tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/factions-30212/articlesFactions – The Conversation2020-11-08T09:11:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1487512020-11-08T09:11:55Z2020-11-08T09:11:55ZUnderstanding violent protest in South Africa and the difficult choice facing leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365540/original/file-20201026-19-uiops5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A police van lies in flames after white farmers went on a rampage in Senekal, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tracy Lee Stark/The Citizen.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Protests and social mobilisation are the lifeblood of democracy. They enable the discontent of citizens to be communicated to political elites between elections, and when intra-institutional processes have lost their efficacy. But <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/24/protest-movement-failings-i-dont-believe-in-it-anymore">most protests never lead to sustainable change</a>. They peter out because of one or other reformist measure. Or they lose support because they tend to take on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world">violent overtones</a>.</p>
<p>Most protesters and leaders engage in peaceful mobilisation. But there are always some leaders and activists who are intent on violence. This is because protests and social movements always involve heterogeneous communities with multiple expressions, political factions and leaders. </p>
<p>Some of these expressions and political factions believe in violent direct action and behave accordingly in the protests. Add to this the opportunism of criminals who use the protests as a cover to conduct criminal activity, and it is not hard to imagine why protests can turn violent.</p>
<p>Much of this is reflected in the contemporary protests and social mobilisation around the world. All of the movements - <a href="https://www.adl.org/education/educator-resources/lesson-plans/black-lives-matter-from-hashtag-to-movement">#BlackLivesMatter</a>, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695">Hong Kong Democracy Movement</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/03/who-are-the-gilets-jaunes-and-what-do-they-want">Gilets Jaunes</a> in France, <a href="https://theconversation.com/feesmustfall-the-poster-child-for-new-forms-of-struggle-in-south-africa-68773">#FeesMustFall</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/16/the-real-meaning-of-rhodes-must-fall">#RhodesMustFall</a> in South Africa - were in the main peaceful. But they nevertheless manifested in violent direct action on occasion.</p>
<p>Protest leaders often expressed disquiet and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VLtWdilSKI">dissociated themselves from the violence</a>. But on many occasions, they also excused the violence, suggesting that it could not be compared to that experienced by protesters at the hands of police or by the victims of oppression and exploitation. This may be true in most cases. But it evades the strategic issue that violence can often undermine and erode the legitimacy of protests. It creates the opportunity for police and security forces to repress the social action itself.</p>
<p>Protest leaders also often blame the violence on criminals or on aggressive police action. Again much of this is true. Criminals use protests to conduct criminal activity including, among others, looting and theft when the opportunity arises. Moreover, aggressive policing and repressive actions by security services can often turn the tide of peaceful protests and prompt violent acts by some protesters. </p>
<p>But these explanations do not account for all forms of violence in protests.</p>
<h2>Why peaceful protests turn violent</h2>
<p>Perhaps the foremost scholar on social movements and political violence is political scientist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=utI_trMAAAAJ&hl=en">Donatella Della Porta</a>. She holds that violence in protests is a product of two distinct developments: aggressive police action and <a href="https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/pdf/EventfulProtest.pdf">political factionalisation</a>, in which distinct political groups try to dominate the leadership of social movements. The explanation of aggressive policing is uncontested by most progressive intellectuals. They often refer to it to explain the violence. But they often ignore the second explanation because it involves a collective self-reflection and a political confrontation with movement participants. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that in many of these movements, there are individual activists and political groupings who explicitly hold the view that <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-08-31-in-defence-of-black-violence/">violent action is legitimate</a>. They use the circumstances to actively drive such behaviour, as I explain in detail in Chapter 9 of my 2018 book, <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rebels-Rage-FeesMustFall-Adam-Habib-ebook/dp/B07P626QB4">Rebels and Rage</a></em>. </p>
<p>These proactive commitments from factions within these protest movements suggest that violence is as much internally driven from within the social movements as it is a response to the repressive actions of the police and security services.</p>
<p>This then necessitates a reflection on the strategic efficacy of violence as a means of sustainably achieving social justice outcomes. Of course, this reflection must be contextually grounded. It must be understood in the context of the democratic societies within which the protests occur. After all it is the democratic character of these societies, flawed as they may be, which establishes the parameters of legitimate political action and the consequences for the violations thereof.</p>
<h2>Rage versus violence</h2>
<p>Social mobilisation requires rage but not violence. When the two get confused, the cause of social justice itself may be delegitimised or defeated. Rage is important because it can inspire people, galvanise them, and as a result enable collective action against injustice. It also need not always lead to violence. Neither does it need to lead to emotionally driven acts of impulsiveness.</p>
<p>If there is a lesson to be learnt from the life of the late statesman <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a>, it is that effective leadership of a social or political struggle requires an understanding of the political lay of the land. It also requires an assessment of the prevailing distribution of power among social forces, an acute grasp of the leverage available to political actors opposed to the social justice cause, and a plan for how to overcome these without compromising on the ultimate social outcome.</p>
