tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/east-china-sea-8183/articlesEast China Sea – The Conversation2023-12-17T19:17:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160682023-12-17T19:17:36Z2023-12-17T19:17:36ZWhat we don’t understand about China’s actions and ambitions in the South China Sea<p>In recent weeks, China’s activities in the South China Sea have raised more concerns in the region. Its ships have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67668930">collided</a> with Filipino vessels, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-accused-of-sonar-blast-aggression-after-spray-with-philippines-vessels-20231209-p5eqbn.html">fired water cannon at others</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/18/australian-naval-divers-injured-after-being-subjected-to-chinese-warships-sonar-pulses">used sonar pulses</a> close to an Australian ship, injuring its divers.</p>
<p>The United States and its allies view this increasingly assertive behaviour as evidence China seeks to challenge the established maritime order, marking it as a “revisionist” power.</p>
<p>The US and its allies have a fairly straightforward view on the South China Sea. They believe these should be open waters accessible to all states and Southeast Asian countries should be able to enjoy their rights to their exclusive economic zones along their shorelines. </p>
<p>But how does China perceive its rights and legitimacy in governing the South China Sea? And how does it view the broader maritime order? Understanding this viewpoint is crucial to deciphering China’s actions in the ongoing disputes in the sea.</p>
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<h2>An evolving approach to the South China Sea</h2>
<p>China’s approach to disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea has been guided by the same principle since the country began opening up in the 1980s. The policy, established by former leader Deng Xiaoping, <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42930.pdf">said China would</a> “set aside sovereignty disputes and seek joint development” in the seas. </p>
<p>This principle took as a given Chinese sovereignty over the waters. Chinese policy elites expected other countries would recognise this sovereignty when engaging in joint development projects with China, such as offshore <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-china-idUSL3E7E90ER20110309/">gas fields</a>. Moreover, they insisted participating nations agree to set aside disputes in favour of common interests. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">Explainer: why is the South China Sea such a hotly contested region?</a>
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<p>But this approach, seen by Chinese scholars and some within the government as a step back from China’s sovereignty claims in exchange for economic gains, did not yield anticipated results.</p>
<p>In the 2000s, Chinese scholars recognised a growing gap in expectations. They noted that engaging in joint development projects did not necessarily build confidence or create closer ties between China and other claimants to the seas. </p>
<p>They argued other nations had taken advantage of China’s step-back policy to assert their own claims, undermining China’s legitimacy to its own sovereignty over the waters. </p>
<p>The surge in great power competition between China and the US in recent years further complicated the situation. This prompted Beijing to address China’s maritime claims more urgently as public opinion turned increasingly assertive, fuelling <a href="http://paper.people.com.cn/hqrw/html/2017-03/01/content_1761508.htm">resentment of the US</a> over the South China Sea.</p>
<h2>China turns more assertive</h2>
<p>A significant turning point came in 2012 with a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-is-risk-conflict-disputed-scarborough-shoal-2023-09-26/">stand-off</a> between the Philippines navy and Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal. The shoal lies about 200 kilometres (124 miles) off the Philippines coast and inside its exclusive economic zone. China seized the shoal and the Philippines launched a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.</p>
<p>This marked a shift in Chinese rhetoric about its approach to maritime claims and set the stage for the conflicts we’ve seen in the South China Sea since then.</p>
<p>From the Chinese perspective, it has been essential to reassert the country’s sovereignty and jurisdiction in the region.</p>
<p>To achieve this, Beijing has pursued actions to “rule the sea by law”. This has involved extensive land reclamation projects on atolls (which China was reluctant to do under former leader Hu Jintao), the strengthening of China’s coast guard, regular patrols of the sea, and reforms to domestic maritime laws. </p>
<p>Chinese intellectuals justify these actions based on two principles. </p>
<p>First, they argue China has historic rights to govern much of the South China Sea based on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">nine-dash line</a>, making the implementation of domestic laws in the area legitimate. </p>
<p>Second, aligning with the Communist Party’s directive of “<a href="http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2015/0618/c1003-27175140.html">ruling the country by law</a>”, these measures ensure clear laws and regulations are in place to govern China’s maritime domain. They strengthen China’s jurisdiction over the contested seas, justifying its steps to build military facilities on islands there. </p>
<p>These activities have been very controversial and have faced international legal challenges. Merely imposing domestic laws and regulations does not automatically legitimise China’s maritime claims and interests. </p>
<p>After China <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china">rejected</a> the arbitration tribunal ruling against it in the case brought by the Philippines, the perception in much of the world was that Beijing was violating international laws. </p>
<p>Within China, however, this rejection solidified a consensus among policy elites that the current maritime order was “unfair”.</p>
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<h2>A ‘fair and reasonable’ maritime order</h2>
<p>In response, China has sought to garner international support for its claims and, more broadly, its worldview. </p>
<p>To do this, Beijing has promoted the establishment of a “fair and reasonable” maritime order. China’s <a href="https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm">14th Five-Year Plan</a> explicitly outlines this goal in 2021, as part of an overarching goal of creating a maritime “Community of Common Destiny"。</p>
<p>This objective aligns primarily with the party’s view, much <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html">trumpeted</a> by President Xi Jinping, of the "rise of the East and decline of the West”. The aim is to shift the existing maritime order from one dominated by the West to one based on what Beijing calls “<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202206/t20220619_10706059.html">true multilateralism</a>”. </p>
<p>With its “Community of Common Destiny”, China is promoting itself as a global leader in ocean governance and suggesting what it deems a better alternative. This narrative, according to Beijing, has <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/26/c_1310333813.htm">gained support</a> in the Global South.</p>
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<h2>Bending rules to its advantage</h2>
<p>Western strategists often label China a revisionist force challenging the established international order. However, such a characterisation oversimplifies China’s ambitions in ocean governance. </p>
<p>China does not appear intent on preserving or altering the established order. Instead, Beijing has demonstrated a propensity to bend specific rules within the existing framework to align with its interests, using its institutional influence. </p>
<p>Because these international rules lack a uniform understanding around the world, China is adept at navigating the grey areas.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-that-the-west-doesnt-understand-about-chinas-foreign-policy-213188">Five things that the west doesn't understand about China's foreign policy</a>
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<p>Ultimately, China aims to dominate the existing maritime governance agreements and treaties, allowing it to impose its own agenda and safeguard its maritime rights and interests. Of course, not all countries view China’s ambitions favourably. The Philippines and Vietnam, in particular, oppose China’s unilateral statements on the South China Sea, perceiving them as assertions of regional hegemony.</p>
<p>I’m not seeking to justify China’s actions here, but rather to provide insight into the internal perspectives driving its actions. </p>
<p>China’s influence in ocean governance is clearly on the rise. Western powers and China’s neighbours need to better understand Beijing’s approach in expanding its maritime interests because future relations in the South China Sea depend on it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Sing Yue Chan is affiliated with Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University.</span></em></p>Understanding China’s perspectives on ocean governance – and where they come from – is vital to forging a path forward on disputes over contested waters.Edward Sing Yue Chan, Postdoctoral Fellow in China Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870612022-07-18T20:06:28Z2022-07-18T20:06:28ZWhy China’s challenges to Australian ships in the South and East China Seas are likely to continue<p>Last week it was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-13/australian-defence-warship-tracked-by-chinese-military/101229906">reported</a> an Australian warship had, in early July, been closely followed by a Chinese guided-missile destroyer, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, and multiple military aircraft as it travelled through the East China Sea.</p>
<p>This incident followed a <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/chinese-fighter-jet-intercepts-australian-surveillance-aircraft-south-china-sea/e99a9d3e-8453-4f1d-ae01-130e6681d8f8">confrontation</a> on May 26, when an Australian maritime surveillance plane was dangerously intercepted by a Chinese fighter over the South China Sea.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-05/australian-government-wont-be-intimidated-in-south-china-sea/101127204">Reportedly</a>, the Chinese fighter flew treacherously close to the Australian plane, releasing flares, before cutting across its path and dropping chaff (a cloud of aluminium fibre used as a decoy against radar).</p>
<p>While there are good reasons not to exaggerate these events, the bad news is these incidents are almost certain to continue. When they do occur, it’s important to place them within their broader historical and geopolitical context and not sensationalise them – we must not frame them as if we’re on the brink of war.</p>
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<h2>The good news: 3 reasons not to panic</h2>
<p>There are three reasons why the significance of these events shouldn’t be exaggerated. </p>
<p>First, Asia’s seas are among the world’s busiest. The warships of different navies are constantly operating in close proximity with each other and most of these interactions are professional and even courteous. This includes most encounters with the Chinese navy.</p>
<p>A second, and related, point is that both the Chinese and Australian navies have grown significantly in size over the past decade. More ships means more total days at sea, which means more opportunities for the navies to come into contact.</p>
<p>Most of these encounters are innocuous. In our research on <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/soundings-papers-indo-pacific-endeavour-reflections-and-proposals-australias-premier-naval-diplomacy-activity">Australia’s naval diplomacy</a>, for instance, the team at Macquarie University investigated <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-09/chinese-spy-ship-docks-next-to-hmas-adelaide-in-fiji/9852748">reports</a> a Chinese ship had spied on HMAS Adelaide visiting Fiji.</p>
<p>The reality, however, was the Chinese ship was deployed semi-permanently to the South Pacific as a satellite relay and regularly came in-and-out of Suva (Fiji’s capital) for supplies. It was nothing more than a chance run-in.</p>
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<p>Third, although confrontations aren’t common, they are also far from unprecedented. During the Cold War, the warships of the United States and the Soviet Union frequently sparred. Few forward deployments occurred without some contact with the opposing forces that may have included overflights, shadowing or dangerous manoeuvring. </p>
