tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/egypt-1402/articlesEgypt – The Conversation2024-02-23T00:08:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237352024-02-23T00:08:21Z2024-02-23T00:08:21ZWhy Egypt refuses to open its border to Palestinians forcibly displaced from Gaza<p>Around 1.5 million Palestinian civilians are currently squeezed into the southern Gaza city of Rafah after repeatedly being forced by Israeli bombardment and ground assaults to evacuate further and further south.</p>
<p>The town, which originally had a population of 250,000, is now host to more than half of Gaza’s entire population. They are sheltering in conditions the UN’s top aid official <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146347">has called</a> “abysmal”, with disease spreading and famine looming. </p>
<p>In a military onslaught the International Court of Justice has <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/gaza-icj-ruling-offers-hope-protection-civilians-enduring-apocalyptic#:%7E:text=The%20ICJ%20found%20it%20plausible,under%20siege%20in%20Gaza%2C%20and">ruled</a> a plausible case of genocide, Israel has so far killed over 29,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Now there are increasing fears Israel’s expected ground assault on Rafah could push civilians across the border into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. </p>
<p>Originally designated as a “safe zone”, Rafah is now being <a href="https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240222_06/">targeted</a> by Israeli airstrikes, as well. Those fleeing the violence have nowhere safe to go.</p>
<p>However, Egypt, the only country aside from Israel that has a border with Gaza, has rebuffed pressure to accept Palestinian refugees displaced by Israel.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/05/world/middleeast/israel-egypt-gaza.html">Reports</a> have indicated that Israeli officials have tried to lobby international support to <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-lobbied-eu-to-pressure-egypt-into-accepting-gaza-refugees-20231031-p5egfs">compel Egypt</a> to accept refugees from Gaza. </p>
<p>Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, however, has been adamant in refusing to allow humanitarian corridors or the entry of large numbers of Palestinians into Sinai. He has <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/510269.aspx">called it</a> a “red line” that, if crossed, would “liquidate the Palestinian cause”. </p>
<p>In recent days, the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has validated Egypt’s position. Grandi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/16/middle-east-crisis-live-israel-gaza-rafah-hamas-biden-cairo-ceasefire-talks-live-news">said</a> displacing Gazans to Egypt would be “catastrophic” for both Egypt and the Palestinians, who, he indicated, would likely not be allowed to return. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<h2>Why Egypt is opposed to the idea</h2>
<p>There are a few reasons for Egypt’s opposition. </p>
<p>The first is that Egypt does not want to be seen to be facilitating <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ethnic-cleansing.shtml">ethnic cleansing</a> through the permanent resettlement of Palestinians outside of Gaza.</p>
<p>In October, <a href="https://www.972mag.com/intelligence-ministry-gaza-population-transfer/">a leaked document</a> from Israel’s Intelligence Ministry included recommendations to forcibly transfer of Gaza’s population of 2.3 million out of the territory and into tent cities in Egypt’s Sinai Desert. </p>
<p>Government ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir have also both <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-slams-irresponsible-calls-by-smotrich-and-ben-gvir-for-emigration-of-gazans/">openly advocated</a> the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza to make way for their replacement by Israeli settlers. </p>
<p>Further, in January, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/israeli-ministers-attend-conference-calling-for-voluntary-migration-of-palestinians">a conference</a> in Israel calling for this very plan was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/12-ministers-call-to-resettle-gaza-encourage-gazans-to-leave-at-jubilant-conference/#:%7E:text=The%20Likud%20ministers%20who%20came,Orit%20Strock%2C%20and%20UTJ's%20Goldknopf.">attended</a> by 11 members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet and 15 additional members of parliament. </p>
<p>While Netanyahu last month <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-let-me-be-clear-israel-has-no-intention-of-displacing-gazas-population/">said</a> Israel has “no intention of permanently occupying Gaza”, he hasn’t shut down talk from his ministers about it. When asked about the conference in January, for example, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/israeli-ministers-attend-conference-calling-for-voluntary-migration-of-palestinians">said</a> everyone was “entitled to their opinions”. </p>
<p>Sisi is also conscious of the strong <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/29/war-gaza-egyptians-palestine-israel-hamas-protest-marches">surge</a> of sympathy the Egyptian public has demonstrated for the Palestinians and the support they have shown for his opposition to any displacement of people across the border. This is due to feelings of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, as well as an awareness of the lessons of history. </p>
<p>Recalling 1947-49, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-how-the-palestinians-were-expelled-from-israel-205151">an estimated 750,000</a> were either expelled or <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2023/11/03/israel-nakba-history-1948/">forced to flee their homes</a> by Zionist forces during the war surrounding the creation of the state of Israel, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2023/10/12/egypt-ponders-what-it-can-and-cannot-for-gazas-palestinians/">Egypt doesn’t want to be seen</a> to be enabling another Nakba, or “catastrophe”.</p>
<p>The total number of refugees created by the Nakba now stands at around <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees">6 million</a>. According to the UN, about <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees">a third</a> live in refugee camps, Israel having <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/15/75-years-later-israel-blocking-palestinian-refugees-return">denied</a> their right to return to their homeland. </p>
<p>Significantly, in November, Israel’s minister for agriculture, Avi Dichter, <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4313276-israel-is-threatening-a-second-nakba-but-its-already-happening/">declared</a>: “We are now rolling out the Gaza Nakba,” adding, “Gaza Nakba 2023. That’s how it’ll end.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">Why do Israelis and the rest of the world view the Gaza conflict so differently? And can this disconnect be overcome?</a>
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<h2>Egypt’s complicated relationship with Hamas</h2>
<p>Another key concern for Egypt is its security. If Palestinians were resettled in Sinai, it could make the Egyptian territory a new base from which to launch resistance operations. This could drag Egypt into a military conflict with Israel.</p>
<p>In addition, Sisi has only just managed to clamp down on Islamist insurgents in North Sinai in <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-egyptian-armys-counterinsurgency-history-past-operations-and-the-sinai-campaign/">recent years</a> and is presumably concerned that an influx of refugees could be destabilising. </p>
<p>Finally, Sisi likely believes Hamas could mount opposition to his regime. </p>
<p>After overthrowing President Mohamed Morsi in a military coup in 2013, the Sisi regime cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood and repressed all dissent. This extended to a demonisation of Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch. </p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, the Egyptian military bombed and flooded tunnels linking Gaza with Egypt, at the same time as <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egyptian-paper-accuses-hamas-of-plotting-cairo-coup/">accusing Hamas</a> of colluding with the Muslim Brotherhood against the state. It has also enforced Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>Having said that, the relationship is not straightforwardly antagonistic. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/85037">Hamas and Egypt have co-operated</a> on counterinsurgency operations against the Islamic State in Sinai. Egypt has also played a role in mediating current and past ceasefire negotiations between Hamas and Israel. </p>
<p>However, the latest rounds of negotiations have gone nowhere, leaving Egypt to nervously ramp up its warnings around any Israeli moves on the border. </p>
<p>Egypt and Israel have had a peace treaty since 1979, and their relationship has become stronger with Sisi in power. However, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/11/egypt-threatens-to-suspend-camp-david-accords-if-israel-pushes-into-gaza-border-town-00140838">Egypt has threatened</a> to suspend the peace treaty if Rafah is invaded. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-egypt-peace-treaty-has-stood-the-test-of-time-over-45-years-expert-explains-its-significance-223560">Israel-Egypt peace treaty has stood the test of time over 45 years: expert explains its significance</a>
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<h2>Where does this leave the people of Gaza?</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-those-telling-us-not-to-enter-rafah-are-essentially-saying-lose-the-war/">vowed</a> to push ahead with a ground incursion of Rafah in the coming weeks.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Egypt has moved to fortify its border and, according to reports and satellite images, begun building a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/16/middleeast/egypt-wall-buffer-zone-gaza-border-intl-hnk/index.html">walled buffer zone</a> of about 21 square kilometres in the Sinai. This suggests Egypt is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-egypt-wall-07a40fddeaf9dbc82c2a33e1f1614419">preparing</a> for a potential removal or exodus of Palestinians. </p>
<p>While it isn’t entirely clear whether this is being done in co-ordination with Israel or as a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/15/israel-hamas-war-news-gaza-palestine/">“contingency” measure</a>, the zone would condemn Gazans to yet another densely packed open-air prison with dire human rights implications. </p>
<p>As much as states like Egypt and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90930">Jordan</a> have strengthened their rhetorical opposition to Israel in the past few months, neighbouring Arab countries have done little to seriously pressure Israel to halt its military operations or significantly improve aid access to the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>In fact, Egypt’s <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/02/19/fourteen-lorries-enter-gaza-with-aid-from-uae-as-rafah-crossing-reopens/">intermittent closures</a> of the Rafah crossing have delayed the entry of desperately needed aid into Gaza. There are also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/08/palestinians-flee-gaza-rafah-egypt-border-bribes-to-brokers#:%7E:text=The%20Guardian%20has%20spoken%20to,sooner%20if%20they%20paid%20more.">reports</a> Egyptian authorities are demanding thousands of dollars in bribes from those desperate to leave via Rafah, deepening a sense of cynicism, despair and, ultimately, abandonment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liyana Kayali has signed a statement of solidarity with Palestine from academics in Australian universities as well as a statement of scholars warning of a potential genocide being committed in Gaza.</span></em></p>Around 1.5 million Palestinians are trapped near the border, with nowhere to go. Egypt, however, has long opposed the idea of resettling Palestinians in the Sinai Peninsula.Liyana Kayali, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242062024-02-22T18:01:32Z2024-02-22T18:01:32ZGaza update: Biden ups the pressure on Israel as deadline for Rafah assault approaches<p>Joe Biden’s most senior Middle East adviser, Brett McGurk, has arrived in Israel to push for a deal to halt the war in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. McGurk has served each successive president since joining George W. Bush’s national security team in 2005, and his presence in the region at this increasingly crucial time, as Israel prepares for a ground assault on the overcrowded southern Gaza city of Rafah, is an indication of the urgency with which the Biden administration views the situation.</p>
<p>Thus far, intransigence on both sides has scuppered various initiatives aimed at securing a ceasefire. Last week, after Benjamin Netanyahu pulled Israeli negotiators out of talks in Egypt, blaming Hamas for refusing to budge on what he called its “ludicrous” demands, Israel’s prime minister pledged to press ahead with the Rafah offensive. However, his war cabinet member Benny Gantz said this week that a deal might still be possible.</p>
<p>Failing that, the prospect of an all-out assault on Rafah, where more than a million Palestinians from across the Gaza Strip have taken refuge, on March 10 – the start of Ramadan – is very real. Casualties are likely to be enormous, unless people are given somewhere to escape to.</p>
<p>Biden has repeatedly urged Netanyahu to rethink the assault on Rafah, calling for a “credible and executable plan” for protecting and supporting the Palestinians sheltering there. And as Paul Rogers, an internationally respected expert in Middle East security issues at the University of Bradford, notes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">there is a precedent</a>.</p>
<p>In 1982, during the war between Israel and Lebanon, the then-US president Ronald Reagan telephoned Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to demand he call off the 11-hour bombardment of West Beirut, where thousands of fighters from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were sheltering. “Menachem, this is a holocaust,” Reagan is reported to have said. Begin duly called off his bombers.</p>
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<img alt="Ronald and Nancy Reagan with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and his daughter Matt Milo in the White House, Setpember 1981." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Friends in high places: Ronald and Nancy Reagan hosting a state dinner for Menachem Begin and his daughter, Matti Milo, in September 1981.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Collection</span></span>
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<p>Rogers highlights the long and close association between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In a country where pretty much anyone who is anyone has served in Israel’s military, this counts for a lot. Perhaps, he writes, the IDF could put extra pressure on Netanyahu to reconsider. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">Gaza war: will Israel respond to US pressure to tread carefully in Rafah? There is a precedent</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, satellite images and video footage have revealed that Egypt is building what appears to be a large concrete enclosure on its side of the Rafah crossing. Analysts believe this is being prepared as a contingency for dealing with what could be hundreds of thousands of displaced persons pushed out of Gaza into the Sinai peninsula.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Gillian Kennedy, an Egypt specialist at the University of Southampton, has been considering what <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">such an exodus would mean</a> for Egypt’s strongman president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. </p>
<p>Sisi is not popular at home. He may have won an election last year with 89% of the vote, but given the lack of opposition candidates, this was hardly surprising. Egypt’s economy is in a parlous state, with rampant inflation and stubbornly high unemployment, so having to host a huge influx of refugees is not something Sisi will be anticipating with much relish.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Egypt building a large concrete structure on its side of the Rafah crossing.</span></figcaption>
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<p>And the close relations between supporters of Hamas and Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood – Sisi’s implacable foes – make this prospect all the more unpalatable, Kennedy concludes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">As Israel's assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees</a>
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<h2>Grim in Gaza</h2>
<p>For Palestinians trapped in Gaza, meanwhile, there is the spectre of starvation. The world’s major authority on food insecurity, the IPC Famine Review Committee, estimates that 90% of Gazans are facing acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>Yara M. Asi, a food security expert at the University of Central Florida, writes that people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">resorting to eating cattle feed and grass</a>. They are hunting cats for food. And things are likely to get worse, Asi observes. The UN agency responsible for coordinating aid in Gaza, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), says it will have to cease operations in March after many of its funders withdrew over Israeli allegations that UNRWA staff had taken part in the October 7 Hamas attacks. </p>
<p>And, making matters worse, Israeli bombing has destroyed bakeries, food production facilities and grocery stores. It is now estimated that, of the people facing imminent starvation in the world today, 95% are in Gaza.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<p>Of course, food production facilities and shops aren’t the only things that have been reduced to rubble by the IDF during its relentless four-month assault. For decades, the people of Gaza had become used to a cycle of destruction and rebuilding writes Yousif Al-Daffaie, a researcher in the field of cultural heritage and post-war countries at Nottingham Trent University. But this time around, the devastation has been so complete that there is almost nothing left to rebuild.</p>
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<p>Most importantly for the soul of Gaza, nearly 200 sites of cultural importance have been wrecked, including an ancient harbour dating back to 800BC, a mosque that was home to rare manuscripts, and one of the world’s oldest Christian monasteries. This act of what Al-Daffaie calls <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">“urbicide”</a> includes Palestine Square in Gaza City, a popular meeting place, and Gaza’s only public library on Omar Al-Mukhtar Street, one of Gaza City’s two main streets, which has been totally destroyed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">The destruction of Gazaʼs historic buildings is an act of 'urbicide'</a>
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<h2>Israel: hurt, angry and isolated</h2>
<p>All the while, the world is watching. What has become clear since the vicious Hamas attack on October 7 sparked Israel’s brutal military response is the massive disconnect between how most Israelis and much of the rest of the world see this current episode. </p>
<p>Eyal Mayroz, a senior lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, says that while the outside world sees daily reports of death and suffering in Gaza, in Israel much of the media <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">remains focused</a> on the pain of the attack by Hamas and the plight of the 130 remaining hostages and their families.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">Why do Israelis and the rest of the world view the Gaza conflict so differently? And can this disconnect be overcome?</a>
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<p>Ilan Zvi Baron of Durham University and Ilai Z. Saltzman of the University of Maryland highlight the pain and anger of most Israelis since October 7. They write that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">reaction of some on the progressive left</a>, some of whom celebrated the Hamas attack as an act of anti-colonial resistance, is not understood in Israel. This, they say, is a problem for Israel’s peace movement, which now feels more isolated than ever and unable to pressure their government to work harder for a peaceful solution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">Gaza war: blaming Israel for October 7 Hamas attack makes peace less – not more – likely</a>
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<h2>Listen up: peace polling</h2>
<p>Finally, regular readers may recall <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">an article we published</a> by Colin Irwin, a researcher at the University of Liverpool whose work with “peace polling” played a key role in the negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland. Irwin noted that he was set to reprise his role when Barack Obama won the US presidency in 2008, but a lack of political will and Netanyahu’s refusal to include Hamas put paid to any chance of peace talks succeeding at that stage.</p>
<p>In this week’s episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, Irwin explains how peace polling emerged from his work among Canada’s Inuit minority, and has been used from Sri Lanka to Cyprus.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">Israel-Gaza: how opinion polls used in Northern Ireland could pave a way to peace</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict in Gaza from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240202024-02-22T10:48:31Z2024-02-22T10:48:31ZAs Israel’s assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees<p>Satellite imagery and video footage <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/egypt-building-walled-enclosure-in-sinai-for-rafah-refugees-videos-suggest">have emerged</a> suggesting that Egypt is building what appears to be a large, concrete-walled enclosure which observers believe will be used to manage a major influx of Palestinian refugees flooding out of Gaza via the Rafah crossng on its eastern border. </p>
<p>As Israel’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">planned military assault</a> on the city of Rafah edges ever closer, it presents the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, with a potentially serious problem. The displacement into his country of potentially hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the afflicted enclave could seriously destabilise what is an extremely fragile political environment.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vbsYURUu_Jo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">To keep Palestinians out, or welcome them into Egypt?</span></figcaption>
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<p>For Egyptians, the potential for spillover of the Gazan conflict is a major concern. Plagued with Islamist groups <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/insurgency-in-sinai-challenges-and-prospects/">mounting regular attacks</a> on Egyptian military instalments in the Sinai Peninsula since 2013, the last thing Sisi needs are enormous numbers of displaced and traumatised refugees. </p>
<p>Yet, with the Palestinian death toll <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-death-toll-rises-29313-rafah-residents-killed-strike-2024-02-21/">now approaching 30,000</a> – approximately 70% of whom are reported to be women and children – and Israel planning on invading Rafah, where upwards of a million Palestinians are huddled, the prospect of refugees spilling into the Sinai looks more and more likely. </p>
<p>Sisi has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-778521">roundly condemned</a> Israel’s military assault on Gaza, and is fully aware of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding just across the border. But two key issues are deterring him from making any hasty altruistic decisions in support of desperate Gazans fleeing hostilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Israel, Egypt and Jordan showing Gaza." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Egypt fears that an assault on Rafah will force hundreds of thousands of Palestinians across the border into its Sinai peninsula.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/part-southern-district-israel-political-map-2373692837">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>For a start, Egypt is in no position to absorb large numbers of Palestinian refugees. Besides dealing with a decade-long insurgency in the very border areas that would have to host the refugees, the strong presence of Islamist groups ideologically close to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood would be very dangerous, given his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/06/as-hunger-bites-is-egypt-ready-to-turn-its-back-on-its-president">unpopularity at home</a>. Despite <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/19/egypt-2023-presidential-election-results-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-wins-no-challengers">winning the election in December 2023</a> with a reported 90% of votes, the ballot was widely seen as the most flawed to date. Opposition leaders were arrested and anyone criticising Sisi faced censure. </p>
<p>Accepting an influx of Palestinians, many of whom would be supportive of Hamas, could be hazardous for Sisi. Especially so given his <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood</a> since the 2013 military coup which ousted the then-president and Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohamed Morsi. </p>
<p>Compounding this is Egypt’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-stumbling-economy-faces-new-pressures-gaza-crisis-2023-11-10/">broken economic model</a>. It is now the second-largest debtor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is currently in talks to increase its loans. </p>
<p>Unemployment has <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/130398/Egypt-s-unemployment-rate-reaches-record-low-of-6-9#">sat at 7%</a> for nearly a decade and as of the end of 2023, inflation was a <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/inflation-cpi">staggering 38%</a>. Egypt has neither the political will nor the economic capacity to handle a mass displacement of Gazan refugees across its border.</p>
<h2>Egypt can help</h2>
<p>But it is possible that, with enough international support, Egypt could be persuaded to offer sanctuary, whether short term or for a longer period, to displaced people from Gaza. It has done similar before in a different context – last year, in return for €21 million (£18 million) in funding from the European Union, Egypt <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-egypt-sudan-pledges-millions-refugee-flow">took in 200,000 people</a> fleeing violence in Sudan. The deal aimed to prevent migrant flows reaching Europe.</p>
<p>Sisi could secure a deal on a similar premise, using the Gaza conflict in return for help from Europe or the US to deal with Egypt’s deteriorating economic situation. But this is not a sustainable solution. </p>
<p>Temporarily, more refugee camps could be provided. But given the damage to Gaza after Israel’s ground assault, the permanent settlement of these displaced people would need to be considered. It’s highly unlikely that Sisi would be prepared to accept this.</p>
<h2>The ‘day after’</h2>
<p>Sisi is not the only leader thinking of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-what-gaza-might-look-like-the-day-after-the-war-217323">“day after”</a> – although, as the Rafah invasion presently scheduled for Ramadan edges ever closer, the problem looms ever larger. The US president, Joe Biden, has spoken about the need for the Palestinian Authority <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-palestinian-authority-should-ultimately-govern-gaza-west-bank-2023-11-18/">to be revitalised</a>, in order to facilitate negotiations for a new two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.</p>
<p>Although it’s difficult to foresee amid the trauma and violence among both populations, this long-term plan is something that Egypt could play an instrumental role in. Its intelligence services are known to have <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/palestine-strange-resurrection-two-state-solution-indyk">significant knowledge</a> of the Hamas tunnel system, and it <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/fix-middle-east-united-states?check_logged_in=1">has been reported</a> that many Egyptian army personnel are involved in the smuggling economy in Gaza.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Egypt’s longstanding position on Palestinian statehood, its decades-long normalisation of relations with Israel, and its more recent reset of relations with pro-Brotherhood states such as Qatar (host of much of the Hamas leadership) puts it in a unique position to foster a plan for a two-state solution. </p>
<p>In December, Egypt and Qatar collaborated to develop a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/25/egypt-sets-out-plan-to-end-gaza-war-free-all-hostages">plan for a ceasefire</a>, contingent on phased hostage releases and prisoner exchanges. While this plan broke down fairly quickly through Israeli intransigence, it could be a model to build on for an eventual end to the conflict.</p>
<p>If there is no sustainable ceasefire, Egypt faces the prospect of having to take on the responsibility of hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians. The Egyptian public, which is largely sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians, is likely to accept refugees on a temporary basis to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe getting worse than it already is. </p>
<p>But Sisi will need to make some serious decisions for the long term, or the bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict could have dire consequences for his own country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gillian Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt would be seriously destabilised by hundreds of thousands of people fleeing Gaza.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226572024-02-15T13:37:47Z2024-02-15T13:37:47ZIsraeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575701/original/file-20240214-20-lgpktd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C215%2C6000%2C3754&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced Gazan children wait in line to receive food.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-children-holding-empty-pots-2-wait-in-line-to-news-photo/1993688681?adppopup=true">Belal Khaled/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The stories of hunger emerging from war-ravaged Gaza are stark: People resorting to<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/briefing/gaza-food-crisis.html"> grinding barely edible cattle feed</a> to make flour; <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/famine-looms-in-gaza-israel-war-intl/index.html">desperate residents eating grass</a>; reports of <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/israel-gaza-war-famine-news-update-ckjntk93j">cats being hunted for food</a>. </p>
