tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/iran-1870/articlesIran – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:58:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265702024-03-28T12:58:02Z2024-03-28T12:58:02ZMoscow terror attack showed growing reach of ISIS-K – could the US be next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584987/original/file-20240328-18-qt434b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C270%2C5115%2C3160&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 140 people died in the Crocus City Hall assualt in Moscow on March 22, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-shows-the-burning-crocus-city-hall-concert-hall-news-photo/2097708778?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">deadly attack in Moscow</a> on March 22, 2024, exposed the vulnerability of the Russian capital to the threat of the Islamic State group and its affiliate ISIS-K. But it also displayed the reach of the network, leading some <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/03/26/isis-k-moscow-attack/">terror experts to ponder</a>: Could a U.S. city be next?</p>
<p>There has not been a mass casualty assault in the U.S. carried out in the name of the Islamic State group since 2017, when a truck <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/sayfullo-saipov-be-sentenced-life-prison-2017-truck-attack-isis">mowed down cyclists and pedestrians on a New York City bikeway</a>, leaving eight dead.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-islamic-state-five-years-later-persistent-threats-u-s-options/">five years after the Islamic State group’s territorial defeat</a> in Baghuz, Syria, had prompted hopes that the terrorist network was in terminal decline, a recent spate of attacks has thrust the group back into the spotlight. On the same day as the Moscow atrocity, an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/21/at-least-three-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-afghan-city-of-kandahar">ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan</a>, resulted in the deaths of at least 21 people.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">terrorism expert and a scholar</a> specializing in radical Islamist militant groups and the geographical scope of their attacks, I believe these incidents underscore the growing threat of ISIS-K both within the region it draws support from and on an international scale. </p>
<h2>Amplifying influence</h2>
<p>A successful terror attack on a Western capital is certainly something ISIS-K, or Islamic State Khorasan Province, aspires to. The intent behind the group’s activities is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">bolster its position among jihadist factions</a> by means of audacious and sophisticated attacks.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man sits looking at screens with Tome, Madrid and London on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An image released by pro-Islamic State media outlet Al Battar Foundation reads ‘After Moscow, who is next?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/posters-pro-islamic-state-isis-media-groups-celebrate-moscow-attack-threaten-and-incite-further">Al-Battar Foundation</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is a strategy that showcases ISIS-K’s capabilities for spectacular operations, distinguishing it from potential rival groups. But it also enhances ISIS-K’s appeal, attracting both supporters and resources in the shape of funding and fighters.</p>
<p>By establishing a unique identity in a crowded extremist landscape, ISIS-K aims to undercut its competitors’ influence and assert its dominance in the jihadist sphere of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/25/the-strange-story-behind-the-khorasan-groups-name/">Khorasan region</a> it targets, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other Central Asian countries.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s ambition <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/moscow-concert-hall-attack-will-have-far-reaching-impact">extends</a> beyond territorial control, engaging in a broader contest for ideological supremacy and resource acquisition globally.</p>
<h2>An expanding threat</h2>
<p>This global reach and ambition are evident in ISIS-K’s recent planned operations.</p>
<p>These include a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kerman-us-warning-isisk-bombings-bcb47f04165b3eb7b9bc7b4868c8399c">suicide bombing in Iran</a> in January 2024 and thwarted attacks across Europe, notably <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/4418496-germany-netherlands-arrest-9-over-alleged-plan-attacks-line-isis">the foiled plots</a> in Germany and the Netherlands in July 2023.</p>
<p>And without a doubt, a successful attack in the United States is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-could-be-first-afghan-terror-group-to-put-us-in-its-sights/6241617.html">seen within ISIS-K’s hierarchy as a major goal</a>.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/25/1240780292/us-officials-warn-of-isis-k-threat">officials in the Biden administration have repeatedly</a> warned of ISIS-K’s escalating danger to American interests, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-mocks-us-hysteria">propaganda has persistently framed</a> the U.S. as its principal enemy – a narrative that is fueled by America’s <a href="https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/">extensive</a> military and economic efforts to dismantle Islamic State operations since 2014.</p>
<p>The United States’ involvement, especially in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">collaboration</a> with the Taliban — ISIS-K’s primary regional adversary — has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108344/text">placed America firmly</a> in the group’s crosshairs. </p>
<p>Employing <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CTC-Beyond-the-Caliphate-Belgium.pdf">tactics refined during</a> the period that the Islamic State group was most active, ISIS-K seeks to inspire lone-wolf attacks and radicalize individuals in the U.S.</p>
<p>The 2015 mass shooting in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html">San Bernardino</a>, California, which left 14 dead, and the 2016 shooting at a nightclub in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/index.html">Orlando</a>, Florida, that resulted in at least 49 deaths, were both attacks inspired by the Islamic State group.</p>
<h2>Targeting major powers</h2>
<p>Taking its lead from the Islamic State group, ISIS-K in 2022 <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/09/islamic-state-afghanistan-khorasan-propaganda-russia-ukraine-war/">publicly condemned</a> America, calling it an enemy of Islam.</p>
<p>Of course, ISIS-K had by then already demonstrated its intention to harm U.S. interests, notably in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/us-to-conduct-new-interviews-into-the-deadly-2021-bombing-at-kabul-airport">2021 Kabul airport attack</a> in which 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans were killed.</p>
<p>ISIS-K views the U.S. in much the same way as it does Russia: both as a military and an ideological foe.</p>
<p>Russia became a prime target due in part to its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">partnering with the Bashar al-Assad government</a> in Syria in operations against Islamic State group affiliates. Similarly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/">Washington has worked with the Taliban</a> in Afghanistan in countering ISIS-K operations.</p>
<p>While it is easier for ISIS-K to penetrate Russian territory, given the country’s geographical proximity to major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/islamic-state-recruiting-militants-from-tajikistan-and-other-central-asian-countries">Islamist recruitment centers, such as Tajikistan</a>, the potential for strikes in the United States remains significant. </p>
<p>In 2023, U.S. authorities <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/29/politics/migrants-us-southern-border-smuggler-isis-ties/index.html">investigated</a> a group of Uzbek nationals suspected of entering the country from Mexico with the assistance of traffickers linked to the Islamic State group, underscoring the group’s threat.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The wreckage of a truck under a blue sheet is seen being towed away." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C2314%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eight people died in a truck attack in New York City in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BikePathAttack/c09a4360d6b74c0c968a3897dbfa37f0/photo?Query=hudson%20bike%20%20attack&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38&currentItemNo=27">AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Targeting American interests serve multiple purposes for ISIS-K. By striking against the U.S., ISIS-K not only retaliates against Washington’s counterterrorism efforts but also aims to deter U.S. involvement in regions of interest to ISIS-K.</p>
<p>It also taps into historical grievances against the U.S. and Western interventions in Muslim countries – from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the stationing of U.S. troops in significant Islamic centers in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/osama-bin-laden">notably Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<h2>Countering a persistent threat</h2>
<p>In response to the growing threat of Islamic State group affiliates, the United States has <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf">adopted a comprehensive strategy</a> combining military, intelligence and law enforcement efforts. </p>
<p>Military operations have targeted ISIS-K leaders and infrastructure in Afghanistan, while security cooperation with regional and international <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-uzbekistan-relations/">partners such as Uzbekistan</a> continues to monitor and counter the group’s activities. </p>
<p>On the home front, law enforcement and homeland security agencies remain vigilant, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023-03-28%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Mayorkas.pdf">working to identify</a> and thwart potential ISIS-K plots.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-cia-terrorism-government-and-politics-87fb25aa94f4e4a8a46d82368f907be9">many experts had warned</a>, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has posed new challenges, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/al-qaeda-a-defeated-threat-think-again/">inadvertently transforming</a> that country once again into a safe haven and operational base for terrorist groups.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">retreat has also resulted</a> in a significant loss of on-the-ground intelligence amid <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html">doubts</a> over the efficacy of relying on the Taliban for counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">Taliban are struggling</a> to prevent or counteract ISIS-K attacks within their own borders.</p>
<p>The successful ISIS-K plots against Iran and Russia also reveal another vulnerability: When a country is distracted or <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-k-allowed-slipped-into-moscow-massacre-because-war-zelenskyy-2024-3#:%7E:text=The%20war%20in%20Ukraine%20distracted,in%20his%20Saturday%20night%20address.">preoccupied with other security concerns or conflicts</a>, it can potentially compromise the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>Recent years have witnessed a decrease in high-profile attacks by groups like the Islamic State, leading many to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-sees-islamic-state-effectiveness-decreasing-but-analysts-warn-resurgence-still-possible-/7238289.html">conclude</a> that the threat was waning. As a result, global attention — and with it, intelligence and security resources — has shifted toward escalating power rivalries and conflicts across the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.</p>
<p>Yet, this shift risks underestimating the enduring threat terrorist groups pose, laying bare the dangers of complacency.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack emphasizes ISIS-K’s resolve to expand its influence, raising concerns about the potential threat to Western nations, including the United States. Considering ISIS-K’s track record and clear aspirations, it would be naive to dismiss the possibility of an attack on American soil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spate of terror operations carried out by the Islamic State group affiliate has raised concerns over a potential attack on US soil.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261202024-03-20T04:45:08Z2024-03-20T04:45:08ZThe government is fighting a new High Court case on immigration detainees. What’s it about and what’s at stake?<p>The government will be on tenterhooks again next month when the High Court of Australia hears another case that could lead to the release of a further cohort of people currently in immigration detention. </p>
<p>Given the ongoing political fallout of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/high-court-reasons-on-immigration-ruling-pave-way-for-further-legislation-218699">previous controversial</a> High Court case, the outcome of this one will be closely watched.</p>
<p>So why is this new case so significant, and how does it differ from the last one?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-governments-preventative-detention-bill-heres-how-the-laws-will-work-and-what-they-mean-for-australias-detention-system-219226">What is the government's preventative detention bill? Here's how the laws will work and what they mean for Australia's detention system</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What is the case about?</h2>
<p>The case is called <em>ASF17 v Commonwealth</em>. It concerns an <a href="https://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/07-Perth/p7-2024/ASF17-Cth-App.pdf">Iranian citizen</a> who has been held in immigration detention for ten years. He failed in his application for a protection visa and is therefore subject to an obligation that he be deported as soon as reasonably practicable. </p>
<p>However, he has hindered his deportation (or “frustrated” it, in legal terms) by refusing to meet with Iranian officials to secure the travel documents needed for his return to Iran. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oIAuaKhQMXU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>He says he has good reason not to want to be returned to Iran because he is bisexual, has converted to Christianity, is Kurdish and has opposed the mistreatment of women by the Iranian government. </p>
<p>He says he fears for his life if he is removed to Iran, but he is prepared to cooperate in his removal to any country other than Iran.</p>
<p>The Commonwealth has accepted there is no prospect of his removal to any country other than Iran. It has also accepted that he cannot be removed to Iran without his cooperation, as Iran does not accept involuntary removals. </p>
<p>So does this mean he’ll be released in accordance with the High Court’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-laws-to-deal-with-immigration-detainees-were-rushed-leading-to-legal-risks-219384">previous <em>NZYQ</em> case</a>? </p>
<h2>How is this different from the previous case?</h2>
<p>You might remember the <em>NZYQ</em> case from late last year. In it, the court found a stateless Rohingya refugee, who couldn’t secure a visa because of previous criminal convictions, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-10/asylum-seekers-indefinite-detention-to-be-released/103088762">couldn’t be held</a> in indefinite detention. This was because there was “no real prospect of his removal from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future”. </p>
<p>The decision overturned a 2004 precedent and triggered the release of at least <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-12/half-released-immigration-detainees-convicted-violent-offending/103455458">149 other detainees</a> in similar situations.</p>
<p>The Commonwealth has argued ASF17’s case falls into a different category, because whether there is a practical prospect of removal must be assessed on the basis that the detainee is cooperating. </p>
<p>When the case was first heard in the Federal Court, the Commonwealth argued that when assessing whether there is a practical prospect of deporting a detainee, delays caused by the detainee not cooperating shouldn’t be taken into account. This is regardless of whatever may be the reasons for his or her non-cooperation. </p>
<p>Justice Colvin, in the Federal Court, <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/FCA/2024/7.html">accepted</a> the Commonwealth’s argument. He pointed out that the reasons for refusal to cooperate, including fear of persecution on return to Iran, were matters separately dealt with during his application for a protection visa. </p>
<p>Once the detainee had reached the end of his appeals on this point, he was being held solely for the purpose of removal from Australia, so the reasons for his concerns could not be revisited. </p>
<p>Justice Colvin concluded that the assessment of whether there was a real prospect of his removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future then had to be made on the basis of the detainee’s cooperation in taking relevant steps towards deportation. This was the case even if the detainee refused to act. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-laws-to-deal-with-immigration-detainees-were-rushed-leading-to-legal-risks-219384">New laws to deal with immigration detainees were rushed, leading to legal risks</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The appeal to the High Court</h2>
<p>ASF17 then appealed to the Full Federal Court, and the Commonwealth government successfully sought the removal of this case directly into the High Court. This is because the lower courts have not been acting consistently on this point. </p>
<p>For example, in <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/FCA/2023/1497.html"><em>AZC20 v Secretary, Department of Home Affairs (No 2)</em></a>, an Iranian detainee who had never been convicted of a crime and had been held in detention for ten years was ordered to be released, despite the fact he was refusing to cooperate with his removal to Iran (although he was prepared to cooperate with his removal to any other country). The Commonwealth therefore wants the High Court to resolve the uncertainty and give a clear decision.</p>
<p>Previously, in its <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2023/37.html"><em>NZYQ</em> judgment</a>, the High Court distinguished that case from cases in which the detainee seeks to frustrate attempts to deport them. </p>
<p>This justifies the Commonwealth’s approach of treating detainees who have frustrated their deportation as being in a different category. It still, however, leaves it open to the High Court to decide whether they should be released or remain in detention. </p>
<p>In the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2019/17.html">past</a>, the High Court has not been sympathetic to those who have sought to thwart their deportation by telling falsehoods about their identity, noting that the courts are disinclined to allow a party to take advantage of his or her own wrongful conduct. </p>
<p>But whether honest non-cooperation, as opposed to falsehoods, would be treated the same way remains to be seen.</p>
<h2>How many detainees will be affected?</h2>
<p>The decision in this case is likely to affect a wider cohort of people in immigration detention who cannot be deported because they have refused to cooperate. <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-unwanted-high-court-to-determine-the-fate-of-another-127-in-limbo-20240318-p5fdah.html">Some countries</a>, such as Iran, do not accept the involuntary return of their citizens, which means detainees can prevent their deportation to these countries by refusing to cooperate. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/mar/20/australia-asf17-immigration-detainees-high-court-challenge-more-than-170-could-be-freed">The Guardian</a>, a leaked government document estimated that about 170 people currently in detention could be affected, although the minister has refused to discuss numbers or the details of the case while it is before the courts.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/high-court-reasons-on-immigration-ruling-pave-way-for-further-legislation-218699">High Court reasons on immigration ruling pave way for further legislation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>If the High Court were to decide that a person could prevent their deportation by refusing to cooperate and could use this to cause their release into the community, it would give detainees a great incentive to refuse cooperation in deportation matters. </p>
<p>The Commonwealth has strong arguments on its side, but as always it is a matter for the High Court ultimately to decide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226120/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Twomey has received grants from the ARC and occasionally does consultancy work for governments, Parliaments and inter-governmental bodies. She is also a consultant with Gilbert + Tobin Lawyers, which does pro bono work for refugee claimants.</span></em></p>The government will head back to the High Court next month for another immigration case. If it loses, there could be wide-ranging consequences.Anne Twomey, Professor emerita, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231382024-03-05T14:01:07Z2024-03-05T14:01:07ZDespite UN warnings, Iran’s execution of Kurds and political dissidents continues unchecked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578993/original/file-20240229-20-8v75py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=57%2C173%2C7571%2C4955&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Human rights activists gather in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 27, 2024, to condemn executions of political dissidents in Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/washington-dc-united-states-iranian-members-of-the-diaspora-news-photo/1963642261?adppopup=true">Ali Khaligh/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 2022 death of Jîna Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman held in police custody for wearing her hijab inappropriately, Iranian demonstrators have protested against the repressive regime and the surge of executions of ethnic and religious political dissidents. </p>
<p>In the first 11 months of 2023, Iran <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/iran">had executed 746 people</a>, prompting United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to observe that Iran was carrying them out “<a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4289500-united-nations-iran-carrying-out-executions-at-alarming-rate/">at an alarming rate</a>.”</p>
<p>So far in 2024, Iran <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/01/iran-executions-of-protester-with-mental-disability-and-kurdish-man-mark-plunge-into-new-realms-of-cruelty/">has executed</a> at least eight Kurdish political prisoners, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-executes-four-people-it-says-are-linked-israeli-intelligence-state-media-2024-01-29/">including four</a> on Jan. 29, 2024, who were convicted on dubious charges such as <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-executes-3-protests-mahsa-amini-death/">waging war against God</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-executions-the-role-of-the-revolutionary-courts-in-breaching-human-rights-197534">corruption on Earth</a>.</p>
<p>As a Kurdish-born scholar and <a href="https://cah.ucf.edu/languages/faculty-staff/profile/414">a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Central Florida</a>, I have previously written about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-across-iran-continues-under-states-extreme-gender-apartheid-183766">“Women, Life, Freedom” movement</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-in-turkish-attack-include-thousands-of-female-fighters-who-battled-islamic-state-125100">the Kurdish female fighters</a> who focus on the protection of women’s rights and <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-in-iran-will-continue-until-religious-rule-ends-90352">protests by the Iranian people against</a> their government.</p>
<p>Those demonstrations includes protests against Iran’s use of the death penalty that, according to a 2022 the U.S. Department of State report, “<a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/">disproportionately affected religious and ethnic minorities</a>.”</p>
<p>With hardliners maintaining their grip on parliament after the election held on March 1, 2024, the plight of ethnic and religious minorities remains <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/23/iran-2-detainees-executed-11-await-imminent-execution">an ongoing tragedy</a> with no end in sight. Because of a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/01/iran-elections-low-turnout-and-boycott-expected.html">nationwide boycott of the election</a>, voter turnout was estimated <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/04/middleeast/iran-low-turnout-election-intl/index.html">at less than 41%</a>, the lowest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.</p>
<p>As human rights organization Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/iran-chilling-execution-spree-with-escalating-use-of-death-penalty-against-persecuted-ethnic-minorities/">warned in 2023</a>, the Iranian authorities had embarked on an “execution spree.” </p>
<h2>Separate and unequal</h2>
<p>In late November 2023, human rights groups reported intense crackdowns on protesters in two Kurdish cities. In one of them, Mahabad, authorities have declared <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211206594">martial law</a>. In another, Javanrud, people have been found massacred and the government accused of ethnic cleansing, according to <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Massacre-in-Javanrud-Iran-Violations-Report.pdf">the Center for Human Rights in Iran and Kurdistan Human Rights Network</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Several cars are unable to move through thousands of demonstrators." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of demonstrators stop traffic in Iran on Sept. 19, 2022, to protest the death of Jîna Mahsa Amini while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-in-protest-against-the-death-of-mahsa-amini-news-photo/1426271257?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This Kurdish region of Iran has been the epicenter for <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-death-widespread-protests-intl-hnk/index.html">nationwide protests</a> that erupted in September 2022 since Amini’s death.</p>
<p>Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini established <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34550377">the Revolutionary Courts</a>
which have supreme power over the general courts and were designed to protect the revolution from any and all perceived enemies of the state. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men with rifles kneel in front of several men who are wearing blindfolds." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 1979 image, an Iranian government firing squad executes 11 Kurdish men.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/government-firing-squad-executed-nine-kurdish-rebels-and-news-photo/1155287072?adppopup=true">Jahangir Razmi/ Bettmann Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most death sentences of the regime’s opponents have been carried out by these courts. The executions are often based on vague charges and forced confessions, many of which are broadcast on state-owned national television. A study by <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/iran/iran-new-report-demands-end-to-the-rampant-use-of-forced-confessions">the International Federation for Human Rights</a> revealed that between 2009 and 2019, Iranian media broadcast 355 such forced confessions.</p>
<h2>Ethnic and religious persecutions</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, the discrimination against the Kurds and other minorities in Iran remains overlooked, and it is even enshrined in the constitution. </p>
