tian and their offspring, Xiao Qi Ji were flown back to China.</p>
<p>At that point, there were suggestions that panda diplomacy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/us/politics/panda-zoo-china.html">was over</a> as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/28/pandas-returning-china-dc-zoo/">tensions</a> between the US and China had risen significantly. Relations between US and Chinese businesses also seemed to be getting worse. A survey by the US-China Business Council of its members in 2023 found that 34% had stopped or reduced planned investment in China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/business/economy/xi-jinping-american-business-leaders-dinner.html">over the previous 12 months</a>.</p>
<p>But later in November, China’s president Xi Jinping held a four-hour summit with President Joe Biden at the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/business/economy/xi-jinping-american-business-leaders-dinner.html">Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) conference in San Francisco</a> and signalled that there was potential for rapprochement. Xi said that, in a world of challenges, the US and China “must handle our relations well”. Xi alluded to the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-jinping-china-pandas-california-biden-summit-rcna125471">pandas’ popularity</a> with Americans. </p>
<p>He added <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-jinping-china-pandas-california-biden-summit-rcna125471">that China</a> is “ready to continue our cooperation with the United States on panda conservation”, and added that China will “do our best to meet the wishes of the Californians so as to deepen the friendly ties between our two peoples”.</p>
<p>Xi also set up a dinner with hundreds of tech executives including Apple CEO Tim Cook and business leaders on the sidelines of the Apec meeting. So it would seem logical that Beijing has decided to send its national treasures to California to signal the state’s importance to the Asian superpower.</p>
<p>It looks like <a href="https://www.history.com/news/panda-diplomacy-the-worlds-cutest-ambassadors">Beijing’s willingness to send its bears</a> back to the US is part of a strategy to improve not only its political relationship with Biden, but, perhaps more importantly, to help bring back US investment, and reframe Beijing as a friendlier trading power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224295/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chee Meng Tan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The arrival of two giant pandas in San Diego is a sign of China’s need to make friends in the US tech industries.Chee Meng Tan, Assistant Professor of Business Economics, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177542023-11-16T01:35:59Z2023-11-16T01:35:59ZWhat Joe Biden’s meeting with Xi Jinping means for geopolitical tensions<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/what-joe-bidens-meeting-with-xi-jinping-means-for-geopolitical-tensions" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has engaged in a crucial <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/joe-biden-has-points-to-prove-as-he-meets-xi-jinping-on-wednesday/articleshow/105217280.cms">face-to-face meeting</a> with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco.</p>
<p>This high-stakes diplomatic encounter was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/politics/biden-xi-meeting/index.html">aimed at alleviating tensions between the world’s two superpowers</a>. The meeting carried immense significance as leaders of the world’s largest economies seek to establish a sense of stability following a challenging year in U.S.-China relations.</p>
<p>Even though both leaders have said they want <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-xi-apec-san-francisco-58d11e7e3902955302182c2bc41430e0">to stabilize their relationship</a>, the meeting is unlikely to bring about transformative changes between the two countries that are inherently antagonistic due to deeper structural reasons. </p>
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<h2>New Cold War?</h2>
<p>The U.S. and China are enmeshed in a grand power competition in which <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/">China aspires to supplant the United States as a superpower</a> while the U.S. aims to maintain its position. </p>
<p>This rivalry spans various facets of global politics, encompassing military, economic and technological domains. However, the contours of this new Cold War differ markedly <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/cold-war">from the previous one</a>, with three key distinctions:</p>
<ol>
<li>In contrast to the Soviet Union, China is intricately woven into the American-built economic order. <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/09/28/how-the-liberal-international-order-shaped-chinas-challenge-to-global-economic-governance/">Beijing’s integration</a> into the global economic framework has been instrumental in its substantial economic development. Unlike the Soviet Union, which existed outside this economic order, China’s active participation has transformed the dynamics of the current geopolitical landscape.</li>
<li>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/business/us-china-economy-trade.html">economic interdependence</a> between the U.S. and China sets this rivalry apart. Unlike the relatively self-contained economies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China relies on the American market for its product sales, while the U.S. depends on China for financial transactions.</li>
<li>People-to-people contact between the U.S. and China surpasses the ties between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. With a 5.4 million-strong <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states/">Chinese diaspora</a> in the U.S. and 300,000 Chinese students studying in American universities, the connections between both countries make outright hostilities less likely.</li>
</ol>
<h2>Stabilizing relations</h2>
<p>In this context, the term coined by American political scientist Joseph Nye — “<a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-us-china-relations-cooperative-rivalry-by-joseph-s-nye-2021-05">co-operative rivalry</a>” — aptly characterizes Chinese-American relations. </p>
<p>The challenges of our globalized world — including climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence, economic volatility and human security — necessitate active Chinese participation. These challenges make it particularly important that the U.S. and China stabilize relations. </p>
<p>The current emphasis on competition over co-operation needs to be shelved. Both nations should seek equilibrium by fostering co-operation in areas of mutual interest while navigating competition in areas of divergence.</p>
<p>Already complex relations between the U.S. and China have been tense in recent years. China was miffed when former U.S. House Speaker <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pelosi-taiwan-china-us-1.6538434">Nancy Pelosi visited</a> Taiwan in August 2022. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
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<p>Because China asserts territorial claims over Taiwan, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/29/asia/tsai-ing-wen-taiwan-president-us-stopover-central-america-trip-intl-hnk/index.html">a stopover</a> in the U.S. by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen added to the list of contentious issues. </p>
<p>Beijing also expressed displeasure over new <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/07/biden-administration-tech-restrictions-china">U.S. exports restrictions</a> on advanced technology, and Biden’s directive to shoot down a Chinese <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spy-balloon-technology/index.html">spy balloon</a> in February 2023.</p>
<h2>Spats intensified</h2>
<p>Tensions escalated to the point that China severed military-to-military communications with the U.S. after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, despite <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3224794/why-china-still-refusing-resume-military-dialogue-us-despite-antony-blinkens-latest-appeal">repeated American appeals for China to reopen these lines of communication</a> to prevent any misconceptions or accidental escalations of conflict in the South China region and Taiwan. </p>
<p>When the U.S. downed the Chinese spy balloon, China’s foreign ministry contended that it was conducting meteorological research. American authorities, however, insisted it carried surveillance equipment inconsistent with a weather balloon.</p>
<p>In response to the balloon incident, Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/03/politics/china-us-balloon-intl/index.html">cancelled his planned visit to Beijing</a> in protest. </p>
<p>Subsequently, China declined to reschedule the visit for several months. This communications void at both military and political levels between China and the U.S. <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/amid-tensions-biden-xi-discuss-restoring-us-china/story?id=104916838">posed a significant risk of potentially dangerous consequences</a>. One of the outcomes of the Biden-Xi meeting is that military-to-military discussions will resume.</p>
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<h2>The Xi-Biden meeting</h2>
<p>Prior to the meeting, U.S. National Security Adviser <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/national-security-adviser-jake-sullivan-face-the-nation-transcript-11-12-2023/">Jake Sullivan emphasized</a> the importance of addressing fundamental aspects of the U.S.-China relationship, highlighting the need to strengthen open lines of communication and responsibly manage competition to prevent it from escalating into conflict.</p>
<p>Sullivan acknowledged the necessity of “intense diplomacy” to clarify misconceptions and avert surprises.</p>
<p>China’s economy is currently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/why-is-chinas-economy-slowing-down-could-it-get-worse-2023-09-01/">experiencing a slowdown</a>, marked by falling prices due to subdued demand from both consumers and businesses. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/economists-stick-to-2024-china-outlook-while-assessing-stimulus-1.1991680">With a projected economic growth of five per cent this year and an expected dip to 4.5 per cent in 2024</a>, these economic challenges have adversely affected Xi’s domestic political standing. That may be behind any motivation to improve relations with the U.S. to address these domestic issues.</p>
<p>Biden, too, is keen on stabilizing relations with China. Confronted with escalating conflicts in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/israel-hamas-war-list-of-key-events-day-39">Middle East</a> and the ongoing <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-live-zelenskiy-says-russian-frontline-attacks-rising-germany-says-eu-won-t-meet-1m-pieces-of-ammo-target/ar-AA1jTjAI">war in Ukraine</a>, Biden is eager to avert the emergence of another global crisis during his tenure. </p>
<p>Restoring a semblance of stability to the Washington-Beijing relationship <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">has been among the top priorities in his foreign policy agenda.</a> </p>
<h2>What the meeting might accomplish</h2>
<p>One summit alone cannot resolve the extensive list of grievances between the two superpowers. Those challenges include issues like espionage, intellectual property theft, human rights abuses, foreign interference and trade penalties, as well as the sensitive matter of Taiwan. </p>
<p>The meeting addressed another point of contention between the two countries: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/biden-xi-talk-fentanyl-city-gripped-by-opioid-crisis-2023-11-15/">fentanyl shipments</a>. The leaders announced an agreement intended to stop China’s illicit exports of chemicals that can be used to make the drug that has led to the overdose deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans.</p>
<p>The agreement on re-opening communication channels at both military and civilian levels could be a crucial step in improving China-U.S. relations. It might serve as a foundation to prevent relations from spiralling out of control, and lay the groundwork for addressing broader challenges in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Relations between the U.S. and China have been particularly tense for the last few years. Can one summit between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping significantly improve relations?Saira Bano, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176112023-11-14T17:12:37Z2023-11-14T17:12:37ZBiden-Xi meeting: 6 essential reads on what to look out for as US, Chinese leaders hold face-to-face talks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559360/original/file-20231114-25-d2sfpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4480%2C2984&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping are set to meet for the first time in a year.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-and-chinas-president-xi-jinping-meet-on-news-photo/1244770358?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP cia Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Joe Biden sits down with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Nov. 15, 2023, in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/13/business/dealbook/biden-xi-china-trade.html">first head-to-head talks between the leaders</a> of the world’s two biggest economies in over a year.</p>
<p>During that time, relations between the two countries have not been their best – a spat over a <a href="https://theconversation.com/spy-balloon-drama-elevates-public-attention-pressure-for-the-us-to-confront-china-199484">purported spy balloon over American airspace</a> in February only added to a list of grievances that includes <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">Biden’s comments over Taiwan</a>, Beijing’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-view-from-moscow-and-beijing-what-peace-in-ukraine-and-a-post-conflict-world-look-like-to-xi-and-putin-202323">support of Russia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-about-to-blow-up-a-fake-warship-in-the-south-china-sea-but-naval-rivalry-with-beijing-is-very-real-and-growing-198651">confrontations in the South China Sea</a> and more generally a competition for influence and trade around the world.</p>
<p>Yet, going into the meeting – which takes place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in the San Francisco Bay Area – there has been talk of trying to put the U.S.-China relationship on a better track. The White House has indicated that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-chinas-xi-will-discuss-communication-competition-apec-summit-2023-11-13/">strengthening communication and managing competition</a> will be the key thing to watch; Xi <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231009-top-diplomat-wang-hopes-us-china-can-rationally-manage-differences">recently commented</a> that there were “a thousand reasons to improve China-U.S. relations, but not one reason to ruin them.”</p>
<p>But how much is achievable? Recent articles from The Conversation’s archive provide insight and background over what is likely to be on the agenda – and the obstacles to improving ties.</p>
<h2>1. Engagement, decoupling or derisking?</h2>
<p>The meeting comes after a hardening stance against China in Washington – and with a general election just a year away, political rhetoric on China is likely to remain robust.</p>
<p>Michael Beckley, an <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/michael-beckley">expert on U.S.-China relations at Tufts University</a>, saw evidence of a more hawkish China policy on display in March when a bipartisan House committee on China held its inaugural meeting.</p>
<p>“What was abundantly clear from the lawmakers was the message that the era of engagement with China is long past its sell-by date,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-more-hawkish-china-policy-5-takeaways-from-house-committees-inaugural-hearing-on-confronting-beijing-200953">wrote Beckley, adding</a>: “Engagement had been the policy of successive government from Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972 onward. But there was a general acceptance among committee members that the policy is outdated and that it is time to adopt if not outright containment then certainly a more competitive policy.”</p>
<p>A key part of that new policy would involve a more robust stance on confronting China’s military posturing in East Asia. </p>
<p>It also included what Beckley described as “selective decoupling,” or the disentangling of certain technology and economic interests. The buzzword being thrown around in foreign policy circles lately is “derisking,” but it alludes to the same thing: U.S. entities limiting their exposure to China.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-more-hawkish-china-policy-5-takeaways-from-house-committees-inaugural-hearing-on-confronting-beijing-200953">A more hawkish China policy? 5 takeaways from House committee's inaugural hearing on confronting Beijing</a>
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<h2>2. War (of words) over Taiwan</h2>
<p>So what has prompted the worsening relations between China and the U.S.? For starters, there is the ongoing tension over Taiwan.</p>
<p>For the best part of 40 years, U.S. diplomatic relations with the island have been governed by the “one China policy” – through which Washington recognizes the People’s Republic of China and acknowledges that Beijing’s position remains that Taiwan is part of China. Prior to 1979, the U.S. recognized the government of Taiwan as “China.”</p>
<p>But in recent years, Beijing has caught wind of subtle changes in the U.S. over the issue. In May 2022, Biden suggested he would intervene “militarily” should China ever invade Taiwan. This would break a long-standing policy of ambiguity over what the U.S. would do in such an event. The White House later walked back the comments, suggesting that it didn’t represent a change. But it <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">wasn’t the first time</a> that Biden has made such a remark, noted Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S. Taiwan relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.</p>
<p>“I think it is clear at this point that Biden’s interpretation of the Taiwan Relations Act – which since 1979 has set out the parameters of U.S. policy on the island – is that it allows for a U.S. military response should China invade. And despite White House claims to the contrary, I believe that does represent a departure from the long-standing policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan,” she wrote.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">Biden on Taiwan: Did he really commit US forces to stopping any invasion by China? An expert explains why, on balance, probably not</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>3. Navigating the South China Sea</h2>
<p>Most experts are of a mind that an invasion of Taiwan isn’t on Beijing’s immediate agenda – or in its interests. But that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-about-to-blow-up-a-fake-warship-in-the-south-china-sea-but-naval-rivalry-with-beijing-is-very-real-and-growing-198651">doesn’t mean that a military confrontation isn’t possible</a>.</p>
<p>“If a war between China and the U.S. is going to happen, I believe the South China Sea is likely to be a major theater, with Chinese aggression toward Taiwan the spark,” wrote Krista Wiegand, a <a href="http://www.kristawiegand.com/">scholar of East Asian security and maritime disputes</a> at the University of Tennessee.</p>
<p>The South China Sea – which is home to large reserves of oil and gas as well as billions of dollars’ worth of fisheries – has become a constant cause of tension between Beijing and a host of East and Southeast Asian nations, including U.S. allies the Philippines and Japan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An infographic shows a map of South China Sea and surrounding countries with their claims to the waters represented by dotted lines." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559366/original/file-20231114-23-c4cy8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-infographic-titled-south-china-sea-a-hotbed-of-news-photo/1246032083?adppopup=true">Omar Zaghloul/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>In April, the U.S. Navy in conjunction with counterparts in the Philippines sunk a mock warship off the archipelago country’s coast.</p>
<p>Washington stressed that it was not in response to increased tension over Taiwan, but it was nonetheless met by Beijing staging its own military exercise around the disputed island.</p>
<p>More generally, China has consistently engaged in so-called “gray zone tactics” in the waters – such as deploying Chinese Coast Guard boats in disputed areas, harassing other nations’ ships and building up artificial islands.</p>
<p>“With China playing by a different set of rules than the U.S. and its allies in the region, the risk of clashes at sea is very real. It could even lead to conflict between the two most powerful countries in the world today,” wrote Wiegand.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-about-to-blow-up-a-fake-warship-in-the-south-china-sea-but-naval-rivalry-with-beijing-is-very-real-and-growing-198651">The US is about to blow up a fake warship in the South China Sea – but naval rivalry with Beijing is very real and growing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>4. Trading blows</h2>
<p>The South China Seas is also a major trade route – and simmering trade competition underpins a lot of the tension between the U.S and China.</p>
<p>City, University of London’s <a href="https://www.bayes.city.ac.uk/faculties-and-research/experts/manmohan-s-sodhi">ManMohan S. Sodhi</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Kk-QbksAAAAJ&hl=en">Christopher S. Tang</a> at the University of California, Los Angeles, explained how economic ties between the two countries flourished in the 1980s only to <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">become more hostile of late</a> – and how that is affecting global trade.</p>
<p>“As U.S.-China relations have moved from building bridges in 1972 to building walls in 2022, countries will increasingly be forced to choose sides and companies will have to plan supply chains accordingly. Those seeking to trade in both blocs will need to ‘divisionalise,’ running parallel operations,” the scholars wrote.</p>
<p>A bipolar trading world is already emerging, with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen calling for “friend-shoring” with trusted partners – in other words, splitting countries into friends or foes and rewarding the former. Such a tactic is aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has seen Beijing pump billions of dollars into developing countries over the last decade.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">China-US tensions: how global trade began splitting into two blocs</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>5. War in Ukraine …</h2>
<p>Biden and Xi have plenty of bilateral issues to talk though. But the meeting takes place with a backdrop of two major conflagrations that continue to occupy the thoughts of foreign policy advisors in both Beijing and Washington.</p>
<p>China’s support of Russia has been a continued source of tension between Beijing and the West since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas puts in jeopardy China’s policy of “balanced diplomacy” in the region.</p>
<p>And yet, there is potential for common ground here between Biden and Xi. Both will be keen that war doesn’t cause more destabilization. As <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/emeritus/rgsuny.html">Ronald Suny of the University of Michigan</a> wrote <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-view-from-moscow-and-beijing-what-peace-in-ukraine-and-a-post-conflict-world-look-like-to-xi-and-putin-202323">in regards to the Ukraine conflict</a>: “Stability, both domestically and internationally, works to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. And Beijing is mindful that a slump in foreign demand and investment is hitting the country’s economic prospects.” </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-view-from-moscow-and-beijing-what-peace-in-ukraine-and-a-post-conflict-world-look-like-to-xi-and-putin-202323">The view from Moscow and Beijing: What peace in Ukraine and a post-conflict world look like to Xi and Putin</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>6. … and now the Middle East</h2>
<p>Yet Beijing is also at pains to promote its vision of a multipolar world, edging away from U.S. dominance. For similar reasons, Beijing is keen to develop its role as friend to all in the Middle East – a position that will become <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-puts-chinas-strategy-of-balanced-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east-at-risk-216246">harder to maintain as war goes on</a>, as Andrew Latham, who <a href="https://www.macalester.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/andrewlatham/">teaches China foreign policy</a> at Macalester College, explained.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-puts-chinas-strategy-of-balanced-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east-at-risk-216246">Israel-Hamas war puts China's strategy of 'balanced diplomacy' in the Middle East at risk</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Scholars writing for The Conversation take a deeper look at some of the issues expected to be on the agenda when the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies meet.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099732023-07-19T04:21:08Z2023-07-19T04:21:08ZHow is China shifting its foreign policy to counter moves to ‘contain’ it from the West?<p>At last week’s NATO summit, the members issued a final statement <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm">criticising</a> China’s coercive policies, which they said challenge the interests, security and values of the bloc. </p>
<p>The NATO members did, however, commit to “constructive engagement” with the rapidly rising superpower. </p>
<p>Beijing reacted strongly to the statement nonetheless. It <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202307/t20230712_11112244.html">accused the alliance</a> of “smearing and lying” about China and warned against NATO’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-nato-expanding-its-reach-to-the-asia-pacific-region-209140">outreach efforts</a> in the Asia-Pacific. </p>
<p>Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said in blunt terms:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NATO must abandon the outdated Cold War mentality and zero-sum mindset, renounce its blind faith in military might and misguided practice of seeking absolute security, halt the dangerous attempt to destabilise Europe and the Asia-Pacific and stop finding pretext for its continuous expansion. </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-nato-expanding-its-reach-to-the-asia-pacific-region-209140">Why is NATO expanding its reach to the Asia-Pacific region?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How the US is challenging China</h2>
<p>China’s strong reaction reflects its serious concerns over the global challenges it faces. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2022.2090767?needAccess=true">growing networks</a> of US-led alliances and security partnerships, such as the Quad and AUKUS, which aim to constrain if not contain China </p></li>
<li><p>US and European Union policies of de-risking and diversifying their supply chains to reduce their reliance on China</p></li>
<li><p>and more restrictive <a href="https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2022/10/us-imposes-additional-export-controls-restrictions-on-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-items">export control regulations</a> the US has enacted on high-tech transfers or exchanges. These are meant to prevent China from gaining the ability to manufacture semiconductors and slow its progress in quantum computing and artificial intelligence. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Even as it becomes more concerned over these challenges, Beijing is hopeful these US-led networks of alliances and partnerships will remain patchwork given their <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-eus-china-strategy-understanding-the-concept-of-de-risking/">diversity of interests</a>, priorities and commitments. </p>
