tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/islamist-terrorism-20559/articlesIslamist terrorism – The Conversation2023-08-28T14:43:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
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<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010392023-07-05T13:25:43Z2023-07-05T13:25:43ZMozambican terror group is strikingly similar to Nigeria’s deadly Boko Haram<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535867/original/file-20230705-17871-w4xgot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican Armed Defence Forces being inspected in Cabo Delgado Province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Terrorism is a global problem affecting many countries. Until 2017, however, southern Africa was largely spared from this phenomenon. The bloody conflict sparked by <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/african-conflicts-to-watch-in-2022">Ansar al-Sunna</a> in northern Mozambique has since changed the region’s security landscape.</p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna, also called Al-Shabaab Mozambique, is an Islamic extremist movement which has <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/the-genesis-of-insurgency-in-northern-mozambique">gained prominence</a> in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province. Despite military intervention by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/rwandan-and-mozambican-army-bosses-meet-ahead-of-sadc-meeting-on-insurgency-20220110">Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/rwandan-and-mozambican-army-bosses-meet-ahead-of-sadc-meeting-on-insurgency-20220110">Rwanda</a> since 2021, the bloody insurgency is far from quelled.</p>
<p>The group’s goals and operations, and the challenges it poses, are similar to those of the most feared terrorist groups in other African countries. These are in particular <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/terrorism-in-africa/">Al Shabaab</a> in Somalia and <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Is%20Might%20Right.pdf">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria.<br>
Boko Haram has posed a significant threat to the Nigerian state since 2009. It has also undermined the security of several neighbouring states. It preys on <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/06/13/nigeria-is-a-fragile-state-international-studies-prove-it/">state fragility</a> and the resultant <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/MASA8-1Eng.06Bamidele413395087.pdf">socio-economic challenges</a>. Poverty <a href="https://www.csef.it/WP/wp495.pdf">disproportionately affects the rural, northern region</a>, where Boko Haram is most active.</p>
<p>Decades of <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=iKCKnrkAAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> on conflict in Africa made me aware of similarities between Ansar al-Sunna and Boko Haram. This prompted me to compare their origins, doctrines and acts of terror. </p>
<p>I recently delivered a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/104218615/Boko_Haram_and_Ansar_al_Sunna_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Insurgency_Dynamics_and_Governance_Failures">paper</a> on the subject at<a href="https://ecasconference.org/2023/programme#12436.68172"> a conference in Germany</a>. The paper deals with:</p>
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<li><p>the emergence of the two groups </p></li>
<li><p>their ideological linkages and links with regional and international jihadist groups </p></li>
<li><p>the socio-economic conditions that facilitate radicalism and recruitment </p></li>
<li><p>how the two groups source their funds </p></li>
<li><p>the security responses of the Nigerian and Mozambican governments.</p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambique-insurgency-focus-needs-to-shift-to-preventing-criminality-at-sea-166138">Mozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea</a>
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<h2>Similarities</h2>
<p>The first similarity is that both Ansar al-Sunna (“the youth” in Arabic) and Boko Haram emerged as militant Islamist movements committed to establishing Islamic caliphates in their countries. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, Boko Haram set out to separate from secular society, and draw students from poor Muslim families to an Islamic school in Borno State. Its founder, Mohammad Yusuf, argued that Islam <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf">forbade western education</a>. The group eventually went beyond targeting western education to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf">attacking Nigeria’s political system</a>. This included the country’s constitution, national anthem, national flag and other formal symbols.</p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna, too, was not primarily politically active at first. It started by rejecting Mozambique’s educational, health and legal systems on religious grounds. It demanded that its followers support alternative services offered <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/">at its mosques</a> – a counter-society of a kind. </p>
<p>Second, there is no real documented evidence of direct control of either Boko Haram or Ansar Al-Sunna by foreign jihadists. This implies a strong local context and drivers. But there are clear ideological linkages or sentiments. They both communicate with regional or international jihadist groups. The United States alleges the two movements are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19361610.2021.1882281">connected to ISIS</a>. It also links Boko Haram to al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Third, I argue in my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/104218615/Boko_Haram_and_Ansar_al_Sunna_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Insurgency_Dynamics_and_Governance_Failures">paper</a> that both Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna are largely <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/crime-illicit-markets-violence-instability-nigeria/">funded by dubious and illegal sources</a>. For Boko Haram, cross-border cattle rustling has been a substantial source of income. So are ransom payments for kidnapping, bank robberies and “tax” collections. </p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GITOC-ESAObs-Insurgency-illicit-markets-and-corruption-The-Cabo-Delgado-conflict-and-its-regional-implications.pdf#page=7">receives its funding</a> primarily from local business people, as well as cash and goods seized during attacks. </p>
<p>Fragile public institutions and the limitations of state security explain the two movements’ ability to get funding and potent large-calibre weapons.</p>
<p>Fourth, poor and even desperate socio-economic conditions provided opportunities for Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna to emerge in the political landscapes of Nigeria and Mozambique. Both operate in the less governed, poverty-stricken parts of their countries – north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique. </p>
<p>Those poor conditions are typical of state fragility and limited statehood. Among the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/AM2021/Global_POVEQ_NGA.pdf">almost 40% of Nigerians living in poverty</a> in 2018–2019, close to 85% lived in rural areas. Almost 77% were in the predominantly Muslim north. In Mozambique, Cabo Delgado has an illiteracy rate of about 60%. Some of <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-27.pdf">the poorest schools and health facilities</a> in the country are in Cabo Delgado. Unemployment is as high as 88%. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-mozambiques-failure-to-find-lasting-peace-and-true-democracy-171434">What lies behind Mozambique's failure to find lasting peace and true democracy</a>
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<p>There is a striking parallel in the inequality and socio-economic exclusion of the affected regions. In both, the central government and relevant state institutions are simply absent, or can’t meet the basic needs of their populations. They don’t provide schools, hospitals, roads and other public infrastructure. They have massive youth unemployment, corruption, poverty and underdevelopment. </p>
<p>Fifth, both militant groups sparked heavy-handed security responses from the respective governments. Confrontations between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state eventually led to a <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Is%20Might%20Right.pdf#page=13">state of emergency in 2013</a> in three north-eastern states. But the group’s violent campaign escalated, taking a heavy toll on lives and property.</p>
<p>Similarly in Mozambique, the emergence of Ansar al-Sunna got a strong response from the security forces in 2020. Foreign private military companies joined later. In both cases, the government adopted a militaristic approach to the insurgency, without any positive outcomes. </p>
<p>In both countries, the insurgency dynamics and problems required political and economic solutions. These are strategies that address the root causes of conflict. Instead, regional military responses were unleashed – by <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan">ECOWAS</a> in Nigeria, and the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique">SADC and Rwanda</a> in Mozambique. Both interventions are hampered by inadequate resources and <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan">insufficient funding</a>. This clearly rules out a military solution or victory.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>State fragility and governance limitations not only provided fertile ground for the rise of Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna. They also prevent the relevant state institutions in Nigeria and Mozambique from solving the problem.</p>
<p>Inequality and socio-economic exclusion in north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique continue.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/regional-military-intervention-in-mozambique-is-a-bad-idea-heres-why-161549">Regional military intervention in Mozambique is a bad idea. Here's why</a>
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<p>The central governments and state institutions are unable to address the dire socio-economic conditions and related instability. </p>
<p>This is why counterinsurgency efforts have had limited impact. The conflict in northern Mozambique could become a long, low-intensity war, as it has in Nigeria and Somalia. That is unless the authorities adopt counter-insurgency measures that go beyond military operations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>In parts of Nigeria and Mozambique, the central governments and state institutions are either absent or unable to address the dire socio-economic conditions and related instability.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2006962023-02-26T13:19:21Z2023-02-26T13:19:21ZSouth Africa has been grey listed for not stopping money laundering and terrorism funding. What it means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512279/original/file-20230225-2133-7jtilj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa provides fertile ground for money laundering and terrorism funding.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Financial Action Task Force <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2023/2023022401%20Media%20statement%20-%20Response%20to%20FATF.pdf">has placed South Africa</a> on a list of countries under increased monitoring, commonly known as the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2023.html#:%7E:text=When%20the%20FATF%20places%20a,as%20the%20%E2%80%9Cgrey%20list%E2%80%9D.">grey list</a>, after it failed to address all of the shortcomings on money laundering and the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/Terrorist-Financing.html">financing of terrorism </a>that the task force identified in its 2019 evaluation of the country. The decision has serious implications for the country, more specifically its financial services sector as well as its ability to attract investment. The Conversation Africa’s political editor Thabo Leshilo talks to Philippe Burger, an economics professor and the dean of the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State, about what the grey listing means for South Africa.</em> </p>
<h2>What does grey listing mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions.html">Grey listing</a> refers to a country being placed on a list of countries under increased monitoring by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/the-fatf/what-we-do.html">Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</a>, the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The FATF <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/mutual-evaluations.html">evaluates </a> each member country’s implementation and effectiveness of measures to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/South-Africa.html">South Africa </a> has been placed on FATF’s grey list because it does not have sufficient mechanisms in place to monitor and combat money laundering and terrorist financing activities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/invisible-trillions-review-global-capitalism-operates-beyond-the-rule-of-law-and-threatens-democracy-199311">Invisible Trillions review: global capitalism operates beyond the rule of law and threatens democracy</a>
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<p>The country undertook to work with the FATF to identify strategies and time frames to <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2023.html">improve its monitoring mechanisms</a>. Specifically, it undertook to work with the FATF on <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/treasury-listing-south-africa-financial-action-task-force-24-feb-2023-0000#:%7E:text=Government%20notes%20the%20Financial%20Action,earlier%20today%2C%2024%20February%202023.">eight specific topics</a>. These include increased investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. It’ll also enhance its capacity to identify, seize and confiscate the proceeds of such crimes. </p>
<p>South Africa also needs to improve its terrorist financing risk assessment to inform its strategy to counter the financing of terrorism activities. In addition, it needs to ensure the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions, and create effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities targeted by such sanctions.</p>
<h2>What are the implications?</h2>
<p>Though the FATF does not explicitly require increased due diligence, grey listing will nevertheless in effect require increased due diligence. Banks dealing with cross-border financial flows and companies wanting to invest in South Africa will have to vet their clients and the sources of client income better before they invest. This can be costly and, therefore, discourage investment. <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/reviews/finstab-review/2022/financial-stability-review/second-edition-2022-financial-stability-review-/Presentation%20%20Second%20Edition%202022%20Financial%20Stability%20Department%20(Dr%20Nicola%20Brink).pdf#page=17">The increased risk</a> associated with South Africa could also result in higher interest rates and cost of capital.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282">South Africa provides fertile ground for funders of terrorism. Here's why</a>
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<p>The higher costs that domestic and international companies will incur when they trade or invest across South African borders will put upward pressure on the cost of living of ordinary South Africans. However, of probably even more significance to ordinary South Africans is that the grey listing will likely deter foreign investment, which is needed to stimulate economic growth and job creation. </p>
<h2>Which other countries are grey listed?</h2>
<p>In being grey listed South Africa joins a list of countries, none of which are known as paragons of governance. Some, such as the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100215/why-cayman-islands-considered-tax-haven.asp#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20having%20no,are%20therefore%20considered%20tax%20neutral.">Cayman Islands</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/panama-papers-show-how-easy-it-is-to-finance-terror-using-u-s-shell-companies-57539">Panama</a>, are known <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-tax-havens-the-answer-explains-why-the-g-7-effort-to-end-them-is-unlikely-to-succeed-163125">tax havens</a> that potentially attract laundered money. Others are known as war zones or countries with jihadist and Islamist terror groupings operating on their land. These include Syria, Yemen, Mali, Nigeria, and Mozambique. The list also includes countries with very weak governments, such as Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen for the grey listing to be lifted?</h2>
<p>South Africa needs to work with the FATF to identify strategies and time frames to improve its monitoring mechanisms. It must then implement these improvements at the latest by January 2025. This might require improved legislation and better monitoring mechanisms to red-flag potential money laundering and terrorist funding flows. </p>
<p>Although the country recently made a belated effort to <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/south-africa-greylisted/">improve its legislation </a> to avert being grey listed, it will need to do more. Doing so will require a dedicated focus from the government to</p>
<ul>
<li><p>pass additional relevant legislation, </p></li>
<li><p>fund the investigative authorities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing activities, and </p></li>
<li><p>ensure the effective and speedy prosecution of individuals and institutions undertaking such crimes. </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sandton-terror-alert-time-for-south-africa-to-improve-its-intelligence-sharing-channels-with-the-us-194542">Sandton terror alert: time for South Africa to improve its intelligence sharing channels with the US</a>
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<p>With the recent history in South Africa of <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> for private gain by individuals, some of whom are themselves probably guilty of money laundering, the onus will be on the government to show that it is serious about implementing effective legislation and mechanisms to combat money laundering and terrorist funding. Thus, to get out of the rut of grey listing the country will have to fight the rot of money laundering and terrorist funding. The jury, or in this case the Financial Action Task Force, is still out on whether it will succeed in doing so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Opinions disclosed in this article by Philippe Burger are made in his private capacity and do not represent the views of any of the institutions from which he received research funding. Philippe Burger received funding from the National Research Foundation as rated researcher. He is also a Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), in which capacity he is the lead for the Macro-Fiscal workstream for the SA-TIED II project. He is also a 2016/17 Fulbright Exchange Scholar.</span></em></p>In being grey listed South Africa joins a list of countries with poor governance. Others are war zones or countries with jihadist terror groupings operating on their land.Philippe Burger, Dean: Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, and Professor of Economics, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996282023-02-20T13:52:18Z2023-02-20T13:52:18ZIslamist terrorism is rising in the Sahel, but not in Chad – what’s different?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511155/original/file-20230220-18-cskr5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local residents gather around the biggest mosque in the region for the evening prayer in Bahai, Chad.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Di Lauro/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the rise of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria and the emergence of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">Islamist-Salafist</a> groups in northern Mali in 2013, the Sahel has increasingly been caught in the maelstrom of Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>The region is now described as the new <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133217">global epicentre</a> of violent extremism. The population is suffering immensely, and in some areas more than <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698048/EPRS_BRI(2021)698048_EN.pdf">2 million</a> people have been displaced. Agriculture and development have come to a halt there.</p>
<p>Five explanations are usually given for the rise of Islamist terrorism in the Sahel: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/salafism-in-nigeria/5EC64F70A4BCBD521C64C610A0A05FD8">dissatisfaction</a> with the political order, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">bad governance</a>, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=364364319">ethnic rivalries</a> to <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/money-talks-a-key-reason-youths-join-boko-haram">economic reasons</a> such as poverty or unemployment, especially among the youth. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/hope-better-jobs-eclipses-religious-ideology-main-driver-recruitment-violent-extremist-groups-sub-saharan-africa">recent study</a> cited economic precarity as the main factor. This is a scenario where young people in particular face high unemployment and thus lose hope about the future.</p>
<p>Chad is one of the <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks">poorest countries</a> in the world. It was ruled for 30 years by the authoritarian president Idriss Déby Itno, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">died in 2021</a> under unexplained circumstances. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno offered Chadians great hope, but ended up leaving a terrible legacy</a>
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<p>The country fulfils all the conditions associated with Islamist terrorism. But, so far, the threat reaches Chad from the neighbouring countries and not from the inside. So then, what holds Chadian society together? </p>
<p>For my <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/contjas/article/view/239122">research</a> I drew on data from an opinion survey I conducted in five Chadian towns (the capital N’Djamena, Abéché, Sarh, Mongo and Moundou) from 2015 to 2016. My aim was to get the views of all ethnic and linguistic groups in the country. Long-term studies show that people do not change their political and religious attitudes overnight. In view of the actual political transition in Chad and the increase in Islamist terror in the region, the results are still valid today and could allow conclusions to be drawn for other countries.</p>
<p>The results show that one reason the threat of Islamist terrorism doesn’t come from inside is because Chadians want to live together peacefully. Other reasons include the fact that Chadians have high religious tolerance and Deby’s authoritarian regime favoured groups who had a tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas - appeasing them with economic benefits. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>My research sampled 1,857 people who answered about 130 questions in face-to-face interviews. By analysing the quantitative dataset, I identified groups within Chadian society according to their propensity for democracy, cohabitation and religiosity, and their religious fundamentalist tendencies.</p>
<p>The data confirmed a high fragmentation of Chad’s society along ethnic, religious and economic lines. </p>
<p><strong>Democracy:</strong> Chad is one of the <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TCD#pos4">least democratic</a> countries of the world. Yet more than half of the survey respondents supported democratic ideas. </p>
<p><strong>Tolerance:</strong> A substantial majority of respondents expressed the desire to live peacefully with other groups. But the respondents who labelled themselves Salafists – the spectrum of Salafism ranges from a spiritual renewal of Islam as in the times of Mohammed to a hybrid religious-political ideology seeking to establish a global caliphate – were the least inclined to social coexistence.</p>
<p>During individual interviews, religious Muslim and Christian leaders and opinion leaders also emphasised Chadians’ willingness to live together peacefully. They stressed that both religions are frequently represented in many families. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-rise-of-jihadist-movements-in-africa-42905">What lies behind the rise of jihadist movements in Africa</a>
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<p><strong>Religion:</strong> Chad, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/04/15/religious-affiliation-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/">a predominantly Muslim society</a>, is one of the few countries in the Sahel region to have a substantial Christian minority. This is partly a legacy of French colonial rule, which fostered a Christian educated elite in the south of the country.</p>
<p>It is also a consequence of Déby’s authoritarian and corrupt rule which emphasised the balance between the different religions. However, he favoured certain groups from the north who had been Islamised for centuries. Members of these groups were over represented in the highest income categories.</p>
<p>The data confirmed that religion played an important role in the daily life of most of those interviewed. The regular observance of religious practices is firmly embedded in the everyday life of Muslims and Christians. </p>
<p>The religious practices of the other religions were also acknowledged. </p>
<p>I was particularly interested in the respondents’ tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas that could possibly lead to religious violence. The dataset allowed me to create an “Islamist fundamentalism” index. </p>
<p>In contrast to “religiosity”, which measures religious affiliation, belief and practice, conceptualising the measurement of any <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4">religious fundamentalism</a> focuses on:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a literal understanding of the sacred book of the respective religion </p></li>
<li><p>the exclusivity of one’s religion </p></li>
<li><p>the importance of religion in societal life. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Islamist fundamentalism index also contained specific items like the introduction of Sharia law. In this way, I was able to identify respondents who were more inclined towards Islamic fundamentalism, and might even be willing to lean towards Islamist terrorism to achieve their goals.</p>
<p>The highest Islamist attitudes were expressed by more than a third of the sampled Muslim population. I found the strongest Islamist fundamentalist attitudes among respondents who attended an Arabic primary school or a Qur’anic school and had no further schooling, and among respondents with two years of higher education.</p>
<p>Only a minority of the respondents who never went to any school showed Islamist fundamentalist attitudes. </p>
<p><strong>Social profile:</strong> A large number of respondents who scored high as Islamist fundamentalists were merchants and came from high income groups. Most were most likely to have benefited economically during the Déby era. They displayed the biggest support for the late authoritarian president, embraced above average undemocratic attitudes, and supported authoritarian structures in general.</p>
<h2>What’s significant</h2>
<p>Why are these results noteworthy? </p>
<p>Research in other countries has shown that dissatisfaction and frustration about bad governance, corruption or poverty fosters the emergence of Islamist terrorism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988">Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship</a>
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<p>In Chad, however, the profiteers of the Déby regime were the most fundamentalist. They admitted that they were willing to take to violence if they did not agree with their political leader. But, with their own position secured, they seem not to have seen any need to turn against the corrupt structures that benefited them. They had made peace with the regime.</p>
<p>Déby’s son Mahamat Déby has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56836109">taken power</a> by violating the country’s constitution. He was appointed transitional president in October 2022 following a so-called national inclusive dialogue. Like his father, he has to deal with sporadic attacks by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria">Boko Haram</a> in the Lake Chad region, which is threatened by Islamist terrorism. The economic situation of the country is precarious. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chad-is-making-a-huge-effort-to-find-peace-chadians-arent-convinced-it-will-work-189268">Chad is making a huge effort to find peace: Chadians aren't convinced it will work</a>
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<p>Will Mahamat Déby continue to satisfy his wealthier, non-democratic compatriots, who are more inclined towards Islamist fundamentalist ideas and were the strong supporters of his father’s rule?</p>
<p>Or will he opt for democratic structures and fair distribution of resources and wealth so as not to give fundamentalist Islamist groups inside Chad a reason to turn to violence and against the state?</p>
