tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/dfat-1700/articlesDFAT – The Conversation2023-05-11T01:38:53Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052242023-05-11T01:38:53Z2023-05-11T01:38:53ZAfter years of decline, the budget gives more money for diplomacy and development capability. What does this mean in practice?<p>Two weeks ago something extraordinary happened: defence recommended <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/defence-review-dfat-gets-boost">more funding for diplomacy</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">Defence Strategic Review</a> – the key planning document for defence policy – recommended more funding for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).</p>
<p>It said that national defence requires “the reversal of a long-term reduction in diplomatic resources, increasing our diplomatic efforts in areas of core national interest. Our diplomatic capability must be resourced, directed and focused”.</p>
<p>This is part of an <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-welcome-turn-to-statecraft/">increasing understanding</a> in policy circles that <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/weaving-webs-statecraft-pacific-islands">defence needs diplomacy and development</a>. This forms part of an <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-australia-can-use-all-its-tools-of-statecraft/">approach</a> known as using “<a href="https://asiapacific4d.com/idea/all-tools-of-statecraft/">all tools of statecraft</a>” or “<a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/a-shared-vision-for-australia-s-security">all elements of national power</a>” – the various instruments and levers through which Australia can exercise influence internationally to its advantage.</p>
<p>In Tuesdays’s federal budget, some steps were taken towards this with an <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-10/budget-assistance-package-pledges-2-billion-into-pacific/102322618">increase to DFAT funding</a> of $457 million.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://theconversation.com/diplomacy-is-essential-to-a-peaceful-world-so-why-did-dfats-funding-go-backwards-in-the-budget-180313">years</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-not-just-had-a-diplomacy-fail-it-has-been-devaluing-the-profession-for-decades-171498">of</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-spending-less-on-diplomacy-than-ever-before-and-its-influence-is-suffering-as-a-result-125722">decrying</a> the lack of investment in Australia’s diplomacy and development, it’s a positive to see some improvement.</p>
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<h2>What will the funding be used for?</h2>
<p>The increase in funding will be used for <a href="https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2023-24.pdf">measures</a> like “maintaining support for an effective foreign service” (code for keeping the department running) and increased diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asia. There’s also a special measure for “enhanced strategic capability” in line with DFAT’s Capability Review.</p>
<p>The Capability Review was motivated by a sense that DFAT’s instruments of foreign policy had been “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-10/budget-assistance-package-pledges-2-billion-into-pacific/102322618">underfunded and, at times, marginalised</a>” by successive governments over decades, according to one of the experts leading the review, <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/farewell-to-allan-gyngell-beloved-leader-mentor-and-friend/">Allan Gyngell</a>, who sadly passed away last week. </p>
<p>While leading the Lowy Institute, he worked with colleagues to chart Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-spending-less-on-diplomacy-than-ever-before-and-its-influence-is-suffering-as-a-result-125722">diplomatic deficit</a> and <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=9413654ca05cdc20JmltdHM9MTY4MzU5MDQwMCZpZ3VpZD0wODBmYmI2My00NjlkLTZjZmItMDkxOS1hOTYyNDdhZjZkMjYmaW5zaWQ9NTIwMQ&ptn=3&hsh=3&fclid=080fbb63-469d-6cfb-0919-a96247af6d26&psq=diplomatic+deficit&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYWZyLmNvbS9wb2xpY3kvZm9yZWlnbi1hZmZhaXJzL2F1c3RyYWxpYS1zLWRpcGxvbWF0aWMtcmFua3MtbGFjay1maXJlcG93ZXItd2hlbi10aGV5LW5lZWQtaXQtbW9zdC0yMDIxMDgxMC1wNThobjk&ntb=1">disrepair</a>. One of his legacies is a focus on the importance of diplomacy and development as <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=9413654ca05cdc20JmltdHM9MTY4MzU5MDQwMCZpZ3VpZD0wODBmYmI2My00NjlkLTZjZmItMDkxOS1hOTYyNDdhZjZkMjYmaW5zaWQ9NTIwMQ&ptn=3&hsh=3&fclid=080fbb63-469d-6cfb-0919-a96247af6d26&psq=diplomatic+deficit&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYWZyLmNvbS9wb2xpY3kvZm9yZWlnbi1hZmZhaXJzL2F1c3RyYWxpYS1zLWRpcGxvbWF0aWMtcmFua3MtbGFjay1maXJlcG93ZXItd2hlbi10aGV5LW5lZWQtaXQtbW9zdC0yMDIxMDgxMC1wNThobjk&ntb=1">key parts of Australia’s engagement with the world</a> through helping establish the <a href="https://www.asiapacific4d.com/">Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue</a> (AP4D). Another is the DFAT Capability Review.</p>
<p>Reports suggest the review includes <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/plan-dfat-boost-for-ineffective-diplomats/news-story/72f9f31c7227248016536023c6a05b6a">recommendations</a> to improve DFAT’s skills, expertise and tradecraft – including specialist knowledge of emerging areas and the ability to anticipate and prepare for future risks. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/may/08/australias-diplomatic-network-has-serious-gaps-and-needs-boost-review-warns?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter">aim</a> is to “build the high-performing and influential foreign service that Australia needs for the future”, that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/may/08/australias-diplomatic-network-has-serious-gaps-and-needs-boost-review-warns?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1683584906">can</a> “make Australia’s case and seek to avert shocks or conflict”.</p>
<p>The review seems to have led directly to the budget investment in lifting DFAT’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-10/budget-assistance-package-pledges-2-billion-into-pacific/102322618">strategic communications capability</a> and improving communications networks. I like to think Allan would be pleased to see growing recognition turning into some improved investment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/penny-wong-said-this-week-national-power-comes-from-our-people-are-we-ignoring-this-most-vital-resource-203145">Penny Wong said this week national power comes from 'our people'. Are we ignoring this most vital resource?</a>
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<p>The budget has also made a specific investment in development capability - the ability to plan, manage and evaluate international development programs. Concerns remain that the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-09/pat-conroy-dfat-wants-development-specialists-ausaid-/101951876">amalgamation of Australia’s independent aid agency AusAID with DFAT in 2013</a> led to a significant loss of experience. Consultations by the <a href="https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/61aeea4630faad7963d2fc75/63fbee3f1ed0511db4dfcd6e_Pulse%20Check_Development_Policy.pdf">Development Intelligence Lab</a> think tank identified <a href="https://www.devintelligencelab.com/intel/27april2023">development capability</a> as a major hindrance to Australia’s development program. </p>
<p>This capability gap will be addressed by funding of $36.8m over four years for an “<a href="https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2023-24.pdf">Australian Development Program Fit for Our Times</a>” to strengthen areas such as program design, implementation, evaluation and accountability. It will be used to invest in people, skills and expertise to ensure Australia’s development program can meet the needs of priorities of partner countries. This was apparently a key point from consultations for Australia’s new international development policy. Further details will be available when the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power">policy is released shortly</a>.</p>
<p>This balances the news that overseas development assistance – after <a href="https://devpolicy.org/labor-promises-not-to-cut-aid-20230510/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=labor-promises-not-to-cut-aid-20230510">a boost in the October budget</a> – only got a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-10/budget-assistance-package-pledges-2-billion-into-pacific/102322618">small increase</a> in this budget. With a bigger economy, that means Australia’s aid will be at a <a href="https://acfid.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ACFID-2023-24-Federal-Budget-Analysis.pdf?mc_cid=cea18d47b4&mc_eid=14695f01a9">historic low</a> as a percentage of national income. Australia has now slid to <a href="https://devpolicy.org/global-aid-2022-australia-risk-becoming-global-minnow-20230414/">near the bottom of the rankings</a> of developed countries.</p>
<p>This suggests development should be next in line for some love. Australian Council for International Development chief executive Marc Purcell has <a href="https://acfid.asn.au/aid-budget-slow-but-steady/?mc_cid=cea18d47b4&mc_eid=14695f01a9">called for</a> “the government to demonstrate they will rebalance resources in development and diplomacy, in order to create the prosperous and stable region that they speak of wanting to see”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/steadying-foreign-aid-budget-signals-the-government-takes-development-seriously-193088">Steadying foreign aid budget signals the government takes development seriously</a>
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<p>If the budget were $100, Australia <a href="https://devpolicy.org/aidtracker/trends/">would be spending</a> $7 on defence, 7 cents on development, and a copper coin on diplomacy. So a focus on increasing diplomatic and development capability is welcome.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/investing-secure-australias-interests-world">joint statement on Tuesday</a>, Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong said “the Albanese government’s approach in the budget will make Australia more influential in the world, by investing in all elements of our statecraft including diplomatic power, trade and development”.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/dfat-show-me-money">hope</a> is that this budget is a step towards putting reality to the rhetoric of respecting and resourcing the different tools of statecraft.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205224/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Conley Tyler is Executive Director of the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D), a platform for collaboration between the development, diplomacy and defence communities. It receives funding from the Australian Civil-Military Centre and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is hosted by the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID).</span></em></p>The budget increases funding for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade by over $450 million, in what’s a positive first step towards remedying our long-term reduction in diplomatic resources.Melissa Conley Tyler, Honorary Fellow, Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997822023-02-22T05:56:51Z2023-02-22T05:56:51ZWhy security vetting in Australia can be detrimental to diversity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510257/original/file-20230215-14-a7bdn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6016%2C4007&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/Q80LYxv_Tbs">Unsplash/Christina@wocintechchat.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The public sector union has levelled complaints at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) this month, alleging that many diverse candidates who’d been given a conditional offer into the graduate program were then denied <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-10/dfat-accused-of-bungling-2023-graduate-program-recruitment/101954814">due to delays in security vetting</a>. This reportedly lead to the rejection of around a quarter of the applicants.</p>
<p>Candidates wanting to work in the public service are required to undergo security vetting if they are to handle classified information. The ABC reports there’s anecdotal evidence this process <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-10/dfat-accused-of-bungling-2023-graduate-program-recruitment/101954814">takes longer for Australians who are born overseas or have family overseas</a>, because of extra checks to ensure such candidates won’t be influenced by foreign governments. The union claims such delays are leading to many diverse candidates missing out on government jobs.</p>
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<p>In 2020, it was <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7044741/wasted-talent-security-clearance-system-discourages-chinese-australians/">reported</a> that Chinese Australians with family living overseas found it challenging to secure jobs in diplomacy due to the difficulty of such security checks. </p>
<p>This issue isn’t unique to Australia, nor to diplomacy. The <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/press-releases/investigation-into-the-performance-of-uk-security-vetting/">UK National Audit Office found</a> security vetting delays were affecting government operations more generally. New Zealand has identified greater diversity in their national security sector as a <a href="https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-10/Draft%20National%20Security%20Long-term%20Insights%20Briefing_1.pdf">key challenge</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed security vetting processes are a critical part of achieving diversity in government. While vetting processes may not be as visible or studied as other elements of the recruitment process, they ultimately determine who progresses, and what position individuals can achieve in government.</p>
<p>Our yet to be published research has, since 2021, focused on vetting in the context of wider social changes over the last six decades and how that may affect diversity. </p>
<p>Vetting processes are legitimate tools for assessing potential national security threats, and don’t directly discriminate on grounds such as gender, sexuality or ethnicity. </p>
<p>But they’re reliant on subjective judgements and may not take into account changing societal norms and wider structural inequalities and discrimination.</p>
<p>Vetting processes can mean decision-makers <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1201-1-v2.html">avoid risk or apply unconscious bias</a>, leading to illegitimate processes of exclusion that are difficult to challenge or review.</p>
<h2>How did we get here?</h2>
<p>Current security vetting practices in Australia and the United States were largely formed in the 1940s and 1950s in response to the emerging Cold War and the need to combat “insider threats”. Laws and policies like the Immigration Restriction Act (the cornerstone of the White Australia Policy) influenced the political culture at the time, as did the Marriage Bar, which restricted married women from government service.</p>
<p>Clearance processes assess candidates for “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/security/clearances/about/overview#:%7E:text=These%20character%20traits%20are%3A%20honesty,vulnerable%20to%20influence%20or%20coercion.">a sound and stable character</a>”. In Australia, vetting practices are currently informed by the <a href="https://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/sites/default/files/pspf-persec-12-eligibility-suitability-personnel.DOCX">Protective Security Policy Framework</a> and are designed to look for “suitability indicators”. These include honesty, trustworthiness, tolerance, maturity, loyalty and resilience. Similar practices are followed globally. </p>
<p>But if you’re from any kind of historically marginalised or under-represented community, how “suitability” is determined may raise flags. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850600150501317">research</a> into US intelligence found that until 1975, the intelligence community openly barred homosexuals, looking for evidence of “sexual deviance” during vetting. Homosexuality was only fully decriminalised across all Australian states and territories just over 25 years ago. Combined with wider latent homophobia and transphobia, LGBTIQ+ communities are one such group that may have cautious relationships with authority.</p>
<p>Head of the National Security College at Australian National University, <a href="https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/department-news/18193/securing-australia-2020s">Rory Medcalf</a>, notes:</p>
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<p>The rigidities of the current [security vetting] system, which dates back to the 1950s, can be an obstacle to harnessing the talent of multicultural Australia, or simply new generations who live and think differently.</p>
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<h2>How does security vetting affect people from diverse backgrounds?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3790777">UK research</a> on security vetting in British intelligence in the early 20th century found distinct class and gender bias.</p>
<p>Researchers found men were considered to “be more patriotic and selflessly loyal” while also “vulnerable to the wiles of women”. On the other hand, women encountered many challenges, and it was believed their “true and overriding loyalties” were to their family, not the state.</p>
<p>These gendered stereotypes impacted how trustworthy the candidates were perceived to be.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/diplomacy-and-defence-remain-a-boys-club-but-women-are-making-inroads-119984">Diplomacy and defence remain a boys' club, but women are making inroads</a>