<p>China also retains significant advantages given its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/24761028.2021.1937841">close economic ties</a> with America’s allies and partners. This will influence whether the US can successfully achieve what Beijing believes is its goal of containing China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-biden-has-said-the-us-wasnt-trying-to-contain-china-but-the-evidence-suggests-otherwise-204809">Joe Biden has said the US wasn't trying to 'contain' China, but the evidence suggests otherwise</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>China’s strategy in response</h2>
<p>Analysts have <a href="https://en.huanqiu.com/china-must-not-overplay-its-strategic-hand/">questioned</a> whether Beijing is smart and patient enough to be able to apply a wedge strategy to divide the US and its allies, or if its misjudgement and hubris could cause it to become overconfident and even arrogant. </p>
<p>Indeed, Beijing’s wolf-warrior diplomacy and assertive policies in recent years have only <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14736489.2023.2180919?journalCode=find20">served to help</a> the US and its allies grow closer to counter these actions.</p>
<p>Beijing may have learned its lessons. It’s now adopting a more proactive and confident diplomacy to counter US encirclement. I’ve observed at least four tactics when it comes to this shifting foreign policy.</p>
<p><strong>1) China is focusing on the region and leaning into its strengths</strong> </p>
<p>Beijing recognises it must focus its diplomatic energies on Asia given its importance to China’s security and economic interests. </p>
<p>It is deepening its economic ties with ASEAN, the 10-nation regional bloc,
while also supporting ASEAN centrality in the region’s security structures. The Southeast Asian group is wary of being drawn into a US-China conflict and forced to choose sides. It is also concerned US-led initiatives such as the Quad could diminish its role in the region.</p>
<p>At the same time, China has been active in promoting the ASEAN-sponsored <a href="https://asean.org/our-communities/economic-community/integration-with-global-economy/the-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep/">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a>. It believes this group offers a more inclusive and cooperative approach to regional economic cooperation. The group includes the ASEAN members, China and several US allies, such as South Korea, Japan and Australia.</p>
<p>Beijing is billing it as an attractive alternative to the US-sponsored <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/indo-pacific-economic-framework-prosperity-ipef">Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity</a>. This group, which includes 14 countries in the region, last month signed an agreement on making their supply chains more resilient.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538191/original/file-20230719-25-rrwrbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi shakes hands with his Indonesian counterpart, Retno Marsudi, at the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Jakarta last week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tatan Syuflana/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>2) Beijing is boosting its diplomatic efforts with Europe</strong></p>
<p>Since lifting its COVID border restrictions, Beijing has welcomed world leaders, hosted business groups and promoted trade and investment opportunities in China. </p>
<p>Europe, in particular, has been the focus of Beijing’s recent diplomacy. Premier Li Qiang’s first major international <a href="https://m.huanqiu.com/article/4DKQ8GNKCAy">trip</a> since taking office was to Germany and France last month, where he emphasised economic opportunities over geopolitical differences, partnership over rivalry. </p>
<p>European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have also become <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-leaders-beat-a-path-to-xi-s-door-seeking-china-s-help/7052843.html">regular features</a> in Beijing.</p>
<p>These efforts are allowing China to deepen its <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/china-s-xi-calls-for-greater-economic-opening-in-charm-offensive-1.1944115">economic ties</a> with Europe. In so doing, Beijing is hoping to undermine US efforts to develop a transatlantic approach toward China, including policies of de-risking or de-coupling their economies from China.</p>
<p><strong>3) China is standing with Russia – for now</strong></p>
<p>Beijing is likely annoyed, if not dismayed, by the fiasco Russia’s war in Ukraine has become. However, it is determined now is not the time to desert Russian President Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>From energy supplies to military technology cooperation, Russia remains a vital strategic partner for China. The last thing China wants is a <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/02/28/after-russia-s-war-against-ukraine-what-kind-of-world-order-pub-89130">decimated Russia</a>, leaving it to face the US and its networks of alliances and security groups alone. China also would not want to deal with any potential threats from Russia, given their long shared border. </p>
<p>Beijing has carefully, if not convincingly, presented itself as a neutral bystander in the conflict, interested in bringing it to an end. China is also taking advantage of Russia’s precarious position by expanding and consolidating its influence in <a href="https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202201/28/WS61f38acea310cdd39bc83ea3.html">Central Asia</a>, while remaining respectful of Russia’s traditional ties to the region.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538195/original/file-20230719-19-c6fftb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) speaks to Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sergei Bobylev/Pool Sputnik Kremlin/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>4) China is promoting itself as a global leader</strong></p>
<p>Finally, China has become more confident and active in promoting its models of global governance in security, development and community building. </p>
<p>Some efforts are still in the development stages, such as its <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/the-global-security-initiative-chinas-new-security-architecture-for-the-gulf/">Global Security Initiative</a>, while others are more concrete. For example, Beijing sees itself as a global mediator after its success in <a href="https://time.com/6262985/china-saudi-arabia-iran-ukraine-peace-talks/">brokering</a> a truce between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1679319243484205056"}"></div></p>
<p>Beijing is also continuing to promote its preferred multilateral institutions, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS">BRICS group</a>, which currently includes China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and India. Beijing has <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202305/1291708.shtml">welcomed</a> expanding the group.</p>
<p>Together with its ambitious and controversial Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing believes it can offer an alternative to the US-led groupings, such as the Quad. By relying on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439?journalCode=rpre20">institutions</a> in this way, Beijing can promote its interests globally while avoiding direct confrontation with the US.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jingdong Yuan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing has dialled back its aggressive stance and is adopting a more proactive and confident diplomacy to counter US encirclement.Jingdong Yuan, Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific security, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077862023-07-09T12:02:11Z2023-07-09T12:02:11ZU.S. allies should rethink their allegiance to an aggressive but declining superpower<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535647/original/file-20230704-17-a7zax4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3458&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. artillery rocket system fires a missile during annual combat drills between the Philippine Marine Corps and U.S. Marine Corps in the northern Philippines in October 2022 in a region where the United States says it wants to deter China.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Aaron Favila)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/us-allies-should-rethink-their-allegiance-to-an-aggressive-but-declining-superpower" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In its pursuit of permanent global domination, the United States has pushed the world towards unnecessary conflict, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/the-us-war-on-terror-20-years-after-mission-accomplished">especially via its two-decade “war on terror.</a>”</p>
<p>American allies could dissuade the U.S. from its tendency to take a dangerous and divisive path, but their own weaknesses and commitment to the status quo are making them complicit.</p>
<p>According to the Watson Institute at Brown University, the conflicts connected to the war on terror have killed <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures">about 4.6 million people</a> since 2001. About a million have died in direct violence but the others — disproportionately women and children — have been casualties of political, economic and social instability in numerous countries that have been the target of the war on terror.</p>
<p>That conflict defines 21st century world politics, far more than the war in Ukraine. It was driven by former U.S. president <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/behind-the-iraq-war-a-story-of-influence-intelligence-and-presidential-power/2020/08/20/23b610ba-cab3-11ea-91f1-28aca4d833a0_story.html">George W. Bush’s messianic impulses</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/iraq-war-2003-bush-neoconservative-failure-civilian-deaths-islamist-insurgencies/">neoconservative ideologues</a> <a href="https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/9249">who aspired to reshape the Middle East</a> in the American image using military force.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/11/us/threats-responses-vote-congress-authorizes-bush-use-force-against-iraq-creating.html">U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly</a> to support the Bush wars. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/19/2003-iraq-invasion-legacy-west-international-law-ukraine">The war in Iraq</a>, an unprovoked and illegal invasion of a sovereign state, demonstrated the danger of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/5/1/ukraine-war-did-putin-learn-from-bushs-iraq-horrors">unchecked American power and hubris</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A grey-haired man stands a podium with the U.S. presidential insignia. Behind him a sign reads Mission Accomplished." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this May 2003 photo, President George W. Bush declares the end of major combat in Iraq as he speaks aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the California coast. The war dragged on for many years after that.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ignoring international law</h2>
<p>The Watson Institute report explains why states targeted by the U.S. have reasons to fear American violence and interference. International law doesn’t necessarily constrain the U.S. — it’s often willing to abuse its power and privileges for political, economic and strategic advantage.</p>
<p>This reality <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/how-russia-war-ukraine-echoes-precedent-set-us-iraq">partly explains Russia’s reaction to the expansion of NATO</a> and its invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/3-nato-gambles-that-have-played-a-big-role-in-the-horrors-of-war-in-ukraine-178815">3 NATO gambles that have played a big role in the horrors of war in Ukraine</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Concerns about U.S. overreach also influences China’s policies in the South China Sea, as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/12/stranglehold-context-conduct-and-consequences-of-american-naval-blockade-of-china-pub-51135">the Chinese worry about being economically strangled by an American naval blockade</a>.</p>
<p>China has done little to the U.S. <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/pentagon-study-declares-american-empire-is-collapsing">except to grow to an economic size and a level of technological innovation that challenges American global domination</a>. </p>
<p>In response, the U.S. is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">attacking China’s economic</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war-semiconductors-export-controls-biden/">and technological</a> development. It is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know">creating economic</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/aukus-explained-how-will-trilateral-pact-shape-indo-pacific-security">military alliances</a> against China. </p>
<p>American leaders apparently believe a country four times the population of the U.S. must remain forever subordinate to American power.</p>
<p>It’s true that China has threatened Taiwan and behaved aggressively in the South China Sea. Even so, compared to the U.S., Chinese foreign policy has been restrained.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
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<p>Much of the world has refused to back western sanctions against Russia because, in part, <a href="https://quincyinst.org/2022/04/11/why-non-western-countries-tend-to-see-russias-war-very-very-differently/">the West’s hypocrisy around issues of global violence and interference has undermined western credibility</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, many countries are <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/02/in-face-of-us-china-rivalry-non-alignment-is-back/">pursuing “non-alignment”</a> — choosing to avoid getting caught in the middle of any future battles between the U.S. and China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A short dark-haired woman shakes hands with a man in a dark suit and glasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, right, shakes hands with her Chinese counterpart Qin Gang during a meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, in February 2023. Indonesia was among states that refused to back western efforts to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Adek Berry/Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rallying allies</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, the U.S. has rallied its established allies against China. Canada has become an <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/biden-visit-makes-it-official-canada-is-a-us-vassal-state/">American vassal</a>, meaning it’s essentially dominated by the U.S. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/23/japan-unveils-record-defence-budget-amid-regional-security-fears">Japan has increased its military spending</a>. The European Union <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/europe-takes-tougher-stance-toward-china-in-boost-to-us-policy-1.1913902">has taken a harder line on economic and technological engagement with China</a>.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/06/the-g7-anti-china-facade-shows-cracks-in-europe/">some indications</a> that <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/france-in-favor-of-status-quo-about-taiwan-being-us-ally-doesnt-mean-being-vassal-french-president/2870526">France</a> and Germany recognize <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/06/decoupling-not-on-europes-agenda-li-visit-shows/">their interests may not align with those of the U.S.</a>, but they have not confronted American officials on these issues.</p>
<p>Why do American allies refuse to discuss U.S. global violence, despite its horrific consequences and the fact that it clearly affects the world view of America’s rivals and the non-western world?</p>
<p>Why are they so tolerant of American militarism — often even <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/european-complicity-in-cia-torture-in-black-sites/">complicit in it</a> — while condemning the militarism of others? </p>
<p>It’s likely because American allies have <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/pentagon-study-declares-american-empire-is-collapsing">benefited enormously from the U.S.-backed status quo</a>, even if they’ve had to deal with the fallout of western militarism — particularly in Europe, where <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/europe/">the influx of refugees</a> has coarsened regional politics. </p>
<p>They’re accustomed to following the U.S. Many have willingly <a href="https://rabble.ca/politics/canadian-politics/freelands-speech-signals-a-dangerous-turn-in-canadian-foreign-policy/">accepted, parroted and even amplified American propaganda</a>.</p>
<h2>Politics of fear</h2>
<p>This attitude is understandable for narrowly self-interested, amoral states, but it’s short-sighted. </p>
<p>American allies are wilfully ignoring the extent of the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/trump-americas-coming-age-instability">profound social, political and economic divisions</a> within the U.S. and their implications for reliable and coherent American leadership and policy. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-should-be-preparing-for-the-end-of-american-democracy-176930">Canada should be preparing for the end of American democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/01/us/politics/richard-haass-biden-trump-foreign-policy.html">Domestic political instability</a> in the U.S. may eventually motivate even more aggressive American foreign policy. The U.S. has never shied away from the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-united-states-independence-day-fear/">politics of fear</a> and the <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/the-united-states-specializes-in-exaggerating-the-threat">exaggeration of threat</a>. Its escalating demonization and provocation of China is especially dangerous.</p>
<p>China is a country of 1.4 billion people with an ancient culture and a massive economy. It cannot be locked in a box, as the U.S. is trying to do, without consequences.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi-org.proxy.hil.unb.ca/10.1093/cjip/pov001">China gains a great deal from the current international system</a>. It has reasons to support much of the existing economic order. </p>
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<img alt="Construction workers at a construction site with a green sign with Chinese characters in front of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Construction workers work at a site in the central business district in Beijing in June 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Accommodating China will require adjustments on the part of status quo states. That means abandoning the <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2020/09/09/why-the-blob-needs-an-enemy/">world view that so many western democracies</a> have embraced as part of western triumphalism since the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Is preserving the privileged global position of the U.S. really so important to the rest of the world? Is maintaining such an imbalanced world order possible or, given its results, truly desirable? </p>
<p>U.S. allies need to learn the lessons of the war on terror and the 4.6 million people it’s killed. A leader needs followers. American allies could make their support of the U.S. conditional on a pledge to ease up on militarism and focus on greater global co-operation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207786/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why have U.S. allies refused to grapple with American global violence, despite its horrific consequences and the fact that it clearly affects how the non-western world responds to the country?Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2080962023-06-20T06:19:21Z2023-06-20T06:19:21ZChina and the US are talking again – so, where does the relationship go from here?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532846/original/file-20230620-21-8c9o8v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=237%2C18%2C3781%2C2685&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Leah Millis/Pool Reuters/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A potentially significant meeting took place in Beijing this week when Chinese President Xi Jinping met US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. </p>
<p>Blinken’s visit to Beijing was ostensibly to meet his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Qin had previously been China’s ambassador to the US until earlier this year and was well-known in Washington diplomatic circles. Blinken’s trip to Beijing had been scheduled for some time, and then postponed. </p>
<p>The meeting with Xi, however, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/19/antony-blinken-china-visit-meetings-talks-trip-xi-jinping-taiwan">uncertain</a> until shortly before it happened. </p>
<p>Media coverage of the event seems to reflect some of the inherent uncertainties in the US-China relationship, as well. Some photographs depict Blinken as <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/19/antony-blinken-xi-jinping-china-tensions-00102558">slightly concerned or ferocious</a>, while others appears to show <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-to-meet-blinken-monday-as-u-s-china-resume-high-level-engagement-c898f541">Xi towering over Blinken</a>. </p>
<p>Some images, however, show more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/19/antony-blinken-xi-jinping-beijing-china">open, friendly gestures</a> between the two – perhaps signalling a genuine thawing of the recent frosty relations between the two superpowers.</p>
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<h2>How relations deteriorated this year</h2>
<p>So, what does this meeting mean in reality? In terms of significance, its not the content of the talks that matter so much as what preceded them. </p>
<p>When Biden came into office in early 2021, it seemed to herald a slight rapprochement between the two governments. Though there were still disagreements over many issues, the two leaders held a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/15/biden-xi-kick-off-virtual-meeting-with-calls-to-increase-communication.html">virtual summit</a> at the end of 2021.</p>
<p>Then, on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Bali in November 2022, Xi and Biden <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/14/world/asia/biden-xi-bali-g20.html">met face to face</a> and spoke at some length. There was a general feeling of mutual appreciation in their respective positions on global issues such as climate change. It was not so much a meeting of minds, but rather an agreement to avoid the catastrophe of open conflict.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532854/original/file-20230620-979-fv3wmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Biden and Xi engaged in a warm handshake in Bali.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Brandon/AP</span></span>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-talks-biden-and-xi-attempt-to-play-down-superpower-tensions-but-ukraine-and-taiwan-loom-large-194471">US-China talks: Biden and Xi attempt to play down superpower tensions but Ukraine and Taiwan loom large</a>
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<p>The leaders also agreed that Blinken would visit Beijing in the new year.</p>
<p>This atmosphere of gradually improving relations came to a halt in February, however, when a Chinese high-altitude balloon – dubbed a “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-spy-balloon-collected-intelligence-us-military-bases-rcna77155">spy balloon</a>” in the US – drifted across North America and was eventually shot down by the US Air Force. Blinken’s visit was postponed, and China criticised the US for destroying the balloon, which it claimed was a weather balloon.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/spy-balloon-drama-elevates-public-attention-pressure-for-the-us-to-confront-china-199484">Spy balloon drama elevates public attention, pressure for the US to confront China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While both sides eventually emphasised the continued need for dialogue, a standoff developed. The situation only worsened when a US reconnaissance flight in the South China Sea was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/30/politics/china-fighter-jet-south-china-sea/index.html">intercepted</a> by a Chinese fighter in late May. </p>
<p>Then, three weeks ago, western media <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/29/asia/china-rejects-us-defense-chief-meet-in-singapore-intl-hnk/index.html">reported</a> that the Chinese defence minister, Li Shangfu, had snubbed the US secretary of defence, Lloyd Austin, by turning down the opportunity to meet at a security conference in Singapore.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1663466542955110403"}"></div></p>
<p>Given the several meetings between US presidential advisers and their Chinese counterparts that had taken place in May before the summit, the significance of Li and Austin not speaking in Singapore may have been exaggerated. At worst, it could be considered a lost opportunity. </p>
<p>The Chinese government may have wanted to ensure Blinken’s rescheduled visit to Beijing would go ahead this month, putting more emphasis on these high-level talks than the meeting between defence officials. </p>
<h2>‘Candid, substantive and constructive’</h2>
<p>While there were apparently no major breakthroughs in Beijing, Blinken’s visit appears to have succeeded in returning relations between the two governments to where they were in November 2022.</p>
<p>The leaders seemed to reinforce the sentiments of that earlier meeting in Bali, focusing on mutual respect and the need to avoid a drift to conflict. Among other things, <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202306/19/WS64907270a310bf8a75d6aba4.html">Xi told Blinken</a> that rivalry between great powers could not solve problems in the United States or challenges facing the world. </p>
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<p>Neither party can shape the other according to its own wishes, let alone deprive the other of its legitimate right to development.</p>
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<p>The State Department, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc/">characterised</a> the discussions as “candid, substantive and constructive”, emphasising </p>
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<p>the importance of maintaining open channels of communication across the full range of issues to reduce the risk of miscalculation. </p>
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<p>Both sides still have domestic constituencies to appease and without a doubt Washington’s may prove less biddable than Beijing’s. </p>
<p>For example, from the Chinese <a href="https://www.gingerriver.com/p/chinese-readout-of-xi-jinping-anthony?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=603765&post_id=129455532&isFreemail=true&utm_medium=email">reports of the meeting</a> Beijing seems to be willing to reopen discussions with Washington on climate change and cooperation on transnational crime of various sorts. </p>
<p>In return, China might well expect some greater commitment from the US to not interfere in what Beijing considers its domestic interests in Taiwan. As China-based commentators have pointed out, American electoral politics may make that commitment difficult (though not impossible) for Biden and Blinken to deliver.</p>
<p>The next step in placing US-China relations on a more even keel would be increased interactions between the two governments. While these have been agreed for the near future in foreign affairs, finance and economic development, the two sides have apparently not agreed to resume talks between their military leaders.</p>
<p>Biden and Xi are expected to meet again face to face later this year, perhaps at <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/05/23/how-biden-could-thaw-us-relations-with-china/">international summits</a> in India or San Francisco.</p>