<p>Indeed, potentially dangerous interactions were common enough that in 1972 the Americans and Soviets signed the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm">agreement</a>. The agreement spelt out the “rules of the road”. The superpowers also committed to an annual meeting between their senior naval officers, with the hosting responsibility alternating between them.</p>
<p>The agreement didn’t eliminate incidents at sea, but it did create a mechanism for the two parties to vent their frustrations, voice their protests and work constructively on solutions. As the meetings were between the two nations’ top professional naval officers, there was a <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/incidents-sea">high degree of mutual respect</a> and a genuine attempt to make the seas a safer place for their sailors.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/japan-signals-a-sense-of-crisis-over-taiwan-this-is-why-it-is-worried-about-chinas-military-aims-164562">Japan signals a 'sense of crisis' over Taiwan — this is why it is worried about China's military aims</a>
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<h2>The bad news: these incidents will continue</h2>
<p>The US attempted to replicate their Soviet agreement with China. In 1998, the US and China <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/august/military-maritime-consultative-agreement">agreed</a> to the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, which copied many of the successful parts of the Soviet agreement, including the annual meeting between their admirals to discuss concerning incidents.</p>
<p>The challenge, however, is that the geopolitical backdrop to the US-China agreement is significantly different from its Cold War antecedent. During the Cold War, tensions at sea rose and fell just as they did on land. However, the areas where the Soviet Union attempted to assert its claims (such as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea) were isolated and icy and generally unimportant to everyone except the Soviets. The Americans would prod there occasionally on intelligence gathering, freedom of navigation operations, or simply to rile up their rivals – but on the whole both sides understood the game.</p>
<p>In contrast, China has claimed exclusive coastal territorial sovereignty over the majority of the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and large parts of the East China Sea. These are among the most geopolitically important and busiest waterways in the world.</p>
<p>Beijing’s options for convincing regional states to recognise its claims are limited, especially when foreign navies continue to traverse these waters, dismissively ignoring China’s sovereignty declarations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
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<h2>Beijing has few options</h2>
<p>Politically, China could attempt to horse trade, such as we’ll treat you as the custodians of the South Pacific if you accept our claims to the South China Sea. Or use economic and diplomatic coercion.</p>
<p>In Australia’s case, neither of these strategies are likely to be successful as they would undermine our relationship with the US, and there’s the fear China will renege in the future. </p>
<p>This leaves tactical deterrence. Describing how deterrence works, American economist Thomas Schelling used the <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1007.3938&rep=rep1&type=pdf">analogy</a> of two people in a row boat where one starts “rocking the boat” dangerously, threatening to tip it over unless the other one does all the rowing. The threat is shared equally between them, but the boat rocker is counting on the other to back down because their appetite for risk is lower.</p>
<p>Confrontations in the air and sea are risky for both the perpetrator and the target. On 1 April 2001, for instance, a Chinese fighter <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hainan_Island_incident">collided</a> with an American signals intelligence aircraft. The American plane was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island, while the Chinese plane crashed and the pilot died.</p>
<p>What China is counting on is Australia not being as risk tolerant as they are. They hope Australia will blink first. But, Australia has shown no indication it will stop deploying to the region. Indeed, the aircraft that was threatened and damaged by chaff on May 26 was one of two Australian aircraft flying out of the Philippines at the time. The Australians were not deterred and the second aircraft appears to have flown missions on <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/general/details-surface-on-china-s-dangerous-interception-of-raaf-p-8a">May 27, May 30 and June 2</a> through the same airspace as the incident occurred.</p>
<p>As China and Australia have few other options than to continue doing what they’re doing, these incidents look likely to continue.</p>
<p>When they occur, however, it’s important they’re not taken out of their historical and operational contexts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lockyer receives funding from the Department of Defence through its Strategic Policy Grant Program. The funding supports his ongoing research on conventional maritime deterrence. </span></em></p>While there are good reasons not to exaggerate these events, the bad news is these incidents are almost certain to continue. But we shouldn’t frame them as if we’re in the brink of war.Adam Lockyer, Associate Professor in Strategic Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600932021-05-04T20:06:43Z2021-05-04T20:06:43ZChina does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398546/original/file-20210504-15-16da3x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Talk of war has become louder</a> in recent days, but the “drumbeat” has been heard for some time now as China’s military capabilities have grown. China does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving. </p>
<p>Scholars like <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/four-flashpoints">Brendan Taylor have identified four flash points</a> for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage. </p>
<h2>Where tensions are currently high</h2>
<p>The armistice between North and South Korea has <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/cold">held for nearly 70 years</a>. The pandemic has severely constrained North Korea’s economy and its testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles has ceased, for now. China has a stake in keeping Kim Jong-un’s regime in power in the North, but the prospects of reverting to a hot war have flowed and ebbed. </p>
<p>Just south of Korea, in the East China Sea, China has intensified its <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf">military activities</a> around the Japanese-claimed but uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China appears to be wearing down Japan’s resolve to resist its claims over what it calls the Diaoyu Islands. </p>
<p>The United States has assured Japan the islands fall under their mutual defence security guarantee. But a confrontation with China could test US backing and possibly set the stage for escalated confrontation elsewhere.</p>
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<img alt="Japanese plane flies over Senkaku Islands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force surveillance plane flies over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo News/AP</span></span>
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<p>Similarly, China’s industrial-scale island building in the South China Sea has resulted in extensive <a href="https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/">military hardware and infrastructure</a>. This will enable the Chinese to consolidate their position militarily and assert control over the so-called <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/">nine-dash line</a> — its vast claim over most of the sea. </p>
<p>The US Navy continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations (<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide">FONOPS</a>) in the sea to <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-fonops-and-the-south-china-sea">challenge China’s claims</a>. With thousands of marked and unmarked Chinese vessels operating there, however, the risk of an <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1296844/south-china-sea-conflict-risk-us-navy-collision-world-war-3">accident triggering an escalation is real</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/indonesia-cites-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-award-at-un-is-that-a-big-deal/">international tribunal</a> rejected China’s claims to the waters in a case brought by the Philippines. Despite being a signatory to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, China has ignored the tribunal’s ruling and continued to intrude on islands claimed by both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-vows-continue-maritime-exercises-south-china-sea-2021-05-02/">the Philippines</a> and <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-china-dispute-natuna-12244200">Indonesia</a>. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/220-chinese-vessels-stake-out-another-reef-in-spratly-islands">220 Chinese vessels were anchored for months at a reef</a> inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China’s actions appear premised on the dictum that <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/asias-nightmare-could-china-take-over-south-china-sea-180026">possession is nine-tenths of the law</a>. </p>
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<p>Like <a href="https://www.bworldonline.com/the-ghost-of-the-2012-scarborough-shoal-stand-off/">China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012</a> that preceded its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expands-island-construction-in-disputed-south-china-sea-1424290852">massive island construction further south</a>, China could conceivably take the unwillingness of the US to challenge its latest moves as a cue for more assertive action over Taiwan. </p>
<p>This is, after all, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/xi-flirting-with-taiwan-seizure-to-secure-legacy-us-20210328-p57eq9">the main prize</a> Beijing seeks to secure President Xi Jinping’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Why Taiwan’s security matters</h2>
<p>Taiwan presents the US and its allies with a conundrum. It is a liberal open democracy and <a href="https://techwireasia.com/2021/02/the-dominance-of-the-worlds-largest-chipmaker-tsmc/">the world’s leading computer chip maker</a>. It also sits in the middle of what military strategists refer to as the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/why-chinas-military-wants-to-control-these-2-waterways-in-east-asia/">first island chain</a>” stretching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Its strategic significance is profound. </p>
<p>Having adopted a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf">“One China” policy</a> since 1979, the US <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_taiwan_alliance.pdf">security guarantee for Taiwan</a> is conditional and tenuous. Reflecting growing unease over China’s actions, polls show <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/poll-shows-increase-in-american-support-for-defending-taiwan/">strong US public support for defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>So far, ambiguity has served US interests well, providing some assurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading. </p>
<p>This guarantee has been important for Japan, as well. With its pacifist constitution, and occasional concern over US commitment to its defence, Japan would be closely watching how the US approaches its Taiwan policy.</p>
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<h2>China is so far avoiding open war</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, China has metamorphosed both economically and militarily. An exponential <a href="https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html">growth in China’s military capabilities</a> has been matched by a steep rise in the lethality, accuracy, range and quantity of its weapons systems. On top of this, Beijing has ratcheted up its <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-china-using-warlike-tactics-against-taiwan-former-defence-minister/">warlike rhetoric and tactics</a>. </p>