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<p>Separate <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2021.1938370">UK research</a> found that even up until more recent decades, traditional methods of recruitment, security vetting and background checks factored heavily into explicit and implicit discrimination against those who didn’t attend Oxford or Cambridge. A small exception was made for specialist linguists, or those who had dual nationality from Commonwealth or English-speaking countries. </p>
<p>Yet, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2021.1938370">the researcher</a> argued that the “wrong sort of British subject” led to curbs in hiring ethnically diverse employees in security departments.</p>
<p>In Australia, citizens with “complicated histories”, even when they are capable, can experience lengthy wait times, causing them to drop out and find another job before their security check is even finished. </p>
<h2>Transparency is needed</h2>
<p>Given roughly <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/Auditor-General_Report_2020-21_21.pdf">50,000 new security clearances are issued each year</a> across Australia’s public service, vetting isn’t a small issue.</p>
<p>Diversity issues aren’t a reflection on the commitment or talent of the contemporary vetting taskforce. But more transparency is needed to understand how vetting impacts diversity in the Australian public service.</p>
<p>In particular, we need greater transparency around who applies for and clears vetting, and who doesn’t. We also need data on who gets delayed during vetting, and about how candidates experience the vetting process. This requires more research, better data collection by agencies, and better access to (and sharing of) that data. </p>
<p>One model worth following is from the US, where intelligence and national security agencies have begun issuing annual demographic reports (which include data on vetting). Australia isn’t doing this yet, but we should be.</p>
<p>Until a greater level of transparency is available, security vetting is likely to retain structural issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199782/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elise Stephenson receives funding from the Australian Government. She is affiliated with the Australian Feminist Foreign Policy Coalition. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Harris Rimmer receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is affiliated with the Australian Feminist Foreign Policy Coalition.</span></em></p>Security vetting is reliant on subjective judgements that may not take into account wider structural inequalities and discrimination.Elise Stephenson, Deputy Director, Global Institute for Women's Leadership, Australian National UniversitySusan Harris Rimmer, Professor and Director of the Policy Innovation Hub, Griffith Business School, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1856072022-06-22T10:12:23Z2022-06-22T10:12:23ZHead of Foreign Affairs Kathryn Campbell ousted in public service shake-up<p>The secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kathryn Campbell, has been replaced in a shake-up of federal departmental heads announced by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. </p>
<p>The new secretary will be Jan Adams, who is presently ambassador to Japan and has previously served as ambassador to China. She was Australia’s ambassador for climate change when the now foreign minister, Penny Wong, was climate change minister in the Rudd government. </p>
<p>In the changes the government has brought in two people from outside the federal service. Three of the four new secretaries are women. When Scott Morrison sacked five secretaries in 2019, three were women.</p>
<p>The removal of Campbell has been widely anticipated. Before the election Wong questioned her sharply at Senate estimates. Campbell has been DFAT secretary less than a year. Formerly she served as secretary of the departments of social services and human services, and was embroiled in the Robodebt disaster. </p>
<p>Albanese said Campbell would “be taking up a senior appointment in the Defence portfolio in an AUKUS-related role”.</p>
<p>In the changes, Jenny Wilkinson, a deputy secretary at Treasury, will become head of the Finance Department. She is a former head of the Parliamentary Budget Office. Wilkinson replaces Rosemary Huxtable, who had indicated for some time she intended to retire. </p>
<p>The new Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water will be headed by David Fredericks, who shifts from his present position as secretary of the Department of Industry, Science and Resources. </p>
<p>Natalie James, a partner at Deloitte Australia, becomes secretary of the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations. She has had wide experience in public service and workplace relations, including being the Fair Work Ombudsman for the Commonwealth. </p>
<p>Jim Betts, who has worked in the NSW and Victorian public services, becomes secretary of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts. He replaces Simon Atkinson, who was regarded by Labor as too close to the Coalition. Atkinson served as a ministerial adviser from 2013-16 and cabinet secretary from 2017-18.</p>
<p>In a farewell message to staff after the announcement Atkinson said: “It is critical that the secretary is the right fit to lead and provide advice and keep the department well connected to ministers.” </p>
<p>The appointment of Gordon de Brouwer as secretary for public sector reform, in a return to the public service, is further evidence of Albanese’s determination to re-invigorate the bureaucracy. De Brouwer will report to the minister for the public service, Katy Gallagher. </p>
<p>After the election Albanese appointed Glyn Davis as head of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Part of Davis’s brief is to drive change in the service, which has been run down under the Coalition government.</p>
<p>Labor is committed to cutting the use of outside consultants, which reduced the role and capability of the public service. Both Davis and de Brouwer were members of the Thodey review of the service – the former government refused to take up many of its major recommendations that would have made the senior levels of the service more independent.</p>
<p>Albanese said a new secretary of the Industry Department would be announced soon.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kathryn Campbell, has been replaced in a shake-up of federal departmental heads announced by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1814852022-05-17T20:01:20Z2022-05-17T20:01:20Z‘Where have all you Australians gone?’ Australia’s shrinking role in cultural diplomacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463161/original/file-20220516-65142-iuuv5g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C0%2C4397%2C2476&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Almost all governments today support some funding towards promoting their international political and economic agendas through cultural activities overseas: commonly referred to as part of “cultural diplomacy” or “soft power”.</p>
<p>Cultural diplomacy is not new. Julius Caesar brought <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1284496/Skeletons-80-gladiators-slaughtered-crowds-unearthed-York.html">gladiatorial performance</a> to Britain, not so subtly suggesting Rome’s power. James Cook <a href="https://www.royalacademy.org.uk/exhibition/oceania">presented gifts</a> to the Pacific island chiefs – albeit insubstantial ones in return for the highly prized objects he received, now in European collections.</p>
<p>The British Council was established <a href="https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/history">in 1934</a> to stem the force of Soviet cultural diplomatic success. The Japan Foundation was founded <a href="https://www.jpf.go.jp/e/about/result/ar/2010/pdf/ar2010-01.pdf">in 1972</a> to create a more sophisticated view of a Japan emerging from the second world war.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463510/original/file-20220517-24-m3mi19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The British Council – photographed here in Washington DC – was established in 1934.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Australia’s efforts have always been paltry. </p>
<p>We have never had an international cultural agency, and the Federal government avenues we do have for supporting international artistic projects, the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Australia Council, have <a href="https://currencyhouse.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NPP2-Caust-Discussion-Paper-download.pdf">shrinking funds</a>.</p>
<p>In the 2000s, I was a member of DFAT’s Australia Indonesia Institute. Our small fund supported almost all the official cultural engagement between the two countries, and even it decreased before our eyes. It didn’t surprise me when leading curator Jim Supangkat asked me in Jakarta: “Where have all you Australians gone?” </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cultural-intelligence-key-to-future-of-australia-indonesia-relationship-29080">Cultural intelligence key to future of Australia-Indonesia relationship</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>‘Regionally inactive’</h2>
<p>In 2021/22, in admittedly difficult COVID times, just one cultural project – the Ubud Writers Festival – <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/foundations-councils-institutes/australia-indonesia-institute/grants/2021-2022-australia-indonesia-institute-grants">was funded</a> through the Australia Indonesia Institute’s tiny A$450,000 allocation for all people-to-people projects between us and our so-important neighbour.</p>
<p>It does not help that the Australia Indonesia Institute, like most of the DFAT bilateral agencies with these precious country colleagues, now has no specialist arts person <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/foundations-councils-institutes/australia-indonesia-institute/management/board-members">on its board</a>.</p>
<p>Most Commonwealth government funding and capacity in the area is allocated to individual applicants by the federal arts agency, the Australia Council. </p>
<p>The application forms for funding from DFAT, bilateral agencies like the Indonesia Institute, and the Australia Council are particularly onerous, as is the ensuing reporting of how funds are spent. There are smarter ways all round.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-values-the-new-buzzword-in-australian-foreign-policy-hint-it-has-something-to-do-with-china-143839">Why is 'values' the new buzzword in Australian foreign policy? (Hint: it has something to do with China)</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The diminishing role of Australia’s cultural diplomacy has been known for a long time, but there has been a change recently of senior arts and diplomatic figures speaking out. </p>
<p>Former Ambassador to China, Geoff Raby writes in his <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/chinas-grand-strategy-and-australias-future-in-the-new-global-order-paperback-softback">2020 book</a> on our general relations with China that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>over the last two decades, Australia has been seen to be regionally inactive. [To change that] active engagement with China in cultural diplomacy should be another essential element of Australia’s statecraft. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Carrillo Gantner’s 2022 book, eloquently titled <a href="https://publishing.monash.edu/product/dismal-diplomacy-disposable-sovereignty/">Dismal Diplomacy</a>, written from his 40 years working particularly in cultural projects with China, pleads for better and more sophisticated relations all round.</p>
<p>In 2018, John McCarthy, former Ambassador to Indonesia (and other places) <a href="https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/strangers-next-door-indonesia-and-australia-in-the-asian-century/ch3-perceptions-and-the-capacity-to-persuade">wrote</a> public diplomacy has “always been the poor relation in Australian foreign policy implementation”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Canada spends more on public diplomacy than Australia spends on the whole of its foreign service. Excluding public broadcasting, France spends an estimated A$1.9 billion, Germany A$1.6 billion, the UK A$350 million, and the Netherlands A$100 million. Australia spends A$12 million, of which, in most years, our Indonesia program will receive about A$1 million.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Cultural diplomacy comes under the umbrella of the broader public diplomacy described by McCarthy. </p>
<p>The Australia Council’s International Engagement Strategy has had an annual budget over the last five years averaging $2.7 million, while DFAT’s Australian Cultural Diplomacy Grants program currently has an <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/public-diplomacy/acdgp/grantees/2021-acdgp-grantees">allocation</a> of $400,000. There are other programs here and there that loosely come under the cultural diplomacy tag, so let us average up this figure to around $5 million. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463162/original/file-20220516-17-k3jes2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Goethe-Institut, pictured here in Singapore, has an annual budget of around A$400 million.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Comparisons are hard for specific cultural activity because each country includes different areas, but Australia’s contrast with the specialist Goethe-Institut and British Council are stark. The Goethe-Institut has had fairly stable funding of A$400 million per annum over recent years, and the British Council A$320 million. </p>
<p>On these figures, they spend A$4-5 per capita on cultural engagement and diplomacy, and we spend 20 cents.</p>
<p>Another calculation is through activities. The Arts and Cultural Program described in the Japan Foundation’s <a href="https://www.jpf.go.jp/e/about/result/ar/2019/pdf/dl/ar2019e.pdf">recent annual report</a> counts audiences of over five million attendances for 2,300 events it has “organised or supported”.</p>
<p>We are nowhere in that ballpark.</p>
<h2>‘How to win friends’</h2>
<p>As Jo Caust writes in her <a href="https://currencyhouse.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NPP2-Caust-Discussion-Paper-download.pdf">recent paper</a>, “support for the arts is not primarily a question of economics. It is a question of values.” </p>
<p>Assessment of the importance of international activities is a bigger issue than straight numbers. </p>
<p>The appreciation of the British Council <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-06-08/debates/25D780FC-924C-438F-A181-4AB111C5B9E6/BritishCouncil">merited debate</a> recently in the House of Commons, concluding the program provided the United Kingdom with </p>
<blockquote>
<p>an object lesson in how to win friends and influence people. […] We intend to continue to ensure that global Britain is a world leader for soft power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is an argument Australia needs cultural diplomacy more than others. </p>
<p>We carry the stain of our settler founding, increasingly clearly articulated. The racist White Australia Policy rescinded relatively recently (in 1966) is well known by our neighbours. Our position in the region has always been debatable, something sensed by our neighbours as much as known. Are we in “in” or “out” of Asia? To many, we have a <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/topics/voices/culture/article/2016/11/21/comment-crisis-identity-australia">confused cultural identity</a>: one that needs all the help it can get.</p>
<p>We can look to the German and Japanese examples, equally recognising their need to be proactive in their international imaging after events of the last 100 years. They have created serious, professional, cultural diplomatic agendas.</p>
<p>Australia’s cultural diplomacy should be done better, more effectively and with more confidence. The best way forward is to give the running to a central, nuanced, specialist body well equipped to tackle it.</p>
<p>We’d all be better served. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-to-reset-new-zealands-cultural-diplomacy-in-the-pacific-100454">Here's how to reset New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy in the Pacific</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alison Carroll does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Germany and England spend around A$4–5 per capita on cultural engagement and diplomacy. We spend 20 cents.Alison Carroll, Senior Research Fellow, Victorian College of the Arts, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1803132022-03-31T23:32:59Z2022-03-31T23:32:59ZDiplomacy is essential to a peaceful world, so why did DFAT’s funding go backwards in the budget?<p>Earlier this month, Prime Minister Scott Morrison <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-prime-minister-scott-morrison">said</a> Australia faces “its most difficult and dangerous security environment” since the second world war. Labor leader Anthony Albanese has made <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-opposition-leader-anthony-albanese">similar comments</a>. </p>
<p>In 1949, shortly after the war, Australia <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-spending-less-on-diplomacy-than-ever-before-and-its-influence-is-suffering-as-a-result-125722">invested</a> 9% of the federal budget in development and diplomacy. If you applied that proportion today, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade would be more than seven times its current size.</p>
<p>In this week’s budget DFAT’s resourcing has <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/pbs-2022-23-foreign-affairs-and-trade-portfolio-budget-statements-2022-23.pdf">gone backwards</a>, with a small increase of A$124 million or 1.6% that is less than indexation. Funding for aid <a href="https://acfid.asn.au/sites/site.acfid/files/resource_document/2022-2023%20ACFID%20Budget%20Analysis.pdf">has increased</a> but this is balanced by <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/politics/federal/foreign-aid-funding-flatlines-as-afghan-refugee-places-soar-20220323-p5a79o.html?ref=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_source=rss_feed">cuts</a> to other parts of the portfolio, including diplomacy.</p>