<p>Much of the case of young activists for adopting violence as a strategic option is predicated on the presence of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/structural-violence">structural violence</a>. This refers to the prevailing economic and political conditions which produce not only deep social marginalisation within and across nations, but also the implicit racism that is codified in institutions and daily practices. </p>
<p>If there is such structural violence present, it is held, is there no legitimacy to acts of physical violence that are targeted to address the marginalisation and oppression? </p>
<h2>Social pact in a democracy</h2>
<p>The answer to this lies in the social pact that undergirds democratic society. Citizens <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679545.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190679545-e-13">cede the authority of legitimate violence to the state</a> in exchange for security and rights. The alternative to this is that all bear the right to legitimate violence, thereby making society vulnerable to the rule of the strongest and the most forceful. The real victims of such an environment are the poorest and weakest in society.</p>
<p>Yet what does one do if political factions or individuals resort to violence in a peaceful protest? This after all is one of the major challenges that confront leaders of protests. Most of them are committed to peaceful social mobilisation, but are confronted with individuals or political factions who violate the peaceful character of the mobilisation – either proactively or as a response to aggressive police action. </p>
<p>The protest leaders have to then engage in a rearguard battle in which they have to explain why there is violence accompanying the protest, even though they have expressed a commitment to peaceful social mobilisation. Inevitably the leaders come off as unconvincing or duplicitous or as making excuses for the violence.</p>
<p>Of course those who are committed to violent direct action are aware of this reluctance by protest leaders to identify them. They realise that most protest leaders will not identify the perpetrators of violence because they would not want to be seen as abetting the authorities. </p>
<p>The perpetrators of violence can then behave in a manner that explicitly defies the collective underlying principles of the protest without having to fear any sanction. Essentially the political norms disable the incentive structure for political factions to abide by the strategic principle of peaceful social action.</p>
<p>The only way out of this dilemma is to change the rules. Leaders must either explicitly exclude political factions or individuals who are committed to violent social action. Or they must make explicitly clear that they will identify those who violate the principle of nonviolence that serves as the guiding philosophy of the protest. </p>
<p>Of course the political factions or individuals are unlikely to meekly accept this state of affairs. But leaders are going to have to explicitly manage this political challenge by openly debating the issue with movement participants, explaining why this is necessary for the success of the protest itself. Otherwise, such leaders will forever remain hostage to factions and small unaccountable political groups who serve as parasites on the progressive social cause.</p>
<p>This then is the challenge for protest leaders. </p>
<h2>Exercising leadership</h2>
<p>Political leadership sometimes requires difficult choices. Such difficult choices are not simply required from those leading institutions and governments. It is sometimes also demanded of leaders of social movements. This is particularly true when individual acts of violence can compromise the outcomes of the protest itself.</p>
<p>Protest leaders have a choice: either they allow acts of violence and, therefore, play to a political script not of their own making, or they act in a manner that keeps the social mobilisation on a path that they have explicitly chosen. This is especially important because the alternative path will not only erode the broader legitimacy of the cause. It will also provoke reactions that could undermine the protest and the sustainability of the social justice outcome. </p>
<p>This choice of enabling or containing political violence is, therefore, the central strategic challenge confronting the political leadership of contemporary protests both in South Africa and around the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are individual activists and political groupings who believe violent action is legitimate and use the circumstances to actively drive such behaviour.Adam Habib, Vice-Chancellor and Principal, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/904162018-01-23T11:19:39Z2018-01-23T11:19:39ZAnother continuing resolution won’t solve the real problem within the Republican Party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202895/original/file-20180122-182938-dv5nj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senator Mitch McConnell walks to the chamber on the first morning of a government shutdown.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Republicans can’t agree on a budget. </p>
<p>That lack of agreement has made it necessary for Congress to pass a series of continuing resolutions to keep the government open. </p>
<p>There’s no budget agreement because factions within the GOP hold contradictory policy positions on almost every issue. James Madison, an author of the <a href="http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/">Federalist Papers</a> might have framed the problem this way: The party draws on votes from – and is accountable to – diverse groups of citizens with conflicting interests. That conflict within the Republicans’ voting base means that any policy they propose would hurt at least some of the members’ key constituents. </p>
<p>In an era of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?oi=bibs&cluster=3897805199941787636&btnI=1&hl=en">hyperaccountability</a>, swift electoral punishment from any negatively impacted constituency is all but inevitable. Every vote and utterance by a political incumbent is scrutinized on Facebook and Twitter. The personal electoral costs of following the party line are prohibitive for enough to break down compromise within the party and preclude any significant policy change. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/12/20/gop-tax-bill-cuts-start/">recent tax bill</a> was a happy exception for the Republicans. It lowered – or, at least, did not raise – federal taxes for practically <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/28/upshot/what-the-tax-bill-would-look-like-for-25000-middle-class-families.html">everyone who mattered to Republicans</a>. In essence, it handed out money to majorities in all categories of supporters without specifying who would bear the costs. </p>
<p>Now with the budget, the time has come to clarify – to agree on where and for whom to cut expenditures. It is no surprise that there is about as much internal consensus within the GOP as they had on cutting expenditures on Obamacare – none. It is the practical reality of unified Democratic opposition that in order to legislate, the Republicans would have to agree on something.</p>
