tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/factionalism-29579/articlesfactionalism – The Conversation2023-07-18T12:35:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099722023-07-18T12:35:19Z2023-07-18T12:35:19ZAndrew Leigh calls out how Labor’s factional ‘duopoly’ is undermining the party<p>Andrew Leigh, an assistant minister in the Albanese government, has launched a swingeing attack on the stranglehold the factional “duopoly” has on the Labor Party. </p>
<p>Leigh says the factions’ power is at an all-time high, which suppresses ideological debate, distorts preselections, and discourages people joining the party. </p>
<p>As one of two non-factional members of caucus, it is generally recognised that the promotion of Leigh, who has strong economic qualifications, has been handicapped by not being in the Left or Right. </p>
<p>In a speech to the Per Capita think tank’s John Cain Lunch, released before its Wednesday delivery, Leigh says he’s not arguing factions should be banned but that “not being in a faction should be as valid a choice as joining a faction”. </p>
<p>He says the silence about the factions and their operations “should be a clue. If a group’s practices and deals start to sound like they’ve been plucked from a John le Carre novel, these people should ask themselves whether their shenanigans befit Australia’s most important political party.” </p>
<p>In an excoriating critique of the way factionalism is operating at federal and state level, Leigh says today’s factions “are less likely to broker ideological debates than to try and find a way of avoiding the debate altogether”. He contrasts this with the 1990s feisty debates at NSW ALP conferences, and at national conferences, which showed Labor “was a sufficiently large tent to contain a spectrum of ideological perspectives”. </p>
<p>“If we stifle internal debate, we miss the chance to test our policies among ourselves,” Leigh says. </p>
<p>“As Assistant Minister for Competition, I can’t help but wonder if part of the problem is what we would call an increase in market concentration.” Leigh points to the collapse of the Centre Left faction, which was strong in the 1980s, and the decline of non-factional parliamentarians, producing a duopoly of Right and Left.</p>
<p>“And just as duopolies in the product market hurt consumers through price gouging and profiteering, so too duopoly factions may engage in behaviour that is not in the long-term interests of the party and its membership. </p>
<p>"When factional competition is less intense, dealmaking can replace debate. If factionalism becomes effectively compulsory, the party may become less dynamic.”</p>
<p>Factions can be profoundly undemocratic, Leigh says. </p>
<p>“In some jurisdictions, factions require their members to use a ‘show and tell’ approach to internal Labor Party elections. In the room where ballot papers are handed out, the faction sets up a second table. </p>
<p>"When members are given their ballot paper, they must walk over to the factional table, and hand their ballot paper to a factional official. </p>
<p>"That factional official then fills in their ballot paper, and gives it back to the party member to be deposited into the ballot box. This rule applies to all members of the faction, from new members to ministers. Failure to comply can mean expulsion from the faction.” </p>
<p>In contrast, “no Labor government would tolerate an organisation that set up a table in the corner of the polling station, asking people to volunteer to have their ballot papers filled in for them. We would see it as utterly undemocratic. Yet we tolerate it in our own internal elections.”</p>
<p>Criticising the way the factions carve up seats, Leigh says they are “at their worst when they serve only as competing executive recruitment agencies”. </p>
<p>“In most states, preselection is virtually impossible for people outside the factional system. It’s a case of Left, Right, or Out.”</p>
<p>He highlights the Victorian “Stability Pact” – “an agreement between the factions in which every winnable seat, every party leadership position, and every spot on every committee is divided between the Left and the Right, with a no-contest rule on the other’s possessions. </p>
<p>"Like the nineteenth century colonial powers meeting in Berlin to divide up Africa, the Stability Pact effectively takes away the ability of local members to have their say. Nominally, the party rules say that preselections depend equally on local member votes and the central committee. But if the factions vote together, then even a 90% local member vote can be overridden by a 95% central committee vote.” </p>
<p>Allocating seats to factions is “electorally reckless” because it can lead to failing to field the best person for a particular electorate, Leigh says. </p>
<p>He says factional dominance causes unnecessary division, with the risk of forcing new recruits to the party into an “uncomfortable choice”. Factionalism also has bad consequences in Young Labor and in university Labor clubs, with many campuses having two clubs, one for the Left and one for the Right. </p>
<p>“Factional dominance risks eliminating a tradition with deep roots in the Labor Party: people who simply choose to be part of the party,” Leigh says. </p>
<p>“Most Labor members will never seek a career in parliament or as a party official. They simply want their party to recognise that a non-factional member of the Labor Party is no less worthy than a factional member.</p>
<p>"On election day, these members will staff booths from dawn to dusk. They are motivated not by power, but by altruism. They joined Labor to shape a better nation. They should not be treated as second-class citizens within our party.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>He says factional dominance causes unnecessary division, with the risk of forcing new recruits to the party into an “uncomfortable choice”Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257722019-10-29T12:58:43Z2019-10-29T12:58:43ZLebanon uprising unites people across faiths, defying deep sectarian divides<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298994/original/file-20191028-113972-6ay3jw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C0%2C5760%2C3811&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lebanese protesters formed a 105-mile human chain connecting geographically and religiously diverse cities across the country, Oct. 27. 