<p>Last month, Xi made a <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-sends-message-to-us-on-chinas-rising-power-in-boao-address-159324">muscular speech to the Boao Forum Asia</a>, calling for an acceptance of China not only as an emerging superpower but also as an equal in addressing global challenges. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="China's navy has been significantly upgraded." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">China has significantly upgraded its navy since Xi took power eight years ago.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Li Gang/Xinhua/AP</span></span>
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<p>Sometimes actions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a <a href="https://diplomacybeyond.com/to-a-man-with-a-hammer-everything-looks-like-a-nail-chinas-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-zhao-lijian-hits-back-at-us/">“nail” to a US “hammer”</a>. This is for good reason. </p>
<p>If war did break out, China would be vulnerable. For starters, it shares <a href="https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/countries-bordering-china.htm">land borders with 14 countries</a>, bringing the potential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-time-for-a-new-way-of-war-what-chinas-army-reforms-mean-for-the-rest-of-the-world-134660">Is it time for a 'new way of war?' What China's army reforms mean for the rest of the world</a>
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<p>Then there are the economic concerns. China has significant <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3095951/china-increasingly-worried-about-losing-face-japan-bankrolls">Japanese</a>, <a href="https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/china/investment">US and European industrial investments</a>, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through the Malacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Indo-Pacific’s jugular vein. </p>
<p>This reliance on the Malacca Strait — referred to by one analyst as the “<a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/">Malacca dilemma</a>” — helps explain why China has invested so much capital in its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> and studiously avoided open conflict, at least until it is more self-reliant. </p>
<p>To avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-chinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html">paramilitary force</a> with white-painted ships and armed fishing vessels in the thousands to push its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and constrict Taiwan’s freedom of action. </p>
<p>It also recently <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas">passed a new law</a> allowing its coast guard to act more like a military body and enforce maritime law — again in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.</p>
<p>China is also expanding its <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/grey-zone-warfare-can-taiwan-counter-china/">“grey zone” warfare</a> against Taiwan, which includes <a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/taiwan-china-hacking-apt40/">cyber attacks</a>, repeated incursions of its air space and territorial waters, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/taiwans-growing-diplomatic-isolation/">diplomatic isolation</a> to undermine Taiwan’s resolve and ability to resist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">Explainer: what is 'hybrid warfare' and what is meant by the 'grey zone'?</a>
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<h2>Would America’s allies help defend Taiwan?</h2>
<p>This persistent and escalating challenge by Chinese forces has demonstrated <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/assessing-the-patterns-of-pla-air-incursions-into-taiwans-adiz/">Taiwan’s inability to fully control its waters and air space</a>. Beijing is continuing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-military-amphibious/">to build a fleet of amphibious</a> capabilities to enable an invasion of Taiwan. </p>
<p>US pundits are also no longer confident the Americans would win in an outright war over Taiwan, with Washington’s top military officer in the region <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns">arguing one could happen within six years</a>.</p>
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<p>Taiwan lacks allies other than the United States, but Japan is mindful of the consequences of a US failure to defend Taiwan. Its <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/tools-owatatsumi">ocean surveillance and coastal defence capabilities</a> would be exposed if China took Taiwan. But Japan’s constitution <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/04/983deef11264-japan-govt-studies-sdf-response-in-event-of-taiwan-strait-conflict.html">precludes direct involvement in defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Under its Anzus obligations, the US could call on Australia for military support to defend Taiwan. The mutual assistance provisions <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-08/does-anzus-commit-us-to-come-to-australias-aid-fact-check/5559288?nw=0">are not automatically invoked</a>, but the implications of Canberra standing on the sidelines would be profound. </p>
<p>Warnings about rhetorical drumbeats of war remind us the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117802016002001">US is no longer the world’s only superpower</a> and suggest Australia should prepare for a more volatile world.</p>
<p>Rather than rely solely on the US, Australia should bolster its own defence capabilities. At the same time, it should collaborate more with regional partners across Southeast Asia and beyond, <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Pages/plan-of-action-for-the-indonesia-australia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-2020-2024">particularly Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://www.theglobaleye.it/quad-bolstering-the-quad-beyond-its-military-dimensions-east-asia-forum/">Japan, India</a> and <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4836-south-korea-and-australia-move-to-deepen-energy-defence-and-industry-ties">South Korea</a>, to deter further belligerence and mitigate the risk of tensions escalating into open war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are four potential flash points where conflict with China could break out. Beijing, though, has yet to present a ‘nail’ to the US ‘hammer’.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899572018-01-28T18:09:19Z2018-01-28T18:09:19ZAsia is set for a difficult year in 2018 – much of it centred around China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202973/original/file-20180123-182965-1hfj219.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China is increasingly viewed by the United States as a full-spectrum adversary.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2017 we finally realised that the four decades of geopolitical stability enjoyed by Asian countries and societies had come to an end. In 2018, the major patterns that will come to dominate the region will become increasingly clear. </p>
<p>China and the United States worked out a way to live with one another in the 1970s, and that paved the way for the region’s remarkable economic growth. The US actively sought to engage China in the belief that Chinese economic integration with the world would eventually lead to the liberalisation of China’s political system.</p>
<p>But as Xi Jinping’s first five years in office have made clear, that optimism was misplaced. A more affluent China has become more authoritarian, more nationalistic, and increasingly intent on changing the international environment to one it perceives better reflects its interests.</p>
<p>In his first year in office, US President Donald Trump surprisingly played a gentle hand with China. In contrast to this campaign rhetoric, his administration approached China with moderation, focusing principally on establishing a good personal relationship with Xi and trying to garner Chinese help to manage North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/at-apec-donald-trump-and-xi-jinping-revealed-different-ideas-of-asias-economic-future-87368">At APEC, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping revealed different ideas of Asia's economic future</a>
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<p>That is likely to change in 2018. As signalled in the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> and the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf">National Defence Strategy</a>, the US sees strategic competition among major powers as the most important feature of the country’s security environment. </p>
<p>The active engagement of China by the US, even one tempered by a degree of containment, is coming to an end. China is viewed now as a country that seeks to mould the international environment in its own image. Expect the US to increasingly contest China’s power and influence, both in the region and globally.</p>
<p>This is likely to take both military and economic forms, as China is increasingly viewed by the US as a full-spectrum adversary. This will mean <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b14b0e84-ff6e-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5">some kind of action</a> on what the US perceives as China’s predatory trade policy, as well as a ratcheting up of military steps to push back on Chinese activities, particularly at sea. </p>
<p>China will not respond to the likely increase in American pressure with equanimity. Indeed, one real risk in 2018 is that China will overplay its hand. Its lesson from 2017 is that Trump is a paper tiger. Trump is perceived as being neither able nor willing to match his bombastic words with deeds. China could be emboldened to act provocatively because it miscalculates how the US might respond. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202976/original/file-20180123-182951-19mk1gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Much attention this year will focus on the power struggle between the US and China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Jonathan Ernst</span></span>
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<p>The disputed islands in the East China Sea are probably the most likely place for this to happen. The South China Sea disputes have a slightly lower risk in 2018, as China has largely achieved its objectives in that area, and while the US would prefer that this hadn’t occurred, it can live with the consequences for the time being. </p>
<p>While Sino-American competition will increase the regional temperature, it is by no means the only way in which great power rivalry will shape the region. </p>
<p>Last year’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-india-border-dispute-a-grim-sign-for-stability-in-asia-81634">Doklam crisis</a> reminds us that the extensive border between China and India is highly contested. Expect India’s ambitions and China’s confidence to lead to further tensions in the Himalayas. </p>
<p>China was slightly surprised by India’s response in Doklam, and will have learned from that occasion. When, and not if, China next tests India, it will probably involve a higher level of military risk.</p>
<p>In late 2017, senior officials from <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/">the US, Japan, India and Australia</a> met, reviving the “quadrilateral initiative” of a decade ago. </p>
<p>The move is publicly framed as efforts to coordinate policies of countries that value an open and free Indo-Pacific. In substance, it is about collaborating to limit Chinese influence and sustain the liberal order. The “new quad” will take further steps in 2018 and China will respond in ways that will further heighten regional tensions. </p>
<p>This year will also see a further decline in the stock of liberalism in Asia. For a period in the early 2000s, liberalism seemed ascendant. China joined the World Trade Organisation, democracy was on the march in Southeast Asia, and economic globalisation was seen as an unalloyed good thing.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-ambition-burns-bright-with-xi-jinping-firmly-in-charge-86307">China's ambition burns bright – with Xi Jinping firmly in charge</a>
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<p>No longer. There are no democracies <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/04/democracy-isnt-receding-in-southeast-asia-authoritarianism-is-enduring/">in continental Southeast Asia</a>. Rodrigo Duterte is undermining liberalism in the Philippines, shutting down a vibrant news website, and some fear that the martial law he imposed in the restive south may be expanded <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/duterte-unchecked">across the country in 2018</a>. </p>
<p>Cambodia has stripped away its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/cambodia-daily-shuts-with-dictatorship-parting-shot-at-prime-minister-hun-sen">thin democratic veneer</a>, while Myanmar’s democratisation process remains highly limited. Even in Japan and India, liberal ideas are under challenge from thin-skinned nationalists. </p>