<p>What once was, arguably, a party united by fiscal responsibility and economic and social laissez-faire is now committed to a wide variety of causes. Disparities among constituencies that vote Republican across the country have been growing since the mid-1990s. Because this lack of unity is electoral in nature, the inability to formulate policies will remain a problem for the long run. </p>
<p>When key decision-makers disagree, the result is that they <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?oi=bibs&cluster=9917263476729135576&btnI=1&hl=en">cannot change the policy status quo</a>. Republican failure to move the policy status quo on health care, or to reach a consensus on the budget is caused not by poor Republican strategies. It is caused by contradictions within Republican rank-and-file members because of who their voters are and what they want.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The party’s promise to be all things to all people has hit a wall.William B. Heller, Associate Professor of Political Science, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkOlga Shvetsova, Professor of Political Science and Economics, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/875282017-11-15T10:20:54Z2017-11-15T10:20:54ZA military coup is afoot in Zimbabwe. What’s next for the embattled nation?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194773/original/file-20171115-19836-oyw8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace have become increasingly divisive figures in Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nobody is safe from the rages of Zimbabwe’s First Lady, “<a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2014/09/21/grace-mugabes-doctorate-uz-remains-mum/">Dr</a>. Amai” Grace Mugabe. There was the young <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/grace-mugabe-split-my-head-open-claims-joburg-woman-10788605">South African model</a> Grace lashed with extension cords. 93-year-old President Robert Mugabe’s longtime and usually trusted ally <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12164/Mugabe_drops_the_crocodile">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, was next in the firing line: he was sacked because his supporters allegedly <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/an-ordinary-man-after-all-mugabe-fires-right-hand-man-mnangagwa-20171106">booed</a> her at a rally. </p>
<p>The consequences of her vengeance may have <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/11/14/live-updates-situation-zimbabwe/">led to a coup</a> headed by Zimbabwe’s army chief General Constantino Chiwenga, who is commonly perceived to be Mnangagwa’s protégé. But <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-emmerson-mnangagwa/4115612.html">ex-freedom fighter Mnangagwa</a> has his own presidential aspirations.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been exiled from the party in which he has served since he was a teenager. But he is not just skulking in the political wilderness. On arrival in South Africa he issued a statement calling those who wanted him out <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/full-statement-im-not-going-anywhere-zanu-pf-is-not-your-personal-property-mnangagwa-tells-mugabe-20171108">“minnows”</a>. He promised to control his party “very soon” and urged his supporters to register to vote in the national elections next July.</p>
<p>As if to back Mnangagwa, on November 13 General Chiwenga announced that he and his officers could not allow the “counter-revolutionary infiltrators”, implied to be behind Grace Mugabe, to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/13/zimbabwe-army-chief-warns-mugabes-party-military-may-intervene/">continue their purges</a>. </p>
<h2>Factions and purges</h2>
<p>Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41992351">declared</a> that the armed forces must ensure all party members attend the extraordinary Zanu-PF congress next month with “equal opportunity to exercise their democratic rights”. He flashed back through Zanu-PF’s history of factionalism, reminding his listeners that although the military “will not hesitate to step in” it has never “usurped power”. Chiwenga promised to defuse all the differences “amicably and in the ruling party’s closet”. </p>
<p>Although this airbrushed more than it <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">revealed</a> about the party’s rough patches when leadership vacuums appeared, the statement appeared more as a cautionary note than a clarion call to arms. It’s not often a coup is announced before it starts; but once in motion direction – and history – can change. Grace Mugabe may have unleashed a perfect storm and her own undoing.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Soldiers stand next to a tank on a road in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All the “shenanigans” that have inspired the generals to consider a coup have set the stage for an extraordinary Zanu-PF congress this December instead of in the expected 2019: that is, <em>before</em> rather than <em>after</em> the July 2018 national elections.</p>
<p>This suggests some people were in a hurry to settle the succession issues for the president, who is now showing every one of his 93 years. Maybe Robert Mugabe won’t rule until he is <a href="http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2114&freedownload=1">100-years-old</a>. If not, and <a href="https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/mugabes-zimbabwe-has-an-angry-population-and-a-potentially-violentfuture/article36934238/">members of his family</a> or party wanted to keep their dynasties alive, they had to work quickly lest some similarly inclined contenders are in their way.</p>
<p>These contenders include Mnangagwa and a slew of his <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">“Lacoste” faction</a> consisting of war veterans and the odd financial liberal. The best-known of these is Patrick Chinamasa. This former finance minister tried to convince the world’s bankers he could pull Zimbabwe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">out of the fire</a>. He was demoted to control cyberspace and then fired. Perhaps he may make a comeback in the wake of the semi-coup.</p>
<p>The pro-Grace faction includes the members of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40, or “G-40”</a>. Many are well over 40. But in Robert Mugabe’s shadow they appear young, as does the 52-year-old First Lady. Without a base in the liberation-war cohort, they resorted to working with the Mugabe couple: sometimes their ideology appears radical, espousing indigenous economics and more land to the tillers. </p>
<p>If the history of their best-known member – the current Minister of Higher Education <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Jonathan_Moyo">Jonathan Moyo</a> – is indicative, however, they are pragmatic; or less politely put, opportunist. </p>
