tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/hamas-4332/articlesHamas – The Conversation2024-03-25T12:38:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259362024-03-25T12:38:41Z2024-03-25T12:38:41ZIsrael’s ‘Iron Wall’: A brief history of the ideology guiding Benjamin Netanyahu<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583238/original/file-20240320-16-lzg9fz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C3052%2C1932&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of Khan Yunis in Gaza on Feb. 2, 2024, after weeks of continuous Israeli bombardment and bulldozing.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-with-destroyed-buildings-and-roads-news-photo/1973198679?adppopup=true">Abdulqader Sabbah/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled that Israel’s military will soon <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/19/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-rafah-offensive.html">launch an invasion of Rafah</a>, the city in the southern Gaza Strip. More than 1 million Palestinians, now on the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-malnutrition-famine-children-dying-israel-palestinians-2f938b1a82d7822c7da67cc162da1a37">verge of famine</a>, have sought refuge there from their bombed-out cities farther north. Despite U.S. President Joe <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-warns-netanyahu-an-assault-on-rafah-would-cross-red-line-c78677ba">Biden’s warning against the move</a>, Netanyahu appears, for now, undeterred from his aim to attack Rafah. </p>
<p>The attack is the latest chapter in Israel’s current battle to eliminate Hamas from Gaza. </p>
<p>But it’s also a reflection of an ideology, known as the “<a href="https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf">Iron Wall</a>,” that has been part of Israeli political history since before the state’s founding in 1948. The Iron Wall has driven Netanyahu in his career leading Israel for two decades, culminating in the current deadly war that <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Hamas-War">began with a massacre of Israelis</a> and then turned into a <a href="https://hhi.harvard.edu/news/humanitarian-situation-gaza">humanitarian catastrophe for Gaza’s Palestinians</a>.</p>
<p>Here is the history of that ideology:</p>
<h2>A wall that can’t be breached</h2>
<p>In 1923, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Jabotinsky">Vladimir, later known as “Ze’ev,” Jabotinsky</a>, a prominent Zionist activist, published “<a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-iron-wall-quot">On the Iron Wall</a>,” an article in which he laid out his vision for the course that the Zionist movement should follow in order to realize its ultimate goal: the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/timeline-for-the-history-of-judaism#brits2">at the time governed by the British</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a double breasted suit, wearing round glasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vladimir ‘Ze'ev’ Jabotinsky, in Prague in 1933.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1176800">United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of L. Elly Gotz</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Jabotinsky admonished the Zionist establishment for ignoring the Arab majority in Palestine and their political desires. He asserted the Zionist establishment held a fanciful belief that the technological progress and improved economic conditions that the Jews would supposedly bring to Palestine would endear them to the local Arab population. </p>
<p>Jabotinsky thought that belief was fundamentally wrong. </p>
<p>To Jabotinsky, the Arabs of Palestine, like any native population throughout history, would never accept another people’s national aspirations in their own homeland. Jabotinsky believed that Zionism, as a Jewish national movement, would have to combat the Arab national movement for control of the land. </p>
<p>“Every native population in the world resists colonists as
long as it has the slightest hope of being able to rid itself of the danger of being colonised,” <a href="https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf">he wrote</a>. </p>
<p>Jabotinsky believed the Zionist movement should not waste its resources on Utopian economic and social dreams. Zionism’s sole focus should be on developing Jewish military force, a metaphorical Iron Wall, that would compel the Arabs to accept a Jewish state on their native land. </p>
<p>“Zionist colonisation … can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach,” <a href="https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf">he wrote</a>.</p>
<h2>Jabotinsky’s heirs: Likud</h2>
<p>In 1925, Jabotinsky founded the <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/revisionist-zionism">Revisionist movement</a>, which would become the chief right-wing opposition party to the dominant Labor Party in the Zionist movement. It opposed Labor’s socialist economic vision and emphasized the focus on <a href="https://www.knesset.gov.il/vip/jabotinsky/eng/Revisionist_frame_eng.html">cultivating Jewish militarism</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/1947%20UN%20Partition%20Plan.aspx">In 1947, David Ben Gurion and the Zionist establishment</a> <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-202101/">accepted partition plans</a> devised by the United Nations for Palestine, dividing it into independent Jewish and Palestinian Arab states. The Zionists’ goal in accepting the plan: to have the Jewish state founded on the basis of such international consensus and support. </p>
<p>Jabotinsky’s Revisionists opposed any territorial compromise, which meant they opposed any partition plan. They objected to the recognition of a non-Jewish political entity – an Arab state – within Palestine’s borders. </p>
<p>The Palestinian Arab state proposed by the U.N. partition plan <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Resolution-181">was rejected by Arab leaders</a>, and it <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/history/">never came into being</a>.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.gov.il/en/departments/general/declaration-of-establishment-state-of-israel">1948, Israel declared its independence</a>, which sparked <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war">a regional war between Israel and its Arab neighbors</a>. During the war, which began immediately after the U.N. voted for partition and lasted until 1949, more than half the Palestinian residents of the land Israel claimed were expelled or fled. </p>
<p>At the war’s end, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Partition-of-Palestine">the historic territory of Palestine was divided</a>, with about 80% claimed and governed by the new country of Israel. Jordan controlled East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>In the new Israeli parliament, Jabotinsky’s heirs – <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/herut-movement">in a party first called Herut</a> <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Likud">and later Likud</a> – were relegated to the opposition benches.</p>
<h2>Old threat, new threat</h2>
<p>In 1967, another war broke out between Israel and Arab neighbors Egypt, Syria and Jordan. It resulted <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/arab-israeli-war-1967">in Israel’s occupation of</a> East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">Yitzhak Rabin led Israel’s military</a> during that war, called the Six-Day War.</p>
<p>From 1948 until 1977, the more leftist-leaning <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Israel-Labour-Party">Labor Party governed Israel</a>. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Menachem-Begin">In 1977, Menachem Begin led the Likud to victory</a> and established it as the dominant force in Israeli politics. </p>
<p>However in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/24/world/israel-s-labor-party-wins-clear-victory-in-election-ready-to-form-a-coalition.html">1992, Rabin, as the leader of Labor, was elected as prime minister</a>. With Israel emerging as both a military and economic force in those years, fueled by the new high-tech sector, he believed the country was <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-would-rabin-do">no longer facing the threat of destruction</a> from its neighbors. To Rabin, the younger generation of Israelis wanted to integrate into the global economy. <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1994/rabin/facts/">Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict</a>, he believed, would help Israel integrate into the global order. </p>
<p>In 1993, Rabin negotiated <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">the Oslo Accords</a>, a peace deal with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The two men <a href="https://www.npr.org/2016/08/06/488737544/oslo-tells-the-surprising-story-behind-a-historic-handshake">shook hands</a> in a symbol of the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The agreement created a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as part of the pathway to the long-term goal of creating two countries, Israel and a Palestinian state, that would peacefully coexist.</p>
<p>That same year, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benjamin-Netanyahu">Benjamin Netanyahu had become the leader of the Likud</a> Party. The son of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/middleeast/benzion-netanyahu-dies-at-102.html">a prominent historian of Spanish Jewry</a>, he viewed Jewish history as facing <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/2012-04-30/ty-article/benzion-netanyahu-father-of-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-dies-at-102/0000017f-e958-d639-af7f-e9df59c90000">a repeating cycle of attempted destruction</a> – from the Romans to the Spanish Inquisition, the Nazis and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2018-07-05/ty-article/when-netanyahus-father-adopted-the-view-of-arabs-as-savages/0000017f-e00a-d3ff-a7ff-f1aa22770000">the Arab world</a>. </p>
<p>Netanyahu saw the Oslo peace process as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/interviews/netanyahu.html">the sort of territorial compromise</a> Jabotinsky had warned about. To him, compromise would only invite conflict, and any show of weakness would spell doom. </p>
<p>The only answer to such a significant threat, Netanyahu has repeatedly argued, is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-no-full-palestinian-state-no-surrender-in-exchange-for-gaza-hostages/">a strong Jewish state that refuses any compromises</a>, always identifying the mortal threat to the Jewish people and countering it with an <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/no-compromise-on-rafah-operation-israeli-pm-vows-to-continue-fight-despite-global-appeals/articleshow/107792076.cms">overwhelming show of force</a>. </p>
<h2>No territorial compromise</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, Netanyahu’s primary focus has not been on the threat of the Palestinians, but rather that of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/netanyahu-at-war/transcript/">Iran and its nuclear ambitions</a>. But he has continued to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/21/1225883757/israels-netanyahu-rejects-any-palestinian-sovereignty-post-war-rebuffing-biden">say there can be no territorial compromise</a> with the Palestinians. Just as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/22/netanyahu-biden-two-state-solution-palestine-river-to-sea/">Palestinians refuse to accept Israel as a Jewish state</a>, Netanyahu <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68025945">refuses to accept the idea of a Palestinian state</a>.</p>
<p>Netanyahu believed that only through strength would the Palestinians accept Israel, a process that would be <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/22/middleeast/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-cnn-interview-intl/index.html">aided if more and more Arab states normalized relations with Israel</a>, establishing diplomatic and other ties. That normalization reached new heights with the 2020 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Abraham-Accords">Abraham Accords</a>, the bilateral agreements signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and between Israel and Bahrain. These agreements were the ultimate vindication of Netanyahu’s regional vision.</p>
<p>It should not be surprising, then, that Hamas’ horrific attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, took place just as Saudi Arabia was <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-israel-netanyahu-politics-4d07d9fd0413c6893d1ddfb944919ae0">nearing normalization of relations</a> with Israel. In a twisted manner, when the Saudis subsequently backed off the normalization plans, the attack reaffirmed Netanyahu’s broader vision: The Palestinian group that vowed to never recognize Israel <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-07/saudi-says-no-ties-with-israel-unless-gaza-aggression-halted">made sure that Arab recognition of Israel would fail</a>. </p>
<p>The Hamas attack gave Netanyahu an opportunity to reassert Israel’s – and Jabotinsky’s – Iron Wall. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/12/israel-gaza-hamas-biden-netanyahu/">The massive and wantonly destructive war that Netanyahu has led</a> against Hamas and Gaza since that date is the Iron Wall in its most elemental manifestation: unleashing overwhelming force as a signal that no territorial compromise with the Arabs over historical Palestine is possible. Or, as Netanyahu has repeatedly said in recent weeks, there will be no ceasefire until there’s a complete Israeli victory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eran Kaplan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The destructive force that Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu has unleashed in Gaza is rooted in a century-old ideology that says overwhelming power is how Israel should deal with Palestinians.Eran Kaplan, Rhoda and Richard Goldman Chair in Jewish Studies, San Francisco State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260862024-03-21T14:42:07Z2024-03-21T14:42:07ZStarvation is a weapon of war: Gazans are paying the price<iframe height="200px" width="100%" frameborder="no" scrolling="no" seamless="" src="https://player.simplecast.com/a0ebccbd-65af-4884-ae7e-49ae086cd98f?dark=true"></iframe>
<p>On Monday, the European Union’s foreign policy chief <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ipc-gaza-famine-report-1.7146974">accused Israel of using starvation as a weapon of war</a> and provoking famine in Gaza. </p>
<p>Israel <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-asks-world-court-not-order-new-measures-over-gaza-hunger-2024-03-18/">denies the allegations</a>, which are some of the strongest words we have heard from a western power about the situation in Gaza since October. The EU statement comes on the heels of a <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-97/en/">UN-backed report</a> that warns that more than one million people — half of Gaza’s population — face catastrophic starvation conditions. </p>
<p>The report compiled through a partnership of more than 19 international agencies, including the United Nations and the Canadian International Development Agency, goes on to say that without an immediate ceasefire and a major influx of food especially into areas cut off by fighting, famine and mass death in Gaza are imminent.</p>
<p>In response to Monday’s report, the United Nations Secretary-General, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2024/3/18/un-backed-report-says-famine-imminent-in-northern-gaza">António Guterres said</a> Palestinians in Gaza are “enduring horrifying levels of hunger and suffering” and called the findings an “appalling indictment of conditions on the ground for civilians.”</p>
<p>“We must act now to prevent the unthinkable, the unacceptable and the unjustifiable,” he said.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/video/famine-expert-analyzes-gaza-humanitarian-crisis/">Scholars of famine</a> say this is the worst food deprivation they have observed in war time since the Second World War. And according to international law, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/31/israel-gaza-starvation-international-law">intentional starvation of a population is a war crime</a>.</p>
<p>Hilal Elver joined us to share her extensive expertise on the issue. Prof. Elver is the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, a position she held for six years, from 2014 to 2020. She is also a research professor of Global Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara and a Global Distinguished Fellow at the Resnick Center for Food Law and Policy at UCLA School of Law. Elver currently serves on the committee of experts at the Committee on World Food Security.</p>
<p>With almost 50 per cent of Gaza’s population under 18, Elver says children are forced to grow up quickly in Gaza. She worries for their future. She says even if we stop the war right now, “we’re going to lose this generation.” </p>
<h2>Listen and follow</h2>
<p>You can listen to or follow <a href="https://dont-call-me-resilient.simplecast.com/"><em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em></a> on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/dont-call-me-resilient/id1549798876">Apple Podcasts (transcripts available)</a> (now featuring <a href="https://www.apple.com/ca/newsroom/2024/03/apple-introduces-transcripts-for-apple-podcasts/">transcripts</a>), <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/37tK4zmjWvq2Sh6jLIpzp7">Spotify</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL_mJBLBznANz6ID9rBCUk7gv_ZRC4Og9-">YouTube</a> or wherever you listen to your favourite podcasts. </p>
<p><a href="mailto:dcmr@theconversation.com">We’d love to hear from you</a>, including any ideas for future episodes.</p>
<p>Join the Conversation on <a href="https://www.instagram.com/dontcallmeresilientpodcast/">Instagram</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationCA">X</a>, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/theconversationcanada">LinkedIn</a> and use #DontCallMeResilient.</p>
<h2>Resources</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Committee_Review_Report_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb_July2024_Special_Brief.pdf">Famine Review Committee Report: Gaza Strip Acute Food Insecurity March 2024</a> — Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662"><em>Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine</em></a> by Alex de Waal</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-pushes-get-aid-into-gaza-process-is-slow-2023-10-20/">U.N. chief pleads for Gaza lifeline at Egypt border crossing</a></p>
<h2>From the archives - in The Conversation</h2>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ramadan-will-be-difficult-for-those-in-gaza-or-other-war-zones-what-does-fasting-mean-for-those-who-might-be-already-starving-225152">Ramadan will be difficult for those in Gaza or other war zones – what does fasting mean for those who might be already starving?</a>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
We speak with Hilal Elver, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and current University of California professor about the looming famine in Gaza after months of Israeli attacks.Vinita Srivastava, Host + Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientAteqah Khaki, Associate Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientHusein Haveliwala, Student Journalist/Assistant Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254132024-03-14T13:28:27Z2024-03-14T13:28:27ZParis 2024: conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East threaten to turn the Olympic Games into a geopolitical battleground<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581622/original/file-20240313-30-xbar5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C0%2C3935%2C2854&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/paris-france-23-september-2017-olympic-736128922">Keitma/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Summer Olympic Games will return to Paris this July exactly a century after it last took place in France. Paris is the hometown of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-baron-de-Coubertin">Pierre de Coubertin</a>, the founder of the modern Olympic Games. </p>
<p>When Coubertin first conceived the revival of this ancient Greek tradition in the late 19th century, he imagined a scene where nations celebrated friendly internationalism by playing sports together. His Olympic idealism provides the foundation for the <a href="https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf">Olympic charter</a>, a set of rules and guidelines for the organisation of the Olympic Games that emphasise international fraternity and solidarity. </p>
<p>In 1992, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) moved to uphold Coubertin’s legacy by renewing the tradition of the <a href="https://olympictruce.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/IOTC-2010-Brochure-EN.pdf">sacred truce</a> associated with the ancient Olympics. The Olympic truce calls for the cessation of hostilities between warring nations during the Olympic Games and beyond. </p>
<p>The Olympic truce has contributed to peace before – albeit only fleetingly. During the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, the South and North Korean delegations marched into the stadium <a href="https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2018/2018-01-20-Declaration.pdf">together</a> under the single flag of the Korean peninsula. They also fielded a unified Korean ice hockey team for this competition. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-winter-olympics-and-the-two-koreas-how-sport-diplomacy-could-save-the-world-89769">The Winter Olympics and the two Koreas: how sport diplomacy could save the world</a>
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<p>The IOC <a href="https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/News/2023/10/14/2023-10-14-IOC-Session-Mumbai-Bach-Opening-speech.pdf">hopes</a> that the forthcoming Olympics will be a moment for world peace. But with the Paris Olympic torch relay starting next month, the world is plagued with conflict and animosity. And tensions in eastern Europe and the Middle East show no sign of easing. </p>
<p>The 2024 Olympics will take place amid geopolitical turmoil. These conflicts will affect the Olympic Games and throw into question the capacity of sport to reduce tension between nations. </p>
<h2>Banned Russian athletes</h2>
<p>Moscow ordered its army to invade Ukraine four days after the end of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. The IOC considered this aggression a violation of the Olympic truce and subsequently <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/media/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries">banned</a> Russian athletes from participating in the Paris Olympic Games.</p>
<p>Russia was unhappy with this decision. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/iocs-ban-russia-cannot-be-compared-with-israel-situation-2023-11-03/">condemned</a> the IOC as being biased towards the west and even appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport against the suspension. But in February 2024, the court eventually <a href="https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/CAS_Award_10093.pdf">upheld</a> the IOC’s position.</p>
<p>Russian athletes will not be absent from the Olympics. The IOC allows them to take part in the competition not as a state delegation but as neutral individuals. Ukraine finds this situation unacceptable, <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/media/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries">arguing</a> that neutrality cannot remove Russian identity from the Olympics.</p>
<p>The IOC has denounced the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories. But it also admits the complexity of this geopolitical conflict, and acknowledges that its best approach would be to keep impartiality on this matter. Ukraine responded by implementing a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-olympics-russia-boycott-paris-569d1c75d5e6c835016dd41f1b10c217">policy</a> for its athletes to boycott any contests involving Russians at Paris 2024, although it later lifted this rule. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three helicopters flying over a war-damaged city." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581616/original/file-20240313-18-ptcldi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian assault on the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in 2022 left thousands of civilians dead and injured.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/war-ukraine-huge-damage-cause-by-2156014785">BY MOVIE/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unhappy Russians</h2>
<p>The war between Israel and Hamas will further complicate the 2024 Olympics, with Olympic officials poised to face allegations of inconsistency concerning Israeli athletes. </p>
<p>This conflict is no less brutal than the war between Ukraine and Russia. According to the Hamas-run health ministry, more than 30,000 people have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68430925">killed</a> in Gaza since the start of the war. And there is also <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/damning-evidence-of-war-crimes-as-israeli-attacks-wipe-out-entire-families-in-gaza">evidence</a> that Israeli forces have committed war crimes in the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>However, the resolution for the Olympic truce of Paris 2024 singles out the suspension of Russia and does not contain a single word on the violence in Israel and Palestine. </p>
<p>These two warring parties can participate in the Olympics – though the strict <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/07/gaza-who-lives-there-and-why-it-has-been-blockaded-for-so-long">blockade</a> of the Gaza Strip will make it hard for Palestinians to take part in the games. But the Russian delegation is prevented from taking part in the same competition. Russia considers this discrepancy unfair and again blames Olympic officials for siding with the west.</p>
<p>Israel and its allies are seemingly very vocal within the Olympic circle. In October 2023, the IOC <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-member-elections-lead-to-increased-female-representation-among-the-membership">offered</a> Yeal Arad, who in 1992 became the first Israeli to win an Olympic medal, their prestigious membership. When accepting this privileged appointment, she <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1141836/arad-comments-after-elected">urged</a> the Israeli athletes to give inspiration and hope to their fellow citizens suffering from the tragedy. </p>
<p>At the same IOC session, Cassy Wasserman, the chairperson of the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, also declared himself “proud to be Jewish” before his speech. </p>
<p>The 2024 Olympic Games in Paris will take place amid conflict and contention. The Olympic truce and the neutrality of international sport is the idealism of the IOC. Not only that, it volunteers to be a messenger of world peace.</p>
<p>Can Paris 2024 be a catalyst for this vision? Unfortunately, the capacity of the Olympics to act as a festival of peaceful internationalism will inevitably be curtailed in this period of geopolitical turmoil. </p>
<p>Despite the facade of festivity in Paris, the escalation of hostilities around the world is likely to trouble the Olympic Games in the French capital.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jung Woo Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Olympic Games have also been highly political events – Paris 2024 will be no different.Jung Woo Lee, Lecturer in Sport and Leisure Policy, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250672024-03-12T18:38:37Z2024-03-12T18:38:37ZCanada’s inaction in Gaza marks a failure of its feminist foreign policy<p><a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf?_ga=2.63794223.1840653675.1709657832-2101566470.1701624369">“Peace and prosperity are every person’s birthright.”</a> So opened then Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland’s introduction to Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP).</p>
<p>Launched in 2017, the policy stated that Canada would take an explicitly feminist approach to international assistance, including a commitment to protecting women’s sexual and reproductive rights. Many considered it to be a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020960120">forward-thinking policy that builds on the past work of NGOs and other international partners.</a></p>
<p>However, the policy also revealed shortcomings. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020953424">It was criticized</a> for its <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/10/the-growth-of-feminist-foreign-policy/">fuzzy definition of feminism,</a> its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2019.1592002">surface-level engagement</a> with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039">overlapping forms of inequality</a> women actually face and for its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz027">neoliberal approach to feminism</a> that seeks to fix problems within the Global South, with little engagement with how these problems arose in the first place.</p>
<p>And now, as Israel’s offensive on Gaza marches on unabated and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/gaza-death-toll-surpasses-30000-with-no-let-up-in-israeli-bombardment#:%7E:text=The%20death%20toll%20in%20%23Gaza,large%20majority%20women%20and%20children.">civilian death toll mounts</a>, Canada’s tepid response calls the strength and sincerity of its feminist commitments into doubt. Furthermore, the country’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-lawsuit-israel-military-exports-1.7134664">continued sale of military equipment to Israel</a> suggests where Canada’s stated feminist values conflict with other political interests leaving Palestinians by the wayside. </p>
<p>On a recent visit to Israel, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly expressed solidarity with Israeli victims of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/oct-7-sexual-violence-united-nations-reasonable-grounds-1.7133305">sexual violence committed by Hamas</a> and announced <a href="https://x.com/melaniejoly/status/1767189501208666293?s=20">$1 million dollars</a> in support. In addition to funding, Joly also offered RCMP support to help investigate the crimes of sexual violence against Israeli women. </p>
<p>In December, Joly issued <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/joly-condemns-hamas-rapes-of-israeli-women-after-weeks-of-pressure-1.6677943">strong condemnations</a> in response to allegations of rape committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023. </p>
