tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/jordan-5913/articles
Jordan – The Conversation
2024-01-31T14:13:19Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/222410
2024-01-31T14:13:19Z
2024-01-31T14:13:19Z
Middle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year
<p>The recent <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">drone attack</a> that killed three US soldiers has placed Joe Biden’s handling of the conflict in the Middle East under renewed scrutiny. Under pressure from critics demanding a hard-hitting response, the president has vowed to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/28/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-attack-on-u-s-service-members-in-northeastern-jordan-near-the-syria-border/">“hold all those responsible to account”</a>.</p>
<p>But using force in an election year is fraught with political risk.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">Recent polls</a> suggests the US public is divided about the Gaza conflict. According to a poll last month, 39% of voters favour a continuation of Israel’s military campaign, while 44% say that Israel should stop to avoid mounting civilian casualties. <a href="https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/econTabReport_Vow57W6.pdf">Another poll</a> suggests that the sympathies of those who voted for Biden in 2020 are evenly split between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<p>Crucially, 57% of voters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">disapprove</a> of the president’s handling of the war. This sentiment is particularly strong among younger voters and Democrats, upon whom Biden’s hopes for reelection may depend. </p>
<p>Biden’s Republican opponents have also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20has%20carefully%20calibrated,killed%20three%20American%20service%20members.">lined up to lambast</a> him. Donald Trump, who looks all but certain to secure his party’s nomination for November’s presidential election, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">attributed the recent attack</a> to Biden’s “weakness and surrender” while Nikki Haley, Trump’s only remaining Republican challenger, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/us/politics/haley-iran-drone-strike.html">suggested that</a> the US should “go after” Iran’s military leaders.</p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/01/29/biden-attacks-iran-mideast/">criticism</a> on all sides, the ideal <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/us/politics/us-biden-iran-drone-response.html">solution</a> for Biden is likely to be one that satisfies public demands to “do something” without alienating his base or provoking a widening of the war.</p>
<h2>Balancing risks</h2>
<p>Biden’s challenge is a familiar one. As I show in <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">my recent book</a>, presidents throughout history have taken political considerations into account when making decisions about war and peace. As both commander-in-chief and holder of the highest elected US office, presidents must balance the competing interests of national security and political survival.</p>
<p>Usually, that results in a degree of caution. Since voters bear the brunt of the human and financial costs of war, they tend not to reward incumbents who recklessly engage in conflict. So presidents have good political reasons to think twice before putting troops in harm’s way. As former president George W. Bush <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060301-3.html">once joked to troops</a> in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’”</p>
<p>But the strength of this kind of democratic constraint can <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691164984/war-and-democratic-constraint">vary across contexts</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/reality-asserts-itself-public-opinion-on-iraq-and-the-elasticity-of-reality/2EC85066D94345C881A4ECD0EBB29848">over time</a>. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B01FKU1IIC?ie=UTF8&linkCode=gs2&creativeASIN=B01FKU1IIC&tag=slate01-21&camp=1789">Mounting casualties</a> tend to erode support for lengthy commitments, but shocking events or provocations like those that took place over the weekend can also lead to a public demand for <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7f9516c8-ee8e-4368-a96b-f45553e277d3/download_file?file_format=application%2Fpdf&safe_filename=Pelican_2021_Justice_intuitions_and.pdf&type_of_work=Thesis">retribution</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons from history</h2>
<p>We have been here before. Almost exactly four years ago, Trump authorised the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a senior Iranian military commander, apparently motivated in part by a desire to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-confusion-and-contradictions-trump-white-house-stumbles-in-initial-public-response-to-soleimanis-killing/2020/01/07/61c9242e-3174-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">appear tough</a> in an election year. Trump then decided to de-escalate, declining to respond militarily for attacks on bases housing US troops in Iraq. It was a sign that his appetite for a direct conflict with Iran was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-confusion-and-contradictions-trump-white-house-stumbles-in-initial-public-response-to-soleimanis-killing/2020/01/07/61c9242e-3174-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">moderated</a> by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">similar political realities</a> that now face his successor.</p>
<p>Trump’s recent criticism of Biden’s policies – including <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/01/28/donald-trump-brink-world-war-three/">his claim</a> on social media that “this attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance” – conveniently fails to mention this. But it is the kind of counterfactual criticism that candidates who are challenging an incumbent have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">often tended to embrace</a>, safe in the knowledge that they won’t be held accountable for delivering on policies that may prove unwise or unworkable. At least, not until after the election.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">my research</a> indicates that these dynamics also featured during previous conflicts involving the US. During the war in Iraq, for example, the administrations of both Bush and Obama grew increasingly anxious about additional or extended troop deployments as elections loomed. </p>
<p>More broadly, several studies find that leaders facing reelection tend to be more <a href="http://conconi.ulb.be/DP.pdf">conflict-averse</a>, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=353">entering fewer wars</a> in the months before an election than during other parts of their tenure.</p>
<h2>Ending endless wars?</h2>
<p>Whether or not a lasting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/us/politics/israel-hamas-gaza-hostages.html">diplomatic solution</a> to the crisis in Gaza can be found remains to be seen. But from a wider perspective, the genie may already be out of the bottle. It is only a few short months since the US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, triumphantly <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/israel-war-middle-east-jake-sullivan/675580/">declared</a> that “the Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades”.</p>
<p>On Monday, by contrast, secretary of state <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4437128-blinken-middle-east-israel-iran/">Antony Blinken warned</a> that the Middle East faces its most “dangerous” situation since at least 1973.</p>
<p>These rhetorical gymnastics reflect a fast-moving strategic reality. But they also render hollow the political promises of successive presidents – <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/#:%7E:text=It%20was%20time%20to%20be,should%20have%20ended%20long%20ago.">including Biden</a> – to bring an end to the era of major military operations in the wider region.</p>
<p>The reality is that many of the forces deployed to the region during the fight against the Islamic State never left. The US still has thousands of troops <a href="https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports">stationed</a> in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. It is these forces that have been subject to periodic attacks from Iranian proxies. Over 150 such attacks have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20has%20carefully%20calibrated,killed%20three%20American%20service%20members.">taken place</a> since October 7. </p>
<p>Coupled with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">joint US-UK airstrikes</a> against Houthi targets in Yemen, the promised response to last weekend’s attack indicates we may be entering the latest instalment of the “endless wars” from which Biden had hoped to move on. The episode therefore raises questions about the scope of the broader US military commitment in the Middle East – and whether either candidate is prepared to make clear the real strategic trade-offs implied in their promises.</p>
<p>In the meantime, we can be sure of one thing: war is very much on the ballot in November’s presidential election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Payne is a Nonresident Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs</span></em></p>
History tells us that US presidents tend to be cautious about foreign policy in an election year – especially in the Middle East.
