tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/jean-luc-melenchon-37600/articlesJean-Luc Mélenchon – The Conversation2022-06-20T13:27:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854132022-06-20T13:27:37Z2022-06-20T13:27:37ZParliamentary elections shock France’s political order to its core<p>The campaign for the second round of France’s legislative elections pitted two antagonistic forces against each other, Emmanuel Macron’s presidential coalition and the left-wing group, the New Popular Ecological and Social Union (NUPES).</p>
<p>But the results also clearly confirmed the weight of a third, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). The far-right party now boasts of a parliamentary group for the first time since 1986, with 89 out of 577 elected deputies. The hopes of Macron’s bloc to secure an absolute majority of seats as in 2017 are now all but buried. Those of a classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">cohabitation</a>, too.</p>
<p>The uncertainty that hung over the campaign of the two rounds is unheard of since the 1997 parliamentary elections, which followed the dissolution decided by then-president Jacques Chirac (in office from 1995 to 2007). What was until now an “unthinkable” relative majority for Macron’s coalition will drive new alliance strategies – particularly between the presidential bloc and Les Républicains (LR) (64 seats), the right-wing party of former presidents Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012). Therein lies a risk of paralysis.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the election, two political forces dominated the public debate. Macron’s party, La République en Marche (now called “Renaissance”) had joined forces with François Bayrou’s MoDem and Edouard Philippe’s Horizons, to form Ensemble! (Together). The left-leaning NUPES was led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise, which hammered together a coalition with France’s Socialist, Communist, and environmental parties after Mélenchon’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-president-emmanuel-macron-wins-re-election-a-victory-with-deep-challenges-181843">strong finish in the presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>While Macron’s coalition won the largest bloc of seats in the new national assembly, 245, it was 100 fewer than the total won in 2017, and Macron fell 34 seats short of the 289 required to have an absolute majority. NUPES picked up the second-largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly, 131, and showed that it was a political force to be reckoned with, but failed to reach the symbolic bar of 150 seats.</p>
<p>On the right end of the political spectrum, the LR party, had been nearly inaudible throughout the campaign, managed to hold on to 64 seats thanks to the anchorage of its local representatives. With the RN holding 89 seats, the new National Assembly is made up of four unequal blocs, the first of which is the presidential coalition which holds only a relative majority.</p>
<h2>A history of compromise</h2>
<p>While unexpected, such results are not without precedent: born in 1958, the country’s Fifth Republic has already seen a relative majority, in 1988. President François Mitterrand (1981-1995) was re-elected in 1986 and had to govern with a National Assembly dominated by the two right-wing parties, the RPR and UDF. After two years of cohabitation, Mitterrand chose to dissolve the National Assembly and hold fresh parliamentary elections. “It is not good for a party to govern alone” he said during the 1988 campaign, during his annual ascent of the <a href="https://www.burgundy-tourism.com/discover-burgundy/holiday-in-the-great-outdoors/unmissable-natural-sites/the-rock-of-solutre-explore-this-remarkable-place/">Solutré rock</a>, north of Lyon, during the Pentecost weekend.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="François Mitterrand climbs Solutré Rock" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">François Mitterrand climbs Solutré Rock on 18 May 1986 alongside with Roland Dumas, mayor Dordogne, and Jack Lang, mayor of Blois.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Feferberg/AFP</span></span>
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<p>Mitterrand campaigned to “open up” to the centre – a movement he intended his new prime minister, Michel Rocard, to embody – and hoped that the gamble would reward him with a clear majority. He did not wish to return to the union of the left between Socialist and Communist parties, which constituted the basis of the government led by Pierre Mauroy between 1981 and 1984, nor to rely on a majority based on the Socialist Party alone, like in 1984-1986.</p>
<h2>The challenge of governing</h2>
<p>The governments led by Michel Rocard (1988-1991), Edith Cresson (1991-1992) and Pierre Beregovoy (1992-1993) had to build majorities to pass each piece of legislation, sometimes with the Communists, sometimes with the centrists and non-affiliated members. Macron’s coalition could also break deadlocks by resorting to Article 49-3 of the French Constitution, which allows the government to pass legislation without a parliamentary vote. Doing so is not without risk, as right- and left-wing oppositions can join up and call for a no-confidence vote.</p>
<p>Successive Mitterrand governments used the article 39 times. In five years, only the 1989 budget was adopted without it. On two occasions, no-confidence votes almost brought down the government. In 1990, Michel Rocard was five votes short of being overthrown when he used Article 49-3 to pass a bill raising taxes to finance social security. In 1992, Pierre Bérégovoy’s government faced a no-confidence vote when it sought to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).</p>
<p>Despite the challenges, governing with a relative majority is therefore possible, and the first 1988 legislature is an example of this. It was marked by a certain ministerial stability and the implementation of important reforms, including the <em>revenu minimum d’insertion</em> (a cash benefit for low-income residents with children) and taxes to fund national health insurance. And all this despite a turbulent international context, with the collapse of the communist bloc, signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the first Gulf War.</p>
<h2>A necessary culture of compromise</h2>
<p>This historical precedent helps shed light on the present political situation. Like Mitterrand, Macron can hardly hope for the support of one of the opposition groups to form a stable majority. The left-wing coalition, NUPES, has emerged strengthened from an election in which their voters supported a collective front and strong opposition to Macron. RN deputies also stand at loggerheads with the executive, which since 2017 has designated the far-right group as its main opponent and an existential threat to France.</p>
<p>As for the LR parliamentarians, while some may be tempted, like the centrists of 1988, to form alliances with the government on ideological grounds, this would nevertheless be with the view of forming an anti-Macron front on the right.</p>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/politique/legislatives-la-majorite-relative-redonne-la-main-au-parlement-20220617_SP4U2GKSXRHZFAJNSKUAZHELN4/?redirected=1">Christian Delporte</a> points out, Macron hardly embodies the “culture of compromise” that the situation calls for. And he does not enjoy the same legislative arsenal as his predecessors.</p>
<p>Indeed, since the <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/fiches/19494-le-recours-larticle-493-de-la-constitution">2008 constitutional reform</a>, the 49-3 article has been considerably weakened. While its principle remains, its use is limited to one bill during a parliamentary session, with the exception of legislation relating to the budget or health care. Prior to this, the government could resort to it as often as it wanted and on any bill.</p>
<h2>An increasingly fragile democratic system</h2>
<p>Macron is facing a more delicate situation than François Mitterrand. He has to grapple with a radicalised opposition, both on the left (with the NUPES) and on the right (with the RN), who have no interest in helping him implement his political agenda. Above all, his majority is much more precarious than that of his distant predecessor. The three-way split of French politics, which we had first seen in the first round of the 2022 presidential elections, is such that deputies might have well been elected under a proportional representation system.</p>
<p>Moreover, the coherence of the presidential majority is more fragile than that of the Socialist Party (PS) in the late 1980s. The presidential party does not have the same territorial anchorage as the PS of 30 years ago, be it in terms of activists, executives or local elected officials. And it has to rely on allies – Edouard Philippe (Horizons) and François Bayrou (MoDem) who guard their autonomy and influence more closely than did the allies Mitterrand was able to count on.</p>
<p>This relative majority comes at a moment when France’s democratic system is far less robust than it was 40 years ago. The legitimacy of elected representatives and institutions is weakened by the rise of abstention (30% in the 1988 legislative elections vs. 52% in those of 2022), with a genuine distrust among a growing part of the population. The rise of the far right (14.5% in the 1988 presidential elections, more than 30% if we add up the voters of Le Pen and Eric Zemmour in 2022) is also one of the symptoms of the rise of populism.</p>
<p>The successive collapse of the parties that structured French political life in the second half of the 20th century (Gaullist, Socialist and Communist) has created a fragmented and shifting political landscape that brings back memories of the unstable <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110810104932582">Fourth Republic</a>, which saw 24 governments during its existence between 1946 and 1958.</p>
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<p><em>This article was translated from the original French by Natalie Sauer and Leighton Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The results of the second round resulted in a historic record of seats for the RN and an even greater polarisation of political life within the National Assembly itself.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1849552022-06-13T11:59:56Z2022-06-13T11:59:56ZFrench parliamentary elections continue to redraw the political map, amid record low turnout<p>The results of the first round of the French parliamentary elections that took place on Sunday are out: according to national daily <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/06/13/legislatives-2022-nupes-ou-ensemble-en-tete-du-scrutin-les-raisons-de-la-divergence-entre-le-monde-et-le-ministere-de-l-interieur_6130066_823448.html"><em>Le Monde</em></a>, France’s new left-wing coalition headed by Jean-Luc Melenchon, the <em>Nouvelle union Populaire Ecologique et Sociale</em> (NUPES, New Popular Ecological and Social Union) has clinched most of the votes (26.10%), just ahead of Emmanuel Macron’s coalition <em>Ensemble</em> (25.81%). Marine Le Pen’s far-right party, Rassemblement National (RN), emerges as the third political force with 18.67% of the vote.</p>
<h2>Puzzling results</h2>
<p>In contrast, the figures of the <a href="https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/legislatives-2022/FE.html">Interior Ministry</a> place the president’s coalition ahead by a fraction of 0.9% (25.75%) over the NUPES (25.66), equivalent to around 21,000 votes. Rassemblement National stands at 18.68%.</p>
<p><em>Le Monde</em> <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/06/13/legislatives-2022-nupes-ou-ensemble-en-tete-du-scrutin-les-raisons-de-la-divergence-entre-le-monde-et-le-ministere-de-l-interieur_6130066_823448.html">attributed</a> the contrasting outcomes to differing views on candidates’ political labels: although the publication recognised several socialist and green hopefuls rebelled against the coalition despite their parties’ agreement, the French daily ended up labelling a higher number of candidates as NUPES by comparison to the Interior Ministry. Speaking on French radio on Monday morning, green MEP <a href="https://twitter.com/franceinfo/status/1536205322691420161?s=20&t=m-44ko4U5Gh9vYuGyKEyLA">David Cormand</a> accused the state of identifying candidates from overseas territories based on their original affiliations (socialist or ecologist) prior to the coalition agreement.</p>
<p>Leaving aside the controversy over the results, what might we retain as the takeaways from this first round?</p>
<h2>French voters continue to shun the ballot box</h2>
<p>First up, the first round of the parliamentary elections saw a high level of abstention, reaching 52.61%, or 1.3 points more than in 2017. This is part of an underlying trend, which has seen French voters increasingly shun the ballot box since the 1993 parliamentary elections.</p>
<p>One of the reasons for the decreasing turnout in parliamentary elections could well be institutional. Reforms such as the reduction of the presidential mandate from seven to five years in 2000 or the new electoral calendar placing presidential elections before parliamentary ones have gradually erased differences between the two elections, accelerating the “presidentialisation” of France’s government, with the parliament becoming a secondary consideration.</p>
<p>Another might be down to circumstances. As journalist Gérard Courtois reminds us, since then-President François Mitterrand failed to clinch a majority in the 1981 and 1988, resulting in the dissolution of National Assembly, newly elected presidents had tended to work hard to dominate parliament. This year, however, the two camps that came out on top in the presidential elections (LREM, now Renaissance, and the Rassemblement National) ran an almost non-existent parliamentary campaign.</p>
<p>On the one hand, President Macron seems to have opted for what journalists have dubbed a <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/chroniques/20220530.OBS59077/macron-et-les-legislatives-la-strategie-du-chloroforme.html">“chloroform strategy”</a> – a reference to the colourless and odourless anaesthetic – by keeping a low profile during this campaign and delaying the nomination of a new government until three weeks after his re-election.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Marine Le Pen seems to have already admitted defeat by <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/legislatives/marine-le-pen-jure-vouloir-battre-la-campagne-plutot-que-battre-en-retraite-20220524">aiming for only about 60 RN deputies in the Assembly</a>, shrinking from public view up <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/legislatives-ou-est-passee-marine-le-pen-211521">to the point that some observers wondered where she’d gone</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, this <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/legislatives-seulement-15-des-francais-trouvent-la-campagne-interessante-213113">parliamentary campaign has captivated only 15% of French citizens</a> and will not have been marked by a central theme in the debates.</p>
<h2>Who comes out on top?</h2>
<p>The creation of the NUPES recalled the glory days of the unified left – the Popular Front of 1936 or the Common Programme of 1972 – and tried to instil a new dynamic for these legislative elections. The slogan <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/elections-legislatives-2022/20220427.OBS57710/elisez-moi-premier-ministre-le-nouveau-cap-de-melenchon.html">“Jean-Luc Mélenchon Prime Minister”</a> adopted by the coalition personified and nationalised these elections and the strategy of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220424-pr%8Esidentielle-le-pen-et-m%8Elenchon-d%8Ej%88-tourn%8Es-vers-le-troisi%8Fme-tour-des-l%8Egislatives">“third round”</a> finally followed the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=SCPO_PERRI_2007_01_0017&download=1">logic of presidentialisation of the regime</a>.</p>
<p>The NUPES’ strong presence <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/legislatives/legislatives-pourquoi-la-nupes-a-t-elle-eu-la-moitie-du-temps-de-parole-radio-et-tele-en-mai-08-06-2022-343IEHEOHNEFHIL56BFC52FFHQ.php">in the media</a> combined with Renaissance’s half-hearted campaign can explain the surprise of this election: for the first time in France’s Fifth Republic, the presidential camp did not obtain a clear majority of the votes cast in the first round of the legislative elections. As a result, Macron’s supporters may not wield an absolute majority in the second round of this election.</p>
<h2>What are the prospects for political life?</h2>
<p>The conservative Les Républicains party, of which Jacques Chirac (president from 1995-2007) and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) were standard bearers, obtained its lowest-ever score in the parliamentary elections with 13.6%. Here again, the campaign steered clear from national politics, focusing instead on its respective constituency identities as it sought to present itself as “party of the territories”.</p>
<p>The strategy appears to have borne little fruit, however, with estimates showing a drop in the number of LR deputies from <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/elections/legislatives/infographies-premier-tour-des-legislatives-2022-voici-a-quoi-pourrait-ressembler-la-future-assemblee-nationale-selon-notre-estimation-ipsos-sopra-steria_5193349.html">100 to around 50 to 80 seats</a>. For the Rassemblement National, on the other hand, the number of MPs could rise to between 20 and 45 depending on the results next week.</p>
<p>In sum, we note a slow decline of LR since 2017 (or even 2012) while the RN consolidates its place on the benches of the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Going by estimates, the presidential camp could eek out a majority in the National Assembly, with just under 300 deputies, comparing with its current 346 seats. If it has fewer than 289 seats, it would fall short of an absolute majority.</p>
<p>For the NUPES coalition, the challenge is now less to obtain a majority than win as many seats as possible to become the leading opposition group in the Assembly. The prospect of a cohabitation with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as head of government is therefore compromised, even though it is important to note the leader of France Insoumise might not have been nominated as prime minister in in <a href="https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/legislatives/nomination-du-premier-ministre-que-prevoit-la-loi-en-cas-de-cohabitation_AN-202206060348.html">the case of a NUPES victory</a> since France’s Constitution (art. 8) does not specify the criteria for the nomination of the prime minister.</p>
<p>Beyond talks of a majority, the NUPES risks seeing other political blocs form an anti-Mélenchon front. Indeed, the coalition’s leader continues to polarise, be it for his calls to disobey European treaties, his stance on Russia, or his recent accusations against the French police after officers shot at a car that refused to stop, killing a female passenger.</p>
<p>If the progressive coalition is to become the country’s chief opposition force, it will need to maintain its coherence in the Assembly amid <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2022/05/30/programme-de-la-nupes-aux-legislatives-les-points-de-convergence-et-de-desaccord-entre-lfi-eelv-le-ps-et-le-pcf_6128161_4355770.html">policy disagreements</a> and <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/legislatives/direct-legislatives-la-gauche-se-lance-unie-pour-la-conquete-de-lassemblee-06-05-2022-A47XOF3Z5BA43HD5QMTUOYM6JQ.php">a lack of a single parliamentary group</a>.</p>
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<p><em>The author is writing his thesis under the supervision of Jean-François Godbout.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Robin has received funding from the Department of Political Science at the University of Montreal. He is a member of the Jean Monnet Research Centre in Montreal.</span></em></p>Amid record abstention, the left-wing NUPES coalition performed well against the presidential coalition.Julien Robin, Doctorant en science politique, Université de MontréalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818432022-04-24T21:21:18Z2022-04-24T21:21:18ZFrench president Emmanuel Macron wins re-election: a victory with deep challenges<p>Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/24/macron-wins-french-presidential-election_5981506_5.html">decisive victory</a> over Marine Le Pen in the second round of France’s presidential election on 24 April 2022 is no surprise. For more than a year, opinion polls had been predicting it. As early as April 2021, the leading polling institutes (Elabe, Harris interactive, Ifop, Ipsos) estimated the final score of the outgoing president in a range of 54 to 57% of the vote. And when it came down to the final night, Macron made it through all the campaign’s twists and came out unscathed, with 58.8% of the vote.</p>
<p>The success continues the theme of the first round, when Macron finished 4.5 points and 1.6 million votes ahead of Le Pen, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon just barely being eliminated for the second round – he won nearly <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/11/french-presidential-election-the-winners-and-the-losers-of-the-first-round_5980244_5.html">22% of the vote</a>, just a single percentage point behind the far-right candidate.</p>
<p>With the first round behind him, Macron knew that he could count on the support of a larger number of candidates (Valerie Pécresse, Les Républicains; Yannick Jadot, Europe Ecologie–Les Verts; Fabien Roussel, Parti Communiste; and Anne Hidalgo, Parti Socialiste) than Le Pen, who was endorsed only by the two other far-right candidates (Eric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan). </p>
<p>While Mélenchon did not call for his supporters to cast votes for Macron, he proclaimed that <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220410-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-jean-luc-m%C3%A9lenchon-appelle-%C3%A0-ne-pas-donner-une-seule-voix-%C3%A0-marine-le-pen">“not a single vote”</a> should go to Marine Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Re-election without shared power</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron thus escapes the curse of the <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-billet-politique/emmanuel-macron-face-a-la-malediction-du-sortant">“punishment vote”</a> against the incumbent president that led to the defeats of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 and Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012, and also contributed to François Hollande’s decision not to stand for re-election in 2017. Macron also becomes the first president of France’s Fifth Republic to be reelected without having to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">share power</a>. François Mitterrand went into the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44484352">1988 elections</a> with the centre-right Jacques Chirac as prime minister. The situation was reversed from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42843396">1997 to 2002</a>, after then-president Chirac made the error of calling elections early and ended up with Lionel Jospin of the Parti Socialiste as his prime minister.</p>
<p>Macron’s win appears to vindicate his 2017 strategy in which he cast himself as the “progressive” champion of pro-European liberals of the right and the left against the “nationalist populists” gathered around Marine Le Pen. In the past five years, Macron’s words and actions have sought to consolidate the bipolarisation that had ensured his success in the second round of the 2017 presidential election and appeared to be the key to a second term.</p>
<h2>An imperfect strategy</h2>
<p>The strategy worked, but only imperfectly. Indeed, the French political landscape is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">structured around three poles</a> rather than two. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s score was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">first round’s biggest surprise</a>, as was his capacity to bring together left-wing voters hostile to Macron’s liberalism. This was most overlooked by Macron himself, who concentrated on capturing the electorate of the traditional right. </p>
<p>During the two-week period between the two rounds, the question of what left-wing voters would – or wouldn’t – do was crucial, with the two finalists both seeking to attract those who voted for Mélenchon. Marine Le Pen pushed her <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">“social-populist strategy”</a> while seeking to minimise her party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649">deep ties to Russia</a>. Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, declared that he would <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/17/macron-unveils-plan-to-address-climate-change-ahead-of-french-election_5980777_5.html">make the environment the top priority</a> of his goverment. Neither succeeded in fully convincing voters nor did the balance of power really shift.</p>
<p>The results of the second round seem to indicate that left-wing voters did not behave in a mechanical and uniform way. A significant proportion opted for Marine Le Pen, particularly in rural areas and in the <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/guadeloupe/marine-le-pen-plebiscitee-par-les-guadeloupeens-les-saint-martinois-et-les-saint-barths-1276256.html">overseas departments and territories</a>. In the latter, she attracted many who had voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round: she obtained almost 70% of the vote in Guadeloupe, where he had won 56% of the vote a fortnight earlier. Still, a slightly larger fraction voted for Emmanuel Macron, especially in the big cities where Mélenchon’s supporters have a sociological profile fairly close to that of the incumbent president. </p>
<h2>Refusing to choose</h2>
<p>Even more numerous are those who refused to choose. More than 12% of voters cast a blank or invalid ballot, compared to 2.2% for the first round. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-cause-cachee-de-la-montee-de-labstention-180152">abstention rate</a> was also significantly higher than that of the first round of 2022 (28% versus 26.3%), and was also higher than that of 2017’s second round (25.4%). </p>
<p>The electorate’s three-way split does not sit well with the two-round majority vote. In 1969, the low proportion of votes cast in relation to the number of registered voters (63%) was already proof of this. 2022 serves as an even bolder example, with turnout sinking below 60% – a record for a French presidential election. Emmanuel Macron is therefore both one of the “best elected” presidents of the Fifth Republic (behind Jacques Chirac in 2002 and himself in 2017) if we compare his score to the votes cast, and “worst elected” if we look at the percentage of registered voters (barely 35%, against 38% for Georges Pompidou in 1969 and 43.5% for himself in 2017).</p>
<p>The scattering of left-wing, and to a lesser extent, of traditional right-wing votes, has caused Macron to fall back by more than 8 points and nearly 4 million voters compared to the second round of 2017. This drop is unprecedented in the history of presidential elections: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in 1981, and Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2012, had respectively lost 3 and 5 points compared to the previous election.</p>
<h2>A crumbling “Republican front”</h2>
<p>This has less to do with a punishment vote than the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2021/06/25/de-la-sfio-aux-regionales-de-2021-la-lente-erosion-du-front-republicain-dans-le-monde_6085704_4500055.html">erosion</a> of the “Republican front” – or the French political tradition consisting in setting aside political differences to prevent the far right’s rise to power. It had a huge impact in 2002, was less effective in 2017 and only worked partially in 2022. Hence although Le Pen has lost again, voting for a far right candidate is no longer seen as unacceptable in France.</p>
<p>The victory of Emmanuel Macron, while anticipated, should not mask the election’s two main lessons. First, the far right obtained a level never before reached in France, thanks to its ability to bring together a heterogeneous, predominantly working-class electorate. Second, the country’s political landscape, now structured around three poles, is out of step with a voting system adapted to two dominant parties. These two issues make the outcome of France’s upcoming legislative elections, which take place in June, all the more uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>Emmanuel Macron’s success validates a strategy aimed at making him appear as the champion of the “progressives”, but it has only partially worked.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1814502022-04-21T12:18:35Z2022-04-21T12:18:35ZMany young French voters are approaching the presidential runoff with a shrug and vow to ‘vote blank’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458944/original/file-20220420-56929-c01pkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C23%2C2619%2C1583&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Decisions, decisions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-past-official-campaign-posters-of-marine-le-pen-news-photo/1392521857?adppopup=true">Chesnot/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The race for the presidential post in France <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220406-the-12-candidates-standing-in-france-s-presidential-election">began with 12 candidates</a>. It will <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/16/europe/macron-le-pen-france-election-runoff-intl/index.html">conclude on April 24</a> with the same choice that confronted voters five years earlier: the centrist Emmanuel Macron or the far-right Marine Le Pen.</p>