<p>In Iran, where people of non-Persian ethnicities constitute more than half of the population and speak nearly <a href="https://iranatlas.net/index.html">100 different languages and dialects</a>, <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">Article 15</a> of the Iranian Constitution recognizes only Persian/Farsi as “the official language” and script of Iran. </p>
<p>As a result, ethnic minorities like the Kurds are prohibited from learning or teaching their own languages. </p>
<p>The law is strictly enforced. In 2020, for instance, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Courts sentenced <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/iran-how-kill-language/">Zara Mohammadi</a> to 10 years in prison for teaching Kurdish, her native tongue. </p>
<p>Ten years earlier, Kurdish primary school teacher <a href="https://barricadejournal.org/volume-5/heirs-of-poetry-and-rain/?fbclid=IwAR2Ef4eDZXNn1351sSIiIfvc3gMMv8M5uyBxz6Wnp2SJ1oFA7o01f8wpobI">Farzad Kamangar</a> was executed for advocating for greater cultural and political self-determination for the Kurds. </p>
<p>Criminalizing religious minorities is also permitted in the constitution of the Islamic republic. </p>
<p>Iran’s <a href="http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">Constitution names</a> the Twelver Ja’fari School of Shi’a Islam as the state religion. This excludes the Sunni Kurds, Baha’is and other religious minorities from the minimal protections granted by Iran’s Constitution. Not surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/iran">Baha’is and Sunnis</a> remain <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-releases-report-religious-freedom-iran#:%7E:text=In%20its%202023%20Annual%20Report,and%20egregious%20religious%20freedom%20violations">the most persecuted</a> religious minorities in Iran. </p>
<h2>Ending ‘hell on earth’</h2>
<p>Jîna Mahsa Amini’s death unleashed a wave of nationwide protests in Iran that <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-across-iran-continues-under-states-extreme-gender-apartheid-183766">called for dismantling the state’s gender apartheid</a> as well as systemic ethnic, racial and religious discrimination, particularly in Sunni- and Kurdish-dominated cities.</p>
<p>Human rights organizations <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-execution-gaza-war-hamas-b2457548.html">have accused Iran</a> of exploiting the current international focus on Gaza to exact revenge on dissidents.</p>
<p>“Since the start of the war, there has been little international focus on the human rights situation in Iran, and there has been no substantial response to the significant increase in executions,” said <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/dec/02/iran-using-gaza-conflict-as-cover-to-step-up-executions-of-protesters">Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam</a>, the director of Iran Human Rights, a nonprofit human rights organization. </p>
<p>Amiry-Moghaddam explained that his organization <a href="https://www.iranhr.net/en/articles/5594/">has compiled data</a> that shows the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown has disproportionately targeted ethnic and religious minorities.</p>
<p>In my view, the current “killing spree” defies the demands of the Iranian people and the Kurds to end the executions and to expel Iran from the U.N. under <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art6.shtml">Article 6, Chapter II</a> of the U.N. charter for the regime’s persistent violation of human rights principles since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. </p>
<p>As former U.N. Secretary-General <a href="https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/dealing-crimes-humanity/">Dag Hammarskjöld</a> once said, the U.N. “was created not to lead mankind to heaven but to save humanity from hell.” </p>
<p>For the long-suffering, stateless Kurdish nation, the U.N. has so far failed to rescue them from their hell on earth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the wake of the death of Jîna Mahsa Amini in police custody in 2022, Iranian authorities have executed political dissenters at what the UN chief described as ‘an alarming rate.’Haidar Khezri, Assistant Professor of Modern Languages, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248042024-02-29T17:47:45Z2024-02-29T17:47:45ZIranian parliamentary election: what people are voting for and why it’s different this time<p>Iranian voters head to the polls on March 1 to elect the country’s next parliament and the powerful Assembly of Experts. The result is likely to be a foregone conclusion, given the tight control that the Islamic Republic holds over who can run for office. But the way the election plays out – and its significance – may be different to normal.</p>
<p>Every four years the public get to vote for the 290 members of the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/parliament">Iranian parliament</a> (also known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly). The parliament is the legislature of the country, and its members are responsible for drafting legislation, approving the annual budget and any international treaties or agreements. It is not responsible for foreign or nuclear policy.</p>
<p>At the same time, elections are being held for the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/assembly-experts">Assembly of Experts</a>, which serves an eight-year term and is imbued under the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989">Iranian constitution</a> to monitor, dismiss and elect the supreme leader. </p>
<p>Despite Iranians being able to vote, there are a number of limitations to the democratic process in Iran. Most notably, all candidates are vetted by the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm">Guardian Council</a> – an unelected body – hence removing a significant element of choice. </p>
<p>Of the 49,000 people who registered to run for parliament this year, <a href="https://www.shora-gc.ir/en/news/243/over-14000-candidates-approved-for-irans-parliamentary-elections">14,200 applicants</a> were approved. This has involved the disqualification of many reformist and centrist conservatives and has left mainly right-wing conservatives vying for posts. </p>
<p>In fact, only 30 reformists have been approved to run for office, leaving them <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402204964">to claim</a> that the elections are “meaningless, non-competitive, unfair, and ineffective in the administration of the country”.</p>
<p>In the Assembly of Experts, 144 candidates have been approved to run for the 88 seats. But the centrist and reformist former president, <a href="https://twitter.com/hassanrouhani?lang=en">Hassan Rouhani</a>, has been <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iran/2024/01/24/irans-rouhani-says-he-is-banned-from-running-in-march-election-for-elite-assembly/">banned from seeking re-election</a>. This has further cemented the Assembly of Experts as a stronghold of conservatives and ultra-conservatives.</p>
<p>The names of the final candidates were also released very late – just two weeks before the election. This has allowed little time for campaigning or, more importantly, for the public to get to know who they are supposed to be voting for.</p>
<h2>It’s different this time around</h2>
<p>There are three important points to note about this election. First, this is the first election since the death of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/what-happened-to-mahsa-zhina-amini/">Mahsa Amini</a>. Amini died in police custody in September 2022, at the age of 26, after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for violating the country’s strict Islamic dress code. </p>
<p>Her death led to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2022/12/06/mahsa-amini-the-spark-that-ignited-a-women-led-revolution/">widespread protests</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/16/iran-one-year-after-the-death-of-mahsa-amini">across Iran</a> which were met with a brutal crackdown. And while these “woman, life, freedom” protests, may have largely died down after 18 months, they <a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-activism-in-iran-continues-despite-street-protests-dying-down-in-face-of-state-repression-213514">continue via online activism and civil disobedience</a>. </p>
<p>Therefore, this election is likely to see some response from these events, with women and young people wanting to continue the protest through the ballot box.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-activism-in-iran-continues-despite-street-protests-dying-down-in-face-of-state-repression-213514">Women's activism in Iran continues, despite street protests dying down in face of state repression</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Second, there is expected to be a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/28/middleeast/iran-election-parliament-turnout-low-jihad-vote-mime-intl/index.html">low turnout</a>. Voting turnout has been on the decline in Iranian elections for some time, but increasing dissatisfaction with the voting choice, combined with apathy and frustration over the lack of change in the country means that many voters are planning to stay away from the ballot box.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.etemadonline.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/652287-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85">recent poll</a> suggested that national turnout is likely to be at 35% and only 18% in the capital, Tehran. By comparison, the <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/2020-parliamentary-election">turnout in 2020 was 42.5%</a> – but this was the lowest it had been since 1979 and was during a global pandemic.</p>
<h2>Succession question</h2>
<p>A low turnout could be problematic for the political leadership, who rely on elections to provide a veil of legitimacy over their regime. As a result, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has started a dual pronged campaign of encouraging citizens to vote and blaming the west if they don’t.</p>
<p>Last month he <a href="https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/1759192438504120516">tweeted</a>: “Elections are the main pillar of the Islamic Republic, and they are the way to improve the country. For those who are seeking to solve the problems, the way to do this is the elections.” </p>
<p>He also attended a meeting with people from the East Azerbaijan province and used the opportunity to emphasise that it was the intention of what he called the <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/495092/Enemies-oppose-Iran-elections">“arrogant powers”</a> and the US to encourage people to boycott the elections.</p>
<p>The third point is that the elections are likely to have a greater significance for the future of Islamic Republic than normal. Khamenei is currently 84 years old, so the election of the next supreme leader is likely to happen within the next eight-year term of the Assembly of Experts. </p>
<p>This is why it is thought that the Guardian Council has been so restrictive when it has come to this year’s <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401293591">candidate selection</a> for the Assembly – because this election could secure Iranian succession.</p>
<p>The first results could emerge within 24 hours, although the full tally – and what it means for Iran’s future – may not be clear for some days.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Kettle is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute</span></em></p>Candidates have been pre-approved to favour the religious right.Louise Kettle, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234172024-02-15T13:34:55Z2024-02-15T13:34:55ZWhy the United States needs NATO – 3 things to know<p>Former President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/13/politics/fact-check-trump-nato/index.html">long made it clear that he deeply resents</a> NATO, a 75-year-old military alliance that is composed of the United States and 30 other countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">Trump escalated his criticism</a> of NATO on Feb. 10, 2024, when he said that, if he is elected president again in November 2024, the U.S. would not defend any member country that had not “paid up.” </p>
<p>Trump also said that he would encourage Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, “to do whatever the hell they want” with a NATO member that was “delinquent” in paying for its defense. </p>
<p>NATO is the Western world’s foremost defense organization. It is headquartered in Brussels. The central idea behind NATO’s existence, as explained in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">Article 5</a> of NATO’s 1949 treaty, is that all NATO countries agree to defend any other NATO country in case of an attack. </p>
<p>NATO has no standing army and relies on member countries to volunteer their military forces to carry out any operation. So all NATO countries agree to <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm#:%7E:text=In%202006%2C%20NATO%20Defence%20Ministers,ensure%20the%20Alliance%27s%20military%20readiness.">spend 2% of their annual gross domestic product</a> on military defense in order to support NATO. </p>
<p>Some countries, like the U.S., the U.K., Poland, Finland, Greece and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, devote more than 2% of their GDP to military defense. About half of NATO’s members, including Germany, France, Norway, Spain and Turkey, <a href="https://www.forces.net/news/world/nato-which-countries-pay-their-share-defence#:%7E:text=Ukraine%20war&text=Poland%20is%20the%20alliance%27s%20biggest,3.01%25%20the%20next%20closest.">spend less</a>. </p>
<p>NATO leader Jens Stoltenberg said in a written statement on Feb. 11 that <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html#">Trump’s suggestion</a> “undermines all of our security, including that of the U.S., and puts American and European soldiers at increased risk.” Other political leaders also criticized Trump’s comments as highly dangerous. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=bs9WVS0AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of history and international affairs,</a> it is clear to me that Trump does not seem to understand the many advantages the U.S. gets from being part of NATO. Here are three major benefits for the U.S. that come with NATO membership: </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two cookies are seen on a plate - one has frosting designed like the American flag, and the other is blue with a white compass on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NATO and American flag cookies are seen at a meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Jan. 29, 2024, in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/and-american-flag-cookies-at-a-meeting-between-defense-news-photo/1963151870?adppopup=true">Julia Nikhinson/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1. NATO gives the US reliable allies</h2>
<p>Militarily and economically, the U.S. is a hugely formidable power. It has the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">largest nuclear arsenal</a> on earth and continues to be the largest economy in the world. </p>
<p>Yet, without its allies in Asia, and above all without those in Europe, the U.S would be a much diminished superpower. </p>
<p>NATO provides the U.S. with a leadership position in one of the strongest military alliance networks in the world. This leadership goes well beyond the security realm – it has profound and very positive political and economic ripple effects. For instance, most Western countries <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/03/14/global-arms-sales-us-dominates-russia#">purchase their arms and military</a> equipment from the U.S. </p>
<p>Russia counts controversial regimes known for human rights violations such as Iran, North Korea and, to some extent, China, among its most important allies. The U.S. considers economically strong countries like Canada, Germany, France, Italy and many other established democracies as its friends and allies.</p>
<p>NATO has invoked <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> only once – immediately after the U.S. <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm#:%7E:text=12%20September%202001&text=Later%20that%20day%2C%20the%20Allies,abroad%20against%20the%20United%20States.">was attacked on Sept. 11, 2001</a>. America’s NATO allies were ready to come to the aid of the U.S. – and, for good or for bad, many subsequently participated in the United States’ war in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>2. NATO provides peace and stability</h2>
<p>NATO provides a blanket of protection and mutual security for all its members, helping explain why the vast majority of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/03/30/7-former-communist-countries-join-nato/476d93dc-e4bd-4f05-9a15-5b66d322d0e6/">countries in central and eastern Europe</a> clamored to join NATO after the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union">fall of the Soviet Union</a> in 1991. </p>
<p>Today, Ukraine continues to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3455199/leaders-agree-to-expedite-ukraines-nato-membership/">push for NATO membership</a> – though its application to join appears unlikely to be granted anytime soon, given the military commitment this would create for the alliance. </p>
<p>Russia fought short wars in recent <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91277">years with Moldova</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">Georgia</a> and also with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/">Ukraine prior</a> to 2022, but Putin has not invaded neighboring countries that are NATO members. Invading a NATO country would bring the entire alliance into a war with Russia, which would be a risky gamble for Moscow.</p>
<p>Despite international concern that Russia’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/us/politics/ukraine-war-expansion.html">war in Ukraine could spill over</a> into neighboring NATO countries, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/29/poland-says-russian-missile-briefly-entered-its-airspace#:%7E:text=%22Everything%20indicates%20that%20a%20Russian,from%20%5BNATO%5D%20allies.%22">like Poland</a> and the three Baltic nations, it has not yet happened. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Donald Trump enters a stage with an American flag on it, with blue-lit lighting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Donald Trump arrives at a news conference during the July 2018 NATO summit in Brussels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-arrives-to-speak-to-the-media-at-a-news-photo/996942026?adppopup=true">Sean Gallup/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. NATO has helped the US get stronger</h2>
<p>The Soviet Union’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_138294.htm">military alliance, called the Warsaw Pact</a>, required the USSR and its satellite states in central and eastern Europe, including East Germany, Poland and Hungary, to join. NATO, on the other hand, is a voluntary military alliance, and countries must go through a demanding application process before they are accepted. </p>
<p>The United States’ current presence in Europe – and Asia – has not been imposed by force. Instead, U.S. troops and influence in Europe are generally welcomed by its allies. </p>
<p>By joining NATO and accepting the military leadership of Washington, the other NATO countries give the U.S. unprecedented influence and power. Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad called this an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338602300305">empire by invitation</a>.” This informal empire has deeply anchored the U.S. and its influence in Europe. </p>
<h2>A split in opinion</h2>
<p>President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that under his leadership the U.S. would “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-calls-trumps-nato-remarks-un-american-rcna138670#:%7E:text=%22As%20long%20as%20I%27m,a%20rally%20in%20South%20Carolina.">defend every inch</a> of NATO territory,” speaking primarily in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine. </p>
<p>Biden has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/30/biden-warns-putin-on-nato-threat-as-russia-annexes-ukraine-regions.html">repeatedly warned Putin</a> that he would face the consequences if Russia attacks a NATO member.</p>
<p>For Trump, however, transatlantic solidarity and mutual defense appear to count for nothing. For him, it seems to be all about the money and whether or not NATO countries spend 2% of their GDP on defense. And despite Putin having begun a terrible war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Trump has continued to voice his <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/trump-putin-ukraine-invasion-00010923">admiration of the Russian leader</a>.</p>
<p>Trump does not view Putin’s Russia as an existential threat to the U.S.-led global order. And thus he does not seem to realize that the U.S. and its European allies need protection from Putin’s Russia, the kind of protection offered by NATO. NATO’s existence gives the U.S. strong and reliable allies, provides Washington with great influence in Europe and makes sure that most of Europe remains stable and peaceful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus W. Larres does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump has threatened to not defend some NATO countries if Russia attacks them. But the US also benefits from the power that NATO gives it, as well as the stability it helped create in Europe.Klaus W. Larres, Professor of History and International Affairs, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231392024-02-08T17:51:39Z2024-02-08T17:51:39ZGaza update: Netanyahu knocks back Hamas peace plan while the prospect of mass famine looms ever larger<p>The Israeli military is poised to enter what its defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has referred to as the “last centre of gravity that remains in Hamas’s hands: Rafah”. Unfortunately for many of the 1.7 million people reportedly displaced by Israel’s four-month onslaught in Gaza, this is where more than a million of them have taken refuge, according to the latest estimates.</p>
<p>As the Gaza death toll compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) surpassed 26,750 people, with a further 65,000-plus people wounded, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected a peace deal proposed by Hamas and relayed by Egyptian and Qatari negotiators as “deluded”. </p>
<p>The proposed three-part plan was for a staged cessation of hostilities and prisoner-hostage swap, with the aim of ending the war completely via negotiations to be finalised by the time the final hostages had been returned.</p>
<p>Insisting that “the day after [the war] is the day after Hamas – all of Hamas”, Netanyahu said he intended to press on until Israel had achieved “total victory”.</p>
<p>But Anne Irfan, an expert in the history of the modern Middle East from University College London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">believes</a> the Israeli prime minister may be thinking it is in his own interests to keep the conflict going as long as he can. His personal approval ratings are abysmal – only 15% of Israelis in a recent survey said they thought he should keep his job after the war ends.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the latest developments in Israel's war with Hamas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Israel’s war with Hamas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, Netanyahu is increasingly trapped between the clamour from the families of the Israeli hostages still trapped in Gaza, and the intransigence of the far-right members of his own government who won’t consider doing a deal with Hamas. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">Netanyahu's position becoming more uncertain as Israeli PM rejects Hamas deal to end war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Netanyahu has also resisted international pressure to consider a two-state solution, which would by definition involve a sovereign Palestine, insisting that Israel is the only state that can guarantee regional security in the long term. </p>
<p>Despite Netanyahu’s wholesale rejection of the notion of Palestinian statehood, both the US and UK have said they are considering the possibility of recognising Palestine after the conflict ends. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, said such a move would be “absolutely vital for the long-term peace and security of the region”.</p>
<p>They would be coming into line with much of the rest of the world: 139 of 193 UN members have already recognised the state of Palestine, which has sat in the UN as a “non-member observer state” since 2012, and has already acceded to many of its human rights treaties.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Tonny Raymond Kirabira, an expert in international law at the University of East London, walks us through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">complex issues</a> involved in becoming a state. At the moment, international law dictates that the prerequsites for statehood are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As Kirabira reminds us, questions remains whether Palestine actually possesses a “defined territory” and “effective government”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">UK and US may recognise state of Palestine after Gaza war – what this important step would mean</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>So what is the two-state solution? It’s a vexed issue that has been exercising the minds of peacemakers since before the state of Israel was even formally declared in 1948. An early UN partition plan called for what was then known as the “Mandate of Palestine” – under British control – to be divided into separate Jewish and Arab states.</p>
<p>Andrew Thomas, an expert in the politics of the Middle East from Deakin University in Australia, runs through the various iterations of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">two-state solution</a> since 1948 – and recalls the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jan-egeland-remembers-the-secret-negotiations-that-led-to-the-oslo-accords-podcast-213092">Oslo accords</a> in the 1990s, when the then-Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat, got so close to agreeing a solution which would have recognised Palestine as a state while guaranteeing Israeli security. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">Explainer: what is the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>War crime and punishment</h2>
<p>Netanyahu’s pledge to push on to total victory, meanwhile, flies in the face of demands made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) more than a week ago. The ICJ ordered Israel to take steps to prevent genocidal actions in Gaza, to punish incitement to genocide, to allow Gaza’s people access to humanitarian aid, and to preserve and collect any evidence of war crimes committed during the conflict.</p>
<p>It appears Israel has not yet done any of these things, although it has about another three weeks until it is due to report back to the ICJ. Basema Al-Alami, an expert in international law from the University of Toronto, considers how reports of what is happening on the ground in Gaza <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">conflict with the ICJ’s demands</a>, and also what pressure the ICJ rulings will put on Israel’s international donors to reconsider their stance.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">Israel isn't complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It didn’t take the international community long to act after Israel raised allegations that some staff from the UN’s Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) had taken part in Hamas’s October 7 massacres. Within days, 18 donor countries including the UK and US had pulled their support for UNRWA, the principal charity supplying aid to Palestinians.</p>
<p>UCL’s Irfan and Jo Kelcey of the Lebanese American University assess the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">fallout from this mass withdrawal of support</a>, concluding that it could be catastrophic for Palestinians in Gaza, 87% of whom are dependent on UNRWA for its services which include food aid, shelter and medical care. They also point out that Israel’s allegations about the involvement of UNRWA staff in October 7 came the day after the ICJ published its interim ruling.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">Gaza conflict: what is UNRWA and why is Israel calling for its abolition?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Greg Kennedy, an expert in strategic foreign policy issues at King’s College London, believes that Israel is deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">weaponising food supplies</a> in Gaza. He writes that it has been a tactic of war for centuries, and that sieges and blockades remain part of the arsenal of armed conflict.</p>