<p>The answers to these questions are unclear. What’s needed is more knowledge about these groups and their attitudes, their behaviour and propensity for radicalisation. This will broaden our understanding of Islamist tendencies and threats, and to develop long-term peace in the Sahel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow received funding from the Gerda-Henkel-Foundation in the framework of the special research programme “Islam” for a research project about laicism in Chad. </span></em></p>Chad fulfils all conditions to be affected by Islamist terrorism. But the threat so far comes from its neighbours, not from the inside.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1957062022-12-29T20:55:25Z2022-12-29T20:55:25ZIs the terrorism threat over?<p>Eight years after <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/threat-advisory-system">raising the national terrorism threat level</a>, Australia recently <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/resources/speeches-and-statements/national-terrorism-threat-level">lowered it</a> again – from mid-range (probable) to low-range (possible). </p>
<p>Does this mean the threat from terrorism is over?</p>
<p>Few are better placed to answer this than Mike Burgess, Director-General of Security and head of ASIO, Australia’s domestic intelligence agency. </p>
<p>Burgess is one of the handful of people who can talk openly about his agency’s work. And when he speaks, his words are carefully calibrated and warrant close attention.</p>
<p>In a rare public address in November he told the Australian public that, for the time being at least, they could stop worrying about the threat of a terrorist attack in Australia. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When ISIL formed its caliphate in the Middle East, significant numbers of Australians were seduced by slick propaganda and false narratives, and that led ASIO to raise the terrorism threat level to PROBABLE. Our decision was tragically justified.</p>
<p>Since 2014, there have been 11 terrorist attacks on Australian soil, while 21 significant plots have been detected and disrupted.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Decades of hard work by police, communities and government agencies have ultimately reduced the capacity of terrorist groups (al-Qaeda and the Islamic State movement in particular) to significantly threaten stable, democratic states.</p>
<p>But in <a href="https://eeradicalization.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Taliban-Report-by-Ajmal-Souhail-final.pdf">weak or failing states</a> (including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia) al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates continue to represent an existential threat. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-04112022.pdf">Global Terrorism Index</a>, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for almost half of all terrorist deaths, and <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/">the Sahel</a> (a region of North Africa that includes countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) is home to some of the most potent terrorist networks on the planet.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadists-and-bandits-are-cooperating-why-this-is-bad-news-for-nigeria-195619">Jihadists and bandits are cooperating. Why this is bad news for Nigeria</a>
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<h2>How have stable democracies minimised the terror threat?</h2>
<p>Established democracies have developed police-led counterterrorism intelligence capacity to the point where ambitious, large-scale, terrorist plots are largely detected and disrupted, and terrorist social networks are effectively pinned down.</p>
<p>And this is not just the case with Western democracies. In our region, for example, Indonesia, <a href="https://stratsea.com/deradicalization-programs-in-malaysian-prisons-amidst-covid-19-pandemic-limitations-challenges/">Malaysia</a> and the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/un-philippines-peacebuilding-programme-scores-gains-achieving-peace-bangsamoro">Philippines</a> have made impressive progress in constraining a resilient and pernicious terrorist threat.</p>
<p>For Indonesia, and Australia, the bomb attacks in Bali 20 years ago were transformative. In the wake the bombings, successful forensic investigations by the Indonesian National Police, in partnership with the Australian Federal Police (AFP), profoundly reshaped the police forces of both nations.</p>
<p>The AFP was established in 1979 and tasked with leading counterterrorism, in response to the <a href="https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/criminal-hilton-hotel-bombing-nsw-1978/">Sydney Hilton bombing of 1978</a>. This was an unprecedented attack that killed three and injured 11. By the turn of the century, however, the modest resources of the AFP were being reorientated towards more pressing threats, such as counternarcotics and port security. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"726266323731259392"}"></div></p>
<p>The September 11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on America in 2001, however, forced an abrupt pivot, returning the AFP to its original focus on counterterrorism. A year later, in October 2002, AFP agents Mick Keelty and Graham Ashton were forced to draw on their relationships of trust with Indonesia National Police officers to figure out who was responsible for the Bali bombings, and to limit their capacity to launch further attacks.</p>
<p>Their successful cooperation led to the arrest of members of a breakaway bombing cell of an Indonesian al-Qaeda affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah. Formed in 1993 along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by so-called mujahideen, or holy fighters, this group supported the resistance to Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The Bali attacks resulted in the establishment of a specialist counterterrorism unit of the Indonesia police called Densus 88. In the 18 years since its establishment Densus 88 has arrested, and contributed to the successful prosecution of, more than 2,000 terrorists (this is my estimate based on the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48687392.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A105e01db6bb2055a5ab2cee590c10073&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1">hundreds of arrests reported year on year</a>).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368">How Indonesia's counter-terrorism force has become a model for the region</a>
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<p>The challenge now for Indonesian police is breaking the cycle of radicalisation. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-63883431">recent release</a> of Bali bomb-maker Umar Patek, on closely supervised parole, is confronting. But it’s also an encouraging indication of the success of Indonesian police in rehabilitating former terrorists.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-extremism-could-beckon-in-north-western-nigeria-if-local-dynamics-are-ignored-195044">Violent extremism could beckon in north-western Nigeria if local dynamics are ignored</a>
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<p>The rise of the Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq in mid-2014 marked a disturbing setback in counterterrorism in Australia and Southeast Asia. It was, in large part, a product of an unwise, and unwarranted, military intervention in Iraq a decade earlier. This toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein and opened the door to insurgent forces, including Al Qaeda in Iraq, which later became Islamic State in Iraq, and then Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).</p>
<p>The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein proved deeply destabilising, with cascading perverse outcomes. The international military operation, in which Australia played a significant role, contributed both to the rise of ISIS and to its ultimate defeat.</p>
<p>A similar, though strikingly incomplete, cycle of events played out in Afghanistan. Initially, the US-led military operation that began in October 2001 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">constrained al-Qaeda</a>, almost to the point of defeat. But <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/index.html">ultimately</a>, the military intervention led to the reconquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban, and the opening of the door to al-Qaeda and its rival Islamic State. </p>
<p>Not only does al-Qaeda now enjoy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/03/al-qaida-enjoying-a-haven-in-afghanistan-under-taliban-un-warns">safe haven in Afghanistan</a>, Islamic State continues to launch <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/is-recruits-multiethnic-fighters-in-afghanistan-threatening-regional-security-us-says/6878397.html">devastating attacks</a> across Afghanistan.</p>
<p>For the time being, however, police counterterrorism intelligence has constrained the capacity of both al-Qaeda and ISIS to project a threat into Australia.</p>
<h2>What about far-right terror?</h2>
<p>Far-right and related conspiracy extremism has gone from representing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/22/asio-reveals-up-to-40-of-its-counter-terrorism-cases-involve-far-right-violent-extremism">just 10-15%</a> of the counterterrorism caseload of ASIO and the AFP to <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7269257/ideologically-motivated-terror-now-taking-up-half-of-asio-work/">almost 50%</a>. This is a <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/rising-right-wing-violence-and-its-impact-on-the-fight-against-terrorism/">pattern</a> matched across <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/the-reichsburger-movement-explainer/">North America and Europe</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-almost-like-grooming-how-anti-vaxxers-conspiracy-theorists-and-the-far-right-came-together-over-covid-168383">'It's almost like grooming': how anti-vaxxers, conspiracy theorists, and the far-right came together over COVID</a>
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<p>For the moment, this new threat is mostly likely to manifest in lone-actor attacks that are mostly smaller-scale and less lethal (but not always, as we saw in <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-extremists-still-threaten-new-zealand-a-year-on-from-the-christchurch-attacks-133050">Christchurch in 2019</a>).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-extremists-still-threaten-new-zealand-a-year-on-from-the-christchurch-attacks-133050">Far-right extremists still threaten New Zealand, a year on from the Christchurch attacks</a>
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<p>For Western democracies, and increasingly Asian democracies as well, toxic ultranationalism in the form of ethnic and religious supremacist movements is the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63889792">rising threat</a>. Currently it’s <a href="https://www.afp.gov.au/news-media/media-releases/extremist-recruitment-reaching-young-australian-gamers">less well organised and coordinated</a> than jihadi terrorism. But that’s <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/extremists-far-right-figures-exploit-recent-changes-twitter">likely to change</a>. </p>
<p>And, as the tragic attacks in <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/devils-and-demons-wieambilla-shooters-film-video-after-killing-police-20221216-p5c6wu.html">Wieambilla</a> have shown, it has all became much more complex and unpredictable. Paranoia fuelled by conspiracy theories, mixed with religious fundamentalism and hatred of governments and police, is generating new forms of violent extremism.</p>
<p>As Mike Burgess reminded us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Terrorism is an enduring threat. And terrorism is an evolving threat […] We keep the terrorism threat level under constant review. There can be no ‘set and forget’ in security intelligence.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. And he is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia and Africa that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>For the time being, terrorism is a reduced threat in Australia. But the threat is not going away entirely.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1833042022-05-21T07:59:53Z2022-05-21T07:59:53ZTogo looks like West Africa’s new frontier of violent extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463982/original/file-20220518-15-9aajps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A group of armed Islamists gathered in Gao, northern Mali in 2012. Now such groups are seeking foothold in Togo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/togo-looks-like-west-africas-new-frontier-of-violent-extremism-183304&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The threat of violent extremism across West Africa has been <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-growing-threat-of-violent-extremism-in-coastal-west-africa/">on the rise</a> in recent times. </p>
<p>Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province have been active in the Lake Chad Basin region. <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin">Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin</a>, the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/isgs">Islamic State in the Greater Sahara</a> and <a href="https://institute.global/policy/what-ansarul-islam">Ansarul Islam in the Sahel</a>. The implications for the peace and security of the sub-region have never been more pronounced. </p>
<p>The activities of these groups have led to the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022">deaths of thousands</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14245.doc.htm">displaced</a> many others across parts of West Africa. The result is a worsening <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2020/4/5e99b5074/across-west-africa-dual-challenge-conflict-coronavirus-threatens-millions.html">humanitarian crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Togo, despite its proximity to countries affected by violent extremism, is one West African country that has experienced relative peace and security, until recently. On May 10 and 11 jihadists <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/203218/togo-suffers-its-first-deadly-jihadist-attack/">attacked</a> a Togolese military outpost and killed eight Togolese soldiers. </p>
<p>The incident was only a few kilometres away from neighbouring Burkina Faso, which struggles with <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220125-burkina-faso-a-history-of-destabilisation-by-jihadist-insurgencies">incessant attacks from violent extremist organisations</a>.</p>
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<p>The African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220512/auc-chairperson-statement-terrorist-attack-togo">condemned</a> the attack and called on neighbouring states to redouble their efforts against terrorism in the region. </p>
<p>No group has claimed responsibility yet for the latest attack, but the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, one of the world’s largest databases of terrorists and terrorist groups, <a href="https://twitter.com/TracTerrorism/status/1524367211644829697?s=20&t=FcHWXj1IsE6DmNlJIvvmkg">points a finger</a> at Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin. The group is <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/306-mali-enabling-dialogue-jihadist-coalition-jnim">backed by al-Qaida and operates in the Sahel region</a>. </p>
<p>It is not the first time Togo has experienced an attack of this nature on security forces. The first was in November 2021, when a security post in a northern village was <a href="https://www.togofirst.com/fr/securite/1011-8904-togo-attaque-terroriste-signalee-pres-de-la-frontiere-avec-le-burkina">attacked</a>. </p>
<p>The question is why these attacks have begun and what they imply for peace and security in the region. </p>
<p>Having closely monitored the conflict and security dynamics of West Africa for over a decade, I am convinced the attacks have to do with the need of violent extremist organisations to establish a presence in Togo as part of a broader recruitment drive.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the underlying socio-economic conditions in Togo make it a prime target for extremist activities. Togo bears the hallmarks of a fragile state in which violent extremism could thrive. </p>
<h2>Breeding grounds for violent extremism</h2>
<p>Some of the warning signs for countries being vulnerable to violent extremism are high rates of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, unemployment, corruption, weak institutions and poor governance.</p>
<p>Togo has a population of just over <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/TG">8.5 million</a>. Its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=TG">gross domestic product stood at US$7.5 billion in 2020</a>. That of its immediate neighbour, Ghana, with a population of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ghana-population">32 million</a>, was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=GH">US$72.3 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Over <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/togo/overview#1">50%</a> of Togo’s population live below the poverty line of US$1.25 per day. It is one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world as measured by the Human Development Index which is based indicators such as life expectancy, education and per capita income. In 2019, Togo’s index score was about <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/TGO.pdf">0.15, positioning it 167th out of 189 countries</a>. </p>
<p>In 2021, the life expectancy at birth in Togo was <a href="http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/tg">61.49</a> years and about <a href="http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/tg">40%</a> of its citizens are illiterate. These rates are similar to Burkina Faso, a country which struggles with violent extremism, where the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1036391/Burkina_economic_factsheet_2021.pdf">life expectancy at birth was 61.6% and illiteracy was 58.8%</a>. </p>
<p>Togo has the conditions for extremism to take root. </p>
<p>Poverty <a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00WQ7X.pdf">contributes</a> to violent extremism as it can provide a way, for those that are desperate, out of economic hardship. Recruits are often provided with an income and protection.</p>
<p>When people are not educated, they’re more <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global_20170322_violent-extremism.pdf">vulnerable</a> to exploitation and ideological manipulation. </p>
<p>Furthermore, low human capital development reinforces societal cleavages created as a result of years of neglect and poor governance, leading to marginalisation. This creates <a href="https://borgenproject.org/does-poverty-result-in-violent-extremism/">feelings of</a> abandonment and resentment, a potential driver of violent extremism once allowed to fester and left unchecked. </p>
<h2>Frustration</h2>
<p>Togo’s indicators tell us that it’s falling behind. This has also resulted in a heightened state of frustration among its citizens, most of which is directed at <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/08/anger-in-togo-after-government-accused-of-using-spyware-on-critics/">the state’s authoritarian rule</a>. </p>
<p>These grievances have been expressed through <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/12/togo-returns-streets-stop-unfair-legislative-elections/">street protests</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.togofirst.com/fr/securite/1011-8904-togo-attaque-terroriste-signalee-pres-de-la-frontiere-avec-le-burkina">previous attempt</a> at infiltrating Togo in the same place as the latest attacks, could signal a coordinated effort by violent extremist organisations to exploit these local grievances. </p>
<h2>Extremism in West Africa</h2>
<p>Togo joins the ranks of other countries in the region that have experienced terrorism attacks by violent extremist organisations. These include Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210608-soldier-killed-in-ivory-coast-attack">Côte d’Ivoire</a> and Burkina Faso.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">Mapping the contours of Jihadist groups in the Sahel</a>
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<p>Peace and security across the region is further threatened by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/malis-military-junta-pulls-out-regional-g5-sahel-force-2022-05-15/">recent decision</a> of the Malian junta to withdraw from the G5 Sahel force. The force, which is expected to contribute to peace, has suffered some operational hindrances owing to a lack of funds. Mali’s withdrawal could trigger other Sahelian states to opt out to suit their own strategic interests.</p>
<p>Though the affected states in West Africa have commenced a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-lifts-internet-suspension-day-after-violent-protest-2021-11-28/">regional response</a> to the threat of violent extremism, such as <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-african-coastal-terror-attacks-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg">Operation Koudanlgou 4 Zone 2</a>, its sustainability remains uncertain due to insufficient funding.</p>
<p>The same can be said of the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-accra-initiative-prevent-terrorism-in-west-african-coastal-states">Accra Initiative</a>, which was launched in 2017 by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo in response to violent extremism and transnational organised crime.</p>
<p>Most of the countries in the region are poor. They have operational funding challenges and insufficiently equipped military forces. They lack smart technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions at the borderlands. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/enablers-of-political-extremism-a-checklist-for-west-african-countries-181110">Enablers of political extremism: a checklist for West African countries</a>
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<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>By establishing a presence in Togo, extremist groups stand to gain by recruiting foot soldiers. Being in northern Togo also puts them close to Burkina Faso, enabling cross-border collaborations and attacks with other violent extremists operating in the area. </p>
<p>The more violent extremist organisations are able to demonstrate their viciousness, the more international attention they attract, that gives them a negotiating edge, as well as financial and logistical support from their parent organisation – in this case Al-Qaida.</p>
<p>West African states must act quickly and decisively to avert instability across the sub-region from violent extremism. Given the constraints highlighted above, they must prioritise efforts aimed at addressing the underlying socio-economic triggers of violent extremism, in addition to fundamentally improving relations between the state and society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent attacks on Togo show that West African states must act quickly and decisively to stop the spread of violent extremism.Folahanmi Aina, Doctoral Candidate in Leadership Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785112022-05-06T12:32:38Z2022-05-06T12:32:38ZBillions spent on overseas counterterrorism would be better spent by involving ex-terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461093/original/file-20220503-28209-o2b2fh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Machmudi 'Yusuf' Hariono, left, a former Indonesian terrorist, holds a book about former terrorists with an Islamic jihadist.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy of Yusuf Hariono</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the U.S. government has sent aid to countries plagued by terrorism, believing that the money could help other nations tackle extremism. Money matters, but it alone isn’t enough to prevent terrorism.</p>
<p>An explosion <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html">at a mosque</a> in northern Afghanistan killed more than 30 people on April 22, 2022, just days after blasts at schools in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-schools-attacked.html">Kabul killed six</a>.</p>
<p>These were the latest in a long string of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-tops-2021-global-survey-of-islamic-state-casualties-/6415735.html">Islamic State conducted</a> 365 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that caused 2,210 casualties in 2021 alone.</p>
<p>The United States, meanwhile, has spent approximately <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-did-the-us-spend-in-aid-to-afghanistan/">US$91.4 billion</a> on foreign aid to Afghanistan since 2001, while other countries gave <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-did-billions-in-aid-to-afghanistan-accomplish-5-questions-answered-166804">billions more</a>. Most of this money went toward Afghanistan’s military. </p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov">spent more than</a> $1.1 billion on Afghanistan in fiscal 2021, and $1 billion on aid in fiscal 2020.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/people/frederick-bernard-loesi/">a doctoral candidate</a> researching how to get militants to adopt more moderate positions and stop committing violence, I have spoken with 23 former Indonesian terrorist detainees since October 2020 to study their experiences. These people planned, facilitated or otherwise took part in bombings and attacks on civilians. </p>
<p>My research shows that international aid does not stop terrorists from carrying out violent acts, because most counterterrorism projects do not directly involve or appeal to detained and released terrorists. </p>
<h2>Speaking with terrorists</h2>
<p>I have found that listening to ex-terrorists is the best approach to understanding how and why they walk away from terrorism.</p>
<p>When I spoke with former Indonesian terrorists through video meetings and calls, they all told me that they once cared only about exterminating America and its allies. This is because they thought these countries were trying to repress Muslims worldwide. </p>
<p>They also justified their violent jihad as a way to enforce a caliphate, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/10/5884593/9-questions-about-the-caliphate-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask">a term</a> that refers to an all-encompassing Muslim state. </p>
<p>Less than half of the 23 former terrorists that I spoke with participated in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf">deradicalization programs</a>, designed to move people away from extremism, while they were in prison. But all of them were part of such programs, sponsored by nonprofit organizations and the Indonesian government, after their release. </p>
<p>All of the former terrorists also went on to receive vocational training, and some also got money from the Indonesian government and nonprofits to start small businesses. </p>
<p>Others received psychological counseling, or participated in talks on religion. Some participated in outdoor retreats organized by the Indonesian police, with hiking and other recreational activities. </p>
<p>A few of the ex-terrorists I spoke with acknowledged that the government helped them pay for their children’s school tuition. </p>
<p>These people began to shift their views, and move away from extremism, after they developed a strong sense of community support and respect for government and police authorities. </p>
<p>“I started to change when the police treated me well, and my community accepted me for who I am,” explained one female former terrorist who was a “bride” – a term used to describe a suicide bomber. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/04/indonesian-women-being-radicalised-into-would-be-suicide-bombers-report">The police captured her</a> just before she could carry out an attack in Bali in 2016. </p>
<h2>Terrorism funding</h2>
<p>Parts of Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population, are considered a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorism-havens-indonesia">haven for terrorism</a> – though the number of terrorist attacks <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/indonesia-becomes-sixth-member-state-brief-ctc-developments-july-2019-follow-visit">has recently declined</a> there. It remains a transit and destination hub for Islamic militants. </p>
<p>Indonesia received <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1881/FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Supplementary-Tables.pdf">almost $5 million in 2020</a> from U.S. Agency for International Development alone to contain violent extremism. It received the third largest amount of money from the U.S. for this kind of programming after Somalia and Bangladesh. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf">spent an estimated</a> $2.8 trillion on counterterrorism from fiscal 2002 through 2017, according to the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>But even extensive international aid isn’t a sure fix for ending terrorism. </p>
<p>Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-announces-humanitarian-assistance-for-iraq/">Iraq are</a> two examples of countries that receive big donations from the U.S. and other countries each year but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">still struggle with violent radicalism</a>.</p>
<p>Most of this money and work focuses on helping governments and local organizations carry out programs to fight extremism. These might include workshops for government officials focused on addressing terrorism and training sessions for women on how to start small businesses. </p>
<p>However, these programs typically do not directly involve former terrorist inmates and their families. This matters, because it mattered to the individuals I spoke with when they were included in counterterrorism projects. This is one of the big reasons they changed their ways, they told me. </p>