<p>Biden is unlikely to visit China himself, though, in the near future. In what is increasingly becoming not just a bad-tempered but an inherently divisive presidential election campaign in the US, that might prove a difficult step for the incumbent to do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David S G Goodman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Both sides have stressed the importance of dialogue in order to avoid confrontation. Can relations between the two continue to improve?David S G Goodman, Director, China Studies Centre, Professor of Chinese Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056672023-05-18T13:46:18Z2023-05-18T13:46:18ZUS laws to promote home-grown industries will hurt African economies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526775/original/file-20230517-30-xpofqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Biden administration has ratcheted up protectionism and industrial policy amid surging <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-11/top-biden-aide-meets-chinese-counterpart-in-bid-to-ease-tensions">economic tensions</a> with China. Legislation passed in 2022 unlocked hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies to spur <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/cleanenergy/inflation-reduction-act-guidebook/">domestic production</a> of renewable energy and electric vehicles, and to support other decarbonisation goals. </p>
<p>The legislation is also designed to support homegrown strategic industries such as high-end semiconductors while constraining China’s access to such technologies.</p>
<p>Having watched global trade patterns since the second world war, I’m concerned that we are now entering a new and more dangerous period. Washington’s protectionist industrial policy started with the US-China <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-15/the-u-s-china-war-over-trade-and-tariffs-explained-quicktake">trade war</a> under the Trump administration. It is exacerbating economic fragmentation of the global economy fuelled by the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed on Russia. It is doing so by fracturing trade and investment flows based on geopolitical considerations. As a result, global economic integration is being reversed. Over the past <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/05/22/blog-why-we-must-resist-geoeconomic-fragmentation">three decades</a>, global economic integration raised productivity growth, lifted living standards and reduced extreme poverty. </p>
<p>We can see this happening as US allies respond with inward looking protection measures of their own and align with the US to create a global supply chain less reliant on China. Cases in point are the EU, Japan and Korea.</p>
<p>This could have far-reaching negative consequences for countries in Africa. Some will be hit harder than others. For example the <a href="https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2023/April/English/text.ashx">19 African countries</a> facing debt distress have scarcer fiscal resources to manage costs of the fallout. But nearly all will feel the impact of higher inflation due to reduced global output in a less productive world. Many will also feel the impact of a brake on regional integration efforts as importers lose ready access to competitively priced inputs needed for value addition. And fragmentation of investment flows could restrict <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/04/05/fragmenting-foreign-direct-investment-hits-emerging-economies-hardest">access to investment</a>.</p>
<p>This would have adverse impacts on growth and plans to boost green investments on the continent.</p>
<h2>US moves on protection and industrial policy</h2>
<p>Last year, the US Congress approved the <a href="https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2022/09/biden-administration-releases-implementation-strategy-50-billion-chips">Chips and Science Act</a> and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/cleanenergy/inflation-reduction-act-guidebook/">Inflation Reduction Act</a> . They offer hundreds of billions of dollars in funding to encourage domestic production of chips and clean energy technologies. They are also aimed at barring exports of high-end semiconductors and equipment to China, and pushing allies to do the same.</p>
<p>These acts, together with the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/">infrastructure bill</a> Biden signed in 2021 to boost iron and steel made in the US with more federal spending, have combined to shape America’s current protectionist industrial strategy.</p>
<p>This has unsettled policy makers in Europe and Asia, where the laws are seen as unfairly benefiting American companies and moving away from free trade. They have also sparked worries that companies and investment from their regions will be lured to the US. Those worries foreshadowed German-based Volkswagen AG’s move in March <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-20/vw-sees-biden-backed-support-for-ev-manufacturing-as-gold-rush#xj4y7vzkg">to build a $2 billion car factory</a> for a new electric brand in South Carolina. </p>
<p>Also, Swedish battery maker Northvolt AB has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/21/northvolt-earmarks-next-quarter-for-us-factory-announcement.html">stated</a> that expansion into the US market is now among its top priorities. For its part, Samsung <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/24/1058770506/samsung-says-it-will-build-17b-chip-factory-in-texas">intends</a> to use chip subsidies for an advanced plant it’s building in Texas.</p>
<p>Unnerved by these moves, the EU has responded with its own massive subsidy plans to support businesses paving the way to a low-carbon economy. It also passed a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-18/eu-negotiators-strike-political-deal-on-43-billion-chips-act#xj4y7vzkg">Chips Act</a> in April to support semiconductor manufacturing within the region with billions of dollars in subsidies.</p>
<p>Other US allies are following suit. Japan’s government has negotiated a deal with Washington that allows <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-27/biden-s-made-in-america-push-unnerves-us-economic-allies">critical minerals</a> shipped from its companies to qualify for US subsidies. </p>
<p>The EU is also interested in securing a similar <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-27/biden-s-made-in-america-push-unnerves-us-economic-allies">deal</a>. South Korea plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars for <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-27/biden-s-made-in-america-push-unnerves-us-economic-allies">investments</a> in chips, batteries, electric vehicles and other green technologies.</p>
<p>The US-led subsidy push and export controls are fragmenting the global economy by redirecting supply chains from China. They are also alienating non-EU and Asian allies that can’t support their companies with similar subsidies.</p>
<h2>African countries will be hit hard</h2>
<p>These shifts will ultimately reduce gains that have been made in increasing integration of international goods and investment markets. These have included higher <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/05/22/blog-why-we-must-resist-geoeconomic-fragmentation">global output</a> growth, the opportunity to take advantage of new <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/05/22/blog-why-we-must-resist-geoeconomic-fragmentation">technologies and lower costs</a> for businesses and consumers. </p>
<p>This means that countries with larger economies like Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya which demand more imports are likely to be hit harder by rising domestic costs and higher international prices of imported goods. These will both feed into higher inflation, to the detriment of businesses and households.</p>
<p>In another blow, regional trade integration efforts including expansion of the digital economy, infrastructure improvements, enhanced regional trade logistics and delivery of financial services will be affected by the higher cost of intermediate inputs and lack of access to new technologies. Both are critical for building regional value chains and diversifying production. </p>
<p>Also, companies in most African countries will lose out because they don’t have the backing of deep-pocketed governments able to provide huge subsidies and other incentives to exploit green investment opportunities on a scale that comes close to that of the US and its rich allies.</p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund has <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023#Geoeconomic-Fragmentation:-Sub-Saharan-Africa-Caught-between-the-Fault-Lines">flagged</a> that the continent stands to lose the most from global economic fragmentation. In a recent assessment it said that the cost to the median African country could be as high as 4% of GDP. </p>
<h2>Mitigating measures</h2>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/08/fact-sheet-u-s-strategy-toward-sub-saharan-africa/">Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa</a> unveiled by the Biden administration last year seems to be the ideal platform to address concerns about America’s protectionist industrial policy. That’s because its key objectives include helping Africa navigate the energy transition and enhancing US trade and investment with the continent.</p>
<p>On the basis of this strategy, Washington and African policy makers should prioritise the following:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Forge public-private partnerships for the production and domestic processing of minerals that are key ingredients for the green energy transition. These include nickel in Tanzania, palladium and manganese in South Africa, copper in Zambia, cobalt in Congo and lithium in Zimbabwe.</p></li>
<li><p>Promote investments to build strong regional supply chains. This should include enabling Africa to take advantage of technologies like digitalisation, which can boost trade through e-commerce. </p></li>
<li><p>Capitalise on any positive effects to drive growth and diversification of trade with Africa under the <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a>.</p></li>
</ol><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Washington’s protectionist industrial policy is fracturing trade and investment flows based on geopolitical considerations.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1994962023-02-17T21:09:40Z2023-02-17T21:09:40ZChinese balloon saga is part of a long history of U.S.-China tensions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510449/original/file-20230216-22-dmqbbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2576%2C2055&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this photo provided by Chad Fish, a large balloon drifts above the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of South Carolina, with a fighter jet and its contrail seen below it, on Feb. 4, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Chad Fish via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s not surprising the recent <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/06/china/china-response-suspected-spy-balloon-intl-hnk/index.html">Chinese “weather balloon” incident</a> has set off alarm bells.</p>
<p>Concerns inevitably mounted as the massive sphere slowly and very visibly sailed from Montana to <a href="https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/news/defense-aviation-news/2023-news-aviation-aerospace/february/8887-f-22-raptor-shoots-down-chinese-spy-balloon-off-south-carolina-coast-with-sidewinder-missile.html">its destruction by a Sidewinder missile off the South Carolina coast</a>. </p>
<p>It didn’t help that a jittery media quickly reported on three additional sightings (and downings) <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64644845">over Alaska, Yukon and Lake Huron</a> — with both the Canadian and American governments choosing science-fiction-tinged language to label these flying objects <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/what-we-know-about-pentagon-efforts-to-study-ufos-and-unidentified-aerial-phenomena-1.6273784">“unidentified aerial phenomena.”</a></p>
<p>But the Chinese origin of the first flying object — defended as a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/202302/t20230203_11019484.html">meteorological balloon by China</a>, an explanation that was met with skepticism by U.S. officials — was especially concerning due to the long history of serious tensions between the United States and China. </p>
<h2>U.S. points to Chinese aggression</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">The U.S. has routinely</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">and historically</a> described Chinese behaviour as aggressive. </p>
<p>In more recent years, Americans have pointed to China’s threatening gestures toward Taiwan, expansionist moves in the South China Sea and efforts to dominate important economic sectors (such as advanced semi-conductors). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
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<p>Last year, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken pledged to “remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/26/blinken-biden-china-policy-speech-00035385">that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.”</a> </p>
<p>But even understandable concerns warrant careful analysis. Cooler heads can help determine whether every alarm is fully justified or whether dealing with perceived aggressions might benefit from looking at the bigger picture.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden ultimately said the three flying objects shot down over North America — after the initial Chinese surveillance balloon was downed — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/16/politics/president-biden-downed-objects/index.html">don’t appear to be part of China’s spy balloon operation</a> and were instead linked to private companies.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An older man with grey hair stands behind a podium with the U.S. presidential ensign and speaks." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510748/original/file-20230216-18-7c241k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. President Joe Biden takes questions from reporters in Washington, D.C., after speaking about the Chinese surveillance balloon and other unidentified objects shot down by the American military.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Determining the appropriate level of anxiety about China’s supposed weather balloon itself will have to wait until an autopsy on whatever remains of the recently decimated flying object can be gathered — but consideration of the broader context is possible now.</p>
<h2>The real ‘awareness gap’</h2>
<p>Amid the balloon brouhaha, Gen. Glen VanHerck, the head of NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), was asked why earlier balloon sightings had not prompted such concern. </p>
<p>He replied the most recent incidents had brought about a recognition of a <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/other-chinese-balloons-slipped-through-domain-awareness-gap-in-us-defenses-general/">“domain awareness gap”</a> — which means NORAD needs to improve its monitoring capabilities for objects like balloons — and said NORAD didn’t have the right mix of sensor capabilities. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/norads-value-is-on-full-display-as-flying-objects-shot-down-over-north-america-199829">NORAD's value is on full display as flying objects shot down over North America</a>
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<p>As a historian, I suggest the “domain” with a real “awareness gap” is greater than the one VanHerck acknowledges — because the balloon saga must be assessed within the context of decades of stormy U.S.-China relations.</p>
<p>On the espionage and surveillance front alone, there has always been mutual suspicions and activity. For many years, Americans had the advantage of economic, military and technological superiority by way of the well-funded Central Intelligence Agency and tools like U-2 spy planes.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A black and white photo shows a bald, aged man raising his fist while making a speech." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510773/original/file-20230217-2950-lnvjn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gestures with his fist during an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City in September 1960.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>In a 1960 incident, in fact, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/u2-spy-incident">when an American U-2 was downed by the Soviet Union over Soviet air space</a>, Nikita Khrushchev stormed out of a Paris summit — comparable to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-antony-blinken-china-314302278a5f05bdc2df146ed5b35ec6">Blinken cancelling his trip to Beijing when the Chinese balloon was discovered.</a></p>
<p>Over the course of the 20th century, China gradually developed its own capacities, and continuous Beijing/Washington <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747/">espionage efforts read like John le Carré novels.</a> </p>
<p>Perennial competition and conflict between the U.S. and China have also always involved a repertoire of methods and tools that have gone far beyond “spying.” From the 1940s into the 1970s alone, <a href="https://doi.org/10.38154/cjas">the U.S. refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China</a> and made numerous efforts to severely contain the Chinese regime.</p>
<p>It did so by building and then generously <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/unfinished-chinese-civil-war">sustaining military alliances with Taiwan, South Korea and a string of leaders in South Vietnam.</a> </p>
<p>For its part, China pushed back against American efforts by developing its own team of countervailing allies, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-north-korea-decided-renew-60-year-old-treaty">including North Korea.</a></p>
<p>Chinese balloons therefore must be assessed within the context of decades of mutual espionage and an awareness of the many storms in the overall U.S.-China relationship. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men shake hands on a public TV screen as people walk by." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510762/original/file-20230217-18-qxc33m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People in South Korea watch a TV news program reporting on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to North Korea in June 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The history of competing empires</h2>
<p>The tense history between the two countries belongs in an even broader domain: not just decades, but centuries of extreme conflict between competing empires. </p>
<p>The United States and China each have affinities with many preceding great powers, including Egyptian, Persian, Mongol, Gupta, Mayan, Zulu, British, French, Russian, German, Japanese and other empires. In their varied ways, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1g248v9">all had appetites for expansion and power while also worrying about the appetites and power of others.</a> </p>
<p>Historians of international relations who date back to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Herodotus-Greek-historian">Greece’s Herodotus</a> have studied the complex interplay of perceptions and impulses driving the behaviour of powerful states. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A portrait of a man with dark hair in a military uniform." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510771/original/file-20230217-3249-hchnp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Carl von Clausewitz is seen in this 1780 portrait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Creative Commons)</span></span>
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<p>Their observations routinely highlight tragic results. Centuries apart, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004285576_003">Greece’s Thucydides</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1826844">Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz</a>, for example, each considered the risks and errors of judgments that emerged when shrewd calculations became infused with emotions — for example, when concerns about national security and economic opportunity intertwined with fear and greed, respectively.</p>
<p>The history of former great powers is therefore relevant to analyzing U.S. and Chinese behaviour.</p>
<p>Do earlier American actions in Vietnam and elsewhere have present-day counterparts in the intensity with which Beijing’s “aggression” is being met by the United States? </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1623537171595661313"}"></div></p>
<p>The Biden administration’s early national security proposals promised to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf">“prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation.”</a> Blinken’s remarks on China have hinted at that intention to “prevail.”</p>
<p>In one major speech on China, Blinken said: “<a href="https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">We will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system</a>.” Obvious follow-ups to such a statement of intent include the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia and an intensified defence relationship with the Philippines.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-the-philippines-military-agreement-sends-a-warning-to-china-4-key-things-to-know-199159">The US and the Philippines' military agreement sends a warning to China – 4 key things to know</a>
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<h2>Is China flexing imperial muscles too?</h2>
<p>Do previous Chinese actions, like its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-chinese-communist-partys-relationship-the-khmer-rouge-the-1970s-ideological-victory#:%7E:text=From%201970%20to%201974%2C%20Chinese,Vietnam%20was%205%2C041%20million%20yuan.">1970s support for the Khmer Rouge</a> and its 1979 <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-bitter-legacy-of-the-1979-china-vietnam-war/">war with Vietnam</a>, have ongoing resonance in its hard-nosed approaches to Taiwan and the South China Sea? </p>
<p>Xi Jinping may be echoing the American pledge to “prevail” when he vows to “<a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/17/content_16314303.htm">press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”</a></p>
<p>More information will clearly be required to understand the motivations and implications behind the recent balloon and “aerial phenomena” incidents, but that information should be processed with both telescopic and wide-angle lenses. </p>
<p>Historians offer the longer lens when they contribute to the analysis, meaning the patterns of great power behaviour can be discerned over time — as if by high-level surveillance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199496/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald W. Pruessen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese balloons must be assessed within the context of decades of mutual espionage and an awareness of the many storms in the U.S.-China relationship — and the history of empires.Ronald W. Pruessen, Professor of History, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1944712022-11-15T14:32:41Z2022-11-15T14:32:41ZUS-China talks: Biden and Xi attempt to play down superpower tensions but Ukraine and Taiwan loom large<p>Presidents Xi Jinping of China and Joe Biden of the United States have held their first face-to-face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ahead-tense-g20-summit-biden-xi-meet-talks-2022-11-14/">meeting</a> since 2017. The pair met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, to discuss their joint obligation for charting a new course towards a better a bilateral relationship. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-before-bilateral-meeting/">emphasised</a> their shared responsibility to “prevent competition from becoming anything ever near conflict”. Xi, in turn, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221114/923108c461a54a9daab22a63803de343/c.html">acknowledged</a> that “the two presidents need to play the leadership role, set the right course for the China-US relationship and put it on an upward trajectory”. </p>
<p>This, of course, is easier said than done given the key areas of bilateral disagreement: Taiwan, North Korea and Ukraine, to name but the top three. The two leaders also face a raft of pressing global challenges in the climate, economic, food and energy crises. And while the tone of the their opening remarks was amicable enough, it cannot disguise the fact that US-China relations have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-53517439">at their lowest</a> point in decades. </p>
<p>Taiwan is a particularly sensitive issue. The US remains committed to its <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">one-China policy</a> of not having diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but has provocatively strengthened its unofficial relationship. From Beijing’s perspective, supporting the status quo is one thing. But it’s quite another when the speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, makes a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pelosis-taiwan-visit-the-substance-and-the-aftermath/">highly publicised visit</a> to Taipei in which she reiterates US security guarantees for Taiwan. </p>
<p>Washington, in turn, takes a dim view of <a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000183-e6a2-d425-a58b-e6ebcc840000">Xi’s statement</a> in his report to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-echoes-of-authoritarian-past-as-xi-jinping-cements-his-place-at-the-heart-of-a-communist-party-now-entirely-built-around-him-193122">20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party</a> last month that: “Resolving the Taiwan question and realising China’s complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakeable commitment.” </p>
<p>According to China’s Xinhua news agency, Xi reiterated this point in his meeting with Biden, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">adding</a> that: “The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests, the bedrock of the political foundation of China-US relations, and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Biden, in response, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">assured</a> Xi that the one-China policy had not changed and that the US continued to oppose “any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side”.</p>
<p>North Korea is similarly contentious for Beijing and Washington, and arguably more prone to unwanted escalation. North Korea’s reclusive regime is hard to predict and even harder to control, including for its Chinese allies. A series of missile tests since late September led to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-north-korea-s-expected-nuclear-missile-test-likely-to-involve-miniature-warheads-/6805278.html">speculation</a> that Pyongyang could also test nuclear warheads themselves, not just the missiles capable of carrying them. </p>
<p>This fear has not materialised so far. But it triggered the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/05/north-korea-launches-more-missiles-as-us-flies-supersonic-bombers-in-support-of-south_6003057_4.html">largest-ever</a> joint US-South Korean air force drills, including supersonic bombers. This prompted more North Korean missile tests. It also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/asia-and-pacific/article/2022/11/13/biden-huddles-with-japan-and-south-korea-in-the-face-of-china-and-north-korea_6004084_153.html">led</a> to intensified defence cooperation between the US, South Korea and Japan.</p>
<p>In the context of the existing three-way strategic defence pact between Australia, the UK and US (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/sep/16/what-is-the-aukus-alliance-and-what-are-its-implications">Aukus</a>) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of the US, Australia, India and Japan (the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/24/what-is-the-quad-and-how-did-it-come-about">Quad</a>), it is easy to see how an increase in US military presence and activities in China’s neighbourhood at a time of already tense bilateral relations with the US is perceived as more than just a potential threat in Beijing. This is the case even if it is related to North Korea rather than directly to China.</p>
<h2>Focus on Ukraine</h2>
