tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/darfur-17867/articlesDarfur – The Conversation2023-08-24T13:10:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119482023-08-24T13:10:35Z2023-08-24T13:10:35ZSudan’s future is being shaped by guns and money – like its past<p>Like most contemporary wars, Sudan’s war cannot be reduced to a contest between <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">two sides</a>. It is many other things, among them a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19226.5.pdf">gun class</a> of constantly shifting coalitions of specialists in violence and political trading that prey on civilians. Sudan’s peripheries have long been a lawless arena of <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137338242_10">brutal exploitation of people and natural resources</a> by a military-commercial complex. Now the whole country is their canvas.</p>
<p>Four months after the fighting began, neither the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has won a decisive victory on the battlefield. That should surprise no-one. Never has a Sudanese war ended that way.</p>
<p>Sudan’s current war began on 15 April when the country’s most energetic and capable politician, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, tried to seize power. Despite scrupulous planning and tactical skill, the coup failed to eliminate the command of the SAF, including its chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. </p>
<p>Even if the RSF does ultimately succeed in controlling the capital, it has failed politically: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/7/sudan-residents-describe-looting-evictions-by-rsf">RSF atrocities</a> —- looting, killings, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2023/8/14/dont-let-the-other-soldiers-watch-rape-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-sudan">rape</a> —- turned its battlefield advances into public relations disasters. </p>
<p>The fight began as a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-descent-chaos">mobster shootout</a> over which soldier-business cartel would run Sudan. But the two bosses are losing their grip. Hemedti appears to be physically incapacitated and has shown none of the populist energy that allowed him to set a political agenda. Trying to dispel rumours that he was dead or in intensive care, the RSF <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLKYBYTw0-U">released a video of patched together clips</a>, in which Hemedti stood, stiff and pallid, speaking for just 11 seconds.</p>
<p>Al-Burhan has emerged from his bunker and been more visible, but hardly more coherent. He is nominal head of a fractious cabal of generals and financiers, many of them old-guard Islamists from the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir.</p>
<p>I have been a scholar of Sudan for four decades. During 2005-06, I was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-13 served as senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, during negotiations over the independence of South Sudan and its aftermath. My most recent <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/event/sudans-unfinished-democracy-w-justin-lynch-and-alex-de-waal/">book</a>, co-authored with Willow Berridge, Justin Lynch and Raga Makawi, tells the story of the civic revolution of 2019 and why it failed.</p>
<p>Looking at Sudan’s war in the context of the history of the Sudanese state and its wars, it’s reverting to type. It’s not an exact replica of earlier wars but if history doesn’t repeat itself, it rhymes. A cabal of generals and Islamist powerbrokers, who prospered under the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir, are managing to secure recognition as the government. But their state has even more limited territorial control and weaker institutions than before, while peripheral mode of paramilitary governance – exemplified by the RSF – is expanding in territory and capability.</p>
<p>The Sudanese state today betrays its history as a plunder state on the margins of the global order. The men contending for power are brokers in this extractive system, not statebuilders. For this reason, current efforts at finding a compromise between al-Burhan and Hemedti are no more than a square peg for a multi-sided hole. </p>
<h2>Sudan’s political marketplace</h2>
<p>The alliance of civilian forces along with some army generals in the SAF, and the majority of African and western nations, aspired for a transition to an institutionalised and democratic state following the overthrow of Al-Bashir. But on the eve of the August 2019 constitutional declaration, I wrote a paper <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf">whose pessimistic summary</a> was at odds with the optimism of that moment. </p>
<p>It was my view that the issues under negotiation at the time <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf#page=24">did not include</a> the real structures of power in the country. I saw the major question not as instituting democracy but whether Hemedti —- the dominant political entrepreneur —- could take power himself and secure an accommodation with the other political-military businesses or whether there would be an establishment counter-coup. </p>
<p>I also <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf#page=2">argued</a> that because Hemedti’s model was not sustainable, the most likely scenario was an acceleration of the trend towards an unregulated and violent ‘political marketplace’ and ‘paramilitary governance.</p>
<p>In the event, Hemedti compromised with the SAF. First, he agreed to al-Burhan taking the chair of the collective presidency, known as the Sovereignty Council, and later with the coup in October 2021. Such collusion was workable as long as security sector hierarchies were left unresolved. But the politics of delay ran out of road with the provision in the <a href="https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Framework-Agreement-Final-ENG-05122022.pdf">December 2022 Framework Agreement</a> that required the absorption of the RSF under SAF command. So Hemedti made his move.</p>
<p>Instead of capturing the state, Hemedti destroyed it. In the continuing war, battlefield losses and gains are less important than material capacity. Most important are the political funds of the bosses of each belligerent coalition. Now as earlier, the SAF has had more material overall but the RSF has more disposable political income, which matters more.</p>
<h2>The square peg</h2>
<p>In the early weeks of the war, American and Saudi mediators pushed a straightforward cessation of hostilities between the Sudanese forces. It was a justifiable immediate response. Four months on, it is unhelpful.</p>
<p><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/03/sudans-next-stop-regional-proxy-war/">The mediation arena is now crowded</a>. The African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development led by Kenya as well as Egypt are all heading initiatives. Each says it is coordinating with the others. Regardless of whether this is sincere or not, the outcome of formal commonality is that all will agree on the simplest possible analysis, a two-sided war. </p>
<p>For Egypt, <a href="https://www.presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news1372023-2/">the underlying issue is a collapsing or fragmenting state</a>. Just as it correctly feared that the Kenyan-led peace talks twenty years ago would lead to the secession of southern Sudan, today it worries about a failed state with two rival governments that generates millions of refugees.</p>
<p>For Kenya, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-interview/20230623-kenya-president-william-ruto-there-are-already-signs-of-genocide-in-sudan">it’s a blocked transition to democracy</a>. The Americans and Saudis are reviving their joint ceasefire plans, shying away from the question of how a Sudanese state can be made viable. Others, for example the United Arab Emirates, may yet propose new forums or insist on having a role. </p>
<p>The United Nations is missing in action.</p>
<p>In contrast to earlier conflicts in Sudan, national civil society and public intellectuals haven’t shaped a vision for how the country can escape from its death spiral. Nor indeed have African scholars and analysts. Sudanese political scientists have provided rich accounts of their country’s historical dysfunction. It’s time for those analyses to be revived and debated. In the vacuum, Sudan’s future is shaped by guns and money.</p>
<h2>A barebones state</h2>
<p>Thirty years ago, the Islamist minister of finance, Abdel Rahim Hamdi, argued that the central parts of Sudan constituted an economically viable miniature country. The towns and commercial farming schemes within a day’s drive of Khartoum became known as the “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/05/07/3-visualizing-sudan-geographical-inequality/">Hamdi Triangle</a>”. This was a middle-income enclave and the locus of most infrastructure and investment. Hamdi argued that this area could prosper without having to administer the troublesome peripheries of southern Sudan, Darfur and other far-flung areas that served chiefly as labour reserves.</p>
<p>The fruit of this war may be a truncated semi-triangle in eastern Sudan. This would be run like the military-Islamist duopoly of the al-Bashir years, except more brutal and more venal. And, probably, more fractious. Different generals and Islamists have united around al-Burhan as their titular leader but are likely to stick together only as long as the RSF in Khartoum poses an existential threat.</p>
<p>The contest between Hemedti and al-Burhan remains an impasse. Early <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-sudan/">statements from American and Saudi Arabian mediators</a> spoke of the SAF merely as a belligerent, putting it on an equal standing with the RSF. Lately, al-Burhan and his group are now widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-govt-representatives-arrive-jeddah-resume-talks-with-rsf-2023-07-15/">recognised</a> as the Government of Sudan. This is despite the fact that they don’t control the capital city. They administer only their de facto headquarters in Port Sudan and a handful of other cities.</p>
<p>The RSF is the revenge of the cannon fodder against Sudan’s political establishment that was ready to <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap">exploit</a> them when it needed a dirty job done. Its leader, Hemedti, had a populist touch and made opportunistic alliances. His political fortunes rose because he had political energy and money. And because he promised an alternative to the old guard. </p>
<p>But Hemedti’s chameleon-like political stratagems couldn’t conceal the DNA of his political-military business. He is the son of the Janjaweed militias, infamous for their atrocities in the Darfur war of 2003-05. RSF is also a family affair, but none of Hemedti’s deputies – brothers, uncles, cousins – have the charisma and status to replace him.</p>
<p>If the RSF were to prevail, we should expect that the Sudanese government, or remnants thereof, would become a wholly owned subsidiary of the commercial-military-ethnic agenda of the Dagalo family and its most powerful backers. </p>
<p>The contradiction of paramilitary governance is its destructiveness. The RSF modus operandi is to attack and loot everything —- markets, farms, schools, hospitals —- leaving a wasteland. The militiamen drive out the locals but they can sustain themselves only by moving on to new victims. In due course they will run out of cities to pillage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex de Waal is the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.</span></em></p>The Sudanese state today betrays its history as a plunder state on the margins of the global order.Alex De Waal, Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102932023-08-01T14:46:56Z2023-08-01T14:46:56ZSudan needs to accept its cultural diversity: urban planning can help rebuild the country and prevent future conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539757/original/file-20230727-17-efhzbn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke rises above buildings in Sudan's capital Khartoum in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sudan is rich in cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. The country’s <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/SD">48 million people</a> come from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698280500423908">56 ethnic groups, with over 595 sub-ethnic groups, speaking more than 115 languages</a>. </p>
<p>This plurality has shaped urban development patterns and the country’s socio-political landscape. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/khartoum-the-creation-and-the-destruction-of-a-modern-african-city-205705">Khartoum</a>. The Sudanese capital <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2005-4-page-302.htm">historically</a> drew traders from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Each placed a <a href="https://jur.journals.ekb.eg/article_88400.html">distinctive stamp</a> on the cityscape. </p>
<p>These range from Ottoman-style Islamic architecture to the narrow alleys, small windows and colourful clothes peculiar to African ethnic groups. The city symbolises Sudan’s cultural mosaic in architecture and urban planning.</p>
<p>However, Khartoum is also a domain of <a href="https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2020/12/02/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8E%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%8A/">ethnic and cultural division</a>.</p>
<p>This dates back to the period of the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/mahdist-state-mahdiyya">Mahdist state (Mahdiyya)</a>, which ruled Sudan from 1881 to 1898 and challenged the colonial ambitions of Britain and Egypt. The Mahdist state made <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Omdurman">Omdurman (Umm Durman)</a> its new capital on the western side of the River Nile, and developed the city around the <a href="https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781782821151">ethnic structure of its army</a>. </p>
<p>A colonial plan for <a href="https://repozytorium.biblos.pk.edu.pl/redo/resources/28522/file/suwFiles/HassanS_UrbanPlanning.pdf#page=3">Khartoum followed in 1910</a>, triggered by the governor-general of Sudan, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Horatio-Herbert-Kitchener-1st-Earl-Kitchener">Horatio Kitchener</a>. It had <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268280184_alywm_alalmy_ltkhtyt_almdn_althdyat_w_almalat_fy_almdn_alswdanyt">three segregated zones</a> to accommodate Europeans, elites and ordinary locals. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/khartoum-the-creation-and-the-destruction-of-a-modern-african-city-205705">Khartoum: the creation and the destruction of a modern African city</a>
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<p>These decades of interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan fostered vibrant cityscapes. But spatial segregation has continued, creating <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">socio-cultural divisions and uneven urban growth</a>. </p>
<p>Drawing on my experiences as an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ibrahim-Bahreldin">educator, researcher and practitioner in urbanism in Sudan</a>, I argue that failure to use urban planning to manage diversity has worsened ethnic and racial divisions. It has fanned <a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-how-historical-patterns-of-conflict-are-haunting-current-violence-144423">conflict and discontent</a> in Sudanese society.</p>
<h2>Embracing diversity</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268280184_alywm_alalmy_ltkhtyt_almdn_althdyat_w_almalat_fy_almdn_alswdanyt">Urban planning</a> is supposed to improve residents’ quality of life. It strategically organises physical spaces and land use. It optimises resources and livelihoods, and promotes social equity. </p>
<p>It holds immense potential to manage diversity and reconstruct a resilient and prosperous Sudan. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say urban planning can single-handedly resolve <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan’s conflict</a>. Peace requires a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-peace-talks-successful-the-4-factors-that-matter-206299">shared commitment</a> to silence the guns and build political stability and security. </p>
<p>Yet the way diversity is managed makes it either a virtue or a <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">curse</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, there are three avenues through which urban planning can positively manage diversity to help prevent conflict: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>by celebrating multiculturalism.</p></li>
<li><p>by boosting regional integration and resource management.</p></li>
<li><p>by ensuring effective governance and public participation in urban spaces.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What Sudan got wrong</h2>
<p>Colonial and post-independence planning practices in Sudan attempted to forge a <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/AHRLJ/2013/17.html">national identity</a>. However, this was done by <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">suppressing ethnic diversity</a>, and disintegrating cultural values and their spatial footprints. </p>
<p>After independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956, Sudan’s ruling elites rejected the demand from southern Sudan for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/federalism">a federal system</a>. This would have created a united Sudan but allowed different regions to maintain their integrity, culture and traditions. The ruling elite instead adopted an “Arab Islamic” identity to create a <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">homogeneous society</a>. </p>
<p>This was among the reasons for the eruption of the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/sudanese-civil-wars">first civil war in southern Sudan in 1955</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-tracing-the-origins-of-the-regions-strife-and-suffering-131931">Darfur: tracing the origins of the region's strife and suffering</a>
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<p>And in Darfur, infringements of communal land ownership rights <a href="https://metropolitics.org/Land-Insecurity-in-Khartoum-When-Land-Titles-Fail-to-Protect-Against-Public.html">fuelled violent conflict</a>. This extended to <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">southern Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287221183_Urban_agriculture_facing_land_pressure_in_Greater_Khartoum_The_case_of_new_real_estate_projects_in_Tuti_and_Abu_Se'id">Khartoum</a>. </p>
<p>The Khartoum <a href="https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Sudan_Khartoum1998.pdf">Public Order Act</a> of 1996 (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50596805">repealed in 2019</a>) was another misjudgement. It <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/12/5194">discriminated against citizens</a> based on their cultural and gender identities. The public order rules were <a href="https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/report-Final.pdf#page=5">vague and open-ended</a>, leaving them open to exploitation for social control.</p>
<h2>Rebuilding a post-war Sudan</h2>
<p>Urban planning should follow the principles of economic, social and physical integration. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Economic integration ensures equal access to employment, education and resources. </p></li>
<li><p>Social integration provides affordable housing, diverse neighbourhoods and accessible social infrastructure. </p></li>
<li><p>Physical integration encourages social interaction and breaks down barriers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These principles help create vibrant, harmonious cities that cater to the needs of diverse populations and future generations. They can be put into practice through three avenues.</p>
<p><strong>1. Celebrating multiculturalism and diversity</strong> </p>
<p>This requires <a href="https://www.cgscholar.com/bookstore/works/the-power-of-diversity?category_id=cgrn&path=cgrn%2F209%2F215">rethinking urban spaces to embrace inclusivity</a>, particularly where ethnocultural ties transcend national boundaries. Inclusive neighbourhoods, mixed-use developments and accessible public spaces promote interaction and foster belonging. Such developments help build understanding, empathy and trust among different communities, preventing community fracturing that <a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-tracing-the-origins-of-the-regions-strife-and-suffering-131931">leads to unrest</a>. </p>
<p><strong>2. Regional integration and resource management</strong></p>
<p>Sudan has experienced <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269336771_Khartoum_2030_Towards_An_Environmentally-Sensitive_Vision_for_the_Development_of_Greater_Khartoum_Sudan">unequal urban growth and the depopulation of rural areas</a>. To address this, the country’s long-term development visions and plans should aim for equitable development. These plans should take into account marginalised regions which may have ethnic populations that extend beyond national borders. A planning vision that transcends the scope of a single nation and seeks a regional approach is indispensable. Regional integration can restructure urban spaces, mobility systems and production patterns. This would foster self-sufficiency and integration. </p>
<p>Urban planning can also address resource management concerns – such as land ownership and economic opportunities – that trigger tension and conflict. Transparent mechanisms for resource allocation can help mitigate conflict arising from scarce resources. In Sudan, this would have helped improve regional employment prospects, reducing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">reliance on paramilitary activities</a> for income.</p>
<p><strong>3. Effective governance and public participation</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261996322_A_Critical_Evaluation_of_Public_Participation_in_the_Sudanese_Planning_Mandates">Participatory urban planning</a> improves governance. It empowers historically marginalised groups like young people, women, rural communities, informal settlers and minorities through public engagement. This enables them to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262008475_Evaluation_of_Two_Types_of_Community_Participation_In_Development_Projects_A_Case_Study_of_The_Sudanese_Neighbourhood_of_Al-Shigla">address their grievances and secure opportunities for meaningful dialogue</a>. The process generates enthusiasm for shaping, financing and managing urban spaces. </p>
<p>Public engagement harnesses local knowledge and culture. It advocates for policy transformation to address systematic inequalities and safeguard rights. Transparent and accountable governance complements these arrangements, promoting equality and preventing tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ibrahim Bahreldin is a member of the Sudanese Institute of Architects and the City Planning Institute of Japan, and is registered as a professional architect and urban planner with the Sudanese Engineering Council and the Saudi Council of Engineers. He is also affiliated with the University of Khartoum in Sudan. Ibrahim does not work for, consult, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article.</span></em></p>The interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan has created vibrant cityscapes, but also led to segregation and division.Ibrahim Z. Bahreldin, Associate Professor of Urban & Environmental Design, King Abdulaziz University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070622023-06-08T14:08:49Z2023-06-08T14:08:49ZChad on the brink: how the war in Sudan hurts its fragile neighbour<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530631/original/file-20230607-17-bbcsrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 2014 view of Gaoui refugee camp in N'Djamena, Chad. Pressure on refugee camps in Chad has increased due to latest fighting in Sudan.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sebnem Coskun/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 15 April <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">outbreak of hostilities</a> in Sudan, the civilian population has been bearing the brunt. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, led by <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (called Hemeti</a>), are in conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s de facto head of state.</p>
<p>Nearly <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/">1.4 million</a> people have been displaced. Of these, 330,000 have crossed into neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>Chad – already a fragile country itself – is one. Around <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/sudanese-refugees-fleeing-violence-flock-chad">90,000</a> Sudanese refugees have entered Chad since the conflict began. The new arrivals have added to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/over-60000-have-fled-chad-sudan-since-conflict-started-unhcr-2023-05-22/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20arrivals%20have%20added,for%20displaced%20people%20from%20Sudan.">600,000</a> mostly Sudanese refugees already in Chad after fleeing previous conflicts, especially in the Darfur region. </p>
<p>Despite its oil wealth, Chad is one of the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/chad">poorest countries</a> in the world. Chad and Sudan share a common border of 1,400 kilometres. They also share the same ethnic groups living on both sides of their borders. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/helga-dickow-1209876">political scientist and expert in ethnic and religious conflict</a> with a focus on Chad, I outline how the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad. </p>
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<h2>Fragile security</h2>
<p>In the past, relations between Chad and Sudan have been characterised by <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf">conflicts, proxy wars and fragile peace agreements</a>. </p>
<p>The Darfur region plays a crucial role. It has at different times been a shelter for rebel groups of both countries.</p>
<p>Before he took power in Chad through a coup in December 1990, <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno</a>, an ethnic Zaghawa, and his militia had their rear base in Darfur. Members of Darfurian Zaghawa belonged to the inner circle of his rule. </p>
<p>After his <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">death in 2021</a>, a military council led by his son Mahamat took power in Chad.</p>
<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-the-feared-ex-warlord-taking-on-sudan-army-hemedti">Hemedti</a> is well connected within Chadian politics and military. He is of Chadian Arab descent and has his stronghold in the Darfur region. His family lives on both sides of the border. </p>
<p>Hemedti’s cousin, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13366/Death_on_the_front_line%2c_a_coup%2c_and_then_an_about_turn">General Bichara Issa Djadalla</a>, is the personal chief of staff to Mahamat Déby. Hemedti’s victory or defeat in Sudan could be a huge risk for the transitional president Déby in Chad.</p>
<p>In the case of his victory, Chadian Arabs could feel encouraged to try to take power in Chad as well. Many Chadians want an end to the Zaghawa rule, which has lasted for more than 30 years. Chadian Arab forces could be a real threat for Mahamat Déby.</p>
<p>In case of defeat, Hemeti would not give up his stronghold, Darfur. The gold of Darfur is the reason for his wealth and military strength. Hemedti is known for his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-hemedti-the-puppeteer-behind-sudans-feared-rsf-fighters">cruelty and ruthlessness</a>. The Zaghawa of Darfur could become the victims, as it was during the <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en">Darfur crisis in 2003</a>. If Mahamat Déby did not intervene, other sons of Déby and Zaghawa members of the army could quickly get rid of him.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian crisis</h2>
<p>The consequences of the outbreak of fighting in Khartoum were immediately felt in eastern Chad. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/23/more-than-90000-sudanese-take-refuge-in-chad-to-flee-the-fighting/">90,000 refugees</a> have fled from Sudan to Chad so far. Among them are about <a href="https://storyteller.iom.int/stories/plight-homecoming-chadians-fleeing-violence-sudan">12,500 Chadian returnees</a> who have been living in Sudan for decades. </p>
<p>Most refugees arrived in eastern Chad with only what they could carry. Here they met a poor but traditionally hospitable population, including earlier refugees. The arrival of more refugees risks worsening a precarious situation.</p>
<p>International aid is desperately needed. The people lack water, food, medical care and all other necessities of life. According to UNHCR, only <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/chad-funding-2023">17%</a> of the funds needed to meet the most urgent needs of refugees in Chad have been received from donors. </p>
<p>During her recent visit, USAID administrator Samantha Power pledged <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/readout/may-20-2023-administrator-samantha-power-travels-chad-visits-refugee-camp-support-humanitarian-response-crisis-sudan">$17 million</a> in humanitarian aid to the Chadian government for new and long-time refugees in the east of the country. </p>
<p>UNHCR’s deputy high commissioner for refugees, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/23/1177626408/unexpectedly-high-number-of-refugees-cross-into-chad-to-flee-fighting-in-sudan">Raouf Mazou</a>, also promised help for refugees and Chadians during his audience with Mahamat Déby on 22 May 2023.</p>