<p>In February 2023, Joly <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9491196/canada-joly-ukraine-visit/">also pledged millions for Ukrainian victims of sexual assault</a> along with Canada’s support for the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence committed during Russia’s war against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Will Canada do the same for Palestinian women affected by military and sexual violence?</p>
<h2>Palestinian women’s rights long ignored</h2>
<p>Joly <a href="https://twitter.com/melaniejoly/status/1760435093342986384?s=20">condemned</a> the sexual and gender-based violence being committed against Palestinian women in Gaza in February 2024, but without explicitly naming who the perpetrators of violence are. </p>
<p>Her statement came after <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/israelopt-un-experts-appalled-reported-human-rights-violations-against">United Nations experts</a> expressed alarm over “credible allegations of egregious human rights violations to which Palestinian women and girls continue to be subjected in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.” They cited reports of arbitrary executions, killings, detentions and sexual abuse of Palestinian women and girls by Israeli forces.</p>
<p>Even before the current escalation of violence, Canada’s support of Israel’s actions have long been identified as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2020.1805340">significant limitation of FIAP</a>.</p>
<p>In the policy’s peace and security section, Canada commits to advocate for the “respect and protection of the human rights of women and girls in its international and multilateral engagements.” It also says that ensuring the safety and security of women and girls is one of the key steps to ensuring peace.</p>
<p>In Gaza, this security is not being assured. Israel’s bombardment and tightened blockade has killed more than 31,000 people, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-walks-back-austins-gaza-casualty-figures-2024-02-29/">most of whom are women and children</a>. Those who survive live under constant threat and without access to basic medical aid, food and water. Over 85 per cent of the total population of Gaza — about 1.9 million civilians — <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15564.doc.htm#:%7E:text=A%20staggering%2085%20per%20cent,proposing%20that%20Palestinians%20should%20be">have been displaced</a> from their homes.</p>
<p>Palestinian women also face increased risk of sexual violence. There <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/22/claims-of-israeli-sexual-assault-of-palestinian-women-are-credible-un-panel-says">are credible</a> reports of sexual violence being used as a tool of war against both Israeli and Palestinian women. </p>
<h2>Reproductive health in Gaza in a dire state</h2>
<p>FIAP identifies a full range of reproductive healthcare <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9491196/canada-joly-ukraine-visit/#:%7E:text=Canada%20is%20pledging%20millions%20of,Russia%27s%20war%20on%20Ukraine%20nears.">as key to ensuring women and girls’ equality and empowerment</a>.</p>
<p>In Gaza, these rights are besieged daily. </p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://prismreports.org/2024/02/13/reproductive-rights-organizations-failing-palestinians/">50,000 pregnant women in Gaza</a> are at <a href="https://jezebel.com/miscarriages-in-gaza-have-increased-300-under-israeli-1851168680">increased risk of miscarriage</a>, stillbirth and maternal death. This is in part due to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uncertain-fate-of-patients-needing-life-saving-dialysis-treatment-in-gaza-220941">Israeli attacks on health-care facilities</a>. These attacks have led not only to direct casualties, but have also severely restricted access to prenatal and natal care. </p>
<p>Women are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/21/gaza-childbirth/">giving birth without appropriate medical care</a>. This puts their lives and the lives of their babies at risk, contributing to higher rates of maternal and infant death.</p>
<p>The widespread food crisis has also had dire implications for reproductive and maternal health. The <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/intensifying-conflict-malnutrition-and-disease-gaza-strip-creates-deadly-cycle">United Nations Children’s Fund has voiced concern</a> over the nutritional vulnerability of over 155,000 pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers. </p>
<p>Malnutrition can make breastfeeding difficult, if not impossible, and yet <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-aid-babies-hamas-israel-war-e0f843a8f5f1af49efc45f6cb02005a6">formula has been difficult</a> (and for some, impossible) to access. This has been exacerbated by high prices and delays and restrictions on delivery of humanitarian aid. Malnutrition affects maternal health, and can also have long-term consequences for the health of mothers and their children.</p>
<h2>Canada must act</h2>
<p>After mounting public pressure, including country-wide protests, Canadian officials first uttered the word “ceasefire” in December, two months after the start of the war. They did so on Dec. 12, 2023, in a non-binding <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/un-onu/statements-declarations/2023-12-12-explanation-vote-explication.aspx?lang=eng">UN resolution vote</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Canadian exports of military equipment to Israel have not only continued, but have <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-authorized-28-million-of-new-military-exports-to-israel-since-october/">increased since October</a>. Global Affairs Canada claims these exports are only for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/demands-for-canada-to-stop-supplying-weapons-to-israel-grow-louder">non-lethal equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, they contribute to Israel’s military capacity. They undermine the legitimacy of Canada’s commitments to peacebuilding, and call into question whether its commitments to protecting the rights of women and girls extend to Palestinians.</p>
<p>Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng">claims to be</a> “a reflection of who we are as Canadians.” It expresses the belief that “it is possible to build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world… A world where no one is left behind.” </p>
<p>By its own standards, Canada has a responsibility to do more than verbalize support for a humanitarian ceasefire and <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/03/canada-announces-continued-assistance-for-people-in-gaza.html">provide humanitarian aid</a>. </p>
<p>Canada’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/israel-gaza-london-ceasefire-ontario-families-1.7056926">delayed</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/30/canada-clarifies-its-stand-on-a-humanitarian-truce-00124372">inconsistent response</a> to Israel’s military violence in Gaza represents a failure to evenly apply its own foreign policy.</p>
<p>Canada’s current strategy of <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-aid-gaza">providing humanitarian aid</a> to assuage the effects of military violence, while simultaneously continuing to <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-authorized-28-million-of-new-military-exports-to-israel-since-october/">sell military equipment</a>, points to paradoxes within its foreign policy. An effective feminist foreign aid policy needs political action to address the root causes of poverty, violence and sexual and reproductive harm. In Gaza, this includes military occupation, violence and blockade. </p>
<p>If Canada truly wants to create a more peaceful and prosperous world, they must not leave Palestinian women behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacqueline Potvin previously received funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mayme Lefurgey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada’s tepid response to the war in Gaza and the severe harm caused to Palestinian women casts doubt on the sincerity of the government’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.Jacqueline Potvin, Research Associate, School of Nursing, Western UniversityMayme Lefurgey, Research Fellow, Department of Sociology, University of New BrunswickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253672024-03-12T14:39:29Z2024-03-12T14:39:29ZIsrael-Hamas conflict: Ramadan brings fresh fears of escalation on both Gaza Strip and West Bank<p>Ramadan has begun, but the 2 million or so inhabitants of the Gaza Strip will have little choice about whether they can observe the customary daylight fasting during the month-long festival. The continuing blockade of the 141 square mile enclave has reportedly reduced some people to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68239320">eating cattle feed</a>, and there remains the dire prospect of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146997">widespread famine</a> if there isn’t a massive and rapid increase in the volume of aid getting to people.</p>
<p>A sea corridor <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/12/first-aid-ship-to-gaza-leaves-cyprus-port">has been opened</a> between Cyprus and Gaza and the first shipments of aid are arriving from Europe. But it’s thought that it <a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-plan-to-build-a-pier-to-get-aid-into-gaza-isnt-enough-here-are-six-issues-needed-for-an-effective-aid-strategy-225369">will be difficult</a> to get a sufficient amount of food, fuel and medicine in by sea.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, negotiations between Israel and Hamas have come to a grinding halt. Both sides have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-chief-blames-israel-stalled-ceasefire-talks-leaves-door-open-2024-03-10/">accused each other</a> of hindering the talks, which were meant to secure the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.</p>
<p>Last month Benny Gantz, a member of Israel’s war cabinet, said the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would begin a ground offensive in Rafah, southern Gaza, to coincide with the start of Ramadan. This varies depending on where you are in the Islamic world and depends on the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/11/world/middleeast/ramadan-moon-sighting.html#">appearance of the early crescent moon</a>. So while authorities in Saudi Arabia reported a sighting on Sunday March 10, other countries, including Iran, reported seeing the crescent moon a day later. </p>
<p>The idea of a major Israeli offensive timed to coincide with Islam’s most important festival has drawn <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/ramadan-israel-hamas-war-impact">criticism from around the world</a>. It “adds a layer of distastefulness and outrage to an already pretty horrendous situation,” Khaled Elgindy, director of the Middle East Institute’s program on Palestine, told Foreign Policy. “It adds more pressure on Arab governments to at least look like they’re doing something,” he added.</p>
<p>Ramadan is a central event in the Islamic holy calendar, commemorating Muhammad’s first revelation of what would later become the Qur'an. A duality of emotions characterises the month-long festival.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Ramadan is a joyous religious holiday when Muslim friends and families celebrate by sharing large meals and exchanging presents. On the other, it is a time of profound spiritual communion with Allah and the Muslim Ummah (community). It is marked by disciplined fasting, intense study of the Qur'an and prayer, accompanied by acts of charity towards less fortunate Muslims facing hardship.</p>
<p>A major military offensive would be a serious provocation to Muslims across the world. It could trigger a new wave of anti-Israeli demonstrations, and completely derail the Arab-Israeli normalisation process that began with the signing of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in September 2020.</p>
<p>If it goes ahead, an Israeli assault on Rafah – where more than a million Palestinians have fled to escape the violence – could play into the hands of those in Hamas’s leadership, including the group’s leader in Gaza, Yahyah Sinwar, who said in February that international pressure would force Israel to end the war. The death toll, according to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/12/israels-war-on-gaza-live-2000-medical-staff-starving-in-north-ministry">Gaza health ministry</a>, has topped 31,000 with nearly 73,000 more people injured. </p>
<h2>West Bank</h2>
<p>Reports <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/rising-concerns-tensions-east-jerusalem-ramadan-begins-no-cease-fire-s-rcna142749">from the Old City of Jerusalem</a>, meanwhile, describe how the usual festivities that take place on Ramadan’s eve were replaced by feelings of sadness over the situation in Gaza and apprehension about the future of the Palestinian people. Instead of being bustling with activity, the narrow alleys of the Old City were almost empty, with many local shops closed. The traditional lights and decorations were <a href="https://www.jerusalemstory.com/en/blog/no-public-celebrations-or-decorations-jerusalem-ramadan">not in evidence</a>.</p>
<p>There is apprehension, too, that al-Aqsa mosque on what Jews call the Temple Mount could become a significant flashpoint for further disturbances, which could quickly spiral out of control. According to <a href="https://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=17&verse=1&to=1#">Surah 17 in the Qur'an</a>, Muhammad ascended to heaven from the site of Al-Aqsa after his miraculous night journey from Mecca. The holy site is traditionally visited by tens of thousands of Muslim pilgrims each day as part of their Ramadan celebrations.</p>
<p>Israel’s national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir – a far-right ideologue on whom Netanyahu depends to hold on to his majority in the Knesset – <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gvir-calls-to-bar-palestinian-authority-residents-from-temple-mount-on-ramadan/">proposed a blanket ban</a> on “Palestinian authority residents” from accessing the site during Ramadan. But the war cabinet has ruled this out. Instead the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has ruled that men over the age of 55, women over 50, and children up to the age of ten will be allowed access.</p>
<p>Restrictions on worshippers visiting the holy site could be particularly problematic during the last ten days of Ramadan when Muslims sleep inside the mosque and rise early for morning prayers. </p>
<p>It is still uncertain whether the delicate calm at al-Aqsa will persist throughout the upcoming month. On March 10, despite Netanyahu’s assurances that there would be no restrictions, the Israeli security forces prevented many young Palestinians <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/police-scuffle-with-worshipers-outside-al-aqsa-mosque-compound-on-1st-night-of-ramadan/">from entering the mosque</a> for Ramadan’s opening prayer. </p>
<p>That instantly resulted in scuffles at one of the shrine’s entrances, with Israeli officers using batons on the Palestinian crowd. The situation in the days ahead may become far more challenging as thousands of Muslims are expected at Al-Aqsa for Friday prayers. </p>
<p>A new IDF campaign in overcrowded Rafah, a drastic curtailment of Muslim worship rights at al-Aqsa or an excessive use of violence by the Israeli police in the Old City of Jerusalem could be all it takes to ultimately ignite the fuse and set the whole region on fire.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225367/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Aldrovandi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major ground assault on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip during one of Islam’s most important months could result in a major escalation of violence.Carlo Aldrovandi, Assistant Professor in International Peace Studies, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2246902024-03-11T19:32:30Z2024-03-11T19:32:30ZUS attempt to ‘revitalize’ Palestinian Authority risks making the PA less legitimate, more unpopular<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580863/original/file-20240311-24-7bkwnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5235%2C3461&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas meet on Nov. 30, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/f6460a47ee174da48d6a3dabc0527453/photo?Query=Palestinian%20authority&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1602&currentItemNo=15">Saul Loeb/Pool via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gaza is still very much in the midst of war, yet discussion is turning to “<a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/29/israel-gaza-saudi-egypt-jordan-palestine-meeting">the day after</a>” the conflict – and who will govern the war-ravaged territory.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has said that a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/7/us-says-doesnt-support-israeli-occupation-of-gaza-after-war">full Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip</a> would be unacceptable. Instead, White House officials have discussed “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/05/palestinian-authority-security-forces-gaza/">revitalizing</a>” the Palestinian Authority, or PA, the governing apparatus of parts of the West Bank, to take over in Gaza. </p>
<p>Seemingly as an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-authority-government-explainer-aefe041e045f2c60918b42f42185f41e">initial step to enable this</a>, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-abbas-israel-hamas-war-resignation-1c13eb3c2ded20cc14397e71b5b1dea5">PA cabinet resigned</a> on Feb. 26, 2024. This begins the process of overhauling the authority and setting up a “<a href="https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-biden-administration-highlights-humanitarian-crisis-palestinians-gaza">technocratic government</a>” tasked with basic, short-term governance objectives, presumably in Gaza as well as the West Bank. </p>
<p>But analysts and researchers have questioned what role the PA could have, given that the body has <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-problem-of-legitimacy-for-the-palestinian-authority/">struggled with a legitimacy crisis</a> for well over a decade. And Israel has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-rebuffs-calls-for-palestinian-authority-to-rule-gaza-6e5509fe">refused to countenance any PA involvement</a> in post-conflict Gaza. </p>
<p>Moreover, PA officials are wary of entering Gaza “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/palestinian-authority-not-going-to-gaza-on-an-israeli-military-tank-pm-says">on the back of an Israeli tank</a>,” in the words of resigning Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://mei.edu/profile/dana-el-kurd">scholar of Palestinian politics</a>, I believe any possible solution to the war in Gaza involving the PA will face significant challenges over its legitimacy, public support and ability to govern. </p>
<p>But why do Palestinians have such a negative assessment of the PA, and is that justified? To answer that, it is important to understand the shift within the Palestinian national movement since the creation of the PA in 1994 and the international community’s role in those transformations.</p>
<h2>What is the Palestinian Authority?</h2>
<p>The PA was created as a result of the Oslo Accords. The accords, a framework for negotiated peace that took place in the early 1990s, represented the first time in which the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, and the state of Israel formally accepted <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/97181.htm#:%7E:text=Along%20with%20the%20DOP%2C%20the,representative%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20people.">mutual recognition</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men two in suits one wearing a traditional Palestinian headscarf stand. Two shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Oslo Accords were negotiated by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestiniansControllingGazaExplainer/533873b1296c4dbb8c2d3d583014a7c6/photo?Query=oslo%20accords%20arafat&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Ron Edmonds</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The accords were intended to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and achieve some sort of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-two-state-solution-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-01-25/">two-state solution</a>.</p>
<p>In anticipation of a future Palestinian state, the PA was established as a governing body. Elections were held, and the dominant party within the PLO, Fatah, also came to dominate the PA.</p>
<p>The goal was that by 1999, the Palestinians would have a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Negotiations would continue as the PA built out the institutions of the state, under the optimistic assumption that both could be arrived at concurrently. </p>
<p>But this shift from seeking liberation to state-building signaled compromises on the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194">right of Palestinian refugees to return</a> to the land they were expelled from during the creation of Israel.</p>
<p>Despite this, <a href="https://pij.org/articles/677/palestinian-public-opinion-polls-on-the-peace-process">many Palestinians were</a> supportive of having some pathway forward in which they might achieve self-determination and sovereignty. </p>
<p>The state-building project reoriented a great deal of energy and resources to the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and attempts by Palestinian leadership to achieve a viable Palestinian state.</p>
<h2>The second intifada’s aftermath</h2>
<p>When a state was not achieved by 1999, the second intifada, or uprising, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/node/31123">broke out</a>.</p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority struggled to maintain order and stability during the period, crucially because the Israeli military raided urban centers and attacked PA infrastructure. Analysts refer to the intifada as a moment of “<a href="https://www.ichr.ps/cached_uploads/download/ichr-files/files/000000436.pdf">infilaat amni</a>,” or a collapse of order. It saw <a href="https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20100927">massive disruption</a> to Palestinians and Israelis and many lives lost.</p>
<p>For the remnants of the PA and its American benefactors, the lesson learned from the second intifada was that such a collapse could never be allowed to happen again.</p>
<p>In the aftermath, the focus of the U.S. and the international community turned to restructuring the PA, expanding and “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/11/palestinian-authority-secuirty-forces-west-bank-faq/">professionalizing</a>” its security forces and ensuring that the PA would be a stalwart partner to Israel in maintaining security in the occupied territories.</p>
<p>But to an increasing number of Palestinians, this focus on security coordination and restructuring did not serve the needs of a people living under occupation. In fact, in the name of security, Palestinians saw themselves more and more repressed not just by the occupation forces but by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/09/palestinian-authority-must-end-use-excessive-force-policing-protests-2013-0/">their own government</a>. </p>
<p>By the mid-2000s, after the intifada tapered off, it was clear the <a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-after-arafat-rabin-handshake-clear-flaws-in-oslo-accords-doomed-peace-talks-to-failure-211362">peace process was going nowhere</a>; the Israeli government had become increasingly right wing, and Palestinian leadership seemed both less willing and less capable to represent its people’s interests.</p>
<p>In what amounted to a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-palestinian-elections-sweeping-victory-uncertain-mandate/">referendum on the status quo</a>, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/node/31125">Hamas beat Fatah and won</a> in the 2006 parliamentary elections for the territories. But the results immediately led to instability and conflict between the two main Palestinian political factions: Fatah, which until then dominated the PA, and Hamas.</p>
<p>The international community also did not support the election results and empowered <a href="https://www.npr.org/2007/01/19/6923812/abbas-gets-money-support-and-distrust">Fatah to remain in power</a>.</p>
<p>This led to a split in governance between the West Bank and Gaza, with the PA losing control of Gaza entirely in the aftermath of infighting between the two parties. </p>
<p><iframe id="4sJq8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4sJq8/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In response, the international community – led by the U.S. – worked to bolster the PA once again.</p>
<p>The PA has not held elections since, with the president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, remaining in office well past his term limit.</p>
<p>Over the years, the PA has continued to play a security coordination role in the West Bank but is perceived <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf">as a burden</a> by Palestinians and as having achieved little in improving their living conditions. </p>
<p>Rather, repression and fragmentation have only worsened within Palestinian society, even as the challenges imposed by the occupation have only amplified with a now 17-year-long <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-strip-the-humanitarian-impact-of-15-years-of-the-blockade-june-2022-ocha-factsheet/">blockade on Gaza</a> and continued <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/09/israeli-settlements-expand-by-record-amount-un-rights-chief-says.html">settlement building in the West Bank</a>. </p>
<p>Many Palestinian today see the PA as little more than a “<a href="https://www.972mag.com/palestinian-authority-nablus-occupation-subcontractor/">subcontractor of occupation</a> in the West Bank.</p>
<h2>Public opinion today</h2>
<p>It is, then, perhaps unsurprising that the Palestinian Authority has faced an ongoing legitimacy crisis. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf">September 2023 poll</a> by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 76% of Palestinians polled within both territories expressed dissatisfaction with the PA’s governance. </p>
<p>This lack of support for the PA does not necessarily signal support for Hamas either; in questions about possible parliamentary elections, Hamas garnered only 34% of the potential vote – second to Fatah.</p>
<p>These low approval trends are echoed in other polling. The <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/what-palestinians-really-think-hamas">Arab Barometer</a>, for example, conducted polling merely days before Oct. 7 and found only 27% of respondents in Gaza selected Hamas as their preferred party. Comparatively, only 30% favored Fatah. Although subsequent <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2090%20English%20press%20release%2013%20Dec%202023%20Final%20New.pdf">polling in December</a> shows a bump for Hamas, this is much more pronounced in the West Bank than in Gaza. And the majority of Palestinians still are unsupportive.</p>
<p>It is clear that most Palestinians are fed up with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/94d888ce-9efc-4e65-b93c-bea952e83824">their political options</a>. Furthermore, the PA has long abandoned attempting to reflect Palestinian public opinion – in no small part because of the international community and the role it wants the PA to play.</p>
<p>Revitalizing the PA, as the U.S. appears intent on doing, looks to be a Herculean task, given how low the body is held in the eyes of many Palestinians. Moreover, any outside attempt to empower unaccountable leadership – and ignore Palestinian public demands and input – risks repeating history. After all, this was precisely how the PA lost its legitimacy to begin with.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dana El Kurd is affiliated with the Middle East Institute and the Arab Center Washington.</span></em></p>Israel has made it clear that Hamas should have no role in Gaza after the war. But seeking an alternative in the Palestinian Authority is fraught with problems.Dana El Kurd, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245572024-03-10T13:17:48Z2024-03-10T13:17:48ZGaza war: The displaced survivors of the Oct. 7 attack remain in need of support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580809/original/file-20240309-29-vprdfs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Evidence of arson during the attack on Kibbutz Be’eri, Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas orchestrated <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2">a series of attacks on Israeli communities</a>. This was the deadliest attack Israel had experienced since the state was established in 1948. An <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:%7E:text=Hamas's%20October%207%20terrorist%20attack,years%20of%20the%20Second%20Intifada">estimated 1,200 people</a> were killed, hundreds were taken hostage and approximately <a href="https://unwatch.org/report-un-silent-on-israeli-idps/">30,000 displaced</a>.</p>
<p>As an associate professor of disaster and emergency management who studies terrorism, I travelled to Kibbutz Be'eri in February, where I had the opportunity to bear witness to survivors of the atrocity.</p>
<p>As a matter of respect for Israel’s dead, survivors <a href="https://stories.bringthemhomenow.net/">and remaining hostages</a>, a certain moral obligation seems clear: <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/representing-evil-the-moral-paradoxes-of-bearing-witness-to-atro/10098410">atrocity requires representation</a>. Bearing witness means taking on a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276418776366">burden of responsibility</a> to observe and document.</p>
<p>Bearing witness can <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/syria/syria">serve multiple purposes</a>. Attempting to understand the toll of the conflict on survivors of violence and documenting atrocity to call attention to the criminality of terrorism can all be results of bearing witness.</p>
<p>I was embedded in an environment that was still in disaster response mode. Conducting research in communities affected by the attack required delicate manoeuvreing due to the precarious security situation and general unpredictability. </p>
<p>To navigate such challenges, my co-ordination with organizations having intimate local knowledge of ground conditions was of utmost importance. Arrangements for bearing witness were facilitated by the <a href="https://apfmed.org/">American Healthcare Professionals and Friends for Medicine in Israel (APF)</a>, who organized the Israel Solidarity Mission, which I participated in.</p>