<p>This is disappointing if you understand what diplomacy can do.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-cost-of-living-budget-cuts-spends-and-everything-you-need-to-know-at-a-glance-180124">A cost-of-living budget: cuts, spends, and everything you need to know at a glance</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>‘Total war’ and Ukraine</h2>
<p>Let’s look at a situation we have watched play out over the last month: the coordinated international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is a an example of diplomacy at work.</p>
<p>How did <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/russias-war-ukraine-sanctions-timeline">sanctions</a> happen? Concerned countries spoke to other like-minded countries to agree an approach, then convinced others to come on board. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A meeting of the UN Security Council" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455417/original/file-20220331-23-urolii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UN Security Council met and discussed Russia and Ukraine on Tuesday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Minchillo/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They persuaded countries like the United Kingdom and Italy they could live without Russian oligarchs, and even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/switzerland-adopts-new-eu-sanctions-russia-2022-03-04/">persuaded Switzerland</a> to break its long-term practice of neutrality and impose sanctions. </p>
<p>They worked with the international banking system on <a href="https://www.swift.com/news-events/news/message-swift-community">cutting Russia off</a> and shared information across countries to identify targets for <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australias-first-magnitsky-style-sanctions">individual sanctions</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-spending-less-on-diplomacy-than-ever-before-and-its-influence-is-suffering-as-a-result-125722">Australia is spending less on diplomacy than ever before – and its influence is suffering as a result</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Then came the snowball effect as other companies began to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/russia-invasion-companies.html">voluntarily exit Russia</a>. The combined effect has been significant, described by a Russian spokesperson as akin to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/29/russia-compares-sanctions-to-war-as-uk-says-putin-preparing-to-send-1000-mercenaries-to-ukraine">total war</a>”. Then we have the international condemnation of the invasion, including the overwhelming support for a <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/ga12407.doc.htm">UN Resolution</a> demanding Russian withdrawal.</p>
<p>This is the work of diplomacy, an area Australian Institute of International Affairs National President Allan Gyngell <a href="https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkLnBvZGJlYW4uY29tL2F1c3RyYWxpYWludGhld29ybGQvZmVlZC54bWw/episode/YXVzdHJhbGlhaW50aGV3b3JsZC5wb2RiZWFuLmNvbS81NThhMjdmZC05Y2M3LTM2NmYtODNkMy1iZjBiYjUwNTZmZjE?hl=en-AU&ved=2ahUKEwjJy6ac5uz2AhVb7XMBHUA5ApcQieUEegQIDRAF&ep=6">recently described</a> as being</p>
<blockquote>
<p>as difficult, hard-edged and hard-headed as any dimension of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Compare the spend</h2>
<p>We shouldn’t underestimate the importance of diplomacy to a country’s national interests, but we often do. If you look at the federal budget you get a sense of how little Australia invests in diplomacy and development. </p>
<p>For example, the government has announced an additional <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/183821-thousands-more-australian-defence-force-personnel-to-be-recruited/">18,000 people</a> for the defence workforce. This increase alone is more than three times the entire staff responsible for diplomacy and development. </p>
<p>To put this in context, if this week’s federal budget was $100, we’d be spending $6 on defence, 72 cents on development and a copper coin on the practice of diplomacy. </p>
<p>Former ambassador James Wise has calculated that of the DFAT budget, <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/costs-discounted-diplomacy">only 10% is spent on its policy function</a> after you take out the development program, passports, consular work and infrastructure.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1509058587288559619"}"></div></p>
<h2>The aid budget has grown</h2>
<p>One good news story from the budget is that the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/2022-23-budget-investing-strong-future-advancing-our-national-interests-and-supporting-regional-prosperity">international development program</a> did get some love, after years of cuts. This includes: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A real increase in the development budget. This is via re-introduction of annual indexation, this year at 2.5%</p></li>
<li><p>Near-record funding to the Pacific, including a package of $324 million to deal with the social and economic costs of COVID-19</p></li>
<li><p>A $300 million program focused on women in Southeast Asia</p></li>
<li><p>Loans to Papua New Guinea and Indonesia for budget support</p></li>
<li><p>Increased humanitarian funding to the World Food Programme and Red Cross</p></li>
<li><p>Doubling Australia’s climate finance to $2 billion</p></li>
</ul>
<p>It is heartening to see the development budget <a href="https://idcc.org.au/latest_news/">stabilising</a>. This reflects a recognition that development programs have a huge role to play in shaping the world around us, from infrastructure to public health to climate to emergencies. It also suggests it is seen as a key part of Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia and the Pacific. </p>
<p>But Australia is still way off the international target for developed countries of <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm">0.7% of gross national income</a>. Even with this week’s increases, Australia is at a low of <a href="https://devpolicy.org/additional-covid-funding-postpones-aid-cuts-20220330/">0.2%</a>. A decade ago, <a href="https://devpolicy.org/publications/policy_briefs/PB16%20Measuring%20Australia%E2%80%99s%20foreign%20aid%20generosity.pdf">it was 0.33%</a>.</p>
<h2>What is the bigger picture?</h2>
<p>While there are positive signs in this budget, it’s important to see the bigger picture. Neither development nor diplomacy are being funded in a way that suggests they are viewed as vital tools for shaping a difficult and dangerous world. This puts Australia out of line with <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6914455911713443840/">international trends</a>.</p>
<p>The Lowy Institute and many <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australian-threadbare-diplomacy-in-conflict/">others</a> have long documented Australia’s <a href="http://archive.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/pubfiles/BlueRibbonPanelReport_WEB_1.pdf">diplomatic deficit</a> and <a href="https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/diplomatic-disrepair-rebuilding-australia-international-policy-infrastructure">disrepair</a>. Defence experts also now <a href="https://theconversation.com/budget-2022-the-government-spends-big-on-its-khaki-election-strategy-but-neglects-diplomacy-and-other-soft-power-180033">openly criticise</a> the “woeful neglect of DFAT”, while the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has outlined <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/costs-discounted-diplomacy">the costs</a> of this underinvestment: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia will be safer, richer, better regarded and more self-respecting if our diplomatic influence is enlarged, not if it remains stunted.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But this advocacy has not yet had an effect, leading former DFAT officer Mercedes Page to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/silver-lining-dfat-s-budgetary-woes">call</a> in her post-budget analysis for an end to the “the familiar round of recriminations and calls for more funding”.</p>
<p>Instead of giving up, we should widen the debate so diplomacy and development are not seen as a niche issue, but one that affects all Australians. We all have a stake in not running down key planks in the way Australia interacts with the world.</p>
<p>In these difficult times, Australia needs to respect and resource all the elements of statecraft.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Conley Tyler is Program Lead at the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D), an initiative hosted by the Australian Council for International Development with funding from the defence portfolio.</span></em></p>Reduced funding for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade makes no sense if you understand what diplomacy can do.Melissa Conley Tyler, Honorary Fellow, Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661542021-08-17T02:27:56Z2021-08-17T02:27:56ZAustralia is at risk of taking the wrong tack at the Glasgow climate talks, and slamming China is only part of it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416430/original/file-20210817-23-gquyx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=459%2C365%2C2570%2C1427&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Buried within the prime minister’s response to the latest report from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-is-the-most-sobering-report-card-yet-on-climate-change-and-earths-future-heres-what-you-need-to-know-165395">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</a> is just about everything we’re at risk of getting wrong at the Glasgow <a href="https://ukcop26.org/">climate talks</a> in October.</p>
<p>After slamming China — whose emissions per person are <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?locations=AU-CN&name_desc=false">half</a> of Australia’s — for not doing more to cut emissions, Scott Morrison said the Glasgow talks were the “biggest multilateral global negotiation the world has ever known”.</p>
<p>If he treats the talks as just another (big) negotiation, we’re in trouble.</p>
<p>The way the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade usually treats negotiations is hold something back, hold out the prospect of “giving it up,” and then only make the concession if the other side gives something in return. Even if holding back damages Australia.</p>
<p>Cars are a case in point. From an economic point of view, there is no reason whatsoever to continue to impose tariffs (special taxes) on the import of cars — none, not even in the eyes of those who support the use of tariffs to protect Australian jobs. Australia no longer makes cars.</p>
<p>Yet the tariff remains, at 5%, making it perhaps <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/time-to-scrap-1b-in-ridiculous-car-taxes-20200218-p541ua">A$1 billion</a> harder than it should be for Australians to buy new cars (although nowhere near as hard as it was in the days when the tariff was 57.5%).</p>
<p>The tariff seems to be in place largely to give the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade something to negotiate away in trade agreements: for use as what the Productivity Commission calls “<a href="https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/trade-assistance/2013-14/trade-assistance-review-2013-14.pdf">negotiating coin</a>”.</p>
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<span class="caption">Australia removed tariffs on cars from Korea but kept them in place more broadly.</span>
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<p>Here’s how it worked in the 2014 <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/fact-sheets/Pages/kafta-outcomes-at-a-glance">Australia-Korea Free Trade Agreement</a>. Australia agreed to remove the remaining 5% tariff on Korean cars, “with consumers and businesses to benefit from downward pressure on import prices”.</p>
<p>But Australia didn’t remove the tariff on car imports altogether, which would have given us a much bigger benefit but denied the department negotiating coin.</p>
<p>The next year the department did it again, agreeing to give up the tariff on imported Japanese cars in the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/jaepa/fact-sheets/Pages/jaepa-fact-sheet-outcomes-at-a-glance">Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement</a> (but not on other cars) so Australians could “benefit from lower prices and/or greater availability of Japanese products”.</p>
<p>Two years later, it did it again, with cars from <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/chafta-outcomes-at-a-glance">China</a>.</p>
<p>When the UK and European agreements are negotiated, it’ll do it there too.</p>
<h2>Australia holds back reforms</h2>
<p>Eventually Australians will get what they are entitled to. But the point is that rather than advancing the cause of free trade, the department has held back, treating a win for the other side as a loss for us, when it wasn’t.</p>
<p>The Centre for International Economics believes the much bigger earlier set of tariff cuts lifted the living standard of the average Australian family by <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/Pages/cie-report-on-australian-trade-liberalisation">A$8,448</a>.</p>
<p>Had our trade negotiators been in charge, we would still be waiting. Instead the Hawke and then the Keating governments pushed through unilateral reductions, asking for nothing in return.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/this-is-the-most-sobering-report-card-yet-on-climate-change-and-earths-future-heres-what-you-need-to-know-165395">This is the most sobering report card yet on climate change and Earth's future. Here’s what you need to know</a>
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<p>As former Trade Minister <a href="https://australianpolitics.com/2010/12/10/future-of-trade-policy-emerson-speech.html">Craig Emerson</a> put it, this gave Australia “credibility in international trade negotiations way beyond the relative size of our economy”. </p>
<p>Does that sound like the sort of thing Australia might need at Glasgow, to have enough credibility to urge even bigger emitters to deliver the kind of cuts on which our futures and future temperatures depend?</p>
<h2>It won’t work with China</h2>
<p>The prime minister is right to say that China is the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, even though its emissions per person are low. Its high population means it accounts for <a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions">28%</a> of all the greenhouse gases pumped out each year. The next biggest emitter, the United States, accounts for 15%</p>
<p>But China’s status is new. Until 2006 it pumped out <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions">less</a> per year than the United States. Because the US has had mega-factories and heating and so on for so much longer, it is responsible for by far the biggest chunk of the greenhouse gasses already in the atmosphere: <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2">25%</a>, followed by the European Union with 22%.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416422/original/file-20210817-13-1tmnqwl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>China might reasonably feel that countries like the US that have done the most to create the problem should do the most to fix it. </p>
<p>Like Australia, the US pumps out twice as much per person as China and has much more room to cut back.</p>
<p>On the bright side, China knows that being big means it is in a position to make a difference to global emissions in a way that other countries cannot on their own. And that’s a position that can benefit its citizens. </p>
<p>China’s latest five-year plan, adopted in March, commits it to cut its “carbon intensity” (emissions per unit of GDP) by <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-14th-five-year-plan-mean-for-climate-change">18%</a>. If it beats that five-year target by just a bit (and it has beaten its previous five-year targets) its emissions will turn down from 2025. </p>
<p>It is aiming for <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-just-stunned-the-world-with-its-step-up-on-climate-action-and-the-implications-for-australia-may-be-huge-147268">net-zero emissions</a> by 2060.</p>
<h2>Australia needs China’s help</h2>
<p>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change finds that Australia is especially <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-has-already-hit-australia-unless-we-act-now-a-hotter-drier-and-more-dangerous-future-awaits-ipcc-warns-165396">susceptible</a> to global warming. We’re facing less rain in winter, longer heatwaves, drier rivers, more arid soil and worse droughts.</p>
<p>We are right to want China to do more, but the worst way to achieve it is to say “we won’t lift our ambition until you lift yours”.</p>
<p>Hardly ever a worthwhile strategy, it is particularly ineffective when we don’t have bargaining power.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-has-already-hit-australia-unless-we-act-now-a-hotter-drier-and-more-dangerous-future-awaits-ipcc-warns-165396">Climate change has already hit Australia. Unless we act now, a hotter, drier and more dangerous future awaits, IPCC warns</a>
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<p>The only power we’ve got is to set an example, unilaterally, as we did with tariffs. And to ramp up our ambition. </p>
<p>If Australia said it would do more, and didn’t quibble, it might just count for something. </p>
<p>It’s all we can do, and it’s the very best we can do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Martin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s usual approach to big international negotiations is to hold out, before reluctantly making “concessions”. It’s the wrong approach for trade, and the wrong approach for climate change.Peter Martin, Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1456152020-09-07T03:29:14Z2020-09-07T03:29:14ZMorrison’s foreign relations bill should not pass parliament. Here’s why<p>The Morrison government wants <a href="https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/2020/08/26/federal-government-new-powers/">sweeping new powers</a> to cancel international arrangements by universities, councils and state governments.