<p>In 2018, liberal ideas in Asia will face an increasingly difficult environment, particularly as the geopolitical competition will encourage erstwhile champions of liberal ideas to put interests ahead of values in order to manage that contest.</p>
<p>This year will sadly see the Rohingya crisis linger on, with insufficient political incentives for international actors to help end the crisis. The alignment of interests between the military and the government in Naypidaw will mean the region’s worst humanitarian crisis in decades will continue.</p>
<p>There is also a good chance that in 2018 we will work out how to live with a nuclear North Korea. The US will ultimately realise that it has no options for managing the crisis – or at least none that carry acceptable costs – and that a nuclear north can be managed. Indeed, a North Korea that feels secure may finally undertake the kind of economic reforms that its populace needs, and which could integrate the isolated country into the regional economy.</p>
<p>Contested Asia has become a geopolitical and geo-economic reality. In 2018 we will see just how sharp the contests will become. The wounded nationalism of China, the erratic and unpredictable US, and the weak political leadership in many regional powers mean the coming year in Asia is going to be even more challenging than 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89957/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is Executive Director of La Trobe Asia, a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs' National Executive and a Board member of China Matters. All of these entities have received funding from Australia's federal government.</span></em></p>The contestation of Asia will continue this year, with many countries facing internal and external battles.Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/727392017-02-14T07:28:16Z2017-02-14T07:28:16ZHas Abe got Trump’s measure? Golf diplomacy puts Japan back on the green<p>Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managed to be the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/donald-trump-election-latest-japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-meeting-a7424106.html">first foreign leader to visit then president-elect Donald Trump</a> last November. He was already embarking on his activist personal diplomacy to counter the <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2016/05/22/donald-trumps-plan-to-make-americans-poor-again/#3b98d7b02db0">bellicose rhetoric Trump occasionally aimed at Japan</a> during his election campaign, accusing the country of unfair trade practices and currency manipulation, and threatening tariffs against imports.</p>
<p>Trump even implied an end to the US-Japan alliance, stating that Japan, along with other US allies, <a href="http://time.com/4437089/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-nukes/">should develop its own nuclear weapons</a>. But Abe’s first official meeting with President Trump last week – the second world leader after British Prime Minister Theresa May – has already achieved Japan’s most fundamental diplomatic goal: ensuring the continuity its security alliance with America.</p>
<p>The trip follows a <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/">successful preliminary visit to Japan</a> the previous week by the US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and a <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000339.html">similarly positive phone call</a> between Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.</p>
<p>Mattis praised the country’s financial contribution to the hosting of US bases in Japan (around 75%, with most bases in Okinawa) as a “<a href="http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003502433">model of cost-sharing</a>”. And he issued a statement that the US would continue to defend Japan’s claims over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (claimed as the Daioyus by China), under the US-Japan Security Treaty.</p>
<h2>Maintaining the status quo</h2>
<p>Reassured by his firm endorsement of the value of Japan’s contribution to the expense of the alliance, the first stage of Abe’s trip to the US produced exactly what was hoped for. In a joint press conference following talks after Abe’s arrival in Washington DC, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/remarks-president-trump-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press">Trump said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control and to further strengthening our crucial alliance. The bond between our two nations and the friendship between our two peoples runs very, very deep. This administration is committed to bringing those ties even closer.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe">A joint statement released afterwards</a> confirmed the US remains committed to defending Japan’s claims over the Senkaku Islands under Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, including use of conventional and nuclear military capabilities, if necessary. </p>
<p>The controversial relocation of the main US military air base on Okinawa will also continue. While maintaining rights to international freedom of flight and navigation in the East China Sea, Abe and Trump also hoped <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-11/trump-committed-to-us-japan-security-after-abe-meeting/8261620">any actions that would escalate tensions</a> in the South China Sea could be avoided.</p>
<p>But, in the first such encounter under the Trump administration, the US Navy has already reported an “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/south-china-sea-us-navy-aircraft-encounter">unsafe interaction</a>” between one of its reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese aircraft during a patrol over the South China Sea.</p>
<p>And this is despite Trump having followed up his greeting letter to Xi Jinping, where he expressed hope they can work productively together, with his first phone call to the Chinese leader. During the call, he reiterated the <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2017/2/10/14575442/trump-accept-one-china">USA’s long-held adherence to the “One China” policy</a> after all.</p>
<h2>The problem of trade</h2>
<p>Before and during the visit, ignoring criticism from opposition parties in Japan, <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701310048.html">Abe remained uncritical of Trump’s controversial</a> – and possibly unconstitutional – immigration ban. Abe is hardly in any position to criticise it, given Japan’s own paltry record of accepting refugees. Despite a record number of over 10,000 applications, <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/10/national/record-10910-refugee-applicants-face-abysmal-odds-acceptance-japan/#.WKA43X82VOY">Japan only accepted 28 refugees in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>North Korea’s first missile launch test of the year, <a href="https://theconversation.com/forget-sanctions-reining-in-north-korea-will-need-a-whole-new-approach-70431">held in the middle of Abe’s US visit</a>, also gave the two leaders an immediate opportunity to display the ongoing strength of the alliance. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38947451">In a joint news conference</a>, Abe condemned the test as “absolutely intolerable”, while Trump declared “the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.”</p>
<p>While the defence relationship may have been secured, trade remains the main area of contention. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Japan strongly supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-trans-pacific-partnership-survive-after-trump-71821">is now likely to be doomed</a>, due to Trump’s condemnation of multilateral trade pacts. </p>
<p>Abe hopes Trump’s hostile campaign rhetoric against Japan over trade can also be mollified. </p>
<p>Appealing to Trump’s populist economic nationalism, Abe brought along a plan called the <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-japan-trade-exclusive-idINKBN15F0LD">US-Japan Growth and Employment Initiative</a>. Projected to be worth around US$450 billion, it pledges potential investment by Japanese corporations in the US – in infrastructure, energy, and robots. The package, which promises the <a href="http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003498622">creation of more than 700,000 jobs</a> in America over ten years, could be incorporated into a potential bilateral trade deal with Japan. </p>
<p>At their Washington meeting, Abe and Trump <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170211/p2g/00m/0dm/005000c">agreed to commence talks on a bilateral trade agreement</a>, in place of the TPP. A new US-Japan economic dialogue group is to be established toward that end, to be led by US Vice President Mike Pence and Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, who also held their first separate meeting in Washington.</p>
<p>As with the TPP though, concluding a bilateral trade treaty is likely to be long, complex, fraught process, particularly over agriculture.</p>
<h2>Work and play</h2>
<p>After the formal Washington meetings, Abe flew to Florida with Trump on Air Force One, accompanied by first ladies Melania Trump and Akie Abe, to the president’s extravagantly luxurious Mar-a-Largo resort, <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2842627/donald-trump-golfing-japanese-prime-minister-abe/">to play golf for the weekend</a>. The White House stated the cost of Abe’s visit to the resort, including golfing fees, would be paid for by Trump as a personal gift. </p>
<p>This is a further sign of the apparently warm personal ties that Abe has managed to cultivate; Trump has already accepted an invitation to visit Japan later this year.<br>
If Abe returns with US trade relations relatively intact, as well as the military alliance, he will have taken advantage of the erratic and turbulent first weeks of the Trump administration to <a href="https://theconversation.com/japans-australian-sub-bid-fits-with-its-strategic-and-economic-transformation-48156">secure favourable strategic and economic relations</a>. His government is likely to be supported by the Trump administration, as it was by president Barack Obama’s, to continue increasing defence spending, and pursuing further constitutional change.</p>
<p>In return, Abe is likely to encourage the US to challenge China’s recent domination of the South China Sea, and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-09/could-the-indian-ocean-become-south-china-sea/8257204">compete with the expansion of Chinese influence into the Indian Ocean region</a>, through its planned massive “One Belt, One Road” land and sea transport infrastructure project. </p>
<p>Abe’s US visit could, in fact, eventually turn out to have been an important step in reviving his long-held ambition for <a href="http://www.nippon.com/en/column/g00339/">a “security diamond” between Japan, the US, India and Australia</a>, which he proposed during his first term as prime minister in 2006-2007. </p>
<p>These four states may now be more willing to revive this idea for a strategic alliance, but if it does proceed, this could threaten a Cold War-style hegemonic confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. And it could have potentially catastrophic consequences if armed conflict breaks out over territorial disputes.</p>
<p>Abe is one of the most energetic practitioners of diplomacy among modern Japanese prime ministers. By flattering Trump’s ego, he has proved adept at handling Trump’s inexperience in foreign policy. He has managed to successfully challenge one of Trump’s strongest held attitudes, publicly expressed as long ago as 1987, that <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/">the US is being exploited by its allies</a> in providing for their military protection. </p>
<p>Abe has demonstrated to other world leaders how to approach President Donald Trump: pay the price to strike a deal that panders to corporate interests and geostrategic nationalism of both sides. </p>
<p>This first official US visit has thus potentially become Abe’s most far-reaching diplomatic achievement so far. That is, if the notoriously temperamental, inconsistent and contradictory Trump can be counted on to stick to his deals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may have just demonstrated to other world leaders how to possibly approach President Donald Trump.Craig Mark, Professor, Kyoritsu Women's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/686252016-11-14T15:41:27Z2016-11-14T15:41:27ZChina grapples with the mixed blessing of a Trump victory<p>Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency was followed with amazement and apprehension across East Asia. China in particular was on tenterhooks – and now it needs to figure out what to do.</p>