<p>Starvation, Kennedy adds, can seriously undermine morale and the will to resist. It is also a collective punishment – something explicitly banned under international humanitarian law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">Gaza: weaponisation of food has been used in conflicts for centuries – but it hasn't always resulted in victory</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>There goes the neighbourhood</h2>
<p>Day by day, missile by missile, tensions are ratcheting up around the region as Iran-backed proxies, who have been targeting US military bases for years, have stepped up their campaign of harassment. Taken individually, these attacks are of little significance. As Middle East expert Julie Norman from UCL notes, neither Iran nor the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">wants to wage a major conflict</a> at the moment – but both countries have political reasons for wanting to act tough. </p>
<p>In Iran, the Islamic Republic presides over a parlous economy and considerable public unrest as the “woman, life, freedom” mass protests continue. In the White House, meanwhile, Joe Biden wants a telegenic show of US force without embroiling his country in a major land war.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">Middle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>George W. Bush once joked to troops in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’” And as Andrew Payne, an international security expert from City, University of London notes, Bush – as well as his successor in the White House, Barack Obama, and even the vainglorious Donald Trump (who said of a recent attack on a US base in Jordan: “This attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance.”) – grew increasingly averse to military action as the next election loomed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">Middle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Christoph Bluth, an expert in international affairs at the University of Bradford, presents a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">cast list of Iran’s affiliates</a> in the region, and explains how Tehran is using them to further its long-term aims in the region – from replacing the US as the dominant power to establishing an “axis of resistance” that could potentially box in Israel.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">How Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215202024-02-07T17:35:23Z2024-02-07T17:35:23ZHow Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy<p>It took the US several days <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">to respond</a> to the January 28 attack on its military base in Jordan that killed three of its service personnel. But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.</p>
<p>The US strikes were carefully calibrated to avoid <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/austin-vows-all-necessary-actions-after-us-troop-deaths-2024-01-29/">escalation</a>. The five days between the attack on the Tower 22 US base in Jordan and the US airstrikes on February 2 gave Iran and its proxies time to move people and high-value assets. </p>
<p>This retaliation wasn’t about body counts, it was about US president Joe Biden showing Iran – and the American electorate – that it doesn’t do to mess with the US. It was a classic shot across the bows.</p>
<p>But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphic showing Middle East and the varioujs armed groups operating there on behalf of Iran" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s network of armed groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Council for Foreign Relations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s foreign policy over nearly five decades since the 1979 revolution has had <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321#">several key objectives</a>. It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security. </p>
<p>It has worked to boost the fortunes of Shia groups in the region, working directly against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni proxies, as seen in the conflict in Yemen. And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.</p>
<h2>Quds Force</h2>
<p>The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs. According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. </p>
<p>Quds was led by General Qasem Soleimani, who had oversight of Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria as well as wielding a significant amount of influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on January 3 2020. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by his longtime deputy <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-new-quds-force-leader-has-a-long-history-with-afghanistan/30379354.html">Ismail Qaani</a>, who had gained extensive experience in organising and supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>In 2021, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">estimated that</a> the IRGC had established 82 fighting units in Syria with up to 70,000 fighters. Many of these have been recruited since 2011 to help the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad combat insurgents there.</p>
<p>Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">Khalil Zahedi</a>, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi. Working through regional subordinates, he controls a number of armed groups, including Liwa al-Quds, Lebanese Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Baqir and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.</p>
<p>Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria. It also aims to create the conditions for a possible encirclement of Israel by occupying strategic position around the Golan heights.</p>
<h2>Iraq</h2>
<p>In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">umbrella organisation</a> called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or <em>Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī</em>. The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia. The PMF was founded in 2014 when Iraq’s Shia religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf">issued a fatwa</a> calling on Iraqis to defend their country after the Iraqi army collapsed and Islamic State took the northern province of Mosul. </p>
<p>In 2018 the PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces as an auxiliary force. As a result its wages are paid by the Iraqi military, but the Iranian government lacks proper command and control over the PMF. The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll. It also performed well in Iraq’s 2023 regional elections and is now believed to wield considerable control in both the Iraqi parliament and the country’s supreme court. </p>
<p>Its military forces are now believed to be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/">active in Kurdistan</a> as part of an overall strategy to force the US to withdraw from the region.</p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>North of Israel’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah has been conducting military operations against Israel for many years and since October 7 clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israel Defence Forces have become <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2024">almost daily occurences</a>.</p>
<p>Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was trained and equipped by Iran, which continues to provide practically all of its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies">financial and military resources</a>. In its <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">1985 manifesto</a>, it vowed to expel western powers from Lebanon, called for the destruction of Israel state and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader.</p>
<p>In 2021 Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that the organisation has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000 trained fighters</a>, but estimates as to its actual strength vary considerably.</p>
<p>While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">doing Iran’s business</a> rather than looking after Lebanese interests.</p>
<h2>Major headache for the west</h2>
<p>As can be seen with the recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea (the Houthis are armed and trained by Iran as part of a civil war against the Sunni national government backed by Saudi Arabia), dealing with Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East is a serious challenge. </p>
<p>Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise. And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran funds a large network of armed groups across the Middle East as part of its ambition to replace the US as regional power.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227682024-02-05T14:23:35Z2024-02-05T14:23:35ZMiddle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained<p>US airstrikes on Iran-backed armed groups <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2024">on February 2</a> have been anticipated for some time. Since the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, US forces in the Middle East have been targeted more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html">150 times</a>. These attacks, mainly on US bases in Iraq and Syria caused minimal damage thanks to US air defence capabilities.</p>
<p>The Biden administration had responded with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/us/politics/us-militias-tipping-point.html">modest strikes</a> on the militias’ weapons storage and training sites. But a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-troops-killed-jordan-american-service-members-syria/">drone attack</a> on January 28 on Tower 22, a US base on the Jordanian-Syrian border, killed three soldiers and wounded dozens of others. </p>
<p>The deaths represented an unofficial red line for many in Washington, and <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&oq=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l3j33i671l4.10890j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:%7E:text=Political%20pressure%20builds,political%2Dpressure%2Dbuil...">political pressure</a> mounted fast on President Biden to respond more forcefully against the armed groups – or even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-28/biden-faces-pressure-to-confront-iran-after-us-troops-killed">against Iran</a> itself.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Officials</a> said the air strikes targeted command-and-control sites, intelligence centres and drone storage facilities in Iraq and Syria affiliated with the militias and also with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Quds Force</a>, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">also stated</a> that the US would continue strikes at times and places of their choosing.</p>
<p>Though more widespread than previous strikes, the response was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news">carefully calibrated</a> to avoid stoking a broader war. Furthermore, the US signalled its intentions days in advance, giving the groups and their advisers time to move to minimise casualties.</p>
<h2>Militant groups targeted</h2>
<p>There are about <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-backed-groups-iraq-militias-middle-east/">40 militant groups</a> in the region backed by Iran. These include high-profile groups such as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas</a>, which carried out the October 7 attack in Israel as well as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which has been engaged in cross-border fire with Israel on the Lebanon border since October. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">Houthi rebels</a> in Yemen have faced separate <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68159939">US and UK strikes</a> in response to their targeting of commercial ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>But many other, smaller groups operate as well. Responsibility for the lethal drone strike was claimed by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/jordan-drone-strike-who-are-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-and-what-is-tower-22">Islamic Resistance of Iraq</a>, a loose network of Iran-backed militias including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/islamic-resistance-in-iraq-israel-hamas/">Kataib Hezbollah</a>, which fought against coalition forces during the Iraq war. These and other militias have continued to target US troops who remain in the region to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attacks on US bases in Middle East by armed groups." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map showing the location and number of attacks on US bases in the Middle East since October 7.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/world/middleeast/iran-militias-israel.html">provides</a> a mix of training, intelligence, funding and weapons to groups within its self-described “axis of resistance”. But Tehran <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/01/iran-proxies-intel-houthis-00139099">does not fully control</a> the militias, who operate with varying degrees of autonomy, and who might be better seen as affiliates than proxies.</p>
<h2>US political choices</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has been walking a tightrope in the Middle East. On the one hand, the administration’s primary aim for the past four months has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war in the aftermath of the Hamas attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. At the same time, the US has sought to deter adversaries who have been using increasing degrees of armed force against US personnel (and, in the case of the Red Sea, against international commercial vessels).</p>
<p>The challenge has been in determining a response that is forceful enough to deter further attacks, but not so devastating as to provoke a fully fledged war.</p>
<p>With the election year, Biden is also facing <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">additional scrutiny</a> from home on his foreign policy decisions. Donald Trump has long sought to make Biden <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">look weak</a> on Iran, while many Democrats have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67959375">critical</a> of the president’s use of airstrikes, as well as his approach to the war in Gaza. The calibrated airstrikes of the weekend will probably attract further <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/27/biden-houthi-rebels-strike-congress">criticism</a> from both sides – for going too far or not far enough.</p>
<h2>Gaza conflict</h2>
<p>There’s no guarantee that a ceasefire (temporary or permanent) would bring a stop to attacks on US troops in Iraq and Syria, or to Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. But it’s undeniable that the crisis in Gaza has emboldened armed groups around the region, who have repeatedly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wT2NTbZ7Q2w">used the war to justify</a> their actions.</p>
<p>The US, Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/us/politics/hostage-deal-cease-fire-hamas-gaza.html">negotiate a deal</a> that would see a halt of military operations in Gaza in return for a phased release of hostages. While clearly crucial for the <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1r11o1b9t">hostages</a> and their families and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67920784/page/2">civilian population of Gaza</a>, the deal could also be the key to defusing other tensions in the region, at least temporarily. </p>
<p>While the deal is far from a final <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/hamas-signals-that-wide-gaps-remain-on-reaching-a-cease-fire-agreement?smid=url-share">agreement</a>, the nature of the US strikes was probably calibrated in part to avoid disrupting the process.</p>
<h2>Preventing regional war</h2>
<p>Iran, as well as Iraq and Syria, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/syria-and-iraq-are-angered-by-us-strikes-warning-they-could-deepen-regional-turmoil?smid=url-share">have denounced</a> the strikes, and accused the US of aggression. But Iran has not indicated it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">plans to retaliate</a>. This suggests that Tehran – like Washington – is still keen to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-us-war.html#:%7E:text=After%20Iran%2Daligned%20militants%20killed,awaiting%20President%20Biden's%20promised%20response.">avoid</a> a head-to-head conflict with the US. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, while Kataib Hezbollah has announced it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/31/kataib-hezbollah-says-it-suspends-attacks-on-us-forces">will halt</a> attacks on US troops, other armed groups have said that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">this</a> is not the end, and they will continue to strike against the US presence in the region.</p>
<p>For the Biden administration, the aim of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war is still the right objective, even – perhaps especially – in the face of rising tensions. A policy of careful calibration, coupled with meaningful negotiations to halt the war in Gaza, may not be as politically enticing as flexing US military might – but it’s the approach that is most in line with the longer-term interests of the US and the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Biden administration has calibrated its strikes so as not to provoke a wider armed conflict in the region.Julie M Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations; Deputy Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227182024-02-03T17:28:29Z2024-02-03T17:28:29ZUS raids in Iraq and Syria: How retaliatory airstrikes affect network of Iran-backed militias<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573194/original/file-20240203-29-7pf0p7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C126%2C1594%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The headquarters of an Iranian-linked group in Anbar, Iraq was among the sites targeted by U.S. bombers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-after-the-us-warplanes-carried-out-an-news-photo/1974225653?adppopup=true">Hashd al-Shaabi Media Office/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>U.S. bombers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-starts-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-officials-2024-02-02/">struck dozens of sites</a> across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.</em></p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes were the first following a deadly assault on a U.S. base in Jordan that U.S. officials blamed on Iranian-backed militias. Sites associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were among those hit by American bombs.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to American University’s <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch</a> and <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center – both experts on Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies – to explain what the U.S. strikes hoped to achieve and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Who was targeted in the U.S. retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The U.S. response extended beyond targeting Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, or <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, the entity <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claiming responsibility</a> for the drone attack on Jan. 28. </p>
<p>This term, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, does not refer to a single group per se. Rather, it encompasses an umbrella organization that has, since around 2020, integrated various Iran-backed militias in the region. </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the Jan. 28 drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports with money, weapons and training through the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="uoUf8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uoUf8/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In recent months, parts of this network of Iran-backed militias have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/">claimed responsibility</a> for more than 150 attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>As such, the U.S. <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">retaliatory strikes</a> targeted over 85 sites across Iraq and Syria, all associated with Iranian-supported groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<p>The U.S. operation’s stated aim is to deter further Iranian-backed aggression. Specifically, in Syria, the U.S. executed several airstrikes, reportedly resulting in the death of at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/middleeast/at-least-18-members-of-iran-backed-groups-were-killed-in-syria-monitoring-group-says.html#:%7E:text=The%20aftermath%20of%20the%20U.S.,16%20people%20had%20been%20killed%2C">18 militia group members</a> and the destruction of dozens of locations in <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/324467/">Al-Mayadeen and Deir el-Zour</a>, a key stronghold of Iranian-backed forces.</p>
<p>In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state security apparatus comprising groups backed by Iran, reported that U.S. strikes resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-launches-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-nearly-40-reported-killed-2024-02-03/">16 of its members</a>, including both fighters and medics. </p>
<p>The U.S. response was notably more robust than other recent actions against such groups, reflecting an escalation in efforts to counter the threats posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.</p>
<h2>What do we know about the network targeted in the strike?</h2>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity. That is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level – in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition is difficult.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy of obscuring the particular source of attacks hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What are the strikes expected to accomplish?</h2>
<p>U.S. Central Command <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">said on Feb. 2</a> that the operation’s aim is to significantly impair the operational capabilities, weaponry and supply networks of the IRGC and its Iranian-backed proxies.</p>
<p>The strikes targeted key assets such as command and control centers, intelligence facilities, storage locations for rockets, missiles, drones and logistics and munitions facilities. The goal is not only to degrade their current operational infrastructure but also to deter future attacks. </p>
<p>The action followed the discovery of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-drone-that-killed-soldiers-was-iranian-made-sources-2024-02-01/">Iranian-made drone</a> used in an attack on Jordan. </p>
<p>In a broader strategy to counter these groups, the U.S. has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">implemented new sanctions</a> against IRGC officers and officials, unsealed criminal charges against individuals involved in selling oil to benefit Hamas and Hezbollah, and conducted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">cyberattacks</a> against Iran.</p>
<h2>How will this affect Iran’s strategy in the region?</h2>
<p>Prior to the U.S. response on Feb. 2, Kataib Hezbollah, a group linked to Iran, announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-suspends-military-operations-us-forces-statement-2024-01-30/">a halt</a> in attacks on American targets – a move seen as recognizing the serious implications of the Jordan drone incident. </p>
<p>It is possible that the cessation was the result of pressure from Tehran, though this has been <a href="https://thehill.com/newsletters/morning-report/4443950-us-plan-retaliate-against-iran-takes-shape/">met with skepticism</a> in Washington.</p>
<p>But the development nonetheless speaks to the interplay of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">influence and autonomy</a> among the so-called Axis of Resistance groups, which oppose U.S. presence in the Middle East and are supported by Iran <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">to varying</a> degrees.</p>
<p>The U.S. airstrikes – <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">combined with sanctions and charges</a> – serve as a multifaceted strategy to deter further aggression from Iran and its proxies. By targeting critical infrastructure such as command and control centers, intelligence operations and weapons storage facilities, the approach aims to undermine Iran’s ability to project power in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">comprehensive and broad nature</a> of the U.S. response signals a robust stance against threats to regional stability and U.S. interests.</p>
<p>The aim is to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, while squeezing its support for regional proxies. This underscores a commitment by the U.S. to counter Iranian influence that could potentially weaken Tehran’s regional engagement strategies, negotiation positions and capacity to form alliances.</p>
<p>However, the effectiveness of airstrikes and sanctions in deterring Iranian-backed aggression remains uncertain. Historical <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">trends suggest</a> that similar U.S. actions since the Oct. 7 Hamas assault in Israel, and as far back as 2017, have not completely halted attacks from Iranian-backed groups.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s approach seeks to navigate this landscape without <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/02/politics/us-strikes-iraq-syria/index.html">escalating the conflict</a>, focusing on <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-31/iran-hamas-gaza-israel-war-terrorism">targeting</a> the financial mechanisms that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">support Iranian proxies</a>. Yet the impact and repercussions of such sanctions on Iran and the broader regional dynamics is complex.</p>
<p>In the short term, any direct U.S. retaliation against Iranian interests could heighten regional tensions and exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>Iran’s “<a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">forward defense” strategy</a> – focused on addressing threats externally before they become ones within its borders – would suggest that Iran will continue to support proxies through weaponry, funding and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/how-iran-and-its-allies-hope-to-save-hamas/">tactical knowledge</a> to reduce the influence and legitimacy of the U.S. and its allies in the region.</p>
<p>This underscores the delicate balance required in responding to Iranian-backed aggression – aiming to safeguard U.S. interests while preventing an escalation into a wider regional confrontation.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: Parts of this story were included in <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">an article</a> published on Jan. 29, 2024.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 85 locations linked to militias were hit in a robust response by Washington to an earlier deadly drone attack on a US base in Jordan.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226952024-02-03T13:35:03Z2024-02-03T13:35:03ZUS launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria − a national security expert explains the message they send<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573164/original/file-20240202-17-gyzhww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden attends the arrival of the remains of three U.S. service members killed in a drone attack in Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-attends-the-dignified-transfer-of-the-news-photo/1973658835?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United States mounted more than 125 retaliatory strikes against Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias at seven military sites in Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, after a drone strike <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">killed three U.S. soldiers</a> and injured 34 more in Jordan on Jan. 28.</em> </p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes, <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">which U.S. military officials say hit 85 targets, including command</a> and control operations centers, intelligence centers and munition supply chain facilities, are the latest chapter in the Middle East conflict, which President Joe Biden has tried to avoid escalating.</em></p>