<h2>Aid doesn’t reach former terrorists</h2>
<p>Major donor countries like the U.S. have increasingly acknowledged <a href="https://institute.global/policy/role-aid-and-development-fight-against-extremism">the role of foreign aid</a> in fighting against extremism. Many countries, including the U.S., see that extremism can be politically destabilizing and pose international security concerns. </p>
<p>But at the same time, <a href="https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Aid%20as%20Counterterrorism.pdf">the incidence of terrorism in countries</a> that get large amounts of international funding, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/aswp.12184">Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.738263">Mali</a>, shows that international aid is an insufficient counterterrorism measure.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, for example, the USAID gave $24 million from 2018 to 2023 for an anti-extremism project called Harmoni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sfcg.org/harmoni-towards-inclusion-and-resilience/">This project</a> carries out workshops for state officials about prison management and handling terrorist detainees, among other programs. </p>
<p>But Harmoni does not include a key constituency – <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/download/L3NpdGVzL3B1c2F0L0RvY3VtZW50cy9KdXJuYWwvSnVybmFsJTIwSHVidW5nYW4lMjBMdWFyJTIwTmVnZXJpLyhGSU5BTCklMjBKVVJOQUwlMjBWT0wlMjA2JTIwTk8lMjAyLnBkZg==">detained or released terrorists</a> and their families – in their work. </p>
<p>This kind of strategy makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to actually reform extremists.</p>
<p>This model, according to my research, is common in counterextremism projects funded by international aid. </p>
<h2>Involving terrorists</h2>
<p>Donor countries, governments and partner organizations working to prevent extremism can involve released terrorists and their families in various ways – including providing vocational, financial, psychological, religious, educational and even recreational programs. </p>
<p>Many countries still need international aid to fight terrorism, but it will work more effectively only when also embracing former terrorist convicts and their families. </p>
<p>Without targeted, inclusive interventions in extremism, I believe the world will continue to see more wasted aid when addressing terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernard Loesi receives funding from Southeast Center, the University of Washington. </span></em></p>The US gives money to help Indonesia and other countries fight terrorism. But research shows that this money might not be effective, unless it directly reaches former extremists.Bernard Loesi, PhD Candidate, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1769882022-02-17T13:58:47Z2022-02-17T13:58:47ZJihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446288/original/file-20220214-112758-106f2ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armed and Security Forces of Mali servicemen stand guard on a military vehicle.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephane De Sakutin/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b149-jihadi-west-africa.pdf">political instability and insecurity</a> in some Sahelian states in West Africa has led to the capture of political power by their military in recent times. <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16275.pdf">Chad</a>, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Burkina-Faso-Fragility-Brief-2021.pdf">Burkina Faso</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-know-about-crisis-mali">Mali</a> have all experienced coups.</p>
<p>One thing these cases have in common is that the states are grappling with the threat of <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198816959.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198816959-e-33">Islamist insurgency</a>. </p>
<p>The insurgents are bent on imposing extremist political ideologies that are anti-democratic, including establishing an Islamic caliphate across the region. The consequences could lead to state collapse across the region, as has been the recent case in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Is there a relationship between jihadism and military coups in the Sahel? There is no easy answer. </p>
<p>Analysts say that while there is no mutually beneficial relationship between jihadist groups and coup plotters, there is a linkage between the increase of jihadism and the protracted insecurity across the region. </p>
<p>What is certain is that the new wave of military coups could dim the prospects of delivering the dividends of democracy in a region already <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981">devastated</a> by jihadism.</p>
<p>The complex, evolving relationship between jihadism and military coups in West Africa’s Sahel region is best understood in how the activities of the former preempts the emergence of the latter. This is not to say however that jihadism is a direct precursor to military coups.</p>
<h2>Convergence of chaos</h2>
<p>The latest coup in West Africa took place in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60112043">Burkina Faso</a>. It was the third in the country within the past eight months. There was also a recent <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/02/03/guinea-bissau-11-killed-in-failed-coup//">attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-s-membership-/6417087.html">The Economic Community for West African States</a> and the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-condemns-wave-of-military-coups/a-60678794">African Union</a> have reacted to the unfolding trends in the region mostly with mere “sanctions” and “suspensions”. These measures tend to further isolate affected states rather than improving transparency and accountability.</p>
<p>A historical <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">deep dive</a> into the Sahel region, where most of these military coups are occurring, shows that most of the states there are confronted by the challenge posed by jihadist groups. </p>
<p>Most of these groups are affiliated with global jihadist groups such <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant">Islamic State in Syria and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>Jihadist groups in the region include <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f3c13.html">Jamaatu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan</a> (popularly referred to as Ansaru), <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jama%27atu-ahlis-sunna-lidda%27awati-wal-jihad-%28boko">Jamaat Ahl as Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad</a> (Boko Haram), the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/islamic-states-determined-expansion-into-lake-chad-basin">Islamic State in the West African Province </a>, the <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-greater-sahara">Islamic State in the Greater Sahara</a> and <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin">Jamaat Nusratul Islam wal-Muslimin</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">Mapping the contours of Jihadist groups in the Sahel</a>
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<p>The underlying circumstances that have led to the proliferation of these jihadist groups across the region include <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/sahel-one-region-many-crises">high levels of poverty and inequality</a>. There is also high unemployment, illiteracy and <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2022/02/coup-in-burkina">poor governance</a>.</p>
<p>The existence of these socio-economic factors as well as political instability and the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/">challenges posed by climate change</a> in the region have compounded the threat posed by jihadism. </p>
<p>Combined, these conditions have given fuel to jihadism in the troubled region, leaving the affected states in perpetual fragility and weakness. </p>
<p>The obvious result has been the continued <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2022/01/making-sense-of-the-coup-in-burkina-faso/">incapacity</a> of the affected states to deal with their many challenges. </p>
<p>This has led to repeated tensions in relations between the state and society, which the jihadist groups have exploited in intensifying their recruitment drive.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the activities of these jihadist groups have also mounted additional pressure on the fragile democratic systems across the region.</p>
<p>This encourages state capture by the military, who see themselves as “guardians of the state” and the “last hope” of the common citizen. </p>
<h2>Battered but not out</h2>
<p>Having to bear the brunt, over the years, of fighting these jihadist groups, while sustaining multiple casualties, has also contributed to disenchantment within the ranks of the military. This was the case in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/28/burkina-fasos-coup-makers-capitalized-wider-grievances-within-ranks/">Burkina Faso</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/09/for-corruption-few-places-worse-than-the-sahel/">Endemic corruption</a> has further increased distrust between the military and the political elites. Corruption is often associated with the affected Sahelian states in West Africa. </p>
<p>The military often blame corruption among the political elite for the lack of required resources to fight insurgencies.</p>
<p>The military’s ascension to power does not necessarily guarantee a defeat of jihadists. Rather, it creates the tendency for an overly militaristic approach to fighting insurgency. </p>
<p>The approach further entrenches the unintended consequence of pushing the vulnerable into joining jihadist groups, rather than pulling them away from extremist ideologies.</p>
<p>The jihadist groups in the region are likely also to intensify their influence operations across the region – aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the locals within their areas of operation. </p>
<p>The continued emergence of coups is likely to be capitalised upon by jihadists as reflecting efforts which are finally yielding desired results – the forced displacement of democratic systems of government. The jihadists could use this as a tactic to get more fighters to join them.</p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>While the situation across the region continues to look bleak, it is important to note that democracy still stands <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30292/don-t-write-off-democracy-in-africa-just-yet?fbclid=IwAR1-8jPqtsVPStk6RMYNqz4BEDZ3K8swM7hOeuJkUFeHHi0KJY3xYNRFRu8">a chance</a> of surviving. </p>
<p>But wishful thinking alone is not sufficient. If the underlying factors that triggered the spate of violent extremism across the Sahel region continue, the military’s penchant for seizing political power might grow.</p>
<p>The military juntas now in power must urgently seek to establish mutuality with the societies they now rule. It’s a tall order, given that they don’t prioritise the relationship between state and society. Doing so would require giving voice to the concerns and grievances of citizens they rule over. </p>
<p>Failure to do this could result in the same disenchantment the people had towards the ousted civilian rulers, in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new wave of military coups could put the dividends of democracy out of reach in a region troubled by the effects of jihadism.Folahanmi Aina, Doctoral Candidate in Leadership Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1746342022-01-10T15:52:15Z2022-01-10T15:52:15ZRising instability in Mali raises fears about role of private Russian military group<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440056/original/file-20220110-27-vlu6xa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colonel Assimi Goita has stepped back from undertakings that there would be a return to civilian rule soon.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Habib Kouyate/Xinhua via Getty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tensions are mounting in West Africa as Mali resists pressure from the region, the EU and US, to come up with a firm timetable on how civilian rule will be restored after two coups and a military takeover. </p>
<p>The atmosphere has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f4525017-eb6f-47ee-b05e-d381e1b05407">worsened in recent weeks</a> in the wake of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/25/mali-approached-russian-private-companies-moscow-not-involved">reports</a> that Mali has entered into an arrangement with the Russian private military company – <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies">the Wagner Group</a>. </p>
<p>In the first weeks of 2022 the regional body of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/9/west-africa-bloc-ecowas-hits-mali-with-sanctions-after-poll-delay">announced</a> that it was closing its borders with Mali. And that it was prepared to activate its <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Final-Communique-on-Summit-on-Mali-Eng-080122.pdf">standby force</a> should the need to deploy it arise. </p>
<p>Ambassadors were withdrawn, with Mali <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/10/mali-protests-ecowas-sanctions-closes-borders/">retaliating</a> in kind.</p>
<p>This ratcheting up was preceded in mid-December 2021 by French forces officially <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/15/french-forces-leave-malis-timbuktu-after-nearly-9-years">withdrawing</a> from Timbuktu – the latest move in France’s strategic draw-down in the Sahel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/france-has-started-withdrawing-its-troops-from-mali-what-is-it-leaving-behind-170375">France has started withdrawing its troops from Mali: what is it leaving behind?</a>
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<p>The day after France’s withdrawal, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/12/16/us-warns-mali-wagner/">weighed in</a> on Mali’s looming deal with the shadowy Russian private military company. He stressed that the Wagner Group “will not bring peace to Mali”. He further urged the transitional government:</p>
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<p>…not to divert scarce budgetary resources away from the Malian Armed Forces’ fight against terrorism</p>
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<p>On December 23rd, 15 European states and Canada issued a <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali/news/article/statement-on-the-deployment-of-the-wagner-group-in-mali-23-dec-2021">joint statement</a> condemning the Malian government’s choice to pursue a deal with “foreign mercenaries instead of supporting the Malian Armed Forces,” a clear reference to the Wagner Group.</p>
<p>The EU also imposed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-hits-russian-mercenary-group-wagner-with-sanctions-2021-12-13/">sanctions</a> against both Mali and the Wagner Group.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/24/africa/russia-mercenaries-mali-intl/index.html">reports</a> emerged soon after that members of Wagner had arrived in Bamako via Libya where the group has been <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies">operating</a> since at least 2015. </p>
<p>For its part, Mali’s current regime continues to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211225-mali-denies-deployment-of-russian-mercenaries-from-wagner-group">adamantly deny</a> collaborating with Wagner.</p>
<p>If recent history offers any lessons, Mali’s experiment with the Wagner Group should be concerning. The group actively seeks out political instability and has done little to genuinely remedy underlying issues in the states with which it contracts. It has arguably made things more volatile for clients. </p>
<p>One needs to look no further than the Central African Republic, where the Wagner Group has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic">exacerbated tensions</a> via summary executions and ethnic targeting. This has contributed to an increasingly dire humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>Indeed, continued political strife may actually be good business for groups like Wagner. As I’ve suggested in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2019.1601869?casa_token=B7qq2OZyBgUAAAAA:27VoUa6uOkfflcKMvwvRzB5tvvd3KmXHuPT1p1AKJYu4jUvnBtXulDjOu7UrgQUhvt8jRQyoeG83">my research</a>, maintaining some degree of instability might ensure the longevity of contracts though private contractors have to be careful to ensure that their reputations aren’t severely damaged by poor performance. </p>
<p>My ongoing work suggests that the political and social context in Mali provide just the right ingredients for the Wagner Group.</p>
<h2>Instability in Mali</h2>
<p>Mali has been politically volatile over the past two years. </p>
<p>The current political climate can largely be traced back to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup">popular protests</a> that began in 2020. Those resulted in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/world/africa/mali-mutiny-coup.html">successful coup in August 2020</a>, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, that saw democratically elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (known by his initials IBK) deposed. </p>
<p>The country has since struggled both to find its democratic footing and to confront an <a href="https://acleddata.com/2021/06/17/sahel-2021-communal-wars-broken-ceasefires-and-shifting-frontlines/">increasingly</a> active and violent Islamist insurgency. </p>
<p>Less than 10 months later Colonel Goita was sworn in as president following a second <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57239805">coup</a> in May 2021. The country has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-mali-government-and-politics-60afe11f3629bc3440b4b2dab14e476a">officially</a> been ruled by a military junta since June 2021. </p>
<p>Goita originally signalled a commitment to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/malis-progress-toward-elections-insufficient-says-w-african-bloc-2021-09-07/">host elections</a> by February 2022. But, unsurprisingly, he has since walked back this pledge. Recent indications point to a potential <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-conference-recommends-election-delay-up-five-years-2021-12-30/">five-year</a> delay until elections. </p>
<p>A coalition of political parties has understandably <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/3/mali-opposition-rejects-election-delay-in-new-transition-plan">rejected</a> this proposal. </p>
<p>The prospects of any return to democracy have been further dimmed by the arrival of the Wagner forces which have a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27717&LangID=E">history</a> of human rights abuses including involvement in extrajudicial killings and torture.</p>
<p>The military junta may want Wagner’s assistance in countering Islamist insurgents, but it is possible that it will simultaneously use the group to repress political opposition.</p>
<h2>The Wagner Group</h2>
<p>Wagner has operated across the African continent in countries including Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique.</p>
<p>A deal with Mali’s current regime is just the type of partner it is looking for. </p>
<p>With a military junta in a state rife with political fragility, uncertainty and a plethora of lucrative natural resources, Mali looks like a winning lottery ticket. It also helps that Western security force assistance is drying up while Russia appears to be using Wagner to sweep in and fill the void. </p>
<p>There is no guarantee that the group will make headway against Islamist Groups in Mali. It has suffered some setbacks in recent history. This has led to a willingness to quickly <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russian-mercenaries-a-string-of-failures-in-africa/">vacate</a> when casualties rise and long term payoffs are unclear. </p>
<p>In late 2019 for instance, the group <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/">withdrew</a> from Mozambique after suffering <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/world/africa/russia-africa-troops.html">several casualties</a> in the fight against <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-secret-to-the-northern-mozambique-insurgencys-success/">Ahlu-Sunna Wa-Jama</a>, an Islamic insurgency that has wreaked havoc in the Cabo Delgado province over the past two years. </p>
<p>Like its other ventures, the Wagner Group was most likely lured to Mozambique’s natural-gas rich region of Cabo Delgado in search of contracts laden with resource concessions for Russian corporations. </p>
<p>In fact, in 2019 Russia’s Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190822-mozambique-russia-sign-energy-security-deals">inked deals</a> with Mozambique that included resource opportunities for Russian firms, but the instability in the country’s north has stalled progress.</p>
<p>Private military and security companies are far from novel and Wagner’s current modus operandi is not all that different from the first generation of similar companies that emerged in the immediate period following the Cold War. </p>
<p>Filling the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203018354/corporate-soldiers-international-security-christopher-kinsey">security vacuum</a>, these groups provided a diverse array of services to client states that had lost economic and military support from superpowers such as the US and Russia.</p>
<p>But comparing Wagner to first generation firms like the infamous South African company, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161407?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Executive Outcomes</a>, may not be entirely fair. </p>
<p>For instance, Wagner is almost certainly connected to the Russian government. The group’s founder, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictment-mueller.html">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a>, is a shadowy Russian oligarch with direct ties to Putin. </p>
<p>The relationship has led many to label Wagner a quasi-state actor offering the Russian government “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies">quasi-deniability</a>” in conducting military activities abroad. </p>
<p>Groups like Executive Outcomes, while drawing from former South African special operations forces, lacked such direct connections to their government. </p>
<p>While Mali’s democratic future remains unclear, the presence of Wagner will only complicate matters. For Wagner, and Russia more generally, Mali is a yet another important outlet in the growing <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30188/the-u-s-must-be-wise-in-strategic-competition-with-china">strategic tensions</a> with the West.</p>
<p><em>The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not represent the Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or the US Government.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174634/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Michael Faulkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rising tensions in West Africa heighten as the military junta in Mali engages Wagner, a Russian private military company while defying ECOWAS.Christopher Michael Faulkner, Postdoctoral fellow - National Security Affairs (Views expressed are the author's own and not those of any US government agency), US Naval War CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1652762021-08-12T10:36:51Z2021-08-12T10:36:51ZAl-Shabaab: why women join the Islamist militant group – podcast<p><em>The Conversation Weekly podcast is taking a short break in August. For the next few weeks, we’ll be bringing you extended versions of some of our favourite recent interviews.</em></p>
<p>This week, we speak to a researcher who interviewed Kenyan women about why they joined the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab.</p>
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<p>Al-Shabaab is in a violent stalemate with the Somali government and a coalition of foreign peacekeeping troops. Attacks and car bombs continue on a regular basis, and in recent weeks the US government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-military-carries-out-second-strike-somalia-this-week-2021-07-23/">targeted Al-Shabaab militants with air strikes</a>. </p>
<p>From its bases in Somalia, Al-Shabaab recruits people from the coastal region of neighbouring Kenya – including women. Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, a lecturer in the department of social sciences at the Technical University of Mombasa in Kenya, has interviewed some of these women to understand the complex dynamics surrounding their involvement in Al-Shabaab. Some joined willingly, and others were forcibly recruited, but the line between voluntary and involuntary is often blurred. </p>
<p>Badurdeen explains how she gained the trust of the women and their families and what her findings mean for their rehabilitation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab</a>
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<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly features an extended version of an interview <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-why-do-children-keep-getting-kidnapped-podcast-159099">first published on April 22</a>. The episode was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165276/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
From the archive: a researcher on the complex dynamics surrounding Kenyan women’s involvement in Al-Shabaab. Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Host, The Conversation Weekly PodcastDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1634352021-07-18T07:47:40Z2021-07-18T07:47:40ZHow Frelimo betrayed Samora Machel’s dream of a free Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408677/original/file-20210628-17-1xx8348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Samora Machel, Mozambique's founding president. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sahm Doherty/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Forty-six years ago, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/death-samora-machel">Samora Machel</a>, the leader of Mozambique’s liberation movement and the country’s first president, stood before a euphoric crowd at Machava Stadium and <a href="https://cedis.fd.unl.pt/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DECLARA%c3%87%c3%83O-DE-INDEPEND%c3%8aNCIA-DE-MO%c3%87AMBIQUE-DE-25-DE-JUNHO-DE-1975.pdf">declared</a> the</p>
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<p>complete and total independence of Mozambique. </p>
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<p>He inspired the people of Mozambique to imagine and build a new nation in which development, social justice, and solidarity with – and care for – the oppressed took centre stage.</p>
<p>Four decades later, Machel’s declarations ring hollow. His words and the new dawn they heralded have since disintegrated.</p>
<p>I’m a Mozambican political sociologist. I have been a keen observer of the country’s changing economic, social and political structures since the early 1990s. </p>
<p>The declaration of independence in 1975 proclaimed a social contract that contained the ideals of freedom. These included economic and social justice, eradication of hunger and poverty, health and education for all, equality of all people regardless of ethnicity, race and gender, emancipation of women, the rule of law and human rights. </p>
<p>But Frelimo has squandered the enormous political capital it enjoyed at independence. The party remains in power by using violence, intimidation, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1019/2019/en/">harassment and threats</a>. Generalised <a href="https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CIP-Custos_da_Corrupcao.pdf">lawlessness</a> characterise Mozambique today.</p>
<p>Governance crises and deep rooted <a href="https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CIP-Custos_da_Corrupcao.pdf">corruption</a> permeate all aspects of political, economic and social life. <a href="https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/CIESE19-BernhardWeimer.pdf">Popular discontent</a> with the Frelimo government is on the rise. This explains the armed conflict in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/24/mozambique-opposition-group-raids-hospitals">central</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/guerra-em-cabo-delgado-erro-hist%C3%B3rico-que-a-frelimo-n%C3%A3o-consegue-remediar/a-57226829">northern</a> regions. </p>
<h2>The context</h2>
<p>Mozambique was the first country in southern Africa to become <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Southern-Africa/Independence-and-decolonization-in-Southern-Africa">independent</a> through armed insurrection. This threatened the white minority regimes of Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe) and <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.crp2b20027_final.pdf">South Africa</a>. Both feared that Mozambique would become a haven for the liberation movement guerrillas of the respective countries. It was, therefore, in their interests to topple the Frelimo government. </p>
<p>As Mozambique celebrated independence the regime of Ian Smith in Zimbabwe conducted air raids in southern and central Mozambique. Civilians were killed and communication systems, <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/3004-1979-04-KS-a-DIR.pdf">bridges and crops were destroyed</a>. </p>
<p>The Rhodesian regime also teamed up with Portuguese malcontents who still had interests in Mozambique, to create a surrogate terrorist movement, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Apartheids-Second-Front-Africas-Neighbours/dp/0140523707">Renamo</a>.