<p>The numbers involved are just as despairing. The world’s major authority on food insecurity, the IPC Famine Review Committee, <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-94/en/">estimates that</a> 90% of Gazans – some 2.08 million people – are facing acute food insecurity. Indeed, of the people facing imminent starvation in the world today, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/95-percent-those-facing-starvation-world-are-gaza">an estimated 95% are in Gaza</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://ccie.ucf.edu/person/yara-asi/">expert in Palestinian public health</a>, I fear the situation may not have hit its nadir. In January 2024, many of the top funders to UNRWA, the U.N.’s refugee agency that provides the bulk of services to Palestinians in Gaza, <a href="https://theconversation.com/funding-for-refugees-has-long-been-politicized-punitive-action-against-unrwa-and-palestinians-fits-that-pattern-222263">suspended donations</a> to the agency in response to <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/allegations-against-unrwa-staff">allegations that a dozen</a> of the agency’s 30,000 employees were possibly involved in the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas. The agency has indicated that it will no longer be able to offer <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146272">services starting in March</a> and will lose its ability to distribute food and other vital supplies during that month.</p>
<p>With at least <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-118">28,000 people confirmed dead</a> and an additional 68,000 injured, Israeli bombs have already had a catastrophic human cost in Gaza – starvation could be the next tragedy to befall the territory.</p>
<p>Indeed, two weeks after Israel initiated a massive military campaign in the Gaza Strip, <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/starvation-weapon-war-being-used-against-gaza-civilians-oxfam">Oxfam International</a> reported that only around 2% of the usual amount of food was being delivered to residents in the territory. At the time, Sally Abi Khalil, Oxfam’s Middle East director, commented that “there can be no justification for using starvation as a weapon of war.” But four months later, the siege continues to <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/gaza-humanitarian-aid-ceasefire/">restrict the distribution of adequate aid</a>.</p>
<h2>Putting Palestinians ‘on a diet’</h2>
<p>Israeli bombs have <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-deliberately-attacks-bakeries-gaza-official#:%7E:text=The%20Israeli%20missiles%20demolished%20the,others%20injured%2C%20according%20to%20Maarouf.">destroyed homes, bakeries</a>, <a href="https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/140230">food production factories</a> and grocery stores, making it harder for people in Gaza to offset the impact of the reduced imports of food.</p>
<p>But food insecurity in Gaza and the mechanisms that enable it did not start with Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 attack.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-out-gaza-2022">U.N. report from 2022</a> found that a year before the latest war, 65% of Gazans were food insecure, defined as <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/food">lacking regular access to enough safe and nutritious food</a>.</p>
<p>Multiple factors contributed to this food insecurity, not least the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022">blockade of Gaza</a> imposed by Israel and enabled by Egypt since 2007. All items entering the Gaza Strip, including food, become subject to Israeli inspection, delay or denial.</p>
<p>Basic foodstuff was allowed, but because of delays at the border, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2007/07/27/gaza-almost-completely-aid-dependent">it can spoil</a> before it enters Gaza. </p>
<p>A 2009 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/wordofmouth/2009/jun/16/gaza-blockade-israel-food">investigation by Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz</a> found that foods as varied as cherries, kiwi, almonds, pomegranates and chocolate were prohibited entirely. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man delivers food to a throng of people behind a fence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Not enough food aid to go around in Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-children-wait-in-line-to-receive-food-prepared-news-photo/1993688439?adppopup=true">Belal Khaled/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At certain points, the blockade, which Israel claims is an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE78C59R/">unavoidable security measure</a>, has been loosened to allow import of more foods; for example, in 2010 Israel started to permit <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/Media/israel-signals-partial-easing-gaza-blockade/story?id=10873488">potato chips, fruit juices, Coca-Cola and cookies</a>. </p>
<p>By placing restrictions on food imports, Israel seems to be trying to put pressure on Hamas by making life difficult for the people in Gaza. In the words of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19975211">one Israeli government adviser in 2006</a>, “The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger.”</p>
<p>To enable this, the Israeli government <a href="https://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/redlines/redlines-position-paper-eng.pdf">commissioned a 2008 study</a> to work out exactly how many calories Palestinians would need to avoid malnutrition. The report was released to the public only following a 2012 legal battle.</p>
<p>The blockade also <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-strip-the-humanitarian-impact-of-15-years-of-the-blockade-june-2022-ocha-factsheet/">increased food insecurity</a> by preventing meaningful development of an economy in Gaza.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unctad.org/press-material/prior-current-crisis-decades-long-blockade-hollowed-gazas-economy-leaving-80">U.N. cites</a> the “excessive production and transaction costs and barriers to trade with the rest of the world” imposed by Israel as the primary cause of severe underdevelopment in the occupied territories, including Gaza. As a result, in late 2022 the <a href="https://gisha.org/en/gaza-unemployment-rate-in-the-third-quarter-of-2022/">unemployment rate in Gaza stood at around 50%</a>. This, coupled with a steady increase in <a href="https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4403">the cost of food</a>, makes affording food difficult for many Gazan households, rendering them dependent on aid, which fluctuates frequently.</p>
<h2>Hampering self-sufficency</h2>
<p>More generally, the blockade and the multiple rounds of destruction of parts of the Gaza Strip have made food sovereignty in the territory nearly impossible. </p>
<p>Much of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-food-system-has-been-stretched-to-breaking-point-by-israel-188556">Gaza’s farmland</a> is along the so-called “no-go zones,” which Israel had rendered inaccessible to Palestinians, who risk being shot if they attempt to access these areas.</p>
<p>Gaza’s fishermen are <a href="https://gisha.org/en/increase-in-israeli-navy-attacks-on-gaza-fishermen-including-children/">regularly shot at by Israeli gunboats</a> if they venture farther in the Mediterranean Sea than Israel permits. Because the fish closer to the shore are smaller and less plentiful, the average income of a fisherman in Gaza has <a href="https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.179-216.pdf">more than halved</a> since 2017. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, much of the infrastructure needed for adequate food production – greenhouses, arable lands, orchards, livestock and food production facilities – have been destroyed or heavily damaged in various rounds of bombing in Gaza. And <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reviving-the-stalled-reconstruction-of-gaza/">international donors have hesitated</a> to hastily rebuild facilities when they cannot guarantee their investment will last more than a few years before being bombed again.</p>
<p>The latest siege has only further crippled the ability of Gaza to be food self-sufficient. By early December 2023, an <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231212-in-gaza-an-estimated-22-of-agricultural-land-has-been-destroyed-since-the-start-of-the-conflict">estimated 22% of agricultural land</a> had been destroyed, along with factories, farms, and water and sanitation facilities. And the full scale of the destruction may not be clear for months or years.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Israel’s <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/09/egypt-army-flood-rafah-tunnels-palestinian-houses.html">flooding of the tunnels</a> under parts of the Gaza Strip with seawater risks killing remaining crops, leaving the land too salty and rendering it unstable and prone to sinkholes.</p>
<h2>Starvation as weapon of war</h2>
<p>Aside from the many health effects of starvation and malnutrition, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-blocking-food-supplies-gaza-will-have-life-long-impacts-children-malnutrition-rising-save-children">especially on children</a>, such conditions make people more vulnerable to disease – already a significant concern for those living in the overcrowded shelters where people have been forced to flee.</p>
<p>In response to the current hunger crisis in Gaza, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53WlmQB_pAc">Alex de Waal</a>, author of “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine</a>,” has made clear: “While it may be possible to bomb a hospital by accident, it is not possible to create a famine by accident.” He argues that the war crime of starvation does not need to include outright famine – merely the act of depriving people of food, medicine and clean water is sufficient.</p>
<p>The use of starvation is <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v2/rule53">strictly forbidden under the Geneva Conventions</a>, a set of statutes that govern the laws of warfare. Starvation has been condemned by United Nations <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13354.doc.htm">Resolution 2417</a>, which decried the use of deprivation of food and basic needs of the civilian population and compelled parties in conflict to ensure full humanitarian access.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch has already accused <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/18/israel-starvation-used-weapon-war-gaza">Israel of using starvation as a weapon of war</a>, and as such it accuses the Israeli government of a war crime. The Israeli government in turn <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/netanyahu-israel-cnn-gaza-civilians-b2446067.html">continues to blame Hamas</a> for any loss of life in Gaza.</p>
<p>Yet untangling what Israel’s intentions may be – whether it is using starvation as a weapon of war, to force mass displacement, or if, as it claims, it is simply a byproduct of war – does little for the people on the ground in Gaza. </p>
<p>They require immediate intervention to stave off catastrophic outcomes. <a href="https://www.972mag.com/rafah-children-hunger-aid/">As one father in Gaza reported</a>, “We are forced to eat one meal a day – the canned goods that we get from aid organizations. No one can afford to buy anything for his family. I see children here crying from hunger, including my own children.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yara M. Asi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Arable land has been destroyed, as have food production sites. But even before the current operation in Gaza, Palestinians there suffered high rates of food insecurity.Yara M. Asi, Assistant Professor of Global Health Management and Informatics, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2159232024-01-02T07:10:47Z2024-01-02T07:10:47ZCoca-Cola in Africa: a long history full of unexpected twists and turns<p><em>A new book called <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/bottled/#:%7E:text=Sara%20Byala%20charts%20the%20company%27s,but%20rather%20of%20a%20company">Bottled: How Coca-Cola Became African</a> tells the story of how the world’s most famous carbonated drink conquered the continent. It’s a tale of marketing gumption and high politics and is the product of years of research by critical writing lecturer <a href="https://www.sarabyala.com">Sara Byala</a>, who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=sara+byala&btnG=">researches</a> histories of <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7208/9780226030449/html">heritage</a>, <a href="https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Water-Waste-Energy_sm-1.pdf">sustainability</a> and the ways in which capitalist systems intersect with social and cultural forces in Africa. We asked her some questions about the book.</em></p>
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<h2>What do you hope readers will take away?</h2>
<p>There are three main takeaways. The first is that while Africa is largely absent from books on Coca-Cola, the company’s imprint on the continent is enormous. It is present in every nation. Most estimates put Coke as one of the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/africa/coca-cola-africa-mpa-feat/index.html">largest private employers</a> in Africa, if not the largest. Beyond official jobs, the company has been shown to have <a href="https://docplayer.net/11916251-The-economic-impact-of-the-coca-cola-system-on-south-africa.html">a multiplier effect</a> that means that for each official job, upwards of 10 other people are supported. </p>
<p>The second takeaway is that Coke’s story in Africa is an old one. It starts with its use of the west African <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20160922-the-nut-that-helped-to-build-a-global-empire">kola nut</a>, from which it takes its name (if no longer <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw-magazine/pop-quiz-whats-in-a-coca-cola-if-its-not-coca-or-the-kola-nut/">its source of caffeine</a>). Arriving in Africa in the early 1900s, it’s a story that is deeply and, often surprisingly, entangled with key moments in African history. This includes the end of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> in South Africa and the advent of postcolonial African nations.</p>
<p>Third, I want readers to see that while we may assume that a multinational company selling carbonated, sugary water is inherently a force for ill, both the history of Coke in Africa and my fieldwork suggest a far more complicated story. Coca-Cola is what it is today in Africa, I argue, because it became local. It bent to the will of Africans in everything from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@GlobalCopaCocaCola/about">sport</a> to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/cokestudioAfrica">music</a> to <a href="https://www.coca-colacompany.com/social/project-last-mile">healthcare</a>. Its ubiquity thus tells us something about African engagement with a consumer product as well as the many ways in which ordinary people wield power. </p>
<h2>How did Coca-Cola first arrive in Africa?</h2>
<p>Coca-Cola doesn’t export a finished product from its corporate headquarters in the US. It sells a <a href="https://www.coca-colacompany.com/about-us/coca-cola-system">concentrate</a>, which comes from a handful of locations around the globe, including Egypt and Eswatini. This concentrate is sold to licensed bottlers who then mix it with local forms of sugar and water before carbonating and bottling or canning it. </p>
<p>Coca-Cola <a href="https://www.coca-cola.com/xe/en/media-center/95-years-operations-community-impact">lore</a> says that the company first secured local bottlers for its concentrate in South Africa in 1928, its first stop on the African continent. By combing through old newspapers, archival documents, and pharmaceutical publications, however, I found evidence to suggest that Coke may in fact have been sold in 1909 in Cape Town as a short-lived soda fountain endeavour. This is just 23 years after the product was invented in Atlanta, Georgia. </p>
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<p>It was neither easy nor assured that Coca-Cola would take off anywhere in the world upon its arrival. The early chapters of my book detail the often ingenious lengths that bottlers had to go to to get Coke off the ground. This included creating a new line of sodas to support the fledgling product called <a href="https://www.coca-cola.com/za/en/brands/sparletta">Sparletta</a>. This includes <a href="https://www.coca-cola.com/ng/en/brands/sparletta">green Creme Soda</a> and <a href="https://www.coca-cola.com/ng/en/brands/Stoney">Stoney ginger beer</a>, both still available for purchase. Later chapters explore the routes by which the product spread across the continent, by detailing everything from the co-branding of petrol stations with Coca-Cola, to the rise of Coke beauty pageants, the birth of local forms of Coke advertising, the proliferation of Coca-Cola signage, and much more. </p>
<h2>What role did it play in apartheid South Africa?</h2>
<p>Coca-Cola was entrenched in South Africa before the advent of the racist, white minority <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> state in 1948. While the company largely attempted to stay out of politics in South Africa, much as it did elsewhere in the world, it resisted certain “petty apartheid” rules. For example, the washrooms and lunchrooms in its plants were open to all ethnic groups, unlike the “whites only” facilities established under apartheid. A turning point came in the 1980s when, in tandem with <a href="https://blackamericaweb.com/2014/08/10/little-known-black-history-fact-operation-push-boycotts/">activism in the US</a> calling on the company to redress racial imbalances in America, the company was forced to reexamine its racial politics in South Africa as well.</p>
<p>What followed was perhaps the most interesting chapter in the story of Coca-Cola in Africa. Breaking with established precedent, the company took a stance against the apartheid state. Coca-Cola executive Carl Ware led the way here. Under his <a href="https://www.carlwareauthor.com/">direction</a>, the company crafted a unique form of <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-09-18-mn-11241-story.html">disinvestment</a> that enabled it to do what no other company managed: keep the products in the country while depriving the apartheid state of tax revenue. To do this, the company <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/09/18/coke-to-sell-all-holdings-in-s-africa/495f0069-2682-4d67-8769-506f4fbd2d83/">sold all its holdings</a> to a separate business that continued to sell Cokes. It then moved its concentrate plant to neighbouring Eswatini, leaving Coca-Cola with no assets or employees in South Africa.</p>
<p>In part, this was possible because the company aligned itself with the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/06/17/mandelas-stops-during-us-tour-reflect-anc-political-concerns/f41a84a3-4aa5-462f-abc3-fc2a9213bb58/">African National Congress (ANC)</a>, making a host of moves to help to end apartheid. These included meeting in secret with ANC leadership, funding clandestine meetings between the ANC and businesspeople, and setting up <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/24/us/coca-cola-giving-10-million-to-help-south-africa-blacks.html">a charitable fund</a> headed by <a href="https://saportareport.com/atlanta-leaders-to-pay-special-tribute-to-desmond-tutu-sept-28/sections/reports/maria_saporta/">Archbishop Desmond Tutu</a> to support Black educational empowerment. In the book, I document these activities for the first time with extensive interviews and archival material.</p>
<p>It was during this era of disinvestment that Coca-Cola exploded within densely populated and remote parts of the country, providing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/26/business/putting-africa-coke-s-map-pushing-soft-drinks-continent-that-has-seen-hard-hard.html">on-ramps to economic participation</a> for scores of South Africans that were later replicated with its global <a href="https://www.coca-cola.com/pk/en/about-us/faq/what-is-5by20-0">5x20 project</a> to empower women in business. </p>
<p>This spread in turn drove the consumption of liquid sugar to new heights, causing a host of other problems such as <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1573448/sugar-tax-pits-jobs-versus-health-diabetes-in-south-africa">diabetes and dental cavities</a>, which both the company and my book tackle too. </p>
<p>What I demonstrate in the book is that Coca-Cola’s shrewd positioning at the end of apartheid allowed it to emerge, in the post-apartheid landscape, ready not only to renew business in South Africa, but also to reinvigorate its presence on the continent at large. The question is how to weigh this spread (and its attendant benefits) against the costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215923/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Byala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Coca-Cola has often been entangled with key political moments in Africa since its arrival in the early 1900s.Sara Byala, Senior Lecturer in Critical Writing, University of PennsylvaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175652023-11-20T14:37:39Z2023-11-20T14:37:39ZLibyan desert’s yellow glass: how we discovered the origin of these rare and mysterious shards<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559038/original/file-20231113-25-wg8y9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The pieces of Libyan desert glass that formed the basis of the study.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.lonelyplanet.com/egypt/western-desert/attractions/great-sand-sea/a/poi-sig/1500963/355269">Great Sand Sea Desert</a> stretches over an area of 72,000km² linking Egypt and Libya. If you find yourself in a particular part of the desert in south-east Libya and south-western parts of Egypt, you’ll spot pieces of yellow glass scattered across the sandy landscape. </p>
<p>It was first described in <a href="http://www.qattara.it/DESERTO%20EGIZIANO_FILES/silica.pdf">a scientific paper in 1933</a> and is known as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/libyan-desert">Libyan desert glass</a>. Mineral collectors value it for its beauty, its relative rarity – and its mystery. A pendant found in Egyptian pharaoh Tutankhamun’s tomb <a href="https://egypt-museum.com/winged-scarab-pendant-of-tutankhamun/">contains a piece of the glass</a>. Natural glasses are found elsewhere in the world; examples include moldavites from the Ries crater in Europe and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/tektite">tektites from the Ivory Coast</a>. But none are as rich in silica as Libyan desert glass, nor are they found in such large lumps and quantities.</p>
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<p>The origin of the glass has been <a href="https://adsabs.harvard.edu/full/1998M%26PS...33..951G">the subject of debate</a> among scientists for almost a century. Some suggested it might be from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/volcanic-glass">volcanoes on the moon</a>. Others propose it’s the product of lightning strikes (“<a href="https://museumsvictoria.com.au/media/5617/jmmv19592301.pdf#page=207">fulgurites</a>” – glass that forms from fusion of sand and soil where they are hit by lightning). Other theories suggest it’s the result of sedimentary or <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/hydrothermal-deposit#:%7E:text=From%20Hydrothermal%20Veins-,Hydrothermal%20deposits%20refer%20to%20the%20accumulation%20of%20minerals%20in%20fractures,can%20also%20heat%20circulating%20groundwater">hydrothermal processes</a>; caused by a massive explosion of a meteor in the air; or <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1945-5100.2001.tb01960.x">that it came from a nearby meteorite crater</a>.</p>
<p>Now, thanks to advanced microscopy technology, we believe we have the answer. Along with colleagues from universities and science centres in Germany, Egypt and Morocco, I <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.2138/am-2022-8759/html">have identified</a> Libyan desert glass as originating from the impact of a meteorite on the Earth’s surface.</p>
<p>Space collisions are a primary process in the solar system, as planets and their natural satellites accreted via the asteroids and planet embryos (also called planetesimals) colliding with each other. These impacts helped our planet to assemble, too.</p>
<h2>Under the microscope</h2>
<p>In 1996 scientists determined that the glass was close to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1945-5100.1996.tb02017.x">29 million years old</a>. A <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/maps.12223">later study</a> suggested the source material was composed of quartz grains, coated with mixed clay minerals and iron and titanium oxides. </p>
<p>This latter finding raised more questions, since the proposed age is older than the matching source material in the relevant area of the Great Sand Sea desert. To put it simply: those source materials didn’t exist in that location 29 million years ago.</p>
<p>For our recent study, a co-author obtained two pieces of the glass from a local who had collected them in the Al Jaouf region in south-eastern Libya. </p>
<p>We studied the samples with a state-of-the-art transmission electron microscopy (TEM) technique, which allows us to see tiny particles of material – 20,000 times smaller than the thickness of a paper sheet. Using this super-high magnification technique, we found small minerals in this glass: different types of zirconium oxide (ZrO₂). </p>
<p>Minerals are composed of chemical elements, atoms of which form regular three-dimensional packaging. Imagine putting eggs or soda bottles on the shelf of a supermarket: layers on top of layers to ensure the most efficient storage. Similarly, atoms assemble into a crystal lattice that is unique for each mineral. Minerals that have the same chemical composition but different atomic structure (different ways of atom packaging into the crystal lattice) are called polymorphs. </p>
<p>One polymorph of ZrO₂ that we observed in Libyan desert glass is called cubic zirconia – the kind seen in some jewellery as a synthetic replacement for diamonds. This mineral can only form at a high temperature between 2,250°C and 2,700°C. </p>
<p>Another polymorph of ZrO₂ that we observed was a very rare one called ortho-II or OII. It forms at very high pressure – about 130,000 atmospheres, a unit of pressure. </p>
<p>Such pressure and temperature conditions provided us with the proof for the meteorite impact origin of the glass. That’s because such conditions can only be obtained in the Earth’s crust by a meteorite impact or the explosion of an atomic bomb.</p>
<h2>More mysteries to solve</h2>
<p>If our finding is correct (and we believe it is), the parental crater – where the meteorite hit the Earth’s surface – should be somewhere nearby. The nearest known meteorite craters, named GP and Oasis, are 2km and 18km in diameter respectively, and quite far away from where the glass we tested was found. They are too far and too small to be considered the parental craters for such massive amounts of impact glass, all concentrated in one spot.</p>
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<img alt="A landscape photograph of sand dunes that appear almost golden in colour, stretching far into the distance." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559039/original/file-20231113-25-mccnnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Great Sand Sea desert.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sylvester Adams</span></span>
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<p>So, while we’ve solved part of the mystery, more questions remain. Where is the parental crater? How big is it – and where is it? Could it have been eroded, deformed or covered by sand? More investigations will be required, likely in the form of remote sensing studies coupled with geophysics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizaveta Kovaleva receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. </span></em></p>Libyan desert glass originated from the impact of a meteorite on the Earth’s surface.Elizaveta Kovaleva, Lecturer, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167732023-11-07T17:29:05Z2023-11-07T17:29:05ZEgypt’s strongman president faces election amid economic slump and popular anger over inaction on Gaza<p>The bitter conflict between Israel and Hamas could not have come at a worse time for Egypt. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former military strongman who <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">seized power in 2013</a> amid the turbulent fallout of the Arab Spring, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-president-sisi-confirms-candidacy-december-presidential-election-2023-10-02/">faces a general election in December</a>. </p>
<p>Beset by economic woes and with a political and humanitarian catastrophe unfolding on his country’s border, it will be an election fraught with risks.</p>
<p>Sisi effectively took power in July 2013, after decades of military dictatorship under Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak’s 30-year reign, which ended in April 2011 during the Arab Spring, was followed by a brief and turbulent interregnum in which a Muslim Brotherhood-backed government led by academic Mohamed Morsi struggled to maintain order. </p>
<p>In July 2013, Sisi removed Morsi from power and <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-counter-revolution-won-out-in-a-year-of-epochal-change-35799">won 96% of the vote</a> the following year in an election which drew <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/international-observers-find-fault-with-egypt-vote.html">widespread international criticism</a>. He has not really faced significant political opposition since, but this can’t hide his deep unpopularity with many Egyptians.</p>
<p>At present, Sisi presides over what most experts would say is a contender for the region’s worst performing economy. Annual inflation hit a historic high of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-inflation-quickens-record-380-september-2023-10-10/#">38% in September</a> and the <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/EGY/egypt/youth-unemployment-rate#">youth unemployment rate is currently running at 17%</a>. </p>
<p>Compounding this economic crisis have been several rounds of currency devaluation and an incoming mandated International Monetary Fund bailout. A harsh <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/egypt-imf-bailout-highlights-risks-austerity-corruption">IMF-imposed austerity programme</a> will push struggling Egyptians to a level of destitution not seen since the Egyptian bread riots of 1977.</p>
<p>It’s against this unstable background that Sisi will have to fight for reelection. You could be excused for assuming it would be a mere box-ticking exercise, as Sisi has ruled Egypt with an iron fist since ousting the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013’s brutal coup. </p>