<p><em>Biden announced on Jan. 30 that he had decided how to respond to the drone strike that killed the soldiers and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75WsnYkuTlI">said</a>, “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East.” The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed militia group, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68063741">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, while Iran denied any direct involvement in it.</em> </p>
<p><em>The U.S. retaliatory strikes happened hours after the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-witness-return-remains-us-soldiers-killed-jordan-2024-02-02/">remains of the American soldiers</a> were returned to the U.S.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/gregory-treverton/">Gregory Treverton</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, to understand the strategic thinking behind this retaliatory attack.</em> </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A satellite image shows a cleared area in a desert with beige and grey buildings, seen from high in the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A satellite image from 2022 shows Tower 22, the U.S. military base where three U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more were wounded on Jan. 28, 2024, in a drone strike by an Iranian-backed militia group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-of-tower-22-which-houses-a-small-news-photo/1963648340?adppopup=true">Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are some of the factors that likely played a role in the US deciding to launch a retaliatory strike and when to launch it?</h2>
<p>Regarding timing, the president may have wanted to get the bodies of the service people who were killed in Jordan back home and give some time for everyone to think. In the last few days, we saw that Iran and Iraq did put pressure on some of the proxy groups to wind down their operations. In one case, one of these Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/kataib-hezbollah-suspend-military-ops-us-intl/index.html">agreed to cease operations</a> this last week. Iran also said that they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news">do not want a wider war</a> with the U.S. </p>
<p>With the time it took Biden to authorize the strike, it also gave the Iranian soldiers and others time to move out of harm’s way, if they wanted to leave the military bases. </p>
<p>More strategically, Biden already committed earlier this week to make some kind of response, and he was under all kinds of political pressure to do something. But he still appears to be trying to avoid further escalating the conflict.</p>
<p>Biden, for example, avoided striking Iranian territory directly, though some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/republicans-pressure-biden-to-strike-iran-directly-after-deadly-drone-strike/">Republicans had pressured</a> him to do so. </p>
<h2>Iran says it wants to avoid a war with the US. But its proxy group just struck a US military base. Does that imply some sort of internal friction there?</h2>
<p>In our own country’s experience with proxy groups, we know that they have their own interests, and there are also the interests that we share. Sometimes, proxy groups that the U.S. has backed act in a way we don’t like and are just in their own interest. These proxy relationships are always complicated, in that sense. </p>
<p>Even if Iran wants to avoid further escalation with the U.S., my guess is that many of these groups would not mind a broader conflict happening, if their goals are more apocalyptic, such as destroying Israel. </p>
<h2>What do these retaliatory strikes accomplish?</h2>
<p>I think they accomplish fulfilling the Biden administration’s commitment to do something significant and respond to the drone strike killing U.S. soldiers. The response itself is measured enough so far that it is unlikely to escalate the conflict dramatically, though we could be surprised by that. </p>
<p>Overall, it is a calibrated measure that plainly is not going to entirely degrade the military capacity of any of these groups. But it should still have a pretty significant effect and weaken their military capabilities, at least to some extent. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms carry a casket draped in an American flag on a grey day. President Joe Biden stands nearby in a dark jacket." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Feb. 2, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden watches as U.S. Army soldiers carry the remains of Army Sgt. Kennedy Sanders, who was killed in a drone strike in Jordan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/army-carry-team-moves-a-flagged-draped-transfer-case-news-photo/1980832024?adppopup=true">Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What else is most important to understand about these retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The wider context here is that the U.S. strikes make it all the more important to get to some cease-fire in Gaza. At least then, these proxy forces would lose that <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">rationale – of Israel’s attacks</a> on Gaza – to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-bolsters-defenses-around-jordan-base-as-it-readies-response-to-drone-attack/7468786.html">justify what they are doing</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to me we are still seeing no real sign from the Israelis of a sense of an endgame in this war. We presume that the Israeli government is thinking about some way to reform the Palestinian Authority or consider some coalition of Arab states, maybe the U.S. and European countries, to govern Gaza once the war ends. But we have not seen any sign of that publicly. </p>
<p>So, as long as the war continues in Gaza and as long as Palestinians are being killed, these proxy groups see this as their only way to respond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US attacks on military sites in Iraq and Syria are unlikely to further escalate conflict in the Middle East, he writes.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222812024-02-01T02:56:51Z2024-02-01T02:56:51ZWhat is Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ and why is it uniting in fury against the US and Israel?<p>Days after a drone attack <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">killed</a> three US soldiers at a military outpost in Jordan – an attack blamed on a shadowy Iranian-linked militia group – it appears a wider regional conflict may have been averted. At least for now.</p>
<p>The US has indicated it will take a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTUYPnX6BlE">tiered response</a> to the attack – though it hasn’t said how – and the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#:%7E:text=aid%20group%20says.-,Iran%20is%20'not%20looking%20for%20war%2C'%20the%20head,of%20the%20Revolutionary%20Guards%20says.&text=The%20head%20of%20Iran's%20Revolutionary%20Guards%20said%20on%20Wednesday%20that,prepared%20to%20respond%20if%20attacked.">said</a> that Tehran is “not looking for war.”</p>
<p>But Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">launched</a> more than 160 attacks against the US military since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and start of the war in Gaza. And Houthi militants in Yemen, also supported by Iran, have threatened to continue their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>So, what is driving these groups in the so-called “axis of resistance” and how much control does Iran have over their actions?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' in the MIddle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s influence in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance?file=Axis_of_Resistance.jpg">Master Strategist/Axis of Resistance</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shia armed groups in Iraq</h2>
<p>The militia blamed by the US for the drone attack in Jordan, Kata’ib Hezbollah, said earlier this week it was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#jordan-drone-iran-iraq-kataib-hezbollah">halting</a> its military operations in Iraq under pressure from both Iran and Iraq. </p>
<p>It is just one of many Iran-backed groups in the country that operates under the umbrella banner of Islamic Resistance in Iraq. </p>
<p>Armed militias began emerging in Iraq in the wake of the US invasion of the country in 2003. These groups grew exponentially stronger when they organised as a collective front to confront the ISIS terror group. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/research/Iraq-Research/iraq-shia-militias">Popular Mobilisation Forces</a>, or Al Hashd Al Sha’bi, was established in 2014 and became the main Shia paramilitary organisation confronting ISIS, alongside other Iran-backed groups such as Hezbollah in Syria. </p>
<p>But with threat of ISIS decreasing after its military defeat in 2019, the Popular Mobilisation Forces shifted their attention back to US targets in Iraq.</p>
<p>In recent years, these groups have presented themselves as the <em><a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/05/23/the-muqawama-and-its-enemies-shifting-patterns-in-iran-backed-shiite-militia-activity-in-iraq/">muqawama</a></em>, or “resistance”, against the US and its allies in Iraq. As such, they have launched hundreds of attacks against US and Turkish military bases and other targets in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<h2>Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Hezbollah, or the “Party of God”, emerged in the 1980s as an armed militia to free the southern parts of Lebanon from Israeli occupation and to improve conditions for the marginalised Shia minority in Lebanon. </p>
<p>The party has subsequently portrayed itself as a legitimate political party in Lebanon. As such, Hezbollah has been able to successfully operate across <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Religion-and-Hezbollah-Political-Ideology-and-Legitimacy/Farida/p/book/9780367784959">multiple domains</a>. It has a civilian (<em>da’wa</em>) role in social welfare and religious education in Lebanon, as well as a military-resistance role (<em>jihad</em>), carrying out attacks against US and Israeli targets in Lebanon and across the border with Israel. </p>
<p>Its relationship with Iran has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">deepened</a> over the years, with Hezbollah <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">receiving</a> hundreds of millions of dollars a year from Iran for training and weapons.</p>
<p>Yet, Hezbollah has proved to be extremely competent in its ability to downplay its religious ideals and principles to operate with autonomy as a mainstream political organisation in Lebanon. </p>
<h2>Houthis</h2>
<p>Also known as Ansar Allah (“Supporters of God”), the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-yemens-houthis-are-getting-involved-in-the-israel-hamas-war-and-how-it-could-disrupt-global-shipping-219220">Houthis</a> are a Shia armed group that emerged out of the Zaydi sect from Yemen’s northern highlands in the 1990s. The group rebelled against Yemen’s government in 2014 and eventually took control over most of the country. The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia that was trying to oust them. </p>
<p>Interestingly, even though Houthis were never directly engaged in attacking US targets (or its allies) in the past, this changed with the Israeli war against Hamas in Gaza. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">How much influence does Iran have over its proxy 'Axis of Resistance' − Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Iran connection</h2>
<p>From the outset, what these groups have in common is a shared sectarian and ideological connection – Shia Islam. </p>
<p>Shias have <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/shia_introduction_comp.pdf">historically</a> been a minority in the Muslim world, suffering systematic persecution, political isolation and low socio-economic status in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf states. </p>
<p>But this began to change with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the rise of Shia clergy in that country. The Iranian regime, mainly through its military apparatus, the Revolutionary Guards, sought to transfer the “Shia revolution” across borders to try to redress years of Shia political isolation and economic deprivation.</p>
<p>Hezbollah was considered the first and most successful of the Iran-backed organisations that arose from this movement. It was able to build and maintain a strong military arm and political presence in Lebanon that made it a key regional player – and still does. </p>
<p>With its weaponry and financial backing, Iran became the ideological guardian of this growing “axis” of groups across the Middle East. These proxy groups, in turn, have helped Iran maintain a great degree of strategic power in the region, which has become key to its foreign policy and its ability to wield influence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">Iran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>United by resistance</h2>
<p>But even though these groups share deep political and ideological connections, they still operate as nationalist organisations in their respective countries. As such, each has its own domestic interests and ambitions. This has included improving the livelihoods of Shia communities and gaining political power. </p>
<p>This has been framed as a form of resistance or <em>muqawama</em>. This can be viewed in different ways: resistance against occupation, resistance against oppressive regimes and resistance against imperialist, hegemonic powers. </p>
<p>This is a cornerstone of Shia ideology – the idea of “oppressors vs. the oppressed” – which grew from the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, during the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2011/10/hussein/#:%7E:text=On%20that%20day%2C%20Hussein%20ibn,and%20Fatima%2C%20the%20Prophet's%20daughter.">battle of Karbala</a> in the year 680. This narrative has become the symbol of Shia resistance in its various forms.</p>
<p>This is part of the reason why groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have united under the same banner – “Axis of Resistance”. This theme extends to Hezbollah’s resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the Houthis resistance against the Saudi-coalition forces, and the armed Shi’ite groups in Iraq attacking ISIS and now US troops.</p>
<p>More recently, these groups have united as a form of resistance against Israel (and its main supporter, the US) over its war in Gaza. </p>
<p>The extent of Iran’s power over these proxies remains a big question. Iran has denied ordering the attacks on US forces in Iraq, Syria and now Jordan, saying each faction in the “axis of resistance” acts independently to oppose “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/world/middleeast/iran-us-troops-jordan.html">aggression and occupation</a>”.</p>
<p>The fact we are seeing a rise in military operations by all of these groups, however, indicates they are becoming increasingly essential to Iran and its strategy of expanding its influence and countering the US in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariam Farida does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Shia militant groups operating in Iraq, Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East share political and ideological connections, yet they also have their own nationalist goals.Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220102024-01-31T18:29:00Z2024-01-31T18:29:00ZPalestinian Islamic Jihad: what you need to know about the militant group<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572434/original/file-20240131-19-lglhmc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3000%2C1931&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of Saraya al-Quds, the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, on a parade and declare that they are ready for an on January 5, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/members-saraya-alquds-military-wing-palestinian-2101603105">Anas-Mohammed/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A missile struck <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/al-ahli-arab-hospital-piecing-together-what-happened-as-israel-insists-militant-rocket-to-blame">Al-Ahli Arab hospital</a> in Gaza City on October 17 2023, killing 471 Palestinians – according to the Hamas-run health ministry. Palestinians blamed an Israeli airstrike, while Israel blamed the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestinian-Islamic-Jihad">Palestinian Islamic Jihad</a> (PIJ) militant group.</p>
<p>Since 1984, PIJ has been carrying out armed attacks against Israel. The group also participated in the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel, which resulted in the deaths of 1,200 people and the kidnapping of a further 240.</p>
<p>But, despite being the third-largest Palestinian organisation, PIJ remains less known than Hamas. The popular image of PIJ is often that of a terrorist group operating in the shadow of Hamas and bent on destroying Israel with the support of Iran. </p>
<p>In this article, I dispel three misconceptions about PIJ: its dependency on Hamas, its radicalism and its ties with Iran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-hamas-attack-and-why-now-what-does-it-hope-to-gain-215248">Why did Hamas attack, and why now? What does it hope to gain?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>In the shadow of Hamas?</h2>
<p>PIJ does occasionally coordinate its military actions with Hamas. But the group does not operate in the shadow of Hamas and often acts independently.</p>
<p>Both groups emerged as an offshoot of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-Brotherhood">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, an organisation founded in Egypt in 1928 that advocated for the application of Islamic law in all aspects of society. However, their identities and strategies diverge. </p>
<p>Hamas was born as a social movement with political and military aspirations, while PIJ emerged primarily as an armed group. As a result, PIJ has never been interested in providing social welfare programmes or participating in elections (though an election has not been held in the Gaza Strip since 2006). Its role is limited to armed resistance. </p>
<p>This doesn’t imply that PIJ has no interest in politics. Rather, it believes it is <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/162562">premature</a> to focus on political power until a full Palestinian national sovereignty, free of “foreign” occupation, is established.</p>
<p>PIJ and Hamas are united in the war against Israel. But tensions between the two often simmer beneath the surface, reflecting a delicate balance between cooperation and competition. </p>
<p>A few days before the October 7 attacks, PIJ organised a <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/palestinian-islamic-jihad-holds-military-manoeuvre-gaza">military parade</a> to celebrate the 36th anniversary of the organisation’s founding. During the event, it showcased new models of self-manufactured weapons, reflecting the recent growth of its military capabilities in Gaza and its independence from Hamas.</p>
<h2>The most radical faction?</h2>
<p>PIJ rejects political compromises and sees violence as the only possible means of defeating Israel. The group <a href="https://pt.icct.nl/article/interview-ramadan-shallah-secretary-general-palestinian-islamic-jihad">rejected</a> Hama’s proposal in 2006 for a long-term truce with Israel. But PIJ is less dogmatically radical than one might assume.</p>
<p>Unlike Hamas, PIJ has never patrolled the streets of Gaza to persecute “deviant” behaviour or impose strict Islamic morals on the local population. And, while PIJ vehemently opposes the Palestinian Authority (the self-governing body that has limited rule over parts of the occupied West Bank), the group refrains from violent clashes with its dominant political party, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fatah">Fatah</a>. </p>
<p>PIJ maintains cordial relations with all Palestinian political forces and often positions itself as a mediator between Fatah and Hamas.</p>
<p>Throughout the repeated cycles of violence with Israel, there have even been instances when PIJ has temporarily softened its stance. In the past, the group has discussed the possibility of limiting its armed struggle to the goal of liberating the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/summary/Six-Day-War#">six-day war</a> of 1967, rather than to the total destruction of Israel.</p>
<p>This stance may not align with the official manifesto, but it reflects strategic efforts to maintain a unified national programme that would be supported by more moderate factions. According to PIJ, internal disagreements would only benefit the enemy.</p>
<p>PIJ has adopted an official position of neutrality over various regional conflicts to avoid upsetting anyone and to keep Palestinian issues outside the dangers of regional sectarianism. For example, during the war in Syria, which began in 2011, Hamas has gradually severed its ties with the Syrian regime and supported the popular revolts. PIJ, on the other hand, has refused to take a side.</p>
<h2>An Iranian proxy?</h2>
<p>The Islamic Republic of Iran has long articulated support for the Palestinian cause. It has cultivated relations with groups across the region who position themselves against Israel and the US. </p>
<p>PIJ does receive significant financial and military support from Iran. However, there is a distinction in religious ideologies – the Sunni PIJ does not share religious affinities with Shia Iran. So, PIJ’s role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict should not be reduced to a puppet under Iran’s control.</p>
<p>When delving into PIJ’s writings, one may be surprised by the geopolitical analysis offered by its leaders. Rather than relying solely on religious rhetoric, they consistently frame the conflict as an asymmetrical power struggle against an occupier state considered an outpost of western colonial powers. </p>
<p>From this perspective, PIJ regards Iran as a source of inspiration. In 1979, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/2/11/iran-1979-the-islamic-revolution-that-shook-the-world">Iranian revolution</a> successfully overthrew the country’s west-friendly regime and subsequently severed ties with Israel.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People driving their motorcycles down a city road holding Iranian flags and banners commemorating the Iranian Revolution." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572439/original/file-20240131-21-8zo1g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People commemorating the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in Tehran, Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/tehran-theran-iran-february-10-2021-1913879353">Amin Monfared/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But, despite oaths of loyalty to the Iranian regime, there have been times when the honeymoon between PIJ and Iran has suffered setbacks. PIJ refused to support the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-houthis-four-things-you-will-want-to-know-about-the-yemeni-militia-targeted-by-uk-and-us-military-strikes-221040">Houthi rebels</a> in the ongoing Yemen civil war, causing Iran to <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/09/201592084340199169.html">temporarily cut off</a> its funding.</p>
<p>PIJ today finds itself <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/iran-hamas-and-islamic-jihad-a-marriage-of-convenience/">financially dependent on Iran</a>. But the Iranian regime does not control its military actions. </p>
<p>PIJ has emphasised that its armed struggle is specifically directed at Israel and not the west. As a result, it has refrained from engaging in terrorist attacks outside Palestinian territories and Israel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antonella Acinapura does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>PIJ is perceived as a terrorist group operating in the shadow of Hamas, aiming to dismantle Israel with the backing of Iran – but that’s not true.Antonella Acinapura, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Middle East Centre, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224102024-01-31T14:13:19Z2024-01-31T14:13:19ZMiddle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year<p>The recent <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">drone attack</a> that killed three US soldiers has placed Joe Biden’s handling of the conflict in the Middle East under renewed scrutiny. Under pressure from critics demanding a hard-hitting response, the president has vowed to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/28/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-attack-on-u-s-service-members-in-northeastern-jordan-near-the-syria-border/">“hold all those responsible to account”</a>.</p>
<p>But using force in an election year is fraught with political risk.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">Recent polls</a> suggests the US public is divided about the Gaza conflict. According to a poll last month, 39% of voters favour a continuation of Israel’s military campaign, while 44% say that Israel should stop to avoid mounting civilian casualties. <a href="https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/econTabReport_Vow57W6.pdf">Another poll</a> suggests that the sympathies of those who voted for Biden in 2020 are evenly split between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<p>Crucially, 57% of voters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">disapprove</a> of the president’s handling of the war. This sentiment is particularly strong among younger voters and Democrats, upon whom Biden’s hopes for reelection may depend. </p>
<p>Biden’s Republican opponents have also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20has%20carefully%20calibrated,killed%20three%20American%20service%20members.">lined up to lambast</a> him. Donald Trump, who looks all but certain to secure his party’s nomination for November’s presidential election, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">attributed the recent attack</a> to Biden’s “weakness and surrender” while Nikki Haley, Trump’s only remaining Republican challenger, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/us/politics/haley-iran-drone-strike.html">suggested that</a> the US should “go after” Iran’s military leaders.</p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/01/29/biden-attacks-iran-mideast/">criticism</a> on all sides, the ideal <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/us/politics/us-biden-iran-drone-response.html">solution</a> for Biden is likely to be one that satisfies public demands to “do something” without alienating his base or provoking a widening of the war.</p>
<h2>Balancing risks</h2>
<p>Biden’s challenge is a familiar one. As I show in <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">my recent book</a>, presidents throughout history have taken political considerations into account when making decisions about war and peace. As both commander-in-chief and holder of the highest elected US office, presidents must balance the competing interests of national security and political survival.</p>
<p>Usually, that results in a degree of caution. Since voters bear the brunt of the human and financial costs of war, they tend not to reward incumbents who recklessly engage in conflict. So presidents have good political reasons to think twice before putting troops in harm’s way. As former president George W. Bush <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060301-3.html">once joked to troops</a> in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’”</p>