Andrew Payne, Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Security, City, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/221660
2024-01-31T11:55:05Z
2024-01-31T11:55:05Z
Iran: with a tanking economy and an election in weeks, the Islamic Republic tries to rally support by acting tough
<p>As tensions continue to rise in the Middle East, the world is waiting for the Biden administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/28/us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-jordan">to act in response</a> to the strike on a US base in Jordan by an Iran-backed militia on January 28, which killed three American service personnel. The US president, reportedly given several options, is weighing up deterrence of further attacks in the region against the risks of escalation.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/iran-with-a-tanking-economy-and-an-election-in-weeks-the-islamic-republic-tries-to-rally-support-by-acting-tough-221660&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">narrated by Noa</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>As has so often been the case in the past, Iran has denied responsibility for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">drone attack</a>, on the Tower 22 outpost in northeast Jordan near the borders with Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella group of Shia militias backed by Iran – has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/#:%7E:text=An%20umbrella%20group%20of%20hardline,said%20their%20troops%20were%20targeted.">claimed responsibility for the attack</a>.</p>
<p>Any involvement of Iran would be something of a gamble for the regime, which needs to look tough – particularly to its population ahead of elections on March 1 – but is in a weakened position. The economy is in trouble, there have been mass popular protests against the authorities’ treatment of women, and now the country has been involved a string of foreign incidents involving Israel, the Islamic State jihadist group and Pakistan. If it sanctioned the killing of Americans, Iran may have only compounded its difficult situation.</p>
<h2>Tehran under pressure</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attack on US bases in the Middle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A regional conflict: strikes against US military bases in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On Christmas Day, Israel hit an Iranian military compound in southern Damascus, killing <a href="https://themedialine.org/headlines/senior-irgc-officer-sayyed-reza-mousavi-killed-in-alleged-israeli-airstrike-in-syria/">Sayyed Reza Mousavi</a>. Mousavi had been the right-hand man of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force who was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">assassinated by the US</a> in January 2020.</p>
<p>Nine days later, Islamic State detonated two bombs at Soleimani’s grave in Kerman in south-central Iran on the fourth anniversary of his assassination. For the regime, Soleimani was the iconic commander who had defeated Islamic State in Iraq. But far from being vanquished, Islamic State was able to decimate his memorial, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-kerman-bombing-death-toll-91/32763647.html">killing 91 people</a>, with the regime apparently powerless to stop it.</p>
<p>Iran’s leaders and military appeared unable to protect their officers abroad or their citizens at home, let alone head the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. They needed a show of strength.</p>
<p>On January 15, the Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-say-they-have-attacked-espionage-centers-iraqs-erbil-2024-01-15/">fired missiles into Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of wiping out an Israeli intelligence cell. They killed a multi-millionaire businessman, members of his family, and other civilians including a Dutch infant less than a year old.</p>
<p>Just over 24 hours later, the target was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes">Baluchistan region in Pakistan</a>. Regime media proclaimed a Guards missile and drone strike on a camp of the Baloch separatist group Jaish ul-Adl, which has fought security forces in southeast Iran for more than a decade. In fact, the dead included two children.</p>
<p>The display backfired. Needing to make its own statement over the violation of sovereignty, Pakistan’s armed forces <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-strikes-cross-border-escalation-region/32782339.html">carried out cross-border attacks</a> in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan. They claimed “terrorists” had been killed – local media said at least three women and four children, all “non-Iranian nationals”, were slain.</p>
<p>On January 20, Iran’s intelligence command in Syria met in southern Damascus to consider the regional situation. They never completed the discussion. Israeli missiles <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/israel-strike-syria-iran-aligned-leaders/32784579.html">destroyed the three-storey building</a>, killing the Iranian head of intelligence, his deputy, and three other Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<h2>Challenges for the supreme leader</h2>
<p>International commentators usually treat Iran’s regime as a player in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. But, while ostentatiously supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the regime has officially kept its distance from those groups’ operations. And the Iranian public has shown <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311061514">little enthusiasm</a> for the regime’s support for Hamas – the absence of large rallies since October 7 has been marked.</p>
<p>The main issue is a domestic one. Soleimani has been admired by many Iranians and his anti-Islamic State legend, burnished and manipulated by the regime. And the killings from Damascus to Kerman come weeks before <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/in-iran-gaza-war-overshadows-preparations-for-2024-legislative-vote-/7361213.html">parliamentary elections</a> on March 1.</p>
<p>The regime is seriously concerned about the prospect of another weak electoral performance, following historic lows of 42.6% in the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/factbox-the-outcome-of-irans-2020-parliamentary-elections/">2020 parliamentary election</a> and 48.8% — a drop from 72% in 2017 — in the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jun/23/raisi-election-results-explainer">2021 presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>But much of Iran’s electorate was alientated by the regime’s repression after the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.elections.timeline/">disputed 2009 presidential election</a>. The brutal crackdown to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-the-hijab-protests-are-now-massive-but-a-revolution-will-need-the-military-to-change-sides-191786">“woman, life, freedom”</a> protests since September 2022 has angered people further. Ahead of the poll, the Guardian Council has excluded thousands of qualified candidates, including the former president, Hassan Rouhani, to ensure the reins of power remain in the hands of hardliners.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy is in the doldrums amid US-led sanctions and ongoing issues of mismanagement and corruption. Inflation is officially <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi#">about 40%</a> and far higher in reality for food and other essential items. Discontent over wages and working conditions is widespread. The currency, which had stabilised after all-time lows in 2022, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401232785">has lost about 10% in value</a> in the past month.</p>
<h2>‘Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran’</h2>
<p>But the regime persists with its tough talk. While racing to proclaim “friendship” with Pakistan, it is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-warns-us-iraq-drones/32060585.html">threatening more attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of dismantling Israeli intelligence networks. Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, declared that Israel’s strikes “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68040493">will not go unanswered</a>”.</p>
<p>Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen are <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-led-taskforce-deploys-in-red-sea-as-middle-east-crisis-threatens-to-escalate-beyond-gaza-220164">damaging international shipping</a> in the Red Sea, site of 12% of global trade. Hezbollah is in daily skirmishes with Israel.</p>
<p>But Iran’s leadership is trapped in a vice. If it pulls back from direct operations, while insisting on the “independence” of its allies, it risks the appearance of being all bark and no bite across the region. If the Revolutionary Guards try another missile strike, they risk further retaliation and even defeat – whether it is from Pakistan or Israel.</p>
<p>So the militias in Syria and Iraq appear to have become the vehicle – and probably the sacrifice – for Iran’s leaders to signal to Iranians that they are still tough, even as they officially deny any role in the attacks.</p>
<p>As the US measures its response, the final word may come from Iranians whose primary concern is at home. Amid the mass protests after the disputed 2009 presidential election, they chanted: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran.” Khamenei and his inner circle are gambling that they can finally bury that message.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Facing a parliamentary election in March, the Islamic Republic is trying to distract attention away from its economic woes with a show of strength.
Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/221722
2024-01-30T17:55:16Z
2024-01-30T17:55:16Z
Iran has so far resisted direct involvement in the Gaza war, but is that changing?
<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-has-so-far-resisted-direct-involvement-in-the-gaza-war-but-is-that-changing" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Iran has tried to keep the war in Gaza at arm’s length by providing support for Hamas <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/04/1222880864/after-striking-throughout-the-middle-east-irans-proxies-now-become-the-targets">through armed groups it backs in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamic Republic has indicated it wants neither to get directly involved in the fighting nor see the conflict escalate across the region. But as illustrated by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/29/politics/biden-jordan-attack-response-options/index.html">the recent drone attack by pro-Iranian militias in Jordan that killed three American soldiers</a>, the violence is spreading. Tehran may not be able to sustain its strategy much longer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">Tehran’s support for Hamas dates back to the 1990s</a>, though the two have never been a perfect ideological match. Hamas comes from the Sunni sect of Islam, identifying more closely with the Muslim Brotherhood than it does with Shi’a Iran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Is Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Relations broke down during the Syrian civil war as <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Tehran backed Bashar al-Assad’s regime</a> and Hamas sympathized with the Sunni opposition. However, when the fighting ebbed, the two mended fences and Hamas rejoined the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/irans-axis-of-resistance-is-a-potent-coalition-but-a-risky-strategy">Axis of Resistance</a>, a group of state and non-state entities centred in Iran that oppose Israel and the American presence in the region. </p>
<p>As part of the alliance, Hamas reportedly receives military equipment, training and somewhere <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">between $70</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">$350 million per year</a>, depending on the source.</p>
<h2>Important role</h2>
<p>Iran does not appear to have been involved in the planning or execution of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Indeed, United States intelligence reported Tehran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/initial-us-intelligence-shows-hamas-attack-surprised-iranian-leaders-ny-times-2023-10-11/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Oct%2011%20(Reuters),U.S.%20sources%20said%20on%20Wednesday.">was surprised</a> by events. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, as the Gaza war continues, Iran is playing an important role. Tehran provides Hamas with rhetorical support and indirect military backing through the other members of the Axis of Resistance. While not tilting the balance of power in Gaza, this has signalled to the West and Israel that the campaign against Hamas will have a cost, particularly if it escalates. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">There have been almost daily</a> skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense Forces on the Lebanese border. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have launched more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-strikes-targets-iraq-after-us-forces-wounded-officials-2024-01-23/">150 attacks</a> against American military installations, and the pro-Iranian Houthis in Yemen have launched ballistic missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nevertheless, Tehran’s message that it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">does not intend to get directly involved</a> in the fighting has been relayed directly to Hamas by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/is-saudi-arabia-relaying-us-messages-to-iran">and to the U.S. privately through intermediaries</a>.</p>
<p>Tehran’s stance is evident in the particular way military force has been employed. Hezbollah’s attacks have been limited in size and restricted to the area around the Lebanese border — significant enough to indicate support for Hamas, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">but not threatening enough</a> to justify Israel opening a second front. </p>
<p>Similarly in Iraq, the attacks have been relatively small. The strike against the Al-Asad air base in Iraq was <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">described by the Pentagon</a> as one of the largest yet, but the result was some damage to non-critical facilities and no fatalities. The U.S. retaliated with strikes of its own, but repeated the same mantra as Tehran; it did not want the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">fighting to escalate.</a> </p>
<h2>Houthis active</h2>
<p>The most active of Iran’s proxies has been, surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">Houthis in Yemen, who say that they will blockade the Red Sea until the Israelis cease military operations in Gaza</a>. By some estimates, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2024/01/28/most-surveyed-companies-are-vulnerable-to-another-supply-chain-crisis/?sh=5c94fd391bd1">90 per cent of container shipping has been diverted</a>, leading to higher prices and fractured supply lines. </p>
<p>Their attacks on shipping have provoked a series of missile and airstrikes from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-helped-plan-but-didnt-have-assets-to-participate-in-u-s-u-k-strikes-against-houthis">with Canada playing a supporting role</a>. </p>
<p>While provocative, the risk for Tehran in this area is far less than it would be on the Lebanese border, where Israel would likely respond with a ground invasion.</p>
<p>A major conflict between Hezbollah and Israel <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">would be devastating</a> and unpredictable. It would put Iran’s main regional ally in jeopardy and could create conditions that would prompt Washington to attack Iran directly.</p>
<p>There’s little chance, however, of a ground invasion in Yemen, where the airstrikes appear <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/saudi-arabias-balancing-act-amid-strikes-yemens-houthis">to be bolstering</a> the popularity of the Houthi leadership.</p>
<h2>On the sidelines</h2>
<p>It’s not difficult to understand why Tehran has chosen to straddle the fence between supporting Hamas and standing on the sidelines. </p>
<p>If Iran was to remain passive while Gaza is flattened by Israel, it would lose credibility. This would cost Tehran in terms of regional influence and undermine an alliance network essential to its ability to deter the U.S. and Israel. </p>
<p>A certain degree of conflict is also in Iran’s interest. Popular support for the Axis of Resistance has increased across the region, and the trend toward Israeli-Arab normalization is on hold for the foreseeable future. At the same time, though, Iran potentially has a lot to lose.</p>
<p>Iran has grown into a formidable military power, but its military, nuclear and economic infrastructure remain vulnerable to U.S.-Israeli military strikes. </p>
<p>The regime may also be politically vulnerable at home. <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/iranians-differ-widely-with-their-leaders-over-the-war-between-israel-and-hamas/">It is unlikely</a> the Iranian public would support a war to liberate Palestine, and given the recent anti-hijab protests and several years of simmering domestic unrest, it can no longer be taken for granted that U.S. military strikes would cause Iranians to rally around the flag.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-protesters-are-making-demands-in-charters-and-bills-of-rights-201543">Iranian protesters are making demands in charters and bills of rights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Maintaining the balance</h2>
<p>Iran’s strategy is designed to strike a balance between these two concerns, but there are a number of things that could go wrong. </p>