<p>No election has been free and fair since then and Egypt’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/journalists-go-on-trial-in-egypt-for-offending-mps">independent media has been all but crushed</a> in the interceding years. Opposition parties have either been suppressed or co-opted, while civil society – previously a lively political sphere – now looks back at Mubarak’s dictatorship with a degree of nostalgia.</p>
<p>Initially – and for the first time since Sisi took power – it looked as if he would face a credible opposition. Former MP <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/67601/egypts-ahmed-tantawi-the-last-major-opposition-leader-standing-up-to-sisi/">Ahmed Tantawi</a>, a candidate for the Civil Democratic Movement, made a name for himself as an MP by openly criticising Sisi in parliament and not taking part in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-launches-national-dialogue-amid-ongoing-security-crackdown-2023-05-03/">National Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>This was a Sisi-sponsored initiative which was launched in May 2023. It was presented by the government as an inclusive forum for addressing Egypt’s economic and political challenges – but has been dismissed by critics as merely a vehicle for Sisi’s own agenda.</p>
<p>Tantawi’s campaign gained momentum with support from prominent left-wingers, secularists and even some Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile, attracted by Tantawi’s stance on releasing political prisoners. There are currently an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-brotherhood-prisons-specialrepo-idUSKCN0R30Y420150903">40,000 political prisoners in Egypt’s jails</a>, many of them Muslim Brotherhood members. </p>
<p>But Tantawi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">withdrew his candidacy on October 13</a>, saying that pro-government “thugs” were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">preventing people from registering their support</a> for his candidacy. </p>
<p>If his abortive campaign wasn’t a direct threat to Sisi, Tantawi’s popularity represents a structural shift in Egyptian politics. Sisi has dealt so badly with Egypt’s economic problems in recent years it has left him vulnerable. </p>
<p>And his habit of <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220523-sisi-suggests-egyptians-eat-tree-leaves-as-prices-soar/">incautious statements</a> hasn’t helped – at one point when questioned about the soaring price of okra, an Egyptian staple, he suggested they emulate the followers of the prophet Muhammad and “eat leaves”.</p>
<h2>War on the doorstep</h2>
<p>With the war in Gaza on Sisi’s doorstep, the regime faces a difficult balancing act. Israel is bent on securing its border no matter the consequences for Egypt. Yet the fallout for Sisi at home could antagonise domestic vulnerabilities. The image of thousands of Gazans dying while Egypt’s Rafah border stays closed could be very harmful for the regime.</p>
<p>Sisi needs to be cautious, given his <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-israels-war-hamas-spells-trouble-egypts-sisi#:%7E:text=Indeed%2C%20ever%20since%20Sisi%20came,a%20decade%20of%20Sisi's%20tenure.">close relationship with the Israeli government</a>. Egypt has been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/egypt-cauldron-gaza">party to the 16-year-long Israeli blockade</a> of Gaza, enforcing tight controls on the border crossing at Rafah. </p>
<p>But with an election looming he now needs to appease an Egyptian public who are far more sympathetic to the Gazan’s plight than the Israelis. He has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/21/exploiting-our-anger-egyptians-denounce-staged-pro-palestine-protests">attracted widespread criticism</a> from opponents who say his administration has been organising staged protests to piggyback on public sympathy for Palestinians as the death toll from Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip rises.</p>
<p>But the real risk to his administration lies at home with the ever-present threat of Egypt’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/egypt-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-history-repression-nationalism-democracy-opposition/">well-established Islamist movements</a>. It was a Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored popular uprising at Tahrir Square that toppled Mubarak and handed government to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. </p>
<p>That history now acts as a serious warning for Egypt’s military to never be complacent about the potential threat of Islamist movements. Sisi’s regime has done its utmost to destroy the Brotherhood. </p>
<p>In the ten years since his security forces <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">massacred more than 900 people</a> while violently breaking up mass anti-government sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares in August 2013, tens of thousands have been subject to arbitrary detention without trial or have been sentenced in military courts to lengthy prison terms for dissent. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most shameful exhibition of corrupt use of power was his regime’s treatment of Morsi. The former president died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egypt-collapses-after-court-session">collapsing inside the defendants “cage” in a Cairo courtroom</a> following six years in solitary confinement. </p>
<p>It is one thing for an incumbent to deal with the failings of a collapsing economy. It is quite another to accommodate an aggrieved public watching a human rights massacre right on its border. If the Sisi regime continues to let this happen on its watch, the opposition will have more ammunition than they have had for years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Gillian Kennedy received previously funding from the Leverhulme Foundation.</span></em></p>Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has held Egypt in an iron grip for a decade, but his regime’s close relations with Israel might prove a problem with voters.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163352023-10-30T12:31:16Z2023-10-30T12:31:16ZPalestinian Christians and Muslims have lived together in the region for centuries − and several were killed recently while sheltering in the historic Church of Saint Porphyrius<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556003/original/file-20231026-17-mhk4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C93%2C7791%2C5214&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children at an Orthodox Christmas Mass at the Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza City on Jan. 7, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/young-altar-servers-take-part-in-the-orthodox-christmas-news-photo/1246056243">Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israeli-airstrike-hits-greek-orthodox-church-in-gaza-killing-more-than-a-dozen">A bomb struck the complex of the historic Church of Saint Porphyrius</a> in Gaza on Oct. 19, 2023, killing more than a dozen of the hundreds of Christians and Muslims taking shelter inside and wounding others. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://religion.utk.edu/people/christine-shepardson/">historian of Roman Christianity</a> who focuses on the Eastern Mediterranean, I am often confronted by the complexity of this region. Many Christian and Muslim families in Gaza today were <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136662">displaced in 1948</a>, after the United Nations divided this formerly Ottoman land into new Arab and Jewish states. Today’s Palestinian Christians occupy a complicated place in this contested land. </p>
<p>The Church of Saint Porphyrius, or Porphyry, is named for a fifth-century bishop remembered for building a church in the city and <a href="https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/porphyry.asp">destroying the local temples to the Roman gods</a>. The <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/10/20/destruction-everywhere-leaves-gazas-heritage-sites-in-ruins/">current building</a> is a 19th-century renovation of a church European Crusaders built in the 12th century over the remains of its fifth-century predecessor, which had been converted to a mosque. While the <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza/">number of Christians in Gaza</a> dwindled to a little over a thousand in 2022, with roughly 50,000 more in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the <a href="https://archive.org/details/PalestineCensus1922/page/n7/mode/2up">1922 census of the British Mandate of Palestine</a> reported over 73,000 in this region where Christians have lived ever since Christianity began.</p>
<h2>Gaza’s early Christians</h2>
<p>As Jesus’ first followers spread the word about the significance of his life, death and resurrection, church communities sprang up around the Mediterranean. In the early fourth century, the church historian Eusebius of Caesarea commemorated Christians who died in the Roman persecution under Emperor Diocletian, including Christians from Gaza and their bishop, Silvanus, in his “<a href="https://www.gorgiaspress.com/history-of-martyrs-in-palestine-by-eusebius-bishop-of-caesarea">History of Martyrs in Palestine</a>.”</p>
<p>Toward the end of the fourth century, a western Christian nun named Egeria <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egerias-travels-9780856687105?cc=us&lang=en&">wrote a journal of her travels</a> to Christian sites in Egypt, Mount Sinai, Roman Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. She described stopping to see the places of biblical events and receiving the blessing of Christian monks living in each region.</p>
<p>Early Christianity flourished in the port city of Maiuma before spreading to the main city of Gaza, a center of Greek learning. In 325, Bishop Asclepas represented Gaza at Emperor Constantine’s famous Council of Nicaea, <a href="https://earlychurchtexts.com/public/nicene_creed.htm">which established the Nicene Creed</a> that defines the central tenets of Christian belief for most of the world’s Christians today. Twenty-first-century Palestinian Christians include a variety of communities with ties to this early history.</p>
<h2>Christians and Muslims in medieval Gaza</h2>
<p>In the early fifth century, the small Christian community of Gaza found a zealous leader in Bishop Porphyry, whose forceful efforts to Christianize the city are commemorated by the historical church building dedicated to his memory today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women, with their head covered, stand in church pews, along with children." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556004/original/file-20231026-25-9m3h1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian Orthodox Christians attend an Orthodox Christmas Mass at the Saint Porphyrius Orthodox Church in Gaza City on Jan. 7, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-orthodox-christians-attend-an-orthodox-news-photo/503825408?adppopup=true">Mohammed Asad/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>In the decades after Bishop Porphyry’s death in 420, Christians in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Christians of Roman Palestine, were divided over politicized theological conflicts. Those came to a head in 451 at the Roman emperor’s church <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Acts_of_the_Council_of_Chalcedon.html?id=4WG1MQEACAAJ">Council of Chalcedon</a>, in modern-day Turkey, which defined the Son of God in two natures, one human and one divine. </p>
<p>Many of Roman Palestine’s neighbors in Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia rejected this council because they believed the Son of God had a single nature, at once human and divine. They are called “miaphysite” Christians, which in Greek means “one nature.”</p>
<p>Most Christians of Roman Palestine, however, accepted the council and remained in the imperial church of Rome and Constantinople that centuries later, in 1054, divided into Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Miaphysites, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholics today all have churches in the land that was Roman Palestine.</p>
<p>Less than a decade after the death of Islam’s Prophet Muhammad in 632, his followers governed Palestinian Christians, and as a result Arabic rather than Greek <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691146287/the-church-in-the-shadow-of-the-mosque">has been the first language</a> of most of the region’s Christians for more than a thousand years.</p>
<p>When medieval Christian <a href="https://www.pennpress.org/9780812220834/the-crusades-and-the-christian-world-of-the-east/">Crusaders reached Jerusalem</a> from western Europe in 1099, they found not only the Muslims they had come to attack but also these ancient local Christian communities caught in the complex conflicts of the region.</p>
<h2>Palestinian Christians today</h2>
<p>Most Palestinian Christians today are Arab Christians and part of the Eastern Orthodox Church under the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. Other local Christians are miaphysites in the Syrian, Coptic, Ethiopian and Armenian Orthodox churches. </p>
<p>Still other Christians in this region, such as Maronites, Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics, Greek Catholics and local Roman Catholics, recognize the authority of the pope and are in communion with the Roman Catholic Church. A variety of Protestant churches have also more recently arrived in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People wailing in grief around the covered body of a dead person." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556008/original/file-20231026-25-f80a15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relatives mourn during an Oct. 20, 2023, funeral ceremony for Palestinians who were killed in Gaza’s Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/relatives-mourn-during-the-funeral-ceremony-for-news-photo/1735021871">Photo by Ali Jadallah/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While diaspora communities span the globe, including many across North and South America, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Christians continue to live in Israel, the West Bank, Jordan and Lebanon, with <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestine-gaza-christians-christmas-celebration-permits-denied">smaller populations in Gaza</a> and other countries in the region. Christian and Muslim communities have been neighbors in this land for over 1,300 years. And last week they sheltered and suffered together in Gaza’s St. Porphyrius Church when it was bombed. </p>
<p>In oversimplifying the story of the Middle East to binary categories – Muslims and Jews, right and wrong, terrorists and innocent – we lose the ability to understand the deeply layered history of this complex region. Meanwhile, the land of Gaza itself is in mourning under a thick ashen shroud.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christine Shepardson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many Christian and Muslim families in Gaza today were displaced following the creation of new Arab and Jewish states. Today, Palestinian Christians occupy a complicated place in this region.Christine Shepardson, Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Department of Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164482023-10-29T19:11:53Z2023-10-29T19:11:53ZWill the Israel-Hamas war become a regional conflict? Here are 4 countries that could be pivotal<p>Fears are escalating the conflict between Israel and Hamas could spill over into a broader war involving other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, as well as regional players like Iran and Qatar, are currently navigating domestic and international pressures in their response. </p>
<p>So, how likely is it that another country could be dragged into the conflict – or have a diplomatic role in helping resolve the crisis? Here are four possibilities beyond Iran (which we covered in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-its-inflammatory-rhetoric-iran-is-unlikely-to-attack-israel-heres-why-216345">separate piece</a>).</p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-its-inflammatory-rhetoric-iran-is-unlikely-to-attack-israel-heres-why-216345">Despite its inflammatory rhetoric, Iran is unlikely to attack Israel. Here's why</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>Egypt: limited desire to get involved</h2>
<p>In Egypt, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s regime came to power in 2013 by ousting the Muslim Brotherhood-led government that was democratically elected following the Arab Spring uprising. The Muslim Brotherhood movement has long been a focal point for political opposition in Egypt and is ideologically aligned with Hamas. </p>
<p>Although El-Sisi’s government has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/20/mass-protests-in-egypt-in-solidarity-with-gaza//">allowed</a> some protests against Israel’s actions in Gaza, these have been tightly controlled. And notably, they have not been permitted at Tahrir Square, the heart of the Arab Spring protests. </p>
<p>El-Sisi’s main concern is the conflict in Gaza does not spark widespread demonstrations in Egypt, which could galvanise <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-israeli-conflict-whats-at-stake-for-egypt-215710">dissatisfaction with his regime</a>. As such, El-Sisi will try to prioritise domestic stability rather than direct involvement in the war. He will likely support Hamas rhetorically, while doing little of substance to assist its fight against Israel. </p>
<p>Critically, this means Egypt will also <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-egypt-wont-open-border-its-palestinian-neighbors">remain reluctant</a> to open its southern border crossing with Gaza to allow Palestinian refugees to leave. </p>
<p>For a decade, Egyptian forces have been battling an <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/insurgency-in-sinai-challenges-and-prospects/">Islamist insurgency</a> in the Sinai desert. El-Sisi is concerned an influx of refugees from Gaza may exacerbate these tensions and lead to increased militant activity against the regime. </p>
<h2>Lebanon: it depends what Hezbollah decides to do</h2>
<p>In Lebanon, war with Israel would be an unwelcome development. In recent years Lebanon’s political landscape has been marked by public dissatisfaction with elites and an ongoing economic crisis. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, a powerful Shiite Muslim militant and political group in Lebanon, has already been clashing with Israeli forces across the border. If violence continues to escalate between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah could enter the war from the north. This would commit Lebanon to an unpopular military confrontation with Israel, shattering the fragile <a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war">peace between the countries that has held since 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Given Hezbollah is embedded in the Lebanese government and commands the strongest and most well-organised militant force in the country, other Lebanese factions are limited in their ability to restrain it. These factions would also be wary of triggering another civil war by trying to prevent Hezbollah from pursuing military action. </p>
<p>Because Hezbollah receives <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">funding, military equipment and training from Iran</a>, it is seen as one of Tehran’s strongest proxies for its ambitions in the region. Any decision by Hezbollah to increase its attacks on Israel would thus be driven by Iran, or at least carried out with Tehran’s approval. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah alone will decide whether Lebanon − already on the brink of collapse − gets dragged into Israel-Hamas war</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Syria: backed into a corner by political debts to Iran</h2>
<p>Political protest in Syria in 2011 led to civil war between President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and rebel groups. Assad depended on Iranian and Russian military support to maintain his grip on power. </p>
<p>Assad has no incentive to engage Israel militarily and destablise his hard-won political control. However, debts to Iran may need to be repaid with agitation against Israel if Israel launches an expected <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-israel-can-completely-eliminate-hamas-does-it-have-a-long-term-plan-for-gaza-216161">ground operation</a> into Gaza. </p>
<p>Since Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israeli communities, Syrian state media says Israel has hit airports in Damascus and Aleppo with missile strikes, causing damage and airport closures. State media also said eight Syrian soldiers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-israeli-attack-kills-eight-soldiers-state-media-2023-10-25/">were killed</a> in an air strike last week. Israel <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-strikes-syria-after-rocket-attack-on-north-8-syrian-soldiers-said-killed/">said</a> it had struck Syrian army infrastructure in response to rocket launches from Syria. </p>
<p>Israel’s likely objective with these strikes was to deter, rather than provoke, a military confrontation. The strikes are a reminder to Assad that Israel has the capability to hit important targets deep in Syrian territory – and is willing to do so. </p>
<p>There is a risk such actions, combined with political pressure from Iran and Hezbollah, may still lead to a military escalation between Syria and Israel. </p>
<p>One actor with the ability to restrain Syria is Russia, which maintains a large military presence in the country. Russia has no interest in seeing Syria enter into a war with Israel, as this would likely fracture the fragile political stability Russia has been heavily invested in maintaining. </p>
<h2>Qatar: seizing a diplomatic opportunity?</h2>
<p>Qatar is perhaps one of the most interesting countries to watch in the coming weeks. For decades, it has played a somewhat provocative and outsized role in regional politics and diplomacy. </p>
<p>Qatar has long had a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates. It also houses Hamas’ political offices in Doha and has been one of the key financial backers for the group. As a Sunni Muslim state, Qatar is ideologically more closely aligned with Hamas than the group’s more prominent financial backer, Iran. </p>
<p>Qatar has already played <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-hostage-mediators-press-hamas-civilian-releases-diplomats-sources-2023-10-24/">a key role in negotiations with Hamas to release four hostages from Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>Qatar lost regional influence in 2017 when four countries in the region <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/08/saudi-arabia-just-lifted-qatars-43-month-blockade-how-did-this-rift-end/">cut ties and imposed a blockade on it</a>. It now wants to regain prominence as a key player in the region. It would be in Qatar’s interests to position itself as a central diplomatic broker in the conflict and avoid being viewed in a similar light to Iran, as an enabler and funder of Hamas activity. </p>
<p>So, could Qatar succeed in leveraging its close relationship with Hamas to facilitate negotiations between the group and Israel to release the remaining Israeli hostages or even bring an end to the conflict? Or would Qatar’s lack of diplomatic relations with Israel thwart these ambitions? </p>
<p>Qatar’s influence may depend on Israel’s appetite for negotiations and the extent to which the United States demonstrates a willingness to broker between the parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries like Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Qatar all have a stake in the outcome of the war – but none want to be actively involved in fighting.Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151022023-10-16T15:36:34Z2023-10-16T15:36:34ZAncient Egypt had far more venomous snakes than the country today, according to our new study of a scroll<p>How much can the written records of ancient civilisations tell us about the animals they lived alongside? <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14614103.2023.2266631">Our latest research</a>, based on the venomous snakes described in an ancient Egyptian papyrus, suggests more than you might think. A much more diverse range of snakes than we’d imagined lived in the land of the pharaohs – which also explains why these Egyptian authors were so preoccupied with treating snakebites!</p>
<p>Like cave paintings, texts from early in recorded history often describe wild animals the writers knew. They can provide some remarkable details, but identifying the species involved can still be hard. For instance, the ancient Egyptian document called the <a href="https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/60690">Brooklyn Papyrus</a>, dating back to around 660-330BC but likely a copy of a much older document, lists different kinds of snake known at the time, the effects of their bites, and their treatment. </p>
<p>As well as the symptoms of the bite, the papyrus also describes the deity associated with the snake, or whose intervention might save the patient. The bite of the “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Apopis-Egyptian-god">great snake of Apophis</a>” (a god who took the form of a snake), for example, was described as causing rapid death. Readers were also warned that this snake had not the usual two fangs but four, still a rare feature for a snake today. </p>
<p>The venomous snakes described in the Brooklyn Papyrus are diverse: 37 species are listed, of which the descriptions for 13 have been lost. Today, the area of ancient Egypt is home to far fewer species. This has led to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/339159652.pdf">much speculation</a> among researchers as to which species are being described. </p>
<h2>The four-fanged snake</h2>
<p>For the great snake of Apophis, no reasonable contender currently lives within ancient Egypt’s borders. Like most of the venomous snakes that cause the majority of the world’s snakebite deaths, the vipers and cobras now found in Egypt have just two fangs, one in each upper jaw bone. In snakes, the jaw bones on the two sides are separated and move independently, unlike in mammals. </p>
<p>The nearest modern snake that <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2072-6651/9/5/171">often has four fangs</a> is the boomslang (<em>Disopholidus typus</em>) from the sub-Saharan African savannas, now only found more than 400 miles (650km) south of present-day Egypt. Its venom can make the victim bleed from every orifice and cause a lethal brain haemorrhage. Could the snake of Apophis be an early, detailed description of a boomslang? And if so, how did the ancient Egyptians encounter a snake that now lives so far south of their borders? </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Ancient Egyptian art depicting a hare-like creature battling a snake." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553356/original/file-20231011-17-79rkof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Representation of Apep (Apophis) in Ancient Egyptian wall painting. Note resemblance to boomslang (above).</span>
</figcaption>
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<p>To find out, our masters student Elysha McBride used a statistical model called <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/journal/climate/special_issues/Niche_Models">climate niche modelling</a> to explore how the ranges of various African and Levantine (eastern Mediterranean) snakes have changed through time.</p>
<p>Niche modelling reconstructs the conditions in which a species lives, and identifies parts of the planet that offer similar conditions. Once the model has been taught to recognise places that are suitable today, we can add in maps of past climate conditions. It then produces a map showing all the places where that species might have been able to live in the past.</p>
<h2>On the trail of ancient snakes</h2>
<p>Our study shows the much more humid climates of early ancient Egypt would have supported many snakes that don’t live there today. We focused on ten species from the African tropics, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Maghreb">Maghreb region</a> of north Africa and the Middle East that might match the papyrus’s descriptions. These include some of Africa’s most notorious venomous snakes such as the black mamba, puff adder and boomslang.</p>
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<p>We found that nine of our ten species could probably once have lived in ancient Egypt. Many could have occupied the southern and southeastern parts of the country as it then was – modern northern Sudan and the Red Sea coast. Others might have lived in the fertile, vegetated Nile valley or along the northern coast. For instance, boomslangs might have lived along the Red Sea coast in places that 4,000 years ago would have been part of Egypt. </p>
<p>Similarly, one entry of the Brooklyn Papyrus describes a snake “patterned like a quail” that “hisses like a goldsmith’s bellows”. The puff adder (<em>Bitis arietans</em>) would fit this description, but currently lives only south of Khartoum in Sudan and in northern Eritrea. Again, our models suggest that this species’ range would once have extended much further north.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wildlife-wonders-of-britain-and-ireland-before-the-industrial-revolution-my-research-reveals-all-the-biodiversity-weve-lost-208721">Wildlife wonders of Britain and Ireland before the industrial revolution – my research reveals all the biodiversity we've lost</a>
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<p>Since the period we modelled, a lot has changed. Drying of the climate and desertification had set in about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10437-022-09487-5">4,200 years ago</a>, but perhaps not uniformly. In the Nile valley and along the coast, for instance, farming and irrigation might have slowed the drying and allowed many species to persist into historical times. This implies that many more venomous snakes we only know from elsewhere might have been in Egypt at the time of the pharaohs.</p>
<p>Our study shows how enlightening it can be when we combine ancient texts with modern technology. Even a fanciful or imprecise ancient description can be highly informative. Modelling modern species’ ancient ranges can teach us a lot about how our ancestors’ ecosystems changed as a result of environmental change. We can use this information to understand the impact of their interactions with the wildlife around them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wolfgang Wüster receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isabelle Catherine Winder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ancient texts are still teaching us new things about the prevalence of wildlife.Isabelle Catherine Winder, Senior Lecturer in Zoology, Bangor UniversityWolfgang Wüster, Professor of Zoology, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143932023-09-29T12:31:48Z2023-09-29T12:31:48ZSouth Africa has one of the strongest navies in Africa: its strengths and weaknesses<p><em>The deaths of three members of the South African Navy (<a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">SA Navy</a>) <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/media/statements/Pages/SANavyIncidentKommetjie.aspx">on 20 September 2023</a>, when a freak wave swept them off the deck of the submarine SAS Manthatisi, has put the spotlight on the organisation and its work. André Wessels is a military historian; his latest <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">book</a> is A Century of South African Naval History: The South African Navy and its Predecessors 1922-2022. The Conversation Africa asked him for insights.</em></p>
