tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/electoral-fraud-2491/articlesElectoral fraud – The Conversation2024-03-25T17:01:34Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261582024-03-25T17:01:34Z2024-03-25T17:01:34ZVladimir Putin: why it’s time for democracies to denounce Russia’s leader as illegitimate<p>When Russians went to the polls on March 17 to 19, it was less an election than an acclamation. </p>
<p>Putin’s margin of victory – he claimed to have won 87.21% of votes cast – was the largest in the country’s history. It put the Russian president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/putin-vote-share-outer-limits-russia-election">on a par</a> with other great post-Soviet “democrats” <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_Karimov">Ilam Karimov</a> of Uzbekistan and Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan whose vote shares rarely fell below 90% Aliyev ousted Azerbaijan’s democratically elected leader Abulfaz Elchibey in a 1993 military coup and subsequently won an election with 99% of the votes.</p>
<p>As the respected Russia-watcher J. Paul Goode said on X (formerly Twitter), Putin’s reelection was more of a <a href="https://twitter.com/jpaulgoode/status/1769490535624982567">“reality show”</a> than a real vote.</p>
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<p>Even before voting began in Russia’s 2024 presidential election, Putin had got rid of any real opposition with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/would-be-putin-challenger-duntsova-barred-running-election-campaign-team-2023-12-23/">Ekaterina Duntsova</a> and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/22/liberal-candidate-boris-nadezhdin-banned-from-russian-presidential-election#:%7E:text=After%20a%20day%20of%20deliberations,aspects%20of%20the%20commission's%20move.">Boris Nadezhdin</a> refused entry to the ballot. The three remaining politicians nominally classed as being “opposition candidates” were there merely to provide a veneer of democratic choice. Interestingly, all said they support the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240315-russia-presidential-election-three-candidates-putin-slutsky-kharitonov-davankov-little-suspense">war in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/press-2024/russian-federation-flouts-international-commitments-once-again-with-decision-not-to-invite-osce-observers-to-presidential-election">Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a> was denied the chance to send an international electoral observation mission. The head of Russia’s domestic election monitoring group Golos (Voice), Grigory Melkonyants, had been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-grigory-melkonyants-golos-election-watchdog/">arrested</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/head-russian-election-monitoring-group-be-kept-jail-until-vote-is-over-court-2023-12-06/">jailed</a> in 2023. The group put out the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/independent-russian-vote-monitor-says-election-was-mockery-2024-03-18/">following statement</a>: “Never before have we seen a presidential campaign that fell so far short of constitutional standards.”</p>
<h2>The fraud</h2>
<p>Polling stations opened in occupied areas of Ukraine on March 14, a day earlier than the rest of the country. Voters there <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-occupied-election-voting-arrests-eb0b0d872cf55e561dc221bbc53d63d4">reported being coerced</a> by government agents who visited them at home to pressure them into voting.</p>
<p>There was also widespread reported ballot stuffing, something that appears to be supported by (non-verified) <a href="https://twitter.com/colleaguespb/status/1770487133532201009">video evidence</a>. Mathematical analysis of the election by a respected Russian psephologist (an expert in how people vote) estimated that <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240320-shpilkin-method-statistical-analysis-gauges-voter-fraud-in-putin-landslide">up to half</a> of all votes were fraudulent.</p>
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<h2>Divergent views</h2>
<p>International reactions were mixed. <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-and-North-Korea-applaud-Putin-s-election-victory">China and North Korea</a> were quick to congratulate Putin, followed by <a href="https://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/lukashenko-calls-putin-to-congratulate-him-on-his-convincing-victory_i_0000169020.html">Belarus</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/19/russia-election-2024-vladimir-putin-victory-who-which-leders-congratulated-him">Venezuela and Cuba</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-modi-india-russia-relations-b2514757.html">India</a>, which has its own elections running from mid-April to the beginning of June, also congratulated Putin, as did <a href="https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1769778213926883753">Houthi rebels in Yemen</a> and <a href="https://tass.com/world/1762087">Hamas</a> in Gaza.</p>
<p>Other, mainly western countries, were not so fulsome in their reaction to Putin’s electoral triumph. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-following-outcome-of-russian-presidential-elections">said in a statement</a> that: “Putin removes his political opponents, controls the media, and then crowns himself the winner. This is not democracy.” </p>
<p>The French foreign ministry meanwhile <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240318-french-fm-western-leaders-denounce-putin-illegal-election-win-russia-allies-congratulations">said</a>: “The conditions for a free, pluralist and democratic election were not met.” Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-election-wasnt-real-election-germanys-baerbock-says-2024-03-18/">stated</a> that the vote “was not a real election”.</p>
<p>The diverse reactions to Putin’s win was to be expected. The global order is rapidly changing, with the rise of rival blocs such as the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) world is becoming <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/">multi-polar</a>. Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran and Ethiopia, have been accepted as candidate members. </p>
<p>This is not to say that a complete realignment of global power structures is imminent. And Brics remains a talking shop of disparate states with a range of often <a href="https://unherd.com/newsroom/brics-is-an-alliance-in-name-only/">competing aspirations</a>. Groupings such as this aim to challenge US global hegemony rather than defeat or replace it. </p>
<h2>Declaring Putin illegitimate</h2>
<p>But Putin has regularly billed the invasion of Ukraine as a fight against “the west” and a defence against Nato. Many believe that the Russian president, who famously called the collapse of the Soviet Union as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/">“greatest geopolitical catastrophe”</a> of the 20th century. Many believe he would use a victory in Ukraine as a launching pad for <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/02/russias-appetite-may-extend-beyond-ukraine.html">further imperial expansion</a>.</p>
<p>So the decision of so many leaders in the west to declare the recent election in Russia as fraudulent and Putin as an “illegitimate” leader is an important moment in international affairs. It shows these leaders are prepared to follow the lead of the <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/">Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Pace)</a>.</p>
<p>Declaring Putin illegitimate would be the final recognition that Putin is out to destroy the international order. Western states should follow Pace’s <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9254/pace-urges-the-international-community-no-longer-to-recognise-putin-s-legitimacy-as-president-beyond-2024">advice</a>. In October 2023, Pace called on member states “to recognise Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian contact and in the pursuit of peace”.</p>
<p>That western governments – and their intelligence agencies – are prepared to continue to reach out – as the US did via the CIA’s warning to Russia of a possible terrorist attack which materialised in the terrible events at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68642162">Crocus City Hall</a> in Moscow at the weekend, is an example of how they might keep channels of communication open while still declaring the Putin regime to be illegitimate. </p>
<p>In the event, the Kremlin chose to ignore American <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/gunmen-open-fire-in-moscow-concert-hall/">warnings</a>. It has even ignored claims by <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-blame-game-over-the-moscow-terror-attack-has-begun/">Isis-K</a> that it was behind the attack in order to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-moscow-concert-hall-terrorist-attack-russia/">link it to Ukraine</a> .</p>
<p>A declaration of illegitimacy would end a clear <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/its-time-to-declare-putin-an-illegitimate-president/">signal</a> to Russian elites that Putin has taken Russia down a dark and dangerous path. It would also reassure those in the Russian population who are concerned about their country’s slide into dictatorship that they have not been abandoned. </p>
<p>As I <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/HJS-Declaring-Putin-Illegitimate-Report.pdf">set out in a report</a> for the Henry Jackson Society earlier this month, a declaration of illegitimacy would allow western states to increase its support for Ukraine, close loopholes in sanctions regimes, support Russia’s neighbours and provide a haven for Russian diaspora groups to develop a plan for a <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/HJS-Getting-a-Foot-in-the-Door-%E2%80%93-Creating-a-Future-Russia-Now-Report-web.pdf">democratic Russia</a> in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many western governments have called Putin’s election ‘illegitimate’. Now they need to adjust their diplomatic relations accordingly.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002892023-02-23T07:11:06Z2023-02-23T07:11:06ZElection observers are important for democracy – but few voters know what they do<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511364/original/file-20230221-14-2b9goz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of a European Union election observation team speak to voters in Zimbabwe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election observers keep watch over polls throughout the world. Their job is to support efforts to improve electoral quality and to provide transparency. In African countries, both local citizen and international observers have been deployed regularly since the 1990s. </p>
<p>During several recent elections across the continent, however, questions have arisen about the competence and impartiality of observation missions. This has led to concerns about the future of observation, both in Africa and elsewhere.</p>
<p>In 2023, <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2023/02/africa-elections-all-upcoming-votes/">more than 20 African countries</a> are scheduled to go to the polls. It will be a busy year for observers who’ll <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/uhuru-to-head-au-polls-mission-in-nigeria-4124542">be present</a> at the majority of these elections. </p>
<p>When done well, election observation <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414008325571">detects</a> ballot-box stuffing, voter suppression and political violence. Observers’ presence at polling stations <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/electoral-fraud-or-violence-the-effect-of-observers-on-party-manipulation-strategies/C1EC14B4C4BBB2156A9A17A24F6A90DF">deters election-day fraud</a>.</p>
<p>Observers also provide public statements about election quality and offer recommendations on how electoral processes could be improved. </p>
<p>Yet some observers have been criticised for a reluctance to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/abs/valid-electoral-exercise-ugandas-1980-elections-and-the-observers-dilemma/300FE5D9472423B0C1F19813688EA87D">point out flawed processes</a>, for holding <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/election-observers-and-their-biases/">biases</a> and for weaknesses in their methodologies. </p>
<p>The perception that observation missions’ verdicts were “proved wrong” by court judgements in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2019.1657277">Kenya (2017)</a> and <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/news/malawi-courts-landmark-ruling-puts-spotlight-on-foreign-observers/">Malawi (2019)</a> has been particularly damaging. In both cases, many commentators (mis)interpreted international observers’ statements as endorsements of electoral processes that the courts later annulled.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
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<p>It’s not clear how widely held these critical views are. The perspectives of the broader public in countries holding elections are often missing from discussions on observation. So we set out to get a sense of what voters in three African countries thought.</p>
<p>We found that people wanted to know more about election observers, but couldn’t easily get the information. Both the media and observers need to do more to provide it. Knowledge of observers’ goals and statements is essential if they are to play the role of public arbiters of election quality. </p>
<h2>What citizens think</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/lmeo">research</a> into citizen perceptions and media representations of election observation took place in Zambia, The Gambia and Kenya. These three countries have had varying experiences of election observation. </p>
<p>We interviewed 520 citizens about topics relating to their perceptions of election observation. In each country, we conducted in-depth interviews in both urban and rural areas, and in constituencies that supported the opposition and the incumbent. </p>
<p>Ordinary citizens in our case study countries rarely offered criticisms of election observation. </p>
<p>For example, we asked 120 Kenyans to evaluate the past performance of election observers during the run-up to the country’s 2022 election. Only one person referred to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/future-election-observation-after-kenyas-supreme-court-judgement">the controversy</a> surrounding observation in 2017 and the supreme court’s annulment of the presidential election.</p>
<p>Instead, we found <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/pdf/Local%20Perceptions%20of%20Election%20Observation__Jan23.pdf#page=2">strong support</a> for election observation among citizens. This was the case in all three of our case study countries, which cover east, southern and west Africa. </p>
<p>Our respondents tended to have concerns about the electoral process in their own country. They spoke favourably about the potential of observation to improve overall electoral quality and transparency. They also felt that observers contributed to reducing the potentially destabilising effects of elections, such as violence. </p>
<p>In both Zambia and Kenya, support for the presence of international observers was higher than support for citizen observers. Respondents in The Gambia, however, tended to prefer citizen observers.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-rest-of-africa-can-learn-from-the-gambias-transition-to-democracy-71822">What the rest of Africa can learn from The Gambia's transition to democracy</a>
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<p>The explanations from those who chose international observers highlighted a perception that they were more impartial than citizen observers, who were often viewed as being biased or corruptible. </p>
<p>Perceptions in Zambia and Kenya may be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2173177">influenced</a> by:</p>
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<li><p>political polarisation</p></li>
<li><p>a perception that political corruption is high</p></li>
<li><p>the prominence of ethnicity in politics. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These factors appear to reduce confidence in citizen observers. </p>
<p>Despite the popularity of election observers in our case study countries, we found that citizens knew little about their roles. Few could name any specific observation missions. Citizens often confused observers with other electoral actors like polling station staff, the electoral management body and party agents. </p>
<p>It’s common for citizens to believe observers can and should intervene in the electoral process. Yet, non-interference should be a key principle for both <a href="https://gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles/">citizen</a> and <a href="https://www.ndi.org/DoP">international election observers</a>. </p>
<h2>The information gap</h2>
<p>Our interviews made it clear that citizens – especially those in rural areas – found it difficult to get information about the activities and statements of election observers. Few of the respondents heard this information when missions issued their preliminary statements.</p>
<p>The media can bridge this information gap by providing more coverage of election observation. </p>
<p>The quality of this coverage could also be improved, as observers’ preliminary statements are <a href="https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/en/publications/re-evaluating-international-observation-of-kenyas-2017-elections">often mischaracterised</a>. </p>
<p>Observers’ statements tend to be complex and nuanced because they are commenting on numerous aspects of an ongoing process. In media coverage, these statements are often reduced to simple either/or judgements (such as “free and fair”). </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Our project has drawn upon interviews with African journalists and editors to create a short <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/doc/Tips%20for%20Journalists%20and%20Editors%20who%20Cover%20Election%20Observation_.pdf">list of tips</a> on covering election observation. These are designed to improve the circulation of accurate information. The tips include getting a range of perspectives from observer missions and reaching out to them early.</p>
<p>Observer missions could also be more active in raising the profile of their work. We created a <a href="https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/assets/doc/Media%20Representations%20of%20Election%20Observation_Jan23.pdf#page=6">list of suggestions</a> from the media in our three case study countries to help them do this. One of the tips is to interact with the media in local languages.</p>
<p>Citizens are more likely to criticise observers for the poor flow of information than for anything else. This doesn’t invalidate other criticisms of observers. In fact, if citizens begin to get more information, these criticisms may become more common. Our research suggests the media and observers need to provide it anyway.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Molony receives funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for the ‘Local Perceptions and Media Representations of Election Observation in Africa’ research project, under grant reference ES/T015624/1.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Macdonald receives funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for the ‘Local Perceptions and Media Representations of Election Observation in Africa’ research project, under grant reference ES/T015624/1.</span></em></p>Voters speak favourably about the potential of observation to improve overall electoral quality and transparency.Thomas Molony, Senior Lecturer in African Studies, The University of EdinburghRobert Macdonald, Research Fellow in African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1972672023-01-31T19:31:26Z2023-01-31T19:31:26ZGeorge Santos: A democracy can’t easily penalize lies by politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505662/original/file-20230120-8189-npl0d8.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C17%2C5973%2C3970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">George Santos, in the middle, lied his way to winning election to Congress, where he took the oath of office on Jan. 7, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXCongress/5e8adfe786f4483295cda7d93dcf20c8/photo?Query=George%20Santos&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=104&currentItemNo=15">AP Photo/Alex Brandon</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>George Santos is not the first politician to have lied, but <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/01/the-everything-guide-to-george-santoss-lies.html">the fables he told to get elected</a> to Congress may be in a class by themselves. Historian Sean Wilentz remarked that while embellishments happen, Santos’ lies are different – “<a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2023/1/24/23569138/george-santos-scandal-lies">there is no example like it” in American history, Wilentz told Vox in a late-January, 2023, story</a>.</p>
<p>Columnist <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-george-santos-lies-matter-new-york-house-gop-integrity-deception-fraud-voters-trust-11672347204">Peggy Noonan wrote</a> that Santos was “a stone cold liar who effectively committed election fraud.” </p>
<p>And now Santos has taken the dramatic step of removing himself temporarily from the committees he’s been assigned to: the House Small Business Committee and the Science, Space and Technology Committee. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/01/31/santos-fabrications-committee-assignments-republicans/">Washington Post reports</a> Santos told his GOP colleagues that he would be a “distraction” until cleared in several probes of his lies.</p>
<p>While Santos’ lies got some attention from local media, they did not become widely known until <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/19/nyregion/george-santos-ny-republicans.html">The New York Times published an exposé</a> after his election. </p>
<p>Santos’ lies may have gotten him into hot water with the voters who put him in the House, and a few of his colleagues, including the New York <a href="https://people.com/politics/new-york-republicans-call-on-george-santos-to-resign/">GOP, want him to resign</a>. <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/george-santos-federal-investigation/">CBS News reported</a> that federal investigators are looking at Santos’ finances and financial disclosures.</p>
<p>But the bulk of Santos’ misrepresentations may be protected by the <a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/">First Amendment</a>. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that lies enjoy First Amendment protection – not because of their value, but because the government cannot be trusted with the power to regulate lies. </p>
<p>In other words, lies are protected by the First Amendment to safeguard democracy. </p>
<p>So how can unwitting voters be protected from sending a fraud to Congress? </p>
<p>Any attempt to craft a law aimed at the lies in politics will run into practical enforcement problems. And attempts to regulate such lies could collide with a 2012 Supreme Court case <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-210">United States v. Alvarez</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large, columned white building at the top of a grand, white set of stairs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505664/original/file-20230120-12-33u2r3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that some false statements are ‘inevitable if there is to be open and vigorous expression of views.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SupremeCourtDisabilitiesEducation/c46b6b0bf6ab45a4b6600360efe3083c/photo?Query=U.S.%20Supreme%20Court&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=8325&currentItemNo=19">AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lies and the First Amendment</h2>
<p>Xavier Alvarez was a fabulist and a member of a public water board who <a href="https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-us-v-alvarez">lied about having received the Congressional Medal of Honor</a> in a public meeting. He was charged in 2007 with violating the <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s1998">Stolen Valor Act</a>, which made it a federal crime to lie about having received a military medal. </p>
<p>The Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that lies should not be protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that lies are protected by the First Amendment unless there is a legally recognized harm, such as defamation or fraud, associated with the lie. So the Stolen Valor Act was struck down as an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The court pointed out that some false statements are “inevitable if there is to be open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation.” </p>
<p>Crucially, the court feared that the power to criminalize lies could damage American democracy. The court reasoned that unless the First Amendment limits the power of the government to criminalize lies, the government could establish an “endless list of subjects about which false statements are punishable.” </p>
<p>Justice Anthony Kennedy, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/709/#tab-opinion-1970529">who wrote the majority opinion</a> in Alvarez, illustrated this danger by citing <a href="https://www.george-orwell.org/1984">George Orwell’s dystopian novel “1984</a>,” in which a totalitarian government relied on a Ministry of Truth to criminalize dissent. Our constitutional tradition, he wrote, “stands against the idea that we need” a Ministry of Truth.</p>
<h2>Lies, politics and social media</h2>
<p>George Santos, unlike Xavier Alvarez, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/saradorn/2023/01/18/george-santos-mom-wasnt-in-new-york-on-911-report-says-heres-the-full-list-of-his-lies/?sh=7e6598a46ce6">lied during an election campaign</a>.</p>
<p>In Alvarez, the Supreme Court expressed concern about laws criminalizing lies in politics. It warned that the Stolen Valor Act applied to “political contexts, where although such lies are more likely to cause harm,” the risk that prosecutors would bring charges for ideological reasons was also high. </p>
<p>The court believed that the marketplace of ideas was a more effective and less dangerous mechanism for policing lies, particularly in politics. Politicians and journalists have the incentives and the resources to examine the records of candidates such as Santos to uncover and expose falsehoods. </p>
<p>The story of George Santos, though, is a cautionary tale for those who hold an idealized view of how the marketplace of ideas operates in contemporary American politics. </p>
<p>Democracy has not had a long run when measured against the course of human history. From the founding of the American republic in the late 18th century <a href="https://www.pennpress.org/9780812250848/democracy-and-truth/">until the advent of the modern era</a>, there was a rough division of labor. Citizens selected leaders, and experts played a critical gatekeeping role, mediating the flow of information. </p>
<p>New information technologies have largely <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691180908/republic">displaced the role of experts</a>. Everyone now claims to be an expert who can decide for themselves whether COVID-19 vaccines are effective or who really won the 2020 presidential election. These technologies <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113702">have also destroyed the economic model</a> that once sustained local newspapers. </p>
<p>Thus, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/small-local-paper-uncovered-and-reported-george-santos-scandal-before-november-election">although one local newspaper did report on Santos’ misrepresentations</a>, his election is evidence that the loss of news reporting jobs has damaged America’s democracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A piece of newspaper, burning up" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/505665/original/file-20230120-14-rrx667.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">With the news business in serious decline, citizens don’t get the information they need to be informed voters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/burning-headlines-as-newspaper-catches-fire-royalty-free-image/1396098618?phrase=journalism%20decline&adppopup=true">iStock / Getty Images Plus</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lies that harm democracy</h2>
<p>The election of George Santos illustrates the challenges facing American democracy. The First Amendment was written in an era when government censorship was the principal danger to self-government. Today, politicians and ordinary citizens can harness <a href="https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/73">new information technologies to spread misinformation and deepen polarization</a>. A weakened news media will fail to police those assertions, or a partisan news media will amplify them. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=aIWyIH8AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of constitutional law, comparative constitutionalism, democracy and authoritarianism</a>, I believe that Justice Kennedy’s Alvarez opinion relied on a flawed understanding of the dangers facing democracy. He maintained that government regulation of speech is a greater threat to democracy than are lies. Laws that targeted lies would have to survive the most exacting scrutiny – which is nearly always fatal to government regulation of speech.</p>
<p><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/709/">Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion</a> argued that a different test should be used. Courts, Breyer said, should assess any speech-related harm that might flow from the law as well as the importance of the government objective and whether the law furthers that objective. This is known as intermediate scrutiny or proportionality analysis. It is a form of analysis that is widely used by <a href="https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/302/">constitutional courts in other democracies</a>. </p>