When the Rhodesian regime fell and Zimbabwe became <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Zimbabwe">independent in 1980</a>, the South African apartheid regime stepped in to finance Renamo’s operations. Its 16-year war of destabilisation consisted of acts of terrorism that produced <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Mozambique-Revolution-Under-Joseph-Hanlon/dp/0862322448">profound psychological trauma</a>. </p>
<p>The war of destabilisation and natural disasters created the need for foreign aid. Working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Frelimo introduced structural adjustments in 1987. These programmes involved <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Peace-without-Profit-Rebuilding-Mozambique/dp/0852558007">economic liberalisation and deregulation</a>. </p>
<p>The programmes involved widespread privatisation of state-run companies, massive layoffs and unemployment and cuts in government spending on social services. The cost of food, water, housing, electricity, transport and telecommunications went up. Poverty and inequality increased.</p>
<p>At the same time Frelimo elites set about building an extensive patronage system. </p>
<h2>Natural resources</h2>
<p>In my view Frelimo political elites have presided over the natural resource mismanagement, looting and environmental crimes. </p>
<p>In the past 20 years many rural communities have been <a href="https://mistra.org.za/mistra-publications/land-in-south-africa/">forcibly removed from their homes</a> to make room for agribusiness, mining, oil and gas companies. </p>
<p>In addition, natural ecosystems have been plundered. The deforestation of central and northern regions has left areas subject to vicious cycles of droughts, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/04/24/how-rampant-deforestation-made-mozambique-more-vulnerable-cyclone-idai">cyclones and floods</a>.</p>
<p>In 2013, the Environmental Investigation Agency <a href="https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-First-Class-Connections1.pdf">investigation</a> found that 93% of logging in Mozambique was illegal. </p>
<p>But the most marked exploitation of natural resources followed the discovery of large reserves of natural gas in Palma district, Cabo Delgado province.</p>
<p>Local rural communities have been dislocated and impoverished. The transfer of the Afungi peninsula in Palma district, where the French company Total has been constructing its liquefied natural gas infrastructure, was marked by government threats, intimidation, coercion and <a href="https://landportal.org/fr/library/resources/industria-extractiva-e-comunidades-locais">lack of transparency</a>. </p>
<p>Without just compensation and meaningful free, prior and informed consent, communities that for centuries relied on fishing for their livelihood were <a href="https://landportal.org/fr/library/resources/industria-extractiva-e-comunidades-locais">evicted from their fishing grounds forever</a>.</p>
<h2>State of human rights</h2>
<p>The Mozambican declaration of independence committed the new nation to upholding the rights enshrined in international and regional human rights covenants. Yet, human rights organisations document violations of fundamental human rights protected under international law year after year. </p>
<p>In Cabo Delgado, nearly 1 million internally displaced people are in <a href="https://www.emergency-live.com/stories/mozambique-islamist-attacks-create-humanitarian-crisis-in-cabo-delgado-1-2-million-people-without-health-care/">desperate need</a> of having their basic needs met. This includes shelter, water, sanitation and education. </p>
<p>Those suspected of aiding the enemy are disappeared, tortured and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/3545/2021/en/">killed</a>. </p>
<p>Journalists attempting to cover the conflict face intimidation and harassment, arbitrary arrests, and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/21/mozambique-media-barred-insurgent-region">torture</a>.</p>
<p>The 1975 declaration of independence also proclaimed the complete “emancipation of women”. But most women in Mozambique live under deplorable conditions, stripped of their rights, humanity and <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/freeing-women-and-girls-violence-mozambique">dignity</a>.</p>
<h2>Poverty and inequality</h2>
<p>In the declaration of independence, Frelimo proclaimed that the new government would fight and eliminate all the “faces of colonialism and underdevelopment”. These included diseases, illiteracy and hunger. It said health services network would be extended throughout the country. Frelimo also <a href="https://cedis.fd.unl.pt/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DECLARA%C3%87%C3%83O-DE-INDEPEND%C3%8ANCIA-DE-MO%C3%87AMBIQUE-DE-25-DE-JUNHO-DE-1975.pdf">promised to</a> promote the spread of education at all levels.</p>
<p>These promises have not been met. The Frelimo government has overseen <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46420748_Poverty_is_not_being_reduced_in_Mozambique">growing poverty and inequality</a>. It presides over low human development indices, especially in rural areas, particularly in the central and northern regions. Among these are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>health (child mortality, nutrition),</p></li>
<li><p>education (years of schooling, enrolment), </p></li>
<li><p>living standards (water, sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel, floor, assets), and </p></li>
<li><p>unemployment (notably of youth). </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Corruption is rife. An egregious example was the revelation of the country’s biggest ever financial scandal in 2016. Senior government officials acquired secret and illegal loans from Switzerland’s Credit Suisse International and Russia’s VTB Capital. It later emerged in court that <a href="https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Privinvest-informa-ao-tribunal-ingle%CC%82s-que-pagou-milho%CC%83es-de-do%CC%81lares-a-Filipe-Nyusi.pdf">more than US$17 million had been paid in bribes</a> to the Frelimo party and two serving ministers at the time – defence and finance.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>The ideals of the struggle for freedom outlined in the 1975 declaration of independence are lost and forgotten. </p>
<p>In my view Frelimo has made a mockery of the ideals of liberation. Mourning, not celebration, is suitable for the occasion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163435/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Matsinhe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Frelimo, which governs Mozambique, has squandered the enormous political capital it enjoyed at independence. It now remains in power through violence, intimidation, harassment, and threats.David Matsinhe, Losophone Research Specialist/Adjunct Professor in African Studies, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1615902021-05-31T15:24:04Z2021-05-31T15:24:04ZUN and African Union key to public support for French military operations in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402830/original/file-20210526-23-1rav1fa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron with French troops during his 2017 visit to France's Barkhane counter-terrorism operation in Gao, northern Mali.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Christopher Petit Tesson/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57239805">coup in Mali</a> and the recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/world/africa/president-chad-killed.html">killing by rebels of Chadian strongman Idriss Déby</a> starkly illustrate the challenges facing France’s counterterrorism operations in Africa.</p>
<p>In February 2021, French president Emmanuel Macron pledged to extend his <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/02/17/france-maintains-sahel-force/">country’s 5,000-strong Operation Barkhane</a> in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. He declared that Barkhane’s primary goal was to help states in the Sahel region “decapitate” insurgent groups that France has persistently portrayed as terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Yet the operation, launched in 2014, has relatively little to show for its efforts. It also comes with a significant price tag for France, <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021C05/">close to €1 billion in 2020</a>. This economic burden has become hard to justify, especially amid the economic pressure from the COVID-19 crisis. </p>
<p>The French public increasingly doubts that armed insurgencies in the Sahel are a major security threat to France. Domestic support for Operation Barkhane <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/operation-barkhane-la-bataille-de-l-opinion-est-lancee-20210112">dropped below 50%</a> for the first time earlier this year. Yet <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030175801">French leaders</a> continue to view their country as an essential security provider in Africa. </p>
<p>French policymakers understand that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1734571">sharing the burden</a> of military operations with global partners can help boost flagging support at home. At the same time, foreign governments <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1733986">hesitate to contribute</a> substantial resources to France’s military efforts in Africa. This includes France’s principal NATO allies, such as the US, UK and Germany. People in these countries often see French operations as self-serving endeavours to defend France’s regional influence and great power status. </p>
<h2>Swaying public support</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/in-search-of-soft-power-does-foreign-public-opinion-matter-for-us-foreign-policy/0C9DB5A0FB1EF43767932DE4E2C4DCEF">Research</a> shows that foreign public opinion has a considerable effect on countries’ willingness to contribute troops and resources to multinational military coalitions.</p>
<p>Seeking to boost foreign public support and facilitate multinational coalition-building, French leaders have sought to portray their interventions in Africa as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz050">part of a “global war on terror”</a>. But people in potential troop-contributing countries may suspect that leaders who advocate intervention are <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Overblown/John-Mueller/9781416541721">inflating the security threats</a>. They thus remain hesitant to contribute. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab032">recently published study</a> we investigate whether, and if so to what extent, endorsements from the United Nations or the African Union (AU) increase foreign public support for contributing to French-led military operations. We hypothesised that UN or AU endorsements might offer an impartial <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00660.x">“second opinion”</a> to sceptical foreign publics that political instability in the Sahel does indeed threaten global security, thus justifying military intervention.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>To test our hypothesis, we conducted nationally representative public opinion surveys in the US, Great Britain, and Germany. The surveys were fielded online by the polling company <a href="https://today.yougov.com/">YouGov</a> in August 2018. </p>
<p>Each survey taker read a vignette that began with the introduction,
“Imagine that France is planning a military intervention in one of its former colonies in West Africa”. Then, the vignette described France’s intervention goal as helping the African country’s government combat Islamist terrorists. </p>
<p>Our surveys contained an embedded experiment. That is, we randomly assigned information to our respondents about whether the UN or the AU endorsed France’s intervention. Participants were then asked if they supported their government contributing to France’s intervention. This could be by providing combat troops, financial and logistical assistance, or advice and training for local government forces.</p>
<p>Our surveys presented realistic scenarios as the US, UK and Germany have partnered with France in Africa over the last two decades. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/world/africa/terrorism-west-africa.html">US</a> has contributed intelligence, aerial refuelling and logistics to Operation Barkhane, worth about $45 million a year. <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/06/14/first-uk-troops-arrive-africa-sahel-france-barkhane/">The UK</a> has deployed about 100 troops in support of French missions since 2018. It recently <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mali-british-troops-al-qaeda-isis-b1795568.html">increased this to 300</a>. It has also offered transport, reconnaissance and logistical assistance. <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/mali-node/mali-bundeswehr/2340748">Germany</a> has contributed 1,400 troops to EU training and UN peacekeeping missions in Mali, in support of French efforts.</p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>We found that approval by the UN or AU (or both) increased US, UK and German public support for contributing to French military operations by about 5 to 7 percentage points. This is significant, given that in all three countries, baseline public support was around or slightly below 50% for non-combat contributions. It was substantially lower for sending combat troops. </p>
<p>The bump in public support from multilateral approval is thus likely to be politically valuable to French leaders intent on building multinational coalitions. This finding is particularly relevant because of our study’s focus on counterterrorism operations. <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/30/1/140/692882/0162288054894616.pdf">Previous scholarship</a> had suggested that the public strongly supports such operations, regardless of multilateral approval. We found that this is not necessarily the case.</p>
<p>In short, multilateral approval does make a difference to public support, even in counterterrorism cases. It helps reassure citizens that the threat from terrorism is real and warrants military intervention.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>French leaders appear to understand that multilateral approval helps build coalitions and share burdens. Since the mid-1990s, they have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1733985">sought to legitimise</a> their African interventions by securing approval from the UN and regional institutions. Our study confirms a strong causal link between such multilateral approval and the willingness of foreign publics to contribute to French-led operations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161590/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joel Rogers de Waal is affiliated with YouGov, which provided the research behind this article. The research was provided in pro bono collaboration as part of YouGov’s public data offering
. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan A. Chu and Stefano Recchia do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>French policymakers understand that sharing the burdens of military operations with global partners can help boost flagging support at home.Stefano Recchia, John G. Tower Chair in International Politics, Southern Methodist UniversityJoel Rogers de Waal, Co-director, YouGov-Cambridge Centre, University of CambridgeJonathan A. Chu, Lecturer, Stanford UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1615492021-05-27T16:42:38Z2021-05-27T16:42:38ZRegional military intervention in Mozambique is a bad idea. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403140/original/file-20210527-21-mrjc1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced people arrive in Pemba, Mozambique, after fleeing Palma following a brutal attack by Islamist insurgents in March.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Wessels/AFF via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The heads of state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have endorsed plans to deploy troops to Mozambique to help it fight <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-extraordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government/">extremists in the Cabo Delgado province in the north of the country</a>. Regional leaders also urged members states to continue working with humanitarian agencies to continue providing humanitarian support.</p>
<p>The insurgency, led by an Islamist group known as the Sunnar (popularly known locally as Al-Shabaab), has destabilised the region <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">since October 2017</a>. Its strength has grown tremendously since last year. In October <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">it made a daring raid</a> on one of the major towns in the north, Mocimbao da Praia. And then in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">March this year</a> it targeted foreign contract workers, including South Africans.</p>
<p>This rang alarm bells in the region.</p>
<p>But is an intervention by the regional body a good idea? And will it help?</p>
<p>Past experiences suggest it’s not. And that it won’t help. </p>
<p>I suggest that the SADC does not have a remarkable record of military interventions in civil conflicts in the region. It would therefore be misguided to attempt an intervention without adequate understanding of the political dynamics at play in northern Mozambique. </p>
<p>Interventions that are hastily prepared by military leaders without deep contextual knowledge of the drivers of conflict are not likely to end well.</p>
<h2>Mixed legacy of intervention</h2>
<p>SADC interventions in internal conflicts in its neighbourhood haven’t worked out well. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">1998</a> Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe took the lead on behalf of the regional body to restore order and constitutional legality in Lesotho. The haste in which the SADC conceived the operation guaranteed that it would not produce clear outcomes. South African troops <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-19-mandela-and-military-force-its-use-is-determined-by-the-situation/">lost their lives</a> and SADC troops had to withdraw in ignominy. </p>
<p>The SADC has since had to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">continually intervene</a> as a peacemaker in the fractious terrain of Lesotho politics.</p>
<p>The other major experience in intervention was through the <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_un_intervention_brigade_rev.pdf">Force Intervention Brigade</a> composed of Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa. This was put together to defeat the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/11/5/qa-who-are-dr-congos-m23-rebels">M23 Movement</a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013. It was deployed under a United Nations Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm">resolution</a> to assist the United Nations <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en">Mission</a> for the Stabilisation of the DRC. </p>
<p>Initially, the Force Intervention Brigade made a difference. It <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20131105-drc-congo-m23-rebels-announce-end-of-rebellion-insurgency">routed the M23</a> and contributed to a return to some form of stability. But the militia menace in the region has continued unabated, raising questions about the long term <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">efficacy of the brigade’s work.</a>. </p>
<p>The brigade remains in place, though countries contributing troops have lost enthusiasm for managing the multiple problems in the region.</p>
<h2>Lessons learnt from past forays</h2>
<p>What can we learn from these military experiences to inform the envisaged Mozambique intervention? </p>
<p>First, military interventions in complex internal conflicts are fraught with profound obstacles. The biggest are inadequate knowledge about the parties to the conflict and what drives the conflict, and uncertainties about the outcomes. </p>
<p>In Mozambique, the insurgents have grown because of preexisting grievances. This includes the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">political marginalisation</a> of the largely poor and rural Muslim-dominated region. This has coincided with the discovery of one of the world’s largest natural gas deposits, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/offshore-gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what-went-wrong-158079">attracted French, Italian and American companies</a>.</p>
<p>The rich gas finds have turned Mozambique into a typical resource-cursed nation, where natural resource abundance in marginalised communities predictably <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125773/ARI172-2010_DiJohn_Resource_Course_Theory_Evidence_Africa_LatinAmerica.pdf">fuels dissent and rebellion</a>. </p>
<p>Second, it is dangerous for regional actors to pick a fight with a group they believe they can easily subdue. The insurgents started low level guerrilla attacks targeted at government installations and gradually <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271?journalCode=rjea20;%20https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/growing-insurgency-mozambique-poses-danger-southern-africa;https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56411157">escalated</a> to widespread massacre of civilians and the acquisition of territory. </p>
<p>This escalation, in part, follows the government’s response to the crisis. Rather than engaging with the communities on stemming the crisis, the immediate response was to <a href="https://sofrep.com/news/wagner-group-russian-mercenaries-still-foundering-in-africa/">hire Russian mercenaries</a> to fight the rebellion. </p>
<p>But the rebels launched a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/scorched-earth-policy">scorched-earth</a> counteroffensive that led to the <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/">defeat and withdrawal</a> of the mercenaries. The consequences were obvious: militarising the conflict inflamed local passions and expanded the recruitment of people into the rebellion. </p>
<p>The deployment of the mercenaries also showed the government wasn’t confident in the capabilities of its own security forces. </p>
<h2>Intervention in a quagmire</h2>
<p>The SADC is now being asked to intervene in a conflict that it has neither resources nor the political will to manage. When the body bags begin to come home, there will be tremendous pressure on SADC forces to withdraw.</p>
<p>Rather than the folly of an intervention, the region should be encouraging the Mozambican state to address the grievances of the communities in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>Throughout Africa, military approaches to grievances over resources have often ended in disaster. For many years, the discovery of oil in South Sudan encouraged the government in Khartoum to militarise a conflict that was, at heart, <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/nexus-between-oil-and-conflict-south-sudan/">about self-determination and dignity for Southerners</a>. South Sudan did attain independence in 2011, but after tremendous loss of lives. </p>
<p>Similarly, a low-level insurgency in Angola’s Cabinda oil-rich region has persisted because of Luanda’s <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/213484">indifference to the plight of the local population</a>.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Nigerian governments have learnt to use political approaches in meeting the demands of the Niger Delta oil-producing communities. In a conflict that has festered for decades, the minorities in the region have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/towards-ending-conflict-and-insecurity-niger-delta-region">contested the exploitation of oil resources</a> by multinational companies, in collaboration with the federal government, to the detriment of their livelihoods and welfare.</p>
<p>Mozambique can learn from these and many other experiences. </p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>It took years for the Mozambican government to address the need to decentralise power and resources to the provinces. This had been a long-standing demand by the former rebel movement, Renamo.</p>
<p>But Frelimo, the dominant ruling party, continued to depend on a heavily centralised form of governance where provinces were mere outposts of the central government. Alternative actors and voices were prevented from participation in major decisions. </p>
<p>In the negotiations to resolve the resumption of the Renamo insurgency in 2013, Renamo prioritised decentralisation. Frelimo reluctantly gave in to this demand. But <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/conflict-and-decentralization-mozambique-challenges-implementation">implementation has remained sluggish</a>.</p>
<p>The resource curse is not inevitable. Many countries have avoided it through prudent natural resource governance and improving the access of local communities to the resources generated in their communities. </p>
<p>Botswana is an example. It has used creative institutions and political will to <a href="https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/could_oil_shine_like_diamonds_-_how_botswana_avoided_the_resource_curse_and_its_implications_for_a_new_libya.pdf">manage its mineral wealth</a>. Ghana has also put in place robust mechanisms to ensure that its oil resources are used <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-tried-to-be-responsible-with-its-oil-wealth-this-is-how-136887">for the common good and not to enrich elites</a>.</p>
<p>It should not take decades for the government to build credible and transparent natural resource governance institutions that meet the yearnings of impoverished communities in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>The SADC’s military intervention will only embolden die-hards in Frelimo who are reluctant to find peaceful and political solutions to the crisis. And the intervention will postpone a problem that is not going to go way any time soon. </p>
<p><em>Updated opening paragraph to reflect latest developments.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Southern African Development Community does not have a remarkable record of military interventions in civil conflicts in the region.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597532021-05-26T18:09:57Z2021-05-26T18:09:57ZDelay in sending regional forces to Mozambique could exact a high price<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402876/original/file-20210526-17-2ro1xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some of the thousands of people displaced by the killings in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">poised</a> to intervene militarily on the side of the Mozambican government to stop the emerging deadly Islamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado Province, in the north of the country.</p>
<p>This comes after the regional body of <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20Zambia%20and%20Zimbabwe.">16-nation states</a> sent a technical team to verify events in the area and advise its heads of state forum on the way forward. </p>
<p>The technical team has recommended that SADC deploys a 3 000-strong <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-28-sadc-ministers-agree-to-deploy-a-regional-force-in-mozambique/">robust intervention force</a> comprised of land, air and naval assets to help quell the insurgency.</p>
<p>The decision to intervene militarily is a clear indicator that the deadly insurgency, which began in earnest <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">in October 2017</a>, has long passed the stage where it can be seen as a purely domestic problem to be addressed by Mozambique as a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438705001018?casa_token=zVwfnh-fXPsAAAAA:85qqLoMgXk36_IE257qYPMUesqoDdZq80T2FtQP8d8sutOaZ5Up2TXsChVU0PqnWm8a-jLGU6A">sovereign state</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to act to prevent the insurgency escalating, SADC and Mozambique are now in the difficult position of having to react after extensive damage has already been done. They will thus have to help stop the insurgency as well as embark on post-conflict rebuilding. These two responses are more complicated, expensive and more dangerous than prevention.</p>
<p>SADC’s late entry into the fray raises the need to deal with its own array of bureaucratic and other pitfalls that make it less than agile. Its overcautious and sluggish response has resulted in the loss of initiative and opportunities to prevent the insurgency escalating. </p>
<p>But, the problem is not purely of its own making. The African Union took too long to designate it as the preferred regional actor to address the Mozambican insurgency problem in a timely way. </p>
<p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention. </p>
<h2>The basis of intervention</h2>
<p>The SADC response to events in Mozambique is in line with the United Nation’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">“responsibility to protect principle”</a> to prevent human catastrophe. </p>
<p>The principle has <a href="https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-18432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y">three elements</a>. These are to prevent conflict, to react once conflict has started with a view to stopping the violence, and to rebuild in the aftermath of the conflict. </p>