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Lebanon-Protests/310a90c1b23147e1979b57a9c52ae763/55/0">AP Photo/Bilal Hussein</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Religion has shaped Lebanon since it gained independence from France in 1943. In this <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanon-is-cracking-under-the-pressure-from-syria-and-iraq-36167">multicultural country</a> of Muslims, Christians and Druze – a <a href="https://theconversation.com/solving-the-1-000-year-old-mystery-of-druze-origin-with-a-genetic-sat-nav-68550">medieval faith derived from Islam</a> – religion defines membership and belonging. It is woven into Lebanon’s economic, political and social fabric.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/21/middleeast/lebanon-protests-explainer-intl/index.html">mass protests</a> that began in mid-October over a proposal to tax WhatsApp calls are challenging that tradition. Over a million Lebanese from all faiths have joined together in these leaderless and nationwide anti-government demonstrations, in which the agenda has now expanded from avoiding taxes to regime change.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/lebanon-protests-latest-corruption-middle-east-revolution-tax-a9165161.html">All of them means all of them</a>,” protesters nationwide chant, demanding the ouster of Lebanon’s entire ruling class.</p>
<p>On Oct. 29, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, a Sunni, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/29/lebanons-pm-saad-hariri-resigns-amid-angry-protests">resigned</a>, elating demonstrators. Protesters blame Hariri, along with Lebanon’s Christian president and Shiite parliament speaker, for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/20/cracks-appear-in-lebanons-governing-coalition-after-third-day-of-protests">rampant corruption, a wrecked economy and a ravaged environment</a>. </p>
<p>In repudiation of the idea that <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745334141/the-politics-of-sectarianism-in-postwar-lebanon/">religious allegiance</a> comes before national unity, they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests.html">are demanding</a> fair elections, a stronger judiciary and more government accountability. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/298999/original/file-20191028-114005-22ghj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police remove an anti-government protester blocking a highway in Beirut, Lebanon, Oct. 26, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Lebanon-Protests/cec27b3ca1f144dbafb1bffcfa4f464a/69/0">AP Photo/Hussein Malla</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Hunger has no religion’</h2>
<p>With 18 recognized sects – including the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6932786.stm">Maronite Christians</a>; Sunni, Shiite and <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55663">Alawite Muslims</a>; and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/solving-the-1-000-year-old-mystery-of-druze-origin-with-a-genetic-sat-nav-68550">Druze</a> – Lebanon is one of the most religiously diverse countries in the Middle East. </p>
<p>When a class struggle broke out there in the mid-1970s, it quickly devolved into a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14649284">civil war</a> between right-wing Christian and left-wing Muslim militias. </p>
<p>To end Lebanon’s conflict, the 1989 <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89">Taif Accords</a> required all factions to relinquish their weapons and distributed government positions to politicians of different faiths. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299015/original/file-20191028-113953-1sgsrc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lebanon’s administrative divisions reflect its religious divisions, with Shiites concentrated in the country’s south and east and Maronite Christians dominating central areas near Beirut.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/56/Lebanon_region_map.png">Globe-trotter/Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection - University of Texas Library Online</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This power-sharing agreement has kept the peace in Lebanon. But it has also given it a political order built on religious factionalism. </p>
<p>Patronage networks run by the “<a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/11/lebanons-fabric-is-fraying-this-is-why-it-matters/">za'eem</a>,” as Lebanon’s powerful sectarian leaders are called, protect the interests of their religious communities, doling out favors both legal and illegal. All faiths have their own za'eem.</p>
<p>Religiously based governance has given Lebanon both <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-national-debt/">extreme national debt</a> and staggering inequality. According to the <a href="https://wid.world/country/lebanon/">World Inequality Database</a>, the richest 1% of Lebanese own approximately a quarter of the nation’s wealth. Lebanon’s infrastructure is crumbling. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/10/21/771820303/lebanon-is-crippled-by-massive-anti-government-protests">Power outages</a> are a chronic problem even in urban middle-class neighborhoods.</p>
<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/lebanon">human rights violations</a> – including <a href="https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Lebanon-Gender-Violence-Publications.pdf">domestic violence</a>, <a href="https://alefliban.org/publications/annual-report-2018/">child labor</a> and abuse of Syrian refugees – are rarely punished.</p>
<p>But, according to the political scientist <a href="http://sas.lau.edu.lb/social-sciences/people/bassel-salloukh.php">Bassel Salloukh</a>, Lebanon’s rulers “<a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/9/30/how-neoliberalism-defeated-itself-in-lebanon">use sectarian mobilization</a> to camouflage intra-sectarian socioeconomic disparities” – a divide-and-conquer strategy meant to stop class solidarity from emerging. </p>
<p>The beneficiaries of this system argue that Lebanon’s stability hinges on this sectarian balance. And, indeed, sectarianism has been remarkably effective in forestalling dissent for the past 30 years. </p>
<p>It has also instilled a deep distrust in government. A <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/countries/lebanon/">recent poll</a> shows that 96% of Lebanese think political corruption is endemic.</p>
<h2>The sectarian construct</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://english.osu.edu/people/kafantaris.6">a literary historian</a>, I study the stories a nation tells itself about belonging, allegiance and identity. In Lebanon, my home country, I recognize sectarianism as a social construct.</p>