<h2>How big is South Africa’s navy? How does it compare?</h2>
<p>The South African Navy has always been one of the strongest naval forces in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Egypt has the <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">strongest navy in Africa</a>, and Algeria is the second strongest as it has been steadily building <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/algeria/navy-modernization.htm">up its</a> naval forces. The Moroccan navy is also strong, as is the Nigerian navy, which has acquired <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/nigerian-navy-commissions-large-number-of-new-vessels/">a large number of naval vessels</a>, mostly patrol ships and smaller patrol craft. </p>
<p>Thanks to its submarine capabilities, the SA Navy can be regarded as one of the strongest on the continent. However, with its present ten “major” warships, the SA Navy is not in the same league as, for example, Brazil (about 100 ships), Russia (550), India (250) and China (600).</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">sources</a> that are in the public domain, the SA Navy at the moment has three submarines, four frigates, one multi-mission inshore patrol vessel (with another to be commissioned in the near future, and a third under construction), one survey ship (with a new one under construction), one combat support ship, and a number of smaller craft (most of them in reserve). In terms of its number of warships, this is the smallest that the navy has been since the mid-1950s.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">Money has little to do with why South Africa's military is failing to do its job</a>
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<p>Severe financial restrictions have put its capabilities under strain. For example, it has had to curtail anti-piracy patrols (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/operation-copper-extension-to-cost-r154-million/">“Operation Copper”</a>) in the Mozambique Channel due to the unavailability of ships.</p>
<h2>Can it protect the country’s territorial waters?</h2>
<p>Submarines provide South Africa with a crucial deterrent potential. And the navy can also do patrol work with its surface vessels (if they are able to go to sea). But it has a limited anti-submarine warfare capability, and is not able to project much power across long distances. </p>
<p>The government needs to gradually increase defence spending from the present less than 1% of GDP to at least 1.8%, which is what countries globally on average spend on defence. That will enable the navy to increase training opportunities, send more ships out to sea, and perhaps even acquire much-needed larger offshore patrol vessels.</p>
<p>South Africa is a maritime state, given that all its borders are on the ocean bar its northern one. The country needs a small but well-equipped navy that can defend it, underpin its diplomatic efforts, and assist other state departments in various ways.</p>
<h2>What’s its role?</h2>
<p>Geographically South Africa is a large <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/peninsula/">peninsula</a> on the strategic Cape sea route. Some <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">90% of its trade</a> flows through its harbours. The navy must assist in ensuring the integrity of the country as an independent state, by patrolling its territorial waters and acting as a deterrent against foreign military aggression and maritime crime. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">core business</a> is “to fight at sea”, with its official mission “to win at sea”. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">vision</a> is</p>
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<p>The navy can also play a role in humanitarian relief operations, search-and-rescue operations and <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">peace support operations</a>. </p>
<p>In the course of its history, the SA Navy has performed these and many other tasks. For example, in 1993 it facilitated the <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/disaster-response/bosnia/726/">sending of a mobile hospital and relief supplies</a> to Bosnia-Herzegovina, by <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/">Gift of the Givers</a>, the disaster response NGO. The navy has also helped provide food and medical aid to countries ravaged by conflict or drought, for example when the combat support ship SAS Drakensberg took supplies to Bangladesh <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">in 1991</a>. The navy has also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/final-voyage-for-veteran-ship-20011010">rescued the crew members</a> of many yachts that have been caught in storms or were in need of other assistance off the South African coast and elsewhere, for example during the 2014 Cape-to-Rio Transatlantic Yacht Race. </p>
<p>The navy is also responsible for hydrographic survey work along the South African coast. It maps the ocean floor so that reliable charts can be drawn up, making it safe for merchant and other ships to sail along the coast and visit ports. </p>
<p>In addition, the navy has an important diplomatic role in sending warships (<a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">“grey diplomats”</a>) on flag-showing visits to other countries. </p>
<p>But under <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">financial constraints</a>, the navy has been hard-pressed to fulfil its obligations. For example, it has for several years not been able to take part in flag-showing visits to other countries because of the unavailability of ships. In general, less time has also been spent at sea. </p>
<h2>What is the history of the SA Navy?</h2>
<p>The navy can trace its history back to <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">1 April 1922</a>, when the SA Naval Service was established. This became the Seaward Defence Force in 1939 when the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">Second World War</a> broke out, and the SA Naval Forces in 1942. It played a <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">small but important role</a> in the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany, patrolling the South African coastal waters. It also sent warships to the Mediterranean and Far Eastern war zones.</p>
<p>On 1 January 1951, the Naval Forces were renamed the SA Navy. In accordance with the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230376366_5">Simon’s Town Agreement</a> (1955), the navy <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">acquired</a> the Simon’s Town Naval Base from Britain (1957), and was strengthened by the acquisition of a number of destroyers, frigates, patrol boats and minesweepers, and later also a replenishment ship (1967) and three submarines (1970-1971). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-set-for-personnel-reforms-why-it-matters-178064">South Africa's military is set for personnel reforms. Why it matters</a>
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<p>But by then, the ruling National Party’s apartheid policy had led to South Africa’s growing international isolation. The United Nations’ <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa/un-arms-embargo-on-south-africa">mandatory arms embargo</a> against the country (1977) had obvious detrimental consequences for the then South African Defence Force (SADF), and in particular the navy. For example, it did not receive the submarines and frigates that it had ordered from France.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the navy <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027#page=5">assisted the other arms of the defence force</a>, in particular the SA Army’s Special Forces, during the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/namibian-struggle-independence-1966-1990-historical-background">Namibian war of independence</a>, which spilled over into Angola. The navy’s submarines and strike craft, as well as other ships, assisted the South African Special Forces <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080013-8.pdf">in operations</a> “behind enemy lines”.</p>
<p>The end of this conflict in 1989, and of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">freedom struggle in South Africa in 1994</a>, led to a new dawn. On the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346383?seq=4">eve of the 1994 elections</a> the SADF was renamed the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). </p>
<p>In due course the navy was transformed into a navy of and for all the people of South Africa. All cultural groups, as well as an increasing number of women, would henceforth be represented in the navy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Wessels in the years c 2012-2017 received funding from the NRF, but at the moment no longer receives any funds from the NRF. </span></em></p>South Africa is a large peninsula on the strategic Cape sea route. Some 90% of its trade flows through its harbours. The navy defends the country’s sovereignty and national interests.André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142252023-09-24T18:24:50Z2023-09-24T18:24:50ZMenendez indictment looks bad, but there are defenses he can make<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549871/original/file-20230924-21-ath6uu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C1985%2C1326&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and his wife, Nadine Arslanian Menendez.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MenendezBriberyDeveloper/4219da16c3724960a83927459e24e8ef/photo?Query=Menendez&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5321&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Susan Walsh, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Reactions came quickly to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/22/nyregion/menendez-indictment-document.html">federal indictment</a> on Sept. 22, 2023, of New Jersey’s senior U.S. senator, Democrat Bob Menendez. New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy joined other state Democrats <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/22/new-jersey-democrats-menendez-indictment-00117693">in urging Menendez to resign</a>, saying, “The alleged facts are so serious that they compromise the ability of Senator Menendez to effectively represent the people of our state.”</em></p>
<p><em>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-senator-robert-menendez-his-wife-and-three-new-jersey-businessmen-charged-bribery">indictment charged Menendez</a>, “his wife NADINE MENENDEZ, a/k/a ‘Nadine Arslanian,’ and three New Jersey businessmen, WAEL HANA, a/k/a ‘Will Hana,’ JOSE URIBE, and FRED DAIBES, with participating in a years-long bribery scheme … in exchange for MENENDEZ’s agreement to use his official position to protect and enrich them and to benefit the Government of Egypt.” Menendez said he believed the case would be “successfully resolved once <a href="https://rollcall.com/?p=727870">all of the facts are presented</a>,” but he stepped down temporarily as chairman of the Senate’s influential Committee on Foreign Relations.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s senior politics and democracy editor, Naomi Schalit, interviewed longtime Washington lawyer and Penn State Dickinson Law professor Stanley M. Brand, who has served <a href="https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/faculty/brand">as general counsel for the House of Representatives</a> and is a prominent white-collar defense attorney, and asked him to explain the indictment – and the outlook for Menendez both legally and politically.</em></p>
<p><strong>What did you think when you first read this indictment?</strong></p>
<p>As an old pal once told me, “even a thin pancake has two sides.”</p>
<p>Reading the criminal indictment in a case for the first time often produces a startled reaction to the government’s case. But as my over 40 years of experience <a href="https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/faculty/brand">defending public corruption cases and teaching criminal law</a> have taught me, there are usually issues presented by an indictment that can be challenged by the defense. </p>
<p>In addition, as judges routinely instruct juries in these cases, the indictment is not evidence and the jury may not rely on it to draw any conclusions. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit pointing at a poster board with various photos on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Damian Williams, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, speaks during a news conference on Sept. 22, 2023, after announcing the Menendez indictment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/damian-williams-u-s-attorney-for-the-southern-district-of-news-photo/1695609428?adppopup=true">Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><strong>The average reader will look at the indictment and say, “These guys are toast.” But are there ways Menendez can defend himself?</strong></p>
<p>There are a number of complex issues presented by these charges that could be argued by the defense in court. </p>
<p>First, while the indictment charges a conspiracy to commit bribery, it does not charge the substantive crime of bribery itself. This may suggest that the government lacks what it believes is direct evidence of a quid pro quo – “this for that” – between Menendez and the alleged bribers. </p>
<p>There is evidence of conversations and texts that coyly and perhaps purposely avoid explicit acknowledgment of a corrupt agreement – for instance, “On or about January 24, 2022, DAIBES’s Driver exchanged two brief calls with NADINE MENENDEZ. NADINE MENENDEZ then texted DAIBES, writing, ‘Thank you. Christmas in January.’” </p>
<p>The government will argue that this reflects acknowledgment of a connection between official action and delivery of cash to Sen. Menendez, even though it is a less-than-express statement of the connection. </p>
<p>Speaking in this kind of code may not fully absolve the defendants, but the government must prove the defendants’ intent to carry out a corrupt agreement beyond a reasonable doubt – and juries sometimes want to see more than innuendo before convicting.</p>
<p>The government has also charged <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1346">a crime called</a> “<a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45479.pdf">honest services fraud</a>” – essentially, a crime involving a public official putting their own financial interest above the public interest in their otherwise honest and faithful performance of their duties.</p>
<p>The alleged failure of Menendez to list the gifts, as required, on his Senate financial disclosure forms will be cited by prosecutors as evidence of “consciousness of guilt” – an attempt to conceal the transactions. </p>
<p>However, under <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/">a recent Supreme Court case</a> involving former <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-prosecutors-and-voters-not-the-feds-can-hold-corrupt-officials-accountable-138385">Gov. Bob McDonnell of Virginia for similar crimes</a>, the definition of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-getting-harder-to-prosecute-politicians-for-corruption-91609">official acts</a>” under the bribery statute has been narrowly defined to mean only formal decisions or proceedings. That definition does not include less-formal actions like those performed by Menendez, such as meetings with Egyptian military officials. </p>
<p>The Supreme Court rejected an interpretation of official acts that included arranging meetings with state officials and hosting events at the governor’s mansion, or promoting a private businessman’s products at such events. </p>
<p>When it comes time for the judge to instruct the jury at the end of the trial, Menendez may well be able to argue that much of what he did in fact did not constitute “official acts” and therefore are not illegal under the bribery statute. </p>
<p><strong>This case involves alleged favors done for a foreign country in exchange for money. Does that change this case from simple bribery to something more serious?</strong></p>
<p>The issue of foreign military sales to Egypt may also present a constitutional obstacle to the government. </p>
<p>The indictment specifically cites Menendez’s role as <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/22/menendez-steps-down-foreign-relations-committee-00117622">chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee</a> and actions he took in that role in releasing holds on certain military sales to Egypt and letters to his colleagues on that issue. The Constitution’s <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-6/clause-1">speech or debate clause</a> <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45043.pdf">protects members from</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/doj-drops-investigation-into-three-senators-for-insider-trading-burr-probe-continues-134875">liability or questioning</a> when undertaking actions within the “legitimate legislative sphere” – which undoubtedly includes these functions. </p>
<p>While this will not likely be a defense to all the allegations, it could require paring the allegations related to this conduct. That would whittle away at a pillar of the government’s attempt to show Menendez had committed abuse of office. </p>
<p>In fact, when the government has charged members of Congress with various forms of corruption, <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-prosecutors-and-voters-not-the-feds-can-hold-corrupt-officials-accountable-138385">courts have rejected</a> any reference to their membership on congressional committees as evidence against them. </p>
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<span class="caption">New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy, left, seen here in 2018 with Robert Menendez and fellow New Jersey Democratic Sen. Cory Booker, has called on Menendez to resign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SuperstormSandyRebuildingAid/b3ee03a1ac9644d8add820dee6f3a57d/photo?Query=Phil%20Murphy%20Robert%20Menendez&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Wayne Parry</a></span>
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</figure>
<p><strong>How likely is Menendez’s ouster from the Senate?</strong></p>
<p>Generally, neither the House nor Senate <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/expulsion.htm">will move to expel</a> <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33229.html">an indicted member before conviction</a>. </p>
<p>There have been rare exceptions, such as when <a href="https://www.nydailynews.com/2001/11/20/ex-sen-harrison-williams-81/">Sen. Harrison “Pete” Williams was indicted</a> in the FBI Abscam sting operation from the late 1970s and early 1980s <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam">against members of Congress</a>. Williams resigned in 1982 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/03/12/williams-facing-expulsion-resigns-from-us-senate/714785a8-a310-47cd-8584-959f4549fd2c/">shortly before an expected expulsion</a> vote. With current <a href="https://about.bgov.com/brief/balance-of-power-a-partisan-convergence-in-the-senate/">Democratic control of the Senate</a> by a margin of just one seat, Menendez’s ouster seems unlikely even though the Democratic governor of New Jersey would assuredly appoint a Democrat to fill the vacancy.</p>
<p><strong>‘In the history of the United States Congress, it is doubtful there has ever been a corruption allegation of this depth and seriousness,’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/23/nyregion/robert-menendez-political-future.html?searchResultPosition=1">former New Jersey Sen. Robert Torricelli said</a>. True?</strong></p>
<p>That seems hyperbolic. The Menendez case is just the latest in a long line of corruption cases involving members of Congress. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam">the Abscam case</a>, seven members of the House and one Senator were all convicted in a bribery scheme. That scheme involved undercover FBI agents <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam">dressed up as wealthy Arabs</a> offering cash to Congress members in return for a variety of political favors. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://ethics.house.gov/committee-reports/korean-influence-investigation">Korean Influence Investigation in 1978</a> – when I served as House counsel – <a href="https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal78-1237310">the House</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/08/17/archives/investigation-into-influencebuying-by-korean-figure-comes-to-an-end.html">Department of Justice conducted an extensive investigation</a> of influence peddling by Tongsun Park, a South Korean national, in which questionnaires were sent to every member of the House relating to acceptance of gifts from Park. </p>
<p>Going all the way back to 1872, there was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/Credit-Mobilier-Scandal">the Credit Mobilier scandal</a> that involved <a href="https://www.americanheritage.com/ultimate-congressional-scandal">prominent members of the House and Vice President Schuyler Colfax</a> in a scheme to reward these government officials with shares in the transcontinental railroad company in exchange for their support of funding for the project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stanley M. Brand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The indictment of Sen. Bob Menendez is full of lurid details – hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash stuffed into clothes among them. Will they tank Menendez’s career?Stanley M. Brand, Distinguished Fellow in Law and Government, Dickinson Law, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105372023-09-05T12:31:07Z2023-09-05T12:31:07ZSaudi reforms are softening Islam’s role, but critics warn the kingdom will still take a hard line against dissent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545381/original/file-20230829-17-2c62j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C8%2C1762%2C1183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHistoryofSuccession/9eb082a3e58543aea3bc012814e60aad/photo?Query=saudi%20arabia%20mbs&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=25&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin, pool, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, or “MBS,” is bringing a new vision of a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476">moderate, balanced”</a> Saudi Islam by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/world/middleeast/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia.html">minimizing the role of Saudi religious institutions</a> once seen as critical to the monarchy. </p>
<p>For decades, Saudi kings provided support to religious scholars and institutions that advocated an austere form of Sunni Islam known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabism</a>. The kingdom enforced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047586.005">strict codes of morality</a>, placing restrictions on the rights of women and religious minorities, among others. </p>
<p>Under MBS, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html">women have been allowed to drive</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-police.html">co-educational classrooms</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/12/12/Saudis-welcome-decision-to-allow-public-cinemas">movie theaters</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/middleeast/saudi-arabia-biggest-rave-mime-intl/index.html">all-night concerts</a> in the desert – in which men and women dance together – are a new normal. </p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1663">Yasmine Farouk</a> and <a href="https://politicalscience.columbian.gwu.edu/nathan-j-brown">Nathan J. Brown</a> call the diminishing role of Wahhabi religious scholars within Saudi domestic and international policy nothing short of a “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/07/saudi-arabia-s-religious-reforms-are-touching-nothing-but-changing-everything-pub-84650">revolution</a>” in Saudi affairs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">MBS acknowledges</a> that these reforms risk infuriating certain constituents or could even provoke retaliation. As a scholar who studies <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/and-god-knows-the-martyrs-9780190092153?cc=us&lang=en&">interpretations of Islamic law</a> to justify or contest militancy, I’ve followed these reforms closely.</p>
<p>In the past, Saudis who challenged the authority of Wahhabis have provoked unrest. When King Fahd, who ruled between 1982-2005, rejected the advice of his Wahhabi scholars and allowed the U.S. military to station weapons and female service members on Saudi soil, several of them <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439">supported a violent insurrection</a> against him.</p>
<p>MBS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/">seems unconcerned</a> with such challenges. In an interview broadcast widely throughout the kingdom, MBS <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">chastised Wahhabi scholars</a>, accusing some of falsifying Islamic doctrines. He then detained a major Wahhabi scholar <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/middleeast/saudi-cleric-sheikh-salman-al-awda-intl/index.html">from whom he once sought counsel</a>, charging him with crimes against the monarchy. MBS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476#:%7E:text=Prince%20Mohammed%20defended%20the%20reforms,to%20live%20a%20normal%20life.">defended these actions</a>, claiming, “We are returning to what we were before. A country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe.”</p>
<h2>Negotiating Wahhabism</h2>
<p>This proclaimed return of “moderate Islam” echoes the reforms of MBS’s grandfather, King Abdulaziz, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511993510.008">founder of the modern Saudi kingdom</a>. This vision rejects policies toward Wahhabi Islam favored by his uncles, King Faisal and King Khalid.</p>
<p>Between 1925 and 1932, Abdulaziz suppressed Wahhabi scholars and militants who had demanded that he uphold <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9780691241609/wahhabism">their version of “pure Islam”</a> and not open the kingdom to trade and development. He did the opposite and asserted the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<p>The booming Saudi oil economy developed by Abdulaziz required his son, King Faisal, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, to <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">reconsider the monarchy’s relationship</a> with Wahhabism. Unlike Abdulaziz, Faisal believed Wahhabis would help him save the kingdom.</p>
<p>Saudis who felt left behind in the emerging Saudi oil economy had found an inspirational symbol of liberation in Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who helped overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and implemented plans to redistribute Egyptian wealth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">Faisal encouraged</a> Wahhabi scholars to work with politically driven Islamists to reject the revolutionary politics of Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and craft a new vision of Islam for Saudi youth.</p>
<p>Faisal permitted Wahhabi scholars to reform Saudi educational institutions with their conservative Islamic curriculum. Abroad, Faisal’s scholars presented Wahhabism as <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25998">an authentic Islamic alternative</a> to the Cold War ideologies of the U.S. and USSR. Wealthy Saudis, these Wahhabi scholars argued, had a religious duty to promote Wahhabism across the globe.</p>
<h2>Resisting Wahhabism</h2>
<p>Faisal’s reforms met with success. King Khalid, who followed Faisal, continued to favor Wahhabi scholars, particularly while responding to two major challenges in 1979. </p>
<p>A group of Saudi students, who believed Faisal’s and Khalid’s reforms to be illegitimate, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred site, for two weeks in 1979. An attack on the Grand Mosque was viewed as an attack on the monarchy itself, which claims the mantle of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph showing smoke rising above the minarets of a mosque with other buildings in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-dated-november-1979-of-burning-meccas-great-mosque-news-photo/51398174?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The seizure came to a violent end with combined action by French and Saudi military forces. Afterward, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/25/inside-the-kingdom-robert-lacey-book-review">Khalid agreed</a> to elevate religious officials who affirmed the Islamic credentials of the monarchy.</p>
<p>Also in 1979, other Saudi youth traveled to join the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One such Saudi who answered the call that year was Osama bin Laden, who would establish al-Qaida in 1988. </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s and al-Qaida’s grievances against the monarchy emerged following King Fahd’s acceptance of an increased deployment of U.S. soldiers to Saudi soil following Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/1952-messages-to-the-world">Bin Ladin proclaimed</a> the presence of American infidels in Saudi Arabia to be a defilement of Islamic holy lands, an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439.003">affront</a>” to Islamic sensibilities, and demanded the destruction of the monarchy. Al-Qaida launched anti-Saudi insurgent campaigns lasting through 2010.</p>
<p>Not all conservative Islamist leaders called for violence. As historian <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/people/madawi-al-rasheed">Madawi Al-Rasheed</a> notes, many Saudi scholars <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/muted-modernists/">framed themselves as reformers</a> who sought to correct Fahd’s departures from “authentic” Islam and restore Faisal’s vision.</p>
<p>When MBS speaks of a “moderate Islam” he is not just condemning the violence of al-Qaida. He’s abandoning the monarchy’s accommodations of the Wahhabi establishment. He <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">blames some Wahhabi scholars</a> for the violence that the monarchy faced in 1979 and again in the the 1990s and 2000s. </p>
<p>He has worked quickly to erase those accommodations and, like his grandfather, affirm the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<h2>A ‘moderate Wahhabism’ for Saudi society?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man, wearing a headdress, walking past a display sign of 'Vision 2030.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Saudi Vision 2030’ aims to bring a complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these revolutionary changes occurred amid the 2016 unveiling of “Saudi Vision 2030,” a plan for complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation. MBS believes that this will meet the demands of Saudis under the age of 30 – who <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/fuller20030601.pdf">number more than 60%</a> of the kingdom’s population.</p>