<p>In spite of these promises, there’s a risk that if any group feels neglected in the allocation of support, tensions between the local population and the newcomers could increase. </p>
<p>With the rainy season approaching, the situation threatens to deteriorate further. Access to the refugee camps becomes almost impossible due to poor or non-existent roads. This will make it even more difficult for aid organisations to distribute relief supplies and to move the refugees away from the border region. A humanitarian disaster in eastern Chad is a possibility. </p>
<h2>Economic crisis</h2>
<p>Landlocked Chad is heavily dependent on imports of most goods – industrial products, raw materials and food. The two main ports that supply Chad are Douala in Cameroon and Bur Sudan in Sudan.</p>
<p>The closure of the borders has had an immediate impact on Chadian consumers. Prices of goods and services have risen by up to <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2023/05/18/nigeria-increases-trade-with-chad-on-war-in-sudan/">70%</a>, according to the Observatory for Economic Complexity. </p>
<p>The few Chadian exports have come to a standstill. Cotton, gum arabic and livestock are Chad’s <a href="https://www.export.gov/article?series=a0pt00000000GtoAAE&type=Country_Commercial__kav">main non-oil exports</a>. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan might bring the already weak Chadian economy to a standstill. To make matters worse, there is currently a <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/03/06/chad-reels-from-fuel-shortage/">shortage of fuel</a> in Chad. The shortage led to an increase in fuel prices of up to 300% - in a country where private households and manufacturers rely almost entirely on their own generators. </p>
<h2>Political implications</h2>
<p>Chad’s transitional president Mahamat Déby was surprised by the fighting in Sudan while on a pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. It took him almost a week to find a safe way to fly back home to N'Djamena. </p>
<p>However, he announced on his <a href="https://www.facebook.com/presidencetd">Facebook account</a> that he had been in telephone contact with the two warring parties, trying to convince them to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>He wanted to present himself as a mediator to the international public. By talking to the two generals, he avoided choosing sides. He cannot afford to get caught on either side of the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemeti. </p>
<p>Since the death of his father, Mahamat Déby has tried to keep a firm grip on power despite national and international criticism. The transitional authorities suppress <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/26/chad-scores-protesters-shot-dead-wounded">opposition</a> to the Déby dynasty. </p>
<p>At its last meeting, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/communique-1152nd-meeting-peace-and-security-council-african-union-report-panel-wise-its-mission-republic-chad-held-11-may-2023">African Union Security Council</a> reiterated the ineligibility of the transitional government, including its president. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan and its outcome could destabilise Chad even further and lead it away from any path to peace and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ongoing war in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056902023-05-24T12:33:38Z2023-05-24T12:33:38ZPeace in Sudan depends on justice for the Darfur genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526880/original/file-20230517-27418-2g9fwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan's Omar al-Bashir (left) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo tour Darfur in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I asked the pilot to deviate from our approved flight path and go low over Darfur. It was 2003 and I was the United Nations Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator in Sudan investigating reports of violence. What I saw was a genocide unfolding on my watch.</p>
<p>This was a decade after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which I also <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/15/lessons-from-a-personal-journey-through-the-genocide-in-rwanda/">witnessed first hand</a>, and where we had sworn “never again”. But <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEUWU8JwnDI">here I was in Darfur</a> watching village upon village burning. </p>
<p>Large-scale horrendous brutalities were being committed across Darfur, a region in western Sudan that’s roughly the size of France. They were <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2707480/">racially directed</a>, targeting black African ethnic groups such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. Eyewitness testimonies indicated that <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/05/06/darfur-destroyed/ethnic-cleansing-government-and-militia-forces-western-sudan">the perpetrators</a> were Arab militia, with Sudanese government backing. The <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-4E9C-A672-3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf">purpose</a> was the permanent removal of the black population in the area so that nomadic Arabs could take over. </p>
<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/f2060c73fcec41c6a483d8d4e8121788">insidious racism</a> has deep roots. It goes back to its ancient role as a marketplace for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01440399908575286?journalCode=fsla20">black slaves</a>. The subsequent divide-and-rule <a href="https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2407&context=luc_theses">Anglo-Egyptian colonialism</a> and <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/32202">supremacist Arab</a> militarised dictatorships further entrenched it. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526877/original/file-20230517-25-yc9w7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of many destroyed villages in Darfur.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carolyn Cole/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Between 2003 and 2005, half of Darfur’s population of 5-6 million was <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/displaced-darfur">displaced</a>. Their fragile means for surviving the arid environment – such as wells and irrigated farming – were completely <a href="https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1480de/pdf/#page=63">destroyed</a>. At least 200,000 <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/darfur">Darfuris died</a>, and thousands of women and girls were raped. </p>
<p>This was <a href="https://www.mukeshkapila.org/books/against-a-tide-of-evil/">intentional</a> – as was confirmed by Sudanese authorities with whom I remonstrated. When they told me that they wanted a “final solution” to the Darfur insurgency, I was left in no doubt that the 1948 <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention</a> – which prohibits ethnically targeted destruction – applied. </p>
<p>The UN and world powers <a href="https://unwatch.org/the-seven-excuses-of-inaction-for-darfur/">refused</a> to listen and <a href="https://www.hmd.org.uk/resource/dr-mukesh-kapila-cbe/">I lost my job</a> for speaking out publicly. But extensive lobbying extracted a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2004/sc8104.doc.htm">UN Security Council presidential statement</a> in 2004, and the first-ever <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm">UN Security Council referral</a> to the International Criminal Court in 2005. This meant that the court could exercise jurisdiction over Sudan and initiate formal investigations.</p>
<p>It was gratifying to provide evidence that enabled Omar al-Bashir to enter history in 2009 and 2010 as the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">first head of state indicted</a> for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. He was alongside <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">five other associates</a> who obstructed us in bringing relief to Darfur.</p>
<p>But this was no consolation. Bashir remained in power despite international arrest warrants. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Darfuri lands, emptied of their African inhabitants, were rehabilitated with generous <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2007/12/13/the-politics-of-aid-helping-darfur/">foreign aid</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402650802068051?journalCode=cper20">re-populated</a> by Arab groups. With the demography of the region changed, this is a clear example of ethnic cleansing.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/our-experts/prof-mukesh-kapila-cbe">an expert in</a> humanitarian affairs, with particular expertise in tackling crimes against humanity, disaster and conflict management, I argue that without <a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/rj-jr/index.html#:%7E:text=What%20is%20Restorative%20Justice%3F,the%20aftermath%20of%20a%20crime.%E2%80%9D">restorative justice</a> – justice that focuses on repairing the harm caused by involving those who have been affected – there cannot be peace.</p>
<p>The failure to hold Darfur rights abusers accountable emboldened the national government and security apparatus to redouble their oppression around Sudan. This ignited several violent rebellions and inevitable countrywide instability. In fact, the crisis in Sudan today involves key military players who rose to power under Bashir during this time. </p>
<h2>Darfur’s toxic legacy</h2>
<p>In 2013, as a Special Representative of the <a href="https://www.aegistrust.org/">Aegis Trust for the Prevention of Crimes against Humanity</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQSj6eIW8IE">I witnessed</a> in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan state the scorched-earth policies of its governor, Ahmed Harun. He was a close associate of Bashir. Even though Harun had been <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/harun">indicted by the ICC</a> in 2007, he carried out new ethnically targeted crimes against black Africans of the Nuba and in Blue Nile state. His tactics were further <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-11-02-the-butcher-of-nubas-new-job/">brutal refinements</a> of what he had deployed in Darfur a decade earlier. </p>
<p>Bashir and Harun effected the original Darfur genocide through their <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">Janjaweed</a> militia, alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces. The Janjaweed were then formalised into the Rapid Support Forces. They were strengthened through <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/border-control-hell-how-eus-migration-partnership-legitimizes-sudans-militia-state">European Union (EU) funding</a> for border control to stem refugee flows into Europe. They gained further combat experience and money by being recruited to fight in <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/sudans-controversial-rapid-support-forces-bolsters-saudi-efforts-yemen/">Yemen</a>. </p>
<p>The international community’s pragmatic Sudan policy has favoured quick fixes rather than systematically tackling underlying problems. <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-has-its-roots-in-three-decades-of-elites-fighting-over-oil-and-energy-204389">Competitive self-interests</a> are also in play as nations vie for access to Sudan’s<a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-oil-and-gas"> oil</a>, <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-extractive-industries">mineral</a> and <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-agricultural-sectors">agricultural</a> riches. And so, deal-making trumped principles to boost the perpetrators instead of demanding their accountability.</p>
<p>Sudan’s military elites triumphed further when the international community undermined the popular pro-democracy uprising that led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/11/sudan-army-ousts-bashir-after-30-years-in-power">Bashir’s removal in 2019</a>. In a massive policy error, the UN, US and EU pushed for a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/20/sudan-civil-war-biden-burhan-hemeti-foreign-policy/">transition</a> that left Bashir’s military successors in control: Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan for the Sudanese Armed Forces, and Commander General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – aka Hemedti – for the Rapid Support Forces. </p>
<p>The violent power competition between these two generals is the immediate trigger to Sudan’s current conflict. There are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65448691">catastrophic humanitarian</a> consequences amid <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65495539">peace mediations</a> that repeatedly fail. </p>
<h2>Making peace</h2>
<p>Peacemaking is never easy, but conflicts hallmarked by war crimes and crimes against humanity are impossible to end without restorative justice. Extraordinary hurts necessitate <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5740.htm">exceptional journeys of recovery</a> through grieving, forgiving and healing. That requires acknowledging wrongs done, penalising wrongdoers, compensating victims and <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1858696/Memory_and_Justice?auto=download&email_work_card=download-paper">memorialising</a> their suffering through monuments that become places of pilgrimage to educate future generations.</p>
<p>That is how the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/documents/library-of-the-court-en.pdf">Nuremberg Tribunal</a> helped post-Nazi Germany and Europe to move on. And how the <a href="https://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</a> strove to heal the Balkans from the 1995 <a href="https://srebrenica.org.uk/">Srebrenica</a> genocide.</p>
<p>Justice is best served closest to the people who suffer but, at the same time, crimes against humanity in one place are crimes against all humanity everywhere. So, the whole world must be part of legal processes that ensure transparency and fairness, provide lessons and reset global norms. The tribunals for the 1970s <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia/case-study/justice/tribunal">Cambodian</a> and 1994 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Aftermath">Rwandan</a> genocides did that with hybrid domestic and international mechanisms.</p>
<p>Where this does not happen, old wounds fester, even ancient ones such as those from the <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-armenian-genocide-1915-16-overview">Armenian</a> genocide a century ago or the 1930s <a href="https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/holodomor">Holodomor</a> genocide of Ukrainians. More recently, the unrectified genocides of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/marking-five-years-since-the-genocide-in-burma/">Rohingya</a>, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/01/20/german-lawmakers-recognize-yazidi-genocide-in-iraq_6012355_4.html">Yazidi</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/22/uk-mps-declare-china-is-committing-genocide-against-uyghurs-in-xinjiang">Uyghur</a>, and in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAyN9LljW7M">Tigray</a> continue to cause turmoil and encourage impunity. That is why “never again” is happening “again and again”.</p>
<h2>Shabby peace deals</h2>
<p>There is no shortage of mediators for Sudan’s current crisis. But their impatient peace panaceas underestimate the impact of the generation-long Darfur genocide and its direct connection to current events. Shabby deals for short-term gains – appeasing the generals and further consolidating their power at the cost of civilian democracy – will unravel. </p>
<p>The bulk of the Sudanese at the centre, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27666997">dominated</a> by an Arabic elite – authorities, intelligentsia, rich – ignored the generation-long inhumanities at the peripheries of their vast land. But, sooner or later, there is no alternative to the path to peace in Sudan that is walked hand-in-hand by all its diverse peoples. </p>
<p>This will be a long journey. Short-changing justice and accountability will make it longer still. The handover of Bashir and other indictees to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in Darfur should be integral to all peace negotiations, and a condition for aiding recovery. Furthermore, fresh crimes being committed in the current conflict must not go unpunished. </p>
<p>Sudan’s stakeholders in Africa, the Middle East and globally serve the nation best – and also their own self-interests – by not standing in the way of peace through justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mukesh Kapila does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The failure to hold the perpetrators of the Darfur genocide accountable has led to further instability in Sudan.Mukesh Kapila, Professor Emeritus in Global Health & Humanitarian Affairs, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2054342023-05-15T13:48:34Z2023-05-15T13:48:34ZSudan is awash with weapons: how the two forces compare and what that means for the war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525499/original/file-20230510-29-ax1z85.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke billows above residential buildings in Khartoum, Sudan, in April 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has escalated <a href="https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/gunshots-in-khartoum">following an outbreak of violence</a> in April 2023. There is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/10/sudan-fighting-in-its-26th-day-a-list-of-key-events">intensive fighting</a> in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, neighbouring Omdurman and elsewhere, including Darfur. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/jeddah-agreement-welcomed-but-also-met-with-scepticism-in-sudan">mediation efforts continue to stumble</a>, both forces are sufficiently armed to sustain a protracted conflict. It’s unlikely either can topple the other.</p>
<p>Sudan is awash with firearms. The country <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/global-firearms-holdings">ranks second</a> among its regional neighbours in total firearms estimates, with combined holdings among civilians and security forces topping out at over three million. First on the list of regional states’ estimated firearms holdings is Sudan’s <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2287966/amp">edgy northern neighbour, Egypt</a>.</p>
<p>A vast majority of these firearms are in the hands of civilians. This underscores the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">significant risk of increased violence within Sudan</a> as the conflict goes on. </p>
<p>I’m the research coordinator of a <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources?combine=hsba&type=All&theme=All&region=All&language=All">project on Sudan and South Sudan</a> at the <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/who_we_are">Small Arms Survey</a>, which provides expertise on small arms and armed violence. The project’s empirical research provides insights into how weapons are sourced and the actors who use them.</p>
<p>In my view, the two Sudanese forces employ strikingly contrasting fighting methods. The army’s superiority is its air force and heavy arsenal on the ground. The paramilitary force is reliant on nimble mobile units equipped with primarily <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-HB-06-Weapons-ID-ch1.pdf">small and light weapons</a>. While battlefield seizures and a loss of weapons stores have affected both groups, it’s unlikely that either will suffer a debilitating shortage of supplies. </p>
<h2>Sudanese Armed Forces</h2>
<p>The Sudanese army has in excess of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-complex-alliances-shaping-sudans-conflict/a-65515892">120,000 troops</a> countrywide – with several thousand more in reserve. Its recruits are primarily from the country’s peripheries, while its leadership is comprised largely of elites from the central Nile region.</p>
<p>The army’s capability is bolstered by its air force and supported by battle tanks and other armoured infantry vehicles.</p>
<p>In the past weeks, the Sudanese Armed Forces have <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article273024/">reportedly seized several bases held by the Rapid Support Forces</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-entire-history-has-been-dominated-by-soldiers-and-the-violence-and-corruption-they-bring-204928">Sudan's entire history has been dominated by soldiers and the violence and corruption they bring</a>
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<p>However, the paramilitary force has also overrun some of the army’s weapons stores and military equipment manufacturing facilities. Its troops have also seized army equipment on the battlefield. </p>
<h2>Rapid Support Forces</h2>
<p>The Rapid Support Forces have <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR508-Darfur-after-Bashir.pdf#page=6">more than 75,000 combatants</a>, most of whom hail from the Darfur region in the country’s far west. The force is buttressed by additional recruits in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/17/world/africa/paramilitary-rsf-explainer.html">Sudan’s north and east</a>. </p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/darfur-after-bashir-implications-sudans-transition-and-region">militia groups aligned with the paramilitary force’s commander</a>, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, could mobilise if conflict intensifies in Sudan’s peripheries, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/27/shifting-alliances-in-sudans-darfur-as-new-civil-war-fears-rise">particularly in Darfur</a>. Here, hundreds of people have been killed in past weeks, mainly from small arms gunfire. </p>
<p>Rapid Support Forces fighters in Khartoum – which has seen the most sustained and concentrated fighting – are relying on small arms and heavy machine guns to control the airport and government buildings, and to hold positions wedged between residential apartment blocks. </p>
<p>While neither side is accustomed to fighting within urban centres, such a setting favours the Rapid Support Forces’s more agile “rapid” ground forces. In the absence of a ceasefire, the paramilitary forces will likely remain entrenched in the city because of the physical protection that it provides, and avoid risking a Sudanese Armed Forces air attack in open terrain. </p>
<p>Still, the Rapid Support Forces’ use of infantry vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in densely populated residential areas of Khartoum has drawn <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/04/sudan-explosive-weapons-harming-civilians">aerial fire</a>. This has killed paramilitary combatants and civilians alike.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">Sudan created a paramilitary force to destroy government threats – but it became a major threat itself</a>
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<p>The Rapid Support Forces have played a significant role in the proliferation of arms in Darfur. They have facilitated supply – financed in part by <a href="https://c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/BreakingtheBank-Report.pdf#page=24">Dagalo’s wealth</a> – and stoked demand among a population subjected to the region’s chronic insecurity. </p>
<p>These dynamics stretch back decades to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/20-years-since-war-began-in-sudans-darfur-suffering-continues">Darfur’s genocidal past</a> spearheaded by the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/14/man-who-terrorized-darfur-is-leading-sudans-supposed-transition-hemeti-rsf-janjaweed-bashir-khartoum/">Janjaweed</a>. It’s from here that Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a>, and the Rapid Support Forces emerged. </p>
<p>These paramilitary fighters have an abundance of AK-pattern rifles and more sophisticated high-calibre weapons. Since former <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47892742">President Omar Bashir’s ouster</a> in 2019 and Hemedti’s rise as deputy leader of Sudan’s government, he’s been relatively unencumbered in procuring weapons and equipment for his force. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/how-the-rsf-got-their-4x4-technicals-the-open-source-intelligence-techniques-behind-our-sudan-expos%C3%A9/">2019 investigation</a> revealed that more than 1,000 vehicles – most of them Toyota Hilux pick-ups – were purchased from dealers in the United Arab Emirates, and later equipped with mounted weapons. The funds to purchase the vehicles were likely sourced from <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/55662/sudan-the-central-role-of-the-gold-trade-in-its-politics/">Hemedti’s vast gold mining operations</a> in Sudan. </p>
<p>Rapid Support Forces fighters <a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1653719117206106113?s=20">recently paraded</a> a handful of man-portable air defence systems, or manpads, on the steps of the presidential palace in Khartoum. Jubilant fighters also waved various small arms, including G3A4 rifles that may be of <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/03/19/who-is-arming-the-yemen-war-an-update/">Saudi origin</a>. </p>
<p>The manpads could target Sudanese army aircraft and are a serious threat to civil aviation. It’s unclear how or when the paramilitary unit acquired them, but the Sudanese army is known to have them stockpiled. Recent reporting alleges that the Wagner Group – a Russian paramilitary force with <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-questions-about-wagner-group-involvement-as-another-african-country-falls-prey-to-russian-mercenaries-204299">close ties to Hemedti</a> and with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html">mutual gold mining interests</a> – offered to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-wagner-offered-arms-to-sudanese-general-battling-army-c71f65f3">supply the Rapid Support Forces</a> with arms, including manpads. </p>
<h2>What this means for the future</h2>
<p>Over the past month, the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces have demonstrated flagrant disregard for the safety of the Sudanese people in the capital and the peripheries. In light of this, it’s difficult to envision a pathway to silencing the guns in Sudan without meaningful participation from civil society and the involvement of civilian political leadership. </p>
<p>For the moment, the most critical need is to establish a lasting ceasefire for emergency assistance to reach the people who <a href="https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/emergency-response-sudan">desperately need it</a>. Only then can attention be given to securing weapons stockpiles, reducing illicit weapons and misuse, and moving beyond Sudan’s fractured power politics. </p>
<p><em>Alsanosi Adam, a researcher with the <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources?combine=hsba&type=All&theme=All&region=All&language=All">Human Security Baseline Assessment project</a> at the Small Arms Survey, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Khristopher Carlson is affiliated with the Small Arms Survey, which is an internationally-funded associated programme of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. The Small Arms Survey's HSBA project on Sudan and South Sudan is funded with a grant from the US Department of State. This article does not necessarily reflect the views of either the Small Arms Survey or its donors.</span></em></p>The Sudan army’s superiority is in its air force and arsenal of ground forces while the rival paramilitary force relies on nimble mobile units.Khristopher Carlson, Senior Researcher and Coordinator of the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment project on Sudan and South Sudan, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049312023-05-04T13:28:43Z2023-05-04T13:28:43ZSudan: the longer the conflict lasts, the higher the risk of a regional war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524404/original/file-20230504-15-id7xs6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi security officers stand guard off the seaport of Port Sudan in April 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fayez Nureldine/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2019 Sudan uprisings that ousted long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir and installed a military-civilian transitional government gave hope that the northern African country could finally <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/232/29/PDF/N2123229.pdf?OpenElement">transition</a> to democratic rule. The country has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-can-avoid-past-mistakes-by-drawing-lessons-from-its-history-115470">ruled</a> by the military for most of its independence since 1956. </p>
<p>But Sudan’s bumpy transition to democracy has come to a complete halt. The country now faces the worst conflict in its history as a full-blown civil war – with external entanglements – looms.</p>
<p>The Sudanese armed forces and a paramilitary force known as the Rapid Support Forces have declared war against each other, bringing the country to its knees. The main protagonists are two generals: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who leads the armed forces, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo</a> (known as Hemedti) of the Rapid Support Forces.</p>
<p>The hostilities have been most intense in the capital city, Khartoum. But violence has broken out in other provinces and is threatening to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/battle-sudans-capital-risks-awakening-war-darfur-2023-04-25/">revive</a> long-simmering violence in Darfur. </p>