<p>I made field observations at Kibbutz Be’eri at a point in time 130 days after the massacre. When <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas attacked</a>, the ensuing <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-devastation-of-beeri">devastation at Be'eri</a> resulted in <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/israels-ground-zero-beeri-kibbutz-bloodiest-scenes-hamas/story?id=103936668">112 residents of the kibbutz</a> being murdered.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="two photographs showing damage caused by weapons and fire to a wall and a window" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Detail showing damages to structures in Kibbutz Be’eri, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Among those <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/vivian-silver-thought-to-be-taken-captive-from-beeri-confirmed-killed-by-hamas/">killed</a> at Be'eri was <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/vivian-silver-friends-mourn-israel-death-manitoba-1.7027813">Vivian Silver</a>, a prominent Canadian Jewish humanitarian originally from Winnipeg.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-will-the-murder-of-peace-activists-mean-the-end-of-the-peace-movement-215973">Israel-Hamas war: will the murder of peace activists mean the end of the peace movement?</a>
</strong>
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<h2>Physical ruins</h2>
<p>One observation that repeatedly stood out was arson. Observable burn scorch marks surrounding windows of bedrooms and safe rooms were apparent. Exterior walls of dwellings were pockmarked by automatic weapon fire. Interior walls of dwellings were scarred with blast effects from anti-personnel grenades.</p>
<p>The locations and characteristics of physical evidence of ruins, directly corresponded with descriptions of deaths as remembered by survivors and other <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/22/world/europe/beeri-massacre.html">third-party analysis</a> describing the mechanics of how the massacre took place.</p>
<p>Overall, my observations — made on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis in Be'eri — indicated the attackers had no apparent tactical objectives to their <a href="https://doi.org/10.4088/pcc.v01n0302">running amok</a>, other than killing and taking hostages.</p>
<h2>The fate of evacuees</h2>
<p>Intertwined with the sites of atrocity are locations where response is taking place. Hotels serve as shelters for those who cannot yet return. Approximately five months after the Oct. 7 attacks, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000">135,000 Israelis</a> remain displaced. </p>
<p>In meeting with emergency management officials at the city of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ramat-Gan">Ramat Gan</a>, east of Tel Aviv, I learned that providing emergency social social services to evacuees has become a new responsibility for the city’s disaster workers. In late February, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000">15,100 evacuees</a> still reside in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="shiny blue hotel building in a city" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hotels in Ramat Gan continue to temporarily house persons who evacuated cities in southern Israel after the Oct. 7 attacks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For evacuees, their sense of security has been shattered, and their responses to the trauma they witnessed on Oct. 7 stretches their capacity to cope. Whether and how they can return to their homes in the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gaza-envelope-communities-case-study-societal-resilience-israel-2006-2016/">Gaza Envelope</a> is a decision fraught with emotion.</p>
<p>The coming months will be a pivotal point for evacuees. The government has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/government-says-evacuees-from-south-can-return-march-1-or-stay-in-subsidized-hotels-through-july/">announced two options</a>. As of March 1, evacuees may start to return home with the approval of the Israel Defense Forces. Or, if they are not ready to return, they can receive funding to remain in hotels until July 7.</p>
<h2>The suffering of others</h2>
<p>On the five-month anniversary of the attacks, attempting to digest and analyze recent events in Israel remains challenging, given the depth of the tragedy. Relevant questions are raised in <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780312422196/regarding-the-pain-of-others"><em>Regarding the Pain of Others</em></a>, in which American writer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/dec/29/guardianobituaries.booksobituaries">Susan Sontag</a> asks: “What does it mean to care about the sufferings of others far away?” </p>
<p>After the visceral experience of bearing witness to atrocity by setting two feet on the ground at Be'eri, I am left with more questions than answers concerning what it means to care about far away suffering. After the more mundane experience of witnessing evacuees having an uncertain future living in hotels, I am thinking about how local disaster response actions play into national crises. </p>
<p>For survivors in Israel, the displacement and trauma are ongoing and it will take the time that it takes for their lives to normalize. A timeline cannot be put on the social and psychological repair of their lives. Experiences of survivors and evacuees should inform emergency measures by suggesting the timeline for evacuees to return home should remain as flexible as possible.</p>
<p><em>Edward Snowden, a graduate of the Master’s in Disaster and Emergency Management Program at York University who specializes in mass casualty management, contributed his observations from Israel.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224557/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack L. Rozdilsky receives support for research communication and public scholarship from York University. He also has received research support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research.</span></em></p>Bearing witness to the displaced victims of the Oct. 7 attack on Kibbutz Be'eri carries a burden of responsibility to observe and documentJack L. Rozdilsky, Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency Management, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228322024-03-07T13:32:50Z2024-03-07T13:32:50ZLebanese-Israeli fighting looks set to scuttle plans for historic land border settlement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578661/original/file-20240228-16-mpt54u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C5414%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.N. navy vessel seen through barbed wire patrols the Mediterranean Sea off the Lebanese coast.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelBorderDealFallout/ceaec2b4d98b426fa4f13dba93f04cb5/photo?Query=lebanon%20israel%20maritime&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=228&currentItemNo=15">AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October 2022, Lebanon and Israel signed a <a href="https://www.state.gov/historic-agreement-establishing-a-permanent-israel-lebanon-maritime-boundary/">maritime border agreement</a> brokered by the U.S., a move interpreted as the beginning of normalizing relations between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/war-decades-lebanon-israel-edge-towards-rare-deal-2022-10-11/">two countries technically at war</a>. </p>
<p>The next step would have been the settlement of the long-running <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/why-is-there-a-disputed-border-between-lebanon-and-israel">land border dispute</a>.</p>
<p>But then came the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s response in bombing Gaza. The following day, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nasrallah-hezbollah-leader-gaza-war">Hassan Nasrallah</a>, secretary general of Lebanon’s political party and militant group Hezbollah, announced the faction had “entered the battle,” effectively dragging Lebanon into fresh, intensified fighting with Israel. </p>
<p>Since then, near-daily tit-for-tat strikes have seen Hezbollah fighters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/15/hezbollah-warns-israel-will-pay-price-after-fighters-civilians-killed#:%7E:text=The%20Lebanese%20armed%20group%20Hezbollah,Hezbollah%20fighters%20in%20southern%20Lebanon.">fire missiles into northern Israel</a> and Israel Defense Forces <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-airstrikes-balbek-drone-ed15c8275fa47e6214784f5ed99649f8">responding in kind</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.dickinson.edu/site/custom_scripts/dc_faculty_profile_index.php?fac=rebeizm">scholar who researches</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Gendering_Civil_War.html?id=mJXZzwEACAAJ&source=kp_author_description">evolving issues in Lebanon and the Middle East</a>, I worry that as regional violence escalates, the long simmering conflict between Israel and Lebanon is heading toward an unavoidable <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-war-preparedness-civilians-military-aafd7a0048dceb810456b93ceecf543c">full-blown war</a>. In such circumstances, hopes for a land settlement to accompany the historic maritime deal look, for now at least, dead in the water.</p>
<h2>Lebanese–Israeli relations</h2>
<p>For over 75 years, Israel’s border with Lebanon has been a source of conflict. Following the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">expelled or fled their land</a>; many ended up as refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. </p>
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<p>In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created and began to operate cells and recruit members from the Palestinian refugee camps in those three countries. In 1970, the PLO was <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/black-september">expelled from Jordan</a>.</p>
<p>It moved its headquarters into Lebanon, and by the mid-1970s over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/08/18/archives/palestinian-groups-fight-for-survival-in-lebanon.html">20,000 PLO</a> fighters were in Lebanon launching attacks on Israel. Their armed presence divided Lebanese public opinion between those who wanted to make peace with Israel and those who wanted to defend the Palestinian cause. </p>
<p>On <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Lebanese-Civil-War">April 13, 1975</a>, violence erupted over the issue of Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, and the country descended into chaos. </p>
<p>It resulted in a messy civil war in which Palestinian insurgents in Lebanon fought the country’s Christian population while also continuing to fire rockets into Israel. Lebanon thus became an unstable political and security threat to Israel. </p>
<p>In 1982, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon launched <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Operation-Peace-for-Galilee.aspx">Operation Peace for Galilee</a>. On June 6 of that year, Israel Defense Forces invaded Lebanon with the intent to eliminate PLO fighters. Nearly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/09/03/war-casualties-put-at-48000-in-lebanon/cf593941-6067-4239-a453-71bdcaf9eba0/">18,000 people were killed and another 30,000 wounded</a> during the invasion. </p>
<p>The Lebanese authorities called for help, and a <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/lebanon.html">multinational peacekeeping force</a> composed of American, French, British and Italian troops arrived in August 1982. Its mission was to evacuate PLO fighters out of Lebanon into Tunisia. </p>
<p>But on Sept. 14, Lebanese President-elect <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/15/world/gemayel-of-lebanon-is-killed-in-bomb-blast-at-party-offices.html">Bashir Gemayel</a> was assassinated. In retaliation, the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and killed over 2,000 civilians. <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/massacres-at-sabra-and-shatila">Evidence suggests</a> Israel played a role in these massacres and was indirectly responsible for them. </p>
<p>Israel officially retreated from Beirut in September 1982, but it occupied southern Lebanon until 2000. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A groupd of mourners carry a coffin." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners at a funeral procession on Feb. 17, 2024, in Nabatiyeh, Lebanon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelPalestinians/28e1c8a9206b40b1a7662a0fe0b6ed6c/photo?Query=Lebanon%20%20Israel%20border&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2301&currentItemNo=18">AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was during this Israeli occupation that <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, a Shiite political party in Lebanon and militant organization backed by Iran, was born. Hezbollah and the IDF have been engaged in fierce fighting ever since, including a 1996 war known as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.israel-lebanon979.html">Operation Grapes of Wrath</a>, in which an estimated 200 were killed. </p>
<h2>Land and maritime border disputes</h2>
<p>Much of the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel takes place along a border that has been contested since the creation of Israel. Matters became more complicated with the occupation of the Golan Heights – a former Syrian territory that borders Israel and Lebanon and was taken by Israeli forces during the 1967 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">Six-Day War</a>.</p>
<p>In the past, there have been attempts to settle land disputes. In 1949, Israel and Lebanon signed the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-generalarmistice49#:%7E:text=Summary%3A,to%20permanent%20peace%20in%20Palestine.">general armistice agreement</a>, which adopted the boundaries of the mandatory territories of Palestine and Lebanon. This agreement continues to exist on paper. </p>
<p>In May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement calling for the establishment of peaceful diplomatic relations between the two states. However, after the assassination of Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the agreement was not implemented. </p>
<p>Following the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, a <a href="https://unifil.unmissions.org/it%E2%80%99s-time-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-key-stability">“Blue Line” was established</a> by the U.N. It is not a real border but rather an imagined line separating the two states and monitored by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Although the Blue Line acts as a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel, it does not offer an accurate drawing of land boundaries and does not solve the issue of a key source of contention: the disputed <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/shebaa-farms-why-hezbollah-uses-israel-s-occupation-of-a-tiny-strip-of-land-to-justify-its-arsenal-1.857998">Shebaa Farms</a>. </p>
<p>Located between Israel, Syria and southern Lebanon, the Shebaa Farms have been contested lands for over two decades. While Lebanon and Hezbollah claim that it is Lebanese territory, Israel asserts that it is part of the Golan Heights, which it continues to occupy.</p>
<p>After appointing cartographers, the United Nations declared the Shebaa Farms Syrian territory <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/assad-the-shebaa-farms-are-syrian-whatever-hezbollah-claims/">captured by Israel in 1967</a>.</p>
<p>In 2011, Syrian leader <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/84303">Bashar Assad recognized that the Shebaa Farms</a> are Syrian, refuting Hezbollah’s claim over this land and Israel’s jurisdiction in the occupied Golan Heights. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, efforts led by the U.S. began to look at the issue of Lebanon and Israel’s disputed maritime boundary, starting in earnest in 2010. </p>
<p>The discovery of the Leviathan field, <a href="https://newmedenergy.com/operations/leviathan/#:%7E:text=Leviathan%2C%20with%2022.9%20TCF%20of,producing%20assets%20in%20the%20region.">the largest gas reservoir in the Mediterranean</a>, made it urgent to address the question of the maritime borders. With gas exploitation and economic growth a possibility, it was deemed important to lower security risks for investors. </p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-special-envoy-hopes-diplomacy-will-calm-lebanon-israel-border-2024-01-11/">Amos Hochstein</a>, the American envoy for energy affairs, met separately at the Blue Line with Israeli and Lebanese officials. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/27/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-maritime-deal/">Hezbollah was involved</a> in the negotiations and gave the green light for the deal to be sealed. In October of that year, the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/MZN161.pdf">U.N. was notified</a> of the new Israeli and Lebanese maritime borders. </p>
<p>It came amid other signs of a lessening in tensions between Israel and Arab states. In September 2020, the United Arab Emirates signed the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in which it recognized Israeli statehood. Soon after, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/israeli-foreign-minister-heads-delegation-discuss-sudan-normalisation-2023-02-02/">Sudan and Bahrain</a> followed suit. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>The maritime border agreement carried a potential for peace in the region, a deal that would, potentially, benefit both Lebanon and Israel. </p>
<p>The next step would have been drawing land boundaries. In fact, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-lebanon-hezbollah-talks.html">Hochstein</a> had already held preliminary discussions over 13 land border points, including the Shebaa Farms, and had explicitly said that the U.S. is ready to help mediate between the two countries.</p>
<p>Hamas’ terrorist attack on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/31/interview-building-evidence-crimes-committed-israel-october-7">Oct. 7, 2023</a>, and the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza have, however, derailed the process.</p>
<p>It is hard to envision a land border deal in such circumstances, especially after <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/assassination-of-hamas-leader-in-lebanon-deepens-concerns-of-broader-regional-conflict">the January 2024 assassination of</a> Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut and Hezbollah’s vow to avenge the death.</p>
<p>The final nail in the coffin looks to be Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-there-will-be-no-diplomatic-relations-with-israel-without-an-2024-02-07/">statement on Feb. 7, 2024</a>, that it can have no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital. </p>
<p>It has ended hopes, for now at least, that Saudi Arabia will follow the UAE’s lead and normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>The U.S. is still desperately trying to keep the land deal alive. Recently, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/lebanon/2024/03/05/amos-hochstein-meets-anti-hezbollah-parties-in-lebanon-for-first-time/">Hochstein visited Lebanon</a> and met with anti-Hezbollah parties in an attempt to end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and move forward with a land agreement. </p>
<p>One voice often neglected in all this is that of the Lebanese public. <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanons-political-forces-oppose-a-war-with-israel/">Many Lebanese</a> have expressed their opposition to war. In one <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shadow-hezbollah-israel-escalation-poll-shows-slim-majority-lebanese-still-want">recent poll</a>, a majority agreed that what the country needed was domestic and economic reforms more than involvement in foreign policy issues. A historic land deal accompanying the maritime settlement may have gone some way to achieve those goals. Instead, the danger now is a full-scale war that will scuttle any negotiations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mireille Rebeiz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A maritime border agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel seemed like a step toward peaceful relations. But now both countries are getting ready for what looks like an unavoidable war.Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies & Associate Professor of Francophone & Women's, Gender & Sexuality Studies, Dickinson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250792024-03-05T06:15:22Z2024-03-05T06:15:22ZWhy have Anthony Albanese and other politicians been referred to the ICC over the Gaza war?<p>In an unprecedented legal development, senior Australian politicians, including Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, have been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation into whether they have aided or supported Israel’s actions in Gaza. </p>
<p>The referral, made by the Sydney law firm <a href="https://birchgrovelegal.com.au/2024/03/01/birchgrove-legal-files-case-for-complicity-to-genocide-to-the-hague-international-criminal-court-media-release/?fbclid=IwAR1mfkJ08SSs3rmZW7inOLNaPnwJ3SsKHXVyIw57usvRpGuyang4x0TCA7c">Birchgrove Legal</a> on behalf of their clients, is the first time any serving Australian political leaders have been formally referred to the ICC for investigation. </p>
<p>The referral asserts that Albanese, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Opposition Leader Peter Dutton and other members of the government have violated the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">Rome Statute</a>, the 1998 treaty that established the ICC to investigate and prosecute allegations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>Specifically, the law firm references:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Australia’s freezing of aid to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the aid agency that operates in Gaza</p></li>
<li><p>the provision of military aid to Israel that could have been used in the alleged commission of genocide and crimes against humanity </p></li>
<li><p>permitting Australians to travel to Israel to take part in attacks in Gaza </p></li>
<li><p>providing “unequivocal political support” for Israel’s actions in Gaza. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A key aspect of the referral is the assertion, under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, that Albanese and the others bear individual criminal responsibility for aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission (or attempted commission) of alleged crimes by Israel in Gaza.</p>
<p>At a news conference today, Albanese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2024/mar/05/australia-news-live-anthony-albanese-asean-green-energy-investment-south-east-asia-cook-kennedy-women-liberals-peter-dutton?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-65e678228f08826910dd03dd#block-65e678228f08826910dd03dd">said the letter</a> had “no credibility” and was an example of “misinformation”. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia joined a majority in the UN to call for an immediate ceasefire and to advocate for the release of hostages, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the upholding of international law and the protection of civilians.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/there-has-been-much-talk-of-war-crimes-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict-but-will-anyone-actually-be-prosecuted-217785">There has been much talk of war crimes in the Israel-Gaza conflict. But will anyone actually be prosecuted?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How the referral process works</h2>
<p>There are a couple of key questions here: can anyone be referred to the ICC, and how often do these referrals lead to an investigation?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp">Referrals to the ICC prosecutor</a> are most commonly made by individual countries – as has occurred following <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022</a> – or by the UN Security Council. However, it is also possible for referrals to be made by “intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, or other reliable sources”, according to Article 15 of the Rome Statute. </p>
<p>The ICC prosecutor’s office has received <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp">12,000 such referrals</a> to date. These must go through a preliminary examination before the office decides whether there are “reasonable grounds” to start an investigation. </p>
<p>The court has issued arrest warrants for numerous leaders over the past two decades, including Russian President <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/icc-arrest-warrant-vladimir-putin-explainer">Vladimir Putin</a> and his commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova; former Sudanese President <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/26/sudan-former-president-accused-of-genocide-may-be-free-after-prison-attack">Omar al-Bashir</a>; and now-deceased Libyan leader <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/6/28/icc-issues-gaddafi-arrest-warrant">Muammar Gaddafi</a>.</p>
<h2>Why this referral is unlikely to go anywhere</h2>
<p>Putting aside the merit of the allegations themselves, it is unlikely the Australian referrals will go any further for legal and practical reasons. </p>
<p>First, the ICC was established as an <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works">international court of last resort</a>. This means it would only be used to prosecute international crimes when courts at a national level are unwilling or unable to do so.</p>
<p>As such, the threat of possible ICC prosecution was intended to act as a deterrent for those considering committing international crimes, as well as an incentive for national authorities and courts to prosecute them. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-accountability-for-alleged-war-crimes-so-hard-to-achieve-in-the-israel-palestinian-conflict-160864">Why is accountability for alleged war crimes so hard to achieve in the Israel-Palestinian conflict?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Australia has such a process in place to investigate potential war crimes and other international crimes through the <a href="https://www.osi.gov.au/">Office of the Special Investigator</a> (OSI).</p>
<p>The OSI was created in the wake of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/19/key-findings-of-the-brereton-report-into-allegations-of-australian-war-crimes-in-afghanistan">2020 Brereton Report</a> into allegations of Australian war crimes in Afghanistan. In <a href="https://www.osi.gov.au/news-resources/former-australian-soldier-charged-war-crime">March 2023</a>, the office announced its first prosecution.</p>
<p>Because Australia has this legal framework in place, the ICC prosecutor would likely deem it unnecessary to refer Australian politicians to the ICC for prosecution, unless Australia was unwilling to start such a prosecution itself. At present, there is no evidence that is the case. </p>
<p>Another reason this referral is likely to go nowhere: the ICC prosecutor, Karim Khan, is <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases">currently focusing on a range of investigations</a> related to alleged war crimes committed by Russia, Hamas and Israel, in addition to other historical investigations. </p>
<p>Given the significance of these investigations – and the political pressure the ICC faces to act with speed – it is unlikely the court would divert limited resources to investigate Australian politicians.</p>
<h2>Increasing prominence of international courts</h2>
<p>This referral to the ICC, however, needs to be seen in a wider context. The Israel-Hamas conflict has resulted in an unprecedented flurry of legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s top court. </p>
<p>Unlike the ICC, the ICJ does not deal with individual criminal responsibility. The ICJ does, however, have jurisdiction over whether countries violate international law, such as the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>This was the basis for <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">South Africa</a> to launch its case against Israel in the ICJ, claiming its actions against the Palestinian people amounted to genocide. The ICJ issued a provisional ruling against Israel in January which said it’s “plausible” Israel had committed genocide in Gaza and ordered Israel to take immediate steps to prevent acts of genocide. </p>
<p>In addition, earlier this week, a new case was launched in the ICJ by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/193">Nicaragua</a>, alleging Germany has supported acts of genocide by providing military support for Israel and freezing aid for UNRWA.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1763633881939427400"}"></div></p>
<p>All of these developments in recent months amount to what experts call “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-israel-pans-nicaraguas-world-court-suit-experts-see-new-lawfare-front-in-war/">lawfare</a>”. This refers to the use of international or domestic courts to seek accountability for alleged state-sanctioned acts of genocide and support or complicity in such acts. Some of these cases have merit, others are very weak. </p>
<p>As one international law expert <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/26/lawfare-on-israels-war-on-gaza-reaches-germany-will-the-case-succeed">described the purpose</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s […] a way of raising awareness, getting media attention and showing your own political base you’re doing something. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These cases do succeed in increasing public awareness of these conflicts. And they make clear the desire of many around the world to hold to account those seen as being responsible for gross violations of international law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225079/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donald Rothwell receives funding from Australian Research Council</span></em></p>The war has resulted in a flurry of legal proceedings in international courts. Some cases have merit, while others are very weak.Donald Rothwell, Professor of International Law, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220922024-02-29T17:37:32Z2024-02-29T17:37:32ZIndians are fleeing their growing economy to work abroad – even in conflict zones. Here’s how to create more jobs at home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576217/original/file-20240216-18-l70jpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C59%2C7951%2C5237&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/people-workers-standing-line-outside-construction-728813566">Rahul Ramachandram/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-68027582">plans</a> to bring in 70,000 workers from abroad, including 10,000 from India, to boost its construction sector. A labour shortage has emerged after 80,000 Palestinian workers were barred from entering the country after the October 7 Hamas-led attacks.</p>