<p>While Taiwan and North Korea have been on the US-China agenda for some time, Ukraine is a more recent problem on which the two sides do not see eye-to-eye either over whose fault the war is or how to end it. On the one hand, China – and Xi personally – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/xi-jinping-meets-vladimir-putin-china-russia-tensions-grow-west">supported</a> Mosocow’s narrative of a western threat to Russia. But China has also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-premier-li-emphasised-irresponsibility-nuclear-threats-asia-summit-us-2022-11-14/">repeatedly emphasised</a> the need to respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity and has spoken out against irresponsible threats to use nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">US account</a> of the meeting, Biden and Xi “reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine”. Chinese state media <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">additionally reported</a> that: “China supports and looks forward to a resumption of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, and hopes that the United States, Nato and the European Union will conduct comprehensive dialogues with Russia.” </p>
<p>This is a far from unequivocal condemnation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Nor is it a sign that China will abandon a position that it considers as “balanced”. This much was obvious when China voted against a subsequent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N22/679/12/PDF/N2267912.pdf?OpenElement">draft resolution</a> at the UN general assembly that had proposed to impose reparations on Russia “for damage, loss or injury, and arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine”. </p>
<p>But what it does demonstrate is that, under Vladimir Putin – and especially since the invasion of Ukraine – Russia has lost more of its former great-power status. It is now a problem for the only two remaining major powers to manage rather than to accommodate.</p>
<h2>A road to détente?</h2>
<p>There are three key takeaways from the Biden-Xi meeting. First, neither side has an interest in the further escalation of tensions in their bilateral relations. On the contrary, the statements by both leaders before and after their meeting point towards efforts to improve relations.</p>
<p>Second, there are areas where both countries will be able to work together. The resumption of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/57aad7fd-de16-4f76-bac0-7db5b4863698">US-China climate security dialogue</a> is a clear sign of this. Planned follow-up talks during a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/state-dept-says-blinken-visit-china-tentatively-planned-early-next-year-2022-11-14/">visit of US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to China</a> next year indicate that both sides see scope for further cooperation elsewhere.</p>
<p>Third, relations between the US and China may be heading towards more stability and cooperation, but this will not end competition between them. While Xi <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">outwardly opposes</a> the “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative, it is equally clear from the Biden-Xi meeting that the US-China relationship will remain the defining feature of the international system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Ukraine was just one of a number of potential areas of conflict that the two leaders discussed at their face-to-face meeting in Bali.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1904502022-09-13T15:07:33Z2022-09-13T15:07:33ZJoe Biden and Cyril Ramaphosa: finding common ground amid divisions at home and abroad<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484038/original/file-20220912-2179-1mjukf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">American president Joe Biden, left, with his South African counterpart Cyril Ramaphosa at the 2021 G7 Summit in England.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Leon Neal/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US president Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/01/statement-by-white-house-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-the-meeting-between-president-joe-biden-and-president-cyril-ramaphosa-of-south-africa/">invitation</a> to South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa to meet at the White House, and the latter’s acceptance, are positive signs of renewed cooperation. But they do not suggest a return to the 1990s era of heady optimism between the two countries. </p>
<p>These two diverse democracies are currently too divided domestically, amid new and escalating tensions globally that affect Africa. These negatives, however, add weight to the importance of the Biden-Ramaphosa meeting in Washington on 16 September 2022. </p>
<p>There are four reasons for its political significance. Two speak to the two countries having a common agenda: both presidents are committed democrats operating in hostile environments. They are also committed to forging mutually beneficial ties.</p>
<p>But there are two prominent issues that could be divisive, and about which the two heads of state may well seek clarity. These have to do with the changing relations among the major powers of concern to South Africa and the rest of Africa. Two specific topics uppermost for Biden and Ramaphosa will be the consequences for Africa of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62817560">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a> and China’s <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-in-africa/">expanding role on the continent</a>. </p>
<h2>Agreements and disagreements</h2>
<p>Biden and Ramaphosa represent progressive democratic factions after very narrow electoral victories.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa won by only 167 votes to head the ruling African National Congress (ANC) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-idUSKBN1EC05I">in 2017</a> and become its candidate for national president. The ANC has held power for the 28 years since the end of apartheid. </p>
<p>For his part Biden defeated Donald Trump in 2020 by barely winning the necessary electoral college votes <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/02/940689086/narrow-wins-in-these-key-states-powered-biden-to-the-presidency">in three swing states</a>. Trump and his supporters still dominate the Republican Party in a two party federal system in which Biden’s Democrats now have a slim majority. </p>
<p>Both leaders won large national votes. Yet they both continue to struggle to sustain liberal democracy after the assaults on core democratic institutions by predecessor regimes. </p>
<p>The similarity in their political challenges is not their only source of empathy. Biden was a prominent opponent of apartheid as a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-09-11-biden-keen-to-keep-ramaphosa-in-the-tent-at-washington-talks/">US senator in the 1980s</a>. An American of Irish heritage, he surely values Ramaphosa’s critical <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ringside-seat-at-irish-theater-of-war-ira-sinn-fein-irish-politics/">role</a> in 2000, monitoring a fragile Irish peace. </p>
<p>A second reason to find common ground relates to what both governments have announced as their <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/01/statement-by-white-house-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-the-meeting-between-president-joe-biden-and-president-cyril-ramaphosa-of-south-africa/">“official” agenda</a>. Listed topics are: trade and investment; infrastructure; climate and energy; and health. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-there-really-a-paradigm-shift-in-us-africa-relations-why-the-answer-seems-to-be-yes-188461">Is there really a paradigm shift in US/Africa relations? Why the answer seems to be yes</a>
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<p>Practical progress in these areas is vital in gaining popular support for democracy in the two troubled nations. They, in turn, could share lessons and resources with other African nations trying to overcome poverty and domestic divisions. </p>
<p>But there are areas of tension between the two countries.</p>
<p>They have divergent views about Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">invasion of Ukraine</a>. National and international media typically give this issue top billing. </p>
<p>But American and South African officials have <a href="https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-the-opening-of-the-u-s-south-african-strategic-dialogue/">downplayed their differences</a>. And it’s likely they will be able to productively discuss several urgent dimensions of that crisis. These include food scarcity hardships in Africa, economic effects of inflation of essential goods, and supply chain disruptions <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/russias-war-ukraine-taking-toll-africa">constraining global trade</a>. </p>
<p>Fresh announcements of joint mitigation efforts would be welcomed in South Africa as well as the hardest hit parts of Africa. </p>
<p>Two other Russia-related topics could be usefully discussed. They are politically sensitive because facts and salience are uncertain. One would be the actual battlefield conditions in Ukraine. South Africa has repeatedly called for an end to hostilities but neither side in the conflict has shown a willingness to compromise. An effort to clarify conditions in Ukraine would help planners in both countries. </p>
<p>The other subject is vital to the future of South Africa and American liberal democracy. There has been speculation in South Africa’s independent media about Russian president Vladimir Putin’s political and financial interests, along with his oligarch allies, in bankrolling the governing ANC and in the expensive and allegedly corrupt nuclear power deal. Ramaphosa <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Cyril_s_Choices.html?id=jzdgzQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">suspended the contract after becoming president</a>, but concerns remain about the ANC’s ties with Moscow.</p>
<p>This has not been as well documented as Russian support for Trump in his <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download">2016 presidential campaign</a>, or in the extensive reports in US media of Russian financial <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/21/how-russian-money-helped-save-trumps-business/">help to Trump’s businesses</a>. Exchanging views on Russia’s alleged partisan efforts in both democracies deserves discussion, if only informally. </p>
<p>A related public topic is the <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57995#:%7E:text=Summary-,H.R">“Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act”</a>, pending in the US Senate. The act would require the secretary of state to report to Congress on issues such as the role of Russian mercenaries, military assistance, and the dissemination of politically consequential disinformation. </p>
<p>South Africa and other African governments <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/why-sadc-leaders-slammed-proposed-us-law-to-punish-african-countries-for-trading-with-russia-3ecbbc74-7a07-433a-b7ea-e5dac7e99460">oppose the legislation</a>. The reason given is that its real aim is to punish African states that declined to support the US position in United Nations <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">resolutions condemning Russia</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/washington-wants-to-address-anti-west-sentiment-in-africa-blinken-is-doing-his-bit-188407">Washington wants to address anti-west sentiment in Africa: Blinken is doing his bit</a>
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<p>Ramaphosa and Biden might well find a formula whereby US intelligence could be quietly shared with African governments on Russian activities in Africa, especially those deemed detrimental to democratic sustainability. </p>
<p>Another subject that will require careful handling is the issue of China’s relations with the continent.</p>
<p>Tensions between the US and China have <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">intensified in recent years</a>, discouraging hopes for Africa-China-US cooperation. Yet Africa is one region where the two major powers might experiment with restrained competition responsive to Africa’s agreed priorities.</p>
<p>South Africa has excellent relations with both China and the Biden administration. Perhaps Ramaphosa and Biden could revisit what was once known as a “win-win-win” formula for <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/africa-china-us-080216.html">parallel and even joint actions</a>.</p>
<p>Managing China-US competition in response to African priorities could be good for peace and development. </p>
<h2>A partnership</h2>
<p>Will the two men be able to cement a resilient, productive partnership between two diverse liberal democracies?</p>
<p>This depends on the degree of trust between them, despite occasional foreign policy differences, such as how to respond to the war in Ukraine. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>Tensions between sovereign countries are inevitable, whether they are allies or adversaries. The US and South Africa are neither firm adversaries nor firm allies. They have a complex and sometimes troubled relationship. </p>
<p>A positive rapport between their leaders at a time of deep domestic divisions and rapid global change could help advance and sustain democracy in both nations. If they make progress in overcoming their domestic divisions, this should allow them to play more active and constructive roles in Africa, a region that is the most important for South Africa, and of growing importance for the US.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Both presidents are committed democrats operating in hostile environments. They are also committed to forging mutually beneficial ties.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1839562022-06-01T12:51:57Z2022-06-01T12:51:57ZThe Quad: US efforts to counter China’s influence in Asia mark a new era of micro alliances<p>US president Joe Biden <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/24/will-bidens-asia-trip-help-the-u-s-meet-its-strategic-objectives/">recently visited Asia</a> in an effort to strengthen relationships in the region, most notably <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/23/asia/the-quad-tokyo-summit-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html">meeting with leaders of the “Quad” alliance</a> of America, Japan, India and Australia. This group of like-minded states represents a 21st-century diplomatic mechanism which is growing in importance in lieu of an Asian Nato. </p>
<p>Biden’s trip coincided with a visit by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to Fiji, as part of Beijing’s so-far unsuccessful attempts to gather a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/30/chinas-foreign-minister-to-meet-with-pacific-nations-amid-push-for-sweeping-regional-deal">coalition of Pacific Island states</a>. China has been wooing nations in the Pacific for some time, as it attempts to expand its diplomatic reach. Most notably, a security deal with the Solomon Islands might open the door to Chinese military presence there.</p>
<p>All these efforts illustrate the kind of reshaped global order that we can expect to see in the future. The new security landscape is of pacts between small numbers of states that produce powerful security groupings with quite specific focus in deterring other great powers. Welcome to a new era of micro alliances in international politics.</p>
<p>The Quad has its roots in cooperative disaster response efforts in the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/after-the-tsunami/article20461149.ece">2004 Boxing Day tsunami</a>, but it has evolved in recent years to become more about security. Although the process has stuttered at various points, it has returned to relevance, particularly as a convenient vehicle for countering China’s <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri">Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)</a> through which the country is using international investment to build influence across Eurasia and Africa. </p>
<p>The Quad has now pledged to extend more than US$50 billion (£39.7 billion) in infrastructure aid and investment in the Indo-Pacific over the next five years to counter China’s economic clout in the region.</p>
<p>Each of the member states has bilateral issues with China, including territorial disputes, historically rooted tensions and spiky diplomatic relations. But the core motivation for its continuance and promotion is the realpolitik consideration of constraining the People’s Republic. This was confirmed <a href="https://2017-2021-translations.state.gov/2019/10/22/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-the-heritage-foundation-presidents-club-meeting-trump-administration-diplomacy-the-untold-story/index.html">in a 2019 speech</a> by the then US secretary of state, Michael Pompeo, who described the group’s role as “ensuring that China retains only its proper place in the world”.</p>
<p>China has been increasingly assertive in recent years, especially with regard to the South China Sea, but also in terms of its economic policies such as the BRI and its occasionally bellicose diplomatic rhetoric. This has prompted states from across the Asia-Pacific region – and beyond – to rethink the previous policies that focused more on engagement with China than containment. </p>
<p>In this light, the Quad can be seen as a demonstration of the willingness of the US and its allies to respond more assertively in defending their position and interests in the region. This has not gone unnoticed in China. The Global Times, a state-owned tabloid newspaper, has repeatedly referred to the Quad as the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202205/1266489.shtml">“sinister gang of Indo-Pacific to contain China”</a>.</p>
<h2>Other alliances</h2>
<p>The underlying principle of the Quad has parallels with <a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-is-an-arms-race-with-china-the-price-of-global-britain-168107">Aukus</a>, a security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. This was announced in September 2021 with the initial purpose of helping Australia develop nuclear-powered submarines. </p>
<p>There is also the “Five Eyes”, an intelligence-sharing arrangement among the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Quad’s fundamental difference is the presence of two Asian powers that are eager for support to balance against China on their doorstep.</p>
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<p>It is important to highlight that the Quad’s prominence is increasing in the context of almost complete silence from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). This is despite <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3178162/differences-within-asean-and-quad-could-sink-us-indo-pacific-agenda">efforts to convince</a> the ten Asean member states that the Quad provides opportunities beyond security, such as the already-mentioned investment pledge.</p>
<h2>New world order</h2>
<p>Looking from a more macro perspective, the Quad – together with Aukus, Five Eyes and the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3178162/differences-within-asean-and-quad-could-sink-us-indo-pacific-agenda">Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)</a>, a regional economic partnership – offers a big picture of the overall US strategy to contain China in the coming decades.</p>
<p>We are not yet in a new cold war, but we no longer live in a unipolar world dominated by a hegemonic US. This reshaping of the international order was already underway, driven by the increasing assertiveness of China. But Russia’s assault on Ukraine, accompanied by Beijing’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/xi-jinping-meets-vladimir-putin-china-russia-tensions-grow-west">“no limits” cooperation</a> with Moscow, has hastened and exacerbated the drawing of lines across the globe.</p>
<p>Biden’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, explicitly confirmed this focus <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blinken-says-china-is-greater-long-term-threat-than-russia/">in a recent speech</a>:</p>
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<p>Even as President Putin’s war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order – and that is the one posed by the People’s Republic of China. </p>
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<p>We should not expect imminent direct conflict but it is clear that global strategic competition between the US and China is intensifying. The Quad is just the most recent example of how the teams are lining up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I'm a member of the following associations but I don't have any institutional affiliations (I don't conduct research or receive funds, etc) with them:
- British International Studies Association
- Royal Society for Asian Affairs
- Association of Asian Studies
- European Association of Taiwan Studies </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Griffith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region is shifting in the face of China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy.Ed Griffith, Deputy Head, School of Humanities, Language & Global Studies, University of Central LancashireMoises de Souza, Course Leader International Relations BA Programme, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1839622022-05-30T14:10:56Z2022-05-30T14:10:56ZWhat US re-entry into Somalia means for the Horn of Africa and for bigger powers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465988/original/file-20220530-26-gv2m4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Navy sailors for the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa off the coast of Djibouti.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The US has announced it will resume a limited military presence in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html">Somalia</a>. The former administration withdrew troops from the country in 2020. The mission of the American soldiers is still what it has been for the last <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia/exclusive-u-s-discloses-secret-somalia-military-presence-up-to-120-troops-idINKBN0F800V20140703">15 years</a>: to advise and assist Somali forces. US troops will not be directly involved in conflict. Their number, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/16/biden-approves-deployment-of-hundreds-of-us-troops-to-somalia">450 to 500</a>, is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-55196130">smaller</a> than the last deployment. </p>
<p>The decision to redeploy in Somalia might appear to be surprising, for two important reasons. First, US president Joe Biden promised during his campaign to avoid the <a href="https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/">“forever wars”</a> against terror lasting since 2002. None of these wars were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1959130">ever fully won</a> and remain unpopular with the US electorate. It is also surprising in the light of moves <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/marine-corps-radical-shift-toward-china">to restructure the US military to meet a threat from China</a>. </p>
<p>What better explains this decision, however, is the <a href="https://www.state.gov/united-with-ukraine/">renewed emphasis</a> on the old rivalry with Russia since Russia’s Ukrainian intervention. </p>
<p>Announcing the redeployment, the Pentagon <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3033345/us-to-resume-small-persistent-presence-in-somalia/">claimed</a> it was partly for operational security. After their withdrawal in 2020, American special forces continued to train Somali soldiers outside Somalia, and at times travelled in and out of the country. The Pentagon said the redeployment would end the ad hoc support by creating bases inside Somalia.</p>
<p>Unofficially, American officials have claimed that the redeployment is due to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/16/us-troops-somalia-return/">worsening security conditions in Somalia</a>. This argument is open to question: the security situation is in reality relatively stable. </p>
<p>What is without doubt is that the deployment will have a direct influence on US-Russian rivalries in the region. </p>
<h2>Military situation in Somalia</h2>
<p>Somalia’s security landscape has not changed much since the US pullout over the previous year. The frontlines between the al-Qaida affiliated Harakat al-Shabaab, the Somali government, and the Forces of the African Union in Somalia have remained largely the same during the American absence. So has the rate of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022">terror attacks</a>. Al-Shabaab <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1959130">has not expanded</a> its territories though it does exercise control in areas supposedly under government control. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/17330-into-darkness-scrutinizing-economic-explanations-for-african-jihad">Several researchers</a> have reported that al-Shabaab is booming economically and is able to infiltrate the Somali security services. But this was also the case before the American withdrawal from Somalia.</p>
<p>What has changed is the international setting. Over the past few years the China-US rivalry has intensified. And over the past year, the US-Russia rivalry has exploded, partly influenced by the outbreak of the Ukraine war. These rivalries have large scale impacts at the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>It is notable that the American redeployment announcement came days after the electoral defeat of Somali president <a href="https://raadinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/a_near_end_to_somali_election.pdf">Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (“Farmaajo”)</a>. The former Somali president was a close ally of Russia’s new friends in the Horn of Africa – Ethiopia and Eritrea. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/15/somalia-elects-hassan-sheikh-mohamud-as-president">newly elected</a> Somali president is much cooler towards Ethiopia and Eritrea. He has also pointedly <a href="https://twitter.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1526546816275255297?s=20&t=by7gPoc3Q4IRp6KfFv07Xw">welcomed</a> the US redeployment. </p>
<h2>Post-Ukrainian reality in the Horn of Africa</h2>
<p>Farmaajo enjoyed a close alliance with Ethiopian president Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea’s president Issayas Afeworki. Ethiopian forces <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/potential-impact-ethiopias-war-tigray-somali-stability-28933">helped</a> Farmaajo insert his candidates in states hostile to him by, for example, suppressing his opponents. This was the case in Somalia’s south west regional state during the election there in 2018. They also backed Farmaajo against his political rival president Ahmed “Madobe” of the Somali Jubaland regional-state in 2019.</p>
<p>In return, Farmaajo sent his Somali forces to <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210609-un-report-says-somali-army-participated-in-tigray-war">fight on the side of Abiy Ahmed</a> in the Ethiopian civil war. And Issayas Afeworki <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/foreign-powers-are-intervening-in-ethiopia-they-may-only-make-the-conflict-worse/2021/11/19/55266426-487d-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html">intervened</a> in Ethiopia’s civil war and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_clandestine-training-somali-forces-eritrea-stirs-families-concern/6202295.html">trained Somali forces</a>. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian civil war and the Ukrainian war increasingly saw the United States at odds with this tripartite alliance. First the US criticised the Ethiopian government for its actions in Tigray, which the United States saw as heavy handed and filled with human rights transgressions. The US special envoy to the Horn of Africa <a href="https://www.state.gov/a-perspective-on-the-ethiopian-u-s-relationship-after-a-year-of-conflict/">stated</a>:</p>
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<p>As the war approaches its one-year anniversary, the United States and others cannot continue ‘business as usual’ relations with the government of Ethiopia. </p>