<p>Sequels tend to be less inspiring, and the election as a whole has f<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poll-shows-gap-between-le-pen-macron-abstention-is-seen-historic-low-2022-04-12/">ailed to spark widespread enthusiasm</a> among <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-election-president-2022-abstention-what-if-nobody-came/">many disappointed and often apathetic voters</a>, despite the starkly different visions for France displayed by the candidates.</p>
<p>Before the field was narrowed on April 10, French voters had a quintet of front-runners from across the political spectrum to choose from: Le Pen was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210913-%C3%A9ric-zemmour-the-far-right-pundit-who-threatens-to-outflank-le-pen">being outflanked on the far right</a>, and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/26/world/europe/melenchon-france-election-left.html">far left was at one point surging</a>. Meanwhile, centrist candidates including Macron seemingly failed to get much traction, and the right-wing Valérie Pécresse, representing the once powerful but now divided Les Républicains, ran arguably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/france-presidential-election-macron-v-le-pen">the least successful campaign</a>.</p>
<h2>Grand disillusions of <em>La Grande Nation</em></h2>
<p>The election process has not been without intrigue, not least over the polarized positions and debates between the far-left environmentalist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/france-presidential-election-macron-v-le-pen">Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the far-right polemicist Éric Zemmour</a>. But even here, the two candidates eventually failed to capture enough enthusiasm to propel them into the runoff.</p>
<p>Mélenchon, who prioritized “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220417-leftist-party-consultation-shows-majority-will-abstain-vote-blank-in-macron-le-pen-run-off">planification écologique</a>,” or “ecological planning,” which focuses on <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/jean-luc-melenchon-france-insoumise-political-philosophy-climate-change-short-termism-long-time">sustainability</a>, became only partially popular among young voters, many of whom tend toward a global, pan-European viewpoint at odds with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-presidential-election-2022-emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-young-euroskeptics/">Mélenchon’s Euro-scepticism</a> and overall critique of the European Union.</p>
<p>The ultra-right Zemmour <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/world/europe/eric-zemmour-france-president.html">captured global headlines</a> through his zealous anti-immigration rhetoric and policies aimed at protecting what he saw as a pure French identity. And he proved quite popular at the beginning of the campaign with a group of youth supporters, numbering around 10,000 members, who called themselves <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20220215-generation-z-pro-zemmour-far-right-youth-group-masters-art-of-posts-posters">Generation Z</a>.</p>
<p>But that name – and the association – quickly became problematic when the letter “Z” became a symbol of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/09/1085471200/the-letter-z-russia-ukraine">Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine</a>. Zemmour’s campaign also suffered from another Z–related faux pas that became known as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">Z chez ZZ/</a> or “Z at ZZ.” Zemmour was booted out of the soccer club set up by the great Zizou, as former French national player Zinedine Zidane is affectionately known, after turning up <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/french-far-right-politician-eric-zemmour-booted-out-of-zinedine-zidane-football-club">uninvited</a> as part of a publicity stunt. Zemmour’s anti-immigration policies apparently did not sit well with the French-Algerian Zidane.</p>
<p>With both extreme candidates’ campaigns faltering, and those of others failing to ignite, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/10/2022-french-presidential-election-a-first-round-marked-by-seriousness-strategic-voting-and-low-turnout_5980223_5.html">one-quarter of French voters stayed away from the ballot</a> on April 10 – the lowest participation rate since 2002. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220410-live-follow-the-results-of-the-first-round-of-france-s-presidential-election">neither of the two front-runners got even close to the 50%</a> of the vote needed to avoid a runoff – Macron secured just shy of 28%, with Le Pen second on 23%. But the list of candidates shrinking to just two has done little to inject enthusiasm into the race.</p>
<p>Macron has governed France, one of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/13/france-lift-most-covid-controls-macron-rides-high-polls">most vaccinated nations in Europe</a>, through the COVID-19 crisis and may seem to outsiders as a sure bet – indeed he is thought likely to win the runoff with Le Pen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/macrons-polling-lead-over-le-pen-widens-ahead-french-presidential-election-2022-04-19/">reasonably comfortably</a>. However, Macron is hardly being carried through on a wave of enthusiasm. His tenure as president to date has been marked by disappointment – with an approval rating that <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/">now hovers in the low 40s</a>.</p>
<p>His image was harmed by the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-frances-yellow-vest-protesters-and-what-do-they-want">Yellow Vests</a> movement – protesters who took to the street over the impact of a flat tax and an energy tax. Macron’s handling of the protest resulted in him being widely perceived as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/macron-finds-elitist-tag-hard-to-shake-but-he-has-the-upper-hand">arrogant representative of the French elite</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s campaign has centered around making the far-right candidate appear more approachable than <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">Macron</a> by attempting to soften her image – hitherto associated with racism and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-le-pen-proposes-referendum-immigration-if-elected-president-2021-09-27/">anti-immigration sentiments</a>.</p>
<p>As the French newspaper Le Monde summarizes, the choice between Macron and Le Pen pits the “<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/04/11/resultats-de-la-presidentielle-2022-le-premier-tour-bouleverse-le-paysage-politique-national_6121578_6059010.html">France of executives and retirees against France of employees and workers, cities against the periphery, European integration against national sovereignty …</a>” It is a choice not simply between the two very different candidates, but between two different futures.</p>
<h2><em>Déjà Vu</em>: Populist vs elitist</h2>
<p>But try as she might, Le Pen will find it hard to extinguish voters’ preexisting reservations concerning the far-right leader. In 2017, Le Pen’s Euro-scepticism, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia <a href="https://www.natcom.org/communication-currents/france-en-marche-communicating-hope">stained her candidacy</a>. It may well keep many from voting for her this time around. Despite trying to soften her image – her <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">promise to not abandon</a> the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">global climate agreement </a> and to take care of the French <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">rural heartlands</a> have helped in this regard – Le Pen still espouses hard-right positions.</p>
<p>She insists on policies such as imposing fines on <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-headscarf-france-presidential-campaign-elections/">Muslim women who wear the veil</a> and advocates for Frexit – a French exit from the EU.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, as the war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of political debates, Le Pen has faced criticism over her <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/what-marine-le-pen-said-about-vladimir-putin-friend-admirer-1698984">apparent admiration for Russian president Vladimir Putin</a> and a <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20220420/latest-macron-and-le-pen-clash-on-household-finance-and-ukraine-in-live-debate/">previous loan to her party from a Russian bank</a>. Le Pen has had to walk a thin line between repairing her image while upholding her <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/cette-photo-le-pen-poutine-qui-gene-au-rn-20220301_D5PSTOFGCZE2VGQPI6ZWW44X3Q/?redirected=1">friendship with the Kremlin</a>.</p>
<p>The rapidly deteriorating image of Russia in France might well haunt Le Pen on election day.</p>
<p>Macron, meanwhile, has been trying to re-win voters’ hearts in multiple ways. He is openly <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20220403-russia-must-answer-for-crimes-in-ukraine-says-france-s-macron-eu-atrocities-bucha">opposing the war in Ukraine</a> – to the extent that he has been accused of “<a href="https://www.indy100.com/news/emmanuel-macron-zelensky-outfit-pictures">cosplaying</a>” Volodymyr Zelenskyy by swapping his usual immaculate suits for the more casual hoodie and jeans preferred by the Ukrainian president. Such sartorial changes are aimed to put across an image of Macron as more approachable, as well as provide a visual juxtaposition to Le Pen’s sympathies for Russia.</p>
<p>Macron has also promised a renewal of his policies to make <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220417-leftist-party-consultation-shows-majority-will-abstain-vote-blank-in-macron-le-pen-run-off">France an environmental leader</a> of the world.</p>
<p>He aims to reboot the economy, even if that risks potentially unpopular measures, such as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/24/macron-wants-to-push-back-frances-retirement-age-to-65-.html">pushing back the retirement age from 62 to 65</a> or tax increases that might lead to even more civil unrest.</p>
<p>It is a fine balance, though. Many families in France are suffering from the increase in the cost of living. Macron has failed to deliver an increase in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/macron-knows-inflation-is-le-pens-best-weapon/2022/04/14/27daf744-bbbd-11ec-a92d-c763de818c21_story.html">purchasing power</a> for many voters and has been accused of being “<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/macron-called-president-of-the-rich-in-new-study/1725852">the president of the rich</a>.”</p>
<h2>Between plague and cholera, <em>ce sera blanc</em></h2>
<p>One thing appears likely: 2022 <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/04/16/the-race-to-be-the-next-president-of-france-enters-the-final-stretch?gclid=CjwKCAjwu_mSBhAYEiwA5BBmfzGia1K02azsdBHLRZr8GiVqds-j42z-nA2gEYSEy1W-b8iXlNLJVRoCdmwQAvD_BwE&amp;gclsrc=aw.ds">will not bring a landslide victory for Macron</a>, especially if the young voters, disappointed in both candidates, abstain. The apathy of the youth, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220414-french-students-block-schools-to-protest-choice-between-macron-and-le-pen">disappointed in both candidates</a>, can significantly alter the election’s outcome.</p>
<p>Environmental issues, particularly important for this demographic, are perceived as being not sufficiently prioritized, as seen in the criticism of the candidates by Clément Sénéchal, spokesperson for Greenpeace France, who described Macron and Le Pen as a “<a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/video/presidentielle-2022-un-climato-cynique-et-une-climato-sceptique-denonce-greenpeace">climate cynic” and a “climate skeptic</a>,” respectively.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>And Macron has also <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">disappointed too many</a> of his young voters with a lack of social dialogue. Some claim that although Le Pen is still worse, it will be <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220413-cette-fois-ci-cela-va-%C3%AAtre-humainement-impossible-de-voter-pour-macron">humanly impossible to vote for Macron</a> – as if the choice between the two is like the choice between plague and cholera.</p>
<p>Calls to boycott the upcoming election altogether have become louder in recent weeks. Many have vowed to abstain from the vote, claiming “<a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/ce-dessin-de-joann-sfar-resume-ce-que-beaucoup-de-francais-pensent_fr_6253ec83e4b0e97a3513e9c4">Pour moi ce sera blanc</a>” – “For me, it will be a blank vote.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>French voters face a stark choice at the polls, but many are saying ‘non’ to both candidates.Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State UniversityEvgeniya Pyatovskaya, Ph.D. Candidate in Communication, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811802022-04-12T18:27:04Z2022-04-12T18:27:04ZFrench elections: a divided country faces an uncertain second round<p>The first round of the French election took place on April 10, and predictably it did nothing to resurrect old-school parliamentarism, five years after <a href="https://theconversation.com/disruption-ou-irruption-la-republique-dans-limpasse-presidentielle-174980">Emmanuel Macron</a> first burst into the country’s fragile party system.</p>
<p>On the contrary. Far from stabilising the political order born in 2017, it unveils an <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-round-of-the-french-election-apparent-stability-yet-a-profound-reconfiguration-181084">eerie landscape</a> from which the old governing parties seem to be excluded, on the right as well as on the left. Five years ago, with candidate Benoît Hamon at 6.36%, it was the Socialist Party (PS) that was on its way out; now it is the turn of conservative Les Républicains (LR), torn between Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM) and Éric Zemmour (Reconquête), tallying less than 5% of the vote. Meanwhile, the PS was overtaken by rural centrist Jean Lassalle (Résistons) and communist Fabien Roussel (Parti Communiste Francais, PCF), marking the lowest score in its history at less than 2%.</p>
<p>This is a terrible descent into hell in a two-tier society where political parties that are still the masters of the game at the local level are paradoxically ditched at the national scale.</p>
<h2>Deadly triangulation</h2>
<p>In France there has been a longstanding discussion over adjusting the balance of power and creating the conditions for full democratic representation. However, this would have required reforming the country’s political institutions, and successive governments, left and right, have failed to do so. As a result, the merciless, guillotine-like mechanics of the presidential election have been at work, amid an atmosphere where anger and fear compete with resignation.</p>
<p>Uncertain voters, who have alternatively cast their ballot in the name of strategy, values, or protest, have hammered the last nails in the coffin of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-gauche-et-la-droite-font-elles-encore-sens-en-france-178181">distinction between the political left and right</a>. Now, voters hover around three poles:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>far right, with 32.29% of the vote and which has gained 1.6 million votes compared to 2017.</p></li>
<li><p>radical left, described by Mélenchon as “union populaire” (popular unity), with 22% of the vote.</p></li>
<li><p>centre right, as embodied by the current president, who received 27.84% of the vote.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Candidates outside these poles are left isolated: Roussel, Jadot, Pécresse, and Hidalgo total just 13.45% (4,727,073 votes). Caught between the far right and Macron, LR comes out particularly damaged by such dynamics. Valérie Pécresse received just 1,679,470 votes – 5,533,525 fewer than those cast for <a href="https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html">François Fillon</a> five years earlier.</p>
<p>Ecologists and the socialists are also reeling from the momentum that has benefited Mélenchon – who cast himself as the only progressive candidate capable of facing off against Macron and Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Spectacular defeats</h2>
<p>In the face of this great political shake-up, some defeats are more noticeable than others: of the twelve candidates, only three received more than 20% of the vote, while nine are below the 10% and eight below the 5% mark – and almost 15 points separate the fourth from the third candidate.</p>
<p>It is particularly strange to observe how at odds this new political field is with <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/linvite-des-matins-dete/entre-decompositions-et-recompositions-ou-va-la-vie-politique-francaise">local power dynamics</a>. The <a href="https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html">2017 presidential election</a>, when the four candidates fought an exceptionally tight race, now seems like another world: at the time, Macron scored 24.01%; Le Pen, 21.30%; LR’s François Fillon, 20.01%; and Mélenchon, 19.58%.</p>
<p>Mélenchon can boast of a higher score than the polls suggested, although probably less important than he had hoped for: at 21.95%, he has progressed by 655,000 votes compared to 2017 (+5.97%). The fact that many ecologists and socialists rallied around him was not enough to compensate for the presence of his former communist ally, Roussell, who this time went it alone. Mélenchon fell short by just 421,000 votes in his bid to overtake Le Pen.</p>
<p>Macron, on the other hand, managed to come out ahead of his main rival by almost four points. With 27.84% of the vote, he improves his 2017 score by more than 1,130,000 votes (+13%). As for Le Pen, her 23.15% shows she has been successful in her appeal to the French to vote strategically for her, thereby overcoming the initial obstacle represented by Zemmour’s candidacy. Compared with the last election, she gains more than 450,000 votes (+5.96%).</p>
<h2>Vote transfers</h2>
<p>The road to the second round is riddled with uncertainties and pitfalls, and the game that will be played is doubly complex. Aside from the question of who will get the keys to the Elysée Palace, there is also the issue of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/sociologie-des-institutions-politiques--9782707158611-page-87.html">capacity of the country’s institutions</a> to meet the expectations of a deeply divided country.</p>
<p>The first round’s results leave us with the illusion the second might yield a clearer outcome. Instead, its three-way crystallisation could curb what constitutes one of the two key dynamics of the second round: <a href="https://www.cairn.info/comment-les-electeurs-font-ils-leur-choix--9782724611076-page-381.htm">vote transfers</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen seems to have the least to worry about on that front: The far-right vote is homogeneous and the two other candidates in her camp, Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, DLF), have called on their supporters to vote for her. In addition, the far-right leanings of the second most popular candidate of the LR’s primaries, Éric Ciotti, make it likely she will reap a share of the votes collected by Pécresse.</p>
<p>Le Pen could end up benefiting from some of Mélenchon’s “everything but Macron” votes. This is despite the fact the leftwing candidate urged his supporters several times on Sunday evening not to “give a single vote” to the far right, while failing to explicitly back Macron.</p>
<h2>A difficult campaign for Macron</h2>
<p>Faced with two blocs united by their common hostility to him, Macron does not have the same potential resources. It is true that Anne Hidalgo, Valérie Pécresse, Yannick Jadot and Fabien Roussel have firmly and clearly called to vote for him. But their potential electorate remains weak. Macron will have to fight hard to attract Mélenchon’s voters and make an LREM ballot politically less toxic to progressives. Other cards left to play include boosting participation levels among those who shunned the first round. Turnout in the latter was lacklustre: only two points more than in 2002 and four less than in 2017.</p>
<p>This brings us to the second dimension of the election: French institutions’ democratic efficiency. French people suffer from a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique.html">dearth of confidence in their elected representatives</a>. These past years have gone to show that elections – however brilliant they may be – are not enough on their own to guarantee consent to politics. It will be necessary to invent a mode of government for the country to exit the dead-end into which the presidential illusion has parked it over the decades.</p>
<p>Rather than presidential smoke and mirrors, the future would look very different if France benefited from a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2021/02/24/quel-serait-le-visage-de-l-assemblee-nationale-avec-la-proportionnelle-integrale-ou-partielle_6071093_4355770.html">proportional representation system</a> that allowed for pluralism and diversity of opinions. If our institutions worked in a way that was more respectful of the balance of power. To make do without this reform in the past five years has been a serious mistake. We must now foot the bill.</p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron seems to have understood this, as he declared on the evening of the first round:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I am ready to invent something new to bring together [the country’s] various convictions and sensibilities.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not having the means to act immediately, Macron must now work to convince voters of how he intends to proceed to help France escape from the vertical and concentrated practice of power up to now.</p>
<p>In light of the results of the first round, the exercise promises to be perilous. One of the French Revolution’s leading figures, Georges Danton, once said that it takes enthusiasm to found a republic. It’s also required to preserve one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claude Patriat ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The first round of the French presidential elections leaves the country’s party system in tatters and voters divided along three poles. What will happen in the second round is now anyone’s guess.Claude Patriat, Professeur émérite de Science politique Université de Bourgogne, Université de Bourgogne – UBFCLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1809942022-04-11T12:58:41Z2022-04-11T12:58:41ZFrench election: as Marine Le Pen makes it to second round, the left-wing vote is what troubles president Emmanuel Macron<p>After the first round of the 2017 presidential election in France, economist <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2017/04/28/thomas-piketty-plus-le-score-de-macron-sera-fort-plus-il-sera-clair-que-ce-n-est-pas-son-programme-q_1566141/">Thomas Piketty</a> suggested that while there were four candidates on very close scores at the head of the field (Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon and Jean-Luc Mélenchon), in reality France was divided into three political camps: a socialist and more-or-less eurosceptic left, a pro-European and liberal centre and right, and a nationalist far right. The results of the first round for this year’s presidential election suggest he was right. </p>
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<p>Despite a poor campaign, centrist president Macron has emerged in <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">first place</a>, with 27.8% of the vote – three points up on 2017 and better than final opinion polls predicted.</p>
<p>Macron hoped that a late entry into the official campaign, leaving six weeks of playing the president-candidate, would allow him to use his management of the pandemic as a platform and focus on the electorate’s key concerns – the cost of living and pensions reform. The Ukrainian war got in the way, with Macron focusing too much on being president and not enough on being the candidate. A brief burst of rallying round the flag saw him surge past 30% before dropping back to a predicted score around 26%. Every vote above that on Sunday will have been seen as a bonus.</p>
<h2>Less is more</h2>
<p>By contrast, the general view is that Le Pen ran a good campaign – not the best, but good – by focusing less on the far-right aspects of her programme and instead posing as the candidate speaking for the economically hard pressed, struggling to make ends meet. This also meant, paradoxically, making less of an effort to look like a president in waiting and putting her <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170324-marine-le-pen-visits-russia-french-presidential-election-putin">pro-Putin past</a> (and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">present?</a>) to one side by simply refusing to address it. Local and low-key were the watch words and they have worked, lifting her from 21% in 2017 to 23.15% now. But the score is nevertheless a disappointment.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s cause has benefited enormously from the presence of the other far-right candidate, Eric Zemmour. His outspoken campaign helped her seem more moderate even though she isn’t. But Zemmour’s low score of barely 7% suggests that Le Pen might not pick up as many votes from his departure from the race as she might have hoped. Even throwing in the 2% of the vote garnered by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (another far-right candidate) and part of the vote for the mainstream right’s Valérie Pécresse suggests Le Pen will come up short again in the second round. </p>
<h2>The death of the French right?</h2>
<p>Pécresse’s tailspin has been a key subplot of the election. When she won the nomination for the mainstream right-wing Les Républicains last December, she was touted as a significant threat to Macron, but her campaign tanked. In the end, she sunk as low as to drop below the 5% vote threshold at which candidates get half their election expenses reimbursed by the state. On reflection, that Pécresse came away with just 4.8% isn’t so much of a surprise. Les Républicains is still a party full of heavyweights who are still household names, but most are throwbacks to the Nicolas Sarkozy years and votes these days are routinely lost to the parties led by Macron and Le Pen in both local and national elections.</p>
<h2>The votes still in play</h2>
<p>The award for the best performance goes to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the left-wing La France Insoumise candidate who hauled himself past Pécresse and Zemmour to 21.95% (19.9% in 2017), despite hovering around 12-14% for much of the campaign. There was even a point late on Sunday evening when he very nearly closed the gap with Le Pen.</p>
<p>This is a remarkable achievement, suggesting the French left is not dead. Mélenchon remains divisive, but while he is not naturally a man to bring together the various factions of the left under his leadership, he has rallied their voters. The big question now is whether his voters will turn out to vote for Macron. Other left-wing candidate <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20220410-french-presidential-election-centre-left-candidate-hidalgo-endorses-macron">Anne Hidalgo</a> and the Green party’s Yannick Jadot have asked theirs to do so but Mélenchon has not followed suit. As in 2017, Mélenchon has not declared himself for Macron, but instead flipped the question around. “Not a single vote for her” is the line.</p>
<p>This is why everything is still in play for the second round. The old certainty of republican discipline to block the far right seems less sure. Many left-wing voters find Macron unpalatable at best. Turnout therefore becomes a key pressure point in the two weeks ahead. There may not be a concern that many left-wing votes would go to Le Pen but Mélenchon’s position means that Macron will have to give those voters a reason to turn out for him rather than stay at home.</p>
<p>By the same token, however, Mélenchon has little to gain, even in the general election that follows in June, from being the man who made Le Pen president. The stakes could scarcely be higher.</p>
<h2>On to the second round</h2>
<p>Now Macron and Le Pen will face off in the second round on April 24. Le Pen’s team has planned a very different itinerary to 2017. Less frenetic, fewer personal appearances, a period of rest before the head-to-head election with Macron.</p>
<p>The president’s handlers, meanwhile, will be hoping that without the noise of the first-round campaign, he can make his programme audible and intelligible, while reining in his alarming tendency to put his foot in his mouth. The margins are too tight for Macron to go, in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/piss-off-annoy-shit-on-why-macrons-use-of-the-french-swear-word-emmerder-is-so-hard-to-translate-174627">vocabulary</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220107-macron-says-he-stands-by-remarks-pledging-to-piss-off-france-s-unvaccinated">pissing anyone else off</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180994/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the great success story of the first round. The question now becomes – who gets his votes in the second?Paul Smith, Associate Professor in French and Francophone Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1810842022-04-11T11:56:36Z2022-04-11T11:56:36ZFirst round of the French election: apparent stability, yet a profound reconfiguration<p>With the majority of the ballots counted on Monday morning, the <a href="https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/presidentielle-2022/FE.html">official results</a> of the first round of the French presidential election appear to confirm the power dynamics at work from the previous election. </p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM) and Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, RN) have made it into the second round – in the same order as five years ago, making it the second time the duel will take place. The last and only time this happened in France was when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (RPR) twice faced off against François Mitterrand (Socialist Party), first in 1974, when the <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/histoire/archives/2017/05/02/26010-20170502ARTFIG00146-10-mai-1974-le-debat-televise-giscard-mitterrand-point-d-orgue-de-l-entre-deux-tours.php">right-wing candidate won</a> and then again in 1981, when the <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/michele-cotta/giscard-mitterrand-1981-un-duel-historique-06-12-2020-2404386_1595.php">socialist candidate triumphed</a>.</p>