After announcing its intentions in August, it <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6596">introduced a bill</a> to parliament last week.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6596_ems_d3fd0486-c0d5-430e-83d7-5c2de5644e99/upload_pdf/747250.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">government argues</a> the bill is needed to “ensure a consistent and strategic approach to Australia’s international engagement”. Prime Minister Scott Morrison has said Australia must “speak with one voice”.</p>
<p>But the bill should not pass parliament. </p>
<p>Not only has the government failed to identify any specific problem with the status quo, the bill rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of modern diplomacy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/morrison-government-set-to-target-victorian-belt-and-road-agreement-under-sweeping-new-legislation-145124">Morrison government set to target Victorian 'belt and road' agreement under sweeping new legislation</a>
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<h2>Modern diplomacy is about multiple voices</h2>
<p>For decades, Australia has had international agreements beyond the federal level. A huge number of actors interact internationally and affect how Australia is viewed. This can’t be exclusively managed from Canberra.</p>
<p>Over the past year, I’ve been researching new diplomatic actors – including <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/asia-s-most-eligible-cities">sister cities</a>, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/30/track-ii-diplomacy-in-solving-asias-refugee-crisis/">think tanks</a>, <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/sports-can-show-australia-s-better-face">sports diplomacy</a>, <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-soft-power-of-education">international education</a>, <a href="https://johnmenadue.com/melissa-conley-tyler-pravin-silva-building-asia-australia-engagement-through-the-new-colombo-plan/">student mobility</a> and corporate diplomacy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-can-the-federal-government-control-the-ability-of-states-to-sign-deals-with-foreign-governments-145164">Explainer: can the federal government control the ability of states to sign deals with foreign governments?</a>
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<p>There are <a href="https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/asialink-dialogues-and-applied-research/emerging-voices/beyond-canberra-australias-states-step-up-on-diplomacy">87 state trade and investment offices</a> overseas and <a href="http://www.sistercitiesaustralia.com/images/images_media/Documents/Aust_SCA_Affiliations.pdf">500 sister cities</a>, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-40-years-of-australian-chinese-sister-cities-how-are-they-faring-128549">more than 100 with China</a>. Each university would have hundreds of international agreements, including for students to study abroad for a semester and for research collaboration. </p>
<p>The proposed legislation mistakenly rests on the idea that speaking with “one voice” in foreign policy is a positive thing, when the modern idea of diplomacy emphasises broad engagement. </p>
<p>Australia benefits when multiple actors across society engage internationally to balance the <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/afaweekly/the-china-freeze-deepens">ups and downs</a> in official relations. As American author Parag Khanna <a href="http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/think-tanks-diplomacy/">memorably described</a> it, “diplomacy is no longer the stiff waltz of elites but the jazzy dance of the masses”.</p>
<h2>This bill overreaches</h2>
<p>The legislation badly overreaches by seeking to regulate activities across education, culture, research and trade. </p>
<p>For example, it treats a <a href="https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/arts/whats-on/2019/victoria-jiangsu-sister-state-artist-exchange">visual artist exchange</a> between Victoria and Jiangsu or a library agreement between the <a href="https://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/learn/about-sydney/sister-cities/sydney-guangzhou-anniversary">City of Sydney</a> and Guangzhou as issues of foreign policy. </p>
<p>Including universities is also a <a href="https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-governments-plan-for-a-veto-over-university-agreements-is-a-step-too-far-145200">step too far</a>. It was <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/they-can-be-cancelled-commonwealth-to-review-states-overseas-agreements-20200826-p55pmt.html">originally thought</a> the legislation would only cover arrangements between universities and foreign agencies, but it also covers universities that do not have institutional autonomy, which is a large number of foreign universities. This vastly increases the <a href="https://go8.edu.au/go8-statement-on-australian-foreign-relations-bill">scope of regulation</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-confucius-institutes-and-do-they-teach-chinese-propaganda-114274">Explainer: what are Confucius Institutes and do they teach Chinese propaganda?</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, the test for vetoing a foreign arrangement is far too wide. The foreign minister can declare an arrangement invalid if it is likely to adversely affect Australia’s foreign relations (undefined) or be inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy (defined as whatever the minister says it is, whether or not written or publicly available). “Arrangements” include anything in writing, whether or not legally binding. </p>
<h2>We don’t actually need this bill</h2>
<p>In sounding the alarm, the government has failed to pinpoint a real problem. </p>
<p>For example, there is <a href="https://johnmenadue.com/james-laurenceson-pm-strikes-the-right-balance-in-managing-china-ties-afr-28-08-2020/">zero evidence</a> that a non-binding, <a href="https://johnmenadue.com/colin-heseltine-opposition-to-victorias-belt-and-road-initiative-is-it-valid/">symbolic</a> memorandum of understanding between Victoria and China on to the Belt and Road Initiative has hampered the Commonwealth in pursuing Australia’s foreign policy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-there-so-much-furore-over-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-139461">Why is there so much furore over China's Belt and Road Initiative?</a>
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<p>It is important to note Australia already has the ability to protect itself, with existing laws on espionage, foreign interference and foreign investment and a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-29/australia-plan-foreign-legislation-university-agreement/12606412">University Foreign Interference Taskforce</a>. We made it <a href="https://johnmenadue.com/under-the-proposed-foreign-relations-bill-the-states-might-be-down-but-they-are-not-out/">through the Cold War</a> without needing this type of legislation.</p>
<h2>What will happen if the bill passes?</h2>
<p>Apart from being unnecessary over-regulation, the bill will also create problems for Australia if passed. </p>
<p>Firstly, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade will have to divert resources to this new function when its <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-spending-less-on-diplomacy-than-ever-before-and-its-influence-is-suffering-as-a-result-125722">funding is the lowest in history</a>. </p>
<p>This means diplomats, who could be pro-actively working to promote the national interest, must check potentially <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-29/australia-plan-foreign-legislation-university-agreement/12606412">tens of thousands</a> of overwhelmingly <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-27/scott-morrison-china-belt-and-road-cancel-state-agreements/12596184">non-controversial</a> arrangements like the <a href="https://asialinkbusiness.com.au/news-media/warrnambool-china-bureau-helps-south-west-victorian-businesses-in-china">City of Warrnambool</a>’s local export bureau with Changchun or the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336716646_Australia-China_Sister_Cities_Seizing_Opportunities_Together">City of Darwin</a>’s student English language competition in Haikou. </p>
<p>Secondly, the bill is likely to reduce international linkages due to uncertainty about what will be approved. Educational or cultural exchanges are the most at risk.</p>
<p>State and local governments will continue to promote trade, but they will waste time filling in the prescribed form to take, say, a <a href="http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/business/start-a-business/startups/Pages/nexus.aspx">delegation of Australian start-ups</a> to pitch to investors in Nanjing. </p>
<p>Beyond this, the legislation sends exactly the wrong message to the wider community: to be uneasy about international engagement. </p>
<p>And all of this at a time of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-03/coronavirus-recession-in-australia-six-graphs-explain/12624250">economic recession</a>, when we need to find new avenues for growth. Sister cities have been shown to have <a href="https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/wagga-wagga-sees-benefits-of-sister-cities">measurable direct economic benefits</a>, while state government <a href="https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/asialink-dialogues-and-applied-research/emerging-voices/beyond-canberra-australias-states-step-up-on-diplomacy">export and investment promotion</a> brings local jobs. </p>
<h2>What could we do instead?</h2>
<p>There are better solutions: more information-sharing between different levels of government; a one-page bill banning state governments from the Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>Even giving the foreign affairs minister the power to request information on, and then cancel, any specific arrangement would be better than the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/01/it-is-about-china-foreign-relations-bill-lambasted-as-complete-overkill-on-qa">overkill</a> regulatory burden proposed.</p>
<p>And if, as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/01/it-is-about-china-foreign-relations-bill-lambasted-as-complete-overkill-on-qa">many believe</a>, the bill is <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/foreign-relations-law-a-necessary-step-to-protect-australian-strategic-interests/">directed at China</a>, the irony is that fighting the Chinese Community Party seems to bring out the Australian government’s authoritarian tendencies. </p>
<p>Speaking with one state-approved voice is not what a open democracy like Australia should aim to achieve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Conley Tyler works for the University of Melbourne.</span></em></p>The proposed bill represents a massive over-reach that will do far more harm than good.Melissa Conley Tyler, Research Fellow, Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1435972020-07-29T07:09:46Z2020-07-29T07:09:46ZI kept silent to protect my colleague and friend, Kylie Moore-Gilbert. But Australia’s quiet diplomatic approach is not working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350077/original/file-20200729-29-1pu2ets.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=65%2C73%2C5390%2C3383&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abedin Taherkenareh/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kylie Moore-Gilbert, a Middle East expert from the University of Melbourne, has now been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-28/dfat-seeks-access-to-kylie-moore-gilbert-jailed-in-iran/12500978">held by the Iranian government</a> for almost two years.</p>
<p>She was arrested in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/17/shes-not-a-spy-friends-shocked-over-academic-dr-kylie-moore-gilberts-jailing-in-iran">September 2018</a> and then convicted of spying and sentenced to ten years’ jail. She has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/may/10/kylie-moore-gilbert-feels-abandoned-by-australia-sources-in-iranian-prison-say">denied all allegations</a> against her, and the Australian government rejects the charges as baseless and politically motivated. </p>
<p>Until recently, Kylie has been in solitary confinement in Iran’s Evin prison, run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. But this week, she was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/29/kylie-moore-gilbert-terrified-and-suffering-inside-notorious-desert-prison-in-iran">transferred to Qarchak</a>, which is notorious for its <a href="https://www.state.gov/report-to-congress-list-of-persons-who-are-responsible-for-or-complicit-in-certain-human-rights-abuses-in-iran/">brutal treatment</a> of prisoners. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Portrait of Australian academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350097/original/file-20200729-33-hux49u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Kylie Moore-Gilbert has been detained in Iran for more than 680 days.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Department of Foreign Affairs</span></span>
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<p>Kylie is a colleague and a friend. For the past two years, I have been keeping silent in the hopes a quiet diplomatic approach would secure her freedom. </p>
<p>But it is hard to overstate how horrific this week’s development is. Australia needs to do more. </p>
<h2>‘Entirely alone’</h2>
<p>I am a Middle East analyst, who specialises in the Persian Gulf. In fact, Kylie and I first met because we both work on state-society relations in Bahrain. I can see, examining the treatment of <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/05/who-are-the-dual-nationals-imprisoned-in-iran/">other foreign political prisoners</a> in Iran, that Kylie has been treated exceptionally poorly. </p>
<p>In letters smuggled out of Evin prison last year, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jan/21/jailed-british-australian-kylie-moore-gilbert-rejected-irans-offer-to-work-as-a-spy">Kylie wrote</a> how she felt “entirely alone”. She has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jan/15/australian-academic-kylie-moore-gilbert-begs-scott-morrison-to-help-get-her-out-of-iranian-jail">also written</a> how her “physical and mental health continues to deteriorate”.</p>
<p>Media reports indicate Kylie was able to speak to her family about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/29/kylie-moore-gilbert-terrified-and-suffering-inside-notorious-desert-prison-in-iran">a month ago</a> and Australian diplomatic staff have also been in contact. </p>
<p>However the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/dfat-seeks-urgent-access-to-kylie-moore-gilbert-after-transfer-to-new-iran-prison">statement this week</a> – that they are “urgently seeking further consular access to her at this new location” and “hold Iran responsible for Dr Moore-Gilbert’s safety and well-being” – suggests Australia was not consulted before her transfer to Qarchak. </p>
<p>On Wednesday, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/29/kylie-moore-gilbert-terrified-and-suffering-inside-notorious-desert-prison-in-iran">The Guardian reported</a> a recording of Kylie out of Qarchak. Speaking Persian, she says: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I can’t eat anything. I feel so very hopeless […] I am so depressed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is this all two years of diplomacy has bought us? </p>
<h2>Australia must do more</h2>
<p>I am not speaking out now to challenge this quiet diplomatic approach regarding Iran. I am speaking because I believe more public pressure must be placed on the Australian government to ensure it is living up to its own rhetoric. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-28/dfat-seeks-access-to-kylie-moore-gilbert-jailed-in-iran/12500978">DFAT claims</a> Kylie’s case is “one of the Australian government’s highest priorities, including for our Embassy officials in Tehran”.</p>
<p>But the amount of secrecy involved in the process means we cannot know if this is true.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australian-government-needs-to-step-up-its-fight-to-free-kylie-moore-gilbert-from-prison-in-iran-130591">The Australian government needs to step up its fight to free Kylie Moore-Gilbert from prison in Iran</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>Even though the situation is sensitive, there are avenues Australia can pursue on behalf of Kylie. </p>
<p>Based on my analysis of publicly reported cases, around one in three foreign political prisoners in Iran over the past five years have been released <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/16/463315972/who-are-the-prisoners-the-u-s-and-iran-are-exchanging">via a prisoner swap</a>. This reportedly includes Australian tourists <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/oct/06/australian-travel-bloggers-released-in-iran-were-freed-in-apparent-prisoner-swap">Jolie King and Mark Firkin</a> who were arrested in Iran last year. </p>
<p>Based on publicly available knowledge, Australia does not currently hold any Iranian prisoners. However our key ally, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/man-taken-custody-after-being-charged-illegally-exporting-prohibited-manufacturing">the United States, does</a>.</p>
<h2>The politics are not straightforward</h2>
<p>It must be acknowledged that the politics around this case are very complicated. Relations between Iran and the US and far from friendly - especially after the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/07/what-the-killing-of-qassem-soleimani-could-mean/">assassination</a> of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. </p>
<p>There is another problem, too. </p>
<p>Despite Australia maintaining constructive relationships with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, they are not the key to securing Kylie’s freedom. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-on-iran-mounts-there-is-little-room-for-quiet-diplomacy-to-free-detained-australians-123599">As pressure on Iran mounts, there is little room for quiet diplomacy to free detained Australians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Iranian political system is fragmented and parts of the army, judiciary and intelligence agencies report to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. </p>
<p>Rouhani and Khamenei’s relationship is also poor and Khamenei’s influence has grown since Kylie was first incarcerated. Iran will hold presidential elections in 2021 and as Khamenei seeks to secure Iran’s future, he may attempt to empower a more hardline president. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Iranian President Hassan Rouhani walking in front of a portrait of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350108/original/file-20200729-23-1a0e027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relations between Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are poor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iran President handout</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This means Australia must think outside the box to secure Kylie’s release. The solution to this crisis is undoubtedly a diplomatic one - and we clearly need to spend more diplomatic capital than we’re already using to fix it. </p>
<p>But it will become more difficult if we do not put sufficient resources into her release before the next presidential election.</p>
<h2>This case is relevant for all of us</h2>
<p>COVID-19 also makes Kylie’s situation more urgent. My assessment is the Australian government must urgently push for Kylie’s immediate transfer out of Qarchak prison, to a safe location where her consular access and health can be protected. </p>
<p>There is precedent for foreign detainees to be transferred to house arrest <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/04/869896772/iran-frees-u-s-navy-veteran-michael-white-who-was-detained-for-nearly-two-years">in embassies</a> while cases are resolved. </p>
<p>Beyond the harrowing personal situation, Kylie’s case is also relevant to all of us. It fits a wider pattern, where the space for <a href="https://theconversation.com/scholars-growing-insecurity-puts-academic-freedom-at-risk-128680">academic research is being narrowed</a> in authoritarian states. This is occurring not just in Iran but in countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>If this research cannot be conducted, or if the Australian government fails to protect its researchers who need to do fieldwork in these countries, this allows authoritarian states to silence criticism. </p>