<p>For one, Iran cannot control how its opponents respond. In Syria, Israel raised the stakes by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/world/middleeast/iran-military-official-israel-syria.html">assassinating a high ranking member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard thought to be involved in arms transfers to Hezbollah</a>. </p>
<p>Compelled to reply directly, Iran was only able to avoid a confrontation with Israel <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-ballistic-missiles-rock-iraqi-kurdistan">by striking targets in Iraq it claimed were associated with the Israeli Mossad</a>.</p>
<p>Even within the Axis of Resistance, the lines of command and control are imprecise. Iran’s allies have their own agendas and their own ideas about how much force to use. </p>
<p>The recent drone attack in Jordan is a case in point. Although the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a loose group of pro-Iranian militias — has claimed responsibility, the U.S. is holding Iran accountable. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-jordan-attack-iran-1.7098603">still seems reluctant to target Iran directly</a>, but the attack has ratcheted tensions up significantly. </p>
<p>It is also possible that Iran’s leadership will simply overplay its hand, particularly in the Red Sea. At a certain point, the West may lose patience with bombing Iran’s proxies and target the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Devine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Iran prefers to engage Israel through its proxies, but the risk of escalation makes this a dangerous strategy.
James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/222216
2024-01-29T22:32:52Z
2024-01-29T22:32:52Z
Drone attack on American troops risks widening Middle East conflict – and drawing in Iran-US tensions
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572013/original/file-20240129-17-78y39l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C3237%2C2183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jordanian and U.S. tanks take part in joint maneuvers in September 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jordanian-apc-and-us-tanks-take-part-in-the-eager-lion-news-photo/1243216092?adppopup=true">Khalil Mazraawi/AFP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A drone attack that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-strike-jordan-drone-attack/">killed three American troops</a> and wounded at least 34 more at a base in Jordan has increased fears of a widening conflict in the Middle East – and the possibility that the U.S. may be further drawn into the fighting.</em></p>
<p><em>President Joe Biden <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-american-service-members-killed-jordan-iran-5cb774fd835a558d840ae91263037489">vowed to respond</a> to the assault, blaming Iran-backed militias for the first U.S. military casualties in months of such strikes in the region.</em></p>
<p><em>But to what extent was Iran involved? And what happens next? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">expert on asymmetric warfare and militant groups in the Middle East</a>, to answer these and other questions.</em></p>
<h2>What do we know about the group that claimed responsibility?</h2>
<p>Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, which translates as the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claimed responsibility</a> for the drone attack. </p>
<p>However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is not a single group per se. Rather, it is a term used to describe an umbrella organization, which, since around 2020, has included various Iran-backed militias in the region.</p>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity – that is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>The collective is notorious for its staunch anti-U.S. posture <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-thwarts-drone-attack-its-troops-iraq-2023-10-18/">and dynamic military campaigns</a>, such as a recent <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-26-2024">two-day drone operation</a> targeting American forces at an Iraqi airbase.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition remains elusive.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What do they hope to achieve in attacking a US target?</h2>
<p>Iranian-backed militias have been <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-forces-attacked-least-160-times-middle-east-since-mid-october-sundays-drone-strike">intensifying attacks on U.S. forces in recent months</a> in response to American support for Israel in the Israel-Hamas conflict, and also to assert regional influence.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, Iranian-backed militias <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">have repeatedly struck</a> American military bases in Iraq and Syria, recently expanding their attacks to include northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border.</p>
<p>The deadly assault on Jan. 28 marks a significant escalation, though – it <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-29-24/index.html">is the first</a> instance during the Israel-Hamas war that American troops have been killed.</p>
<p><iframe id="uoUf8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uoUf8/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The attack in Jordan forms <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">part of a strategy</a> by Iranian-backed militias to counter Washington’s support for Israel in the Gaza conflict. But it is also aimed at advancing a wider goal of pushing U.S. forces out of the Middle East entirely. </p>
<p>By coordinating attacks under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, these groups are trying to display a unified stance against U.S. interests and policy, showcasing their collective strength and strategic alignment across the region.</p>
<h2>What role did Iran have in the attack?</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the drone strike.</p>
<p>But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports.</p>
<p>Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, has <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">provided such militias</a> with money, weapons and training. However, the extent of Iran’s command and coordination in specific incidents like the Jordan attack remains unclear. At this stage, more concrete evidence is necessary to firmly implicate Iran.</p>
<p>As Iran expert <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> and I recently explained in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">article for The Conversation</a>, Iran’s strategy in the region involves supporting and funding militia groups while granting them a degree of autonomy.</p>
<p>By doing so, Iran maintains plausible deniability when it comes to attacks carried out by its proxies.</p>
<p>So while Iran’s direct involvement in the attack has not been definitively established, Tehran’s long-standing support of groups like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is well documented, playing a significant role in the regional conflict dynamics and geopolitical strategies.</p>
<h2>What options does the US have to respond?</h2>
<p>It isn’t clear how the U.S. intends to respond to the attack. The Biden administration faces complex dynamics when it comes to responding to attacks linked to Iranian-backed militias.</p>
<p>While a forceful military strike is an option that the Biden administration <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/3-american-troops-killed-25-injured-attack-jordan-base-near-syria-border">appears to be looking at</a>, targeting Iran directly on its own soil is fraught with risks and may be seen as a step too far.</p>
<p>Even when targeting Iranian interests or personnel, such as the assassination of Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, the U.S <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">has conducted</a> these actions outside Iranian territory.</p>
<p>Iran’s denial of direct involvement in the attack further complicates the situation and makes it less likely that the U.S. attacks Iran in retaliatory strikes.</p>
<p>But adopting a targeted approach, such as striking militia leaders outside of Iran, raises questions about the effectiveness of U.S. tactics in deterring Iran and its proxies. </p>