<p>Figures suggest that India is one of the <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/india-seizes-crown-of-fastest-growing-g20-economy-dec23.html">fastest-growing</a> economies in the world. Between July and September of 2023, it grew at a pace of 7.6%. If it continues along this current growth trajectory, India will become the world’s <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminlaker/2024/02/23/india-to-become-third-largest-economy-by-2027-implications-for-leaders/">third-largest</a> economy by 2027.</p>
<p>The fact that thousands of Indian workers are nonetheless queuing up to secure a job in a conflict zone abroad is a consequence of a jobs crisis at home. Despite the country’s apparent economic growth, many Indians – even those with a university degree – are struggling to secure stable employment.</p>
<p>Casual work makes up <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/04/10/indias-workforce-woes/#:%7E:text=About%2052%20per%20cent%20of,cent%20are%20regular%20salaried%20workers.">25% of the workforce</a>, while only 23% of workers are paid a regular salary. The remainder are self-employed, and quite vulnerable to irregular and insecure income too.</p>
<p>But India has a large working-age population (people between 15 and 64 years of age), so the demand for jobs is immense. India needs to create an <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/04/10/indias-workforce-woes/">estimated</a> 10 million to 12 million jobs each year for the unemployed, new workforce entrants, and surplus agricultural workers to be able to secure non-farm work.</p>
<p>How can India provide jobs for its increasingly educated young? It needs even faster economic growth and for this growth to be labour intensive. This will, in turn, generate demand in the economy from all sections of society (not just the middle class and above).</p>
<h2>Structural change</h2>
<p>Between 2004 and 2014, India’s economy grew at a rate of <a href="https://thewire.in/economy/modi-claims-india-saw-a-lost-decade-between-2004-and-14-is-that-true">nearly 8% per year</a> (despite the global financial crisis in 2008). This rapid growth was accompanied by a hastening of structural change in employment.</p>
<p>During that period, the economy created on average <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ijlaec/v64y2021i2d10.1007_s41027-021-00317-x.html">7.5 million</a> new non-farm jobs every year. The number of manufacturing jobs in India rose from 53 million in 2004 to 60 million by 2012.</p>
<p>However, ₹500 (£4.78) and ₹1000 (£9.56) notes were <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.1.55">taken out of circulation</a> in 2016, making 86% of India’s currency illegal. The cash recall was intended to accelerate the country’s transition towards a formal economy. But it led to acute shortages of cash, destroying jobs in the construction and manufacturing sectors.</p>
<p>Growth slowed to 2020 when, at the beginning of the COVID pandemic, the Indian government imposed a nationwide lockdown at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-52081396">four hours’ notice</a>. The lockdown caused India’s gross domestic product (GDP) to <a href="https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/">contract by 5.8%</a> – more than twice the rate at which the global economy shrank.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Six Indian police officers wearing masks and standing on a city street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police in Gujarat, India, enforcing the COVID lockdown.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bharuch-gujarat-india-april-05-2020-1702650391">Kunal Mahto/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Employment in manufacturing jobs fell again, especially in labour-intensive manufacturing where employment had already been in decline for five years following the botched implementation of demonetisation. Around <a href="https://thewire.in/economy/what-we-know-about-indias-post-covid-economy-recovery-and-rising-inequality">60 million workers</a> returned to jobs in agriculture, reversing the structural change in employment that had been underway for 15 years.</p>
<p>To take advantage of its bulging working-age population, India needs to create more non-farm jobs. In his new book, “Breaking the Mould”, the former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan, <a href="https://www.penguin.co.in/book/breaking-the-mould/">says</a> that India needs to focus on exports of services, drawing on the country’s new digital infrastructure and IT-based services growth for the domestic (and export) market.</p>
<p>But a focus on services alone will not suffice. This “New India” economy currently constitutes <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indian-economy-gdp-growth-capex-global-market-share-digital-public-infrastructure-9073549/">less than 15%</a> of the country’s economy and a fraction of that in employment. Such a strategy will generate jobs mainly for highly skilled people, rather than the millions of Indian workers that are searching for non-farm jobs.</p>
<p>What India needs is a <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/03/make-in-india-a-work-in-progress/">manufacturing strategy</a> akin to China’s that focuses on labour-intensive manufacturing. China has pursued an industrial policy since the 1950s, which has become even more evolved since the 1980s, helping the country establish dominance in global high-tech manufacturing.</p>
<h2>Creating jobs in India</h2>
<p>In India, the demand for jobs will only be met if several different factors come together. Construction activity needs to continue at its current brisk pace. But, for the next year or two, it must be led by public sector investment as private investment remains sluggish. </p>
<p>India’s investment-to-GDP ratio is <a href="https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/">still below 30%</a>, and has remained below the 31% inherited by the current government when it came to power ten years ago. The potential for a twofold increase in construction employment (a trend that was observed between 2004 and 2012) over the next five years hinges on the revival of private investment.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of workers in hi-vis jackets at a construction site." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Labour workers building an overhead metro in Bangalore, India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bangalore-karnataka-india-january-21-2014-282302282">PI/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Labour-intensive manufacturing by micro, small and medium enterprises also needs a sustained fillip. The government’s focus is currently on large companies – so-called “national champions” like industrial conglomerates Tata and Mahindra – which are being encouraged through <a href="https://thewire.in/political-economy/why-the-modi-government-policy-of-national-champions-is-unravelling">subsidies</a>.</p>
<p>If these subsidies were instead redirected towards smaller enterprises, they might do more for employment generation. Large corporations <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/planning-in-the-20th-century-and-beyond/817DA53ABC693583B3E3D052CA5B2CE5#fndtn-information">typically</a> use highly capital-intensive methods of production, whereas smaller ones tend to absorb more labour. Historically, it is the latter that has generated <a href="https://archive.org/details/developmentwithh0000unse/mode/2up">most</a> of the non-farm jobs in developing countries.</p>
<p>The third area where employment can be generated is, indeed, services. Public expenditure should prioritise public health, education, vocational training and universities.</p>
<p>These sectors are labour-intensive, contribute to the creation of public goods, and will build the human capital needed by both manufacturing and modern export-oriented services. That is the only way India’s health and education services can reach the <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/385696/hcd-sa.pdf">levels observed</a> in east Asia and attract more foreign investment.</p>
<p>A renewed focus on smaller enterprises across these sectors is needed. Inclusive growth requires providing jobs rapidly at the bottom of the pyramid, not only at the top of the wage – and skill – distribution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Santosh Mehrotra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>India needs to follow a path akin to China’s to find answers to its job woes.Santosh Mehrotra, Visiting Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241322024-02-27T22:52:56Z2024-02-27T22:52:56ZOther nations are applying sanctions and going to court over Gaza – should NZ join them?<p>Despite the carnage, United Nations resolutions and international court rulings, the war in Gaza has the potential to get much worse. Unless Hamas <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/509603/israel-sets-march-deadline-for-gaza-ground-offensive-in-rafah">frees all Israeli hostages</a> by March 10, Israel may launch an all-out offensive in Rafah, a city of 1.5 million people, cornered against the border with Egypt.</p>
<p>The US has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/us-vetoes-another-un-security-council-resolution-urging-gaza-war-ceasefire">continued to block</a> UN Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate ceasefire. But President Joe Biden has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a869bfd8-7303-4178-998a-7257eca1f167">cautioned Israel</a> against a Rafah ground assault without a credible plan to protect civilians.</p>
<p>More direct calls for restraint have come from the UN <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/un-chief-warns-of-gigantic-tragedy-if-israeli-military-expands-fight-to-rafah-/7480114.html">secretary-general</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/karimkhanqc/status/1757081372680700206?s=46">prosecutor of the International Criminal Court</a>. To its credit, New Zealand, along with Australia and Canada, added its voice in a <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-prime-ministers-australia-canada-and-new-zealand">joint statement</a> on February 15:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A military operation into Rafah would be catastrophic […] We urge the Israeli government not to go down this path […] Palestinian civilians cannot be made to pay the price of defeating Hamas.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>New Zealand also reiterated its commitment to a political settlement and a <a href="https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/038/88/pdf/nr003888.pdf?token=7OZgOAUvsg2og5R5UP&fe=true">two-state solution</a>. Given how hard some other countries are pushing for a ceasefire and peace, however, it is fair to ask whether the National-led coalition government could be doing more.</p>
<h2>NZ absent from a crucial case</h2>
<p>So far, New Zealand’s most obvious contribution has been to <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-deploying-nzdf-team-protect-red-sea-shipping">deploy a six-member defence force</a> team to the region to deter Houthi rebel attacks on commercial and naval shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>This collaboration with <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/">13 other countries</a> is on the right side of international law. But the timing suggests it is more about preventing the Israel-Gaza situation from spreading and destabilising the region than about protecting international waterways <em>per se</em>.</p>
<p>Furthermore, there is a risk of New Zealand’s response appearing one-sided, considering its relative silence on other fronts.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uns-top-court-didnt-call-for-a-ceasefire-in-gaza-how-does-nz-respond-now-221977">The UN’s top court didn’t call for a ceasefire in Gaza – how does NZ respond now?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For example, following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/26/world-courts-interim-ruling-on-genocide-in-gaza-key-takeaways-icj-israel">interim ruling</a> by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the application of the Genocide Convention to Israel’s devastation of Gaza, a second opinion is <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203274">being sought from the court</a> over the legality of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory.</p>
<p>Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad Al-Malki <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240219-palestinians-accuse-israel-colonialism-apartheid-un-top-court-icj">told the court</a> his people were suffering “colonialism and apartheid” under Israeli occupation. It is the latest round in a monumental debate central to any lasting peace process.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240209-pre-01-00-en.pdf">More than 50 countries</a> are presenting arguments at the ICJ, the most to engage with any single case since the court was established in 1945. But New Zealand is not present in the oral proceedings.</p>
<p>This absence matches New Zealand’s abstention at the United Nations General Assembly vote that referred the case to the ICJ. A country that prides itself on an independent foreign policy seems to have lost its voice.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-egypt-refuses-to-open-its-border-to-palestinians-forcibly-displaced-from-gaza-223735">Why Egypt refuses to open its border to Palestinians forcibly displaced from Gaza</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An even-handed foreign policy</h2>
<p>New Zealand does call for the observance of international humanitarian law in Gaza. It has been less vocal, though, about calling for accountability for war crimes, no matter which side commits them.</p>
<p>The International Criminal Court, New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/united-nations-general-assembly-report-of-the-international-criminal-court-2/">permanent representative to the UN has said</a>, is “a central pillar in the international rules-based order and the international criminal justice system”.</p>
<p>Directly supporting that sentiment would mean calling for independent investigations of all alleged crimes in the current Israel-Gaza conflict.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Given countries it considers friends and allies do more to register their disapproval of the situation, New Zealand needs to consider whether its own current sanctions system is adequate. </p>
<p>The White House has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/01/message-to-the-congress-on-imposing-certain-sanctions-on-persons-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank/">begun to sanction</a> individual Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories, accusing them of undermining peace, security and stability. Britain has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/uk-places-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers-for-forcing-palestinians-from-their-land">placed sanctions</a> on a small number of “extremist” settlers. France has recently <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestinian-territories/news/2024/article/israel-palestinian-territories-france-adopts-sanctions-against-violent-israeli#:%7E:text=France%20is%20adopting%20sanctions%20against,ban%20on%20entering%20French%20territory.">identified and sanctioned</a> 28 such individuals.</p>
<p>So far, however, New Zealand has remained silent. This prompts an obvious question: if sanctions can be applied to both <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-sanctions-also-mark-one-year-russia%E2%80%99s-invasion-ukraine">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2022/12/new-zealand-imposes-travel-bans-on-22-iranian-security-forces-members-connected-to-mahsa-amini-s-death-violent-response-to-protests.html">Iran</a> for their actions, should New Zealand now follow the lead of its allies and take active measures to express its disapproval of what is happening in Gaza and the occupied territories?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International pressure on Israel to halt its onslaught in Gaza is mounting. New Zealand has so far chosen to stay on the sidelines, despite allies taking more decisive stands.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242062024-02-22T18:01:32Z2024-02-22T18:01:32ZGaza update: Biden ups the pressure on Israel as deadline for Rafah assault approaches<p>Joe Biden’s most senior Middle East adviser, Brett McGurk, has arrived in Israel to push for a deal to halt the war in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. McGurk has served each successive president since joining George W. Bush’s national security team in 2005, and his presence in the region at this increasingly crucial time, as Israel prepares for a ground assault on the overcrowded southern Gaza city of Rafah, is an indication of the urgency with which the Biden administration views the situation.</p>
<p>Thus far, intransigence on both sides has scuppered various initiatives aimed at securing a ceasefire. Last week, after Benjamin Netanyahu pulled Israeli negotiators out of talks in Egypt, blaming Hamas for refusing to budge on what he called its “ludicrous” demands, Israel’s prime minister pledged to press ahead with the Rafah offensive. However, his war cabinet member Benny Gantz said this week that a deal might still be possible.</p>
<p>Failing that, the prospect of an all-out assault on Rafah, where more than a million Palestinians from across the Gaza Strip have taken refuge, on March 10 – the start of Ramadan – is very real. Casualties are likely to be enormous, unless people are given somewhere to escape to.</p>
<p>Biden has repeatedly urged Netanyahu to rethink the assault on Rafah, calling for a “credible and executable plan” for protecting and supporting the Palestinians sheltering there. And as Paul Rogers, an internationally respected expert in Middle East security issues at the University of Bradford, notes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">there is a precedent</a>.</p>
<p>In 1982, during the war between Israel and Lebanon, the then-US president Ronald Reagan telephoned Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to demand he call off the 11-hour bombardment of West Beirut, where thousands of fighters from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were sheltering. “Menachem, this is a holocaust,” Reagan is reported to have said. Begin duly called off his bombers.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ronald and Nancy Reagan with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and his daughter Matt Milo in the White House, Setpember 1981." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Friends in high places: Ronald and Nancy Reagan hosting a state dinner for Menachem Begin and his daughter, Matti Milo, in September 1981.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Collection</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rogers highlights the long and close association between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In a country where pretty much anyone who is anyone has served in Israel’s military, this counts for a lot. Perhaps, he writes, the IDF could put extra pressure on Netanyahu to reconsider. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">Gaza war: will Israel respond to US pressure to tread carefully in Rafah? There is a precedent</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Meanwhile, satellite images and video footage have revealed that Egypt is building what appears to be a large concrete enclosure on its side of the Rafah crossing. Analysts believe this is being prepared as a contingency for dealing with what could be hundreds of thousands of displaced persons pushed out of Gaza into the Sinai peninsula.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Gillian Kennedy, an Egypt specialist at the University of Southampton, has been considering what <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">such an exodus would mean</a> for Egypt’s strongman president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. </p>
<p>Sisi is not popular at home. He may have won an election last year with 89% of the vote, but given the lack of opposition candidates, this was hardly surprising. Egypt’s economy is in a parlous state, with rampant inflation and stubbornly high unemployment, so having to host a huge influx of refugees is not something Sisi will be anticipating with much relish.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/B0IzqiMirWo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Egypt building a large concrete structure on its side of the Rafah crossing.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And the close relations between supporters of Hamas and Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood – Sisi’s implacable foes – make this prospect all the more unpalatable, Kennedy concludes. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">As Israel's assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Grim in Gaza</h2>
<p>For Palestinians trapped in Gaza, meanwhile, there is the spectre of starvation. The world’s major authority on food insecurity, the IPC Famine Review Committee, estimates that 90% of Gazans are facing acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>Yara M. Asi, a food security expert at the University of Central Florida, writes that people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">resorting to eating cattle feed and grass</a>. They are hunting cats for food. And things are likely to get worse, Asi observes. The UN agency responsible for coordinating aid in Gaza, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), says it will have to cease operations in March after many of its funders withdrew over Israeli allegations that UNRWA staff had taken part in the October 7 Hamas attacks. </p>
<p>And, making matters worse, Israeli bombing has destroyed bakeries, food production facilities and grocery stores. It is now estimated that, of the people facing imminent starvation in the world today, 95% are in Gaza.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Of course, food production facilities and shops aren’t the only things that have been reduced to rubble by the IDF during its relentless four-month assault. For decades, the people of Gaza had become used to a cycle of destruction and rebuilding writes Yousif Al-Daffaie, a researcher in the field of cultural heritage and post-war countries at Nottingham Trent University. But this time around, the devastation has been so complete that there is almost nothing left to rebuild.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1738543040560570514"}"></div></p>
<p>Most importantly for the soul of Gaza, nearly 200 sites of cultural importance have been wrecked, including an ancient harbour dating back to 800BC, a mosque that was home to rare manuscripts, and one of the world’s oldest Christian monasteries. This act of what Al-Daffaie calls <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">“urbicide”</a> includes Palestine Square in Gaza City, a popular meeting place, and Gaza’s only public library on Omar Al-Mukhtar Street, one of Gaza City’s two main streets, which has been totally destroyed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">The destruction of Gazaʼs historic buildings is an act of 'urbicide'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Israel: hurt, angry and isolated</h2>
<p>All the while, the world is watching. What has become clear since the vicious Hamas attack on October 7 sparked Israel’s brutal military response is the massive disconnect between how most Israelis and much of the rest of the world see this current episode. </p>
<p>Eyal Mayroz, a senior lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, says that while the outside world sees daily reports of death and suffering in Gaza, in Israel much of the media <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">remains focused</a> on the pain of the attack by Hamas and the plight of the 130 remaining hostages and their families.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">Why do Israelis and the rest of the world view the Gaza conflict so differently? And can this disconnect be overcome?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ilan Zvi Baron of Durham University and Ilai Z. Saltzman of the University of Maryland highlight the pain and anger of most Israelis since October 7. They write that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">reaction of some on the progressive left</a>, some of whom celebrated the Hamas attack as an act of anti-colonial resistance, is not understood in Israel. This, they say, is a problem for Israel’s peace movement, which now feels more isolated than ever and unable to pressure their government to work harder for a peaceful solution.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">Gaza war: blaming Israel for October 7 Hamas attack makes peace less – not more – likely</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Listen up: peace polling</h2>
<p>Finally, regular readers may recall <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">an article we published</a> by Colin Irwin, a researcher at the University of Liverpool whose work with “peace polling” played a key role in the negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland. Irwin noted that he was set to reprise his role when Barack Obama won the US presidency in 2008, but a lack of political will and Netanyahu’s refusal to include Hamas put paid to any chance of peace talks succeeding at that stage.</p>
<p>In this week’s episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, Irwin explains how peace polling emerged from his work among Canada’s Inuit minority, and has been used from Sri Lanka to Cyprus.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">Israel-Gaza: how opinion polls used in Northern Ireland could pave a way to peace</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict in Gaza from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241712024-02-22T17:01:34Z2024-02-22T17:01:34ZGaza war: will Israel respond to US pressure to tread carefully in Rafah? There is a precedent<p>As the deadline for Israel’s ground assault on the southern Gaza city of Rafah approaches on March 10 – the beginning of Ramadan – world leaders are urging its government to rethink its strategy. Casualties from such an assault may even dwarf the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/world/middleeast/gaza-death-toll-israel.html">huge human losses</a> so far of close to 30,000 Palestinians killed and 70,000 wounded. </p>
<p>US president, Joe Biden, has repeatedly urged his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu – in private and public – to hold off on the assault and to come up with a plan to protect civilians. What Biden may or may not do to influence Netanyahu’s decision is unclear – and will, in part at least, be calibrated by Biden’s domestic political requirements in an election year.</p>
<p>But there is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/13/world/reagan-demands-end-to-attacks-in-a-blunt-telephone-call-to-begin.html">important precedent</a> which shows that Israel has been known to heed US pressure in similar situations. In 1982 Israeli jets bombed west Beirut, where fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) were embedded during Israel’s war with Lebanon. </p>
<p>Ronald Reagan, who was then US president, phoned his Israeli counterpart, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and ordered him to to stop the bombardment, reportedly using the words: “Menachem, this is a holocaust.”</p>
<p>A White House statement at the time reflected that Reagan’s approach got immediate results: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The President made clear that it is imperative that the ceasefire in place be observed absolutely in order for negotiations to proceed. We understand the Israeli cabinet has approved a new ceasefire, which is in effect. It must hold.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Special relationship</h2>
<p>One factor that will lend weight to any pressure from Biden is the singularly close and cooperative relationship between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Pentagon.</p>
<p>When Israel won its war of independence in 1948, the US support came primarily from American Jews. But that changed rapidly through the 1950s as the cold war hardened, Arab nationalism emerged and Israel became America’s key ally in the region.</p>
<p>While not supporting Israel’s role in the Franco-British <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm#:%7E:text=Although%20the%20United%20State%20was,military%20solution%20that%20involved%20Israel.">Suez Canal disaster in 1956</a>, in just about every other respect military relations with Israel became steadily closer. It is thought to be highly unlikely that Israel could have succeeded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/11/politics/presidents-israel-cnn/index.html#">without US backing</a>.</p>
<p>Through the 1980s and 1990s the two armed forces maintained close relations. Just as important, though, were the <a href="https://www.bits.de/public/briefingnote/bn02-3.htm#:%7E:text=Israeli%20companies%20are%20also%20active,past%20the%20Lavi%20attack%20aircraft.">ever closer links</a> between US and Israeli arms corporations, not just in joint research and development but even in weapons production.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ronald and Nancy Reagan with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and his daughter Matt Milo in the White House, Setpember 1981." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Friends in high places: Ronald and Nancy Reagan hosting a state dinner for Menachem Begin and his daughter Matti Milo in September 1981.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Collection</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even so, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s changed the calculus of interests. For Washington, with the threat from the Soviet Union a thing of the past, the strategic significance of Israel in the Middle East <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/03/world/after-cold-war-views-israel-israelis-worry-that-us-will-need-them-less-new.html">was diminished</a>. This was a matter of serious concern to Israeli governments at the time.</p>
<h2>After 9/11</h2>
<p>That all changed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the start of the “war on terror”. Israel suddenly gained a much greater significance – and this came to a head in late 2003, six months into the war to terminate Saddam Hussain’s regime in Iraq.</p>