<p>The religious curriculum shaped by King Faisal is gone, replaced with a “Saudi first” education, which <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-saudi-founding-day-and-the-death-of-wahhabism/">removes Ibn abd al-Wahhab</a>, the founder of Wahhabism, from textbooks and emphasizes Saudi patriotism over a Wahhabi Islamic religious identity. Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200125-saudi-arabia-to-stop-funding-mosques-in-foreign-countries/">has announced it will no longer fund</a> mosques and Wahhabi educational institutions in other countries.</p>
<p>Saudi religious police, once tasked with upholding public morality, saw their <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64501">powers curtailed</a>. They no longer have powers of investigation or arrest. They cannot punish behaviors deemed morally inappropriate.</p>
<p>Critics remain unimpressed, noting that demoting religious officials does not diminish the violence of the Saudi state. Religious police continue their online surveillance of social media. In 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/06/read-jamal-khashoggis-columns-for-the-washington-post/">following his calls</a> for a continued voice for Islamist reformers in Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/women-saudi-arabia-make-gains-overall-rights-remain-issue-n838296">Al-Rasheed argues</a> that the images of a new Saudi society conceal suppression of Saudi reformers. Some observers note that a growing Saudi “<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/01/08/many-saudis-are-seething-at-muhammad-bin-salmans-reforms">surveillance state</a>,” with capacities to peek into the private lives of Saudis, underwrites these reforms. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://schar.gmu.edu/profiles/pmandavi">Peter Mandaville</a>, a scholar of international affairs, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/BbxJAWvM1tc">observes, the “moderate Islam” offered by MBS is complicated</a>. On the one hand, it characterizes a new tolerant Saudi Arabian Islam. Yet, inside the kingdom, Mandaville argues that the “moderate Islam” of MBS demands that Saudi youth – as good Muslims – will submit to the authority of the monarchy over the kingdom’s affairs.</p>
<p>Some observers believe this might not be enough. <a href="https://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty-staff/full-time-faculty/mohammad-fadel">Mohammad Fadel</a>, a professor of Islamic legal history, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-arabia-mbs-religious-reform-incoherent-modernism">argues that the current configuration of the Saudi monarchy is incompatible</a> with “the kind of independent thought the crown prince is calling for in matters of religion.” Saudi society will flourish, he adds, “when Prince Mohammed recognizes the right of Muslims to rule themselves politically.”</p>
<p>With these reforms to Wahhabism, MBS hopes to secure the loyalty of a generation of young Saudis. As Saudi history would indicate, however, such a bargain requires constant renegotiation and renewal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nathan French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who has closely followed reforms that MBS has made to Wahhabism, an austere form of Islam, explains the changes taking place in the Saudi kingdom and their impact.Nathan French, Associate Professor of Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096092023-09-03T07:45:37Z2023-09-03T07:45:37ZAfrica’s vast underground water resources are under pressure from climate change - how to manage them<p>All countries have a variety of water resources – some are on the surface, like rivers, and some are beneath the ground. This groundwater provides <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2023/06/13/groundwater-the-hidden-wealth-of-nations">almost 50%</a> of all global domestic use and <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099145503202323072/p178601171e7ffac1ea0714b5e187c0122449517b07d">43%</a> of all the water used for agriculture.</p>
<p>Groundwater is stored in aquifers, which come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They can be accessed in several ways, but mostly by drilling wells. Not all groundwater is useful to us – it depends on whether it’s fresh or mixed with salt and on how deep it is, as this will affect how easy it is to tap into. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-aquifers-hold-more-than-20-times-the-water-stored-in-the-continents-lakes-but-they-arent-the-answer-to-water-scarcity-201704">Africa’s aquifers hold more than 20 times the water stored in the continent's lakes, but they aren’t the answer to water scarcity</a>
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<p>In Africa, groundwater is very important. It supports <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2023/06/13/groundwater-the-hidden-wealth-of-nations">almost 100%</a> of household and agricultural activities in rural areas. And, because it’s underground it’s protected from evaporation, a crucial resource in a warming climate.</p>
<p>These facts and figures are in a recent World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/publication/the-hidden-wealth-of-nations-groundwater-in-times-of-climate-change">report</a> which unpacks issues facing groundwater in times of climate change. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=m6uqRGMAAAAJ&hl=th">groundwater scientist</a> focusing on its sustainable use, I’ve picked out some of the key issues when it comes to managing groundwater from the report. It’s vital that African countries address these as pressure <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/state-of-climate-africa-highlights-water-stress-and-hazards">increases</a> on the continent’s water resources, through growing populations, development and changing weather patterns. </p>
<h2>Key issues</h2>
<p><strong>Ownership of groundwater</strong></p>
<p>Figuring out ownership of groundwater is important for the management of this finite resource. Without a clear understanding of ownership, conflict can happen.</p>
<p>In some countries groundwater is owned by the landowner, in others by the government. Generally, it’s being poorly managed <a href="https://publications.iwmi.org/pdf/H048386.pdf">across the continent</a>. In many cases, boreholes used to extract groundwater <a href="https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1094769/Perceptions_of_trends_in_the_development_of_private_boreholes_for_household_water_consumption.pdf">aren’t</a> even being registered. </p>
<p>South Africa has used laws and policies to <a href="http://ward2forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NWAguide.pdf">transfer</a> the ownership of resources to the government. But this has led to issues around red tape and licensing permits, which determine how water is allocated.</p>
<p>The success of permit systems depends on a thorough understanding of the resources, property owners’ compliance with granted user rights, and the enforcement of this regulation. This is particularly problematic in the developing world, according to the World Bank report. </p>
<p>A possible solution is decentralised management, as seen by the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/harvesting-water-and-harnessing-cooperation-qanat-systems-middle-east-and-asia">Qanat system</a> in the Middle East. The system consists of a network of underground canals that transport water from aquifers in highlands to the surface at lower levels using gravity. It is normally managed by the community and financed collectively. These historical pieces of infrastructure have been abandoned in recent times, but could solve many of the water shortage issues in the semi-arid to arid areas of Africa.</p>
<p><strong>Recharging aquifers</strong></p>
<p>Groundwater in aquifers is finite, but it <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/12/7/1846">can be recharged</a> with surface water or treated wastewater. The process also sometimes helps in the removal of harmful chemicals because the aquifer’s material can act like a very large filter. </p>
<p>The World Bank report highlights <a href="https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/managed-aquifer-recharge#:%7E:text=Managed%20aquifer%20recharge%20(MAR)%2C,water%20supplies%20may%20be%20low.">managed aquifer recharge</a> as a technique which can be used to recharge aquifers. Water is either injected through a well or seeps into the ground through infiltration ponds, man-made or natural depressions in the ground which allows water to soak into the earth.</p>
<p>Countries in <a href="https://gw-project.org/books/managed-aquifer-recharge-southern-africa/">southern Africa</a> have practised this for the past 40 years. </p>
<p>Aquifers can also be recharged <a href="https://unepdhi.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/05/WEB_UNEP-DHI_NBS-PRIMER-2018-2.pdf">naturally</a> when rainwater infiltrates deep into the ground. This can be encouraged through afforestation, agricultural terraces and the prevention of land clearing. These practices allow permeable surfaces to dominate the landscape, stabilise the soil through plant growth, and slow the flow of water.</p>
<p><strong>Monitoring aquifers</strong></p>
<p>Monitoring aquifers is vital to know how much water is left in them. Unfortunately many African countries have poor monitoring networks and infrastructure in place. The number of monitoring points in certain countries is <a href="https://www.un-igrac.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Kukuric%20and%20van%20Vliet%2C%202008.pdf">also dwindling</a>, owing to financial constraints. </p>
<p>Satellite data can be used for monitoring. One example is the <a href="https://grace.jpl.nasa.gov/data/data-analysis-tool/">GRACE (Gravity, Recovery and Climate Experiment)</a> twin satellites which have provided insights into subsurface water storage over the past 20 years. This means that the changes in aquifer volumes can be monitored, but only at a very large scale. It’s necessary to know what’s happening on the ground. Localised monitoring networks are needed, with data loggers at multiple wells.</p>
<p><strong>Effective policies</strong></p>
<p>Policies and incentives play a major role in the use of groundwater. They influence the cost of energy and abstraction and the overall accounting of groundwater resources and environmental impact. </p>
<p>In an African context, good policies are missing in places. There are, however, some community practices which help to protect the resource, like the Qanat system. These types of systems should be encouraged and replicated. </p>
<p><strong>Groundwater dependent ecosystems</strong></p>
<p>Groundwater dependent ecosystems, such as wetlands, play a <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/fs_7_livelihoods_en_v5_2.pdf">critical role</a> for many livelihoods in Africa and need to be more effectively managed. These ecosystems use groundwater to support plant and animal life and ecosystem services, such as fresh water and clean air, throughout the year. </p>
<p>But they’re exposed to major risks because they’re often close to semi-arid and arid areas. This is particularly true in the Sahel region. Groundwater dependent ecosystems are often close to border crossings and transport routes. Human activities, such as over-pumping, could adversely affect how they function and lead to a loss of biodiversity. </p>
<p>The conservation of these water bodies is of the utmost importance for the preservation of water resources and livelihoods. Policies which protect them – like the <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/">Ramsar convention</a> – must be properly enforced. Governments could should also consider creating protected areas around some of these ecosystems. </p>
<h2>Managing resources</h2>
<p>It’s imperative that governments better monitor our water resources. Coupled with good practical solutions, such as managing pump rates, this will sustain groundwater resources for many years to come. </p>
<p>The monitoring network on our continent is unfortunately limited or non-existent in certain countries. In some, like South Africa, the network is slowly diminishing. This is unfortunate as the ability to measure allows better management of groundwater resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaathier Mahed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Better monitoring of groundwater is important for sustainable management.Gaathier Mahed, Senior lecturer, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113532023-08-11T15:39:27Z2023-08-11T15:39:27ZMilitary coups in Africa: here’s what determines a return to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542141/original/file-20230810-25-hyb3hk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's July 2023 coup celebrate in the capital, Niamey. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Slightly more than two years after Niger’s first peaceful handover of power from one civilian president to another, the military seized power in July 2023. The coup – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13943662">the fourth in Nigerien history</a> – follows on the heels of recent military interventions in Africa. Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Sudan (October 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the number of military coups has <a href="https://arresteddictatorship.com/coups/">declined sharply</a>. However, francophone west Africa now accounts for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">approximately two-thirds of all military coups</a> that have occurred since then. </p>
<p>As a political scientist analysing African politics, I have <a href="https://people.clas.ufl.edu/selischer/">studied</a> military coups and their outcomes for the last decade and a half. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">recent article</a>, Justin Hoyle, a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Florida, and I demonstrate that since 1989, military coups across the world have resulted in two outcomes. </p>
<p>First is the withdrawal of the junta from executive power. This means the junta doesn’t participate or interfere in post-coup elections. While it is necessary for the transition to democracy, it isn’t sufficient in itself. This scenario played out in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/110/439/295/164122">Nigerien coup of 2010</a> and the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472330701651929">Thailand coup of 2006</a>. </p>
<p>Second is electoral rigging by the junta in favour of its own candidate. This scenario establishes a regime in which coup leaders entrench themselves in executive power.</p>
<p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy. It also provides insights into the effect of coups on the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">quality of democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">studied</a> five countries and 12 post-coup transitions: Egypt (coups in 2011 and 2013), Mauritania (coups in 2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010), Fiji (2000 and 2006) and Thailand (1991, 2006 and 2014). </p>
<p>Overall, we examined slightly more than a third of all military coups between 1989 and 2017.</p>
<p>Out of a total of 32 post-coup environments, we found that in half of all cases, juntas withdrew from executive power in the coup’s aftermath.</p>
<p>However, even with the military’s withdrawal from power, the transition period to civilian rule was highly volatile. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, counter-coup attempts by a rival faction within the armed forces intending to remain in power occurred rather frequently. This was the case most recently in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/09/17/441222504/presidential-guard-announces-takeover-of-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Although many coups result in the withdrawal of juntas from executive power, many of the cases from our study were near-misses – the country could’ve ended up under <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">military authoritarian rule</a>.</p>
<p>We examined four key variables and their influence on coup outcomes. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the internal coherence of the armed forces</p></li>
<li><p>the ability of civil society organisations and political parties to mobilise against the junta</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of donor leverage </p></li>
<li><p>trade dependency on regional and western partners. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, we argue that the two that matter the most are: the internal cohesion of the military and the vibrancy of civil society groups. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">analysis</a>, we found that the single most important variable that accounts for different coup outcomes is the internal coherence of the military.</p>
<p>When there’s internal coherence, militaries generally feel <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/12/2/192/2367607">inclined</a> to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system">withdraw</a> from executive power. This is because holding on to power <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">challenges</a> their internal cohesion.</p>
<p>Internal cohesion <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2023.2230718">is based on</a> the factors that triggered the coup. If a coup occurs in response to threats to the country’s territorial integrity, to the preservation of public order, or to the military’s material or reputational benefits, the junta will have the backing of the military at large. This is because the benefits of seeking power outweigh the risks of not being in power. </p>
<p>If a coup occurs for reasons outside these, the junta either won’t seek power or will face resistance from within the military and withdraw. We found this confirmed in all the coups that we analysed.</p>
<p>Another relevant yet less significant variable is the positioning of civil society toward the junta. </p>
<p>Where civil society groups manage to rally the population to demand a return to democratic civilian rule, juntas depart from power. The most prominent example of this was in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=xSZwAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=egypt+2011+nepsted&ots=r-G56kRRmg&sig=YmiQioJNNM-ECTabvUcrsIT2w_c#v=onepage&q=egypt%202011%20nepsted&f=false">Egypt after the 2011 coup</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly, we didn’t find that aid dependency or membership in an international organisation with anti-coup rules exerted any discernible influence on juntas. This means that domestic variables – and in particular the drivers of the coup – influence political aftermaths.</p>
<h2>What it all means</h2>
<p>For the current transitions in parts of Africa, these findings are troubling. </p>
<p>In Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, militaries overthrew their governments because of threats to their countries’ territorial integrity or to the military’s material benefits. The juntas in these countries can rely on the backing of the military at large. This decreases the likelihood of a return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The implications of our findings for Niger and Guinea are less straightforward, however. Here, coups were staged by a sub-section of the military, even though such a move wasn’t in line with the interests of the armed forces at large. Our research findings suggest a more volatile dynamic for these two post-coup states.</p>
<p>At this stage, no one can predict how the motives of Niger’s presidential guard will shape future action. Much will depend on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">coup leader Abdourahmane Tchiani’s</a> ability to convince the military that a coup was the right thing to do politically. </p>
<p>Generally, military coups bode ill for democratic processes. In instances where juntas withdraw from power, democracies don’t emerge. When juntas rig post-coup elections, they <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/military-coups-are-key-to-understanding-contemporary-autocracies/">become entrenched in power</a> in the medium to long-term. This has devastating consequences for the political and civil rights of their populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sebastian Elischer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Examining how military coups unfold is crucial to understanding a country’s path back to democracy.Sebastian Elischer, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102382023-07-31T12:22:46Z2023-07-31T12:22:46ZTourists search for Mount Sinai in Saudi Arabia – but does a geographical location for pivotal Bible event even exist?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539841/original/file-20230727-25-cdzqrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C4955%2C3398&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mount Sinai is mentioned in the second book of the Bible, Exodus, as the site where Moses received his first instruction from God.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-burning-bush-is-an-object-described-by-the-book-of-news-photo/1354443003?adppopup=true">Pictures From History/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Saudi Arabia relaxed rules and expanded visas for tourists in 2019, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/24/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-christian-tourists.html">Christians have been increasingly visiting the country</a>, drawn by word of mouth and promotional YouTube videos, in search of Mount Sinai, where the Bible recounts God revealing the Ten Commandments to Moses. </p>
<p>For many centuries people have believed the location to be in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, near the site of a monastery built around 550 C.E. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saint-Catherines-Monastery">and named after St. Catherine</a>.</p>
<p>But this was entirely based on the word of local tribes living some 2,000 years after the event. Most scholars believe that <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/Encyclopaedia-Judaica/oclc/123527471">the location of Mount Sinai is unknowable</a> from the available textual evidence. As a <a href="https://history.utk.edu/jacob-f-love/">scholar of the Hebrew Bible and language</a>, I agree with them. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C5%2C1955%2C1263&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cross resting on top of a monastery located amid mountains." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C5%2C1955%2C1263&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Greek Orthodox Monastery of St. Catherine on the Sinai Peninsula, some 240 miles from Cairo, Egypt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastEgypt/87b5a64207a44d2387e138560a49a504/photo?Query=mount%20sinai&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=563&currentItemNo=11&vs=true">AP Photo/Enric Marti, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The existence of Mount Sinai is likely a legendary myth that is part of the stories of many cultures. There is no corroborating evidence, archaeological or otherwise, to support any particular location. </p>
<h2>What’s in a name?</h2>
<p>The first biblical mention of the holy mountain occurs in Exodus, the second book of the Bible and the primary source for the story of Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt. </p>
<p>In Exodus 3:1, a mountain is referred to as Horeb and called the “mountain of God.” Horeb is mentioned twice more in Exodus but then disappears without mention in the third and fourth books – Leviticus and Numbers – until it reappears in the last book of the first section of the Bible, or the Pentateuch – Deuteronomy. </p>
<p>Deuteronomy retells the history of Israel as the Israelites were poised to enter the Holy Land. Throughout Deuteronomy, there are over a dozen references to Horeb as the place where Moses received the commandments.</p>
<p>Horeb is also found in biblical books after the Pentateuch. For example, the <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Malachi+4%3A4&version=RSV">prophet Malachi says in the book that bears his name</a>, “Remember the statutes of Moses … whom I commanded at Horeb.” </p>
<p>Horeb is a common name for the mountain in the Bible and yet is far less known than Sinai. The name Sinai is used throughout Exodus and occurs in Leviticus and Numbers, although Horeb is absent from those works. </p>
<p>But in Deuteronomy, Sinai all but disappears – it is <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%2033&version=RSV">used just once in a poem quoted by the author of Deuteronomy</a> (33:2). The poem is cast as Moses’ final benediction of the people and begins, “This is the blessing with which Moses the man of God blessed the children of Israel before his death. He said, ‘The Lord came from Sinai, and dawned from Se′ir upon us; he shone forth from Mount Paran,
he came from the ten thousands of holy ones, with flaming fire at his right hand.’”</p>
<h2>Horeb or Sinai?</h2>
<p>It is not simply a matter of two different names for the same place. That could be explained as easily as noting that Jerusalem is also called the City of David. And it would be logical if the various books scattered these names as if they were interchangeable. But I would argue that the distribution is anything but random. </p>
<p>The references to Sinai are concentrated in Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers, while Deuteronomy refers almost exclusively to Horeb. In other words, the author or authors of Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers strongly preferred the word Sinai while the author of Deuteronomy used only Horeb.</p>
<p>For over 200 years biblical scholars have been analyzing the Pentateuch to discern its editorial history. The result of this search for the authors of the Pentateuch <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Who-Wrote-the-Bible/Richard-Friedman/9781501192401">has led to the conclusions</a> that the first four books were written by at least three authors and redacted by editors to combine their stories. </p>
<p>There is evidence to show that the last book, Deuteronomy, was written by a single author. However, scholars argue, an editor <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Who-Wrote-the-Bible/Richard-Friedman/9781501192401">probably changed and added material</a>. It is likely that the one poem that mentions Sinai in Deuteronomy, when every other mention of that mountain is in Horeb, is a result of the editorial changes.</p>
<p>A second possibility is that they are two different locations, each of which had sacred status to a particular group of Israelites. The third possibility, favored by most biblical scholars, is that the ancient stories cataloged among the Israelites <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Who-Wrote-the-Bible/Richard-Friedman/9781501192401">came from different sources and were ultimately reconciled by editors</a>. </p>
<p>The second and third possibilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive – in other words, even if the stories were written by different authors, those different authors could have the same place in mind. </p>
<p>Perhaps the key fact to keep in mind is that scholars know very little about the location of Mount Sinai and whether or not it is the same place as Horeb.</p>
<h2>A strange absence</h2>
<p>Many of the books recounting the early history of biblical times, especially the prophets, however, have practically no reference to Sinai or Horeb. Among the 150 Psalms there is <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Psalm+68&version=RSV">but one reference to Sinai</a>. </p>
<p>How can it be that such a critical source of the religion of Israel was of little interest to these prophets? The commandments that Moses is believed to have received from God framed the lives of all Israelites and established the priestly offerings, the courts, and the rules for marriage, divorce and inheritance. Yet, none of the prophets felt a need to call upon Israel to follow the laws of Moses given at Sinai or Horeb. Is it not more reasonable to imagine that they simply knew little of those events or did not attach much importance to them? </p>
<p>Some people might conclude that the belief about Moses at Sinai is just invention. After all, there is so much historical and archaeological evidence for the history of places such as Jerusalem and Lachish. But in the case of Horeb or Sinai, the geographical hints found in the Bible are insufficient to make any sort of determination. </p>
<p>In other words, there isn’t sufficient data to decide whether the biblical account of Sinai or Horeb happened somewhere, or whether it is perhaps a foundation legend created for some purpose such as uniting the disparate Hebrew-speaking tribes of Israel.</p>
<p>When some Christians, such as the ones now looking for Sinai in Saudi Arabia, examine these sources, they often try to stitch together texts written over centuries after the events supposedly happened. It is not surprising that various people have assigned the location of Sinai <a href="https://www.openbible.info/geo/ancient/abfba2a/mount-sinai">to locations hundreds of miles apart</a>.</p>
<p>Based on all the evidence – or lack thereof – I argue that Sinai is located not in any specific place but rather in the hearts and minds of those who treasure the meaning of the Hebrew Bible.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article has been updated in order to correct information about St. Catherine’s Monastery.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob F. Love does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of the Hebrew Bible argues that very little is known about the location of Mount Sinai, and it is likely that it was once part of a foundational legend.Jacob F. Love, Lecturer in Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096302023-07-27T14:49:42Z2023-07-27T14:49:42ZHow hidden details in ancient Egyptian tomb paintings are revealed by chemical imaging<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537110/original/file-20230712-39282-w8qnrv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C1888%2C537&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">XRF study of the painting of Ramesses II.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martinez et al., 2023, PLOS ONE.</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The walls of ancient Egyptian tombs can teach us much about the lives of the pharaohs and their entourages. Tomb paintings showed the deceased and their immediate family members involved in religious activities, the burial itself, or feasting at banquets and hunting in the Nile marshes.</p>
<p>But many such tombs were looted in antiquity and later on, or roughly excavated by foreign treasure hunters and early archaeologists. As a result, much of the painted decoration has suffered damage, despite being well-preserved by the arid environment.</p>
<p>Reconstructing those damaged sections of painted decoration has largely been done through educated guesswork, but a <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0287647">new study</a> reveals how a technique called portable X-ray fluorescence (<a href="https://www.fieldmuseum.org/science/special-projects/elemental-analysis-facility/portable-x-ray-fluorescence-pxrf">pXRF</a>) is being used to study ancient materials and identify remnants of decoration which are either faint or entirely invisible to the eye.</p>