<p>But the strength of this kind of democratic constraint can <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691164984/war-and-democratic-constraint">vary across contexts</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/reality-asserts-itself-public-opinion-on-iraq-and-the-elasticity-of-reality/2EC85066D94345C881A4ECD0EBB29848">over time</a>. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B01FKU1IIC?ie=UTF8&linkCode=gs2&creativeASIN=B01FKU1IIC&tag=slate01-21&camp=1789">Mounting casualties</a> tend to erode support for lengthy commitments, but shocking events or provocations like those that took place over the weekend can also lead to a public demand for <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7f9516c8-ee8e-4368-a96b-f45553e277d3/download_file?file_format=application%2Fpdf&safe_filename=Pelican_2021_Justice_intuitions_and.pdf&type_of_work=Thesis">retribution</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons from history</h2>
<p>We have been here before. Almost exactly four years ago, Trump authorised the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a senior Iranian military commander, apparently motivated in part by a desire to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-confusion-and-contradictions-trump-white-house-stumbles-in-initial-public-response-to-soleimanis-killing/2020/01/07/61c9242e-3174-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">appear tough</a> in an election year. Trump then decided to de-escalate, declining to respond militarily for attacks on bases housing US troops in Iraq. It was a sign that his appetite for a direct conflict with Iran was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-confusion-and-contradictions-trump-white-house-stumbles-in-initial-public-response-to-soleimanis-killing/2020/01/07/61c9242e-3174-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">moderated</a> by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">similar political realities</a> that now face his successor.</p>
<p>Trump’s recent criticism of Biden’s policies – including <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/01/28/donald-trump-brink-world-war-three/">his claim</a> on social media that “this attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance” – conveniently fails to mention this. But it is the kind of counterfactual criticism that candidates who are challenging an incumbent have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">often tended to embrace</a>, safe in the knowledge that they won’t be held accountable for delivering on policies that may prove unwise or unworkable. At least, not until after the election.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">my research</a> indicates that these dynamics also featured during previous conflicts involving the US. During the war in Iraq, for example, the administrations of both Bush and Obama grew increasingly anxious about additional or extended troop deployments as elections loomed. </p>
<p>More broadly, several studies find that leaders facing reelection tend to be more <a href="http://conconi.ulb.be/DP.pdf">conflict-averse</a>, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=353">entering fewer wars</a> in the months before an election than during other parts of their tenure.</p>
<h2>Ending endless wars?</h2>
<p>Whether or not a lasting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/us/politics/israel-hamas-gaza-hostages.html">diplomatic solution</a> to the crisis in Gaza can be found remains to be seen. But from a wider perspective, the genie may already be out of the bottle. It is only a few short months since the US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, triumphantly <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/israel-war-middle-east-jake-sullivan/675580/">declared</a> that “the Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades”.</p>
<p>On Monday, by contrast, secretary of state <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4437128-blinken-middle-east-israel-iran/">Antony Blinken warned</a> that the Middle East faces its most “dangerous” situation since at least 1973.</p>
<p>These rhetorical gymnastics reflect a fast-moving strategic reality. But they also render hollow the political promises of successive presidents – <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/#:%7E:text=It%20was%20time%20to%20be,should%20have%20ended%20long%20ago.">including Biden</a> – to bring an end to the era of major military operations in the wider region.</p>
<p>The reality is that many of the forces deployed to the region during the fight against the Islamic State never left. The US still has thousands of troops <a href="https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports">stationed</a> in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. It is these forces that have been subject to periodic attacks from Iranian proxies. Over 150 such attacks have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20has%20carefully%20calibrated,killed%20three%20American%20service%20members.">taken place</a> since October 7. </p>
<p>Coupled with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">joint US-UK airstrikes</a> against Houthi targets in Yemen, the promised response to last weekend’s attack indicates we may be entering the latest instalment of the “endless wars” from which Biden had hoped to move on. The episode therefore raises questions about the scope of the broader US military commitment in the Middle East – and whether either candidate is prepared to make clear the real strategic trade-offs implied in their promises.</p>
<p>In the meantime, we can be sure of one thing: war is very much on the ballot in November’s presidential election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Payne is a Nonresident Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs</span></em></p>History tells us that US presidents tend to be cautious about foreign policy in an election year – especially in the Middle East.Andrew Payne, Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Security, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216602024-01-31T11:55:05Z2024-01-31T11:55:05ZIran: with a tanking economy and an election in weeks, the Islamic Republic tries to rally support by acting tough<p>As tensions continue to rise in the Middle East, the world is waiting for the Biden administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/28/us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-jordan">to act in response</a> to the strike on a US base in Jordan by an Iran-backed militia on January 28, which killed three American service personnel. The US president, reportedly given several options, is weighing up deterrence of further attacks in the region against the risks of escalation.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/iran-with-a-tanking-economy-and-an-election-in-weeks-the-islamic-republic-tries-to-rally-support-by-acting-tough-221660&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">narrated by Noa</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>As has so often been the case in the past, Iran has denied responsibility for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">drone attack</a>, on the Tower 22 outpost in northeast Jordan near the borders with Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella group of Shia militias backed by Iran – has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/#:%7E:text=An%20umbrella%20group%20of%20hardline,said%20their%20troops%20were%20targeted.">claimed responsibility for the attack</a>.</p>
<p>Any involvement of Iran would be something of a gamble for the regime, which needs to look tough – particularly to its population ahead of elections on March 1 – but is in a weakened position. The economy is in trouble, there have been mass popular protests against the authorities’ treatment of women, and now the country has been involved a string of foreign incidents involving Israel, the Islamic State jihadist group and Pakistan. If it sanctioned the killing of Americans, Iran may have only compounded its difficult situation.</p>
<h2>Tehran under pressure</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attack on US bases in the Middle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A regional conflict: strikes against US military bases in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On Christmas Day, Israel hit an Iranian military compound in southern Damascus, killing <a href="https://themedialine.org/headlines/senior-irgc-officer-sayyed-reza-mousavi-killed-in-alleged-israeli-airstrike-in-syria/">Sayyed Reza Mousavi</a>. Mousavi had been the right-hand man of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force who was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">assassinated by the US</a> in January 2020.</p>
<p>Nine days later, Islamic State detonated two bombs at Soleimani’s grave in Kerman in south-central Iran on the fourth anniversary of his assassination. For the regime, Soleimani was the iconic commander who had defeated Islamic State in Iraq. But far from being vanquished, Islamic State was able to decimate his memorial, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-kerman-bombing-death-toll-91/32763647.html">killing 91 people</a>, with the regime apparently powerless to stop it.</p>
<p>Iran’s leaders and military appeared unable to protect their officers abroad or their citizens at home, let alone head the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. They needed a show of strength.</p>
<p>On January 15, the Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-say-they-have-attacked-espionage-centers-iraqs-erbil-2024-01-15/">fired missiles into Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of wiping out an Israeli intelligence cell. They killed a multi-millionaire businessman, members of his family, and other civilians including a Dutch infant less than a year old.</p>
<p>Just over 24 hours later, the target was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes">Baluchistan region in Pakistan</a>. Regime media proclaimed a Guards missile and drone strike on a camp of the Baloch separatist group Jaish ul-Adl, which has fought security forces in southeast Iran for more than a decade. In fact, the dead included two children.</p>
<p>The display backfired. Needing to make its own statement over the violation of sovereignty, Pakistan’s armed forces <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-strikes-cross-border-escalation-region/32782339.html">carried out cross-border attacks</a> in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan. They claimed “terrorists” had been killed – local media said at least three women and four children, all “non-Iranian nationals”, were slain.</p>
<p>On January 20, Iran’s intelligence command in Syria met in southern Damascus to consider the regional situation. They never completed the discussion. Israeli missiles <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/israel-strike-syria-iran-aligned-leaders/32784579.html">destroyed the three-storey building</a>, killing the Iranian head of intelligence, his deputy, and three other Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<h2>Challenges for the supreme leader</h2>
<p>International commentators usually treat Iran’s regime as a player in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. But, while ostentatiously supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the regime has officially kept its distance from those groups’ operations. And the Iranian public has shown <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311061514">little enthusiasm</a> for the regime’s support for Hamas – the absence of large rallies since October 7 has been marked.</p>
<p>The main issue is a domestic one. Soleimani has been admired by many Iranians and his anti-Islamic State legend, burnished and manipulated by the regime. And the killings from Damascus to Kerman come weeks before <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/in-iran-gaza-war-overshadows-preparations-for-2024-legislative-vote-/7361213.html">parliamentary elections</a> on March 1.</p>
<p>The regime is seriously concerned about the prospect of another weak electoral performance, following historic lows of 42.6% in the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/factbox-the-outcome-of-irans-2020-parliamentary-elections/">2020 parliamentary election</a> and 48.8% — a drop from 72% in 2017 — in the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jun/23/raisi-election-results-explainer">2021 presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>But much of Iran’s electorate was alientated by the regime’s repression after the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.elections.timeline/">disputed 2009 presidential election</a>. The brutal crackdown to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-the-hijab-protests-are-now-massive-but-a-revolution-will-need-the-military-to-change-sides-191786">“woman, life, freedom”</a> protests since September 2022 has angered people further. Ahead of the poll, the Guardian Council has excluded thousands of qualified candidates, including the former president, Hassan Rouhani, to ensure the reins of power remain in the hands of hardliners.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy is in the doldrums amid US-led sanctions and ongoing issues of mismanagement and corruption. Inflation is officially <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi#">about 40%</a> and far higher in reality for food and other essential items. Discontent over wages and working conditions is widespread. The currency, which had stabilised after all-time lows in 2022, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401232785">has lost about 10% in value</a> in the past month.</p>
<h2>‘Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran’</h2>
<p>But the regime persists with its tough talk. While racing to proclaim “friendship” with Pakistan, it is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-warns-us-iraq-drones/32060585.html">threatening more attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of dismantling Israeli intelligence networks. Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, declared that Israel’s strikes “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68040493">will not go unanswered</a>”.</p>
<p>Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen are <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-led-taskforce-deploys-in-red-sea-as-middle-east-crisis-threatens-to-escalate-beyond-gaza-220164">damaging international shipping</a> in the Red Sea, site of 12% of global trade. Hezbollah is in daily skirmishes with Israel.</p>
<p>But Iran’s leadership is trapped in a vice. If it pulls back from direct operations, while insisting on the “independence” of its allies, it risks the appearance of being all bark and no bite across the region. If the Revolutionary Guards try another missile strike, they risk further retaliation and even defeat – whether it is from Pakistan or Israel.</p>
<p>So the militias in Syria and Iraq appear to have become the vehicle – and probably the sacrifice – for Iran’s leaders to signal to Iranians that they are still tough, even as they officially deny any role in the attacks.</p>
<p>As the US measures its response, the final word may come from Iranians whose primary concern is at home. Amid the mass protests after the disputed 2009 presidential election, they chanted: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran.” Khamenei and his inner circle are gambling that they can finally bury that message.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Facing a parliamentary election in March, the Islamic Republic is trying to distract attention away from its economic woes with a show of strength.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217222024-01-30T17:55:16Z2024-01-30T17:55:16ZIran has so far resisted direct involvement in the Gaza war, but is that changing?<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-has-so-far-resisted-direct-involvement-in-the-gaza-war-but-is-that-changing" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Iran has tried to keep the war in Gaza at arm’s length by providing support for Hamas <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/04/1222880864/after-striking-throughout-the-middle-east-irans-proxies-now-become-the-targets">through armed groups it backs in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamic Republic has indicated it wants neither to get directly involved in the fighting nor see the conflict escalate across the region. But as illustrated by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/29/politics/biden-jordan-attack-response-options/index.html">the recent drone attack by pro-Iranian militias in Jordan that killed three American soldiers</a>, the violence is spreading. Tehran may not be able to sustain its strategy much longer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">Tehran’s support for Hamas dates back to the 1990s</a>, though the two have never been a perfect ideological match. Hamas comes from the Sunni sect of Islam, identifying more closely with the Muslim Brotherhood than it does with Shi’a Iran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Is Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Relations broke down during the Syrian civil war as <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Tehran backed Bashar al-Assad’s regime</a> and Hamas sympathized with the Sunni opposition. However, when the fighting ebbed, the two mended fences and Hamas rejoined the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/irans-axis-of-resistance-is-a-potent-coalition-but-a-risky-strategy">Axis of Resistance</a>, a group of state and non-state entities centred in Iran that oppose Israel and the American presence in the region. </p>
<p>As part of the alliance, Hamas reportedly receives military equipment, training and somewhere <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">between $70</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">$350 million per year</a>, depending on the source.</p>
<h2>Important role</h2>
<p>Iran does not appear to have been involved in the planning or execution of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Indeed, United States intelligence reported Tehran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/initial-us-intelligence-shows-hamas-attack-surprised-iranian-leaders-ny-times-2023-10-11/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Oct%2011%20(Reuters),U.S.%20sources%20said%20on%20Wednesday.">was surprised</a> by events. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, as the Gaza war continues, Iran is playing an important role. Tehran provides Hamas with rhetorical support and indirect military backing through the other members of the Axis of Resistance. While not tilting the balance of power in Gaza, this has signalled to the West and Israel that the campaign against Hamas will have a cost, particularly if it escalates. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">There have been almost daily</a> skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense Forces on the Lebanese border. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have launched more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-strikes-targets-iraq-after-us-forces-wounded-officials-2024-01-23/">150 attacks</a> against American military installations, and the pro-Iranian Houthis in Yemen have launched ballistic missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nevertheless, Tehran’s message that it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">does not intend to get directly involved</a> in the fighting has been relayed directly to Hamas by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/is-saudi-arabia-relaying-us-messages-to-iran">and to the U.S. privately through intermediaries</a>.</p>
<p>Tehran’s stance is evident in the particular way military force has been employed. Hezbollah’s attacks have been limited in size and restricted to the area around the Lebanese border — significant enough to indicate support for Hamas, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">but not threatening enough</a> to justify Israel opening a second front. </p>
<p>Similarly in Iraq, the attacks have been relatively small. The strike against the Al-Asad air base in Iraq was <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">described by the Pentagon</a> as one of the largest yet, but the result was some damage to non-critical facilities and no fatalities. The U.S. retaliated with strikes of its own, but repeated the same mantra as Tehran; it did not want the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">fighting to escalate.</a> </p>
<h2>Houthis active</h2>
<p>The most active of Iran’s proxies has been, surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">Houthis in Yemen, who say that they will blockade the Red Sea until the Israelis cease military operations in Gaza</a>. By some estimates, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2024/01/28/most-surveyed-companies-are-vulnerable-to-another-supply-chain-crisis/?sh=5c94fd391bd1">90 per cent of container shipping has been diverted</a>, leading to higher prices and fractured supply lines. </p>
<p>Their attacks on shipping have provoked a series of missile and airstrikes from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-helped-plan-but-didnt-have-assets-to-participate-in-u-s-u-k-strikes-against-houthis">with Canada playing a supporting role</a>. </p>
<p>While provocative, the risk for Tehran in this area is far less than it would be on the Lebanese border, where Israel would likely respond with a ground invasion.</p>
<p>A major conflict between Hezbollah and Israel <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">would be devastating</a> and unpredictable. It would put Iran’s main regional ally in jeopardy and could create conditions that would prompt Washington to attack Iran directly.</p>
<p>There’s little chance, however, of a ground invasion in Yemen, where the airstrikes appear <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/saudi-arabias-balancing-act-amid-strikes-yemens-houthis">to be bolstering</a> the popularity of the Houthi leadership.</p>
<h2>On the sidelines</h2>
<p>It’s not difficult to understand why Tehran has chosen to straddle the fence between supporting Hamas and standing on the sidelines. </p>
<p>If Iran was to remain passive while Gaza is flattened by Israel, it would lose credibility. This would cost Tehran in terms of regional influence and undermine an alliance network essential to its ability to deter the U.S. and Israel. </p>
<p>A certain degree of conflict is also in Iran’s interest. Popular support for the Axis of Resistance has increased across the region, and the trend toward Israeli-Arab normalization is on hold for the foreseeable future. At the same time, though, Iran potentially has a lot to lose.</p>
<p>Iran has grown into a formidable military power, but its military, nuclear and economic infrastructure remain vulnerable to U.S.-Israeli military strikes. </p>
<p>The regime may also be politically vulnerable at home. <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/iranians-differ-widely-with-their-leaders-over-the-war-between-israel-and-hamas/">It is unlikely</a> the Iranian public would support a war to liberate Palestine, and given the recent anti-hijab protests and several years of simmering domestic unrest, it can no longer be taken for granted that U.S. military strikes would cause Iranians to rally around the flag.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-protesters-are-making-demands-in-charters-and-bills-of-rights-201543">Iranian protesters are making demands in charters and bills of rights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Maintaining the balance</h2>
<p>Iran’s strategy is designed to strike a balance between these two concerns, but there are a number of things that could go wrong. </p>
<p>For one, Iran cannot control how its opponents respond. In Syria, Israel raised the stakes by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/world/middleeast/iran-military-official-israel-syria.html">assassinating a high ranking member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard thought to be involved in arms transfers to Hezbollah</a>. </p>
<p>Compelled to reply directly, Iran was only able to avoid a confrontation with Israel <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-ballistic-missiles-rock-iraqi-kurdistan">by striking targets in Iraq it claimed were associated with the Israeli Mossad</a>.</p>
<p>Even within the Axis of Resistance, the lines of command and control are imprecise. Iran’s allies have their own agendas and their own ideas about how much force to use. </p>
<p>The recent drone attack in Jordan is a case in point. Although the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a loose group of pro-Iranian militias — has claimed responsibility, the U.S. is holding Iran accountable. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-jordan-attack-iran-1.7098603">still seems reluctant to target Iran directly</a>, but the attack has ratcheted tensions up significantly. </p>
<p>It is also possible that Iran’s leadership will simply overplay its hand, particularly in the Red Sea. At a certain point, the West may lose patience with bombing Iran’s proxies and target the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Devine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran prefers to engage Israel through its proxies, but the risk of escalation makes this a dangerous strategy.James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222162024-01-29T22:32:52Z2024-01-29T22:32:52ZDrone attack on American troops risks widening Middle East conflict – and drawing in Iran-US tensions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572013/original/file-20240129-17-78y39l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C3237%2C2183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jordanian and U.S. tanks take part in joint maneuvers in September 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jordanian-apc-and-us-tanks-take-part-in-the-eager-lion-news-photo/1243216092?adppopup=true">Khalil Mazraawi/AFP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A drone attack that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-strike-jordan-drone-attack/">killed three American troops</a> and wounded at least 34 more at a base in Jordan has increased fears of a widening conflict in the Middle East – and the possibility that the U.S. may be further drawn into the fighting.</em></p>
<p><em>President Joe Biden <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-american-service-members-killed-jordan-iran-5cb774fd835a558d840ae91263037489">vowed to respond</a> to the assault, blaming Iran-backed militias for the first U.S. military casualties in months of such strikes in the region.</em></p>
<p><em>But to what extent was Iran involved? And what happens next? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">expert on asymmetric warfare and militant groups in the Middle East</a>, to answer these and other questions.</em></p>
<h2>What do we know about the group that claimed responsibility?</h2>
<p>Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, which translates as the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claimed responsibility</a> for the drone attack. </p>
<p>However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is not a single group per se. Rather, it is a term used to describe an umbrella organization, which, since around 2020, has included various Iran-backed militias in the region.</p>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity – that is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>The collective is notorious for its staunch anti-U.S. posture <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-thwarts-drone-attack-its-troops-iraq-2023-10-18/">and dynamic military campaigns</a>, such as a recent <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-26-2024">two-day drone operation</a> targeting American forces at an Iraqi airbase.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition remains elusive.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What do they hope to achieve in attacking a US target?</h2>
<p>Iranian-backed militias have been <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-forces-attacked-least-160-times-middle-east-since-mid-october-sundays-drone-strike">intensifying attacks on U.S. forces in recent months</a> in response to American support for Israel in the Israel-Hamas conflict, and also to assert regional influence.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, Iranian-backed militias <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">have repeatedly struck</a> American military bases in Iraq and Syria, recently expanding their attacks to include northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border.</p>