<p>Social constructs, like <a href="https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/otm/segments/problem-with-civility">civility</a> or <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2953734?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">money</a>, are concepts that only mean something because humans agree they do. Often, social constructs benefit the powerful. </p>
<p>By drawing the boundaries of inclusion along religious lines, Lebanese sectarianism has impeded the rise of more unifying ideologies like nationalism or secularism.</p>
<p>“Sectarianism has been depicted as a monolithic force, unchanging in the face of history,” historian <a href="https://history.rice.edu/faculty/ussama-makdisi">Ussama Makdisi</a> wrote in his 2000 book “<a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520218468/the-culture-of-sectarianism">The Culture of Sectarianism</a>. But, he continues, "sectarianism was produced. Therefore it can be changed.”</p>
<p>Since the civil war, Lebanese have been raised to see religion as the only marker of kinship and rivalry, but the Lebanese share many things: a multilingual literary heritage, for example, and a love of <a href="https://en.vogue.me/culture/fairouz-facts-singer-birthday/">Fairuz</a>, one of the Arab world’s most admired singers. </p>
<p>Lebanese of different faiths suffer together, too. As one protester told Foreign Policy, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/22/iran-losing-middle-east-iraq-lebanon-protests-bad-governance/">hunger has no religion</a>.</p>
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<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri, right, with President Michel Aoun before an emergency cabinet meeting, Oct. 21, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Lebanon-Protests/cff1a70541e24d78aed19f0a1d5653a2/25/0">Dalati Nohra via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sectarian politics have been dismantled before. Two decades after <a href="http://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa">Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement</a>, the divide between Catholics and Protestants there remains. But it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-top-down-solution-to-the-irish-border-after-brexit-undermines-20-years-of-peacebuilding-89260">official government policy</a> to foster peace-building, human rights and religious freedom.</p>
<p>Like protesters in both <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/09/15/beyond-the-spectre-of-sectarianism-the-case-of-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> and, more recently, Sudan – who pushed out religiously divisive leaders in hopes of nurturing a more secular democracy – Lebanon’s protests challenge a tired western stereotype that the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15570274.2017.1354462">Middle East is an intolerant, naturally authoritarian place</a>.</p>
<h2>Hezbollah is no exception</h2>
<p>In recent days, demonstrators who support Hezbollah <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/10/25/773532482/anti-government-protests-continue-in-lebanon-and-move-to-include-hezbollah-leade">have protested</a> the inclusion of their leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in the movement’s calls for regime change. They say accusations of <a href="https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2019/Oct-23/494113-hezbollah-party-and-leader-under-rare-street-pressure.ashx">corruption</a> against this powerful Lebanese political and social force are <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691180885/hezbollah">evidence of a conspiracy by Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States</a>.</p>
<p>Violence <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-supporters-break-up-beirut-protest-camp-burning-and-dismantling-tents/">erupted</a> on Oct. 29 when Hezbollah supporters attacked demonstrators, re-opening key roads blocked by protester encampments and setting their tents on fire. </p>
<p>Still, the uprising grows. Past <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/25/lebanon-protests-michel-aoun-corruption-mismanagement/">violence</a> has failed to quell protests, as have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/23/lebanese-protesters-dont-trust-their-government-reform-heres-why/">offers</a> from the government to cut lawmakers’ salaries by half and tax banks to relieve national debt. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Hariri’s resignation opens the door for real change in Lebanon, but protests will likely continue. The za'eem system means Hariri’s replacement may well reinforce the same power-sharing model.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299301/original/file-20191029-183107-1bv0tar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in Beirut cheer the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Oct. 29, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Lebanon-Protests/f6521e4ecc0c4aa6b1531a412f8ca405/16/0">AP Photo/Bilal Hussein</a></span>
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<p>The current grassroots protests build on the momentum of a 2015 uprising called the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2057047315617943">#YouStink movement</a>. Those protests began when Lebanon’s main landfill was shut down and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-33656778">mounds of trash</a> filled the streets of Beirut, but they came to embody numerous other causes: <a href="https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/doi/10.1177/1461444816686321">Children</a> marched for climate action. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/25/lebanon-migrant-domestic-workers-children-deported">Feminists</a> defended the rights of domestic workers.</p>
<p>In 2018, women <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/5/news-record-number-of-women-on-the-ballot-in-lebanon">ran for office in Lebanon record numbers</a>.</p>
<h2>Rebuilding a nation</h2>
<p>There is an academic theory I like about how nations are built, called “cultural intimacy.”</p>
<p>It holds that <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Cultural_Intimacy.html?id=zzDw3qiOYrYC">communal acts</a> like breaking bread together, say, or self-deprecating humor play a crucial role in creating a shared citizenry.</p>