<p>The first few weeks of that war, in March and April, seemed to be remarkably successful, but within a couple of months it had gone badly wrong as US troops found themselves faced with a growing urban insurgency with most of their troops inadequately trained or equipped to respond.</p>
<p>By October 2003, the position was getting dire – and one Pentagon response was to turn to Israel with its of experience of urban warfare. In early December, the head of Israel’s ground forces, Major-General Yiftah Ron-Tal, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/article_1655jsp/">hosted a series of meetings</a> with a visiting senior US team headed by General Kevin Byrnes, commander of the US army’s training and doctrine command (Tradoc), to strengthen cooperation and to look at ways the US could benefit from Israeli experience in urban combat.</p>
<p>The Pentagon was particularly interested in how the IDF had operated during the first three years of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13776.10?seq=8">second Palestinian Intifada</a> – especially across the occupied West Bank – and went on to use Israeli equipment and tactics in Iraq.</p>
<p>It may have been useful to the US – but it also presented a valuable propaganda opportunity to the militias fighting the US forces. They were now able to characterise the war as a <a href="https://rebelion.org/us-iraq-israel-zionist-connection/">Zionist/Christian “crusade”</a>.</p>
<h2>Cooperation and collective punishment</h2>
<p>In the event, there were many ways in which US-Israeli military cooperation hardened in the wake of the war. A groundbreaking development was the decision to <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/american-military-aid-to-israel-serves-both-countries-well">station US army personnel</a> permanently in Israel, running an advanced X-Band Radar facility that provided early warning of long-distance missile attacks. </p>
<p>Another was the US Army Corps of Engineers building a complete Arab town, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/israel-fake-city-mini-gaza-baladia-invasion-1835003">Baladia</a>, in the Negev Desert, used by the US, Israel and others for urban warfare training. </p>
<p>With all this cooperation, Israel might well have been strengthened in its ability to control urban insurgencies. But even while the war in Iraq continued, it found that a ground force operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 was going badly wrong, leading to unexpected casualties and recourse to mass aerial bombardment.</p>
<p>Much of this was focused on the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiya district south of Beirut, and that gave its name to the IDF’s current <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/05/israel-disproportionate-force-tactic-infrastructure-economy-civilian-casualties">Dahiya doctrine</a> in which a costly urban insurgency is met with collective punishment against whole communities, not just the insurgents.</p>
<p>Biden has spoken out against this approach and has insisted in conversations with Netanyahu that “a military operation in Rafah should not proceed without a credible and executable plan” for protecting and supporting the Palestinians sheltering there.</p>
<p>Whether or not Israeli will heed this message remains unclear. But the White House will be hoping that – in a society where the armed forces have effectively been a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/former-commandos-dominate-israeli-politics/">breeding ground for political leaders</a> and where all Israeli Jews are required to do army service – the close military links between the two countries can be a factor in Israel’s decision-making.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers has received funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. He lectures regularly at the Royal College of Defence Studies.</span></em></p>History tells us that the White House and the Pentagon have been able to wield a degree of influence over Israel’s decision-making.Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240202024-02-22T10:48:31Z2024-02-22T10:48:31ZAs Israel’s assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees<p>Satellite imagery and video footage <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/egypt-building-walled-enclosure-in-sinai-for-rafah-refugees-videos-suggest">have emerged</a> suggesting that Egypt is building what appears to be a large, concrete-walled enclosure which observers believe will be used to manage a major influx of Palestinian refugees flooding out of Gaza via the Rafah crossng on its eastern border. </p>
<p>As Israel’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">planned military assault</a> on the city of Rafah edges ever closer, it presents the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, with a potentially serious problem. The displacement into his country of potentially hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the afflicted enclave could seriously destabilise what is an extremely fragile political environment.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vbsYURUu_Jo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">To keep Palestinians out, or welcome them into Egypt?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Egyptians, the potential for spillover of the Gazan conflict is a major concern. Plagued with Islamist groups <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/insurgency-in-sinai-challenges-and-prospects/">mounting regular attacks</a> on Egyptian military instalments in the Sinai Peninsula since 2013, the last thing Sisi needs are enormous numbers of displaced and traumatised refugees. </p>
<p>Yet, with the Palestinian death toll <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-death-toll-rises-29313-rafah-residents-killed-strike-2024-02-21/">now approaching 30,000</a> – approximately 70% of whom are reported to be women and children – and Israel planning on invading Rafah, where upwards of a million Palestinians are huddled, the prospect of refugees spilling into the Sinai looks more and more likely. </p>
<p>Sisi has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-778521">roundly condemned</a> Israel’s military assault on Gaza, and is fully aware of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding just across the border. But two key issues are deterring him from making any hasty altruistic decisions in support of desperate Gazans fleeing hostilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Israel, Egypt and Jordan showing Gaza." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577101/original/file-20240221-16-t0dhjg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egypt fears that an assault on Rafah will force hundreds of thousands of Palestinians across the border into its Sinai peninsula.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/part-southern-district-israel-political-map-2373692837">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For a start, Egypt is in no position to absorb large numbers of Palestinian refugees. Besides dealing with a decade-long insurgency in the very border areas that would have to host the refugees, the strong presence of Islamist groups ideologically close to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood would be very dangerous, given his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/06/as-hunger-bites-is-egypt-ready-to-turn-its-back-on-its-president">unpopularity at home</a>. Despite <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/19/egypt-2023-presidential-election-results-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-wins-no-challengers">winning the election in December 2023</a> with a reported 90% of votes, the ballot was widely seen as the most flawed to date. Opposition leaders were arrested and anyone criticising Sisi faced censure. </p>
<p>Accepting an influx of Palestinians, many of whom would be supportive of Hamas, could be hazardous for Sisi. Especially so given his <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood</a> since the 2013 military coup which ousted the then-president and Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohamed Morsi. </p>
<p>Compounding this is Egypt’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-stumbling-economy-faces-new-pressures-gaza-crisis-2023-11-10/">broken economic model</a>. It is now the second-largest debtor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is currently in talks to increase its loans. </p>
<p>Unemployment has <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/130398/Egypt-s-unemployment-rate-reaches-record-low-of-6-9#">sat at 7%</a> for nearly a decade and as of the end of 2023, inflation was a <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/inflation-cpi">staggering 38%</a>. Egypt has neither the political will nor the economic capacity to handle a mass displacement of Gazan refugees across its border.</p>
<h2>Egypt can help</h2>
<p>But it is possible that, with enough international support, Egypt could be persuaded to offer sanctuary, whether short term or for a longer period, to displaced people from Gaza. It has done similar before in a different context – last year, in return for €21 million (£18 million) in funding from the European Union, Egypt <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-egypt-sudan-pledges-millions-refugee-flow">took in 200,000 people</a> fleeing violence in Sudan. The deal aimed to prevent migrant flows reaching Europe.</p>
<p>Sisi could secure a deal on a similar premise, using the Gaza conflict in return for help from Europe or the US to deal with Egypt’s deteriorating economic situation. But this is not a sustainable solution. </p>
<p>Temporarily, more refugee camps could be provided. But given the damage to Gaza after Israel’s ground assault, the permanent settlement of these displaced people would need to be considered. It’s highly unlikely that Sisi would be prepared to accept this.</p>
<h2>The ‘day after’</h2>
<p>Sisi is not the only leader thinking of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-what-gaza-might-look-like-the-day-after-the-war-217323">“day after”</a> – although, as the Rafah invasion presently scheduled for Ramadan edges ever closer, the problem looms ever larger. The US president, Joe Biden, has spoken about the need for the Palestinian Authority <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-palestinian-authority-should-ultimately-govern-gaza-west-bank-2023-11-18/">to be revitalised</a>, in order to facilitate negotiations for a new two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.</p>
<p>Although it’s difficult to foresee amid the trauma and violence among both populations, this long-term plan is something that Egypt could play an instrumental role in. Its intelligence services are known to have <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/palestine-strange-resurrection-two-state-solution-indyk">significant knowledge</a> of the Hamas tunnel system, and it <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/fix-middle-east-united-states?check_logged_in=1">has been reported</a> that many Egyptian army personnel are involved in the smuggling economy in Gaza.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Egypt’s longstanding position on Palestinian statehood, its decades-long normalisation of relations with Israel, and its more recent reset of relations with pro-Brotherhood states such as Qatar (host of much of the Hamas leadership) puts it in a unique position to foster a plan for a two-state solution. </p>
<p>In December, Egypt and Qatar collaborated to develop a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/25/egypt-sets-out-plan-to-end-gaza-war-free-all-hostages">plan for a ceasefire</a>, contingent on phased hostage releases and prisoner exchanges. While this plan broke down fairly quickly through Israeli intransigence, it could be a model to build on for an eventual end to the conflict.</p>
<p>If there is no sustainable ceasefire, Egypt faces the prospect of having to take on the responsibility of hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians. The Egyptian public, which is largely sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians, is likely to accept refugees on a temporary basis to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe getting worse than it already is. </p>
<p>But Sisi will need to make some serious decisions for the long term, or the bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict could have dire consequences for his own country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gillian Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Egypt would be seriously destabilised by hundreds of thousands of people fleeing Gaza.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239342024-02-21T14:41:13Z2024-02-21T14:41:13ZGaza war: blaming Israel for October 7 Hamas attack makes peace less – not more – likely<p>The UK Labour party recently withdrew support for one of its parliamentary candidates for making comments that perpetuated antisemitic stereotypes. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-rochdale-israel-azhar-ali-election-b2495351.html">Azhar Ali said</a> that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu “allowed” the deadly Hamas attack on October 7 as a way to divert public opinion away from his political woes and give the Israelis “the green light to do whatever they bloody want [in Gaza]”. Ali went on to make antisemitic comments about Jewish influence in British politics and the media.</p>
<p>Such comments are symptomatic of a wider problem among some, on the progressive left in particular, to ignore the violence against Israelis and exclusively focus on the plight of Palestinian citizens. A minority have even celebrated the attack as a kind of <a href="https://quillette.com/2023/11/18/the-return-of-the-progressive-atrocity/">“progressive atrocity”</a>.</p>
<p>Hamas’s <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:%7E:text=The%20October%207%20attack%20is,sense%20of%20loss%20for%20Israel.">horrific attack</a>, which included physical and psychological torture, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/middleeast/oct-7-attacks-hamas-israel-sexual-violence.html">mass rape</a> and the taking of more than 200 hostages, left Israeli society deeply traumatised. Responses that focus only on Palestinian victimhood and dismiss Israel’s experience of violence and terror are likely to contribute to Israel’s sense of isolation and anger. </p>
<p>The more that Israelis feel abandoned by the international community, the harder it arguably is to bring a workable, lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The situation is dire enough without making things worse, and the situation is bad.</p>
<p>Israel’s military response to the October 7 attack has resulted in the killing of <a href="https://time.com/6696507/palestinian-death-toll-gaza-israel-hamas/">more than 29,000 Palestinians</a> and the displacement of nearly 2 million more. It almost certainly violates <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-a-better-understanding-of-the-violence-on-both-sides-might-give-us-a-chance-at-a-solution-216855">international humanitarian law</a>, as well as Israel’s own military code of conduct. </p>
<p>There is no excuse for this extreme military response, but we need to understand Israel’s perspective if we are to break the cycle of violence. It’s important to consider that the scale of Israel’s response may be the result of anger, fear and trauma as opposed to reasoned strategic thinking. It’s likely a sense of isolation serves to exacerbate these sentiments.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-reacts-surprise-attack-by-hamas-israel-2023-10-07/">world leaders</a> expressed outrage at the attack, with some providing military and diplomatic support. But other reactions were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/we-are-at-war-reactions-to-palestinian-hamas-surprise-attack-in-israel">far less empathetic</a>. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-declares-brazils-lula-persona-non-grata-for-comparing-gaza-war-to-holocaust/">Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</a> even went as far as to compare Israel’s military campaign to the Holocaust. </p>
<p>A similar lack of empathy has been seen in some non-governmental organisations. For example, the United Nations body UN Women took <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eight-weeks-after-oct-7-onslaught-un-women-condemns-brutal-attacks-by-hamas/">eight weeks</a> to issue a statement condemning the gendered violence against Israeli women. </p>
<p>This inability to acknowledge the horror of October 7 is primarily a problem among some on the left. Left-wing antagonism toward Israel <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-and-the-european-left-9781441150134/">is not new</a> and political parties in many countries <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-palestine-war-gaza-left-tearing-itself-apart/">have been divided</a> over their response. </p>
<p>One local politician in California, during a <a href="https://forward.com/fast-forward/571631/oaklands-city-council-considered-condemning-hamas-oct-7-conspiracy-theorists-turned-out-en-masse/">heated debate</a> on calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, reportedly stated: “The notion that this was a massacre of Jews was a fabricated narrative.” In the UK, former Labour MP (and independent parliamentary candidate) <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/article-772775">George Galloway</a>, made disparaging remarks <a href="https://twitter.com/georgegalloway/status/1722961911619145874?lang=en">on X</a> (formerly Twitter) that seemed to justify the killing of Israelis on October 7.</p>
<p>Others have even <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/anti-israel-activists-celebrate-hamas-attacks-have-killed-hundreds-israelis">condoned the attack</a>. They argue it was an inevitable outcome of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land for 75 years and tried to label Hamas’ attack as a legitimate anti-colonialist act of defiance. The US <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/psl-statement-free-palestine-free-all-palestinian-political-prisoners-end-all-u-s-aid-to-the-israeli-apartheid-regime/">Party for Socialism and Liberation</a> proclaimed: “The actions of the resistance over the course of the last day is a morally and legally legitimate response to occupation.” </p>
<p>What many Israelis found even more disconcerting was how some of these messages blaming Israel <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/contextualising-gaza-colonial-violence-and-occupation/">started to emerge before</a> Israel launched its massive military invasion of Gaza.</p>
<h2>Bleak outlook</h2>
<p>The one-sided nature of many responses that unequivocally supported the Palestinians have arguably fed into Israel’s sense of isolation and victimhood, amplifying its preexisting <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791494">siege mentality</a>. This has likely contributed to an ongoing erosion in Israel of any belief in a future peace with a Palestinian state. A poll conducted by <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/547760/life-israel-oct-charts.aspx">Gallup</a> in late December 2023 found that 65% of Israelis now reject the idea of an independent Palestine.</p>
<p>There is no legitimate justification for the scale of death that Israel has unleashed under <a href="https://ict.org.il/operation-swords-of-iron/">Operation Swords of Iron</a>. It is likely to inflame and anger future generations of Palestinians and makes it hard to envisage a hopeful future for both peoples. </p>
<p>Indeed, according to a poll conducted in late December 2023 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Palestinian support for armed struggle has <a href="https://pcpsr.org/en/node/961">increased significantly</a> since October 7, and the majority of Palestinians believe Hamas’ onslaught was justified. </p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.awrad.org/en/article/10719/Wartime-Poll-Results-of-an-Opinion-Poll-Among-Palestinians-in-the-West-Bank-and-Gaza-Strip">survey</a> found that 98% of Palestinians will “never forget and never forgive” Israel for its actions in the Gaza Strip. Some 90% thought that Israeli-Palestinian coexistence is unlikely.</p>
<p>Yet despite this hardening of views on both sides, this should be an opportunity for the left in Israel. The current government of Benjamin Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-finds-netanyahu-would-be-pummeled-by-gantz-were-elections-held-today/">deeply unpopular</a>. The October 7 attack is widely seen as evidence of the right’s failing security approach led by Netanyahu, who has always been a vocal critic of the Oslo accords and the peace process in the 1990s. </p>
<p>There will almost certainly be an official inquiry about Israel’s failure to protect itself on October 7, and possibly also of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68318856">Netanyahu’s knowledge</a> of an imminent threat or at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/10/world/middleeast/israel-qatar-money-prop-up-hamas.html#:%7E:text=For%20years%2C%20Israeli%20intelligence%20officers,keep%20a%20power%20plant%20running.">his complicity in funding Hamas for years</a>. He is already under indictment on corruption charges and the longer this war lasts the longer he can defer his reckoning. </p>
<p>But regardless of his and his government’s unpopularity, the brutality of the October 7 attack led to a feeling within Israel that a line had been crossed by the Palestinians. An overwhelming majority supports the military campaign in Gaza, according to a survey conducted by the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-war-support/">Institute for National Security Studies</a>. </p>
<p>Consequently, many in the Israeli peace camp who have been advocating for a two-state solution for years appear unable to call on the Israeli leadership for restraint. Those who are still active have noted the increasingly difficult <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231122-israeli-palestinian-peace-camp-shaken-but-determined">circumstances they face</a>. </p>
<p>Many on the left in Israel feel increasingly isolated from their progressive brethren around the world and weakened domestically. With the Israeli public moving <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/world/middleeast/israel-oct-7-left-wing-peace.html">increasingly to the right</a>, this trend is contributing to a sense of despair and loneliness on the part of those who desperately need support in their pursuit of peace.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the resilience and appeal of the Israeli peace camp <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/world/middleeast/israel-oct-7-left-wing-peace.html">may prove to be another casualty</a> of Hamas’s attack. For peace to be possible, it’s vital to recognise that Israelis can be victims too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In addition to his affiliation with the University of Maryland, Ilai Saltzman is a board member with Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies is a think tank based in Israel.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilan Zvi Baron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Israeli peace movement has been demoralised by the lack of support from the progressive left.Ilan Zvi Baron, Professor of International Political Theory, Durham UniversityIlai Z. Saltzman, Professor and Director of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226572024-02-15T13:37:47Z2024-02-15T13:37:47ZIsraeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575701/original/file-20240214-20-lgpktd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C215%2C6000%2C3754&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced Gazan children wait in line to receive food.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-children-holding-empty-pots-2-wait-in-line-to-news-photo/1993688681?adppopup=true">Belal Khaled/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The stories of hunger emerging from war-ravaged Gaza are stark: People resorting to<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/briefing/gaza-food-crisis.html"> grinding barely edible cattle feed</a> to make flour; <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/famine-looms-in-gaza-israel-war-intl/index.html">desperate residents eating grass</a>; reports of <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/israel-gaza-war-famine-news-update-ckjntk93j">cats being hunted for food</a>. </p>
<p>The numbers involved are just as despairing. The world’s major authority on food insecurity, the IPC Famine Review Committee, <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-94/en/">estimates that</a> 90% of Gazans – some 2.08 million people – are facing acute food insecurity. Indeed, of the people facing imminent starvation in the world today, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/95-percent-those-facing-starvation-world-are-gaza">an estimated 95% are in Gaza</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://ccie.ucf.edu/person/yara-asi/">expert in Palestinian public health</a>, I fear the situation may not have hit its nadir. In January 2024, many of the top funders to UNRWA, the U.N.’s refugee agency that provides the bulk of services to Palestinians in Gaza, <a href="https://theconversation.com/funding-for-refugees-has-long-been-politicized-punitive-action-against-unrwa-and-palestinians-fits-that-pattern-222263">suspended donations</a> to the agency in response to <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/allegations-against-unrwa-staff">allegations that a dozen</a> of the agency’s 30,000 employees were possibly involved in the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas. The agency has indicated that it will no longer be able to offer <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146272">services starting in March</a> and will lose its ability to distribute food and other vital supplies during that month.</p>
<p>With at least <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-118">28,000 people confirmed dead</a> and an additional 68,000 injured, Israeli bombs have already had a catastrophic human cost in Gaza – starvation could be the next tragedy to befall the territory.</p>
<p>Indeed, two weeks after Israel initiated a massive military campaign in the Gaza Strip, <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/starvation-weapon-war-being-used-against-gaza-civilians-oxfam">Oxfam International</a> reported that only around 2% of the usual amount of food was being delivered to residents in the territory. At the time, Sally Abi Khalil, Oxfam’s Middle East director, commented that “there can be no justification for using starvation as a weapon of war.” But four months later, the siege continues to <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/gaza-humanitarian-aid-ceasefire/">restrict the distribution of adequate aid</a>.</p>
<h2>Putting Palestinians ‘on a diet’</h2>
<p>Israeli bombs have <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-deliberately-attacks-bakeries-gaza-official#:%7E:text=The%20Israeli%20missiles%20demolished%20the,others%20injured%2C%20according%20to%20Maarouf.">destroyed homes, bakeries</a>, <a href="https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/140230">food production factories</a> and grocery stores, making it harder for people in Gaza to offset the impact of the reduced imports of food.</p>
<p>But food insecurity in Gaza and the mechanisms that enable it did not start with Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 attack.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-out-gaza-2022">U.N. report from 2022</a> found that a year before the latest war, 65% of Gazans were food insecure, defined as <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/food">lacking regular access to enough safe and nutritious food</a>.</p>
<p>Multiple factors contributed to this food insecurity, not least the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022">blockade of Gaza</a> imposed by Israel and enabled by Egypt since 2007. All items entering the Gaza Strip, including food, become subject to Israeli inspection, delay or denial.</p>
<p>Basic foodstuff was allowed, but because of delays at the border, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2007/07/27/gaza-almost-completely-aid-dependent">it can spoil</a> before it enters Gaza. </p>
<p>A 2009 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/wordofmouth/2009/jun/16/gaza-blockade-israel-food">investigation by Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz</a> found that foods as varied as cherries, kiwi, almonds, pomegranates and chocolate were prohibited entirely. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man delivers food to a throng of people behind a fence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575702/original/file-20240214-30-6871gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Not enough food aid to go around in Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-children-wait-in-line-to-receive-food-prepared-news-photo/1993688439?adppopup=true">Belal Khaled/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At certain points, the blockade, which Israel claims is an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE78C59R/">unavoidable security measure</a>, has been loosened to allow import of more foods; for example, in 2010 Israel started to permit <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/Media/israel-signals-partial-easing-gaza-blockade/story?id=10873488">potato chips, fruit juices, Coca-Cola and cookies</a>. </p>
<p>By placing restrictions on food imports, Israel seems to be trying to put pressure on Hamas by making life difficult for the people in Gaza. In the words of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19975211">one Israeli government adviser in 2006</a>, “The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger.”</p>
<p>To enable this, the Israeli government <a href="https://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/redlines/redlines-position-paper-eng.pdf">commissioned a 2008 study</a> to work out exactly how many calories Palestinians would need to avoid malnutrition. The report was released to the public only following a 2012 legal battle.</p>
<p>The blockade also <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-strip-the-humanitarian-impact-of-15-years-of-the-blockade-june-2022-ocha-factsheet/">increased food insecurity</a> by preventing meaningful development of an economy in Gaza.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unctad.org/press-material/prior-current-crisis-decades-long-blockade-hollowed-gazas-economy-leaving-80">U.N. cites</a> the “excessive production and transaction costs and barriers to trade with the rest of the world” imposed by Israel as the primary cause of severe underdevelopment in the occupied territories, including Gaza. As a result, in late 2022 the <a href="https://gisha.org/en/gaza-unemployment-rate-in-the-third-quarter-of-2022/">unemployment rate in Gaza stood at around 50%</a>. This, coupled with a steady increase in <a href="https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4403">the cost of food</a>, makes affording food difficult for many Gazan households, rendering them dependent on aid, which fluctuates frequently.</p>