<p>And then set the narrative about their internal politics as they see fit. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/scholars-growing-insecurity-puts-academic-freedom-at-risk-128680">Scholars' growing insecurity puts academic freedom at risk</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessie Moritz receives funding from the Australian National University for her research. She is a Board Member at-Large with the Association for Gulf and Peninsula Studies. Her opinions and analysis as expressed in the Conversation are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the ANU or AGAPS. </span></em></p>Australian academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert has been detained in Iran since 2018. Her transfer to a notoriously brutal prison this week has pushed a fellow researcher to speak out.Jessie Moritz, Lecturer in Middle East studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1339382020-03-17T11:05:09Z2020-03-17T11:05:09ZView from The Hill: MPs aim for lightning sitting on stimulus, as third parliamentarian contracts virus<p>A pared-down parliament will aim to pass the government’s stimulus package in a single day’s sitting on Monday.</p>
<p>As a third federal parliamentarian tested positive for coronavirus, the government and opposition agreed to pair 30 a side from the 151 House of Representatives members. The Senate will also be reduced.</p>
<p>Members with personal or family health issues will be the first off the list of attendees, followed by those who live furthest away. Staff travelling from interstate will be kept to a minimum.</p>
<p>If complications arise the sitting – originally scheduled for four days – might have to extend to a second day but both sides want to avoid that.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/au/podcasts/politics-with-michelle-grattan"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/320022/original/file-20200312-116250-bptggc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=113&fit=crop&dpr=2" alt="Sign up to The Conversation" width="100%"></a></p>
<p>On Tuesday NSW Liberal senator Andrew Bragg announced he has tested positive for the virus. This follows Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton and Queensland Nationals senator Susan McDonald also being confirmed with the virus.</p>
<p>Bragg contracted the disease at a March 6 wedding where multiple guests were infected. Bragg chaired a Senate committee on March 9. Senate crossbencher Rex Patrick, one of those present at the inquiry, said he had no symptoms but was going into self-isolation and would get tested.</p>
<p>Foreign affairs late Tuesday issued advice to Australians abroad that if they want to come home, they should do so now. “If you’re already overseas and wish to return to Australia, we recommend you do so as soon as possible by commercial means.”</p>
<p>Against the background of increasingly disastrous news from the business community and more chaos in supermarkets, Scott Morrison and his senior ministers are working at full speed on the new support measures to be added to last week’s $17.6 billion package.</p>
<p>The NSW government unveiled a $2.3 billion package including health measures and tax relief for small business.</p>
<p>With travel to and from overseas drying up and local air travel drastically reduced as events are cancelled and businesses ground their employees, Qantas announced it was cutting 90% of its international capacity and 60% of its domestic capacity.</p>
<p>The government is blunt about the devastating economic consequences of the virus crisis.</p>
<p>Finance Minister Mathias Cormann, who usually puts an upbeat interpretation on everything, said: </p>
<p>“The impact is clearly getting more severe. We expect that businesses will close and people will lose their jobs. We are currently working to provide the necessary support through what will be a difficult transition. That is the grim reality of it.” </p>
<p>Cormann said tourism and hospitality sectors were “very much on the front line”, while also pointing to the difficulties of the not-for-profit sector.</p>
<p>“There are a whole series of Australians at the lower income end that are facing particular challenges,” he said. These people would need “appropriate levels of support”.</p>
<p>Cormann said the government was considering “to what extent we might be able to channel those workers who have less work for a company like Qantas, but might be able to do more work for companies like Coles and Woolworths”.</p>
<p>The government announced expanded telehealth services. They will now cover midwives, access to more GPs, and a range of specialist services including general surgeons, psychiatrists and mental health support, and geriatricians.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-government-forced-to-scale-up-fiscal-response-to-deal-with-impact-of-scaled-up-health-response-133816">View from The Hill: Government forced to “scale up” fiscal response to deal with impact of “scaled up” health response</a>
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<p>Health Minister Greg Hunt also said 230,000 new masks had just arrived in Australia and flagged an expansion of testing. He said he had had discussions with the Doherty Institute about new testing regimes, so “we can expand beyond the individual tests”.</p>
<p>“They are looking at ways of expediting the testing process, and, indeed, some significant new mass testing processes over and above what we’re doing.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A pared-down parliament will aim to pass the government’s stimulus package in a single day’s sitting on Monday.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257222019-11-05T18:58:15Z2019-11-05T18:58:15ZAustralia is spending less on diplomacy than ever before – and its influence is suffering as a result<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299634/original/file-20191031-187894-uz84r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scott Morrison has heavily promoted his government's 'Pacific Step Up', but it hasn't invested the requisite funds to support the initiative diplomatically.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren England/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years ago, the Lowy Institute <a href="https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-diplomatic-deficit">published a report</a> on the state of Australia’s diplomatic capacity that painted a “sobering picture” of overstretched foreign missions and declining resources. </p>
<p>In the words of then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who was quoted in the report: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Given the vast continent we occupy, the small population we have and our unique geo-strategic circumstances, our diplomacy must be the best in the world. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, since then we haven’t put enough resources into our diplomacy as we should. New research by Asialink at the University of Melbourne published in <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/essay/2019/10/china-dependence">Australian Foreign Affairs</a> shows continuing under-investment in Australia’s diplomatic capacity, with funding for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) now at a new low of <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">just 1.3% of the federal budget</a>.</p>
<h2>Still in deficit?</h2>
<p>According to Allan Gyngell, the founding director of the Lowy Institute, the reason for its 2009 report, Diplomatic Deficit, was simple. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>For Australia to do things in the world, it needs a number of assets. These include the instruments of foreign policy, including the overseas network of posts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The idea for the report was to go beyond the usual suspects and involve people like business leaders in making the case for diplomacy. It made 24 recommendations, many of which were not specifically about funding. These have mostly been met.</p>
<p>Sadly, the situation is less positive for recommendations that called for additional funding. Since 2013, Australia’s total diplomatic, trade and aid budgets have fallen from 1.5% of the federal budget to 1.3%. In pure dollar terms, this is a fall <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">from A$8.3 billion to A$6.7 billion</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, the budgets for defence, intelligence and security have ballooned. In the almost two decades since the September 11 terror attacks, the Department of Defence budget has increased by 291%, while the allocation for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has grown by 528% and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service by 578%.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/methodology-finding-the-numbers-on-australias-foreign-aid-spending-over-time-71470">Methodology: finding the numbers on Australia's foreign aid spending over time</a>
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<h2>Lost opportunities</h2>
<p>This systematic under-funding of DFAT has run down Australia’s diplomatic capacity to the point that it is under-resourced to confront current foreign policy challenges.</p>
<p>To give an idea of what this means, these are some examples of what Australia’s diplomats do on a day-to-day basis:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>consular work assisting Australians in trouble with law enforcement, such as visiting them in prison and advocating for fair treatment</p></li>
<li><p>counter-terrorism cooperation, working with overseas governments to build capacity and help keep Australian travellers safer</p></li>
<li><p>business promotion of Australian products and services and investment promotion for companies considering setting up operations in Australia</p></li>
<li><p>networking with influential politicians and business people to try to impact decisions that will affect Australians.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>When Australia’s diplomats are asked to accomplish more with fewer resources, they have to cut back what they can do. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australias-soft-power-in-the-pacific-fades-chinas-voice-gets-louder-111841">As Australia's soft power in the Pacific fades, China's voice gets louder</a>
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<p>Scaling back has a real effect on Australia’s influence. If Australia reduces the scholarships to bring future regional leaders to study in Australia, for instance, they’ll likely study and form bonds elsewhere. </p>
<p>If Australia reduces its investment in Indonesia’s education system, it will be dominated by the country’s other major funder, Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>When Australia pulls back on its diplomacy, other countries take up the slack. </p>
<p>One impetus for the Morrison government’s much-vaunted “<a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/stepping-up-australias-pacific-engagement.aspx">Pacific Step Up</a>” was the realisation that cuts in aid and diplomacy had led to lessened Australian influence in its neighbourhood. In the words of one diplomat I spoke to, “China had been eating our lunch”. </p>
<p>The problem is that the “step up” did not come with increased funding for diplomats, meaning that DFAT’s new <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/Pages/office-of-the-pacific.aspx">Office of the Pacific</a> is being formed by taking staff and resources from other parts of department.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"995799502635204608"}"></div></p>
<h2>Getting back in black</h2>
<p>We recommend an immediate increase in spending on diplomacy, trade and aid to 1.5% of the federal budget. This is closer to the spending of countries such as <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">Canada (1.9%) and the Netherlands (4.3%)</a>, though still much lower than the challenging era after the second world war, when Australia was <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">spending 9% of the federal budget</a> on diplomacy, trade and aid.</p>
<p>If nothing else, DFAT should be granted an exemption from the efficiency dividend – an annual funding reduction for government agencies – until its budget rises to a more normal, historical level. This measure, usually levied at 1% to 1.25% of the administrative budget, reached 4% in 2012–13. With DFAT cut to the bone, the focus should be on increasing its budget, not constant cuts.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/next-government-must-find-australias-place-in-a-turbulent-and-rapidly-changing-world-110794">Next government must find Australia's place in a turbulent and rapidly changing world</a>
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<p>The aspirations for our diplomacy must be upgraded beyond the bare minimum. Ten years on from <a href="https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-diplomatic-deficit">Diplomatic Deficit</a>, Australia must resist the magical thinking that foreign affairs and trade somehow happen by themselves. In the 2009 report, former DFAT Secretary Richard Woolcott is quoted as saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I do feel that the Department of Foreign Affairs … has been allowed to run down to a dangerously low level … we can’t go on doing more with less … these sorts of undertakings do need to be properly resourced.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If only this had changed in the last 10 years.</p>
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<p><em>Mitchell Vandewerdt-Holman, a Master of International Relations student at the University of Melbourne, contributed to this report.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asialink at the University of Melbourne receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade along with other federal and state government departments, philanthropists and fee-for-service programs. </span></em></p>New research shows that funding for DFAT has hit a new low of 1.3% of the federal budget. Scaling back has a real effect on Australia’s influence around the world.Melissa Conley Tyler, Director of Diplomacy at Asialink, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1107942019-03-08T03:29:05Z2019-03-08T03:29:05ZNext government must find Australia’s place in a turbulent and rapidly changing world<p><em>This is part of a major series called Advancing Australia, in which leading academics examine the key issues facing Australia in the lead-up to the 2019 federal election and beyond. Read the other pieces in the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/advancing-australia-66135">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>The 2019 federal election, like most before it, is unlikely to be won or lost on foreign policy. Yet diplomacy is increasingly crucial to ensure the everyday well-being of Australians. </p>
<p>Foreign policy is no longer an elite, secret activity that affects only the powerful or political. For an open economy like Australia’s, with mobile citizens in a shifting but interconnected region, it is the stuff of everyday life. </p>
<p>As 2019 began, <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-should-brace-for-a-volatile-year-in-foreign-policy-in-2019-109006">I outlined</a> the volatile events that lay on the immediate horizon for Australian foreign policy. I dealt with big meetings like APEC in Thailand and the G20 in Japan, and elections for Australia’s partners in some of our most important relationships, like India and Indonesia. I noted the difficulties of implementing big policy ideas like the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-09/australia-pacific-funding-pivot-after-china-enters-region/10479286">“Pacific pivot”</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-senate-is-set-to-approve-it-but-what-exactly-is-the-trans-pacific-partnership-104918">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>.</p>
<p>And, of course, there is the delicate business of crafting independent foreign policy positions while acknowledging the giant panda/bald eagle in the room.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-should-brace-for-a-volatile-year-in-foreign-policy-in-2019-109006">Australia should brace for a volatile year in foreign policy in 2019</a>
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<p>When the then foreign minister, Julie Bishop, commissioned the <a href="https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/">2017 Foreign Policy White Paper</a>, she <a href="https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2016/jb_sp_161213.aspx">noted</a> it was designed to help Australian diplomacy be more proactive. She said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… it’s about looking at the kind of framework that needs to be in place so that we’re not reacting to events, we’re strategically positioned to manage, maybe even shape, events.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Invest in shaping our region’s future</h2>
<p>One key election issue should rest on who is most willing to invest in Australian diplomacy. We must increase our capacity to be nimble if we wish to shape events instead of being hostage to American and Chinese fortunes.</p>
<p>It is difficult with limited resources, but we must create as many diplomatic options as possible to reframe problems and create non-military solutions over the next decade. That means heavy engagement in international forums.</p>
<p>Moreover, Australia must become a state that helps the international community solve problems associated with climate change in our region and at home through <a href="https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/">climate diplomacy</a>. There is simply no more time to waste. </p>
<h2>Sophisticated soft power</h2>
<p>Australia should invest in a sophisticated soft power strategy, pending the wisdom gained by the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/soft-power-review/Pages/soft-power-review.aspx">DFAT Soft Power Review</a>. Uncertainty in international relations creates opportunities for smart pivotal powers. Now is the time to invest in innovation in public diplomacy and focus on a strategy that harnesses the strengths of our First Australians, our migrants, the business community, universities, charities, creative industries, cities and regions. </p>
<p>Australia needs a sophisticated soft power strategy that connects our well-travelled and outward-facing multicultural citizenry to our nation-branding. We should <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/an-australian-world-view-a-practitioners-perspective.aspx">lead with our values</a>. This approach is certainly not doing New Zealand any harm. Photos and videos of NZ Prime Minister Jacinda Arden addressing the United Nations with her baby created a diplomatic moment in 2018. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1045745700078866433"}"></div></p>
<p>We also need to <a href="http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/decency-and-diplomacy-the-value-of-human-impact/">be principled and decent</a> in our international interventions. We need our face to the world to be more diverse and reflect our citizenry. </p>
<p>DFAT should continue to focus on delivering the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-strategy.pdf">Gender Strategy</a> and the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/women-in-leadership-strategy.aspx">Women in Leadership Strategy</a> as matters of key importance, as well as consolidating the success of the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/our-people/homs/Pages/ambassador-for-women-and-girls.aspx">Ambassador for Women and Girls</a>. Whatever the election result, the foreign minister, Marise Payne, and shadow minister, Penny Wong, are both excellent emblems of Australian commitment to equality on the world stage.</p>
<p>Some ideas to enhance our soft power include:</p>
<ul>
<li>DFAT to be more creative in <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/Overseas%20Representation/report/chapter4">digital diplomacy</a> </li>
<li>DFAT developing a youth strategy and creating a new thematic ambassador to reflect the youth of our region</li>
<li>the foreign minister convening a meeting of Australian mayors to map diplomatic
activity and coordinate a strategy. More broadly, DFAT should consider the rise of
<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/worldtoday/cities-as-global-actors-the-future-of-governance/10481858">cities as diplomatic actors</a> in our region</li>
<li>DFAT to support and engage more with <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/business-envoy/Pages/august-2017/international-education-in-australia-soft-power-and-solid-results.aspx">international students</a> and <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/chapter-18.html">diaspora</a> in Australia </li>
<li>Australian universities to increase their investment in international relations and diplomatic skills, which are useful for many global professionals.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Free and fair trade</h2>
<p>The Australian Bureau of Statistics recently released data showing Australia recorded a <a href="https://trademinister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2019/sb_mr_190205a.aspx?w=97hIoZC4PHe7VC%2F%2F1w31%2FA%3D%3D">A$22.2 billion trade surplus</a> in 2018, the highest ever for a calendar year.</p>
<p>Metals, ores and minerals (A$94.9 billion) and coal, coke and briquettes (A$66.7 billion) were our biggest exports, followed by natural gas and rural goods. Service exports are growing, but a transition away from reliance on extractive industries towards services and the digital economy may be a painful one.</p>