<p>But with Grace Mugabe sans Robert, they would have to muster inordinate amounts of patience and manipulation to steer the sinking ship to the shores of stable statehood and incorporate yet <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Search-Elusive-Zimbabwean-Dream-Autobiography/dp/0994707924">younger generations</a> who cut their political teeth as Robert Mugabe’s rule faltered. </p>
<h2>Perfidious ‘saviours’</h2>
<p>Yet the possible plan for the upcoming congress – to create a third vice-president – appears not to move far beyond the cold hands of the old. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/People/phelekezela_mphoko">Phelekezela Mphoko</a> would be pushed to third vice-president status. Grace would be the second vice-president. </p>
<p>The current defence minister, <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/10/mnangagwas-great-escape-details/">Sydney Sekeramayi</a> would be first vice-president and so, next in line for the presidential palace. He is a quiet but no less tarnished member of the Zanu-PF old guard; especially when one remembers the massacre of thousands of Ndebele people during the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a>. </p>
<p>When performing the calculus necessary to rectify Zimbabwe’s graceless imbalances, remember that Mnangagwa was perhaps the key architect of the nearly genocidal <em>Gukurahundi</em>, now chronicled in archival detail in historian Stuart Doran’s <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">Kingdom, Power, Glory: Mugabe, Zanu, and the Quest for Supremacy</a>. Among the scores implicated therein are the British, condemned by Hazel Cameron, another meticulous archivist, as exercising <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">“wilful blindness”</a> during what Robert Mugabe has dismissed as a “moment of madness”.</p>
<p>Perhaps it’s no surprise, then, that many are suspicious of Mnangagwa’s <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">relationship</a> with the UK. Many suspect he has been swimming with perfidious Albion for a very, very long time.</p>
<p>Those waters, in the shadow of Mugabe’s heritage, will take a few more generations of hard political work to clear. It hardly seems propitious that a coup, and the same generation that has ruled since 1980, starts it off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The protracted political crisis in Zimbabwe has worsened since President Mugabe fired vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Now the military has entered the fray, raising fears a coup is imminent.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812162017-07-19T18:22:22Z2017-07-19T18:22:22ZMoney has little to do with why South Africa’s military is failing to do its job<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178679/original/file-20170718-10316-wlsu7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier with the 9th South African Infantry Battalion during a biennial training exercise with the US military in the Eastern Cape.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Army/ Taryn Hagerman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much has been said about the size of South Africa’s <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/16/sandf-unable-to-meet-mandate-due-to-reduced-budget">defence budget</a>, the tension between commitments and capabilities, and the need to arrest the decline in <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">defence</a>. Despite the fact that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still a major player in <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/112885/south-africas-military-power-vs-the-world-in-2016/">Southern Africa</a>, it has real problems.</p>
<p>For one, directing vital peacekeeping funds, which should be part of the defence budget, away from the military to the
national budget, is a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-30-00-diverted-funds-puts-soldiers-at-risk">major problem</a>.
But, it’s time for the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">SANDF</a> to face some serious realities. </p>
<p>Firstly, it should not place its hope in the rollout of the current <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a>. The review doesn’t provide an honest outline of the threats and vulnerabilities facing the country, defence capabilities needed, military organisation or the cost to taxpayers.</p>
<p>The review saw the light in 2014 when the country’s economic outlook was substantially better. It was deliberately drafted without considering the costs and threats facing the country. As nothing more than an honest internal analysis of the state of South African defence, the document is of little strategic significance.</p>
<p>Secondly, in view of the social, educational and other economic realities, there is no fat in the national budget for defence. It needs to accept the reality that it is not to receive a cent more than what’s already allocated. For the foreseeable future, defence spending will remain at about 1% of GDP. South Africa cannot afford the 2% of GDP that’s accepted for defence spending across the world. </p>
<p>In addition, the SANDF also confronts a number of critical political realities. It is, for all practical purposes, the face of South African foreign policy in Africa and is, to a large extent, functioning in a domestic political conundrum shaped by the policy and political cravings of the governing party and its elite.</p>
<p>It’s also subject to the political expressions of policy documents such as the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf">National Development Plan</a>, which aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. The Force is also hostage to the factional battles within the governing African National Congress (ANC), as reflected in the fallout over such slogans as <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a>. Like all sectors of the society, defence is also victim to the political manoeuvring, underpinning the current national executive’s need for survival.</p>
<h2>Political whims trump strategy</h2>
<p>For the SANDF, these realities unfold along the lines of a need to be everything for everybody, with little strategic guidance and priorities forthcoming <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-06-11-op-ed-the-sandfs-misguided-role-in-africa/#.WW8LPoSGOos">from the political domain</a>. In practice, this means that there’s no emphasis on defence priorities and that the demands for the Defence Force to “assist” unfolds through a process of adhocracy. </p>
<p>Generals, functioning in a self sanctioning institutional culture of misplaced political loyalty, stretch the defence capacity to please their political masters. In the process, they oversee the breakdown of the institution they command, because there are limits to what a defence force can do.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma and government ministers visit a border gate and temporary army base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Politicians don’t necessarily understand the borders of these limitations and, if not clearly outlined, this may have disastrous consequences for the military as an institution.</p>