<p>There is also a risk that the conflict could spill over to neighbouring countries and escalate into a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09654.4">regional conflict</a>. Geographically, Sudan borders seven countries: Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya. Politically and culturally, it straddles the Middle East, north Africa and the Horn of Africa. </p>
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<p>Regional powers and neighbours have lined up behind either of the two generals – or in some cases both. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been backing al-Burhan. For their part, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and General Khalifa Haftar of Libya have supported the Rapid Support Forces. But many other actors remain undecided. </p>
<p>There is a real possibility that regional and international actors will be arming different sides as they pursue their own, often competing interests. This could bring unprecedented shifts in the region’s already uneasy regional equilibrium, and test pre-existing alliances. </p>
<p>Regional and international actors are key in enabling – or preventing – the development of the crisis into a protracted civil war with regional dimensions. The best chance of halting Sudan’s slide into civil war lies in a united front of Western and regional powers, with Sudanese civil society groups putting pressure on the warring generals for a permanent ceasefire. And a return to a civilian-led transition. </p>
<p>But as time goes by, many despair that Sudan will soon reach the point of no return.</p>
<h2>Fretful neighbours</h2>
<p><strong>Egypt:</strong> Egypt had a long history of meddling in Sudan’s affairs. This has included supporting various military governments, as well as containing the Islamist resurgence in the 1990s. In 2019, when al-Bashir was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudans-military-ousts-president-omar-al-bashir-following-protests/a-48282243">deposed</a>, Egypt supported al-Burhan in the transition. It didn’t want a military regime – and its ally – being replaced by a civilian democratic government. It feared that this would inspire Egyptians to do the same. </p>
<p>Since the outbreak of the recent conflict, Egypt has adopted a cautious approach by working to <a href="https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2023/05/03/egypt-seeks-to-consolidate-ceasefire-in-sudan-to-pave-way-for-peaceful-dialogue-al-sisi/">mediate</a> a permanent ceasefire.</p>
<p>This is because the war brings risks. It is already having to manage a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/29/sudanese-flee-to-egypt-as-cairo-works-to-avoid-refugee-crisis">refugee crisis</a> as tens of thousands of Sudanese attempt to get away from the conflict. </p>
<p>In addition, an escalation of the conflict could potentially bring instability to Egypt’s southern borders. This could open up routes for arms smuggling and illegal trade. </p>
<p>Also, Egypt may be goaded to get involved militarily if the fighting continues.</p>
<p>But, Egypt’s greatest fear must be that it will lose its main ally in the ongoing disagreement with Ethiopia over the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), situated on the Blue Nile river near Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. The conflict will complicate the management of the dam, as both generals may have <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2293531/world">different views</a> on the issue. A prolonged conflict in Sudan could have long consequences for Egypt’s food and water security.</p>
<p><strong>Ethiopia:</strong> Relations with Sudan have been strained in recent years due to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/04/coordinating-international-responses-ethiopia-sudan-tensions/03-untangling-ethiopia-and">border disputes</a> over land claims and disagreements over <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">the GERD</a>. A protracted conflict in Sudan could have an effect on border disputes. These disputes are connected to tensions over the contested fertile farmland of Al Fashaga and apparent Sudanese support for Tigrayan opponents against the Ethiopian federal government. </p>
<p>The crisis in Sudan may affect the equilibrium on these border issues.</p>
<p>On Sudan’s western frontiers, Libya, Chad and CAR risk <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/what-does-fighting-in-darfur-mean-for-sudans-western-frontier">spill overs</a> from violence and tensions in the Darfur region. Hemedti is a tribal leader from the Mahariya clan of Darfur’s Rizeigat tribe. He has been a main partner to Haftar of Libya in trading drugs, arms and refugees across borders between Sudan, Libya and Chad. </p>
<p>With tensions rising in Darfur, forces could be split: some will side with Hemedti’s forces. Others will seek to undermine them. </p>
<h2>External powers</h2>
<p>In civil wars in the Middle East and Africa, such as in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, international actors have intervened by replenishing their allies with weapons, sponsoring diplomacy involving the warring groups, and sometimes taking matters into their own hands by launching military interventions. </p>
<p>Clashes in Sudan could very well turn the region into a playground for external powers to extend their influence. </p>
<p>Under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12777">US influence waned</a> across Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, America’s competitors took steps to carve out a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa and the critical maritime route of the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Russia, for example, is reportedly negotiating <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7824-port-sudan-caught-in-the-international-race-to-control-the-red-sea-region">military and economic deals</a>, allowing it to use Sudan’s ports on the main trading routes to Europe. There have also been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746">accusations</a> that Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-questions-about-wagner-group-involvement-as-another-african-country-falls-prey-to-russian-mercenaries-204299">Wagner Group</a> is involved in illicit gold mining in Sudan. </p>
<p>For its part <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/whats-stake-china-in-sudan">China</a>, Sudan’s <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/SUD">second-largest trading partner</a> (after Saudi Arabia), has invested heavily in infrastructure and oil extraction, giving it an important stake in the conflict. </p>
<p>Wealthy oil producers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have an interest in establishing regional dominance. The UAE, aspiring to control maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, has taken serious interest in <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2215641/business-economy">ports in Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>For its part, Saudi Arabia has been keen to prevent Iran from establishing a foothold in Sudan. As a result, it has <a href="https://pomeps.org/the-great-game-of-the-uae-and-saudi-arabia-in-sudan">poured money</a> into supporting Sudan’s military. </p>
<p>Both interfered to shape the 2019 transition in Sudan to ensure a friendly regime would end up in power. And both invested in a range of economic and military enterprises. </p>
<p>But they haven’t been supporting the same general: Saudi Arabia has supported al-Burhan while the UAE has been an ardent supporter of Hemedti.</p>
<p>The longer the conflict continues, the greater the odds for a longer, bloody war with regional and international entanglements. This will make it more difficult to contain the conflict or find a resolution that satisfies all parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>May Darwich is the principal investigator of a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York for the project: Port Infrastructure, International Politics, Everyday Life: From the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Africa, <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a>. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. </span></em></p>There is a risk that Sudan’s conflict could spill over into neighbouring countries.May Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049282023-05-03T15:48:55Z2023-05-03T15:48:55ZSudan’s entire history has been dominated by soldiers and the violence and corruption they bring<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Briefing-Central-Reserve-Police.pdf">Central Reserve Police</a> (CRP) recently announced it would be deploying officers to the streets of Khartoum to <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article273488/">“secure public and private property”</a>. That may sound puzzling in the context of the current violence: what are the police doing in the middle of this?</p>
<p>The answer is simple. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-sanctions-sudans-central-reserve-police-over-crackdown-protesters-2022-03-21/">The CRP are not “police” in any civilian sense</a> – they are one of several paramilitary groups in Sudan, and they are intervening on the side of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).</p>
<p>This helps explain <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-has-its-roots-in-three-decades-of-elites-fighting-over-oil-and-energy-204389">recent events in Sudan</a>, where history has entangled military force and state power, and has produced multiple armed groups which are now vying for control of the state.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-conflict-has-its-roots-in-three-decades-of-elites-fighting-over-oil-and-energy-204389">Sudan's conflict has its roots in three decades of elites fighting over oil and energy</a>
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<p>That history began with the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1570579">Turco-Egyptian conquest</a> by the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, in 1820. By consolidating territory over several decades, this created what became Sudan: a colony built by armed force.</p>
<p>At the end of the 19th century, it <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/sudoverview3.htm">came under effective British control</a>. While colonial states always tended to be violent, Sudan was particularly fierce in imposing central control on a large and diverse population. The state was always uniformed and armed.</p>
<p>And when Sudan – then the largest territory in Africa – became <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/sudoverview4.htm">independent in 1956</a>, the new country inherited that militarised and centralised nature. Soldiers have always seen themselves as the proper guarantors of its sovereignty. They played a central role in the attempts to impose central authority which <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531055.2014.949599">led to protracted civil war</a>, beginning in the south in the 1960s and spreading to the west and east from the 1980s.</p>
<h2>Mostly ruled by soldiers</h2>
<p>Sudan has been mostly ruled by soldiers since 1956: in 1958, 1969 and 1989, <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/26044/sudan-coup-timeline/">military coups</a> overthrew shortlived civilian governments. When popular unrest threatened military rulers – <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2014/10/50-years-on-remembering-sudans-october-revolution-by-willow-berridge/">as happened in 1964, 1985</a> and 2019 – their regimes were toppled only because some of the soldiers changed sides and turned on the incumbents. Every time, soldiers continued to wield much power. Even in revolution, Sudan has never tamed its army.</p>
<p>That process looks cyclical: soldiers kept defying the authority of civilian politicians. But there was a long-term trend of change. Soldiers who seized power by force learned from experience. The greatest threat to them lay among their own rank and file, who might turn against them. So, particularly under the long rule of Omar el-Bashir, who <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/a-timeline-of-key-events-in-rule-of-sudan-s-al-bashir/4871412.html">seized power in 1989</a>, they fostered the emergence of alternative armed forces. </p>
<p>Alongside the SAF, new paramilitaries were created <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-security-forces-in-sudan-for-serious-human-rights-abuses/">like the CRP</a>. The long-running wars with rebels encouraged that process – Sudan’s rulers recruited militia who would <a href="https://csf-sudan.org/library/remote-control-breakdown-sudanese-paramilitary-forces-and-pro-government-militias/">fight insurgents on the cheap</a>, but who could also support them against insubordinate soldiers. Those militias came from the peripheries of Sudan – in some ways, they had much in common with the rebel armed groups against whom they fought, some of whom occasionally switched sides.</p>
<p>Even after the <a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/right-nationality-and-secession-south-sudan-commentary-impact-new-laws">secession of South Sudan in 2011</a>, Sudan had multiple armed forces. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the SAF’s main antagonist in the current violence – grew out of a local militia in Darfur to become the largest, most dangerous product of that process. </p>
<p>All these armed groups shared the belief that control of the state was rightfully theirs, and the ultimate prize. It was not simply that the state paid, armed and fed soldiers – though that was always important, and especially so when a brief <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2020/073/article-A003-en.xml">boom from oil revenues</a> swelled state resources in the first decade of the 21st century.</p>
<h2>Money talks – so do guns</h2>
<p>Control of the state allowed soldiers to establish themselves as entrepreneurs – in anything from <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/exposing-rsfs-secret-financial-network/">manufacturing and banking to gold mining </a>– and to reward their friends and supporters. Much of Sudan’s economy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/29/sudan-economy-dominated-by-military-interests-report">came under the control of soldiers</a> not as a single, coherent group, but as actual or potential rivals, each anxiously watching the others.</p>
<p>In the end, this increasingly messy and splintered array of armed groups could not save Bashir. When popular anger against his rule seemed unstoppable in 2019, both the SAF and RSF turned against him and Bashir was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-bashirs-fall-is-only-the-start-of-a-new-sudan-115389">pushed out of office</a>. The effective leaders of the SAF and RSF, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo</a> (aka Hemedti) established themselves as the faces of military power. </p>
<p>But by that time, there were too many armed groups for any stable transition to be agreed. The SAF and RSF <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/critical-window-bolster-sudans-next-government">circled around each other for months</a>, each hoping the move to civilian rule could be manipulated to preserve their own position while disadvantaging the other. The two briefly cooperated in removing the civilian parts of the transitional government <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/sudans-coup-one-year-later">in the coup of October 2021</a>, but their rivalry only grew more intense. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">Sudan: violence between army and militia is a symptom of an old disease that is destroying Africa</a>
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<p>Across Sudan, armed militias and rebel groups (some large, some not) staked their claims to inclusion in a new government, and threatened violence if they were denied. The SAF and RSF both treated these local pretenders <a href="https://timep.org/2023/03/07/a-plague-o-both-your-houses-the-false-dilemma-of-sudans-elites/">as potential allies in their rivalry</a>. In the end, it was (ironically) pressure to agree the terms of a new transition to civilian rule that finally precipitated open conflict between the SAF and RSF. Both knew that civilian rule was a threat, and each tried to deflect its impact on to the other.</p>
<p>That history – which has left soldiers at the centre of power while dividing them into opposing factions – explains why the current violence is so messy and intractable. There are multiple actors beyond the SAF and RSF, from paramilitary police in Khartoum to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/01/fighting-devastates-sudans-west-darfur">rival militias in Darfur</a>. For the leaders of these armed factions, control of the state is an existential matter: they need it to keep their followers loyal. </p>
<p>Yet the resources of the state are not sufficient to support them all – and any civilian government would want to turn those resources to other uses. So, even if Sudan’s untamed soldiers could be reconciled, it is hard to see how they would be brought under civilian control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Willis has in the past received funding for research from the UK Research Councils and the UK government</span></em></p>Sudan was formed by conquest, and its politics and, increasingly, its wealth have been controlled by the military ever since.Justin Willis, Professor of History, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043912023-04-25T13:10:57Z2023-04-25T13:10:57ZOmar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522631/original/file-20230424-1289-n7envf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese in Khartoum protest the 2021 military coup that blocked a transition to civilian rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1956 the Sudanese have lived through <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/26044/sudan-coup-timeline/">35 coups, attempted coups and coup plots</a> – more than any other African country. When the 2019 uprising against long-time dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">Omar al-Bashir</a> created a military-civilian transitional government, the Sudanese hoped that their country would <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-can-avoid-past-mistakes-by-drawing-lessons-from-its-history-115470">transition to democratic rule</a>. </p>
<p>But their hopes were dashed in October 2021 when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">led a coup</a> against his civilian counterparts in the transitional government. </p>
<p>In the latest round of conflict that began on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">15 April 2023</a>, civil war looms as the security actors who benefited from Bashir’s downfall battle for supremacy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.ncl.ac.uk/hca/people/profile/willowberridge.html">studied Sudanese politics</a> for 15 years, and this latest round of conflict is the worst in the country’s recent history. And the legacy of Bashir’s rule is central to this calamity.</p>
<p>Bashir <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2021.1882385">bent government institutions</a> to serve his regime. He chose conflict over compromise in dealing with politically marginalised groups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/20-years-since-war-began-in-sudans-darfur-suffering-continues">Darfur</a>, in Sudan’s west, and in the south. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">used force</a> to hold on to power. This fuelled <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Bashir-repression-in-Sudan/4552902-5158960-eifsgw/index.html">his support</a> of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was used to check regional rebels and the army. </p>
<p>Bashir’s legacy has continued to play out today. His former allies have mobilised to block the transition to civilian rule. This had been promised to the Sudanese people under a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/return-civilian-rule-sudan#:%7E:text=The%20Sudanese%20military%20and%20a,in%20an%20October%202021%20coup.">framework agreement</a> signed in December 2022 by the military and a coalition of civilian actors.</p>
<p>In my view, Burhan’s fear of civilian attempts to rein in military privileges led him to preserve key elements of the Bashir system. This is playing a divisive role in the current conflict.</p>
<h2>The ideology of Islamism</h2>
<p>Part of Bashir’s legacy has to do with Islamist politics. It’s this legacy that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a> and who heads the paramilitary force, sought to exploit to his favour when he labelled Burhan a “<a href="https://twitter.com/GeneralDagllo/status/1647887773011959809">radical Islamist</a>”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1647887773011959809"}"></div></p>
<p>This characterisation was designed to <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-turmoil-why-hemeti-taking-aim-radical-islamists">appeal to Western powers</a>. But it’s inaccurate. To understand why, one has to understand the ideological trajectory of the Bashir regime.</p>
<p>When Bashir staged the coup in 1989, he was acting as a representative of a cell in a military carefully cultivated by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-National-Front">National Islamic Front</a>. The political party co-ordinated the coup with Bashir. </p>
<p>The National Islamic Front was led by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">Hasan al-Turabi</a>, who had run Sudan’s Islamic Movement since the 1960s. He had grown frustrated at his failure to introduce his version of Muslim law (Sharia), through parliamentary means. </p>
<p>Soon after the coup, Bashir and Turabi initiated a process of <em>tamkeen</em> (empowerment). This policy, the legacy of which still remains, enabled them to give <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7062-sudans-popular-uprising-and-the-demise-of-islamism">adherents of Islamism</a> and security bosses willing to ally with them control over almost every part of public life in Sudan.</p>
<p>Formally, Bashir installed an independent, technocratic government. In practice, however, power lay with a military-Islamist coalition that ran the country behind the scenes. </p>
<p>Throughout the 1990s, Bashir set about ruthlessly purging Sudan’s independent civil society organisations and political parties. By the end of the decade, he’d fallen out with Turabi. </p>
<p>He ejected Turabi from the government in 1999 and co-opted selected representatives of the opposition into his regime in the decades that followed. Bashir maintained the military-Islamist coalition as the basis of his National Congress Party. This kept the edifice built through tamkeen in place.</p>
<h2>Making amends</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, the Sudanese government hosted <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">radical Islamists</a> who sought to export revolution abroad and topple neighbouring regimes deemed to be Western proxies. However, after the split with Turabi in 1999, the Bashir regime attempted to <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-sudans-genocidal-regime-a-cia-favorite">repair its international image</a> by distancing itself from such militant groups. It also began to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>In the later Bashir period, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-sudan-idUSKCN0SC0E120151018">Sudanese government supported</a> the Saudi-Emirati coalition against the militant Islamist Houthis in Yemen. <a href="https://www.sudanakhbar.com/488615">Burhan oversaw this deployment</a>. </p>
<p>When he emerged as the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190413-veteran-soldier-burhan-becomes-sudans-new-ruler">transitional military leader</a> in 2019, Burhan benefited from the perception that he was a professional soldier more than an Islamist. </p>
<p>His principal interests are aligned with the military’s core interests: maintaining its privileged social and political status, as well as its numerous business enterprises. Burhan made the <a href="https://3ayin.com/en/ncp-returns/">political calculation</a> in 2021 that National Congress Party-era security bosses and bureaucrats were his best allies in the battle to both prevent civilians challenging the military’s grip on the economy, and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces emerging as an alternative power centre. After taking over power, he co-opted these former security bosses into government.</p>
<p>The Islamism of the Bashir-era stooges Burhan has been returning to government is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sudans-unfinished-democracy/">defined by</a> three elements. These are socially conservative authoritarian politics, including the <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/outrage-in-sudan-as-new-force-reminiscent-of-public-order-police-is-installed">return of morality policing</a>; a hostility to the Sudanese left; and corruption.</p>
<p>While these leaders are mostly not the “radical Islamists” the West fears, for many Sudanese, their ongoing commitment to a narrowly defined Arab-Islamic identity is divisive.</p>
<h2>A difficult dismantling</h2>
<p>After he seized power in 1989, Bashir insisted that his coup was a conventional military movement designed to return order to public life. Bashir, who has been in jail since April 2019, still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">maintains</a> that line. The military that overthrew him has been reading the same script.</p>
<p>Four months after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">the military</a> had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/20/sudans-military-removes-al-bashir-all-the-latest-updates#:%7E:text=Sudan's%20President%20Omar%20al,a%20maximum%20of%20two%20years.">removed Bashir</a>, it signed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/4/what-does-sudans-constitutional-declaration-say">constitutional declaration</a> with the main civilian coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change.</p>
<p>This led to the formation of a joint military-civilian transitional government. The government established an Empowerment Removal Committee to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-anti-corruption-team-continues-purging-remnants-of-old-regime">dismantle the network</a> of parastatal charities, media enterprises and banks that had enabled Bashir and his allies to maintain their grip on Sudan. </p>
<p>But Burhan’s October 2021 coup disrupted this. The committee was pushed aside and most of its prominent members <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/lawyers-question-legal-grounds-of-erc-arrests">arrested</a>.</p>
<p>But even before this coup, dismantling Bashir’s regime was an enormous challenge. </p>
<p>The media is a case in point. In the Bashir period, the media was controlled by nominally independent proprietors. In practice, they were National Congress Party cronies, thriving off the party’s domination of the Sudanese economy. </p>
<p>The notorious al-Intibaha newspaper, for instance, is known for its hostile rhetoric towards the South Sudanese. It continued to act as a platform for Bashir’s warmongering uncle, al-Tayyib Mustafa, even after Mustafa was <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2315281/bashir%E2%80%99s-uncle-arrested-over-threat-violence-topple-transitional-govt">arrested</a> for posing a threat to the transitional government.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.sudaress.com/kushnews/286365">Mustafa’s death in 2021</a>, the paper retained his style. A <a href="https://alintibaha.net/online/162998/">piece</a> published shortly before the April 2023 outbreak of conflict characterised the civilians in the 2019-2021 transitional government as dual nationals serving foreign interests. It attacked efforts to curtail the security services’ powers.</p>
<p>Bashir may have fallen in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of his regime’s infrastructure. The remnants of this continue to undermine democratic transition in Sudan, with ultimately disastrous consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>My research on Islamist politics in Sudan (for my book on Hasan al-Turabi) was funded by a British academy small grant. I have also recently been a fellow at the World Peace Foundation (2020-2022).</span></em></p>Omar al-Bashir fell in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of the authoritarian infrastructure of his regime.Willow Berridge, Lecturer in History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2023112023-04-24T16:07:41Z2023-04-24T16:07:41ZGenocide resisters, long overlooked by history, step into the spotlight<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522625/original/file-20230424-26-lc5hws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C7%2C5187%2C3176&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A minaret from which Turks fired upon Christians in 1909 in Adana stands amid the town's ruins.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2014696599">Bain News Service via Library of Congress</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The anniversary of the <a href="https://www.armenian-genocide.org/">Armenian Genocide</a> is marked every year on April 24. That was the date in 1915 when hundreds of Armenian community leaders were arrested by the government of the Ottoman Empire in the capital Constantinople, now known as Istanbul.</p>
<p>At the time, Armenians lived throughout what is modern-day Turkey. <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674251434">Modern scholars estimate</a> up to <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/armenian-genocide-9780857719300/">1.5 million Armenians were killed</a> by the Turkish government, and around 800,000 to 1.2 million were deported during World War I. Most ended up in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, Europe and the Americas. <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691147307/they-can-live-in-the-desert-but-nowhere-else">During that period</a>, Greek, Assyrian and Yezidi communities were also massacred and forced to flee into exile.</p>