<p>The SADC intervention fits in with the commitment by African leaders to find <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277886206_AFRICAN_SOLUTIONS_TO_AFRICA'S_PROBLEMS_AFRICAN_APPROACHES_TO_PEACE_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY">“African solutions for African problems”</a>. It is underpinned by SADC’s <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">peace and security protocol</a> and its <a href="https://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/regional-peacekeeping/standby-force/">Standby Force and SADC Brigade</a> to guide and execute decisions.</p>
<p>SADC is also guided by its 2003 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1038">Mutual Defence Pact</a> regulating responses to armed attacks on a fellow SADC member state. The pact outlines the type of responses to be undertaken to defend a member state under attack. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation</a> stipulates that a member state under siege should invite SADC to intervene. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/offshore-gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what-went-wrong-158079">Offshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: what went wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Mozambique has been slow to invite SADC to intervene. A final decision is likely at a meeting of SADC and Mozambique set for the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">end of May</a>. </p>
<p>In terms of SADC protocols and the report of the technical team following its visit to Mozambique, military support is recommended as an instrument to assist the Mozambique government. The recommendation points to assembling a military contingent with mixed military capabilities. That aligns with the following functions under the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">SADC Protocol</a> on politics, defence and security cooperation. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Observation and monitoring missions such as peace support missions,</p></li>
<li><p>Interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of a member state, and</p></li>
<li><p>Actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Dangers and vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>At the moment, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides an example of ongoing military intervention in a fellow SADC member country. SADC member states - South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi - are actively involved in a UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/un-drc">MUNOSCO</a>, in the country. </p>
<p>It is the largest ongoing UN mission and dates back to 2010. Elements from SADC are now largely concentrated in the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Force Intervention Brigade</a> to pursue armed groups in the east and help the DRC government regain control of its territory.</p>
<p>The operation in Mozambique will be different as SADC will be operating without the cover of the UN. This places it in a precarious position. It will have to take full responsibility for any fall-out resulting from failure. </p>
<p>There’s no precedent for an intervention of this kind. <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">In 1998</a> South Africa and Botswana sent troops into Lesotho. In the same year <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC</a>. In both cases the interventions were controversial and messy. SADC authorisation came after deployment and placed great strain on relationships within the regional body.</p>
<p>SADC’s decision to intervene in Mozambique comes with its own set of difficulties. Chief among these is to get member states to commit resources to establish an <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2021/04/sadc-to-deploy-force-intervention-brigade-in-mozambique/">intervention brigade</a> to deploy against the insurgents.</p>
<p>The size of the final force will be depend on how extensive the armed conflict has become, and what level of intervention the Mozambican government is willing to accept from SADC.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-has-a-keen-interest-in-extremist-violence-in-northern-mozambique-140745">Why South Africa has a keen interest in extremist violence in northern Mozambique</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To succeed, SADCS’s intervention in Mozambique will require extensive investment in time, human resources and money. The extent of this investment will, of course, be determined by the speed with which it contains – or even defeats – the insurgents.</p>
<p>Military action will need to entail a parallel process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and assisting with returning people to their normal life. Most of all, it must help the Mozambique government prevent a resurgence of the violence. </p>
<p>The violence has had a devastating effect on security and rule of law. The impact spilled offshore as gas companies placed extensive foreign infrastructure development for the energy sector on hold. </p>
<p>Rebuilding the confidence needed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/opinion-the-extractive-gas-industry-in-mozambique-has-done-more-damage-than-good-for-mozambicans-by-iiham-rawoot-153657/">for the gas industry</a> to resume activities is a major incentive to get the insurgency under control.</p>
<h2>Costly and dangerous mission ahead</h2>
<p>Success in turning the tide against militants in Cabo Delgado could give SADC’s image a major boost. Failure, however, could tarnish its image of protecting a fellow member country and the region for years to come.</p>
<p>In essence, Cabo Delgado shows how a slow and over-cautious approach to a potentially explosive security situation can allow matters to deteriorate to such an extent that deadly violence can’t be prevented.</p>
<p>The scene is now set for a military response that leaves SADC facing an expensive and dangerous intervention, and rebuilding costs that a poor country such as Mozambique can ill afford.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Francois Vreÿ receives funding from the NRF and Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1560272021-03-11T13:29:43Z2021-03-11T13:29:43ZHow the quest for significance and respect underlies the white supremacist movement, conspiracy theories and a range of other problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388886/original/file-20210310-23-1oud1kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C2941%2C1962&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Unemployed Blackjewel coal miners, their family members and activists man a blockade along railroad tracks leading to their old mine on Aug. 23, 2019, in Cumberland, Kentucky. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/unemployed-blackjewel-coal-miners-their-family-members-and-news-photo/1169799870?adppopup=true">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Joe Biden’s fundamental pitch to America has been about dignity and respect. He never tires of repeating his father’s words that “a job is about more than a paycheck, it is about … dignity … about respect … being able to look your kid in the eye and say, ‘<a href="https://twitter.com/joebiden/status/1202972212384288768?lang=en">Everything is going to be OK</a>.’”</p>
<p>In strikingly similar language, Princeton economists <a href="http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=bKON6gYAAAAJ&hl=en">Anne Case</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rvFjcQIAAAAJ&hl=en">Angus Deaton</a> affirm that “jobs are not just the source of money.” When jobs are lost, they wrote in 2020, “it is the loss of meaning, of dignity, of pride, and of self respect … <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691190785/deaths-of-despair-and-the-future-of-capitalism">that brings on despair, not just or even primarily the loss of money</a>.”</p>
<p><a href="https://psyc.umd.edu/facultyprofile/kruglanski/arie">I am a psychologist</a> who studies <a href="https://scholar.google.gr/citations?user=Trd2BdsAAAAJ&hl=en">the human quest for significance and respect</a>. My research reveals that this basic motivation is a major force in human affairs. It shapes the course of world history and determines the destiny of nations. It underlies some of the chief challenges society is facing. Among others, these are: </p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691190785/deaths-of-despair-and-the-future-of-capitalism">The suicides – known as “deaths of despair” – of working-class Americans</a> </li>
<li>White supremacist movements </li>
<li>Systemic racism </li>
<li>Islamist terrorism</li>
<li>The proliferation of conspiracy theories</li>
<li>The growing rift in the Republican Party between moderates and extremists</li>
</ul>
<p>In all these cases, people’s actions, opinions and attitudes aim, often unconsciously, to satisfy their fundamental need to count, to be recognized and respected. </p>
<p>The very term “supremacism” betrays concern for superior standing. So do names like “Proud Boys” or “Oath Keepers.” Systemic racism is rooted in the motivation to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/885878564/what-systemic-racism-means-and-the-way-it-harms-communities">put down one race to elevate another</a>. Islamist terrorism targets the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032615">alleged belittlers of a religion</a>. Conspiracy theories identify alleged culprits <a href="https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461298021">plotting the subjugation and dishonor of their victims</a>. And the <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90553503/its-time-to-respect-that-republicans-care-about-only-one-thing-winning">extremist faction of the Republican Party cares exclusively about winning, no holds barred</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Torch-bearing white men marching at night, shouting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388889/original/file-20210310-19-70s8h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chanting ‘White lives matter! You will not replace us!’ and ‘Jews will not replace us!’ several hundred white nationalists and white supremacists march through the University of Virginia campus in Charlottesville on Aug. 10, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chanting-white-lives-matter-you-will-not-replace-us-and-news-photo/831221784?adppopup=true">Evelyn Hockstein/For The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Triggering the quest</h2>
<p>This quest for significance and respect must first be awakened before it can drive behavior. We don’t strive for significance 24/7. </p>
<p>The quest can be triggered by the experience of significant loss through humiliation and failure. When we suffer such a loss, we desperately seek to regain significance and respect. We are then keen to embrace any narrative that tells us how, and to follow leaders who show us the way. </p>
<p>The quest for significance can also be triggered by an opportunity for substantial gain – becoming a hero, a martyr, a superstar.</p>
<p>Over the past several decades, many Americans have experienced a stinging loss of significance and respect. Social scientists examined the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217721174">perception of social class in the United States between 1972 and 2010</a>. The results of their research were striking: In the 1970s, most Americans viewed themselves as comfortably middle class, defined at the time by conduct and manners – being a good neighbor and a good member of the community, exhibiting proper behavior.</p>
<p>In contrast, by the 2000s, membership in the middle class was determined primarily by income. And because incomes have stagnated over the past half-century, by 2010 many Americans (particularly the lower-income ones) lost their middle-class identity entirely. </p>
<p>Small wonder, then, that they resonated to the Trump campaign slogan that promised to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12647">make America (or Americans) “great again</a>.” </p>
<h2>Piling on</h2>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/How-to-turn-the-coronavirus-anxiety-into-15136037.php">compounds people’s sense of fragility</a> and insignificance. </p>
<p>Isolation from loved ones, the danger to our own health and the dread of an economic disaster are all stressors that make a person feel weak and vulnerable. They increase the attraction to ideas that offer quick fixes for loss of significance and respect. </p>
<p>Though the ideas that promise restoration of significance and dignity range widely, they share an important core: They <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032615">depict the promotion of different social values as paths to significance</a>. Promoting freedom and democracy, defending one’s nation or one’s religion, advancing one’s political party – all aim to earn respect and dignity in communities that cherish those values.</p>
<p>When the quest for significance and respect is intensified, other considerations such as comfort, relationships or compassion are sidelined. Any actions that promote significance are then seen as legitimate. That includes actions that would otherwise seem reprehensible: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000260">violence, aggression, torture or terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>An intense quest for significance does not invite reprehensible actions directly. But it boosts a person’s readiness to tolerate and enact them for the sake of significance and dignity. </p>
<p>The path ultimately taken depends on the narrative that identifies significance-bestowing actions in a given situation. Depending on one’s moral perspective, such actions may be seen as “good,” “bad” or “ugly.” One might have an entirely different moral evaluation of the Black Lives Matter movement and the Proud Boys and yet recognize that, psychologically, both represent routes to significance.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A gallows with a noose hanging on it at the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388895/original/file-20210310-17-1hmj7vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A noose is seen on makeshift gallows erected on Jan. 6 at the Capitol before Trump supporters violently stormed a session of Congress.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/noose-is-seen-on-makeshift-gallows-as-supporters-of-us-news-photo/1230473117?adppopup=true">Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The allure of violence</h2>
<p>A special danger to societies stems from the primordial, significance-lending appeal of violence. </p>
<p>Among animals, dominance is established through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idOVDU2NS9R">“trial by combat,” to use Rudy Giuliani’s</a> recent turn of phrase at the rally before the Capitol insurrection. And as President Theodore Roosevelt famously observed, <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/foreign-affairs">walking with a “big stick”</a> makes other nations pay attention and respect. </p>
<p>Most narratives adopted by violent extremists identify a real or imagined enemy at the gates, and fighting such enemies is depicted as worthy and honorable: For Trump acolytes, the enemy is the “<a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-10-02/the-deep-state-is-fighting-back">deep state</a>.” For much of the far right, the enemy is, variously, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006">immigrants, refugees</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/race-america/far-right-us-facebook-groups-pivot-attacks-black-lives-matter">people of color</a>, <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Antisemitism%20as%20an%20Underlying%20Precursor%20to%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20American%20Far-Right%20and%20Islamist%20Contexts%20Pdf.pdf">Jews</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/study-shows-rise-of-hate-crimes-violence-against-asian-americans-in-nyc-during-covid/2883215/">Asians</a>, or even <a href="http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1860871_1860876_1861029,00.html">reptilians who plot to dominate the world</a>. </p>
<p>Evangelicals view Trump’s alleged battle <a href="https://theconversation.com/demons-of-the-deep-state-how-evangelicals-and-conspiracy-theories-combine-in-trumps-america-144898">against the “deep state” as divinely inspired</a>. And a QAnon message from Jan. 13, 2018, stated: “You were chosen for a reason. You are being provided the highest level of intel to ever be dropped publicly in the history of the world. <a href="https://joyinliberty.com/q/category/qanon-quotes/">Use it – protect and comfort those around you</a>.” These views sow division among segments of society, inviting fissures and polarization.</p>
<p>The quest for significance and respect is a universal and immutable aspect of human nature. It has the potential to inspire great works but also tear society asunder. The formidable challenge these days is to harness the energies sparked by this fundamental motive and channel them for the betterment of humanity.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arie Kruglanski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The quest for significance and respect is a universal part of human nature. It has the potential to inspire great works – but lately, it has been much in evidence tearing society apart.Arie Kruglanski, Professor of Psychology, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1459142020-09-10T21:12:41Z2020-09-10T21:12:41Z19 years after 9/11, Americans continue to fear foreign extremists and underplay the dangers of domestic terrorism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357512/original/file-20200910-14-1vqlypw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=67%2C71%2C2847%2C1670&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A visitor looks at the faces of some of the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing at the Oklahoma National Memorial museum in Oklahoma City.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/visitor-looks-at-the-faces-of-some-of-the-victims-of-the-news-photo/1316440?adppopup=true">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On a Tuesday morning in September 2001, the American experience with terrorism was fundamentally altered. Two thousand, nine hundred and ninety-six people were killed as the direct result of attacks in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania. Thousands more, including many first responders, later lost their lives to <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/16/9-11-death-toll-rising-496214.html">health complications</a> from working at or being near Ground Zero.</p>
<p>Nineteen years later, Americans’ ideas of what terrorism is remain tied to that morning.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/911comm.html">9/11 attacks were perpetrated</a> by al-Qaida terrorists. They resulted in nearly 18 times more deaths than America’s second most devastating terrorist attack – <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing">the Oklahoma City bombing</a> that occurred 15 years earlier. That intense loss of life has meant that the 9/11 attacks have come to symbolize terrorism for many Americans. </p>
<p>But focusing solely on Islamist extremism groups like al-Qaida when investigating, researching and developing counterterrorism policies does not necessarily align with what the numbers tell us. Homegrown far-right extremism also poses a persistent and lethal threat to the lives and well-being of Americans. This risk is often underestimated because of the devastating impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<h2>By the numbers</h2>
<p>Historically, the United States has been home to adherents of many types of extremist ideologies. Our 15 years of research shows the two current most prominent threats are motivated by Islamist extremism and far-right extremism.</p>
<p>To help assess these threats, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice have in the past funded our work with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.713229">Extremist Crime Database</a>, collecting data on crimes committed by ideologically motivated extremists in the U.S. Our analyses of that data are published in peer-viewed journals and on the website for the <a href="http://start.umd.edu/publications?combine=ECDB&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=">National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>The ECDB includes data on ideologically motivated homicides committed by both Islamist extremists and far-right extremists going back more than 25 years. </p>
<p><iframe id="rS0Fa" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/rS0Fa/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Between 1990 and 2019, the ECDB identified 47 events in the U.S. motivated by Islamist extremism that killed 154 people. When you include 9/11 as a singular event, those numbers jump dramatically to 48 homicide events and 3,150 people killed. </p>
<p>The database also identified 217 homicide events motivated by far-right extremism, with 345 killed. And when you include the Oklahoma City bombing, it rises to 218 homicide events and 513 killed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=75%2C46%2C3803%2C2460&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=75%2C46%2C3803%2C2460&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357509/original/file-20200910-16-1ltiriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Armed members of the far-right Proud Boys groups on Sept. 5, 2020 in Vancouver, Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/armed-members-of-the-far-right-proud-boys-groups-stand-news-photo/1228364682?adppopup=true">Nathan Howard/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The locations of violent extremist activity also differ by ideology. Our data show that between 1990 and 2019, most Islamist extremist attacks occurred in the American South (51%), and most far-right extremist attacks occurred in the West (36.7%). Both forms of violence were least likely to occur in the Midwest, with no incidents committed by Islamist extremists and 25 events committed by far-right extremists (11.5%).</p>
<p>Our research has also identified violent Islamist extremist plots against 333 targets that were either foiled or failed between 2001 and 2019. Many of the same Islamist extremists are responsible for plotting against multiple targets simultaneously. On average, 18 various sites in the United States are targeted every year, with civilians and military personnel ranking as the most likely to be targeted, and New York City and Washington D.C. ranking as the cities most likely to be targeted. The FBI was responsible for thwarting two-thirds of the Islamist extremist plots identified by the ECDB during this time frame. </p>
<p>We are still in the process of compiling similar data on far-right plots. Although data collection is only about 75% percent complete for failed and foiled extreme far-right plots, we have already identified over 800 violent far-right extremist targets between the same time period, making clear that the absolute numbers are much higher.</p>
<h2>Motives and methods</h2>
<p>There are also differences in demographics, motives and methods for different types of extremists. For instance, guns continue to be the weapon of choice in approximately 74.5% of Islamist extremist homicides and in only 54.6% of far-right extremist homicides. We attribute these differences to far-right extremists using forms of violence that include beating or stabbing victims to death.</p>
<p>We have also found that suicide missions are not unique to Islamist extremists.</p>
<p>From 1990 to 2019, we identified ten suicide missions in which at least one person was killed connected to Islamist extremism, including the 9/11 attacks as one event. In contrast, there were 16 suicide missions committed by far-right extremists.</p>
<p>Our analyses found that compared to Islamist extremists, far-right extremists were significantly more likely to be economically deprived, have served in the military and are more involved in the the extremist movement. Far-right extremists were also significantly more likely to be less educated, single, young and to have participated in training by a group associated with their extremist ideology.</p>
<h2>Threat to law enforcement and military</h2>
<p>Terrorists associated with Islamist extremism and far-right extremist ideologies do not only attack civilians. They also pose a deadly threat to law enforcement and military personnel. During the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 72 law enforcement officers and 55 military personnel were killed by members of Al-Qaida. On April 19, 1995, 13 law enforcement officers and four military personnel were killed when the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was bombed by an anti-government far-right extremist in Oklahoma City.</p>
<p><iframe id="LPx0s" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/LPx0s/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Apart from these two events, Islamist extremists are responsible for the murders of 21 military personnel in four incidents, and eight law enforcement officers were killed in six incidents between 1990 and 2019. Far-right extremists have murdered 59 law enforcement officers in 48 incidents, but have never directly targeted military personnel.</p>
<p>Far-right extremists, who typically harbor anti-government sentiments, have a higher likelihood of escalating routine law enforcement contacts into fatal encounters. These homicides pose unique challenges to local law enforcement officers who are disproportionately targeted by the far right.</p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>The events of 9/11 will continue to skew both our real and perceived risks of violent extremism in the United States. To focus solely on Islamist extremism is to ignore the number of murders perpetrated by the extreme far right and their place in a constantly changing threat environment. At the same time, to focus solely on far-right extremism is to ignore the extraordinary lethality of Islamist extremist attacks. </p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Some experts have even warned that there is <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2010.514698">potential for collaboration</a> between these extremist movements. Our own <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2010.514698">survey research</a> suggests this is a concern of law enforcement.</p>
<p>Focusing on national counterterrorism efforts against both Islamist extremism and far-right extremism acknowledges that there are differences between these two violent movements. Focusing solely on one, while ignoring the other, will increase the risk of domestic terrorism and future acts of violence.</p>
<p>Both ideologies continue to pose real threats to all Americans. Evidence shows far-right violent extremism poses a particular threat to law enforcement and racial, ethnic, religious and other minorities. Islamist violent extremism is a specific danger to military members, law enforcement, certain minorities, and society at large. It remains imperative to support policies, programs and research aimed at countering all forms of violent extremism.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on <a href="https://theconversation.com/threats-of-violent-islamist-and-far-right-extremism-what-does-the-research-say-72781">one that originally ran on Feb. 21, 2017</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Gruenewald receives funding from the National Institute of Justice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua D. Freilich receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Chermak receives funding from the National Institute of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brent Klein receives funding from the National Institute of Justice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Parkin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sept. 11 bombings killed almost 3,000 Americans. But if you exclude that unique event for the last two decades of terrorist activity, a different picture of US vulnerability appears.Jeff Gruenewald, Associate Professor and Director of the Terrorism Research Center, University of ArkansasJoshua D. Freilich, Professor of Criminal Justice, City University of New YorkSteven Chermak, Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State UniversityWilliam Parkin, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Seattle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1407452020-06-22T14:32:54Z2020-06-22T14:32:54ZWhy South Africa has a keen interest in extremist violence in northern Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342951/original/file-20200619-43225-4yacj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Mozambican military has proven to be inept at stopping atrocities by extremist insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Antonio Silva</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A growing insurgency in the northern parts of Mozambique has caught the attention of conflict analysts and observers worldwide. There is now even a possibility that the South African National Defence Force <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883">might become involved</a> in the most northern Cabo Delgado province, with a view to ending the deadly violence and <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/opinion/2020/04/09/op-ed-mozambique-islamist-militants-continue-attacks-in-cabo-delgado/">litany of atrocities</a>, abductions and destruction of infrastructure.</p>