<p>The 1.5 million Lebanese Sunnis, Shias and Christians who have for weeks been walking side by side, holding hands and raging against the system are not merely protesting. They’re building a society that works for them.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125772/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mira Assaf Kafantaris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lebanon’s 1989 peace deal ended a civil war by sharing political power between religious factions. That created a society profoundly divided by religion – something today’s protesters hope to change.Mira Assaf Kafantaris, Senior Lecturer in English, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/651232016-09-18T16:43:08Z2016-09-18T16:43:08ZSouth Africa’s dysfunctional cabinet is a far cry from Mandela’s era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137640/original/image-20160913-4983-33aar2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Nelson Mandela forged a powerful cabinet of national unity.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s cabinet has become dysfunctional. This highest executive body charged with managing the state’s daily affairs has 35 members. </p>
<p>The cabinet is responsible for, among other things:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… developing and implementing national policy [and] coordinating the functions of state departments and administration.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But judging from <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-patronage-and-state-capture-spell-trouble-for-south-africa-64704">recent events</a> it is failing dismally at its task. There is mounting evidence that cabinet’s co-ordination and decision-making capacity has collapsed. </p>
<p>It hasn’t always been this way. Recent history reveals just how important co-ordinated cabinet decision making can be. In 1994 President Nelson Mandela created a <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol3-2/Traniello.pdf">“power-sharing” cabinet</a>. It was made up of ministers from the African National Congress as well as the party’s erstwhile enemies – the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party. Mandela forged a powerful and effective decision-making body.</p>
<p>A functioning, stable cabinet is an important ingredient for building prosperity. This is particularly true in a developing democracy like South Africa. The executive cabinet is uniquely empowered to improve the quality of ordinary people’s lives.</p>
<p>A strong cabinet provides the direction and political impetus for schools to be run effectively, houses to be built and corruption to be minimised. And, as <a href="http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/kenya-powersharing-cabinet">illustrated by Kenya</a>, it can help restore order in the midst of instability.</p>
<p>But a disjointed cabinet beset by infighting, as infamously seen in countries like <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/escaping-political-deadlock-nepal-caretaker-cabinet">Nepal</a>, undermines the state’s ability to effectively implement development policies.</p>
<h2>Contradictory statements</h2>
<p>The recent <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-02-cabinet-to-seek-judicial-inquiry-into-banks-moves-against-the-guptas/#.V9aHIa2Gzvs">statement</a> by Mineral Resources Minister Mosebenzi Zwane provides the most glaring evidence of a meltdown in the executive. Zwane claimed that cabinet had resolved to establish a judicial inquiry into the country’s banking sector. </p>
<p>This came after South Africa’s four largest banks cut ties with companies linked to the controversial <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-there-needs-to-be-judicial-oversight-of-bank-account-closures-58003">Gupta family</a>. The family is at the centre of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-state-capture-is-a-regressive-step-for-any-society-56837">state capture allegations</a>. </p>
<p>Zwane was immediately contradicted by the presidency. It released a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-02-presidency-statement-of-minister-of-mineral-resources-is-not-government-position/#.V9aIoK2Gzvs">statement</a> which said Zwane:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… does not speak on behalf of cabinet and the contents of his statement do not reflect the position or views of cabinet.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A defiant Zwane, who has previously been <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/guptas-have-business-link-to-mines-minister-zwane-20160219">linked</a> to the Guptas, refused to answer questions about the matter in parliament. </p>
<p>At the same sitting, his cabinet colleague and the finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, publicly distanced himself from the call for a judicial inquiry. Gordhan <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/gordhan-contradicts-zwane-on-call-for-banking-inquiry-20160908">asserted</a> that South Africa already had a strong financial regulatory framework in place.</p>
<p>This episode inflicted further damage on dwindling investor <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/02/SA-business-concerned-over-unstable-investor-confidence">confidence</a> in the country. </p>
<p>But the most concerning aspect of Zwane’s conduct is the fact that it was not an isolated incident.</p>
<p>Discord within cabinet was also evident in December last year when Zuma ill-fatedly replaced his finance minister, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">Nhlanhla Nene</a>, with Des van Rooyen.</p>
<p>The appointment sparked turmoil in the <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2015/12/13/Zuma-faces-uprising-over-Nene-sacking">currency markets</a> and Van Rooyen was moved to a different cabinet portfolio after <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/pravin-gordhan-appointed-minister-of-finance-20151213">just four days</a>. He subsequently <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/08/30/Van-Rooyen-accuses-Gordhan-of-dragging-Hawks-investigation">launched</a> a public attack on his successor, Gordhan. </p>
<p>There are other recent examples of a lack of cohesion within cabinet. These include the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nomvula-defies-treasury-20160910-2">revelation</a> that Water Affairs Minister Nomvula Mokonyane has defied the National Treasury by resolving to merge the country’s two most powerful water boards. </p>
<p>The scale of the infighting and conflicting messages suggest that the Zuma cabinet has undermined its ability to manage the affairs of state. It evidently lacks coherent, deliberate and evidence-based policymaking procedures. It is quite simply the most paralysed cabinet the country has had since democratisation in 1994.</p>
<p>Thanks to Mandela’s effective leadership, in addition to the tireless work of committed people like Cabinet Secretary Jakes Gerwel, a group of former adversaries were able to overcome their differences for the sake of the public interest. </p>