<p>Such stability is largely linked to the main candidates’ clout. Already in the game five years ago, Macron and Le Pen have been able to retain a loyal electoral base. Over the past weeks new voters have rallied around them, prioritising a so-called strategic vote (“vote utile”) over partisan considerations. </p>
<h2>Strategic voting</h2>
<p>Compared to 2017, Macron is up by <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-retrouvez-tous-les-resultats-du-scrutin-commune-par-commune-4104853">nearly 4%</a>. The rise is all the more notable given the incumbent president has abandoned the middle-ground stance between right and left that had ensured his initial success and adopted an agenda that clearly places him <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/editos-analyses/emmanuel-macron-balise-au-centre-droit-1362478">on the centre-right</a> of the political spectrum. </p>
<p>The move alienated a fraction of his voters from the left, but attracted a larger part of the voters from the centre and the right – a testament of which is the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/les-resultats-de-valerie-pecresse-sont-les-pires-a-la-presidentielle-pour-la-droite_fr_624ebd8ce4b007d3845fbea5">very low score</a> (4,7%) of Valérie Pécresse, candidate of Les Républicains (LR).</p>
<p>Le Pen has <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-avec-pres-de-24-des-voix-marine-le-pen-obtient-un-score-historique-pour-son-parti-4104873">risen nearly as much</a>, with a score never before achieved by the Front National (FN) and then RN within the context of a presidential election. She too benefited from calls to vote strategically and was thus able to largely outperform Éric Zemmour (Reconquête), the former <em>Figaro</em> journalist and far-right candidate. Having initially undermined her leadership, in the end Zemmour helped complete Le Pen’s decade-long effort to “normalise” her candidacy. By claiming the niche of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dou-vient-lobsession-identitaire-de-la-politique-francaise-175540">identity-based right</a>, Zemmour enabled Le Pen to stress the bread-and-butter issues that appealed to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">working classes</a>. </p>
<p>On the left of the political spectrum, Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (LFI) obtained his best score in his third presidential election, also benefiting from the in extremis support of an electorate of the moderate left concerned above all to avoid a second round opposing Emmanuel Macron to Marine Le Pen. Mélenchon came within less than 1.5 points of Le Pen’s score, yet wasn’t able to stop her and make it to the second round himself. </p>
<h2>A French political field split into three</h2>
<p>The momentum of the strategic vote, which picked up barely a month before the first round, appears to confirm the restructuring of the French political field around three major poles dating back to the 2017 election.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A liberal, centrist and European pole attracting, at every national election, a little more than a quarter of the voters but which, thanks to the mechanics of the majority vote, manages to dominate political life until now. </p></li>
<li><p>A populist and identity-based pole, today dominated by Le Pen and represented by two candidates whose cumulative score (over 30%) constitutes an all-time record for the extreme right and populist identity in a national election in France: it is therefore this pole that has recorded the strongest surge over the last five years.</p></li>
<li><p>A radical left-wing pole, dominated by the La France Insoumise. If we include the results of the communist and Trotskyist candidates, this totals just under 25% of the vote. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Such a three-way split results in the marginalisation of the two political parties that have structured French political life since the 1970s, the centre-right Les Republicains (formerly the UMP) and the centre-left Socialist Party.</p>
<h2>The decline of the traditional parties: an air of déjà vu</h2>
<p>With less than 2% of the vote, the Socialist Party sees a decline that could merely be circumstantial. Such a turn of events is not without reminding of the fate of the Radical Party at the beginning of the Fifth Republic: having dominated the left at the time, the party had fallen victim to the bipolarisation of the political landscape set in motion by President Charles de Gaulle and had survived only thanks to a large network of elected representatives, mainly present (like that of the Socialist Party today) in the southwest of France.</p>
<p>The decline of the traditional right is another significant fact of this election, with LR candidate Valérie Pécresse gaining just a quarter of the score achieved by her party five years earlier. The result appears as yet another blow to Les Républicains (LR), who recorded their <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2019/05/26/elections-europeennes-2019-les-republicains-placent-la-droite-a-son-plus-bas-niveau_5467643_4355770.html">lowest vote share</a> in the 2019 European elections at 8.4%, in contrast to 20.1% in 2014. It also goes to show the narrowness of the political space now occupied by this party, wedged between Macron’s centre-right and Marine Le Pen’s populist far right.</p>
<h2>Important developments since 2017</h2>
<p>It’s important to not interpret the results of this first round as a repeat of the 2017 election. The apparent stability of the balance of power masks important changes. The political landscape continues to shift rightward. Testament to this is the emergence of Éric Zemmour’s identity-based platform and Emmanuel Macron’s renewed political offer. While Jean-Luc Mélenchon made gains, they were not enough to compensate for the Socialist Party’s precipitous decline.</p>
<p>Populism also continues to grow. In five years and under the effect of a certain number of social movements (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/yellow-vest-protests-65314">Yellow Jackets</a> in particular), its rhetoric has become more radical. More than ever, the split between the people and the elite shows itself at the ballot box. This populist rise weakens Emmanuel Macron, whose position is less favourable than it may appear at first glance.</p>
<p>The incumbent president obtains scores comparable to some of his predecessors who were not re-elected for a second term: Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 (28% of the vote), Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012 (27% of the vote). Moreover, he cannot capitalise on the desire for change that largely explained his victory five years ago. The campaign between the two rounds will thus bring into play two antagonistic projects, two visions of society, but also a tension between the “dégagisme” (i.e., a political ideology based on the French verb <em>dégager</em>, “to oust”, calling for the rejection of the established political class) hostile to the outgoing president, and calls by most first round candidates for a collective front against the extreme right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>The dynamics of the “strategic vote” in France have amplified the restructuring of the political field around three major poles: centrist, identitarian and far left.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807192022-04-08T10:45:25Z2022-04-08T10:45:25ZFrench election: who are the candidates running against Emmanuel Macron?<p>On April 10, 48 million French will be asked to vote in the first round of France’s 2022 presidential election. Of the 12 candidates, only two will qualify for the second-round runoff taking place on April 24. These are the candidates in the running. </p>
<h2>Emmanuel Macron</h2>
<p>Incumbent President Emmanuel Macron is the favourite to win both the first and second rounds of the election to secure a second five-year mandate. He survived the two main crises of his term: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/yellow-vest-protests-65314">“yellow vests”</a> protests and the pandemic. He has also benefited from the Ukraine war and the “rally-round-the-flag” effect, polling up to 30%.</p>
<p>The 44th president has campaigned on gender equality, European integration and his strong record on employment. Yet, the rising cost of living, a recent scandal involving consulting firm <a href="https://qz.com/2152056/macron-could-be-in-trouble-for-hiring-mckinsey-to-help-run-france/">McKinsey</a> and his refusal to engage in TV debates with other candidates will not help his image of an aloof and elitist “president of the rich”. </p>
<p>Despite a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-election-poll-macron-beat-le-pen-le-pen-gains-ground-2022-04-06/">marked drop in the latest polls</a>, Macron remains popular with the elderly and the middle classes, two groups who can be relied upon to vote even if a low turnout is expected.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-anxiety-makes-french-voters-rally-round-macron-for-how-long-179120">War anxiety makes French voters rally round Macron. For how long?</a>
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<h2>Marine Le Pen</h2>
<p>A candidate for the far right since 2012, Marine Le Pen is the favourite to face president Macron in the second round, as she did in 2017. Moving away from the traditional far-right agenda and softening her eurosceptic stance, she has cleverly campaigned on economic issues and the popular theme of the cost of living, getting solid support from the working class.</p>
<p>Her proposals include lowering VAT and ditching income tax for under 30s, as well as a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-le-pen-proposes-referendum-immigration-if-elected-president-2021-09-27/">referendum on immigration</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s former image of a harsh and incompetent leader has been replaced by a softer, more composed figure. She has resisted Eric Zemmour’s challenge, even when key members of her party and even her niece (Marion Maréchal Le Pen) deserted her to support him. The key question now is whether this new image will be enough to see off a challenge from the far left to make it to the second round again.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">Economic fallout from Ukraine war could give Le Pen’s social-populist strategy an edge</a>
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<h2>Jean-Luc Mélenchon</h2>
<p>The man worrying Le Pen as she aims for a head-to-head with Macron is currently Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The candidate from the radical left-wing party La France Insoumise is enjoying a surge thanks to a strong, and at times <a href="https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/04/06/france-election-jean-luc-melenchon-s-hologram-held-12-campaign-rallies-at-once">innovative</a>, campaign. Mélenchon has steadily climbed in the polls to become the strongest outsider. Solid oratory skills, consistency and lack of competition on the left have enabled him to position himself as the only credible left-wing option.</p>
<p>The 70-year-old veteran campaigner is running on a <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/jean-luc-m-lenchon-s-populist-gamble/">post-Keynesian agenda</a> involving increased public spending and is emphasising green policies.</p>
<p>Mélenchon would like to be seen as the voice of the deprived suburbs and ethnic minorities. And as a great debater, he will pose a significant challenge for Macron if makes it as far as the TV debate which traditionally takes place after the first round.</p>
<p>However, Mélenchon’s weak points – including his ambiguous <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0Z7el1PtXM">position</a> on what to do about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine and his radical economic agenda – have the potential to alienate moderate voters.</p>
<h2>Éric Zemmour</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="French presidential candidate Éric Zemmour" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Eric Zemmour has run a controversial campaign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Controversial far-right journalist Éric Zemmour was the sensation of the beginning of the campaign. Presenting himself as the French Donald Trump, he surprised everyone by polling up to 18% and had looked set to qualify for the second round.</p>
<p>Zemmour has attracted impressive crowds to his rallies and he has even managed to create a successful <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-luc-melenchon-eric-zemmour-launch-presidential-campaigns/">new political party</a>. But Zemmour’s project has rapidly unravelled thanks to confusion and controversy surrounding his position on issues such as immigration, gender and the Ukraine war. Still, Zemmour and his supporters claim he remains the one to watch on April 8.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eric-zemmour-the-far-right-polemicists-ideas-have-a-long-history-in-france-169430">Éric Zemmour: the far-right polemicist’s ideas have a long history in France</a>
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<h2>Valérie Pécresse</h2>
<p>Valérie Pécresse, the conservative candidate from Les Républicains (the party of former president Nicolas Sarkozy) is the big disappointment of this campaign. After unexpectedly winning the vote to become the candidate of Les Républicains, she looked at one point able to qualify for the second round.</p>
<p>Yet due to a lacklustre campaign, the absence of support from Sarkozy and one particularly <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20220215/opinion-fear-and-laziness-explain-pecresses-disastrous-french-election-start/">catastrophic public meeting</a>, she has continuously slipped in the polls. It’s now unlikely that Pécresse will take more than 10% of the vote, leaving her clearly behind the other main contenders.</p>
<h2>…And everyone else</h2>
<p>Alongside the candidates who stand some chance are a crowd of others who do not. Yannick Jadot, the Green candidate, is too far from the main candidates to hope for a second round place. Green parties do well in France’s local elections but traditionally struggle in presidential votes and 2022 will be no exception, despite the global environmental challenges. </p>
<p>Another six candidates are currently under 5% in the polls. Fabien Roussel, the communist candidate, has run a cheerful and positive campaign, in particular by defending the French gastronomic heritage. He is estimated to achieve between 3% and 5% of the vote. </p>
<p>Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, the eurosceptic right-wing candidate, will try to capitalise on his very vocal opposition to the government’s COVID policies. Jean Lassalle, the iconoclast MP for the Pyrenees, who ran in 2017, claims to be the voice of “authentic France” and the countryside. He will be happy to get 3% of the vote.</p>
<p>Socialist Anne Hidalgo is the car-crash candidate in this election. She epitomises the decline of the former ruling Socialist Party, and her record as technocratic mayor of Paris – where she is blamed for rising crime, dirtiness and traffic jams – has not helped her. Finally, the far left will be represented by two candidates: Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud. Both are estimated to win just 1% of the vote.</p>
<p>This campaign has caused frustration, not least because of the lack of proper debates. And a low turnout has long been expected. But this remains an important contest which shows how much the French political landscape is changing and fragmenting, resulting in the demise of the two big traditional parties. Radical forces are thriving on both left and right, while the centre is now key. Many of the personalities that have been the driving forces of these changes, including Macron, Mélenchon and Le Pen, may not run again next time. And while Macron’s victory had looked inevitable, surprises are still possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurent Binet does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are 12 candidates in the first round of the campaign – two favourites, three outsiders and a host of people with no chance of making it to the second round.Laurent Binet, Senior Lecturer, School of Modern Languages, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1750932022-01-18T18:26:05Z2022-01-18T18:26:05ZWill a surprise candidate shake up the French election?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441147/original/file-20220117-17-65np2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C0%2C4467%2C2993&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/image-photo/mulhouse-france-19-december-2021-torned-2093250544">NeydtStock/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the history of French presidential elections under the Fifth Republic, no candidate has ever managed to gather <a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00238459/">more than 50% of the votes in the first round</a> of voting and accede to power without having to get through a second round.</p>
<p>Until recently, the vote for a new president was perceived as an expected duel between the two favourites usually representing the right and the left (De Gaulle/Mitterrand in 1965, Giscard d’Estaing/Mitterrand in 1974 and 1981, Chirac/Mitterrand in 1988, Chirac/Jospin in 1995, Sarkozy/Royal in 2007, Sarkozy/Hollande in 2012).</p>
<p>After departures from this norm in 1969 and 2002, the consensus was again upturned in 2017 with the victory of centrist Emmanuel Macron over far-right Marine Le Pen, neither of whom represented the two major parties who have held the presidency since 1958.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/macrons-2017-victory-was-supposed-to-usher-in-a-new-politics-instead-france-remains-gripped-by-political-crisis-174089">Macron’s 2017 victory was supposed to usher in a new politics – instead, France remains gripped by political crisis</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/sondages/sondage-presidentielle-2022-lanalyse-de-la-semaine-1379320">According to the current opinion polls</a>, 2022 will be different again: alongside Macron, two frontrunner candidates representing nationalist and extreme right ideas (<a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/le-pen-zemmour-l-avenir-du-camp-nationaliste-en-jeu-20220102">Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour</a>) could potentially receive 30% of the votes; a traditional right-wing candidate (<a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/journal-de-18h/journal-de-18h00-par-laura-dulieu-du-samedi-04-decembre-2021">Valérie Pécresse</a>) is in a position to reach the second round again; meanwhile, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/01/12/election-presidentielle-2022-la-gauche-face-au-mur-de-la-division-pecresse-attaque-le-quasi-candidat-macron-le-recap-politique-du-jour_6109223_6059010.html">the left has never been so divided</a>.</p>
<p>As always in France, there is the possibility of a surprise additional candidate shaking things up at the last minute. Could that happen in 2022? A look back at history can help us understand how things might pan out this year.</p>
<h2>De Gaulle’s new republic</h2>
<p>In 1958, thirteen years after France’s liberation at the end of the Second World War, <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=93hNBQAAQBAJ">Charles de Gaulle returned to the French political stage and to power</a>. He had been a fierce critic of the Fourth Republic, created in 1945, a regime characterised by the dominance of political parties over individual candidates. The conflict in Algeria handed De Gaulle the role of saviour of France once again.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white photograph of Charles de Gaulle delivering a speech" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1206&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1206&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/441149/original/file-20220117-13-19sccim.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1206&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Charles de Gaulle delivers his famous speech on constitutional reform in Bayeux, 1946.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The constitution of the Fifth Republic was inspired by his famous <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/la-presidence/le-discours-de-bayeux-194">1946 speech</a> in Bayeux, and was largely written by Michel Debré, one of De Gaulle’s closest aides who would become his first prime minister. Under this new constitution, the president was elected by indirect universal suffrage – that is, via an electoral college, as in the US today.</p>
<p>In 1962, convinced that the president’s legitimacy had to be further strengthened, De Gaulle initiated a successful referendum to introduce a system of <a href="https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/les-revisions-constitutionnelles/loi-n-62-1292-du-6-novembre-1962">direct universal suffrage</a>, where citizens vote for individual candidates.</p>
<p>This act thoroughly changed the political logic of France and its balance of power. Instead of voting for a party, people had to vote directly for a person. Instead of voting for a program, they had to vote for a leader. The French presidential election thus <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/03/07/la-rencontre-d-un-homme-et-d-un-peuple-histoire-d-un-mythe_5090440_4854003.html">became hailed</a> as an “encounter between a man and the people”.</p>
<h2>The potential of a third candidate</h2>
<p>In 1965, De Gaulle became the first president of the Fifth Republic to be elected by direct universal suffrage. He had to face a second round against <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=9FzCCgAAQBAJ">the left-wing candidate François Mitterrand</a>. De Gaulle won with 55.2% of the votes to Mitterand’s 44.8%.</p>
<p>De Gaulle’s new system also created a space for the emergence of a potential third candidate like <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=coxUEAAAQBAJ">Jean Lecanuet</a> in 1965 or <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-commentaire-2007-3-page-721.htm">François Bayrou</a> in 2007. These are usually symbolic, <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/histoirepolitique/1047">“small” candidates</a> who have little chance of becoming president.</p>
<p>But the multiplication of these candidacies can still upset the battle between the two main frontrunners. In 1969, despite having five candidates out of seven in total, the left did not make it to the second round of voting. Instead, <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsp_0035-2950_1970_num_20_2_393223">Georges Pompidou</a>, De Gaulle’s former prime minister, won against the centre-right candidate Alain Poher, the leader of the senate who was serving as temporary president following De Gaulle’s resignation.</p>
<p>In 2002, the whole country expected a second round between the right-wing incumbent, Jacques Chirac, and the left-wing Lionel Jospin, Chirac’s prime minister, whom the president was forced to appoint after losing his majority at the Assemblée Nationale in legislative elections.</p>
<p>Early opinion polls introduced a “third man”, <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/fpcs/22/1/fpcs220105.xml">Jean-Pierre Chevènement</a> a left-wing candidate who had served as a minister under Mitterrand and Jospin. He eventually received 5.33% of the votes in the first round with a modest sixth position.</p>
<p>Despite late opinion polls showing narrow difference between Jospin and Jean-Marie Le Pen, the far-right candidate, many potential left-wing voters decided to cast ballots for minor left-wing candidates or to wait for the second round to take part in the election, assuming the second round would be a run-off between Jospin and Chirac.</p>
<p>But Jospin came in third with 16.18% of the vote while <a href="https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/68/4/602/1884181">Le Pen scored 16.86%</a>. Chirac eventually won the second round with <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/21968-election-presidentielle-2002-resultats-des-deux-tours">82% of the vote</a>.</p>
<h2>Fragile legitimacy</h2>
<p>In 2007 and 2012, presidential elections seemed to be back to normal with second rounds coming down to a contest between Nicolas Sarkozy, the right-wing candidate, and left-wing candidates <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/mots/18763">Ségolène Royal in 2007</a> and <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=_NlNktQGlMQC">François Hollande in 2012</a>.</p>
<p>But the 2017 presidential election marked a turning point. As in 2002, the extreme right candidate, Jean-Marie’s daughter Marine Le Pen, managed to <a href="https://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=SCPO_PERRI_2017_02_0251&download=1">reach the second round</a>. But Le Pen’s presence at this stage of the final presidential race did not produce the national crisis witnessed by her father’s success in 2002, showing how the far-right had become normalised in the intervening years. None of the traditional French political parties reached the second round and <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/9781526153463/9781526153463.xml">Emmanuel Macron was able to win without their support</a>.</p>
<p>With four candidates (Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon, Jean-Luc Mélenchon) receiving between 20% and 24% of the votes in the first round of the 2017 election, the legitimacy that De Gaulle wanted to give to the direct universal suffrage process <a href="https://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=ARCO_FRINA_2021_01_0111&download=1">appeared fragile</a> and has been highly contested since by Macron’s opponents.</p>
<h2>The limits of direct universal suffrage</h2>
<p>What will happen this year? It seems that 2022 might reinforce the trend set up in the last presidential election. With none of the left-wing candidates in a position to compete for the two top spots and the spread of extreme-right ideas among the voters, the traditional right v left opposition seems a distant memory. A candidate defending nationalist far-right ideas could reach the second round for the second time in a row.</p>
<p>On one hand, the 2017 and 2022 elections call into question the system inspired by De Gaulle and the legitimacy of the president in a system where the splintering of traditional parties has led the concept of a “third man” or “third woman” to become obsolete.</p>
<p>On the other, a candidate positioned outside of the main French political parties can be carried to a presidential victory and a majority at the Assemblée Nationale just as Macron did in 2017, which could be seen as the ultimate vindication of the third candidate theory.</p>
<p>If calls for a change of the system of <a href="https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20111004_presidentielle.pdf">direct universal suffrage</a> and for <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-pouvoirs-2018-3-page-139.htm">a Sixth Republic</a> regularly bubble up, French people’s aspiration to a more participatory democracy seems to show their limits when it comes to electing their president.</p>
<p>Ultimately, while French people may want to have their say about everything, they also want a leader who decides, takes responsibility and makes decisions. Despite the fluctuations within the political system of recent years, the tradition instigated by De Gaulle back in 1962 remains strong to this day, even if the main players are different.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Guyottot ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Charles de Gaulle created a system where a surprise candidate can upend the presidential elections in France. Will it happen in 2022?Olivier Guyottot, Enseignant-chercheur en stratégie et en sciences politiques, INSEEC Grande ÉcoleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1084072018-12-08T13:31:04Z2018-12-08T13:31:04ZWhat French populists from the ‘50s can teach us about the 'yellow vests’ roiling Paris today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249513/original/file-20181208-128214-1wwgf0z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators march down Paris' Champs-Elysees Dec. 8.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/France-Protests/5ac333a6752c49bdb5790955d8b7f4d6/67/0">AP Photo/Michel Euler</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The populist protests roiling France remind me of a similar anti-tax revolt that occurred in Paris nearly 65 years ago. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/demonstration-at-the-porte-de-versailles-directed-by-pierre-news-photo/107409483">January 1955</a>, tens of thousands of French men and women gathered at the Porte de Versailles in Paris to express their disgust for the elites who had burdened their lives with crushing taxes. They had come to hear the populist icon <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38370962">Pierre Poujade</a>, a bookstore owner from the rural Lot valley and the leader of a movement that <a href="https://electionsfrance.wordpress.com/2011/12/15/the-poujadist-movement-in-1956/">tried to topple</a> the government of Pierre Mendès-France. </p>