<p>April is also <a href="https://sfi.usc.edu/genocide-awareness-month">Genocide Awareness Month</a>. Holocaust Remembrance Day takes place this month every year, as do commemorations for genocides in Cambodia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur.</p>
<p>For much of the 20th century, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-04-24/hundreds-protest-outside-turkish-consulate-in-beverly-hills-on-107th-anniversary-of-armenian-genocide">commemorations of mass killings and genocide</a> have focused on remembering the dead as victims and condemning the perpetrators. </p>
<p>But recent research has taken a broader view, recognizing that mass violence takes place because of many complex factors. Besides political, economic and cultural currents, the resistance and resilience of the people who were targeted are coming to the fore of scholarly work and public understanding.</p>
<h2>1909 before 1915</h2>
<p>The 1915 Armenian Genocide was not the first attack on Armenians in what is now Turkey. In the 1890s, hundreds of thousands of Armenians were targeted by the government of the Ottoman Empire in what came to be called the <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1812&context=gsp">Hamidian Massacres</a>, as they took place during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.</p>
<p>And in 1909 – again, in April – there was a separate such episode. Those massacres took place in the region historically known as Cilicia, on the Mediterranean coast of southeastern Turkey today. In two waves of violence at the end of April 1909, more than 20,000 Armenians and other Christians were killed by Turks connected with the government. The violence happened in and around the city of Adana and extended into neighboring areas. Muslim populations suffered as well, with an estimated 2,000 killed in retaliation for the massacres.</p>
<p>Some present the Hamidian and Adana massacres as dress rehearsals for the Ottoman Turkish government’s plan, decades in the making, to implement the all-out elimination of the Armenians in 1915, dispossessing them of their millennia-old historical homeland. Among Armenians, this is the prevalent nationalist reading of Armenian history. </p>
<h2>Survivors on their own terms</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A portrait of a woman in a dress" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Author Zabel Yessayan helped lead relief efforts after the 1909 massacres.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zabelle_Yesayan.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Recent scholarship has taken a closer look at the details of these massacres. In particular, scholars are beginning to highlight the fact that, despite facing mass violence, Armenians and others organized resistance activities and put together relief work in the aftermath of killings. Sometimes resistance was armed, and sometimes it consisted of putting together protest campaigns or publishing newspaper articles and books in the Ottoman Empire and beyond.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26239">The Horrors of Adana</a>” by Bedross Der Matossian is the first in-depth work on the Adana Massacres. Der Matossian writes about the actions of a prominent literary figure, Zabel Yessayan, who was among the leaders of relief efforts following the 1909 massacres, bringing in food, clothing and other necessities for the survivors. Yessayan also wrote “<a href="https://aiwa.wildapricot.org/Sys/Store/Products/266950">In The Ruins</a>,” published in 1911, specifically to document the aftermath of the killings and to support humanitarian aid, media outreach and legal efforts.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://msupress.org/9781611863949/the-resistance-network/">The Resistance Network</a>” by Khatchig Mouradian documents the work of Armenian community leaders such as <a href="https://armenianweekly.com/2023/04/19/ahari-hosts-dr-khatchig-mouradian-a-story-of-resistance-and-revival/">Rev. Aharon Shirajian</a> to support the survivors of death marches and deportations. Shirajian himself cared for a number of orphaned genocide survivors in Syria.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed fighters stand together for a portrait." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Armenian freedom fighters at Musa Dagh in 1915.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Musadagh.jpg">The New Armenia Publishing Company via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>These stories are not only powerful on their own but can also have lasting effects in the global effort to end genocide. Fiction can play a role, too. “<a href="https://worldcat.org/title/607574173">The Forty Days of Musa Dagh</a>” by Franz Werfel is a gripping novel that recounts the armed defense by a group of Armenians in one corner of the Ottoman Empire in 1915. </p>
<p>The book, which was published in 1933, the year Hitler took power, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-armenias-1915-musa-dagh-fighters-inspired-jews-to-resist-nazi-genocide/">served as an inspiration</a> for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/defying-the-holocaust-didnt-just-mean-uprising-and-revolt-remembering-jews-everyday-resistance-on-yom-hashoah-and-year-round-198722">anti-Nazi resistance</a> in the Jewish ghettos of Warsaw, Bialystok, Vilnius and elsewhere in the 1940s.</p>
<p>Jewish resistance to the Nazi genocide is another topic being given due attention by historians. The forthcoming “<a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300267198/resisters/">Resisters</a>” by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/wolf-gruner-829895">Wolf Gruner</a> is a work along these lines, focusing on the actions of five Jewish individuals during the Holocaust.</p>
<p>These efforts are beginning to shift how scholars and the public understand genocide. Those horrific actions were not carried out against passive victims, but rather were aggressions which, in many cases, faced intense and organized resistance. The perpetrators killed many but did not destroy the spirit of their victims. The survivors and their descendants have good reason to celebrate that spirit of resilience in the face of immense suffering.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am personally acquainted with two of the authors I mention in this piece. We are simply friends and colleagues. There is no financial relationship among us or any other relevant interest.</span></em></p>Recent studies on mass violence have turned the spotlight on the resilience of targeted individuals and communities.Nareg Seferian, Ph.D. Candidate, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039282023-04-18T05:12:41Z2023-04-18T05:12:41ZExplainer: why has fighting broken out again in Sudan and what does it mean for the region?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521448/original/file-20230418-14-pnl5jb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marwan Ali/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the last few days, a deadly conflict has erupted in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between rival factions of the armed forces, leaving at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/04/17/world/sudan-fighting-news">180 people dead</a> and at least 1,800 civilians and combatants injured. </p>
<p>The fighting, which broke out between the Sudan Armed Forces led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, saw fighter jets take to the skies over the capital and armed fighters take to the streets.</p>
<h2>Militia vs military</h2>
<p>The latest fighting comes as no surprise to many in Sudan, where a power struggle has been brewing for some time between the two generals, al-Burhan and Dagalo (also known as Hemedti). It has a historical tail of more than 20 years, right back to the early days of the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/understanding-darfur-conflict">Darfur conflict</a> and the rise of the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/08/camel-trader-next-ruler-sudan-meet-hemedti-brutal-militia-commander/">notorious Janjaweed militia</a>.</p>
<p>From that time, Hemedti, a leader of the Janjaweed militia group from the Abbala Rezeigat tribe in northern Darfur, came to prominence for his willingness to carry out raids on villages leading to mass killings, rapes and looting on a grand scale.</p>
<p>What he learned very early on was that strength came from doing things that no reasonable person would do. In contrast to the army, his fighters were “free range” - able to roam around and kill people at will.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Sudan conflict: Hemedti -- the warlord who built a paramilitary force more powerful than the state</a>
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<span class="caption">Fighting in the capital city also caused damage to aircraft on the runway at the Khartoum International Airport.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maxar Technologies handout/ EPA</span></span>
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<p>His work had another function, too. Because he was “free range” and out of a direct chain of command, it meant that he could do the government’s bidding, but do it with maximum deniability.</p>
<p>It was this ruthless mindset and operational flexibility that brought him into the favour of the then-president of Sudan, General Omar al-Bashir, who needed an informal paramilitary group to protect him from enemies within his party, the National Islamic Front. </p>
<p>This militia became the Rapid Support Forces, which is currently fighting Sudan’s military. It was given special status in 2017 as an “<a href="https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/571cdc5a-4b5b-417e-bd22-edb0e3050428">independent security force</a>”, not part of the regular armed forces.</p>
<p>It wasn’t just al-Bashir who benefited from this relationship, either. In return for his assistance, Hemedti was given free rein to access <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2016.1130378">gold mines in Darfur</a>, which has made him immensely rich. </p>
<p>Contrast this with al-Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces. A career general, he has been involved in the army since 1991, running multiple campaigns. He was in Darfur since the early days of the conflict coordinating a “counter-insurgency” campaign, but <a href="https://afsaap.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Anne-L-Bartlett-Dismantling-the-Deep-State-in-Sudan-pp-49-69.pdf">he is neither as entrepreneurial</a> as Hemedti, nor as cashed up.</p>
<p>Yet, as former president al-Bashir was running into trouble at the start of 2019, Hemedti was the one to stab his former patron in the back by supporting the other side. This has <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4276566/sudans-burhan-hemedti%E2%80%A6-violent-end-old-friendship">never been forgotten</a> by the Islamists of Sudan.</p>
<p>Al-Bashir was subsequently ousted in a coup, but the generals have never been comfortable bedfellows. While they have worked together, there have been clear cases where Hemedti has <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/mister-hemedti-goes-moscow">attempted to undermine</a> al-Burhan. </p>
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<h2>The region wants more business, less war</h2>
<p>All of these developments are taking place in what are increasingly choppy geopolitical waters for Sudan, where old alliances are rapidly changing.</p>
<p>While Hemedti managed to forge strong ties with Saudi Arabia and an alliance of countries in the Persian Gulf by sending soldiers to fight in the war in Yemen, there are now hopeful signs this eight-year-long conflict may be coming to an end. Fuelling this hope is <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2276011">a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a> recently brokered by the Chinese.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-sudans-coup-is-about-and-why-the-rest-of-the-world-needs-to-act-170774">Explainer: what Sudan's coup is about and why the rest of the world needs to act</a>
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<p>The United Arab Emirates, who hosted al-Burhan in February, has called for restraint in Sudan and for the two sides to work towards <a href="https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2023/2/15/15-02-2023-uae-sudan">a peaceful solution</a> to the current crisis.</p>
<p>Egypt, which has traditionally supported al-Burhan and the army, has also expressed its willingness to work for peace, calling for an immediate ceasefire before things spiral out of control.</p>
<p>Russia, which has been <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1604831">consolidating relations with Sudan</a> over recent years, has also called for restraint. Russia has provided arms to Sudan’s military.</p>
<p>For many of the countries in the region, the overall approach to Sudan can be summed up as more business, less war. The country’s Gulf neighbours are seeking to diversify their oil-based economies and are looking to Sudan for business opportunities. Conflict disrupts those opportunities.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521489/original/file-20230418-20-jwzs1z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Sudan’s neighbours called an emergency meeting in Cairo, Egypt, to call for restraint.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khaled Elfiqi/ EPA</span></span>
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<h2>As the generals fight for power, civilians struggle for food</h2>
<p>In Sudan itself, it is difficult to assess what the appetite is among the public for more fighting. Hemedti has declared himself to be the wronged party, and says he is <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudans-rsf-will-not-allow-the-killing-of-young-demonstrators-from-today-on">against civilian killings</a> and in favour of civilian rule.</p>
<p>Al-Burhan sees Hemedti as a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b75628bb-e042-4116-8ba8-f6593d8432b3">criminal and an upstart</a>.</p>
<p>Undoubtedly, both are aware that the longer the situation goes on, the more unsustainable their activities will become.</p>
<p>Yet, while the generals fight it out, the economy continues to decline and the cost of living soars. Since the coup, basic household goods such as bread are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/25/to-save-its-economy-sudan-needs-civilian-rule">ten times more expensive than before</a>, with other items increasing by up to 300%. </p>
<p>As one woman in the market in Khartoum <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-politicians-blame-bashir-loyalists-discord-2023-04-14/">pointed out</a> in a recent Reuters report, as they fight to loot the country, we fight for food.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne L. Bartlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sudan’s neighbours are urging restraint, favouring more business, less war. Both generals are aware the longer the situation goes on, the more unsustainable it will become.Anne L. Bartlett, Associate Professor, United Arab Emirates UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039492023-04-17T16:52:11Z2023-04-17T16:52:11ZSudan conflict: Hemedti – the warlord who built a paramilitary force more powerful than the state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521306/original/file-20230417-14-7dwu6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces commander, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti"
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Dozens have been killed in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/16/sudan-conflict-why-is-there-fighting-and-what-is-at-stake-in-the-region">armed clashes</a> in the Sudanese capital Khartoum following months of tension between the military and the powerful paramilitary group <a href="https://acleddata.com/2019/07/02/the-rapid-support-forces-and-the-escalation-of-violence-in-sudan/">Rapid Support Forces (RSF)</a>. Behind the tensions is a disagreement over the integration of the paramilitary group into the armed forces – a key condition of a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-sudan-khartoum-651a0be9bf731d32df41d493a191418e">transition agreement</a> that’s never been signed but has been adhered to by both sides since 2021. </p>
<p>General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, is the leader of the RSF. He is a key mover in the fast-escalating civil war, as he has been in other key moments in Sudan’s recent history. </p>
<p>Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces is led by Darfurian Arabs known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">Janjaweed</a>. The term refers to the armed groups of Arabs from Darfur and Kordofan in western Sudan. Drawn from the far west of the country’s periphery, they have – in a mere decade – become the dominant power in Khartoum. And Hemedti has become the face of Sudan’s violent, political marketplace.</p>
<p>I have been a scholar of Sudan for decades. During 2005-06, I was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-11 served as <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/alex-dewaal">senior adviser </a>to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, in the lead-up to the independence of South Sudan. My most recent <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/event/sudans-unfinished-democracy-w-justin-lynch-and-alex-de-waal/">book</a>, co-authored with Justin Lynch, examines Sudan’s unfinished democracy.</p>
<p>Hemedti’s career is an object lesson in political entrepreneurship by a specialist in violence. His conduct and (as of now) impunity are the surest indicator that politics of the mercenary kind that have long defined the Sudanese periphery, have been brought home to the capital city. </p>
<h2>Coming in from the periphery</h2>
<p>Hemedti is from Sudan’s furthest peripheries, an outsider to the Khartoum political establishment. His grandfather, Dagalo, was leader of a subclan that roamed across the pastures of Chad and Darfur. Young men from these camel-herding, landless and marginalised group became a core element of the Arab militia that led Khartoum’s counterinsurgency in Darfur from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan/Conflict-with-South-Sudan">2003</a>. </p>
<p>A school dropout turned trader, Hemedti has no formal education. The title ‘General’ was awarded on account of his proficiency as a commander in the Janjaweed brigade in Southern Darfur at the height of the 2003-05 war. A few years later, he <a href="http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf">joined a mutiny</a> against the government, negotiated an alliance with the Darfurian rebels, and threatened to storm the the government-held city of Nyala.</p>
<p>Soon Hemedti <a href="https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtxd8n">cut a deal</a> with the government. Khartoum would settle his troops’ unpaid salaries and compensation for the wounded and killed. He got promotion to general and a handsome cash payment. </p>
<p>After returning to the Khartoum payroll, Hemedti proved his loyalty. President Omar al-Bashir who <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Omar-Hassan-Ahmad-al-Bashir">ruled</a> Sudan from 1993 to April 2019 when he was deposed became fond of him, sometimes appearing to treat him like the son he had never had. </p>
<p>But, in the days after Bashir was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496">overthrown</a>, some of the young democracy protesters camped in the streets around the Ministry of Defence embraced him as the army’s new look.</p>
<h2>A country in his pocket</h2>
<p>Back in the fold, Hemedti ably used his commercial acumen and military prowess to build his militia into a force more powerful than the waning Sudanese state. </p>
<p>Al-Bashir constituted the Rapid Support Forces as a separate unit in 2013, initially to fight the rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains. The new force came off second best. But, with a fleet of new pickup trucks with heavy machine guns, <a href="https://stillsudan.blogspot.com/2015/05/himeidti-and-his-president-war-as.html">it soon became a force to be reckoned with</a>, fighting a key battle against Darfurian rebels in April 2015.</p>
<p>Following the March 2015 Saudi-Emirati military <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">intervention</a> in Yemen, Sudan cut a deal with Riyadh to deploy Sudanese troops in Yemen. One of the commanders of the operation was General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan who has chaired the Transitional Military Council since 2019. But <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/saudi-arabias-blood-pact-with-a-genocidal-strongman-houthis-bashir-sudan-yemen-uae/">most of the fighters were Hemedti’s RSF</a>. This brought hard cash direct into Hemedti’s pocket.</p>
<p>And in November 2017, Hemedti’s forces took control of the artisanal gold mines in Jebel Amer in Darfur — Sudan’s single <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-extractive-industries#:%7E:text=Gold%20is%20Sudan's%20most%20valuable,first%20nine%20months%20of%202021.">largest source of export revenues</a>. This followed the defeat and capture of his arch-rival Musa Hilal, who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKBN2B32OC">rebelled</a> against Al-Bashir. </p>
<p>Suddenly, Hemedti had his hands on the country’s two most lucrative sources of hard currency.</p>
<p>Hemedti is adopting a model of state mercenarism familiar to those who follow the politics of the Sahara. The late President Idriss Déby of Chad rented out his special forces for counter-insurgencies on the French or U.S. payroll in much the same manner. One can expect to see RSF troops deployed to Libya some day.</p>
<p>On the other hand, with the routine deployment of paramilitaries to do the actual fighting in Sudan’s wars at home and abroad, the Sudanese army has become akin to a vanity project. It is the proud owner of extravagant real estate in Khartoum, with impressive tanks, artillery and aircraft. But it has few battle-hardened infantry units. Other forces have stepped into this security arena, including the operational units of the National Intelligence and Security Services, and paramilitaries such as special police units — and the RSF. </p>
<h2>Reaping the whirlwind</h2>
<p>But there’s also a twist to the story. Every ruler in Sudan, with one notable exception, has hailed from the the heartlands of Khartoum and the neighboring towns on the Nile. The exception is the Khalifa Abdullahi “al-Ta’aishi” who was a Darfurian Arab. His armies provided the majority of the force that conquered Khartoum in 1885. The riverian elites remember the Khalifa’s rule (1885-98) as a tyranny. They are terrified it may return. </p>
<p>Hemedti is the face of that nightmare, the first non-establishment ruler in Sudan for 120 years. Despite the grievances against Hemedti’s paramilitaries, he is still recognised as a Darfurian and an outsider to the Sudanese establishment.</p>
<p>When the Sudanese regime sowed the wind of the Janjaweed in Darfur in 2003, they least expected to reap the whirlwind in their own capital city. In fact the seeds had been sown much earlier. Previous governments adopted the war strategy in southern Sudan and southern Kordofan of setting local people against one another. This was preferred to sending units of the regular army -— manned by the sons of the riverain establishment — into peril. </p>
<p>Hemedti is that whirlwind. But his ascendancy is also, indirectly, the revenge of the historically marginalised. The tragedy of the Sudanese marginalised is that the man who is posing as their champion is the ruthless leader of a band of vagabonds, who has been supremely skillful in playing the transnational military marketplace.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article was <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/07/01/general-mohamed-hamdan-dagolo-hemedti/">first published</a> by the World Peace Foundation.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex de Waal is affiliated with the World Peace Foundation.</span></em></p>Hemedti ably used his commercial acumen and military prowess to build his militia into a force more powerful than the waning Sudanese state.Alex De Waal, Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1991702023-02-27T13:23:30Z2023-02-27T13:23:30ZCan mass atrocities be prevented? This course attempts to answer the question<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512232/original/file-20230224-1648-wr1thv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2000%2C1245&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather around a hole being dug in search of water in Darfur, Sudan, in 2004.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SudanalBashirsFate/a74921ed1ca247fc8e76c82186cdcf35/photo">AP Photo/Ben Curtis</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em> </p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>“Introduction to Genocide Studies”</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>Many genocide classes take a historical view, spending a lot of time on the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/learn">Holocaust</a> or <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/cambodia/case-study/introduction/cambodia-1975">Cambodia’s Killing Fields</a>. As a <a href="https://humanrights.uconn.edu/person/mike-brand/">scholar-practitioner</a> in the field of atrocities prevention and human rights, I wanted something that would make clear to students that mass atrocities – genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing – are not just in the past, but are very much happening in the present. </p>
<p>By exploring recent and ongoing mass atrocities in places such as <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/syria">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ethiopia">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/south-sudan">South Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">Yemen</a>, students are able to better connect to the material once they realize that these issues have happened during their lifetimes, not decades or centuries ago. </p>
<p>Between exploring recent mass atrocities and focusing on U.S. foreign policy, I try to keep the course grounded in a way that makes some of these abstract concepts much more tangible.</p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>The course starts off by exploring <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/learn-about-genocide-and-other-mass-atrocities/definitions">the definitions of mass atrocities</a> and the associated crimes, how their definitions are similar and different from one another, and constraints within international law.</p>
<p>We review several case studies of mass atrocities. Students also learn about successes and failures of different intervention tactics, everything from peacekeeping to sanctions to military intervention. And we discuss efforts to seek justice, including international tribunals like the <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a>, national court systems and the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court">International Criminal Court</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd gathers around a pile of sacks containing food." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512094/original/file-20230223-4704-lhcx3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugees from the Rwanda genocide in 1994 get food at a refugee camp in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo, then known as Zaire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NetherlandsRwandaGenocideTrial/b7f052d2abfb4c2fadc02c6880d8ed5b/photo">AP Photo/Javier Bauluz</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We then explore the ethical principle called “responsibility to protect,” committed to in a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/2005-world-summit-outcome-a-60-l-1/">United Nations agreement in 2015</a>, including its first test with the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/sudan">genocide in Darfur, Sudan</a>. Individual governments are responsible for preventing their citizens from experiencing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. However, if a government is unable or unwilling to protect its people, then the international community must do so.</p>
<p>We also look at the modern-day global anti-genocide movement and efforts to prevent mass atrocities, including by sanctions – though <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1240516">there is little evidence to suggest</a> they work – and military intervention, which is quite rare.</p>
<p>Then we discuss U.S. foreign policy efforts, including <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1158/text">the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act</a> of 2018, which made it the policy of the United States to “regard the prevention of atrocities as in its national interest.” We also discuss the development of a
<a href="https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/">governmentwide strategy</a> to prevent and respond to mass atrocities around the world.</p>
<p>I’ve found that students appreciate learning about what the U.S. government is and is not doing to confront mass atrocities.</p>
<p>The course culminates with a group presentation and individual research into an ongoing mass atrocity situation. After they complete their projects, students often make comments like “I had no idea this was happening” or “I can’t believe I never heard about this before.”</p>