<p>Elaborate tomb decoration, designed to reflect the status and esteem of the deceased person within, reached its zenith during Egypt’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Eighteenth-Dynasty">18th</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/19th-Dynasty">19th dynasties</a> (1550-1189 BCE) in <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/87/">ancient Thebes</a> (modern Luxor). Royals were buried in the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/valley-of-the-kings">Valley of the Kings</a> and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Valley-of-the-Queens">Valley of the Queens</a>. </p>
<p>Members of the court and other high-ranking officials were laid to rest in several locations on the western bank of the Nile, close to the mortuary temples of the kings they served in life. Their tombs were cut into the rock, the rough-hewn walls of the chambers covered in plaster to provide a smooth surface for teams of artists and draughtspeople. </p>
<p>The decorative motifs they painted were not static, but changed from the 18th to the 19th dynasties. The former focused on vibrant scenes of the natural landscape and daily life, while more austere religious scenes were preferred during the later period.</p>
<p>The paints and pigments used by the ancient Egyptians were made from minerals and as such, have specific chemical markers. Yellow, as an example, was achieved by grinding up the arsenic sulfide orpiment, whereas blue pigment could be created using hydrated copper chloride, and red with iron oxide. By using portable X-ray fluorescence, scientists can use these chemical markers in the pigments to create a map of damaged areas. </p>
<h2>Physics and Egyptology</h2>
<p>The fields of archaeology and Egyptology have a long history of using tools and techniques developed by other disciplines. Developed in the early 20th century by physicist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-Moseley">Henry Moseley</a>, XRF and pXRF measure secondary X-rays given off by a material when bombarded with primary X-rays. These signals can then be used to determine the material’s elemental composition. </p>
<p>Rather than the bulky (and immobile) analytical equipment frequently used to study archaeological artefacts in labs, the equipment needed to conduct a pXRF analysis weighs only a couple of kilogrammes and can easily be taken into the field.</p>
<p>While pXRF has been used in the past to determine the chemical composition of ceramics and metals, a new international research project headed by Philippe Martinez from Sorbonne University has recently used it to analyse the complex and beautiful paintings found in the tombs of Egyptian nobles.</p>
<h2>Reconstructing ancient art</h2>
<p>The process is not useful only for reconstructing damaged sections, it also has the potential to illuminate elements of artistic technique. In the 18th dynasty tomb chapel belonging to the Overseer of the Fields of <a href="https://www.ees.ac.uk/the-tomb-of-menna-tt69-luxor#:%7E:text=Menna%20was%20a%20scribe%20and,recommend%20a%20(virtual)%20trip!">Amun, Menna</a> (TT69), the team identified a phantom arm on the portrait of the tomb owner. </p>
<p>This third arm, which would have been invisible when the tomb was first finished, is the result of an alteration to the stance of the subject, made for unknown reasons by the painters. In this way, the technique can show stages of decoration and technical or aesthetic choices made by artists many thousands of years in the past.</p>
<p>In addition to the tomb of Menna, the team also analysed a portrait of <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/ramses-ii">Ramesses II</a> found in the <a href="https://www.osirisnet.net/tombes/nobles/nakhtamon341/e_nakhtamon341_01.htm">tomb of Nakhtamun</a>, which has traditionally been dated to the 19th dynasty.</p>
<p>The painting contained several subtle alterations, including to the shape of the royal sceptre held by the ruler (maybe to avoid it colliding with the figure’s face). The necklace worn by the king may also have been changed, and this change, the team behind the project claims, may have significance for the dating of the tomb. </p>
<p>They suggest that the king was first depicted wearing a type of necklace known as a <a href="https://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/jewellerycollar/"><em>shebyu</em></a>, which was popular during the 20th dynasty, some years after Ramesses II’s death.</p>
<p>This original necklace seems to have been altered to another type, known as a <a href="https://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/jewellerycollar/"><em>wesekh</em></a>, which was more popularly used in royal depictions during his lifetime. It seems that the tomb painters originally depicted this 19th-dynasty ruler wearing 20th-dynasty jewellery, realised their error and then made the necessary alterations.</p>
<p>This in turn, may then suggest that the tomb owner, Nakhtamun, actually lived and worked during the 20th rather than the 19th Dynasty, and that the portrait of Ramesses II is not the portrait of the living king, but rather of the deceased and deified ruler.</p>
<p>Scientific analysis is increasingly being incorporated into most facets of Egyptological research from material analysis of pigments, ceramics, metals and wood, to <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6933776/">spectroscopic analysis</a> of ancient <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/papyrus-writing-material">Egyptian papyrus</a>.</p>
<p>These techniques not only allow minimally or non-invasive investigations which help to preserve artefacts and prevent further damage, they also illuminate crucial details about the technological and artistic achievements of the ancient Egyptians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicky Nielsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A technique called portable X-ray fluorescence has helped Egyptologists identify changes and adjustments to details of tomb decoration that are invisible to the human eye.Nicky Nielsen, Senior Lecturer in Egyptology, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102552023-07-26T14:54:19Z2023-07-26T14:54:19ZEgypt and Ethiopia are finally working on a water deal – what that means for other Nile River states<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539011/original/file-20230724-25-5rnfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam began generating electricity in 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Hailu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Egypt and Ethiopia have waged a diplomatic war of words over Ethiopia’s massive new dam – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – on the Blue Nile, which started filling up in July 2020. The political row has threatened to get out of hand on occasion but now the two countries have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/egypt-ethiopia-agree-to-reach-deal-on-dam-in-4-months-4303192">finally agreed</a> to conclude “a mutually acceptable agreement” within four months. We asked John Mukum Mbaku, the author of a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/856122/pdf">recent article</a> on the Ethiopian dam and a co-author of a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/books/governing-the-nile-river-basin/">book</a> on the Nile River’s changing legal regime, to answer four key questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is the context of the current tussle?</h2>
<p>Ethiopia, whose highlands provide more than 85% of the water that flows into the Nile, has long argued that it has the right under international law to manage resources within its own borders for its national development. It sees the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">Nile as a gift of God</a>” given to Ethiopians to use for their development. </p>
<p>Egypt, which depends on the Nile for more than 90% of its fresh water, has argued that the Ethiopian dam represents a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-of-existential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam">threat</a> to its water security and its very existence as a people.</p>
<p>The decision by Addis Ababa to begin construction of the dam on the Blue Nile in 2011 exacerbated an already deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and its two downstream neighbours, Egypt and Sudan, over access to Nile waters. After Egypt’s diplomatic efforts failed to stop construction, Cairo redirected its energies to securing a legally binding agreement for filling and operating the dam. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://enterprise.press/stories/2018/04/10/egypt-sudan-ethiopia-fail-to-reach-agreement-in-gerd-talks/">no mutually</a> acceptable <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/5/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-fail-to-succeed-in-disputed-dam-talks">agreement</a> for filling and operating the dam was ever reached.</p>
<p>In August <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/20/ethiopia-electricity-production-gerd-blue-nile-mega-dam#:%7E:text=The%20process%20of%20filling%20the,was%20to%20add%2013.5%20billion.">2020</a>, Addis Ababa began to fill the dam’s reservoir. That process was repeated in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/second-filling-gerd-reservoir">2021</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">2022</a>. </p>
<p>In 2023, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the country would delay the fourth filling until September “to alleviate the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-delays-filling-of-flagship-dam-vows-to-heed-downstream-nations-concerns/2940475">concerns of neighbouring people</a>”. </p>
<p>The dam’s reservoir filling in particular, and its operation in general, are issues that the three countries must resolve, most likely through a legally binding agreement or treaty. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-reacts-ethiopia-switches-first-nile-dam-turbine">February 2022</a>, the Ethiopian dam started producing electricity. Egyptians claimed that Addis Ababa was “violating its obligations under the 2015 Declaration of Principles” and endangering Egyptian “<a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/egypt-reacts-ethiopia-switches-first-nile-dam-turbine">water interests</a>”.</p>
<h2>What are the main sticking points going into the talks?</h2>
<p>An agreement would have to explicitly deal with issues that are important to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The most important are Egypt’s and Sudan’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">historically acquired rights</a> to Nile waters. The rights were granted by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan (1959 Nile Treaty). </p>
<p>After estimating the average annual flow of the Nile River as measured at Aswan to be 84 billion cubic metres, the two treaties granted <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">66%</a> of Nile waters to Egypt, 22% to Sudan and 12% to account for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">seepage and evaporation</a>. These allocations exhausted all the Nile’s average annual flow of water. Egypt was also granted veto power over all construction projects on the Nile and its tributaries. </p>
<p>These rights came to be known as Egypt’s and Sudan’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/">acquired rights</a>. They have been the main <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">sticking point</a> in efforts to conclude a treaty between all <a href="https://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/media-center/maps#:%7E:text=The%20Nile%20River%20flows%20through,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20and%20Uganda">11 Nile riparian states</a> for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, as well as between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Ethiopian dam. </p>
<p>While Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states see these two treaties as colonial anachronisms that have no relevance to modern Nile governance, Egypt and Sudan insist that they are <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">binding</a>.</p>
<h2>What impact would a breakthrough have on other Nile Basin agreements?</h2>
<p>The impact will depend on what type of agreement is reached. Assume that both Egypt and Sudan agree to abandon the rights granted by the 1929 and 1959 treaties. They could then enter into negotiation with Ethiopia to produce a new treaty that creates rights for all three states. </p>
<p>Such a treaty could provide the impetus for all 11 Nile Basin states to return to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">Cooperative Framework Agreement</a>, which was expected to provide a legal framework for governing the Nile based on equitable and reasonable water use. The framework agreement has been in limbo since Egypt and Sudan <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article60989/">rejected</a> it. </p>
<p>The other Nile Basin states see these colonial-era treaties as a violation of <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article60989/">international law principles</a>, and a breach of the vision of the Nile Basin Initiative.</p>
<h2>What other claims threaten the status quo?</h2>
<p>Egypt fears that if Addis Ababa is allowed to fill the reservoir without a legally binding agreement, other Nile Basin states might also take unilateral actions. This could harm Egypt’s water security and ability to control projects on the Nile River and its tributaries. </p>
<p>Then, there is the matter of how to manage issues related to climate change, such as droughts and floods. The existence of the dam means Addis Ababa’s cooperation will be required. In times of drought, for example, the Ethiopian dam will be expected to release some water to help Egypt and Sudan. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s right to water for agriculture and household consumption is an issue that has not yet been agreed upon by all three countries.</p>
<p>Egypt and Sudan are worried about the <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/491429.aspx">harm</a> that could come to them from activities upstream. Egypt remains adamant that the dam will hurt its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">water supply</a> and threaten domestic development. </p>
<p>But Sudanese officials appear to have changed their assessment of the impact of the dam. They now see it as a potential regulator of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">seasonal floods</a> and provider of clean energy. </p>
<p>These issues should be examined thoroughly during the negotiations. The three countries should adopt a treaty or agreement that is mutually acceptable and beneficial. </p>
<p>Over the years, the three countries have struggled to bring meaning to terms like “significant harm” and “equitable and reasonable utilisation”. The final treaty should define these terms. It should also create a mediation mechanism, which can include referring certain specified matters to the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/how-the-court-works">International Court of Justice</a> for resolution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nile Basin states are keen to see what kind of deal Ethiopia reaches with Egypt and Sudan.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071502023-06-25T11:11:29Z2023-06-25T11:11:29ZChildren’s movement affects health and development but research is lacking in Africa: here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531373/original/file-20230612-220077-jzsxfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children’s health and development depend on how much time they spend doing physical activity, being sedentary and sleeping.</p>
<p>Research on movement behaviours in children is essential. It helps us to understand what influences these behaviours, and their contribution to health and development. </p>
<p>Most <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/10/e049267">evidence</a> on movement behaviours comes from high-income countries. Here children have different lifestyles, environments and cultures from those in low- and middle-income countries. For example, children in African countries face different challenges in achieving healthy levels of physical activity and sleep. Safety, transport, infrastructure, culture, climate, nutrition, and different levels and types of screen time exposure may all present challenges. </p>
<p>Africa, as a continent, contributes less than <a href="https://www.elsevier.com/connect/africa-generates-less-than-1-of-the-worlds-research-data-analytics-can-change-that">1% of research</a> worldwide. This means over <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/">16%</a> of the world’s population has been excluded from the research. </p>
<p>The international <a href="https://sunrise-study.com/#about">SUNRISE study</a>, which we are part of, aims to bridge this gap. It conducts studies on movement behaviour in collaboration with researchers in several African countries, including Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, where we are based. We bring a collective expertise across disciplines such as public health, physiotherapy and child development. </p>
<p>SUNRISE findings so far show that the proportion of children in low- and middle-income countries meeting recommendations for movement behaviours is low, compared to high-income countries. This highlights the need for research and intervention in Africa. </p>
<p>But since the beginning of this study we have faced a wide range of challenges. In each country, the target number of children for the study is around 1,000. Researching their movement behaviour requires technology.</p>
<p>The challenges include access to devices to track movement, the lack of awareness of such tools and what they do, difficulty in securing funds, and institutional challenges. </p>
<p>Solutions include local collaboration, reducing financial barriers, developing new low-cost devices, and using contextually relevant methods. The following sections describe the challenges and possible solutions in detail.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p><strong>Access to devices</strong></p>
<p>Accelerometers are a type of digital wearable device, similar to Fitbits and smart watches. But they measure movement more accurately than commercially available devices. This is why they are more commonly used in research. These devices are generally more expensive because they are “research-grade”, and upwards of US$250 each (before software and delivery). This is a major challenge for those of us working in African countries, as at least 50 devices would be needed to conduct large scale studies like SUNRISE. There is no local manufacturer or distributor of accelerometer devices. Researchers need a legal licence to import or export them. </p>
<p>The SUNRISE study is able to loan devices. But exorbitant customs and shipping charges for moving this equipment to and between African countries makes sharing difficult – even when it’s only for research. This leads to unnecessary costs and delays, which means Africa gets left behind in this scientific field. </p>
<p><strong>Lack of awareness about the benefits of accelerometers</strong></p>
<p>These devices are often novel in African settings. Some parents and caregivers in our study areas have been sceptical about using them. For example, caregivers have asked whether the devices attract lightning, or whether they have some physical effect on the body. This may lead to another challenge in recruiting sufficient participants for the study. And data collection can take a long time when the shortage of devices is added to the time to get local buy-in. </p>
<p><strong>Difficulty in securing funds</strong></p>
<p>SUNRISE study researchers in Africa battle to get funding. They rely on highly competitive international funding, which seldom prioritises movement behaviour research in young children. It costs a lot to attend conferences internationally and to publish research in reputable academic journals. Open access journal fees can even exceed the monthly salary of a research assistant in an African country. </p>
<p><strong>Institutional challenges</strong></p>
<p>Within African research institutions, another challenge is how to build capacity. Few research institutes focus on movement behaviours in Africa. Accelerometer data is often complex to manage, and needs trained staff. High-income countries typically have access to support staff and students who can assist with this. This is not the case in many African countries. So it is difficult to conduct high-quality research and translate it into policy and practice. </p>
<h2>Possible solutions</h2>
<p>A possible solution is to collaborate with local partners and stakeholders to identify the most appropriate devices for each context and population. </p>
<p>All stakeholders, including local government and non-government organisations, ought to remove barriers so that the researchers can focus on the quality of evidence to inform policy and practice that is anchored to the local context. </p>
<p>Establishing some type of research equipment hub in Africa would go some way to help. But even moving equipment within Africa is not easy. Governments should consider waiving import and export charges for research equipment. The development of low-cost devices that can be produced and used efficiently in Africa is the best way forward. </p>
<p>Researchers in Africa could also examine other new data collection methods that are customised to the local context. Qualitative research (interviews and focus groups) can provide valuable insights into the factors that influence movement behaviours in different contexts. These insights are vital for the development of measurement tools and interventions that are culturally appropriate and effective. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>There are many other pressing needs in Africa. But the contribution of movement behaviours to population health and development is significant, particularly as there is growing evidence of the global economic costs of physical <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2822%2900482-X">inactivity</a>. We need local research on these behaviours, starting in the early years, when patterns of behaviour are established. </p>
<p>Without addressing barriers to robust research, researchers in this region will continue to lag behind in this field. </p>
<p>This means that we lose opportunities to learn how to promote movement behaviours that support health and development, thus setting children on the best path for life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Draper receives or has received funding from the British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the South African Medical Research Council, the Jacobs Foundation, and the European Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Okely receives funding from NHMRC, Research Council of Norway, World Health Organization, and UNICEF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoko Oluwayomi receives funding from ISBNPA-PIONEER PROGRAM SCHOLARSHIP 2022</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chalchisa Abdeta receives funding through HDR Scholarship from the University of Wollongong, Australia.</span></em></p>Africa contributes less than 1% of research worldwide on movement behaviours in children. This means that research on movement behaviours has largely excluded over 16% of the world’s population.Catherine Draper, Associate Professor at MRC/Wits Developmental Pathways for Health Research Unit, University of the WitwatersrandAnthony Okely, Distinguished Professor of Public Health, University of WollongongAoko Oluwayomi, PhD Candidate (Exercise Physiology), University of LagosChalchisa Abdeta, PhD candidate, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2075532023-06-25T11:08:20Z2023-06-25T11:08:20Z920 million people could face conflict over the world’s rivers by 2050: what our study found in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533686/original/file-20230623-21-q74dgb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Blue Nile river passes through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nile-basin-at-a-turning-point-as-ethiopian-dam-starts-operations-178267">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project</a> on the Nile River started operating in February 2022. It reinforced tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. The three countries rely most heavily on the Nile’s water. Sudan and Egypt consider the US$4.6 billion dam a threat to vital water supplies. Ethiopia sees it as essential for its development.</p>
<p>This is just one example of how conflicts can arise between states that share river basins. And there’s a real risk that such conflicts will become more common as <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-warming-to-bring-record-hot-year-by-2028-probably-our-first-above-1-5-c-limit-205758">global temperatures rise</a>.</p>
<p>Hundreds of rivers are shared between two or more countries. Sharing waters can be a source of cooperation or conflict. This depends on economic, cultural and institutional conditions. It also depends on <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-imperialist-past-that-started-dam-politics-between-egypt-sudan-and-ethiopia-156760">historical relations</a> between countries. </p>
<p>Although <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2023/03/tracking-conflict-cooperation-worlds-international-freshwater-resources/">cooperation historically prevails over conflict</a> and large-scale violent international conflicts haven’t happened so far, tensions over water have long existed. They are also <a href="https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan">rising</a> in <a href="https://www.international-alert.org/stories/climate-change-trigger-conflicts-border-rivers-central-asia/">several river basins</a>. </p>
<p>Africa has <a href="https://tfddmgmt.github.io/tfdd/map.html">66</a> transboundary river basins. These include the Nile basin, and the Juba–Shebelle and Lake Turkana basins in the Horn of Africa. Conflict risk can rise as populations grow, water use intensifies and the climate changes. </p>
<p>There’s no consensus on the precise mechanisms that fuel conflict in such basins. It is, however, possible to identify basins where risks are projected to compound. This can be done by combining data on conflict risk conditions identified in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S095937801730537X?via%3Dihub">existing literature</a>. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2023.2184650?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">a recent study</a> I conducted with three water system researchers from IHE Delft, Utrecht University and Wageningen University & Research, we came up with three possible futures regarding conflict risk in global transboundary river basins. </p>
<p>Our study projects that if nothing substantially changes in how transboundary river basins are managed and with climate change worsening, 920 million people will live in very high to high conflict-risk basins by 2050. </p>
<p>If nations improve water use, strengthen cooperation and do more to prevent or mitigate conflict, this number drops to 536 million. </p>
<p>Water treaties and strong river basin organisations increase the likelihood of long-term, stable cooperation between states. </p>
<h2>Our research</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2023.2184650?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">Our study</a> combined projections on the construction of mega-dams and institutional resilience. It looked at hydroclimatic, governance and socio-economic risk factors. Combining these factors provided an idea of the overall conflict risk per transboundary river basin. </p>
<p>We used a broad interpretation of conflict over transboundary water resources. This ranged from accusations and diplomatic tensions to economic sanctions and violent disputes. </p>
<p>A lack of cooperation between countries can lead to a loss of benefits that could arise from joint activities. These include adapting to climate change, protecting the environment and developing socio-economically. Tensions between states over such issues can also spill over into other sectors, compromising regional political or economic relations.</p>
<h2>Our findings</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2023.2184650?src=recsys">Our results</a> show that under a business-as-usual scenario – where no major changes are made – 920 million people out of the <a href="https://tfddmgmt.github.io/tfdd/map.html">4.4 billion people living in transboundary river basins</a> will live in very high to high conflict-risk basins by 2050. In Africa, this number includes people living in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. It also includes those in Mozambique, Malawi, Benin and Togo.</p>
<p>In the high ambition scenario – which implies improved water use practices and rising institutional resilience – this number decreases to 536 million. The low-ambition scenario implies some improvement in water use efficiency, institutional capacity and governance quality. Under this scenario, 724 million people would be living in very high to high conflict-risk basins by 2050.</p>
<p>Basins in Africa and Asia especially are projected to face high overall risks, since several risks collide here. In Africa, several basins face extra risks like high variability of water flows and limited water availability. There is also a dependence of downstream countries on upstream ones. </p>
<p>The current tensions in the Nile over <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-dam-dispute-five-key-reads-about-how-it-started-and-how-it-could-end-187644">Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam</a>, for instance, could escalate when Ethiopia decides to develop several new mega-hydropower dams. Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan are highly dependent on basin-related water resources. </p>
<h2>What it means</h2>
<p>Our study shows that potentially, 11 more large hydropower dams could be built in the Nile basin. This is based on physical feasibility, energy yield and construction costs. The projection takes into account some restrictions, such as protected natural reserves. </p>
<p>Seven of these dams would be in Ethiopia, and the other four would be in South Sudan. The construction of these dams would be happening alongside rising water shortages, high water dependencies and limited economic resources to deal with water-related risks.</p>
<p>These new dams could worsen regional climate change impacts and water demands, especially when the population and economy are both growing. Although scholars cannot predict when this will occur, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19089-x">a multi-year drought in the Nile basin is inevitable</a>. This would have severe impacts on water allocation. </p>
<p>The prospect of a multi-year drought in parts of the Nile basin requires preparations today. And even if the impact of new dams will be moderate, the perception of risk could affect how Egypt, for instance, makes decisions over shared river cooperation.</p>