<p>Despite challenges, Mandela’s cabinet ultimately laid the foundation for a long-term democratic future through the adoption of the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">1996 Constitution</a>.</p>
<p>Out of the ashes of apartheid, Mandela’s cabinet also played a central role in:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>creating the conditions to restore fiscal stability;</p></li>
<li><p>drawing up new laws;</p></li>
<li><p>conducting South Africa’s first democratic local government elections; and</p></li>
<li><p>supporting the creation of key institutions such as the Constitutional Court and Public Protector. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But it would appear those days are long gone. Mandela fostered an environment of goal-oriented collaboration, dialogue and compromise. And while Thabo Mbeki’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/12283440">centralisation</a> of executive power ultimately contributed to a political backlash that cost him his job, his administration was downright coherent compared to the Zuma cabinet. </p>
<p>Zuma’s lack of leadership and his relentless focus on self-enrichment has created an environment of fear, factionalism and selfishness.</p>
<p>While Mandela’s cabinet made allies out of erstwhile adversaries, Zuma’s cabinet is making enemies out of former allies.</p>
<p>A functional, collaborative and goal-oriented cabinet is vital for good governance. In recent months Zuma and many of his fellow executives have conclusively demonstrated they lack the leadership qualities needed to steer South Africa out of its economic and social crises.</p>
<p>With ever-darker storm clouds gathering on the horizon, the country’s captain is feasting below deck while his ministers fight over control of the ship’s wheel. If it is not steadied, the consequences will be disastrous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leon Schreiber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Nelson Mandela’s cabinet made allies out of erstwhile adversaries, Jacob Zuma’s cabinet is making enemies out of former allies.Leon Schreiber, Senior Research Specialist, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/646432016-09-01T15:35:45Z2016-09-01T15:35:45ZComrades in arms against apartheid are now at one another’s throats<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135954/original/image-20160830-28260-1ivszm5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Des van Rooyen, cooperative governance minister and new treasurer-general of the MK Military Veterans Association. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">eNCA.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s embattled finance minister Pravin Gordhan has come under attack from two colleagues in government. The public attack has <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-30-des-van-rooyen-says-gordhan-is-undermining-the-hawks-and-trying-to-garner-sympathy">made headlines</a> because all three men serve in government as members of the African National Congress (ANC). In addition, they all served in the ANC’s military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. Gordhan was, and is, very much the two men’s senior. Cooperative governance minister Des van Rooyen and military veterans’ affairs deputy minister Kebby Maphatsoe inferred at a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/08/29/Gordhan-accused-of-undermining-the-Hawks-using-media-to-solicit-sympathy">media briefing</a> that Gordhan’s <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2016/08/24/hawks-accuse-pravin-gordhan-of-corruption">refusal</a> to present himself to the country’s elite police unit, the Hawks, was because he had something to hide. Politics and society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Keith Gottschalk to unpack what the incident says about tensions in the ANC.</em></p>
<p><strong>How important was MK in the liberation struggle and what significance does it have today?</strong></p>
<p>Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was the armed wing of the then underground ANC. While it could never physically block apartheid soldiers from entering any “liberated zone”, its importance was threefold.</p>
<p>First, it electrified millions of oppressed people to mobilise internally in the United Democratic Front, trade unions and a host of civil society organisations and their campaigns “to make South Africa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41067113?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">ungovernable</a>”.</p>
<p>Second, it gave the ANC credibility internationally as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">dominant resistance movement</a> against the apartheid regime, in a way that for example, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the Azanian People’s Organisation and the Unity Movement could never claim. </p>
<p>Third, its activities compelled the apartheid regime to extend conscription successively during the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/military-service-becomes-compulsory-white-south-african-men">Conscription</a> was instituted in 1962 in the form of nine months of service for all white males between the ages of 17 and 65. Conscripts became members of the South African Defence Force or the South African Police. They were used to enforce the government’s stance against liberation movements, anti-apartheid activists and the “communist threat”. </p>
<p>In 1972, conscription (national service) was increased from nine months to one year. After completing the year, they were called up annually for 19 days for five years as part of the Citizen Force. </p>
<p>By the middle of 1974 control of northern Namibia was handed over to the South African Defence Force from the South African Police, and in 1975 the army invaded Angola. To keep up with operational demands, Citizen Force members were then required to complete three-month tours of duty.</p>
<p>In 1977 conscription was once again increased, this time to two years plus 30 days annually for eight years. </p>
<p>The state was also forced to pour funds into the Armaments Corporation of South Africa <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/topic/armaments-corporation-south-africa-armscor">(Armscor)</a>, building <a href="http://fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/">six atomic bombs</a> and a long-range missile to threaten neighbouring states that were providing rear bases to MK. All this was a crippling financial burden which contributed to bring down the apartheid state, as did the emigration of white professionals to <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AG1977/AG1977-A5-19-001-jpeg.pdf">avoid conscription</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What role did Gordhan play in MK?</strong></p>