<p>Today, the French government is <a href="https://theconversation.com/gilets-jaunes-why-the-french-working-poor-are-demanding-emmanuel-macrons-resignation-107742">again facing</a> an <a href="http://time.com/5472304/france-yellow-vests-macron-fragile/">existential threat</a> over an unpopular tax, but this time by the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/fr/topics/gilets-jaunes-62467">gilets jaunes</a>,” or <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/gilets-jaunes-63133">yellow vests</a>. And even though President Emmanuel Macron has since nixed his government’s plan, the demonstrations show no sign of abating.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Y58-EhUAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">I believe</a> that the Poujadist protests, which I am studying as part of a book project on the political economy of France, can shed light on today’s unrest – as well as on the many other <a href="https://medium.com/@lseideas/understanding-the-global-rise-of-populism-27305a1c5355">populist movements</a> agitating governments across the world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249486/original/file-20181207-128220-ec7x0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some of the protests have turned violent.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-France-Gas-Price-Protests/2e4ec01db6e64ff1aab2fb858c95908a/65/0">AP Photo/Kamil Zihnioglu</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The ‘gilets jaunes’</h2>
<p>The “gilets jaunes” movement <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/yellow-vests-protesting-france-181206083636240.html">started in November</a> as a response to a fuel tax hike meant as an environmental measure. </p>
<p>Cars, trucks and tractors play a critical role in the lives of rural and suburban French people, and the insensitivity of the government to this reality sparked the anger of these “non-metropolitan” citizens. They have long felt <a href="https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1340637898&disposition=inline">marginalized</a> by city-dwelling French elites, who would <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/french-minister-says-fuel-tax-protests-smaller-more-violent">barely be affected</a> by the rising fuel prices.</p>
<p>The yellow vest itself perfectly embodies the resulting sense of grievance. </p>
<p>All French drivers are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-30/why-people-in-yellow-vests-are-blocking-french-roads-quicktake">required to keep</a> a yellow vest in their car for emergencies. Practically speaking, therefore, it is a cheap and readily available garment for supporters of the movement. </p>
<p>More than that, the yellow vest is a <a href="https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/french-protests-gilets-jaunes-yellow-vests-paris-gas-tax/577300/">potent symbol</a> because motorists don it to attract attention in an emergency. For many protesters, that is exactly what they are trying to do by marching through the streets.</p>
<h2>Revolt or revolution?</h2>
<p>But the protests have evolved from a pure tax revolt into something broader, combining a <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2018/12/emmanuel-macron-has-succeeded-uniting-france-s-different-groups-against-him">wide range</a> of political views. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://elabe.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/20181128_elabe_bfmtv_les-francais-et-les-gilets-jaunes.pdf">recent poll</a> shows that about 42 percent of the protesters supported the far right candidate <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-and-lepen-are-battling-for-frances-heart-and-soul-in-election-runoff-76966">Marine Le Pen</a> in the last elections. The survey also shows that 20 percent of them backed the far leftist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, while many others voted a blank ballot or even supported the conservative François Fillon.</p>
<p>And perhaps because the movement lacks a leader, its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/world/europe/yellow-vests-france.html">demands</a> have included everything from reinstating a wealth tax to increasing welfare protections. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181206-french-student-protests-intensify-alongside-yellow-vest-revolt">Students</a> are demanding that the government backtrack on proposed education reforms, while more radical elements want a fundamental transformation in government.</p>
<p>To top it all off, extremists known as “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/world/europe/france-yellow-vests-protests-macron.html">les casseurs</a>” – literally “people who break things” – and anarchists have added violence to what were primarily peaceful protests. As a result, <a href="https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/8xpm3a/paris-riots-yellow-vests-macron-fuel-tax">there have been</a> hundreds of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-08/police-arrest-317-in-paris-ahead-of-new-yellow-vests-protests?srnd=premium">arrests</a> and injuries.</p>
<p>Under tremendous pressure, Macron, on Dec. 5, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46460445">backed away</a> from the fuel taxes. But protests continued on Dec. 8, with more <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-08/police-arrest-317-in-paris-ahead-of-new-yellow-vests-protests?srnd=premium">violence reported</a>, and signs that they will continue. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/12/06/01016-20181206ARTFIG00352-eric-drouet-ce-leader-des-gilets-jaunes-qui-appelle-au-putsch.php">Loose talk</a> among some extremists of violently overthrowing the government, along with a small but growing current of <a href="https://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1505/Monde/article/detail/3502399/2018/12/07/La-grogne-des-gilets-jaunes-tout-profit-pour-l-extreme-droite.dhtml">anti-Semitism</a>, has done little to calm the situation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249487/original/file-20181207-128190-wjzyz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstrator holds a french flag at the toll gates on a motorway.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/France-Protests/d38913b95d494ee0bf037a343bd4bf4f/15/0">AP Photo/Bob Edme</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The past and the present</h2>
<p>The perception of burdensome taxes as a symptom of unjust elite rule was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406514">something shared</a> by Pierre Poujade and his followers in their day. </p>
<p>His protests – like today’s – represented a populist <a href="https://theconversation.com/gilets-jaunes-why-the-french-working-poor-are-demanding-emmanuel-macrons-resignation-107742">rejection</a> of “the system,” which the lower middle classes saw as serving only the elite and leaving them behind. </p>
<p>In the 1950s, <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/387/Transformative_Relationships_-_Journal_Article_-_Hankla.pdf?1544198980">France was just a few years past the suffering</a> caused by the Second World War, the German occupation and the quasi-fascist Vichy regime. In order to rebuild the country, the leaders of the new Fourth Republic adopted a system of economic planning to channel huge amounts of central investment to selected industries. </p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-economic-history/article/capitalism-and-the-state-in-modern-france-renovation-and-economic-management-in-the-twentieth-century-by-kuisel-richard-f-new-york-cambridge-university-press-1981-pp-xv-344-3750-cloth/3C8BB4F8E60A914484F3617BC1338730">historians believe</a> this helped drive the incredible growth that France experienced through the early 1970s. But it had a downside for millions of small business owners, especially those outside the big cities, who believed that their high taxes were being used to help privileged big businesses <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42843321">take over</a> the economy.</p>
<h2>Populism today</h2>
<p>The “gilets jaunes” are very much following in the tradition of the anti-elite movements before them, especially the Poujadists.</p>
<p>Today, as then, the French economy is <a href="http://www.oecd.org/economy/france-economic-forecast-summary.htm">doing reasonably
well</a>, with its annual growth rate <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=FR">improving since 2012</a> and currently <a href="http://www.oecd.org/economy/france-economic-forecast-summary.htm">close to 2 percent</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1074&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1074&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249488/original/file-20181207-128196-10o16a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1074&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pierre Poujade led a movement that bears similarities to today’s ‘gilets jaunes.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-France-File-/2e8b5ca008f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/1/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But, as in the 1950s, the times are not good for everyone. The unemployment rate remains stubbornly <a href="https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rates-by-education-level.htm">above 9 percent</a> and is much higher at 15 percent among those without a high school diploma. <a href="http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2017/04/18/inequality-in-france/">Data</a> from the French economist Thomas Piketty shows that income inequality has widened since the 1980s.</p>
<p>More importantly, the rising cost of living makes it difficult for members of the lower middle class to make ends meet. And all the while they see the privileged enjoying a lifestyle that they cannot imagine. </p>
<p>All of this echoes the Poujadists, but the “gilets jaunes” of today are responding to economic challenges that are very different from the ones of the past.</p>
<p>Today, what matters most are the <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300233766/twilight-elites">uneven gains</a> of globalization. Although deeply integrated world markets have benefited many in France, they have left behind workers and small-business owners who lack the skills to profit from them. </p>
<p>And Macron’s policies are seen as <a href="http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/yellow-vest-protests-macrons-failure-to-address-inequality.html">exacerbating</a> these inequalities and favoring the elites over the lower classes. Besides the fuel tax, his decision to abolish the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/france-could-keep-wealth-tax-in-bid-to-placate-yellow-vests-1544025588">wealth tax</a> and plan to make <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-reforms-education/no-kid-left-behind-macron-tries-to-fix-frances-education-system-idUSKBN1JV0MM">university admissions more selective</a> have added to Macron’s pro-elite image. </p>
<p>So how might it all end? Poujade’s movement, for its part, was able, at its height to win <a href="https://www.economist.com/obituary/2003/09/04/pierre-poujade">52 seats</a> in the French National Assembly. Poujadism did eventually disintegrate, but its longevity shows how it had tapped into something much deeper than a simple aversion to taxes. </p>
<p>This “something deeper,” a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/02/france-is-deeply-fractured-gilets-jeunes-just-a-symptom">suspicion of the system</a>, is shared by the yellow vests and explains why we should not be surprised that Macron’s backtracking on the fuel tax has done little to quiet the protests. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248873/original/file-20181204-34131-500r02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Riot police use a water cannon and tear gas against demonstrators.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/paris-france-1st-december-2018-riot-1246495381?src=j1OCKrFnYEq3RY7foMcsfA-1-7">Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Populism around the world</h2>
<p>Their rage against out-of-touch elites also links the “gilets jaunes” protests with other recent populist movements in Britain, the United States and elsewhere.</p>
<p>In all these places, populism has emerged as a result of the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/chart-of-the-week-distribution-of-globalization-s-gains">uneven distribution of economic gains</a> that have accrued from globalization. </p>
<p>For example, while most elites <a href="http://fortune.com/2013/09/11/the-rich-got-a-lot-richer-since-the-financial-crisis/">have fully recovered</a> their losses from last decade’s global financial crisis, nearly everyone else has seen their income and wealth little changed. This situation is especially galling for the <a href="http://www.ethicalmarkets.com/global-crisis-rooted-in-systemic-failure-of-the-financial-and-political-elite/">many who blame</a> those very elites for causing the crisis in the first place. </p>
<p>When Macron upended the French political system to become president in 2017, many hoped that he could channel the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/anti-establishment-anger-drives-france-elections/3815593.html">anti-elite anger</a> brewing in France into his new, youthful party. But Macron’s paradoxical “centrist populism” has not delivered the change that many citizens sought, one reason the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20181205-french-back-yellow-vest-protests-despite-govt-u-turn-poll">vast majority</a> of the public supports the protests.</p>
<p>The “gilets jaunes” represent a reckoning. It is a reckoning that will take more than tax policy to avert, and one whose future impact will be difficult to predict. </p>
<p>After all, among the young legislators first elected on Poujade’s ticket was Jean-Marie Le Pen, a man who would go on to create the modern French far-right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108407/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A populist movement that threatened to topple a French government more than 60 years ago has important lessons for today’s protests and why they represent a reckoning.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793652017-06-13T16:17:33Z2017-06-13T16:17:33ZAs France’s electoral marathon nears its denouement there could still be surprises<p>When Emmanuel Macron launched his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/emmanuel-macron-outsider-bid-french-presidential-race-election">outsider campaign for France’s presidency</a> in November 2016, most observers thought he had little chance of winning – he was “too young” and had support from neither of the major parties. Then he squeaked out a win in the first round and went on to crush the extreme right-winger Marine Le Pen <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-crushes-le-pen-66-34-in-french-presidential-runoff-76941">nearly two-to-one</a> in the May 7 finale. </p>
<p>Now the candidates put forward by Macron and his party, La République en Marche (LREM) have dominated the first round of the legislative elections, with potential wins in more than <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-macron-marches-to-parliamentary-majority-in-france-79245">400 seats out of a total of 577</a>. </p>
<p>The legislative elections have served to amplify the restructuring that was already taking place during the presidential elections. This featured a collapse of the Socialist Party, a weakening of Les Républicains (LR), and a significant drop for both Le Pen’s Front National (FN) and the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (France Unbowed). </p>
<h2>A record abstention</h2>
<p>The overall abstention rate in the first round of the legislatives on June 11 was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/12/french-parliamentary-elections-emmanuel-macron-low-turnout">51.3%</a>, a jump of 8.5 points over 2012’s 42.8% – the previous record low. The abstention rate has steadily risen since the 2002 reform that moved the legislative elections to <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidentielle-pourquoi-les-tirs-au-but-devraient-etre-tires-avant-la-prolongation-76299">immediately after the presidential election</a>. The feeling for many voters seems to be that the president should be able to move forward with his proposals – tacit approval without an explicit vote.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/doc_associe/sondage_ipsos_sopra_steria_11_juin_20h_comprendre_le_vote_des_francais.pdf">According to an Ipsos poll</a> on the eve of the first round, 24% of respondees agreed with Macron and wanted him to have a majority in the assembly; another 28%, while they didn’t agree with the new president, also felt that it was preferable for him to have a majority.</p>
<p>This in part explains the high abstention rate in the legislative elections – one that was <a href="http://www.ipsos.fr/decrypter-societe/2017-06-11-1er-tour-legislatives-2017-sociologie-electorats-et-profil-abstentionnistes">most pronounced</a> among far-right and far-left voters. Of those who voted for the FN in the first round of the presidential election, 57% skipped the legislative elections. On the far left, 52% of Mélenchon’s supporters stayed home. The abstention rates were lower for the centre-left and centre-right: 43% of those who had backed Benoît Hamon, the Socialist Party’s candidate, and 38% of supporters of François Fillon, candidate for Les Républicains, stayed home. By comparison, the abstention rate for Macron supporters was only 37%.</p>
<p>Polls also show continuing disapproval of the political class. The emergence of new political forces – mainly LREM and France Insoumise – have not been enough to convince disappointed citizens to come back to the voting booth. The sociological characteristics of non-voters <a href="http://www.ouest-france.fr/elections/legislatives/legislatives-les-raisons-d-une-abstention-record-5055547">remain the same</a>: 64% of the 18-to-34-year-olds didn’t vote, compared to 35% of those over 60-years-old. Working-class voters remained on the sidelines, with 66% not participating, and abstention rates were high for low-income and less-educated residents as well.</p>
<h2>The president’s side, on the rise</h2>
<p>Candidates aligned with Macron received 32.3% of the votes cast (28.2% for LREM and 4.1% for François Bayrou’s centrist MoDem party), a jump of 8.3 points over the first round of the presidential election. While many LREM candidates are new to politics, the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/12/le-premier-tour-des-legislatives-en-cartes-les-partis-qui-gagnent-les-partis-qui-perdent_5142951_4355770.html">district-level results have been excellent</a>. Not only did Macron’s backers remain mobilised at a higher rate, they picked up 21% of those who had voted for Fillon, 17% of Hamon’s supporters, and 14% of Mélenchon’s. Macron won many more voters than he lost.</p>
<p>Macron’s strategic choices since his election have paid off. He appointed a prime minister from the political right, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/emmanuel-macron-names-edouard-philippe-as-french-prime-minister">Edouard Philippe</a> and ministers on the left and right according to their “Macron-compatible” profile. He has already begun announcing his first reforms, and been a confident presence on the international scene. According to the Ipsos poll, <a href="http://www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/doc_associe/sondage_ipsos_sopra_steria_11_juin_20h_comprendre_le_vote_des_francais.pdf">58% of those surveyed</a> said they were satisfied with Macron’s first actions in office, no small accomplishment.</p>
<h2>Tradition in meltdown</h2>
<p>Things are less rosy for two traditional parties, the centre-left Socialists and centre-right Les Républicains. In the 2012 legislative elections, the Socialists and their allies won 34.4% of the votes – in 2017 they collected only 9.5%. Victims in the first round of the legislative elections included Hamon and Jean‑Christophe Cambadélis, the head of the party itself, both of whom lost seats they had long held. The poor showing is a verdict on François Hollande’s presidency as well as the result of internal divisions between the party’s left wing and centrist right wing.</p>
<p>By comparison, Les Républicains held on better. They and other centre-right parties won 21.6% of the vote, versus 32% in 2012. This is barely better than Fillon’s 20% score in the first round of presidential election. Their high abstention rate in the legislative election is explained by the party’s divisions – between those favouring a hard-right ideological line and a more moderate approach, as well as the split between those who urged “constructive” support of Macron versus those who wanted to be a part of the opposition.</p>
<h2>The decline of the FN and France Insoumise</h2>
<p>While Le Pen obtained 21.3% in the first round of the presidential election, support for the FN’s legislative candidates dropped from 13.6% in 2012 to 13.2% in 2017. This calls into question the party’s longstanding efforts to remake itself and leave behind its sulphurous past. Following the double loss, internal divisions have risen again as well as questions on the party’s platform. In particular, its positions against the euro and the EU probably led many FN supporters to abstain.</p>
<p>Mélenchon won 19.6% of the votes in the first presidential round, but has been on the decline since. The party’s candidates got only 11% of the vote in the legislative elections, which can be explained by its strategy of isolation and rejection of an alliance with the once-powerful Communist Party. Overall, however, compared to the 2012 legislative election, the far-left is on the rise and hopes to dominate the moderate left in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Two possible scenarios</h2>
<p>At the end of this first legislative round, France faces a new political landscape. Instead of four almost equal political forces with between <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest">24% and 20% of the vote</a>, France now has a single dominant force in the centre, a weakened family on the right, an extreme right that’s stumbling, and a deeply divided left. And half of potential voters are still sitting on the sidelines, seeing how the political situation evolves.</p>
<p>Two scenarios can be anticipated for June 18 – when the second and final round of the legislative elections take place. Because the winner of each constituency will be the candidate with the majority of votes, it’s likely to confirm the results of the first round and give a large majority to Macron. But one can also imagine a decrease in the momentum for the president, with opposition parties gaining more seats than anticipated.</p>
<p>And there could still be some surprises at the end of a very long series of elections that have completely transformed the French political landscape.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Leighton Walter Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Bréchon ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Many French voters seems willing to give the new president and his party, La République en Marche, a broad mandate, even if they didn’t initially support him.Pierre Bréchon, Professeur émérite de science politique, Sciences Po Grenoble, Auteurs historiques The Conversation FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775882017-05-12T12:18:49Z2017-05-12T12:18:49Z‘Horseshoe theory’ is nonsense – the far right and far left have little in common<p>After the first round of the French presidential elections, several <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/24/10-things-learned-french-election-macron-le-pen">liberal commentators</a> condemned the defeated leftist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon for refusing to endorse the centrist Emmanuel Macron. His decision was portrayed as a failure to oppose the far-right Front National, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/europe/france-melenchon-macron-le-pen.html?_r=0">it was argued</a> that many of his supporters were likely to vote for Marine Le Pen in the second round. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/25/le-pen-far-right-holocaust-revisionist-macron-left">Comparisons were drawn</a> with the US presidential elections and the alleged failure of Bernie Sanders supporters to back Hilary Clinton over Donald Trump.</p>
<p><a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/05/could-the-french-far-left-propel-marine-le-pen-to-victory/">Underlying these claims</a> is a broader and increasingly popular notion that the far left and the far right have more in common than either would like to admit. This is known as the “horseshoe theory”, so called because rather than envisaging the political spectrum as a straight line from communism to fascism, it pictures the spectrum as a horseshoe in which the far left and far right have more in common with each other than they do with the political centre. The theory also underlies many of the attacks on the leader of the UK Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, who is accused of cosying up to authoritarian and theocratic regimes and fostering antisemitism within his party.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"747527349525176321"}"></div></p>
<p>Taken one by one, these claims do not withstand scrutiny. Did Mélenchon give succour to Le Pen? No: he explicitly ruled out supporting Le Pen, and most of his supporters <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62d782d6-31a7-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a">voted for Macron</a> in the second round. Are there antisemites in the Labour Party? Yes: but there are antisemites in every British political party; the difference is that <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/27-times-tory-party-racism-7904018">repeated incidents of racism</a> in other parties go unremarked (as does Corbyn’s longstanding record of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/29/jeremy-corbyn-arrest-protesting-apartheid-shows-ready-lead-britain/">anti-racist activism</a>).</p>
<p>Fans of the horseshoe theory like to lend their views weight and credibility by pointing to the alleged history of collusion between fascists and communists: the favoured example is the Nazi-Soviet Pact. But – aside from the fact that the Soviet Union played a vital role in defeating the Nazis – it is patently absurd to compare Stalin to present-day leftists like Mélenchon or Corbyn.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"861523534677463041"}"></div></p>
<p>Can we instead find convergence between far left and far right at the level of policy? It is true that both attack neoliberal globalisation and its elites. But there is no agreement between far left and far right over who counts as the “elite”, why they are a problem, and how to respond to them. When the billionaire real-estate mogul Donald Trump decries global elites, for example, he is either simply giving his audience what he thinks they want to hear or he is indulging in <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/11/06/is_donald_trump_s_closing_campaign_ad_anti_semitic.html">antisemitic dog-whistling</a>.</p>
<p>For the left, the problem with globalisation is that it has given free rein to capital and entrenched economic and political inequality. The solution is therefore to place constraints on capital and/or to allow <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-100-trillion-case-for-open-borders-72595">people to have the same freedom of movement</a> currently given to capital, goods, and services. They want an <em>alternative</em> globalisation. For the right, the problem with globalisation is that it has corroded supposedly traditional and homogeneous cultural and ethnic communities – their solution is therefore to <em>reverse</em> globalisation, protecting national capital and placing <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-marine-le-pens-144-point-presidential-plan-for-france-actually-says-72910">further restrictions on the movement of people</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump and Sanders both attacked globalisation – for different reasons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/80038275@N00/31642423416/in/album-72157674058907543/">Michael Vadon</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Is there a more fundamental, ideological resonance between far left and far right? Again, only in the vaguest sense that both challenge the liberal-democratic status quo. But they do so for very different reasons and with very different aims. When fascists reject liberal individualism, it is in the name of a vision of national unity and ethnic purity rooted in a romanticised past; when communists and socialists do so, it is in the name of international solidarity and the redistribution of wealth.</p>
<p>Given the basic implausibility of the horseshoe theory, why do so many centrist commentators insist on perpetuating it? The likely answer is that it allows those in the centre to discredit the left while disavowing their own complicity with the far right. Historically, it has been “centrist” liberals – in Spain, Chile, Brazil, and in many other countries – who have helped the far right to power, usually because they would rather have had a fascist in power than a socialist.</p>
<p>Today’s fascists have also been facilitated by centrists – and not just, for example, <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/694928/why-not-le-pen?utm_source=links&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=twitter">those</a> on the <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/05/is-marine-le-pen-really-far-right/">centre-right</a> who have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/opinion/sunday/is-there-a-case-for-le-pen.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fross-douthat&action=click&contentCollection=opinion&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection">explicitly defended Le Pen</a>. When centrists ape the Islamophobia and immigrant-bashing of the far right, many people begin to think that fascism is legitimate; when they pursue policies which exacerbate <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-1">economic inequality</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-french-election-shows-the-democratic-limits-of-the-countrys-presidential-system-77114">hollow out democracy</a>, many begin to think that fascism looks desirable.</p>