<p>This strategy has been employed in the past, yet it has not significantly curbed Iran’s or its proxies’ aggressive actions. The concern is that while such strikes are precise, they may not be enough to deter ongoing or future attacks. </p>
<p>The key to the strategy’s success may rest in identifying the most influential factors, or “centers of gravity,” that can effectively influence Iran’s behavior. This means determining key leaders, critical infrastructure or economic assets, which, if killed, destroyed or seized, could substantially alter Iran’s decision-making or operational capabilities.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s need to balance a strong response with the geopolitical consequences highlights the difficulties of navigating a tense and evolving situation.</p>
<h2>How might the attack affect the wider Middle East conflict?</h2>
<p>How the U.S. responds could reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape and influence the dynamics of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">proxy warfare in the region</a>. </p>
<p>A strong military response from Washington might deter Iranian-backed militias from future attacks, but it could also provoke them into taking more aggressive actions. </p>
<p>In the short term, any U.S. retaliation – especially if it targets Iranian interests directly – could escalate tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It could also exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict.</p>
<p>And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Three American troops were killed and dozens more injured in an attack on a base in Jordan. How the Biden administration responds could determine if conflict in the Middle East widens.
Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/216142
2023-11-01T14:00:17Z
2023-11-01T14:00:17Z
Gaza bombing adds to the generations of Palestinians displaced from their homes
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556655/original/file-20231030-29-emhiqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C20%2C6689%2C4446&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children sitting near their home at al-Shati camp for Palestinian refugees in the central Gaza Strip on June 20, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/girl-carries-a-young-child-near-their-home-at-al-shati-camp-news-photo/1221111213?adppopup=true">Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-16">estimated 1.4 million Palestinians</a> have been displaced from their homes since the Israeli military <a href="https://apnews.com/world-news/mapping-out-the-israel-hamas-war-0000018b286cd98aa18bea7efbdb0000">began bombing the Gaza Strip</a> on Oct. 8, 2023, in retaliation for a surprise attack by Hamas militants. Many of these Palestinians have sought refuge in United Nations emergency shelters in a situation <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/21-10-2023-joint-statement-by-undp--unfpa--unicef--wfp-and-who-on-humanitarian-supplies-crossing-into-gaza">the World Health Organization has described as “catastrophic</a>.” </p>
<p>With shelters running out of adequate access to water, food, electricity and other critical supplies, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142652">humanitarian agencies are deeply concerned</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/29/palestinians-break-into-gaza-un-aid-warehouses-in-a-sign-of-desperation">fear a total breakdown in order</a>. </p>
<p>While the current refugee crisis in Gaza has raised global concern over Palestinian displacement, this is not the first time Palestinians have endured the hardships of forced migration. Long before the latest upheaval, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/22188/palestinian-refugees-gaza-strip-1948-1967">Palestinians who today live in Gaza</a> and <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work">throughout the Middle East</a> were forced from or fled their homes in what became the state of Israel. Today, they number about <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/palestinian-refugees-dispossession#">5.9 million refugees</a>, <a href="https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_InterPopDay2022E.pdf">almost half of the entire global Palestinian population</a>.</p>
<p>Over the past 20 years, <a href="https://www.memphis.edu/anthropology/people/michael_perez.php">my research</a> as an anthropologist has focused on the situation of Palestinian displacement in the Middle East. Having studied some of the daunting challenges millions of Palestinians face as stateless refugees denied the ability to <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194">return to their homeland or the right of compensation</a>, I believe it is critical to understand their history and what is at stake for those trapped in indefinite exile. </p>
<h2>Fear, violence and exodus: the Nakba of 1948</h2>
<p>The majority of Palestinian refugees today receive aid from the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/">United Nations Relief and Works Agency</a>, or UNRWA. Dispersed throughout the region, including in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">occupied Palestinian territories</a>, about <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees">one-third of all Palestinian refugees live in UNRWA refugee camps</a>, while the remainder live in surrounding cities and towns. </p>
<p>The origins of Palestinian displacement are ongoing and cannot be reduced to a single cause. Most Palestinian refugees, however, can trace their roots to two significant events in Palestinian history: The “Nakba” and the “Naksa.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large number of people, some holding their luggage, as they try to flee." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556658/original/file-20231030-29-v96jhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1948 Palestinian exodus, known in Arabic as Al Nakba, or the ‘catastrophe.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-1948-palestinian-exodus-known-in-arabic-as-the-nakba-news-photo/1354487454?adppopup=true">History/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=u5oHFei_GuMC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">principal event in modern Palestinian history and memory</a> is the Nakba, or what is roughly translated into <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/about-the-nakba/">the “catastrophe</a>.” The term refers to the mass displacement of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136662">approximately 700,000 Palestinians</a> during the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=oi8cmbTa6qMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=palestine+war+history&ots=pCKeM1Nzzj&sig=2lbV5e979b4VYA_-NqOhcfNXdPQ#v=onepage&q=palestine%20war%20history&f=false">Arab-Israeli War of 1948</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-189917/">creation of the state of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>The majority of Palestine’s Arab population fled their homes during the war, seeking temporary refuge across the Middle East but <a href="https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/E147494750800019X">hoping to return</a> after hostilities ceased. </p>
<p>The mass exodus of Palestinians in 1948 resulted in two realities that have marked the region since. The first involved about <a href="https://cris.huji.ac.il/en/publications/the-state-of-israel-versus-the-palestinian-internal-refugees">25,000 Palestinians displaced within the boundaries of what became Israel</a>. Known as <a href="https://mada-research.org/storage/uploads/2020/06/english.indd_.pdf#page=26">internally displaced Palestinians</a>, this community did not cross any official border and thus never received refugee status under international law. Instead, they became Israeli citizens, distinguished by their legal designation in Israel as “<a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1648031">present absentees</a>.”</p>
<p>Through the <a href="https://www.jerusalemstory.com/en/article/how-israel-applies-absentees-property-law-confiscate-palestinian-property-jerusalem">Absentee Property Law</a> the Israeli state proceeded <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestinian-absentees-property-law-eviction-homes-explained">to confiscate displaced Palestinians’ properties</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/02/qa-israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-cruel-system-of-domination-and-crime-against-humanity/">deny their right to return to the homes and villages of their birth</a>.</p>