<p>Two other large basins – the Juba–Shebelle in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the Lake Turkana basin in Kenya and Ethiopia – are projected to face high conflict risk levels. In these two basins, <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/emergency-response-appeal-greater-horn-of-africa">multiple issues</a>, such as local conflict, low human development and limited water availability already collide today. </p>
<p>This may be worsened without additional efforts towards 2050 due to relatively high population growth and climate change impacts – without sufficient resources to adapt. </p>
<p>Even in our high ambition scenario – which implies substantial improvements in water management, overall domestic governance and institutional resilience – the Juba–Shebelle and Lake Turkana basins still face high risks. </p>
<p>The challenges and risks these basins face must be explicitly included in wider plans. For example, when large hydropower dams are built, their operation must not hinder the climate adaptation goals of the wider region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie de Bruin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hundreds of rivers are shared between two or more countries – this could be a source of cooperation or conflict.Sophie de Bruin, Researcher in Environmental Change, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082742023-06-22T14:59:14Z2023-06-22T14:59:14ZHow protest movements use feminine images and social media to fight sexist ideologies of authoritarian regimes – podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533296/original/file-20230621-14551-qi1cio.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C7%2C806%2C603&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pro-resistance social media pages share photos of graffiti like this.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Provided by Michaela Grancayova and Aliaksei Kazharski.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Modern protest movements, like the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/iranian-protesters-remain-defiant-in-the-face-of-violent-and-brutal-regime-oppression/ar-AA1cK1KX">ongoing protests in Iran</a>, often center around women who have been killed or harmed by agents of authoritarian governments. While it can be easy to chalk up this consistent, state-sponsored abuse of women to simple sexism, researchers say there is a deeper story at play.</p>
<p>Authoritarian regimes often lack a coherent underlying ideology. So to fill that gap, many leaders turn to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2022.1713752">discrimination, using gender, race or sexuality</a> to vilify opponents and generate support. As a result, pushback against gender as a tool of oppression has taken on a visual and artistic component as protests have entered the social media age.</p>
<p>In this episode of <em>The Conversation Weekly</em>, we speak to three experts who have studied protests and the role of gendered ideology, images and social media as tools of resistance as well as of oppression. </p>
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<p>In August 2020, <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">Belarus erupted into unrest</a> after Alexander Lukashenko, the longtime authoritarian leader of the country, won the presidency for the fifth time in an election few considered free or fair.</p>
<p>“There had never been so many people out in the streets before – hundreds of thousands in a country of less than 10 million,” says <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=RNtIwG4AAAAJ">Aliaksei Kazharski</a>. Kasharski researches international politics and security at Charles University in Prague, in the Czech Republic. He himself is Belarusian. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A huge crowd of people holding Belarusian flags and colors." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533297/original/file-20230621-27-sqokg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Belarusian people rose up in massive protests after Alexander Lukashenko claimed to have been reelected to the presidency in 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/august-2020-belarus-minsk-thousands-of-people-gather-for-a-news-photo/1228167689?adppopup=true">Ulf Mauder/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michaela-Grancayova">Michaela Grancayova</a> is a researcher who focuses on language and politics, particularly in the Middle East, and was studying at the same university as Kazharski in 2020. As she was watching the protests in Belarus unfold, Grancayova noticed some <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-female-iranian-activists-use-powerful-images-to-protest-oppressive-policies-193507">striking similarities to the Arab Spring</a>, her own area of research. “The regimes in both countries were <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-female-iranian-activists-use-powerful-images-to-protest-oppressive-policies-193507">relying on the traditional gender images</a>, images of how the ideal woman should behave and should look like,” she explains. “Or how an ideal man should look like, should behave – in this case, hegemonic masculinity.”</p>
<p>“These ideas of hegemonic masculinity and gender basically substitute for an official ideology, which is missing from those regimes,” Kazharski explains. “And in a society that’s more or less traditionalist, this image of a strong leader, a macho, real man actually appeals to many people.”</p>
<p>Not only were there similarities between Lukashenko and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian leader who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html">was overthrown during the Arab Spring</a>, Grancayova noticed that the protest movements of both countries fought against these gendered ideologies in much the same fashion, too.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A graffiti of a blue bra." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533298/original/file-20230621-30-8q2lh1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman known as the ‘girl in the blue bra’ was beaten during protests against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces which ruled Egypt after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. After a video showing her beating, during which her abaya came off and revealed her blue bra, event went viral, protesters used the image of the blue bra, as seen in this social media post, as a symbol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Provided by Michaela Grancayova and Aliaksei Kazharski</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One prominent theme was an idea the researchers call the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2022.1713752">iconization of victimhood</a>. “There were people who were tortured and humiliated by the regimes, and they were meant to be turned into the victims,” explains Grancayova. “But in reality the people who took part in the protest turned them into heroes and visual icons.” </p>
<p>In both Egypt and Belarus, protesters turned to social media to distribute <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/belarusian-venus-bruised-female-nude-173332876.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9kdWNrZHVja2dvLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAACZG2HON2LK0j72QYqmthIFWX94dRse8ZAymHFFdNCgol_L_KiaSAEn7Yg0doh2RGyMijXtesPUPU2eCX5AMV4o05QP4hJnxpEPqGWoY-lHOHnE1kC_rhKKysmLfrCymSA4uXZjvHm71aDXtVOCeWmvFNVE2wYzifMbO4kXDnEw9">images of the bloodied martyrs</a> or share images of graffiti or other symbolic visuals. </p>
<p>As a response, both the Egyptian and Belarusian governments tried to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/1/25/arab-spring-anniversary-when-egypt-cut-the-internet">squash the social media branches of the protests</a>. As Kazharski explains, Lukashenko “did try to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/belarus-internet-outage-election/">shut down the internet</a> in 2020 for a couple of days but then realized it was way too costly.” Instead, agents of the regime went door to door, searching laptops and phones and torturing those who wouldn’t give up their passwords. </p>
<h2>Women’s movements in Iran</h2>
<p>These same themes of gender and weaponized social media are playing out today, too, in the ongoing protests in Iran. </p>
<p>Since Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, was killed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-irans-morality-police-a-scholar-of-the-middle-east-explains-their-history-196023">the Morality Police</a> in fall of 2022, Iran has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-across-iran-continues-under-states-extreme-gender-apartheid-183766">enveloped in protests</a>. The movement, called “Woman, Life, Freedom” is in many ways focused, as the name suggests, on restoring the freedoms of women, who have severely limited by the Iranian government.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A protestor throwing something at police with a woman in the foreground with her hair free." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533299/original/file-20230621-30-vsawr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During the initial uprisings after the death of Mahsa Amini in Iran, many women began going in public without the mandated headscarves.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Uprising_in_Tehran,_Keshavarz_Boulvard_September_2022_(3).jpg">Darafsh/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://cas.uoregon.edu/directory/political-science/K">Parichehr Kazemi</a> is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Oregon, in the US, where she studies women’s resistance movements across the Middle East with a focus on the use of images on social media. </p>
<p>Previous women’s movements in Iran, like <a href="https://www.mystealthyfreedom.org/">My Stealthy Freedom</a>, where women posted photos of themselves without hijabs in public places, were often centered around images. Kazemi explains that after 2009, “images were birthed because of a very repressive environment under the Islamic Republic that didn’t really give women other opportunities to express dissent.” </p>
<p>When protests erupted in late 2022 after the Morality Police killed Amini, videos of massive crowds and clashes between police and protesters flooded social media. As Kazemi followed the protests on social media, she began seeing more representational imagery emerge. “Over time, it’s not just images of tons of women running from security forces in the streets,” she says. “You see women cutting their hair. You see girls in the streets without their veils. You see them burning their hijabs. You see them dancing in circles. This isn’t something that we’ve seen under the Islamic Republic.”</p>
<p>Under a regime where public protesting can get you killed, Kazemi says, “Images have become a way for <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-protests-in-iran-are-part-of-a-long-history-of-womens-resistance-191551">people to continue showing the world what’s happening</a> in Iran.”</p>
<p>As in Belarus and Egypt, the Iranian government has been cracking down on social media as a tool of resistance. Among the debates over whether social media is generally a force for resistance or a tool of state control, Kazemi had a bigger-picture perspective. “Social media is embedded within our lifestyles, and we’ll figure out a way to use it as an extension of ourselves. But regimes will also use it as an extension of themselves.”</p>
<hr>
<p>This episode was written and produced by Katie Flood. Mend Mariwany is the executive producer of <em>The Conversation Weekly</em>. Eloise Stevens does our sound design, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl.</p>
<p>You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter">free daily email here</a>. </p>
<p>Listen to <em>The Conversation Weekly</em> via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a> or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From the Arab Spring to the Belarus Awakening and the ongoing Iranian protest Women, Life, Freedom, female-centered imagery and social media are battlegrounds of resistance and oppression.Daniel Merino, Associate Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationNehal El-Hadi, Science + Technology Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2068282023-06-09T12:28:03Z2023-06-09T12:28:03ZNever mind Cleopatra – what about the forgotten queens of ancient Nubia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530270/original/file-20230606-17-xfaojz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C0%2C1017%2C751&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jewelry of the kandake Amanishakheto from a pyramid at Meroe.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/19/Amanishakheto_Jewellery_03.jpg/1024px-Amanishakheto_Jewellery_03.jpg">Einsamer Schütze/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Jada Pinkett Smith’s <a href="https://www.netflix.com/tudum/articles/african-queens-release-date-cast-news">new Netflix documentary series on Cleopatra</a> aims to spotlight powerful African queens. “We don’t often get to see or hear stories about Black queens, and that was really important for me, as well as for my daughter, and just for my community to be able to know those stories because there are tons of them,” the Hollywood star and producer told a Netflix interviewer.</p>
<p>The show casts a biracial Black British actress as the famed queen, whose race <a href="https://denison.edu/academics/classical-studies/wh/136845">has stirred debate for decades</a>. Cleopatra descended from an ancient Greek-Macedonian ruling dynasty known as the Ptolemies, but some speculate that her mother may have been an Indigenous Egyptian. In the trailer, Black classics scholar <a href="https://www.hamilton.edu/academics/our-faculty/directory/faculty-detail/shelley-haley">Shelley Haley</a> recalls her grandmother telling her, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IktHcPyNlv4">I don’t care what they tell you in school, Cleopatra was Black</a>.” </p>
<p>These ideas provoked commentary and even outrage in Egypt, Cleopatra’s birthplace. Some of the reactions have been unabashedly racist, mocking the actress’s curly hair and skin color. </p>
<p>Egyptian archaeologists like <a href="https://scholar.google.com.eg/citations?user=JNvJ2noAAAAJ&hl=en">Monica Hanna</a> have criticized this racism. Yet they also caution that projecting modern American racial categories onto Egypt’s ancient past <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/netflix-cleopatra-black-egypt-controversy-ancient-queen/">is inaccurate</a>. At worst, critics argue, U.S. discussions about Cleopatra’s identity overlook Egyptians entirely.</p>
<p>In Western media, she is commonly depicted as white – most famously, perhaps, by screen icon Elizabeth Taylor. Yet claims by <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2022/03/egypt-and-the-afrocentrists-the-latest-round">American Afrocentrists</a> that current-day Egyptians are descendants of “Arab invaders” also ignore the complicated histories that characterize this diverse part of the world.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A stone engraving depicts a woman standing with her arms raised." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530272/original/file-20230606-19-wjoaet.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A relief depicting the Nubian Kandake Amanitore in the Egyptian Museum in Berlin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aegyptisches_Museum_Berlin_InvNr7261_20080313_Barkenuntersatz_Natakamani_Amanitore_aus_Wad_Ban_Naga_4.jpg">Sven-Steffen Arndt/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some U.S. scholars counter that ultimately what matters is to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/10/opinion/black-cleopatra-netflix.html">recognize Cleopatra as culturally Black</a>,” representing a long history of oppressing Black women. Portraying Cleopatra with a Black actress was a “political act,” <a href="https://variety.com/2023/tv/global/queen-cleopatra-black-netflix-egypt-1235590708/">as the show’s director put it</a>. </p>
<p>Ironically, however, the show misses an opportunity to educate both American and Egyptian audiences about the unambiguously Black queens of ancient Nubia, a civilization whose history is intertwined with Egypt’s. As <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/anthro/people/faculty/socio-cultural-faculty/ymoll.html">an anthropologist of Egypt who has Nubian heritage</a>, I research how the stories of these queens continue to inspire Nubians, who <a href="https://www.taraspress.com/nubian">creatively retell them</a> for new generations today. </p>
<h2>The one-eyed queen</h2>
<p>Nubians in modern Egypt once lived mainly along the Nile but lost their villages when the <a href="https://aucpress.com/product/nubian-encounters/">Aswan High Dam was built in the 1960s</a>. Today, members of the minority group live alongside other Egyptians all over the country, as well as in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2740853">a resettlement district</a> near the southern city of Aswan.</p>
<p>Growing up in Cairo’s Nubian community, we children didn’t hear about Cleopatra, but about Amanirenas: <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2022/05/23/queen-amanirenas-the-nubian-queen-who-defeated-the-romans/">a warrior queen</a> who ruled the Kingdom of Kush during the first century B.C.E. Queens in that ancient kingdom, encompassing what is now southern Egypt and northern Sudan, were referred to as “kandake” – the root of <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/The_Candaces_of_Meroe/">the English name “Candace</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A comic book cover showing a Black woman in brilliant blue robes and gold jewelry in front of pyramids." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530269/original/file-20230606-30-hykc0k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A comic inspired by the story of Amanirenas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AMANI_RENAS_COVER_COMPS_03102022-final_sml.png">Chris Walker, Creative Director, Lymari Media/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/09/28/130190252/the-true-story-of-antony-and-cleopatra">Like Cleopatra</a>, Amanirenas knew Roman generals up close. But while Cleopatra romanced them – strategically – Amanirenas fought them. She led an army up the Nile about 25 B.C.E. <a href="https://egyptianexpedition.org/articles/the-roman-egyptian-nubian-frontier-during-the-reigns-of-augustus-and-amanirenas-archaeological-evidence-from-talmis-qasr-ibrim-and-meroe/">to wage battle against Roman conquerors</a> encroaching on her kingdom.</p>
<p>My own favorite part of this story of Indigenous struggle against foreign imperialism involves what can only be characterized as a power move. After beating back the invading Romans, Queen Amanirenas <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=pcgxBwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA117&dq=amanirenas+&ots=D_hBdOLBPc&sig=purD9nD2bxHnY9ksPxdlLqUnhEg#v=onepage&q=amanirenas&f=false">brought back the bronze head</a> of a statue of the emperor Augustus and had it buried under a temple doorway. Each time they entered the temple, her people could literally walk over a symbol of Roman power.</p>
<p>That colorful tidbit illustrates those queens’ determination to defend their autonomy and territory. Amanirenas personally engaged in combat and <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315621425-23/women-ancient-nubia-jacke-phillips">earned the moniker “the one-eyed queen</a>,” according to an ancient chronicler of the Roman Empire named Strabo. The kandakes were also <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ijAXEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT38&dq=kandaka+nubian+queens&ots=upazD6-aTO&sig=ES1HSdy1EfrgB1wzvsda30jFvuI#v=onepage&q=kandaka%20nubian%20queens&f=false">spiritual leaders and patrons of the arts</a>, and they supported the construction of grand monuments and temples, including pyramids.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A blocky pyramid of stone with an elegant facade, set against an open blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530264/original/file-20230606-23-br78mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A pyramid of Kandake Amanitore amid the Nubian pyramids of Meroe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/meroe-pyramids-pyramid-n1-of-kandake-amanitore-royalty-free-image/1169605877?phrase=kandake&adppopup=true">mtcurado/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Interwoven cultures and histories</h2>
<p>When people today say “Nubia,” they are often referring to the Kingdom of Kush, one of several empires that emerged in ancient Nubia. Archaeologists have recently started to bring Kush <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/geoff_emberling_what_happened_to_the_lost_kingdom_of_kush/transcript?language=en">to broader public attention</a>, arguing that its achievements deserve as much attention as ancient Egypt’s. </p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.31826/9781463239688/html?lang=en">those two civilizations are entwined</a>. Kushite royals adapted many Egyptian cultural and religious practices to their own ends. What’s more, a Kushite dynasty ruled Egypt itself for close to a century. </p>
<p>Contemporary Nubian heritage reflects that historical complexity and richness. While their <a href="https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20210922-a-revival-of-egypts-nubian-culture">traditions and languages remain distinctive</a>, Nubians have been intermarrying with other communities in Egypt for generations. Nubians like my mother are proudly Egyptian, yet <a href="https://doi.org/10.5743/cairo/9789774162893.003.0015">hurtful stereotypes persist</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two women with their heads covered and colorful robes sit on a blanket, holding a laptop and an open notebook." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530266/original/file-20230606-15-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hafsa Amberkab, right, and Fatma Addar, Nubian Egyptian women who compiled a dictionary, show off a Nubian lexical chart near Aswan in upper Egypt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/hafsa-amberkab-and-fatma-addar-nubian-egyptian-women-who-news-photo/1210648292?adppopup=true">Khaled Desouki/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, some Black Americans embrace Cleopatra as a powerful symbol of Black pride. But the idea of ancient Nubia as a powerful African civilization also plays a symbolic role in contemporary Black culture, inspiring images in everything <a href="https://www.juviasplace.com/collections/the-nubian-collection">from cosmetics</a> <a href="https://www.dc.com/blog/2020/05/28/dc-debuts-first-look-at-nubia-real-one">to comics</a>.</p>
<h2>Egyptian voices</h2>
<p>Researchers do argue about Cleopatra’s heritage. U.S. conversations about her, however, sometimes reveal more about Western racial politics than about Egyptian history.</p>
<p>In the 19th century, for example, <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520240698/whose-pharaohs">Western interest in ancient Egypt took off amid colonization</a> – a fascination called “Egyptomania.” Americans’ fixation with the ancient civilization reflected their own culture’s <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/egypt-land">anxieties about race in the decades after slavery was abolished</a>, as <a href="https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/artsandsciences/english_language_and_literature/our_people/directory/trafton_scott.php">scholar Scott Trafton</a> has argued.</p>
<p>A century later, a 1990s advertisement for a pale-colored doll of queen Nefertiti sparked debate in the U.S. about <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/02/26/was-nefertiti-black-bitter-debate-erupts/4e7bdc74-18a6-435e-a5f6-df900cb7f014/">how to represent</a> her race.</p>
<p>Nefertiti’s bust – one of the most famous artifacts from ancient Egypt – is on display at a <a href="https://www.smb.museum/en/museums-institutions/aegyptisches-museum-und-papyrussammlung/collection-research/bust-of-nefertiti/">German museum</a>. Egypt has <a href="https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/nefertiti-affair-history-repatriation-debate/">called for the artifact’s return</a> for close to a hundred years, to no avail. Even Hitler <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674983755">took a personal interest in the bust</a>, declaring that he “will not renounce the queen’s head,” according to <a href="https://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/persons/joyce.tyldesley">archaeologist Joyce Tyldesley</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A faded but painted bust of a woman with an exaggerated, large hairdo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530271/original/file-20230606-17-x1xppy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The famed and fought-over bust of Queen Nefertiti.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/side-view-of-limestone-bust-of-queen-nefertiti-circa-1340-news-photo/635751065?adppopup=true">Francis G. Mayer/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even today, contemporary Egyptian perspectives are almost absent in Western depictions of ancient Egypt. Only one Egyptian scholar is interviewed in the new Netflix series’ four episodes, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/5/1/cleopatra-was-egyptian-whether-black-or-brown-matters">as he himself notes</a>, and he is employed not by an Egyptian university, but by a British one.</p>
<p>For many Egyptians, this lack of representation rehashes troubling colonial dynamics about who is considered an “expert” about their past. The Netflix series “was made and produced without the involvement of the owners of this history,” argues the Egyptian journalist Sara Khorshed in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/14/egypt-netflix-queen-cleopatra-race-history-heritage-imperialism-afrocentrism/">a review of the series</a>.</p>
<p>To be sure, there is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26528972">anti-Black bias in Egyptian culture</a>, and some of the social media reaction has been slur-filled and racist. Educating people about the stories of Nubian queens <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/603605/warrior-queens-by-vicky-alvear-shecter-illustrated-by-bill-mayer/">like Amarinenas</a> might be a way to encourage a more inclusive understanding of who is Egyptian. </p>
<p>Yet I believe Egyptians’ frustrations about portrayals of Cleopatra also reflect long-standing concerns that their own understandings of their past are not taken seriously.</p>
<p>That includes Black Egyptians, like my mother. When I asked her if she planned to see the Cleopatra series, she shrugged. She already knows that queen’s story well from its many portrayals on screen, whether <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1968/03/15/archives/cleopatra-ban-lifted-by-egypt-film-with-elizabeth-taylor-opens-in.html">in Hollywood films</a> or <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0729780/">Egyptian ones</a>.</p>
<p>“I will wait for the series on Amanirenas,” she said.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206828/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasmin Moll does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The way many Americans think about racial identity today is hard to map onto the complex history of ancient Egypt and ancient Nubia.Yasmin Moll, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2038822023-05-25T12:27:09Z2023-05-25T12:27:09ZAfrica is getting renewed attention from Washington — and some African states are courting African Americans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527594/original/file-20230522-25-4eb04j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C0%2C4283%2C3890&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden delivers remarks at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington on Dec. 15, 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-delivers-remarks-alongside-secretary-of-news-photo/1449457317?adppopup=true">Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent allegations by the U.S. ambassador to South Africa that the African nation <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/11/world/africa/us-south-africa-russia-weapons.html?searchResultPosition=1">gave ammunition and weapons to Russia</a> in December 2022, amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, illustrate the complexity of U.S.-Africa relations. </p>
<p>Even as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aa650020-030b-4ff8-9741-be1314e39eac">South Africa investigates those claims</a>, the Biden administration is trying to strengthen ties with the African Union, a continental member organization, and 49 of Africa’s 54 countries, including South Africa, on <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/">geopolitical and commercial </a> issues.</p>
<p>The only African countries the U.S. is not courting <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3773942-these-five-african-countries-were-not-invited-to-bidens-summit/">are four that were suspended</a> from the African Union, and Eritrea, a country with which the United States doesn’t have a formal relationship.</p>
<p>The U.S. is making this grand African play as it <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26301066">competes with China to influence the continent’s future</a>. And while this particular U.S.-China contest is relatively new, U.S. involvement in Africa is not. </p>
<p>The way the U.S. has been involved on the continent, though, has changed over time, depending on the era, U.S. interests and a particular African nation’s needs. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/essays/uspolicy/">In 1822, for example, the U.S. began to send freeborn African Americans</a> and emancipated former enslaved African Americans to Africa, where they settled the colony that would eventually become Liberia. That settlement was originally governed by white Americans. </p>
<p>After Liberia <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/liberian-independence-proclaimed">became a self-governing, Black republic in 1847</a>, it relied heavily on U.S. financial assistance. By 1870, that assistance came by way of high-interest loans.</p>
<h2>Decolonization and US interest in Africa</h2>
<p>U.S. involvement with other African states took root after various countries, formerly governed by colonial powers, entered into self-rule. American policy objectives on the continent centered around U.S. strategic interests and came in the form of military and economic aid. </p>
<p>The U.S., for example, established diplomatic relationships with <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-egypt/">Egypt in 1922</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/">Sudan in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-ghana/">Ghana in 1957</a>, after those countries gained independence from the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>Beginning in <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d27">the late 1950s</a>, when other African countries gained independence, the U.S. formed diplomatic and commercial ties with them as well and worked to reduce the Soviet Union’s influence on the continent. In 1961 and 1962, the U.S. persuaded West African countries <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/25770/chapter-abstract/193342868?redirectedFrom=fulltext">to deny the Soviet Union commercial flyover and landing rights</a> in their territories.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.ushistory.org/us/59e.asp">the Cold War ended</a>, the U.S. <a href="https://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org/read/united-states-africa-relations-in-the-age-of-obama/section/4f22d59e-2be7-41b7-ba61-d965e80fa4bf">lacked clear policy objectives</a> toward Africa, and interaction between the superpower and the continent waned.</p>