<p>Intermediate scrutiny or proportionality analysis does not treat all government regulations of speech as presumptively unconstitutional. It forces courts to balance the value of the speech against the justifications for the law in question. That is the right test, Justice Breyer concluded, when assessing laws that penalize “false statements about easily verifiable facts.”</p>
<p>The two approaches will lead to different results when governments seek to regulate lies. Even proposed, narrowly written laws aimed at factual misrepresentations by politicians about <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/congressmans-santos-bill-aims-ban-obvious-candidates-who-lie-1770285">their records</a> or <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/in-testimony-wa-gov-inslee-says-bill-on-lying-about-election-results-written-to-protect-the-first-amendment/">about who won an election</a> might not survive the high degree of protection afforded lies in the United States.</p>
<p>Intermediate scrutiny or proportionality analysis, on the other hand, will likely enable some government regulation of lies – including those of the next George Santos – to survive legal challenge.</p>
<p>Democracies have a better long-term survival track record than dictatorships because they can and do <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691178134/the-confidence-trap">evolve to deal with new dangers</a>. The success of America’s experiment in self-government may well hinge, I believe, on whether the country’s democracy can evolve to deal with new information technologies that help spread <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393357424">falsehoods that undermine democracy</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miguel Schor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When candidates can get elected to Congress based on a mountain of lies they’ve told, is it time to reconsider whether such lies are protected by the First Amendment?Miguel Schor, Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Drake University Constitutional Law Center, Drake UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1835412022-05-24T09:01:40Z2022-05-24T09:01:40ZPan-African integration has made progress but needs a change of mindset<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464807/original/file-20220523-21-unn2ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres addresses an African Union summit in Addis Ababa via video in February 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year’s celebration of <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/africa-day-2022-18-oct-2021-1312">Africa Day</a> provides another opportunity to assess how far continental integration has progressed. </p>
<p>Integration would mean a truly united Africa – either a federalist “United States of Africa” or the African Union (AU) exercising <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337898687_Can_Africa_ever_achieve_continental_sovereignty_in_the_shifting_West-to-East_strategic_landscape_The_geopolitics_of_integration_and_autonomy">binding powers over member states</a>. At present the AU merely serves as a platform for coordinating the interactions of its <a href="https://au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles2#:%7E:text=The%20AU%20is%20made%20up,divided%20into%20five%20geographic%20regions.">55 member states</a>. </p>
<p>Although some progress has been made, more needs to be done to achieve the goal of integration.</p>
<p>Member states need to move beyond paying lip service to unity, and empower critical AU organs. This requires a shift in mentality. States need to appreciate the need to sacrifice some autonomy for common socioeconomic and political gains. Lacklustre commitment to continental integration is connected with Africa’s peripheral position in global dynamics. </p>
<p>In my view, as a researcher of the institutional dynamics of Africa’s integration process, pan-African integration is in a crucial phase. This phase is as important as the creation of the Organisation of African Unity <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">in 1963</a> and its eventual replacement with the AU <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">20 years ago</a>.</p>
<h2>A pan-African worldview</h2>
<p>In a 1969 speech, the then Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, <a href="https://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/stability_and_change_sw.pdf">captured</a> what the African worldview entails:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We recognise that we are involved in the world and that the world is involved in us. Involvement without understanding, however, can be embarrassing and even dangerous. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A pan-Africanist worldview understands that the continent cannot exist in isolation. However, this must be accompanied by a determination to drive an agenda that enhances pan-African goals.</p>
<p>This position reflects the views of many of Nyerere’s contemporaries, and those who came after him, on how Africa should position itself on the global stage. </p>
<p>Kwame Nkrumah’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9780230118645_8.pdf">“African personality”</a>, Thabo Mbeki’s <a href="https://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html">“African renaissance”</a>, and the oft-repeated <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-solutions-to-african-problems">“African solutions to African problems”</a> have also been used to capture the essence of an effective pan-African worldview. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sobukwes-pan-africanist-dream-an-elusive-idea-that-refuses-to-die-52601">Sobukwe's pan-Africanist dream: an elusive idea that refuses to die</a>
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</em>
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<p>Mbeki’s idea speaks to restoring Africa’s dignity, and pushing for its economic and political development. Nkrumah’s advances the principles of societal equality. It places the community over the individual in preparing African societies to establish a federal union of African states that is assertive on the global stage.</p>
<h2>What’s working</h2>
<p>The continent has seen some positive developments that could advance integration. They include the adoption of the following instruments and processes: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">AU Agenda 2063</a>, the AU’s blueprint for faster economic growth </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing">0.2% import tax levy</a> on member states to finance AU programmes and policies </p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/our-resources/6730-continental-free-trade-area-cfta.html">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> </p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement">free movement protocol</a> (yet to come into force) </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181127/african-union-strengthens-its-sanction-regime-non-payment-dues#:%7E:text=Cautionary%20sanctions%20will%20be%20applied,meetings%20of%20the%20African%20Union.">sanctions</a> for non-payment of membership dues</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/au-commission-has-made-a-good-start-on-gender-equality-but-a-lot-remains-to-be-done-155005">reducing</a> the number of AU Commission members</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/au-commission-has-made-a-good-start-on-gender-equality-but-a-lot-remains-to-be-done-155005">gender equality in leadership</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15548-how-relevant-is-the-protocol-on-relations-between-the-recs-and-the-au.html">regulating the relations</a> between the AU and the eight regional economic communities.</p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=632&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=632&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464981/original/file-20220524-24-2q84o5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=632&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The African Union: timeline of events.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Usifo Omozokpea / AU</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932">Thomas Tieku</a>, an expert on Africa’s international relations, has observed, despite some of the failures of pan-African integration, the AU has set admirable guidelines on governance, peace and security. </p>
<p>It has also developed enforcement mechanisms for violations of its standards. It has quickly adopted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>, empowered the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-union-at-20-a-lot-has-been-achieved-despite-many-flaws-175932">mobilised resources to get COVID-19 vaccines</a>, and integrated the AU development agenda <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/MDG/SDGs_Country_Report_2019_South_Africa.pdf">into national development plans</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/making-sense-of-decades-of-debate-about-nkrumahs-pan-african-ideas-132684">Making sense of decades of debate about Nkrumah’s pan-African ideas</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Yet pan-African continental integration remains constrained by many problems. These include countries’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">unwillingness</a> to transfer powers to AU organs.</p>
<p>Addressing this will require a change of worldview. Africa needs to rebalance the way it sees itself and relates to the world. African states need to equip national and regional institutions to deliver on the promise of political and economic development.</p>
<h2>What’s not working</h2>
<p>The ability to project a strategic pan-African worldview is undermined by several factors. One is the unwillingness to transfer supranational powers to key AU institutions. For example, the Pan-African Parliament has only <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">limited, advisory</a> rather than full legislative powers.</p>
<p>Similarly, the AU Commission lacks the power to make member states comply with institutional rules. The 2017 <a href="http://www.mandelaschool.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf">Kagame report</a> on AU reforms noted that the union has passed over 1,500 resolutions but has no mechanism for tracking their implementation.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">Toothless Pan-African Parliament could have meaningful powers. Here's how</a>
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<p>Member states have failed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/successes-of-african-human-rights-court-undermined-by-resistance-from-states-166454">comply</a> with about 75% of the decisions of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In reaction to judgments against them, member states such as <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/individual-and-ngo-access-to-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights-the-latest-blow-from-tanzania/">Tanzania</a>, <a href="https://ijrcenter.org/2020/05/06/benin-and-cote-divoire-to-withdraw-individual-access-to-african-court/">Benin</a>, <a href="https://ijrcenter.org/2016/03/14/rwanda-withdraws-access-to-african-court-for-individuals-and-ngos/">Rwanda</a>, and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/04/30/ivory-coast-withdraws-from-african-human-rights-and-peoples-court/#:%7E:text=Ivory%20Coast%20withdrew%20from%20the,to%2020%20years%20in%20jail.">Côte d’Ivoire</a> have withdrawn the permission allowing individuals and NGOs access to the court.</p>
<p>The AU’s dependence on external funding is another impediment. Despite ongoing financial reforms, at least <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/african-union-sustainable-funding-strategy-gains-momentum">61% of its budget</a> comes from external donors. Some use donations as a tool to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354654152_'She_who_pays_the_piper'_Examining_the_delegitimising_influence_of_European_Union's_financial_support_to_the_African_Union">manipulate</a> AU processes. </p>
<p>The continuous violation of AU norms and standards on human rights and governance is a major obstacle to deepening continental integration. For example, there has been an <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-latest-sign-of-a-rise-in-the-ballot-box-being-traded-for-bullets-175642">upsurge</a> in military coups in recent years. In addition, <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/a-divided-continent">democratic backsliding</a> is on the rise, through unconstitutional changes of term limits, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/deluge-digital-repression-threatens-african-security/">digital repression</a>, violent <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/a-divided-continent">clampdown on opposition voices</a>, and <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2020/03/how-african-presidents-rig-elections-to-stay-in-office/">electoral fraud</a>.</p>
<p>The AU’s response has been tepid. In some cases, leaders involved in <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/sisis-chairmanship-isnt-tonic-african-union-currently-needs/">suppressing</a> democratic voices are <a href="https://au.int/en/speeches/20200209/statement-president-paul-kagame-overview-implementation-institutional-reform-au">tasked</a> with leading key processes in the AU.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/connecting-african-citizens-with-african-decisions">limited role</a> of civil society in pan-African integration is another concern. And there is little public awareness of what the AU does and how.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/successes-of-african-human-rights-court-undermined-by-resistance-from-states-166454">Successes of African Human Rights Court undermined by resistance from states</a>
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<p>Despite the benefits that could come from <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/promise-of-african-economic-integration-by-c-lestin-monga-2019-01">an integrated Africa</a>, many African countries remain wary of the process. For example, some restrict human mobility. They have refused to sign the continental protocol on free movement, citing security concerns and <a href="https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/barriers-free-movement-africa-remove/">protection of local jobs</a>.</p>
<h2>Changing mindsets</h2>
<p>The effectiveness of reforms at the AU depends on a change of mindset. Members need to understand that enhancement of Africa’s position in global realpolitik depends on an internally cohesive body. This will require actions in three key areas:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a detailed but <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/bafr/8/2/article-p156_7.xml">flexible</a> plan showing how willing states will transfer supranational powers to AU organs </p></li>
<li><p>including the African populace in AU programmes and processes </p></li>
<li><p>adherence to constitutionalism. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Without a system that emphasises fundamental rights and good governance, regional integration goals such as trade, free movement of people, gender equality, peace and security cannot be realised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babatunde Fagbayibo receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. </span></em></p>Despite the benefits that could come from integration, many African countries remain wary of the process.Babatunde Fagbayibo, Professor of International Law, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1596932021-05-09T08:26:11Z2021-05-09T08:26:11ZNigeria’s electoral system is still broken. Here’s a list of what’s urgent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399177/original/file-20210506-16-1aw36uh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Electoral reforms are important before Nigerians go to the polls in 2023 </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/polling-station-workers-adding-posters-on-the-wall-at-news-photo/1228601182?adppopup=true">Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The chairman of Nigeria’s electoral commission, Mahmood Yakubu, was <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/mahmood-yakubu-becomes-first-inec-chairman-sworn-in-for-second-term">sworn in</a> for a second term nearly six months ago. His second term will be defined by how much he’s able to improve the integrity of the country’s election system.</p>
<p>Yakubu faces an uphill task. </p>
<p>Complaints that Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission can’t deliver free and fair polls have been growing louder. In particular, the 2019 elections came in for a heavy dose of criticism on the grounds that they were not <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/25/africa/nigeria-election-unrest-intl/index.html">totally free and fair</a>. </p>
<p>Yakubu’s hand could be strengthened if the National Assembly finally approves amendments to the country’s 2010 electoral act. The changes, which have been put up for <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/430402-national-assembly-holds-public-hearing-on-amendment-of-electoral-law.html">public debate</a>, are designed to ensure free and fair elections.</p>
<p>Delivering credible elections in 2023 will show how well the Commission is successful under his leadership. </p>
<h2>A chequered election history</h2>
<p>The electoral commission has conducted elections at national and state levels since 1999 when the country returned to democratic rule. </p>
<p>Its performance <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence">reached a nadir</a> in 2007. Five governorship elections won by candidates of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that year were <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE11.1Aiyede.pdf">reversed by the courts</a>. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was elected president in the poll and he served until his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/06/yaradua-nigeri-dies-president">sudden death</a> in 2010. On assuming office he admitted that they <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200705300320.html">had shortcomings</a> and went on to <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200903301538.html">establish</a> an electoral reform committee headed by Justice Mohammed Uwais. </p>
<p>The committee submitted <a href="https://www.nas-int.org/currentaffairs/public-lectures/687-ten-years-of-nigerian-democracy-a-review-of-the-electoral-process?start=3">its report</a> 16 months later. It recommended various reforms to strengthen electoral administration. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>making the election commission truly independent by removing the president’s powers to appoint the chairman and members of the commission and making appointments the responsibility of the National Judicial Council.</p></li>
<li><p>changing the funding model for the electoral commission to ensure it was left free of government interference. </p></li>
<li><p>the integration of the independent electoral commissions of each state into the commission’s structures. </p></li>
<li><p>the establishment of an Electoral Offences Commission to prosecute electoral offenders.</p></li>
<li><p>shifting the burden of proof in election petitions from the petitioner to electoral commission. This is to show that elections were free and fair when challenged. </p></li>
<li><p>the introduction of a mixed electoral system, with an introduction of elements of proportional representation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Attahiru Jega, a member of the committee who later <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2010/06/08/jonathan-picks-prof-jega-as-inec-chairman/">became</a> the commission chairman, was able to implement some of the recommendations. These included reorganising the commission, streamlining the voting procedure and biometric register of voters. </p>
<p>But, for the most part, the major structural reforms remained stalled.</p>
<p>Some improvements have nevertheless been made.</p>
<h2>Reforms</h2>
<p>Yakubu was able to incorporate lessons learnt from past elections to build on the workings of the commission. He has also stepped up interaction with election observer groups and political parties.</p>
<p>He also:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>introduced the transfer of registration location and release of a copy of voters’ register on demand at the payment of a fee. This enables the voter who has changed residence between elections to vote in his or her current location and make the registration process more transparent.</p></li>
<li><p>simultaneous accreditation and voting with the announcement of elections results from the polling unit. This will enable access to the results from lowest to highest level to promote transparency. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Other changes include amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Act which empower the Independent National Electoral Commission to de-register parties. But this has been only partly successful. The changes to the Act led to <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/02/full-list-of-the-74-parties-deregistered-by-inec/">74 being deregistered</a>. The Supreme Court <a href="https://punchng.com/breaking-supreme-court-upholds-inecs-deregistration-of-74-political-parties/">recently upheld</a> an earlier judgment of the Court of Appeal which okayed the deregistration of the 74 parties.</p>
<p>Changes have been made in the ceiling on campaign or party finance too. There’s a penalty for failing to provide accurate audited financial records. There were also changes in the penalty on electoral offences. </p>
<p>But there’s a great deal that hasn’t happened that should have.</p>
<h2>Challenges of 2019 elections</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350467727_Aiyede_Matters_Arising_from_the_2019_Elections_and_Electoral_Reform_Processes?origin=mail&uploadChannel=re390&reqAcc=Salawu-Ibrahim-Ajisola&useStoredCopy=0">review</a> of election observers’ reports on the 2019 elections show there were interferences with results collation by political party agents and security agencies with the connivance of electoral commission officials. Inefficiencies in its operations manifested in puzzling discrepancies in records, voters’ register data and declared election results.</p>
<p>For instance, presidential and National Assembly elections were held simultaneously. But there were more votes cast in the presidential elections than the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Figures on the total number of registered voters announced before the election and the figures announced by electoral commission during the collation in 30 of the 36 states were inconsistent. Furthermore, poor logistics and supply of materials resulted in delays and created room for malpractices. There were also localised incidents of voter intimidation, ballot snatching and destruction.</p>
<p>And the primaries for the major parties were riddled with allegations of bad practice. </p>
<p>My review also concluded that security agencies were deployed without any clear coordination with electoral commission as required by law. The <a href="http://www.eods.eu/library/nigeria_2019_eu_eom_final_report-web.pdf">military</a> posed significant challenges and obstruction to the performance of election duties by commission officials in some parts of Rivers State. Reports noted the overbearing and partisan role of the police and the secret service personnel.</p>
<h2>Yakubu’s agenda</h2>
<p>On being sworn in Yakubu made clear that he was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHmu1qG0ihg">intent on improving</a> the integrity of elections under his watch. </p>
<p>He announced his commitment to getting the proposed changes to be made through the Electoral Act Repeal and Re-enactment Bill 2021. In the build-up to the 2019 elections, President Muhammadu Buhari refused assent to bills proposing election-related amendments to the Constitution three times in 2018 – in <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/buhari-declines-assent-to-electoral-amendment-bill-2018/">March</a>, <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/why-buhari-declined-assent-to-electoral-act-amendment-bill-presidency/">September</a> and <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/again-buhari-declines-assent-to-electoral-act/">December</a>. </p>
<p>The Act provided more detailed rules on various aspects of the electoral process than the constitution. The provisions of the Act must not contradict that of the constitution otherwise the courts would declare such provisions unconstitutional. An example is the earlier provision of the Act that allowed the electoral commission to de-register parties. This contradicts the freedom of association guaranteed by the constitution.</p>
<p>Yakubu has also begun consultations across the country to facilitate constituency delimitation to increase the number of polling units to reduce the distance voters have to cover and easy access to voting points. </p>
<p>There are other issues he should address as a matter of urgency too.</p>
<p>First, the channels for the distribution and retrieval of election materials must be strengthened. He must also improve the transparency of the collation and transmission of election results. And he must seek greater use of technology, especially electronic accreditation and verification of voters. Similarly electronic transmission of results, storage and publication of electoral data.</p>
<p>He must work with others to reduce vote buying and provide innovative means of reducing electoral malpractices such as the use of violence and ballot snatching. </p>
<p>He should also promote internal democracy among political parties. This is a major reason to continue pushing for an electoral offences commission. </p>
<p>He also needs to address the proliferation of political parties and its implications for election logistics, ballot access and polling management. I urge Yakubu to consider measures to control access to the ballot by political parties as an option for managing party proliferation. </p>
<p>Lastly, Nigeria needs to review the current first-past-the-post single member district system that continues to make electoral competition a winner takes all game. Introducing elements of proportional representation will ameliorate the intensity of electoral competition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmanuel Remi Aiyede does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria must fix its electoral system before the next general elections in 2023.Emmanuel Remi Aiyede, Professor of Political Institutions, Governance and Public Policy, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465482020-09-28T18:55:32Z2020-09-28T18:55:32ZElection violence in November? Here’s what the research says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360160/original/file-20200927-16-1vvp0ql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C12%2C8582%2C5704&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man carrying a club is seen as the Proud Boys, a right-wing pro-Trump group, gather with their allies in a rally against left-wing Antifa in Portland, Oregon, Sept. 26, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-carrying-a-club-is-seen-as-the-proud-boys-a-right-wing-news-photo/1228751842?adppopup=true">John Rudoff/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After Kenya’s 2007 election, as incumbent President Mwai Kibaki declared victory, the opposition alleged the election had been rigged. </p>
<p>A wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-people-participate-in-election-violence-insights-from-kenyas-2007-elections-143016">protests, riots and ethnic violence</a> followed. As many as 1,500 citizens were killed and another 600,000 forcibly displaced.</p>
<p>As the U.S. presidential election draws near, many have expressed <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/8/18/21371964/2020-transition-integrity-project-simulation-trump">concern that a similar scenario may unfold here</a>. Some envision President Donald Trump’s supporters using <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/03/trump-stay-in-office/">misinformation to mobilize vigilante militias</a> to clash with leftist protesters. Others envision that groups on the left will <a href="https://time.com/5892945/law-enforcement-post-election-violence/">refuse to accept the results and mobilize</a>, leading to violence and deaths across the country.</p>
<p>Having a contested election in times of crisis, however, is by no means a guarantee of violence. The front-runners in the 2017 French presidential election, for example, were <a href="https://www.daily-sun.com/post/223523/Violence-scars-Frances-preelection-May-Day-marches">as politically polarizing</a> as their U.S. 2020 counterparts, with centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron calling right-wing leader Marine Le Pen’s party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/marine-le-pen-defeated-front-national-far-from-finished">racist and xenophobic</a> and Le Pen charging that Macron was “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39802776">the candidate of savage globalisation</a>.”</p>
<p>And the first round of voting in France took place just after a shooting in the heart of Paris sent the country into a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ae9439a65ff04fb19bf8e102a0840703">state of emergency</a>. Yet, as the votes were counted and Macron was declared the winner, Le Pen <a href="https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2017/05/07/le-pen-concedes-defeat-in-french-election/">conceded defeat</a>, allowing for a peaceful transition.</p>