<p>In the short-term, the outcome suits Beijing’s objectives. First and foremost, it provides a rich vein of propaganda fodder. The venom of the campaign, coupled with the West’s general atmosphere of disaffection and economic stagnation, are certainly themes that the Chinese media have been quick to latch on as evidence of the “rigged” Western system. </p>
<p>The first-past-the-post electoral principles that guide the American and British electoral systems can be easily mystified in China and Russia as a means of manipulating election results behind the scenes by plutocrats and the military. After all, how can Hillary Clinton have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/opinion/clintons-substantial-popular-vote-win.html">won the popular vote</a> and all the major cities and still been denied the White House? In China, whose privileged urbanites are deeply suspicious of people they regard as mere country bumpkins, such a scenario is the ultimate democratic turnoff.</p>
<p>The campaign has also provided plenty of material for the argument that the “free” Western media is in fact mind-numbing and ineffectual. While America’s mainstream media was supposedly heavily tilted towards Clinton, or at least away from her rival, Trump managed to beat the elite at their own game with little more than his blustering reality-TV delivery and Twitter account.</p>
<p>His victory also puts a major dent in democracy’s worldwide appeal. Whereas Chinese party officials are only promoted to the national stage after many years’ gruelling experience in provincial posts, Trump’s record in public office is nonexistent. That <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016/heres-what-happened-with-the-latino-vote">29% of the Hispanic vote went to Trump</a> despite his assailing of “bad hombres” is grist to the mill, as is the fact that white women <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/hillary-clinton-white-women-vote/507422/">did not desert him</a>.</p>
<p>This is all a gift to Beijing. But the Sino-American relationship is so complex, and so crucial to the stability of the rest of the world, that the election of Trump will inevitably have much deeper ramifications.</p>
<h2>Wiggle room</h2>
<p>In the intermediate term, Trump’s victory buys China time to advance its maritime claims in the South and East China seas. On this front, the election counts as a bullet dodged: during her time as secretary of state, Clinton was the brain behind the Obama administration’s much-heralded “<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/">pivot to Asia</a>”, and was all set to galvanise more support in East and South-east Asia to constrain China’s manoeuvres there. </p>
<p>For Trump, it seems economic interests at home will take precedence over traditional alliances and shared values. If he actually follows his professed non-ideological, business-like approach to international relations, he will hollow out the democratic values through which many other countries in the region, too, feel bound to the US.</p>
<p>Both <a href="http://time.com/4517524/north-korea-missile-rocket-test-japan-threat/">Japan</a> and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/tag/thaad-deployment-to-south-korea/">South Korea</a> are terrified of North Korea; without the assurance of American support against potential attacks, they may decide to seek refuge in new Chinese security guarantees. And from non-democratic <a href="https://theconversation.com/vietnam-is-struggling-to-unite-its-mekong-neighbours-against-china-63969">Vietnam</a> to democratic Indonesia, the region’s heavyweights have been sitting on the fence for quite some time: they are deeply troubled by China’s new assertive foreign policy, its military buildup and historical claims to nearly all the <a href="https://theconversation.com/troubled-waters-conflict-in-the-south-china-sea-explained-59203">South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>Having watched Obama cold-shoulder first Egypt’s <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2011/01/obama-pulls-away-from-mubarak-048412">Hosni Mubarak</a> and then the <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-media-indicates-obama-sold-us-out/">Saudis</a>, the US’s south-east Asian allies now worry about just how reliable their superpower backer will be in a regional crisis. Some seem outright dismissive of it: the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte – who endorsed Trump as someone who like himself is <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/10/asia/duterte-trump-military-exercises/">fond of swearing</a> – declared before the election that his country’s alliance with the US was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/philippines-duterte-china-announces-split-161020131226993.html">over and done with</a>.</p>
<p>Further afield, in Central Asia and the Middle East, Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and apparently isolationist bent might offer China much more breathing space. It could drive more allies into Xi Jinping’s <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/02/whats-driving-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/">One Belt, One Road</a> initiative, a programme to better connect China with its post-Soviet western neighbours. It could even see China boosting its presence in the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/26/chinas-thirst-oil-foreign-policy-middle-east-persian-gulf/">Persian Gulf</a>. </p>
<p>Trump has vowed to make the Saudis, Japanese and NATO pay more for American security guarantees. Yet the government in Beijing is keen to learn from Western mistakes, and will think hard before it takes up any costly military deployment beyond its immediate periphery. Who will fill the looming security vacuum in Asia remains to be seen; besides China, Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-japan-tempt-russia-into-an-alliance-against-china-60888">clearly has ambitions</a> in that direction.</p>
<h2>Delicate balance</h2>
<p>Trump’s economic regeneration plan, such as it is, could be a major boost to China’s economic credentials. Much of his policy rhetoric, after all, is about <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/trump-promises-make-infrastructure-major-focus/">huge investment in infrastructure</a> aimed at catching up with the quality of China’s recently completed airports, high-speed rail and motorways. He can, in short, be portrayed as a closet admirer of the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-13/china-trumps-trump-when-it-comes-to-infrastructure">Chinese developmental-state model</a>. He may often invoke the need for deregulation and lower taxes, but to blue-collar America he projects big-government assistance funded by divesting from costly obligations overseas. </p>
<p>Pragmatism, isolationism and non-interventionism are all principles that the Chinese government can relate to. Nevertheless, in the long run, Trump’s election poses very new serious challenges to China’s rise as an economic and trading titan. </p>
<p>If Putin and Trump strike some sort of cosy deal to defuse their two countries’ tensions, they could spell trouble for the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f8959924-cab6-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44">closer relations</a> Moscow and Beijing currently enjoy. The One Belt, One Road initiative, for instance, is contingent on Russian assent. If it loses the precedence it enjoys in Russia, China will not be able to easily compensate with added heft elsewhere.</p>
<p>Trump is unpredictable, and he has already proven he would have no hesitation to demonise China if it proved uncooperative in helping him bring about economic turnaround in the US. Whether his plans can be achieved without slapping import duties on Chinese goods remains to be seen – and China has already tried to deter him with an <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/14/apple-iphones-could-be-hit-if-trump-imposes-a-45-percent-tariff-on-china-exports-beijing-warns.html">array of threats</a>, including over potential iPhone tariffs.</p>
<p>The last two decades have been defined by Sino-American interdependence on the world stage, with the US cast as policeman and China as banker and sweatshop. But globalisation and neoliberalism have now been placed in the dock; the old order suddenly looks unsustainable. China has a huge opening on its hands, but it knows better than to dive in headfirst. </p>
<p>In a phonecall with Trump after he declared victory, Xi Jinping reportedly told the president-elect that co-operation was their “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1390D3">only choice</a>”. He may prove to be right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China may have more to gain from Trump’s rise than any other nation – but the risks of a miscalculation are enormous.Niv Horesh, Visiting Research Fellow, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608882016-08-03T10:19:34Z2016-08-03T10:19:34ZCan Japan tempt Russia into an alliance against China?<p>Russia, and the Soviet Union before it, has traditionally been on Japan’s diplomatic radar mostly by virtue of its proximity and sheer influence. The two countries’ bilateral ties have been frosty at best, however, thanks to a decades-old territorial dispute over the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11664434">South Kuril islands</a>, referred to in Japan as the Northern Territories. </p>
<p>But all that is changing. Ever since Shinzo Abe began his second stint as prime minister in December 2012, Japan has been on something of a charm offensive, and it has made Russia a key part of its strategy towards a rising and increasingly assertive China. </p>
<p>Well-known for his <a href="https://theconversation.com/japans-government-has-politicised-a-generation-with-its-militarism-52561">strong conservative leanings</a>, Abe initially reached out to Russia to try and make progress on the Northern Territories row, as well as <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/heres-why-japan-and-russia-might-sign-a-peace-treaty-70-years-after-the-war">signing a peace treaty</a> to formally end the state of war that they never technically exited after 1945. The progress of these interrelated issues had been stymied since the early 2000s thanks to the Putin government’s off-and-on denial that a territorial dispute even existed, and the two countries’ <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/04/the-northern-territories-remain-the-stumbling-block-in-russo-japanese-relations/">seemingly irreconcilable views</a> on how to go about resolving it.</p>
<p>So a formal resolution to the territorial dispute remains a highly uncertain possibility, and a long-term one at that. But Abe has more tangible and immediate goals, too. </p>
<h2>Keeping the lights on</h2>
<p>First and foremost is energy. For Japan, which imports <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS?locations=JP">the vast majority</a> of the energy it uses, more oil and gas from the Russian Far East would mean a <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/why-russia-and-japan-are-making-nice/">closer and more secure</a> source of hydrocarbons than the Middle East – the supplies from which must traverse the unstable South China Sea. Russia, the rationale goes, can also sell its oil and gas to energy-hungry Japan on more lucrative terms than to Europe or China. </p>
<p>But more importantly, Japan believes that Russia can reshape the whole security architecture in East Asia and views it as a counterbalance to Beijing’s growing assertiveness and influence. </p>
<p>This is in line with Abe’s attempts to create an anti-Beijing coalition in the region by forging new partnerships with countries other than the US, in particular the Philippines, Vietnam and India. </p>
<p>But the newly improved ties between Russia and Japan were suddenly jeopardised by the Ukrainian crisis that broke out in early 2014. Abe was forced to <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/26/the-ukrainian-crisis-and-japans-dilemma/">walk a diplomatic tightrope</a>, falling in line with the rest of the G7 to impose anti-Putin sanctions while trying to preserve whatever Russo-Japanese goodwill had been generated since 2012. </p>
<p>Eventually, Japan’s well-earned identity as a responsible member of the international community with a reactive foreign policy prevailed, and Tokyo <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-announces-new-russia-sanctions-1411553420">imposed a series of sanctions on Russia</a>. Predictably, they had little practical impact, but they nonetheless provoked a political backlash from Moscow, one that chilled the two countries’ relationship for the next two years. </p>