<p>Should the South African government decide to send in its military, the main aim would be to focus on the violent activities of an extremist and militant Islamic group, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah</a>. It is also locally known as Al Shabaab, even though it has no connections with the Somali movement of the same name. The group aims to <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">establish its own mosques and madrassas</a> to enhance the spread of its radical dogma.</p>
<p>Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah started as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">religious sect which turned into a guerrilla group</a>. Initially its goal was to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/harsh-punishments-under-sharia-are-modern-interpretations-of-an-ancient-tradition-115211">Sharia law</a> (Islamic law) in Cabo Delgado. It rejected the state’s schooling, health system and laws, which resulted in much tension in the province. Some analysts argue that the movement is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44320531">motivated more by greed</a> than by dogma or grievance: that it is making millions of dollars a week through criminal activities relating to mining, logging, poaching and contraband.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, many of its members appear to be socio-economically marginalised young people without a proper education and formal employment. They have been joined by young immigrants in a similar marginalised position. It is estimated that the movement’s members are <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">organised in tens of small cells</a> along the coast of northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>There is rightly widespread concern over these developments. Should South Africa – and specifically its defence force – get involved, it would certainly be venturing into a highly violent and complex landscape, requiring a counter-terrorism type of operations. </p>
<p>Such operations are always highly challenging. Countering terrorist and insurgent forces in Mozambique could be as challenging as the protracted operations <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2015/02/03/boko-haram-and-al-shabaab-comparable-threats-to-african-security/">against Boko Haram and Al Shabaab</a>, the militant Islamist sects that operate predominantly in Nigeria and Somalia, destabilising large areas with their terror campaigns.</p>
<p>Why should there be serious concern over the situation in Mozambique? </p>
<p>Mozambique borders Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and eSwatini. Four of these six countries are landlocked, and hence depend on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">Mozambique as a gateway to global markets</a>. Events in Cabo Delgado could thus threaten regional stability. </p>
<p>Even though <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-insurgents-leave-mocimboa-da-praia-after-1-day-occupation-which-showed-local-support-by-joseph-hanlon-156346/">Mocímboa da Praia</a>, which is regarded as the headquarters of the extremists, is about 2,500km from South Africa, the group nevertheless poses a challenge to the country too. After all, Mozambique has strong economic ties with South Africa as the region’s economic engine. Regional stability is certainly in the interest of South Africa.</p>
<p>From a South African standpoint, four main issues stand out. These are: the danger of the spread of Islamist extremism so close to home; the strategic importance of the area under siege; weakness of Mozambican security forces; and combating organised crime. </p>
<h2>Violent extremism</h2>
<p>This is the first case of violent extremism of this kind in southern Africa. It is also the first manifestation of a militant movement which is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/mozambique-admits-presence-isil-affiliated-fighters-200424200048073.html">associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</a>, and the notion of a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamic-state-taking-charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency">jihadist insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>Until recently, acts of terror conducted by extremists in southern Africa were confined to Tanzania and Zanzibar. </p>
<p>The death toll and displacements of Mozambican locals in Cabo Delgado are difficult to verify. But reports indicate that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883">more than 1,000 people have died</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-deteriorating-humanitarian-situation-cabo-delgado-province-short-note">about two million are affected</a> by the crisis overall.</p>
<p>Secondly, in recent years massive <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">offshore natural gas deposits</a> have been identified, drawing some of the world’s biggest energy players. Offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area is among Africa’s three largest liquid natural gas projects. </p>
<p>Investments of billions of dollars have already been made, but an escalation of violence is <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency/">putting the future of these investments at risk</a>.</p>
<p>These projects could be of major importance to poverty alleviation in the country. Poverty affects most of those in rural areas with low levels of formal education. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">Economic activity in Mozambique</a> has improved in recent years and has the potential to strengthen in the foreseeable future. But much will depend on the megaprojects in Cabo Delgado, debt restructuring, COVID-19, macroeconomic stability and improved political and economic governance, among other key factors. </p>
<p>For decades, South Africa has experienced an illegal influx of Mozambicans due to development challenges in their country. Thus, economic, political and social development in Mozambique are of the utmost importance to South Africa, which is battling massive poverty and unemployment of its own.</p>
<p>Although exploration in Mozambique is offshore, support facilities are onshore and most vulnerable to attacks. The foreign companies with their massive investments feel threatened, especially now that <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency/">final investment decisions</a> have to be taken. </p>
<p>South Africa has another interest in these developments. The South African energy and chemical multinational <a href="https://www.sasol.com/growing-our-upstream-base-mozambique">Sasol</a> has invested heavily in gas exploration projects since 2014. </p>
<p>The arrival of foreign companies has led to deep discontent among local people who are deeply aggrieved by their activities. They had to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">relocate to make way</a> for the infrastructure development, amid complaints about the compensation they received. They’re also aggrieved that they have been resettled inshore, away from the coastal fishing areas. </p>
<p>These factors further complicate security challenges in the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">very delicate social landscape</a>. Moreover, the insurgents can easily exploit local grievances as matters play into their hands.</p>
<p>The Mozambican military and police have proven to be no match for the militants. They have been unable to prevent them from taking the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-26-islamist-insurgents-capture-second-town-in-northern-mozambique-within-48-hours/#gsc.tab=0">northern strategic town of Mocímboa de Praia</a>, as well as invading a town near Quissanga.</p>
<p>To counter the growing insurgency, the Mozambican government has contracted <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-in-northern-mozambique/#gsc.tab=0">the Wagner group</a>, a private Russian military company, to assist government forces. But the situation appears to have gone from <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamic-state-taking-charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency">bad to worse</a>.</p>
<p>A South African security group, the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/private-military-contractors-appear-to-be-active-in-mozambique/">Dyck Advisory Group</a>, was also allegedly assisting the Mozambican government.</p>
<p>A fourth cause for concern over dynamics in the Cabo Delgado province relates to organised crime. The area is a major conduit for <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-06-27-research-paper-heroin-coast-pdf.pdf">smuggling drugs and other contraband</a>. The volume of heroin produced and shipped from Afghanistan along a network of routes, via East and southern Africa, has increased considerably in recent years. </p>
<p>Cabo Delgado is a key point for smuggling drugs, wildlife, timber, gems and gold. The insurgency makes it more difficult to enforce the law in the province.</p>
<h2>No choice</h2>
<p>Operations aimed at countering Islamist extremists tend to continue for many years. Success at curbing violent terrorist attacks requires careful and long term responses.</p>
<p>Ideally, these should comprise a mixed set of interventions, including social reform, economic development and varying degrees of military force.</p>
<p>South African political involvement is now almost inevitable as the Southern African Development Community <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-20-leaders-commit-sadc-to-helping-mozambique-fight-jihadist-insurgency/#gsc.tab=0">has already undertaken to help Mozambique</a> in its fight against the insurgency. This makes it highly likely that South Africa’s military forces will somehow get involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Should South Africa’s military get involved, it would be venturing into a highly violent and complex landscape, requiring a counter-terrorism type of operations.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1323012020-02-25T13:52:08Z2020-02-25T13:52:08Z100,000 Indians say ‘Namaste Trump’ and the president ignores some key human rights concerns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316893/original/file-20200224-24676-1n1wfoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=224%2C30%2C3174%2C2369&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Ahmedabad, India.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/India-Namaste-Trump/3ffb90d2076047c8bf66a6ddb94213d4/24/0">AP Photo/Aijaz Rahi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-usa-trump/namaste-trump-modi-holds-huge-rally-for-presidents-visit-idUSKCN20I0B6">kicked off his first official</a> visit to India by addressing a rally of more than 100,000 people on Feb. 24 in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state of Gujarat. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://in.reuters.com/article/india-usa-trump/namaste-trump-modi-holds-huge-rally-for-us-presidents-india-visit-idINKCN20I0BA">promised</a> the thousands of cheering Indians who greeted him “an incredible trade deal” and “the most feared military equipment on the planet.” </p>
<p>Accompanied by first lady Melania Trump, he then toured Sabarmati ashram, where Mahatma Gandhi lived for 13 years. Afterwards, Trump visited the Taj Mahal, a 17th-century mausoleum built by an Indian emperor for his beloved wife. </p>
<p>Trump and Modi have built a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indias-modi-seeks-personal-rapport-with-donald-trump-on-us-visit/a-39387071">personal rapport</a>. The U.S. president’s 36-hour visit to India – named “Namaste Trump” – is seen as India returning the favor for “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/23/807481509/india-set-to-welcome-trump-whose-first-stop-will-be-in-modis-home-state-of-gujar">Howdy Modi</a>” – a rally in Texas in fall 2019, where the two leaders appeared together. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-india-visit-opens-with-more-symbolism-than-substance-as-he-celebrates-ties-with-a-fellow-nationalist/2020/02/24/4396ea2c-56d1-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532_story.html">few news reports</a> had suggested that Modi and Trump could discuss <a href="https://time.com/5617161/india-religious-hate-crimes-modi/">rising violence</a> and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/01/30/india-citizenship-act-caa-nrc-assam/">discrimination against religious minorities in India</a>. However, media reports noted that President Trump later <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/02/24/trump-india-live-updates-2/">defended Prime Minister Modi</a> on religious freedom in India, even as riots broke out in New Delhi, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51612461">leaving at least 10 people dead</a>. </p>
<p>I am a scholar <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/ganguly-sumit.html">who studies U.S. foreign policy</a> toward India. In the past, U.S. administrations concerned with boosting trade with India have celebrated the two countries’ <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/01/14/444786/united-states-india-forging-indispensable-democratic-partnership/">shared commitment to democracy and human rights</a>. Under the Trump administration, I argue, the relationship is in danger of becoming purely transactional. </p>
<h2>Departing from the past</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, American presidents, regardless of political affiliation, have reaffirmed the shared values that have bound the two states.</p>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199354863.001.0001/acprof-9780199354863">ebbs and flows in the India-U.S. relationship</a>, both sides have long seen democracy as an important link. </p>
<p>In 1977, President Jimmy Carter visited India shortly after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi lost an election. Gandhi had declared a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691186726/emergency-chronicles">state of emergency</a> in India, ruthlessly curtailing civil rights and personal liberties. Carter opposed providing U.S. nuclear fuel to India because India had conducted a nuclear test in 1974, arguing that it had violated the spirit of a prior agreement.</p>
<p>Nevertheless Carter went out of his way to <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Hope_and_the_reality.html?id=4Cp2AAAAMAAJ">laud India</a> for its ability to restore democratic practices, following the state of emergency. Several decades later, a president of a wholly different ideological leaning, George W. Bush, adopted a markedly similar stance when hosting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for a state visit in Washington.</p>
<p>When introducing his visitor to his wife Laura Bush, the U.S. president famously <a href="https://time.com/3817133/india-muslim-assimilation-islam-us/">celebrated the absence of religious extremism in India</a>, calling it “a democracy which does not have a single al-Qaeda member in a population of 150 million Muslims.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316898/original/file-20200224-24655-1u83b57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, with first lady Laura Bush and Singh’s wife, Gursharan Kaur.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-Domestic-News-Dist-of-Columbi-/3134807c36e1da11af9f0014c2589dfb/13/0">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bush went on to attribute the absence of Islamic extremism in India to its commitment to democracy. </p>
<p>By the time of the first George W. Bush administration, the Indo-U.S. bilateral relationship had opened up a significant market for American goods. </p>
<p>A big reason for this growing trade relationship was a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1964-01-01/pakistan-american-alliance">shift in India’s U.S. foreign policy</a>. Even as trade grew, the U.S. presidents have not <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-prime-minister-dr-manmohan-singh">shied away</a> from criticizing India. </p>
<p>After President Barack Obama’s second visit to India in 2015, he <a href="https://www.bokus.com/bok/9781526135018/the-united-states-in-the-indo-pacific/">criticized</a> India’s failure to uphold human rights during Prime Minister Modi’s first term in office. </p>
<p>“Every person has the right to practice his religion or not to practice it if they choose so without persecution,” <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/27/remarks-president-obama-address-people-india">Obama stated</a> in a speech in Mumbai shortly before his departure from India on Jan. 27, 2015. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316903/original/file-20200224-24685-4t7zkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Barack Obama during his second visit to India in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-India-US-Obama/dc7fc29d076149dc91a6293b9213f988/31/0">AP Photo/Saurabh Das</a></span>
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<h2>A transactional relationship?</h2>
<p>Trump’s visit diverges from this past of U.S. presidents alternately celebrating and critiquing democracy in India. Trump seems to be focused on material issues – primarily India’s increasing spending on U.S. military supplies. </p>
<p>In recent years, defense and military sales relationship with India have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/world/asia/india-military-exercises-trump.html">burgeoning</a>, growing some 557% between 2013 and 2017 over the previous five-year period and now reaching <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/world/asia/india-military-exercises-trump.html">almost US$20 billion</a>. In early February of this year India announced it would <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/cabinet-clears-2-4-billion-deal-for-mh-60-romeo-helicopters-for-navy-ahead-of-trump-visit/368061/">purchase</a> $2.4 billion in Sikorsky naval helicopters from the U.S. </p>
<p>These military acquisitions, in considerable part, stem from <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/02/04/new-weapons-purchases-suffer-under-indias-latest-defense-budget/">India’s growing apprehensions</a> about China. These fears stem from China’s military capabilities arrayed along much of India’s Himalayan border and the failure to resolve a border dispute. </p>
<p>Indeed Trump has adopted a hard line stance toward India when it comes to business transactions. On the eve of his departure to New Delhi, Trump <a href="https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/India-US-struggle-to-bridge-trade-disputes-as-15076132.php">ended</a> India’s preferential trade status as a developing country. The move could impose as much as $260 million in new duties and is meant to induce India to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/business/trump-india-trade.html">open up its markets</a> to a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-18/india-offers-concessions-on-u-s-farm-goods-to-reach-trade-deal">range of American manufactured and agricultural products</a>. </p>
<h2>A requiem for human rights?</h2>
<p>Missing from Trump’s visit is any allusion whatsoever to recent disturbing political developments in India. </p>
<p>In early August 2019, India <a href="https://time.com/5706847/what-happens-now-kashmir/">ended the special status</a> of the portion of the state of Kashmir, under India’s control. It also placed a number of prominent politicians under house arrest, blocked telephone and internet services and dramatically bolstered its military presence in the region.</p>
<p>In December 2019, India passed the Citizenship Amendment Act, a law that allows the immigration of a range of minorities to India from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan but <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/11/india-citizenship-bill-discriminates-against-muslims">bars Muslim migrants</a>. Protests that erupted across the country in opposition to the new law have been brutally repressed by police.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316905/original/file-20200224-24680-19dwuud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Indian Muslims participate in a protest against a new citizenship law.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/India-Citizenship-Law-Protest/935d58615f0f44ea8da39b4ae6bee104/39/0">AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool</a></span>
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<p>India is also drafting a National Register of Citizens, an effort to document all voting-age Indians that could in effect <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/12/they-will-lock-us-up-or-just-kill-us-muslims-fearful-in-west-bengal">disenfranchise</a> millions of poor minorities because of their inability to produce appropriate papers.</p>
<p>All of these policy initiatives have been undertaken since Prime Minister Modi was re-elected in April 2019. Several members of U.S. Congress, most notably U.S. Rep. Pramila Jayapal of Seattle, have been outspoken about India’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/12/indian-born-u-s-congresswoman-asks-modi-to-rein-in-cow-vigilantes/">human rights challenges</a>. But Trump has stayed silent – and he seems unlikely to break that silence on his first-ever official visit to India.</p>
<p>As I see it, Trump’s message is clear: As long as India opens up its markets to American products, and is willing to make common cause with the United States on some foreign policy issues, the shared commitment to democratic values and civil rights of minorities can be set aside. </p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sumit Ganguly receives funding from the US Department of State, the US Army War College and is affiliated with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. </span></em></p>A shared commitment to democracy was always key to the India-US relationship – until Trump. A foreign policy expert explains what’s on the agenda for Trump’s trip to India and what’s missing.Sumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1161952019-06-03T10:02:30Z2019-06-03T10:02:30ZHow Muslim leaders can respond in an age of extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275653/original/file-20190521-23829-1kwsaq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Newspaper headlines the day after the 2017 terrorist attack in Westminster, London in which Khalid Masood killed at least three people.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-england-march-23-2017-newspaper-607155128?src=E0UiXlUhLnN_-3xQXIUPGg-1-1">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Islamic terrorism <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/22/sri-lanka-terrorist-attacks-among-worst-world-911">remains a global issue</a> – with the horrific bombings in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48010697">Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday</a>, which claimed over 250 lives, <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/asia/new-attacks-on-churches-planned-cardinal-says-sri-lanka-attacks-26063">just the latest example</a>. In that case, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/isiss-new-target-south-asia/">Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility</a>, but the extent of its direct involvement remains unclear.</p>
<p>What we know for certain is that murdering innocent people in their homes or places of worship, or as they go about their daily business, yields outrage, fear and grief. It turns people against one another, and invites retribution. Terror is a vicious cycle, always a catastrophe for its victims, inevitably a calamity for its perpetrators, and unavoidably a cost for humanity.</p>
<p>But can community leaders help mitigate this? In <a href="https://www.academia.edu/39312605/Challenges_of_overcoming_othering_How_an_American_Muslim_leader_starts_healing_divisions_after_the_Boston_Marathon_bombings_Sub-theme_15_Faking_It_Identity_Work_in_an_Age_of_Exclusion">ongoing research</a>, partly funded by the University of Portsmouth, we asked more specifically how Muslim leaders should respond in communities simultaneously blamed for and victimised by terrorism. </p>
<hr>
<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-sri-lankas-muslims-115825">Who are Sri Lanka’s Muslims?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>Many Muslims leaders condemn such attacks outright. And in May 2017, 70 Muslim clerics from three Muslim countries – Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia – issued a Fatwa against violence and terrorism in <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/11/610420149/70-muslim-clerics-issue-fatwa-against-violence-and-terrorism?t=1556039829522">all its forms</a>. The Fatwa said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We reaffirm that violence and terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, as violent extremism and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations including violence against civilians and suicide attacks are against the holy principles of Islam.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite these and other public pronouncements, however, <a href="https://www.mediaite.com/tv/new-york-times-columnist-i-hold-moderate-muslims-responsible-for-terrorism-to-a-degree/">Muslim leaders are often held accountable</a>. They are expected to rein in terrorists acting according to radical interpretations of Islam, or, even worse, stand accused of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34967994">being terrorist sympathisers</a> themselves.</p>
<h2>An ‘other’</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/nor.2008.29.issue-2/nor-2017-0192/nor-2017-0192.pdf">Earlier research</a> suggests that a key problem is that Islam is commonly treated as an “other”, something in opposition to the “Western world”. The upshot is that Muslim leaders in the West face prejudice when they attempt to speak for themselves and their communities, particularly if their message doesn’t chime precisely with the majority view.</p>
<p>Over a century ago, W. E. B. Du Bois called out the “othering” of black Americans in the early 20th century. In his seminal text, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/408/408-h/408-h.htm">The Souls of Black Folk</a>, he argued that the problem is not only how the dominant group categorises minority groups in stereotypical ways, but also how these communities come to see themselves from the dominant group’s perspective. </p>
<p>Indeed, when Muslim leaders respond to terrorist attacks, they are faced with a double bind. In the eyes of wider society, either their community is to be pitied as collateral victims of violence enacted by a few radical ideologues in their midst, or they deserve to be shamed as complicit by virtue of several shared beliefs.</p>
<p>A condemnation of the attacks by Muslim leaders, alone, does not redeem Muslims, as it still portrays them as an “other”, collectively responsible for, and somewhat complicit in, the actions of a few. Similarly, appealing to victimhood merely reinforces prejudices of weakness, depicting Muslims as unable to resolve their own matters, and therefore in need of “rescue”.</p>
<p>But such marginalisation of a group could itself sow the seeds of further violence. The leader of the biggest Muslim party in Sri Lanka, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/asia/sri-lanka-negombo-muslim-tensions.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share">Rauff Hakeem</a>, warned that feelings of marginalisation among Muslims may be exacerbated if crackdowns are overzealous. If Muslims, a minority community in Sri Lanka, are more widely seen as “others”, it is less likely that distinctions will be made between terrorists, criminals – and ordinary followers of the religion. Tensions will likely rise. As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/asia/sri-lanka-negombo-muslim-tensions.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share">Hakeem said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>That’s a worrying factor for all of us. The vulnerability can result in serious feelings of insecurity. We should not build up fertile ground for radicalisation further.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Alternative narratives</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.academia.edu/39312605/Challenges_of_overcoming_othering_How_an_American_Muslim_leader_starts_healing_divisions_after_the_Boston_Marathon_bombings_Sub-theme_15_Faking_It_Identity_Work_in_an_Age_of_Exclusion">investigation</a> into how Muslim leaders responded in the aftermath of the April 2013 <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/index.html">Boston Marathon bombings</a>, which killed three and injured hundreds, shows that leaders of minority communities can create alternative narratives that can help reshape the dominant perspective.</p>