<p>With the barrage of 24/7 media coverage of the upcoming U.S. election, it can be hard to tell what’s real and what’s not – and that can be frightening. It’s important to step back and ask: What does the research say about the likelihood of election-related violence in November?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters around a bonfire" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Deadly violence followed the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya, including in this Nairobi slum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyans-demonstrate-30-december-2007-at-the-kibera-slum-as-news-photo/107605579?adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Predicting political instability</h2>
<p>When <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/koren-ore.html">social science researchers like me</a> try to predict political violence, we look at a large number of historical cases across multiple countries, and try to identify which events have resulted in many casualties. </p>
<p>In taking this approach, we can systematically evaluate what explains these extreme events, pinpointing specific issues that were present in most of the situations, and avoiding the inaccuracies that can happen by relying too much on anecdotal stories. </p>
<p>Such studies have highlighted three factors relevant to the upcoming election.</p>
<p>First, strong political institutions are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x">especially effective</a> in reducing the risk of violence. Many have voiced concerns that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/04/how-to-destroy-a-government/606793/">President Trump has weakened American political institutions</a>. But as one of the world’s longest-enduring democracies, the United States and its democratic institutions have proven their capacity to maintain order through <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html">crises and abuse of presidential power</a> before.</p>
<p>In the U.S., for example, despite allegations to the contrary, <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-fraud-is-very-rare-in-american-elections/">electoral fraud is extremely rare</a>. Even if uncertainty and chaos were to ensue in the wake of the election, the authority to decide a winner is vested in an independent institution such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-of-biden-versus-trump-or-how-a-judge-could-decide-the-presidential-election-146367">the U.S. Supreme Court</a> or by the <a href="https://history.house.gov/Institution/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/">House of Representatives</a>. Kenya in 2007 had no comparable institutional anchors to help ensure post-election stability.</p>
<p>Second, research, including <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/2/274/4909422">my own</a>, finds that mass political violence usually happens in countries that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3118222.pdf">have no capacity to prevent it</a>. In Kenya, for example, most violence was perpetrated by unofficial militias affiliated with ethnic or religious groups, such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20406424.pdf">Mungiki</a>, which the government was unable – or unwilling – to curb.</p>
<p>In the U.S., if any political leader calls for vigilantes to mobilize, both the federal government and states have the capacity to expeditiously eliminate this threat. Militias may be armed, but they are no match for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/remind-us-what-exactly-is-the-national-guard-94621">well-trained National Guard</a> or Army regiment. This should help deter the risk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">violence by vigilantes</a>. </p>
<p>Some, however, fear that the president will send <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/09/19/assessing-donald-trumps-use-of-the-homeland-security-department">federal agencies to seize ballots</a>. Although military officers continue to express <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/pentagon-election-insurrection-act/index.html">formal commitment</a> to <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/west-point-grads-raise-concerns-about-politicization-of-military-urge-class-of-2020-to-uphold-ideals-1.633448">keeping the military nonpoliticized</a>, such actions, if taken, may result in a violent backlash by left-wing vigilantes. But federal agents acting under orders from the White House will have the tactical upper hand in such clashes, which greatly adds to their deterrent capacity.</p>
<p>Finally, an especially strong predictor of election violence is a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/15/4/473/1862712?casa_token=QxU1-hjGgBYAAAAA:6TdId2CGSKQi-Kaj6pKm64uGluAQ-RnhlbbXSOwr1ulk2LeKTQ_zbFI2MQIN7SDLOxBdvbjDXpQ">history of armed political conflict</a>. After the 2016 elections, America experienced <a href="https://www.politico.com/gallery/2016/11/2016-election-protest-photos-002366?slide=0">massive protests and some rioting</a>, but little in the way of deadly political violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women protesting Trump's 2016 election." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the 2016 elections, America experienced large protests and some rioting, but little deadly political violence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-fill-5th-avenue-in-midtown-manhattan-during-a-news-photo/959107274?adppopup=true">David Cliff/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the numbers say</h2>
<p>Is post-election violence impossible in 2020 America? No. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">data suggests</a> it is unlikely. </p>
<p>Ninety-five percent of the 12,607 political demonstrations in the U.S. between May 24 and Sept. 19, 2020, were peaceful. There were 351 other kinds of incidents, including imposing curfews and perpetrating physical attacks. In 29 of those, there was violence against civilians, where 12 people were killed, nine of them by the police. And in an additional five drive-by shootings, three police officers were killed by the extremist group the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/19/magazine/boogaloo.html">Boogaloo Bois</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the number of people involved in the recent Black Lives Matter and COVID-19 protests, and the fact that <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">many were heavily armed</a>, these casualty figures are surprisingly low. According to <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">the data</a>, the majority of deaths were caused by police, not vigilantes or protesters, and all of the perpetrators (with the exception of two drive-by shooters), police and civilians alike, were taken into custody.</p>
<p>Like the U.S., France experienced protests and riots, in addition to multiple terrorist attacks, prior to Election Day. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/18/secret-plans-protect-le-pen-french-republic-emerge">There was even a government plan</a> to handle the potential violence and instability that might ensue if Le Pen were elected. And yet, as the most polarizing elections in decades concluded, there were few riots and no killing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="French riot policemen advance during clashes with protesters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French riot police clash with protesters at a demonstration against the presidential candidate for the far-right Front National party, Feb. 25, 2017 in Nantes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/french-riot-policemen-advance-during-clashes-with-news-photo/645260214?adppopup=true">Jean-Sebastien Evrard/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>So, what will happen in November?</h2>
<p>Researchers cannot perfectly predict political violence. Their analyses rely on the past. </p>
<p>Add to the equation a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-promised-this-kind-of-presidency--unpredictable-ad-hoc-and-impulsive/2018/03/10/e928b73e-23ef-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.html">notoriously unpredictable incumbent</a> against a backdrop of <a href="https://time.com/5876599/election-2020-coronavirus/">unprecedented social and economic conditions</a>, and making accurate predictions about potential post-election bedlam is impossible, as much as scholars and others may try.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>While I think some concern is valid, it is important to remember that there is a big difference between using a call to arms to mobilize your voters and instill fear in the other party’s supporters, and staging a post-election insurrection, which could subject its instigators to charges of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381">sedition, if not high treason</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the three factors discussed here suggest that fears of widespread violence by vigilantes and activists during and after Election Day should be treated as fears, not as a probable outcome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In the past, Ore Koren received funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Are the conditions ripe in the US for violence before, during or after the presidential election?Ore Koren, Assistant Professor, Indiana University Bloomington; International Security Fellow, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1456282020-09-09T15:26:13Z2020-09-09T15:26:13ZHow to hold elections safely and uphold democracy during the COVID-19 pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356972/original/file-20200908-16-13dpl0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A campaign poster of John Magufuli of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party who is seeking re-election as president in October. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ericky Boniphace/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Free and fair elections face a new kind of threat. In addition to scheming leaders and compromised electoral commissions, there is now the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.</p>
<p>In response, a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343787629_How_to_hold_elections_safely_and_democratically_during_the_COVID-19_pandemic">new report</a> published by the British Academy sets out how elections can be held safely and democratically amid COVID-19. Edited by renowned political scientist Sarah Birch, it covers a range of topics, including how to establish health protocols and manage the risk of election violence. The report sets out the options for international election observers.</p>
<p>This is critically important because despite the health crisis, there will be no letup in controversial elections – starting with Tanzania in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/tanzania-presidential-election-held-october-28-200721100331444.html">October</a> and the United States in <a href="https://ig.ft.com/us-election-2020/">November</a>. International observation will not insulate these polls from malpractice, but it will make it less likely and allow it to be exposed. </p>
<p>Yet the kind of observation carried out by the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">Carter Centre</a>, <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/election-observation-missions-eueoms_en">European Union </a>, <a href="http://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/default.aspx?Lang=En">Organisation of American States</a>, and other international organisations requires flying large numbers of people between countries. It is therefore one of the election activities threatened by the pandemic. </p>
<p>The report looks at how the observation industry can best adapt. It concludes that, instead of simply introducing short-term COVID-19 guidelines and protocols to get through the crisis, <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/press-release-how-to-hold-elections-democratically-and-safely-during-covid19/">observers should</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>look for new ways to harness technology and build stronger partnerships between domestic and international groups. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>By doing this they will be able to both respond to the COVID-19 challenge and more effectively counter new forms of electoral manipulation. </p>
<h2>Importance of election observation</h2>
<p>International observation has come in <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/09/21/see-no-evil-how-international-election-observers-lost-credibility-during-the-august-elections/">for criticism</a> in recent years – sometimes unfairly – for failing to call out electoral manipulation that was later condemned by the courts. But it nonetheless remains a vital weapon in the fight against election rigging. The verdicts of foreign observers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000140">carry more weight</a> than those of their domestic counterparts, and are more likely to prompt international intervention.</p>
<p>Simply not observing elections would be the easiest way to manage health risks. But it would significantly increase a variety of important political risks. In Burundi, for example, a late requirement that international monitors <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/05/10/burundi-warns-eac-observers-will-be-quarantined-for-14-days/">would be quarantined</a> made observation impossible. In its absence, there was no significant attempt by ruling party leaders to stop the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/widespread-violence-rises-ahead-burundis-2020-election">intimidation of the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Even when observers do not condemn every electoral abuse, they can highlight and hence dissuade such explicit human rights violations. </p>
<p>So what options do observers have to respond to COVID-19? The report finds that they have a menu of three options to choose from: they can carry on regardless, observe through expats or work virtually and through partnerships.</p>
<h2>Carry on as normal - carefully</h2>
<p>The most obvious strategy is simply to observe “traditionally” while adopting strict social distancing protocols. This would involve dispatching teams of foreign nationals – usually between 15 and 140 people – earlier than usual in case they must quarantine. It would also mean holding fewer socially distanced meetings with key groups and individuals in the capital, and taking greater care when dispersing to polling stations. </p>
<p>Although this option represents the path of least resistance, it is problematic on health grounds and could mean <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/managing-elections-during-covid-19-pandemic.pdf">no international observation</a> in countries where the disease is spiking. It also represents a missed opportunity.</p>
<p>The health risk of flying in international observers is obvious. The missed opportunity is that the sector needs to adapt to the changing nature of electoral manipulation. More <a href="https://books.google.mw/books/about/How_to_Rig_an_Election.html?id=jaNUDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">subtle strategies of rigging</a> and the increasing <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1470165">digitisation</a> of electoral processes mean that the traditional model of international observation looks outdated.</p>
<p>By responding effectively to the pandemic, when constraints on public campaigning mean that there will be an even greater focus on digital politics, observers can also build a more effective model for the post-pandemic world.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-concerns-mount-over-integrity-of-us-elections-so-does-support-for-international-poll-monitors-144305">As concerns mount over integrity of US elections, so does support for international poll monitors</a>
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<h2>Observe through expats</h2>
<p>If observers are to evolve new ways of working to deal with changing electoral realities it is essential that they do not simply look for stop-gap responses to COVID-19 such as working through foreign nationals already resident in the country.</p>
<p>This may at first appear to be a tempting option as it would enable observation groups to tap into a pool of people who would not need to travel, and would have greater knowledge of the context.</p>
<p>But it would also generate new problems. Most obviously, people who have spent a long time in a country may have developed political attachments that mean they are not seen as being independent. This undermines the fundamental point of international observation, which is to build teams around people who have no personal interest in the elections, and so are seen to be neutral.</p>
<p>It would also encourage observers to continue with business as usual just when they should be innovating.</p>
<h2>Observe virtually and through partnership</h2>
<p>A more radical alternative is for international observers to reduce the significance that they place on deploying their own staff on the ground, and to instead observe “virtually” and through partnerships with domestic organisations. While international donors already funding domestic civil society groups, and international observers do engage with their domestic counterparts, this rarely takes the form of a true partnership. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two local men and a woman wearing jackets idenifying them as election observers watch as a woman reads out results of the 2017 presidential election in Liberia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">International and local election observers monitor the tallying of votes in Liberia recently.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Adopting three new ways of working could make observation more effective, both now and in the future:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Partnership</strong>. Working with domestic monitors and civil society groups, helping to fund their activities and then sharing the data collected, would reduce the need to deploy large numbers of international observers. Given that domestic groups deploy many more individuals to many more polling stations, working in this way would enhance both the geographical coverage of international missions and the resource base of domestic groups. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Virtual monitoring</strong>. With an increasing proportion of electoral activity taking place digitally and online, it makes sense for international observers to place greater emphasis on monitoring digital processes and online spaces such as Twitter and Facebook.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Crowd sourcing</strong>. Crowd sourcing (and then verifying) data from individuals on the ground can be a cost effective way of mapping the extent of electoral manipulation. A good example is how the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/4316">Ushahidi</a> platform famously tracked the violence in Kenya’s 2007/8 general elections.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>By allowing domestic and international groups to focus on areas in which they have particular strengths, this option would be more efficient and effective.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Of course, observing virtually and through partnership would generate new logistical challenges and require international observers to recruit new kinds of skills and experience. Observers would also need to be careful not to distort the priorities of domestic groups by adopting a rigid funding regime. But while global intergovernmental organisations don’t tend to do this at present, NGOs such as the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">Carter Centre</a> and the <a href="https://www.ndi.org/pvt">National Democratic Institute</a> have been using elements of this strategy for many years. There is no reason these programmes can’t be deepened and extended.</p>
<p>This approach would also yield other benefits, such as boosting suitability. One of the aims of the international observation should surely be to make itself redundant by helping to build the capacity and authority of domestic observers. This may be a very long-term goal, but it is an important one. In addition to giving ownership of the process to the citizens concerned, it would also help to show that criticisms of poor quality electoral processes are not the result of foreign <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-hits-back-at-germany-over-election-interference-criticism/a-40162026">“meddling”</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International observation will not insulate controversial polls – such as Tanzania’s in October – from malpractices, but will make them less likely and allow them to be exposed.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1094222019-01-08T06:04:31Z2019-01-08T06:04:31ZThe DR Congo is bracing for election results and it’s likely to get bloody. Here’s what you need to know<p>When Congolese gynaecologist Dr Denis Mukwege <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/mukwege/55721-denis-mukwege-nobel-lecture-2/">received his Nobel Peace Prize</a> a few months ago, he inferred responsibility for what happens in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to everyone who owns a smart phone. As well as diamonds and oil, the country is rich in the gold, coltan and cobalt vital to the production of the smart phone in your pocket. </p>
<p>But it is also rich in strife. The DRC is holding its breath while the electoral commission decides the results of elections held on December 30, 2018. The Congolese constitution <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/drc-president-joseph-kabila-seek-term-pm-180612163432778.html">limits presidents</a> to two five-year terms. But current president, Joseph Kabila, has now been president for 18 years.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1081247488256995329"}"></div></p>
<p>But that may be about to change. Martin Fayulu, the man supported by a former rebel commander who had been previously charged (<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba">but later acquitted</a>) with allowing rape and crimes against humanity under his leadership, may have won the election away from the ruling party.</p>
<p>But though one of the most trusted institutions in the country, the Catholic church – which deployed tens of thousands of election observers – announced it knew of a clear winner, the results can only legally be declared by the electoral commission. And the commission <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/dr-congo-edge-presidential-election-results-delayed-190105181501718.html">announced further delays</a> in the results over the weekend.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/poll-in-the-drc-looms-but-the-election-is-unlikely-to-bring-change-107235">Poll in the DRC looms. But the election is unlikely to bring change</a>
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<p>In the meantime, however, the New York Times has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/world/africa/fayulu-congo-presidential-vote-catholic.html">announced Fayulu’s</a> win. Anticipating violence and unrest, the US has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/us-sends-troops-ahead-of-possible-congo-election-protests/2019/01/05/635dae74-10cb-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b2ca4ef208d4">sent troops to neighbouring countries</a> to protect US citizens and diplomatic facilities. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the UN’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/un-security-council-to-meet-on-drc-elections-20190104">Security Council</a> met to discuss the issue on Friday. Although the meeting was closed to the public, it is known the Council was unable to agree on steps forward. There is to be another meeting in an open session in New York on Tuesday.</p>
<p>So, what is actually going on in the DRC?</p>
<h2>Who were the lead candidates?</h2>
<p>President Joseph Kabila had <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drcs-shadary-pro-kabila-loyalist-blacklisted-by-the-eu-20181217">handpicked the government’s candidate</a> to run in the elections. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46447089">Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary</a> had been Interior Minister and enjoyed the full resources of the government for his campaign, including unlimited access to state-run media outlets. </p>
<p>Shadary is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/eu-renews-sanctions-dr-congo-ruling-party-candidate-181211053903725.html">subject to an EU travel ban</a>, asset freeze and sanctions. This is due to his role in obstructing Congo’s electoral process and carrying out a crackdown against protesters angry over the vote which had been delayed for years.</p>
<p>The government is good at <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/17/dr-congo-campaigning-violently-suppressed">repressing political opposition</a>. During previous elections, SMS communication was cancelled. But this year the government also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/01/drc-electoral-fears-rise-as-internet-shutdown-continues">turned off the internet</a>. Key independent radio and television programs <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/01/drc-electoral-fears-rise-as-internet-shutdown-continues">have been closed</a> and reporters ejected from the country. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1081328243620409344"}"></div></p>
<p>In turn, opposition parties have struggled to form coalitions or campaigns to topple the government democratically. In a landmark sign of cooperation, seven opposition parties banded together to endorse a single candidate, Martin Fayulu, to run against the ruling party’s pick. </p>
<p>But that agreement barely lasted 24 hours before the parties with the largest membership <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/13/congo-oppositions-electoral-pact-to-fight-ruling-party-collapses">withdrew their support</a> to run their own leaders instead. </p>
<p>After the pact collapsed, former warlord, Jean-Pierre Bemba maintained his support for Fayulu. Bemba had returned to the DRC after <a href="https://theconversation.com/bemba-acquittal-overturns-important-victory-for-sexual-violence-victims-99948">being imprisoned</a> at the Hague for charges he allowed his troops to use sexual violence in war crimes and crimes against humanity when he deployed them to the neighbouring Central African Republic. Bemba’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/08/former-congo-leader-jean-pierre-bemba-wins-war-crimes-appeal-international-criminal-court">conviction was later</a> overturned on technical grounds.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bemba-acquittal-overturns-important-victory-for-sexual-violence-victims-99948">Bemba acquittal overturns important victory for sexual violence victims</a>
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<p>Despite this record, he was a popular choice to run against the current president but was deemed ineligible by the electoral commission due to witness tampering charges that had been upheld by the International Criminal Court. So, Fayulu prevailed. </p>
<p>Fayulu is a wealthy businessman, a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-12/former-exxon-manager-leads-congo-opposition-s-bid-for-presidency">former Manager at Exxon Mobil</a> who has been politically active in opposition for many years. He was even injured when government forces fired on opposition protesters in the capital in 2006. </p>
<p>He has promised to create an environment conducive to business and investment in the DRC, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-candidates/candidates-to-succeed-kabila-after-congos-presidential-election-idUSKBN1OH017">to revise mining and oil contracts</a>. This won’t necessarily improve the lives of the average person as oil is <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/04/04/politics-and-oil-unseen-drivers-violence-congo-s-ituri-province">seen as a driver</a> of conflict and displacement in the parts of the country with such reserves. </p>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>Many state functions fail in the DRC. The <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update">country ranks</a> 176 out of a possible 189 on the Human Development Index. In the <a href="http://poll2018.trust.org/country/?id=democratic-republic-of-the-congo">latest Reuters Poll</a>, it came in as the seventh worst country in the world to be a woman. An estimated 70% of Congolese have <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/fact-sheets/usaiddrc-fact-sheet-health">little or no access</a> to health care. Serious diseases are rife, with <a href="https://www.who.int/csr/don/13-December-2018-ebola-drc/en/">a current Ebola outbreak in the country</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/congos-controversial-voting-machines-start-arriving-idUSKCN1MU0MJ">made questionable decisions</a> about the election logistics in the years and months leading up to the poll. Early in December one of their warehouses was burned to the ground, including the thousands of electronic voting machines stored there. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/QE2yBGaG6zc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An electoral commission warehouse in the DRC.</span></figcaption>
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<hr>
<p>In the lead up to the election, more than one million voters who live in largely opposition-held areas (and those facing the Ebola outbreak) were told they <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-29/almost-a-million-congolese-denied-vote-because-of-ebola/10672976">would not be allowed to vote</a> for health and security reasons. But <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-31/congo-bars-1-million-from-election-voting-over-ebola-outbreak/10674582">mock elections were staged</a> in the area to show they were able to do so.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://undocs.org/S/2018/1133">United Nations Security Council published a report</a> of “major security incidents including attacks against civilians, security forces and United Nations peacekeepers in many provinces,” as well as illegal importation of military materiel. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/05/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">Human Rights Watch have reported</a> violence, widespread irregularities and voter suppression during the election.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drcs-flawed-election-means-for-emerging-democratic-culture-in-africa-109410">What DRC's flawed election means for emerging democratic culture in Africa</a>