<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this course will likely be relevant for years to come as mass atrocities continue to occur in several places around the world. The <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/more-military-spending-wont-end-atrocities-we-must-focus-on-preventing-them/">ongoing atrocities in Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/index.html">genocide against the Uyghurs in China</a> show how intractable these issues are when a powerful nation is the one committing atrocities. </p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/03/yemen-airstrikes-saudi-arabia-mbs-us">United States has been accused of complicity in the commission of war crimes</a> in Yemen through its continued support of violence committed by Saudi Arabia and allied forces. This provides an example of how the U.S. does not always play a positive role on the international stage.</p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<ul>
<li><p>The documentary “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1e0HFCKcVhc">Watchers of the Sky</a>” provides the students with a strong background on the topic of mass atrocities. It discusses the creation of the term “<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2192363">genocide</a>” in 1944, and explores key examples, including the <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/subsequent-nuremberg-proceedings-case-9-the-einsatzgruppen-case">Nuremberg trials</a> in the wake of World War II and more recent efforts by the International Criminal Court.</p></li>
<li><p>Chapters from Scott Straus’ “<a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/reports-and-resources/fundamentals-of-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-prevention">Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention</a>” provide a great overview of some key topics. </p></li>
<li><p>David Moshman’s 2001 paper “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520120097224">Conceptual constraints on thinking about genocide</a>,” which discusses how not all genocides will resemble the Holocaust. It is important to know that a situation may fit the definition of genocide – intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group – without employing death camps and gas chambers.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>I believe the course provides my students with tangible ways they can get more involved in atrocities prevention advocacy and programs.</p>
<p>They also learn how to research U.S. legislation that is relevant to genocide, contact members of Congress, write op-eds and create fact sheets.</p>
<p>By giving assignments like this, in addition to more traditional papers, my students learn how to effectively engage in human rights advocacy, even in a small way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Brand is affiliated with the University of Connecticut and George Mason University’s Raphaël Lemkin Genocide Prevention Program. </span></em></p>Many genocide classes review the Holocaust or Cambodia’s Killing Fields. A scholar wanted to show that genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing still happen today.Mike Brand, Adjunct Professor of Genocide Studies and Human Rights, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1755912022-01-30T07:32:59Z2022-01-30T07:32:59ZEritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442673/original/file-20220126-19-1el1euu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (L) and Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at an event in Ethiopia in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region since the conflict broke out <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">in November 2020</a>. Eritrea shares a <a href="https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/eritrea-ethiopia-land">1,000 km border with Ethiopia</a>, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.</p>
<p>These actions have both prolonged and worsened the hugely <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b171-ethiopias-tigray-war-deadly-dangerous-stalemate#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%E2%80%99s%20Tigray%20War%3A%20A%20Deadly%2C%20Dangerous%20Stalemate%20Both,the%20war%20zone%2C%20while%20maintaining%20pressure%20for%20talks.">destructive conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Eritrea’s involvement also has wider implications. It represents an attempt by Asmara to reassert itself on the regional stage, following two decades of relative diplomatic isolation.</p>
<p>The large-scale commitment of soldiers – as well as logistical and political support for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed – is the result of a remarkable turnaround in relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa. After almost two decades of hostility, Abiy struck a peace deal with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/joint-declaration-of-peace-and-friendship-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia/76C651A25602F6DF3E2D62B01BC5984E">July 2018 </a>. This appeared to usher in a new era of stability and cooperation. </p>
<p>But that’s not what transpired. In the following months, Abiy intensified his programme of political reform in Ethiopia. He <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/269-managing-ethiopias-unsettled-transition">consolidated his power</a> at the expense of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The movement had <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/understanding-contemporary-ethiopia/">dominated politics in Ethiopia since 1991</a>.</p>
<p>The front was also Eritrea’s bitterest enemy. There had been a troubled history of relations between it and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dating back to the 1970s. This antagonism culminated in a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0384AC30F3C8F59E15F88AE823623DA7/S000197200009166Xa.pdf/old_problems_in_new_conflicts_some_observations_on_eritrea_and_its_relations_with_tigray_from_liberation_struggle_to_interstate_war.pdf">between 1998 and 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The outbreak of the war in Tigray served a number of purposes for Isaias. Firstly, it gave him the opportunity to end Eritrea’s long-standing international isolation. It did this by enabling him to exercise influence in a conflict which threatened to completely destabilise the region. This was a deeply worrying prospect to a range of international actors.</p>
<p>Secondly, it reasserted his influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. </p>
<p>And lastly it provided an opportunity to seek revenge on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The front’s leadership outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily in the 1998-2000 war. It also outmanoeuvred Eritrea diplomatically in the years following the conflict.</p>
<h2>Eritrea’s opportunistic policy</h2>
<p>The government in Asmara has pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. Its aim has essentially been to gain regional superiority at <a href="https://libcat.simmons.edu/Record/b2158131/TOC">Ethiopia’s</a> expense. </p>
<p>Eritrea has sought to exercise leverage by getting involved in others’ conflicts. For much of the 2000s and 2010s, for instance, Asmara defied the international consensus on Somalia. This consensus was primarily orchestrated by the government in Ethiopia, at the time led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Reaching the consensus involved the creation of a Transitional Federal Government with broad international support. </p>
<p>Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers, supported in the air by the US, launched offensives against al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group which Eritrea was accused of supporting.</p>
<p>This led to the 2009 imposition of <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm">sanctions on Eritrea</a>. There were also interventions in Darfur and eastern Sudan by the Eritrean government.</p>
<p>Eritrea’s regional policy has largely been influenced by Ethiopia, its much more powerful southerly neighbour. But Ethiopia has represented both an obstacle and an opportunity in the pursuit of regional dominance. </p>
<p>In many respects, the single biggest obstacle facing the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime in Asmara is a strong, united Ethiopia. A country capable of dominating the region in economic, military and diplomatic terms – and especially one covertly or overtly hostile to Eritrea itself. This was the case under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpethiopiaeritrea.pdf">regime</a> led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>A weakened and disunited Ethiopia – with at least some political actors who are easy to influence – therefore represents an opportunity for Eritrea’s interests. This is because the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s vision for the country is as regional gatekeeper and pivot – secure in itself, cohesive and militarily potent. </p>
<p>In search of that status, the best scenario is to have Ethiopia unstable enough to allow opportunities for intervention and influence. Asmara would also want to be able to justify prolonged militarisation, which has become the hallmark of independent Eritrean nationhood. But, it wants to avoid Ethiopia’s total collapse. </p>
<p>Asmara’s best-case scenario is a prolonged, unresolved conflict in Ethiopia in which the presence of Eritrean forces and political support are still required by Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>Abiy’s assent to power and the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – combined with widespread and growing political protest in the preceding years – presented just such an opportunity. </p>
<h2>Risky strategy</h2>
<p>But this is a risky strategy. </p>
<p>Isaias has essentially harnessed his cause to that of Abiy. When things were going well against the Tigrayan forces – as in late 2020 and early 2021 – it looked like a justifiable policy, however catastrophic for the civilian population. But it could backfire. </p>
<p>There have been signs that negotiations between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership may be <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/rare-chance-peace-ethiopia#:%7E:text=A%20Rare%20Chance%20for%20Peace%20in%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%E2%80%99s,should%20step%20up%20to%20provide%20support%20for%20talks.">possible</a>. </p>
<p>If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated. This would take him back to the pariah status he has occupied for most of the last two <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea/eritrea-siege-state">decades</a>. </p>
<p>Further, in the longer term, an Ethiopia where various parties are reconciled to one another’s legitimacy could once again become a hostile entity on Eritrea’s southern flank. </p>
<p>Involvement in other people’s wars is inherently risky business. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime has frequently played with fire. It has done so domestically and regionally. Yet, to date, it has seemingly defied geopolitical gravity.</p>
<p>But the Eritrean army’s disproportionately violent and inhumane intervention in Ethiopia in pursuit of payback against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the regional stature Isaias has long craved could result in the most destructive blowback imaginable: a coalescence of Ethiopian antagonists and domestic opposition that presents an existential threat to the Eritrean government itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Reid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war in Tigray appears to have boosted Eritrea’s efforts at regional pre-eminence. But it could backfire.Richard Reid, Professor of African History, St Cross College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1328082020-03-24T14:09:41Z2020-03-24T14:09:41ZHow the people of Sudan pulled off an improbable revolution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318607/original/file-20200304-66056-47rhqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman flashes the V for victory sign as Sudanese protesters demonstrate in Khartoum on July 25, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the turbulent and often tragic history of the past decade in North Africa is written, the 2019 <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">pro-democracy revolution in Sudan</a> will likely be considered one of the few bright spots. One of the world’s most brutal dictatorships —- in power for over 30 years —- was overthrown in a massive nonviolent civil insurrection involving millions of Sudanese. In its place is a liberal technocratic <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190808073257/https:/www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/sudan-military-council-opposition-reach-power-sharing-agreement-190705013332385.html">civilian administration</a>.</p>
<p>Whether civilian democratic rule will survive the serious challenges still facing the country remains to be seen. But for now a key question is: how did they do it?</p>
<p>Conditions in Sudan were not auspicious for a successful pro-democracy civil resistance movement. The regime was oppressive, entrenched, and had been successful in its divide and rule tactics when it came to the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sudan-population/">large and ethnically heterogeneous nation</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, three decades of repressive military rule had largely decimated civil society institutions like labour unions and human rights organisations and the reactionary Islamic leadership had put severe <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-one-of-worst-countries-for-women-s-rights-survey">restrictions on women</a>. Over <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=dxoqCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA49&lpg=PA49&dq=sudan+exiles+five+million&source=bl&ots=W1eX-FP-Pm&sig=ACfU3U0WauwEVWfIQWrFafR8t9ZUztC8WQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjnyMDl9a7oAhWFGDQIHSliBj0Q6AEwAHoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=sudan%20exiles%20five%20million&f=false">five million Sudanese</a>, including many of the country’s most educated people, had emigrated.</p>
<p>Lastly, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests/saudi-arabia-uae-to-send-3-billion-in-aid-to-sudan-idUSKCN1RX0DG">helping to prop up</a> the military regime. And most of the West had seemingly written off Sudan as a hopeless case.</p>
<p>Yet, starting in December 2018, a movement emerged which eventually brought millions of Sudanese onto the streets. By April 2019, General Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by fellow military officers. Protests continued and, despite hundreds of additional deaths, by August the military stepped down in favour of a civilian-led transitional government.</p>
<p>There are numerous reasons for the success of this uprising. The key ones range from the regime’s incompetence and the fact that the economy was in a mess, to the way in which the opposition forces organised themselves into a broad-based movement. Another major factor in their success was that they chose to use nonviolent tactics such as sit-ins and demonstrations.</p>
<h2>Ingredients of success</h2>
<p>A number of factors contributed to the success of the uprising. These included the regime’s weaknesses, as well as the tactics used by the opposition forces.</p>
<p>As far as the regime was concerned, there were at least four factors working against it. These included:</p>
<p><strong>Divisions:</strong> To the opposition’s advantage, some of the main elements of the repressive apparatus of the regime — the police, intelligence, military, and special forces — <a href="https://pachodo.org/latest-news-articles/news-from-various-sources/18878-rival-security-forces-clash-in-sudan-amid-anti-government-protests">were divided</a>. The opposition did an excellent job of exacerbating those divisions and using them to its own advantage, offering sanctuary for deserting troops, shaming families of the hardline forces, and winning over some junior officers.</p>
<p><strong>Incompetence:</strong> The state was in many respects weak and incompetent. <a href="https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/sudan-economy-and-military-fall-bashir">The economy</a> was in a shambles. This became particularly marked after the country lost access to oil reserves in the south after South Sudan became independent in 2011. Education, transport, health care, agriculture and other basic infrastructure had <a href="https://fanack.com/sudan/economy/">deteriorated significantly</a> during its three decades in power.</p>
<p><strong>Sanctions:</strong> international sanctions added to chronic corruption and mismanagement in weakening the economy.</p>
<p><strong>Disaffected youth:</strong> Young Sudanese had had enough. They felt they had no future and they had nothing more to lose. Interviews with young people during my visit in January revealed a sense of sheer desperation, a sense that “enough is enough”.</p>
<p>When it came to the movement itself, a number of factors contributed to strengthening its efforts, and making them more effective. Among them were:</p>
<p><strong>Scope and scale:</strong> While some civil insurrections have largely taken place in the capital with mostly middle class support, the Sudanese revolution took place all over country, in all regions, with diverse class and ethnic participation. Another key component was the fact that popular resistance committees were active in even the poorest neighbourhoods. </p>
<p>This was in conjunction with the role played by the Sudanese Professionals Association, an alliance of professional trade unions, which played a key leadership role.</p>
<p>Building such a broad coalition of forces was vitally important, given the size and complexity of the country.</p>
<p><strong>National unity:</strong> For decades, the regime had tried to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2182870/omar-al-bashir-exploited-sudans-ethnic-division-decades-now-people">divide Sudanese</a> by North and South, Arab and non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim. The pro-democracy protesters recognised that national unity was critical and consciously resisted efforts at divide-and-rule.</p>
<p>One example was the regime’s efforts at the beginning of the uprising to try and blame the uprising in Khartoum on Furs, the people indigenous to the Darfur region. In response, the largely-Arab but multi-ethnic protesters began chanting <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/01/12/sudans-genocidal-regime-is-under-siege">“We are all Darfur!”</a>. In solidarity, protesters in Al Fashir, the Darfur capital, started chanting “We are all Khartoum!”</p>
<p><strong>The role of women:</strong> strong leadership from women helped increase the numbers of protesters by encouraging women to join the protests. It also lent credibility to the protests and better popular perception of the movement and its goals by challenging notions that they were violent and dangerous.</p>
<p><strong>Nonviolent action:</strong> In my view, the single most important factor was possibly the decision to stress nonviolent action.</p>
<p>The Sudanese opposition had, on previous occasions, engaged in violent struggles. For example, in 1993 an armed guerrilla movement operating out of bases in Eritrea was launched. But it failed to provoke a more widespread popular uprising and was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4007063?seq=1">formally disbanded in 2006</a>. Similarly, protesters turned violent during <a href="https://sudanreeves.org/2013/09/29/uprising-in-sudan-what-we-know-now-september-28-2013/">the civil insurrection of 2013</a>. The uprising was crushed within days after scores of civilian deaths.</p>
<p>The choice of peaceful protests, sit-ins and strikes made it difficult for the regime to depict the movement in a negative light. And nonviolence meant that the movement attracted sympathy it would have lost through violent tactics. This swelled the number of people coming out onto the streets.</p>
<h2>What still needs to be done</h2>
<p>There is still much to do to consolidate democracy and civilian rule in Sudan. Though civilians dominate the transitional government, the military and other elements of the old guard are still part of the system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aus-role-in-brokering-sudan-deal-offers-lessons-for-the-future-121822">The AU's role in brokering Sudan deal offers lessons for the future</a>
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<hr>
<p>But the accomplishment of toppling Omar al-Bashir can be a lesson to those struggling for greater political freedom and social justice through the greater Middle East – and beyond.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article first appeared in <a href="https://insidearabia.com/sudans-democratic-revolution-how-they-did-it/">Inside Arabia</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132808/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author wishes to thank the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict for supporting his research.</span></em></p>Remaining nonviolent despite enormous provocation made it difficult for the regime to depict the movement in a negative lightStephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of San FranciscoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1322772020-03-02T14:18:52Z2020-03-02T14:18:52ZBringing al-Bashir to justice: the pros and cons of various options<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317543/original/file-20200227-24664-1r1nwgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese protestors celebrate a deal with the ruling generals on a new governing body, in the capital Khartoum, recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After coming into power in a military coup in 1989, Omar al-Bashir, former president of Sudan, targeted the civilian populations in the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawo regions of Darfur, whom he regarded as opposing his rule. According to the International Criminal Court, he played an active role in the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/AlBashirEng.pdf">design and coordination of the atrocities</a> against them. </p>
<p>This is why the court indicted him on numerous charges of crimes against humanity – including murder, torture, rape, war crimes and genocide – in 2009 and again in 2010.</p>
<p>Yet al-Bashir never faced trial. For over a decade he travelled throughout Africa managing to evade arrest. This was despite the fact that 33 <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx">African countries</a> have signed the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. </p>
<p>But the tide turned in early 2019 when peaceful protests by Sudanese led to al-Bashir <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">being ousted</a>. This led to the new ruling Sovereign Council of Sudan announcing earlier this year that it would hand al-Bashir over, together with four of his aides, to the International Criminal Court. It used <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/11/africa/sudan-omar-bashir-icc-intl/index.html">the emotive words that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>We cannot achieve justice unless we heal wounds with justice. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>An International Criminal Court delegation has since visited Khartoum to discuss cooperation with the Sovereign Council. But it’s unclear what will happen <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200218-icc-mulls-extradition-of-sudans-bashir/">next</a>.</p>
<p>The Sovereign Council’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur/icc-trial-in-the-hague-one-option-for-sudans-bashir-minister-idUSKBN20B1PC">initial announcement</a> stated that al-Bashir would be surrendered to the International Criminal Court. But other possibilities have subsequently been floated, including <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202002240022.html">a hybrid court</a>. These remain under discussion.</p>
<p>Al-Bashir’s legal counsel will also be strongly opposed to sending him for trial in The Hague on legal and political grounds. They <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/al-bashirs-handover-decision-to-icc-divides-sudanese/1744653">assert</a> that the International Criminal Court lacks jurisdiction because Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome Statute. And they argue that the interim government is merely attempting to placate world leaders. </p>
<p>This legal argument’s weakness is that the Rome Statute gives the United Nations Security Council <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nations-security-council-referrals/">the mandate</a> to refer non-signatory countries to the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>Whatever the reason – true justice or placating other countries – some form of accountability is required. But prosecution by the International Criminal Court is not the only way for victims to obtain justice. Various options are available for his prosecution and with the ICC dependent on the cooperation of the Sudanese government, the new Sudanese government will ultimately hold his fate in their hands.</p>
<h2>The options</h2>
<p>Al-Bashir can be handed over to the International Criminal Court for prosecution. This option should receive due consideration since his arrest and handing over was one of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/darfuris-rejoice-as-sudan-agrees-to-hand-bashir-to-icc-20200217">primary demands</a> of those who rose up against his rule. </p>
<p>It would also be seen as a reflection of the new Sudanese government’s commitment to justice and international law. </p>
<p>But handing al-Bashir over to the International Criminal Court need not mean prosecution in The Hague. One argument is that consideration should be given to the need for the victims and survivors to have access to his trial. The International Criminal Court could therefore opt for an ICC trial away from The Hague, conducted in Sudan. </p>
<p>This would create its own challenges. For example, there may be jurisdictional issues as Sudan is not a signatory of the Rome Statute. Another potential hurdle is that <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202002240022.html">factions of the military</a> that still support al-Bashir will stop the prosecution from interviewing witnesses and conducting the trial in Sudan. </p>
<p>A third possible route would be for al-Bashir to stand trial in a Sudanese court. But some argue that the Sudanese courts aren’t fit to prosecute <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/al-bashirs-handover-decision-to-icc-divides-sudanese/1744653">war crimes</a> and crimes against humanity . There is also <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/al-bashirs-handover-decision-to-icc-divides-sudanese/1744653">little trust</a> in the courts, since the <a href="https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Sudan.html">rule of law has been compromised</a>. </p>
<p>Yet another option would be a hybrid court consisting of Sudanese and other international judges as <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202002240022.html">originally mooted by the African Union</a>. This would be to counter the mistrust, particularly if the judges were from African countries. </p>
<p>This model was used successfully in the prosecution of former Chadian president Hissène Habré by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-trial-of-chadian-dictator-habre-is-a-landmark-against-impunity-60469">Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal</a>. The hybrid court in that instance was hailed as the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/05/02/habre-trial-future-african-justice/">future of African tribunals</a>. </p>
<p>But the use of “universal jurisdiction” to justify the prosecution of Habré in a foreign country was controversial. The AU has been critical of this legal concept since a Rwandan general’s arrest in London on a Spanish warrant. Al-Bashir’s supporters might echo this and once again claim a lack of jurisdiction. And whether this option could work in the prosecution of al-Bashir may ultimately depend on the political will of the heads of states with whom al-Bashir had strong political ties, especially those in neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The final option would be to see The Hague as only a last resort should the Sudanese justice system fail. This would fit into the idea of complimentarity – that the ICC is authorised to take cases only where states cannot or will not prosecute. Considering the African Union’s stance on the court, and its desire for the continent to solve its own problems, a trial in Sudan, with The Hague as only a last resort should the Sudanese justice system fail, may be the most appropriate option. </p>
<h2>Will justice be done?</h2>
<p>Considering the AU’s vehement criticism of the International Criminal Court, it has been strangely quiet in response to al-Bashir’s arrest and the likelihood of his being handed over to the court. </p>
<p>With the narrative already changing from the definite handing over of al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court, to one of options being considered, it remains to be seen whether justice will indeed be done – and seen to be done – for his victims.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Nel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union’s staunch support for al-Bashir, cloaked in criticism of the International Criminal Court, denied justice to the millions affected by the conflict in Sudan.Michelle Nel, Lecturer in Criminal and Military law and the Law of Armed Conflict at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318502020-02-16T14:31:55Z2020-02-16T14:31:55ZAl-Bashir and the ICC: there are better ways to achieve justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315492/original/file-20200214-10980-9tf82m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan's ousted President Omar al-Bashir appears in court in Khartoum on December 14, 2019. He was later sentenced to two years in prison for corruption.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Mahmoud Hajaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been widely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/11/sudan-says-it-will-send-former-dictator-omar-al-bashir-to-icc">reported</a> that Sudan is considering handing its former leader, Omar al-Bashir, over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. </p>