<p>The deadly assault on Jan. 28 marks a significant escalation, though – it <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-29-24/index.html">is the first</a> instance during the Israel-Hamas war that American troops have been killed.</p>
<p><iframe id="uoUf8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uoUf8/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The attack in Jordan forms <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">part of a strategy</a> by Iranian-backed militias to counter Washington’s support for Israel in the Gaza conflict. But it is also aimed at advancing a wider goal of pushing U.S. forces out of the Middle East entirely. </p>
<p>By coordinating attacks under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, these groups are trying to display a unified stance against U.S. interests and policy, showcasing their collective strength and strategic alignment across the region.</p>
<h2>What role did Iran have in the attack?</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the drone strike.</p>
<p>But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports.</p>
<p>Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, has <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">provided such militias</a> with money, weapons and training. However, the extent of Iran’s command and coordination in specific incidents like the Jordan attack remains unclear. At this stage, more concrete evidence is necessary to firmly implicate Iran.</p>
<p>As Iran expert <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> and I recently explained in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">article for The Conversation</a>, Iran’s strategy in the region involves supporting and funding militia groups while granting them a degree of autonomy.</p>
<p>By doing so, Iran maintains plausible deniability when it comes to attacks carried out by its proxies.</p>
<p>So while Iran’s direct involvement in the attack has not been definitively established, Tehran’s long-standing support of groups like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is well documented, playing a significant role in the regional conflict dynamics and geopolitical strategies.</p>
<h2>What options does the US have to respond?</h2>
<p>It isn’t clear how the U.S. intends to respond to the attack. The Biden administration faces complex dynamics when it comes to responding to attacks linked to Iranian-backed militias.</p>
<p>While a forceful military strike is an option that the Biden administration <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/3-american-troops-killed-25-injured-attack-jordan-base-near-syria-border">appears to be looking at</a>, targeting Iran directly on its own soil is fraught with risks and may be seen as a step too far.</p>
<p>Even when targeting Iranian interests or personnel, such as the assassination of Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, the U.S <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">has conducted</a> these actions outside Iranian territory.</p>
<p>Iran’s denial of direct involvement in the attack further complicates the situation and makes it less likely that the U.S. attacks Iran in retaliatory strikes.</p>
<p>But adopting a targeted approach, such as striking militia leaders outside of Iran, raises questions about the effectiveness of U.S. tactics in deterring Iran and its proxies. </p>
<p>This strategy has been employed in the past, yet it has not significantly curbed Iran’s or its proxies’ aggressive actions. The concern is that while such strikes are precise, they may not be enough to deter ongoing or future attacks. </p>
<p>The key to the strategy’s success may rest in identifying the most influential factors, or “centers of gravity,” that can effectively influence Iran’s behavior. This means determining key leaders, critical infrastructure or economic assets, which, if killed, destroyed or seized, could substantially alter Iran’s decision-making or operational capabilities.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s need to balance a strong response with the geopolitical consequences highlights the difficulties of navigating a tense and evolving situation.</p>
<h2>How might the attack affect the wider Middle East conflict?</h2>
<p>How the U.S. responds could reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape and influence the dynamics of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">proxy warfare in the region</a>. </p>
<p>A strong military response from Washington might deter Iranian-backed militias from future attacks, but it could also provoke them into taking more aggressive actions. </p>
<p>In the short term, any U.S. retaliation – especially if it targets Iranian interests directly – could escalate tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It could also exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict.</p>
<p>And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three American troops were killed and dozens more injured in an attack on a base in Jordan. How the Biden administration responds could determine if conflict in the Middle East widens.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220272024-01-25T18:34:06Z2024-01-25T18:34:06ZGaza update: Netanyahu calls for ‘total victory’ as International Court of Justice ponders genocide accusations against Israel<p>No sooner were the international media reporting this week that Israel had proposed a pause of up to two months in its assault on Gaza to allow for a prisoner-hostage exchange and the delivery of humanitarian aid, than Benjamin Netanyahu declared there would be no ceasefire and that “we will not stop fighting until total victory”.</p>
<p>The Israeli prime minister was commenting as he paid tribute to 24 soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) who were killed in the fighting with Hamas on January 22. Netanyahu has also rejected out of hand the idea of a two-state solution to the conflict as an “existential danger to Israel”. There will, he says, be no Palestinian state.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the location of fighting in the Gaza Steip, January 24 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The state of the conflict on the Gaza Strip as of January 24 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Certainly, there are few signs that the fighting on the ground in Gaza is going to end anytime soon. The Institute for the Study of War, which has been closely tracking developments in the conflict, has identified renewed fighting in the north of Gaza as well as in Khan Younis, which has been the focus of the IDF’s drive south. </p>
<p>As Gaza’s civilians are pushed into ever smaller and more crowded enclaves in the south of the Strip, it seems Hamas fighters have been able to reoccupy some of the areas that Israel had thought were clear of militant activity. And so the killing continues and the death toll, according to reports from the Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry, has risen to 25,700.</p>
<h2>Iran’s regional ambitions</h2>
<p>Apart from the sheer scale of the killing in Gaza, the big fear for many is that the conflict will morph into a regional conflagration. This has seemed to be borne out recently by the US and UK airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels, in response to the Houthi’s attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How would Iran respond? The Islamic Republic already controls Hezbollah, which is harassing IDF units along Israel’s border with Lebanon, and also has a list of proxies doing its bidding in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>James Horncastle, a professor of international relations at Simon Fraser University in Canada, cautions that the western airstrikes in Yemen could have <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">unintended consequences</a>, as seen in Iran’s retaliatory strikes against targets in Iraq, Syria – and even Pakistan.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For Nir Barkat, Israel’s economy minister and number two in Netanyahu’s Likud party, this conflict is a “really big opportunity” for Israel to rid itself of any threat from Iran. He told the Telegraph:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Iran is a legitimate target for Israel. They will not get away with it. The head of the snake is Tehran … And we should very very clearly make sure the Iranians understand that they will not get away with using proxies against Israel and sleep good at night if we don’t sleep good at night.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But many close analysts of the Middle East conflict believe that Iran’s role as “puppetmaster” in the region is overplayed. Simon Mabon, an expert in Middle East security at Lancaster University, thinks this oversimplifies what is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">far more complex set of relationships</a>. Iran has limited control over the groups it supports, he writes, despite offering money and, in some cases, training to militant groups in the region.</p>
<p>However, this could in fact be even more of a concern – in that the more moving parts this conflict develops, the more that unintended consequences of any one player’s actions might spiral out of control.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">Iran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ben Soodavar, meanwhile, believes the threat from Iran remains critical. Soodavar, a researcher in the department of war studies at King’s College London, believes Donald Trump and his foreign policy advisers were seriously misguided when they pulled the US unilaterally out of the nuclear deal signed in 2015 with Iran, the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany), and the EU.</p>
<p>He writes that Iran remains hell-bent on developing a nuclear capability, which it would then leverage to disrupt the Middle East even more, possibly sparking a dangerous arms race with Saudi Arabia. Coming up with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-increased-belligerence-and-nuclear-ambitions-show-why-the-west-needs-a-more-robust-policy-of-deterrence-221137">policy of deterrence</a> to persuade Iranian hawks of the folly of this should be a key focus for the US and its allies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-increased-belligerence-and-nuclear-ambitions-show-why-the-west-needs-a-more-robust-policy-of-deterrence-221137">Iran's increased belligerence and nuclear ambitions show why the west needs a more robust policy of deterrence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Red Sea fears</h2>
<p>Whether or not they are directly doing Tehran’s bidding, attacks by the Houthi rebels on shipping off the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait continue to disrupt one of the world’s most important trade routes. The Suez canal accounts for 12% of global trade. It’s possible to avoid the canal, of course, but this means taking the long way round the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks and an estimated US$1 million to the cost of transporting the average cargo.</p>
<p>As if to demonstrate that it never rains but it pours, various other key trade chokepoints are under pressure: drought in the Panama Canal is making that route less accessible while taking goods overland across Russia, always an option in the past, is no longer viable given the war in Ukraine.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the world's biggest trade routes and the various chokepoints that pose a risk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Global trade can be disrupted at various ‘chokepoints’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GIS/visualcapitalist.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sarah Schiffling of the Hanken School of Economics and Matthew Tickle of the University of Liverpool, both experts in global trade and supply chains, are concerned the conflict could infect shipping going in the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman, through which about 30% of oil shipped by sea must pass and which already has a long history of tensions. Choking traffic through Hormuz could represent a <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-suez-canal-is-not-the-only-choke-point-that-threatens-to-disrupt-global-supply-chains-221144">real disaster</a>, they write.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-suez-canal-is-not-the-only-choke-point-that-threatens-to-disrupt-global-supply-chains-221144">Red Sea crisis: Suez Canal is not the only 'choke point' that threatens to disrupt global supply chains</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Is Israel guilty of genocide in Gaza?</h2>
<p>Sometime in the next 24 hours (on January 26), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague is due to deliver its interim ruling on South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. Carlo Aldrovandi, an expert in international security at Trinity College Dublin, listened in as both sides <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">laid out their cases</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">Gaza war: how South Africa's genocide case against Israel is shaping up</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Meanwhile Victor Peskin, a professor of politics and global studies at the University of Arizona, considers <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">what happens</a> after the ICJ delivers its ruling. Does the court have any powers of enforcement beyond a purely moral obligation to act? As far as Peskin is concerned, the ICJ’s track record gives little cause for optimism that anything will be resolved anytime soon.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">What enforcement power does the International Court of Justice have in South Africa's genocide case against Israel?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Breeding grounds for terror</h2>
<p>While the eyes of the world are fixed on the rising death toll on the Gaza Strip, the longstanding conflict between militant settlers and residents of the occupied West Bank has continued pretty much unabated through the crisis. The most recent estimates are that nearly 400 Palestinians have been killed in clashes with the Israeli settlers.</p>
<p>Anna Lippman, who researches settler aggression in the West Bank, says that 16 villages have been displaced since October 7, with many farmers now cut off from their crops and livestock. She and her team were <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-scene-in-the-west-banks-masafer-yatta-palestinians-face-escalating-israeli-efforts-to-displace-them-221104">recently in the Masafer Yatta region</a> in the southern West Bank, not only to protest against settler violence directed at West Bank families, but also to ensure that crops are watered and livestock fed, helping out those farmers too terrified to do it themselves.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-scene-in-the-west-banks-masafer-yatta-palestinians-face-escalating-israeli-efforts-to-displace-them-221104">The scene in the West Bank's Masafer Yatta: Palestinians face escalating Israeli efforts to displace them</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There is no doubt that the continuing occupation and brutalisation of Palestinians has made both the West Bank and Gaza – as well as refugee camps in neighbouring countries – fertile ground for recruiting fighters.</p>
<p>But interestingly, there’s little direct connection between poverty or poor education and terrorism. In fact, as Junaid B. Jahangir of MacEwan University in Canada <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas-221105">writes</a>, a study of the economics of terrorism suggests that those recruited as suicide bombers have tended to have a higher education and economic status than the average Palestinian. </p>
<p>Economic theory has some fascinating insights to offer when considering this long-running conflict, Jahangir believes – and may even provide some ideas about how to tackle the problem over the long term.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas-221105">How economics can shed light on the motivations of extremist groups like Hamas</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Finally, it’s worth remembering that a lot of what we know about what’s happening in Gaza is thanks to the brave journalists who risk their lives to bring reports and footage to international attention. They do so at great risk to their own lives and those of their families.</p>
<p>According to a report by the Committee to Project Journalists published on January 20, 83 journalists and media workers have been confirmed dead in Gaza since October 2023, of which 76 were Palestinian, four were Israeli and three were Lebanese. Colleen Murrell, a professor of journalism at Dublin City University, says the big question is whether Israeli occupying forces are deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-high-numbers-of-journalists-are-being-killed-but-its-hard-to-prove-theyre-being-targeted-221042">targeting these media workers</a>.</p>
<p>But history tells us it’s extremely unlikely anyone will be held to account for the killing of these vital witnesses.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-high-numbers-of-journalists-are-being-killed-but-its-hard-to-prove-theyre-being-targeted-221042">Gaza: high numbers of journalists are being killed but it's hard to prove they're being targeted</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214302024-01-23T16:01:22Z2024-01-23T16:01:22ZIran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates<p>Despite the recent admission by the US president, Joe Biden, that the joint US-UK campaign of airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/defiant-houthi-leader-mocks-biden-and-calls-for-boycott-of-israeli-goods-yemen">not working</a>, the two allies conducted their eighth round of bombardment against Houthi positions on January 22. A spokesman for the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/51d3f2d6-a460-4a04-b0d6-2749f9f46f4f">told journalists</a> that the military action was accompanied by diplomacy aimed at “putting diplomatic pressure on Iran to cease their support of Houthi activity”. </p>
<p>The US-UK bombing campaign has come in response to repeated Houthi <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">attacks on vessels in the Red Sea</a>, which they claim aims to target Israeli vessels or sea traffic bound for Israel, in response to the Israeli military action against Hamas in Gaza.</p>
<p>All this comes at a precarious moment for the region. Hezbollah, the Lebanese “Party of God”, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">increasing its presence</a> on Lebanon’s southern border with Israel. Jordan has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordanian-jets-strike-iran-linked-drug-dealers-inside-syria-intelligence-sources-2024-01-09/">carried out airstrikes</a> against suspected drug dealers in Syria. Tensions in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes">Balochistan</a> – on the border of Iran and Pakistan – are escalating. Iran and its allies in Iraq and Syria continue regular attacks against US bases in the region. And the relentless <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">Israeli assault on Hamas</a> in Gaza continues, at a massive cost – mainly to Palestinian civilians.</p>
<p>While some may look at the Middle East and reject any semblance of order in the region, the reality is rather different. Although the region has endured a tumultuous two decades since the 9/11 attacks on New York sparked the US-led “War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the underlying structures that regulate life largely remain in place. Broadly speaking, sovereign states remain intact – albeit with challenges to the territorial sovereignty of Iraq and Yemen – along with a strong authoritarian current, powerful armies, and the role of the US in the region.</p>
<h2>October 7 changes the picture</h2>
<p>Things have come a long way since the beginning of 2023, which had offered much hope for the gradual improvement of regional security. The year began with a normalisation agreement <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/normalization-non-aggression-next-step-iran-saudi-ties">between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a> while, thanks to the signing of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-how-could-it-change-the-middle-easts-political-landscape-expert-qanda-215473">Abraham Accords in 2020</a>, there was also the prospect of normalisation of relations between the Saudis and the Israelis. The kingdom appeared to be keen to follow neighbours Bahrain and the UAE in establishing relations with Israel for the first time. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, continuing peace talks between <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/catching-back-channel-peace-talks-yemen">Saudi Arabia and the Houthis</a> gave hope of an end to the long civil war in Yemen. As a result, there was reason to (tentatively at least) hope for a new era of regional politics, driven by economic interests. </p>
<p>All that changed with the October 7 Hamas attacks in Israel and the Israeli response in Gaza, which appear – for now at least – to have scuppered any hope for warming relations between Israel and the Arab nations.</p>
<p><strong>The ‘axis of resistance’</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' in the MIddle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s influence in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance?file=Axis_of_Resistance.jpg">Master Strategist/Axis of Resistance</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran’s regional relations</h2>
<p>Unlike its Arab neighbours, the Islamic Republic of Iran has long articulated support for the Palestinian cause, drawing on ideas of martyrdom and resistance found within Shia Islam – of which Iran has long aimed to be recognised as the ideological head – to support this position. This ideological approach has helped Tehran cultivate relations with groups across the region who position themselves against Israel and the US. </p>
<p>The axis is directly at odds with the dominant ordering principles of Middle East politics. It operates as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-axis-of-resistance-how-hamas-and-tehran-are-attempting-to-galvanise-their-allies-against-israel-216670">transnational collective of violent non-state actors</a> opposed to the US, Israel, and those Sunni Arab states who have relations with Washington and normalised with Israel. </p>
<p>Over the past two decades, Arab leaders have framed Iran as a malign actor in the Middle East, seeking to destabilise the region in pursuit of its own goals. Iran is positioned as nefarious puppetmaster, the patron of a proxy network whose constituent parts do its bidding. </p>
<p>The reality, however, is more complex. A closer look at the relationship between Iran and the Houthis reveals this complexity. Unlike Hezbollah, which was formed under direction from Iran in the early 1980s, the Houthi movement emerged as a result of sectarian conflict. Yemen’s Houthis come from a strong <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaydism">Zaydi</a> tradition in north Yemen, which placed them in direct conflict with Saudi-backed <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2022/09/13/saudi-arabia-s-split-image-approach-to-salafism-pub-87895">Salafis</a> who dominated the (internationally recognised) national government. </p>
<p>It is generally accepted that the Houthis procured weapons from Yemeni sources until the late 2000s, when Iran sensed an opportunity to increase its influence on the region at relatively little cost. </p>
<p>But since then, tensions between the Houthis and Iran have appeared around ethnic, linguistic and doctrinal differences. While both are Shia, the Houthis are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaydism">Zaydi</a> and Iran is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelver_Shi%27ism">Twelver</a>. The difference, while subtle, is significant. While Iran has been a source of inspiration (and funding) to Houthi leaders, Zaydis do not follow ayatollahs for theological or political guidance. Significantly, they are also not beholden to Tehran for every move they make.</p>
<p>Much like with Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah, there are numerous instances of friction between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic, stemming from ethnic tensions, sectarian schisms and geopolitical aspirations.</p>
<h2>Iranian pragmatism</h2>
<p>It’s also important to realise that despite appearances and the way it is often portrayed in the west, Iran is a <a href="https://gulfif.org/pragmatic-investment-possibilities-for-saudi-iranian-cooperation-amid-the-gaza-war/">deeply pragmatic state</a>, as shown in its attempts to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in recent years. So, while Tehran and its allies have engaged in low-level skirmishes with the US and Israel, it has been careful to keep these acts of violence below a threshold that might lead to escalation. </p>
<p>That said, there’s no doubt this is a very dangerous time in the Middle East. As the situation in Gaza and the Red Sea deteriorates and against the backdrop of continuing skirmishes between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the sheer number of moving parts in this picture means that the situation could easily spiral out of everyone’s control.</p>
<p>As recent history has shown us, despite the myriad challenges and spoilers on all sides, diplomacy can work. Now, more than ever, it must be given a chance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Research Fellow with the Foreign Policy Centre </span></em></p>The Middle East crisis has many moving parts and could easily descend into chaos.Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212692024-01-23T13:27:31Z2024-01-23T13:27:31ZHow much influence does Iran have over its proxy ‘Axis of Resistance’ − Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570697/original/file-20240122-59268-wb9gt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C12%2C4025%2C2609&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A billboard depicts the leaders of the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yemeni-woman-carrying-her-bay-walks-near-a-billboard-with-news-photo/1942966164?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-iran-deeply-involved-red-sea-attacks-commercial-vessels-2023-12-22/">attacks by rebels in the Red Sea</a> to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-accuses-iran-ordering-sundays-hezbollah-attacks-lebanon-border-2023-10-16/">raids in northern Israel</a> and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25">Oct. 7, 2023, assault by Hamas</a>, Western analysts have pointed a finger of blame toward Iran.</p>
<p>Regardless of how involved Tehran is directly in the planning and carrying out of such incidents, the accusations get at a broader truth: In Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iran’s strategy of aligning with violent nonstate actors – notably <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Hamas in Gaza</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-both-israel-and-hezbollah-are-eager-to-avoid-tit-for-tat-attacks-escalating-into-full-blown-war-220745">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">Houthis in Yemen</a> – influences the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">experts in Iran’s relationship</a> with <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/team/dr-nakissa-jahanbani/">its network of proxies</a>, we understand that Iran’s connection with each group is distinct yet interlinked, revealing Tehran’s regional objectives. From southern Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen, these alliances shape the political landscape and highlight the nature of influence and control in proxy warfare. It serves as a counterweight to Iran’s relatively <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/irans-conventional-military-capabilities/">limited conventional military capabilities</a>, forming a key part of its foreign policy.</p>
<h2>Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’</h2>
<p>Managed by the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/irgc_fto.html">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</a>, Iran’s paramilitary security service that answers only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, these regional groups form what Tehran has labeled the Axis of Resistance. </p>