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<p>Given Fayulu is not the government candidate, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/dr-congo-edge-presidential-election-results-delayed-190105181501718.html">further violence</a> is likely. The President has shown his reluctance to let go of power. He and his party have the capacity to either announce Shadary the winner of the election, regardless of the count; or to simply refuse to give up power. </p>
<p>Either way, it is looking more and more likely it will get bloody.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Hutchinson is a member of the Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security. </span></em></p>The US has sent troops to countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of Congo in anticipation of violence and unrest once the election results are announced.Susan Hutchinson, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015112018-08-14T22:25:25Z2018-08-14T22:25:25ZHow Cambodia’s prime minister rigged an election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231781/original/file-20180813-2912-vhcme4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen weaves a traditional cotton scarf In Phnom Penh in June. He won the recent Cambodia election in a landslide after literally rigging the vote by banning the main opposition party, among other tricks. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Heng Sinith)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won a recent landslide victory in the Southeast Asian country. </p>
<p>After outlawing the main opposition party that challenged the ruling CPP, Hun Sen secured more than <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/hun-sen-easily-wins-every-province-in-cambodian-election-10572630">80 per cent of the popular vote and well over 100 of the 125 contested seats</a> in the National Assembly. Despite calls to boycott the election, voter turnout was around 82 per cent, or about 6.88 million people. </p>
<p>The response from the international community has been split. </p>
<p>Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States have expressed “<a href="https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/three-nations-disappointed-elections?utm_source=Phnompenh+Post+Main+List&utm_campaign=f39fa3800d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_31_04_23&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_690109a91f-f39fa3800d-62207109">profound disappointment</a>” with the lack of opposition participation. Regional countries and populist European leaders, on the other hand, have endorsed the result.</p>
<p>The re-election of Prime Minister Hun Sen and his CPP contributes to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/democracy-crisis-freedom-house-releases-freedom-world-2018">growing global democratic crisis</a>. The government has taken advantage of the retreat of leading democracies to use blatant repression to suppress opponents, stifle media freedom and compromise rules-based institutions. </p>
<p>With the advent of digital technology and increased social media use in Cambodia, the government has also turned to “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power">sharp power</a>” to manipulate information, target crucial democratic institutions to exert control and change public opinion.</p>
<p>What went wrong this election?</p>
<h2>Pulled out all the stops</h2>
<p>In the last competitive elections in 2013, the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) gained significant ground with 44 per cent of the popular vote, shaving the CPP’s vote share to 48 per cent. In this election, Hun Sen and the CPP were determined to pull out all the stops to prevent a replay of 2013’s humiliating results.</p>
<p>In 2016, a prominent political commentator and activist Kem Ley was assassinated. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231784/original/file-20180813-2897-2b31kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kem Ley is seen in this 2016 photo.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The following year, the main opposition party, the CNRP, was dissolved and banned from contesting the election. The CNRP’s leader, Kem Sokha, was arrested on trumped-up charges of “<a href="https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/nrp-leader-kem-sokha-arrested-treason-134249/">treason</a>.” This move followed weeks of tensions involving the expulsion of the National Democratic Institute from the country and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cambodia-considers-new-law-targeting-fake-news/a-43323565">the shuttering of 32 radio stations</a> critical of the government, including the U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia and Voice of America. </p>
<p>A key assault on independent media included the imposition of back taxes on the leading newspaper, the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Hun-Sen-is-tempting-fate-in-Cambodia-s-election">Cambodia Daily</a>, resulting in its bankruptcy. Meantime, the Phnom Penh Post was sold to a Malaysian businessman from a public relations company that worked for the Cambodian government.</p>
<p>Journalists were also constrained by a list of arbitrary, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-s-controversial-press-guidelines-draw-concern/4419214.html">controversial rules</a> regarding how they cover elections. They were prohibited from having their “own ideas to make conclusions,” asking detailed questions about the election result or from “interfering” at the voting booths by talking to voters. Cambodian journalists also routinely deal with <a href="http://www.aseantoday.com/2018/05/the-collapse-of-cambodias-free-press/">phone-tapping and death threats</a>, and are forced to self-censor.</p>
<p>Other drastic measures to tilt the level playing field included opposition harassment, voter intimidation and vote-buying. While small parties were allowed to contest, the <a href="https://anfrel.org/anfrel-2018-cambodia-pre-election-assessment-report/">Asian Network for Free Elections</a> (ANFREL) reported the anti-regime parties faced harassment from government officials, creating “a noxious pre-election environment characterized by impunity, threats and intimidation.”</p>
<p>What’s more, high-ranking members of the <a href="https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/officials-dismiss-hrw-report">armed and police forces campaigned for the CPP</a> prior to the election, while others <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/threats-07172018164210.html">threatened to take away public services</a> to residents in certain provinces unless they voted. The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-s-controversial-press-guidelines-draw-concern/4419214.html">government also threatened people</a> who wanted to boycott elections. Additionally, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Hun-Sen-is-tempting-fate-in-Cambodia-s-election">vote-buying</a> was reported in which envelopes filled with 20,000 riel (approximately US$5) were handed out to voters at campaign rallies.</p>
<h2>Fake news and online censorship</h2>
<p>Aside from stifling the mainstream media, the government also cracked down on digital media to prevent the opposition from making any headway. To prevent digital technology from becoming a liberalizing or mobilizing tool, the government ramped up its surveillance of online activities. </p>
<p>In 2015, the controversial <a href="http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/pressrelease.php?perm=401">Law on Telecommunications</a> was passed to authorize the government’s eavesdropping on all telecommunications. Every phone conversation, text message, email or post on Facebook, if deemed to have violated “national security” clauses, could result in a 15-year prison sentence.</p>
<p>Weary of the spread of online “fake news” — also known as negative media coverage — staff from three government ministries were tasked to control news content, writing, audio, pictures, videos and any other media with “<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/cambodia-to-monitor-online-news-ahead-of-july-election">the intention to cause instability</a>” prior to the July 29 election. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231780/original/file-20180813-2903-1wzy18w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen waves to supporters just before the July 29 election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Heng Sinith)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Internet service providers were also required to have software and equipment to filter or block websites, accounts or social media pages that “broadcast in violation of the law.” </p>
<p>The government is now drafting “fake news” legislation similar to Malaysia’s “Anti-Fake News Act” to punish those found guilty of creating or distributing supposedly false information with up to two years imprisonment and fines of up to US$1,000.</p>
<p>Many of Cambodia’s government-approved media outlets, with their <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2149029/cambodias-fresh-news-it-journalism-chinese-characteristics">links to China</a>, are looking more like China’s authoritarian model, which should be cause for concern for proponents of democracy.</p>
<p>While internet penetration has increased in Cambodia, internet freedom has declined. Cambodia was <a href="https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/cambodia%E2%80%99s-looming-democratic-decline-eve-nationwide-elections-what-gives">ranked as having the worst environment</a> for clean elections and for freedom of political parties from 2000 to 2015 in Southeast Asia. Once a thriving and open media hub, Cambodia now sits at 142 in the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/cambodia">World Press Freedom Index</a>.</p>
<h2>Divided international community</h2>
<p>The international community’s response to Cambodia’s sham election is divided. The U.S. and the EU, who provided aid to Cambodia after its first UN-administered election in 1993, cut electoral assistance and suspended funding prior to the vote. On the other hand, <a href="https://www.voacambodia.com/a/former-opposition-mp-calls-for-japan-boycott-of-general-election/4419577.html">Russia, South Korea, Japan and China</a> have remained loyal donors. </p>
<p>While Russia provided election monitors, China and Japan supplied election ballot boxes and booths. China also promised <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2151495/chinas-pledges-more-military-aid-cambodia-prepares">US$100 million in military aid</a> to boost ties with Cambodia prior to the election.</p>
<p>Despite calls from local election watchdogs not to send observers, Cambodia’s National Election Committee (NEC) reported there were more than 50,000 observers, including some from China, Myanmar and Singapore, who participated in election monitoring. And a group of European populist and nationalist politicians from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Czech Freedom and Direct Democracy Party, the Austrian Freedom Party and other right-wing party leaders also descended on Cambodia to observe and endorse the national election.</p>
<p>The CPP’s victory does not bode well for Cambodian democracy. Given the failure of international sanctions to have any effect, it is likely Cambodia will slide further into electoral authoritarianism in the coming years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Netina Tan receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and International Development of Research Centre (IDRC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cassandra Preece receives funding from McMaster University.</span></em></p>The re-election of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen contributes to the growing global democratic crisis. Here’s why.Netina Tan, Associate Professor, McMaster UniversityCassandra Preece, Political Science, MA Student, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/990652018-07-02T22:25:56Z2018-07-02T22:25:56ZWhy the public needs more say on data consultations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225359/original/file-20180628-117374-1gbhxjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The transformative nature of our move to a data-driven economy and society means that any data strategy will have long-lasting effects. That's why the Canadian government needs to ask the right questions to the right people in its ongoing national consultations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The federal government’s recent <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2018/06/government-of-canada-launches-national-consultations-on-digital-and-data-transformation.html">announcement of national consultations on “digital and data transformation”</a> was a long time coming. It’s been clear for years that “Big Data” and digital communication technologies are reshaping the foundations not only of our economy, but of society itself, and must be addressed comprehensively. </p>
<p>The Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development will be holding a series of regional roundtables with business, academic and civil society organizations that will include women, Indigenous peoples and other under-represented groups. <a href="http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/084.nsf/eng/home">Canadians can also submit comments online</a>. </p>
<p>These consultations demonstrate that the government recognizes the need for input from Canadians in designing a strategy that will benefit all Canadians.</p>
<p>But while it would be easy to say “finally!” and feel gratitude that the government is going to talk with Canadians about how to address one of the biggest social issues of our time, the consultations’ primary focus on the economic aspects of data governance is too restrictive. It raises questions about whether it will adequately address the breadth of issues a national data strategy must cover.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225360/original/file-20180628-117436-sglls1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Navdeep Bains is seen in the House of Commons during Question Period in Ottawa in June.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/ Patrick Doyle</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The consultation does get two important things right. It is heartening that Navdeep Bains, the innovation, science and economic development minister, is calling for a diversity of public viewpoints given the all-encompassing nature of the issue. </p>
<p>Also, relying on structured questionnaires rather than just asking Canadians to submit briefs on a “data strategy” will go some way toward compensating for the general lack of deep public understanding of these issues. </p>
<p>That said, some background briefs explaining what something as seemingly simple as what “personal data” actually is would be helpful in producing informed responses. </p>
<h2>Too narrow</h2>
<p>However, despite the emphasis on a diversity of viewpoints, the framing of the consultations themselves is much too narrow. </p>
<p>It emphasizes data governance as primarily an economic and innovation issue, rather than viewing it from a wider perspective that emphasizes both its social and economic elements. That the <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4284194/canadians-data-cows-federal-action/">consultations have already begun</a>, with a roundtable featuring 20 industry leaders being held on the day of the announcement, further suggests the unbalanced nature of this process.</p>
<p>Canada’s place in the global data economy is an important issue, and the consultation’s questions do a good job of addressing this particular topic. However, what’s missing is a broader appreciation of data’s place in the wider society.</p>
<p>The possibility that some data should never be collected is not presented as an option in the online consultation questions. For example, should companies be permitted to design or operate facial-recognition systems that amass biometric data, and under what circumstances should governments be permitted to do so? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-time-we-demanded-the-protection-of-our-personal-data-94960">It's time we demanded the protection of our personal data</a>
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</em>
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<p>The issue of the government’s collection or use of data isn’t addressed. This is a particularly important question given the emerging research highlighting the fact that algorithms and big data sets themselves contain inherent biases. </p>
<p>These issues are highly relevant to the consultations, given the increasingly tight relationships between the public and private sectors.</p>
<h2>Blind spots</h2>
<p>The online questionnaires also have some blind spots.</p>
<p>The issue of trust is linked only to data breaches, and not to the use of data for socially questionable purposes, such as micro-targeting of political ads. They neglect the possibility of social control of data (as opposed to individual or commercial ownership). </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-social-media-from-interfering-in-canadian-elections-93565">Preventing social media from interfering in Canadian elections</a>
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</em>
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<p>They treat privacy as merely a personal issue rather than as a collective one. For example, <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/how-the-golden-state-killers-dna-search-is-like-the-cambridge-analytica-scandal.html">one person’s decision to upload a DNA sample to an ancestry site can reveal sensitive genetic information about their entire family</a>. </p>
<p>The questionnaire also fails to mention the important issue of cross-border data flows. Free cross-border data flows can make it easier for Canadian data to leave the country, making it more difficult for the Canadian government to regulate Canadians’ data, while the benefits accrue to non-Canadian entities. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say these consultations won’t have value. But the value will be limited based on what we’ve seen so far. </p>
<p>A proper, full consultation on a national data strategy must begin from a digital-rights perspective of the kind being promoted by the <a href="https://digitalrightsnow.ca/">Digital Rights Now campaign</a>. This campaign, which is being run by the digital-rights organizations Tech Reset Canada, the Digital Justice Lab, and the Centre for Digital Rights, is calling for “a national conversation about digital rights” and a “digital rights strategy.” </p>
<p>Such a consultation and strategy would address innovation and prosperity issues, but within a context that emphasizes the effect of data governance on, “our quality of life, the governance of our economy, and the safety of our democracy.”</p>
<p>The transformative nature of our move to a data-driven economy and society means that any data strategy will have long-lasting effects. Asking the right questions, to the right people, in the right way, is the crucial first step toward creating a policy that is in the best interest of all Canadians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99065/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blayne Haggart receives funding from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Development Grant (SSHRC) and from the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Tusikov receives funding from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Development Grant (SSHRC) and from the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). </span></em></p>The Canadian government is right to hold public consultations on digital and data transformation given how profoundly it affects society at large. But the scope is far too narrow.Blayne Haggart, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityNatasha Tusikov, Assistant Professor, Criminology, Department of Social Science, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974802018-06-01T08:12:50Z2018-06-01T08:12:50ZEven Africa’s most entrenched presidents are still preferable to dictators<p>There are fewer and fewer outright dictatorships in Africa, but even as elections are held across the continent, still the same faces have occupied the same elected presidential offices year after year.</p>
<p>All over Africa, leaders are using elections to legitimise themselves and shore up international support – or at least to make sure the rest of the world tolerates them. An uneasy but still secure tolerance is extended to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-cant-achieve-reconciliation-without-fixing-its-democracy-94925">Paul Kagame</a> of Rwanda, who’s extended his tenure via a democratic referendum – and the president of neighbouring Burundi, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/burundi-court-validates-vote-to-extend-presidents-tenure-20180531">Pierre Nkurunziza</a>, has followed suit.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, parties with historically massive majorities, including the ANC in South Africa, know that they still have electoral breathing space – even after their leaders are exposed as failures and even <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zumas-trial-matters-for-south-africas-constitutional-democracy-94323">fraudsters</a>. Party loyalties take a long time to fade. Promises for a better future are easily made by incumbents and oppositions alike – except that whereas incumbents can point to their record in office, most oppositions can’t.</p>
<p>Most oppositions haven’t been given the chance to become governments, despite election after election. There are conspicuous exceptions, such as Ghana and Zambia, though the latter is showing signs of a new authoritarianism. And some strong ruling parties – in Ethiopia, for instance – are yielding to huge public protest and starting to incorporate opposition personnel and policies. </p>
<p>Provided a ruling party is strong enough not to lose office, it can afford to do this in the name of sustaining itself. Even Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, after some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2008/jun/23/zimbabwecrisisthabombekisr">protracted interventionist diplomacy</a> from South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, gave in and formed a coalition government with the opposition in 2008. Then again, he went on to defeat that opposition once more in 2013.</p>
<h2>Till the bitter end</h2>
<p>Until he was ousted at the end of 2017, Mugabe was the ultimate presidential limpet. He subjected himself to regular elections, but somehow, for nearly a quarter of a century, his popularity and that of his party proved remarkably enduring. In his latter years that changed dramatically – and Mugabe is now gone. But today, his successor and party comrade Emerson Mnangagwa hopes to secure an electoral victory of his own <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwe-elections-a-major-test-for-mnangagwa-20180530">in July</a> – promising, as Mugabe did, to win it freely and fairly.</p>
<p>That Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF party will win is highly likely. The opposition, having lost its charismatic leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/morgan-tsvangirai-the-man-who-dared-zimbabweans-to-dream-again-91925">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> to cancer, has a new young and untested leader – but not everyone in the opposition wants to follow him. At time of writing, there are at least two major MDC parties, with several splinter parties that were once part of the MDC or ZANU-PF.</p>
<p>It would take a remarkable swing to the MDC, now run by Nelson Chamisa, to make ZANU-PF lose its nerve and resort to irregularities and the massive powers of incumbency. The party’s contingency tactics are all-too familiar: sudden splurges of public spending in electorally volatile areas, police forces being mysteriously slow to permit opposition rallies, electoral espionage into the plans and strategies of the opposition parties – all this even before any intervention in the vote-tallying itself. </p>
<h2>The bad and the ugly</h2>
<p>This sort of thing is unedifying, to be sure – but it needs to be kept in perspective. </p>
<p>These “masquerade democracies” aren’t all that outlandish by global standards. At least they <em>have</em> opposition parties – which is more than can be said for China, among others. While many of sub-Saharan Africa’s opposition leaders face intimidation, their travails generally pale in comparison to the deadly government retribution meted out in Russia. And then there are the various Western powers, especially the UK and the US, where two long-established parties simply trade power back and forth while their governing institutions remain largely unchanged.</p>
<p>Even where real change is not forthcoming, elections at least allow for some sort of political debate and airing of political demands. Even if the incumbent government knows it’s going to win, it has to make a show of listening to the public. Of course, as in Uganda, an uneasy government can imprison or prosecute opposition leaders to stop them leading a national campaign – but most governments’ tactics are now more sophisticated and subtle than that.</p>
<p>Yes, the results are less than ideal, to put it mildly. But better than out-and-out dictatorship? The answer can only be yes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many African elections are less than ideal. But is the rest of the world really that much better?Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/938642018-03-23T13:03:37Z2018-03-23T13:03:37ZClaims about Cambridge Analytica’s role in Africa should be taken with a pinch of salt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211682/original/file-20180323-54903-1vik3c8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, left, and his successor Muhammadu Buhari. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Deji Yake</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election manipulation is a hot story. In the last few days, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/22/cambridge-analytica-scandal-the-biggest-revelations-so-far">Cambridge Analytica</a>, which claims to use data to change behaviour including that of voters, has been accused of breaching Facebook rules in its efforts to collect personal data and use them to bring Donald Trump to power. </p>
<p>Cambridge Analytica is accused of interfering in elections on a very broad canvas. In Nigeria, it’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/cambridge-analyticas-ruthless-bid-to-sway-the-vote-in-nigeria">said to have used underhand tactics</a> to try and secure the re-election of then President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015. </p>
<p>Allegations in Kenya have focused on claims that Cambridge Analytica helped president Uhuru Kenyatta to retain power in 2017 by designing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/20/how-cambridge-analytica-poisoned-kenyas-democracy/?utm_term=.6236050c6e12">divisive campaigns that demonised opposition</a> candidate Raila Odinga, bringing the country closer to civil conflict.</p>
<p>But caution is required, at least when it comes to the stories about interference in Nigeria and Kenya. The company’s impact has in fact been massively exaggerated as a result of claims made by Cambridge Analytica itself.</p>
<p>Speaking about the campaign of Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party, managing director <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-facebook-cambridge-analytica-kenya/cambridge-analytica-stage-managed-kenyan-presidents-campaigns-uk-tv-idUKKBN1GV302">Mark Turnbull</a> has been caught on camera claiming to have “staged the whole thing”. Unsurprisingly, given the willingness of employees of the firm to talk about the use of underhand strategies such as honey traps and fake news, opposition leaders are up in arms. National Super Alliance official Norman Magaya has called for a full investigation into Cambridge Analytica’s role, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43471707">accusing</a> it, and the ruling party, of trying to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>subvert the people’s will.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But while such investigations need to be conducted and questions raised by the opposition need to be answered, we should also ask a prior question: can Cambridge Analytica deliver on its claims? </p>
<p>The evidence from Africa is no. </p>
<p>This is not to say that Cambridge Analytica doesn’t present a threat to democracy, or that it should not be ashamed of itself or face investigation. But it is to say that its impact in Africa has been over-hyped because it serves a variety of interests to do so. </p>
<h2>Failures in Nigeria and Kenya</h2>
<p>In Nigeria, the company was brought in to save President Jonathan by wealthy supporters desperate for him to stay in power. It failed. In the 2015 elections, Jonathan became the first ever Nigerian leader to <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/04/economist-explains-2">lose at the ballot box</a>. In fact he didn’t only lose. He was soundly beaten by an opposition party competing with one hand tied behind its back in a political system that conferred massive advantages of incumbency.</p>
<p>There are also reasons to think that the company’s impact has been overstated in Kenya. It is true that Kenyatta was eventually declared the winner of the election – though the first contest was nullified by the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-11-15/why-kenyas-supreme-court-cant-solve-countrys-electoral-crisis">Supreme Court for procedural irregularities</a> and the opposition did not take part in the re-run – but there is little evidence that Cambridge Analytica’s much vaunted ability to manipulate “big data” was the reason for this.</p>