<p>Moreover, modern trade deals go deep into standards and consumer services. Most Australians still do not realise the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2016.1220492">implications for domestic policy</a> raised by the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal, the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep/Pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a> and other free trade agreements.</p>
<p>The next government should commission a Trade White Paper and think seriously about better ways to involve the community in trade negotiations. </p>
<h2>Tell the story</h2>
<p>We must increase efforts to explain Australian foreign policy in accessible and transparent ways to all kinds of domestic audiences. Foreign policy must be reframed as a non-elite issue. Bill Shorten noted this in a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/foreign-policy-next-labor-government">headland speech</a> designed to connect DFAT more with everyday conversation. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>John Curtin and Ben Chifley knew this, they understood the connection between the lives of working Australians and the corridors of international diplomacy.</p>
</blockquote>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-should-brace-for-a-volatile-year-in-foreign-policy-in-2019-109006">Australia should brace for a volatile year in foreign policy in 2019</a>
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<p>At the same time, we have to rewrite the current international narrative that Australian democracy has lost its way because the constant changes of PM give the impression of political instability.</p>
<p>I recently saw a tote bag that said “Ban the Single Use Prime Minister”. <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-should-brace-for-a-volatile-year-in-foreign-policy-in-2019-109006">I have written</a> previously about the idea of reversing some of the churn damage caused by our revolving prime ministers to our foreign policy reputation by using Bishop, Payne, Julia Gillard and Malcolm Turnbull as envoys on particular issues. </p>
<h2>Signature ideas – Australian conflict resolution</h2>
<p>We need bigger ideas that the Australian public and people around the world can connect with. The time has come to support John Langmore’s idea of a <a href="https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-social-and-political-sciences/research/research-clusters/conflict-development-and-justice/research-projects-and-collaborations/australian-international-conflict-resolution-project">specialised mediation unit in DFAT</a>. </p>
<p>Australia must invest more in preventive diplomacy as volatility increases – perhaps in partnership with New Zealand. Many scholars and practitioners have argued that Australia should build our negotiation and mediation capacity through DFAT. We have the talent – both here and inside the United Nations. </p>
<h2>Vote global</h2>
<p>DFAT clearly needs more resources to undertake the role Australians need it to accomplish in the next decade. Increased DFAT investment should be coupled to the Defence White Paper investment targets. To shape the future, we need to invest now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Harris Rimmer receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is affiliated with the International Womens Development Agency. </span></em></p>Whoever forms the next government should increase investment in foreign affairs and trade, finding ways to make Australia more prominent in global dispute resolution.Susan Harris Rimmer, Australian Research Council Future Fellow, Griffith Law School, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966322018-05-23T19:57:02Z2018-05-23T19:57:02ZWhy microfinance as aid isn’t enough to empower women<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219314/original/file-20180517-155623-1n60rcs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A women's savings club in Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usaid_images/14926942762/in/photolist-oK3u37-n1TaXZ-ea2d2y-Uj2hMq-WDigbq-by4rc9-Vm77CW-prEq7R-JDRS88-c7jpx1-by4r1u-anwU1A-anx7G5-d99PE9-b2FbLH-djXZbX-9FiJow-by4s4u-anwUv3-XSDzZJ-oD99SV-b2FbmP-d99MXN-55rDAd-FsRzGS-by4r4U-WQLbhm-f15baH-by4qZ3-r8zso2-eWRDPH-mvCZfD-awVdJ1-55ns5r-d99JAL-2WkCdQ-V1uscj-d99J1J-d99P1w-22vYeGq-qhS8Xz-nhNH58-nziGrM-25vZMig-by4rbm-nhP8ES-gzitqq-nB4ipZ-DUVfom-nzhKSB">USAID/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Giving small loans to people for small household purchases or to invest in businesses has been an integral part of <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-strategy.pdf">Australian</a>, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/asia-regional/fact-sheets/womens-livelihood-bond">American</a> and other aid programs for decades. This is called “<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/microfinance.asp">microfinance</a>”, and the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-strategy.pdf">aim</a> is not only to alleviate poverty, but to <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment">empower women</a>.</p>
<p>But simply improving a woman’s economic situation does not necessarily result in greater equality. Increasing women’s economic engagement often increases their work burden on top of all the unpaid labour they do. It can also challenge established gender roles and power hierarchies, causing conflict in the home and even domestic violence. </p>
<p>Empowering women needs to be about more than economics and requires changing the power dynamics and other cultural factors that repress women. So that they can make decisions about their life and mobility, control their money and have access to information, transport, tools and land. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13552070127738?needAccess=true">Several studies</a> have shown a link between women’s increased access to credit and increased domestic violence. Development agencies have been forced to develop <a href="https://iwda.org.au/resource/do-no-harm-toolkit/">“do no harm” procedures to try to prevent this</a>. </p>
<p>Santi Rozario from Cardiff University <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255651556_Grameen_Bank-style_microcredit_Impact_on_dowry_and_women's_solidarity">found</a> that after 25 years of microfinance programs in Bangladesh, “ingrained gender values are still essentially unchanged”. </p>
<p>And on top of all this, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250500">some microfinance programs only have a minimal impact</a> on development outcomes like health and education.</p>
<h2>Not tackling the problem</h2>
<p>Microfinance programs <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290420001672859">do nothing to challenge or transform</a> the structural conditions that create poverty in the first place. It is like putting a band-aid over a deep wound.</p>
<p>Indeed, microfinance shifts responsibility for poverty alleviation onto the poor and marginalised. This is particularly concerning in places such as Cambodia and Myanmar, where vulnerable post-conflict populations can become easily <a href="https://theconversation.com/microfinance-could-wind-up-being-the-new-subprime-59001">trapped in debt cycles</a>, using one loan to repay another. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/challenge-11-how-improving-womens-status-helps-us-all-7545">Challenge 11: How improving women's status helps us all</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>Empowerment requires addressing women’s lack of control over their own lives. Professor Naila Kabeer <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00125">defines empowerment</a>, as “the ability to exercise choice” where previously people could not.</p>
<p>This kind of empowerment <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/6163/Stories%20of%20Influence%20Pathways%20of%20Womens%20Empowerment.pdf;jsessionid=4B9D6E33ECEBED8AFC05C4EDF8575CB5?sequence=1">requires structural change</a> within both families and societies. This includes greater access to and control of resources, as well as new norms for women both individually and within families and society.</p>
<p>If development programs don’t challenge the structural causes of gender inequality, at best, microfinance will just continue to reinforce poverty and inequality. </p>
<h2>A more considered approach</h2>
<p>We shouldn’t write off microfinance entirely. It can work if returned to its grassroots, and run for the benefit of participants rather than to create profit. </p>
<p>There has been a trend toward <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/making-money-poor-microfinance-institutions-going-public-creates-controversy">profit-making microfinance institutions</a> that charge higher interest rates, extracting the little surplus poor people are able to raise from their meagre livelihoods.</p>
<p>Microfinance must be culturally sensitive and driven by the community. If nothing else, we know that there is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all model, and results in one region don’t necessarily transfer across regions or cultures. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-healthy-world-starts-with-a-healthy-mother-12740">A healthy world starts with a healthy mother</a>
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</p>
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<p>There are some microfinance variations that appear to work better than others, such as Oxfam’s <a href="https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/work/rural-resilience/saving-for-change/">Saving for Change</a>. This program operates in rural villages throughout 13 countries, with 680,000 members. </p>
<p>This model focuses on supporting small groups of women who save money together and then extend credit amongst themselves and then their communities. </p>
<p>But these alternatives to mainstream microfinance models <a href="http://profiles.arts.monash.edu.au/sara-niner/womens-empowerment%E2%80%8B-and-microfinance-in-the-asia-pacific-wemap/">require further investigation and support</a> as to the impact on women’s empowerment. In the meantime the development sector needs to be more self-critical about the impact of their programs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Niner receives funding from Academy of Social Sciences Australia, the Research Development Impact Network of ACFID and Monash University</span></em></p>If programs don’t challenge the structural causes of gender inequality, microfinance will just continue to reinforce poverty and inequality.Sara Niner, Lecturer and Researcher, School of Social Sciences, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/944222018-05-09T20:26:04Z2018-05-09T20:26:04ZExplainer: how the Australian intelligence community works<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218210/original/file-20180509-34021-zjlpgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm Turnbull has put Peter Dutton at the head of the Home Affairs super portfolio.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Glenn Hunt</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is the first in a five-part series exploring Australian national security in the digital age.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>National security, intelligence and espionage have been in the headlines due to events abroad and significant developments at home. News of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/mar/31/two-australian-diplomats-to-be-among-59-expelled-by-russia">diplomatic expulsions</a>, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/increasing-cyber-crime-attacks-costing-up-to-1b-a-year-20180410-p4z8ui.html">cyber-attacks</a>, <a href="https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/spying-shock-shades-of-big-brother-as-cybersecurity-vision-comes-to-light/news-story/bc02f35f23fa104b139160906f2ae709">leaked documents about sweeping new surveillance powers</a> and the creation of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-department-of-home-affairs-is-unnecessary-and-seems-to-be-more-about-politics-than-reform-81161">new Home Affairs Department</a> make it hard to follow. </p>
<p>What’s more, everyone has heard of the CIA, for instance, but Australia’s own national security organisations are comparatively unknown. So how is intelligence gathered? What are Australia’s peak national security bodies and how do they interact?</p>
<p>Australia’s national security architecture consists of a number of federal government departments and agencies, with links to state government counterparts. These include the state police forces and counter-terrorism authorities. Those arrangements are in transition, the full details of which are still to unfold.</p>
<h2>The major players</h2>
<p>The peak national security body in the Commonwealth is the National Security Committee of Cabinet (<a href="https://www.directory.gov.au/commonwealth-parliament/cabinet/cabinet-committees/national-security-committee">NSC</a>). It includes the ministers of the principal departments concerned with national security, including the Departments of Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Attorney-General, Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Treasury.</p>
<p>Several of the ministers on the NSC oversee a range of national security bodies. These have emerged as a result of trial and error, royal commissions and various reforms over several decades. </p>
<p>For starters, the defence portfolio includes a range of military intelligence units. There are hundreds of uniformed intelligence practitioners across the nation in the navy, air force and army, as well as in the Headquarters Joint Operations Command in Canberra. It also includes three of the nation’s principal intelligence agencies (with a mix of civilian and military intelligence practitioners): </p>
<p>• the Defence Intelligence Organisation (<a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/index.shtml">DIO</a>), defence’s principal intelligence assessment agency</p>
<p>• the Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation (<a href="http://defence.gov.au/ago/">AGO</a>), responsible for satellite and aerial imagery intelligence, maps, nautical charts and related geo-spatial products </p>
<p>• the Australian Signals Directorate (<a href="https://asd.gov.au/">ASD</a>), responsible for the collection and processing of signals intelligence (essentially, eavesdropping on radio and electronic transmissions). </p>
<p>ASD’s motto, “to reveal their secrets and protect our own”, captures the essence of its functions, which have been the subject of <a href="https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/spying-shock-shades-of-big-brother-as-cybersecurity-vision-comes-to-light/news-story/bc02f35f23fa104b139160906f2ae709">recent controversy</a> after leaked documents proposed giving the ASD domestic surveillance powers. </p>
<p>The antecedents of these defence agencies date back to the intelligence organisations established, alongside their American and British counterparts, during the second world war. The ties to that era have endured in the so-called “Five Eyes” intelligence arrangement. </p>
<p>Initially focused on signals intelligence (the principal remit of ASD), Five Eyes is a trusted network between the US, Britain, Australia and the two other predominantly English-speaking allies from that era, Canada and New Zealand.</p>
<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131204055230/http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canada%20and%20the%20Five%20Eyes%20Intelligence%20Community.pdf">The title</a> was a derivative of the stamp used to restrict the dissemination of sensitive intelligence to a particular classification: “SECRET – AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY” – hence Five Eyes.</p>
<p>Nowadays, the network extends beyond signals intelligence and defence circles to include a broader range of departments, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (<a href="http://dfat.gov.au/pages/default.aspx">DFAT</a>).</p>
<p>DFAT is Australia’s principal agency <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/Pages/about-us.aspx">tasked with</a> “promoting and protecting our interests internationally and contributing to global stability and economic growth”. As part of that role, it is responsible for diplomatic reporting. Much of the information Australia gathers from counterpart governments abroad is collected openly, but discreetly, by Australia’s diplomats. </p>
<p>In addition, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (<a href="https://www.asis.gov.au/">ASIS</a>) is in the foreign minister’s portfolio. Established in 1952 and tasked with the collection overseas of secret intelligence, the <a href="https://www.asis.gov.au/About-Us/Overview.html">ASIS mission</a> is listed as being “to protect and promote Australia’s vital interests through the provision of unique foreign intelligence services as directed by the Australian Government”. This is otherwise known as human intelligence collection or, in traditional terms, foreign espionage.</p>
<p>Countering foreign espionage (particularly from Soviet, later Russian and other countries operating in Australia) is the remit of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (<a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/">ASIO</a>). Established in 1949, ASIO has been part of the attorney-general’s portfolio until now.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/our-purpose.html">ASIO’s purpose</a> is described as being to “counter terrorism and the promotion of communal violence”, “counter serious threats to Australia’s border integrity”, “provide protective security advice to government and business” and “counter espionage, foreign interference and malicious insiders”.</p>
<p>The Office of National Assessments (<a href="https://www.ona.gov.au/">ONA</a>) is Australia’s peak intelligence assessment agency. It was established in 1977, after the <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/security/royal-commisson/">Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security</a> commissioned by then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and chaired by Justice Robert Marsden Hope.</p>
<p>ONA was established to help coordinate priorities across related intelligence agencies. Today, it is charged with assessing and analysing international political, strategic and economic developments for the prime minister and senior ministers. ONA draws on the intelligence collected by the other intelligence agencies, as well as unclassified, or “open source”, intelligence and material provided by international partners.</p>
<p>The agencies mentioned so far – ONA, ASIO, ASIS, AGO, ASD and DIO – form what has come to be known as the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). The AIC emerged from the reforms initiated by Justice Hope in the 1970s and 1980s, notably following the 1977 commission and the 1985 Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies. The combined effect of these commissions was that ONA was tasked with coordinating intelligence priorities along with the other agencies. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214224/original/file-20180411-554-jflaf8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The tangled web of the Australian Intelligence Community.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ona.gov.au/about-ona/overview/australian-intelligence-community">Office of National Assessments</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A greater level of scrutiny</h2>
<p>Another mechanism that emerged during this period was the office of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (<a href="https://www.igis.gov.au/">IGIS</a>), currently held by former Federal Court judge Margaret Stone. Established in 1987 with the enduring power of a royal commissioner, the IGIS has extraordinary powers to inspect and review the operations of AIC agencies. </p>
<p>The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (<a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/pjcis">PJCIS</a>) exists to provide a level of parliamentary oversight, complementing the work of the IGIS. It conducts inquiries into matters referred by the Senate, the House of Representatives or a minister of the Commonwealth government.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00596">Intelligence Services Act 2001</a> saw legislation more closely account for the functions that AIC members were expected to perform and the Inspector General monitors. In addition, an Independent <a href="http://www.inslm.gov.au/about">National Security Legislation Monitor</a> (INSLM) was established.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.pmc.gov.au/national-security/2017-independent-intelligence-review">2017 Independent Intelligence Review</a> was the third such review since 2001. As part of the review, ONA is <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-18/malcolm-turnbull-announces-new-office-of-national-intelligence/8719672">to become</a> the Office of National Intelligence (ONI), exercising oversight of the expanded National Intelligence Community (NIC). This covers the initial six AIC members and four additional ones described below.</p>