<p>There’s no certainty about what will happen next. And there’s also a case to be made for a different course of action.</p>
<p>First, it’s not clear that all members of the provisional government in Sudan are on board. And there is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51462613">speculation</a> that the military will not honour an agreement to extradite al-Bashir or others to the international court.</p>
<p>The 11-member provisional government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/sudan-politics/update-1-sudan-announces-nine-month-plan-to-rescue-economy-tame-inflation-idUSL5N26E2WP">was announced</a> in August 2019. It is made up of an even mixture of military and civilian representatives, and currently headed by the military. The government includes – and is likely secretly controlled by – Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemeti”. Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces are accused of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-fresh-evidence-of-government-sponsored-crimes-in-darfur-shows-drawdown-of-peacekeepers-premature-and-reckless/">atrocities in Darfur and elsewhere</a>. Violence <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/dozens-killed-violence-sudan-west-darfur-state-200102075611506.html">continues to the present day</a>. </p>
<p>There is also a strong argument to be made for al-Bashir to be tried in Sudan, and not by the ICC. This, of course, depends on whether Sudan proceeds with indictments for atrocity crimes against him and others in its own judicial system. If it does, the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction. As a court of last resort, the ICC is authorised to take cases only where states cannot or will not prosecute them. This is called “complementarity” and it is central to the court’s organisation and legitimacy.</p>
<p>The ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda suggested as much herself last year when <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/icc-prosecutor-fatou-bensouda-calls-for-transfer-of-al-bashir-to-the-hague">she told</a> the UN Security Council:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Consistent with the bedrock principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute, I am ready to engage in dialogue with the authorities in Sudan to ensure that the Darfur suspects face independent and impartial justice, either in a courtroom in The Hague, or in Sudan. Continued impunity is not an option. The victims of the Darfur situation deserve to finally have their day in court.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another important factor to consider is cooperation between Sudan and the ICC could come with unacceptable constraints. In the past, the ICC <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/03/19/why-the-icc-wont-prosecute-museveni/">has been criticised</a> for cutting deals with authoritarian leaders who, in fact, could just as easily stand in the dock as the accused they are handing over. </p>
<p>At this juncture, more than ever, the ICC needs to be careful not to further destroy its credibility by cooperating with the sorts of bad actors who should be before a court themselves.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>The ICC issued an <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">arrest warrant</a> for al-Bashir in 2009. Sudan is not a member state of the ICC, and the case came before the court based on a <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm">2005 referral</a> from the UN Security Council. But the UN referral didn’t have a lot of support, and the ICC proved unable to take custody of al-Bashir. </p>
<p>For years the ICC frustratedly reminded member states across Africa and the middle east about their duty to arrest al-Bashir when he travelled. The court also <a href="http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20180321/arrest-bashir-icc-member-state-jordan-fails-arrest-sudanese-president-summary-filings">adjudicated</a> cases on the matter. But to no avail.</p>
<p>When al-Bashir was ousted from power in April 2019, calls for his extradition to The Hague were renewed.</p>
<p>In June 2019, a peaceful protest in Sudan was crushed by government-sponsored violence. Hundreds were killed and raped. As I wrote <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-and-the-icc-is-it-worth-getting-your-man-if-you-jeopardise-your-mission-119317">mid-last year</a>, cooperating with human rights abusers in power in Sudan for the arrest of al-Bashir was a bad bargain. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-and-the-icc-is-it-worth-getting-your-man-if-you-jeopardise-your-mission-119317">Al-Bashir and the ICC: is it worth getting your man, if you jeopardise your mission?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The military forces that violently reasserted power last year also opposed cooperation with the ICC. Instead, al-Bashir faced charges of corruption and other financial crimes. In September 2019, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/14/sudanese-court-sentences-omar-al-bashir-to-2-years-in-prison">sentenced</a> to two years’ prison by a Sudanese court. Since these are not the crimes that the ICC has indicted him for, his sentence in Sudan did not affect the ICC’s interest in his case.</p>
<p>But there were signs late last year that al-Bashir’s fate may be changing. The country’s attorney general <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/africa/sudan-darfur-investigation.html">announced</a> that Sudan would investigate atrocity crimes committed in Darfur since 2003. This investigation could implicate al-Bashir and others indicted by the ICC.</p>
<p>More recently negotiations between Sudan’s provisional government and Darfur rebel groups appear to have re-introduced the idea of turning over al-Bashir. The <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20200211-sudan-hand-over-officials-wanted-icc-ex-president-bashir-refuses-co-operate">spokesman</a> for Sudan’s provisional government, which is made up of a mix of military and civilian leaders, announced that individuals indicted by the ICC will be extradited to The Hague.</p>
<h2>Preferred directions, in Sudan and elsewhere</h2>
<p>In my view the ICC’s best course is to monitor and support anti-impunity in Sudan. It already does this in another country, Colombia. The ICC has been <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/pr-search.aspx?k=colombia">working with</a> the government and members of Colombian civil society to observe implementation of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/colombia-signs-historic-peace-deal-with-farc-rebels">2016 peace accords</a> and the transitional justice process. </p>
<p>This flexibility has two advantages. It allows countries to craft their own paths forward following violence. It also keeps the resources, promises, and threats that accompany international prosecution close and available, should domestic alternatives fail.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the ICC has other meaningful opportunities it should pursue that would underpin its institutional relevance. It has been approached about <a href="https://theconversation.com/migration-in-the-mediterranean-why-its-time-to-put-european-leaders-on-trial-120851">European Union policies</a> towards migrants, and it’s been asked to investigate whether European arms sales are <a href="https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Fallbeschreibungen/CaseReport_ECCHR_Mwatana_Amnesty_CAAT_Delas_Rete.pdf">aiding and abetting war crimes</a>.</p>
<p>Advocates for greater ICC involvement in western countries’ treatment of migrants suffered a defeat this week, as the ICC rejected a 2017 request to investigate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/feb/13/international-criminal-court-told-australias-detention-regime-could-be-a-against-humanity">Australia’s immigration policies</a>. The ICC noted that while conditions in Australia’s immigration camps are in <a href="https://uploads.guim.co.uk/2020/02/14/200213-Andrew-Wilkie-Response-from-International-Criminal-Court-Australian-Government-treatment-of-asylum-seekers_(1).pdf">“violation of fundamental rules of international law,”</a> they nonetheless fall outside of the court’s jurisdiction.</p>
<p>This is a mistake. By declining to intervene on behalf of vulnerable and victimised populations, the ICC misses a chance to act where its mission <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/morejustworld">to create a more just world</a> could have real impact. That is does so where its ideological and political alliances are strongest only compounds the error.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerstin Bree Carlson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ICC must not further destroy its credibility by cooperating with the sorts of bad actors who should be before a court themselves.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1298232020-01-20T13:53:31Z2020-01-20T13:53:31ZUN peacekeeping is stymied by serious contradictions. They need to be resolved<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310268/original/file-20200115-134789-6gqdq0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">UN/Isaac Billy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For three decades, UN peace operations have been falling into the same traps because stakeholders don’t want to tackle some of the contradictions confronting peacekeeping. Professor Paul D. Williams from George Washington University recently called this the UN Security Council’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ia/iiz199/5612943">“peacekeeping trilemma”</a>. This refers to the fact that peacekeeping missions have to meet multidimensional mandates and minimise casualties while working with increasingly tight budgets.</p>
<p>Williams argued that these factors have </p>
<blockquote>
<p>constrained the design of peacekeeping operations and set them up for failure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unless member states try to solve these contradictions, the UN will not be fit for purpose in the future. Even if the <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/peace-operations-review-2019">trend</a> towards smaller missions and a spectrum of peace operations continues, it still has five big, multidimensional missions in <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/">South Sudan</a>, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma">Mali</a>, the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca">Central African Republic</a>, <a href="https://unamid.unmissions.org/about-unamid-0">Darfur in Sudan</a>, and the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> to manage and conclude for the next two to four years. </p>
<p>Then there’s the prospect that a member state might ask the secretariat to prepare for another multidimensional deployment in West Africa or in the Middle East. </p>
<p>To move forward, therefore, the UN must solve some of the contradictions, in terms of capacity, ambitions and finances, that tend to entangle peace operations. As the director of the International Peace Institute’s Centre on Peace Operations, Jake Sherman, <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/09/action-for-peacekeeping-will-political-consensus-lead-to-change-in-practice">explains</a>, there is a </p>
<blockquote>
<p>growing dissonance between the Security Council’s expectations and what peacekeeping operations can realistically achieve.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Constraints</h2>
<p>As I have <a href="http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/can-we-make-un-peacekeeping-great-again/">highlighted</a> previously, peacekeeping has always been done on the cheap. For example, when in 1993 UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested 8,000 troops to protect the safe areas of Bosnia, the Security Council provided only 3,000. </p>
<p>The current <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded">peacekeeping budget</a> represents just 0.3% of the world’s military expenditure. Yet the question of whether the resources given to peacekeeping are enough has never been seriously put on the table. As a result, operations are underfunded for their missions. </p>
<p>They accordingly face severe and continuous gaps in terms of capacity and material such as armoured vehicles, helicopters, engineers, transport, signals, aviation and medical personnel.</p>
<p>Such gaps would be intolerable to any other military deployment. The <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma">mission in Mali</a>, in particular, which was created to stabilise the main populated areas of the northern part of the country and to support the implementation of the <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2017/06/lessons-from-inter-malian-peace-agreement">Algiers Agreement</a>, has been facing <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-capability-requirements-un-peacekeeping_may-2019.pdf">numerous gaps</a>.</p>
<p>Yet the Security Council has asked that it protect civilians in both the north and the centre of the country. This without significant increases to its budget and troops, overstretching it even more. </p>
<p>The achievements of UN missions are judged as if they have the resources to implement their mandates. This consistent lack of resources has an immediate impact on peacekeepers’ ability to protect themselves and local populations.</p>
<p>It also contradicts the wish of member states for UN operations to be more robust. (These are the same states that want to reduce the peacekeeping budget and contribute sparingly to peace operations, chiefly Western countries.) </p>
<p>Indeed, the push towards the “militarisation” of peacekeeping, embodied in the 2018 <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf">report</a> of General Carlos dos Santos Cruz, the former Force Commander of the UN’s operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, contradicts decisions to cut peacekeeping budgets. This in turn constrains the <a href="https://www.challengesforum.org/paper/policy-brief-20192-improving-the-military-effectiveness-and-proficiency-of-peacekeeping-operations-a-new-goal-for-a4p/">call</a> to strengthen UN military structures and capacities. </p>
<p>As Professor Lise Howard from Georgetown University <a href="https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/give-peacekeeping-a-chance">underlines</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>All current multidimensional missions are mandated to use force to protect civilians, but they are not designed or equipped to use force effectively.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Using force brings a whole new set of challenges. The biggest is the ability of peacekeeping operations to cope with the consequences of using it. Peacekeepers aren’t equipped, prepared, or sufficiently supported politically to assume that responsibility. </p>
<p>In such conditions, all troop-contributing countries logically tend to prioritise the safety of their soldiers. </p>
<p>These contradictions have an impact on the daily lives of peacekeepers. They affect the level of fatalities, the number of personnel suffering from post-traumatic disorders, the management and coherence of a mission, the way the mandate is interpreted, and the morale of the personnel.</p>
<p>When personnel lack proper care, consideration and motivation, it affects the efficiency of their operations. These gaps also have an <a href="http://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/09/twenty-years-on-time-for-accountability-system-protection-civilians/">impact</a> on the relationships between the various stakeholders of peace operations.</p>
<h2>Towards effective partnerships</h2>
<p>In future, the UN will have to enhance its partnerships with regional organisations, coalitions of the willing or bilateral actors if it wants to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping. But the partners will need to let it be the main coordinator of such efforts, and give it the means to do so. </p>
<p>That will require giving away a bit of their own visibility, and being more willing to share information. Indeed, everybody calls for a coordinated approach to crisis or conflict management, but nobody wishes to be coordinated. This leaves the UN with little leverage in undertaking its task.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2019/11/partners-and-competitors-forces-operating-in-parallel-to-un-peace-operations">vision</a> of partnership in which each actor understands its role in a larger political project is more likely to share the burden of peacekeeping more equitably.</p>
<p><em>This article is a shortened version of the one published in December 2019 for the NYU Center on International Cooperation’s Peace Operations <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/peace-operations-review-2019">Review 2019</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129823/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandra Novosseloff is a non-resident senior fellow at the International Peace Institute and at the NYU Center for Cooperation. She is also an independent consultant on UN issues.</span></em></p>Unless member states try to solve the contradictions in expectations, UN peacekeeping will not be fit for purpose in the future.Alexandra Novosseloff, Chercheure-associée au Centre Thucydide, Université Paris-Panthéon-AssasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297962020-01-16T13:40:18Z2020-01-16T13:40:18ZHow the UN’s more nimble approach can contribute to peace and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309913/original/file-20200114-151880-1r9y4vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwandan soldiers line up to receive their UN peacekeeping medals for their work in Juba, South Sudan in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations’ peace operations are changing. This is true of a range of operations, from special political missions and peacebuilding offices to multidimensional peace efforts.</p>
<p>This reflects the fact that the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">UN Security Council</a> has always adapted to new forms of conflict and to new security environments, expanding the notion of security in its resolutions. As a result, peacekeeping has adapted to suit the purpose and methods of its time. </p>
<p>Until the end of the 1980s, peacekeeping was mainly a tool to help end interstate conflicts. These included the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unefi.htm">Suez crisis</a>, the conflict between <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unipom.htm">India and Pakistan</a> and that between Israel and Syria over the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/undof">Golan heights</a>. The exceptions were civil wars in the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onuc.htm">Congo</a> and <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil">Lebanon</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, UN peacekeeping has become mainly an imperfect tool to help solve intrastate conflicts like those in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm">Angola</a>, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosomi.htm">Somalia</a>, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untac.htm">Cambodia</a> and elsewhere. Exceptions have been the conflicts between <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmee/index.html">Ethiopia and Eritrea</a> in 2000 and the civil unrest in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah">Haiti</a> in 2004.</p>
<p>Peace operations are now becoming entangled in conflicts with regional and transnational dimensions. These very often involve a proliferation of armed groups (both rebel and criminal). Many are in conflict with the host countries. As a result, the relationship between peacekeepers and host states has been more complicated. Many don’t see an interest in complying with the mandate of the UN, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo under former <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20180926-Congo-Joseph-Kabila-UN-withdraw-troops-elections">president Joseph Kabila</a>, or in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-peace-operation-mali-troubled-yet-needed-mission">Mali</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, peace operations have become, more than ever before, playgrounds for the political interests of China, France, Russia and the US, whether allied with regional actors or not. Some of the operations have become bases for creating new spheres of influence or strengthening existing ones, like in Central Africa and Mali. </p>
<p>This power struggle is not helping peace operations deliver on their various complex mandates. </p>
<h2>New direction</h2>
<p>For a few years now, UN peace operations have stood at a crossroads. Do they continue with expensive missions with little peace to keep, but which provide much-needed confidence and security in the world’s most difficult contexts? Or do they opt for less ambitious and more achievable objectives, which would place more responsibility on other actors (national, regional, parallel forces) to shore up basic security in trying to find a path to peace?</p>
<p>In 2019, peace operations seem to have taken the second path, shifting away from large, multidimensional, “conflict management” operations. The reasons for this shift include political and budgetary pressures – the kind of investments member states and the Security Council are willing to make – as well as structural reforms. </p>
<p>The number of personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping has slowly been decreasing. In April 2015 the UN was responsible for 107,800 soldiers and police officers worldwide. It now has only 83,669 uniformed personnel deployed. Four missions have been closed – <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/06/un-operation-in-cote-divoire">Côte d’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/12/liberias-peacekeeping-transition">Liberia</a> and two in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/12/planning-for-end-of-un-peacekeeping-in-haiti">Haiti</a>).</p>
<p>Despite this, the UN is today the second largest single deployer of troops in the world after the United States.</p>
<p>Divisions within the Security Council have also affected the delivery of mandates, and have weakened the relationships between various missions and their host states. As pointed out by <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/by/arthur-boutellis">Arthur Boutellis</a>, a senior advisor at the International Peace Institute, in a recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-019-00274-2">paper</a>, a number of peacekeeping missions did not enjoy unanimously supported mandates. And cracks have started to occur among the United States, the United Kingdom and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, on some missions.</p>
<h2>Adaptability</h2>
<p>UN bodies should recalibrate peacekeeping operations to accord with the level of investment member states are willing to provide. This would, according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, help </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/secretary-generals-remarks-to-security-council-high-level-debate-collective-action-to-improve-un">to refocus peacekeeping with realistic expectations</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This means that multidimensional peacekeeping seems to be behind us as it has become too expensive for the UN. It contradicts the push for dramatic financial cuts to make peacekeeping more nimble. </p>
<p>The political missions that are likely to take over from the multidimensional missions in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid">Darfur</a> in Sudan, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-ready-for-peacekeepers-to-leave-by-2022-127729">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/audio/2017/12/640461">Haiti</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13887.doc.htm">in Hodeida, Yemen</a> all show the wide array of tools the UN has at its disposal, and the spectrum its conflict resolution and conflict management is covering.</p>
<p>As pointed out by a recent United Nations University <a href="https://cpr.unu.edu/conflict-prevention-in-the-sahel-emerging-practice-across-the-un.html">report</a>, another example is the task force established in Burkina Faso by the UN resident coordinator, the UN country team and the UN Office in Western Africa and the Sahel to reinforce conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacities in key areas. It is supported by the UN’s <a href="https://news.un.org/en/tags/peace-building-fund">Peace-building Fund</a>. This example shows another innovative way the UN can work.</p>
<p>Such an approach is yet more proof of the adaptability of the UN system. As was the effort in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia to deal with the <a href="https://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer">Ebola pandemic</a> in 2014–2015 – the UN’s first emergency health mission. Another is the strengthened coordination established in the <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/crises/cod/en/">Beni region of the DRC</a> with the World Health Organisation in May 2019. </p>
<p>This breadth of tools and this spectrum of crisis resolution and management is an asset that makes the UN unique. It enables a truly global approach in dealing with crises and conflicts. The more the UN is able to use these tools and the systems attached to them, the more flexible it will be in adapting to evolving challenges. </p>
<p>The transitions in Haiti and Darfur, and the evolving situation in Burkina Faso, will serve as a reality check for the new secretariat’s nimble approach to maintaining international peace and security.</p>
<p><em>This article is a shortened version of the one published in December 2019 for the NYU Center on International Cooperation’s Peace Operations <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/peace-operations-review-2019">Review 2019</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandra Novosseloff is a non resident senior fellow at the International Peace Institute and at the NYU Center for Cooperation. She is also an independent consultant on UN issues.</span></em></p>The number of personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping has slowly been decreasing.Alexandra Novosseloff, Chercheure-associée au Centre Thucydide, Université Paris-Panthéon-AssasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1193172019-06-25T12:18:37Z2019-06-25T12:18:37ZAl-Bashir and the ICC: is it worth getting your man, if you jeopardise your mission?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281104/original/file-20190625-81766-3jutek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The International Criminal Court has renewed calls for the arrest of former Sudan leader Omar al-Bashir. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been trying without success to take custody of Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir for more than a decade. In April, al-Bashir was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/sudans-bashir-ousted-by-military-protesters-demand-civilian-government-idUSKCN1RN0AY">removed from power</a>, and in June he appeared before a Sudanese court on <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1TI1AR-OZATP">corruption charges</a>. </p>
<p>Following al-Bashir’s fall, the ICC has reinvigorated its call for his extradition. This is fraught with danger, however, because it requires that the ICC cooperate with the men who have taken charge in Sudan, who are themselves deeply implicated in the very acts that al-Bashir is accused of. Such cooperation risks damaging the ICC’s reputation and legitimising a criminal regime.</p>
<p>Ten years ago the ICC <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">indicted Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir</a>, together with four others, for the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan">genocide in Darfur</a>. But neither Sudan – nor any other state – would turn him over. In 2014, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/icc-suspends-darfur-crime-investigations-over-lack-of-action/a-18126467">ICC suspended its investigations in Darfur</a> because neither Sudan nor the UN Security Council were co-operating. It was the Security Council that had <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm">referred</a> the situation in Darfur to the court in 2005. </p>
<p>Even though the ICC has stopped its investigations in Darfur, the case against al-Bashir continued to trigger several political imbroglios for the court. Pressure on South Africa to arrest the visiting al-Bashir in 2015 led to the country’s <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/12/south-africa-threatens-to-withdraw-from-icc-alleging-anti-african-bias.html">near exit from the Court</a>. The ICC ultimately determined <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1320">not to punish South Africa’s non-cooperation</a>. </p>
<p>Earlier this year the ICC Appeals Chamber issued its latest decision on questions involving noncooperation regarding al-Bashir, this time against <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1452">against Jordan</a>. Again the court articulated its right to try state sovereigns while determining not to sanction the uncooperative member state. </p>
<p>Thus before al-Bashir’s fall from power, his indictment had developed into a lose-lose situation for the Court and its proponents. On the one hand, the situation that prompted the indictment – the genocide in Darfur – was <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-fresh-evidence-of-government-sponsored-crimes-in-darfur-shows-drawdown-of-peacekeepers-premature-and-reckless/">ongoing and unaddressed</a> by the court. On the other hand, any action the ICC could take against al-Bashir was politically costly, continuing to weaken an <a href="http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/Lincolns-22-May_ForKevinJonHeller-2.pdf">institution already under threat</a>.</p>