<p>Take the question of targeted social media campaigns. It is true that material was circulated attacking Odinga as a <a href="http://www.pressreader.com/china/global-times/20170718/281706909732026">dangerous and irresponsible leader</a>. Cambridge Analytica may have advised the government to adopt this strategy – although we know that some of the worst videos were actually made by another company <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/955/press-release-texas-media-company-hired-trump-behind-kenyan-presidents-viral">Harris Media</a>. </p>
<p>But even if they did, there are two reasons to doubt that it was a new or particularly effective tactic.</p>
<p>First, these messages do not appear to have been targeted. Ahead of the elections, and as part of a comparative research project on elections in Africa, we set up multiple profiles on Facebook to track social media and political adverts, and found no evidence that different messages were directed at different voters. Instead, a consistent negative line was pushed on all profiles, no matter what their background. </p>
<p>Second, the <a href="http://www.dotsavvyafrica.com/the-5-biggest-social-media-platforms-in-kenya/">vast majority of Kenyans</a> are not on Facebook, and so there is no reason to think that messages circulated in this way would swing the wider electorate. Instead, surveys show that radio remains the <a href="http://www.itwebafrica.com/unified-communications/657-kenya/238860-kenyans-dont-trust-news-about-the-general-elections-that-are-shared-on-social-media-geopoll-596f3d39b1b25">major source of information</a>, and that Kenyans are highly sceptical of the reliability of social media.</p>
<p>In other words, the campaign led by Cambridge Analytica does not seem to have been that different to the ones that preceded it. For all the claims of a hi-tech innovative strategy, their real role appears to have been to advocate negative campaigning. But there is nothing new about this. </p>
<p>Back in 2007, when Raila Odinga’s opposition appeared to be on the brink of winning power, his rivals claimed that his victory would lead to the country’s collapse and circulated flyers with his <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/108/430/1.full.pdf">head superimposed on Idi Amin’s body</a> to drive the point home. This was well before Cambridge Analytica was even formed, and stands as proof that Kenyan leaders don’t need foreign consultants to tell them the value of ethnic scaremongering.</p>
<p>It is also important to keep in mind that you cannot simply use messaging to win votes in a system in which the ethnicity, patronage and credibility of candidates are <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-elections-are-much-more-than-just-a-ruthless-game-of-thrones-81957">major drivers of voter behaviour</a>. To mobilise voters to the polls, leaders reinforce their support base by attending funerals and giving generously to the bereaved; attending church and contributing to building funds; turning up at parent-teacher meetings and paying school fees for poor children. </p>
<p>To show generosity at these events is to demonstrate that the candidate acknowledges the morality of voters’ claims and will not forget them once elected. If you don’t do this you will not win, no matter what your PR team is doing.</p>
<h2>Exaggerated claims</h2>
<p>The tendency to exaggerate Cambridge Analytica’s powers is no accident. Exaggerated claims are part and parcel of the company’s <a href="https://ca-political.com/?__hstc=163013475.98b7519b832f0a523b96ce41a80956c6.1521732839909.1521732839909.1521732839909.1&__hssc=163013475.1.1521732839910&__hsfp=700733249">marketing strategy</a>. For journalists, the more powerful the company, the bigger the story. For opposition parties, the more effective Cambridge Analytica is seen to be, the more it can be blamed for an electoral defeat.</p>
<p>There is also something more profound at work: the suspicion that Africa is the victim of European or American schemes is a powerful one. Many, in Africa and elsewhere, will see this as further evidence of that eternal truth. And we are all increasingly suspicious of the power of big data, uneasily aware that we may not have fully grasped the small print of our deal with the tech companies. </p>
<p>We may have good reason for that suspicion – but we should beware of flattering those firms by exaggerating their power and reach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93864/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Willis receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1 . </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman receives funding from UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant ES.L002345.1.</span></em></p>Claims about Cambridge Analytica’s role in elections in Nigeria and Kenya have been overstated.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickJustin Willis, Professor of History, Durham UniversityNic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/870722017-12-06T11:19:35Z2017-12-06T11:19:35ZVenezuela’s elections are just a new way for Maduro to cling to power<p><em>Leer <a href="https://theconversation.com/bajo-maduro-las-elecciones-venezolanas-son-otra-forma-de-mantener-el-poder-88615">en español</a>.</em></p>
<p>Nicolás Maduro, president of crisis-stricken Venezuela, will run for reelection in Venezuela in 2018, <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/13525">Vice President Tarick Al Aisammi announced</a> in a Nov. 29 press conference. </p>
<p>Just a few months ago, it would have seemed unlikely that the Maduro regime would opt for elections as a way to hold onto power. After three years in office, Venezuela is in full <a href="https://theconversation.com/thousands-flee-violence-and-hunger-in-venezuela-seeking-asylum-in-the-united-states-74495">political and economic meltdown</a>, with hyperinflation expected to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-10/imf-sees-venezuelan-inflation-rate-rising-beyond-2-300-in-2018">top 2,300 percent this year</a>. </p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics/venezuelas-maduro-approval-rises-to-23-percent-after-trump-sanctions-poll-idUSKCN1C8037">a 20 percent approval rating</a>, in October the government unilaterally <a href="https://www.apnews.com/005de3f24fd84d1bba9217712156a211/Venezuela-braces-for-turbulence-after-recall-is-stalled">canceled a presidential recall referendum</a> called by the opposition. It also put off gubernatorial elections, originally scheduled for December 2016, for nine months. </p>
<p>But when they were finally held, on Oct. 15, Maduro’s Socialists saw <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/americas/venezuela-election.html?_r=0">surprising success</a>. In an election <a href="http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-41630893">widely denounced as fraudulent</a>, three-quarters of states in Venezuela elected governors from the ruling party. </p>
<p>Now, according to <a href="https://politikaucab.net/2017/11/10/el-dios-jano/">analysis</a> from the Political Studies Center at Andrés Bello Catholic University, where I am director, Maduro will once again <a href="https://venezuelablog.org/voter-confusion-caused-electoral-center-changes-testimony-table-witness/">make use of voter frustration and confusion</a> to take on its opposition at the ballot box.</p>
<p>First up: the country’s Dec. 10 mayoral elections. If the Socialists win big there, I expect Maduro will call an early presidential election in the first half of 2018. </p>
<h2>Winning by not losing</h2>
<p>Despite the Maduro regime’s lack of popular support, I believe that ruling-party mayoral candidates could actually triumph in upcoming elections. </p>
<p>The regime has clearly been reprising the two tactics that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-venezuela-opposition-took-risk-that-might-not-pay-off/2017/10/16/187e41f6-b27c-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.fd8ea2f89911">worked for him back in October</a>: suppressing turnout among opposition voters and using pork-barrel incentives to motivate his own base. </p>
<p>In other words, Maduro’s electoral strategy seems to be less about winning democratic legitimacy than about ensuring that his opponents lose it. </p>
<p>Abstention should be what most concerns Venezuela’s beleaguered opposition movement. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/10/17/venezuelas-democracy-is-fake-but-the-governments-latest-election-win-was-real/?utm_term=.e56b0cb321ae">Post-election analysis of October’s regional elections</a> shows that abstention – in large part due to voter suppression and manipulation – played a major role in the Maduro regime’s big win.</p>
<p>The regime-controlled National Electoral Council used dirty tricks to confuse voters. It kept candidates who’d withdrawn from the governor’s race on the ballot and <a href="http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/oposicion/ocariz-denuncio-irregularidades-durante-las-regionales-miranda_208048">relocated voting centers</a> in opposition-dominated areas into high-crime neighborhoods just hours before voting began.</p>
<p>The government also influenced voter opinion using disinformation. Spreading fake news about having <a href="http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/venezuela/355459/maduro-dialogo-oposicion-avance">purportedly reached agreements with opposition parties</a>, it stoked doubt among the many Venezuelans who oppose all engagement with Maduro’s authoritarian regime. </p>
<p>This split the opposition in the October elections. While some Venezuelans still see democratic elections as the only way out of this crisis, many others <a href="https://es.panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2017/09/27/trampas-del-chavismo-abstencion/">accused opposition parties of complicity with the regime</a> and refused to vote.</p>
<p>All the while, the government was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/venezuela-opposition-leaders-lopez-ledezma-jailed-170801142243482.html">persecuting popular opposition leaders</a>, disqualifying them from running.</p>
<h2>The race to 2018</h2>
<p>Now, as the Dec. 10 municipal elections approach, Maduro is again undermining the opposition to ensure a Socialist victory.</p>
<p>He’s been doing his best to <a href="https://venezuelablog.org/talk-talks-latest-push-dialogue-venezuela/">keep some opposition parties engaged in talks with the government</a>, asserting that <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Venezuelan-Opposition-Pulls-out-of-Continued-Dialogue-with-Government-20170926-0008.html">negotiations in the Dominican Republic</a> are making progress. In fact, as most commentators agree, these mediated talks have <a href="https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2017/01/19/el-vaticano-se-retiro-de-la-mesa-de-dialogo-en-venezuela/">long been fruitless</a>. </p>
<p>But insisting on negotiations helps Maduro deepen the divide within this <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-opposition-is-on-the-verge-of-collapse-86187">polarized, struggling opposition</a>. </p>
<p>The government has also sought to dampen criticism by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/world/americas/venezuela-leopoldo-lopez-political-prisoner.html?_r=0">releasing a few political prisoners</a> – typically not jailed dissident leaders but citizens who’ve been arrested for protesting. Simultaneously, it’s been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-17/venezuela-steps-up-crackdown-on-dissident-and-maduro-s-opponents">cracking down ever harder on resistance</a>. </p>
<p>All of this stirs up voter mistrust and confusion, making it less likely voters will head to the polls next week. It may also be stoking violence. On Nov. 29, a congressman <a href="http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/venezuela-es/article187920779.html">was shot</a> in his car. </p>
<p>Maduro is also catering to his own dwindling base. How does a president <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics/venezuelan-presidents-approval-rating-falls-to-nine-month-low-idUSKCN10Q28M">with record low approval</a> still even have supporters to motivate? The answer is patronage. </p>
<p>In September 2017, Maduro government introduced a new identity document called the <a href="http://www.hogaresdelapatria.org/2017/09/ultimo-listado-de-beneficiarios-del.html#axzz4zfiEsHJt">Carnet de la Patria</a>, which promised card-holders benefits like food and medicine in exchange for <a href="https://venezuelaparaelmundo.com/la-lealtad-porta-carnet-tiempos-vacas-flacas/">loyalty</a> to the regime. In a time of great scarcity, the offer of basic necessities was compelling. </p>
<p>Today, more than 12 million government employees and Venezuelan citizens – or about half the population – have the Carnet. Their gratitude helped Maduro’s Socialists attract over half a million more votes in October’s gubernatorial election than it had in the last legislative election, even though <a href="http://democraciaennumeros.org">nearly 90 percent of Venezuelans say their country’s crisis has worsened</a> in the past year.</p>
<p>Such voter inducement will surely help again in the upcoming mayoral elections. And when Maduro runs for president next year, Carnet beneficiaries will give him a substantial leg up.</p>
<h2>Internal dissent</h2>
<p>In other words, Maduro’s increasing turn toward “democratic” elections should not be understood to mean that this Socialist government enjoys the same wild support it did under Hugo Chávez. </p>
<p>The vast majority of Venezuelans <a href="http://democraciaennumeros.org">want a change in government</a>. Maduro also faces <a href="http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40283610">internal opposition within the Socialist Party</a>. He may be <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-04-15/chatter-venezuela-chooses-chavezs-heir">Chávez’s chosen successor</a>, but not everyone in government supports Maduro just because he’s heir to Chávez’s legacy. </p>
<p>This is why three of the four main opposition parties have decided to <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/10/31/59f895b5468aeb51138b46b3.html">boycott</a> municipal elections in December. Rather than run mayoral candidates in a fraudulent election, they say, they’re focusing on demanding fairer conditions for the 2018 presidential election. </p>
<p>There, they hope to capture voter anger and defeat the president fair and square. </p>
<p>They have their work cut out for them. Venezuelans demand new leadership, but that doesn’t mean they’ll trust anyone who opposes Maduro. To forge a future of freedom and democracy, Venezuela’s opposition must first regain the faith of the people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benigno Alarcón does nor receive any funding nor have any professional affiliations relevant to the subject of this article.</span></em></p>President Nicolás Maduro has announced he will run for reelection, a sign that Venezuela’s authoritarian regime now has an electoral strategy for beating the opposition.Benigno Alarcón, Director of the Center for Political Studies, Universidad Católica Andrés BelloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/860942017-11-29T12:29:19Z2017-11-29T12:29:19ZVenezuela’s government clings on by splitting the opposition and strong-arming the poor<p>Despite a crippling economic crisis, alarming social turmoil and a <a href="https://informe21.com/datanalisis">17% approval rating</a>, Nicolás Maduro’s government has racked up successive <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-what-chavezs-mentor-told-me-about-the-countrys-castro-inspired-road-to-ruin-80249">electoral victories</a> in recent months. It is now in a position to change the country’s constitution in its favour, and the opposition that rattled it so badly over the summer is in chaos.</p>
<p>After months of violence and killings, all the blood, sweat and tears Venezuela’s opposition activists, protesters and voters gave to the anti-Chavista cause seem to have gone down the drain. So how is this spectacularly unpopular government, which so recently seemed on the edge of collapse, shoring itself up? In a nutshell, with a combination of corruption, electoral meddling, and outright coercion.</p>
<p>One of its most powerful tools is the <em>Carnet de la Patria</em> (Homeland Card). This is an identity card ostensibly meant to improve the efficiency of government social programmes by linking everyone who requests and receives services and handouts to their government records. But, in reality, the card’s main function is to keep a tight grip on the state’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-workers/phone-calls-dismissal-threats-venezuela-pressures-state-workers-to-vote-idUSKBN1AE08P">2.8m</a> employees and also the millions of people seeking government assistance, many of whose livelihoods depend on it. </p>
<p>Because <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Al-menos-15-millones-de-venezolanos-tienen-Carnet-de-la-Patria-20170724-0048.html">15m</a> people are registered for the Homeland Card, it’s an effective means of controlling the poor population and ensuring their obedience. </p>
<p>Without registering for the card, Venezuelans <a href="http://infovzla.net/nacionales/murio-joven-que-le-negaron-atencion-medica-en-el-perez-carreno-por-no-tener-carnet-de-la-patria/">cannot access</a> public <a href="http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/gobierno/carnet-patria-integrara-sector-salud_83747">healthcare</a>, <a href="https://es.panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2017/08/21/maduro-coacciona-estudiantes/">universities</a>, or much-needed subsidised food provided in the <em>Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción</em> (<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f073edd2-4c78-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b">CLAP</a>) <a href="https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2017/06/15/claps-is-a-giant-scam/http://example.com/">box</a>, a food package containing basic products such as rice, pasta, lentils, corn flour and oil.</p>
<p>Because most of Venezuela’s productive farming and food production industries have been <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/ways-chavez-destroyed-venezuelan-economy/story?id=18239956">expropriated</a>, nationalised – and thereafter poorly managed or closed – this fertile country is struggling to produce enough food for domestic consumption. As a result, the basic foodstuffs in the CLAP box come from Mexico under a contract run by a <a href="http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2017/08/01/1178934">company owned</a> by Nicolás Maduro. </p>
<p>Maduro’s company is further bleeding Venezuela’s already cash-strapped state coffers by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-food/venezuelan-congress-says-200-million-wasted-on-low-income-food-packs-idUSKBN19704R">astronomical overbilling</a> for the CLAP box’s contents. Cardholders are charged approximately <a href="http://efectococuyo.com/economia/productos-clap-mexicanos-se-revenden-en-venezuela-al-doble-de-su-precio-real">US$34</a> to receive the monthly box, again inflating the suppliers’ margin. </p>
<p>In other words, food scarcity is another lucrative method for <em>Los Enchufados</em> (the “well-connected”) to further enrich themselves while keeping the masses under control. People have little option but to put up with it and do <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/venezuela-black-market-nicolas-maduro-1.3824555">whatever they must to survive</a>. It seems Venezuela’s current iteration of socialism works by keeping the masses perpetually close to the poverty line, forcing them to depend on handouts – and, by extension, on the leaders of an elusive “revolution”.</p>
<p>The Homeland Card also comes in very handy for the government when an election rolls around. </p>
<h2>Arms twisted</h2>
<p>Maduro-style socialism increasingly relies on outright electoral manipulation and intimidation. All cardholders were ordered to participate in July 2017’s hugely controversial <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-40776301">Constituent Assembly Election</a>. They were required to personally take a photo of their card as it was scanned by the voting machine and send it to a government official or line manager at work. Failure to do so would lead to the cancellation of government support and, for government employees, automatic dismissal from their jobs. </p>
<p>In other words, voters were forced to show loyalty by turning out at a manipulated election <a href="https://www.npr.org/2017/07/30/540448052/venezuelans-opposed-to-president-maduro-boycott-elections">despite an opposition boycott</a>. I personally know individuals who were fired from their jobs at local councils for not sending the expected photos to their line managers.</p>
<p>When the new Constituent Assembly ordered the electoral commission to hold state governor elections on October 15 2017, most opposition political parties decided to participate. According to reputable polling organisation <a href="http://diariodecaracas.com/politica/leon-en-elecciones-transparentes-oposicion-tendria-18-21-gobernaciones">Datanálisis</a>, had the 23 state elections been transparent, the opposition could have won 18-21 governorships. But as many expected, they were instead a clear win for the government – and not a clean one.</p>
<p>Irregularities were widespread: more than <a href="https://www.lapatilla.com/site/2017/10/23/mas-de-1-600-000-votos-no-tienen-una-huella-que-corresponda-a-algun-votante-denuncio-borges/">1.6m</a> votes bore erroneous fingerprints. More than 700,000 voters in pro-opposition areas were <a href="http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2444627&CategoryId=10717">relocated</a> to pro-government areas, and states such as Bolívar and Miranda saw <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/10/19/59e8ebf9ca474187108b45c0.html">reports of serious electoral interference</a> –discrepancies between votes in ballot boxes and votes cast at electronic voting machines. There are also reports of opposition observers being thrown out of voting centres by the military. In the end, the opposition won only five states. </p>
<h2>Home and dry</h2>
<p>The drama of the governors’ elections proved that the government has made great strides in its effort to keep the opposition divided. When prominent opposition leader Carlos Ocariz, the former mayor of the Sucre Municipality, announced he would run for the governorship of Miranda State, he was threatened with trumped-up corruption charges that would have barred him from office. Yet in the end he was permitted to stand. </p>
<p>Rumours soon spread that the government had offered to drop the charges against Ocariz if he revealed the whereabouts of an opposition agitator, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/mundo/media-40851753">Juan Caguaripano</a>, who was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-40907088">arrested in August</a> for his part in an attack on an army base. Rumours soon circulated that Ocariz had caved into the pressure and given up information leading to Caguaripano’s capture. It wasn’t clear if they were true, but once the rumours went viral, many Venezuelan social media users treated them as if they were. The story discredited Ocariz, his party and the <em>Mesa de la Unidad Democrática</em> (MUD) opposition alliance in one fell swoop.</p>
<p>The final blow for the fragile MUD alliance came when four recently elected governors from the opposition <em>Acción Democrática</em> party decided to take their seats in the hated Constituent Assembly. Without accepting the country’s new institutional rules, they would not have been able to take office – in other words, they subordinated themselves to the corrupt Chavista revolution rather than stay united against this increasingly authoritarian regime. </p>
<p>It seems the government has, for now, come through. The use of food and medicines as political weapons, the push to split the opposition via the Constituent Assembly, to test the impact of the Homeland Card at the ballot box and strengthen state authority in the governor elections – all these brazen efforts to consolidate the government’s corrupt power have apparently paid off. </p>
<p>All the while, everyday Venezuelans are still living in crisis. For the <em>Enchufados</em>, Hugo Chávez’s slogan “<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-venezuelas-revolutionary-dream-descended-into-chaos-75685">Homeland, Socialism, or Death</a>” still rings true, but for the people, “Homeland, Hunger and Death” is more in line with reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan Brading does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By resorting to all means necessary, Nicolás Maduro’s government has clawed its way back from the brink of collapse.Ryan Brading, Research Associate, Department of Development Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/859032017-10-19T04:18:30Z2017-10-19T04:18:30ZMaking voting both simple and secure is a challenge for democracies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190936/original/file-20171019-32358-1wb6z4y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The US compares relatively poorly with equivalent countries when it comes to voter registration.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Bria Hall</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent elections around the world have raised concerns about the procedures used for voter registration and their potential consequences. The effects include disenfranchisement (voters being prevented from casting a ballot) and voter rights, fraud and security, and mismanagement and accuracy.</p>
<p>It’s critical to strike the right trade-off between making registration accessible and making it secure. But how many countries are affected by these sorts of issues? And which is more problematic – lack of security or lack of inclusion?</p>
<h2>Our study</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/the-year-in-elections-2016-2017/">Perceptions of Electoral Integrity survey</a> asked experts for their assessments of electoral integrity in 161 countries that held 260 national elections from January 1 to June 30, 2017.</p>
<p>The study used three criteria to monitor the quality of the voter registration process: inclusion, accuracy, and security.</p>
<p>These aspects can be considered equally important to ensure all and only eligible citizens are able to vote. The items can be analysed separately and also combined into an index.</p>
<p>As illustrated below, the results show the quality of the voter registration process in Northern Europe and Scandinavia performed well, as did several Latin American countries like Brazil. </p>
<p>At the same time, voter registration proved problematic in many countries in Africa and the Middle East, as well as in India and parts of Asia.</p>
<p>The US compared relatively poorly with equivalent liberal democracies on voter registration. This is in no small measure due to the partisan polarisation over the issue, and past reliance on self-registration. By contrast, governments in many other countries register voters on their behalf.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=606&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=606&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190968/original/file-20171019-1052-m4pwnh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=606&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
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</figcaption>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=657&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=657&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=657&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190967/original/file-20171019-1062-b9d8p5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The quality of voter registration worldwide.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Inclusiveness versus security</h2>
<p>The global comparison below shows mean ratings on the measure of inclusion on the vertical axis. The measure of security is shown on the horizontal.</p>
<p>Some countries performed well on both indicators – notably Sweden, Denmark and Finland, as well as Slovakia, Costa Rica and the Czech Republic. </p>
<p>By contrast, many other places (located in the bottom left quadrant) performed poorly on both measures, such as Syria (which failed to allow citizens to vote if they had fled to neighbouring states as refugees), Haiti (which lacked the capacity to administer elections), Bahrain (with internal conflict), and Afghanistan (with high levels of electoral corruption).</p>
<p>Finally, several countries scored worse on inclusiveness than on security. In these elections, experts thought the more serious problem was the exclusion of eligible citizens.</p>
<p>These problems can arise for many reasons – such as disputed citizenship rights, attempts at voter suppression, lack of capacity to include young people, women, linguistic or ethnic minorities and hard-to-reach rural populations, or failing to maintain up-to-date electoral rolls.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190946/original/file-20171019-32355-bi8o8u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monitoring inclusion and security worldwide. Scale ranges from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). Regimes classified according to Freedom House.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Responding to the challenges</h2>
<p>So, the challenge is to strike the optimal balance between security and accessibility, to make ensure eligible citizens – and only eligible citizens – cast a ballot. Doing so strengthens public confidence in the electoral process and democracy.</p>
<p>Easier registration processes, such as the availability of online applications and same-day registration, usually strengthens voter turnout. But the introduction of more accessible registration without sufficient verification raises security risks of abuse and fraud. </p>