<h2>Hampering self-sufficency</h2>
<p>More generally, the blockade and the multiple rounds of destruction of parts of the Gaza Strip have made food sovereignty in the territory nearly impossible. </p>
<p>Much of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gazas-food-system-has-been-stretched-to-breaking-point-by-israel-188556">Gaza’s farmland</a> is along the so-called “no-go zones,” which Israel had rendered inaccessible to Palestinians, who risk being shot if they attempt to access these areas.</p>
<p>Gaza’s fishermen are <a href="https://gisha.org/en/increase-in-israeli-navy-attacks-on-gaza-fishermen-including-children/">regularly shot at by Israeli gunboats</a> if they venture farther in the Mediterranean Sea than Israel permits. Because the fish closer to the shore are smaller and less plentiful, the average income of a fisherman in Gaza has <a href="https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.179-216.pdf">more than halved</a> since 2017. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, much of the infrastructure needed for adequate food production – greenhouses, arable lands, orchards, livestock and food production facilities – have been destroyed or heavily damaged in various rounds of bombing in Gaza. And <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reviving-the-stalled-reconstruction-of-gaza/">international donors have hesitated</a> to hastily rebuild facilities when they cannot guarantee their investment will last more than a few years before being bombed again.</p>
<p>The latest siege has only further crippled the ability of Gaza to be food self-sufficient. By early December 2023, an <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231212-in-gaza-an-estimated-22-of-agricultural-land-has-been-destroyed-since-the-start-of-the-conflict">estimated 22% of agricultural land</a> had been destroyed, along with factories, farms, and water and sanitation facilities. And the full scale of the destruction may not be clear for months or years.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Israel’s <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/09/egypt-army-flood-rafah-tunnels-palestinian-houses.html">flooding of the tunnels</a> under parts of the Gaza Strip with seawater risks killing remaining crops, leaving the land too salty and rendering it unstable and prone to sinkholes.</p>
<h2>Starvation as weapon of war</h2>
<p>Aside from the many health effects of starvation and malnutrition, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-blocking-food-supplies-gaza-will-have-life-long-impacts-children-malnutrition-rising-save-children">especially on children</a>, such conditions make people more vulnerable to disease – already a significant concern for those living in the overcrowded shelters where people have been forced to flee.</p>
<p>In response to the current hunger crisis in Gaza, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53WlmQB_pAc">Alex de Waal</a>, author of “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine</a>,” has made clear: “While it may be possible to bomb a hospital by accident, it is not possible to create a famine by accident.” He argues that the war crime of starvation does not need to include outright famine – merely the act of depriving people of food, medicine and clean water is sufficient.</p>
<p>The use of starvation is <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v2/rule53">strictly forbidden under the Geneva Conventions</a>, a set of statutes that govern the laws of warfare. Starvation has been condemned by United Nations <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13354.doc.htm">Resolution 2417</a>, which decried the use of deprivation of food and basic needs of the civilian population and compelled parties in conflict to ensure full humanitarian access.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch has already accused <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/18/israel-starvation-used-weapon-war-gaza">Israel of using starvation as a weapon of war</a>, and as such it accuses the Israeli government of a war crime. The Israeli government in turn <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/netanyahu-israel-cnn-gaza-civilians-b2446067.html">continues to blame Hamas</a> for any loss of life in Gaza.</p>
<p>Yet untangling what Israel’s intentions may be – whether it is using starvation as a weapon of war, to force mass displacement, or if, as it claims, it is simply a byproduct of war – does little for the people on the ground in Gaza. </p>
<p>They require immediate intervention to stave off catastrophic outcomes. <a href="https://www.972mag.com/rafah-children-hunger-aid/">As one father in Gaza reported</a>, “We are forced to eat one meal a day – the canned goods that we get from aid organizations. No one can afford to buy anything for his family. I see children here crying from hunger, including my own children.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yara M. Asi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Arable land has been destroyed, as have food production sites. But even before the current operation in Gaza, Palestinians there suffered high rates of food insecurity.Yara M. Asi, Assistant Professor of Global Health Management and Informatics, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231752024-02-09T00:14:06Z2024-02-09T00:14:06ZIsrael-Gaza war: why did the ceasefire negotiations collapse – and can they be revived?<p>US Secretary of State Antony Blinken looked exhausted at his media conference in Israel this week as he tried to remain optimistic about prospects for a truce in the Gaza war.</p>
<p>Despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu comprehensively <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-mediators-search-final-formula-israel-hamas-ceasefire-2024-02-07/">rejecting</a> Hamas’s ceasefire counter-proposal, Blinken said it “creates space for an agreement to be reached”. He pledged the US would continue to “work relentlessly” to achieve a ceasefire and hostage release deal.</p>
<p>Putting aside the fact the job description of senior diplomats requires them to remain upbeat in the face of negotiating setbacks, does Blinken’s shuttle diplomacy – he has visited the Middle East five times since Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel – have any chance of success?</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Antony Blinken sounded optimistic in a press conference in Israel this week.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Where the negotiations stand</h2>
<p>Israel and the US presented a proposal to Hamas via Qatar about a week ago. It was not made public, but Qatar’s Al Jazeera news agency <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/7/blinken-in-israel-to-try-to-seal-gaza-truce-deal">reported</a> sources “close to the talks” as saying it involved an initial 40-day truce, during which Hamas would free the remaining Israeli civilian hostages it holds, followed by Israeli soldiers and the remains of dead hostages.</p>
<p>Hamas’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/07/world/middleeast/netanyahu-hamas-gaza-negotiations.html">counter-proposal</a>, delivered on February 7, offered freedom for all remaining hostages and the return of the deceased in a three-stage ceasefire lasting 4.5 months. In return, Israel would first release all Palestinian women and children held in Israeli jails, as well as 1,500 male prisoners, including 500 serving long sentences. </p>
<p>At the same time, the Israeli military would implement a phased withdrawal of its troops from Gaza, and the ceasefire would become permanent. The obvious implication of the proposal was that Hamas would remain in control of Gaza.</p>
<p>It’s not surprising each set of proposals was unacceptable to the other party. Israel didn’t offer any guarantees that it wouldn’t resume its military campaign after the release of the hostages. And Hamas’s proposal was effectively a return to the status quo before October 7, which would be entirely unacceptable to the Netanyahu government.</p>
<p>Each proposal appeared to represent the maximalist positions of each side. As such, the standard technique of practised negotiators is to examine both proposals and look for – or try to create – common ground for a deal. Can that work now?</p>
<h2>Will Netanyahu keep negotiating?</h2>
<p>Despite Netanyahu’s stern rebuff of Hamas’s counter-proposal, a Hamas delegation has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-785709">travelled</a> to Cairo this week for more ceasefire talks. But whether Netanyahu is prepared to keep talking will depend on his evaluation of the pressures he faces on three fronts:</p>
<p>First, Netanyahu is beholden to prominent hardliners in his right-wing government, particularly Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. Ben-Gvir threatened to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/far-rightist-threatens-quit-israel-govt-over-any-reckless-gaza-deal-2024-01-30/">bring down his government</a> over any attempt to enter a “reckless” deal with Hamas to free the hostages. </p>
<p>If Netanyahu is forced to hold new elections, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/surveys-show-gantz-holds-commanding-lead-over-netanyahu-as-war-approaches-100th-day/">opinion polls</a> show he would have very little chance of forming a new administration.</p>
<p>Second, the families of the 136 hostages still held in Gaza and their supporters hold daily demonstrations demanding the government prioritise negotiating their release over the military campaign against Hamas. </p>
<p>The news that 31 of the hostages <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-chief-military-spokesperson-31-hostages-gaza-are-dead-2024-02-06/">have been confirmed dead</a> can be expected to raise the families’ anxiety levels and increase the tempo of their protests.</p>
<p>And third, Netanyahu faces increasing pressure from the Biden administration, which is suffering <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/07/bidens-support-of-israel-leaves-him-as-isolated-as-russia-on-the-world-stage-analyst.html">reputational damage</a> across the Middle East and in the Global South because of its unconditional support (including <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-approves-emergency-sale-of-weapons-to-israel-bypassing-congress-/7418698.html">providing weapons</a>) for Israel’s Gaza campaign. </p>
<p>Within the US, Biden is also experiencing <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4288202-biden-progressives-anger-over-israel-hamas-conflict/">blow-back</a> from young, progressive Democrats, horrified at the Palestinian death toll, which now stands at over 27,000. That could affect his re-election prospects if they decide not to turn out for him in the November vote.</p>
<h2>For Hamas, pluses and minuses</h2>
<p>By comparison, the pressures on Hamas are of a lower order. Obviously, Israel’s military campaign, particularly its current extension into southern Gaza, is causing enormous suffering to the civilian population. But the degree to which this affects the Hamas leadership is uncertain.</p>
<p>In negotiating through Qatar and Egypt for a ceasefire, an increase in aid and, ultimately, an end to the conflict, Hamas is presumably motivated – at least partly – by a desire to reduce civilian suffering.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-palestinian-conflict-is-the-two-state-solution-now-dead-221967">Israel-Palestinian conflict: is the two-state solution now dead?</a>
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<p>But its main aim is unquestionably its own survival. What would force Hamas to compromise on its demands would be the capture or deaths of its senior leaders, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/400000-for-sinwar-100000-for-mohammed-deif-israel-said-to-place-bounty-on-hamas-leaders/">Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif</a>.</p>
<p>It should be noted Hamas derives some benefits from the continuing conflict. What Biden has described as Israel’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/12/israel-gaza-hamas-biden-netanyahu/">indiscriminate bombing</a>” campaign actually boosts Hamas’s image as a standard bearer for Palestinian rights. The Gaza war, with its horrifying human toll, has brought the Palestinians’ plight to international attention and harmed Israel’s global standing.</p>
<p>Hamas would also be aware that it does not have to defeat Israel militarily in order to win this war. It needs merely to survive. A ceasefire that left Hamas in charge of a Gaza in ruins would thus be a victory.</p>
<h2>Do negotiations stand a chance?</h2>
<p>Unless there is an unexpected development – Israel’s elimination of Sinwar and Deif, or its military locating and freeing the remaining hostages – the war is likely to continue for some months. </p>
<p>Netanyahu probably feels he has no choice, from a political perspective, but to continue prosecuting the war in the same manner, in the hope of a breakthrough. </p>
<p>His history of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahus-unprecedented-snub-of-obama-meeting-defies-explanation/">staring down US presidents</a> means he almost certainly won’t back down under pressure from Biden. And he will continue to tell the hostages’ families that their loved ones can only be rescued by military action alone, even if their demonstrations grow in size and number. </p>
<p>To appease the families, Netanyahu may be prepared to sanction renewed temporary ceasefire offers to Hamas in an effort to win more hostage releases – but not if doing so puts his governing coalition at risk.</p>
<p>Israel also has to bear in mind the interim ruling of the International Court of Justice last month over accusations its military campaign breaches the Genocide Convention. The court has ordered Israel to produce a report by late February on measures it has taken to prevent genocide. </p>
<p>Though Netanyahu has <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">rejected</a> the ICJ’s ruling, he needs to take account of the views of his Western supporters who place high value on the role of the court.</p>
<p>The entrenched positions of the Netanyahu government and the Hamas leadership mean Blinken’s work is nowhere close to being done. That means more trips to the region, more shuttle diplomacy and, likely, more sleepless nights. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">Israel isn't complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu probably feels he has no choice, from a political perspective, but to continue prosecuting the war in the same manner.Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231392024-02-08T17:51:39Z2024-02-08T17:51:39ZGaza update: Netanyahu knocks back Hamas peace plan while the prospect of mass famine looms ever larger<p>The Israeli military is poised to enter what its defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has referred to as the “last centre of gravity that remains in Hamas’s hands: Rafah”. Unfortunately for many of the 1.7 million people reportedly displaced by Israel’s four-month onslaught in Gaza, this is where more than a million of them have taken refuge, according to the latest estimates.</p>
<p>As the Gaza death toll compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) surpassed 26,750 people, with a further 65,000-plus people wounded, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected a peace deal proposed by Hamas and relayed by Egyptian and Qatari negotiators as “deluded”. </p>
<p>The proposed three-part plan was for a staged cessation of hostilities and prisoner-hostage swap, with the aim of ending the war completely via negotiations to be finalised by the time the final hostages had been returned.</p>
<p>Insisting that “the day after [the war] is the day after Hamas – all of Hamas”, Netanyahu said he intended to press on until Israel had achieved “total victory”.</p>
<p>But Anne Irfan, an expert in the history of the modern Middle East from University College London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">believes</a> the Israeli prime minister may be thinking it is in his own interests to keep the conflict going as long as he can. His personal approval ratings are abysmal – only 15% of Israelis in a recent survey said they thought he should keep his job after the war ends.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the latest developments in Israel's war with Hamas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Map of Israel’s war with Hamas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Meanwhile, Netanyahu is increasingly trapped between the clamour from the families of the Israeli hostages still trapped in Gaza, and the intransigence of the far-right members of his own government who won’t consider doing a deal with Hamas. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">Netanyahu's position becoming more uncertain as Israeli PM rejects Hamas deal to end war</a>
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<p>Netanyahu has also resisted international pressure to consider a two-state solution, which would by definition involve a sovereign Palestine, insisting that Israel is the only state that can guarantee regional security in the long term. </p>
<p>Despite Netanyahu’s wholesale rejection of the notion of Palestinian statehood, both the US and UK have said they are considering the possibility of recognising Palestine after the conflict ends. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, said such a move would be “absolutely vital for the long-term peace and security of the region”.</p>
<p>They would be coming into line with much of the rest of the world: 139 of 193 UN members have already recognised the state of Palestine, which has sat in the UN as a “non-member observer state” since 2012, and has already acceded to many of its human rights treaties.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Tonny Raymond Kirabira, an expert in international law at the University of East London, walks us through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">complex issues</a> involved in becoming a state. At the moment, international law dictates that the prerequsites for statehood are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As Kirabira reminds us, questions remains whether Palestine actually possesses a “defined territory” and “effective government”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">UK and US may recognise state of Palestine after Gaza war – what this important step would mean</a>
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<p>So what is the two-state solution? It’s a vexed issue that has been exercising the minds of peacemakers since before the state of Israel was even formally declared in 1948. An early UN partition plan called for what was then known as the “Mandate of Palestine” – under British control – to be divided into separate Jewish and Arab states.</p>
<p>Andrew Thomas, an expert in the politics of the Middle East from Deakin University in Australia, runs through the various iterations of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">two-state solution</a> since 1948 – and recalls the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jan-egeland-remembers-the-secret-negotiations-that-led-to-the-oslo-accords-podcast-213092">Oslo accords</a> in the 1990s, when the then-Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat, got so close to agreeing a solution which would have recognised Palestine as a state while guaranteeing Israeli security. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">Explainer: what is the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?</a>
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<h2>War crime and punishment</h2>
<p>Netanyahu’s pledge to push on to total victory, meanwhile, flies in the face of demands made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) more than a week ago. The ICJ ordered Israel to take steps to prevent genocidal actions in Gaza, to punish incitement to genocide, to allow Gaza’s people access to humanitarian aid, and to preserve and collect any evidence of war crimes committed during the conflict.</p>
<p>It appears Israel has not yet done any of these things, although it has about another three weeks until it is due to report back to the ICJ. Basema Al-Alami, an expert in international law from the University of Toronto, considers how reports of what is happening on the ground in Gaza <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">conflict with the ICJ’s demands</a>, and also what pressure the ICJ rulings will put on Israel’s international donors to reconsider their stance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">Israel isn't complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?</a>
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<p>It didn’t take the international community long to act after Israel raised allegations that some staff from the UN’s Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) had taken part in Hamas’s October 7 massacres. Within days, 18 donor countries including the UK and US had pulled their support for UNRWA, the principal charity supplying aid to Palestinians.</p>
<p>UCL’s Irfan and Jo Kelcey of the Lebanese American University assess the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">fallout from this mass withdrawal of support</a>, concluding that it could be catastrophic for Palestinians in Gaza, 87% of whom are dependent on UNRWA for its services which include food aid, shelter and medical care. They also point out that Israel’s allegations about the involvement of UNRWA staff in October 7 came the day after the ICJ published its interim ruling.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">Gaza conflict: what is UNRWA and why is Israel calling for its abolition?</a>
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<p>Greg Kennedy, an expert in strategic foreign policy issues at King’s College London, believes that Israel is deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">weaponising food supplies</a> in Gaza. He writes that it has been a tactic of war for centuries, and that sieges and blockades remain part of the arsenal of armed conflict.</p>
<p>Starvation, Kennedy adds, can seriously undermine morale and the will to resist. It is also a collective punishment – something explicitly banned under international humanitarian law.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">Gaza: weaponisation of food has been used in conflicts for centuries – but it hasn't always resulted in victory</a>
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<h2>There goes the neighbourhood</h2>
<p>Day by day, missile by missile, tensions are ratcheting up around the region as Iran-backed proxies, who have been targeting US military bases for years, have stepped up their campaign of harassment. Taken individually, these attacks are of little significance. As Middle East expert Julie Norman from UCL notes, neither Iran nor the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">wants to wage a major conflict</a> at the moment – but both countries have political reasons for wanting to act tough. </p>
<p>In Iran, the Islamic Republic presides over a parlous economy and considerable public unrest as the “woman, life, freedom” mass protests continue. In the White House, meanwhile, Joe Biden wants a telegenic show of US force without embroiling his country in a major land war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">Middle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained</a>
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<p>George W. Bush once joked to troops in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’” And as Andrew Payne, an international security expert from City, University of London notes, Bush – as well as his successor in the White House, Barack Obama, and even the vainglorious Donald Trump (who said of a recent attack on a US base in Jordan: “This attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance.”) – grew increasingly averse to military action as the next election loomed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">Middle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year</a>
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<p>Christoph Bluth, an expert in international affairs at the University of Bradford, presents a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">cast list of Iran’s affiliates</a> in the region, and explains how Tehran is using them to further its long-term aims in the region – from replacing the US as the dominant power to establishing an “axis of resistance” that could potentially box in Israel.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">How Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231132024-02-08T17:38:34Z2024-02-08T17:38:34ZNetanyahu’s position becoming more uncertain as Israeli PM rejects Hamas deal to end war<p>The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has rejected a ceasefire plan put forward by Hamas, calling the terms “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/07/middleeast/hamas-counterproposal-israel-pullout-ceasefire-hostages-intl/index.html">delusional</a>”. Claiming that an Israeli victory in Gaza is “within reach”, Netanyahu has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/07/middle-east-crisis-live-diplomatic-push-to-secure-gaza-ceasefire-as-hamas-responds-to-plan">vowed to fight on</a> until Hamas is completely destroyed. </p>
<p>But the US, which is involved in negotiation efforts along with Qatar and Egypt, has said that there could still be a path to a deal. </p>
<p>Hamas’s plan came as a counter offer to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68138853">proposal</a> put forward a week ago by Israel, the US, Qatar and Egypt. That framework reportedly involved a six-week truce during which Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners would be exchanged. In response, Hamas proposed a sweeping <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/07/hamas-responds-to-israel-plan-with-three-stage-proposal-to-end-gaza-war">three-stage plan</a> aimed at ending the war completely. </p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68225663">terms of the plan</a>, phase one would see a pause in fighting to allow for the release of Palestinian women and children from Israeli jails. They would be exchanged for Israeli women and males under 19 being held in Gaza, as well as the elderly and the sick. At the same time, Israeli forces would withdraw from Gaza’s built-up areas as the reconstruction of hospitals and refugee camps begins. </p>
<p>During the second phase, Israeli forces would leave Gaza completely as the remaining Israeli hostages are exchanged for Palestinian prisoners. In phase three, Israel and Hamas would exchange bodies and remains. Throughout the process, the pause in fighting would allow for essential aid supplies to be delivered to Gaza. </p>
<p>Hamas’ plan also envisages ongoing negotiations to end the war completely, with a view to these concluding by the end of phase three. </p>
<h2>Netanyahu’s calculations</h2>
<p>Both the content of the Hamas proposal and Netanyahu’s rejection of it are revealing about the current political state of play for both parties. Netanyahu, long a highly divisive figure in Israel and abroad, has seen his <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-14/ty-article/.premium/as-war-rages-israelis-trust-in-netanyahu-hits-rock-bottom-polls-find/0000018b-cd86-dd11-a19f-edf6f2b00000">approval ratings plummet</a> in Israel since the Hamas attacks of October 7 in which <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/haaretz-explains/2023-10-19/ty-article-magazine/israels-dead-the-names-of-those-killed-in-hamas-massacres-and-the-israel-hamas-war/0000018b-325c-d450-a3af-7b5cf0210000">1,200 Israelis were killed</a> and around 240 taken hostage. </p>
<p>A poll last month found that only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">15% of Israelis</a> think he should keep his job after the war ends. Such figures suggest an alternative reason why he may be keen to continue the war for as long as possible. </p>
<p>Netanyahu and his government have also been under increasing pressure from the hostages’ families, who recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-68054982">stormed a meeting of the Knesset</a> to demand more action to release their loved ones. On February 6, five Israeli women who were released from Gaza during the November ceasefire <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/released-hostages-tell-pm-only-saving-remaining-captives-will-be-absolute-victory/">called on Netanyahu</a> to do whatever is necessary to secure the release of the remaining 136. </p>
<p>Similarly, Sharone Lifshitz, whose 85-year-old mother, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/24/freed-gaza-hostages-named-yocheved-lifshitz-nurit-cooper">Yocheved</a>, was freed during the November ceasefire and whose 83-year-old father, Oded, is still being held, has criticised Netanyahu’s rejection of the ceasefire proposal. In a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-palestine-war-hostages-b2492024.html">press conference</a> in the UK, Sharone Lifschitz said: “We need that deal to happen now … I don’t think Israel has another option.”</p>
<p>Yet Netanyahu is also facing pressure from hardliners within his own government. In particular, far-right national security minister, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-10/ty-article/.premium/far-right-israeli-minister-ben-gvir-does-as-he-pleases-rattling-the-netanyahu-government/0000018c-f2b8-d2f9-a3ef-f6ff3a3f0000">Itamar Ben-Gvir</a>, has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d5693fc7-7c13-4509-a45d-db14423dfe77">threatening</a> to dissolve the coalition if Netanyahu makes any concessions to Hamas. </p>
<p>While Ben Gvir is not part of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eebddeb0-9745-45ae-a7fb-55f574bb45b1">Israeli war cabinet</a> – formed as an emergency response to the October 7 attacks – Netanyahu will be conscious of his potential to collapse the government.</p>
<h2>Hamas’ aims</h2>
<p>As for Hamas, there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/06/optimism-fades-over-gaza-ceasefire-amid-rumoured-split-in-hamas-leadership">reports of a deepening rift</a> between the Gaza cadre, led by October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar, and the exiled leadership in Doha, headed up by political bureau chair Ismail Haniyeh. </p>
<p>Sinwar, who has become <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/hamas-twin-power-structure-complicates-gaza-truce-talks">increasingly powerful in Gaza </a> in recent years, is said to back a temporary immediate truce while Haniyeh is pushing for a full ceasefire with major Israeli concessions. </p>