<p>In addition, ASD is being established as a statutory body (still under the defence minister, but administered separately from the rest of the Defence Department) alongside other principal agencies ASIO and ASIS.</p>
<h2>An expanded community with ambiguous oversight</h2>
<p>The ONI is now tasked with overseeing implementation of recommendations arising from the 2017 review. This includes managing the four-body expansion to the ten-agency NIC. </p>
<p>These four bodies have played an increasingly prominent national security role since 2001. They are:</p>
<p>• the Australian Federal Police (<a href="https://www.afp.gov.au/">AFP</a>), with a remit for criminal intelligence and counter-terrorism</p>
<p>• the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (<a href="http://austrac.gov.au/about-us/intelligence">AUSTRAC</a>), Australia’s specialist financial intelligence unit</p>
<p>• the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (<a href="https://www.acic.gov.au/">ACIC</a>), responsible for “investigative, research and information delivery services work with law enforcement partners”. </p>
<p>• the Australian Border Force (<a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/australian-border-force-abf/who-we-are">ABF</a>), described as Australia’s customs service and an “operationally independent” agency in the Home Affairs portfolio.</p>
<p>These agencies work in conjunction with other AIC agencies as well as state police and security counterparts.</p>
<p>The 2017 independent review was announced at the same time the new Home Affairs Department was made public. These four bodies are among the agencies transitioning to the Home Affairs portfolio. This has complicated arrangements for implementing the review recommendations and left considerable ambiguity concerning overlap of changed arrangements.</p>
<p>The INSLM certainly has a significant task as well and the PJCIS will be growing in staff to meet the expanded set of responsibilities outlined by the 2017 review as our intelligence community grows from six to ten agencies. </p>
<p>Implementing the 2017 review recommendations alone presents a significant challenge. The creation of Home Affairs on top of this adds to the complexity at a time of growing security challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland is one of the principal authors of the three-volume official history of ASIO</span></em></p>The recent creation of the Home Affairs super portfolio has added another four agencies to the national intelligence community. Here’s how they work together.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880092017-11-23T04:59:05Z2017-11-23T04:59:05ZAustralia is hedging its bets on China with the latest Foreign Policy White Paper<p>No surprises: the <a href="https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/">Foreign Policy White Paper</a> from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is about trade, not guns. </p>
<p>Unlike Defence, DFAT is about quiet diplomacy, not security dilemmas. So this is no reprise of the 2009 Defence White Paper, which infamously canvassed the “China threat”. </p>
<p>But the message in this white paper is undeniably for Beijing’s ears. It tells China that Australia will have polygamous economic relationships with its multiple trade partners throughout the world. </p>
<p>Although it welcomes China’s advances, it will not submit to the monogamous embrace of the People’s Republic of China’s economy. It emphasises that China’s emergence, prosperity and future wealth is inextricably linked with the status quo: a liberal international economic order under the rule of law. The alternative is unpredictability, potential economic chaos and possible conflict. </p>
<p>The paper does not level accusations at Beijing in the ham-fisted manner the 2009 Defence White Paper did. But in a high-stakes game of international poker, there is one certainty: you must hedge your bets. </p>
<h2>The revolution has been postponed</h2>
<p>In reality, white papers are elite exercises, designed to be pored over by journalists, while strategically engaging a narrow, overseas audience of decision makers. Foreign governments are the real target readership. </p>
<p>There are virtually no parliamentary questions that aren’t Dorothy Dixers about foreign affairs and defence. That is because the Canberra political class are all sailing the same ship. </p>
<p>The Labor Party and minor parties may grumble aloud about free trade details, but you would have to go back many years to witness a collapse in bipartisanship on foreign affairs and defence. To 2003, in fact. To Mark Latham and a war with Iraq.</p>
<p>You will find no revisionism in this foreign policy white paper; the first foreign policy white paper since 2003 is firmly in the camp of the status quo. </p>
<p>From the inception of the Abbott government in 2013, the Coalition endorsed a global strategy to consolidate and extend Australia’s network of bilateral and regional free trade agreements. The objective was to achieve preferential trade access to Australia’s major markets in the Asia, Europe and the Pacific region. This latest white paper emphasises the continuity of this overarching strategy.</p>
<p>The problem is that the status quo that persisted when the Coalition government took office under Tony Abbott no longer exists. </p>
<p>The promulgation of Xi Jinping’s assertive presidency in 2013, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Brexit conflagration of 2016, and the inauguration of US President Donald Trump in 2017 have overturned conventional wisdom about the structure of the future global order.</p>
<p>Inquietude about China is not entirely absent, but the criticism is mild and polite. The white paper expresses concern about Beijing’s aggrandisement of the South China Sea, where China has constructed more than 3,200 acres of artificial land as part of its “<a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-great-wall-sand-the-south-china-sea-history-repeating-15784">Great Wall of Sand</a>” strategy. </p>
<p>However, the paper merely reiterates bland statements of principle, calling for disputes to be settled under international maritime law. Open seas are, of course, the lifeblood of commerce.</p>
<h2>A hedging strategy?</h2>
<p>The white paper’s economic forecasts are aggressive. It envisages a Chinese economy valued at US$42 trillion in purchasing power parity terms in 2030, almost double that of the US and EU, respectively. Purchasing power parity is an economic measure that compares different countries’ currencies. </p>
<p>Indian purchasing power parity GDP will expand by 250% by 2030. By contrast, Japan is expected to atrophy, with virtually no growth in the next decade. Indonesia will almost double in size, but its growth will be slower than China or India. </p>
<p>Naturally, China dominates the thinking of the white paper’s authors. China is, by far, Australia’s <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/geo/china/pages/china-country-brief.aspx">biggest two-way trade partner</a> with A$62 billion in imports and A$93 billion in exports in 2016, an increase of 3.7% since the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement entered into force in December 2015. The paper recognises China will continue to dominate consumption of Australia’s minerals exports, tourism and education services.</p>
<p>There are clues to DFAT’s thinking in the white paper’s terminology, which eschews the traditional “Asia-Pacific” mindset for the “Indo-Pacific”, which manages to integrate both India and Indonesia, while offending neither of them. Australia’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific should not be understated. </p>
<p>Foreign Minister Bishop <a href="https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2017/jb_sp_170718.aspx">says</a> the ultimate goal is a Indo-Pacific free trade area, reiterating Japanese Prime Minister <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/japan-calls-for-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy/article19685817.ece">Shinzo Abe’s objective</a> of “a free and open Indo-Pacific”. </p>
<p>The paper recognises its strategic economic partnerships with India, Indonesia and Southeast Asia, noting that in 2016:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia’s trade with ASEAN countries was greater than with our second-largest bilateral trading partner, the United States. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>More than any previous public government document, the 2017 paper articulates a hedging strategy. It acknowledges China’s centrality to Australia’s trade, investment and prosperity. </p>
<p>But the TPP, the EU and UK free trade agreements, together with this Indo-Pacific free trade area, are clear economic messages to Beijing: there are alternative trade agreements.</p>
<h2>Getting real</h2>
<p>There has long been an “Australian realism” in international affairs. It’s a realism that recognises Australia is a weak power in a region inhabited by great powers bristling with nuclear weapons, and fragile states (Pakistan and North Korea) possessing baroque. But it also acknowledges these nations’ lethal, nuclear capabilities. </p>
<p>Australian foreign policy has long recognised that as a subordinate power, heavily reliant upon the region’s sea lines of communication and a working peace system to advance its commercial interests, Canberra should maintain great and powerful friends throughout the Asia-Pacific.</p>
<p>In practice, that has meant consolidating and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-11/australia-would-enter-conflict-with-north-korea/8796586">extending</a> the US military alliance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-appeasement-the-slow-boat-to-china-7224">appeasing Indonesia</a>, forming a virtual alliance with Japan, and deepening and widening Australia’s trade and investment links with China.</p>
<p>But despite the fact that Australian budgets are built in Beijing, the white paper is curiously silent about the China-dominated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with merely one passing reference. In contrast, the paper reinforces Australia’s support for Washington-dominated institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF and NATO. </p>
<p>Despite the China challenge, it is clear that in the minds of Canberra, US hegemony is not over, and the Asian century is still to begin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88009/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Remy Davison's Chair was awarded by the EU Commission. He has delivered confidential diplomatic briefings to government officials.</span></em></p>You will find no revisionism in this foreign policy white paper; the first foreign policy white paper since 2003 is firmly in the camp of the status quo.Remy Davison, Jean Monnet Chair in Politics and Economics, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/869312017-11-07T19:26:17Z2017-11-07T19:26:17ZWhy Australia shouldn’t fear a wave of trade protectionism<p>A rollback of free trade agreements could lead to a loss of 270,000 Australian jobs and a reduction in household incomes by around A$8,500 a year, according to a <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/Documents/cie-report-trade-liberalisation.pdf">report</a> released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).</p>
<p>But this is an incomplete picture of the factors that affect trade, both now and into the future. Services (such as education, tourism and telecommunications) <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/international-organisations/wto/pages/the-importance-of-services-trade-to-australia.aspx">now dominate</a> Australian production and exports. The DFAT report is based on an assessment of trade and exports over the past 30 years, during which merchandise and manufacturing were more important. </p>
<p>Services are not nearly as negatively affected by tariffs as manufacturing exports were. So even if there were a sudden bout of protectionism around the world, it is unlikely to have the drastic consequences that the DFAT report predicts. Furthermore, the report fails to consider broader socioeconomic outcomes from trade, such as the <a href="https://www.adb.org/publications/international-trade-and-inequality">impact on inequality</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="t9sDm" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/t9sDm/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As you can see from this chart, services account for roughly 60% of our national output (approximately A$1.02 trillion). <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/international-organisations/wto/pages/the-importance-of-services-trade-to-australia.aspx">The sector</a> employs four of every five Australian workers and contributes around 40% to our export earnings. </p>
<p>These are outcomes of Australia’s structural change in industrial production that has, over the years, moved away from the production of agriculture and manufacturing to that of services. This trend will only continue, and services are likely to be Australia’s leading export into the future. </p>
<p>Of course the export of services, like all forms of international trade, can be subjected to barriers. However, unlike manufactured goods, the <a href="https://wiiw.ac.at/trade-in-services-and-trade-in-goods-differences-and-complementarities-p-1897.html">most important barriers to services trade</a> aren’t imposed at the border in the form of tariffs and the like. </p>
<p>Rather, the barriers to services occur within markets themselves in the form of domestic regulations, which range from contract enforcement, to labour market regulations and compatibility requirements for communication technology. This means that services exports are unlikely to be meaningfully affected by the rollback of free trade agreements.</p>
<p>In fact, if structured correctly, embracing a tide of trade protectionism could be beneficial for many Australian exporters and households. This is demonstrated by our <a href="http://www.atimes.com/asia-pacific-services-trade-needs-harmonized-regulation/">recent research</a> on mobile telecommunications services exports within the multilateral <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/trade-in-services-agreement/pages/trade-in-services-agreement.aspx">Trade in Services Agreement</a> (TiSA) region. </p>
<p>Our <a href="http://www.atimes.com/asia-pacific-services-trade-needs-harmonized-regulation/">preliminary findings</a> show that, in terms of profitability, Australian services firms with international operations in emerging services would benefit from countries harmonising domestic regulation. For example, by setting common standards between mobile telecommunications services among among member countries. </p>
<p>In the telecommunications sector alone, improving and harmonising domestic regulation under a multilateral framework such as TiSA would raise average net company profitability by 1.73%.</p>
<p><iframe id="elhB4" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/elhB4/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Telecommunications services are not the largest export sector for Australia. The export of education and travel services are significantly higher in volume. But a similar argument to that of mobile telecommunications can be made for harmonising standards in skills and training in key education export markets for Australia. </p>
<p>Other trading powers, especially those championing TiSA, like the European Union and Japan, find themselves in similar positions and are prompting a drive to <a href="http://us9.campaign-archive1.com/?u=6fc18e2d4abd250eb5f7b2445&id=c5fc669d49&e=abb157e48b#GATS">establish a services focused free trade agreement</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-charts-on-g20-countries-stealth-trade-protectionism-80678">Three charts on: G20 countries' stealth trade protectionism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The problem with reports like the one from DFAT is that they exclude services and the need for regulatory harmonisation. The focus on merchandise tariffs also implies that the only tool available to “stop protectionism” is the further deregulation of international markets, as tariffs are already <a href="https://business.mb.com.ph/2017/09/06/asean-agreeable-to-reducing-non-tariff-trade-barriers/">close to zero</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, no major economy is currently contemplating blanket rises of tariffs, not even Trump’s administration. The United States is instead <a href="http://www.atimes.com/trumps-legal-options-sparking-us-china-trade-war/">pushing for the literal application</a> of anti-dumping and countervailing measures against distorted trade of selected countries. </p>
<p>To put it simply, tariffs in merchandise trade are no longer the key arena of protectionism in the 21st century. Rather, it is the combination of factors including the lack of regulation and common standards in the international markets for emerging services, as well as the resilience of non-trade barriers by emerging economies. </p>
<p>Ultimately, this is all aggravated by the unilateral geopolitical strategy of the US to legally enforce trade remedies against non-compliant economies of countries that challenge the American world order, such as China, Iran and North Korea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Treisman is affiliated with the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia and the Royal Geographic Society.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Giovanni Di Lieto is affiliated with the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA).</span></em></p>The Australian economy has changed significantly over the past 30 years to focus on services. They are unlikely to be drastically affected by repealing free trade agreements.David Treisman, Lecturer in Economics, Bachelor of International Business, Monash Business School, Monash UniversityGiovanni Di Lieto, Lecturer, Bachelor of International Business, Monash Business School, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/631992016-08-04T02:13:00Z2016-08-04T02:13:00ZWikiLeaks reveals the TiSA agreement could cost Australian services<p>A recent release of confidential documents from WikiLeaks has finally relieved the silence surrounding the negotiations of an important but fairly obscure multilateral trade agreement. </p>
<p>Australia, the US and the European Union have been quietly negotiating the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/trade-in-services-agreement/pages/trade-in-services-agreement.aspx">Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)</a> since 2013, but until now there has been silence around the process and substance of the negotiations.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/">release of confidential documents</a> by WikiLeaks shows the agreement would further complicate multilateral trading systems set by the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm">General Agreement on Trade in Services</a>.</p>
<p>This is a serious concern for the future of service-oriented economies, like Australia, considering that TiSA parties collectively account for around 70% of the <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/trade-in-services-agreement/Pages/trade-in-services-agreement.aspx">global trade in services</a>. The complexity and uncertainty created by TiSA would be an incentive for businesses to avoid navigating the existing framework, making it harder to access trading opportunities in emerging sectors. </p>
<h2>What is TiSA?</h2>
<p>In 2013, the European Commission opened negotiations for a new international agreement on trade in services. Initially, this proposed multilateral treaty was named the International Services Agreement (ISA) and involved a co-opted grouping of 23 WTO members, led by the top global trading economies including the US, the EU, Japan, Australia and Canada.</p>
<p>The ISA then evolved as the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) to harmonise with WTO rules.</p>
<p><a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/trade-in-services-agreement/news/Pages/news.aspx">Australia chaired the last round of TiSA negotiations</a>. These made further headway in negotiations in the areas of market access, liberalisation of financial services, telecommunications, temporary entry of business persons, and transport and localisation sectors. </p>
<p>Besides, the latest WikiLeaks’ release included a previously unknown <a href="https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20151006_Annex-on-State-Owned-Enterprises/">annex to the TiSA on state-owned enterprises</a>. This aims to level the ground of transnational competition between public and private sector businesses. It does so by stating that state-owned enterprises must apply the same commercial considerations to buying or selling services as a private sector entity would when it engages in commercial activities.</p>
<p>The documents show that TiSA is going to add further complexity to the regulations around emerging services sectors, such as telecommunications and payments. The prospects for its later incorporation into the WTO framework seem very uncertain. </p>
<h2>TiSA doesn’t work with other trade frameworks</h2>