<p>From a theoretical perspective, there are two broad approaches to deal with a problematic defence budget. The so-called interests-driven approach accepts the need to prioritise defence commitments in line with national interests, which the Force needs to extend or protect.</p>
<p>The priorities should provide a clear indication of what funding level is required to execute the defence function. This approach, though, has to be content with the reality that no country in the world has the capacity to fund all its defence priorities.</p>
<p>The budget driven approach, in contrast, takes the national budget as a point of departure. The question that drives this approach is what can be done with the money allocated for defence. This is the question central to South Africa’s defence budget woes.</p>
<p>An analysis of the structure of South African defence spending provides a better understanding of the military’s budgetary problems. As a guideline, defence forces around the world accept that the budget, irrespective of its size, ought to be divided between personnel, operational and capital expenditure, more or less in equal portions. </p>
<p>In reality this boils down to between 30 and 35% for operational and capital expenditures and 35 to 40% for personnel. This represents the first major challenge in South Africa’s defence budget: almost 80% of it is for <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/enebooklets/Vote%2019%20Defence%20and%20Military%20Veterans.pdf">personnel expenses</a>. </p>
<p>The rest is allocated for operational expenditure, with only limited money available for any capital projects. It’s no surprise then that the Defence Force complains about the maintenance of equipment, infrastructure, training, administration and force preparation. </p>
<p>The truth is: if personnel are the problem; they are also the solution. The failure of the defence force over many years to implement an <a href="http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/06/11/up-or-out-carson-pentagon/71067386/">up-or-out personnel management system</a> is very much at the heart of its budgetary problems. The nature of military work relies on the availability of young people. In a typical military hierarchical personnel system, most of them must be out by age 30.</p>
<h2>The veterans burden</h2>
<p>Another problem is the way in which the defence budget has been taxed with veterans’ affairs. Since the Ministry of Defence was renamed the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/minister.htm">Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans</a>, the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/aaa2011311.pdf">Veterans Act, Act 18 of 2011</a> has been adopted. The name change is significant. </p>
<p>This is to a large extent a reflection of the intimate link between the executive and the military veterans of <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02918/06lv02985.htm">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>, the former armed wing of the governing ANC. This is embodied in the appointment of <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/emmanuel-ramaotoana-kebby-maphatsoe/">Kebby Maphatsoe</a> as the deputy minister of Defence and Military Veterans. </p>
<p>In line with the Veterans Act, a new body has been created to deal specifically with military veterans’ affairs. The new <a href="http://www.archivalplatform.org/registry/entry/south_africannational_militaryveterans_associationsanmva/">South African National Military Veterans Association</a> is a public entity, state-funded, and accountable to the department. The SANDF is now increasingly financially and socially directly responsible for military veterans.</p>
<h2>Time for hard choices</h2>
<p>Thus, the problem is not in the size of the budget; the problem is how that budget is divided. A bigger defence budget is not the solution. Almost every problem in the SANDF is personnel related. </p>
<p>Money has very little to do with many of the challenges the military faces. Yet, its leadership sees the lack of money as its single most important challenge. Searching for the solution in the budgetary domain is the easy way out. </p>
<p>Blame it on a lack of money and no thinking is required; no innovation; no initiative; no dynamism; no drive. All one has to do is drift along. The solution is rooted in difficult political and strategic decisions about the future of the Defence Force. Decisions that will address, among other things, the professionalism and effectiveness of the organisation, the oversized bureaucratic corporate army in Pretoria, and the age brackets of serving personnel. More specifically, the SANDF should not be allowed to spend more than 40% of its budget on personnel!</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Esterhuyse is an associate professor of strategic studies at the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University</span></em></p>One of the problems bedevilling South Africa’s army is being compelled to be everything to everybody. Its strategic direction is compromised by generals who pander to the whims of politicians.Abel Esterhuyse, Associate Professor of Strategy, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/804232017-07-03T11:57:26Z2017-07-03T11:57:26ZLiberal Party reform becomes the next proxy battle in Abbott versus Turnbull<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176605/original/file-20170703-4180-rjvkev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The end game of Tony Abbott's policy pitches is unknown, but in the interim they seem to be destabilising the party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Esposito/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For his own good, Malcolm Turnbull can’t get out of the country quickly enough. He’s off on Wednesday to the G20 in Germany and, if he has any sense, while he’s abroad he’ll try to avoid being drawn on local Liberal shenanigans.</p>
<p>As it is, one year from his narrow election win, he’s been talking his way into trouble.</p>
<p>There was the interview with the Sunday News Corp papers in which he said “when I cease to be prime minister, I will cease to be a member of parliament”. While he might have had his mind on how Tony Abbott should behave, inevitably this came to be interpreted as Turnbull threatening a by-election if he were rolled.</p>
<p>Then on Monday he told reporters: “Look, I intend to be prime minister for a very long time. I know you may think that at 62 I am too old – I can assure you I’m going to be prime minister for a very long time. I will be running at the 2019 election and will win.”</p>
<p>This wasn’t as provocative as when Bob Hawke, riled by Paul Keating’s “Placido Domingo” speech, told journalists he would be prime minister for the following five years (only to be deposed a year later). But it was bad on two grounds.</p>