<p>All the while, the war in Gaza continues. With United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reporting <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">a toll of</a> more than 26,000 Palestinians killed, more than 65,000 injured, and 1.7 million displaced, the UN is now warning that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/28/famine-in-gaza-is-being-made-inevitable-says-un-rapporteur">famine is inevitable</a> in the Strip. </p>
<p>As negotiations continue to go back and forth, time is running out for the most vulnerable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223113/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Irfan has received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>Netanyahu has rejected the latest peace deal and vowed to continue until Israel achieves ‘total victory’.Anne Irfan, Lecturer in Interdisciplinary Race, Gender and Postcolonial Studies, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226822024-02-08T13:37:04Z2024-02-08T13:37:04ZRussia’s fanning of anti-Israeli sentiment takes dark detour into Holocaust denialism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574111/original/file-20240207-16-big2ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4164%2C3816&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People wave Russian, Palestinian and Hamas flags.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wave-russian-palestinian-fatah-and-hamas-flags-and-news-photo/1734736098?adppopup=true">Hazem Bader/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Gaza isn’t only challenging the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/gaza-war-reverberates-across">geopolitics of the Middle East</a>: It is also <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/how-does-israel-hamas-war-impact-russia-and-ukraine#:%7E:text=At%20the%20same%20time%2C%20the,assistance%20for%20that%20embattled%20country.">complicating matters in Ukraine</a>, as Russia seeks to capitalize on growing <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-reaction-to-gaza-siege-has-exposed-the-growing-rift-between-the-west-and-the-global-south-216938">anti-Israeli sentiment in the Global South</a>.</p>
<p>Russia was slow to condemn the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">Oct. 7 attack in Israel</a> and has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/12/russia-israel-hamas">hosted a succession of Hamas delegations in Moscow</a>. It also <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/essential-questions-about-russia-hamas-link-evidence-and-its-implications">works closely with Iran, Hamas’ main sponsor</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, U.S. backing for Israel is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/23/us/ukraine-gaza-global-south-hypocrisy.html">further eroding</a> support for Ukraine in the Global South, amid <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/23/us/ukraine-gaza-global-south-hypocrisy.html">accusations of double standards</a> over how the West views the plight of civilians in the two wars.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.wesleyan.edu/academics/faculty/prutland/profile.html">expert on modern Russia</a>, I see deeper dynamics at work. Putin’s stance on the Israel-Hamas conflict feeds into a narrative of using antisemitism to disparage perceived enemies and defend Russian actions: a tactic that has deep historical <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/99945786B60F74C869F8F1E36BE7280E/S0037677900158966a.pdf/origins_and_development_of_soviet_antisemitism_an_analysis.pdf">origins in the Soviet Union</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123407000105">czarist Russia</a>.</p>
<h2>‘A century of antisemitism’</h2>
<p>The Gaza war erupted at a crucial moment in the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the fall of 2022 <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/hold-build-and-strike-a-vision-for-rebuilding-ukraines-advantage-in-2024/">had stalled</a>, while <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/06/us/politics/senate-ukraine-aid-bill.html">Republicans in the U.S. Congress blocked</a> the Biden administration’s efforts to send more aid to Ukraine.</p>
<p>On Jan. 25, 2024, the U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center, tasked with combating Russian disinformation, <a href="https://www.state.gov/more-than-a-century-of-antisemitism-how-successive-occupants-of-the-kremlin-have-used-antisemitism/">released a 50-page report</a> documenting the ways in which Russian propaganda has weaponized antisemitism to rally support against Western backing for Ukraine.</p>
<p>The report, released two days before <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/remember/international-holocaust-remembrance-day">International Holocaust Remembrance Day</a>, argues, “For over a century, Tsarist, Soviet and now Russian Federation authorities have used antisemitism to discredit, divide, and weaken their perceived adversaries at home and abroad.” </p>
<p>As if to prove the report’s main point, just two days before it was published, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman <a href="https://www.state.gov/faces-of-kremlin-propaganda-maria-zakharova/">Maria Zakharova</a> strayed into the area of Holocaust denialism.</p>
<p>In a Jan. 21 <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1926818/">press conference</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/faces-of-kremlin-propaganda-maria-zakharova/">Zakharova criticized</a> Germany for filing a motion in support of Israel at the International Court of Justice in the Hague, where Israel is defending itself <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/10/south-africa-israel-icj-genocide-case/">against the charge</a> of genocide. </p>
<p>Germany, Zakharova said, had no right to lecture anyone about genocide. After all, she continued, during World War II, Germany presided over the extermination of “various ethnic and social groups,” with Hitler’s main goal being the elimination of the Slavic peoples.</p>
<p>At no point during her lengthy remarks, which ran to 1,500 words, did Zakharova mention that Jews had been among Hitler’s victims. The omission <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-downplays-holocausts-impact-on-jews-pans-german-defense-of-israel-at-icj/">led to criticism</a> that Russia is deliberately downplaying if not denying the Jewish Holocaust.</p>
<p>Zakharova went on to conflate Germany’s defense of Israel with its support for Ukraine: “Berlin has once again mired itself in exterminating people in a part of Europe where 80 years ago Hitler failed in his effort to exterminate or subdue people.” </p>
<p>Presumably, Zakharova’s comments were aimed at <a href="https://www.ponarseurasia.org/why-the-west-is-losing-the-global-information-war-over-ukraine-and-how-it-can-be-fixed/">audiences in the Global South</a>, which have generally been more sympathetic to Russia’s argument that the war in Ukraine is a war against Western imperialism.</p>
<h2>Weaponizing hate</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that the Russian foreign ministry has opened itself to accusations of antisemitism. In May 2022, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov provoked international outrage when, in response to a question over how Russia could claim to be denazifying Ukraine when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61296682">replied</a>: “I could be wrong, but Hitler also had Jewish blood. (That Zelensky is Jewish) means absolutely nothing. Wise Jewish people say that the most ardent antisemites are usually Jews.”</p>
<p>Putin <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61339749">subsequently apologized</a> for Lavrov’s remarks in a call with then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, although there was no public apology.</p>
<p>And Lavrov soon returned to the theme of equating the actions of perceived enemies with those of Nazis. In January 2023, Lavrov <a href="https://archive.is/uFCc1">said NATO</a> is “using Ukraine to wage a proxy war against Russia with the old aim of finally solving the ‘Russian question,’ like Hitler, who sought a final solution to the ‘Jewish question.’”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit shuffles papers behind a sign reading Russia. Behind him are various flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574114/original/file-20240207-28-9m721g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Putin’s words are aimed at members of the Global South.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-pool-photograph-distributed-by-russian-state-agency-news-photo/1794235202?adppopup=true">Alexander Kazakov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>This rising tide of state propaganda spilled over into some actual acts of mob antisemitism. In October 2023, at an airport in Dagestan, a Muslim-majority province in southern Russia, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/29/mob-storms-dagestan-airport-in-search-of-jewish-passengers-from-israel">a crowd hunted</a> for Jewish refugees after a flight landed from Israel. Moscow has been accused of <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/putin-has-unleashed-a-twisted-new-wave-of-antisemitism">doing little</a> to rein in such manifestations of antisemitism.</p>
<h2>Distorting history</h2>
<p>As the State Department <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GEC-Special-Report-More-than-a-Century-of-Antisemitism.pdf">report documents</a>, antisemitism has been a scourge in imperial, Soviet and now post-Soviet Russia. </p>
<p>It spans the pogroms of czarist Russia and the 1903 publication of the fake <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-protocols-of-the-elders-of-zion-is-still-pushed-by-anti-semites-more-than-a-century-after-hoax-first-circulated-145220">“Protocol of the Elders of Zion</a>,” through Stalin’s campaign against “<a href="https://tonykaron.com/what-is-rootless-cosmopolitan/">rootless cosmopolitans</a>,” to <a href="https://ia804707.us.archive.org/30/items/DisinformationFormerSpyChiefRevealsSecretStrategiesForUnderminingFreedomAttackin/Disinformation%20-%20Former%20Spy%20Chief%20Reveals%20Secret%20Strategies%20for%20Undermining%20Freedom%2C%20Attacking%20Religion%2C%20and%20Promoting%20Terrorism.pdf">Operation Zarathustra</a>, which involved Soviet agents painting neo-Nazi graffiti in West Germany in the late 1950s.</p>
<p>Zakharova’s remarks can be seen as a continuation of the Soviet tradition of Holocaust denial. As Cold War scholar Izabella Tabarovsky <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/dont-learn-russians-about-the-holocaust">has noted</a>, “The Soviets systematically denied that Jews were particular targets of Nazi atrocities.” Memorials on the sites of killing fields in the Soviet Union where Jews were marched out and shot in the fall of 1941 and 1942 typically referred to the victims as “peaceful Soviet citizens” rather than Jews. </p>
<p>The official Russian narrative of World War II argues that the loss of <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/09668139408412190">27 million lives</a> meant that the Soviet Union was the main victim of Nazism. It is, of course, true that Russians suffered grievously at the hands of the Nazis and that the <a href="https://www.queenslibrary.org/book/Absolute-war-:-Soviet-Russia-in-the-Second-World-War/1167271">Soviet Union bore the brunt of the fighting</a> against Hitler once they joined the war in June 1941, two years after it started.</p>
<p>However, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Yugoslavs and Poles all suffered <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties_of_the_Soviet_Union">greater casualties</a>, as a proportion of their population, than Russians. </p>
<p>And the Jews and Roma of Europe, of course, were uniquely targeted for elimination.</p>
<p>As the Soviet Union drew into closer alliance with the Arab world in the 1960s, the Soviet Union became increasingly hostile to U.S.-backed Israel. For example, Moscow was a sponsor of the controversial United Nations <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121206052903/http:/unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/761C1063530766A7052566A2005B74D1">Resolution 3379</a>, which denounced Zionism as a form of racism. The resolution, seen by critics as <a href="https://www.state.gov/usun-engaging-the-united-nations-in-the-fight-against-antisemitism/">fueling antisemitism</a>, passed the U.N. General Assembly in 1975 but was revoked in 1991.</p>
<h2>Putin’s flirtation with antisemitism</h2>
<p>During the first years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, he had a <a href="https://www.meforum.org/690/putins-pro-israel-policy">very positive</a> attitude toward Israel. In 2005, he was the first Russian leader to visit Israel. And there is no evidence that Putin is personally antisemitic. </p>
<p>Ties between Russia and Israel were deep, in part due to the presence of some 1.25 million <a href="https://ridl.io/war-aliyah-of-russian-speaking-jews-to-israel-past-experience-and-new-surprises/">Jews from the former Soviet Union in Israel</a>, accounting for 17% of the total population. Around 50,000 more have arrived since the outbreak of the Ukrainian war in 2022.</p>
<p>However, after 2021, as Russian officials started making absurd claims about <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1502775">neo-Nazis being in power in Kyiv</a>, the relationship with Israel cooled. </p>
<p>Israel <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/netanyahu-has-finally-realised-russia-is-no-friend-of-israel/">backed Ukraine</a> during the June 2021 to December 2022 coalition government of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid and condemned the Russian invasion. But Israel subsequently <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/why-israel-has-been-slow-support-ukraine">shifted away from Kyiv</a> after Benjamin Netanyahu took power in 2022.</p>
<p>In part, Israel changed its stance because it did not want Russia to use its air defenses in Syria to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/19/world/middleeast/russia-syria-israel-ukraine.html">prevent Israel from striking</a> targets there. After the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, however, Israel stepped up its raids in Syria and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-03/israel-russia-ties-worsen-as-it-fights-iran-proxies-in-syria-amid-war-with-hamas">stopped warning Russia</a> in advance, while Russia aggressively condemned Israel’s military actions in Gaza. </p>
<h2>Putin’s ploy may backfire</h2>
<p>Russia’s ploy to link the wars in Gaza and Ukraine may win it a few more friends in the Global South. But it risks alienating influential players such as <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/strategising-indias-red-sea-maritime-diplomacy-13662382.html">India</a>, which under Narendra Modi has become <a href="https://time.com/6336217/india-modi-pro-israel/">increasingly pro-Israel</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-expert-unpacks-houthi-attacks-and-other-security-threats-220951">strikes by Houthi militants</a> on ships in the Red Sea are of concern to India and others who see their international trade disrupted. India is now the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-oil-europe-india-ukraine-war-b2477443.html">second-largest importer</a> of Russian oil after China, and that oil is carried on tankers through the Suez Canal. </p>
<p>On Jan. 26 2024, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-battle-blaze-tanker-hit-by-missile-gulf-aden-2024-01-27/">Houthi missile struck</a> an Indian-crewed tanker carrying Russian oil from Greece to Singapore, vividly illustrating how Moscow’s fanning of anti-Israeli sentiment can backfire, affecting the economic interests of its allies and of Russia itself. </p>
<p>The next day, Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73334">spoke at a ceremony</a> to open a monument to Nazi genocide in Zaitsevo, near St. Petersburg, to mark the 80th anniversary of the lifting of the siege of Leningrad. He talked about death camps and Auschwitz but never mentioned the Jews.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222682/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Rutland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Gaza war has complicated issues in Ukraine, with Putin looking to exploit events in the Middle East to garner support among the Global South.Peter Rutland, Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223502024-02-06T18:08:20Z2024-02-06T18:08:20ZIsrael isn’t complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?<p>More than a week has passed since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">mandated provisional measures against Israel</a> following South Africa’s <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203394">accusation of genocide</a>.</p>
<p>The court’s demands were clear: Israel must take immediate steps to prevent genocidal actions in Gaza; prevent and punish incitement to genocide; allow access to humanitarian aid; and prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence of alleged crimes. It must also report back to the court within a month on the implementation of these measures. </p>
<p>There’s little evidence Israel has changed course, despite these clear orders. In fact, reports from Gaza suggest <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/5/israels-war-on-gaza-list-of-key-events-day-122">escalated violence and increased civilian casualties each day</a>. </p>
<h2>No adherence</h2>
<p>In the days since the Jan. 26 ICJ ruling, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/south-africa-israel-ignoring-court-ruling-ordering-prevent-106837772#:%7E:text=Since%20the%20ruling%2C%20Israel%20has,Ministry%20in%20Hamas%2Drun%20Gaza.">Israel has intensified its military operations</a>. According to the Health Ministry in Gaza, more than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/1/israels-war-on-gaza-live-death-toll-in-gaza-nears-27000-66000-wounded">27,000 Palestinians have now been killed and more than 66,000 injured since the Hamas attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Israel has also targeted several medical facilities in Gaza, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/5/israels-war-on-gaza-live-israeli-strikes-level-homes-in-deir-el-balah">including Nasser hospital</a>, since the ICJ ruling. Instead of halting acts that could constitute genocide under Article II of the Genocide Convention, Israel’s military operations have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/04/overnight-israeli-airstrikes-kill-gaza-fears-grow-push-rafah">expanded towards Rafah</a>, intensifying the already dire situation in the last refuge for Gaza’s displaced — despite being labelled as a safe zone for civilians. </p>
<p>The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) called Rafah a “<a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/gaza-rafah-pressure-cooker-despair-assault-looms">pressure cooker of despair</a>.”</p>
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<h2>In direct contravention</h2>
<p>On Feb. 5, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) <a href="https://twitter.com/UNLazzarini/status/1754511426406744518">published an image</a> on social media showing its damaged food convoy, waiting to travel towards northern Gaza, after it said it was struck by Israeli naval gunfire. Such action would be in direct contravention of ICJ’s explicit order that Israel ensures basic services and humanitarian aid reaches civilians in Gaza.</p>
<p>Israel is continuing to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/3/israel-floods-tunnels-with-seawater-what-impacts-on-gazas-water-supply#:%7E:text=Israel%20confirmed%20this%20week%20that,in%20the%20besieged%20Palestinian%20enclave.">pump seawater into tunnels throughout Gaza</a> in its assault on Hamas’s labyrinth of tunnels, which experts warn could render Gaza <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-s-flooding-of-gaza-tunnels-to-make-enclave-unlivable-for-100-years-environmentalist/3081432#:%7E:text=Israel%20begins%20to%20pump%20seawater,by%20Palestinian%20fighters%20in%20Gaza&text=Israel%27s%20pumping%20seawater%20into%20a,a%20Palestinian%20environmentalist%20warned%20Wednesday.">uninhabitable for 100 years</a> by contaminating underground fresh water. </p>
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<p>These developments underscore the gravity of the conditions in Gaza following the ICJ ruling, and highlight the urgent need for Israel to comply with the orders. </p>
<p>Despite this, there is hope of a potential reprieve as, according to Qatar, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/hamas-studying-ceasefire-plan">Hamas has received a new ceasefire proposal</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/02/israel-and-hamas-closer-to-ceasefire-deal-amid-warning-over-gaza-children">is reportedly responding positively to it.</a></p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The ICJ’s decision is legally binding, compelling Israel to adhere not only to the specific provisional measures, but also to the broader mandates of the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions.</p>
<p>But the ICJ relies on the United Nations Security Council to ensure compliance with its decisions, a process complicated by geopolitical realities, namely the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/26/how-the-us-has-used-its-veto-power-at-the-un-in-support-of-israel#:%7E:text=A%20history%20of%20US%20vetoes%20protecting%20Israel&text=Since%201945%2C%20a%20total%20of,two%20by%20Russia%20and%20China.">United States’ longstanding support of Israel</a> and its potential use of its veto power at the Security Council.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the ICJ ruling sends a clear message to the international community, especially to states allied with Israel, reminding them of the collective responsibility to respect and uphold international law.</p>
<p>As such, the implications of the decision extend well beyond the immediate parties involved. It raises concerns about Canada’s military exports, especially the <a href="https://www.cjpme.org/pr_2023_06_12_arms_exports">$21 million</a> of military equipment sent to Israel in 2022. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/ruling-by-uns-top-court-means-canada-and-the-u-s-could-be-complicit-in-gaza-genocide-222110">Legal experts</a> remind us that, in alignment with the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/e-19/page-4.html#h-203166">Export and Import Permits Act</a>, such transactions should cease if there’s a substantial risk the exported goods could contribute to violations of international humanitarian or human rights law. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ruling-by-uns-top-court-means-canada-and-the-u-s-could-be-complicit-in-gaza-genocide-222110">Ruling by UN's top court means Canada and the U.S. could be complicit in Gaza genocide</a>
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<p>After weeks of silence by the Canadian government, Global Affairs Canada <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-admits-it-authorized-new-israeli-military-exports-after-october-7/#:%7E:text=After%20October%207-,Trudeau%20Government%20Admits%20It%20Authorized%20New%20Military%20Exports%20To%20Israel,that%20term%20offers%20little%20reassurance.">says it’s authorized, and continues to authorize, new permits for military exports to Israel since Oct. 7</a>.</p>
<p>The ICJ ruling places Canada in a difficult spot. Continuing military exports under these circumstances would not only breach Canadian law, but also contravene the country’s commitment to preventing genocide, potentially implicating Canadian officials in these acts.</p>
<h2>The Global South strikes back?</h2>
<p>In a broader context, the ICJ’s involvement represents an example of the Global South striking back, as international law expert Heidi Matthews argues <a href="https://soundcloud.com/hmodpod/hmod-ep12-haguewars">in her podcast</a>. South Africa’s historical fight against apartheid has made the Palestinian cause resonate for South Africans, lending credibility and moral weight to its case against Israel. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, despite the hope that the Global South may begin to effectively hold powerful nations to account, the international reaction to the ICJ ruling has been notably ambivalent. </p>
<p>Within hours of the ICJ decision, the White House <a href="https://www.state.gov/statement-on-unrwa-allegations/">paused its funding</a> to the UNRWA <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/serious-allegations-against-unrwa-staff-gaza-strip">in the wake of Israeli allegations</a> that 12 of its staff were involved in the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks in southern Israel. <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/10259619/canada-unrwa-funding/">Canada soon followed suit</a>.</p>
<p>Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eu-top-diplomat-says-defunding-unrwa-collective-punishment-will-endanger-lives/#:%7E:text=Funds%20paused%20by%20other%20donors,at%20stake%2C%22%20Borrell%20said.">recently noted</a> that the total suspended funds amount to more than US$440 million, which makes up half the agency’s expected funds for 2024.</p>
<p>Some nations aren’t following the U.S. lead. <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/spain-to-boost-funding-to-unrwa-after-donors-suspend-aid-264b7df6#:%7E:text=Spain%20said%20Monday%20that%20it,several%20nations%20suspended%20their%20funding.">Spain has announced an urgent aid package of $3.8 million to UNRWA</a> to ensure the organization can maintain its activities during this desperate situation. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/cutting-unrwas-funding-will-have-dire-humanitarian-consequences-222586">Cutting UNRWA’s funding will have dire humanitarian consequences</a>
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<p>Australia has also signalled it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/01/wong-signals-labor-wants-to-resume-un-agency-funding-to-ensure-fewer-children-are-starving-in-gaza">will resume its funding to UNRWA to prevent more children from starving</a> given the lack of any sustainable alternative agencies to deliver aid to Gaza. Belgium has also announced it <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/belgium-to-continue-financial-support-to-unrwa/3125223#:%7E:text=%22Belgium%20will%20continue%20to%20fund,UNRWA%20must%20provide%20complete%20transparency.">will continue to provide funds to UNRWA</a> while monitoring the UN’s internal investigation. </p>
<p>Canada, meantime, says it will allocate an additional <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/01/canada-provides-additional-humanitarian-assistance-in-gaza.html">$40 million</a> to support the humanitarian efforts of other organizations. But the specifics haven’t been disclosed, and there are few other organizations with the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/">expertise and infrastructure to meet the needs of Palestinians in Gaza</a>. </p>
<h2>Upholding international law</h2>
<p>The ICJ ruling calls for urgent action, not just from Israel, but also from the wider international community — including Canada — to uphold the tenets of international law and support humanitarian efforts.</p>
<p>Global Affairs Canada recently <a href="https://twitter.com/CanadaFP/status/1752333508884767096">stated on social media</a> that “Canada rejects any proposal that calls for the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the establishment of additional settlements. Such inflammatory rhetoric undermines prospects for lasting peace.”</p>
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<p>Some have labelled this statement as “<a href="https://twitter.com/aliceseba/status/1752345532843119069">empty words</a>,” given that Canada has yet to take clear actions following the ICJ decision, such as issuing sanctions against Israel or stopping arms exports. </p>
<p>Gazans are now <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/famine-looms-in-gaza-israel-war-intl/index.html">eating grass and drinking polluted water</a> to stave off death. By choosing not to resume its financial support for UNRWA during this pivotal time, Canada is intensifying its complicity in potential genocidal acts. </p>
<p>It’s time to reinforce, not weaken the UNRWA. <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145987">UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has urged governments to resume funding</a>, otherwise UNRWA will be <a href="https://twitter.com/UNLazzarini/status/1753064498259189925">forced to shut down operations by the end of February</a> — not only in Gaza, but across the region. </p>
<p>The world is watching, and Canada’s actions now must showcase its commitment to justice, human rights and the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basema Al-Alami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is Israel changing course following the recent ruling by the International Court of Justice? It appears not, and that poses risks for the international community, including Canada.Basema Al-Alami, SJD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205242024-02-06T13:30:51Z2024-02-06T13:30:51ZA two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians might actually be closer than ever<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573592/original/file-20240205-29-qs6cet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of destroyed buildings and roads is shown in Khan Yunis, Gaza, on Feb. 2, 2024. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-with-destroyed-buildings-and-roads-news-photo/1973206078?adppopup=true">Abdulqader Sabbah/Anadolu via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the war in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/03/fresh-strikes-southern-gaza-talks-two-month-pause-killed-injured-palestinians">enters its fourth month</a>, on the surface it might seem like possibilities for long-term, peaceful solutions are impossible. Even before the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel by Hamas-led forces from Gaza, many analysts were already declaring the idea of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/19/it-is-time-to-acknowledge-the-death-of-the-two-state-solution">a two-state solution dead</a>. </p>
<p>There are real barriers to the creation of a Palestinian state alongside a separate Israel. For example, the current Israeli government <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/21/israels-netanyahu-doubles-down-on-opposition-to-palestinian-statehood">rejects the creation</a> of a Palestinian state, and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-14/ty-article/top-hamas-official-suggests-recognizing-israel-following-official-plo-stance/0000018c-67e4-d798-adac-e7ef81fd0000">Hamas refuses</a> to recognize Israel. After Oct. 7, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-palestinian-conflict-is-the-two-state-solution-now-dead-221967">some analysts</a> think the barriers are <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-02-13/two-state-solution-for-israel-palestine-hopes-dashed-alternatives">even more</a> insurmountable.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://asu.academia.edu/BenjaminCase">scholar of political violence and conflict</a>, I think the unprecedented scale of violence in Israel and Gaza is creating equally unprecedented urgency to find a solution, not just to the current violence, but to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p>