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<p>The worsening US-Ethiopian relations were also fuelled by a Russian military cooperation <a href="https://anchor.fm/krulak-center/episodes/MES-Research-Talk---Dr--Stig-Jarle-Hansen--Phoenix-Rising-U-S--Strategic-Competition-in-the-Red-Sea-Zone--Horn-of-Africa-with-China-and-Russia-e1f03du">agreement</a> with Ethiopia. This came in a period when Ethiopia had lost a lot of Russian produced materials in the battlefields of Tigray. Anti-American demonstrations took place in Addis Ababa, with Russian flags and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/31/why-are-protestors-in-ethiopia-and-mali-waving-russian-flags/">pro-Russian slogans</a>. And the US imposed sanctions on Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders.</p>
<p>The relationship between the US and Eritrea and Ethiopia was worsening before the Ukrainian war. When the Ukrainian war broke out, Eritrea <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">fully supported</a> Russia at the United Nations while Ethiopia abstained from a vote condemning the action. That’s not all. The US was also worried about <a href="https://anchor.fm/krulak-center/episodes/MES-Research-Talk---Dr--Stig-Jarle-Hansen--Phoenix-Rising-U-S--Strategic-Competition-in-the-Red-Sea-Zone--Horn-of-Africa-with-China-and-Russia-e1f03du" title=") in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and [Russian attempts](https://anchor.fm/krulak-center/episodes/MES-Research-Talk---Dr--Stig-Jarle-Hansen--Phoenix-Rising-U-S--Strategic-Competition-in-the-Red-Sea-Zone--Horn-of-Africa-with-China-and-Russia-e1f03du ">Chinese investments</a> to secure a naval base in Eritrea.</p>
<h2>US deployment timing</h2>
<p>The timing of the American redeployment in Somalia has two possible explanations in my view. It might have been delayed until after the recent elections in order to insulate it from local politics. Or one could see it as the US way to shore up a president with the will and potential to withstand the Russian-backed alliance of Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Horn. That would in turn shore up the US and its allies against Russia. </p>
<p>The latter point will be an outcome of the deployment anyway. It may well turn out to be the most important outcome, given that US engagement over 13 years has failed to bring about the end of al-Shabaab. The insurgents remain strong, and rich, but short of the ability to overrun the Somali government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183962/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision to redeploy in Somalia represents a renewed emphasis on the old rivalry with Russia.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837452022-05-27T12:48:45Z2022-05-27T12:48:45ZHow Ukraine war could boost tensions between US and China over future of Taiwan<p>China is becoming “more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad”, according to the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken. Blinken made a major statement on US foreign policy on May 26 at <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/26/politics/blinken-china-speech/index.html">George Washington University</a>. It received a great deal of attention, internationally – not least because reporters and foreign policy analysts wanted to know whether Blinken would clarify remarks made earlier in the week by the president, Joe Biden, to the effect that the US would take military action to defend Taiwan if China launched an invasion.</p>
<p>This appeared to be a shift away from the US policy of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-withdrawal-has-taiwan-pondering-its-alliance-with-the-us-and-china-is-upping-the-pressure-166713">strategic ambiguity</a>”, by which the US is committed to supplying Taipei with weapons systems and training to defend itself, but leaves open whether it would intervene militarily.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-withdrawal-has-taiwan-pondering-its-alliance-with-the-us-and-china-is-upping-the-pressure-166713">Afghanistan withdrawal has Taiwan pondering its alliance with the US – and China is upping the pressure</a>
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<p>Biden’s remarks suggested a substantial change of emphasis and drew a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/23/us-would-defend-taiwan-if-attacked-by-china-says-joe-biden">sharp response from Beijing</a> which said the US was “using the ‘Taiwan card’ to contain China, and will itself get burned”. His statements prompted some commentators to describe US policy has having moved from strategic ambiguity to <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/05/23/what-is-americas-policy-of-strategic-ambiguity-over-taiwan">strategic incoherence</a>.</p>
<p>Blinken appeared to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/may/26/antony-blinken-china-us-cold-war">row back slightly on Biden’s position</a>. He acknowledged that Washington had a limited ability to counter China directly, but said: “We will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open and inclusive international system”. </p>
<h2>Shifting priorities</h2>
<p>It is important to consider Biden’s remarks in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Until recently, the main areas of competition between the US, China and Russia had been perceived to be political and economic. The concept of a large-scale war of aggression involving a nuclear power against a weaker neighbour had been <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf">considered unlikely</a>. But Ukraine has raised disturbing parallels with security risks in east Asia. </p>
<p>Just as the Russian government views Ukraine as part of its own territory without a right to independence, China sees Taiwan as part of its territory. Russia’s actions in Europe raised fears that the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, might seriously consider a similar invasion of Taiwan. In this context, the Biden administration might decide it is necessary to deter Beijing by stating more clearly that the US would use its military to defend Taiwan in response.</p>
<p>Military analysts are divided on what lessons China might draw from Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine. Russian military setbacks might remind China how problematic and costly such an attempt to invade of Taiwan would be. But China may also be carefully analysing Russian military operations in order to absorb the lessons of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/ukraine-war-china-and-taiwan">what problems to avoid</a>. </p>
<h2>One China?</h2>
<p>After the US established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in January 1979, the US <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479">Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)</a>, passed the same year, defined relations between the US government and “the people of Taiwan”. Washington subsequently drew up a list of <a href="http://www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm">“Six Assurances”</a> in 1982, by which the US pledged not to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and stated its intention to continue to supply Taiwan with arms without reference to China. But the foundation of US policy has been the “one China” policy, reaffirmed by the Trump administration in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38927891">2017</a> and again by <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/02/biden-doubles-down-on-trumps-taiwan-policy-but-will.html">Biden</a> in February 2021. Under the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter">one China policy</a>, the US recognises the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. but only acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China.</p>
<p>The Taiwan Travel Act of 2018 elevated US-Taiwan relations to a more formal basis and the following year a consular agreement <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/us-and-taiwan-strengthen-ties-by-signing-agreement-to-formalize-consular-functions-1.602182">was concluded</a>. On January 2021, all restrictions on governmental relations with Taiwan <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">were removed</a>, meaning that US cabinet officers could directly engage with their counterparts. </p>
<p>But defence relations continued to be based on the provision of advanced military equipment and the principle of strategic ambiguity. </p>
<p>In recent years, China has <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-taiwan-why-the-war-of-words-is-unlikely-to-lead-to-military-conflict-for-now-at-least-169746">sharpened its rhetoric</a> and military pressure on Taiwan, insisting that “the party has chosen to make reunification with Taiwan a symbol of the strength and legitimacy of CPP rule”. But that does not mean that an attack on Taiwan is planned in the foreseeable future.</p>
<h2>Strategic dilemma</h2>
<p>Washington now faces a serious dilemma. It is concerned that strategic ambiguity may no longer be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan, particularly in the face of China’s increasingly assertive talk of “resolving” the Taiwan issue through reunification. This could imply that the US needs to clarify and strengthen its security commitments.</p>
<p>But this would require more concrete steps to demonstrate it could effectively defend Taiwan – and China’s military buildup has made this much more problematic than it was 30 years ago. There are only two US bases within a 500-mile radius of Taiwan that would allow fighter aircraft to operate without refuelling. Both are vulnerable to China’s increasingly sophisticated arsenal of land-based conventional <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/19/china-keeps-inching-closer-to-taiwan/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI_a73por99wIVOBoGAB2orAwPEAMYASAAEgI7y_D_BwE">ballistic missiles</a>. The US might have to operate from its aircraft carriers, which are also becoming <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27003437">increasingly vulnerable</a> to attacks from the Chinese mainland. </p>
<p>Taiwan has a highly advanced military <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">configured to resist a Chinese attack</a>, and China would face serious logistical challenges. But its total military resources completely outmatch Taipei’s. China also has a nuclear arsenal that can strike the continental US, although its strategic forces – while being expanded – are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/beijing-belligerent-birthday-party-nuclear-missiles-new-arms-race/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIt_D_7J_99wIVVPhRCh3QBQ6EEAMYASAAEgLN1vD_BwE">quite small compared to those of the US</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-how-the-porcupine-doctrine-might-help-deter-armed-conflict-with-china-169488">Taiwan: how the 'porcupine doctrine' might help deter armed conflict with China</a>
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<p>In a large-scale Chinese attack on Taiwan, the US would face considerable challenges to live up to any defence commitment. In principle, the US could forward deploy military resources on a larger scale, perhaps even on the territory of Taiwan itself. </p>
<p>But deploying to Taiwan would itself escalate tensions with China to an unprecedented degree. It would also further complicate US-China strategy which is also dealing with major international issues which require a measure of cooperation, including on trade, climate change, managing North Korea, and political crises in other regions. Therefore it is likely that strategic ambiguity will remain US policy on the security of Taiwan for the foreseeable future, even if the US feels it necessary to highlight its option of coming to Taiwan’s defence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns about China’s intentions towards Taiwan.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordOwen Greene, Professor of International Security and Development, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1767652022-05-24T12:46:37Z2022-05-24T12:46:37ZBiden on Taiwan: Did he really commit US forces to stopping any invasion by China? An expert explains why, on balance, probably not<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464882/original/file-20220523-25530-80lkyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C41%2C7000%2C4610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pondering a shift in strategy on Taiwan? Possibly not.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">Nicolas Datiche/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The White House has been left scrambling a little after President Joe Biden suggested on May 23, 2022, that the U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">would intervene militarily</a> should China attempt an invasion of Taiwan.</em></p>
<p><em>The comment, which Biden made during a trip to Japan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61548531">was taken by</a> some observers <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/video/biden-signals-major-shift-warning-us-respond-militarily-84914670">as a deviation</a> from the official U.S. line on Taiwan, in place for decades. But officials in Washington <a href="https://nypost.com/2022/05/23/white-house-walks-back-biden-taiwan-defense-claim-again/">walked back that interpretation</a>, saying instead that it only referred to military assistance.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the background to Biden’s recent comments and untangles what should be read into his remarks – and what shouldn’t.</em></p>
<h2>What did Biden say and why was it significant?</h2>
<p>Asked if the U.S. was willing to get involved “militarily” in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/23/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">Biden replied</a>, “yes.” A follow-up question saw the U.S. president add: “That’s the commitment we have made.”</p>
<p>By my count, this is the third time Biden has as president suggested that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s aid militarily if the island is attacked. In 2021 he made similar remarks in an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/20/us-position-on-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-says.html">interview with ABC News</a> and then again <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/">while taking part in a CNN town hall event</a>.</p>
<p>But it is significant that this is the first time he has made the assertion while in Asia.</p>
<p>An important thing to note is that on each occasion he has made such a comment, it has been followed quite quickly by the White House walking back the remarks, by issuing statements along the lines of “what the president actually means is…” and stressing that this isn’t a shift away from the official U.S. policy on China or Taiwan. </p>
<p>However, the remarks and the clarifications have increased doubt over whether Biden is continuing the policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.</p>
<h2>What does ‘strategic ambiguity’ mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-strategic-ambiguity-trumps-strategic-clarity-taiwan/">Strategic ambiguity</a> has long been the U.S. policy toward Taiwan – really since the 1950s but certainly from 1979 onward. While it does not explicitly commit the U.S. to defending Taiwan in every circumstance, it does leaves open the option of American defensive support to Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack by China.</p>
<p><iframe id="NS3cP" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NS3cP/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Crucially, the U.S. hasn’t really said what it will do – so does this support mean economic aid, supply of weapons or U.S. boots on the ground? China and Taiwan are left guessing if – and to what extent – the U.S. will be involved in any China-Taiwan conflict.</p>
<p>By leaving the answer to that question ambiguous, the U.S. holds a threat over China: Invade Taiwan and find out if you face the U.S. as well. </p>
<p>Traditionally, this has been a useful policy for the U.S., but things have changed since it was first rolled out. It was certainly effective when the U.S. was in a much stronger position militarily compared to China. But it might be less effective as a threat now that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-22/china-is-catching-up-to-the-u-s-when-it-comes-to-military-power">China’s military is catching up</a> with the U.S.</p>
<p>Leading voices from U.S. allies in Asia, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/U.S.-should-abandon-ambiguity-on-Taiwan-defense-Japan-s-Abe">such as Japan</a>, believe that “strategic clarity” might be a better option now – with the U.S. stating outright that it would defend Taiwan if the island is attacked.</p>
<h2>So Biden’s comments could hint at this shift?</h2>
<p>There does seem to be a pattern: Biden says something seemingly very clear on defending Taiwan, and that then gets walked back. If no one in Washington was walking back the comments then it would seem like an intentional shift in policy by the Biden administration.</p>
<p>But the fact that the White House has always been quick to clarify the comments suggests to me that it isn’t necessarily intentional. It seems like Biden is simply trying to signal more support for Taiwan, and perhaps reassure U.S. allies in Asia. </p>
<p>But I’m a historian, not a strategist. It could be that this is some advanced chess game that I can’t figure out.</p>
<h2>What is the history of US relations with Taiwan?</h2>
<p>After the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949</a>, the defeated Republic of China government withdrew to the island of Taiwan, located just 100 miles off the shore of Fujian province. And until the 1970s, the U.S. recognized only this exiled Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="President Richard Nixon confers with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong as they sit in comfy chairs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nixon in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peking-china-president-richard-m-nixon-confers-with-chinese-news-photo/515401848?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in 1971, the <a href="https://web-archive-2017.ait.org.tw/en/un-res-2758-voted-to-admit-communist-china.html">United Nations shifted recognition</a> to the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. In 1972, President Richard Nixon made a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nixons-1972-visit-china-50">now-famous trip to China</a> to announce a rapprochement and sign the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement from communist China and the U.S. signaling a commitment to pursue formal diplomatic relations. A <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325">critical section of that document</a> stated: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>The wording was crucial: the U.S. was not formally committing to a position on whether Taiwan was part of the China nation. Instead, it was acknowledging what the governments of either territory asserted – that there is “one China.” </p>
<h2>Where does US commitment of military support for Taiwan come from?</h2>
<p>After establishing formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, the U.S. built an informal relationship with the ROC on Taiwan. In part to push back against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to recognize communist China, U.S. lawmakers passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Taiwan%20Relations%20Act%20%2D%20Declares%20it,other%20people%20of%20the%20Western">Taiwan Relations Act in 1979</a>. That act outlined a plan to maintain close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan and included provisions for the U.S. to sell military items to help the island maintain its defense – setting the path for the policy of strategic ambiguity. </p>
<h2>What has changed recently?</h2>
<p>China has long maintained its desire for an eventual <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification</a> of its country with the island it considers a rogue province. But the commitment to the principle of “one China” has become increasingly one-sided. It is an absolute for Beijing. But in Taiwan, however, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/">resistance to the idea of reunification has grown</a> amid a <a href="https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202112.jpg">surge of support for moving the island toward independence</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing has become more aggressive of late in asserting that Taiwan must be “returned to China.” Domestic politics plays a role in this. At times of internal instability in China, Beijing has sounded a more belligerent tone on relations between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait. We have seen this over the last year with Beijing sending <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-taiwan-warplanes-fly-incursions-air-defense-zone/">military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chinese <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_5--Hong_Kongs_Government_Embraces_Authoritarianism.pdf">assertion of increased authority over Hong Kong</a> has damaged the argument for “one country, two system” as a means of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>How has the US position shifted in the face of Beijing’s stance?</h2>
<p>Biden has definitely been more openly supportive of Taiwan than previous presidents. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01N">officially invited a representative from Taiwan to his inauguration</a> – a first for an incoming president – and has repeatedly made it clear that he views Taiwan as an ally.</p>
<p>He also didn’t overturn the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a> passed under the the previous administration of Donald Trump. This legislation allows U.S. officials to visit Taiwan in an official capacity.</p>
<p>So there has been a shift to a degree. But the White House is keen not to overstate any change. At heart, there is a desire by the U.S. to not stray from the Shanghai Communique. </p>
<h2>So is an invasion of Taiwan likely?</h2>
<p>I don’t think we are anywhere near that yet. Any invasion across the Taiwan Strait would be militarily complex. It also comes with risks of backlash from the international community. Taiwan would receive support from not only the U.S. – in an unclear capacity, given Biden’s remarks – but also Japan and likely other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China maintains that it wants to see reintegration through peaceful means. As long as Taiwan doesn’t force the issue and declare independence unilaterally, I think there is tolerance in Beijing to wait it out. And despite <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3462914-russias-war-on-ukraine-makes-chinas-attack-on-taiwan-more-likely/">some commentary to the contrary</a>, I don’t think the invasion of Ukraine has raised the prospects of a similar move on Taiwan. In fact, given that Russia is now bogged down in a months-long conflict that has hit its military credibility and economy, the Ukraine invasion may actually serve as a warning to Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden’s suggestion that the US is prepared to intervene militarily if Taiwan was invaded was quickly walked back by White House officials.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726622022-01-06T15:29:30Z2022-01-06T15:29:30ZAfrica can use great power rivalry to its benefit: Here is how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436610/original/file-20211209-136652-1fr1bvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Senegalese Foreign Minister Aissata Tall Sall in Dakar, Senegal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Andrew Harnik /pool/AFP/via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Geopolitical competition between the United States and China is taking central stage in global affairs. Growing tensions and rivalry between the two are worsening in <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/dont-make-us-choose-southeast-asia-in-the-throes-of-us-china-rivalry/">South East Asia</a>, the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/vietnam-asean-and-the-us-china-rivalry-in-the-indo-pacific/">Indo-Pacific</a>, the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/coming-us-china-cold-war-view-gulf">Gulf</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/latin-america-shouldnt-be-pawn-us-china-rivalry">Latin America</a>. </p>
<p>US President Biden has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/pentagon-issues-directive-countering-china-offers-few-details-2021-06-09/">identified countering China</a> as one of the main strategic priorities of his foreign policy. This <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-africa">rivalry</a> is also playing out in Africa. </p>
<p>Former US secretaries of state Mike Pompeo and Hillary Clinton have often warned African leaders of the pitfalls of engaging with Russia and China. US officials are also dissuading African governments from <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-africa">relying on Chinese telecommunications leader Huawei</a> for security reasons. </p>
<p>Great power rivalry in Africa has been well <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-africa">documented</a>. But there’s another angle to consider – how can African countries use the rivalry to their advantage? </p>
<p>I explore this question in a <a href="https://afripoli.org/zero-sum-benefitting-from-great-power-rivalry-in-africa">recent article</a>. </p>
<p>I argue that African governments should avoid the zero-sum game, especially when dealing with US-China rivalry. They should adopt measures that strategically play rivals against each other. They should also implement long-term strategies and domestic policies for dealing with strategic partners like China.</p>
<h2>Avoid the zero-sum game</h2>
<p>China’s engagement with Africa is often presented <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/23526/mike-pompeos-africa-trip-is-about-china-not-africa/">as a spectre</a> by US officials during meetings with African leaders. In the past, both Republican and Democrat secretaries of state have warned of the dangers presented by China. The recent trip by Anthony Blinken, US Secretary of State, suggested a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-health-china-antony-blinken-nigeria-ae944eaf8e5ecfbb3661651fce69784e">rhetorical shift</a>. Nevertheless, indirect criticism of China was still present. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/china-africa-to-avoid-falling-into-zero-sum-trap/">argue</a> that the US is attempting to put on a zero-sum game, disrupt China-Africa cooperation, and exclusively advance American interests in Africa.</p>
<p>In response, African leaders have stipulated that they don’t want to be used as pawns in a proxy rivalry. <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/african-leaders-question-us-position-on-china-at-investment-event-98347">Their main strategic priority</a> is partnership diversification.</p>
<p>This makes sense. African governments should avoid restricting their strategies to those of a mutually exclusive zero-sum game. African economies are facing a crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. They need several partnerships and should exploit the silver linings presented by great power rivalry. <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-05-21/competition-can-be-good-developing-world">As Branko Milanovic</a>, an economist at City University of New York, says, those who once played the US and Soviet Union against each other during the Cold War could do the same now with the US and China.</p>
<h2>Play one rival against the other</h2>
<p>African countries should be seeking to exploit rivalries to their advantage.</p>
<p>Here are some examples. </p>
<p>Indian and Turkish contractors compete with China for contracts in Africa. In Guinea, rivalry largely takes place between China and Russia in the mining sector. Negotiators there found <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/tips-african-negotiators-doing-deals-china-rebalancing-asymmetries">a silver lining</a> in pitting both parties against each other.</p>
<p>Chinese negotiators were keener to <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/tips-african-negotiators-doing-deals-china-rebalancing-asymmetries">reevaluate the clauses</a> of their contracts, and to comply with requests when the Guinean government played the “Russia card”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-negotiate-infrastructure-deals-with-china-four-things-african-governments-need-to-get-right-109116">How to negotiate infrastructure deals with China: four things African governments need to get right</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The strategy of playing one rival against the other also proved advantageous to Ethiopian negotiators in the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/63e0b8d0-34ed-4b9d-add6-67973c7f0838">allotment of the first telecom licenses</a> in 2021.</p>