<h2>From the frying pan into the fire</h2>
<p>Late last year protesters began assembling in cities across Sudan, calling for al-Bashir’s resignation. Some were <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/sudans-crackdown-protest-stirs-concern">killed, others beaten and arrested</a>. Nevertheless the Sudanese authorities also showed restraint, and stories of soldiers protecting protesters against security forces <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-47860804/sudan-protest-some-soldiers-protect-demonstrators">made international headlines</a>. </p>
<p>In April, amid much celebration, al-Bashir was removed from power by a military council.</p>
<p>But the euphoria was short lived. In the two months since his removal, demonstrations have intensified, <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1T10SJ-OZATP">seeking to pressure the military council</a> which deposed him to relinquish power. This interim government is nominally led by Lt General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, an unknown figure with experience fighting in Yemen and with <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190603-sudans-burhan-relative-unknown-regional-player">ties to the Rapid Support Force</a>, the paramilitary group responsible for ongoing atrocities in Darfur. But, real power is said to lie with his second in command, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Sudan-s-Burhan-rises-from-obscurity-to-strongman/4552902-5144628-euasplz/index.html">Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo (known as Hemeti</a> whose forces now control Khartoum. </p>
<p>On June 3 Hemeti’s fighters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/world/africa/sudan-leader-hemeti.html?module=inline">killed</a> more than 100 protesters and raped and sexually abused dozens of people. As Alaa Salah, the woman pictured in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/fashion/demonstration-clothing-women-sudan.html?module=inline">iconic, April 2019 photo</a> of peaceable Sudanese protests, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/world/africa/sudan-leader-hemeti.html?module=inline">told</a> The New York Times,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For years Hemeti killed and burned in Darfur. Now Darfur has come to Khartoum.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hemeti has contested the numbers but not the aim of the violence, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48535165">saying</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not allow chaos and we will not go back on our convictions. There is no way back. We must impose the respect of the country by law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Sudan, for now, that seems to be the law of the armed and not the rule of law. </p>
<h2>The question of prosecution</h2>
<p>In May, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-bashir-court/sudans-bashir-charged-with-corruption-in-first-appearance-since-april-idUSKCN1TH0IP">prosecutors in Sudan announced</a> that al-Bashir would be tried for corruption, financing terror, and for protest deaths. This answered concerns that a comfortable retirement was being planned for him. </p>
<p>But, conspicuously absent from the listed crimes are atrocities committed in Darfur and elsewhere – in other words the charges the ICC has laid against al-Bashir and four others. This means that local prosecutions will not address the international criminal law violations al-Bashir is accused of. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the ICC has now renewed calls for <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=190619-stat-otp-UNSC-Darfur-Sudan">al-Bashir’s arrest</a>. Speaking to the UN Security Council on 19 June 2019, the ICC prosecutor urged:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=190619-stat-otp-UNSC-Darfur-Sudan">now is the time to act</a>. Now is the time for the people of Sudan to choose law over impunity and ensure that the ICC suspects in the Darfur situation finally face justice in a court of law. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her request is the immediate handover of al-Bashir and the four associates named in the 2009 arrest warrant.</p>
<p>But what would ICC prosecution of al-Bashir and his four associates mean, at this point? </p>
<p>In the present situation, the prosecutor’s articulation of “fighting impunity” rings hollow. This is because cooperation with the Sudanese government to try al-Bashir would mean cooperating with – even possibly legitimising – those who themselves have been implicated in genocide. This is a problem the <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-why-the-icc-is-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-115388">ICC has faced, and failed,</a> before. </p>
<p>Moreover, focusing resources on obtaining a post-power al-Bashir in the midst of ongoing atrocities by the governing authorities may strengthen a developing <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/03/19/why-the-icc-wont-prosecute-museveni/">critique</a> that the ICC is not objective and neutral, but rather political, pursuing foremost those who are not strong. The ICC’s recent determination not to move forward with investigations of US conduct in <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan">Afghanistan</a> has bolstered this view.</p>
<p>The ICC asserts that it is <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/morejustworld?fbclid=IwAR0ENGc_erY0ZYewsEmT%20%20%20-wfRp-ZR1AFVsL1ZD4oDRNAFxWsVo7gqKiaNXMs">“building a more just world”</a>. But action that legitimises or strengthens authoritarian rule or criminal regimes does not serve that aim. </p>
<p>At this juncture, the ICC needs to ask itself a cost-benefit question: would the benefit of trying a defunct dictator who is already facing a future in jail override the detriment of legitimising a genocidal ruling authority? Is it worth getting your man, if you jeopardise your mission?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerstin Carlson receives funding from the Dreyer's Fund regarding her research on international criminal justice in Africa. </span></em></p>Cooperation with the Sudanese government to try al-Bashir could amount to legitimising those who themselves have been implicated in genocideKerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1087062018-12-18T08:49:00Z2018-12-18T08:49:00ZGenocide: 70 years on, three reasons why the UN Convention is still failing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250952/original/file-20181217-185258-1edisbj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Skulls of those murdered by the Pol Pot regime in the Killing Fields of Cambodia in a shrine to the dead.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/phnom-penh-cambodia-jan-11th-2012-1164118168?src=lEuSApQg3BZvP9NUPoIzNw-2-51">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seventy years after the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf">UN Convention</a> on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide came into force, its effectiveness is disputed. </p>
<p>Jewish laywer and Polish refugee, Raphael Lemkin, coined the word <a href="http://genocidewatch.net/2013/03/14/raphael-lemkin-defines-genocide-2/">“genocide”</a> in 1943 to describe the killing and destruction of peoples, deriving the word from the Greek “genos” (people, tribe or race) and the Latin “cide” (killing). Against the backdrop of the Holocaust, this had been, in the words of Winston Churchill, a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20141120-shining-a-light-on-genocide">“crime without a name”</a> – at least officially. But on December 9, 1948, the international community formally adopted a definition of genocide within the 1948 convention – essentially enshrining the message of <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/695150-never-again-becomes-more-than-a-slogan-it-s-a-prayer">“never again”</a> in international law. </p>
<p>But questions over whether the convention has achieved what it set out to do focus on three key failings. First, the very application of the term “genocide” is applied too slowly and cautiously when atrocities happen. Second, the international community fails to act effectively against genocides. Third, too few perpetrators are actually convicted of their crimes. </p>
<h2>Failure to define</h2>
<p>Consider how many genocides have occurred since the 1948 convention and its ratification in 1951. Now consider that only three have been legally recognised – and led to trials – under the convention: <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13431486">Rwanda</a> in 1994, Bosnia (and the 1995 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/28/dutch-soldiers-let-300-muslims-die-in-bosnian-war-court-rules">Srebrenica massacre</a>), and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46217896">Cambodia</a> under the 1975-9 Pol Pot regime.</p>
<p>The widespread killing and displacement of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-islamic-state-yazidi-sex-slaves-genocide-sinjar-death-toll-number-kidnapped-study-un-lse-a7726991.html">Yazidi</a> by IS and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/24/rohingya-genocide-is-still-going-on-says-top-un-investigator">Rohingya</a> in Myanmar are ongoing and recognised by the UN as a whole, but have yet to be officially recognised as genocides by some individual states. Similarly, 13 years after atrocities took place in the Sudanese region of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">Darfur</a>, criminal investigations continue but no official charges of genocide have been made under the convention. </p>
<p>Perhaps more broadly applied than the legal definition is the academic one – something which changes subtly depending on who is defining it. Criminologist <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Crime-All-Crimes-Criminology-Genocide/dp/1479859486/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1544973114&sr=8-1&keywords=rafter+genocide">Nicole Rafter</a>, for example, also specifically named the Indonesian genocide of 1965-66 and the Guatemalan genocide of 1981-83.</p>
<p>Political scientist <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Genocide-Comprehensive-Introduction-Adam-Jones/dp/1138823848/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1544973142&sr=1-1&keywords=jones+genocide">Adam Jones</a>, meanwhile, also names the genocides committed <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb1d0.html">under Saddam Hussein</a> against the Kurds in 1988-91 in Iraq, and by West Pakistan forces against <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/genocide-us-cant-remember-bangladesh-cant-forget-180961490/">Bangladeshis</a> in 1971. He also highlights crimes committed during <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2010/09/23/naimark-stalin-genocide-092310/">Stalin’s “Great Terror”</a> and by China in <a href="http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/outlook/opinions-and-columns/4643-china-is-guilty-of-mass-genocide-against-12-million-people-of-tibet">Tibet</a>.</p>
<p>And the list of “genocides” that <em>might</em> fall under the UN definition is frighteningly long. The International Criminal Court is investigating several states in which human rights violations and war crimes “may” have occurred.</p>
<p>Myanmar already is under criminal investigation over its treatment of its Muslim Rohingya minority, and the genocide against the Yazidi has been defined by the UN as such. Other “genocides”, such as that involving Australia’s <a href="https://australianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/stolen-generations/">“stolen generations”</a>, are academically debated but have never formally or legally been recognised as such. Indeed, many states may not acknowledge a genocide when others do. The US, for example, famously never officially recognised the <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_armeniangenocide.html?mcubz">1915 Armenian genocide</a> as one. </p>
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<p>In her 2018 Nobel lecture, Nobel Peace Prize winner <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqB0cMvGnIk">Nadia Murad</a>, a survivor of the most recent (Yazidi) genocide, referred to several other instances when the Yazidi people have been victims of the same crime, but these atrocities have never officially been recognised. </p>
<p>There is, it seems, an ongoing distinction between “genocide” and genocide.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nobel-peace-prize-awarded-to-nadia-murad-and-denis-mukwege-for-campaigns-against-sexual-violence-104494">Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Nadia Murad and Denis Mukwege for campaigns against sexual violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Failure to act</h2>
<p>Prevention is a critical part of the convention and parties can call upon the UN to intervene when they have evidence of a genocide. The actual application of this, however, has been woeful. </p>
<p>Former UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged, for example, that UN troops were pulled out of Rwanda “<a href="http://webtv.un.org/assets/rss/video3804186128001/watch/ban-ki-moon-commemoration-of-the-20th-anniversary-of-the-rwandan-genocide-kigali-rwanda/3446330426001/?term=&page=3">when they were most needed</a>” and further acknowledged that the innocent at Srebrenica were “abandoned to slaughter” in 1995.</p>
<p>Atrocities committed by government troops against Tamils in <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21884&LangID=E">Sri Lanka</a> between 1983 and 2009 were never officially recognised as a genocide, but UN troops stationed there also stood by impotently as thousands were massacred, and the world watched in apparent indifference. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250953/original/file-20181217-185240-12ziytg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Names of victims inscribed on the National Memorial to the victims of genocide in Kigali, Rwanda.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/kigali-rwanda-march-2-2017-names-615677552?src=Ey6MwH4GAcQKso1S7KEUbw-1-0">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/13/politics/house-resolution-myanmar-genocide/index.html">December 15, 2018</a>, The US House of Representatives formally labelled the crimes against the Rohingya in Myanmar as a genocide but still there is inaction to support those displaced in Bangladesh and help them to rebuild their lives. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/30/bangladesh-and-myanmar-agree-to-start-rohingya-repatriation-in-mid-november">Myanmar remains unsafe</a> for them. The status of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/14/middleeast/yazidi-iraq-uk-asylum-intl/index.html">Yazidi refugees</a> is also still in a state of flux and many are fearful of returning to their homes.</p>
<p>Some criminal investigations are underway while the genocides continue. And when the physical evidence of killings is uncovered, evidence of the criminal <em>intent</em> for genocide must also be gathered, and the ringleaders identified and caught. </p>
<h2>Failure to prosecute</h2>
<p>The true number of perpetrators in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia is unknown, but still only a handful have been convicted. So far, <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">93</a> Rwandans and <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases">161</a> former Yugoslavian perpetrators have been indicted. But there have been only two UN-backed prosecutions of Cambodian perpetrators of genocide. Indeed, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/16/khmer-rouge-leaders-genocide-charges-verdict-cambodia">Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan</a> were already serving life sentences for their crimes against humanity in Cambodia when they were convicted, while countless others live freely in the country, untouched by international law. Surely more must be done.</p>
<p>In thanking the Nobel committee for her peace prize, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqB0cMvGnIk">Murad stated</a> that “the only prize in the world that may restore our dignity, is justice and the prosecution of criminals”. With so few convictions to date, the international community has much catching up to do if Murad’s wish for a more peaceful future is to be realised. </p>
<p>Seventy years after the UN Convention, genocide remains ever present in our global society. For Nobel laureate and Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/695150-never-again-becomes-more-than-a-slogan-it-s-a-prayer">“never again”</a> was “a prayer, a promise, a vow”. Unfortunately, this vow is all too often broken.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachael Burns previously received PhD funding from ESRC. </span></em></p>For Nobel laureate and Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, ‘never again’ was ‘a prayer, a promise, a vow’. Unfortunately, this vow is all too often broken.Rachael Burns, Associate Lecturer in Criminology, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1018372018-08-21T07:14:22Z2018-08-21T07:14:22ZKofi Annan: a man who paid his dues to global peace and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232654/original/file-20180820-30593-1un7mqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/ Fredrik Persson</span></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>All the world’s a stage; And all the men and women merely players; They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts. (<a href="https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/you-it-act-ii-scene-vii-all-worlds-stage">As you like it</a>, Act II, scene VII, William Shakespeare.) </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, Kofi Annan, born in 1938, entered the world in the City of Kumasi in Ghana, and exited the world in 2018 as a humanitarian, a true statesman and a peacebuilder.</p>
<p>He became Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) a few years after the demise of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the bi-polar world reduced to the barest minimum the constraints imposed by the Cold War rivalry on the world body. It also led to the expansion of its role and responsibilities to address the new challenges and dimensions of security. </p>
<p>Annan’s tenure began a few years after the (re)introduction of two important international security lexicons – peacebuilding and human security. These two were popularised in the UN commissioned works by former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s <a href="http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm">An Agenda for Peace</a> (1992) and the Pakistani economist, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-mahbub-ul-haq-1169323.html">Mahbub ul Haq</a>. Boutros-Ghali’s initiative expanded the UN’s role and responsibilities to the world. It also redefined global peace and security architecture. </p>
<p>The 1990s was characterised by complex and intractable armed conflicts. The period saw a significant shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. There was a rise in the number of
failed states as well as egregious violations of human rights.</p>
<p>As the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and later the Secretary-General, Annan’s task of overseeing the implementation of the new security agenda was no doubt arduous. </p>
<h2>The fight against poverty</h2>
<p>Throughout his life Annan committed himself to peace and security, human rights and rule of law. He was committed to ensuring respect for human rights and improving human security. Both were considered important in improving the quality of living of people. On one occasion he <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/68/pdf/human_security/FINAL%20Gasper_HumanSecurityApproach_UNGA-18June2014.pdf">remarked</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…anyone who speaks forcefully for human rights but does nothing about human security and human development – or vice versa – undermines both his credibility and his cause. So let us speak with one voice on all three issues.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He pursued the agenda of improving the quality of people by getting world leaders to commit themselves to addressing the basic concerns of the world’s population – poverty. In his <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf">2000 report</a>, We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21st century, he urged member states to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Put people at the centre of everything we do …. to make their lives better.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the concluding part of the report, Annan <a href="https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf">admonished</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Free our fellow men and women from the abject and dehumanising poverty in which more than 1 billion of them are currently confined. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Throughout his international public service, measures to address the basic needs of people were ever present, both in his words and deeds. Even on retirement, he continued to work for the improvement of the living standards of ordinary people.</p>
<h2>The reformist</h2>
<p>Annan was a reformist. On taking up the post as the seventh Secretary-General of the UN, he <a href="http://www.g77.org/doc/policy%20brief.htm">drove</a> the implementation of two management reports on reform. The first introduced a cabinet kind of body which assisted the Secretary-General in the effective running of the organisation. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1020&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1020&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/232656/original/file-20180820-30608-19zde3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1020&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former UN Secretary-general Kofi Annan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Lynn Bo bo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second established of the position of Deputy Secretary-General and the reduction of administrative costs to the world body. He presided over reforms intended to make the UN an effective international peace and security interlocutor. In his <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061213000423/http:/www.un.org/largerfreedom/">progress report</a> he made further far reaching recommendations for the expansion of the Security Council and a number of other <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061213172029/http:/www.un.org/mandatereview/">reforms</a> that brought about significant changes to the UN. </p>
<p>His past experiences shaped his international engagements, especially on international intervention to save humanitarian catastrophes. The failure of the UN to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre when Annan served as the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were key events in this context.</p>
<p>Under Annan, the UN General Assembly in 2005 endorsed the doctrine of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_Protect">Responsibility to Protect</a>” following the incorporation of this doctrine in his report, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/in_larger_freedom.shtml%7CIn">Larger Freedom</a>. </p>
<p>In the preparation to invade Iraq in 2003, Annan condemned the US and the UK, urging them not to do so without the support of the UN. He believed the intervention didn’t conform with the UN charter, and was therefore <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm">illegal</a>.</p>
<h2>Reflections</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pPXpiXQ45osC&pg=PA90&lpg=PA90&dq=All+of+us+must+bitterly+regret+that+we+did+not+do+more+to+prevent+it&source=bl&ots=JFLE201ClH&sig=eYK3IYyO3_9Rze--faz7aj7dePs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi-r-2q1PncAhXQY1AKHfa2ApIQ6AEwBHoECAUQAQ#v=onepage&q=All%20of%20us%20must%20bitterly%20regret%20that%20we%20did%20not%20do%20more%20to%20prevent%20it&f=false">memoir</a> which he coauthored with his former advisor and speechwriter, Nader Mousavizadeh, Annan, he reflected on his roles at the UN. </p>
<p>On the Rwandan genocide, one of the significant lapses that dented the UN’s peacekeeping reputation, Annan reported on how he lobbied about 100 governments – and made personal calls to others – to assist with the passage of the Security Council Resolution (918) to dispatch about 5,500 troops to the country. He recalls how he received no single serious offer for troop contribution. </p>
<p>The 1999 independent investigation into what had happened categorically concluded that the UN had failed to prevent, and stop, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486">genocide in Rwanda</a>. As Secretary-General during the investigation, Annan accepted responsibility of the lapses during the genocide in Rwanda. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it,</p>
</blockquote>
<p>pointing out that UN peace force at the time was “neither mandated nor equipped” for the kind of forceful action needed to prevent the genocide.</p>
<p>Nonetheless with a deeper refection, Annan said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>On behalf of the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Recounting more recently on the genocide in Rwanda and his later diplomatic undertakings after the end of his tenure as the Secretary General, Annan said he’d learnt some useful lessons:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I realised after the genocide that there was more that I could and should have done to sound the alarm and rally support. This painful memory, along with that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44412275">has influenced</a> much of my thinking, and many of my actions, as secretary-general". </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He was to put these lessons into practice as he continued to pursue avenues for peace in conflicts around the world. For example, six months after his appointment as the UN-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Annan <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/08/416872-kofi-annan-resigns-un-arab-league-joint-special-envoy-syrian-crisis">resigned</a>. His reasons included the stalemate in the Security Council to take measures that could ensure a peaceful resolution to the Syrian crisis as well as the intransigence of both the Assad regime and the rebels towards a peaceful outcome. </p>
<p>And in 2016 he headed the Rakhine Commission which was appointed to look into the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar. The commission’s recommendations were unpopular to both sides. But in 2018 the Myanmar civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi accepted the commission’s recommendations and convened a new board, ostensibly to implement them.</p>
<p>Annan acquitted himself well as an international diplomat, a humanist and peace-builder. He lived a fulfilled life, and contributed significantly in his chosen career. Kofi ‘Damirifa Duei Duei ne amane hunu’ (Rest in Peace).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101837/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission IN the UK for my PhD</span></em></p>Kofi Annan’s tenure began after the reintroduction of two important international security lexicons – peacebuilding and human security.Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/943312018-04-24T13:21:14Z2018-04-24T13:21:14ZClimate change is not a key cause of conflict, finds new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214265/original/file-20180411-549-1vn9u0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=822%2C0%2C3864%2C2700&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Piyaset / www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“The Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis”, wrote the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html">then-UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon</a> back in 2007, about an ongoing war which arose, he said, “at least in part from climate change”. Since then the idea that climate change has caused and will cause human conflict and mass migrations has become more and more accepted – just look at the claimed effects of droughts in Syria and Ethiopia.</p>
<p>The media has even started using terms such as “climate refugees” and “environmental migrants” to describe people fleeing their homes from these climate-driven conflicts. But it isn’t clear whether there is much evidence for this link between climate change and conflict – there certainly seems to be no consensus within the academic literature.</p>
<p>In our recent <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0096-6">paper</a>, my student Erin Owain and I decided to test the climate-conflict hypothesis, using East Africa as our focus. The region is already very hot and very poor, making it especially vulnerable to climate change (in fact neighbouring Chad is by some measures the single <a href="https://theconversation.com/chad-is-the-country-most-vulnerable-to-climate-change-heres-why-78423">most vulnerable country</a> in the world). </p>