<p>There is scope for parties to TiSA to introduce measures that do not conform or are inconsistent with the treaty. This may hinder the commercial development of services in new sectors such as non-banking digital payments (e.g. Apple Pay, Paypal), the sharing economy (e.g. Uber, Airbnb) and digital communications (e.g. Whatsapp, Skype).</p>
<p>This is because the TiSA only partially conforms to either the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or the majority of the existing regional trade agreements (RTAs). The complexity means there will be varying interpretations of the agreements, mostly those related to services like payments, transfers and telecommunications. </p>
<p>The best trading strategy for multinational agreements like this is still <a href="http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/ditc-ted-Nairobi-24082015-USAID-stephenson.pdf">contested</a>. However, approaches that complicate the system, as with TiSA, should be rejected because in the end it costs the services sector. </p>
<p>According to <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/trade-in-services-australia.aspx">the latest DFAT data</a>, the services sector employs four out of five Australians, and the role of international trade in services in Australia is significantly expanding. In fact, Australia’s exports of services rose by 9.4% to A$62.8 billion in 2014-15, accounting for
19.7% of Australia’s total exports, up from 17.3% in 2013-14.</p>
<p>In global trade in services reform, Australia’s priority sectors include financial services, telecommunications, professional services, education, mining-related and environmental services.</p>
<p>With the disruption TiSA may create in the existing multilateral trading system, it would be harder for the Australian services economy to access much-needed trading opportunities in emerging sectors. </p>
<p>In particular, uncompetitive or transforming Australian businesses dealing with cross-border services would be discouraged from navigating the regulatory framework. This is going to trigger a perverse dynamic that may lead to the lessening of crucial legal safeguards and economic innovation. </p>
<p>This situation may add yet another layer to the rule-making environment of international trade in services. It is quite the opposite of a straightforward deregulation of <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/121967/whats-really-going-trade-services-agreement">professional licensing and technical standards</a>. Complex regulation is the real enemy in the pipeline of Australian businesses under pressure from globalising economies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Giovanni Di Lieto is affiliated with NOMIT Inc., a not-for-profit network of contemporary Italian culture in Melbourne.</span></em></p>A WikiLeaks release of confidential documents about a multinational trade agreement shows it will add more complexity to trade in services which may cost Australian businesses.Giovanni Di Lieto, Lecturer, Bachelor of International Business, Monash Business School, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/466792015-08-26T05:47:21Z2015-08-26T05:47:21ZPolitics podcast: Peter Varghese on foreign aid and the Australian world view<p>The secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Varghese sat down with Michelle Grattan to talk about aid, the integration of AUSAID, Islamic State, the Asian century and much, much more.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>DFAT secretary Peter Varghese sat down with Michelle Grattan to talk about aid, the integration of AUSAID, Islamic State, the Asian century and much, much more.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/171592013-09-05T04:31:50Z2013-09-05T04:31:50ZSame old stereotypes of Indonesia – and our politicians aren’t helping<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/30522/original/n9p6gvcw-1378101448.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bali remains a popular tourist destination for Australians. But what do we really think about Indonesia?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chong Eileen</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia is one of Australia’s closest neighbours, but attitudes towards our southeast Asian counterparts are far from neighbourly. A recently released Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) <a href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/australian-attitudes-towards-indonesia/">report</a> concludes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Indonesia is perceived as important to Australia, but knowledge about it is poor and perceptions are very mixed. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite the end of Suharto’s authoritarian rule in the late 1990s and our political cultures converging since Indonesia became a democracy, we haven’t seen much change in Australian public perception of Indonesia. The report showed 53% of respondents did not recognise Indonesia as a democracy. </p>
<p>The report also found that nearly half of Australians surveyed felt Indonesia was “a threat to Australian national security”. This is nothing new. Australians began to single out Indonesia as a “threat” during the mid-1970s when Indonesia’s military invaded East Timor. </p>
<p>From the 1980s, Australians have regarded Indonesia as the country most likely to threaten our national security. A 1993 survey revealed that 57% of Australians believed Indonesia could threaten Australia’s security within the next ten to 15 years. </p>
<p>From the Indonesian side, perceptions of Australia are perhaps more positive, in part because of the 17,000 students who come to study in Australia each year. But much more work needs to be done to ensure this improves over time. </p>
<p>So far, the Australian election campaign has hardly been covered in the Indonesian news, even when Indonesia is mentioned. Most reports are minimal or come from wire services or Australian-owned news services such as Radio Australia. </p>
<p>Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) <a href="http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2010/03/10/1353.html">commented in Australian parliament</a> in March 2010 that “the most persistent problem in our relations in the persistence of age-old stereotypes” and that some Indonesians believe that “Australia harbours ill-intention towards Indonesia”. ANU international relations professor Hugh White <a href="http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2013/june/1370181600/hugh-white/what-indonesia-s-rise-means-australia">wrote earlier</a> this year in The Monthly that despite SBY’s rather frank warning, “we have completely ignored it”.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=639&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=639&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=639&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30525/original/prqs4qjh-1378101684.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono receives an Honorary Companion of the Order of Australia from governor-general Quentin Bryce.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mark Graham</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So why is this? And how do we address Australian misconceptions of Indonesia?</p>
<p>In his 2001 essay <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357710120095225#.UiWAUGRdNHg">Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination</a>, international politics lecturer Simon Philpott argued that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…fear is an integral and inescapable element of Australia’s relations with Indonesia…The images and metaphors used to describe Indonesian society and assumption about “our” and “their” national character reflect an enduringly negative view of Indonesia. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>An example of this was the recent Channel 9 television program <a href="http://catchup.ninemsn.com.au/balithedarksideofparadise">Bali: The Dark Side of Paradise</a> which warned that “one Australian dies every nine days”. The program raised some important issues, but according to <a href="http://www.news.com.au/travel/news/australians-dying-overseas-in-record-numbers/story-fnizu68q-1226572967847">DFAT statistics</a>, more Australians died last year in Thailand (111), the Philippines (68), Greece (60), Vietnam (54), the United States (51), Hong Kong (40) and Germany (41) than they did in Bali (39). </p>
<p>We are unlikely to see a prime-time Sunday night mainstream Australian TV show about these other countries. There is something about Indonesia that generates this long-held Australian interest in its “dark side”. </p>
<p>The DFAT survey shows that those who have studied some aspect of Indonesian culture or language are more likely to have positive feelings toward the country. This is perhaps good evidence for putting more studies of Indonesian society (and Asia more broadly) in our school curriculum. It is also an argument to address the decline of Indonesian language and studies in universities and for pushing programs which encourage Australians to spend time in Indonesia, such as Labor’s <a href="https://aei.gov.au/International-network/Australia/AsiaBound/AsiaBoundFAQs/Pages/AsiaBound-FAQs.aspx">AsiaBound Program</a> or the Coalition’s proposed <a href="http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/indonesia-first-port-of-study-for-students-in-reverse-colombo-plan/story-e6frfkp9-1226707894291">Reverse Colombo Plan</a>. </p>
<p>Yet there is clearly more to this national psyche. Scholars have written that at the heart of the misperceptions and fears of Indonesia reflects how we see ourselves and our nation. We have been described as an “anxious”, “insular” and “complacent” nation. </p>
<p>The DFAT report shows that at the heart of the concerns of those Australians surveyed was “people smuggling through Indonesia to Australia”. This shows the current domestic political debate and subsequent media reports on asylum seekers does shape public perceptions. </p>
<p>As Philpott wrote in 2001:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The use of fear to win a political point in debate about Australia-Asia relations or to discipline Australian voters is far from unusual. </p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1149&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1149&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/30524/original/6txzhntd-1378101588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1149&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A better understanding of Indonesian culture results in more positive attitudes towards our neighbour.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We’ve seen it again and again this election. Opposition leader Tony Abbott has said he will <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/say-we-vote-to-turn-back-those-boats-what-next-20130712-2pvkg.html">“turn back the boats”</a>. Prime minister Kevin Rudd <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/rudd-stands-by-conflict-claim-over-boats-20130629-2p3iv.html">argued</a> that Abbott was “trying to risk conflict” with Indonesia, then Abbott <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-23/coalition-to-announce-scheme-to-buy-unsafe-asylum-boats/4907546">said</a> we need more Australian Federal Police on Indonesian soil and that we should buy boats from Indonesian fishermen. It led one Indonesian politician to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/jakarta-hits-out-at-coalitions-crazy-unfriendly-boat-buyback-scheme-20130826-2slsg.html">publicly state</a> that Abbott himself “shows a lack of understanding and poor knowledge about the situation in Indonesia”. </p>
<p>So if our own political leaders have little understanding of Indonesia and play the “fear” card whenever it suits their cause, should we be surprised that Australians single out Indonesia as a threat to our national security? </p>
<p>This is not to say that Indonesia is without problems or that the concerns of many Australians highlighted by these surveys are completely without merit (for example, terrorism, corruption or asylum seekers dying at sea). But for too long we’ve looked at Indonesia predominately as a place to fear. </p>
<p>In the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/asian-century-white-paper-experts-respond-10370">Asian Century</a>, it is time for a new generation of Australians to see Indonesia as a place of opportunity. An opportunity not solely to make money from its increasing economic success, but to change these age-old stereotypes by building deeper and more personal relationships with one of our nearest neighbours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/17159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ross Tapsell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Indonesia is one of Australia’s closest neighbours, but attitudes towards our southeast Asian counterparts are far from neighbourly. A recently released Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report…Ross Tapsell, Lecturer in Asian Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/39302011-10-20T04:56:39Z2011-10-20T04:56:39ZDoing business with China is a necessity, not a choice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4654/original/chinaeconomy2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=176%2C74%2C3844%2C2597&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">By 2050, China's economy is projected to be as large as the US and India combined.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Opposition leader Tony Abbott has sparked some controversy with his suggestion that <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/abbott-cold-on-china-deal-warms-to-japan-20111019-1m86z.html">Australia’s trade emphasis should be on Japan, rather than China</a>.</p>
<p>Abbott’s suggestion that it would be easier to negotiate a free trade agreement with Japan as
“a fellow market economy and a fellow liberal democracy” was <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/labor-says-tony-abbott-as-pm-would-trash-australias-relations-with-china/story-fn59niix-1226171597703">blasted by Trade Minister Craig Emerson</a>, who said Abbott would “trash” trade relations between the two countries. </p>
<p>Given that China is Australia’s largest trading partner for both its imports and exports, it is critical for Australia to come to grips with China’s unique mix of a planned and market economy.</p>
<h2>Destination Asia</h2>
<p>Somewhere between 50-56% of Australian businesses do business in Asia, depending on which survey you accept.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/cot-cy-2010.pdf">Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)</a>, Australia’s top five export destinations for 2010-2011 are - in order - China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and Taiwan.
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4655/original/chinaeconomy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure></p>
<p>Our top five import destinations (again in order) are China, United States, Japan, Singapore and Germany. </p>
<p>In recent times an interesting change in these activities has been the increasing amount of investment flowing from China into Australia. </p>
<h2>Investment shift</h2>
<p>In 2007 Australian investment into China was on par with Chinese investment in Australia.</p>
<p>But each year since then this has changed so that now, for every dollar Australia seeks to invest in China, China seeks to invest $21 back.</p>
<p>The question of doing business with the Chinese is still highly relevant - the only shift has been the location. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, doing business with China has not been easy for Western organisation. Fundamentally the reason we fail is because we refuse to accept China is different and will remain so. </p>
<p>Now, with China projected to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy by 2027, the assumption of economic dominance is shifting to the East for the first time in 100 years. </p>
<p>By 2050 China’s economy will not only be the largest, but will be the size of America and India put together. </p>
<p>Its population is roughly equal to that of the US and India added together - substantially greater than the <a href="http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html">US population</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4657/original/jiabao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Premier Wen Jiabao addresses the World Economic Forum in September.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This situation makes China a superpower, both economically and politically. It is the latter that concerns many nations. </p>
<p>Yet doing business with China is not a question of choice but one of necessity. I have been preaching to companies for the last five years “You should have had a China strategy yesterday”. </p>
<h2>Cultural change</h2>
<p>To further understand China and its differences, I want to emphasise culture. Unique in the world, China’s model of a centrally planned economy and market economy with socialist characteristics is not easy to understand. </p>
<p>The Western cry for “transparency” reflects the frustration of failing to understand this system.</p>
<p>Equally China’s attempt to make its systems “transparent” does not really help. Dressing up a model that is completely different as something familiar merely papers over the differences. </p>
<p>The centrally planned economy has five year plans and 15 year plans. In these plans the government allocates resources to certain industries and sectors.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4656/original/chinaeconomy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China is Australia’s top import and export partner.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This type of central planning is foreign to a democratic country such as Australia. </p>
<p>Yet it is naive to think that a centrally planned system does not impact on business operations in Australia, as increasing merger and acquisition activities by Chinese companies in Australia demonstrates.</p>
<h2>Understanding the culture</h2>
<p>The Chinese business culture is a relationship-based networking credit system. The credibility of a contact is of greater importance than an established global brand name. (Although the two together would work better.) </p>
<p>The barriers to closer ties with China are largely due to the lack of understanding of cultural differences. </p>
<p>For instance: when the immigration policy changed and Chinese students were required to take up a different type of visa to Indian students, the perception was that Australia was treating Chinese students less favourably than the Indian students. As a result the student numbers dropped in 2009 and 2010. </p>
<p>Similarly, the latest changes in investment policies were seen as being directed at Chinese investment in particular. </p>
<p>There are many areas of cultural difference we are not mastering, although we have been trying to do business with China since the beginning of the “open door” policy in 1979.</p>
<h2>How to succeed in China</h2>
<p>In my latest book <a href="http://www.bookdepository.co.uk/Doing-Business-Successfully-China-Mona-Chung/9780857091550">“Doing Business Successfully in China”</a> I included a chapter titled “Eat, drink and may your business prosper”.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4660/original/chinaeats.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eat, drink and prosper is a Chines business mantra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This chapter specifically discusses the role eating and drinking plays in business in China. This topic has not been previously covered. </p>
<p>Every business person who has been to China or will go to China has faced, or will face, this issue. </p>
<p>However the challenge is how to manage business dining and use it as an effective tool, instead of it being seen by some Western business people as a form of “bribery”. This is unique to the Chinese culture.</p>
<p>Eating and drinking is far more complex in business in China. Mastering the concept, as well as proper behaviour, will have a direct impact on business deals. </p>
<p>The above is only a glimpse of the many differences which impact on business transactions with China. </p>
<p>Australia has moved a very long way from the 1950s when over 50% of its exports went to the UK to today’s position of trading mostly with our Asian neighbours. </p>
<p>Do we see ourselves as a part of Asia? Or do we see ourselves as “superior” Asians? We must first answer these questions before we will be able to position ourselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/3930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mona Chung does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition leader Tony Abbott has sparked some controversy with his suggestion that Australia’s trade emphasis should be on Japan, rather than China. Abbott’s suggestion that it would be easier to negotiate…Mona Chung, Lecturer in International Business, Management, School of Management and Marketing, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.