<p>By requiring new operators to build their own infrastructure or lease it from the state company (<a href="https://www.ethiotelecom.et/">Ethio telecom</a>) instead of third-party tower operators, the Ethiopian government selectively limited the number of contenders by prioritising its national interests. This enabled them to circumvent final bids between the MTN/China-backed consortium and the US backed <a href="https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/home-banner/vodafone-safaricom-beat-mtn-to-ethiopia-licence">Safaricom-Vodafone company</a>. </p>
<h2>Implement long-term strategies</h2>
<p>African governments should determine how offers from rival partners can best align with their national development priorities. <a href="https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/kandeh-yumkella-covid-19-has-helped-people-understand-the-vital-connection-between-energy-and-health">Kandeh Yumkellah</a>, a Sierra Leonian development economist and former Director of United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, put it this way: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Africa needs all partners. We need to be smart and eclectic, picking what works for us depending on time and context.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To achieve this, I argue that five key measures are required: </p>
<p>Firstly, the “take-it-all” mentality of accepting short term, opportunistic offers should be avoided. Loans, grants and donations should fit African countries’ national development plans. They must also translate into projects that will directly affect people’s living standards.</p>
<p>Secondly, African governments should adopt more integrated and comprehensive policies. Senegal adopted a <a href="https://www.sec.gouv.sn/dossiers/plan-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-emergent-pse">strategic plan</a> that included sector-specific priorities via a <a href="http://www.big.gouv.sn/index.php/2020/03/24/bureau-de-prospective-economique-bpe-premiere-evaluation-du-niveau-demergence-globale-du-senegal/">special unit</a> attached to the Presidency. Members of the unit selectively choose which foreign partners have the best potential to carry out these priorities.</p>
<p>Diversifying partners via a selective and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/29/africa-china-summit-continues-in-dakar/">strategic approach</a> also allowed Senegal to be less dependent on old partnerships with France or their newer partnerships with China.</p>
<p>Thirdly, geopolitical rivalry is also taking place in other regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia. <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-china-rivalries-what-matters-asean">Learning how some of them</a> deal with this may present an opportunity to enhance <a href="https://developmentreimagined.com/portfolio-posts/china-africa-to-africa-china/">the strategies of African governments</a>.</p>
<p>Fourth, a coherent strategy requires enhancing the capacity of African bureaucracies to deal with China, Russia, Turkey and India. This, by building an internal pool of experts with knowledge of their modus operandi, cultures and languages. In the short term, African leaders can rely on the expertise of former African students who were trained in the universities of these countries to provide expertise and language skills. </p>
<p>Fifth, African governments should take the best of both worlds by promoting <a href="https://www.onas.sn/actualites/actualites-onas/lancement-des-travaux-de-depollution-de-la-baie-de-hann-coup-denvoi-de-la">more trilateral or quadrilateral cooperation</a> between new and traditional partners. Examples are the joint infrastructure projects <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5fa956eef6d3991188800be2/1604933359644/PB+50+Pairault+French+Chinese+Business+Cooperation+Africa.pdf">carried out by Chinese and French enterprises</a>.</p>
<p>Bridging rivalry through various forms of collaboration mobilises additional pools of finance and avoids project duplication. Furthermore, African governments should take their own citizens’ opinions on this topic into account.</p>
<p><a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad489-africans-welcome-chinas-influence-maintain-democratic-aspirations">A recent survey by Afrobarometer</a>, the pan-African surveys institution, across 34 countries showed that 63% see China’s influence in Africa as positive. This is similar to the 60% who said so in the case of the US. </p>
<p>This suggests that US-China rivalry may not constitute an either-or dilemma for ordinary African citizens, but rather a win-win situation. It is up to African governments to use the benefits these rivalries present.</p>
<p><em>This is an edited version of an article that was initially published by the <a href="https://afripoli.org/zero-sum-benefitting-from-great-power-rivalry-in-africa">Africa Policy Research Institute</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folashade Soule does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African countries should adopt measures that strategically play rivals against each other. They should implement long-term strategies and domestic policies for dealing with strategic partners.Folashade Soule, Senior Research Associate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600932021-05-04T20:06:43Z2021-05-04T20:06:43ZChina does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398546/original/file-20210504-15-16da3x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Talk of war has become louder</a> in recent days, but the “drumbeat” has been heard for some time now as China’s military capabilities have grown. China does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving. </p>
<p>Scholars like <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/four-flashpoints">Brendan Taylor have identified four flash points</a> for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage. </p>
<h2>Where tensions are currently high</h2>
<p>The armistice between North and South Korea has <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/cold">held for nearly 70 years</a>. The pandemic has severely constrained North Korea’s economy and its testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles has ceased, for now. China has a stake in keeping Kim Jong-un’s regime in power in the North, but the prospects of reverting to a hot war have flowed and ebbed. </p>
<p>Just south of Korea, in the East China Sea, China has intensified its <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf">military activities</a> around the Japanese-claimed but uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China appears to be wearing down Japan’s resolve to resist its claims over what it calls the Diaoyu Islands. </p>
<p>The United States has assured Japan the islands fall under their mutual defence security guarantee. But a confrontation with China could test US backing and possibly set the stage for escalated confrontation elsewhere.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Japanese plane flies over Senkaku Islands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force surveillance plane flies over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo News/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Similarly, China’s industrial-scale island building in the South China Sea has resulted in extensive <a href="https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/">military hardware and infrastructure</a>. This will enable the Chinese to consolidate their position militarily and assert control over the so-called <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/">nine-dash line</a> — its vast claim over most of the sea. </p>
<p>The US Navy continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations (<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide">FONOPS</a>) in the sea to <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-fonops-and-the-south-china-sea">challenge China’s claims</a>. With thousands of marked and unmarked Chinese vessels operating there, however, the risk of an <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1296844/south-china-sea-conflict-risk-us-navy-collision-world-war-3">accident triggering an escalation is real</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/indonesia-cites-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-award-at-un-is-that-a-big-deal/">international tribunal</a> rejected China’s claims to the waters in a case brought by the Philippines. Despite being a signatory to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, China has ignored the tribunal’s ruling and continued to intrude on islands claimed by both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-vows-continue-maritime-exercises-south-china-sea-2021-05-02/">the Philippines</a> and <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-china-dispute-natuna-12244200">Indonesia</a>. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/220-chinese-vessels-stake-out-another-reef-in-spratly-islands">220 Chinese vessels were anchored for months at a reef</a> inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China’s actions appear premised on the dictum that <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/asias-nightmare-could-china-take-over-south-china-sea-180026">possession is nine-tenths of the law</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1389158989066276868"}"></div></p>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.bworldonline.com/the-ghost-of-the-2012-scarborough-shoal-stand-off/">China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012</a> that preceded its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expands-island-construction-in-disputed-south-china-sea-1424290852">massive island construction further south</a>, China could conceivably take the unwillingness of the US to challenge its latest moves as a cue for more assertive action over Taiwan. </p>
<p>This is, after all, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/xi-flirting-with-taiwan-seizure-to-secure-legacy-us-20210328-p57eq9">the main prize</a> Beijing seeks to secure President Xi Jinping’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Why Taiwan’s security matters</h2>
<p>Taiwan presents the US and its allies with a conundrum. It is a liberal open democracy and <a href="https://techwireasia.com/2021/02/the-dominance-of-the-worlds-largest-chipmaker-tsmc/">the world’s leading computer chip maker</a>. It also sits in the middle of what military strategists refer to as the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/why-chinas-military-wants-to-control-these-2-waterways-in-east-asia/">first island chain</a>” stretching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Its strategic significance is profound. </p>
<p>Having adopted a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf">“One China” policy</a> since 1979, the US <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_taiwan_alliance.pdf">security guarantee for Taiwan</a> is conditional and tenuous. Reflecting growing unease over China’s actions, polls show <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/poll-shows-increase-in-american-support-for-defending-taiwan/">strong US public support for defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>So far, ambiguity has served US interests well, providing some assurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading. </p>
<p>This guarantee has been important for Japan, as well. With its pacifist constitution, and occasional concern over US commitment to its defence, Japan would be closely watching how the US approaches its Taiwan policy.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Australia would be wise not to pound 'war drums' over Taiwan with so much at stake</a>
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<h2>China is so far avoiding open war</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, China has metamorphosed both economically and militarily. An exponential <a href="https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html">growth in China’s military capabilities</a> has been matched by a steep rise in the lethality, accuracy, range and quantity of its weapons systems. On top of this, Beijing has ratcheted up its <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-china-using-warlike-tactics-against-taiwan-former-defence-minister/">warlike rhetoric and tactics</a>. </p>
<p>Last month, Xi made a <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-sends-message-to-us-on-chinas-rising-power-in-boao-address-159324">muscular speech to the Boao Forum Asia</a>, calling for an acceptance of China not only as an emerging superpower but also as an equal in addressing global challenges. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="China's navy has been significantly upgraded." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China has significantly upgraded its navy since Xi took power eight years ago.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Li Gang/Xinhua/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sometimes actions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a <a href="https://diplomacybeyond.com/to-a-man-with-a-hammer-everything-looks-like-a-nail-chinas-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-zhao-lijian-hits-back-at-us/">“nail” to a US “hammer”</a>. This is for good reason. </p>
<p>If war did break out, China would be vulnerable. For starters, it shares <a href="https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/countries-bordering-china.htm">land borders with 14 countries</a>, bringing the potential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts. </p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-time-for-a-new-way-of-war-what-chinas-army-reforms-mean-for-the-rest-of-the-world-134660">Is it time for a 'new way of war?' What China's army reforms mean for the rest of the world</a>
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<hr>
<p>Then there are the economic concerns. China has significant <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3095951/china-increasingly-worried-about-losing-face-japan-bankrolls">Japanese</a>, <a href="https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/china/investment">US and European industrial investments</a>, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through the Malacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Indo-Pacific’s jugular vein. </p>
<p>This reliance on the Malacca Strait — referred to by one analyst as the “<a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/">Malacca dilemma</a>” — helps explain why China has invested so much capital in its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> and studiously avoided open conflict, at least until it is more self-reliant. </p>
<p>To avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-chinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html">paramilitary force</a> with white-painted ships and armed fishing vessels in the thousands to push its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and constrict Taiwan’s freedom of action. </p>
<p>It also recently <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas">passed a new law</a> allowing its coast guard to act more like a military body and enforce maritime law — again in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.</p>
<p>China is also expanding its <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/grey-zone-warfare-can-taiwan-counter-china/">“grey zone” warfare</a> against Taiwan, which includes <a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/taiwan-china-hacking-apt40/">cyber attacks</a>, repeated incursions of its air space and territorial waters, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/taiwans-growing-diplomatic-isolation/">diplomatic isolation</a> to undermine Taiwan’s resolve and ability to resist.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">Explainer: what is 'hybrid warfare' and what is meant by the 'grey zone'?</a>
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<h2>Would America’s allies help defend Taiwan?</h2>
<p>This persistent and escalating challenge by Chinese forces has demonstrated <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/assessing-the-patterns-of-pla-air-incursions-into-taiwans-adiz/">Taiwan’s inability to fully control its waters and air space</a>. Beijing is continuing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-military-amphibious/">to build a fleet of amphibious</a> capabilities to enable an invasion of Taiwan. </p>
<p>US pundits are also no longer confident the Americans would win in an outright war over Taiwan, with Washington’s top military officer in the region <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns">arguing one could happen within six years</a>.</p>
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<p>Taiwan lacks allies other than the United States, but Japan is mindful of the consequences of a US failure to defend Taiwan. Its <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/tools-owatatsumi">ocean surveillance and coastal defence capabilities</a> would be exposed if China took Taiwan. But Japan’s constitution <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/04/983deef11264-japan-govt-studies-sdf-response-in-event-of-taiwan-strait-conflict.html">precludes direct involvement in defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Under its Anzus obligations, the US could call on Australia for military support to defend Taiwan. The mutual assistance provisions <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-08/does-anzus-commit-us-to-come-to-australias-aid-fact-check/5559288?nw=0">are not automatically invoked</a>, but the implications of Canberra standing on the sidelines would be profound. </p>
<p>Warnings about rhetorical drumbeats of war remind us the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117802016002001">US is no longer the world’s only superpower</a> and suggest Australia should prepare for a more volatile world.</p>
<p>Rather than rely solely on the US, Australia should bolster its own defence capabilities. At the same time, it should collaborate more with regional partners across Southeast Asia and beyond, <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Pages/plan-of-action-for-the-indonesia-australia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-2020-2024">particularly Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://www.theglobaleye.it/quad-bolstering-the-quad-beyond-its-military-dimensions-east-asia-forum/">Japan, India</a> and <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4836-south-korea-and-australia-move-to-deepen-energy-defence-and-industry-ties">South Korea</a>, to deter further belligerence and mitigate the risk of tensions escalating into open war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are four potential flash points where conflict with China could break out. Beijing, though, has yet to present a ‘nail’ to the US ‘hammer’.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1599932021-04-29T20:11:09Z2021-04-29T20:11:09ZAustralia would be wise not to pound ‘war drums’ over Taiwan with so much at stake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397724/original/file-20210429-23-anop0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=98%2C116%2C5892%2C3889&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Taiwan's military has been on alert amid large numbers of Chinese war plane incursions in its air space.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chiang Ying-ying/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australians woke up to the freelancing advice this week that “drums of war” were beating louder in their neighbourhood, according to the country’s top security official.</p>
<p>It is hardly news that regional anxiety is rising as the countries of the Indo-Pacific scramble to accommodate China’s surging power and influence.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/get-ready-to-fight-for-our-liberty-home-affairs-secretary-michael-pezzullo/news-story/87239deac0153147989ac508d6447046">an essay by Michael Pezzullo, Home Affairs secretary</a> that spoke publicly of a possible war with an unnamed adversary, ventured into territory not previously traversed by government officials.</p>
<p>It appears <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/morrison-backs-peace-over-drums-of-war-20210427-p57mpm">not to have had the imprimatur of Prime Minister Scott Morrison</a>. Morrison did not repudiate Pezzullo’s remarks, nor did he endorse them. He <a href="https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/scott-morrison-announces-suspension-of-flights-from-india-to-australia-press-conference-transcript">said</a> Australia’s goal was to “pursue peace and stability” and a “world order that favours freedom”.</p>
<p>This is what Pezzullo, whose responsibilities include the domestic spy agency the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, said in a message to his staff without directly mentioning the dragon in the room — China.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In a world of perpetual tension and dread, the drums of war beat sometimes faintly and distantly, and at other times more loudly and ever closer […] until we are faced with the only prudent, if sorrowful course — to send off, yet again, our warriors to fight the nation’s wars.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These words, untethered from any immediate threat, might have been put aside, but their timing has helped focus attention on the security challenges facing Australia at a moment of considerable strategic uncertainty.</p>
<p>The change of administration in Washington, along with a continuing <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/morrison-backs-peace-over-drums-of-war-20210427-p57mpm">deterioration in relations between Canberra and Beijing</a>, has further unsettled Australia’s national security calculations in an age of regional uncertainty.</p>
<p>The simple question in all of this is whether conflict with China has become more likely, even inevitable? And whether hawkish elements in the Australian national security establishment, like Pezzullo, are overstating the risks?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/timeline-of-a-broken-relationship-how-china-and-australia-went-from-chilly-to-barely-speaking-151567">Timeline of a broken relationship: how China and Australia went from chilly to barely speaking</a>
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<h2>Is war over Taiwan likely?</h2>
<p>The core of this discussion relates predominantly to Taiwan, amid the many other issues bedeviling relations between China and the West.</p>
<p>These include human rights abuses in places like <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-should-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654">Xinjiang</a>, the abrogation of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">“one country, two systems” agreements over Hong Kong</a>, China’s abrasive, mercantilist<a href="https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/economic-coercion-china-australia-224335330.html"> economic practices</a>, its suspected <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-17/wa-parliament-targeted-cyber-attack/13253926">cyber intrusions</a>, and its aggressive base construction in the disputed waters of the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea">South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>All of these issues cause tensions with its neighbours and the wider international community.</p>
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<p>However, it is China’s recent threats against Taiwan that have emerged as the most vexed issue. They present a risk, however remote, of a military confrontation between superpowers.</p>
<p>Barring a miscalculation by either side in a tense environment, the likelihood of open conflict is low, given the potential costs involved on either side.</p>
<p>On the other hand, unless Washington and Beijing achieve new understandings that lower the temperature in and around the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese security will continue to weigh heavily on America and its alliance partners in the Asia-Pacific.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus">ANZUS Treaty</a> ally of the United States — and with its own regional security preoccupations — Australia cannot avoid contemplating the possibility of a meltdown in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
<p>This includes the perennial question of whether Australia would involve itself militarily against China if asked to do so by its treaty ally. Such an outcome hardly bears contemplating.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-chinas-swift-rise-as-naval-power-australia-needs-to-rethink-how-it-defends-itself-119459">With China's swift rise as naval power, Australia needs to rethink how it defends itself</a>
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<hr>
<h2>Will the US make clear its intentions on Taiwan?</h2>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/us/politics/biden-china-taiwan.html">initial interactions with China on the Taiwan issue</a>, the new Biden administration is treading carefully. This is in contrast to its predecessor, whose foreign posturing tended to follow the fluctuating whims of Donald Trump.</p>
<p>Among the options for Biden’s State Department is one that would transition America’s approach to Taiwan from one of strategic ambiguity to clarity.</p>
<p>This means rather than taking a non-explicit approach — leaving open the option of a military response should China seek to reunify Taiwan by force — the US would make an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/will-us-make-clear-cut-commitment-defend-taiwan-china">explicit declaration</a> that it would would, in fact, respond militarily.</p>
<p>This approach is gaining support in Congress, where sentiment has hardened against China’s behaviour on various fronts.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Former Senator Chris Dodd in Taiwan this month." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397719/original/file-20210429-13-6cw9cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Senator Chris Dodd led a US delegation to Taiwan this month to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to the self-governing island.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Taiwan Presidential Office/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It would be premature to declare a watershed has been reached on the Taiwan issue in which the US would make clear its intentions. But the debate appears to be heading in that direction.</p>
<p>Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, penned an <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous">influential essay in the September 2020 edition of Foreign Affairs</a> in which he declared a policy of strategic ambiguity had “run its course”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The time has come for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that the United Sates would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan. Such a policy would lower the chances of Chinese miscalculation, which is the likeliest catalyst for war in the Taiwan Strait.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Haass has a point.</p>
<p>In another <a href="https://wamu.org/story/21/04/08/opinion-dont-help-china-by-hyping-risk-of-war-over-taiwan/">essay published this month</a> by three veteran security analysts, however, the authors issue a warning that “hyping the threat China poses to Taiwan does China’s work for it”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As troubling as the trend-lines of Chinese behaviour are, it would be a mistake to infer that they represent an unalterable catastrophe. China’s top priority now and in the foreseeable future is to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1386839379578998785"}"></div></p>
<h2>Why China favours a less risky approach</h2>
<p>Beijing’s crude policy of conducting war games in Taiwan’s vicinity, including intrusions into its airspace, might suggest China is preparing retake the island. But the question is at what cost to its international standing, economic interests, and internal stability?</p>
<p>What is much more likely, Haass argues, is China will continue to exert pressure on Taiwan by various means in the hope that “once ripe the melon will drop from its stem”.</p>