<p>In the US, parties are <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-voter-id-laws-discriminate-study/517218/">deeply polarised</a> over whether the use of strict photo ID at polling places helps maintain accurate and reliable lists, or whether this suppresses voting rights for eligible citizens who lack such ID. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/2012/02/14/pew-one-in-eight-voter-registrations-inaccurate-51-million-citizens-unregistered">2012 report</a> found many American states faced major challenges of accuracy, cost, and efficiency in their voter registration systems. Since then, they have <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/voter-registration-modernization">made many efforts</a> to upgrade electronic procedures by allowing citizens to register and check their records online.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration">An initiative</a> sweeping the US – led by Oregon in 2015 – is states requiring citizens to opt-out rather than opt-in to being registered to vote. </p>
<p>But new risks have also became evident, not least Russian meddling and cyber-security threats to official voting records. To tackle this, the US Electoral Assistance Commission has <a href="https://www.eac.gov/news/2017/06/07/06/07/2017-advisory-media/">recently issued new guidelines</a>, working with the states and the Department of Homeland Security to implement them. Yet the overhaul of America’s ageing voting equipment will carry a hefty price tag.</p>
<p>Foreign attempts at interference in voting have been reported in other countries, including <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/data-stolen-during-hack-attack-on-german-parliament-berlin-says/a-18486900">Germany</a> and <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/france-election-2017-russia-hacked-cyberattacks/">France</a>. </p>
<p>Following the 2017 UK general election, the Electoral Commission <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/17/watchdog-investigates-claims-of-people-voting-twice-at-general-election">expressed concern</a> about the risks of double voting and duplicate registration applications.</p>
<p>In populous developing countries like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, without reliable census information or identification documents, the challenges are even greater. Poor quality records can create opportunities for vote manipulation.</p>
<p>Strict registration processes, such as those relying on biometric technologies for ID, may remove ineligible applicants but simultaneously throw out legitimate voters and make the list less accurate, not more. And biometric voter registration, which many African countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/biometric-voting-in-chad-new-technology-same-old-political-tricks-58663">have adopted</a>, presents challenges for the protection of personal information.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85903/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pippa Norris receives funding from Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Cameron and Thomas Wynter do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are good reasons to be concerned about the procedures used for voter registration in many countries, including many long-established democracies.Pippa Norris, ARC Laureate Fellow, Professor of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney and McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Harvard Kennedy SchoolSarah Cameron, Electoral Integrity Project Manager and Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of SydneyThomas Wynter, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Electoral Integrity Project, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/709142017-01-05T18:23:18Z2017-01-05T18:23:18ZShowing ID at polling stations will not end election fraud<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151815/original/image-20170105-18641-v779j0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Private polls.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-536466367/stock-photo-people-vote-in-a-voting-booth-at-a-polling-station.html?src=mbf6PD95Y-vZlrvF9-l2uw-1-23">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK’s former communities secretary, Eric Pickles, ended 2016 by claiming the mantle of defender of British democracy. To combat electoral fraud in local government he <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/27/voters-will-have-show-passports-combat-voter-fraud-vulnerable/">called for new controls to guarantee the probity of voting</a> in municipal elections. Most notably, this would mean the requirement of voters to produce photographic ID before they are allowed into a polling booth.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06255/SN06255.pdf">proposals</a> were <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/josiah-mortimer/electoral-fraud_b_11539640.html">dismissed by some</a> as using “a sledgehammer to crack a nut”. But that metaphor may actually be too generous. The intended target of the reforms may be missed altogether, while the collateral damage to British elections could be significant. Pickles’s sledgehammer is more like a blunderbuss.</p>
<p>The Tory MP argued that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-32428648">recent episodes of electoral fraud</a> in local contests illustrate a wider problem of corruption whereby votes are cast in other people’s names. He proposes that in future, in certain areas, voters should present documentary identification prior to voting at the polling station. </p>
<p>It is true that there have been episodes of electoral fraud in recent years, and, as Mr Pickles states, in strongly diverse communities. One resulted in the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/4406575.stm">unseating of three Birmingham councillors in 2005</a> for the mishandling of postal ballots “on an industrial scale”. And a directly-elected mayor in a London borough was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-32428648">accused of falsifying postal vote applications</a> and manipulating voters through community leaders in 2015. But the rarity of these cases demonstrates that Pickles’s proposals are based on an exaggeration of the situation, and likely to be welcomed by divisive extremists. </p>
<p>Nowhere has personation (falsely claiming a voter’s identity) at the polling station been widespread enough to undermine the credibility of a British local election. A House of Commons <a href="http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06255/SN06255.pdf">briefing paper</a> found that the majority of the 224 allegations electoral fraud made to police in 2011 had not been substantiated. And most of those that had been concerned a failure to print agents’ details on posters, or claims of false information issued by candidates. There was only one case of personation that had been the subject of any court proceedings.</p>
<p>Pickles’s proposals for dealing with this supposed problem range from the obstructive to the ineffective, and are mostly impracticable without considerable extra public investment. In all cases they are likely to diminish still further the already shrinking community of municipal voters.</p>
<p>Voters would apparently have to identify themselves using documents such as a passport or driving licence – but these documents are not possessed by all adults. Pickles has also suggested a “voter ID card” might be made available at taxpayers’ expense in the small number of areas where he wants to pilot this idea. But this would exclude those people not determined enough to acquire the card, retain it and then remember it on polling day. </p>
<h2>First past the postal vote</h2>
<p>A far greater potential menace to fair procedure in elections <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26520836">is actually postal voting</a>. Postal (or as it was once known, “absent”) voting was originally used only for members of the armed services overseas, or for others whose occupations made it impossible for them to vote in person. In the 1950s this was extended to those prevented by disability from getting to the polling station. Until 2000, though, the postal vote was for those who could not, rather than chose not, to get there. After 1945 it never accounted for more than 2.6% of votes cast. </p>
<p>Then the Blair government made postal voting an on-demand choice for all voters in the hope of improving sluggish voter turnout. Postal voting surged to represent over 15% of votes cast, yet <a href="http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout45.htm">turnout overall fell</a> from 71% to 59%. It was after this that the electoral fraud cases came. It would be unfortunately ironic if Pickles’s measures deterred voters from actually going to the polling station while leaving the more vulnerable option of the postal vote open to anybody who asked (or appeared to ask) for it.</p>
<p>There is a last, potentially sinister twist to Pickles’s proposals. The current idea is that only in 18 authorities will this identification requirement be imposed – all with unusually high ethnic minority populations, mainly Muslim. Pickles makes no apology for pointing to the “vulnerability of some South Asian communities, specifically those with roots in parts of Pakistan or Bangladesh, to electoral fraud”. He accuses those running elections of “turning a blind eye” out of “political correctness.” He is also pressing for documentary proof of nationality to prevent immigrants voting in local elections. </p>
<p>Election Commissioner Richard Mawrey pointedly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-32428648">told the High Court</a> in unseating the mayor of Tower Hamlets: “This is not the consequence of the racial and religious mix of the population.” But the association drawn by Pickles between these communities and electoral fraud, might be regarded by the far right as an acknowledgement of racist sentiments, and by segregationist Islamists as proof of the official persecution they claim their community suffers. </p>
<p>For the great majority of British citizens, regrettably, it will just be seen as another reason not to vote in elections in these areas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Cole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Passports for polling booths should not be a vote winner.Matthew Cole, Teaching Fellow, Department of History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/677572016-11-04T07:37:47Z2016-11-04T07:37:47ZDear Donald Trump, this is what a rigged election looks like<p>Throughout the 2016 campaign, Republican Party nominee Donald Trump has consistently claimed the US election will be rigged. Trump has said he will accept the outcome of the vote on November 8, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/us/politics/campaign-election-trump-clinton.html">if he wins</a>. But he has not confirmed whether he will accept a Hillary Clinton victory as valid.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/can-you-rig-a-us-presidential-election-experts-say-its-basically-impossible/2016/10/18/7bcc4390-9557-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html">Experts agree</a> that it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hard-is-it-to-rig-an-election-67374">almost impossible to rig a US election</a> due to the complex, distributed electoral system, and the sheer number of people involved in overseeing it. </p>
<p>But that’s not the case everywhere. In many parts of the world, ballot boxes are routinely stuffed, opposition parties silenced and voters intimidated. </p>
<p>The Conversation asked scholars from countries where electoral fraud has happened, from Kazakhstan to Mexico, to explain what a rigged election really looks like. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"787699930718695425"}"></div></p>
<h2>Kazakhstan</h2>
<p>Kazakhstan is a long way from the centre of the global politics. It is largely known for British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen’s Kazakhstani alter-ego, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20161028-what-kazakhstan-really-thought-of-borat">Borat</a>, as well as the vast amounts of oil it produces, or perhaps its nuclear weapons <a href="http://thebulletin.org/kazakhstans-nuclear-ambitions">withdrawal in the 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>But there is a connection between the Republican nominee and the Central Asian oil state: the Financial Times has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/33285dfa-9231-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923">published an investigation</a> into links between ex-officials of Kazakhstan and the building of Trump Tower.</p>
<p>Kazakhstan does hold elections: to local authorities, to the lower chamber, to the parliament and to the presidency. In theory, we are not an absolute kingdom or <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0263493022000010062?journalCode=ccas20">khanate</a>. At least not yet.</p>
<p>But the elections that take place are often rigged. Elections are held not to provide the people with representatives, but to create a façade of democracy for the West. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe regularly observes elections in Kazakhstan, and its reports are damning. In their assessment of the 2015 presidential election, <a href="http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/174811?download=true">observers stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Serious procedural deficiencies and irregularities were observed throughout the voting, counting and tabulation processes, including indications of ballot box stuffing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a result, the ruling party, Nur Otan, won <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-kazakhstan-parliamentary-elections-analysis/27626143.html">81% of the parliamentary vote</a> in 2016, and President Nursultan Nazarbayev won with <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/world/asia/nursultan-a-nazarbayev-kazakhstan-re-elected.html">97.7% of the vote</a> in the 2016 presidential election. </p>
<p>The current president doesn’t participate in TV debates. The <a href="http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution#_Toc150237531">constitution</a>, meanwhile, conveniently states that presidents can only serve two terms – except the first president. Nazarbayev has been in power since 1989, and was elected the country’s first president following Kazakh independence in 1991.</p>
<p>In addition to fraud on election day, parliaments are <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/russian/reports/kazakh/1999/october/topic11.html">often dissolved</a> or declare voluntary dissolution. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that the people of Kazakhstan have lost trust in the electoral system. But still we have hopes for honest elections in the future. </p>
<h2>Gabon</h2>
<p>A self-fulfilling prophecy, Gabon’s presidential election on 27 August 2016 resulted in chaos. After the proclamation of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/24/gabon-court-rules-president-ali-bongo-rightful-winner-of-september-election">victory of incumbent president Ali Bongo</a> with <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/10/africa/gabon-election-ping-court-challenge/">49.8% of the vote</a>, over his rival, Jean Ping, who had 48.2%, the country descended into serious riots. </p>
<p>The National Assembly was partially burned, shops were looted, barricades were set up. Throughout the country, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37252778">1,000 people were arrested</a>; the headquarters of Jean Ping were attacked by security forces and three people were killed in the capital, Libreville.</p>
<p>This violence was a reaction to the insurmountable paradox of the Gabonese state. It showed how fed up Gabonese people had become, having been confronted yet again by routine systemic fraud, which is understood locally as “electoral adjustment”. This is at its worst in the region of Haut-Ogouué, Bongo’s family’s stronghold, where turn-out was a suspicious 99.9%. </p>
<p>The riots have highlighted the lack of transparency in the electoral process and the widespread hatred for Bongo. </p>
<h2>Malaysia</h2>
<p>In Malaysia, general elections have been rigged since the 1970s, through <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2013.857146">gerrymandering and malapportionment</a>, to keep the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), in power. This is mainly done by the Electoral Commission, the body established to conduct the elections. The BN has not lost an election since independence.</p>
<p>In the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22422172">most recent general election</a>, in 2013, the opposition <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2013.857145?scroll=top&needAccess=true">won the popular vote</a> with 52% versus the BN’s 47%. But under the first-past-the-post system, this mean the opposition only held 40% of the seats in the Malaysian parliament and the BN was returned to power.</p>
<p>Several <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2013.857146?journalCode=ctrt20">academic studies</a> confirmed what is widely known: without the gerrymandering, the opposition would have won government with a clear parliamentary, as well as popular, majority.</p>
<p>After the result, the opposition organised mass rallies around the country, hoping to build a “<a href="https://www.academia.edu/7483939/Electoral_Reform_Movement_in_Malaysia_Emergence_Protests_and_Reform">people power</a>” movement to push out the government. In the first few weeks, thousands turned out for the rallies. But after three months, people were no longer interested in the rallies when it was clear the BN was unwilling to give up power. </p>
<p>Another significant factor was a lack of support from rural people. Most of the demonstrators were from the young, urban population. The biggest factor in voter apathy towards the rigged results was, simply, apathy and indifference. The BN’s long history, more than half of century, of rigging elections was now considered commonplace. In other words, the governing party’s cheating was considered “normal”. </p>
<p>Looking ahead, it will take a new generation of Malaysians to demand a fairer electoral system. Whether this will happen remains uncertain given the political culture. The rise of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/12016374/Malaysia_Pseudo-democracy_and_the_making_of_a_Malay-Islamic_State_James_Chin">political Islam</a> has added a complication – many Muslims who are disheartened by the present system are willing to consider an Islamic system to replace the current system.</p>
<h2>Mexico</h2>
<p>Electoral fraud has <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-fraud-accusations-may-hurt-his-endgame-just-ask-mexico-67687">not been a problem in Mexico</a> for many years. But that was not always the case. </p>
<p>Mexico’s 1988 presidential election is widely seen as fraudulent – both in terms of how the then-hegemonic party, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) outspent its two main competitors and in <a href="http://www.elsevier.es/es-revista-revista-mexicana-opinion-publica-109-articulo-elecciones-1988-mexico-crisis-del-S1870730014709044?redirectNew=true.">how the votes were counted and the results reported</a>. </p>
<p>Politicians from the PRI had won every senate, gubernatorial, and of course, presidential race since its founding in 1929, many of these with huge margins. But due to a severe economic crisis and painful economic restructuring in the decade of the 1980s, Mexican voters were angry at what they deemed a corrupt and inefficient system.</p>
<p>On the night of the 1988 elections, the district results began to flow in from district counting centres to the Federal Electoral Commission, then a non-autonomous federal agency whose head was the Minister of Governance, a position appointed by the president.</p>
<p>These first set of results did not favour the PRI’s presidential candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, so the Secretary of Governance apparently made a decision to halt the reception of the results and reported that the FEC’s computer had gone down (<em>“se cayó el sistema”</em>), rendering it impossible to continue giving <a href="http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/07/03/index.php?section=politica&article=013n1pol.">preliminary vote counts</a>. </p>
<p>When the computer came back online several hours later, the PRI’s candidate was <a href="http://www.planeacionestrategica.net/comentarios-a-%20la-noticia/fraude-electoral-%20de-1988-%20en-mexico/.">declared the victor</a> with a majority of votes (50.36% versus 31.12% for the candidate of the left coalition and 17.07% for the center-right opponent). </p>
<p>Under Mexican electoral law at that time, the newly elected legislature had the right to determine whether the presidential elections were binding, and since the PRI won the majority in the House, Salinas was declared the victor. When opposition deputies claimed fraud and demanded that the presidential votes be recounted, the PRI majority (with many members of the center-right opposition party acceding) ordered the ballots to be burned, so it impossible to know who won the presidential election of 1988.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump is wrong: the US election can’t be rigged. But it’s a different story in Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Gabon and Mexico.Nygmet Ibadildin, Assistant Professor, KIMEP UniversityJames Chin, Director, Asia Institute & Prof of Political Science, University of TasmaniaJoseph Tonda, Professeur de sociologie et d'anthropologie, Université Omar Bongo (UOB)Joy Langston, Professor, Centro de Investigación y Docencia EconómicasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/676872016-10-31T07:46:16Z2016-10-31T07:46:16ZTrump’s fraud accusations may hurt his endgame – just ask Mexico<p>In Mexico, we’ve heard all about electoral fraud. And the view here is that Donald Trump’s recent accusations of “<a href="http://mediamatters.org/video/2016/10/23/nbcs-chuck-todd-grills-trump-campaign-manager-over-rigged-election-claims-all-stuffs-been-debunked/214055">rigged elections</a>” and his ambivalence about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/20/donald-trump-refuse-concede-election-electoral-college">conceding defeat</a> will do him more harm than good. </p>
<p>Pippa Norris <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/21/trumps-election-rigging-claim-will-backfire-heres-the-evidence/">has argued</a> in the Washington Post that Trump’s allegations will probably depress voter turnout for him on November 8. I bet that’s true. But odds are also high that Trump is already looking beyond defeat, setting his sights on a project that will capitalise on the audience he has attracted over the past year. </p>
<p>One <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/10/19/why_is_donald_trump_is_whining_about_a_rigged_election_mark_cuban_has_a.html">much discussed</a> possibility is that he’ll launch a <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/business/21709071-candidates-fan-base-has-what-it-takes-support-new-tv-service-channelling-trump">TV network</a> in his name. If so, Trump may have a harder time building an audience than he expects. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/822/614">My research on Mexico’s contested elections</a> shows that people don’t like politicians who make accusations of electoral fraud.</p>
<h2>To work, fraud accusations must be credible</h2>
<p>Mexican democracy went through a decades-long process of consolidation that ended when electoral institutions became independent from the executive in 1996. </p>
<p>I cannot do justice to the history of democratisation and electoral scandals in Mexico here. But what you need to know is that the country’s experience with real election fraud emboldened one of its most prominent opposition candidates to repeatedly cast doubts on the legitimacy of two elections – in 2006 and in 2012 – even though the results were <a href="http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2014/05/the-evolution-of-democracy-in-mexico-a-conversation-with-jose-woldenberg/">largely considered credible</a>. </p>
<p>León Krauze’s has written a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/10/21/in-mexico-we-know-what-happens-when-an-elections-loser-wont-admit-defeat/?utm_term=.fa7480d8fe64">useful primer</a> for understanding how and why such accusations have been made in past decades. To cut a long story short, in 2006, the leading candidate from the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) lost the presidential election by a mere 0.56% of the vote. </p>
<p>Tens of thousands of his supporters took to the street to demand a recount. A partial recount was undertaken, but it failed to change the outcome.</p>
<p>Results of <a href="http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/822/614">research I carried out</a> three years later (in 2009), showed that Mexicans in general dislike candidates who make accusations of fraud. If the accuser is a member of their own political party, their opinions improve – but only if the electoral context makes the fraud accusation credible. </p>
<p>Mexico fulfilled a key condition for giving credibility to accusations of a rigged election: past election fraud. By 2006, the country was definitely a democracy, but memories of fixed elections remained, and they provided a baseline of credibility for the allegations.</p>
<p>Sadly for Donald Trump (but happily for US citizens), recent American history has no large-scale electoral scandal. So the fallout from his fraud accusations will probably be worse than what any Mexican candidate could expect. </p>
<p>For Trump, then, the “rigged elections” discourse could improve his standing among Republicans, or perhaps a small group of them, but only if the accusations seem reasonable. Beyond that, he will surely damage his brand. </p>
<p>In fact, his campaign seems to have <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/27/donald-trump-s-march-to-loserland-is-only-beginning.html?via=FB_Page&source=NYMFB&mid=facebook_nymag">damaged his brand already</a>, and
<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/27/you-cant-buy-that-its-ivanka-how-trumps-campaign-is-hurting-his-daughters-clothing-line/?tid=sm_fb">even his daughter’s</a> seems to be in trouble too. The fraud accusations will likely only make things worse.</p>
<p>Much like the rest of Trump’s campaign, his refusal to acknowledge the legality and fairness of US electoral procedures has been a gamble that uses the power of negativity to attract attention like a lightning rod. But he’s wandering in the open during a storm of his own making, and these baseless allegations may well attract a lightning strike too close for comfort.</p>
<h2>‘Nobody likes a sore loser’</h2>
<p>The problem with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00I0UNIHE/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">negativity</a> in campaigns is that, while it’s good for getting attention, <a href="http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071905.101448?requestedContent=thumbnails&">almost nobody</a> (beyond a minority of the candidate’s most ardent followers) appreciates them.</p>
<p>To understand the incentives that candidates face in making an accusation of fraud, I studied attitudes toward an unnamed candidate, who makes an accusation in a hypothetical election that he then goes on to lose. </p>
<p>I gave respondents only key pieces of information about his accusations (it was an experiment, so these features varied randomly between respondents). Among other things, my study tested whether the hypothetical candidate made accusations of fraud, and whether the results of the election were close.</p>
<p>The result: almost nobody likes a sore loser. </p>
<h2>Don’t go negative</h2>
<p>Fraud accusations work as negative campaigns aimed at the legitimacy of elections, and people generally dislike them. In my study, the hypothetical candidate who contests electoral results lost six points (on a 100-point scale) just for going negative. He lost another five for doing so in a scenario similar to Mexico’s 2006 scandal. </p>
<p>This may not be terribly interesting to the Trump team, mostly because they are probably focused on how his supporters, not the overall electorate, will react to his accusations on and after November 8. </p>
<p>But because independents and moderate Republicans might also be repelled by Trump’s discourse, it follows that not only will they probably not vote for him but also that they’re unlikely to follow him on his post-election adventures in entertainment.</p>
<p>Party identification colours almost everything we see and hear in politics, including fraud accusations. After such a contentious US election campaign, it is unsurprising that 67% of <a href="https://polling.reuters.com/#poll/TM1043Y16/dates/20161016-20161021/type/day">survey respondents</a> who identify as Republican but only 15% of Democrats believe a Clinton victory will be the result of fraud.</p>
<p>In my experiment, PRD-identified respondents gave the hypothetical candidate who lost by a narrow margin a whopping 30-point rating boost after he went negative. But, critically, this only happened when respondents also learned that the electoral margin gave credibility to his accusations.</p>
<h2>Don’t lose <em>bigly</em></h2>
<p>The point here is the narrow margin. If Clinton ends up winning the election with a wide margin, Trump’s accusations will be robbed of credibility, and the positive response from his supporters will be milder. This will have a negative effect on Trump’s reputation. </p>
<p>The narrow margin issue, of course, gives a powerful incentive for both candidates to drive up turnout: Trump wants to close the gap, and Clinton to widen it.</p>
<p>Trump’s voters may even penalise him because he “went negative”. The hypothetical candidate in my study did gain standing in the eyes of PRD-affiliated respondents, but they hit him with a 16-point loss for going negative in election that did not result in a narrow defeat. </p>
<p>Interestingly, they also penalised him for losing by a narrow margin when <em>he didn’t</em> make an accusation, perhaps because they expected him to win. So the result here is basically that, in the end, nobody likes a loser.</p>
<p>Adding together the three effects – partisans reward credible accusations; but they punish accusers that are not credible; and they also punish their candidates when they lose – I found that the accuser ends up with a result that’s statistically indistinguishable from zero. That is, for PRD supporters, the negatives they attributed to their hypothetical candidate were sufficient to cancel out any gains he might have achieved with a credible accusation. </p>