<p>Gordhan was in the MK underground network operating in KwaZulu-Natal during the 1980s. He was joint secretary of the Regional Politico Military Committee in the greater Durban region of the then banned and underground ANC.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=823&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=823&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=823&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1035&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1035&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1035&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African finance minister Pravin Gordhan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gordhan was responsible for setting up a number of MK units operating in what was then southern Natal. He was closely involved in the mobilisation process and recruitment of young guerrillas in that area to undergo military training inside South Africa. This was part of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/members-anc-and-sacp-are-detained-due-operation-vula">Operation Vula</a>, one of the ANC’s major offensives towards the end of apartheid. Gordhan was <a href="http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37a/043.html">one of nine senior</a> Operation Vula trialists charged with terrorism by the apartheid state - it was the last terrorism trial in pre-democratic South Africa. In 1991 they were indemnified by the government.</p>
<p><strong>What is the status of MK today?</strong></p>
<p>MK was disbanded in 1991. The <a href="http://mkmva.anc.org.za/show.php?id=11329">MK Military Veterans Association</a> was formed shortly afterwards. Today it is just another ANC structure like the <a href="http://www.ancyl.org.za/">Youth League</a> and the <a href="http://womensleague.anc.org.za/">Women’s League</a>.</p>
<p>MK veterans are not a political force per se. But they are mobilised by <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/fransman-claims-anc-factions-out-to-stop-him-2045705">rival factions</a> within the ANC. For example, the smear attacks by <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/09/14/kebby-admits-he-ran-away-from-mk-camp1">Maphatsoe</a> against former intelligence minister <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/kasrils-and-kebby-settle-defamation-case-2060192">Ronnie Kasrils</a> are part of his defence of President Zuma. It is unlikely that his smears represent the views of most veterans, or that he has even consulted them.</p>
<p>These <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/03/02/behind-the-sars-wars-are-intelligence-agents-with-agendas">contestations</a> will continue until Zuma’s successor has been chosen by the ANC. This should happen in 2017 when the ANC is due to hold its national conference to <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-02-mchunu-zikalala-war-foreshadows-ancs-2017-leadership-race">elect</a> a new president and national executive.</p>
<p><strong>What does the attack on Gordhan by two colleagues tell us about the ANC?</strong></p>
<p>ANC disagreements, like those of the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-01/corbyn-sows-civil-war-as-u-k-labour-lawmakers-desert-him">British Labour Party</a>, are more often in public than is the case with their rival parties. For example, it is many years since then Democratic Alliance (DA) leader Helen Zille publicly <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2012-01-24-hilarious-storm-over-das-mazibuko-mnqasela-to-plead-not-guilty">dressed down</a> a (black) DA elected representative for saying that the party’s former parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, was not black enough. </p>
<p>But when cabinet ministers and deputy ministers criticise each other in public, as both Van Rooyen and Maphatsoe have done with Gordhan, it shows that even the top leadership is seriously divided on important issues.</p>
<p><strong>What does it all mean going forward?</strong></p>
<p>What this means for the future is that divisiveness between ANC factions in national and provincial structures will continue or even deteriorate all the way in the run-up to its 2017 conference.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member. He writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>MK, the army of the then banned ANC, electrified millions of oppressed people to rise against the apartheid regime. Today, its veterans are being used in factional battles within the ruling party.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/630632016-07-26T20:53:02Z2016-07-26T20:53:02ZWhy the battle for Nelson Mandela Bay has captured South Africa’s attention<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132022/original/image-20160726-7028-1smc3ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance, woos voters in hotly-contested Nelson Mandela Bay.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by the DA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/party-big-guns-city-last-shot-wooing-voters/">Political heavyweights</a> from South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) and the country’s leading opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) have descended on Nelson Mandela Bay in a bid to woo voters ahead of local government elections. </p>
<p>The Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, set in the Eastern Cape, the heartland of the ANC, is a <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-nelson-mandela-bay-may-be-the-ancs-mini-waterloo-58010">strategic battleground</a> for both parties. A loss to the main opposition party would suggest that people are losing faith in the ANC as a governing party. A victory for the DA would indicate that it is breaking through a protected core of voters and that it could become a formidable challenger for power in future.</p>
<p>The ANC has suffered significant losses in the area due to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8197409/Bitter_battles_for_survival_Assessing_the_impact_of_the_political_factionalism_in_Nelson_Mandela_Bay_Municipality_s_post-Polokwane_landscape">factional political battles</a> that have had a direct effect on service delivery. Governance has been undermined by <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/09/Auditor-General-report-flags-wasteful-expenditure-in-EC">maladministration</a>, <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-19-former-mandela-metro-manager-wins-r31-in-damages">political interference</a>, and alleged corruption in the <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/assets/Documents/KabusoLegalInterpretation.pdf">Kabuso</a> and <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/new-delays-in-pikoli-report/">Pikoli</a> reports.</p>