<p>The second event involved over 700,000 Palestinians who fled beyond what became the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54116567">de facto borders of Israel</a> and <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are">acquired formal refugee status under the United Nations</a>. This group of refugees sought shelter in <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/atlas2019/">areas of Palestine unconquered by Jewish forces</a>, like Nablus and Jenin, and in neighboring states, including Jordan, Syria, Lebanon <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/sustainable-livelihoods/elabed">and Egypt</a>. </p>
<p>Immediately following their displacement, these Palestinians were subject to ad hoc support from <a href="https://www.quakersintheworld.org/quakers-in-action/216">various international organizations</a> until <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/general-assembly-resolution-302">the 1949 creation of the UNRWA</a>, which assumed official responsibility for the management of direct relief operations and <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work">refugee camp infrastructure throughout the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to providing education, health care and other services, including microfinancing and jobs training, the UNRWA has been supporting refugee camp improvement projects through <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/improving-conditions?program=42">road construction and home rehabilitation in the camps</a>. </p>
<h2>Refugees in Jordan, Egypt and Syria: the Naksa of 1967</h2>
<p>The second-largest displacement of Palestinians occurred in 1967 during <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/6/4/the-naksa-how-israel-occupied-the-whole-of-palestine-in-1967">the Israel-Arab war known to Palestinians as Al Naksa</a> or the “setback.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young barber getting a young child seated on a chair while several others wait." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556661/original/file-20231030-19-ylyj2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A local barbershop inside Al-Wehdat Palestinian refugee camp in Amman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/local-barber-shop-inside-al-wehdat-palestinian-refugee-camp-news-photo/1093054342?adppopup=true">Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fought between Israel on one side and Syria, Egypt and Jordan on the other, the war ended with <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/1967/wDhYMiAnidAC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=1967+war+israel&printsec=frontcover">Israel occupying territory in all three countries</a>, including the remaining areas of Palestine: the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During the war, approximately <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan">400,000 Palestinians were displaced from the West Bank and Gaza primarily to Jordan</a> and housed in one of six new UNRWA refugee camps. </p>
<p>Others found refuge in Egypt and Syria. More than a third of those Palestinians displaced in 1967 were already refugees from 1948 and thus suffered a second forced migration. Just as in 1948, when the 1967 war ended, the <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-abstract/36/3/6/53874/The-June-1967-War-and-the-Palestinian-Refugee">Israeli government blocked the return of any refugees</a> and proceeded to destroy several Palestinian villages in the occupied territory, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203061428/israel-west-bank-international-law-allan-gerson">including Emmaus, Yula and Beit Yuba</a>. After their destruction, these areas were leased to Jewish Israelis. </p>
<h2>Beyond Al-Nakba and Al-Naksa</h2>
<p>Although the tragedies of the Nakba and the Naksa turned the vast majority of Palestinians into refugees, numerous events since then have increased their number. One of the most significant causes of Palestinian displacement today is the Israeli practice of home demolitions. </p>
<p>Whether as a punitive measure or the result of a permit system that rights groups say <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/02/israels-system-of-apartheid/">systematically discriminates against Palestinians</a>, between <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition">2009 and 2023</a> the practice destroyed over 9,000 homes and left approximately 14,000 Palestinians homeless. </p>
<p>The further displacement of Palestinians has also resulted from regional wars involving neither Palestinians nor Israelis. Following the end of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990, <a href="https://www.badil.org/publications/al-majdal/issues/items/1355.html">over 300,000 Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait in</a> retaliation for support offered by the leading Palestinian national organization, the <a href="http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/palestine-liberation-organization/">Palestine Liberation Organization</a>, to Saddam Hussein. </p>
<p>Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/syria">over 120,000 Palestinian refugees have fled the country</a>, primarily to Turkey and Jordan, while another 200,000 have been internally displaced. More recently, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/israel-hamas-war/">the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip</a> has already internally <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142687">displaced over 1.4 million Palestinians</a>.</p>
<h2>Many refugees, many exiles</h2>
<p>Because Palestinians live under various governments in <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2538257">diverse circumstances</a>, no single experience can account for their experience of exile. In Jordan, for example, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2010.482911">where I have conducted research</a>, Palestinian refugees can be divided into numerous groups, each with its own set of opportunities and challenges.</p>
<p>There are Palestinians displaced in 1948 <a href="http://www.alawdaeu.prc.org.uk/index.php/en/palestine/refugees/582-">who became citizens</a> of Jordan but depend on UNRWA for basic services like education and health care. There are also <a href="https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/facpubs/169/">refugees displaced from the Gaza Strip in 1967</a> who lack citizenship and are thus deprived of certain civil and political rights. More recently, there are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2013/07/a-dog-has-more-freedom-palestinians-at-cyber-city-camp-for-refugees-from-syria/">Palestinians displaced from Syria</a> for whom movement and work opportunities have been severely restricted in Jordan.</p>
<p>Palestinians living beyond Jordan also face distinct circumstances. In the West Bank, <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank">approximately 900,000 Palestinian refugees</a> live under Israeli occupation, subject to a discriminatory system that <a href="https://www.btselem.org/apartheid">human rights organizations have called “apartheid</a>.” </p>
<p>Palestinian refugees in the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-power-gazas-islamist-secularist-democratic-authoritarians">Hamas-ruled</a> Gaza Strip, <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip">who today number around one-and-a-half million</a>, are currently living under a 16-year blockade established by Israel but supported by the Egyptian government. Since the closure began in 2007, restrictions on the import of goods, the movement of people and access to basic resources like electricity have produced dire conditions for Palestinians, including over <a href="https://unctad.org/press-material/prior-current-crisis-decades-long-blockade-hollowed-gazas-economy-leaving-80">45% unemployment</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/2021-gaza-emergency-food-security-assessment-following">food insecurity among 70% of households</a>. </p>