<p>The relationship between the groups and Tehran is designed to serve as a balance against both U.S. influence in the region and that of Washington’s regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p><iframe id="C9fdn" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/C9fdn/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But to characterize the Axis of Resistance as straight proxies is slightly off. Rather, Iran’s approach – spanning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and the Palestinian territories – is to extend its influence through strategic partnerships. While based on shared objectives and ideologies, these alliances allow varying degrees of autonomy. Iran provides resources and coordination, but each group maintains its own agenda and local support base, functioning more as partners than proxies. And the relationship between Iran and each member of this Axis of Resistance is unique.</p>
<h2>Hezbollah: Iran’s pivotal partner</h2>
<p>Established in the early 1980s, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a> – a Shiite militant organization – emerged with direct assistance from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, primarily as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Aiming to establish an Iranian-influenced base on Israel’s border, Tehran provided training, financial support and weaponry, bolstering Hezbollah’s growth and capabilities.</p>
<p>This collaboration has led to Hezbollah developing a sophisticated arsenal, including advanced <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/comparative-study-non-state-violent-drone-use-middle-east">drone technology</a>, <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/hezbollah-transporting-chemical-weapons-lebanon-help-iran-north-korea-report-claims">chemical weapons</a> and <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/iran-israel-drone-competition-and-the-changing-nature-of-warfare-in-the-middle-east/">expanded</a> <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/fdd-monograph-arsenal-assessing-iran-ballistic-missile-program.pdf">rocket</a> capabilities.</p>
<p>As a result of its involvement in the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">Syrian civil war</a> and ongoing hostilities with Israel, Hezbollah has <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5438?disposition=inline">professionalized its military</a>. By deploying troops to support the Syrian government in line with Iran’s support for the regime, Hezbollah has transitioned from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare. Additionally, its ongoing conflict with Israel has sharpened its <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollahland-mapping-dahiya-and-lebanons-shia-community">military strategy and capabilities</a>. This helped elevate Hezbollah to a notable political and military role within Lebanon’s government, which has frequently aligned with Iran’s geopolitical interests. </p>
<p>This evolution has also enabled Hezbollah to become a mentor and supporter for other Iran-backed groups. Hezbollah has imparted its <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/iranian-drone-proliferation-is-scaling-up-and-turning-more-lethal/">expertise in drone operations</a> to organizations such as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/">Fatemiyoun in Afghanistan</a>, Iraq’s <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/kata%E2%80%99ib-hezbollah">Kataib Hezbollah</a> and Houthi fighters.</p>
<p>The relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah has deepened over the years, evolving from mere assistance to a robust strategic alliance. The entities share goals, strategies and materials. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hezbollahs-record-war-politics">close relationship</a> between Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Iran’s Khamenei further cements this alliance.</p>
<p>Despite Iran’s considerable influence, particularly in regional conflicts, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_terrorism_byman.pdf">Hezbollah retains autonomy</a> in domestic Lebanese politics and its social services.</p>
<p>This Hezbollah-Iran alliance is arguably more significant than Iran’s relationship with other proxies and is instrumental in Tehran’s regional strategy. It not only extends Iran’s influence in the Middle East but also serves as a counterbalance to its adversaries, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<h2>Hamas: United against Israel</h2>
<p>Emerging in the <a href="https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1198908227">first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, of 1987</a>, Hamas forged ties with Iran in the early 1990s. Despite the ideological differences – Hamas is predominantly Sunni Islamist, while Iran is a hard-line Shiite regime – they found common ground in their opposition to Israel and a shared vision for Palestinian liberation.</p>
<p>Iran’s backing of Hamas includes financial aid, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-iran-relationship">military training</a> and, crucially, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/world/middleeast/arms-with-long-reach-bolster-hamas.html">the supply</a> of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">rocket technology</a>. This <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-hamas-relationship-in-2008">funding</a> has escalated Hamas’ <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/hamas-fights-patchwork-weapons-built-iran-china-russia-106381152">operational capabilities</a>, enabling the development of a more sophisticated and far-reaching rocket arsenal.</p>
<p>Iran’s support has shifted the balance in Hamas’ conflict with Israel, demonstrating Iran’s influential role in regional power dynamics.</p>
<p>The alignment between Iran and Hamas, however, has fluctuated. In 2012, differences over the Syrian civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/06/hamas-no-military-aid-for-iran">introduced a rift</a> in their relationship. Hamas’ tacit support for Sunni rebels in Syria was at odds with Iran’s allegiance to the Assad regime, leading to a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/how-hamas-lost-the-arab-spring/277102/">temporary withdrawal</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE95I0W4/">of Iranian support</a>.</p>
<p>However, this strain was not permanent. In subsequent years, the Iran-Hamas relationship was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/hamas-iran-rebuild-ties-falling-out-syria">realigned and reinforced</a>, evidenced by Iran’s resumption of substantial military aid. The sophisticated planning and execution of the Oct. 7 attack showed how Hamas has been able to improve its military capacity with a helping hand from Iran.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the group maintains a degree of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a06e7ea0-a7f8-4058-85b7-30549dd71443">political and strategic independence</a>, primarily focusing on Palestinian interests. </p>
<p>This dynamic reflects Iran’s broader regional strategy: to empower allied groups in extending its reach, while granting them autonomy to pursue specific agendas.</p>
<h2>Houthis: Strategic ally against Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>Emerging in the 1990s in Yemen as a Zaidi Shia Islamist group, the Houthi movement initially <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">focused on religious and cultural revivalism</a> before progressively <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">becoming engaged</a> in Yemen’s political and military arenas.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a headscarf stands next to a heavy weapon with shells." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570700/original/file-20240122-23-spbiqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Houthi supporter in Sanaa, Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/houthi-supporters-gather-as-they-carry-heavy-weapons-and-news-photo/1945478590?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fueled by grievances against the central government and foreign interference in Yemen, the group shifted to an armed rebellion. This evolution was marked by <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">growing confrontations</a> with the Yemeni government and involvement in a wider regional conflict against a coalition led by Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. This set the stage for their alliance with Tehran.</p>
<p>The Houthis’ <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-houthi-jihad-council-command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/">alignment with Iran</a> was spurred by shared religious beliefs as well as opposition to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.</p>
<p>The collaboration with Iran <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/containing-houthis-yemen-issues-and-options-policy-review">gained momentum</a> following the Houthis’ <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204415">capture of Yemen’s capital Sanaa</a> in 2014 – a move that is believed to have triggered an escalation in Iranian support. </p>
<p>Support from Tehran came in the shape of <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/yemens-houthis-and-the-expansion-of-irans-axis-of-resistance/">sophisticated weaponry</a>, military training and financial aid, and it has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/17/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-gulf.html">substantially enhanced</a> the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities. The Houthis have utilized this growing <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">capability to challenge</a> <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/yemens-houthis-and-the-expansion-of-irans-axis-of-resistance/">Saudi Arabia</a> and, more recently, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/26/uk-maritime-group-reports-drones-explosion-off-yemen-coast">Israel</a> </p>
<p>Empowered by Iranian support, the Houthis have <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">expanded</a> their operations to include <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-01-15/ty-article-magazine/30-attacks-all-red-sea-ships-targeted-by-the-houthis/0000018c-5df7-d6f9-afbc-5dff7a430000">assaults on U.S.</a> and other international vessels in the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-intercepts-cruise-missile-attack-on-its-warship-in-red-sea-363300da">Red Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the depth of Iranian support, the Houthis retain a level of autonomy, specifically in local Yemeni politics. While Iran’s influence is notable, it does not translate into outright control. Instead, the Houthis are positioned more as strategic allies within Iran’s regional agenda rather than mere proxies.</p>
<h2>Iran’s expanding influence</h2>
<p>Iran’s proxy network, which extends to groups in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">Syria</a> and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/reviewing-irans-proxies-by-region-a-look-toward-the-middle-east-south-asia-and-africa/">beyond</a>, is a key part of Tehran’s strategy to expand its influence and confront that of Washington and its allies.</p>
<p>These partnerships, though seldom involving <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_terrorism_byman.pdf">absolute control</a>, also demonstrate Iran’s adeptness in navigating geopolitical landscapes. The <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-war-gaza-revived-axis-resistance">Axis of Resistance</a> allows Iran to adapt its strategy to shifting regional dynamics. For example, positioning Hamas under the Revolutionary Guard’s guidance fits a strategy to confront Israel as regional dynamics shift toward normalization between Israel and Arab states.</p>
<p>Such partnerships also pose a challenge to Iran’s adversaries. Deterring these proxy groups requires navigating a complex web of relationships, interests and ongoing conflicts. And this complexity, coupled with Iran’s pivotal role, has reshaped the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, signaling a period of heightened tensions with broad international implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran has expanded its network of partners across the Middle East. But it isn’t a simple case of Tehran dictating the terms of the alliance.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215852024-01-22T19:03:08Z2024-01-22T19:03:08ZFrom the Middle East to the South China Sea: NZ’s new government inherits a defence dilemma<p>When the previous government released the first ever <a href="https://theconversation.com/nzs-first-national-security-strategy-signals-a-turning-point-and-the-end-of-old-certainties-210885">national security strategy</a> last year, it forecast stormy geopolitical weather ahead. In the brief few months since then, the sky has darkened further still.</p>
<p>Beyond a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/16/three-takeaways-from-biden-xi-meeting-pub-91042">slight rapprochement</a> between China and the United States at the end of 2023, <a href="https://theconversation.com/oppenheimers-warning-lives-on-international-laws-and-treaties-are-failing-to-stop-a-new-arms-race-210545">arms control</a> remains poor, measures to prevent <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-black-sea-drone-incident-highlights-the-loose-rules-around-avoiding-accidental-war-202030">accidental war</a> limited, and a genuinely rule-based international order patchy at best.</p>
<p>British foreign secretary David Cameron may have been <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/more-attacks-in-red-sea-if-uk-didnt-act-says-david-cameron-as-he-defends-military-action-13048021">speaking to his own government’s agenda</a> when he said the “lights are absolutely flashing red on the global dashboard”. But the analogy still holds.</p>
<p>Three big issues are now rising to the boil: the war in Ukraine, tension in the South China Sea, and the widening disaster in Israel and Gaza. Each instance of global disorder touches Aotearoa New Zealand and its largely untested coalition government.</p>
<h2>Ukraine in the balance</h2>
<p>While New Zealand has not joined the fighting, it is not neutral on Ukraine. It has provided weapons, training and other forms of assistance – including joining actions against Russia at the International Court of Justice.</p>
<p>But the prognosis is not good. Russia’s military counterpunch is coming while external support for Ukraine is at risk of fading.</p>
<p>Defence officials in Sweden <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67935464">have warned</a> their country should prepare for the possibility of conflict. A leaked plan from the German government shows it is also preparing for potential widening Russian aggression.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-being-a-welcome-guest-at-nato-nz-now-needs-to-consider-what-our-partnership-with-the-alliance-really-means-209316">partner to NATO</a>, New Zealand needs to consider its response should the tide of war turn against Ukraine – or worse still, spreads to other countries.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talk-of-russian-spring-offensive-raises-fears-that-kyiv-is-ill-prepared-to-face-it-221142">Ukraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>US-China standoff</h2>
<p>New Zealand has said it is “deeply concerned” about China’s tactics over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Of particular concern have been Chinese efforts to stop Philippine vessels resupplying citizens in the islands (to which the Philippines has sovereign rights).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/home/">Permanent Court of Arbitration</a> has affirmed Philippine claims to its territories. Although China opposes the court decision, a clear majority – including New Zealand – <a href="https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/">either positively acknowledge or support the ruling</a>.</p>
<p>New Zealand <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Environment/Oceans-and-fisheries/20210803NzNote.pdf">also asserts</a> “there is no legal basis for states to claim ‘historic rights’ with respect to maritime areas in the South China Sea”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden last year <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67224782">promised to defend</a> the Philippines should China attack. The region – where the Chinese navy <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300907470/nz-frigate-confronted-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-seas-investigation-reveals">confronted a New Zealand frigate</a> during a freedom of navigation exercise last year – remains a raw nerve.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1733692031229431833"}"></div></p>
<h2>Widening Middle East threats</h2>
<p>The situation in Israel and Gaza is a legal, political and ethical mess that risks spilling over. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has already <a href="https://beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-prime-ministers-new-zealand-australia-and-canada">joined Australia and Canada</a> to reiterate the need for a negotiated two-state solution and the importance of respecting international law.</p>
<p>However, there has so far been no mention of accountability for war crimes through the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-can-learn-from-south-africa-the-gambia-and-others-when-it-comes-to-international-accountability-221114">New Zealand can learn from South Africa, The Gambia and others when it comes to international accountability</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>New Zealand’s focus has shifted to the protection of global waterways, specifically the Red Sea. With nine other countries, it has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/11/joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-australia-bahrain-canada-denmark-germany-netherlands-new-zealand-republic-of-korea-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states/">pledged</a> to defend lives and protect the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways.</p>
<p>New Zealand has not been involved in the first military actions against Houthi rebels trying to control the sea lanes. But if things escalate, the coalition government has effectively signed up to fight a proxy group directly connected to an angry and dangerous Iran.</p>
<h2>Increasing military spending</h2>
<p>To meet these challenges at a practical and logistical level, New Zealand will need to invest more in its military. While the new government <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/504787/tough-defence-budget-decisions-loom-for-new-government">wants to control spending</a>, it would be prudent to increase defence spending to at least 2% of GDP to match various allies.</p>
<p>It makes sense for New Zealand to focus on inter-operability and shared spending on common military platforms with its one official ally, Australia.</p>
<p>New Zealand can still maintain its nuclear-free policy and work for arms control while improving its own self-defence. It does not need the offensive capacity of the next generation of armaments (from AI and cyber capabilities to bioweapons), but it must have access to defences against them.</p>
<p>At the same time, self-defence need not be linked to new alliances such as the AUKUS security pact. The security issues outlined here are separate, not part of one large fire. China, North Korea, Russia and Iran are close. But they are not connected by mutual military obligations.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182">The 'number 8 wire' days for NZ's defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Independence and self-defence</h2>
<p>It might make more sense for New Zealand to join agreements like AUKUS if other like-minded countries (such as Canada, South Korea and Japan) joined at the same time.</p>
<p>But this might also create problems. First, it could accelerate a divide of the world into two large blocs. And second, without the kind of trade agreements with the US that other partners enjoy, New Zealand would be more exposed than most.</p>
<p>An independent foreign policy where each issue is treated on its own merits should still be the preferred approach. There is much to be said for working with countries which have shared values and common histories.</p>
<p>At the moment, some challenges warrant New Zealand’s involvement, but others do not. Defending the values and agreements that underpin the United Nations and a rule-based international order is the best guide.</p>
<p>Simply to follow the US, come-what-may, is a dangerous bet, especially given the uncertainties around the presidential election in November. At the same time, not to be better militarily prepared is a utopian position New Zealand can no longer afford.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With geopolitical tension and uncertainty rising, New Zealand’s ruling coalition faces urgent questions about defence spending, alliances and its independent foreign policy.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213922024-01-22T16:59:46Z2024-01-22T16:59:46ZWestern strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The United States and the United Kingdom <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">are launching ongoing missile and drone strikes</a> against the Yemeni armed group Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. A faction in the ongoing Yemen civil war, the Houthis had been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/world/middleeast/houthi-hijack-ship-galaxy-leader.html">attacking ships</a> in the Red Sea in the months preceding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">U.S.-British strikes.</a></p>
<p>These kinds of strikes, however, don’t dissuade the Houthis, a predominately Shia minority group in Yemen. They’re continuing <a href="https://time.com/6563864/us-strikes-houthis-yemen-red-sea/">to attack ships in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Continuing to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, furthermore, will undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Middle East. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">The Houthis have said</a> they’re attacking ships affiliated with Israel in response to Israel’s ground invasion and blockade of the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>With the U.S. reputation in the region already in tatters amid mass opposition to Israel’s attack on Gaza, these strikes are creating unintended consequences.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s civil war</h2>
<p>The Yemen civil war is one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It officially started in 2014 when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668">Houthis seized the capital of Sana'a</a>, but multiple entities have become involved since then.</p>
<p>Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict and subsequent blockade <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-fuel-intl/index.html">helped create ongoing famine and food insecurity</a> in Yemen.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Yemen’s civil war, the Houthis have received Iranian support. For both ideological and geopolitical reasons, Iran has helped the Houthis in their efforts to seize the country. While Iran has continually denied claims that it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/21/iran-giving-houthis-significant-and-lethal-support-us-envoy">provides military aid</a> to the Houthis, most <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/12/22/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#iran-has-helped-the-houthi-militia-target-ships-us-intelligence-says">outside observers</a> agree that it has done so in the past and continues to now.</p>
<p>The Houthis are invaluable partners to Iran because of their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This narrow channel is responsible for a significant portion of the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/bab-al-mandan-red-sea-suez-shipping-crisis-houthis-gaza">world’s cargo</a> <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073">and oil</a> shipping. While most vessels can avoid the region by sailing around Africa, this detour <a href="https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/">increases costs</a> for shipowners and, by extension, consumers.</p>
<p>The Houthis, either acting in their own interests or for Iran, escalated their attacks against ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Outside of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09">one cargo ship</a> the Houthi seized in November, however, their attacks have been <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/first-images-released-houthi-damage-153119479.html">largely unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<h2>More time needed for anti-piracy efforts</h2>
<p>Piracy in maritime shipping is not a new phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv21r3j8m">and has been a persistent scourge throughout human history</a>. In contemporary history, however, multilateral efforts to combat piracy have been largely successful in limiting its impact. </p>
<p>Multinational efforts off the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">coast of Somalia</a> and in the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/">Malacca Strait</a> in southeast Asia significantly reduced the piracy threat in those regions.</p>
<p>Given the past success of such measures, American Defense Secretary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220216698/pentagon-announces-new-international-maritime-protection-force-for-the-red-sea">Lloyd Austin’s announcement in late December</a> of an international maritime task force was both practical and had the potential to solve the issue. The problem, however, is that such efforts take time to succeed. The U.S. didn’t give the initiative the time it needed.</p>
<p>U.S.-led strikes against the Houthis in Yemen only stood a chance of success if neighbouring states, most notably Saudi Arabia, combined the American air presence with a ground threat. Saudi Arabia, however, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/">won’t get involved</a> as it seeks to extricate itself from Yemen.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-13/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-on-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say">anger towards</a> Israelis in the region, as well as the Houthi’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/how-houthi-anger-with-israel-is-reshaping-the-middle-east-conflict?ref=mc.news">avowed goal</a> to strike Israel, countering the Houthi would be politically dangerous for Riyadh’s government.</p>
<p>The Houthis know the Americans lack regional allies and therefore they’ve not been deterred, but emboldened. In the aftermath of the U.S.-U.K. strikes, Houthis have vowed to continue <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-red-sea-houthis-1.7083030">to target ships</a> in the Red Sea and are making good on the threat.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has even been forced to admit that the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/us-again-targets-yemen-s-huthis-in-new-strikes-9cac37d1">ongoing airstrikes</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/18/politics/biden-houthi-strikes/index.html">are not having the desired effect</a> of deterring the Houthis, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/us-launches-fresh-strikes-on-yemens-houthi-as-conflict-escalates">but says they’re necessary to protect merchant and military vessels</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback in the broader region</h2>
<p>International norms and laws are effective so long as everyone adheres to them. Norms and laws, furthermore, are most vulnerable immediately after a state has breached them, which the U.S. did when it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-says-us-british-attacks-on-yemen-a-clear-violation-of-the-countrys-sovereignty/ar-AA1mQIsa">violated Yemen’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the strikes against the Houthis.</p>
<p>Because the Houthis are a key partner of Iran, Tehran’s government apparently believed it had to take action in case their credibility became compromised. Iran <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-strikes-targets-in-northern-iraq-and-syria-as-regional-tensions-escalate/ar-AA1n1xOP">conducted strikes</a> against targets in Iraq and Syria. Iran claims the strikes in Iraq were against an Israeli spy installation. </p>