<p>All the while, as Russia dug its heels in for a stand-off with the West, it <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/19/what-happened-to-russias-pivot-to-asia/">attempted to “pivot” eastward</a>, specifically to China. But for all that Moscow paraded its thickening relations with Beijing as a symbol of its defiance, the results of Russia’s eastward turn have been distinctly lacklustre, as both it and China prioritise their variously severe domestic economic problems. </p>
<p>More importantly, Beijing has made it abundantly clear that it will not sacrifice its traditional economic interests in the West in exchange for closer ties with Moscow, whatever powerful political symbolism such an alliance might have.</p>
<p>So once again, Japan has seen an opening – and the plan is already underway.</p>
<h2>Come together</h2>
<p>When he visited Russia in May 2016, Abe <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/16/national/politics-diplomacy/tokyo-moscow-vow-cooperate-developing-russian-far-east/#.V5jE9ZOAOko">unveiled an eight-point plan</a> for bilateral economic cooperation, which he is likely planning to use to exert pressure on Moscow in exchange for concessions on the territorial dispute. </p>
<p>Abe has another bit of leverage besides. He has put a lot of effort into achieving a rapprochement with Putin even as the other G7 countries have pressured him to help them punish Russia for annexing Crimea in 2014. That means Japan is the <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/21/talks-on-russo-japanese-territorial-disputes-still-going-nowhere/">only country</a> in the G7 willing to engage with Russia on unambiguously friendly terms, making itself a highly valued go-between in dangerously tense times. </p>
<p>The question is whether Russia will respond in kind. The Russian leadership’s <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/is-the-japan-russia-honeymoon-over-before-it-even-began/">recent statements</a> have made it abundantly clear that Moscow does not entertain any gesture towards ceding even some of the islands to Japan.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Abe is clearly committed to convincing Putin that in a region increasingly shaped by China’s interests, everyone else has to club together to protect their own. Whether the Kremlin truly buys it remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dmitry Filippov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two of East Asia’s biggest powers are still technically at war and deadlocked over contested territories. Now one of them wants to be friends.Dmitry Filippov, PhD candidate in Japanese studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439532015-07-01T05:12:55Z2015-07-01T05:12:55ZTaiwan’s presidential election could start a pivot to Beijing<p>Taiwan is limbering up for its 2016 presidential election. Its two main parties have picked their candidates – and gotten very different receptions.</p>
<p>When the ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) nominated <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-strange-case-of-the-kmts-hung-hsiu-chu/">Hung Hsiu-chu</a> as its candidate for the 2016 Taiwan presidential elections, the reaction was disbelief. Instead of picking its much younger chairman, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/04/taiwan-ruling-party-leader-affirms-support-for-unity-with-mainland-china">Eric Chu</a>, who has a PhD in accounting and who’s already served as deputy premier in government, the KMT has instead chosen a quirky party apparatchik with no substantial record in government.</p>
<p>Hung, who has been <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/06/21/2003621191">dubbed</a> Taiwan’s Sarah Palin, offers an outspoken antidote to President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Chu’s temperate demeanour and sagely tenor. But she faces a tough opponent in the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai Ying-wen.</p>
<p>Though younger than Hung, Tsai has considerably more executive experience. Like Chu, she has served as deputy premier in the past – and a recent <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/06/06/2003620029">visit she paid to Washington</a> was widely deemed a success. Crucially, she is said to have allayed American fears that a DPP victory would destabilise Taiwan’s delicate relations with China, potentially dragging the US military into a conflict it would rather avoid. After all, US-China tensions are already mounting over China’s maritime disputes with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dispute-over-the-south-china-sea-could-put-east-asia-at-war-again-37825">Philippines</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/japan-is-regaining-lost-military-muscle-and-the-us-needs-it-42277">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Tsai’s visit was proof that Taiwanese politics has come full circle. The KMT, once the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) fiercest enemy, is now pushing for closer links with a CCP-led mainland; Hung’s own father was smeared as a CCP agent and jailed for three years, and yet she is now suggesting she would steer Taiwan even closer to Beijing’s orbit. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Tsai is going out of her way to portray herself as the status quo candidate par excellence – definitively breaking with her party’s history of exuberant opposition to Beijing.</p>
<h2>About face</h2>
<p>Tsai’s success at the DPP helm has convinced many observers in the West that the KMT is headed for a crushing defeat in 2016; the ruling party has already taken a drubbing in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30257504">2014 local elections</a>, and the popular tide in Taiwan seems to be turning against its policy of compromise with Beijing, which many Taiwanese see as a step towards “peaceful reunification” on Beijing’s “one country, two systems” terms. </p>
<p>Indeed, the 2014 protests by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32229214">Sunflower Movement</a> – a groundswell of opposition to Ma’s proposed free trade agreement with Beijing – badly rattled Taiwan’s establishment. The last local elections confirmed the movement was not just a student uprising, but in fact a reflection of broader public discontent at the KMT government.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The KMT’s Hung Shiu-chu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hung-shiu-chu-3by2.png">Gibsontom4 via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given that clear signal from the electorate, many Western observers expected the KMT to pick a centrist candidate who would appeal to these popular currents without changing Taiwan’s relationship with China. In Hung, they see a Beijing appeaser who is likely to alienate not just the electorate but also the Taiwanese military top brass, who are still understandably suspicious of Beijing’s grand strategy. </p>
<p>Hung has gone beyond Ma by suggesting she would end Taiwanese arms procurement from the US if elected president. Before the KMT elders prevailed on her to change tack, she even hinted she would break with the tradition of visiting Washington in the lead-up to the presidential elections.</p>
<h2>Wind of change</h2>
<p>But Tsai has not shown any real enthusiasm for a new push for true independence from China. Whatever the Taiwanese people’s sentiments, she clearly has no intention of reviving the policies that typified her DPP predecessor <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30677700">Chen Shui-bian</a>’s controversial presidency in the early 2000s. </p>
<p>At its height, the Chen era saw a carefully orchestrated “<a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/07/01/2003367611">de-sinification</a>” campaign. Chen pushed Beijing’s patience to the limit by adding the word Taiwan to the cover of new passports alongside the familiar Republic of China emblem, and besought Ban Ki-Moon to readmit Taiwan to the UN as an independent polity.</p>
<p>Things have changed greatly in Taiwan since then. What Western analyses of the DDP tend to miss is that its policies may be beginning to converge with the KMT’s – and could build a new bridge between Taipei and Beijing even if Tsai is the one elected. Thus, for example, the DPP position on the South China Sea as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu maritime disputes is very similar to the KMT’s. This is a position that aligns with Beijing’s ethnocentric claims by and large. Moreover, the DDP’s position is surprisingly at odds with the position of Tokyo and Manila in spite of the fact that Taipei, like Tokyo and Manila, is heavily tied to a US security umbrella.</p>
<p>Today’s Taiwan is much more reliant on China economically than it was when Chen took power, and it’s highly unlikely Tsai would renege on her assurances to Washington by changing course. As president, she might opt to tone down the DPP’s rejection of the <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm">“One China” principle</a> too. </p>
<p>Tsai is even backing off the party’s longtime military posturing against China, keeping relatively quiet about the KMT’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21583271-conscripts-death-has-brought-young-out-streets-blooded">plan to abolish conscription</a>. She reportedly wants to combine compulsory and voluntary military service into one system, but that hardly means she would increase the size of Taiwan’s armed forces or send the armed forces on a weaponry procurement spree in Washington.</p>
<p>This emerging consensus speaks to a long-running narrative of Chinese identity, at least amongst the older, mainland-born population of Taiwan. And while one might imagine Taiwanese youth to be increasingly disdainful of mainland China, in recent years some younger Taiwanese have <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/08/18/2003540562">made a show</a> of landing on disputed Japanese and Philippine islands while toting the Republic of China flag.</p>
<p>Whether Hung would be roundly defeated by Tsai in 2016, as suggested, or post an upset remains to be seen. A Tsai win, at any rate, would not necessarily preclude accommodation with Beijing. </p>
<p>What is also clear is that Taiwan would have a new female president in 2016 for the first time in its history. This would be another major achievement toward gender equality in Asia, following Park Geun-hye’s sweeping to power in South Korea. It has to be remembered in this context that none of the seven members in China’s peak policy-making body (CCP politburo central committee) is female. China – like Japan or the US for that matter – has not had a female leader yet. In that sense, the 2016 elections in Taiwan are globally significant. Female presidents have been a common sight in Southeast Asian politics but not in the more economically powerful region of Northeast Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the 2016 presidential candidates are anything to go by, Taiwan’s relationship with Beijing could be in for a major defrost.Niv Horesh, Professor of Modern Chinese History and Director of the China Policy Institute , University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/422772015-05-27T05:37:33Z2015-05-27T05:37:33ZJapan is regaining lost military muscle – and the US needs it<p>After years spent delicately staying out of military disputes around the world, Japan is suddenly reasserting itself as a serious player in regional and international disputes – and America is ushering it along. </p>
<p>And while circumstances in Japan’s neighbourhood mean that the country needs to show more muscle, there’s an inescapable irony in seeing these two countries holding hands militarily.</p>
<p>After World War II, Japan <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php">renounced war</a> and outlawed the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes in <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php">Article 9</a> of its constitution. This set the stage for decades of explosive economic development on the home front.</p>
<p>Japan spent the postwar decades transitioning from military to economic power, with the US sheltering it under the <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html">Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security</a> that the two countries signed in 1960.</p>
<p>But now, with the Asia-Pacific region under intense pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US-Japan alliance is reverting back to a more muscular and defensive posture.</p>
<p>Things hit a peak in April 2015, when President Obama reminded the Asia-Pacific – specifically the PRC – that the US and Japan’s mutual security treaty covers Japanese’s maritime disputes in the East China Sea. Therefore, America will defend the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china">Senkaku Islands</a>, an uninhabited archipelago at the heart of a long-running territorial dispute with the PRC.</p>