<p>Since 1948, Palestinians in Lebanon <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mde180052006en.pdf">have faced severe restrictions</a> in work, education and health. Treated as an unwanted population in the country, their presence has been a source of significant divisions in Lebanon and a factor in numerous conflicts, including the Lebanese Civil War and the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211709-16/palestinians-lebanon-status-ambiguity-insecurity-flux-rosemary-sayigh">War of Camps</a> between Syrian-backed militias and factions within the Palestinian Liberation Organization. </p>
<h2>Permanent exile or return?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Families, holding children in their arms, leave areas near the fighting in Gaza." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/556665/original/file-20231030-29-cj72h0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian families leave areas in Gaza on Oct. 24, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-with-kids-leave-the-area-for-safer-spots-as-news-photo/1742046372?adppopup=true">Ashraf Amra/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Palestinian refugees represent <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136662">the longest protracted refugee situation</a> in modern history. For 75 years now, they have been forced to live as a <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/palestine/shiblak.pdf">stateless population</a> without the ability to return to their homeland. </p>
<p>The duration of their predicament is undoubtedly tied to the uniqueness of their displacement. Palestinians fled a homeland that became the state of another population, in this case Jewish, whose leaders <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/05/israels-refusal-to-grant-palestinian-refugees-right-to-return-has-fuelled-seven-decades-of-suffering/">treat the return of Palestinians as a demographic threat</a>. </p>
<p>Any solution to Palestinian displacement that involves returning to territory in contemporary Israel thus faces the problem of overcoming the idea of Israel as an exclusively Jewish state. And yet that is the challenge. Whatever peace negotiations may bring, no permanent solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2023/06/right-return-palestinian-refugees-must-be-prioritised-over-political">can avoid answering the question of return</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216142/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Vicente Perez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A scholar who has studied Palestinian refugees for 20 years explains the history of their displacement and the stakes involved for those living in an indefinite exile.
Michael Vicente Perez, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Memphis
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/215852
2023-10-23T18:35:09Z
2023-10-23T18:35:09Z
The Israel-Hamas war deepens the struggle between US and Iran for influence in the Middle East
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554866/original/file-20231019-22-45pt1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranians stage a rally outside the former U.S. embassy in Tehran in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pro-regime-iranians-stage-a-rally-outside-the-former-us-news-photo/1244484898?adppopup=true">Contributor#072019/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Israel readies for a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-b084e9c453cc99f7bec6f66d7b5913d9">ground invasion of Gaza</a>, and Palestinian and Israeli civilian deaths continue to mount, a broader struggle for influence continues in the Middle East between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has long played an important leadership role in the Middle East. American influence has hinged on <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-power-and-influence-middle-east-part-one">maintaining close ties</a> to diverse allies, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>And since the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, Iran’s leaders have sought to boost their regional influence and secure their domestic position in power by <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">undermining America’s relationships</a> in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/battle_lines/">built its own regional network</a>, composed largely of Shia Muslim entities, including Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Iran also has long <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">supported Hamas</a>, a Sunni Islamist movement and U.S.-designated terrorist group that controls Gaza. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/iran-israel-and-war-in-the-middle-east/">Like Iran</a>, Hamas is committed to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">destruction of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/john-ciorciari">scholar of international politics</a>, I am interested in how this rivalry between the U.S. and Iran has evolved and how this war may affect it. </p>
<p>The long-standing Israel-Palestinian dispute is central to Iran’s regional strategy, which aims to drive a wedge between Israel and its neighbors and complicate U.S. relations throughout the Arab world. So far, the Israel-Hamas war appears to be having precisely those effects.</p>
<h2>Iran’s role in the Gaza war</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hamas-attacks.html">denied direct involvement</a> in Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, atrocities in Israel, in which Hamas fighters <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed about 1,400 people</a> and kidnapped more than 200. </p>
<p>U.S. officials and others have said that it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/">is too soon to determine</a> Iran’s exact role in the violence. </p>
<p>Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/18/israel-hamas-war-how-iran-could-spread-gaza-conflict-through-middle-east/76d4e006-6dcf-11ee-b01a-f593caa04363_story.html">applauded the attacks</a>. </p>
<p>He has called Israel’s ensuing assault on Gaza “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-israeli-officials-should-face-trial-their-crimes-2023-10-17/">a genocide</a>,” as <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">Palestinian casualties</a> generate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/gaza-hospital-al-ahli-al-arabi-blast-explosion-protests-demonstrations-middle-east">large protests</a> against the Israeli offensive throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>Israeli strikes on Gaza since Oct. 7 have <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed more than 3,780 people</a>, according to the United Nations. </p>
<p>Iran has also threatened “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/iran-warns-of-preemptive-action-against-israel-amid-gaza-war">preemptive</a>” action against Israel if it continues its offensive. </p>
<p>Israel and Hezbollah are now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/hezbollah-lebanon-israel-explained.html">exchanging daily artillery and rocket fire</a>. Israel has drawn a buffer zone near its border with Lebanon and has begun <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiEn_Ga_4SCAxVwlokEHVVMCQ4QvOMEKAB6BAgREAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Fisrael-evacuate-residents-town-near-lebanon-border-after-flare-up-2023-10-20%2F&usg=AOvVaw1k3eGVpjw_jNIskM4HpFmI&opi=89978449">evacuating its citizens</a> there. </p>
<p>Israel also has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67093081">bombed key airports</a> in Syria, its longtime adversary, which also has strong ties to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>These actions bring Israel, one of America’s closest allies, perilously closer to a wider war with a coalition backed by Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men stand on a city street with a police car nearby and burn a drawn Israeli flag. Behind them is a large billboard of a man with a white beard and black hat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian demonstrators burn an Israeli flag in Tehran on Oct. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tehran-iran-in-the-aftermath-of-the-bombing-of-gazas-al-news-photo/1734088645?adppopup=true">Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran’s push for regional clout</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, Iran has looked to grow its regional influence while exploiting the differences between the U.S. and Israel.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">helped build Hezbollah</a> in the early 1980s, backing deadly <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1696242955-iranian-official-admitting-tie-to-beirut-1983-attack-breaks-decades-of-denial">1983 attacks</a> on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. </p>