<p>“A very long time” manages to sound simultaneously presumptuous and defensive. And why would a leader who feels totally secure choose to assert, rather than have it taken for granted, that he would be running at the next election?</p>
<p>Abbott’s ultimate objective is to see Turnbull leave the leadership. It’s unclear what will be the outcome of that story. But if he has an intermediate goal – of distraction and destabilisation – he is achieving that. Turnbull is talking about himself – unhelpfully – while his ministers are having to defend him and comment on Abbott, and the message to voters is of a party divided.</p>
<p>The rather plaintive if obvious statement from Industry Minister Arthur Sinodinos – “I can’t control Tony Abbott” – goes for them all. Abbott has disproportionate negative power, in the sense that his public contributions, whether speeches or radio interviews, routinely gain maximum attention and become reference points for the media.</p>
<p>Abbott is operating on two fronts. One is a populist pitch to the voters on the right. The other is an appeal to disgruntled members of the Liberal Party, both broadly but especially in his home state of New South Wales.</p>
<p>He is picking up on issues of concern to ordinary people and throwing out prescriptions – for example proposing a freeze on subsidies for wind farms to help ease pressure on power prices, and urging a cut in immigration to assist with housing pressures.</p>
<p>For the conservatives among the party faithful, he has become the voice of tradition. For the NSW rank and file, he is the vanguard in the fight for internal democracy.</p>
<p>While his policy pitches, to voters generally and those within the party, are simplistic, unconvincing and often at odds with what he did while prime minister, his stand on party reform in his home state highlights serious flaws in the NSW party organisation.</p>
<p>Party reform – more often something that has bugged federal Labor leaders than Liberal ones – is also emerging as a serious front on which Turnbull will have to manage the “Abbott factor”.</p>
<p>In 2014, in a report commissioned by Abbott, John Howard outlined the NSW Liberal division’s problems, including its entrenched factionalism, and recommended changes, one of which was a system of preselection plebiscites for lower house seats, in which branch members of two years’ standing would be able to vote.</p>
<p>Howard has acknowledged that reform in the NSW division will only come if the party’s federal and state leaders get behind it.</p>
<p>Last year, as Abbott promoted the issue, Turnbull and then-premier Mike Baird backed a broad motion on reform but kicked the issue down the road to a party convention, which will be held on July 22-23.</p>
<p>Abbott is pushing a radical plan, with rank-and file-votes for preselections for all seats and for all organisational positions including for the party president. He told Alan Jones on Monday: “The best way to liberate our party from factional control, the best way to liberate our party from the lobbyists is to give every single member a vote because it’s much harder to control 500 members than it is to control 50.”</p>
<p>Once again, Turnbull and the state leader, Premier Gladys Berejiklian, will have to take a stand.</p>
<p>To say it’s difficult for Turnbull is an understatement. His moderate faction (together with a “soft right” subsection of the right) controls the NSW division, including its preselections, tightly and with an iron fist.</p>
<p>The power of lobbyists over what happens and who is selected is notorious. Abbott’s attempt when prime minister to break their clout did not succeed.</p>
<p>Genuine reform would weaken the present factional control, although to what degree and over what time frame is not clear. The whole power structure could be transformed.</p>
<p>This is the last thing the moderates want. Moderates express doubts about going too far because of the dangers of branch stacking, which is what they say has happened in Victoria. Their opponents call this “branch building”.</p>
<p>There are counter proposals that include a longer qualifying time to vote in preselection plebiscites, and a test that would reward people for their activities in the party.</p>
<p>The outcome of the convention is not binding on the party hierarchy but would be hard to defy.</p>
<p>Turnbull is caught between his nemesis, who has wrapped himself tightly and conspicuously in the flag of party reform, and his faction, which doesn’t want to give away more than absolutely necessary.</p>
<p>The expectation is that Turnbull will back changes but they will be hedged and qualified. One would think the party would support the Turnbull position, given the stakes.</p>
<p>The wider point is that Turnbull, with all his other problems, does not need a battle over Liberal “internals” as another distraction.</p>
<iframe src="https://www.podbean.com/media/player/smqzz-6c8fdc?from=yiiadmin&skin=1&btn-skin=107&share=1&fonts=Helvetica&auto=0&download=0&rtl=0" height="100" width="100%" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" data-name="pb-iframe-player"></iframe><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
For his own good, Malcolm Turnbull can’t get out of the country quickly enough. He’s off on Wednesday to the G20 in Germany and, if he has any sense, while he’s abroad he’ll try to avoid being drawn on…Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/645922016-09-28T03:49:44Z2016-09-28T03:49:44ZTurnbull will not succeed as prime minister unless he unites his party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137332/original/image-20160912-3796-5e0w3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm Turnbull is something of an odd-man-out in the Liberal Party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When he displaced Tony Abbott as Liberal Party leader, Malcolm Turnbull ascended to what has traditionally been thought of as a position of some power within the party. </p>
<p>The Liberal Party is something of a top-down organisation in which the parliamentary leader forms the ministry and defines the party’s policy agenda. The party organisation exists not to give direction on policy, but to support the leader with resources to run election campaigns.</p>
<p>The partyroom is expected to get behind the leader to show unity and eschew ideology in order to maximise the party’s appeal to a pragmatic “middle Australia”. </p>
<p>As author <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=dkgQAQAAIAAJ&source=gbs_similarbooks">Katharine West</a> so succinctly put it, the Liberal Party was about “power without ideology”. Ideology, factions and organisations telling the parliamentary wing what to do were meant to be the burdens of the Labor Party.</p>
<p>So, the prerogatives of leadership were assumed to be available to Turnbull when he became leader. There was an expectation in some quarters of a shift in government policy away from some of the things that defined the approach of Abbott, his more socially conservative predecessor. This clearly has not happened.</p>