<p>These events may have a direct effect on the electoral performance of the ANC. For the first time the party faces the real possibility of losing one of its strongholds. Voter support for the ANC is no longer unconditional as communities have become more vocal about its failure to deliver on its promise of “a better life for all”.</p>
<h2>The promise of a better life</h2>
<p>The ANC’s election <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/07/23/DA-the-offspring-of-the-National-Party-Zuma">campaign rhetoric</a> has focused on the dangers of the past, a <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/da-is-apartheid-snake-zuma-tells-crowd-of-voters-20160723">return to apartheid</a> if the DA wins, and its continued commitment to advancing human dignity and freedom. The DA has focused on debunking the <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/apartheid-return/">myth of a return to apartheid</a>, saying that life would be better under rule by the opposition party.</p>
<p>Both parties claim their policies and governance strategies will make for a better life for the electorate.</p>
<p>Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=nelson-mandela-bay-municipality">sixth largest</a> municipality in South Africa, tells the story of both the advancing of a better life, but also of disappointment that a better life has not materialised.</p>
<p>Manufacturing, community services, transport and finance industries are the foundation of the metro’s economy. But unemployment among the 1.2 million people who live in the municipality is estimated to stand at <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2016.pdf">33.2%</a> compared with the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/09/SA-unemployment-rate-rises">26.7% national unemployment</a> rate. </p>
<p>Most households have access to electricity and other basic services. But about 6% of the population, predominantly in informal settlements, still use the <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/3c6aa6004d21849fa0f6e293fd523eaa/Bucket-toilet-system-still-a-challenge-in-EC-20161406">bucket system</a> as they don’t have access to proper sanitation. This is despite promises that the problem would be addressed. It is estimated that <a href="http://mype.co.za/new/bucket-toilet-crisis-mokonyane-and-jordaan-both-turn-a-blind-eye/61388/2016/02">35% of all bucket systems</a> nationally are located in Nelson Mandela Bay. </p>
<p>The illusion of a better life finds expression in dissatisfaction with poorly built government-supplied houses, the basis of human security. In Khayamnandi, a number of ablution facilities have been built, but no houses have materialised. This is colloquially referred to as “<a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/toilet-outcry-leads-plans-homes/">toilet city</a>”. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/f85022804bc720f289638d96fb2bb898/Police-ministry-intervenes-to-curb-PE-gang-violence">Gang violence</a> has also increased. And, for many, basic education provision remains critical as classes are overcrowded and limited teachers have been appointed to schools. Education is, of course, a vehicle for social mobility.</p>
<h2>Changing political landscape</h2>
<p>Support for the DA has grown significantly, most notably during the 2011 local government election when it got <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-11-the-partys-over-anc-sees-decline-in-support">40% of the vote</a>. This went up marginally in the 2014 general election from 40.13% to 40.16%. </p>
<p>The party is running an aggressive electoral campaign that capitalises on its governance successes in Cape Town, which it controls, and the Western Cape region, where it holds power in a number of local municipalities.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1024&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1024&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132001/original/image-20160726-7028-1bnd2ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1024&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A man collects fallen election posters for recycling in South Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
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<p>To take over the metro council the party would need to make significant gains in ANC strongholds within the metro. But to do this it would need to work on losing the label that it is a “white party”. The DA is in fact one of the most racially diverse parties in South Africa. </p>
<h2>Framing ‘the better life’</h2>
<p>In contesting the elections, both parties have addressed critical issues like job creation, governance, basic service delivery, gangsterism and delivering on the promise of a better life. </p>
<p>The DA has also focused on the delivery failures of the ANC. Here it has capitalised on creating a new political agenda: dealing with key priorities like poverty alleviation, unemployment, and clean and accountable governance, while also emphasising social cohesion, diversity and nation-building. </p>
<p>In turn, the ANC has focused on regaining the trust of voters. With the deployment of former South African Football Association President <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/-UWC-alumnus-Danny-Jordaan-as-mayor.aspx">Danny Jordaan</a> as the mayor, the first priority has been to clean up the administration. The party has sought to counter the perception that council posts serve as a road to riches for “<a href="http://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">tenderperneurs</a>” – reference to businesspeople who enrich themselves, often in underhanded ways, through government tenders.</p>
<p>The Jordaan administration has rolled out free Wi-Fi, is attempting to address botched housing delivery and has set out a clear five-year strategic plan.</p>
<h2>Bets are off</h2>
<p>It is difficult to predict the outcome of the election in Nelson Mandela Bay. <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/polls-eff-drops-in-nelson-mandela-bay">Recent polls</a> show that the DA is leading the race. But a number of factors could swing the result either way. </p>
<p>One of these is how other opposition parties – the United Democratic Movement, the United Front and the Economic Freedom Fighters – perform. </p>
<p>We also do not know to what extent the divisive politics of the ANC will resonate with voters, especially in its strongholds. </p>
<p>Voter turn-out will also be a crucial factor. Will ANC voters stay away from the polls? Will the DA get its voters out on the day?</p>