<p>As the planet warms, East Africa’s seasonal rains are expected to become <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/">much more unpredictable</a>. This is a particular problem as recent economic development has been concentrated in agriculture, a highly climate-sensitive sector that accounts for more than half of the entire economy in countries like Ethiopia or Sudan. One study led by the European Commission found that declining rainfall over the past century may have <a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/rest.2010.11212">reduced GDP across Africa by 15-40%</a> compared with the rest of the developing world. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214473/original/file-20180412-543-awxi8j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chilling in North Darfur.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Albert Gonzalez Farran, UN/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>East Africa also has a long history of conflict and human displacement, which persists in some countries to this day, such as the civil wars in Sudan and Somalia. The <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/">UN Refugee Agency reports</a> there were more than 20m displaced people in Africa in 2016 – a third of the world’s total. The <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-million-to-migrate-within-countries-by-2050-world-bank-report">World Bank</a> predicts this could rise up to 86m by 2050 due to climate change. </p>
<h2>Is it really because of climate change?</h2>
<p>To test the climate-conflict hypothesis, Erin and I therefore focused on the ten main countries in East Africa. We used a new <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html">database</a> that records major episodes of political violence and number of total displaced people for the past 50 years for each of the ten countries. We then statistically compared these records both at a country and a regional level with the appropriate climatic, economic and political indicators.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=926&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1164&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1164&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216134/original/file-20180424-57601-7rntx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1164&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lower levels of conflict are associated with economic growth and stable politics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0096-6">Owain and Maslin, 2018</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We found that climate variations such as regional drought and global temperature did not significantly impact the level of regional conflict or the number of total displaced people. The major driving forces on conflict were rapid population growth, reduced or negative economic growth and instability of political regimes. Numbers of total displaced people were linked to rapid population growth and low or stagnating economic growth. </p>
<p>The evidence from East Africa is that no single factor can fully explain conflict and the displacement of people. Instead, conflict seems to be linked primarily to long-term population growth, short-term economic recessions and extreme political instability. Halvard Buhaug, a professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, looked at the same questions in 2015 and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.336">his study</a> reached much the same conclusion: sociopolitical factors were more important than climate change.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214268/original/file-20180411-566-ixe3e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fetching water in Ethiopia, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Melih Cevdet Teksen/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>But refugees are linked to climate change</h2>
<p>Things were different for “refugees”, however – those displaced people who were forced to cross borders between countries. Refugee numbers were related to the usual demographic and socio-economic factors. But in contrast to total displaced people and occurrence of conflict, variations in refugee numbers were found to be related significantly to the incidence of severe regional droughts. And these droughts can in turn be <a href="https://theconversation.com/droughts-in-east-africa-some-headway-in-unpacking-whats-causing-them-75476">linked to</a> a long-term drying trend ascribed to anthropogenic climate change.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=706&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=706&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=706&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216133/original/file-20180424-57611-1u5ke77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">As droughts have become more severe, refugee numbers have increased.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0096-6">Owain and Maslin, 2018</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, it is important to consider the counterfactual: had there been slower population growth, stronger economies and more stable political regimes, would these droughts still have led to more refugees? That’s beyond the scope of our study, which may not be a definitive test of the links between climate change and conflict. But the occurrence of peaks in both conflict and displaced people in the 1980s and 1990s across East Africa suggest that decolonisation and the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/africas-forever-wars/">end of the Cold War</a> could have been key issues. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, while conflict has decreased across the region since the end of the Cold War, the number of displaced people remains high. We argue that with good stable governance there is no reason why climate change should lead to greater conflict or displacement of people, despite the World Bank’s dire predictions. Water provides one reason to be optimistic. The <a href="http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml">UN reports</a> that, over the past 50 years, there have been 150 international water resource treaties signed compared to 37 disputes that involved violence. </p>
<p>What our study suggests is the failure of political systems is the primary cause of conflict and displacement of large numbers of people. We also demonstrate that within socially and geopolitically fragile systems, climate change may potentially exacerbate the situation particularly with regards to enforced migration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94331/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Maslin is a Professor at University College London, Founding Director of Rezatec Ltd, Director of The London NERC Doctoral Training Partnership and a member of Cheltenham Science Festival Advisory Committee. He is an unpaid member of the Sopra-Steria CSR Board. He has received funding in the past from the NERC, EPSRC, ESRC, Royal Society, DIFD, DECC, FCO, Innovate UK, Carbon Trust, UK Space Agency, European Space Agency, Leverhulme Trust and British Council.</span></em></p>We looked at ten countries in East Africa and found poverty and politics were much more important drivers of conflict and displacement than climate change.Mark Maslin, Professor of Earth System Science, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/861672017-11-27T12:25:58Z2017-11-27T12:25:58ZForeign parliaments are not powerless to help the Rohingya – their pressure on Myanmar is vital<p>As the pope <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42132594">made a high profile</a> visit to Myanmar in late November, attention turned to how to help the thousands of Rohingya Muslims who have fled their homes to Bangladesh following violence and what UN officials have described as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/rohingya-flee-to-bangladesh-to-escape-myanmar-military-strikes">ethnic cleansing</a>. A deal <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42094060">struck</a> between the two countries to start returning the refugees, has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-and-bangladesh-strike-a-shameful-deal-on-rohingya-refugees-88041">criticised</a> for going against international refugee law. </p>
<p>Western politicians have also travelled to Myanmar and Bangladesh to witness the crisis in recent months. In September, the British foreign office minister Mark Field <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/mark-field-burmese-military-to-blame-for-humanitarian-crisis-facing-rohingya-11125307">travelled</a> to Rakhine state, the centre of the violence. Members of the US senate also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/u-s-congress-members-decry-ethnic-cleansing-in-myanmar-suu-kyi-doubts-allegations-idUSKBN1DL0CO">travelled there</a> in November. The British Labour MP Rosena Allin-Khan, a doctor, then <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p05nrdsj">travelled</a> to Bangladesh to work in a refugee camp there.</p>
<p>We believe that parliaments in foreign countries, such as those in Europe, can contribute to a resolution of the Rohingya crisis. Many parliaments have the authority and power to shape government policy. Governments such as Myanmar’s are sensitive to foreign opinions. The British and Dutch governments have, for instance, facilitated <a href="http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/business/aec/30317885">extensive business investments</a> in the water management infrastructure of Myanmar – and it is not in the country’s interest to lose them. A forceful call from parliaments in Europe could strengthen the existing condemnation by European governments that violence towards the Rohingya population has consequences for Mynamar’s future relations with European countries.</p>
<p><em><strong>Read more: <a href="https://theconversation.com/they-shot-my-two-daughters-in-front-of-me-rohingya-tell-heartbreaking-stories-of-loss-and-forced-migration-86153">‘They shot my two daughters in front of me’: Rohingya tell heartbreaking stories of loss and forced migration</a></strong></em></p>
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<h2>What happened in Darfur</h2>
<p>Our elected representatives can play an important role in shaping the way Western governments respond to gross human rights violations. In our research, we <a href="http://rdcu.be/wbzw">analysed</a> the actions of parliaments and individual MPs in the Netherlands, France and the UK at the start of the Darfur crisis in Sudan 13 years ago. While the Darfur and Rohingya crises are quite different, they are also similar in some important aspects. In both situations, a grave humanitarian situation followed attacks on a marginalised ethnic group, and Western governments limited their involvement to diplomacy and humanitarian assistance.</p>
<p>Our research showed that in the case of Darfur, the Dutch and UK parliaments had some measurable effect on changing the policy of their own governments, for example through requests for additional funding for humanitarian workers and an African Union monitoring mission. Relative to the French parliament, the UK and Dutch parliaments have greater constitutional rights in foreign policy, such as the right to ratify international treaties or deploy the military. This allowed MPs to be more active in shaping their governments’ response to the Darfur crisis through debates, parliamentary questions and motions.</p>
<p>Knowledge and expertise in committees and from individual MPs help parliaments to ask relevant questions and make useful suggestions for policy. We found this to be the case for the UK and Netherlands. In these two countries and France, we found that ideological party divisions were largely absent from discussions on the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. This gives hope that parliamentarians can form a unifying front on human rights violations. </p>
<h2>European parliaments and the Rohingya</h2>
<p>We have found similar patterns in the response to the Rohingya crisis. In the <a href="https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1772.html">Netherlands</a> and <a href="http://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-10-17/debates/85ADE193-5E40-4798-B15F-F916C81CD87D/TheRohingyaAndTheMyanmarGovernment">UK</a>, MPs sitting on foreign affairs and development cooperation committees have discussed the Rohingya crisis with relevant ministers in recent weeks. We have found no such debates in France, although <a href="http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q15/15-1671QE.htm">some</a> <a href="http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q15/15-1383QE.htm">French</a> <a href="http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q15/15-1051QE.htm">MPs</a> submitted <a href="http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/recherche/questions">questions</a> to the French minister of foreign affairs. In each country, MPs from most political parties encouraged governments to be bold in emergency aid and to exert pressure on Myanmar’s military to halt their actions.</p>
<p>One problem is that MPs often respond when there is a lot of media attention. Unfortunately, specialist reports by NGOs or their own governments, often written <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state">long before the issue reaches a crisis point</a>, are rarely as effective in triggering a forceful response from MPs. At the moment that MPs become more interested, they often find that their governments are too far ahead in formulating a policy response to the crisis for parliamentary involvement to have a meaningful effect. </p>
<p>Some individual politicians do try to bring the issue to their government’s attention at an early stage. For instance, the House of Lords debated the Rohingya situation in <a href="http://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2017-01-12/debates/3D6CABAD-A187-4944-A8FE-2BE522FA7998/BurmaRohingya">January</a> 2017, and some MPs in the <a href="https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20162017-1290.html">Netherlands</a> and <a href="http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q14/14-101469QE.htm">France</a> submitted questions. When the UK foreign minister, Boris Johnson, went to Myanmar in February 2017, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/boris-johnson-urged-to-use-myanmar-trip-to-press-aung-san-suu-kyi-on-rohingya">urged by MPs</a> to raise the issue of the Rohingya. </p>
<p>Foreign affairs are not the exclusive domain of world leaders and their ministers. Through parliamentary representatives, citizens can demand that governments prevent foreseeable emerging crises from occurring and give them credit when doing so. But this requires timely intervention and unity within parliament. </p>
<p>There is no guarantee that this could have prevented the current crisis in Myanmar, or would stop other ones in the future. But we do believe that MPs can play a stronger and more positive role in humanitarian crises than they often do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wessel Vermeulen was employed in the past as a research assistant at Maastricht University through funding from the Horstman Foundation to research the role of third parties in the Darfur crisis.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andreja Pegan works on the COHESIFY project, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement no 693427. In the past, Andreja Pegan received funding from Luxembourg National Research Fund under the AFR call. </span></em></p>Foreign MPs can strengthen the message that violence towards the Rohingya has consequences for Myanmar’s future relations with European countries.Wessel Vermeulen, Lecturer in Economics, Newcastle UniversityAndreja Pegan, Research Fellow, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/803342017-08-30T14:27:38Z2017-08-30T14:27:38ZCutting the UN’s peacekeeping budget will cost the world dear<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/183760/original/file-20170829-10438-1rmhqbj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cutting back on peace keeping.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/new-york-ny-usa-september-24-488226595?src=SZNN9enf6F4yyPTFAOutmA-1-0">Shutterstock/Osugi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations General Assembly voted this summer to cut $US600m from its peacekeeping budget. This is the money which pays for more than 100,000 troops, police and civilians in 16 missions across the world.</p>
<p>The reduction in funds was <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/un-peacekeeping-budget-cut-by-600-million-dollars/3923664.html">pushed for by the Trump administration</a>, and immediately labelled a success by the White House. But there are fears that the spending cuts hailed by US Ambassador Nikki Haley could come at a huge price.</p>
<p>Haley was <a href="http://time.com/4838459/nikki-haley-tweet-un-peacekeepers-reaction/">widely criticised</a> after she boasted of over half a billion dollars being slashed from the peacekeeping budget. “We’re only getting started,” she added enthusiastically.</p>
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<p>Peacekeeping consists of more than a military presence. As well maintaining ceasefires and agreements, it is intimately involved in the political aspects of the peace process. Work by civilians can drive political engagement and create environments conducive to lasting peace.</p>
<p>Even a cursory read of peace operation mandates shows the serious implications of the existing gap between available resources and the work needed. Neither the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/">United Nations Security Council</a> nor the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/about.shtml">Fifth Committee</a> (responsible for passing UN budgets) seem confident that current mandates are achievable. </p>
<p>While the idea of a peacekeeping “go-between” might appear frivolous to Ambassador Haley, this kind of delicate communication is vital. Peace operations facilitate the early steps towards peace. </p>
<p>Planning for even more cuts is an extraordinarily shortsighted approach if the US is serious in its commitment to international security. It is particularly troubling at a time when peace operations across the world are only growing in complexity.</p>
<p>In both conflict and post-conflict environments, security institutions are often weak, corrupt, and mistrusted by those they are charged with securing. Those no longer employed as combatants face a difficult time reintegrating into society. </p>
<p>In many cases, peace operations conduct <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml">disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration</a> programs that prevent former fighters from rejoining armed groups. Even during ongoing conflict, UN operations can boast success in this area. </p>
<p><a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/408/89/PDF/N1640889.pdf?OpenElement">In 2015</a>, the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur, Sudan, worked on reconciliation initiatives and local dialogue projects following attacks on internally displaced citizens. But budget shortcomings resulted in their temporary suspension.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/adf_decide_now.pdf">UN Stabilisation Mission in the Congo</a> has had modest but positive results. The modesty is largely due to the <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/99741/briefing-ddr-eastern-drc-try-try-again">strained resources</a> invested in the project. But with more than 50 armed groups operating in the country, the bill is likely to rise as the conflict persists.</p>
<p>As well as working to improve the environment for a peace process to take place, <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civil/">Civil Affairs Officers</a> conduct <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Chapter12.pdf">Quick Impact Projects</a> to foster good relations and confidence in the operation among local populations. </p>
<h2>Multi-tasking for peace</h2>
<p>These projects take many forms. <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/quick-impact-projects-qips">The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</a> included improving rubbish disposal in the cities of Kidal and Timbuktu. There was also work to increase access to electricity for residents and medical facilities. </p>
<p>Civil Affairs Officers installed water pumps in schools and city centres. To support the preservation of Mali’s cultural heritage, MINUSMA restored three libraries of manuscripts of Timbuktu. In the city of Gao, there was increased support for people affected by HIV, additional security for the main prison, and the rehabilitation of the regional orchestra.</p>
<p>Conflict recurrence is commonplace, particularly where conflicts have ended in a <a href="http://bev.berkeley.edu/Ethnic%20Religious%20Conflict/Problem%20with%20negotiated%20settlements.pdf">negotiated settlement</a>. Often this is the result of unresolved grievances affecting marginalised groups. </p>
<p>Peace operations encourage dialogue at the local level and help to establish community dynamics in which local economies can prosper and prevent disaffected groups from returning to violence. </p>
<p>Other artefacts of war persist after conflicts are settled. Landmines haunt regions until they have been detonated – either professionally or accidentally, with horrific consequences. </p>
<p>Peace operations are often involved in clearing them and educating effected populations on how to keep safe in their midst. The <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/624">UN Interim Force in Abyei</a> provided mine risk education to 28,000 residents and cleared landmines from important routes in Sudan.</p>
<p>Modern peacekeeping has many dimensions. It involves a myriad of different, specialised tasks. Slashing its funding will just put carefully crafted initiatives at risk. And people will die because of it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Helms does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Slashing funding will put carefully crafted initiatives at risk – and people will die because of it.Emily Helms, PhD candidate in Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/674812016-10-25T14:59:00Z2016-10-25T14:59:00ZSouth Africa’s reasons for leaving the ICC don’t quite add up<p>The government of South Africa <a href="https://theconversation.com/withdrawal-from-the-icc-a-sad-day-for-south-africa-and-africa-67489">intends to withdraw</a> from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It had already notified the United Nations secretary-general to explain its intentions, and its withdrawal will take effect one year after the notification. </p>
<p>According to a government <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-formally-withdrawing-icc">press release</a>, the South African Cabinet reached the decision to withdraw from the ICC for three main reasons: a desire to preserve diplomatic immunity for incumbent leaders; umbrage at the court’s incompatibility with South Africa’s diplomatic mandate; and the ICC’s supposed bias against African states. </p>
<p>Strong stuff indeed – but do these arguments really hold water?</p>
<h2>Immunity for incumbent leaders</h2>
<p>The struggle over diplomatic immunity for sitting leaders infamously came to a head in 2015 when Omar al-Bashir, the incumbent Sudanese president, visited South Africa for an African Union summit. Al-Bashir stands accused of genocide and other international crimes in Sudan’s Darfur region, and is subject to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/south-africa-to-fight-omar-al-bashirs-arrest-warrant-sudan">an ICC warrant for his arrest</a>. Despite this, he was <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashirs-escape-why-the-african-union-defies-the-icc-43226">allowed to leave South Africa</a> in apparently chaotic circumstances before he could be arrested.</p>
<p>Subsequently, in its <a href="http://www.ejiltalk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Bashir-South-Africa-Supreme-Court.pdf">2016 judgment</a>, South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that although international law doesn’t currently provide a special exception to the immunity and inviolability that heads of state enjoy when visiting foreign countries, the South African government should have arrested al-Bashir under domestic law. Persuasive in parts and <a href="http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-bashir-case-has-the-south-african-supreme-court-abolished-immunity-for-all-heads-of-states/">expansive</a> in others, the judgment described the South African government’s conduct as “disgraceful”. </p>
<p>But instead of appealing – the normal course of action for a government to take in a well-functioning legal system – the South African government instead responded by opting to withdraw from the ICC. The minister for justice and correctional services, Michael Masutha, explained that the domestic law that implements the ICC’s charter in South Africa is “in conflict and inconsistent” with the provisions of the <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-formally-withdrawing-icc">Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, 2001</a>. </p>
<p>But in the current state of affairs, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment continues to stand – as does its finding that the government acted unlawfully by allowing al-Bashir to leave.</p>
<h2>Minding their business</h2>
<p>South Africa’s second reason given for withdrawing is that the ICC impinges on the country’s own diplomatic mandate when it comes to resolving conflicts elsewhere, and in particular on the African continent.</p>
<p>As Masutha <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-formally-withdrawing-icc">explained</a>, the legal arguments around the failure to detain al-Bashir “pinpointed Pretoria’s main problem with the ICC obligation to arrest heads of state”. He went on to say that “what may need to happen is that we host conflicting parties, thus our international legal obligations may hinder our efforts to remain a key player in conflict resolution in Africa”. </p>
<p>But South Africa’s rationale in this case appears to jar with the work of the UN Security Council which, under <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf">Article 24 of the UN Charter</a>, has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It was, after all, the Security Council that considered it necessary <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm">to refer</a> the situation in Darfur to the ICC in the first place, citing violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. </p>
<p>By not arresting al-Bashir, the South African government acted contrary to paragraph two of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85FEBD1A-29F8-4EC4-9566-48EDF55CC587/283244/N0529273.pdf">UN Security Council resolution 1593 (2005)</a>, which “urges all states and concerned regional and other international organisations to cooperate fully [with the ICC]”. And by failing to live up to this responsibility, it did the institutions of international justice potentially serious harm.</p>
<h2>Anti-African bias</h2>
<p>The third reason the South African government cites is the ICC’s supposed <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-formally-withdrawing-icc">bias towards African states</a> – and this is one issue where South Africa does have a case. </p>
<p>While it is <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html?_r=1">often</a> pointed out that the majority of cases currently before the ICC are either self-referrals from African states themselves or referrals by the UN Security Council, it’s wrong to dismiss this criticism as a mere “<a href="http://www.afronline.org/?p=41792">misperception</a>”. The way the court is set up, together with its jurisdictional limitations, means there’ll inevitably be a geographic imbalance among the cases it handles. </p>
<p>A big factor is the court’s principle of “<a href="https://www.ictj.org/complementarity-icc/">complementarity</a>”, which essentially means that states have the primary responsibility to try international crimes. The role of the ICC is to try defendants for violating international law when states can’t or won’t put them on trial. </p>
<p>States that have signed up to the court and also have developed, well-functioning judicial systems of their own (such as the UK) are therefore unlikely to send defendants to be tried in the court, since they will most likely be tried domestically. States with weak justice systems, on the other hand, are more likely to refer cases to the court – and that includes many states in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>This imbalance is not necessarily a bad thing. The complementarity principle arguably impels states and regional organisations to up their judicial game. That’s what happened with the trial of Chadian dictator <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-trial-of-chadian-dictator-habre-is-a-landmark-against-impunity-60469">Hissène Habré</a>, who was tried at the <a href="http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/5/1139.abstract">Extraordinary African Chambers</a> in Senegal. He was found guilty crimes against humanity, summary execution, torture and rape, and duly sentenced to life in prison.</p>
<p>The ICC certainly has serious flaws, and it’s not in itself surprising that South Africa has apparently lost patience. But the government’s actions are a shame nonetheless. In 2002, when the Rome Statute came into force, the ICC was <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=4078&Cr=icc&Cr1=#.WA4_geArLIU">hailed</a> as a historic step forward. Here at last was a court “for trying individuals responsible for war crimes as a powerful tool for prosecuting and preventing atrocities”. </p>
<p>The court has had some successes and several setbacks in its 15 years of operation, but it remains one of the best hopes we have for bring the abusers of state power to justice. The South African government’s move to back out of it is a retrograde step – one that will only encourage impunity for powerful perpetrators of some of the world’s most heinous crimes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67481/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aldo Zammit Borda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Arguably Africa’s most powerful diplomatic player, South Africa is now backing out of the world’s most important mechanism for bringing war criminals to justice.Aldo Zammit Borda, Senior Lecturer in International Law, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.