<p>Instead of just condemning terrorism or highlighting their victimhood, they can emphasise the recovery, healing and development of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Following the Boston Marathon bombings, for example, Muslim leaders doubled their efforts in community development and <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/23/leader-mosque-where-marathon-brothers-prayed-praises-law-enforcement-and-community-for-their-support/x1SsUH18pkGol9IYe8EusM/story.html">outreach</a> to other groups. And when responding in the media, they discussed what they had been doing to contribute to <a href="https://religionnews.com/2019/04/19/at-boston-marathon-bombing-anniversary-local-muslims-host-blood-drive">broader society</a>. </p>
<p>Muslim leaders in Boston refused to merely condemn the attacks but went further by mourning the victims alongside other individuals and communities who had been affected by the attack. They also organised counselling and support sessions for the victims of the attacks. Going beyond the immediate aftermath of the atrocity, they now participate in campaigns to control illegal guns, broaden healthcare access and tackle the problem of homelessness in Boston.</p>
<p>This endeavour has been picked up by the local press which since then has provided a different kind of coverage of the <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/01/new-generation-muslim-leaders-rises-fore-boston/77lrvP7afdJNqUqK2U4QxJ/story.html">Muslim community in Boston</a>, recognising its efforts to combat different social problems.</p>
<p>By following this example, Muslim leaders can help to make Muslim identity, not “other”, but part of the mainstream. And this would allow whole societies to respond collectively to terror, and resist the temptation to find scapegoats in their midst.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Viewing Muslims as ‘other’ just makes the problem worse – but research has some solutions.Hamid Foroughi, Senior Lecturer in organization studies, University of PortsmouthHarry Hutson, Professor, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158152019-04-22T21:19:58Z2019-04-22T21:19:58ZSri Lanka has a history of conflict, but the recent attacks appear different<p>Sri Lanka has long been subject to extremist violence. Easter Sunday’s coordinated bomb blasts, which killed almost 300 and injured hundreds more, are the latest in a long history of ethno-religious tragedies.</p>
<p>While no one has yet claimed responsibility for the attacks, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/asia/sri-lanka-bombing-explosion.html">24 people</a> have been arrested. Three police were killed in their capture. </p>
<p>The Sri Lankan government has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/asia/ntj-sri-lanka-national-thowheeth-jamaath.html">blamed the attacks</a> on the National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ), a radical Islamist group known for vandalising Buddhist statues.</p>
<p>These attacks are different from previous ethno-religious violence in Sri Lanka. By fomenting generalised religious hatred, they appear to have more in common with Al-Qaeda, which has sought specific political change.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-sri-lankas-christians-115799">Who are Sri Lanka's Christians?</a>
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<p>For many, the bomb blasts immediately recalled Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war. The war was fought between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) and the Sri Lanka government from 1983 until 2009. </p>
<p>In its final weeks, around 40,000 mostly Tamil civilians were killed, bringing the war’s total toll to more than 100,000 from a population of around 20 million.</p>
<p>The Tamil Tigers were completely destroyed in 2009. Many Tigers, including their leader, were summarily executed. There remains much bitterness among Tamils towards the ethnic majority Sinhalese, but there is no appetite for renewing a war that ended so disastrously.</p>
<h2>A history of unrest</h2>
<p>Ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka were high prior to independence in 1948, and stoked by the 1956 election of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party under Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike. </p>
<p>Bandaranaike proclaimed himself “defender of the besieged Sinhalese culture”, and oversaw the introduction of the Sinhala Only Act. The act privileged the country’s majority Sinhalese population and their religion of Buddhism over the minority Hindu and Muslim Tamils. The fallout from this legislation forced Bandaranaike to backtrack, but he was assassinated in 1959 by an extremist Buddhist monk for doing so. </p>
<p>Inter-ethnic tensions continued with outbursts of mob violence. In 1962, there was an attempted military coup, and in 1964, around 600,000 third and fourth generation “Indian” Tamils were forcibly removed to India.</p>
<p>In 1972, and again in 1987, the predominantly Sinhalese Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna party (JVP) launched insurrections that were bloodily suppressed. Clashes between Sinhalese and Tamils in 1983 led to an attack on a Sri Lankan army convoy. This sparked the “Black July” Sinhalese rampage against ethnic Tamils, leaving at least 3,000 dead and marking the start of the inter-ethnic civil war.</p>
<p>The war was noted for its bitterness, with the Tamil Tigers using suicide bombing as a tactical weapon, as well as for targeted political assassinations. India intervened in the war in 1987. In retribution, a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-buddhist-extremists-are-targeting-muslims-in-sri-lanka-92951">Violent Buddhist extremists are targeting Muslims in Sri Lanka</a>
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<h2>Extremist violence isn’t new</h2>
<p>Sri Lanka’s Muslims are predominantly ethnic Tamils and make up about 10% of the population. They have been at the margins of these more recent conflicts – excluded as Tamil speakers, but at odds with the more numerous Hindu Tamils. However, they also have long been subject to Sinhalese persecution, with anti-Muslim riots dating back at least as far as the early 20th century.</p>
<p>As the Tamil Tiger war progressed, Sinhalese Buddhism became more radicalised. Some Sinhalese claimed that all of Sri Lanka should be exclusively Buddhist. With the Tamil Tigers defeated, Sri Lanka’s non-Buddhist communities were again persecuted. This culminated in 2013 with a Buddhist attack on a mosque. Anti-Muslim riots in 2014 resulted in a ten day state of emergency. Last year, there were more anti-Muslim riots. Buddhist monks have also disrupted Christian church services.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-sri-lanka-is-sliding-into-political-turmoil-and-what-could-happen-next-106526">Explainer: Why Sri Lanka is sliding into political turmoil, and what could happen next</a>
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<p>Sri Lanka’s history of extremist violence, then, is far from new. Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinism has been the driver of much of this conflict. It may be that the Colombo East bombings are a reaction to recent ethnic persecution. </p>
<p>But if so, this raises the question of why Christian churches and upmarket hotels were bombed, rather than symbols of the Sinhalese Buddhist community. One can speculate about the logic of radicalisation and its possible manifestations. It is possible that, if Islamist-inspired, the bombings were not a direct retaliation for last year’s anti-Muslim riots, but part of a wider jihadi agenda.</p>
<p>It is instructive that, when the suspected terrorists were arrested and weapons found, three police were shot dead. Clearly, whoever was responsible was well trained, and there have been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/22/asia/sri-lanka-investigation-easter-attacks/index.html">suggestions of international links</a>. This contributes to speculation of returned Islamic State fighters having joined NTJ.</p>
<p>The Sri Lankan government was slow to release details of those believed responsible, as it knows ethnic and religious tensions are easy to spark. Identification of responsibility could well provide fuel for another round of inter-ethnic bloodletting.</p>
<p>If NTJ links are proven, or if the more radical elements of the Buddhist community are persuaded by wider speculation, it is likely Sri Lanka’s Tamil Muslims will bear the brunt of their reprisals. It is in this manner that Sri Lanka’s wheel of ethno-religious conflict turns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damien Kingsbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By inciting religious hatred, the recent attacks in Sri Lanka appear to have more in common with Al-Qaeda than past ethno-religious violence, which has sought specific political change.Damien Kingsbury, Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1115632019-02-18T14:26:08Z2019-02-18T14:26:08ZTracing the history of Mozambique’s mysterious and deadly insurgency<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259002/original/file-20190214-1748-193gr4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique, provides fertile ground for extremism. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flcker</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province has been held hostage by insurgents for nearly 17 months. Armed attacks, decapitations and the destruction of property have <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">become common</a>. Many are worried that the violence may escalate and destabilise the country’s economy further. </p>
<p>One of the biggest problems is that nobody really knows who the insurgents are. They don’t make public statements, so their motives are unclear.</p>
<p>Speculation and conspiracy theories abound. Many, including state officials and the new president of the <a href="https://macua.blogs.com/files/perdiz-n%C2%BA-245.pdf">Renamo opposition party</a>, believe the insurgency is part of a struggle within the national elite for the control of Cabo Delgado’s oil, gas and mineral riches. </p>
<p>The government offers few – and contradictory – explanations. It has said both that the violence is committed by local unemployed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/no-attacks-in-cabo-delgado-just-crimes-say-police-mozambique">“criminals”</a>, and that the attacks are the result of <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/president-nyusi-warns-that-cabo-delgado-terrorists-can-spread-to-other-neighbouring-countries/">global jihadism trying to move into Mozambique</a>.</p>
<p>Lack of information and clashing explanations have led to confusion as to what’s happening in Northern Mozambique and what should be done to reverse the situation. </p>
<h2>Roots of insurgency</h2>
<p>The local population calls the group behind the attacks “al-Shabaab”. This means “youth” in Arabic and refers, of course, to the global terror group in Somalia (though the Mozambican insurgents have no formal links to them). In Mozambique, the group’s origins go back to the 2000s, when some young men within the Islamic Council of Mozambique began to develop a <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1074#ftn89">new reading and practice of Islam</a>. </p>
<p>In Cabo Delgado, they created a sub-organisation within the Islamic Council called <a href="https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/academico-recomenda-cuidado-ao-governo-para-nao-alienar-apoio-popular-no-norte-de-mocambique-10470432.html">“Ansaru-Sunna”</a> which registered legally with the state. It built new mosques and preached a stricter form of Islam across the province. Soon, a more radical and activist group formed within this sub-organisation and split off as a sect – what has become known locally as “al-Shabaab”.</p>
<p>This group initially concerned itself with religious debates, practice and opposition to the secular state. In 2010 the villagers of Nhacole in the Balama district decided to get rid of the group and destroyed its mosque. Sect members fled to the town of Mucojo, in the district of Macomia. There tensions flared with the local population and authorities. </p>
<p>The police had to intervene twice in Mucojo. In 2015 they were called in because the sect tried to forcefully impose a ban of alcohol in the town. Death and injuries ensued when a sect member fatally <a href="http://www.jornaldomingo.co.mz/index.php/reportagem/7791-tumultos-em-pangane-provocam-morte-e-feridos">stabbed a policeman</a>. </p>
<h2>Resort to arms</h2>
<p>Mainstream Muslim organisations and individuals, among them the Islamic Council from which the “al-Shabaab” sect split off, were disquieted by the group’s actions. They repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ataque-em-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-ter%C3%A1-sido-caso-isolado/a-40977442">asked the government to intervene</a>.</p>
<p>In late 2016, the government finally acceded to their request and began to arrest and bring some group leaders to court across the province. The men were accused of engaging in disinformation, rejecting state authority, refusing to send their children to school, and <a href="http://www.magazineindependente.com/www2/detidos-tres-membros-grupo-muculmano-promove-desinformacao-cabo-delgado">using knives to protect themselves</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not clear when the “al-Shabaab” members began to train militarily, but the state’s actions against their leaders seem to have been the tipping point towards their passing to armed action. Their <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia-">first attack</a> was in October 2017 in the town of Mocímboa da Praia and surrounding communities.</p>
<p>Since then, sect members have taken to the bush from where they attack isolated villages. The number of attacks and their brutality increased steadily in 2018. The insurgency seems to have become more organised. Its attacks and activities have focused on a coastal band about 150kms wide, from the provincial capital of Pemba to the Tanzanian border. </p>
<h2>Seeds of discontent</h2>
<p>It is clear, then, that the insurgency has built on some local social, religious and political tensions. Cabo Delgado is Mozambique’s poorest province; unemployment is high, particularly among the youth. It’s also largely rural. <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/northern_mozambique_violence/">Government services are not reliable</a>.</p>
<p>Major recent oil and gas <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">discoveries in the area</a> have generated many expectations, but communities have seen <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/poverty-and-unemployment-fuels-cabo-delgado-insurgency-admits-nyusi-by-joseph-hanlon/">very few, if any, benefits, particularly in rural areas</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the fact that Muslims feel particularly marginalised in Cabo Delgado, where their ethnic neighbours have had <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1410">privileged access to national political power since independence</a>, helps explain how an anti-state Islamist discourse may have gained traction.</p>
<p>Another aspect is the group’s international connections. Much has been said about <a href="http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/67947-atanasio-mtumuke-reinsiste-que-os-ataques-armados-em-cabo-delgado-tem-mao-externa">links to Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda</a>. But most connections are with Tanzania.</p>
<p>Mozambican Islamic clerics have trained in Tanzania for more than a century and exchanges have taken place for longer, among religious communities on both sides of the border. So it’s unsurprising that the Mozambican “al-Shabaab” connected with like-minded Muslims in Tanzania in the 2010s.</p>
<p>After Tanzanian radicals became violent and the state <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/tanzania">responded forcefully against them after 2015</a>, and <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282841.htm">particularly strongly in early 2017</a>, some of them took refuge with the Mozambican “al-Shabaab”. This has reinforced and partially internationalised the insurgency.</p>
<h2>Seeking solutions</h2>
<p>Since the “al-Shabaab” in Mozambique is not the result of an internal or external conspiracy, the state needs to focus on the social, religious and political dynamics at play to control and combat the insurgency.</p>
<p>While the Mozambican army has managed successfully to contain the geographical spread of the armed sect, the government needs to focus with equal force on redressing the local grievances which the insurgents are tapping into.</p>
<p>Mozambican scholar <a href="https://pt.euronews.com/2018/10/05/yussuf-adam-nega-jihadismo-nos-ataques-de-cabo-delgado">Yussuf Adam</a> has put forward an interesting idea to start addressing these grievances. He argues that the state should hold district “general estate assemblies” to identify issues, and to design solutions from the bottom up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Speculation and conspiracy theories abound about the Mozambican insurgents leaving a trail of violence in resource rich Cabo Delgado.Eric Morier-Genoud, Senior Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1087792018-12-18T11:09:26Z2018-12-18T11:09:26ZPrevent counter-terrorism strategy remains unfair on British Muslims, despite Home Office efforts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250956/original/file-20181217-185234-1kokniw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/londonenglandunited-kingdom-09152017-diverse-group-visitors-1148795042?src=2o5HqK8a7qDRSKJwmHlf4w-1-19">Sharkshock/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Home Office responded to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/anti-terror-prevent-programme-controversial/">concerns</a> over the effectiveness, legitimacy and transparency of its controversial counter-terrorism strategy, Prevent, by making fresh data available for public scrutiny in mid December. The <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/763254/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf">figures</a> reveal 7,318 people were referred to Prevent in the year to April 2018, compared to 6,093 the previous year. </p>
<p>Amid allegations that the counter-terrorism strategy discriminates against British Muslim communities, the Home Office data highlight a more balanced approach to Islamist and right-wing extremism, although evidence of disproportionate targeting remains.</p>
<p>The Prevent programme aims to safeguard people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Many workers in the public sector are under <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance">a legal duty</a> to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. Concerns can be reported to a local authority or the police. Some of those <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">perceived as being at risk are offered</a> mentoring, life skills training, or anger management sessions delivered through the Home Office’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance">Channel programme</a>, after discussion by what’s called a Channel panel. Some vulnerable individuals are sent to non-Prevent services, such as in education or health, or are referred back to the police. Others – the vast majority of referrals – face no further action.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/by-casting-teachers-as-informants-british-counter-extremism-policy-is-promoting-violence-85474">By casting teachers as informants, British counter-extremism policy is promoting violence</a>
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<h2>New ‘mixed or unstable ideology’ category</h2>
<p>The Home Office links the 20% increase in Prevent referrals between the years to April 2017 and April 2018 to the recent terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. Against this backdrop, and ongoing criticisms, it offers evidence that Prevent is improving, in particular achieving a better balance between Islamist extremism and far-right cases. </p>
<p>While such assertions are unlikely to persuade ardent anti-Prevent campaigners, the Home Office deserves some cautious praise. The publication of detailed information about Prevent referrals going back to 2015 is an admirable step forward. It repairs a sizeable gap in public evidence and is capable of allaying public misgivings.</p>
<p>The published figures also suggest the Home Office has developed more sophisticated methods of categorising risk. This has implications for improving relations with British Muslim communities. Previously, the Home Office relied on four categories of concern: “Islamist extremism”, “right-wing extremism”, “other extremism” and “unspecified”. Now a new category has been created: “mixed, unstable, or unclear ideology”. This increased willingness to consider disparate or uncertain motivations coincides with a reduction in the proportion of Islamic extremism referrals – down from 61% in 2016-17 to 44% in 2017-18 – and offers the grounds for tentative optimism.</p>
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<p>The Home Office is also keen to point out that, for the first time, a similar number of people received Channel support for concerns relating to Islamist and right wing extremism – 179 and 174 respectively. It reports that those referrals discussed by a Channel panel relating to right-wing extremism “were proportionately more likely” to receive Channel support than those relating to Islamist extremism – 41% compared to 27%. </p>
<p>But this isn’t quite enough evidence to quash allegations made about the unfair targeting of British Muslim communities. In 2017-18, 3,197 referrals for concerns related to Islamist extremism resulted in 179 individuals receiving Channel support, but only 1,312 right-wing extremism referrals were needed to identify 174 individuals.</p>
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<p>Thinking about the communities at risk from Islamic and right-wing extremism, the figures reveal that many more Muslims are engaged by the Home Office than non-Muslims, despite the fact that only a small number from each group require counter-terrorism support. This difference suggests the excessive targeting of Muslims. The Home Office should be congratulated for moving in the right direction, but further work is required to flatten discrepancies and help alleviate grievances.</p>
<h2>A stubbornly blunt instrument</h2>
<p>Another area of concern is the low proportion of overall Prevent referrals that result in the provision of Channel support. Of the 7,318 people referred in 2017-18, only 394 received support from the Channel programme. This means a whopping 95% of individuals referred to Prevent required no further action, were signposted to non-Prevent services, or were referred to Channel but not placed on a programme of support.</p>
<p>Figures from the two previous years demonstrate the stubborn persistence of this 95% statistic and raise serious questions about the precision of Prevent as a tool to measure terrorism risk. </p>
<p>Terrorism policies are often highly contentious and fragile community relations are damaged easily by perceptions of state discrimination. So it’s imperative to design Prevent interventions that have high rates of sensitivity and specificity, such as the ability to correctly identify who does and who doesn’t need support. </p>
<p>The extremely low number of people engaged in Islamist terrorism, particularly when compared to the overall size of the British Muslim population, will always produce systematic detection errors. That said, the Home Office would be well-advised to address the messy nature of the Prevent referrals process so that it identifies more people who need Channel support and fewer who don’t.</p>
<p>While a full-scale review of Prevent is now well overdue, the Home Office has demonstrated a commendable willingness to engage with criticism. Any increases in transparency and accountability should be welcomed, but the Home Office should continue to refine and improve its counter-terrorism strategies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108779/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julian Hargreaves does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the publication of promising new statistics on referrals to the Prevent counter-terrorism programme, the strategy remains a blunt instrument.Julian Hargreaves, Research Fellow at the Woolf Institute and Research Associate at St Edmund's College, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1031702018-10-01T05:16:57Z2018-10-01T05:16:57ZWhy the media needs to be more responsible for how it links Islam and Islamist terrorism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238611/original/file-20181001-18991-lqzb0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim protesters in India marching against the Islamic State after the 2015 terror attacks in Paris.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Divyakant Solanki/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/09/911-the-day-of-the-attacks/100143/">Sept. 11, 2001 attacks</a> in the US, Islam has become central to debates about social cohesion and national security in Australia. </p>
<p>Restrictions on Muslim immigration have been openly discussed – most recently by Senator Fraser Anning in his <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-14/fraser-anning-maiden-speech-immigration-solution/10120270">maiden speech</a> to parliament – and many believe another terrorist attack in the name of “Islam” is <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/national-security/terror-attacks-on-australia-inevitable/news-story/ecafadb627eb58ce8c5c3914abc42145">inevitable</a>. </p>
<p>Confronted with this reality, the media are playing an essential role in informing us about Islam and influencing how we respond. But, perhaps due to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13602004.2017.1314631?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=cjmm20">a limited understanding of Islam</a> or a fear of antagonising Muslims, a fundamental point has largely been absent from reporting: the threat of terrorism does not stem from Islam. Rather, it stems from Islamism, a political ideology.</p>
<p>The two terms may sound similar, but Islam and Islamism are not the same thing. Islam is a faith observed by <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/">over 1.6 billion people</a>, whereas Islamism is the political ideology of relatively small groups that borrow concepts like <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885492"><em>shariah</em></a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327382128_Halim_Rane_-_Reconstructing_Jihad_amid_Competing_International_Norms_2009_Palgrave_Macmillan"><em>jihad</em></a> from Islam and reinterpret them to gain legitimacy for their political goals. </p>
<h2>How the media legitimises the aims of terrorists</h2>
<p>Islamist groups like al Qaida and the Islamic State use violence against non-Muslims with the aim of establishing a political institution (<a href="https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/a-religion-not-a-state-ali-abd-al-raziqs-islamic-justification-of">“caliphate”</a>) based on shariah law – <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885492">neither of which have a basis in the Quran or <em>hadith</em> (Islamic prophetic traditions)</a>. </p>
<p>Part of the appeal of the Islamic State comes from its insidious ability to selectively use Islamic teachings and repackage them as legitimate religious obligations. </p>
<p>In particular, Islamists have appropriated the concept of <em>jihad</em> to legitimise an offensive “holy war” against non-Muslims. This interpretation, however, has been rejected by studies that have <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230620988">examined the Quran’s principles concerning war and peace</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/defeated-in-syria-and-iraq-the-islamic-state-is-rebuilding-in-countries-like-indonesia-96724">Defeated in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is rebuilding in countries like Indonesia</a>
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<p><a href="https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/nceis/welcome/community-engagement/national-imams-consultative-forum/rulings-and-statements#overview">Islamic teachings</a>, for instance, prohibit terrorism and the use of violence against civilians. Further, Muslim leaders and scholars around the world have repeatedly condemned terrorism, issuing <a href="https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/nceis/welcome/community-engagement/national-imams-consultative-forum/rulings-and-statements#overview"><em>fatwas</em> (Islamic legal rulings)</a>.</p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6088185/ISIS-chief-al-Baghdadi-urges-fresh-jihad-followers-supposed-speech-year.html">reporting on this misleading interpretation of <em>jihad</em></a> and under-reporting Muslim condemnations, the Western news media reinforce the <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_RIPSO_223_0203--.htm">perceived connection between Islam and terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>In some cases, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/12007852/There-is-a-clear-link-between-Islam-and-terrorism.-Its-up-to-all-of-us-to-break-it.html">media pundits explicitly make this link</a>, pointing to the fact terrorists specifically refer to “Islam” as the basis for their actions. </p>
<p>This uncritical acceptance of terrorists’ claims and misrepresenting of Islam legitimises and unwittingly promotes the Islamist agenda. </p>
<p>In other words, the media plays into the hands of terrorists by allowing them to become the representatives for Islam and Muslims in general. </p>