<p>It shouldn’t be overlooked that in its latest five-year plan, China <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/03/c_139488522.htm">reaffirmed</a> a policy guideline of pursuing “peaceful development of cross-strait relations”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-strong-words-the-us-has-few-options-left-to-reverse-chinas-gains-in-the-south-china-sea-97089">Despite strong words, the US has few options left to reverse China's gains in the South China Sea</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Finally, in all of this, there is the cold hard calculation of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. </p>
<p>In its <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF">latest annual report</a> to Congress, the US Department of Defence acknowledged China had “achieved parity with — or even exceeded – the United States” in three areas: shipbuilding, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and air defence.</p>
<p>In other words, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait is continuing to shift in China’s favour. This reality makes loose talk of Australian “warriors” responding to the trumpet call of war even less palatable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159993/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The likelihood of open conflict is low, given the risks to China and the US. With the Biden administration treading carefully over Taiwan, why is there so much loose talk of war in Canberra?Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1548702021-02-10T15:21:46Z2021-02-10T15:21:46ZWhat African countries can expect from Biden: and what they should ask for<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383222/original/file-20210209-13-hp2jek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US president Joe Biden makes a foreign policy speech at the State Department in Washington, DC, on 4 February. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Jim Lo Scalzo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Joe Biden delivered his first public statement on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-onamericas-place-in-the-world/">US foreign policy </a> last week. Africa was not mentioned. Does this suggest the continent will be absent from the new administration’s considerations? </p>
<p>I think not.</p>
<p>Firstly, the day after his speech, the new president addressed the 34th Summit of the African Union (AU), which was meeting virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He reiterated his commitments to active diplomacy and multilateralism <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CE3X77YBSN8&feature=youtu.be">in concert with the AU</a>.</p>
<p>All US efforts would be consistent with America’s core democratic values, which are also enshrined in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU’s Constitutive Act</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a>. They have recently been assaulted in Uganda and Ethiopia. But at least a broad US-Africa consensus to cooperate in preventing and resolving problems may be emerging.</p>
<p>And within days of becoming president Biden issued an executive order voiding Trump’s 2017 policy banning all recipients of US government assistance from mentioning abortion, much less counselling women on it. Lifting <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-anti-abortion-gag-rule-hits-women-hard-what-we-found-in-kenya-and-madagascar-154434">the gag rule</a> has been applauded by women’s rights groups throughout Africa for its practical importance and as another signal of his support for their goal of securing gender equality. </p>
<p>Secondly, the themes and priorities Biden set out in his foreign policy speech point to vital pathways for productive Africa-US cooperation. </p>
<h2>Biden’s international priorities</h2>
<p>Biden comes to office with more foreign affairs experience – including US-Africa policy – <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-seven-pillars-of-bidens-foreign-policy">than any of his predecessors</a>. </p>
<p>At the top of his foreign policy agenda are COVID-19 and climate change. On his first day in office, he issued orders for America to <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2021/01/22/scientists-applaud-biden-decision-rejoin-world-health-organization/4243377001/">rejoin</a> the World Health Organisation and <a href="https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2021/02/04/u-s-rejoins-paris-agreement/">Paris Agreement</a> on climate change. He also pledged to make diplomacy and multilateralism the primary means of US foreign policy.</p>
<p>These significant policy priorities will benefit African countries. It is now up to them to press the US to urgently increase funding on two fronts. Firstly to ensure African access to <a href="https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax">affordable, adequate COVID-19 vaccines</a>. Secondly, to boost the <a href="https://www.greenclimate.fund/">Green Climate Fund</a> to help Africa mitigate and adapt to global warming.</p>
<p>Several other highlights of Biden’s international priorities should please Africans:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Refugee issues. Biden announced his approval of an executive order to restore admissions levels, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/04/biden-vows-to-allow-more-refugees-into-the-united-states.html">raising last year’s level fivefold</a> to 125,000. He also said that, in partnership with other nations, the administration will back efforts to redress the deprivations that drive people to flee their homes. Finally, he made a commitment to ensuring more humane sanctuaries for those who must flee.</p></li>
<li><p>Racism and white supremacy. In another reminder that good foreign policy derives from domestic decency, he asserted in his <a href="https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/joe-biden-speech-on-foreign-policy-transcript-february-4-america-is-back">4 February foreign policy address</a>: </p></li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>We’ve taken steps to acknowledge and address systemic racism and the scourge of white supremacy in our own country. Racial equity will not just be for one department in our administration, it has to be the business of the whole of government in all our federal policies and institutions.</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>Equal rights. Elaborating on his determination to ensure greater respect for diversity and inclusion, domestically and internationally, Biden <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/biden-signs-foreign-policy-memo-putting-u-s-forefront-global-n1256848">declared</a>: “When we defend equal rights of people the world over – of women and girls, LGBTQ individuals, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities, the people of every ethnic background and religion – we also ensure those rights are protected for our own children here in America.” He also emphasised the importance of his decision to overturn the ban on Muslims entering the US, from Africa and other regions. He also criticised China for its suppression of its Muslim minority, among other contentious issues that he pledged not to ignore in Sino-American relations.</p></li>
<li><p>China. Biden <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-biden-idUSKBN2A42RM">offered</a> to work with China, “when it’s in America’s interest to do so”. Africans should seize this as an opening for diplomatic agency to press China and the US to compete in ways beneficial to Africa. An example would be to advance the African Continental Free Trade Area, which the US and China support.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What comes next</h2>
<p>Biden will not ignore immediate crises. His address focused on just two – Yemen and Myanmar (Burma). In both he advocated using diplomacy and multilateralism. </p>
<p>African governments are not directly involved in either. But they can expect the Biden administration to deal similarly with African crises and, when asked, to assist the AU’s efforts at peacekeeping, conflict prevention and regional security.</p>
<p>As African governments consider how best to engage the US they should look beyond the Executive Branch to Congress, where African programmes have traditionally enjoyed the bi-partisan support that Biden vows to encourage. Recent changes in key leadership positions also augur well for US-Africa relations.</p>
<p>The first public statement from the new chair of the powerful House Foreign Affairs Committee, Gregory Meeks, was to call for a new Africa policy, which he said would be <a href="https://www.csis.org/events/online-event-new-us-policy-toward-africa-conversation-chairman-gregory-meeks-and-african">his top priority</a>. Meeks and his Africa sub-committee chair, Karen Bass, are from the Africa diaspora, a constituency Biden credits for ensuring his nomination and election.</p>
<p>Biden also has close personal ties to the pro-Africa members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which <a href="https://www.coons.senate.gov/issues/africa">he once chaired</a>.</p>
<p>This too should be to Africa’s advantage together with the principles and processes prominent in Biden’s maiden foreign policy address.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At the top of President Biden’s foreign policy agenda are COVID-19 and climate change. He has also pledged to make diplomacy and multilateralism the primary means of US foreign policy.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1449122020-08-26T20:04:41Z2020-08-26T20:04:41ZThe China-US rivalry is not a new Cold War. It is way more complex and could last much longer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354786/original/file-20200826-20-13zrxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Susan Walsh/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The author will be leading on online discussion through La Trobe University today on the threat of a new Cold War between China and the US, with former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and China Matters director Linda Jakobson. Click <a href="https://www.latrobe.edu.au/events/all/online-event-the-china-challenge-can-a-new-cold-war-be-avoided?referrer=organic_social&referrertype=twitter">here</a> for more information.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>China-US relations have been sliding toward confrontation throughout the Donald Trump presidency. The “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/donald-trump-shares-chocolate-cake-great-chemistry-china-s-xi-n745931">beautiful chocolate cake</a>” shared by Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017 seems from another era. </p>
<p>The competition that had started with <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide">tensions over trade</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/12/11/18134440/huawei-executive-order-entity-list-china-trump">technology</a> has moved beyond the economic domain. </p>
<p>Tit-for-tat consulate closures in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53497193">Houston</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/27/crowds-wave-chinese-flags-and-take-selfies-as-us-consulate-closes-in-chengdu">Chengdu</a>, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d689c498-6875-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3">expulsion of journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/">ideological rhetoric</a> from the likes of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and increased <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/17/asia/us-navy-aircraft-carriers-south-china-sea-intl-hnk-scli/index.html">military manoeuvres</a> in the East and South China Seas have led many to conclude the world is on the cusp of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/world/asia/us-china-cold-war.html">second Cold War</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">Explainer: why is the South China Sea such a hotly contested region?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/01/hong-kongs-security-laws-usher-in-new-era-of-chinese-control">Beijing’s recent shredding</a> of its treaty commitments toward Hong Kong has the air of Berlin about it — a free and dynamic city with a complex past suddenly engulfed by an outside authoritarian state.</p>
<p>The great power contest between the US and China has been steadily ratcheting up over many years. Washington’s long-term strategy in Asia — to ensure the region is not dominated by a hostile hegemonic force — is plainly threatened by the growth in Chinese power. </p>
<p>It is tempting to look back to the most recent geopolitical analogue to make sense of current conditions. The Cold War was, after all, a global contest between two superpowers who saw the other as an implacable foe. </p>
<p>But we are in uncharted waters. Sino-American competition, if it continues on its current trajectory, will be no Cold War. It is likely to be more complex, harder to manage and last much longer. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354787/original/file-20200826-20-ddoj2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A protester shouts pro-China slogans outside the US consulate in Chengdu after its closure last month.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ALEX PLAVEVSKI/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Risks of analogies</h2>
<p>Using the Cold War to frame our understanding of the competition between China and the US is a risky endeavour. As Columbia University’s Adam Tooze <a href="https://lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n15/adam-tooze/whose-century">put it</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For Americans, part of the appeal of allusions to Cold War 2.0 is that they think they know how the first one ended. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>An overconfident reading of the past is accelerating the drive to confrontation in dangerous ways.</p>
<p>The point Tooze was hinting at is that the Cold War played out in different ways in both Asia and Europe. And crucially, in Asia, it ended in a much more ambivalent manner for the US and the West than many realise.</p>
<h2>Asia’s Cold War</h2>
<p>While the Cold War was a global contest, its dynamics were starkly different in Asia and Europe. </p>
<p>Most obviously, the first three decades of the contest were anything but cold in Asia. Indeed, the label seems like a cruel joke for a region that experienced several large-scale wars from the 1950s to the 1970s in Korea and Indochina, killing many millions of people. War and revolution was almost the norm.</p>
<p>Europe’s Cold War, by contrast, was an extended high-tension period, but one that was thankfully free of bloodshed. </p>
<p>As in the second world war, the timing and location of the end of the Cold War in Asia was also very different from Europe. </p>
<p>In Asia, there was no Berlin Wall moment, no <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/prague-spring-begins-in-czechoslovakia">“spring” tide of national liberation</a>. Instead, the Cold War dynamics were subtly but significantly transformed in different places over different timeframes. </p>
<p>At one level, the Cold War ended in Asia in 1979 with the formal normalisation of relations between the US and China. This transformed the geopolitics of the region, at once marginalising the USSR, and establishing a four-decade period of great power amity between China and the US. </p>
<p>This, in turn, resulted in the greatest period of economic development in human history. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, however, the Cold War festered on long after the maps of Europe had changed. Korea remains divided and its border is among the most militarised parts of the planet. Taiwan’s uncertain standing — a state in all but name — is likewise a legacy of the Cold War’s early years.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354788/original/file-20200826-22-1sagg0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Cold War hasn’t ended at the DMZ separating the two Koreas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEON HEON-KYUN/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the most important difference between the two is that in Europe, communism was defeated. </p>
<p>In Asia, however, it lives on. The Chinese Communist Party has not gone the way of the Soviet Union; quite the contrary, it now oversees the world’s second-largest economy, retains a high level of internal legitimacy and runs a country that is tightly connected with the rest of the world.</p>
<p>During the 1990s, Western scholars and politicians argued that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184?seq=1">history had ended</a> and their liberal democratic model had vanquished all comers for all times. </p>
<p>The lesson for the world seemed to be that there was no option but to open their markets, liberalise their politics and free the animal spirits of their economies — or be left behind.</p>
<h2>Could the West really win a Cold War redux?</h2>
<p>Even then, such claims seemed self-indulgent. But the risk we face today is that policy-makers in Washington and elsewhere still believe in this premise: that a Cold War redux can be won by the same strategy and virtues that knocked the Soviet parrot off its perch. </p>
<p>The language of many in Washington and its allied capitals reflects this belief. The West is inherently superior in the organisation of its politics, economy and society, while China is a bundle of malign contradictions. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-values-the-new-buzzword-in-australian-foreign-policy-hint-it-has-something-to-do-with-china-143839">Why is 'values' the new buzzword in Australian foreign policy? (Hint: it has something to do with China)</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Squaring up to China in a full-spectrum competition should therefore be relatively easy. These Western leaders have the confidence of the sports fan watching a match they already know their team has won.</p>
<p>Beyond the fact that anyone who thinks the US model of politics and economics is particularly well-suited to the current moment is delusional, this outlook badly misunderstands the nature of the foe they have put in their geopolitical sights. </p>
<p>Perhaps the biggest failing of the Soviet Union was the communist party’s ignorance about the nature of the economy it ran and the people it led. The PRC is perhaps the most internally fixated great power yet seen. Party elites are acutely aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the system they have built. </p>
<p>Without doubt, China has a long list of significant challenges, from environmental degradation to widespread corruption, but the party has proven extremely effective at overcoming its internal difficulties. Moreover, it has shown economic and geopolitical success does not require conformity to a liberal model.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354789/original/file-20200826-22-ntwey6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China has an increasingly robust military to match its enhanced position on the global stage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pavel Golovkin/AP Pool</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A serious challenge still unrealised</h2>
<p>The biggest problem of seeing the China challenge as a repeat of the Cold War is this: Western leaders appear not to be taking seriously enough the scale of the confrontation they are heading toward. </p>
<p>The Cold War was won in Europe — but only after 50 years. And that included the US having a significant economic head start in 1945. </p>
<p>There is no sign Washington and its fellow travellers have begun to think through, let alone prepare for, a similar multi-decade fight across all domains against the world’s most populous country.</p>
<p>Given China’s scale, its importance to the global economy and its technological sophistication, an escalation of the rivalry between Beijing and Washington could bring costs of monumental proportions. Rather than carelessly invoking the past, we should be doing everything we can to stop the competition between the two sides from spiralling out of control.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/payne-and-reynolds-leave-washington-with-key-wins-and-room-to-disagree-with-us-on-china-143612">Payne and Reynolds leave Washington with key 'wins' — and room to disagree with US on China</a>
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</em>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley has received funding from the Australian government for research and is a member of the China Matters' Advisory Board.</span></em></p>It is tempting to look back to the Cold War to make sense of current US-China relations. But we are in unchartered waters — and need a better understanding where this competition is heading.Nick Bisley, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1419252020-07-14T14:49:47Z2020-07-14T14:49:47ZCanada must navigate U.S.-China tensions by staying true to its values<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346647/original/file-20200709-22-ayp2ib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C112%2C2910%2C1814&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this June 2019 photo, U.S. President Donald Trump poses for a photo with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, western Japan</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Susan Walsh)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Canadian government’s inability to navigate the ongoing rivalry between the United States and China has exposed a striking dysfunction in Canada’s foreign policy.</p>
<p>It speaks to a serious vulnerability in a nascent superpower conflict driven by <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/07/the-rise-of-techno-nationalism-and-the-paradox-at-its-core/">techno-nationalism</a> and populist politics. What’s clear is that both Beijing and Washington are willing to manipulate Canada’s rule of law system for their own political ends. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346356/original/file-20200708-19-1789pqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Meng Wanzhou is seen leaving her home to attend a court hearing in Vancouver in October 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Trump administration’s request to arrest and extradite Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wenzhou, followed by China’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/22/trudeau-canadians-arrest-huawei-333773">retaliatory detention</a> of Canadians <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/who-are-michael-kovrig-and-michael-spavor">Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor</a>, illustrate Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s helplessness and confusion on how to handle such a difficult situation. </p>
<p>In fact, near policy paralysis coupled with a “wait and see” approach appears to have guided the government throughout the crisis. </p>
<h2>Middle power interests</h2>
<p>The tragedy of Kovrig and Spavor’s imprisonment provides guidance on how <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power">middle power states</a> should navigate rivalries between more powerful nations. On the one hand, the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/04/america-first-is-only-making-the-world-worse-heres-a-better-approach/">America First policy</a> has shown its traditional allies are expendable, while Xi Jinping’s emboldened authoritarianism advocates the detention of foreigners for political leverage. Middle power states, meantime, must protect their values and interests. </p>
<p>But what is Canada’s national interest and what are Canadian values? Finding an agreed-upon set of non-partisan ethics is an emotional and a complex endeavour. Despite the difficulty, times of crisis require leaps of political faith in finding unity to build meaningful policy. </p>
<p>Now is one of those times. </p>
<p>As Canada becomes a playground in a great power rivalry, Canadians must prepare themselves for an era marked by fierce competition between the U.S. and China. A conflict with both global and regional implications, Canada is notably vulnerable given its geographic proximity to the United States and its economic <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/180606/t001a-eng.htm">interdependency</a> with both nations. </p>
<h2>Canada in a no-win situation</h2>
<p>There is a strong lesson for Canada and other middle power states. It’s clear now that Huawei is a <a href="https://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/general/faq-pep-eng">politically exposed</a> firm, and the American request to extradite Meng Wenzhou poses a significant risk for Canadians. As <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3091333/canadas-duty-lies-freeing-kovrig-and-spavor-china-means-letting">David Zweig</a>, a professor emeritus at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, rightly points out, if Meng is deported, hundreds of thousands of Canadians in China will be in peril. Canada has been forced into a no-win situation. </p>
<p>Michael Kovrig’s wife, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/kovrig-spavor-nadjibulla-interview-1.5621981">Vina Nadjibulla</a>, has noted: “We cannot win a race to the bottom with China; we cannot become aggressive and confrontational because confrontation is not a strategy.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346650/original/file-20200709-26-1fd482a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo speaks at a news conference in Washington on July 1, 2020, in front of a video monitor showing Spavor, left, a Canadian businessman, and Kovrig, right, a former Canadian diplomat, detained in China since December 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both Zweig and Nadjibulla, along with a <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7105280/michael-kovrig-spavor-meng-wanzhou-letter/">powerful collective</a> of Canada’s political elite, are advocating for Meng’s release in exchange for the two Michaels. There is of course <a href="https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canada-must-reject-calls-release-meng-wanzhou-open-letter-prime-minister-trudeau/">fierce objection</a> to a prisoner swap, along with calls for tougher action while diplomatic efforts continue <a href="https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2020/06/25/trudeau-refuses-demands-to-release-meng-wanzhou-saying-it-would-put-millions-of-canadians-in-danger.html">behind the scenes</a>. </p>
<p>A prisoner swap would in fact undermine Canada’s credibility and signal to the world and our allies that Ottawa accepts hostage diplomacy. It would in many ways jeopardize Canada’s future relationship with Asia. </p>
<h2>Embracing human security</h2>
<p>While there is speculation that China and the United States are headed towards what’s known as a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/">Thucydides Trap</a> — which holds that war is inevitable when a rising power challenges a dominant state — Canada must prepare itself for the worst and find creative ways of navigate this superpower rivalry. </p>
<p>In doing so, Canadian policy-makers must understand that they’re in no position to change the behaviour of nuclear-armed, authoritarian China. To think otherwise is pure fantasy. </p>
<p>But Canada has options. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346651/original/file-20200709-18-3solli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trudeau and Xi Jinping listen to opening remarks at a plenary session at the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, in June 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>First, the government should return to its post-Cold War roots and advocate clear principles of <a href="https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/">human security</a>. Unlike traditional security, human security is a people-to-people, centred approach for understanding how communities can build capacity and resilience. As <a href="https://utorontopress.com/ca/freedom-from-fear-freedom-from-want-4">Kenneth Christie at Royal Roads University and I have written</a>, human security is fundamentally concerned with supporting good governance, human well-being and sustainable development.</p>
<p>Second, Canada should draw on its Cold War experience as a middle power state navigating great power rivalries through multilateral organizations. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/multilateralism-nearly-dead-s-terrible-news/598615/">The Trump administration’s retreat</a> from global institutions is an opportunity for Western allies to implement progressive policies with a clear focus on human security. While Canada has friends, it must do better in reminding them what we stand for. </p>