<h2>Renewed US interest in Africa</h2>
<p>In the 21st century, the U.S. began to turn its attention back to Africa as a way of pushing its strategic interests and strengthening commercial and diplomatic ties with African countries.</p>
<p>In 2000, during the Clinton administration, Congress enacted the <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a> to open American markets to eligible African countries. </p>
<p>Then, in 2003, President George W. Bush <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/72424694-a86e-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04">launched the global health initiative</a>, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, that has been the U.S.’s most significant action on the continent since its nearly 250-year enslavement of Africans - first as Colonial America, then the U.S. - from 1619 to 1865.</p>
<p>Known as PEPFAR, the initiative is credited with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-george-w-bush-government-and-politics-1950277193678c96bbdae61db9be9687">saving 21 million lives</a>, mostly in Africa and the Caribbean. </p>
<p>More recently, the U.S. has held <a href="https://qz.com/us-africa-leaders-summit-biden-obama-1849873793">two U.S.-Africa Leaders Summits</a>. President Barack Obama <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit">hosted the first one</a> in 2014, and President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/">held the second one in 2022</a>. And, as part of the Biden administration’s Africa outreach, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/27/world/africa/kamala-harris-visit.html">Vice President Kamala Harris visited </a> Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia in March 2023 to discuss security and economic issues with leaders of those countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in a pants suit on the left and suited man on the right walk on a red carpet. Behind them on the left stands the American flag. Behind them on the right stands the Zambian flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vice President Kamala Harris and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema walk outside the State House in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, on March 31, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vice-president-kamala-harris-and-zambian-president-hakainde-news-photo/1250104734?adppopup=true">Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>It’s not just about diplomacy</h2>
<p>Yet, the relationships between the U.S. and African nations run deeper than government-to-government partnerships or aid.</p>
<p>As Biden said during the December 2022 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/12/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-sall-of-the-republic-of-senegal-at-the-u-s-africa-leaders-summit-dinner/">U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit dinner</a>: “Our people lie at the heart of the deep and profound connection that forever binds Africa and the United States together. We remember the stolen men and women and children who were brought to our shores in chains, subjected to unimaginable cruelty. My nation’s original sin was that period.”</p>
<p>As the U.S. courts Africa broadly, African countries, such as <a href="https://vindicatornewspapersl.com/?p=990">Sierra Leone</a>, <a href="https://frontpageafricaonline.com/news/liberia-bracing-to-welcome-thousands-home-in-greatest-reunion-since-slavery-era/">Liberia</a> and others, are courting African Americans, encouraging them to visit, set up homes and establish businesses and economic ties in their ancestral homeland. No country has made more of an effort than <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ghana-accra-barbara-oteng-gyasi-floyd-disapora-1509845">Ghana,</a> which, for example, is making <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ghana-to-black-americans-come-home-well-help-you-build-a-life-here/2020/07/03/1b11a914-b4e3-11ea-9a1d-d3db1cbe07ce_story.html">special accommodation for Americans who purchase land</a> there.</p>
<h2>Invitation to the motherland</h2>
<p>In 2000, the Ghanaian <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora">Parliament passed a Citizenship Act</a>, which grants the right of dual citizenship to people of Ghanaian descent. African Americans have been able to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-slavery-usa/an-african-american-mother-and-daughter-journey-to-their-familys-past-in-ghana-idUSKCN1VC16H">trace their ancestry to Ghana</a> and other African countries because of genetic testing. And the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora">Immigration Act,</a> passed the same year, includes a “Right of Abode” that allows anyone in the African diaspora to travel to and from the country freely.</p>
<p>In September 2018, Nana Akufo-Addo, president of Ghana, <a href="https://www.yearofreturn.com/about/">announced a campaign commemorating</a> the 400-year anniversary of the first enslaved Africans brought to Jamestown, Virginia, with a goal of spurring African American business, investment and tourism in the West African nation. Ghana has long promised African Americans and other people in the African diaspora <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora">dual citizenship rights</a> and business opportunities. Ghanaian leaders have made it clear that they want African Americans and others to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/ghana-looks-long-relationship-african-americans-investment">invest</a> in the country.</p>
<p>Since the Year of Return, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/back-to-roots-why-african-americans-are-flocking-to-ghana/a-64403580">at least 1,500 African Americans have received citizenship rights</a> in Ghana, and some 5,000 African Americans <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/black-americans-leave-racism-in-us-to-reclaim-destiny-in-ghana/">have made Ghana their permanent home</a>.</p>
<p>The Ghanaian government launched <a href="https://beyondthereturngh.com/">another campaign in 2020</a> to increase tourism and investment in the country by people in the African diaspora, as well as to deepen social ties between Ghanaians and the diaspora.</p>
<p>Following Ghana’s playbook, in 2021, Senegal worked with African American business leaders <a href="https://qz.com/africa/2022699/senegal-launches-juneteenth-initiative-for-african-americans">to celebrate its first “The Return</a>.” Held on June 19 that year, the event was a historic Juneteenth initiative, <a href="https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories/historical-legacy-juneteenth">modeled after the American holiday</a> to commemorate the end of slavery in the United States and encourage African American investment in the country.</p>
<p>Akufo-Addo may have sparked a 21st century resurgence of trans-Atlantic African appeals to African Americans and other people in the African diaspora.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people stand on sand, near an ocean both behind and in front of a long, elevated white wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">African American tourists hold hands as they enter the ocean during a remembrance ceremony in Ghana, after visiting the ‘Door of No Return’ at Cape Coast Castle. It is where enslaved Africans were held before being taken by force to what would become the United States.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-african-american-tourists-hold-hands-as-they-enter-news-photo/1163080416?adppopup=true">Natalija Gormalova/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the United States government builds economic and security ties with African countries, some of those countries are encouraging African Americans to establish social and economic ties in Africa.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060082023-05-22T14:53:35Z2023-05-22T14:53:35ZSouth Africa’s 10 year-olds are struggling to read – it can be fixed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527278/original/file-20230519-29-zuh178.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">While there's no single solution to the crisis, a range of approaches can help to bolster children's literacy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kobus Louw/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>More than 80% of South Africa’s grade 4 pupils – who are on average nine or 10 years old – cannot read for meaning. That means they can’t answer basic questions about or draw inferences from a text they’re reading. This worrying statistic emerged from the 2021 <a href="https://pirls2021.org/">Progress in International Reading Literacy Study</a> (PIRLS), which <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/in-numbers-sa-produces-one-of-worst-global-reading-results-among-over-50-countries-20230516">were released</a> by the country’s basic education minister, Angie Motshekga, on 16 May.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa asked Karen Roux, a specialist in reading literacy and development of equivalent assessments, to unpack the results.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What is the purpose of the study?</h2>
<p>It’s an international large-scale assessment which provides participating countries with comparisons across education systems. Perhaps more importantly, it also allows countries to monitor trends over time and indicators of growth in the early years of children’s education. The assessments are conducted in five-year intervals; more than 50 countries participate. Only three African countries participated in the latest cycle: South Africa, Egypt and Morocco.</p>
<p>One of the main objectives for South African education authorities and researchers was to compare how well grade 4 learners read, across the country’s 11 official languages and its nine provinces. This information is vital to government bodies, policy-makers, non-government organisations, and scholars – it can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses and to address curriculum or policy shortcomings.</p>
<h2>How did South Africa fare?</h2>
<p>The PIRLS 2021 study showed that 81% of South African grade 4 pupils, across all 11 official languages, cannot read for meaning. Five years earlier, in the <a href="https://pirls2016.org/wp-content/uploads/encyclopedia-pirls/downloadcenter/3.%20Country%20Chapters/South%20Africa.pdf">2016 study</a>, the figure stood at 78%.</p>
<p>The latest results indicate that eight out of 10 grade 4 children did not reach the <a href="https://pirls2021.org/results/international-benchmarks/">Low International Benchmark</a>, where they are expected to read a piece of text and locate and retrieve explicitly stated information. For example, the text would say “octopuses sometimes even make rock ‘doors’ for their dens that can be pulled closed to keep them safe” and the question would ask “what do octopuses use to make doors for their dens?” </p>
<p>The texts used in these tests came from all over the world, submitted by the participating countries. Twelve were trend texts; they were used in previous PIRLS cycles. Six new tests were developed. All countries got the same tests. </p>
<h2>What explains South Africa’s performance?</h2>
<p>The study happened in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, when schools all over the world had to close for a period of time. It was to be expected that school closures would cause <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-much-learning-south-african-children-lost-in-the-pandemic-183659">learning losses</a> – that is, what pupils ought to have gained over a normal year of schooling, versus what they actually learned.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-learning-losses-what-south-africas-education-system-must-focus-on-to-recover-176622">COVID learning losses: what South Africa's education system must focus on to recover</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>In low- and middle-income countries, including South Africa, the pandemic <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/education/learning-loss-covid-sub-saharan-africa-evidence-malawi">exacerbated</a> existing learning losses. Some scholars <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059321001334">suggest</a> that learning losses also include the “deterioration” of accumulated knowledge that is lost over time.</p>
<h2>COVID disruptions weren’t unique to South Africa, so what explains its poor outcomes?</h2>
<p>It is a (less than) perfect storm of problems. COVID was just part of it. There are also issues with how teachers are being trained to teach languages; parents not instilling a love of reading in their children from a young age, or being involved as they are taught to read at school; and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-can-disrupt-its-deeply-rooted-educational-inequality-48531">inadequate school and classroom resources</a>, especially in poorer schools.</p>
<p>The country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/languageeducationpolicy19971.pdf">school language policy</a> also likely plays a role. In South Africa, the language of learning and teaching in the early grades is meant to be the language that the pupils speak at home. However, this is not always the case; classrooms, especially in urban areas, are full of pupils speaking diverse languages – not just isiXhosa or isiZulu, for instance, but these and other African languages. </p>
<p>Then, just as the pupils are getting the hang of the language used in the early grades, they switch to English in grade 4. The foundation is not yet laid for one language before this shift happens, so the pupils struggle with the new language (English).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6168212/">Language acquisition theories suggest</a> that before mastering a second language, the child must first have a solid foundation in their first, or home, language.</p>
<h2>Can this crisis be turned around?</h2>
<p>It’s been done elsewhere. </p>
<p>Brazil, which like South Africa is classified as an <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=ZA-XT">upper-middle class income country</a>, has been working hard on improving education. One of its poorest states, Ceará, has made huge strides in boosting literacy and numeracy. In <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/540371593598919465/pdf/From-Bad-to-Best-How-One-State-and-One-Municipality-in-Brazil-are-Eradicating-Illiteracy-and-Innumeracy.pdf">a report about</a> the process, the World Bank writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It began with political leadership. Ceará’s government placed learning at the center of the education policy with a series of reforms under three categories.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These three categories were: (1) incentives for municipalities to better their education outcomes; (2) extensive support from the state’s literacy programme for municipally run schools and (3) regular results monitoring.</p>
<p>As this approach shows, there’s no one solution to solve any country’s reading crisis. But political will is key. So, too, is ensuring the equitable provision of reading resources to South African schools – developed in African languages and grade appropriate. African language experts and storytellers should be the key source here. </p>
<p>Another thing that should be considered is a revision of the current <a href="https://www.education.gov.za/Portals/0/CD/National%20Curriculum%20Statements%20and%20Vocational/CAPS%20IP%20%20HOME%20ENGLISH%20GR%204-6%20%20WEB.pdf?ver=2015-01-27-160412-720">curriculum policy</a> for the early grades, introduced in 2012. The amount of time available for the skill of reading is extremely limited. Only six hours per week are allocated for home language, but this is divided into the different skills that learners must be competent in: listening and speaking, reading and viewing, writing and presenting, as well as language structures and conventions.</p>
<p>That leaves pupils with about five hours in a two-week period to work on reading. This time should be extended.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen Roux works for the University of Pretoria. She is affiliated with Literacy Association of South Africa. </span></em></p>Political will is key to tackling pupils’ literacy struggles.Karen Roux, Senior Lecturer in Assessment and Quality Assurance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2044532023-04-28T12:46:12Z2023-04-28T12:46:12ZSudan’s plunge into chaos has geopolitical implications near and far – including for US strategic goals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523311/original/file-20230427-26-r895dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C68%2C3473%2C2258&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jordanians being evacuated from Sudan amid fighting between two factions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UnitedStatesSudanEvacuationExplainer/f1ecc7c128e3456eaeb70f9f90762d1a/photo?Query=Sudan%20evacuations&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=292&currentItemNo=22">AP Photo/Raad Adayleh</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The sight of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-evacuations-united-states-diplomats-khartoum-eb48df9d2d6334f9de36ffe92b9bede1">diplomats fleeing Sudan</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/26/sudan-fighting-evacuation-americans-british/">amid chaotic scenes</a> reflects the gravity of the situation, but also the extent of international interest in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">strife-torn nation</a>.</p>
<p>Days into fighting that has left <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-death-toll-rises-413-world-health-organization-says-2023-04-21/#:%7E:text=GENEVA%2C%20April%2021%20(Reuters),out%20there%20six%20days%20ago.">at least 400 people dead</a>, governments from <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/04/26/what-middle-east-nations-have-done-to-evacuate-citizens-from-sudan/">across the Middle East</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-65380753">Europe</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218178/china-evacuates-citizens-sudan-violence-continues">Asia</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3371442/us-forces-evacuate-americans-from-khartoum-embassy/">and the Americas</a> evacuated nationals – teachers, students and workers, as well as embassy staff – from the capital, Khartoum.</p>
<p>Of course, expat employees are to be found in all countries. But as a <a href="https://history.washington.edu/people/christopher-tounsel">scholar of Sudanese history</a>, it is difficult to ignore the fact that, in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/22/world/africa/sudan-war-international-relations.html">words of one analyst</a>, everyone wants “a chunk of Sudan.” While a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496">2019 coup</a> ended the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/11/omar-al-bashir-sudan-ousted-regime-president">brutal dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir</a>, the years since have not given way to democracy. Rather, it has led to a period in which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/22/world/africa/sudan-war-international-relations.html">various overseas governments have sought to capitalize</a> on the transition of power and Sudan’s strategic importance and mineral wealth.</p>
<p>And while a descent into all-out civil war would be devastating for Sudan, it would also create ripples that would be felt throughout the geopolitical world. </p>
<h2>Where things stand</h2>
<p>The evacuation of foreign nations followed the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">eruption of violence</a> between the Sudanese military, led by the country’s leader, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, generally known by the name Hemedti.</p>
<p>The two men jointly ran the government but now find themselves deadlocked in a power struggle. On April 25, 2023, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. brokered a three-day ceasefire. Despite sporadic fighting, that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65414838">ceasefire was later extended</a>.</p>
<p>Efforts of international governments to broker peace may hint not only at a desire to halt the bloodshed, but also a desire to limit the fallout that the situation will have for world politics. </p>
<h2>Sudan’s regional, economic and strategic importance</h2>
<p>Sudan is located at a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan/overview">critical nexus, geographically</a>. It borders Egypt and Libya in North Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, the East African nation of South Sudan, and Central Africa’s Chad and the Central African Republic.</p>
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<p>Sudan is the site where the White and Blue Nile Rivers merge to form the main Nile and is home to <a href="https://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/sudan">more than 60% of the Nile River Basin</a>. Safe <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14576.doc.htm">management of the Nile’s water</a> is crucial for stability of the region. Northern neighbor Egypt is <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/basic-page/egypt-34124">90% dependent on the river</a> for its water supply, while Ethiopia to the east is looking to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/20/ethiopia-electricity-production-gerd-blue-nile-mega-dam">double the country’s electricity generation</a> through the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. </p>
<p>The project has been a source of contention, though – Ethiopia began filling the dam in 2020-2021 <a href="https://www.pesmaastricht.com/post/geopolitical-tensions-surrounding-the-nile-river-what-should-europe-do">without an agreement with Egypt</a>, and last year Egypt protested Ethiopia’s planned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">third filling of the dam to the U.N. Security Council</a>. The United Nations has called on the three nations to <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14576.doc.htm">negotiate a “mutually beneficial” agreement</a> over the Nile’s management – something that will be difficult should Sudan fall into a prolonged period of instability.</p>
<p>Sudan also has a <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/countries-concerns-interests-sudan-latest-conflict-explained-8571913/">strategic location on the Red Sea</a>, a body of water that <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-complicated-nature-of-red-sea-geopolitics/">approximately 10% of global trade passes through</a>, with the Suez Canal <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/china-middle-east-are-spending-on-sudan-but-us-policy-is-confused.html">connecting Asian and European markets</a>. </p>
<p>And then there are Sudan’s immense mineral resources. The nation is Africa’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">third-largest producer of gold</a>, has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/china-middle-east-are-spending-on-sudan-but-us-policy-is-confused.html">major oil reserves</a> and produces over <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-agricultural-sectors">80% of the world’s gum arabic</a> – a component of food additives, paint and cosmetics.</p>
<h2>Sudanese gold, Russia’s war</h2>
<p>As a result of this strategic and economic importance, Sudan has attracted willing international partners. Gulf oil states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example, saw Bashir’s ouster as a chance to stabilize the region and invest in everything <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/21/why-the-conflict-in-sudan-is-worrying-its-neighbours">from agricultural projects to Red Sea ports</a>.</p>
<p>Sudan’s leaders have seemingly been none too picky about who they partner with. While much of the international community shunned and sanctioned Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Sudan provided Moscow with an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">economic lifeline through its gold reserves</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s interest in Sudan’s gold dates back to 2017, when after a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-president-visits-russia-asks-for-protection-from-us/4131704.html">meeting between Bashir and Russian President Vladimir Putin</a>, the two countries <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/documents-reveal-wagners-golden-ties-to-sudanese-military-companies">established the Meroe Gold corporation</a> – a subsidiary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner Group network of mercenaries</a>. </p>
<p>Since the 2019 coup, Moscow has increasingly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/26/africa/sudan-generals-west-democratic-transition-intl/index.html">aligned itself with Hemedti</a>, as the RSF leader sought to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65284948">control more and more of the country’s richest gold mines</a>. In July 2022, Sudanese sources told CNN that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">at least 16 Russian gold smuggling flights</a> had embarked from Sudan over the previous year and a half.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in Sudanese gold extraction and its role in supplying fighters in Ukraine have prompted many observers to suggest that <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/04/27/why-is-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-and-what-does-it-have-to-do-with-the-war-in-ukraine#:%7E:text=According%20to%20a%20number%20of,of%20the%20mineral%20in%20Africa.">Sudanese gold is being used to finance Moscow’s war</a>.</p>
<p>In return, Russia has provided <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">political and military assistance to Sudan’s paramilitary leadership</a>. According <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/23/world/africa/sudan-russia-wagner-group.html">to U.S. officials</a>, the Wagner Group has offered weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles, to the RSF. </p>
<p>Hemedti is not alone in currying Russian support. Theodore Murphy, Africa director at the European Council of Foreign Relations, has suggested that the RSF leader’s now-rival, Burhan, would also be <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-cold-shoulder-for-un-warm-embrace-for-russia/a-61526111">open to working with Moscow</a>.</p>
<h2>China a winner in Sudan scramble</h2>
<p>China also has considerable interests in Sudan as part of its “Belt and Road” global infrastructure initiative. From 2011 to 2018, Beijing granted Sudan an <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/whats-stake-china-in-sudan">estimated US$143 million in loans</a> and has <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/others/oil-rich-sudan-begins-to-sense-exploitation-meted-out-to-them-by-chinese20210810040556/">invested in projects</a> such as the construction of Sudanese oil pipelines, Nile bridges, textile mills and railway lines. </p>
<p>Indeed, China was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/china-middle-east-are-spending-on-sudan-but-us-policy-is-confused.html">one of the main investors to Sudan</a> during the rule of Bashir and one of the few countries to <a href="https://besacenter.org/china-and-sudan-coup/">supply the regime with weapons</a>.</p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30990268">relies on Africa’s mineral resources</a> to meet its own expanding industrial needs. China-Sudan mining cooperation dates back to the 1970s, and over 20 Chinese enterprises have operated in Sudanese mining with a <a href="http://sd.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshd/202010/t20201016_6689197.htm">total investment of over $100 million</a>.</p>
<p>However, this relationship is not entirely one-way. Sudan exported $780 million worth of products to China in 2021 and in the previous quarter-century <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/sdn">increased its exports to China at an annual rate of 10.6%</a>. Indeed, China is Sudan’s <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/SUD">second-largest trading partner</a> after the UAE, and the African nation’s biggest supplier of goods.</p>
<p>Although the U.S. <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/">revoked long-standing sanctions against Sudan in 2017</a>, allowing for American companies to pursue business interests in Sudan, Washington is still playing catch-up with China. </p>
<h2>Concerns of contagion</h2>
<p>The United States’ strategic interest in the Sudanese crisis can be considered through the lens of its opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine and concern over regional contagion – that is, the spread of instability.</p>
<p>Sudan’s potential to prop up Moscow’s war effort would make Western leaders wary of the RSF gaining an upper hand in the current fighting; the paramilitary group could reward Russia’s friendship with Sudanese gold. But with an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-cold-shoulder-for-un-warm-embrace-for-russia/a-61526111">apparent willingness of both sides</a> of the current fighting to exploit the country’s gold mines in return for Moscow’s military assistance, a better outcome for the West – and indeed the Sudanese people – would be a transition away from military rule altogether.</p>
<p>Of perhaps more concern to Washington is the impact of an unstable Sudan on the region. In recent years, the U.S. has benefited from a warming relationship with Sudan’s leaders, especially through <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-priorities-sudan-stability-or-democracy">counterterrorism cooperation</a>. The Biden administration will surely be fearful of Sudan’s instability providing the kind of conditions in which terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab, may thrive. or that the situation could trigger a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/world/africa/sudan-war-civilians.html">refugee crisis on Sudan’s borders</a>, especially in Ethiopia and South Sudan – countries that are already struggling to keep fragile peace deals in place.</p>
<p>While the people of Sudan have the most to lose should the current fighting descend into civil war, the geopolitical significance of the country means millions in the surrounding regions – and indeed around the world – also stand to be impacted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Tounsel has previously received funding from the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Social Science Research Council, the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the University of Michigan, the Pennsylvania State University, Macalester College, and the University of Washington. </span></em></p>Sudan’s location and natural resources have attracted international partners keen to benefit either geopolitically or economically.Christopher Tounsel, Associate Professor of History, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.