<p>If liberals genuinely want to understand and confront the rise of the far right, then rather than smearing the left they should perhaps reflect on their own faults.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Choat is a member of the Labour party.</span></em></p>Both attack the status-quo, but for entirely different reasons.Simon Choat, Senior Lecturer in Political Theory, Kingston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/771822017-05-06T13:51:09Z2017-05-06T13:51:09ZCould blank and invalid votes change the result of the French election?<p>The question of every pollster’s mind this Sunday, during France’s presidential election, will be, “So, how many in total?” – and they won’t be referring to the number of votes for each candidate. Instead, what concerns election monitors this year are <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5505592/_Bulletin_avec_Y._Deloye_in_Yves_Deloye_dir._Dictionnaire_des_%C3%A9lections_europ%C3%A9ennes_Paris_Economica_2005">blank and invalid ballots</a>. </p>
<p>Blank votes indeed are not recognised in the French system, where voters actually have the option to cast an empty ballot, making it the mathematical equivalent of abstaining. This trend <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2001-1-page-247.htm">has been slowly growing in France since 1981</a>, including in European Union elections.</p>
<p>In presidential elections, however it <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/03/30/l-abstention-en-hausse-depuis-1958-la-presidentielle-toujours-mobilisatrice_5103297_4355770.html">has thus far been stable</a>, totalling about <a href="http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Presse/Dossiers-de-presse/Dossier-de-presse-de-l-election-du-President-de-la-Republique-2017/Annexe-n-12-les-resultats-des-elections-presidentielles-de-1965-a-2012">6%</a> in the 1995 and 2013 votes (it <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=_GyhQAJeOZoC&pg=PA14&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">peaked</a> at 6.4% after the first president of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle, left office in 1969).</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/v4m5-ueUk8Y?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The French elections of 1969.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Commentators aren’t so confident that trend will continue this year. Some have suggested blank votes could comprise <a href="http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2017/05/05/2569043-vote-blanc-vote-gris-deuxieme-bulletin-face-choix-macron-pen.html">about 10% of all votes cast</a> on May 7. Abstention also could be high if a substantial number of citizens, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/63f542cc-30ce-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a">heed the recommendations</a> of some political parties and trade unions.</p>
<p>If that happens, the impact could be decisive. Emmanuel Macron, the leader of the En Marche! movement, is by far the <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/macron-won-french-presidential-debate-poll/">favourite to win against Marine Le Pen, according to the latest polls</a>. But he could flounder if turnout is unexpectedly low. </p>
<p>Will “lost” votes determine who leads France? </p>
<h2>A spike in blank votes</h2>
<p>Indeed, there are widespread fears of an “electoral earthquake” after a campaign that left <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/22/france-presidential-election-le-pen-macron-socialists">a good number of voters disoriented</a>; both major parties were crushed in the first round of voting.</p>
<p>The entire range of electoral choice has been called into question <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-shuns-mainstream-political-parties-world-experts-react-76564">by the blurring of the left-right divide</a>, dissatisfaction with current governmental institutions, rejection of government by elites, and challenges to economic and social policies. </p>
<p>The blank vote expresses a citizen’s rejection of electoral platforms and/or of candidates themselves. The issue of blank votes thus seems like an apt summary of the failings of electoral democracy in France. </p>
<p>And, on Sunday, each one is effectively a vote lost for Macron in his battle against the far-right Le Pen. </p>
<p>According to a survey conducted just before the first round of voting in late April, nearly <a href="http://www.ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=poll&id=3708">40% of French voters</a> regretted the fact that the blank vote is not, under French law, <a href="http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/documentation/dossiers-thematiques/2005-referendum-traite-constitution-pour-l-europe/bulletins-blancs-et-nuls.45631.html">taken into consideration</a>. </p>
<p>It is fair to say, then, that the results of this election so far have masked the extent – and perhaps the meaning – <a href="http://www.businessinsider.fr/uk/french-people-not-voting-2017-3">of widespread voter indecision</a>. One startling figure helps to clarify the situation: on May 7, almost two-thirds of voters will have to choose between two candidates they did not support just a fortnight ago.</p>
<p>This situation is unprecedented. How will such people redistribute their votes? And how many of them will choose not to choose, either by avoiding the polls altogether or by sliding a blank or spoiled ballot into the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5505814/_Urne_in_Pascal_Perrineau_Dominique_Reyni%C3%A9_dir._Dictionnaire_du_vote_Paris_PUF_2001_p._928-930">box</a>?</p>
<h2>Counting blank votes</h2>
<p>Since the mid-19th century, <a href="http://www.eyrolles.com/Droit/Livre/le-vote-9782707611901">there have been calls</a> to recognise the electoral significance of the blank vote in France. </p>
<p>Various movements <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/csuperti/files/blankasprotest_final.pdf?m=1455298855">have emerged regarding blank voting</a> across the world. In <a href="https://www.ch.ch/en/how-where-vote/">Switzerland</a>, <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/csuperti/files/dissertationpaper1_spainitaly_0.pdf">Spain</a>, <a href="http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_36099.pdf">Brazil</a> and <a href="http://colombiareports.com/blank-vote-explained-colombia-biggest-electoral-gamble/">Colombia</a>, blank voting <a href="http://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/union-europeenne/20140214trib000815495/vote-blanc-ce-qui-se-fait-a-l-etranger.html">is either recognised or counted</a> (or both), depending on whether an election is local, legislative, executive or a referendum.</p>
<p>In some of these countries, voting is also compulsory, and <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0020/16157/ECCompVotingfinal_22225-16484__E__N__S__W__.pdf">non-voters face different sorts of sanctions</a>, usually a fine (though, rarely, imprisonment). </p>
<p><a href="http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB026en.pdf">In Peru</a>, for example, where voting is obligatory, two-thirds of voters choose a blank ballots, which gives real veto power to citizens come election time.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/10-things-to-know-about-nota-a-voter-s-right-to-reject/story-SkX0EsDQbjG5e2sz0L5N9H.html">In India</a>, voters have enjoyed a None of The Above option at the ballot box since 2013. </p>
<p>France’s own resistance to recognising blank votes was set in stone by a <a href="http://conflits.revues.org/995">February 1852 imperial decree by Napoleon Bonaparte</a>. In 2014 a new law finally allowed <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2014/05/26/europeennes-vote-blanc-comptabilise-premiere-fois_n_5390601.html">blank votes to be counted</a> and separated from null or invalid votes, but they still have no weight among the total count. They are thus as ineffective as abstention.</p>
<h2>In France, blank voting is ‘un-republican’</h2>
<p>The main argument for not taking blank ballots into consideration, which has been put forward by each successive Ministry of the Interior, is that counting such votes would be contrary to the very principle of Republican elections: the obligation to make a decision. </p>
<p>People may be dissatisfied with their political choices, but, in France, abstaining has long been perceived as morally reprehensible (if not punished by law). That is, while voting is not compulsory in France, choosing is. </p>
<p>This requirement has enabled voting within a party system based on a two-round majority vote. Historically, sacred place given to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5273632/Lacte_de_vote">voting</a> has done the rest, by providing motivation for even for the most puzzled voters.</p>
<p>Today, a majority of voters now feel that they are unrepresented by the electoral choices on offer and distrust the candidates. Thanks to this gap between voters and parties, they are unable to express a real preference or discern differences on the issues. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, if the blank vote were taken into account, <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/04/21/six-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-sont-favorables-a-la-reconnaissance-du-vote-blanc_5115210_4854003.html">as several candidates have proposed</a>, the French people would like their elections more and voter turnout would increase.</p>
<p>That’s because such a reform would make it more difficult to obtain a majority. Politicians would thus be incentivised to develop platforms that actually meet the expectations of French people. If spoiled or blank ballots met a certain threshold (half of all votes, for example), the election would be voided, compelling another round of voting. </p>
<p>This would be one way to increase the number of people who vote out of conviction, and free voters from the restrictions of the available electoral choices. In short, it would make voting a real, rather than a default, choice.</p>
<h2>2017 – A turning point</h2>
<p>Blank and invalid ballots will not be taken into account for the May 7 election, and abstention in this round has been widely denounced <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/05/05/nous-refusons-les-discours-de-la-peur-et-du-declin_5122635_3232.html">by academics, artists, politicians and civic leaders</a> as a reckless abandonment of duty. But that does not guarantee that people will fall into line. </p>
<p>There are two possible scenarios. First, blank voting will have a direct effect on Marine Le Pen’s rise to office and be held responsible for a political crisis of a scale France has not seen since <a href="http://m.slate.fr/tribune/82121/francois-hollande-mort-cinquieme-republique">the end of the Fourth Republic</a> in 1958. This crisis will upset the balance of all Europe.</p>
<p>Alternatively, Emmanuel Macron will win, and his victory will make France forget the unprecedented political instrumentalisation of the blank vote. </p>
<p>The memory of the threat it once posed would remain, though. So the debate on these “<a href="https://www.academia.edu/5273562/Des_voix_pas_comme_les_autres._Votes_blancs_et_votes_nuls_aux_%C3%A9lections_l%C3%A9gislatives_de_1881">votes unlike any other</a>” is just beginning. </p>
<p>For the future of French democratic electoral institutions, odds are high that May 7 will be a date to remember.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Ihl does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Never before in French presidential elections have commentators and pundits expressed alarming concern about the size of the blank voting.Olivier Ihl, Professeur de sciences politiques, Sciences Po GrenobleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765882017-04-25T14:08:07Z2017-04-25T14:08:07ZAnd the winner in the French presidential election is… populism<p>The first round of the 2017 presidential election highlighted a transformation in the French political landscape. This is clear from <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-23/le-pen-macron-in-french-presidency-runoff-as-main-parties-lose">the weak performance</a> of candidates from the two major parties that have dominated the political scene in France since 1981. </p>
<p>The votes cast for both François Fillon (Republican Party) and Benoît Hamon (Socialist Party) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/22/france-presidential-election-le-pen-macron-socialists">added up to just 26%</a> of the total. The remaining 74% went to candidates who did not participate in the primaries and who have not dominated parliamentary life for decades. </p>
<p>But the greatest victor of the presidential election is clearly populism. Together, candidates who in some way exploited <a href="https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-frances-brand-of-populism-differs-from-what-drove-brexit-and-trump">populist ideology</a> captured about half the vote. </p>
<p>Populism relies on the principle that “the people” (a vague concept that’s now back in the political discourse) know what is best for themselves and that, as a consequence, they do not need political representatives. </p>
<p>Thus, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/populism-in-europe-primer">argue</a> sovereignists, nationalists, and a few half-baked intellectuals, the oligarchic divide between the people and the elites is intolerable. And the European project is reprehensible. </p>
<p>In the same vein, scientific or intellectual study of society is considered unnecessary. Throughout the campaign, polls were frequently called inaccurate and cited as instruments of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-voters-deluge-fake-news-stories-facebook-twitter-russian-influence-days-before-election-a7696506.html">media manipulation</a> – an assertion disproved on election night. </p>
<h2>Populism takes root</h2>
<p>If we add up the votes for populist candidates in the first round – that is, all votes except those for conservative François Fillon, socialist Benoît Hamon, and centrist Emmanuel Macron – they make up 50% of what was counted on the night of April 23 2017. </p>
<p>This is in line with <a href="https://www.enef.fr">a French electoral survey</a> carried out April 16-20 by Cevipof, demonstrating the extent to which populist ideas have taken root in the French collective imagination. </p>
<p>The survey included five statements that allowed us to measure populist attitudes among those surveyed:</p>
<ul>
<li>Parliamentarians in the National Assembly should follow the will of the people </li>
<li>The most important political decisions should be taken by the people, not by politicians </li>
<li>The political differences between ordinary citizens and elites are greater than those between ordinary citizens themselves </li>
<li>I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than a professional politician</li>
<li>Politicians talk too much and do not take enough action.</li>
</ul>
<p>Each of these statements garnered various rates of positive answers (four or five on a scale from zero to five). The vast majority of people agreed with the statement that parliamentarians should follow the will of the people, and that politicians talk to much and do not take enough action (80% and 84%, respectively). </p>
<p>But while 71% of respondents agreed with the statement that political differences between ordinary citizens and elites are greater than those between ordinary citizens themselves, just 57% thought that the most important decisions should be made by the people rather than politicians. And 51% would prefer to be represented by an ordinary citizen rather than a professional politician. </p>
<p>These lines of inquiry may appear questionable because, for example, of their use of rather vague concepts such as “ordinary citizen”. But they help us identify strong criticism of political representation, and the professionalisation of elected representatives. </p>
<p>If we establish a populism index on this basis, counting the number of positive answers and using a scale from zero to five, we can see that the average level of agreement with these statements is very high: 69% of respondents are at level four or above on the index. </p>
<p>We can then split the index, as this simplifies the calculations and allows us to distinguish the 55% of respondents with a high level of support for populism from the 45% with a weak to moderate level. </p>
<p>Table 1: Populism Index (%)</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166379/original/file-20170423-25594-1xbde0f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Number of times that respondents agreed with each statement (answers of four or five on a scale from zero to five. Total respondents = 8,122).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">French electoral survey, Cevipof, phase 13.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Populism affects even the most highly educated</h2>
<p>According to our survey, the average level of support for populism did not correlate with the respondent’s age, employment status (working, unemployed, retired, or self-employed), or whether their career is in the public or private sector. But it did depend of their level of education. </p>
<p>Among those who ended their studies after primary or secondary school, the level of support for populism is at 63%. And it drops to 40% among those who completed their tertiary education at one of France’s prestigious <em>grandes écoles</em>. </p>
<p>This correlation is also evident when looking at socio-professional categories. While 44% of professionals and entrepreneurs and 45% of executives can be categorised as highly populist, this percentage rises to 58% for private and public sector employees and to 64% for skilled labourers in the private sector. </p>
<p>Overall, the rate of populism’s appeal is at 59% for low-income families, 54% for median-income families and 44% for high-income families. This demonstrates that the feeling of unease with the state of democracy goes far beyond the working class. </p>
<p>The difference lies in the extent to which each category rejects professional politics: 38% of professionals and managers (as compared to 56% of labourers) would still prefer to be represented by ordinary citizens than professional elected representatives. </p>
<h2>Prominent political figures against the populists</h2>
<p>As shown in table 2, the level of support for populism varies significantly for each electoral base and remains associated with each candidate’s level of support for the European Union. Among supporters of far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon (<em>La France Insoumise</em>), it is similar to that found among supporters of far-right candidate Marine Le Pen (National Front). </p>
<p>Table 2: The level of populism for each candidate’s electoral base (%)</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166380/original/file-20170423-24654-kpq9mf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"><em>Faible</em> = weak; <em>Forte</em> = strong. Results for Artaud, Asselineau and Lassalle suffer from small sample size; Cheminade’s electoral base is not featured.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">French electoral survey, Cevipof, phase 13</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Conversely, supporters of the candidates from the movement <em>En Marche</em> (Emmanuel Macron), the Republicans and the Socialist Party — themselves fairly representative of French elites — are relatively less eager to challenge the idea of elected representatives and representative democracy. </p>
<p>As for minor candidates, their supporters – from the left and the right – are even more comfortable with populism. This is perhaps the basis for the argument that France has moved beyond the left-right divide, even though those in each camp still have nothing in common when it comes to economic or societal values. </p>
<p>This confrontation between populists and elites, which is embodied in the May 7 Macron-Le Pen run-off, revives the historical opposition between advocates for direct democracy and supporters of a liberal democracy that allows representatives enough freedom to take action during their mandate. </p>
<p>It also reveals very different perceptions of political life. Anger plays a greater role in the political choices of populists: 62% of highly populist voters (versus 41% of less populist voters) say they are angry at France’s current political situation.</p>
<p>This initial, rapid examination of the situation shows that the current French desire for political change is expressed by a blanket challenge to modern representative democracy. The model, born of the French and American revolutions, requires unconstrained mandates, competent elected representatives trained in the political profession, and a sharp separation between the public and private spheres. </p>
<p>First round presidential election results from France suggest that the question of this separation will hang heavily over the next five-year term. </p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for Fast for Word.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luc Rouban does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A survey shows that candidates who exploited populism in one way or the other during the first round of the French presidential election captured about half of the vote.Luc Rouban, Directeur de recherche CNRS, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/766152017-04-24T14:34:53Z2017-04-24T14:34:53ZFrench election: how the vote came to be so split<p>Four numbers illustrate just how divided France now is: 24, 21, 20, 20. They’re the percentage of votes obtained by the four top finishers (Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon and Jean-Luc Mélenchon respectively), in the <a href="http://graphics.france24.com/results-first-round-french-presidential-election-2017/">first round of the 2017 French presidential election</a>, held on April 23. Eliminated were the two major political parties that have alternated running the country since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958 – together, the left-wing Socialist Party and right-wing Les Republicains gathered just 26% of the votes cast.</p>
<p>Three of the four top candidates that stand out in this unprecedented contest have never been in power, and the political party of top vote-getter Emmanuel Macron didn’t even exist a year ago. </p>
<p>This new, puzzle-like dispersion of voter support isn’t good news for the governability of the country, as the emergence of a legislative majority in June is anything but certain. In a situation where the balance of power is so close, the future president won’t necessarily find a sufficient number of districts where his or her candidates can prevail.</p>
<h2>Four key criteria</h2>
<p>The first round of the presidential election shows a split of the electorate, and thus France itself, around several key issues. Research at Sciences Po Paris enables us to identify the attitudes and values through which the French have restructured their political identity and via which we see the emergence of new political movements.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the vote, it was often said that the endless cycle of scandals – from François Fillon’s alleged <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/francois-fillon-placed-under-formal-investigation-over-fake-jobs">misuse of public funds</a> to Marine Le Pen’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/14/marine-le-pen-french-prosecutors-seek-to-lift-immunity-over-expenses-inquiry">EU “assistants”</a> – masked substantive debate. While the judicial affairs took up a lot of space in the media, voters understood what was at stake and what was important to them.</p>
<p>Here are four key criteria voters were using to judge the candidates. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Economic liberalism. Supporters of the free market (with or without state regulation) against those who advocate an egalitarian interventionism by the government.</p></li>
<li><p>Cultural liberalism. The defence of individual emancipation with mutual respect and tolerance against those who demand the respect of rules and values that are collectively defined and imposed on individuals.</p></li>
<li><p>Euroscepticism (which can go as far as europhobia). It welcomes all those with a nationalist discourse and who criticise the European Union to the point of considering leaving it.</p></li>
<li><p>Ethnocentrism. Those who accept the diverse reality of a globalised world and a multicultural and open society face off against defenders of a national identity and its historical roots – with the implicit willingness to exclude those who are not of the nation – all the while denouncing the supposed misdeeds of cultural globalisation.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The combinations of these four criteria explain the contemporary electoral landscape in France. The following table indicates with a plus sign when a candidate holds a divisive position and with a minus sign when they’re against it. Some candidates are ambiguous about certain positions, or are obliged to deal with a split electorate, as is the case of the FN in the north and the south.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=126&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=126&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=126&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166521/original/file-20170424-12645-6jhfxs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Where the four main candidates stand</h2>
<p><strong>Emmanuel Macron</strong> is clearly on the side of a certain economic liberalism. Still, he sees the state as being able to intervene when required and also to help victims of international economic competition. He is also on the side of cultural liberalism, and has defended women’s rights, reproductive rights and gay marriage. Moreover, the individual emancipation of everyone is one of his recurring themes, including removing the limitations to entrepreneurial spirit.</p>
<p>He is not a eurosceptic. On the contrary, his defence of anchoring France within the European Union was one of the markers of his campaign. He was one of the few candidates who made EU flags available to his supporters at campaign meetings. Compare this to Marine Le Pen, who demanded that the TV station TF1 remove a blue EU banner from the studio before her appearance. Emmanuel Macron also supports an open society, so much so that Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon accused him of being a supporter of globalism.</p>
<p><strong>Marine Le Pen</strong> and the Front National are directly identified with a rejection of the European Union as it was conceived and currently functions, and Le Pen goes so far as to advocate an exit from the EU and the euro. This position guarantees her a solid electoral base, but also limits her because it displeases many conservative and elderly voters. The defence of ethnocentrism has long been the backbone of the FN’s appeal, and the candidate even returned to these fundamentals when she started to slip in the polls. The work of <a href="http://www.sciencespo.fr/centre-etudes-europeennes/fr/chercheur/nonna-mayer">Nonna Mayer</a> clearly shows that hostility to immigrants and Islam are the leading characteristics of FN support among voters who feel that French identity and culture are in danger.</p>
<p>In terms of cultural or economic liberalism, the FN’s position is ambivalent, as its supporters and those it targets have divergent viewpoints. Blue- and white-collar workers are in favour of strong social protection, while farmers, small business owners, craftsmen and retirees are generally against the growth of the state, trade unions, and “fiscalism”, to use the expression of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine’s father. As for “moral” questions, the party’s supporters include those rooted in traditional Catholicism as well as many who are not religious. But overall, Le Pen’s emphasis on more order (this is indeed the central message of her first-round election poster) and authority place her on the side of rejecting cultural liberalism.</p>
<p><strong>François Fillon</strong> was the strongest advocate of pure economic liberalism. He proposed radical measures to “free the economy”, and cited Margaret Thatcher as his model. These promises might well have impeded him from winning the working-class, right-wing vote that Nicolas Sarkozy captured in 2007. The display of his personal Christian convictions and the support of the movement Common Sense (which organises street protests against same-sex marriage) clearly moved the candidate of Les Républicains toward a cultural conservatism. This stance certainly allowed Fillon – on the brink of being evicted completely after <a href="https://theconversation.com/francois-fillon-scandal-is-the-once-favourite-presidential-candidate-toast-72430">“Penelopegate”</a> and other scandals – to keep himself in the race, but it limited support by conservative voters who are culturally liberal.</p>
<p>As for Europe, Fillon adopted a middle position. He chastised his opponents who claimed that leaving the EU or dropping the euro would be beneficial, but also was highly critical on some constraints related to the EU. The same can be said of ethnocentrism: Fillon gradually adopted positions held by former president Nicolas Sarkozy on national identity, French citizenship, and the struggle against fundamentalism (especially Muslim), while posing as a defender of order and security.</p>