<p>The uncertainty around the outcome has captured South Africa’s imagination. In previous elections speculation has focused on the size of the ANC’s majority. This time the question on people’s minds is: will the ANC win in Nelson Mandela Bay?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the NRF and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. </span></em></p>In previous elections speculation in South Africa focused on the likely size of the ruling ANC’s majority. This time the question on people’s minds is: will the ANC win or lose Nelson Mandela Bay?Joleen Steyn Kotze, Associate Professor of Political Science, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/629392016-07-23T06:36:19Z2016-07-23T06:36:19ZWong wins foreign affairs in Shorten’s new frontbench line-up<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131668/original/image-20160723-26848-p8kgsf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bill Shorten announces his frontbench with deputy Labor leader Tanya Plibersek.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Andrew Taylor</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bill Shorten has made some very sound decisions in his far-reaching frontbench overhaul, but the exercise contained some shockers as well.</p>
<p>Moving deputy leader Tanya Plibersek from shadow foreign minister to a beefed-up education portfolio puts more heft into one of Labor’s policy strengths.</p>
<p>Elevating Jim Chalmers to finance spokesman and into shadow cabinet is all positive. Chalmers is one of Labor’s rising stars, with strong economic credentials and the real-life experience of having worked for then-treasurer Wayne Swan during the global financial crisis.</p>
<p>Penny Wong becomes shadow foreign minister. It might have been better to have her, like Plibersek, in a domestic job. One also wonders about combining foreign affairs with the highly demanding duties of being Labor’s Senate leader, but the post in opposition doesn’t involve anything like the travel of the foreign minister (unless you’re Kevin Rudd).</p>
<p>Stephen Conroy has been moved from defence – which is a good thing, given some of his bellicose comments on the South China Sea recently – into special minister of state. This will be a significant area this term, when both sides are talking about electoral reforms.</p>
<p>Richard Marles, who as immigration spokesman shepherded through Labor’s reluctant acceptance of turnbacks, has been rewarded with the much more congenial shadow defence portfolio. Shayne Neumann has drawn the short straw of immigration. Neumann has been low profile in indigenous affairs – now he’s in an area that is perennially fraught for Labor.</p>
<p>Jason Clare, who has yet to demonstrate his full potential, moves from communications to resources and northern Australia, as well as trade and investment. Trade is a testing portfolio for Labor, which is often under union pressure to be more restrictive and protectionist.</p>
<p>Michelle Rowland is switched from small business to communications, while Katy Gallagher takes small business and financial services.</p>
<p>Tony Burke, who had finance, goes back to an area he held in government – environment – and also takes up citizenship and multicultural affairs.
Mark Butler retains climate change and energy, but loses environment and water. It’s an unfortunate squeezing of one of Labor’s good public faces.</p>
<p>Linda Burney, just elected as the first Aboriginal woman to enter the House of Representatives, becomes shadow minister for human services; Clare O'Neil gets the justice portfolio, and Ed Husic is shadow minister for employment services and workforce participation.</p>
<p>Of those who stay put, the most obvious is Catherine King in health. While there would have been logic in moving this portfolio to a more high-profile figure, there is also logic in leaving it with King, who did a good job last term. Health was a vote-deliverer for Labor at the election and it would have looked a little odd to jettison the shadow minister.</p>
<p>Chris Bowen remains shadow treasurer; Anthony Albanese stays in infrastructure; Jenny Macklin in families and social services; Brendan O'Connor in workplace relations; Joel Fitzgibbon in agriculture. Mark Dreyfus remains as shadow attorney-general.</p>
<p>Shorten has taken Indigenous affairs under his own wing, with Aboriginal leader Pat Dodson his shadow assistant minister.</p>
<p>This should be a good pairing, especially with the Indigenous recognition referendum coming up. But there are risks too, that must be handled carefully, when the person dealing directly with the area comes from the stakeholder community, has strong views, and is new to parliament as well. If he can avoid the hazards there are enormous opportunities for Dodson to make a difference for Aboriginal people. It will test to the limit his skills, and his ability to adapt to working in an unfamiliar environment.</p>
<p>The shocker aspects of the frontbench flow from Shorten’s dealing with the Kim Carr problem. The left dropped Carr, who then – as a veteran factional fighter – mounted a shock-and-awe campaign for survival, turning his several supporters into a new faction.</p>
<p>Shorten, who remains afraid of Albanese’s ambitions, did not want to risk losing the backing of Carr, who supported him in the 2013 leadership contest, in case dangerous times arise in the future. Therefore Shorten had the shadow ministry expanded by two to allow for Carr.</p>
<p>This has put the total of shadow ministers in excess of the number who can get an extra allowance. So Andrew Leigh, who continues as assistant treasurer, cops a pay cut of A$40,000. The diligent Leigh was a soft target simply because he is not in a faction. The decision is totally unfair. It would have been more appropriate for Carr to take the pay hit. The whole affair shows the disreputable side of factionalism.</p>
<p>In the changes, Carr retains the industry part of his old job although he loses higher education to Plibersek.</p>
<p>The jack-in-the-box Sam Dastyari becomes shadow minister for consumer affairs and manager of opposition business in the Senate. He also is in the shadow ministerial “overflow” and so he won’t get extra money. In his case, it is not so bad – he’s not losing any, and he gets a promotion which, given his ambitions, is worth a lot more to him than the dollars.</p>
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Bill Shorten has made some very sound decisions in his far-reaching frontbench overhaul, but the exercise contained some shockers as well. Moving deputy leader Tanya Plibersek from shadow foreign minister…Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.