<p>Rather, there is an impression that the Coalition lacks direction on policy and is under siege from a group of ultra-conservatives who are fixated on matters like blocking marriage equality and unwinding racial vilification laws. </p>
<p>To add to his woes, the free-market economic hardliners who toy with ideas such as raising the GST rate and cutting government expenditure have also been hyperactive, driven partly by frustration with Turnbull’s dithering on economic policy.</p>
<p>The most charitable assessment right now would be that Turnbull appears to be struggling as prime minister. His inability to exercise the sort of influence that leadership is supposed to grant under Liberal Party rules is part of his problem.</p>
<p>One explanation for this might be that the old Liberal traditions no longer apply because the party itself has changed. The middle-of-the-road party West described has transformed into something more ideological. This may in turn reflect the nexus between the party members, who have significant powers over preselection, and the MPs they preselect. </p>
<p>In the safe seats in state and federal politics, and in the Senate tickets, the Liberal organisation is increasingly preselecting people of firm ideas espousing values-based politics. This might be about the need for conservative social values or free market economics.</p>
<p>Turnbull won his preselection for Wentworth in 2004 on the back of <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/06/1065292502033.html">a good old-fashioned branch-stack</a>. This involved marshalling friends and associates to displace sitting Liberal member <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=00AMQ">Peter King</a> – much to the annoyance of the NSW Liberal organisation at the time. </p>
<p>That preselection was a throwback to the old days before the dominance of rigidly disciplined political parties. Back then, a notable local could gather supporters from the local parish to elect him, after which he might participate in the leadership politics of the parliament. </p>
<p>It even resonated with the type of candidate that was common during the Menzies era – male, a success in business or community affairs, critical of unions, holding moderately liberal or conservative outlooks, but also pragmatic.</p>
<p>These days Liberal preselections are a battlefield in which branch-member ideologues or members of various factions (“moderates”, “conservatives”, “uglies”, “Krogerites”, “Costelloites” and so on) slug it out. The partyroom reflects the success or failures of the contest. </p>
<p>With his old-school preselection, his association with causes such as republicanism, and his moderate, modern and cosmopolitan views, Turnbull is something of an odd-man-out in the contemporary Liberal Party. That he should end up being its parliamentary leader not once but twice is testament to his ambition and tenacity.</p>
<p>To grab the leadership is an achievement. But to be able to consolidate and survive (let alone actually do anything) is something else again. </p>
<p>Insights on how to do it can be gained from successful past Liberal leaders Robert Menzies, Malcolm Fraser and John Howard. They all had internal critics, enemies and rivals, and all had firm views on some issues. But they were good at keeping the parliamentary wing unified and disciplined, sometimes with clever strategies. </p>
<p>Howard, for example, was adept at utilising conscience voting to deal with morality issues that had the potential to divide his partyroom. </p>
<p>Howard, as a social conservative himself, was also very good at absorbing the occasional defeat on some of these conservative causes. That’s because he had a more urgent aspiration: to keep his party united (mindful, no doubt, of the mayhem caused by people like Andrew Peacock and Joh Bjelke-Petersen during those bleak years in opposition between 1983 and 1996).</p>
<p>Menzies, Fraser and Howard were also adept at winning elections. Interestingly, Abbott’s electoral success didn’t save his leadership, because opinion polls have become a major test of leadership viability. This is hardly surprising, for wanting to win elections is the thing that binds moderates, social conservatives and everyone else in the party room.</p>
<p>So now we get to the essence of Turnbull’s leadership problem, of which the agitation of the Cory Bernardis in the partyroom is only a minor part. If Turnbull had any authority as leader when he took over from Abbott, it dissipated completely at the <a href="http://vtr.aec.gov.au/HouseDefault-20499.htm">2016 election</a>. Any leader who loses 13 lower house seats and allows the populist right to consolidate in the Senate – after promising to get rid them – is not in a great political position.</p>
<p>In truth, Turnbull is not going to be able to do anything more than grimly hang on and hope that either the opinion polls don’t go down further or the memory of Labor’s leadership woes stops his colleagues from putting him to the sword. </p>
<p>Turnbull is an odd moderate in a party with many liberal economic and socially conservative hardliners. That he nearly lost an election and helped revive the political career of Pauline Hanson will severely test his ambition and tenacity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Economou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Liberal Party is increasingly preselecting parliamentarians of firm, values-based ideas, leading to a more ideological and riven party.Nick Economou, Senior Lecturer, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637102016-08-14T20:15:31Z2016-08-14T20:15:31ZNSW Liberals’ factional battles stand in way of reform, but changes in participation demand it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133877/original/image-20160812-18023-1uy4x69.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tony Abbott has called for reform to the way the NSW branch of the Liberal Party preselects election candidates.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A recent ABC <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2016/08/08/4513599.htm">Four Corners</a> program once again put the spotlight on the “cold war” in the New South Wales branch of the Liberal Party over internal party democracy.</p>
<p>The conflict is not just a dispute over internal party processes. It is also driven by the NSW branch’s <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=GT6UG9TKZTMC&lr=&redir_esc=y&hl=en">decades-long factional conflict</a>. The dispute’s origins can be traced back to the late 1960s and, without too much effort, back to the party’s formulation out of the ashes of the United Australia Party in the 1940s.</p>
<h2>What’s holding back reform?</h2>
<p>The NSW branch has three factions: the moderates, the right and the hard right. </p>