<p>Few, if any, historical conflicts neatly compare to the one between Israelis and Palestinians. But there are similarities in the fall of apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s, when growing international pressure and an intensifying war focused attention on an unsustainable system – and pushed people to find possibilities for peace that previously seemed impossible.</p>
<h2>The fall of South African apartheid</h2>
<p>In 1948, the white-nationalist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">Afrikaner National Party</a> was elected to run South Africa, a country that had already been controlled by a colonial white minority government. </p>
<p>The National Party formalized racial segregation policies in a system known as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a>, an Afrikaans word that means “apartness” or “separateness.” Apartheid ranked people by racial group, with white people at the top, Asian and people of mixed heritage lower, and Black people at the bottom with the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">most restrictions and fewest rights</a> – for example, to live or work where they chose.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Black man walks away from a limestone building, while a white man is seen entering on the other side. There are two signs above the entryways, one that shows a black man and the other shows a white man." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573574/original/file-20240205-15-wxrl8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Black man leaves a segregated public bathroom in Johannesburg, South Africa, while a white man enters the bathroom on a different side in 1985.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/black-man-leaving-and-white-man-entering-segregated-public-news-photo/72367774?adppopup=true">William F. Campbell/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Apartheid <a href="https://www.history.com/news/apartheid-policies-photos-nelson-mandela">resulted in deep poverty</a> and indignity for Black communities, quickly generating <a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/anti-apartheid-struggle-south-africa-1912-1992/">anti-apartheid social movements</a> that South African police tried to violently suppress. </p>
<p>The collapse of apartheid policies in the early 1990s is often attributed to a combination of South African resistance and the economic pressure brought by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/israel-apartheid-boycotts-sanctions-south-africa">international anti-apartheid boycotts</a> of South Africa.</p>
<p>There was another <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/98678.htm">major factor</a>, though: South Africa’s “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/12/annals-of-wars-we-dont-know-about-the-south-african-border-war-of-1966-1989/">border war</a>” in Namibia and Angola.</p>
<p>Since 1948, South Africa had imposed its apartheid policies over a neighboring region it occupied after World War II, then called South-West Africa, which <a href="https://www.namibiahc.org.uk/history.php">is now Namibia</a>.</p>
<p>Like Black South Africans, people in South-West Africa resisted apartheid. Beginning in the 1960s, South Africa’s military began employing local militias in South-West Africa to combat a <a href="https://mcfarlandbooks.com/product/the-namibian-war-of-independence-1966-1989/">Namibian independence</a> movement. Soon after, South Africa attempted to expand its control over neighboring Angola, which was in civil war after winning independence from Portugal.</p>
<p>The war in South-West Africa and Angola <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/proxy-war">became a proxy</a> for the ongoing Cold War and Western countries’ fear of communism spreading. The U.S. supported South Africa’s army and pro-Western militias, while the Soviet Union and Cuba supported pro-independence fighters. Cuba would eventually send <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/">30,000 troops</a> to fight on the ground on Angola’s side.</p>
<p>By the 1980s, the conflict was <a href="https://www.thecollector.com/south-african-border-war-vietnam/">escalating</a> into wider war, threatening to pull the United States and Soviet Union into direct conflict. </p>
<p>South Africa was forced to mobilize its reserve troops, and white South Africans began protesting at home. It was becoming clear that not just the war but <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253210623/comrades-against-apartheid/">the country’s brutal apartheid system</a> was not sustainable, lending credibility to those who wanted a democratic solution.</p>
<p>The mutually destructive war had no clear end <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/12/23/the-peace-process-in-southern-africa/487c4938-fc72-49d4-8ec7-74328ea3ea47/">or military solution</a>. South Africa and opposing armies were also <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/12/23/the-peace-process-in-southern-africa/487c4938-fc72-49d4-8ec7-74328ea3ea47/">running out of money to keep fighting</a>. </p>
<p>This stalemate pushed <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/agreement-between-angola-cuba-and-south-africa-principles-peaceful-settlement-southwestern">Cuba, Angola and South Africa to a peace deal</a> in 1988, and South Africa withdrew its forces. </p>
<p>The war with Namibia continued, but not for long.</p>
<p>South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/apartheid#:%7E:text=The%20effects%20of%20the%20internal%20unrest%20and%20international%20condemnation%20led,bring%20order%20to%20the%20country">resigned in 1989</a> after losing the support of his own far-right party for his failure in the war and inability to impose order. In 1990, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/namibia-gains-independence">Namibia declared independence</a>.</p>
<p>That same year, the new South African government began rolling back apartheid policies, paving the way for <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-cbs-news-covered-nelson-mandelas-1994-presidential-victory/">historic elections</a> in 1994 that were won in a landslide by anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela.</p>
<p>South Africa’s involvement in its border war is different in many ways from Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. But there are also similarities that may offer guidance.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nelson Mandela wears a dark suit and dances alongside women, in front of a sign that has the words 'a better life.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573572/original/file-20240205-15-s8uf2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelson Mandela celebrates his win for president in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-south-african-president-nelson-mandela-dances-at-a-news-photo/88312698?adppopup=true">Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A way toward two states?</h2>
<p>For more than half a century, Israel has controlled the borders of the West Bank and Gaza. Home to 5 million Palestinians, these areas exist in a kind of netherworld between being part of Israel and being separate, sovereign entities. Israel controls their territory, but Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza cannot vote in Israel and do not have basic rights or freedom of movement.</p>
<p>It is a situation that many analysts have <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/27/no-horizon-in-perpetually-unsustainable-palestine-pub-52234">long understood</a> is unsustainable, as it has repeatedly given way to extreme fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. Yet with the U.S. and other powers <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/26/how-the-us-has-used-its-veto-power-at-the-un-in-support-of-israel">firmly backing</a> Israel as a strategic ally, few could see realistic possibilities for change.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/live-updates-death-toll-gaza-passes-27000-south-106861226">shocking scale</a> of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna136308#">violence in</a> the war is changing that. About 1,200 people were killed and 240 were kidnapped in Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack. In <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-02-05-2024-dd005061f9925525c56ea460ab5c9e77">Gaza, Israel’s war has killed more than 27,000 residents</a>, mostly civilians.</p>
<p>I think that this violence, along with the threat of a wider war breaking out, is upending the once-remote idea of significant change in the region.</p>
<p>Nearly the entire population of 2 million people in Gaza have been displaced from their homes and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/over-one-hundred-days-war-israel-destroying-gazas-food-system-and-weaponizing-food-say-un-human-rights-experts#:%7E:text=Since%209%20October%2C%20Israel%20declared,insecure%20and%20more%20than%2080">face dire</a> <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/over-one-hundred-days-war-israel-destroying-gazas-food-system-and">humanitarian emergencies</a> due to food, water and power shortages, foreign aid blockages and the destruction of Gaza’s hospitals. </p>
<p>With Houthi militants in Yemen <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/01/20/world/middleeast/houthi-red-sea-shipping.html">entering</a> the conflict and threats from Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, the U.S. <a href="https://inkstickmedia.com/the-stark-implications-of-the-israel-gaza-war-for-the-united-states/">is wary</a> of being <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-is-getting-embroiled-in-yet-another-middle-east-conflict-it-should-increase-pressure-on-israel-instead-221222">pulled into</a> another war in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Pressure is growing internationally for a cease-fire – and a two-state solution. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/01/us/politics/biden-israel-palestinians-peace.html">U.S.</a>, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/four-day-truce-israel-hamas-conflict-is-important-first-step-eus-borrell-2023-11-27/">European Union</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/china-calls-concrete-roadmap-two-state-solution-solve-gaza-conflict-2023-11-30/">China</a> all voice support for a two-state solution, and <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4443055-gaza-war-gives-new-urgency-to-us-push-for-israel-saudi-ties/">Saudi Arabia</a> has made the possibility of a historic accord with Israel contingent on it.</p>
<p>United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has said that a two-state solution is the “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1146097">only path</a>” to peace.</p>
<p>Pressure is mounting in Israel as well, as people continue to protest for the Israeli government to make a deal and bring 130 <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hostage-hamas-gaza-captive-02b11a8ec897970589e580dee732d484">hostages still captive</a> home alive. </p>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approval ratings <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">are tanking</a>. Israel’s economy is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/25/world/middleeast/israel-economy-gaza-war.html">shrinking</a>. And the Israeli government is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israeli-leaders-increasingly-divided-over-hamas-war-and-prospect-of-two-state-solution">increasingly divided</a> over the war effort, with Netanyahu <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-782778">losing support</a> in his own far-right party.</p>
<p>There remain large <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-two-state-solution-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-01-25/">obstacles</a> to realizing a two-state solution. There is also growing international consensus that a two-state solution is the only acceptable outcome of the current violence. </p>
<p>In my view, the conditions unfolding in Israel and Gaza are beginning to reach a breaking point, similar to the conditions in South Africa that formed prior to apartheid’s defeat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Case does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the conflict between Hamas and Israel is unique, the case of South Africa’s border war – and subsequent fall of apartheid – might offer lessons that apply to the Middle East.Benjamin Case, Postdoctoral research scholar at the Center for Work and Democracy, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227182024-02-03T17:28:29Z2024-02-03T17:28:29ZUS raids in Iraq and Syria: How retaliatory airstrikes affect network of Iran-backed militias<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573194/original/file-20240203-29-7pf0p7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C126%2C1594%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The headquarters of an Iranian-linked group in Anbar, Iraq was among the sites targeted by U.S. bombers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-after-the-us-warplanes-carried-out-an-news-photo/1974225653?adppopup=true">Hashd al-Shaabi Media Office/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>U.S. bombers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-starts-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-officials-2024-02-02/">struck dozens of sites</a> across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.</em></p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes were the first following a deadly assault on a U.S. base in Jordan that U.S. officials blamed on Iranian-backed militias. Sites associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were among those hit by American bombs.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to American University’s <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch</a> and <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center – both experts on Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies – to explain what the U.S. strikes hoped to achieve and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Who was targeted in the U.S. retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The U.S. response extended beyond targeting Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, or <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, the entity <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claiming responsibility</a> for the drone attack on Jan. 28. </p>
<p>This term, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, does not refer to a single group per se. Rather, it encompasses an umbrella organization that has, since around 2020, integrated various Iran-backed militias in the region. </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the Jan. 28 drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports with money, weapons and training through the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="uoUf8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uoUf8/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In recent months, parts of this network of Iran-backed militias have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/">claimed responsibility</a> for more than 150 attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>As such, the U.S. <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">retaliatory strikes</a> targeted over 85 sites across Iraq and Syria, all associated with Iranian-supported groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<p>The U.S. operation’s stated aim is to deter further Iranian-backed aggression. Specifically, in Syria, the U.S. executed several airstrikes, reportedly resulting in the death of at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/middleeast/at-least-18-members-of-iran-backed-groups-were-killed-in-syria-monitoring-group-says.html#:%7E:text=The%20aftermath%20of%20the%20U.S.,16%20people%20had%20been%20killed%2C">18 militia group members</a> and the destruction of dozens of locations in <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/324467/">Al-Mayadeen and Deir el-Zour</a>, a key stronghold of Iranian-backed forces.</p>
<p>In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state security apparatus comprising groups backed by Iran, reported that U.S. strikes resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-launches-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-nearly-40-reported-killed-2024-02-03/">16 of its members</a>, including both fighters and medics. </p>
<p>The U.S. response was notably more robust than other recent actions against such groups, reflecting an escalation in efforts to counter the threats posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.</p>
<h2>What do we know about the network targeted in the strike?</h2>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity. That is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level – in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition is difficult.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy of obscuring the particular source of attacks hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What are the strikes expected to accomplish?</h2>
<p>U.S. Central Command <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">said on Feb. 2</a> that the operation’s aim is to significantly impair the operational capabilities, weaponry and supply networks of the IRGC and its Iranian-backed proxies.</p>
<p>The strikes targeted key assets such as command and control centers, intelligence facilities, storage locations for rockets, missiles, drones and logistics and munitions facilities. The goal is not only to degrade their current operational infrastructure but also to deter future attacks. </p>
<p>The action followed the discovery of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-drone-that-killed-soldiers-was-iranian-made-sources-2024-02-01/">Iranian-made drone</a> used in an attack on Jordan. </p>
<p>In a broader strategy to counter these groups, the U.S. has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">implemented new sanctions</a> against IRGC officers and officials, unsealed criminal charges against individuals involved in selling oil to benefit Hamas and Hezbollah, and conducted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">cyberattacks</a> against Iran.</p>
<h2>How will this affect Iran’s strategy in the region?</h2>
<p>Prior to the U.S. response on Feb. 2, Kataib Hezbollah, a group linked to Iran, announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-suspends-military-operations-us-forces-statement-2024-01-30/">a halt</a> in attacks on American targets – a move seen as recognizing the serious implications of the Jordan drone incident. </p>
<p>It is possible that the cessation was the result of pressure from Tehran, though this has been <a href="https://thehill.com/newsletters/morning-report/4443950-us-plan-retaliate-against-iran-takes-shape/">met with skepticism</a> in Washington.</p>
<p>But the development nonetheless speaks to the interplay of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">influence and autonomy</a> among the so-called Axis of Resistance groups, which oppose U.S. presence in the Middle East and are supported by Iran <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">to varying</a> degrees.</p>
<p>The U.S. airstrikes – <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">combined with sanctions and charges</a> – serve as a multifaceted strategy to deter further aggression from Iran and its proxies. By targeting critical infrastructure such as command and control centers, intelligence operations and weapons storage facilities, the approach aims to undermine Iran’s ability to project power in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">comprehensive and broad nature</a> of the U.S. response signals a robust stance against threats to regional stability and U.S. interests.</p>
<p>The aim is to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, while squeezing its support for regional proxies. This underscores a commitment by the U.S. to counter Iranian influence that could potentially weaken Tehran’s regional engagement strategies, negotiation positions and capacity to form alliances.</p>
<p>However, the effectiveness of airstrikes and sanctions in deterring Iranian-backed aggression remains uncertain. Historical <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">trends suggest</a> that similar U.S. actions since the Oct. 7 Hamas assault in Israel, and as far back as 2017, have not completely halted attacks from Iranian-backed groups.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s approach seeks to navigate this landscape without <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/02/politics/us-strikes-iraq-syria/index.html">escalating the conflict</a>, focusing on <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-31/iran-hamas-gaza-israel-war-terrorism">targeting</a> the financial mechanisms that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">support Iranian proxies</a>. Yet the impact and repercussions of such sanctions on Iran and the broader regional dynamics is complex.</p>
<p>In the short term, any direct U.S. retaliation against Iranian interests could heighten regional tensions and exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>Iran’s “<a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">forward defense” strategy</a> – focused on addressing threats externally before they become ones within its borders – would suggest that Iran will continue to support proxies through weaponry, funding and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/how-iran-and-its-allies-hope-to-save-hamas/">tactical knowledge</a> to reduce the influence and legitimacy of the U.S. and its allies in the region.</p>
<p>This underscores the delicate balance required in responding to Iranian-backed aggression – aiming to safeguard U.S. interests while preventing an escalation into a wider regional confrontation.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: Parts of this story were included in <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">an article</a> published on Jan. 29, 2024.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 85 locations linked to militias were hit in a robust response by Washington to an earlier deadly drone attack on a US base in Jordan.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214762024-02-01T17:22:52Z2024-02-01T17:22:52ZGaza: weaponisation of food has been used in conflicts for centuries – but it hasn’t always resulted in victory<p>More than <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/500000-people-gaza-face-catastrophic-hunger-unrwa/story?id=106593939">half a million Gazans</a> are currently facing “catastrophic hunger”, according to UN agencies. Reducing access to food is being used as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/health/gaza-hunger-starvation.html">weapon in Gaza</a> by the Israeli government. </p>
<p>Denying food to a civilian population is a tactic that has been <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/hunger-and-war/">used in conflicts</a> for centuries. Starvation and malnutrition provide the attacker with a number of <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1160939.pdf">advantages</a>. At the tactical level the enemy is denied mobility, is unable to sustain law and order among its population as vital foodstuffs become scarce, and the will to fight diminishes. Also the physical ability to fight is likely to erode. </p>
<p>Weakened bodies become susceptible to disease, while fear and hopelessness are enhanced due to the body’s inability to provide the brain with required nutrients. Fighters watch their families suffering and this can <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/13444479_Stress_Reactions_of_Children_and_Adolescents_in_War_and_Siege_Conditions">create doubt and guilt</a> in their minds.</p>
<p>There are similarities between Israel’s tactic and the way <a href="https://aoav.org.uk/2020/the-effects-of-strategic-bombing-in-wwii-on-german-morale/">strategic bombing in the second world war</a> and the <a href="https://files.libcom.org/files/blockade%20Germany_0.pdf">allied blockade of Germany</a> in the first world war aimed to make the civilian population unwilling to support their government’s war effort. Drastically reducing access to food is a <a href="https://archive.blogs.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/2013/10/CHE-Project-IHL-and-SC-Practice-concerning-Urban-Siege-Operations.pdf">punitive and indiscriminate attack</a> on the morale and will of an opponent.</p>
<p>Restricting food reaching the people of Gaza is a strategy sometimes called <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2023/10/israeli-deterrence-hamas-gaza">deterrence by punishment</a>. Weakening Gazans by limiting their access to food, as well as conducting bombing raids, allows the Israelis to conserve their conventional land forces in case the conflict escalates and those forces are required to face other enemies. </p>
<p>The strategy also signals to potential adversaries the severe actions and levels of commitment Israel <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2023/10/israeli-deterrence-hamas-gaza">is prepared to go</a> to in search of victory, and to rebuild the image of Israel’s ability to defend itself, which was damaged after the October 7 attacks.</p>
<h2>Sieges in history</h2>
<p>Sieges are typically associated <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/urban-warfare-sieges-and-israels-looming-invasion-of-gaza/">with an aggressor</a> encircling a defender, and controlling access to a city with implications for food supply. One of the earliest recorded sieges, a military operation to force the population to give up control, was the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3855517">battle of Megiddo</a> in present day Israel, during the 15th century BC. </p>
<p>Egyptians besieged the city for seven months. The city’s name when translated <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/biblical-city-armageddon-signs-early-vanilla-and-elaborate-medical-care#:%7E:text=DENVER%E2%80%94Looming%20over%20a%20strategic,also%20a%20surprisingly%20cosmopolitan%20place.">from Hebrew gives us the modern word armageddon</a>, meaning a terrible battle that may lead to the destruction of the world. </p>
<p>Another example is the battle for the <a href="https://www.military.com/history/7-most-incredible-sieges-military-history.html">Spanish city of Ceuta</a>. Believed to be the <a href="https://militarymaps.rct.uk/miscellaneous/siege-of-ceuta-1720-plan-of-the-front-of-ceuta">longest siege</a> in history, it lasted 26 years. The Moroccans eventually took the city in 1720, but it was recaptured when Spain brought in thousands of reinforcements. </p>
<p>In more modern times, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union during the second world war it laid siege to the former imperial capital of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). German forces cut off the city for 872 days. Very few supplies got through to Leningrad until January 1943, and the city itself would not be relieved until January 1944. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC313894/">630,000 people died of hunger</a>. </p>
<p>Starvation is a powerful tool on the battlefield, producing crippling and destructive effects as efficient in many ways as bombing, though it takes longer for the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/urban-warfare-sieges-and-israels-looming-invasion-of-gaza/">necessary effects to take place</a>.</p>
<p>At the strategic level the fear of starvation, disease and civil breakdown creates a powerful deterrent. The idea of women and children <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/17/4/699/5721410">indiscriminately being subjected</a> to the horror of conflict weighs heavily in the mind of leaders of conflicts, often causing doubt and disunity. </p>
<p>Sellers of foodstuffs and tradespeople fear disruption to their trade and economic welfare, bringing even more pressure to bear on those leaders to acquiesce and find a peaceful solution, even if it means compromise and strategic defeat. Images and stories of humans starving to death evoke primal emotions, which have a <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2451/RAND_RR2451.pdf">powerful effect on policy and decision making</a> in times of conflict. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/setting-the-record-straight-on-attrition/">attritional siege-like strategy</a> is used to avoid costly losses to a state’s own forces in unfavourable terrain or conditions, such as urban warfare, mountain warfare, jungle warfare or having to retake large areas of territory with <a href="https://www.rand.org/topics/urban-warfare.html">limited land forces</a>. </p>
<p>Reducing access to food to attack the morale and will of a group to resist is not always successful in terms of creating the environment for victory or deterrence. Aggressors sometimes gain control of a city or area for a short time only, as was true in Stalingrad. </p>
<p>The use of food as a weapon, in Gaza represents the same <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-19/israel-netanyahu-biden-gaza-blinken-saudi-civilian-deaths-palestinian-state">dangerous double-edged sword</a> it has throughout history. </p>
<p>The tactical action can create the motivation for previously divided or splintered groups to come together in the face of <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2451.html.">unspecific and general terror</a>. Neutral parties, and allies, can view depriving women and children of food as being indicative of a state or group that is not to be associated with, causing a loss of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/oct/24/obama-israel-food-water-gaza">moral high ground</a>. That momentum can gather pace and build alliances between those who wish to defeat any nation that <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2451.html.">would wield such an indiscriminate weapon</a>. </p>
<p>And as far as deterring other future acts of aggression, the use of food as a weapon may only create future enemies, or at the very least, alienate friends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221476/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Starvation is used as a military strategy to avoid costly losses to one’s own forces in unfavourable terrain or conditions.Greg Kennedy, Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy and Director of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.