<p>While these events <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/iran-claims-it-has-attacked-an-israeli-spy-base-in-kurdistan">would have been troubling in their own right in terms of the impact on regional stability</a>, Iran followed up these strikes with ones in Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-iran-strike.html">Pakistan retaliated</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465">both Iran</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pakistan-conducts-strikes-in-iran-retaliating-for-earlier-hit-by-tehran/ar-AA1n9O2J">and Pakistan</a> are emphasizing that they’re not targeting the other country, but rather <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/paistan-cnucstrike-in-iran-in-retaliation-to-drone-and-missile-strikes-hits-baloch-separatist-groups/ar-AA1n9AwW">non-state militants</a>.</p>
<p>That said, Iran’s strike against Pakistan occurs as the country is <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/01/imran-khan-loses-his-battle-with-pakistans-army">politically vulnerable</a> in the aftermath of the army’s takedown of Prime Minister Imran Khan. With the Pakistani military unable to appear weak as the country faces crucial elections next month, the potential for events to escalate are very real.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the goal of nearly everyone involved, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/us-israel.html">particularly the U.S.</a>, has been to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. Recent events are compromising this goal, including <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-blames-israel-for-strike-that-killed-four-senior-military-officials-in-syria-as-mid-east-conflict-spirals/ar-BB1gZPbm">strikes by Israel in Syria</a> and an Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/01/21/us-troops-iraq-getting-evaluated-traumatic-brain-injuries-after-iran-backed-militia-attack.html">missile-and-rocket</a> attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.</p>
<p>By abandoning the focus on building a maritime coalition force and instead resorting to air strikes, the U.S. and its allies may have inadvertently created the situation they sought to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the West has aimed to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. But strikes on the Houthis in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. may ensure it will.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214112024-01-19T00:37:04Z2024-01-19T00:37:04ZIsrael now ranks among the world’s leading jailers of journalists. We don’t know why they’re behind bars<p>Israel has emerged as one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists, according to a <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2024/01/2023-prison-census-jailed-journalist-numbers-near-record-high-israel-imprisonments-spike/">newly released census</a> compiled by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists.</p>
<p>Each year, the committee releases a snapshot of the number of journalists behind bars as of December 1 2023 was the second highest on record with 320 in detention around the world. </p>
<p>In a small way, that is encouraging news. The figure is down from a high of 363 the previous year.</p>
<p>But a troublingly large number remain locked up, undermining press freedom and often, human rights.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-one-journalist-per-day-is-dying-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict-this-has-to-stop-217272">More than one journalist per day is dying in the Israel-Gaza conflict. This has to stop</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>China takes out unenviable top spot</h2>
<p>At the top of the list sits China with 44 in detention, followed by Myanmar (43), Belarus (28), Russia (22), and Vietnam (19). Israel and Iran share sixth place with 17 each. </p>
<p>While the dip in numbers is positive, the statistics expose a few troubling trends. </p>
<p>As well as a straight count, the Committee to Protect Journalists examines the charges the journalists are facing. The advocacy group found that globally, almost two-thirds are behind bars on what they broadly describe as “anti-state charges” – things such as espionage, terrorism, false news and so on. </p>
<p>In other words, governments have come to regard journalism as some sort of existential threat that has to be dealt with using national security legislation. </p>
<p>In some cases, that may be justified. It is impossible to independently assess the legitimacy of each case, but it does point to the way governments increasingly regard information and the media as a part of the battlefield. That places journalists in the dangerous position of sometimes being unwitting combatants in often brutally violent struggles.</p>
<p>China’s top spot is hardly surprising. It has been there – or close to it – for some years. Censorship makes it extremely difficult to make an accurate assessment of the numbers behind bars, but since the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in 2021, journalists from Hong Kong have, for the first time, found themselves locked up. And almost half of China’s total are Uyghurs from Xinjiang, where Beijing has been accused of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf">human rights abuses</a> in its ongoing repression of the region’s mostly Muslim ethnic minorities.</p>
<p>The rest of the top four are also familiar, but the two biggest movements are unexpected. </p>
<p>Iran had been the <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2022/12/number-of-jailed-journalists-spikes-to-new-global-record/#:%7E:text=The%20Committee%20to%20Protect%20Journalists,in%20a%20deteriorating%20media%20landscape.">2022 gold medallist</a> with 62 journalists imprisoned. In the latest census, it dropped to sixth place with just 17. And Israel, which previously had only one behind bars, has climbed to share that place. </p>
<p>That is positive news for Iranian journalists, but awkward for Israel, which repeatedly argues it is the only democracy in the Middle East and the only one that <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-709045#google_vignette">respects media freedom</a>. It also routinely points to Iran for its long-running assault on critics of the regime. </p>
<p>The journalists Israel had detained were all from the occupied West Bank, all Palestinian, and all arrested after Hamas’s horrific attacks from Gaza on October 7. But we know very little about why they were detained. The journalists’ relatives told the committee that most are under what Israel describes as “administrative detention”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-government-has-haaretz-newspaper-in-its-sights-as-it-tightens-screws-on-media-freedom-218730">Gaza war: Israeli government has Haaretz newspaper in its sights as it tightens screws on media freedom</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>17 arrests in Israel in less than 2 months</h2>
<p>The benign term “administrative detention” in fact means the journalists have been incarcerated <a href="https://www.btselem.org/topic/administrative_detention">indefinitely, without trial or charge</a>. </p>
<p>It is possible that they were somehow planning attacks or involved with extremism (Israel uses administrative detention to stop people they accuse of planning to commit a future offence) but the evidence used to justify the detention is not disclosed. We don’t even know why they were arrested. </p>
<p>Israel’s place near the top of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ list exposes a difficult paradox. Media freedom is an intrinsic part of a free democracy. A vibrant, awkward and sometimes snarly media is a proven way to keep public debate alive and the political system healthy. </p>
<p>It is often uncomfortable, but you can’t have a strong democratic system without journalists freely and vigorously fulfilling their watchdog role. In fact, a good way to tell if a democracy is sliding is the extent of a government’s crackdown on the media.</p>
<p>This is not to suggest equivalence between Israel and Iran. Israel remains a democracy, and Israeli media is often savagely <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/public-trust-in-government-scrapes-bottom-amid-criticism-for-inadequate-war-response/">critical</a> of its government in ways that would be unthinkable in Tehran. </p>
<p>But if Israel wants to restore confidence in its commitment to democratic norms, at the very least it will need to be transparent about the reasons for arresting 17 journalists in less than two months, and the evidence against them. And if there is no evidence they pose a genuine threat to Israeli security, they must be released immediately. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/at-a-time-when-journalism-needs-to-be-at-its-strongest-an-open-letter-on-the-israel-hamas-war-has-left-the-profession-diminished-218596">At a time when journalism needs to be at its strongest, an open letter on the Israel/Hamas war has left the profession diminished</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Greste is Professor of Journalism at Macquarie University, and the Executive Director of the Alliance for Journalists' Freedom. He was also a signatory of an open letter calling for balanced coverage in the Gaza/Israel conflict and in 2006, covered Gaza for the BBC. </span></em></p>New statistics show a spike in the amount of journalists jailed in the country. To protect its democracy, Israel needs to be transparent about why members of the media are arrested.Peter Greste, Professor of Journalism and Communications, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211372024-01-15T17:30:08Z2024-01-15T17:30:08ZIran’s increased belligerence and nuclear ambitions show why the west needs a more robust policy of deterrence<p>Numerous attempts by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-houthis-four-things-you-will-want-to-know-about-the-yemeni-militia-targeted-by-uk-and-us-military-strikes-221040">Houthi rebels</a> to attack and disrupt cargo shipping in the Red Sea have been met by airstrikes by the UK and US on Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen – including the capital Sana'a. The intervention represents a <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">significant level of escalation</a> in the Middle East and is indicative of just how volatile the region has become.</p>
<p>While the Houthis claim their attacks are in retaliation for Israel’s war against Hamas, it’s actually more complicated. Iran’s <a href="https://time.com/6554861/yemen-houthi-rebels-history-cause-israel-hamas-war/">backing of the Houthis</a> looks like part of a plan by Tehran to draw the west into a protracted Middle Eastern conflict in order to sow regional discord and further its plans for hegemony.</p>
<p>Over the recent years, Iran has consistently demonstrated its disruptive ability. It has done this despite the best efforts of the west (and Israel) to deter its aggression and contain its influence. The latest episode is another sign of how badly the west has failed in this. </p>
<p>A succession of tough sanctions packages and targeted drone strikes on Iranian commanders has not prevented Tehran from pursuing its foreign policy ends, despite ongoing domestic unrest which <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">some analysts predicted</a> might unsettle or even topple Iran’s clerical regime. </p>
<p>As well as funding and training the Houthis in their campaign to control Yemen and disrupt Red Sea trade, reports suggest Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proven to be highly competent in coordinating Hamas and Hezbollah in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25">their attacks on Israel</a>. It has also been a key ally for Russia during its war in Ukraine, providing a supply of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-iranian-kamikaze-drones-can-inflict-serious-damage-but-will-not-be-a-gamechanger-192754">Shahed drones</a> which have helped Vladimir Putin maintain pressure on Kyiv with regular barrages of attacks on power infrastructure over the two years of the conflict.</p>
<h2>Revisionist state</h2>
<p>In short, Iran is a <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-iran-toward-axis-revisionism-amid-war-gaza">revisionist state</a> – it wants to change the regional order – and its belligerent behaviour is likely to continue. Now the larger (and recurring) problem the west must address is how to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear capability. This would undoubtedly embolden the regime’s actions. A nuclear-armed Iran would arguably represent the greatest threat to Israel’s national security and the international liberal order.</p>
<p>Barak Obama’s administration assumed that Iranian hostility could be mitigated by providing economic incentives in return for assurances that uranium enrichment levels would be curtailed by Tehran. This culminated in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">nuclear deal</a> signed in 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – plus Germany) and the European Union. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">What the Iran nuclear deal means – and what it doesn't</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>That deal is all but extinct. Donald Trump signalled its death knell when he <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-backs-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what-96317">withdrew the US from the agreement</a> in 2018. Efforts by the Biden administration to resurrect the agreement have yet to bear fruit. At present this would appear to be a long way off, given the collapse in relations between Iran and the west.</p>
<h2>Empire, Islam and revolution</h2>
<p>In any case, the whole approach did not appreciate the internal social structures driving Iranian foreign policy. The country’s behaviour is shaped <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-history-foreign-policy/">by its history</a> and identity as a former imperial power. This is something Britain and west should pay attention to. </p>
<p>Much of Iran’s national identity constitutes a mixture of revolutionary fervour, Shia Islam and a form of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2016.1159541?needAccess=true">nationalism</a> focused around Iran’s pre-Islamic history, notably the Persian empire during the Achaemenid dynasty (550-330 BC). </p>
<p>Meanwhile, power resides with individuals – such as supreme leader Ali Khamenei – who were influential in Iran’s revolutionary period (1979). This was a time in which religiously guided militant action was the primary course of action to redress political grievances.</p>
<p>As a former imperial power and a country that experienced revolution, Iran presumes that it has the natural right to intervene in other country’s affairs. Tehran’s <a href="https://opencanada.org/iranian-interventionism-in-a-changing-middle-east/">interventionist stance</a> is guided by a religious sense of duty. It takes on the role as protector and provider of honour for the <a href="https://gulfif.org/iranian-identity-warfare-the-making-of-the-shia-brotherhood/">Shia Islamic world</a>, which has in part driven its <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/israel-iran-saudi-arabia-battle-for-supremacy-in-the-middle-east/">competitive rivalry with Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<p>Conversely, Iran’s foreign policy discourse is informed by its view of the west as inherently <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10669920500280623?needAccess=true">devious and imperialist</a>. This national narrative, as a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/895acb5a-3c50-11ea-a01a-bae547046735">state under perennial attack from the west</a>, selectively draws on its experience of imperial clashes with the Russian empire in the 19th century and with Britain and US over the <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-coup-timeline.html?scp=1&sq=mossadegh%2520coup&st=cse">1953 coup d’etat</a> which toppled the elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, to restore the Shah. The coup is thought to have fostered the conditions for the 1979 revolution.</p>
<p>I believe these two factors are the primary drivers of Iranian belligerence and adventurism. The country’s resilience in the face of western sanctions – in part now eased by trade with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2022-russia-iran-trade-corridor/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-09/why-the-us-can-t-stop-iran-s-lucrative-oil-trade-with-china">China</a> – should remind us that Iran is not a state which will easily abandon its regional ambitions. Even though UK defence secretary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67967372">Grant Shapps</a> has asked Iran to control its proxies, it will not suddenly stop funding terrorism in the Middle East because Britain asks it to.</p>
<h2>No nukes</h2>
<p>If Iran was to acquire a nuclear capability, that does not mean that it would use it. But it would stiffen Tehran’s resolve to continue its current dangerous behaviour. It would fundamentally disrupt the balance of power in the region and could lead to a spiralling arms race with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>So the UK’s main foreign policy in the Middle East must be to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal. Until now, Britain has been averse to deploying coercive measures to deter Iran. The current situation calls for this posture to be revisited. I would argue the UK’s strategy towards Iran should be unambiguous, with clear red lines. </p>
<p>Building coalitions with regional partners will be key to this. The current UK government understandably does not want to escalate tensions and it may want to pursue a risk-free policy in the region. But, increasingly, that option may no longer be available.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Soodavar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s role in the recent conflict between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah shows how badly western containment policy has failed.Ben Soodavar, Researcher, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209612024-01-11T17:29:22Z2024-01-11T17:29:22ZGaza update: no end to the killing in sight as extremists on both sides make a peace deal hard to imagine<p>As the death toll from Israel’s assault on Gaza climbed past 23,000 – including nearly 10,000 children – according to the latest figures from the Hamas-controlled health ministry, the Palestinian militant group released a series of videos showing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. Analysts commented that Hamas was keen to emphasise, contrary to claims by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), it still has operational capabilities in the north of the enclave.</p>
<p>Meanwhile attacks by Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militant groups continue in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as against US bases in Iraq and Syria as part of an ongoing campaign to harass and expel US troops.</p>
<p>Antony Blinken returned to the region for another round of shuttle diplomacy, putting on a determinedly optimistic face as he insisted after a meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman that Israel could still normalise relations with Saudi Arabia. Visiting the West Bank this week, Blinken also restated Washington’s commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state.</p>
<p>Of course, a major hurdle to the “two-state solution” is the inconvenient fact that two of the biggest players in any peace agreement along those lines would be Israel and Hamas. Hamas has always refused to recognise the state of Israel, while Israel’s Netanyahu government is being kept in power with the cooperation of the extreme right Religious Zionism party.</p>
<p>Amnon Aran, an expert in Israeli politics at City, University of London, says that the party’s leaders – national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich – flatly reject any cooperation with the Palestinians. But, significantly, Aran also believes that they will also prevent any real progress at other regional peace initiatives. This includes a joint US-French gambit that aims to reduce tensions between Israel and Lebanon by finally realising a deal originally mooted as a way of ending the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. </p>
<p>That would involve a new land demarcation agreement specifying where and how the two sides could deploy forces across the Israel-Lebanon border. It is already backed by UN security council resolution 1701 from 2006, which would replace any Hezbollah troops close to the Israel border with the Lebanese army. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-biggest-problem-in-negotiating-an-end-to-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah-may-be-his-own-government-220736">Aran notes</a>, Netanyahu faces a string of corruption charges and has been marking strenuous efforts to delay his trial. The collapse of his coalition could give his main rival, former defence minister Benny Gantz, a chance to form a government. Gantz is itching to pass legislation to prevent anyone facing criminal charges from being able to lead a government.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-biggest-problem-in-negotiating-an-end-to-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah-may-be-his-own-government-220736">Benjamin Netanyahu's biggest problem in negotiating an end to war with Hamas and Hezbollah may be his own government</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>In peril on the sea</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to cause chaos in the Red Sea, mounting such regular attacks on shipping there that many ships are opting to take the longer way round the Cape instead of risking access to the Suez Canal. </p>
<p>A US-led taskforce involving Royal Navy ships this week fought off what has been described as the biggest attack by Houthi rebels yet, involving a mix of rockets, drones and cruise missiles. UK defence secretary Grant Shapps did the rounds of the media making appropriately belligerent noises. </p>
<p>But in truth the Houthis are mounting what appears to be a classic example of “assymetrical warfare”, leveraging their limited means to cause major disruption to global supply chains and sending insurance premiums skywards. This will inevitably feed into higher commodity prices. </p>
<p>Noting that the Red Sea accounts of 15% of global trade, Basil Germond, an expert in maritime affairs at Lancaster University, believes that the west has few options for dealing with this. As of the time of writing, the UK is talking up the likelihood of airstrikes against the Houthis on the ground in Yemen. But, as Germond <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">writes here</a>, this is an entirely different proposition from shooting down the odd drone at sea.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">Houthi rebel Red Sea attacks and the threat of escalation and supply chain chaos are a major headache – and not just for the west</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the state of the Middle East conflict by the Institute for the Study of War." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How the Middle East conflict stands as of January 10 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Major escalation unlikely</h2>
<p>As well as pursuing its war aims in Gaza, Israel continues to make good on its promise to find and kill all those involved in planning and carrying out the October attacks. While Israel and its spy agencies rarely claim responsibility for assassinations, it appears to be generally accepted that the decisions to target high-ranking Iranian general Sayyed Razi Mousavi in Damascus on Christmas Day and senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on January 2 were taken in Israel.</p>
<p>Scott Lucas, a Middle East security expert at University College Dublin, says that while the killings were greeted with predictably bloodcurdling threats from Hezbollah and Iran, a close reading of their statements suggests a major regional escalation <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">remains unlikely for now</a>. </p>
<p>As Lucas points out, both Iran and Lebanon, where Hezbollah comprises a state within a state, face severe economic problems. They are more likely to harass Israel, or in Iran’s case, use its proxies including the Houthis to do it for them.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">Gaza war: Israeli assassinations draw fiery rhetoric from Iran and Hezbollah – but regional escalation is unlikely</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A post-Palestinian Gaza?</h2>
<p>Another of the factors making a durable peace deal more difficult to imagine is the vision that many high-ranking Israeli politicians have for a post-conflict Gaza – without any Palestinians living there. Both Smotrich and Ben Gvir have talked up the idea of Gaza’s population being farmed out as refugees around the world, while Gaza is reoccupied by Israeli settlers. </p>
<p>But it isn’t just the extreme right in Netanyahu’s government that have proposed moving Palestinians out of Gaza. As Leonie Fleischmann, a Middle East expert at City, University of London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-government-riven-with-division-over-future-of-gaza-after-far-right-calls-to-expel-palestinians-220602">writes</a>, more moderate voices have criticised the international community for a moral failure to help Palestinian civilians. For example, former Israeli ambassador to the UN Danny Danon and the centre-left politician and former deputy director of Mossad Ram Ben-Barak have proposed that countries around the world should accept some of Gaza’s population who “have expressed a desire to relocate”.</p>
<p>On the other side is the settler movement, which is already making ever larger and more aggressive inroads into the West Bank. One of the movement’s leading lights, Daniella Weiss, appeared recently on mainstream Israeli television to describe her longing for a Gaza where “there will be no homes, there will be no Arabs”, adding that Gaza City had always been “one of the cities of Israel. We’re just going back. There was a historical mistake and now we are fixing it.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-government-riven-with-division-over-future-of-gaza-after-far-right-calls-to-expel-palestinians-220602">Israeli government riven with division over future of Gaza after far-right calls to expel Palestinians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Peace polling</h2>
<p>One of the great tragedies in all this is the way that ideas and opportunities which might have provided a pathway to peace have been squandered over the years. Colin Irwin, now a research fellow at the University of Liverpool, has been involved in peace negotiations in various conflicts over several decades. Perhaps the most conspicuous success was his involvement in the negotiations which led to the signing of the Good Friday agreement in 1998. Irwin was working with Bill Clinton’s peace envoy, Senator George Mitchell, conducting peace polls.</p>
<p>As Irwin <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">explains</a>, the principle of polling as a part of peace negotiations is absolute inclusivity and public buy in. He developed relations with eight political parties across the spectrum of Northern Irish politics, including those that represented the Irish Republican Army, Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Freedom Fighters. His team commissioned polls on the many different political positions held by the parties, who then used this information to negotiate a peace deal they knew would receive support.</p>
<p>Irwin writes that he was all set to repeat this process with Mitchell in 2009, who Barack Obama had appointed as his Middle East envoy. But several things got in the way – including, most significantly, the election of Netanyahu as prime minister in the spring of 2009. Unlike his predecessor Ehud Olmert, Netanyahu did not want to include Hamas in any talks. The process collapsed. And so the killing has continued to this day.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">How Israel failed to learn from the Northern Ireland peace process</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.