<p>In the late 1960s, groups of religious conservatives and advocates of “captive nations” (countries behind the Iron Curtain) organised into a faction known as “The Uglies”. Their aim was to gain more influence within the Liberal Party by creating new branches in Sydney’s west. </p>
<p>The right (then just one faction) were pushing a radical brand of conservative politics compared to the social liberalism dominating the party at the time.</p>
<p>By the late 1970s, the right faction had established enough power to start becoming a force within the party. Disputes over claims of branch-stacking and intimidation became ever more frequent – so much so that by the mid-1980s the moderates responded by <a href="http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p323151/pdf/introduction.pdf">forming a faction</a> known as “The Group”. </p>
<p>The Group saw the rise of the right as a danger to the party’s integrity. Its organisation was focused on controlling the state executive and preselections, rather than on ideological issues. This way, there would be less chance for them to disagree.</p>
<p>The Group was highly successful <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2006/s1688866.htm">until the mid-2000s</a>, when the right finally broke its hegemony. Yet, soon after, the right faction split into two groups (the right and the hard right). The more centrist of the two was more inclined to do deals with the moderate faction to lock out the hard right. See, for example, the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/liberal-party-factions-at-war-over-tony-abbotts-alleged-role-in-the-garrotting-of-bronwyn-bishop-20160417-go88zx.html">deal to deny Bronwyn Bishop preselection</a> in 2016.</p>
<p>It is in this context that <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-19/liberals-suspended-for-talking-preselection-to-abc-730/7185652">calls</a> for <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2013/s3861931.htm">democratic</a> <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2007/s1963657.htm">reform</a> are resisted within the NSW branch. Liberal Party membership is now very small compared to the time the party’s institutions were designed, which makes the party vulnerable to branch-stacking and other attempts to gain control of the political organisation. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/the-concierge-faction-is-choking-the-nsw-liberal-party-and-threatening-malcolm-turnbulls-authority-20160124-gmcyps.html">debate</a> over perceptions of conflict of interest of state council members who are also lobbyists has emerged.</p>
<p>There are long-standing problems with democratic participation within the NSW branch. Allowing greater democracy in the party, through changes to preselections and broader membership categories as recommended by <a href="http://australianpolitics.com/downloads/liberal/11-07-18_review-of-2010-election-campaign_reith.pdf">previous reviews</a>, would empower the membership. </p>
<p>The membership is locked out by the factions’ dominance of decision-making bodies. But giving members a greater say would upset the current power balance within the party because the membership base is more conservatively inclined than many of the party’s elites. </p>
<p>This disjuncture is an important driver of resistance to reforms. But given the conflict’s factional nature, it is likely that were the roles reversed, the situation would be the same.</p>
<h2>Preselection models</h2>
<p>The major parties’ preselection models for choosing candidates for election come out of the days of “mass party” memberships. In the Australian context, most parties have advocated a move to primaries as a way to reinvigorate their flagging membership bases.</p>
<p>Labor has trialled community preselection in <a href="http://democraticaudit.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/miragliotta.pdf">Victoria</a> and, more recently, in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-17/verity-firth-to-fight-for-labor-pre-selection-in-balmain/5263718">NSW</a> <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-30/nsw-mp-penny-sharpe-wins-alp-community-preselection/5354582">with</a> <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/labor-abandons-community-preselection-process-for-sydney-mayor-20160715-gq6ima.html">mixed results</a>. On the basis of these trials, federal Labor leader <a href="http://www.alp.org.au/rebuild_labor">Bill Shorten</a> has called on the party to extend this method to seats it doesn’t already hold. However, Labor’s state branches rejected similar calls by <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2012/05/14/labor-state-bosses-stare-down-pm-on-primaries/">Julia Gillard</a> in the lead-up to the 2013 election.</p>
<p>Several Liberal Party reviews have also recommended the use of primaries. The <a href="http://australianpolitics.com/2011/07/18/reith-2010-campaign-review.html">Reith report in 2010</a> recommended primaries as a way of helping to deal with the problems of branch-stacking and promoting organisational renewal through increased and more meaningful participation by members.</p>
<p><a href="http://democraticaudit.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/miragliotta.pdf">The Nationals</a> have experimented with primaries in regional seats. Again, the rationale was based on reviving membership numbers and inclusivity.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10361146.2012.731490">Research</a> points to the importance of party elites in driving these pushes for reform instead of grassroots action. For party elites, primaries are a way to help reinvigorate parties, dilute the power of destructive factions and increase <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00344893.2015.1108359?needAccess=true">candidate diversity</a>. </p>
<p>However, <a href="http://democraticaudit.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/miragliotta.pdf">other research</a> suggests different considerations are at play. Trialling primaries are good public-relations exercises for parties and – in the case of the Nationals – a way to challenge and ward off independent candidates. Primaries can also be rebranding exercises after scandals.</p>
<p>This is not just a phenomenon unique to Australia. Political parties in other Westminster countries are experimenting with primaries for similar reasons. But preselection is not the only way to encourage people to be involved in politics. Globally, other parties are experimenting with supporters’ networks.</p>
<p>As the changing nature of political participation presents increasing challenges for parties, we are likely to see more experimentation with new forms of participation, not less.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marija Taflaga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the changing nature of political participation presents increasing challenges for parties, we are likely to see more experimentation with new forms of participation, not less.Marija Taflaga, PhD Candidate, School of Political Science and International Relations, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.