<p><strong>Jean-Luc Mélenchon</strong> has chosen a unique combination of positions across the four divisions. While, like Emmanuel Macron, he has historical links to the Socialist Party, he nevertheless shares with Macron only two out of the four boxes: for cultural liberalism and against national ethnocentrism.</p>
<p>On the other hand, he’s a resolute opponent of economic liberalism and a robust supporter of government intervention to improve the living conditions of those who are less well off. And, of course, his positions on Europe put him squarely with the eurosceptics, even europhobes, since his “Plan B” provides room for a possible break from the EU.</p>
<h2>Across the divide?</h2>
<p>When we visualise France’s new four-way political split, it’s easier to understand when activists, elected representatives or citizens say they hesitate for this or that reason, why they find that candidates can say things they support, yet hold other positions they reject. And in this way, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Socialist Party standard-bearer Benoît Hamon deny Emmanuel Macron the right to say he’s from the left, even if a good part of Macron’s electorate is the same as Hollande’s in 2012. And this rejection of economic liberalism is a marker of the left-wing identity Mélenchon and Hamon used to build their electoral bases.</p>
<p>In a sense, Hamon didn’t hesitate to call on his supporters to support Macron in the second round because he shares three boxes with him, while Jean-Luc Mélenchon only two. François Fillon shares just one square with Macron, while Marine Le Pen takes opposite positions from him on three-and-a-half issues out of four.</p>
<p>Because of such cleavages, is France condemned to fall into a kind of enduring political paralysis? Emmanuel Macron has adopted a position of conciliator, but many see their positions as non-negotiable. The question that will become acute in the coming political years – starting with the June legislative campaign and the resulting coalitions – is the ability of both sides to recognise rivals as possible partners, seeing more what is shared than what separates.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Leighton Walter Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arnaud Mercier ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The first round of the presidential election has left French citizens and politicians divided – and the top candidates’ four-way split doesn’t favour governance of the country.Arnaud Mercier, Professeur en Information-Communication à l’Institut Français de presse, Université Paris-Panthéon-AssasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765642017-04-24T14:26:13Z2017-04-24T14:26:13ZFrance shuns mainstream political parties: world experts react<p>The first round of voting in France has concluded, but nerves are hardly calmed. Emmanuel Macron, a former French finance minister who heads up his own political movement, <em>En Marche!</em> (Forward), secured the largest share of votes during Sunday’s presidential election, with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-france-election.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0">approximately 24%</a>.</p>
<p>This outcome places him ahead of the other candidates, including far-right populist Marine Le Pen. But, with 22% of votes, she is still in the race for the country’s May 7 run-off. </p>
<p>Both candidates have made strong anti-establishment statements, but they promote opposing visions for France, particularly vis-a-vis its foreign policy, economy <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fate-of-europe-will-depend-on-the-winner-of-the-french-presidential-election-76566">and membership in the European Union</a>. </p>
<p>As the candidates ramp up their run-off campaigns, The Conversation Global has asked scholars from around the world to give their view on this tense European contest. </p>
<h2>Luis Gómez Romero - The toughest battle is yet to come</h2>
<p>Both the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/04/24/chez-les-soutiens-de-macron-a-bruxelles-cela-va-changer-la-dynamique-europeenne_5116159_4854003.html?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#link_time=1492991048">EU</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-39688501">markets</a> all over the world are breathing a sigh of relief after the results of the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/04/23/les-resultats-de-l-election-presidentielle-2017_5115952_4355770.html">first round</a> of the French election. </p>
<p>The prospect of a final victory of Emmanuel Macron – who has pledged to promote a “<a href="https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/europe">rebirth</a>” of the EU – over the right-wing firebrand Marine Le Pen has sent the euro soaring to its <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/04/23/euro-surges-towards-six-month-high-early-projections-indicate/">highest level</a> in almost six months.</p>
<p>The April 23 results will also facilitate Mexico’s own survival strategies after Donald Trump has threatened to dump the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he has <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-tpp-nafta-president-trade-deals-mexico-canada-china-executive-order-a7541611.html">called</a> “the worse trade deal” ever. In an urgent move to mitigate the impact of US protectionism on Mexican economy, Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration is now <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/02/01/589237a846163f846b8b457d.html">pushing</a> for a renewal of its free trade agreement with the EU.</p>
<p>Mexicans can be relatively confident that the EU will survive the French election. It would be very difficult for Le Pen to win the second round. Both the conservative François Fillon and the socialist Benoît Hamon, following the tradition of “<em><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-emmanuel-macron-le-pen">le Pacte Républicain</a></em>” that previously blocked the National Front in 2002, <a href="http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-politique/appel-quasi-unanime-de-la-classe-politique-a-voter-macron-23-04-2017-6882210.php">have asked their supporters</a> to vote for Macron.</p>
<p>Yet the genie of discontent that Le Pen’s <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/04/23/les-resultats-de-l-election-presidentielle-2017_5115952_4355770.html">22.9%</a> share of the vote has evidenced is not getting back into the bottle at any time soon. The next French president will come from neither of the two main traditional parties for the first time <a href="http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2017/04/23/actualidad/1492971204_654849.html">since the foundation of the Fifth Republic</a> in 1958. </p>
<p>This is symptomatic of how little mainstream political parties have to offer to effectively redress basic social problems caused by <a href="http://ctxt.es/es/20170315/Politica/11447/Politica-Francia-Elecciones-Presidenciales-Thomas-Guenole.htm">capitalist globalisation</a> – such as unemployment, job precariousness and the impact of migration in configuring multicultural societies.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s National Front has many <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/france-national-front-marine-le-pen-fascism-antisemitism-xenophobia/">similarities</a> with fascism. It would hence be convenient to remember that, in the 1930s, fascist parties didn’t raise to victory based on pure hatred and discrimination: they also offered their voters <a href="https://aeon.co/ideas/fascism-was-a-right-wing-anti-capitalist-movement">alternative narratives</a> on protection against predatory capitalism. </p>
<p>These narratives should be central to Macron’s campaign if he wants to obtain, in the legislative elections in June, a big enough majority in the National Assembly to govern. Considering that his movement <em><a href="https://en-marche.fr/">En Marche!</a></em> didn’t even exist a year ago, the toughest battle is yet to come.</p>
<h2>Simon Watmough - French election could endanger relations with Turkey</h2>
<p>While France and Turkey have a very long and rich connection <a href="http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0262-france-and-turkey-new-horizons-for-a-secular-relationship">that extends back centuries</a>, their relations have been deteriorating since the mid 2000s, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/02/eu.france">when France vetoed Turkey’s accession</a> to the European Union.</p>
<p>Dating back to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/1497072/Chirac-on-collision-course-with-Blair-over-Turkey-in-EU.html.">president Jacques Chirac</a>, French presidents have largely used Turkey’s status as a Muslim-majority nation and French domestic resentment about its large first- and second-generation Turkish population to mobilise <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2009/05/19/les-desarrois-turquesques-de-sarkozy_558771">anti-Turkey sentiment</a> during elections. </p>
<p>This first round of elections was no differrent: both the centrist Emmanuel Macron and far-right Marine Le Pen antagonised Turkey over its April 18 <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-constitutional-referendum-experts-express-fear-for-a-divided-country-76289">referendum</a>, which dramatically expanded the powers of Recep Tayipp Erdogan, Turkey’s president.</p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron took the opportunity to bolster his centrist and EU credentials <a href="http://www.livemint.com/Politics/c9M94s729vIG1qFAuZC40O/Turkey-referendum-Merkel-calls-for-talks-France-warns-on-d.html">by criticising</a> the referendum results, saying they were indicative of Turkey’s slide into authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Marine Le Pen, who had blasted <a href="http://www.gulf-times.com/story/537250/Fillon-and-Le-Pen-attack-government-for-allowing-r">Turkey’s referendum rallies</a> in March, actually promotes within France a vision similar to President Erdogan’s conservative, “country first” populism. She hopes for “<a href="http://int.ert.gr/marine-le-pen-frexit-is-part-of-my-policy/">a privileged relation with Turkey</a>” and, if in power, <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/795288/Marine-Le-Pen-French-Presidential-Elections-European-Union-Germany-Die-Welt">says she would orchestrate France’s exit from the bloc</a>. </p>
<p>To add fuel to the fire, this past weekend, French professor Philippe Moreau Defarges, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations, <a href="http://www.trtworld.com/europe/french-professor-calls-to-assassinate-erdogan-341505">asserted</a> that the best way to “deal” with Erdogan would be a political assassination. Predictably, many outraged Turkish citizens living in France took to social media to express their dismay. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166365/original/file-20170423-12650-1e7cauh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Reactions from Turks in France outraged by the statement of Professor Moreau Defarges.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Erdogan, for his part, has been highly adept at <a href="http://asbarez.com/52742/turkeys-erdogan-to-chirac-keep-it-to-yourself/">using French claims</a> that Turkey is not Europe to bolster his argument that Europe will never accept Turkey as a member and to present <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-latest-bump-in-the-road-of-turkeys-quest-to-join-the-eu-european-ultra-nationalism-74639">France as a bastion of European Islamophobia</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/communaute-turque-compte-611515-personnes-en-france-7311.html">Some half a million first-</a> and <a href="https://hommesmigrations.revues.org/286?lang=en">second-generation</a> Turks (<a href="https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2575541">about 4% of people</a> among those with at least one immigrant parent in 2015) live in France today. The Turkish community is widely viewed as <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36059/INTERACT-RR-2015%20-%2014_France.pdf;sequence=1">the least integrated</a> immigrant community in France due to local Turks’ <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/general/20160805-french-turks-divided-turkey-failed-coup">strong connections </a> to their home country. Policies of the Turkish state also encourage them in this direction.</p>
<p>It will be interesting to analyse how Turkish-French citizens vote on May 7. For now, what’s certain is that given the resurgence of the French far-right and Turkey’s lurch toward authoritarianism, prospects for renewed relations between the two nations are dim.</p>
<h2>Balveer Arora - Election ‘has echoes in India’</h2>
<p>The French presidential election has aroused great interest in India. The context has undoubtedly something to do with it, sandwiched as they are between the Brexit vote and the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election-afd-idUSKBN17P0DO">upcoming German elections</a>. </p>
<p>Given the restrictive policies of the Trump administration, the direction that Europe will now take is of acute interest here, as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/747d7f7a-d808-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e">Indian students and professionals</a> turn their gaze away from the US to other possible destinations. </p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the first round has allayed fears of the backlash against globalisation wrecking the European Union. His political positioning as neither left nor right, and his invocation <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/a-lyon-macron-se-prend-pour-de-gaulle_1876095.html">of general Charles de Gaulle</a> – the first president of the French Fifth Republic and former leader of the resistance – while founding his movement, echoed the foundational principles of modern France. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/francois-hollande-aurait-il-choisi-emmanuel-macron-15-01-2017-2097290_20.php">The astute choreography of his rise</a>, designed by none other than the unpopular French president Francois Hollande himself, was also a fascinating study in political strategy. </p>
<p>Marine Le Pen’s Right-wing ultra-nationalist ideology has parallels in India. <a href="https://news.vice.com/story/the-rise-and-fall-and-possible-rise-again-of-marine-le-pen-frances-answer-to-donald-trump">The trajectory of her party</a> over the past 15 years – from outcast untouchable to major player – recalls that India’s ruling Hindu nationalist party, the BJP <a href="https://qz.com/630144/explainer-what-are-the-origins-of-todays-hindu-nationalism/">clawed its way to respectability</a> after having been ostracised for its hostility towards minorities. </p>
<p>France’s hybrid regime of the executive presidency (<a href="http://www.gouvernement.fr/en/how-government-works">with a strong prime minister</a> appointed by the president) has been watched in India since the mid-1970s, when Indira Gandhi’s government discussed <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-st-jaipur/20170330/281736974291720">constitutional reforms</a>. Indeed, the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/fp.2015.4">French model</a> has been cited in <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/frances-new-five-year-presidential-term/">many reform proposals</a> for its promise of a stronger central leader liberated from the constraints of a fragmented parliament. </p>
<p>The fact <a href="https://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/the-semi-presidential-system-in-france-politics-essay.php">that this regime</a>, which was being <a href="http://www.lesinrocks.com/2016/11/20/actualite/faut-remettre-question-democratie-11876770/">questioned during the campaign</a>, appears to have got a second lease of life with Macron’s first-round victory will strike a chord in India. </p>
<p>The apparent decline of the major national parties is a development that will be followed closely when <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/the-french-election-that-really-matters-president-parliament-2017-le-pen-macron-fillon-hamon/">legislative elections come around in June</a>. Will the new parliamentary majority inaugurate an era of coalitions and <em>cohabitation</em>, (a scenario in which the president in power works with a parliament composed of the opposition), or will it further accelerate the decomposition of the mainstream parties?</p>
<h2>Donatella Della Porta - Anti-establishment wins, and so does the radical left</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen have emerged triumphant from 11 candidates this week end, showing that anti-establishment candidates were favourite for French voters. This trend confirms the increasing relevance of new electoral politics in Europe and the continued need for strong social movements. </p>
<p>It’s important to note the success of the far left in this election. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/left-wing-firebrand-jean-lucmelenchon-policies/">a surprise challenger</a> with his “<em>La France Insoumise</em>” rallying cry, came in fourth place, with 19,2% of the votes, just behind François Fillon (who got 20%). </p>
<p>The centre-left parties are <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695887-centre-left-sharp-decline-across-europe-rose-thou-art-sick">losing members and voters</a> in Europe, and the radical left that is <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/04/how-jean-luc-m-lenchon-built-resistance">emerging in its place is capable of attracting</a> not only attention but also extraordinary electoral success. Take, as examples, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/spain-podemos-syriza-victory-greek-elections">Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain</a>, <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2016/01/could-portugal-give-new-hope-europes-warring-left">Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal</a> and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/02/iceland-pirate-party-invited-form-government-coalition">Pirate Party in Iceland</a>. </p>
<p>None of these parties can be seen as the sole direct expression of the social movements that in recent years <a href="https://theconversation.com/polish-citizens-turn-their-back-on-ngos-and-embrace-community-activism-72537">have mobilised</a> against neoliberalism or authoritarian regimes. Still, the claims of these parties overlap strongly with the views and <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-hashtags-how-a-new-wave-of-digital-activists-is-changing-society-57502">forms of actions</a> of current popular movements, including France’s <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/are-frances-nuitdebout-protests-the-start-of-a-new-political-movement-57706">Nuit Debout</a></em> (roughly translated as the “standing up all night” movement).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166376/original/file-20170423-12658-y335xb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Catarina Martins, chairman of Portugal’s Bloco de Esquerda (‘Leftist Bloc’) party, in Rabo de Peixe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bloco_de_esquerda/29900041020/sizes/o/">Bloco/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuadors-populist-electoral-victory-for-moreno-shows-erosion-of-democracy-75157">Latin America</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-podemos-the-party-revolutionising-spanish-politics-33802">Southern Europe</a>, electoral earthquakes have happened when centre-left parties have embraced neoliberalism. The same thing happened with the French Socialist Party (PS), which once in power betrayed its own short-term and long-term promises. </p>
<p>Whatever the final results of the French presidential election, it points to the broad and deep discontent in Europe over increasing inequality and the widespread evidences of corruption of the political class. Across Europe, the far left has demonstrated a capacity to innovate and to empower progressive ideas, at a moment in which the centre-left is being bitterly punished for its neoliberal turn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76564/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balveer Arora is Chairman Centre for Multilevel Federalism at the Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donatella Della Porta receives funding from European Council Research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luis Gómez Romero and Simon P. Watmough do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>France must now choose between two candidates with strongly opposing visions. The outcome of the May 7 run-off could radically alter France, as well as its position in Europe and in the world.Simon P. Watmough, Postdoctoral research associate, European University InstituteBalveer Arora, Emeritus professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University Donatella Della Porta, Dean, Institute of Human and Social sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence Luis Gómez Romero, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Legal Theory, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763852017-04-24T09:59:56Z2017-04-24T09:59:56ZWhat happened to the French Socialist Party?<p>The 2017 French presidential election was destined to go down to the wire and it didn’t disappoint. The traditional political landscape has been shot <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-and-le-pen-to-face-off-for-french-presidency-but-she-wont-be-pleased-with-first-round-result-76565">through by the victory</a> of two outsiders, Marine Le Pen, the candidate of the far-right Front National, and Emmanuel Macron, the new kid on the block. </p>
<p>Under the ashes lie the two mainstream parties, the two pillars of French politics. The Republican right and its candidate François Fillon, marred by <a href="https://theconversation.com/francois-fillon-scandal-is-the-once-favourite-presidential-candidate-toast-72430">scandals</a>, only missed the second spot by a whisker but you need to go all the way down to 6% to find Benoît Hamon, the candidate for Parti Socialiste (PS), the French Socialist Party. He came in fifth position, with a thoroughly humiliating result.</p>
<p>The PS is a giant of modern French politics. It is the party of the former president François Mitterrand, whose 14 years in the Élysée Palace, between 1981 and 1995, shaped much of contemporary France. It is the party of the other François, Hollande, who entered the Elysée in 2012. And it is the party of other leading and legendary figures of the French left from Jean Jaurès to Léon Blum, and many others. </p>
<p>But the party which won the presidency in 1981, in 1988, and again in 2012, has been reduced to less than 10% of the vote in 2017. </p>
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<p>Since 1969, the PS has always been either the ruling party or the largest opposition party. In 1969, its predecessor, the SFIO, reached a nadir and obtained just 5% of the vote. The party rebranded and was rebooted by Mitterrand, who took over in 1971, with a programme much more to the left. </p>
<p>It hasn’t been plain sailing all the way, with the highs of winning elections followed by troughs. The worst was in 1993 when the party collapsed and only obtained 57 MPs out of 577. More recently in 2002 its candidate failed to reach the second round of the presidential election, leaving the Front National’s Jean-Marie Le Pen to face Jacques Chirac. But even then, its candidate, Lionel Jospin, finished in third place in the first round, with 16% of the vote, ten points higher than Hamon. </p>
<p>The PS is renowned for its infighting and party factionalism. It has experienced nasty episodes of civil war, most notably at a 1991 Rennes party conference and a near break-up during the 2005 referendum on the EU constitution, which saw it split in the middle. </p>
<h2>Enter Hamon</h2>
<p>More recently, its “rebel” MPs, including Hamon have opposed Hollande’s “pro-business” policies, which they perceived as a betrayal of the promise he made in 2012 to fight the power of global finance. No one really expected any Socialist candidate to win this election. Hollande’s popularity rating <a href="http://www.tns-sofres.com/dataviz?type=1&code_nom=hollande">reached</a> an all-time low for any president in November 2016 of 11% and has recovered little since. The party has lost ground in all local, regional and European elections since 2012, including a bloodbath in the 2014 municipal elections. </p>
<p>Part of Hamon’s predicament stems from the way <a href="https://theconversation.com/benoit-hamon-wins-french-socialist-nomination-as-party-sees-a-reassuring-bump-in-the-polls-72139">he was chosen</a> as the party’s candidate. Hollande was expected to stand for a second term and the other candidates were ready to fight the primary on an anti-Hollande platform. When, faced with dire polls, Hollande threw in the towel, Manuel Valls, the former prime minister, stepped in. The battle pitted two visions of the party, the more moderate and reformist one around Valls, and that of the rebels, represented by Hamon. </p>
<p>Hamon won on a programme designed to get the party squarely back to the left, away from the pro-business reforms carried out by Hollande. He might have won the socialist primary handsomely (with 58.7% of the vote) but it was not long before he was caught in a pincer movement. </p>
<p>On his right, his victory left a boulevard for the centrist Macron, who was able to appeal to the moderate electorate of the PS. And with more and more socialist politicians, opposed to Hamon’s vision, announcing their support for Macron, including Valls, Hamon lost the full support of a strong and organised party. </p>
<p>On his left, Hamon was overtaken by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-jean-luc-melenchon-the-far-left-candidate-shaking-up-the-french-election-76384">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a>. He had a much more radical programme, and was not tainted by having ruled the country for five years with limited economic and social results to show for it. Hamon may have left the government in 2014 but his party remains inextricably linked to Hollande’s presidency. With Macron a new face in politics, Mélenchon a much better orator, and Hamon slow to launch his campaign and appearing shy in the two televised debates, the socialists’ voice quickly became inaudible.</p>
<h2>What next for the left?</h2>
<p>Now the results are in, the whole of the French left is likely to undergo a radical transformation, with a social-democratic and reformist pole around Macron and a radical left around Mélenchon. This will leave the PS in a very tight corner. With the French media now openly wondering whether the party itself can survive, the 2017 presidential election is likely to be a watershed moment for one of the oldest parties in France. All bets are off as to whether it will reinvent itself once again or suffer a slow and inglorious agony.</p>
<p>The parliamentary elections due in June could provide one possible road to redemption. After all, the PS has always been very resilient after a presidential defeat. Even after its shock rout in 2002, it succeeded in being the second largest party in the National Assembly, with <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2113_02.htm">just under 140 seats</a>. This time, however, is likely to prove very different, with two major obstacles in its fight for survival. </p>
<p>Macron might well act as a magnet, with socialist candidates, aware of the toxic brand of their party, tempted to jump ship and seek endorsement from his movement En Marche! The socialists are also faced with the stark erosion of their support at a local level. The number of regions under their control declined from nearly all of them in 2010 to just five in 2015, and the party lost control of more than 140 large towns between 2008 and 2014. </p>
<p>Humiliated, unloved and threatened to be plundered by Macron’s movement, the French socialists stand shivering at a crossroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ariane Bogain is affiliated with the trade union UCU. </span></em></p>With just 6% of the vote, the French socialist party of outgoing president François Hollande came a distant fifth in the French election.Ariane Bogain, Senior Lecturer in French and Politics, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765652017-04-23T21:30:58Z2017-04-23T21:30:58ZMacron and Le Pen to face off for French presidency – but she won’t be pleased with first round result<p>In the end, the polls were right. Emmanuel Macron will go into the second round of the French presidential election against Marine Le Pen. For a while it seemed as though a dead heat were on the cards but, in the end, Macron <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39686993">took first place</a>, with nearly 24%, ahead of Le Pen at just under 22%.</p>
<p>Republican candidate François Fillon and far-left contender <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-jean-luc-melenchon-the-far-left-candidate-shaking-up-the-french-election-76384">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a> followed close behind, with Socialist Benoît Hamon trailing badly. </p>
<p>Despite coming second, for Le Pen and her supporters, the score is a disappointment. For so long, she was touted for first place and predicted a score as high as 27%. Even on the eve of the vote, some pundits were predicting the possibility of a score of 30%. Her score is well behind the 28% the Front National scored in the regional elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/dec/13/french-regional-elections-2015-live">December 2015</a>. Above all, it reflects Le Pen’s failure to make the key aspects of her programme count in the campaign. She was strangely muted in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-pen-fails-to-land-her-punches-in-first-tv-debate-of-french-presidential-campaign-74950">TV debates</a> and now it shows.</p>
<p>The disappointment was clear on Le Pen’s face when she made her first TV appearance at a little after 9pm on the night of the vote. At her campaign HQ, by 10pm they’d turned off the TV screens and half her supporters had gone home while others were enjoying the disco.</p>