<p>Third, Canada should aggressively market its human security campaign within China’s vital <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> countries and the hallways of NATO, advocating human rights and the rule of law. Billboards should be placed on the sides of highways reminding allies how far their economic partners will go to meddle in a nation’s legal sovereignty should they not comply with their wishes. </p>
<p>China does not have to agree with Canada’s liberal democratic principles, nor should we force our values on China. </p>
<p>But the world needs to know how Canada’s sovereign rule of law has been steamrolled by two self-interested superpowers. And Canadians must stay true to our values and help other vulnerable and marginalized victims of great power rivalry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert J. Hanlon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government seems helpless and confused on how to manage the tensions between the United States and China after being caught in the conflict’s crosshairs.Robert J. Hanlon, Associate Professor of International Relations and Asian Politics, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1402832020-06-12T11:01:24Z2020-06-12T11:01:24ZPlaying hardball with China works – the west is right to move to a ‘constrainment’ strategy<p>Global attitudes towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-risks-imperial-overstretch-with-post-pandemic-aggression">hardening</a>. In 2019, the European Union declared the PRC a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-slams-china-as-systemic-rival-as-trade-tension-rises/">“systemic rival”</a> amid rising trade tensions. </p>
<p>In May 2020, the White House published <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf">a paper</a> that described the US’s competitive approach to the PRC based on “principled realism”. One of the report’s key passages stated that the US government will: “Respond in kind to Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof.” </p>
<p>And on June 5, the <a href="https://time.com/5848808/inter-parliamentary-alliance-china/">Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)</a> was formed. Lawmakers from 11 countries, including the US, UK, Australia, Japan and Canada are <a href="https://www.ipac.global">now working</a> “towards reform on how democratic countries approach China”. They seek to safeguard the rules-based international order, uphold human rights, promote trade fairness, strengthen security and protect national integrity. </p>
<p>All of these developments suggest that western China policy is rapidly changing. What remains unclear, however, is what exact form it will take. </p>
<p>In the past, western policy towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was informed by <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/447443/summary">two opposing camps</a>. One group called for engagement with China, typified by German chancellor Angela Merkel. She has argued for <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/merkel-says-eu-has-strategic-interest-in-working-with-china">continued dialogue and cooperation</a>, regardless of President Xi Jinping’s increasingly totalitarian approach to governance. </p>
<p>The other group demanded China containment. The former Trump adviser Steve Bannon, for example, has called for the <a href="https://www.mediaite.com/politics/steve-bannon-compares-china-to-nazi-regime-on-fox-calls-for-people-to-overthrow-chinese-communist-party/">overthrow of the CCP</a>. </p>
<p>But foreign and security policy regarding China should not be reduced to such overly binary and reductionist choices.</p>
<h2>Constrainment</h2>
<p>In the mid-1990s, the renowned international relations expert Gerald Segal suggested an alternative. He called it “<a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/447425">constrainment</a>”. Segal described this as a policy aimed at constraining the CCP, which intended to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tell China that the outside world has interests that will be defended by means of incentives for good behaviour, deterrence of bad behaviour, and punishment when deterrence fails. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Segal’s sound advice wasn’t heeded. Instead, western politicians and strategists naively believed in modernisation theory. By becoming economically more prosperous, they thought, mainland China’s society <a href="https://www.gppi.net/2018/03/15/china-is-the-most-difficult-strategic-challenge-the-west-has-faced-to-date">would also become more open</a>. The CCP’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a8366500-2271-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b">hard authoritarian turn under President Xi Jinping</a> has revealed how unrealistic this expectation was. </p>
<p>At first sight, constraining authoritarian excesses of the CCP may appear rather difficult. It certainly requires western politicians to accept considerable political risks. Roland Paris, former foreign policy adviser to the prime minister of Canada, has rightly <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/disunited-democracies-cannot-face-challenge-china">pointed out</a> that while maintaining cooperation with Beijing in areas of mutual interest and “pushing back” at the same time is a “tricky policy to manage”, there is “no other choice”. </p>
<p>As the following examples show, constrainment of the CCP is not merely a theoretical possibility. The US and UK seem to have belatedly caught up with Segal’s proposed foreign policy path. </p>
<h2>Playing hardball</h2>
<p>When Beijing <a href="https://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/China-blocks-US-airlines-from-resuming-flights">prohibited American airlines to fly to China</a>, the Trump administration <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/u-s-suspends-chinese-airline-flights-to-u-s-as-relations-fray">responded in kind</a>: Chinese airlines would no longer be able to fly to the US. Playing hardball worked and the CCP immediately <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/us-scraps-plan-to-ban-chinese-airlines-after-beijing-permits-foreign-carriers.html">reversed its initial decision</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/341256/original/file-20200611-80746-1s32ytz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pressure works.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">adike via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The position of the British government on Hong Kong is another case of constrainment in action. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab have long <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/05/22/why-is-the-uk-so-silent-as-beijing-trashes-the-hong-kong-handover-agreement/">kept mum</a> on the suppression of Hong Kong’s democracy movement. Yet once China’s rubber-stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/28/china-vote-npc-national-security-laws-hong-kong-us-protest">passed the controversial National Security Law for Hong Kong</a>, the British government took decisive action. </p>
<p>Johnson made a generous <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868859749/u-k-willing-to-admit-nearly-3-million-from-hong-kong-if-china-adopts-security-la">offer for a possible 3 million Hongkongers to relocate to the UK</a> should the controversial law come into effect in Hong Kong. Raab also made clear that the government <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/uk-prepared-to-sacrifice-free-trade-deal-with-china-to-protect-people-of-hong-kong-raab-says-11999873">would not sacrifice Hong Kong</a> for a possible trade deal with China. </p>
<p>This UK government policy shift is risky, for two reasons: it has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/china-accuses-uk-of-gross-interference-over-hong-kong-citizenship-offer">incurred the wrath of the CCP</a>, and mass migration from Hong Kong may not be supported by British voters. But a recent public opinion survey indicated that the British public <a href="https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/widespread-support-for-welcoming-hong-kong-bnos-even-as-immigration-attitudes-remain-hardened/">stood behind Johnson’s decision</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-does-british-offer-of-citizenship-to-hongkongers-violate-thatchers-deal-with-china-139413">Hong Kong: does British offer of citizenship to Hongkongers violate Thatcher's deal with China?</a>
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<h2>United front</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus209224653/Totalitarismus-Das-eigentliche-Problem-ist-Merkels-China-Politik.html">case of Germany</a> can serve as a warning of what happens when western liberal democracies remain stuck in an outdated China engagement paradigm. Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas, <a href="https://foref-europe.org/blog/2020/06/07/germany-heiko-maas-german-foreign-minister-embarrasses-germany-by-soft-pedaling-on-hongkong-joshua-wong/">claimed</a> in early June that Germany is too small a country to face up to a new superpower China. Maas also appeared sceptical about the chances of developing a new European China strategy. </p>
<p>The German government remains <a href="https://www.rusi.org/commentary/germanys-china-policy-change-through-trade-has-failed">oblivious to its own considerable power and leverage</a> over the CCP. And yet in its search for a more assertive China policy, the EU is being <a href="https://www.change.org/p/politicians-europe-can-no-longer-afford-germany-s-failed-china-policy-of-change-through-trade">held back by Germany</a>. It is not without irony that the UK outside the EU could become the European country which will take the lead on taking a tougher stance against China. </p>
<p>For China’s constrainment to work, like-minded countries have to develop a liberal-democratic united front. This means overcoming self-limiting debates about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/16/westlessness-is-the-west-really-in-a-state-of-peril">“westlessness”</a> and the decline of the west. Without such an alliance among liberal democracies, the CCP will continue to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3084684/china-trying-divide-and-rule-europe-eu-foreign-policy-chief">divide and rule</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreas Fulda has previously received funding from the European Union, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Geneva Global and the Ford Foundation.</span></em></p>Why a new Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China of MPs from 11 countries is a step in the right direction.Andreas Fulda, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1399122020-06-05T11:17:09Z2020-06-05T11:17:09ZGeorge Floyd protests show how the US has retreated from its position as a world leader<p>The killing of George Floyd at the hands of the Minneapolis police has sparked a furious response from all sections of American society. One poll showed that <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2020/06/01/floyd-protests-are-backed-by-most-americans-as-more-say-racism-isnt-taken-seriously-enough/">55% of Americans believe</a> police violence against the public is a major problem, while 58% support the view that racism is one of today’s biggest problems. Another poll showed two-thirds of Americans believe their country is <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/direction_of_country-902.html">heading in the wrong direction</a>. </p>
<p>The US has been brought to this point by a long-term <a href="https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18044/">legitimacy crisis</a> of the American elite, accompanied by rising levels of mass discontent and coercive state responses. The Floyd killing appears to be the spark that lit the fuse. The protests are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/02/abuse-of-power-global-outrage-grows-after-death-of-george-floyd">fuelled by anger</a> at other recent deaths of minorities from police brutality, and at the disproportionate effects of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/coronavirus-race.html">coronavirus pandemic</a> on African-Americans.</p>
<p>At the same time, America’s global image as world leader has further diminished as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Hell_of_Good_Intentions.html?id=PDtTDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">it adopts increasingly coercive attitudes</a> to allies, competitors, rivals and international institutions, to protect its positions in the face of greater competition. This is a long-term shift that President Donald Trump’s “America First” approach has systematically intensified to previously unseen heights. </p>
<p>The European Union, using language normally reserved for undemocratic states, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/d-c-police-response-george-floyd-protests-prompts-alarm-abroad-n1221916">expressed grave concerns</a> over Floyd’s killing and police response. It hoped “all the issues” related to the protests in the US “will be settled swiftly and in full respect for the rule of law and human rights”.</p>
<p>In the broadest sense, at home and internationally, the US is moving towards coercion and the exercise of hard power, and <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691171678/why-wilson-matters">away from its previous strategies</a> based on soft power and international leadership. </p>
<h2>Racism and foreign policy</h2>
<p>America, the land of the ethno-racial melting pot, is once again facing what the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal optimistically called <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/An_American_Dilemma.html?id=1R4uDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">The American Dilemma</a> in 1944. He explained this as the chasm between white American’s apparently deeply-held creed of equality – a fundamental attachment to democracy, freedom, equality and humanity as defining core values – and the country’s glaring levels of racial inequality. </p>
<p>In truth, Myrdal and his philanthropic sponsors at the Carnegie Corporation were imbued with the ideology of white supremacy and <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Foundations_of_the_American_Century.html?id=yR_q5sTQyloC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">sought to find ways to preserve it</a> on a global scale. In their view, the future of African-Americans <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-first-civil-right-9780199892785?cc=gb&lang=en&">lay in assimilation into white culture</a> because black culture was pathological. </p>
<p>Yet, there was also US elite recognition, in the context of the anti-Nazi second world war, that scientific racism and American racial segregation <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/retreat-of-scientific-racism/F285B7C58B4FBCB508E596AE0DFA3A04">were politically untenable</a>. This was reinforced by the needs of wartime production and the imperatives of US-Soviet cold war competition to recruit allies at the UN from among newly independent, post-colonial states. </p>
<p>The position was clear: for the US to lead the world, not just the west, it had to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0141987042000246318">deal with its domestic racial inequalities</a>, or at least their most visible manifestations. This created <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Cold_War_Civil_Rights.html?id=TyT1r03nTCAC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">permissive space</a> for key Supreme Court decisions such as <a href="https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=87">Brown vs Board of Education</a>, which ended state-sanctioned racial segregation in schools. The permissive environment also helped create favourable conditions for the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. </p>
<p>To be a world leader after 1945, the US had to be seen to be anti-racist. The world was watching to see what kind of culture the fledgling American superpower really was.</p>
<h2>From Obama to Trump</h2>
<p>Aspirations for a post-racial America <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Barack-Obama-and-the-Myth-of-a-Post-Racial-America-1st-Edition/Ledwidge-Verney-Parmar/p/book/9780415813945">soared with the election of President Barack Obama</a> in 2008. America’s moral authority, so severely dented by the Iraq War, seemed to have been rescued. </p>
<p>But the longed-for post-racial society was exposed as a myth even before the end of Obama’s first term. Obama, known among pollsters as a moderate “no-demands black”, had <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-017-0035-y">largely circumvented issues of structural racism</a> in a sea of soaring rhetoric about the American dream. </p>
<p>Despite two terms of office, poverty and inequality in general and especially for African-Americans <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/how-barack-obama-failed-black-americans/511358/">increased to levels greater than prior to Obama’s election</a>, as did police violence. Numerous deaths of African-Americans occurred at the hands of the police during his presidency, leading to major uprisings including in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/30/michael-brown-ferguson-america-george-floyd">Ferguson, Missouri,</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>And it was in the wake of Obama’s electoral victories that Trump, who questioned the president’s very identity as an American, cut his political teeth as a leader of the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/04/what-donald-trumps-birther-investigators-will-find-in-hawaii/237198/">“birther” movement</a>, and won the 2016 presidential election on a platform of (white) America First. </p>
<h2>The whole world is watching</h2>
<p>American media has long projected its news and culture to a fascinated global audience. And the world has been watching as Trump tries to remake American identity along even starker racial lines. Trump harnessed growing anxieties among white, mainly Republican, voters, about an emerging non-white majority in the US population, predicted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/us/white-americans-minority-population.html">by demographers to occur around 2044</a>. </p>
<p>In foreign policy, Trump has controversially challenged, undermined and begun <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/issue/94/1">coercing or withdrawing</a> from key institutions of the liberal international rules-based order. The US under Trump has stepped back from multilateral cooperation, and “soft power”, and adopted a coercive and transactional approach to foreign policy steeped in America First nationalism. In doing so, it has retreated from its position as a world leader. </p>
<p>A world view based around ideas of western and white superiority is embedded in the Trump administration at home and abroad. <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_United_States_in_the_Indo_Pacific.html?id=B790xgEACAAJ&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">It is evident</a> in its policies regarding immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and attitudes towards China. The immigrant is <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/04/21/anti-immigrant-movement-has-history-politicizing-disease">frequently portrayed</a> as a disease-carrier, the coronavirus is “Chinese”, and China is a “non-Caucasian” <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/china-threat-state-department-race-caucasian-1413202">challenger to US</a> and western power. </p>
<p>This trend has been confirmed by the fourth <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-us-scare-campaign-against-china/">resurrection</a> of the infamously hawkish Committee on the Present Danger, a group of national security experts, think tank members and former military staff, some with links to the far right. This time its sole focus is on China, and it is headed by Trump’s <a href="https://thewire.in/world/donald-trump-steve-bannon-return">former chief strategist</a>, Stephen Bannon. </p>
<p>As Trump’s America seeks neither global approval nor cross-party electoral appeal, it no longer worries so much about who is watching. Coercion is trumping leadership at home and abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inderjeet Parmar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To be a world leader after 1945, the US had to be seen to be anti-racist. Now it no longer cares who is watching.Inderjeet Parmar, Professor in International Politics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1396052020-06-01T10:24:31Z2020-06-01T10:24:31ZWhy the US dollar remains crucial for Hong Kong’s economic prosperity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338537/original/file-20200529-96741-wrscw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/ckxoFlEtlUc">Dan Freeman on Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Increasing economic tensions between the US and China continue to threaten Hong Kong’s economy. China’s proposed <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">national security law</a> will see greater controls over areas such as secessionist activities, terrorism and foreign interference. Similarly, the announcement by the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, that Hong Kong <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/27/politics/hong-kong-pompeo-certification/index.html">should no longer be viewed as independent from China</a> could undermine Hong Kong’s longstanding role as an intermediary between China and the rest of the world. </p>
<p>But one important pillar of Hong Kong’s economy remains unchanged and outside of Chinese government control – its currency, which is pegged to the US dollar via a currency board. This could have significant benefits for the city as it tries to deal with pressing socioeconomic challenges. But this also requires more public spending from the special administrative region’s government. </p>
<p>Since its introduction, the currency peg has withstood a variety of challenges – from the UK handover of Hong Kong back to China, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4b6c382-c408-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9">to attacks from speculators</a>. But it has often resulted in the Hong Kong government adopting an overly conservative approach to spending. Although the peg gives Hong Kong a considerable financial buffer, successive governments have tended towards fiscal conservatism. Public spending has rarely exceeded <a href="https://www.budget.gov.hk/2019/eng/pdf/e_appendices_b.pdf">20% of GDP since the 1997</a> handover. </p>
<h2>Bad timing and poor management</h2>
<p>Hong Kong is struggling to deal with sluggish economic growth and myriad socioeconomic challenges, not least increasing levels of poverty <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-protesters-dont-identify-as-chinese-amid-anger-at-inequality-survey-suggests-122293">and a high level of inequality</a>. The city was poised to benefit from legislation passed by the US senate which could force <a href="https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/05/24/bears-on-the-potomac/">Chinese companies to delist</a> from the US stock exchange. This would make Hong Kong the natural route for Chinese companies seeking to access overseas funds – something the city’s financial markets <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X08003379">have long provided</a>. But the new national security law and Pompeo’s comments will make Hong Kong less attractive. </p>
<p>Many of the challenges now facing Hong Kong have their roots in decades of <a href="https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/1696.php">mismanaged prosperity</a>. Yet they do not necessarily threaten the US dollar peg. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/338539/original/file-20200529-96717-1jnwyqm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ongoing protests in Hong Kong have hurt business.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hong-kong-june-16-2019-kongs-1473462398">Tee Jz / Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>In theory, the dollar peg gives the US the ultimate sanction on Hong Kong. In practice, it is more complicated, not least because the global demand for dollar assets <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/exorbitant-privilege-9780199642472?q=Eichengreen&lang=en&cc=ie">helps subsidise US living standards</a>. Nevertheless, were the US to strictly apply export controls or remove special tariffs, it would make Hong Kong’s task of sustaining a net inflow of foreign exchange more difficult.</p>
<h2>A pragmatic choice</h2>
<p>Hong Kong’s currency board was introduced in 1983 following concerns over capital flight <a href="https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/298.php">and the volatility of Hong Kong’s then free-floating currency</a> as UK-China negotiations over Hong Kong’s handover progressed. The currency board requires Hong Kong to hold enough liquid assets in the form of US dollar reserves to cover the amount of Hong Kong dollars that are in circulation. </p>
<p>The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), which acts as a de facto central bank, ensures the US dollar trades in a narrow band between HK$7.75-7.85. So the HKMA will buy up Hong Kong dollars to strengthen the currency when it falls to the lower margin of this band and it will sell them when it gets too strong. </p>
<p>Replacing the US dollar with the Chinese RMB is currently not feasible due to restrictions on the RMB’s deliverability as a currency. This makes the RMB unsuitable as a liquid reserve asset. Meanwhile, China’s state enterprises and the offshore market for RMB continue to benefit from Hong Kong’s deep and liquid financial markets as a source of offshore US <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603u.htm">dollar funding</a>. </p>
<h2>Hong Kong’s future prosperity</h2>
<p>Hong Kong’s future prosperity depends on good relationships between China and the US. But this is hindered by a historical reluctance by business interests and senior officials in the city to contemplate <a href="https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/316.php">even moderate political reform</a>. Such reforms are now unavoidable, however. </p>
<p>A deterioration in Hong Kong’s business <a href="https://www.hkeconomy.gov.hk/en/pdf/box-20q1-1-2.pdf">sentiment can be traced to early 2019</a> and public concerns over democracy. Addressing public concerns should also benefit Beijing. China’s economic growth has seen its business interests in the city increase but also become more fragmented. This has made it more difficult to read the public mood. As issuer of the global reserve currency, the US also has a responsibility to ensure that liquidity shortage is not used as a political stick to punish Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Ultimately, neither the security law nor changes in the US stance towards Hong Kong will help the squeeze on living standards faced by many of Hong Kong’s residents. Conversely, maintaining the currency peg gives the Hong Kong government ample fiscal scope to deal with these. </p>
<p>Its own economic research indicates the economic impacts of external events on Hong Kong’s economic growth tend to be large but not long lasting. Data from <a href="https://www.hkeconomy.gov.hk/en/pdf/box-20q1-1-1.pdf">Hong Kong’s government</a> show that the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis saw Hong Kong’s economy contract by 8.3% in the third quarter of 1998 while the global financial crisis resulted in a 7.8% contraction in the first quarter of 2009. In both instances, Hong Kong’s economy returned to growth following four to five quarters of contraction. </p>
<p>Recent indications that the US is set <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-debt-and-deficit-projections-hit-records/">to run budget deficits so great</a> they will exceed wartime records could provide Hong Kong’s fiscally conservative government with the political justification for increasing much needed public spending.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damian Tobin receives funding from the ESRC. </span></em></p>Hong Kong’s currency is pegged to the US dollar, which offers an opportunity to increase public spending and placate protestors.Damian Tobin, Lecturer in Management, Cork University Business School, University College CorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.