<p>And now, America is standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Japan as the latter steps up both regionally and internationally, transforming back into the sort of power it had apparently decided never to be again. </p>
<h2>Revival</h2>
<p>In July 2014, Japanese PM Shinzō Abe and his cabinet <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-japan-defense-idUSKBN0F52S120140701">approved</a> a reinterpretation of Article 9, which granted the nation the right of collective self-defence. </p>
<p>Although Japan is the <a href="http://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/topics/un_budget.html">second largest financial contributor</a> to the United Nations and has been sending troops on UN peacekeeping missions <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reinterpreting-article-9-enhancing-japans-engagement-in-un-peacekeeping/">since 1992</a>, Article 9 has always limited Japan’s direct participation from any possible combat missions. Now the grey area is gone, and no misgivings have been raised by the US.</p>
<p>Seven months after the shift, Abe <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/departing-from-countrys-pacifism-japanese-premier-vows-revenge-for-killings.html?_r=0">took a strong stand</a> against Islamic State, calling for revenge after the capture and killing of two Japanese hostages. Such a bold statement is rare coming from Japan – and combined with the reinterpretation of Article 9, it suggests at the very least that Japan will engage in future peacekeeping missions in a more involved way that possibly participate in combat operations, especially if Islamic State is the target. </p>
<p>With this new assertiveness, Japan is starting to regain the status as a “normal” state. And this is shaking up the Asia-Pacific balance of power in a big way.</p>
<h2>Stand-off</h2>
<p>Besides the backup it gets from America, Japan’s new foreign policy posture enjoys substantial internal support. Abe’s programme of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-abenomic-growth-japan-still-needs-reform-14447">Abenomics</a>” has actually made a pretty good job of bringing Japan’s stagnant economy back to its feet, and that was the main reason his administration was <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-japan-pm-set-for-re-election-after-abenomics-poll-win-2014-12?IR=T">re-elected</a> last year. </p>
<p>Whether Abe took a strong stance on foreign policy was not a main consideration when the Japanese voted. But as Abe’s domestic legitimacy improves, he and his cabinet are getting more licence to engage in international affairs and regional maritime disputes, and responding to the PRC’s maritime belligerence with a strikingly belligerent tone. </p>
<p>Even though the PRC is testing the red lines of maritime disputes with <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28322355">oil drilling in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone</a>, various <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11225522">vessel collisions near the Senkakus</a> and its recent <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/uk-southchinasea-usa-idUKKBN0O50T420150520">land-reclamation work</a> around reefs in the South China Sea, the party-state has backed off or at least stopped escalating hostilities when it has pursued these aggressive actions.</p>
<p>Clearly, Beijing is not yet prepared to trigger full-scale hostilities with even relatively weak states like Vietnam, never mind an ever more muscular Japan. But if the party-state continues with its red line tests, and the maritime disputes it insists on inflaming could blow the fuse on the region’s fragile stability. After all, nearly every state in the Asia-Pacific has at least one maritime dispute with its neighbours rumbling away. </p>
<p>Yet America chooses to engage with Japan to a level that could possibly upset Washington’s other alliances across East Asia. The growing US-Japanese alliance is clearly intended to counterweight the PRC, and to shift the volatile balance of power in the region in ways we cannot foresee. </p>
<p>But one thing’s for sure: the land of the rising sun is rising again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neville Chi Hang Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Japan has spent decades proudly staying out of military matters, but China’s maritime belligerence has changed all that.Neville Chi Hang Li, PhD Candidate in International Security and Demography, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/321252014-09-26T09:56:52Z2014-09-26T09:56:52ZChina and India’s border dispute rises to dangerous new heights<p>On September 19 the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, concluded a three-day trip to India. As he set off to meet Narendra Modi, Xi <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/towards-an-asian-century-of-prosperity/article6417277.ece">wrote in The Hindu</a> that China and India “need to become co-operation partners.” </p>
<p>This does not explain why his soldiers entered Indian territory without authorisation on the first day of his visit. </p>
<p>As Xi landed in Gujarat, Indian media was abuzz with reports of a <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/chinese-civilians-intrude-into-ladakh-area/article1-1264293.aspx">Chinese intrusion into Indian territory</a> in Ladakh, with 130 Indian troops facing down 230 Chinese troops. Both sides publicly downplayed the face-off – but it was apparently serious enough for Modi to raise it twice with Xi. </p>
<p>Whatever he said did nothing to relieve the tension, which is still high: <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/24/india-china-modi-chumar-army-ladakh-idINKCN0HJ2FU20140924">around 1,000 soldiers from each side</a> have now been stationed in Ladakh and the dispute is playing out through a seemingly endless series of rushed tit-for-tat construction of military huts and roads.</p>
<p>Clearly, the latest increase in tension is not just an everyday mishap; thanks to constant mistakes, misperception and mistrust, it risks escalating into a more intense conflict. </p>
<h2>Crossing the line</h2>
<p>Chinese-Indian border incursions are nothing new: according to the Indian government, 334 “encroachments” <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-president-xi-jinping-arrives-in-delhi-as-troops-face-off-at-india-china-border-1410968062">have already happened in 2014</a> (with 411, 426 and 213 incidents in 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively).</p>
<p>Disputed since China <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/02/tibet-through-chinese-eyes/306395/">annexed all of Tibet</a> in 1950, the border still eludes clarification. India claims about 15,000 square miles of Chinese-controlled territory in <a href="http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/sino-indian-relations-the-geopolitics-of-aksai-chin-4822/">Aksai Chin</a>, while China claims Indian <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-23/news/54239588_1_pm-modi-incursions-gujarat-additional-chief-secretary">Arunachal Pradesh</a> (about 34,000 square miles) as “Southern Tibet”.</p>
<p>The failure to clearly demarcate the China-India border has led to overlapping perceptions of where the so-called <a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/lac-line-of-actual-control-chinese-incursion-ladakk-pla/1/269640.html">Line of Actual Control</a> (LAC) lies, guaranteeing that rival border patrols will run into each other and force the issue. </p>
<p>It’s possible that troops stationed high up in the Himalayas are just horribly out of touch with international politics. Alternatively, the People’s Liberation Army could be airing its own foreign policy views in opposition to the civilian leadership. </p>
<p>Then again, this could also be a co-ordinated strategy on the part of the Chinese: talking peace and dangling economic incentives while implementing hard-nosed security policies, just as Beijing is doing in the East and South China Seas. </p>
<p>But whatever is behind the latest dial-up in tensions, it has taken emotions to a height unseen in years.</p>
<h2>Making a scene</h2>
<p>Territorial issues haunt Indian-Chinese relations even at the best of times – and so it went during Xi’s visit. India had mixed success keeping Tibetan protests out of the Chinese president’s path: to safeguard the atmosphere before his arrival in Ahmedabad, 52 Tibetan students were pre-emptively detained, and north-east Indian staff in Xi’s hotel were banned from their workplace. </p>
<p>But still, Tibetan girls <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/tibetans-breach-xis-security-in-new-delhi/article6425604.ece">descended onto Hyderabad House</a>, site of the Delhi meeting, shouting anti-Chinese slogans. Other activists scaled scaffolding outside Xi’s hotel and unfurled pro-Tibetan banners.</p>
<p>Some Indians speculated that the authorities deliberately allowed the protesters to reach Hyderabad House in retaliation for the border incursion. If true, beating up the protesters and bundling them away within minutes is a strange and feckless way to send a message to China. </p>
<p>In any case, ahead of Xi’s arrival, it had been predicted that he would pressure New Delhi to help curtail the Dalai Lama’s activities and shut down the Tibetan “government-in-exile”. New Delhi reportedly rejected these demands – but in a signal that the incursions had introduced a <em>froideur</em> into proceedings, it also refused to resurrect its expression of support for “One China Principle” in the customary joint declaration.</p>
<p>All this might sound like it calls for a reasonable sort of detente – but the problem is, New Delhi and Beijing need far more from each other than that. </p>
<h2>Forced co-operation</h2>
<p>The economic case for co-operation is obvious. China and India are currently trading only at the volume of US$66.4 billion, although India suffers a trade deficit of around US$35 billion. The 16 deals signed during Xi’s visit will bequeath a Chinese investment of US$20 billion in Indian power equipment, automobiles, infrastructure development and airlines.</p>
<p>For India, securing foreign investment is a crucial priority. China has plenty of capital to invest, and if Modi is serious about <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-bank-watch-out-the-brics-bank-is-a-game-changer-29437">co-operating in global institutions with the other BRICS</a>, he will have to defrost New Delhi’s relations with Beijing. </p>
<p>But for China, embroiled in various sharp territorial disputes with neighbours on its eastern Pacific front, improving relations with India is a point of paramount security importance. </p>
<p>With Modi <a href="https://theconversation.com/modi-takes-manhattan-in-bid-to-bolster-strategic-partnership-with-obama-32178">headed to the US</a> with an imperative to repair relations with Washington, this just weeks after he <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-09-02/visiting-japan-indias-modi-pokes-at-china">implicitly decried Chinese “expansionism”</a> in Tokyo, hopes that the world’s two largest countries will manage to improve their relationship may be premature at best.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32125/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tsering Topgyal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On September 19 the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, concluded a three-day trip to India. As he set off to meet Narendra Modi, Xi wrote in The Hindu that China and India “need to become co-operation partners…Tsering Topgyal, Lecturer in International Relations, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/208022013-12-09T06:19:10Z2013-12-09T06:19:10ZWest fears the rise of some countries more than others<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36699/original/x32zc8cf-1386002574.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">At ease: Indian soldiers deployed at the 2010 Commonwealth Games.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Giles/PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When a highly populous, rapidly developing, nuclear armed, space-voyaging and increasingly assertive Asian nation announces the purchase of its third aircraft carrier, a few months after launching its first domestically-produced nuclear submarine, a nervous reaction in the West may appear natural.</p>
<p>After all, China’s economy has been growing rapidly for more than 30 years, allowing Beijing to enhance its military capabilities at a corresponding rate. Inevitably, this has drawn Western attention and China’s “rise” is now among the most hotly debated issues in global affairs – particularly at moments such as the latest <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25062525">Senkaku/Diaoyu islands incident</a>. </p>