<p>All the polls that have run a Le Pen/Macron scenario for the second round have suggested a 60/40 split in favour of Macron. Le Pen will hope for better, of course, but while she has to believe she can win on May 7, it’s a very long shot. </p>
<p>The final result will have an impact on Le Pen and the future direction of the Front National. She is not in danger of being replaced if she loses; there is no alternative leader for the time being. But the strategy and the programme, largely devised by her acolyte Florian Philippot, will be put under the spotlight. </p>
<p>Her voters are loyal, and Le Pen will hope to secure a proportion of Fillon’s voters as well as those Mélenchon followers who cannot countenance supporting Macron. But with so many other candidates urging their followers to now back Macron, she has a lot of ground to cover in a very short space of time. </p>
<h2>Fillon gracious in defeat</h2>
<p>Despite Mélenchon’s late rally, it seems that Fillon is the third man in this race. At 8.45pm, he appeared at his campaign headquarters to deliver a remarkably dignified speech in which he accepted his defeat and called, without hesitation, for his supporters to vote for Macron in the second round.</p>
<p>Not all of them will. Le Pen will hope that the right wing Catholic vote will swing to her rather than Macron, for example. Nevertheless, with Fillon’s defeat, most of the Republican heavyweights came out in favour of Macron. It may even be that, in due course, once the allegations against him are out of the way and show him to be innocent, Fillon might even foresee a situation where he and other figures from the right might have a role to play between now and 2022.</p>
<p>While Fillon demonstrated both restraint and dignity, throughout the evening Mélenchon and his camp showed the opposite. They refused to accept the projections based on exit polls, even as they appeared to confirm the gap between Macron and Le Pen, and again Fillon and Mélenchon. This is the downside of Mélenchonite. After the fever reaches its high point, it inevitably leads to disappointment, not to say depression. In 2012, having thought he might come third, Mélenchon slipped to fourth, and by a distance. In the last fortnight of this campaign, Mélenchon and his supporters convinced themselves that they would be in the second round. Fly high, fall far.</p>
<p>But Mélenchon succeeded in one of his missions: to reduce Socialist candidate Benoît Hamon to fifth place and a crushing 6.5%. Hamon was out of the blocks first, by 8.15pm, to call for his supporters to vote Macron. By nine, his HQ was empty, with only a handful of journalists hanging around.</p>
<p>Now, with the second round approaching on May 7, Le Pen will be hoping that Macron blunders. But until this point, he has avoided the obstacles thrown across his path, while Le Pen has failed to make her key points count. Perhaps, just perhaps, now that Fillon and Mélenchon are out of the way, Le Pen will find a second wind, and more easily be able to define her programme. She may take back the initiative that has eluded her so far in this campaign. To win she would have to win over a huge slice of the electorate that so far continues to regard a Le Pen presidency as an anathema.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After a historic battle, we now know that one of two people will be the next president of France.Paul Smith, Associate Professor in French and Francophone Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/764972017-04-21T16:55:53Z2017-04-21T16:55:53ZThe voice of youth at the ballot box: lost or unheard?<p>The rise of nationalism across the European Union and in the United States has led to much discussion about the impact on global trade, the future of trading blocks and the changing nature of politics. One common factor among these developments has been that young people’s voice appears to have been largely ignored. France appears to be different in that the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2016/12/23/les-jeunes-du-fn-formes-a-l-antifillonisme_5053295_4854003.html">presidential</a> front-runners have vocal <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/02/millennial-man-how-emmanuel-macron-charming-frances-globalised-youth">youth support</a>. However, if youth are visible on the stage alongside candidates, does that mean their voices will be heard after the election?</p>
<h2>Old and new lenses on the past</h2>
<p>One characteristic of the rise of populism is a romanticisation of a past time when a country was <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/07/13/they-did-things-differently-there-how-brexiteers-appealed-to-voters-nostalgia/">“great”</a> and times were somehow “better”. This nostalgic view of the past is something held largely by older voters, while younger voters have only ever known the more precarious times. Indeed it could be said that those young people who entered the labour market during the economic and financial crisis were truly in the wrong place at the wrong time.</p>
<p>With the UK’s EU referendum, it was older voters that helped swing the vote towards leaving the EU: 60% of voters over 65 voted leave while just <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36619342">27% of those under 25 did</a>. If we factor in the lower <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/09/young-people-referendum-turnout-brexit-twice-as-high">participation</a> (and registration) of young people, the missing voice of young people becomes even starker.</p>
<h2>Paying the price of nationalism</h2>
<p>Young people have much to lose from a more insular perspective of nationalisation and a desire to turn back time. Open borders and the promotion of a spirit of inter-nation cooperation have created a youth cohort who have seen the benefits of European integration. Admittedly, these young people are among the more privileged in each country but their concerns around the end of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/feb/07/a-students-plea-to-brexit-negotiators-keep-the-erasmus-scheme">student mobility</a> and loss of <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/campus/article/2017/03/02/la-generation-erasmus-a-la-rescousse-de-l-europe_5088465_4401467.html">European identity</a> are very real. While the consequences for youth in Britain are now becoming obvious, these risks are present across Europe with the rise of nationalism.</p>
<p>Young people’s weak position amid these emerging political trends can be replicated in terms of their representation in key political decisions. <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2158244015574962">Research</a> confirms that young people were among the hardest hit by the economic crisis, experiencing rapid rises in unemployment and declining employment opportunities. Yet we also see that the polices enacted to address the crisis were not necessarily in <a href="http://www.style-research.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/D_10_4_Flexicurity_Policies_to_integrate_youth_before_and_after_the_crisis_FINAL.pdf">their interests</a> or were <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eu-watchdog-brands-youth-unemployment-programme-a-disappointment/">weakly implemented</a>. Young people are on the wrong side of an intergenerational divide that threatens to deepen inequalities across age groups as well as <a href="http://www.style-research.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ftp/D_3_2_The_effectiveness_of_policies_to_combat_youth_unemployment_FINAL.pdf">inequalities between households and families</a>.</p>
<h2>Can young people engage politically?</h2>
<p>Election turnout has long been lowest amongst youth, and <a href="https://www.youthup.eu/app/uploads/2015/11/YFJ_YoungPeopleAndDemocraticLifeInEurope_B1_web-9e4bd8be22.pdf">this trend</a> seems to be on the rise. In the <a href="http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/elections-europeennes-2014/20140526.OBS8488/europeennes-qui-a-vote-fn.html">2014 European elections</a> only 27% of French under-35s voted. Furthermore, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01995.x/abstract">Europeans’ membership</a> in political parties has been declining.</p>
<p>Yet elections are not the only means of political engagement. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/cep.2012.31">Research has shown</a> that protests are especially popular amongst those under 34, in France and elsewhere. Likewise, <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-frances-nuitdebout-protests-the-start-of-a-new-political-movement-57706">Nuit debout</a>, similar to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_movement">Occupy Movement</a> elsewhere in the world, has offered an alternative form of political engagement – a space for public discussion and cooperation without traditional hierarchies.</p>
<p>Investigations of young people’s use of social media as a form of political engagement <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369118X.2013.871571">highlight the potential</a> for these platforms to encourage critical engagement by increasing their ability to share and discuss politically relevant information.</p>
<h2>Online engagement, offline influence?</h2>
<p>While alternative forms of engagement are invigorating, they may be difficult to translate into political power and influence. Although there is <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0363811112000276">some evidence</a> to suggest that online political engagement is correlated with offline participation, as long as young people fail to turn out for elections, politicians have fewer incentives to cater to their interests, fueling a cycle of disaffection.</p>
<p>France is perhaps different in this respect. The foregrounding of <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/07/marine-le-pens-youth-brigade-national-front-young-voters-france/">young supporters and politicians</a> by the Front National appeals to a neglected demographic: <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5119f9ac-08cb-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b">recent polls</a> show 39% of 18- to 24-year-olds intend to vote for Le Pen. And there are indications that other parties are also making greater efforts to build their youth share. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5119f9ac-08cb-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b">Recent polling</a> shows Macron to be second to Le Pen among 18 to 24-year-olds and neck-a-neck in the 25-34 age group. This could in part be attributable to the “Youth with Macron” group’s <a href="http://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/les-jeunes-avec-macron-antichambre-strategique-d-en-marche-09-03-2017-2110459_3121.php">online engagement strategies</a>. For the Socialists, Hamon’s signature <a href="https://theconversation.com/universal-basic-income-is-it-really-what-todays-youth-need-72979">universal basic income policy</a> has been a primary point of appeal to young people and the <a href="https://www.benoithamon2017.fr/rue/">interactive explanations</a> on the campaign website aim to appeal to digital natives. This seduction of youth is a trend emerging in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/20/greens-kick-off-election-campaign-by-reaching-out-to-young-people">other elections</a> as well.</p>
<p>There are also attempts to mobilise young people without an <a href="http://events.euractiv.com/event/info/lengagement-des-jeunes-en-europe-democratie-participative-et-economie-collaborative">explicit agenda</a>. In the run-up to the presidential election, <a href="http://www.voxe.org/sinformer/">Voxe.org</a>has attempted to capitalize on and develop the link between online and offline engagement with the #Hello2017 initiative. Their website offers attractive, video-heavy explainers of parties, candidates and policies with debates taken into the “real world” at cafes and bars.</p>
<p>The extent to which these initiatives deliver a higher youth turnout and a true voice for young people’s concerns will be seen in the short term in the two rounds of the French presidential election and then in the medium term as policies of the new French president are put into place. Whatever the outcome, the rise of precariousness and disaffection means that building a political voice for young people has never been more important, both in France and elsewhere in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76497/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>François Hollande promised to make France’s youth a priority, but was a disappointment to them. While current candidates often showcase young supporters, will they have a voice after the election?Mark Smith, Dean of Faculty & Professor of Human Resource Management, Grenoble École de Management (GEM)Genevieve Shanahan, Research assistant, Grenoble École de Management (GEM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763842017-04-19T13:42:07Z2017-04-19T13:42:07ZProfile: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the far-left candidate shaking up the French election<p>The French call it <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/lefigaromagazine/2012/04/05/01006-20120405ARTFIG01071-melenchonite-aigue.php">Mélenchonite</a>, a feverish excitement brought on by over-exposure to left-wing populism. </p>
<p>There was an outbreak of it during the country’s 2012 presidential campaign, when, just a fortnight before the election, the “left of the left” candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17637181">credited</a> with 15% of voting intentions and looked like challenging the Front National’s (FN) Marine Le Pen for third place. Then, suddenly, he seemed to run out of steam in the home straight, and <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20120422-socialist-hollande-advance-runoff-french-presidential-election-le-pen">fell back</a> to 11% in the first round of the election, well behind the far-right candidate on 17%.</p>
<p>The 2012 election was a very different campaign from 2017. It was largely a referendum against the right-wing incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy; a straightforward left vs right contest pitting the Parti Socialiste’s (PS) François Hollande against Sarkozy. The struggle between Mélenchon and Le Pen served as an interesting, though peripheral sub-plot. </p>
<p>This time, and with <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-election-marine-le-pen-emmanuel-macron-francois-fillon-jean-luc-melenchon-polls-too-close-to-a7686466.html">some polls</a> putting him in third place ahead of the first round of the election on April 23, Mélenchon is pulling out all the stops to be, at the very least, the third man.</p>
<h2>Impeccable far-left credentials</h2>
<p>Like one of his mentors, Lionel Jospin, Mélenchon began his political career as a young Trotskyite, before joining the PS in the mid 1970s. If that seems unlikely, it should be remembered that, at the time, Francois Mitterrand’s PS shared a common programme with the communist party, the Parti Communiste Français (PCF). A senator from 1986, it was under Jospin’s plural left government (1997-2002) that Mélenchon made his debut as a junior minister. He watched in dismay as Jospin was eliminated from the 2002 presidential race, in part because of a poor campaign, but also because of the presence of two other left-wing candidates who took enough votes from the then-prime minister to see him finish third, behind Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine’s father.</p>
<p>Mélenchon shared with Jospin the view that the EU should be a social space, not simply one where the free market and globalisation can proceed unfettered. To that end, in 2005 he <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380500389232?src=recsys&journalCode=fwep20">led the opposition</a> from within the PS to the EU constitution referendum, while the majority of the party (led by Hollande) backed the “yes” vote. Mélenchon began to draw together a broad alliance of left-wing voters disaffected with social-democracy, communists, and environmentalists, and reached out to the global justice movement, known in France as “altermondialisme”.</p>
<p>There was no space for Mélenchon to develop his ideas in the PS, so in 2008 <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2008/11/07/jean-luc-melenchon-quitte-le-ps_1115955_823448.html">he quit</a> the party and set up his own: Parti de Gauche. The following year, he was elected a member of the European parliament. He negotiated an alliance (the Front de Gauche) with the remnant of the PCF to back his bid for the Elysée. And although, in the end, his score looked disappointing, it was, along with the renaissance of the FN, the main story of 2012.</p>
<h2>Gathering momentum</h2>
<p>Since then, however, things had not been going very well. The Front de Gauche fell apart, largely due to the PCF leadership refusing to put up with Mélenchon’s ego. Electoral performance at local and regional level was poor and even within his own party, support looked to be dwindling. </p>
<p>He was, to a very large degree, rescued by the incompetence and unpopularity of the Hollande-Valls administration, the continued rise of Le Pen and growing support for left-wing populism and altermondialisme. Mélenchon makes no excuses for being anti-elite and Eurosceptic and economically patriotic (though not in the same way as Le Pen), though his insistence on a strong state is different from the new anarchism of other left-wing populisms in Latin America and southern Europe.</p>
<p>In any case, in the spring of 2016 he announced his intention to stand for presidency again, published a political testament called <a href="http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/le-choix-de-l-insoumission-jean-luc-melenchon/9782021326543">Le Choix de l’insoumission</a> (the choice not to submit) and launched a new political movement, <a href="https://jlm2017.fr/">La France insoumise</a>. This is a difficult term to translate into English, but the best rendering I have come across is “France unbowed”. If it sounds a little pretentious to English ears, it works perfectly well in French and has an open-ended appeal, in much the same way as the centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron’s new party En Marche!</p>
<p>Initially, the leaders of the PCF refused to back Mélenchon (and they have been conspicuously absent during the campaign) but they were outbid by the party membership, which <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-26/french-communist-party-votes-to-support-melenchon-for-president">voted decisively</a> to back him. This provided him with an organisational network to which he has added an impressive determination to put new technologies and social media to work. </p>
<p>In early February, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-hologram-a-family-scandal-and-a-man-on-the-march-the-french-election-just-got-really-exciting-72605">thanks to a hologram</a>, he managed to appear in two places at once and his presence via YouTube has been enormous. In <a href="http://melenchon.fr/2017/02/19/esprit-de-campagne-special-chiffrage-programme/">one of his videos</a> he takes five hours to carefully explain his economic programme of Keynesianism in one country (to be paid for by a hike in the wider tax burden from 45% to 49%).</p>
<p>The television debates have shown Mélenchon at his best. Whatever one may think of his politics, he is a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-leftist-idUSKBN17632S?il=0">fine orator and master</a> of the put-down, particularly of Le Pen. </p>
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<p>There appears to be 25% of the electorate who want to vote for a left-wing candidate, but for many of them now, that candidate is Mélenchon, not the PS candidate, Benoît Hamon. The feebleness of Hamon, the limitations of Le Pen and Macron, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-francois-fillon-defied-all-odds-to-stay-in-the-french-presidential-race-74318">the scandals</a> surrounding the right-wing François Fillon have all worked in Mélenchon’s favour, to the point that some polls had him overtaking Fillon. </p>
<h2>Second round: hard choices</h2>
<p>And as Macron stalled, too, the possibility of a Le Pen-Mélenchon run-off in the second round of voting on May 7 has been mooted. Within the Fillon camp there is even some concern that centre-right voters might back Macron in the first round to prevent a Mélenchon-Le Pen duel.</p>
<p>This still seems unlikely, but the question remains whether third place is a possibility – and what Mélenchon could actually do with that, if it is followed by a Macron victory. Mélenchon’s policies are so far from Macron’s that a coalition seems out of the question. And a good score for Mélenchon may translate into only a few seats in parliament in June’s general election. But if he doesn’t make the second round, he will certainly ask his supporters to bar the way to Le Pen.</p>
<p>Mélenchon maintains that he can get through to the second round and that he can win. But there is an elephant in the room. If it does come down to a Mélenchon-Le Pen duel, can he really win it? It is by no means certain that centre-right leaning voters would vote for the far left to keep out the far right. Back in the 1930s, there was a <a href="http://worldatwar.net/biography/b/blum/">slogan</a> among right-wing opponents of France’s socialist (and Jewish) prime minister, Léon Blum: “Better Hitler than Blum”. If Fillon is eliminated, some of them may might feel it’s a case of “Better Le Pen than Mélenchon”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mélenchon is making a strong bid for the Élysée Palace.Paul Smith, Associate Professor in French and Francophone Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762492017-04-18T14:35:15Z2017-04-18T14:35:15ZFrench election: where the candidates stand on foreign policy<p>The first round of the French presidential elections will take place on April 23. Foreign policy has traditionally played a central role during presidential campaigns, but this has not been the case this time around. This can partly be explained by the unusually high number of candidates (11 in total), the fact that what matters to the French today seems limited to what is happening within France, and the focus of the journalists on domestic issues. </p>
<p>So, what can be expected in terms of foreign policy from the four leading candidates from the extreme left to extreme right: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Emmanuel Macron, François Fillon, and Marine Le Pen?</p>
<h2>The European Union</h2>
<p>Europe has been one of the most debated foreign policy issues during this election campaign. A win for Macron, the centrist independent representing his En Marche! movement, would please europhiles, since he is by far the most pro-European candidate. As well as expressing his support for the survival of the EU, he even wants to expand its capacity. For instance, he proposes to further develop Europe’s defence capability by creating a European security council. It would be composed of “<a href="https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/defense">military, diplomats, and intelligence experts</a>” and would advise the key European decision makers on defence related issues. </p>
<p>Mélenchon from the far-left France Insoumise party, and Le Pen of the Front National are both highly eurosceptic. Mélenchon wants to dramatically renegotiate the terms of the union and to leave if that process fails. Le Pen wants to take France out of the eurozone and to propose a referendum on a full “Frexit”.</p>
<p>Fillon, from the right wing Les Républicains is not as pro-Europe as Macron but remains committed to the regional organisation. However, he wants reforms to take place in order to address some of the perceived weaknesses of the EU, in particular in terms of security and the governance of the eurozone.</p>
<h2>Syria (and Russia)</h2>
<p>Apart from Le Pen, who does not explicitly mention Syria in her manifesto, the other three candidates have argued that France needs to be actively involved in resolving the conflict. But they take different views of what should happen to Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president.</p>
<p>Mélenchon’s position is not clear while Fillon’s has shifted: he used to tolerate Assad because the priority was to eradicate terrorism and the Syrian leader was seen as a tool to achieve this goal. In <a href="https://www.fillon2017.fr/projet/politique-etrangere/">his programme</a>, Fillon suggested that anyone fighting so-called Islamic State (IS), including – if necessary – the current regime, would be an ally of France in Syria. However, Fillon’s reaction to the regime’s recent chemical attack against civilians appears to suggest that this is no longer the case. In an <a href="https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/geopolitique/geopolitique-06-avril-2017">interview after the attack</a>, he declared that he wanted to talk with the Russians and others in order to begin organising a political transition to put an end to the massacres. </p>
<p>Since the beginning of the conflict, Le Pen has supported the idea that Assad is <a href="http://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRKBN15Z1AF">“the only viable solution”</a> to the situation in Syria. She condemned the chemical attack, but <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/07/35003-20170407ARTFIG00069-le-fn-decu-par-donald-trump-apres-les-frappes-sur-la-syrie.php">refused to blame</a> Assad until a full international investigation could take place. She also criticised US president, Donald Trump, for authorising airstrikes before such an investigation could occur. </p>
<p>Macron adopts the middle ground. He doesn’t see Assad as being part of the future of Syria but is willing to work with him temporarily. This can be explained by the fact that his priority is to fight IS, but also because in his view, the “Assad must go” approach has put the UN Security Council in a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-vote-idUSKBN17E2LK">state of stalemate</a> for too long. Even though he has consistently criticised the Syrian leader and has expressed his will to see him referred to the International Criminal Court, <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/06/35003-20170406ARTFIG00132-comment-les-pretendants-a-l-elysee-comptent-ils-gerer-le-dossier-syrien.php">he also explained after the chemical attack</a> that not all objectives could be achieved at once, therefore suggesting that Assad was here to stay in the immediate future.</p>
<p>The candidates also disagree on what Russia’s role should be in Syria. Mélenchon, Fillon and Le Pen all promote a central role for Russia and have even suggested that the EU sanctions established after the conflict in Ukraine should be lifted. Le Pen also undertook a very controversial visit to Russia to meet with Putin in March 2017, showing her ties with the Russian leader. </p>
<p>Macron deplores what he refers to as his adversaries’ fascination with Putin. He believes the Russian president is key to the conflict resolution, but also wants <a href="http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/ce-que-dit-melenchon-sur-la-syrie-n-est-pas-serieux-selon-macron-1139178.html">Russia to face its responsibilities</a>, in particular when it comes to pressuring the Syrian regime to put an end to the massacres. </p>
<h2>Security and migration</h2>
<p>The fight against terrorism remains a priority for all the candidates. In light of the recent attacks on French soil and neighbouring countries, this is a major concern for the French population. The main candidates have expressed their willingness to cooperate with any regime that is willing to take part in this fight (even, in some cases, controversial ones like Assad’s).</p>
<p>However, terrorism has mainly been discussed in terms of its domestic implications. Le Pen and Fillon want to strip people who hold dual nationality and are convicted of terrorism of their French nationality – an idea first mooted by the current government. They would also expel any nationals who have gone abroad to fight for terrorist organisations.</p>
<p>Mélenchon sees such an approach as <a href="http://melenchon.fr/2016/01/21/contributions-contre-la-decheance-de-nationalite/">“shameful”</a>. He suggests alternative options, such as the withdrawal of some civil rights (such as voting). Macron seems more indecisive and appears to suggest that it could be an option for people holding double nationality, but only in extreme cases.</p>
<p>Tied to this issue is the question of what to do about French national borders. As part of the Schengen area, there are no checks at the borders with European countries – a practice called into question every time a terrorist attack occurs on French soil.</p>
<p>Le Pen and Mélenchon both want to leave Schengen – although their reasons are not strictly limited to security concerns but are also linked to their vision of an independent and free France.</p>
<p>Macron though wants France to remain within Schengen, but suggests a reinforcement of <a href="http://frontex.europa.eu/">FRONTEX</a> (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency). Fillon goes a step further by arguing that although France needs to remain part of the shared space, the Schengen agreements need to be reformed in order to allow additional measures – such as targeted controls in areas which refugees and immigrants are known to use.</p>
<p>Even though foreign policy has been forgotten during this campaign, its implications will be major, not only for France, but for the rest of Europe and the international community. As such, it should hopefully – although, unlikely – play a more predominant role in the last few days of campaigning and during the two-week wait for the second round of voting for the two leading candidates on May 7.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76249/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Eglantine Staunton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Their policies on Syria, Russia, terrorism and the European Union.Dr Eglantine Staunton, Research fellow, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762262017-04-17T06:31:00Z2017-04-17T06:31:00ZThe evolution of France’s left and right politics, from the 1789 French Revolution to this year's election<p>France is heading to the polls on April 23 for the first round of its presidential election. This election holds particular <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2017/04/french-politics-election-democracy/">importance for the European nation</a>, which finds itself at a crossroads, with its whole political system in question. </p>