<p>This result is particularly worrisome for Trump if his post-election plan requires his core constituency to remain faithful (as consumers of whatever product he turns to next). He may well be punished for both going negative and losing.</p>
<p>Trump’s incendiary rhetoric has led many Republicans to say that any Clinton victory will be illegitimate, and some of them will likely still believe that for years to come. But for Trump’s brand, the accusations could cost him much more than he bargained for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67687/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado works for the Office of the President of Mexico as a survey researcher. His research discussed here predates his current job and is independent of it. All opinions and mistakes are his own. </span></em></p>Some advice for Trump from Mexico, a place that knows something about contested elections: nobody likes a sore loser.Salvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/648572016-09-06T09:11:06Z2016-09-06T09:11:06ZGabon violence reflects longstanding and deep mistrust of election handling<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136618/original/image-20160905-4773-1ueqdje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Paris against Gabonese President Ali Bongo with placards reading: 1967-2016, 50 years in power is enough!</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gabon’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-01/gabon-eurobond-yields-jump-as-election-outcome-triggers-violence">closest election</a> since independence has erupted into controversy and violence. President Ali Bongo, who succeeded his father’s 42-year rule in 2009, claims the narrowest of victories over challenger Jean Ping. Ping is former chairman of the African Union and son-in-law of the former president.</p>
<p>Massive protests amid allegations of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/opinion/save-gabon-from-election-fraud.html?_r=0">election fraud</a> began after Bongo was declared the winner by a mere 5,594 votes, 49.8% to Ping’s 48.23%. Of particular concern to the opposition and international observers is the reported <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37252778">99% turnout</a> in Haut-Ogooue, Bongo’s home province, where 95.5% of the vote went to the incumbent. Ping won six out of the nine provinces. Turnout in the other provinces was between 45% and 71%, according to the Interior ministry. Even members of the government, including Justice Minister Séraphin Moudounga who has just resigned, have begun to question whether the results “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37281970">tally with reality</a>.”</p>
<p>This close and contested result has been released in a <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/gabon-overwhelming-public-distrust-cenap-and-election-quality-forms-backdrop-presidential-vote">context</a> where Gabon’s electoral commission has continually failed to meet the public’s demands for transparency and confidence in managing free and fair elections. Data from the <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer survey</a> conducted in September and October of 2015 reveal that a majority (51%) of Gabonese had no trust “at all” in the election commission. Another 24% reported “a little bit” of trust <strong>(see Figure 1)</strong>. These are the lowest trust ratings of any election commission among the 36 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Gabon enjoys a per capita income <a href="http://www.forbes.com/places/gabon/">four times</a> that of most sub-Saharan African nations. But because it has high levels of income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Oil accounts for approximately 80% of its exports. </p>
<h2>Election mistrust runs deep</h2>
<p>Not only do Gabonese mistrust the electoral commission, they also do not feel elections are free and fair. When asked to judge Gabon’s last election (in 2011 for the National Assembly), a majority (55%) found the elections to be seriously flawed. One-third of citizens (31%) reported that the elections were “not free and fair”. Another 24% found them “free and fair but with major problems”. </p>
<p>The most intense discontent with election quality was recorded among urban residents. A majority (58%) said they were not free and fair or had major problems. This is compared to 45% in rural areas.</p>
<p>At the heart of the protests that have broken out are allegations of fraud in the form of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>multiple voting, </p></li>
<li><p>ballot stuffing, and </p></li>
<li><p>a manipulated vote count. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Afrobarometer data reveal that seven in 10 Gabonese citizens (71%) believe votes are “never” or only “sometimes” counted fairly. A mere 15% believe that the vote count is always fair. Citizens who doubt that votes are counted fairly may question the government’s announcement of fewer than 6,000 votes separating the two contenders and 99% turnout in the president’s home area.</p>
<h2>Fears of violence and intimidation</h2>
<p>Gabonese also expressed major concerns about the environment leading up to elections <strong>(see Figure 2)</strong>. Significant proportions (56%) believe that the government interferes with the political opposition by at least “sometimes” preventing opposition candidates from running. Three-fourths (77%) said the news media “never” or only “sometimes” provides fair coverage of all candidates. That is the worst rating among the 36 surveyed countries. And 71% perceived that voters are “often” or “always” bribed, well above the 36-country average of 43%.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>In the 2015 survey, Gabonese also reported high levels of fear of intimidation or violence during election campaigns. Nearly two out of three (64%) expressed at least “a little bit” of fear, including almost one-fourth (23%) who expressed “a lot” of fear. With protests and government response turning violent, the fears of many have become reality. </p>
<p>Since the results were announced and protests broke out, the situation has escalated from:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>protesters’ attacks on the Parliament building to; </p></li>
<li><p>a helicopter attack on the opposition headquarters; </p></li>
<li><p>the arrests of opposition figures and hundreds of protesters as well as several deaths; to</p></li>
<li><p>the government cutting off Internet and social media communication</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Gabon has one of the lowest proportions among surveyed countries (only 45%) who believe that voters are “often” or “always” given a genuine choice in voting. Few citizens believe that elections function “well” or “very well” to ensure that voters’ views are reflected (23%) and that voters can remove poorly performing leaders from office (19%). Both of these figures are the lowest among the 36 surveyed countries.</p>
<h2>But Gabonese have faith in democracy</h2>
<p>Yet despite their extreme levels of discontent with the current implementation of elections, Gabonese still have <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/behind-gabons-election-dispute-citizens-strongly-support-multiparty-democracy-reject-autocratic-alternatives">faith</a> in the ideals of democracy and rule through elections. Two-thirds (68%) of Gabonese citizens say democracy is preferable to any other political system. This matches average support for democracy across the surveyed countries. </p>
<p>Large majorities reject forms of autocracy (one-party, one-man and military rule). And three-fourths (76%) of Gabonese say that regular, open and honest elections are the best way to choose leaders. In their support for multiparty competition (80%), Gabonese are second only to Ivoirians (82%) and far above average (63%) <strong>(Figure 3</strong>).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>The Afrobarometer results underscore the longstanding concerns of ordinary Gabonese about the extent to which the country’s elections are free, fair and an honest reflection of the will of the people. Unfortunately, neither the government nor regional or international attention addressed these concerns in time to prevent bloodshed. The gap between the reality of Gabon’s elections and its democratic ideals appears to be widening.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gabon has the lowest trust ratings of any election commission among the 36 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/482212015-12-09T23:41:51Z2015-12-09T23:41:51ZFrom Africa to America, manipulation and money make elections less than truly democratic<p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>2016 is almost upon us and with it the global media event that is the US presidential election. In November, Americans will vote for their next national leader – a practice more than 90% of countries share.</p>
<p>In West Africa, the people of Burkina Faso voted last month in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/africa/burkina-faso-elections.html?_r=0">national elections</a>. The vote followed a popular uprising last year that ousted the president of 27 years, Blaise Compaoré, after he tried to extend his rule.</p>
<p>An election date of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/central-african-republic-announces-fresh-elections">December 13</a> has been set in the Central African Republic. The vote was postponed in October due to violence.</p>
<p>The spread of elections after the Cold War led to a burst of optimistic scholarship about the prospects for democracy around the world. Citizens have never been more empowered; they get to choose their leaders (in theory, at least).</p>
<p>But optimism, especially in political matters, never lasts long. By the turn of the millennium, more and more regimes appeared to have made only cosmetic shifts (adopting democracy’s formal institutions but not its substance). Concerns about democratic backsliding and reversal grew.</p>
<p>New democracies in particular were criticised for holding elections despite lacking many civil liberties and even the basic rule of law. Elections could be rigged, manipulated and <a href="http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434">subverted to sustain authoritarianism</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103504/original/image-20151128-11618-1bnrq9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A park in Nairobi became home to military barracks to stop protests after Kenya’s 2007 presidential election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/44222307@N00/2203789368">DEMOSH/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The latter has been particularly true in Africa. A number of countries held multi-party elections at the time of decolonisation. By the late 1980s, however, 42 out of 47 regimes in Africa were closed autocracies or socialist regimes holding non-competitive, single-party elections.</p>
<p>At the end of the Cold War, a <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/filer_public/43/dd/43ddad26-aae0-48fb-895a-5609fd96e981/v-dem_working_paper_2015_3.pdf">rapid transition</a> took place. The proportion of countries in Africa holding multi-party elections jumped from 25% in 1988 to 84% in 1994. Today, 94% hold multi-party <a href="http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html">elections for national office</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103987/original/image-20151202-14429-glwlbz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A long menu of manipulation</h2>
<p>The quality of elections in Africa still varies widely. They range from elections plagued by violence and fraud (like those in <a href="http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya">Kenya in 2007</a> or the Democratic Republic of Congo <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/10/congo-election-result-violent-protests">in 2011</a>) to the relatively free and fair elections in (Ghana <a href="http://www.nai.uu.se/news/articles/ghanaian_elections_narrow/">in 2008</a> and Cape Verde <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/cape-verde">in 2011</a>).</p>
<p>The variety of methods that can be used to manipulate and undermine an election’s integrity is dazzling. The list includes manipulation of electoral legislation and <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/">gerrymandering</a>, opposition and voter intimidation, flawed voter registries, biased media and campaigning, ballot box rigging and vote count manipulation. The possibilities come down to context, which includes a country’s level of democratisation.</p>
<p>Electoral manipulation can be classified into three categories: coercion, co-optation and institutional manipulation. These strategies are distributed along a continuum from more coercive to more co-optive.</p>
<p>One way to determine election outcomes is to intimidate voters and opposition candidates to reduce competition sufficiently for the incumbent to stay in power. Another way is vote buying to “persuade” voters with gifts and financial rewards. A third strategy is to manipulate institutions – that is, the legal framework and administration of elections.</p>
<p>All these practices require organisational and financial resources. However, some are more costly than others.</p>
<p>For example, manipulating electoral institutions may be relatively easy for incumbent political actors. Vote buying often requires more extensive financial resources and organisational networks. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=680&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=680&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=680&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103506/original/image-20151128-11628-29uvx5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Manipulation of results often occurs without voters’ knowledge.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Truthout.org/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It makes sense that political actors choose the cheapest, least visible and most effective forms of manipulation. The aim is to avoid attracting formal and informal sanctions, in the form of legal prosecution or depleting resources, and losing legitimacy among citizens.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9680150&fileId=S0017257X15000068">study</a> of electoral manipulation in Africa between 1986 and 2012 found institutional manipulation of electoral management and administration, along with the tabulation of results, likely to be most effective. Electoral institutions are highly accessible to incumbents. Most of their work is “behind the scenes”, so in many cases institutional rigging is the least costly and least visible option. </p>
<p>The next most favoured tactic is coercion. Though intimidation is more visible, it involves relatively little cost and is quite effective. Vote buying is the most costly and least effective type of manipulation.</p>
<p>It makes sense, then, to expect political actors to prefer institutional manipulation and coercion to vote buying. However, the options available to them – the “menu of manipulation” – depend on the political and economic context of each election.</p>
<p>Political actors will not be able to get away with manipulating electoral institutions or intimidation in more developed democracies. In such countries, independent media and judiciaries will denounce (and prosecute) such behaviour. The manipulation of institutions only really succeeds in authoritarian regimes where the rule of law is weak and the bureaucracy vulnerable to partisan capture.</p>
<h2>Not all good things go together</h2>
<p>This means that, paradoxically, as countries move towards democracy, they experience an initial increase in vote buying. </p>
<p>The new <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/filer_public/40/1f/401f4c6b-f336-44f1-88ed-5ce0a02f0061/v-dem_codebook_v3.pdf">Varieties of Democracy database</a> includes almost 400 fine-grained indicators of democracy in 173 countries from 1900 until 2012. These reveal a trade-off between different types of electoral manipulation. When institutional manipulation and coercion is higher, vote buying is lower; as democratisation progresses, there is a shift in the opposite direction.</p>
<p>It seems democracy in Africa promises better administered but not necessarily fairer elections. Not all good things go together. The move towards democratisation will mean more money in politics, more patronage and more clientelistic offers thrown around, at least in the short to medium term.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/105157/original/image-20151209-15564-1hnrx2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=964&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests gave voice to concerns about the Koch brothers and money politics in the US.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/shankbone/6183371761/in/photolist-aqpoZX-aCmcQq-aw2pqK-ariLUk-aCiJ6k-aCmnwE-aCmQMw-aCiwFF-c8C9jy-c593zC-bUCWJz-ayVh4W-bfTsKg-auE2du-bfTMo2-aukZrC-bfUnH8-bfUvyn-bfUx6i-bfUqdt-bfUkBH-bfTyyt-bfUdTT-bfTwE8-bfUu6M-bfUmBp-bfTWPD-bfUipz-bfTuuM-bfTEK6-bfTxzv-bfTtyX-bfUcFH-bfTJY6-bfTUb6-kEFdvM-vBGJzR-zeYMLp-zkVuAX-roeHTP-q5ncQX-bfTHVg-bfTAJp-bfU2un-bfUhn4-bfTLdc-bfTBNe-bfTXPT-bfTVk8-bfUjwk">flickr/David Shankbone</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Whether money politics will eventually decline as democratisation progresses remains to be seen. This trade-off poses questions about the quality of democracy not only in Africa but in established democracies like the US. Multibillionaires Charles and David Koch are projected to spend <a href="http://www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2015/nov/06/bernie-s/sanders-says-koch-brothers-are-outspending-either-/">US$900 million</a> backing Republican candidates in the 2016 presidential campaign.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html?_r=0">CBS newspoll</a> this year, Americans, regardless of political affiliation, agreed that wealth has too much influence on elections. They also agreed that candidates who win office promote policies that help their donors.</p>
<p>In Africa or America, money politics is a continuing concern – underscoring that high-quality democracy depends on more than just elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolien van Ham receives funding from the Australian Research Council's DECRA funding scheme (project number RG142911, project name DE150101692). The views expressed in this article are the views of the author, based on the author's research, and in no way represent the views of the ARC. </span></em></p>Voting for national leaders has become the global norm in a remarkably short time – in Africa in 1988, only 25% of countries had multiparty elections, but 94% do today. Yet all is not well.Carolien van Ham, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/477142015-09-18T04:35:15Z2015-09-18T04:35:15ZBeyond political violence in Burundi: an economy in crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95209/original/image-20150917-7530-1xkg6vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vendors sell bananas in an open market in a village near Bujumbura. Burundians are being driven deeper into poverty.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi may have slipped off the world’s attention, but the crisis that <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-teeters-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-following-coup-attempt-41869">erupted</a> in May when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term is far from being resolved. </p>
<p>Most commentators have, rightfully so, discussed the political aspects of the crisis. This includes whether Nkurunziza’s third mandate is <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/08/17/afraf.adv045.full">constitutional</a> and the lack of coherence of the political <a href="https://storify.com/Emayi2011/le-burundi-dans-le-piege-des-obstinations-politiqu">opposition</a>. They also discussed the alarming <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/burundi-opposition-spokesman-patrice-gahungu-shot-dead-as-violence-escalates">political violence</a> and <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/16624/burundi-rwanda-spat-stokes-fear-of-revived-ethnic-tensions">mounting tension</a> with Rwanda.</p>
<p>Often overlooked is the economy, which is central to understanding the backdrop to the most severe crisis Burundi has had since the end of the <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/%7Eenm2105/docs/onub/Taylor_Samii_Mvukiyehe_Burundi_apsa06_061003.pdf">1993-2005 civil war</a>. While acknowledging the crucial political dimension of the crisis, this article focuses on the economic situation and its consequences.</p>
<h2>Hungriest nation on earth</h2>
<p>With a GDP per capita of US$267, the country’s 10.16 million people are among the poorest in the world. Burundi ranked 180 out of 186 in the last <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/BDI.pdf">Human Development Index</a>.</p>
<p>89% of the active population depends on farming a territory as densely populated as Belgium. Coffee, once the proud main export of Burundi, was controversially <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13246&LangID=E">privatised</a> in 2008 and has been declining for 20 years. Tea and cotton, the other traditional exports, are also in poor shape.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">source: http://www.indexmundi.com.</span>
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</figure>
<p>The country has few mineral resources. It has been expecting a lot, so far in vain, from a potentially important <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/significant-pgm-prospects-at-burundi-project-2014-08-22">nickel</a> <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/significant-pgm-prospects-at-burundi-project-2014-08-22">deposit</a>. The hopes in gold, which is artisanally mined and had become Burundi’s <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/bdi/">first export</a> by 2012, collapsed with the recent crash of international prices. Part of Burundian gold has also reportedly been <a href="http://enoughproject.org/reports/congo%E2%80%99s-conflict-gold-rush">smuggled</a> from the DR Congo.</p>
<p>The apparently decent 4% to 4.5% <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi">growth</a> of Burundi’s GDP in the past years is dwarfed by a population growth above <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW/countries/BI?display=graph">3%</a>. The number of mouths to feed keeps growing very fast and the GDP per capita has not grown by more than <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG">1.5%</a> in the best of the past years. </p>
<p>Even before the crisis, <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/183047/burundi-faces-challenges-beyond-elections.aspx">reports</a> indicated that the living conditions were deteriorating for most people. Burundi was, and still is, the <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/topic/global-hunger-index">hungriest nation</a> on earth. With the political crisis, things have deteriorated even further.</p>
<p>When violent unrests exploded in Bujumbura, the city was paralysed for months. It concentrates 70% of the <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/07/20/the-political-crisis-leaves-burundi-on-the-brink-of-economic-collapse-by-lorraine-nkengurutse/">economic activity</a> of the country. </p>
<p>Trade with regional and local markets was heavily disrupted and is still not back to normal as security forces control displacements of people in and out the capital city. The government recently estimated that the insurrection cost at least US$ 32.7 million in <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150910-soulevement-burundi-rapport-autorites-accable-opposition">material damage</a>.</p>
<p>At least <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php">190,000 people</a> have left the country since April, and among them investors, business people, and part of the middle class. Most of them still have not returned. </p>
<p>The Burundian diaspora, mostly from Canada, the US, France, and Belgium, are a habitual and most-welcomed source of cash in the summer. But they did not spent their holidays on the beaches of Bujumbura this year.</p>
<p>Perhaps more important for the economy, Western donors are in the process of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201509071997.html">cutting</a> their support to Burundi, whose budget relies <a href="http://finances.gov.bi/index.php/budgets">49% on aid</a>. </p>
<p>The government already had to use its own money to organise the elections, reportedly diverting <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/burundi-to-fund-election-by-cutting-education-malaria-budgets">funds</a> earmarked for malaria and education. And it seems clear that the 2015 budget is now totally offtrack. Hypothetical fresh support from <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/28/how-the-west-lost-burundi/">Russia or China</a> is unlikely to be enough to balance the budget. Inflation only rose by a bit less than a percentage point <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-inflation-hits-8-in-July-as-political-unrest-persists-20150828">since May</a>. But official tax revenues for May-August are about 30% lower than expected, and 23% less than <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKCN0RB1MX20150911">last year</a>.</p>
<h2>Pressure points</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza, who was controversially re-elected in August, is now facing an economic crisis that could destabilise him in at least three different ways:</p>
<ul>
<li>First, the first long-serving Hutu president has built his popularity on generous social policies including the abolition of healthcare user fees for children below five and pregnant women, free primary education, and a national fertiliser subsidy program. These social services depend on foreign and are now in grave danger.</li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Ministry of Finance of Burundi.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<ul>
<li><p>Second, if the reported current disruption of wage payment continues, Nkurunziza may alienate a small but influential middle-class of civil servants as well as the police and military still mostly loyal to him.</p></li>
<li><p>Third, benefits from politically appointed positions are becoming potentially less interesting as the economy contracts. This makes it harder to buy off loyalty and opponents, and potentially exacerbates corruption, which is already a key reason for discontent with the regime.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Nkurunziza’s current strategy, in a fashion not dissimilar to his predecessor president <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Buyoya">Pierre Buyoya</a>, is to <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/burundi-president-announces-early-inauguration/2925131.html">blame</a> the insurgents and Western countries for the economic difficulties. This may reinforce him, but probably only for a short while.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Burundians are being pushed towards even more intolerable levels of poverty. The locking of the political space and the volatility of the situation is likely continue to scare off economic actors and international partners and fuel the mismanagement of public services. </p>
<p>In the current context, few have any interest or incentive to look beyond the very short term. The economic and social costs of protracted fragility are <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_197_-_Estimating_the_Economic_Cost_of_Fragility_in_Africa.pdf">huge</a>, even in an already impoverished nation.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/article/democracy-and-growth-new-evidence">safest route</a> to restoring stability and developing the Burundian economy is to rebuild strong and inclusive institutions that citizens and international partners – including the diaspora that has an important potential for economic development – can trust. </p>
<p>In the past years, the boundaries between the state and party apparatus have <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx">blurred</a> at the expense of ordinary citizens. Abuses used to be vocally denounced by the local independent media, but most of them were shut down after the failed May coup attempt.</p>
<p>Calls for a national unity government, which the president says he has responded to by including a few not-too-virulent opposition parties to his government, are missing the point if they only lead to <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/185-burundi-la-crise-de-corruption.aspx">redistributing rents</a> between a slightly larger or different elite group. </p>
<p>Burundi needs a social and economic vision that rests on economic and political institutions that are genuinely accountable and directed to the people, and that everybody, including the poorest and non-party members, can rely on.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on a blog that appears on the <a href="http://blog.qeh.ox.ac.uk">Oxford Department of International Development</a> site.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Benoit Falisse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whenever the crisis in Burundi is discussed, the economy is often overlooked, even though it is central to understanding the backdrop to the most severe crisis since the end of the civil war.Jean-Benoit Falisse, DPhil candidate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/402052015-04-15T12:28:36Z2015-04-15T12:28:36ZBoycott ensures that the Sudan election result will be a foregone conclusion<p>What are elections for? Sudan’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/world/africa/voting-opens-in-sudan-but-many-are-resigned-to-bashirs-re-election.html?_r=0">current ballot</a> raises this question in a very evident way. There is, after all, no doubt who will win: Omar al-Bashir, who has controlled the country since taking power in a coup in 1989, will be re-elected as president. </p>