<p>Is China a threat or an opportunity? Will it wield its new powers responsibly or for selfish gain? Questions like these circulate widely as Americans, Australians, Europeans and others watch China with cautious – and sometimes nervous – eyes. </p>
<p>Consider this, though: the country which in November purchased its <a href="http://rt.com/news/russia-india-aircraft-carrier-834/">third aircraft carrier</a>, and which earlier this year launched its first <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-a-first-for-india-nuclear-subs-reactor-activated/article5009164.ece">domestically built nuclear submarine</a> was not China, but India.</p>
<p>India is often regarded as today’s second “rising” power. It shares many attributes with China – notably a large, growing, modern and well-equipped military – and yet it rarely provokes anxiety in the West. The reasons for this warrant careful consideration.</p>
<h2>One of the club</h2>
<p>Broadly speaking, India is met with less suspicion because it is seen as more like “us”. English, in conjunction with Hindi, is the Indian language of government. India is democratic and capitalist and due to its regrettable colonial past it shares cultural and historical links to the United Kingdom and is a member of the Commonwealth. To a significant extent, it is “one of the club”. </p>
<p>This affinity is evident in the West’s relations with India. In a <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india">speech</a> to the Indian parliament in 2010 for example, US president Barack Obama emphasised “our shared interests and our shared values” (and variations of the word “democracy” appeared no fewer than 21 times). US politicians are more lukewarm when addressing China’s leaders, talking instead of <a href="http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217937.htm">“building trust” and “seeking common ground”</a>. Similarly, in 2012, the then Australian prime minister, Julia Gillard, and India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, <a href="http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/news/read-gillard-and-singh%E2%80%99s-joint-statement">spoke</a> of their nations’ common values as liberal democracies. </p>
<p>The world’s democratic systems are of course not identical, but they are bound by the powerful myth that democracy is necessarily good. Correspondingly, any non-democratic system is implicitly identified as “bad”. History does not help the communist cause. Most infamously, the Soviet experiment descended into dictatorial violence and brutality. Yet communism, in its intended form, is not inherently evil. Moreover, a truly communist country has never actually existed and so technically, at least, it has no track record for us to assess. The communism we imagine is the key factor. </p>
<p>Certainly, China has a dubious record of upholding human rights. At times it is <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/06/02/china-and-the-biggest-territory-grab-since-world-war-ii/">highly assertive</a> towards its neighbours; it engages in international “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/opinion/china-and-cyberwar.html?_r=0">cyber warfare</a>”; and it seems to have only <a href="http://e360.yale.edu/feature/china_at_crossroads_balancing_the_economy_and_environment/2710/">recently</a> begun caring to any meaningful extent about the environment within and beyond its borders, among other things. But China is far from alone. Other nations guilty of these crimes (at one time or another) include the United States, Australia, the UK – and India. </p>
<h2>Self-fulfilling prophecy</h2>
<p>Broadly speaking, China is doing little to demonstrate that it represents a major imminent security threat to the West, or even to its Asian neighbours. In the recent round of disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands China has acted aggressively and perhaps unreasonably, but the situation has a long and complex history. Moreover, the other key actor, Japan, has long enforced its own regional “Air Defence Identification Zone”, attracting claims of <a href="http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-11-25/rest-of-world/44448780_1_japan-pm-south-china-sea-shinzo-abe">hypocrisy</a> from China that went largely unreported in the West. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, India consistently devotes a <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS">larger proportion of its GDP </a>to its military than does China; for the past five years it has been the world’s largest importer of weapons, and it is expected to be the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poised-become-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end">fourth largest</a> military spender by 2020. Yet a new Indian aircraft carrier is immediately considered a <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-11-21/news/44327041_1_defence-policy-defence-cooperation-defence-ashton-carter">welcome development</a>, while in the case of China we are grimly told: <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military">“It’s not time to panic. Yet.”</a></p>
<p>Importantly, the more we assume that China is a probable instigator of hostility and even war, the more we ready ourselves for that eventuality. Indeed, the “China factor” is used to justify efforts by India, as well as Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and others, to bolster their defence capabilities, leading to increasing tensions across a highly sensitive region. The “China factor” has also been used to rationalise the United States’ recent “<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century">pivot</a>” (or “rebalancing”) towards the Asia Pacific. China is becoming a bigger threat, the logic goes, so others should prepare. </p>
<p>Yet we should also recognise the potential effects of an “India factor” in China and that the actions of others will not go unnoticed in Beijing. In consequence we risk trapping ourselves in a self-fulfilling prophecy of Chinese aggression. We may, in other words, end up literally imagining a threatening China into existence and through our ideas and actions become faced by the fictional demon we feared all along.</p>
<p>In short, ideas matter, and not just in policy-making circles. China might declare war on others in the future. It might show intent of becoming that all-conquering superpower which successfully pushes Chinese culture and values upon the world and dictates global affairs. But it might not, and most experts agree that for various reasons this appears highly <a href="http://asiasociety.org/new-york/david-shambaugh-assesses-china-partial-power">unlikely</a>. </p>
<p>The biggest danger is in expecting it to happen, as we welcome moves by other major powers to equip and arm themselves for an imagined worst case scenario. Put simply, we should not allow ourselves to be led by the fear of what might be. The disastrous and ill-conceived “War on Terror” showed us that hysteria over a fictitious enemy can reap terrible, destructive and long-lasting consequences. For now, China’s future (just like India’s) is unclear. In the West we should think twice before assuming we know otherwise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20802/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Turner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When a highly populous, rapidly developing, nuclear armed, space-voyaging and increasingly assertive Asian nation announces the purchase of its third aircraft carrier, a few months after launching its…Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow in Political Economy , University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209882013-11-29T15:41:41Z2013-11-29T15:41:41ZMore than a neighbourly dispute awaits Joe Biden in Asia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36549/original/cxqs2zp5-1385735325.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">All parties are posturing for influence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fotopedia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia next week could not come at a more timely moment. It is the first high level visit since President Obama cancelled his trip during the government shutdown in October and comes amidst renewed tensions in the region. </p>
<p>Countries on Joe Biden’s list include Japan, South Korea and China – all currently involved in a spat following China’s abrupt <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2013-11/23/content_4476180.htm">announcement last week</a> of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea. </p>
<p>The air defence zone covers territory also claimed by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. China has said all planes transiting the zone must file flight plans and identify themselves, or face “defensive emergency measures”.</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/28/chinas-new-adiz-do-not-panic-yet-do-worry/">As noted elsewhere</a>, the
establishment of such a zone is not exceptional, nor is it in contradiction with <a href="http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/Dutton-NC-1st-proofs-(9-29-09)-(3)1.pdf">international law</a>. Many nations have done so in the past, including all the other regional stakeholders in the case of the East China Sea. But, the devil is always in the details. In this case, the details lie in <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm">the rules governing China’s zone</a> and its overlap with Japan’s. Plus, Beijing has established its zone over the contested Senkaku islands, which fall between the two.</p>
<p>The stakes here are not negligible. Japan and China have both been rattling sabres over who has sovereignty of the islands and China has been trying hard to challenge the US-Japan defence alliance. This year they have made frequent incursions into Japan’s <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-expanding-cabbage-strategy/">waters</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/war-is-boring/545cebcdfe00">air space</a>, and patrolled their borders.</p>
<p>None of this has succeeded in driving a wedge between Washington and Tokyo. Quite the opposite. U.S. officials have moved from somewhat <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/world/asia/china-criticizes-clintons-remarks-about-dispute-with-japan-over-islands.html?_r=0">ambiguous statements</a> about their mutual defense treaty with Japan to explicit recognition that the <a href="http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392">Senkaku Islands are covered by Article V</a> of the treaty. This implies that any Chinese attempt to seize the islands will result in US intervention.</p>
<p>Perhaps China felt encouraged by a similar affair in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/">South China Sea</a>, the so-called Scarborough Shoal. A standoff with the Philippines in mid-2011 resulted in China’s effective control of the area. But the Senkakus are not just uninhabited rocks with no significance. The area is an important source of fish stocks for all surrounding states and it is likely to contain significant deposits of oil and natural gas.</p>
<p>More important than natural resources – the South China Sea has those too – is territorial integrity. The Philippines made a stand against China despite having no navy and air force to speak of because it felt its territorial integrity is under the threat. Joe Biden should take note.</p>
<p>China is playing a multidimensional game. Asserting territorial claims and challenging America’s alliance structure in the region forms an important part of it. Beijing is also testing reactions so it can adjust future steps and planned actions elsewhere. </p>
<p>Making predictions in the realm of international politics is a tricky business, especially when the situation is still developing as it is now. Yet, it is more likely that Beijing will go for soft enforcement as opposed to strict enforcement of the announced rules. That is not a reason to rejoice though. Already Japan has begun considering how to deal with increasing incursions of Chinese air patrols, including drones. And <a href="http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201310020040">shooting them down</a> is one of the options that Tokyo has mooted. The establishment of China’s air defence identification zone does not make this dilemma any less urgent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michal Thim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia next week could not come at a more timely moment. It is the first high level visit since President Obama cancelled his trip during the government shutdown in…Michal Thim, PhD candidate, China Policy Institute, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.