<h2>Islamic State recruiting tool</h2>
<p>Islamist terrorists have a strategic interest in propagating the belief that Islam and the West are engaged in a civilisational war. </p>
<p>As the Islamic State <a href="https://theintercept.com/2015/11/17/islamic-states-goal-eliminating-the-grayzone-of-coexistence-between-muslims-and-the-west/">outlined in its online magazine</a> in February 2015: </p>
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<p>Muslims in the West will soon find themselves between one of two choices. </p>
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<p>The group explained that, as the threat of further terrorist attacks looms, Western Muslims will be treated with increased suspicion and distrust, forcing them to: </p>
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<p>…either apostatize [convert] … or [migrate] to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution from the crusader governments and citizens. </p>
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<p>The Islamic State’s divide-and-conquer strategy is crucial to its ability to replenish its ranks with foreign recruits. The group targets disaffected and marginalised Western Muslims and invokes an Islamist narrative with <a href="http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf.">promises of brotherhood, security and belonging</a>.</p>
<p>In turn, the Western news media indirectly advance the group’s interests by repeatedly linking Muslim communities to terrorism and failing to meaningfully distinguish the Islamic faith from Islamist political ideology. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-isis-isil-islamic-state-or-daesh-40838">Explainer: ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State or Da'esh?</a>
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<p>For example, as the first wave of Syrian refugees arrived in the UK in 2015, The Daily Mail warned of “<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3319873/As-plane-loads-Syrian-refugees-arrive-MAX-HASTINGS-reveals-deadly-threat-Britain-s-enemy-within.html">the deadly threat of Britain’s enemy within</a>” and associated refugees with the threat of “Muslim extremists”. </p>
<p>In the midst of the 2014 Sydney siege, The Daily Telegraph <a href="https://theconversation.com/qanda-how-the-sydney-siege-was-reported-by-the-public-and-news-professionals-35518">prematurely linked the Muslim hostage-taker with the Islamic State</a> – a claim that was later dispelled by <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-26/experts-divided-over-sydney-siege-as-terrorism-or-mental-illness/6726772">terrorism experts</a>. </p>
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<h2>The impact of careless reporting</h2>
<p>This kind of overly simplistic and sensationalist media coverage serves the Islamic State’s objective to pit Muslims and non-Muslims against one another. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15205436.2017.1342131">a study conducted at the University of Vienna in 2017</a> confirmed, media coverage that does not explicitly distinguish between Muslims and Islamist terrorists fuels hostile attitudes toward the general Muslim population.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-wants-australians-to-attack-muslims-terror-expert-31845">Islamic State wants Australians to attack Muslims: terror expert</a>
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<p>With growing awareness of the impact of this kind of reporting, some media outlets like CNN have tried to <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1748048513504158?casa_token=9fLnsAm-8SwAAAAA:sIUEbhCXKsRGg1TUhcEV5b0CKJvcTxWjZjf0IPDgFMaLRa2NR8aTjV0o826CqjY2NR2ubghyLZe-LUI">distinguish</a> between “moderate Islam” and “radical Islam”, “Islam” and “Islamic extremism”. But this, too, is misleading because it focuses on presumed religious motivations and overlooks the central role of Islamist political ideology. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/11/Cradle-to-Grave2.pdf">survey of almost 1,200 foreigner fighters by the Combating Terrorism Center</a> revealed that over 85% had no formal religious education and were not lifelong, strict adherents to Islam. The report suggests the Islamic State may prefer such recruits because they are: </p>
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<p>less capable of critically scrutinising the jihadi narrative and ideology.</p>
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<p>Islamism masquerades as religion, but is much more a post-colonial expression of political grievances than a manifestation of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings. While the establishment of a caliphate or shariah-based order is the expressed agenda of Islamist terrorists, this is not a religious obligation for Muslims. </p>
<p>And it is not an assault on Islam for non-Muslims to say so. </p>
<h2>Political correctness, or a more nuanced discussion?</h2>
<p>In an effort to strip the Islamic State of its legitimacy, some governments have advised news outlets in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jan/18/david-cameron-criticises-bbc-for-use-of-islamic-state">UK</a> and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/why-france-wants-you-to-call-them-daesh-2015-12/?r=AU&IR=T">France</a> to use the derogatory acronym “Da'esh” to refer to the group, although this is not always practised. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jun/06/pm-says-australia-facing-growing-threat-from-islamist-terrorism-after-melbourne-siege">Malcolm Turnbull</a> also adopted the term “Islamist terrorism” in order to differentiate between those subscribing to the Islamist ideology and Muslim communities.</p>
<p>But many politicians such as <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-britain-first-latest-updates-tweet-theresa-may-radical-islamic-terrorism-a8083571.html">Donald Trump</a> continue to blur the distinction by using rhetoric like “radical Islamic terrorism” instead.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"665896711685087237"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/02/political-correctness-allowing-islamic-terrorism-flourish-government/">Some argue</a> that our “political correctness” inhibits us from tackling the problem head on. </p>
<p>But those who say the problem stems from Islam are are mistaken. We should be able to have a constructive conversation about the central concepts of Islam, including whether establishing a “caliphate” and committing violence against non-Muslims are indeed religious obligations or have legitimacy in Islam.</p>
<p>Given the extent to which concerns about Islam have impacted on our society, there is an ethical obligation to differentiate between Islam and Islamism – or at least present a counter to the Islamist perspective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sensationalist media coverage serves the Islamic State’s objective by pitting Muslims and non-Muslims against one another.Audrey Courty, PhD candidate, School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science, Griffith UniversityHalim Rane, Associate professor, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1025032018-09-09T10:07:06Z2018-09-09T10:07:06ZExplainer: the role of foreign military forces in Niger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235213/original/file-20180906-190668-dm6qu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The people of Niger have been protesting against the presence of foreign troops in their country</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arnaud Roin/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Niger is one of the most militarised countries in Africa. In November 2017, this came to wider notice when four American Special Forces soldiers and at least four of their Nigerien counterparts died in an ambush. Since then, the military presence has only intensified. Why are these forces there, whose interests are they serving and are they having the impact that was intended?</p>
<p>The US is not the only nation with a military presence in Niger. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/10/operation-barkhane-frances-counter-terrorism-forces-in-africa/543834/">France</a>, <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/12/23/german-military-presence-in-africa-the-morning-call/">Germany</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-training-niger-1.4016277">Canada</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-diplomacy-niger-libya/italy-approves-military-mission-in-niger-more-troops-to-north-africa-idUSKBN1F6270">Italy</a> also have troops in the West African country. </p>
<p>In April this year, Niger hosted <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51351:exercise-flintlock-2018-begins-in-niger-&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105">Exercise Flintlock</a>, a military exercise that brought together 1900 troops from more than 20 partner countries. <a href="https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock">Sponsored by the US</a>, it purported to <a href="https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock">develop capacity and collaboration</a> among African security forces to protect civilians against <a href="http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Security_Threats.pdf">violent religious extremism</a>. </p>
<p>Three main reasons are given for this military presence: countering terrorism, preventing migration of Africans to Europe, and protecting foreign investments.</p>
<h2>Terrorism in the region</h2>
<p>North Africa’s Sahel region, which includes Niger, hosts <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/menara_papers/future_notes/the_transmutation_of_jihadi_organizations_in_the_sahel_and_the_regional_security_architecture">a number of Islamic extremist groups</a>. The Sahel has been described as the <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35765:trans-sahel-new-frontier-in-global-counter-terrorism-operations&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115">‘new frontier’</a> in global counter-terrorism operations. The US has a <a href="http://afjn.org/u-s-military-presence-and-activity-in-africa-sahel-region/">military presence</a> in Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Chad as well as Niger. As far as we know, only <a href="https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-military-is-cozying-up-to-sudan-of-all-countries/">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/congressman-pushes-eritrea-us-military-partnership/3972539.html">Eritrea</a> do not host US troops. The Sahel has also hosted <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35765:trans-sahel-new-frontier-in-global-counter-terrorism-operations&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115">“a range of second-tier external actors”</a> including armed forces from the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/clingendael_monitor_2016_en/2_the_eu_as_a_security_actor_in_africa/">European Union</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/israel-goals-west-africa-170701021641836.html">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/mabel-gonz%C3%A1lez-bustelo/us-and-colombia-building-exportable-model-of-security">Colombia</a>, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/08/31/rising-sino-japanese-competition-in-africa/">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>America’s involvement in the Sahel has its roots in the post 9/11 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/911-terror-militarism-war-fear-160911055050615.html">war on terror</a>. In 2003 it set up the <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/9538/ASC-1241486-052.pdf?sequence=1">Pan-Sahel Initiative</a>, which brought together Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to train military units. In 2004, the initiative was replaced by the <a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=1eVMMQ4qMUdMke4zw5o8vnxDkwqo8ronR">Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership</a>. The <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP">expanded partnership</a> includes Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Its aim is to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism.</p>
<p>In 2014, the heads of State of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad signed a convention establishing the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/">G5 Sahel</a>, aimed at ensuring “development and security to improve the population’s quality of life.” </p>
<p>In 2017 the same heads of state established the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security">Joint</a> <a href="https://www.apnews.com/b251443a01f5468fac90a9071649717d/In-Africa,-US-special-forces-shifting-approach-on-extremism">Force</a> of the G5 Sahel - a decision sanctioned by both the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-679th-psc-meeting-on-the-draft-strategic-concept-of-operations-conops-of-the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12881.doc.htm">United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>The purpose of the Joint Force, which is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/05/foreign-troops-should-not-be-fighting-in-niger-says-countrys-president">now chaired</a> by Nigerien president Mahamadou Issoufou, is more comprehensive in nature when compared to other joint security operations in the region. In addition to improving security along shared borders, its scope encompasses “<a href="http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/9/33">soft security</a>” issues. </p>
<p>The US has provided each member state with military support and <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security">pledged $60 million</a> in bilateral support to the initiative. </p>
<h2>Strategic importance</h2>
<p>Niger occupies a <a href="https://www.google.co.za/maps/place/Sahara+Desert/@25.9258004,6.6623805,4z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x13883b64fb267151:0xd6406bdc582d7390!8m2!3d23.4162027!4d25.66283">central geographical position</a> in the Sahel region. Unfortunately for its citizens, the country is surrounded and affected by <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/13/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-niger-and-its-unstable-neighbors/">instability</a>.</p>
<p>And then there’s the fact that Niger has historically <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/niger-europe-migrants-jihad-africa/553019/">served as a gateway</a> for migrants between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. And recently, it has become a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/niger-europe-migrants-jihad-africa/553019/">popular transit point</a> for people seeking better opportunities in Europe. Countries like Italy are now deploying troops to Niger to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-diplomacy-niger-libya/italy-approves-military-mission-in-niger-more-troops-to-north-africa-idUSKBN1F6270">prevent illegal migration</a>. </p>
<p>Foreign armed forces in Niger <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-25-00-why-is-the-us-chasing-congolese-rebels-in-the-northern-cape">train African troops</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/pentagon-niger-drones.html">fly drones</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/us/politics/drone-base-niger.html">build bases</a>, <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/why-is-the-u-s-military-occupying-bases-across-africa/">engage in cross-border raids</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_story.html">collect intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>The scope of these activities points primarily to countering terrorism and controlling migration. However, Africa’s <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/lions-still-on-the-move-growth-in-africas-consumer-sector">growing potential for consumption</a>, which explains the <a href="http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/protect-us-interests-africa">expanding</a> economic and trade relations with the continent, offers a further reason for the increasingly diverse foreign military presence in Niger and in the region more broadly.</p>
<h2>A willing host</h2>
<p>What of Niger’s own interests? Its government has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies#img-5">welcomed the presence of foreign troops</a>. President Mahamadou Issoufou is happy to support Washington’s interests in the region as long as the US is willing to mentor and train his armed forces. </p>
<p>US involvement in Issoufou’s military affairs will help him fulfil his election promise to “<a href="https://ewn.co.za/2016/02/22/Niger-holds-tense-vote-with-Issoufou-running-for-2nd-term">crush Islamist militants</a>.”</p>
<p>Niger’s cosy relationship with the US is of particular significance given the recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/america-should-beware-a-chadian-military-scorned-trump-travel-ban/">strained relations</a> between America and Niger’s neighbour, Chad. In late 2017, US President Donald Trump added Chad to his travel ban - a move that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-muslim-ban-chad-travel-countries-list-immigration-restrictions-a7969021.html">baffled foreign policy experts</a> and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-muslim-ban-boko-haram-chad-niger-travel-restrictions-a8000451.html">clearly upset</a> the Chadian government. The travel ban has <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/trump-chad-us-travel-ban-muslim-majority-north-korea-venezuela-a8300061.html">since</a> been lifted. </p>
<h2>The cost of foreign military presence</h2>
<p>Has the presence of foreign forces in Niger achieved the aims of combating terrorism and stemming migration? And at what cost? Have there been unintended and potentially dangerous consequences?</p>
<p>There is certainly a view that their presence has had a negative impact on domestic politics in Niger.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies">report</a> published in the months following the deaths of US troops suggests an increasingly oppressive and undemocratic political culture in Niger.</p>
<p>Civil society and opposition political leaders who offer their testimony in the report argue that the building of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/13/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-niger-and-its-unstable-neighbors/">foreign military bases</a> in Niger is <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/">unconstitutional</a>. They view the foreign military presence in the country and the concurrent <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/security-concerns-in-niger-polls/">securitisation</a> of Niger’s political and civil society arenas as a means to strengthen a government lacking in domestic support. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-election/boycott-helps-niger-president-issoufou-win-re-election-idUSKCN0WO0ZN">Niger’s 2016 elections</a>, which gave Issoufou a second term, were reportedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies">“plagued by serious irregularities”</a>.</p>
<p>Niger’s military build-up is also cause for concern in a country where the <a href="http://secgovcentre.org/2013/03/securing-the-sahel-from-mali-to-niger/">Forces Armées Nigeriennes</a> is “an intensely politicised organisation” with “a distinct distaste for civilian oversight”. Such a force may prove valuable to a president who wishes to entrench his power beyond democratic means. </p>
<p>This year, citizens took to the streets chanting <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-29-what-exactly-are-foreign-troops-protecting-in-the-sahel-2/">“French, American and German armies, go away!”</a>. Issoufou responded by cracking down on further protests in March. He defended the move by saying it was important to have a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/05/foreign-troops-should-not-be-fighting-in-niger-says-countrys-president">democratic but strong</a>” state.</p>
<p>What the future holds is unclear, particularly given a recent report that Washington is considering <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/world/africa/pentagon-commandos-niger.html">withdrawing most of its troops</a>. For those opposing foreign military presence in Niger, this couldn’t happen soon enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Bailie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The build-up of foreign armed forces does not bode well for the citizens of Niger.Craig Bailie, Lecturer in Political Science (Mil), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/985372018-06-18T19:59:47Z2018-06-18T19:59:47ZThe fight against terrorism: the rule of uncertainty?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223665/original/file-20180618-85869-12j2v5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C1500%2C974&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest in Toulouse in January 2016 against the state of emergency in France.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1b/Toulouse_contre_l%27%C3%A9tat_d%27urgence-0137.jpg/640px-Toulouse_contre_l%27%C3%A9tat_d%27urgence-0137.jpg">Gyrostat/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>On September 25, 2017, <a href="http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/dossiers/securite_interieure_lutte_terrorisme.asp">yet another antiterrorism bill</a> was put before the French National Assembly. While proposing to end France’s current “state of emergency”, the bill would normalise a certain number of exceptional measures, thereby undermining core democratic principles.</strong></p>
<h2>Terrorism, a challenge for democratic societies</h2>
<p>The apparent increase in terrorist attacks has captured public imagination, placing rising pressure on the political classes. While attacks are more frequent and damaging in African, Middle-Eastern and Asian countries, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nos-enfants-face-aux-images-du-terrorisme-83118">power of images</a>, beamed instantly across Western media, renders their violence inescapable.</p>
<p>Regardless of their individual circumstances, all countries impacted by these attacks have implemented their own policies, aimed at combating “terrorism” – increased surveillance and military arsenals, radicalization prevention programs, and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-enjeux-du-recrutement-pour-les-services-de-renseignement-francais-78505">recruitment of undercover agents</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, increased security measures have gleaned ambivalent, or even counterproductive, results. Ironically, authorities’ preferred methods for combating threats to our democratic institutions undermine <a href="https://theconversation.com/geopolitique-du-risque-le-nouvel-age-de-lincertitude-78657">the very nature of said institutions’ principles and practices</a>. Reinforcing police powers weakens civil liberties and clouds the democratic transparency in public institutions.</p>
<p>As a result, governments are suffering from a kind of democratic identity crisis: how much can we undermine our democratic principles before they lose all meaning? Liberal, democratic principles are put to the test by the policy choices that arise when trying to effectively combat terrorism.</p>
<p>The bill that is being examined by the French lower house aims to <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-an-apres-le-droit-face-a-lexception-de-letat-durgence-54252">“end the state of emergency”</a> that has been in force since the terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015, in Paris and Saint-Denis. However, it fails to take into account an important lesson derived from the political reaction to 9/11 in America: undermining the rule of law, a fundamental notion in our modern democracies, is no guarantee of safety. On the contrary, weakening the institutional and symbolic operation of the rule of law gives rise to new risks, and therefore increased insecurity.</p>
<h2>Politics in the age of uncertainty</h2>
<p>The “fight against terrorism” is unique in that it requires us to find and conquer something that is unspecified, unidentified and may not even exist. More than anything else, terrorism, by its very nature, thrives on unease, anxiety and fear. The terror arises from an actual attack, but the threat of a future attack, whose form we can only imagine, remains. While an imminent terror attack is a question of fact and reality, its political impact lies in the imagination, in the power of uncertainty, which creates fear.</p>
<p>This is why the shock that descended upon France after the 2015 terrorist attacks helped to justify and even legitimize the creation of a state of exception within French society. If adopted this week as it stands, the bill before the assembly will put an end to it, but it will also integrate its chief measures into standard law. By normalizing this weakening of the rule of law, the bill would constitute a strategic step towards normalizing uncertainty.</p>
<p>Based on the idea that everything is uncertain, the proposed law seeks to arm authorities against the unknown, the unforeseen and the unpredictable. This is a new form of politics, the politics of suspicion, fear, assumption and mistrust.</p>
<h2>Threats to the rule of law</h2>
<p><a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01337026/">Political theory</a> tells us that the declaration of a state of emergency is a step towards questioning the legitimacy of democracy. Only the Head of State has the authority to declare it. A state of emergency devolves the State into a kind of democratic sub-jurisdiction in which legislative and judicial powers are subject to executive power (typically, only for a given period of time).</p>
<p>This clearly implies the existence of a particular crisis in the wake of which political authorities are temporarily exempt from certain democratic safeguards, normally guaranteed by the rule of law. Let us recall that the rule of law refers to the hierarchical structure of the legal system, and that government bodies must conform to the law when making political decisions in the name of the people. It is what guards the ever-fragile balance between freedom and security in a democratic State.</p>
<p>Integrating measures from the state of emergency into standard law and sacrificing a little “freedom” in the name of “security” destabilises the rule of law, creating insecurity. If, as Aeschylus said, truth is the first casualty of war, the same is true for the state of emergency, only doubly so. The state of emergency also forces governments to break the social contract guaranteeing democratic transparency, yet it is the only political foundation that shields citizens from danger, even in these uncertain times.</p>
<h2>Responding to the “terrorist risk”</h2>
<p>Democratic systems are a form of institutional structure. Traditionally, they are both philosophically and legally bound to protect the safety of citizens. Yet, increasing security measures and reducing their transparency undermines – or, at the very least, threatens – the democratic nature of governments.</p>
<p>Several measures in the bill currently being discussed by French MPs will lead to reduced transparency when it comes to the management of internal security. It is also worth noting that many decisions will rest on the more-or-less arbitrary choices of prefects (France’s state representatives in a given region), given that the text is at times deliberately vague regarding the appropriate grounds for searches, house arrests and even the closure of “places of worship”. Previously, by virtue of the rule of law, judicial authority would have been required beforehand.</p>
<p>With this new bill, the government appears willing to exceed its original mandate by moving towards a system in which they also control contingencies liable to create risk. The real danger then becomes the creation a kind of quixotic society where citizens are mobilized to tilt at windmills.</p>
<p>By targeting anyone and everyone, terrorism aims to damage liberal society (in the philosophical sense), which defines the rights and freedoms intrinsic to community life. By removing the principles and practices of this society in the name of the “fight against terrorism” we run the risk of letting the terrorists win. Let us never forget that democracy – like life itself – is fragile.</p>
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<p><em>Created in 2007, Axa Research Fund supports more than 500 projects worldwide led by researchers of 51 nationalities. For more information, visit the[Axa Research Fund] website (https://www.axa-research.org).</em></p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Perret received funding from the Chair of Risk Geopolitics at the École normale supérieure, whose work is supported by the Axa Research Funds.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>J. Peter Burgess heads the Chair of Risk Geopolitics at the École normale supérieure, whose work is supported by the Axa Research Fund. </span></em></p>Weakening the institutional as well as the symbolic functioning of the rule of law has the consequence of introducing new “risks”, and thus creating more insecurity.Sarah Perret, Chercheuse (Post-doc) Chaire de Géopolitique du risque, École normale supérieure (ENS) – PSLJ. Peter Burgess, Professeur, philosophe et politologue, École normale supérieure (ENS) – PSLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.