<p>From abroad, the situation seems <a href="http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/03/24/french_elections_the_elusive_debate_112266.html">puzzling</a> to many commentators. According to the newspaper China Daily, for instance, the election is particularly “<a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-02/18/content_28250685.htm">messy</a>” (because it’s confusing). </p>
<p>While five candidates <a href="http://time.com/4666894/france-election-candidates-president/">appear to have emerged</a> as favourites from the 11 who qualified to stand for election, their platforms, the values they promote and their political affiliations (except for a few) are not very obvious. </p>
<p>Indeed, France is witnessing a “<a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-journal-des-idees/la-fin-du-clivage-droite-gauche">political blur</a>”, in which the clash between left- and right-wing ideologies seems long gone. Just ahead of the first round of the polls, <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/04/05/anne-muxel-l-electeur-apprend-a-gerer-l-incertitude-de-son-vote_5106193_3232.html?xtmc=anne_muxel&xtcr=1">42% of French people have declared</a> that they still haven’t made up their minds. </p>
<p>The second round of voting will take place on May 7.</p>
<h2>Labels that date to the King</h2>
<p>Left and right are old labels, <a href="http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/election-101-how-did-the-political-labels-left-wing-and-right-wing-originate">dating back to the French Revolution</a>. In 1789, the National Constitutive Assembly met to decide whether, under France’s new political regime, the king should have veto power. If so, it queried, should this right should be absolute or simply suspensive, for a period of time.</p>
<p>When voting, supporters of the absolute veto sat on the president’s right, the noble side. <a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c2a6.htm">According to Christian tradition</a>, it is an honour to be seated at the right side of God, or to the right <a href="http://ask.metafilter.com/60767/Sit-down-and-shut-up">of the head of the family</a> at dinner. Those who wanted a highly restricted veto were seated on the left. </p>
<p>Thus, the layout of the room took on political significance: to the right, supporters of a monarchy that sought to preserve many of the king’s powers; to the left, those who wished to reduce them.</p>
<p>In the 19th century, this vocabulary was increasingly used to describe the political leanings of members of the French parliament. </p>
<p>The great advantage of these labels is their simplicity: they reduce complex political ideas to a simple dichotomy. It also makes it easy for people to identify the “right” side, to which they belong, and the “wrong” side, <a href="http://junior.senat.fr/les-dossiers/droite-et-gauche-histoire-dun-clivage-politique.html">which they condemn</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The French parliament in 1877.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/63/Le_Lib%C3%A9rateur_du_Territoire-_Jules-Ars%C3%A8ne_Garnier.jpg/1024px-Le_Lib%C3%A9rateur_du_Territoire-_Jules-Ars%C3%A8ne_Garnier.jpg?uselang=fr">Jules-Arsène Garnier/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From the 19th century onward, sub-categories quickly developed, aimed at placing every politician on a kind of spectrum from left to right. In this way, political parties can be said to be more or less left wing, or more or less right wing, in relation to one another. </p>
<p>Soon, people were talking about “right-wing coalitions”, “left-wing blocks”, “centre-right”, “centre-left”, “far-right” and “far-left”, and the like.</p>
<h2>‘The clash of two Frances’</h2>
<p>At the beginning of the 19th century, the left-right divide essentially distinguished supporters of an absolute monarchy from those of a constitutional monarchy. </p>
<p>It would later set monarchists against republicans, then conservative republicans against the modernists who implemented the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-moderne-et-contemporaine-2009-5-page-40.htm">major social reforms of the Third Republic</a> that included the freedom of the press, freedom of association, the right to belong to a trade-union and divorce, among other things. </p>
<p>At the turn of the 20th century, the left-right debate essentially covered the divide between the defenders of Catholicism and advocates for the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2141325">separation of church and state</a>. This shift, which took place in 1905, would often <a href="https://assr.revues.org/1115">be referred to</a> as “the clash of two Frances” – Catholic and anticlerical. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Caricature from a satirical paper, ‘Le Rire’, in May 1905, illustrating the separation of church and state in France.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Le_Rire_-_S%C3%A9paration_de_l%27Eglise_et_de_l%27Etat.jpg">Charles Léandre-Bibliothèque nationale de France/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From the 1930s onward, the economic divide came to the fore, with the left advocating for socialism and the right calling for economic liberalisation.</p>
<p>By the 1970s, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/egalit-libert-sexualit-paris-may-1968-784703.html">the liberalisation of social mores</a> had become a key issue, with continuing debates on abortion, divorce, homosexuality, marriage equality and euthanasia. The same is true of immigration and openness to the world, which stood in opposition to cultural, social and economical protectionism.</p>
<h2>Parties with many faces</h2>
<p>In France, the divide grew in several political realms. In his famous work, <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/1574.html">The Right Wing in France</a>, political historian René Rémond defined three separate right-wing currents: the legitimist and counter-revolutionary right, the liberal right, and the Bonapartist right, <a href="http://www.persee.fr/doc/ahrf_0003-4436_2006_num_343_1_2881_t1_0241_0000_2">authoritarian and conservative</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former president Nicolas Sarkozy was the face of the 21st-century Republican right.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Flickr_-_europeanpeoplesparty_-_EPP_Summit_October_2010_%28105%29.jpg">Parti populaire européen/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Whether or not these divisions still exist today is open to debate. What is certain is that there is still a significant difference between the conservative, more authoritarian right that favours an economy in which the state plays a regulatory and protective role, and the liberal right that favours deregulation, less restrictive labour laws and more entrepreneurship. </p>
<p>Today’s French Republican party represents the latter position well, from former prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin to former president Nicolas Sarkozy. </p>
<p>The Bonapartist right – often identified to Gaullism after the former French president Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969) – can now be partially <a href="http://www.la-croix.com/Archives/2012-11-30/La-droite-hier-et-aujourd-hui.-L-analyse-de-Rene-Remond-relativise-aujourd-hui-la-coupure-droite-gauche.-Jerome-Grondeux-historien-_NP_-2012-11-30-882553">identified</a> with Marine Le Pen’s National Front, which prizes a strong leader, order and patriotism. </p>
<p>In truth, for each overarching area of political debate, there are at least two right wings and two left wings. Concerning family values and gay marriage, for instance, a minority on the right are open to increased tolerance, while a minority on the left are rather reluctant.</p>
<p>The same can be said of immigration. Not everyone on the right is convinced by restrictive immigration policies, while open immigration policies are far from universally approved of on the left.</p>
<h2>Don’t forget the centre</h2>
<p>Centrist positions are often difficult to pin down. Those who self-identify as centrists sometimes occupy the middle ground on certain main political issues but stand to the left on one issue and to the right on another. </p>
<p>Early 20th century radicals, often characterised as defenders of secularism and basic freedoms, were also economically liberal, and generally considered as having “<a href="http://www.larousse.fr/archives/grande-encyclopedie/page/2584">their heart on the left but their wallet on the right</a>”. Centrists from the Christian Democratic tradition, who favoured social protections, dialogue between workers and management, and oppose unchecked economic liberalism, were also conservative on family issues. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Young women dressed as Marianne, the French revolutionary symbol of freedom, demonstrating against same-sex marriage in Paris on January 13 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Manif_pour_tous_Paris_2013-01-13_n44.jpg">Marie-Lan Nguyen / Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While it is possible to identify broad schools of thought that can be classified as right, left or centre over the long term, policies vary greatly over time. We cannot ascribe unchanging, universal content to these categories.</p>
<p>These days, we cannot even say that the right is for the status quo or that the left wants change, as has sometimes been <a href="http://www.rfs-revue.com/spip.php%3Farticle1267&lang=en.html">claimed</a>. When it comes to the welfare state, people on the right clamour for reform, whereas those on the left want to defend social protections. </p>
<p>Still, in each era, centre, left and right have served as signposts, allowing us to classify political parties, politicians and the ideas they promote.</p>
<h2>The 2017 presidential election deepens the divide</h2>
<p>In the right- and left-wing “primaries” that took place a few weeks ago, French parties selected candidates who clearly illustrated their ideological differences. </p>
<p>But this process also revealed more left- or right-leaning positions within each camp, as demonstrated by the second-round primary between <a href="https://theconversation.com/alain-juppe-victime-de-la-peur-du-chirac-bis-69181">François Fillon and Alain Juppé</a>, on the right, and, on the left, between <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/en-direct-hamon-valls-le-debat-du-second-tour-de-la-primaire-a-gauche_1872753.html">Benoît Hamon and Manuel Valls</a>. </p>
<p>It’s likely that the majority of those who watched the first televised debate on March 20, prior to the first round of voting, would have similarly placed candidates on the spectrum of left to right. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38875197">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a>, the candidate for “<em>La France insoumise</em>” (the rebellious France), embodies a type of social protest. He refuses any alliance with the current left-wing government and takes more radical stands on institutions, Europe and economics than the Social Democrat <a href="http://gauravdhakar.com/top-stories/benoit-hamon-to-be-socialist-candidate-in-french-election-bbc-news/">Benoît Hamon</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jean-Luc Mélenchon, France’s current ‘protest’ candidate, represents several ‘radical left-wing’ groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Melenchon,_6%C3%A8me_R%C3%A9publique_-_MG_6549.jpg">Pierre Sélim/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Emmanuel Macron, the former economy minister responsible for a large share of President François Hollande’s economic policy, is running on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macron-plus-proche-de-juppe-que-de-hollande-dans-les-urnes-virtuelles-60402">centrist platform</a>. A strong proponent of liberal economic policies, he also supports a certain social safety net and the integration of immigrants while opposing discrimination against minorities. He is trying to attract moderates from the left and the right.</p>
<p>In other words, Macron seeks to build an electorate comprised of Socialists who find Benoît Hamon too lefty and of Republicans or centrists who find François Fillon too far to the right. That marks a clear difference between this mainstream right and the populist, protectionist, anti-European extreme right represented by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401">Marine Le Pen’s</a> National Front.</p>
<h2>Not all the same</h2>
<p>So why is the belief that there is no real difference between left and right so commonly held? </p>
<p>This view can be traced back to opinion surveys from the 1980s. A growing number of people now claim that the concepts of left and right have lost all meaning. Yet these same people, in the same surveys, happily self-identify on a continuum of left to right and define their political identity in these dichotomous terms. </p>
<p>They also <a href="http://www.pressesdesciencespo.fr/fr/livre/?GCOI=27246100672860">respond differently to a variety of political issues</a>, as compared to their self-established position on that scale. </p>
<p>This apparent paradox can be explained. Many people who personally feel more left wing or right wing according to their convictions also believe that governments tend to implement similar policies when in power. They therefore expect clear political platforms that can be summarised as left wing or right wing but are ultimately disappointed by the outcomes.</p>
<p>As a result, candidates make promises to attract votes without taking into account how difficult they may be to implement. But selling right- or left-wing ideas during an election campaign also serves to make people dream – capturing hearts and minds at the expense of considering the realities that elected governments must face.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76226/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Bréchon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As France heads to the polls ton April 23, citizens seem more confused than ever about just what is “left” and what is “right”.Pierre Bréchon, Professeur émérite de science politique, Sciences Po Grenoble, Auteurs historiques The Conversation FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/761412017-04-14T00:49:58Z2017-04-14T00:49:58ZSix questions about the French elections<p><em>Editor’s note: As France goes to the polls to elect a new president, observers are wondering if the vote will follow a populist trend that led to <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-exits-the-eu-how-brexit-will-hit-america-61412">Brexit</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-that-explain-donald-trumps-stunning-presidential-election-victory-66891">the election of Donald Trump</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Here are a few important things to know about the upcoming vote, as explained by Joshua Cole, an American scholar of <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/webad.aspx?id=17165">European history</a>.</em></p>
<h2>1. How does the French presidential electoral process work?</h2>
<p>Prospective candidates must gather 500 signatures of support from French elected officials and have their candidacy approved by the Constitutional Court. A presidential term is five years, and all citizens 18 years and older can vote. This year the first round of voting is on April 23. If no candidate gets more than 50 percent, there will be a second-round runoff between the top two candidates on May 7.</p>
<h2>2. Is president an important job in France?</h2>
<p>The prime minister is the head of the French government, but the president outranks the prime minister and has important powers in national defense and foreign relations. </p>
<p>The president also chooses the prime minister from the majority party in parliament. Occasionally, the president is forced to choose a prime minister from a different party than his or her own. This is called “cohabitation.” This year, the legislative elections will be in two rounds on June 11 and 18.</p>
<h2>3. Who are the most popular candidates for president?</h2>
<p>Eleven <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38220690">candidates</a> are running, with five seen as the main contenders. Two candidates are leading the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-french-election/">polls:</a> Marine Le Pen of the extreme right-wing National Front and Emmanuel Macron, a centrist and former economics minister, who is not associated with a traditional party. </p>
<p>Surprisingly, the candidates from the <a href="http://about-france.com/political-parties.htm">parties</a> who have dominated presidential politics for almost 40 years – the Republicans and the Socialists – are seen as unlikely to make the second round. Republican François Fillon has been hobbled by <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/europe/francois-fillon-investigation/">scandal.</a> Socialist Bénoit Hamon has found little traction among voters tired of the current socialist president, François Hollande. </p>
<p>A candidate from the far left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has seen his <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21720667-worst-case-scenario-run-between-marine-le-pen-and-communist-backed-firebrand-frances">chances</a> of making the second round improve in recent days.</p>
<h2>4. France has been under a nationwide state of emergency since November of 2015. Is security a big issue?</h2>
<p>Multiple terrorist attacks in 2015-2016 have made security more important than ever. <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008">Article 16 of the French Constitution</a> gives the president the power to declare a state of emergency and then exercise executive and legislative powers simultaneously, ruling directly by decree. Given the likelihood of more terrorist attacks, this possibility has received a great deal of attention of late. A group of lawyers and jurists recently published a <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/04/11/la-constitution-donne-trop-de-pouvoir-au-president-pour-le-confier-au-fn_5109367_3232.html?xtmc=article_16&xtcr=5">letter</a> arguing that the Constitution gives too much power to the presidency and that electing Le Pen was a danger to French democracy.</p>
<h2>5. During the 2012 election, some said then-President Nicolas Sarkozy was afraid to visit immigrant neighborhoods. How are these so-called “banlieues” playing into the election this time?</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france">banlieues</a> are zones of economic and cultural exclusion, where problems of chronic unemployment are concentrated. Not all French Muslims (about 8 percent of the <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/">population</a>) live in the banlieues, but some banlieues have large Muslim populations. Le Pen’s campaign painted the banlieues as zones of failed assimilation and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/marine-le-pens-anti-islam-message-gains-influence-in-france.html?_r=0">danger</a> to France, blaming the residents for their own isolation.</p>
<h2>6. What are the chances Le Pen will win?</h2>
<p>Le Pen is popular among many <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/01/522177444/frances-national-front-party-draws-young-voters-to-the-far-right">young people</a>, who seem not to be bothered by the National Front’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401">long association</a> with racism and anti-Semitism. She is also supported by those who are opposed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-the-eu-with-france-first-policies">European integration</a>. Most <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-presidential-election-marine-le-pen-lose-emmanuel-macron-win-poll-voters-certain-choice-a7665706.html">polls</a> say a second-round runoff between Le Pen and Macron is likely, and that Macron will win this match-up. With more than a third of the <a href="https://qz.com/950677/france-presidential-election-2017-the-voter-apathy-that-helped-donald-trump-win-could-help-elect-frances-marine-le-pen/">electorate</a> saying they’re undecided on whom to vote for in the second round, the result may end up being much closer than predicted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Cole has previously received funding from the Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Bourse Chateaubriand (France), the Centre National des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaires (France), the Social Science Research Council, and the Council for European Studies. He has also received research support from the University of Georgia and the University of Michigan (including from the Frankel Institute for Advanced Judaic Studies, the Institute for the Humanities, and the Eisenberg Institute for Historical Studies).</span></em></p>Get up to speed before the first round of voting on April 23.Joshua Cole, Professor of History, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/758602017-04-07T01:56:40Z2017-04-07T01:56:40ZFrance’s presidential campaign pits a strategy of fear against one of opportunity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164371/original/image-20170407-16685-1o8vkp2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It is still difficult to predict who will be the next French president.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With two weeks to go until the first round of the French presidential election, many people in France are stunned by the low quality of the campaign, which has been largely dominated by François Fillon’s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fillon-corruption-scandal_us_58c83a00e4b015d064bfa9eb">legal saga</a>. There has, to date, been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/france-right-wing-scandals-socialists-struggling-heard-hamon-melenchon">very little in-depth discussion</a> about actual policy.</p>
<p>Behind the judicial turmoils of some of the candidates, it is becoming increasingly clear that the campaign is about two significantly opposed visions of the future. One is declinist, supported by strategies of fear. The second is optimistic, promoting a strategy of opportunity.</p>
<h2>Optimism versus anxiety</h2>
<p>Three candidates claim they represent a majority of the French people, are haunted by a fear of French decline, and are deeply anxious about France’s role in an increasingly globalised world. </p>
<p>This approach of anxiety and threat perception is represented by Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Front, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, candidate for the far-left movement Unsubmissive France, and François Fillon, for the conservative Republicans.</p>
<p>But, there is also a very different strategy, developed by Benoît Hamon, the Socialist Party candidate, and Emmanuel Macron, leader of En Marche! What’s remarkable is that both candidates promote a far more optimistic vision of opportunities for a better life and a better France.</p>
<p>Far-left Mélenchon and far-right Le Pen are diametrically opposed in many respects. However, Le Pen and Mélenchon share four similar diagnoses of the economic, identity and societal insecurities France is facing.</p>
<p>First, both Mélenchon and Le Pen base their strategies on anti-EU policies. They claim France’s economic independence requires a withdrawal from the eurozone, from the European Union’s treaties, and even – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/24/european-far-right-hails-britains-brexit-vote-marine-le-pen">in Le Pen’s case</a> – an exit from the EU as a whole.</p>
<p>Second, both leaders adhere to significant anti-globalisation policies. Le Pen and Mélenchon claim France’s economic difficulties come from its openness to the global market. Their remedy is protectionist policies.</p>
<p>A third common approach in narrative is that both play on the rejection of traditional elites and present themselves as anti-system. </p>
<p>This has been successful as a populist strategy, even though both belong to the system they loudly condemn – a trait observers of Donald Trump will recognise. Le Pen’s family is extremely wealthy and deeply connected to France’s aristocracy. Mélenchon was a minister in a former Socialist government. </p>
<p>A final similarity is that both claim to genuinely defend the working class and advance similar social policies – notably, to <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/le-scan-eco/decryptage/2017/01/06/29002-20170106ARTFIG00177-retraite-a-60-ans-secu-integrale-le-programme-economique-de-jean-luc-melenchon.php">lower the pension age to 60</a>.</p>
<p>These similarities partly attract the <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/politique/comment-le-front-national-capte-t-il-lelectorat-de-gauche">same electorate</a>: the working class and the less-educated sections of society that have not benefited from globalisation.</p>
<p>However, the far-left has been associated with policy failure because Mélenchon has been in government in the past. Thus the strategy of fear mainly reinforces Le Pen’s popularity, rather than Mélenchon’s. </p>
<p>The current graphic representation of the far-right electorate in France tends to be an overlay of the traditional map of the communist and far-left electorate until the 1990s, when the Communist Party lost its appeal. According to a poll carried out in early March, 48% of the French working class now <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/03/07/un-tiers-des-francais-se-disent-en-accord-avec-les-idees-du-front-national_5090202_4854003.html">supports Le Pen’s program</a>.</p>
<p>More broadly, both Le Pen and Mélenchon call for a return to an idealised – and historically inaccurate – past. </p>
<p>According to Le Pen, France’s salvation will come from going back to a traditional society that does not value any diversity, by <a href="http://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/candidats-et-programmes/le-programme-de-marine-le-pen-pour-la-presidentielle-2017-13-02-2017-6677067.php">implementing strict assimilation policies</a>. For Mélenchon, the solution is a return to a protectionist economy that supports a strong working class.</p>
<h2>The less-extreme candidates</h2>
<p>Fillon is not as pessimistic as these extremes, although he does call for <a href="https://www.fillon2017.fr/projet/dette/">tough austerity measures</a> – such as reducing the numbers of public servants by 500,000. He argues the French must tighten their belts for the next five years to avoid a situation like Greece.</p>
<p>What then of the two youngest candidates in the presidential election, who have developed their strategies with a distinctly optimistic tone? </p>
<p>Macron and Hamon, whose programs are significantly different, share a discourse around the politics of opportunity. Both candidates promote a strategy of welcome and acceptance when it comes to immigration and refugees.</p>
<p>At a time of continued crisis in the EU, both promote a significant deepening of EU integration. Hamon is in favour of <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/03/09/benoit-hamon-veut-renforcer-la-zone-euro-pour-sauver-l-union-europeenne_5091770_4854003.html">strengthening the eurozone</a>. And Macron has made the development of a genuine <a href="https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/europe">European army and diplomacy</a> a priority.</p>
<p>Macron seems to have found a successful strategy – at least for now. His centrist approach has become very popular; he’s <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/03/09/macron-devant-le-pen-qui-fait-peur-aux-francais_5091659_4854003.html">leading in the polls</a>. What’s more, many politicians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/22/french-elections-centrist-bayrou-offers-alliance-with-macron">from the left and the centre</a> have publicly supported Macron, as they calculate that En Marche! constitutes the most effective opposition to Le Pen. </p>
<p>However, Macron, like Hamon, struggles to convince many workers that a globalised economy offers benefits for them. Macron’s base is currently limited to the most-educated part of the population, which has been the main beneficiary of globalisation.</p>
<p>It is still difficult to predict who will be the next French president. The campaign has an increasingly populist dimension. All candidates have had to deal with a disaffection with established parties and political elites. </p>
<p>What’s clear is that the campaign has revealed narratives of two very distinctive Frances – one that perceives an ever-more globalised economy as a direct threat, and another that perceives challenges as opportunities. </p>
<p>After Brexit and Trump, will French voters put a halt to the declinist and populist wave sweeping other Western nations?</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was co-published with <a href="https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/">Pursuit</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75860/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Soyez is a non-active member of En Marche! </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philomena Murray does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Behind the judicial turmoils of some of the candidates, it is becoming increasingly clear that the French presidential campaign is about two significantly opposed visions of the future.Paul Soyez, PhD Candidate in International Relations, The University of MelbournePhilomena Murray, Professor, School of Social and Political Sciences and EU Centre on Shared Complex Challenges, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.