<p>His country is smaller now, following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, but his grip on power is no less tight – if anything it is even stronger – and his National Congress Party (NCP) will just as surely win a majority in the national assembly and in all of the 18 “state assemblies” which have a degree of devolved power. </p>
<p>There is nominal competition in all these elections: there are 44 other parties contending. But none has any hope of anything more than the most local, token victory – and some are widely believed to be sham parties, created to ensure the illusion of an electoral contest.</p>
<p>There are other opposition parties, but they are boycotting the elections. They argue that the whole electoral process is grossly unfair, and it is hard to disagree. Political scientist Andreas Schedler has identified a “<a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v013/13.2schedler.html">menu of manipulation</a>”, from which would-be cheats may dine – and al-Bashir has certainly supped to his fill over the years – from using state resources to campaign, to arresting and harassing the opposition, to the manipulation of registers. </p>
<p>Plus, of course, there are the more classic forms of rigging: <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8633162.stm">a video</a> circulated after the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2010/africa/sudans-rigged-elections.aspx">2010 election</a> showed a team of weary-looking election officials methodically stamping ballot papers and glumly stuffing wads of them into ballot boxes. And just in case manipulation doesn’t work, there are other options: the position of state governor, which was an elective one in 2010, produced some unwelcome results in spite of manipulation – so now the law has been changed, and <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2896276/Sudan-amends-constitution-let-Bashir-governors.html">state governors are appointed directly by the president</a>.</p>
<h2>No contest</h2>
<p>Whether all of this manipulation is really necessary is perhaps open to question. The boycotting parties include what are still thought of as Sudan’s major parties: the Umma party – long associated with the al-Mahdi family – and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which has an equally long association with the al-Mirghani family. Based partly on the religious authority of these two families, Umma and DUP intermittently dominated the political landscape for decades after independence in 1956, as the country lurched from crisis to crisis and civil war flared, died down, then burst out with ever more destructive force. </p>
<p>The leaders of Umma and DUP still pretend to be figures of national influence, but there is ample reason to doubt that claim. They flirt with more radical politicians in an endless round of meetings and dramatic declarations; at the same time, they pursue a sort of family politics of dalliance with the regime, for Sudan’s elite are linked by multiple ties of marriage and kinship. </p>
<p>They boycotted - or at least, half-boycotted - the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09744053.2011.10597304#.VS5O8dzF-So">last elections too</a>. Boycott may be, for them, a convenient way of avoiding the painful truth – that their parties, riven by factionalism and hollowed out by a loss of local activists who have gone without reward for many years, could not challenge the NCP even if the more gross aspects of manipulation were removed. In much of Sudan, the NCP has both an organisation and a degree of popular support based on patronage – even though the oil revenues which funded the regime’s generosity have <a href="http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=su">severely reduced since 2011</a>.</p>
<p>The extent of the manipulation produces its own problems. Sudan has had to pay for its own elections this time – the extensive international support which made the 2010 elections possible is not available this time, because of widespread doubts over the fairness of the process. A “<a href="http://africanarguments.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AU-Pre-election-Assessment-Mission-Report-Sudan-2015-elections.pdf">pre-election assessment mission</a>” sent by the African Union judged that the conditions for a free and fair election “have not been satisfied” and recommended that elections be postponed. There is local, as well as international, scepticism: reports from the first day of polls suggest a low turn-out and there are eloquent photographs of empty polling stations and disconsolate staff.</p>
<h2>Electoral authoritarianism</h2>
<p>But the elections continue. This tells us something about politics in Sudan, and internationally. Sudan’s regime is an extreme case of “electoral authoritarianism”. While the result of the polls is not in doubt, and despite despite awareness of the problems and manipulation, it needs the elections because the ballot creates the impression – however illusory – of two key pillars of legitimacy: the rule of law, and popular support. </p>
<p>States are based in law, the law prescribes elections, so elections must be held. Omar al-Bashir, like all presidents, draws comfort from the cheering crowds – even if the rallies are partly stage-managed. Internationally, he – like others – is happy to stress his credentials as a popularly-elected leader. There is a risk in this: a really effective boycott could turn elections into a charade. But while parties may boycott the elections, voters may not.</p>
<p>In the end, enough voters will probably turn out to avoid embarrassment – enthusiastically or not, perhaps drawn by local networks of patronage and loyalty, by hope of reward or by fear of possible consequences. </p>
<p>Despite the assessment mission report, the African Union has sent observers to monitor the election, because refusing to do so would be an implicit statement that the government is incapable, or unwilling, of obeying its own laws. And the observers will probably – as observers usually do – offer an endorsement of the process, though it may be qualified. The polls will provide reassuring spectacles of orderly queues and statistics of voting, which will make that endorsement easier – and will remind voters of the pervasive power of the NCP.</p>
<p>None of which means that elections, in Sudan or elsewhere, are necessarily or always a bad thing. They can still provide choice, often even in the face of manipulation and nightmarish logistics; the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/nigeria-election-2015">recent example of Nigeria</a> seems to have shown exactly this. But where opposition parties are chronically weak, and regimes well-entrenched and determined, elections may simply provide the opportunity for an incumbent elite to offer a performance which manifests and reaffirms their power. </p>
<p>Boycotts are a tactic of limited effectiveness in the face of a well-resourced regime keen to assert its electoral legitimacy; but boycott or not, it’s hard to say no to an election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Willis received a research grant in 2009-10 from the UK Department for International Development to undertake a historical study of elections in Sudan: the report from this was published as Elections in Sudan: Learning from Experience. He is a member of staff at Durham University and is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.</span></em></p>Despite an African Union report warning the election would not be fair, the vote looks set to extend Omar al-Bashir’s 26-year rule.Justin Willis, Professor of History, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/376502015-02-17T01:59:54Z2015-02-17T01:59:54ZHow do we know when elections succeed – or fail?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72182/original/image-20150216-18463-1ckxelf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The most serious risks to electoral integrity usually arise from disparities in political finance and media coverage during a campaign.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Dan Peled</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many recent elections have ended with bitter disputes about electoral integrity. The issue is perhaps best exemplified by partisan divisions in the United States over Republican allegations of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/">voter fraud</a> and Democratic claims of <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/voting-rights-elections">voter suppression</a>. </p>
<p>However, this disease has become contagious in other Anglo-American democracies. It has generated controversies about the <a href="http://www.democracy.arts.ubc.ca/fairelectionsact/">Fair Elections Act</a> in Canada and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-04/wa-set-to-head-back-to-polls-in-six-senate-by-elections/5066718">lost ballot boxes</a> in Australia. In Britain, questions have arisen over insecure <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/164609/Electoral-fraud-review-final-report.pdf">postal ballots</a>, proxy voting and fraudulent practices. </p>
<p>The 2015 UK general election will provide a further test case following <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31014171">warnings by the Electoral Commission</a> of “ethnic kinship” voting in British Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. This is a practice thought to make these areas particularly vulnerable to electoral fraud. Reforms to processes of electoral administration are also under debate in <a href="http://politicalreform.ie/tag/electoral-reform/">Ireland</a>.</p>
<p>The consequences of voting irregularities are even more serious elsewhere in the world. Contentious elections have sparked massive street protests in Cambodia, a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27519940">military coup d’état</a> in Thailand, bloody violence in 2007 in <a href="http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya">Kenya</a> and the 2004 <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4061253.stm">Orange Revolution</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The recent six-week postponement of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigeria-election-delay-raises-red-flags-at-home-abroad/2015/02/12/affb818a-b2c8-11e4-bf39-5560f3918d4b_story.html">Nigeria’s presidential election</a>, amid delays in distributing voter ID cards, has also raised widespread concern.</p>
<p>But how do we know when complaints about electoral malpractices reflect genuine flaws and failures, and when they are false claims stoked by sore losers?</p>
<h2>The expert survey</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com">Electoral Integrity Project</a>, based at Harvard and Sydney universities, has just released a report and dataset for <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/expert-survey-2/the-year-in-elections-2014">The Year in Elections 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Expert assessments evaluate the state of the world’s elections each year. The third release of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) dataset covers 127 national parliamentary and presidential contests held from July 1, 2012, to December 31, 2014, in 107 countries.</p>
<p>Evidence is gathered from a global survey of 1429 domestic and international election experts (with a response rate of 29%). Immediately after each contest, the quality of each election is evaluated based on 49 indicators. Responses are clustered into 11 stages throughout the electoral cycle and then summarised to construct an overall 100-point expert PEI index and ranking.</p>
<p>The world map of electoral integrity below identifies the best and worst elections around the globe in this period.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72107/original/image-20150216-6120-zebzq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The global map of electoral integrity, 2012-2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Electoral Integrity Project</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Failed elections</h2>
<p>During 2014, the five worst elections worldwide were in Egypt, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Bahrain and Syria. All failed to meet international standards.</p>
<p>For example, in the second round of the <a href="http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2793/">Afghanistan presidential election</a> in April, a bitter dispute about alleged fraud “on an industrial scale” – resolved only by an eventual UN/US-brokered power-sharing arrangement – undermined confidence in the process and outcome.</p>
<p>In Syria, the <a href="http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2734/">presidential election</a> in June was attempted in the midst of a bloody civil war and deep humanitarian crisis. Polling did not take place in rebel areas where an estimated nine million Syrians have fled their homes.</p>
<h2>Contests meeting international standards</h2>
<p>By contrast, during 2014, the five best elections were in Lithuania (ranked first), Costa Rica, Sweden, Slovenia and Uruguay.</p>
<p>But compared with 127 contests covered in PEI-3 since 2012, it is striking that the 2012 presidential election (ranked 42nd) and the 2014 Congressional elections (ranked 48th) in the US scored lowest among all Western democracies.</p>
<p>Experts expressed concern about US electoral laws and voter registration procedures. These are areas of heated <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/17/voter-id-laws-a-microcosm-of-a-divided-america/">partisan debate</a>. There are also concerns over partisan gerrymandering of district boundaries and the deregulation of <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/higher-campaign-finance-limits-require-better-reforms/2014/12/13/41c38526-8241-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html">campaign finance</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, the US midterm contests in 2014 were ranked as similar in quality to elections in Colombia and Bulgaria.</p>
<h2>What drives electoral integrity?</h2>
<p>Electoral integrity is generally strengthened by three factors: democracy, development and power‐sharing constitutions. Longer experience over successive contests usually consolidates democratic practices, deepens civic cultures and builds the capacity of professional electoral management bodies. </p>
<p>Economic development provides the resources and technical capacity for professional electoral administration. Power‐sharing institutions, such as a free press and independent parliaments, serve as watchdogs curbing malpractices.</p>
<p>Systematic cross-national research has established these general patterns. However, several important exceptions can still be observed.</p>
<p>States in Africa and the Middle East usually face the greatest risks of failed elections, as shown by Mauritania, Iraq, Egypt and Bahrain. But there are clear exceptions within these regions. Notable successes were the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/05/three-remarks-on-the-tunisian-elections/">Tunisian</a> presidential and legislative elections and fairly well‐rated contests in South Africa.</p>
<p>The most serious risks usually arise during the electoral cycle from disparities in political finance and media coverage during the campaign. Experts assess problems at these stages as far more widespread than malpractices occurring on election day or in its aftermath, such as ballot stuffing or fraud.</p>
<h2>Problems during the electoral cycle</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72117/original/image-20150216-18500-17qzefq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Electoral Integrity Project</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pippa Norris receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Many recent elections have ended with bitter disputes about electoral integrity. The issue is perhaps best exemplified by partisan divisions in the United States over Republican allegations of voter fraud…Pippa Norris, ARC Laureate Fellow, Professor of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney and McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/344402014-11-20T06:06:20Z2014-11-20T06:06:20ZTower Hamlets residents must be wondering why they bothered to vote<p>With a forced smile and through gritted teeth, Tower Hamlets’ elected mayor, Lutfur Rahman, has announced himself <a href="http://www.eastlondonadvertiser.co.uk/news/politics/eric_pickles_ready_to_send_squad_in_to_take_over_tower_hamlets_council_1_3851301">willing to accept</a> – and even “welcome” – the intervention package set out for his borough by Eric Pickles, secretary of state for communities and local government.</p>
<p>The mayor had kept the minister waiting until almost literally the 23rd hour of the 14th day of a two-week deadline set for his response to the package. He had made two fruitless and costly appeals for judicial review, but in the end was left with little choice. He has no intention of resigning, but must now watch as three appointed commissioners take over until March 2017 some of his most valued and important responsibilities, following what Pickles described to the Commons as a “fundamental breakdown of governance”.</p>
<p>Pickles vowed to send in the troops after reading the critical findings of a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/370277/140311_-_final_inspection_report.pdf">“Best Value”</a> Inspection report he had commissioned from PricewaterhouseCoopers. His chief concerns were the payment of grants; transfer of property to third parties; process and practices for entering into contracts; and spending and decisions on publicity. PwC found the council to be particularly failing in its duties regarding the first two areas.</p>
<p>The minister could afford to offer the mayor a conciliatory fortnight to respond. He knew, after all, that the fate of Tower Hamlets had effectively been sealed in the summer. Rahman applied to the High Court for a judicial review in an attempt to stop Pickles from investigating allegations of fraud and mismanagement in the borough. The court dismissed the application as <a href="http://www.lgcplus.com/Journals/2014/09/05/w/j/t/Tower-Hamlets-Judicial-Review-Judgement.pdf">“hopeless”</a> in the first line of its judgement, and last week’s second application received almost equally cursory treatment.</p>
<p>By one of life’s pleasing coincidences, that first judgement coincided almost precisely with PwC being fined <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11042362/PwC-fined-25m-for-hiding-banks-sanctions-violations.html">$25 million</a> (roughly Tower Hamlets’ annual transport budget) for watering down a report on dodgy dealings at a Japanese bank. The consultancy has also been fined for lax practices in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/06/financial-sector-jpmorgan">protecting client assets</a> and failing to comply with <a href="http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-82.htm">“some of the most elementary auditing standards and procedures”</a>.</p>
<p>When the PwC report was published, Rahman and his council immediately responded by saying it contained <a href="http://www.eastlondonadvertiser.co.uk/news/tower_hamlets_rejects_government_audit_report_saying_no_evidence_of_fraud_1_3832599">“no evidence of criminality or fraud”</a>.</p>
<p>This was an at least questionable claim, for the report does refer to “evidence of possible fraudulent payments” to third-sector organisations and the matter is now in the hands of the police.</p>
<p>The denial also leaves Rahman a hostage to fortune. He might be able to challenge the suggestion that fraudulent activity was happening in council business but many – and in fact probably most – of the fraud accusations levelled at him relate to elections, and particularly his own 2014 mayoral re-election. </p>
<p>Rahman won by a margin of just 4% against Labour candidate John Biggs, and investigations of both the conduct and result of that election are still very much ongoing. There has been detailed scrutiny of ballot papers and an election fraud trial is to take place in the High Court, probably in January.</p>
<p>Rahman knows as well as anyone that fraud is not what Best Value is primarily about. This policy was introduced by New Labour in 1999 and for councils it means putting in place arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the performance their functions.</p>
<p>To demonstrate failure to comply, therefore, it isn’t necessary to demonstrate that money has been spent fraudulently, merely that satisfactory arrangements haven’t been in place. It’s doubtless a relief that PwC didn’t find glaring instances of financial fraud, but that wasn’t its primary task and there was plenty of nasty stuff it did uncover.</p>
<p>It sounded bad, then, when Rahman’s initial reaction seemed to be to downplay the failings that were uncovered by the report as easily remediable <a href="http://www.wharf.co.uk/2014/11/mayor-lutfur-rahman-calls-pwc.html">“regrettable flaws”</a>. Best Value is a statutory duty, and these matters are serious.</p>
<p>The really unfortunate thing about this case is the message it sends about local democracy. A Conservative minister, for whom most Tower Hamlets residents would never dream of voting, commissions a report from a bunch of highly paid professionals, which finds that locally elected politicians have had the temerity to question and even override the advice of more highly paid, unelected officials, probably living outside the borough. And finally, a third set of highly paid unelected officials is sent in to take over. At least some of those voters must surely be wondering why they bothered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Game does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a forced smile and through gritted teeth, Tower Hamlets’ elected mayor, Lutfur Rahman, has announced himself willing to accept – and even “welcome” – the intervention package set out for his borough…Chris Game, Honorary Senior Lecturer, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/57232012-03-07T04:00:11Z2012-03-07T04:00:11ZIs Putin’s leadership legitimate? A closer look at Russia’s elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8381/original/86rd74z4-1331010999.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C151%2C4035%2C2578&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">After vote rigging in Russia's elections, Putin's authority has been called into question.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Alexey Nikolsky/Ria Novosti/Government Press Service Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Russian presidential elections, held on 4 March, gave a solid electoral win to the President-elect Vladimir Putin. But much of the Western press saw it as a tainted victory. With <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/observers-detail-flaws-in-russian-election.html">allegations of election rigging</a> and <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/05/putin-protesters-moscow">large public demonstrations</a> in various Russian cities, many observers claimed Putin’s presidency is now fatally wounded.</p>
<p>With representatives of the Russian opposition lining up to criticise the election outcome and much of the Western press simply accepting what they say at face value, perhaps it is time to take a better look at what actually happened. </p>
<h2>The push for fairness</h2>
<p>The lead-up to this election was like none before it. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-protests-elections-but-putin-is-safe-for-now-4711">December 2011 legislative election</a> had stimulated popular protest on the part of opposition supporters who argued, on the basis of a large amount of anecdotal evidence, that the election had been fraudulent because of widespread tampering with the vote. </p>
<p>These demonstrations were biggest in Moscow, but occurred elsewhere in the country as well, and had extended the theme of the “stolen election” to embrace the call for “Russia without Putin”.</p>
<p>There thus seemed to be a groundswell, how large was uncertain, both to ensure the fairness of the forthcoming presidential poll and to defeat Putin in that poll. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8380/original/xcvhrk8r-1331010950.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">“Russia without Putin” has become the slogan for the anti-Putin opposition in Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Sergei Ilinstky</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In response to these protests, Putin introduced two measures to the presidential electoral process designed to combat fraud: the placement of <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/article/webcams-ready-for-electoral-debut/453983.html">webcams</a> in polling stations and the use of <a href="http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111228/170534194.html">transparent ballot boxes</a> to guard against ballot box stuffing. </p>
<p>As the election approached, all sides were, therefore, conscious of the question of fraud tainting the election. Indeed, the opposition even organised a protest demonstration for the day after polling in order to protest against the fraud they were convinced would occur. </p>
<h2>Was the election fraudulent?</h2>
<p>Reports have come in from private election monitors and monitors sent to Russia by the <a href="http://www.osce.org/">Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a> referring to cases of what the OSCE called “procedural irregularities”. The opposition and some of the private monitors have been more direct referring to fraud. </p>
<p>While it is impossible to measure how extensive fraud was, it is likely that it was nowhere near on the scale as claimed by the opposition. Five candidates faced the electors on Sunday, with Putin receiving some 63% of the vote. Election forecasts conducted by the three main polling agencies showed support for Putin as follows:</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.levada.ru/eng/">Levada Centre</a></em></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16-20 Dec 11</th>
<th>20-23 Jan 12</th>
<th>17-20 Feb 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>FOM</em></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>28-29 Jan 12</th>
<th>4-5 Feb 12</th>
<th>11-12 Feb 12</th>
<th>18-19 Feb 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>VtsIOM</em></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11-12 Feb 12</th>
<th>25-26 Feb 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Putin’s final vote was within the range of these polls, but even if we exclude the Levada Centre figure, allowing for a margin of error, the likely dimension of any fraud would be only a couple of percentage points. This was nowhere near enough to change the election result or even to force the ballot into a second round. This would have happened if Putin had received less than 50% of the vote.</p>
<h2>No fair fight</h2>
<p>More important than any fraudulent activity on the day of the voting was the way in which, as the OSCE noted, the conditions under which the election took place were skewed in favour of Putin. This included the judicious use of electoral regulations to limit candidates, the biased nature of the media, and the access enjoyed by Putin alone to the vast resources of the state ensured. All these factors ensured it was not a fair contest.</p>
<p>But it would be a mistake to attribute Putin’s success only to these factors. Putin has remained genuinely popular with large sections of the Russian people. He has projected a “tough guy” image which has had wide appeal, and he has been popularly associated with policies deemed to have brought about both greatly improved conditions at home and the re-emergence of Russian power abroad. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8376/original/q97gkhy8-1331008027.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian Prime Minister and President elect Vladimir Putin with his preliminary results.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Sergei Ilnitsky</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This popularity is enhanced by the fact that he has really not had to face anyone who could unite oppositionist forces behind them and mount an effective mass appeal. The inability of the opposition to either unite or produce an electable leader has been a major factor in Putin’s success.</p>
<h2>Putin’s authority</h2>
<p>But does this mean his presidency is weakened, or even illegitimate as some oppositionists claim? It is important in this regard not to exaggerate the protest demonstrations. </p>
<p>While they have been important events, the protests are not mobilising enormous numbers of people onto the streets. The largest number reported in the post-December 2011 protests was about 125,000 in Moscow, although police reports suggest the actual figure was much lower. The protest on 5th March is said to have numbered about 20,000. </p>
<p>In a city of nine million people, even the 125,000 figure is a very small percentage. And many fewer are protesting outside Moscow. There is not a wave of mass protest at this stage calling Putin’s victory into question. Indeed when anti- and pro-Putin protests were held on 4th February, the pro-Putin rally was larger.</p>
<h2>Change is possible?</h2>
<p>But it may be less the size of the demonstrations than what they are seen to mean that is important. The demonstrations raise the question of whether political change is a possibility in Russia, and as reflected in the words of the protesters, they declare that it is. </p>
<p>If this idea catches on, and someone can pick it up and use it to garner popular support, it may be that the sentiment for change will spread further than it currently appears. But until that happens, Putin seems secure in the presidency for the foreseeable future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/5723/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Gill receives funding from the ARC and the University of Sydney.</span></em></p>The Russian presidential elections, held on 4 March, gave a solid electoral win to the President-elect Vladimir Putin. But much of the Western press saw it as a tainted victory. With allegations of election…Graeme Gill, Professor, Department of Government and Public Administration, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.