<p>In Iraq, Tehran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-iraq">built influence</a> by affiliating itself with friendly Shiite groups following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was one of Iran’s top rivals. </p>
<p>In Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have helped the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/">Assad regime gain an upper hand</a> in the country’s ongoing civil war by giving the government weapons, intelligence and troops.</p>
<p>And in Yemen, Iran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">backed Shiite rebel groups</a> that are fighting the government, which is in turn supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>Iran’s support for Palestinian militants</h2>
<p>In the Palestinian territories, meanwhile, Iran has supported militant groups since the 1980s. By the early 1990s, Iranian forces and Hezbollah were <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism">training Hamas fighters</a> in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Iran boosted aid to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjI4vOj_4SCAxWSl4kEHZ58DCkQFnoECCUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Firanprimer.usip.org%2Fresource%2Firan-and-palestinians&usg=AOvVaw2tFw0DL41km7oV3K1act-j&opi=89978449">Hamas during the Second Intifada</a>, a violent Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, and again after a 2006 election victory brought Hamas to power in Gaza. Iran <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GazaCrisis_ENG-151-157.pdf">also gave weapons and money</a> to Hamas during its 2008-09 and 2014 armed conflicts with Israel. </p>
<p>Recurrent fighting in Gaza has helped keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict salient in Middle Eastern politics. This fighting and tension has advanced Iran’s aims of undermining U.S. and Israeli ties with Iran’s Arab rivals, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The United States therefore scored a major diplomatic victory by brokering the 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>, in which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to have diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Iran announced it made a deal to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal">restore diplomatic relations</a> with Saudi Arabia in March 2023, seven years after they broke ties. </p>
<p>After this announcement, U.S. officials tried to make a deal to formalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – an agreement that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13/">Gaza war has put on ice</a>. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-is-the-only-one-likely-to-benefit-from-hamas-attack-on-israel/">speculated that Iran</a> may have encouraged Hamas to attack Israel precisely for this reason. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Joe Biden sits next to Benjamin Netanyahu, behind a row of Israel and US flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-listens-to-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/1730656163?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The diplomatic challenge ahead</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war poses serious diplomatic challenges for the U.S. </p>
<p>Israel’s bombing, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/israel-security-officials-signal-readiness-for-ground-offensive-into-gaza">threatened ground invasion</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/israel-says-it-wont-block-humanitarian-aid-entering-gaza-from-egypt">restrictions of aid to Gaza</a> have energized its enemies and created additional tensions with its partners. </p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called the Israeli assault a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israeli-siege-and-bombing-of-gaza-a-massacre">massacre</a>.” Qatar has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231007-qatar-holds-israel-responsible-for-escalation-in-gaza/">blamed Israel</a> for the violence, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Israel’s campaign amounts to “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sissi-says-israeli-gaza-campaign-has-gone-beyond-right-to-self-defense/">collective punishment</a>” of the people of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Preventing a wider war</h2>
<p>Fraying diplomatic ties among some partners became even more apparent after Hamas accused Israel of the Oct. 17 explosion outside a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/middleeast/gaza-hospital-israel-hamas-explained.html">Gaza hospital</a>. Although Israel and the U.S. have maintained that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-hospital-blast-what-we-know-about-explosion-2023-10-18/">Palestinians caused the explosion,</a>, possibly in error, anti-Israel demonstrations quickly swept across the Middle East. </p>
<p>Shortly before President Joe Biden arrived in Israel for a regional visit on Oct. 18, Jordan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-cancels-summit-with-biden-egyptian-leader-amman-2023-10-17/">canceled his planned summit</a> with el-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. </p>
<p>The Biden administration has tried to balance strong support for Israel with a message of restraint.</p>
<p>During his visit to Israel, Biden defended Israel’s right to respond to protect its borders and people and tried to deter Iran and others from expanding the war. At the same time, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/joe-biden-urges-israel-not-be-consumed-by-rage-pledges-support-netanyahu-gaza-hamas">pressed Israel</a> to follow the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwir-5vN_4SCAxUUvokEHTspDo0QFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fhow-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493&usg=AOvVaw2gJZ_OA0_IsqEijkwTksSG&opi=89978449">laws of war</a>, and he secured an Israeli agreement to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/20/1207370235/israel-rafah-border-crossing-gaza-humanitarian-aid">allow some aid</a> into Gaza through Egypt. The Egypt-Gaza border crossing opened to allowed some <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-captives-border-aid-f5976ed58ba508f14d45b72b428125ac">bottled war and medical supplies in to Gaza</a> on Oct. 21. </p>
<p>Despite tension and anger across the region, the Biden administration’s effort to deter Iran and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67128900">prevent a wider war</a> aligns with the priorities of most Arab governments, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/the-arabs-forlorn-envy-of-iranians.html">fear Tehran</a> and its allies are deeply wary about domestic and regional stability. </p>
<p>Perceptions that Tehran is causing escalation and regional instability could push other nations back toward Washington. Pressing for Israeli restraint may be the key both to mitigating the humanitarian crisis and to preventing Iran from emerging a winner from the war in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Ciorciari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Iran’s long-term strategy includes eradicating Israel and driving a wedge between Israel and its regional neighbors. So far, the war seems to be accomplishing that goal.
John Ciorciari, Professor of Public Policy, University of Michigan
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/214719
2023-10-04T19:05:09Z
2023-10-04T19:05:09Z
New path for early human migrations through a once-lush Arabia contradicts a single ‘out of Africa’ origin
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551581/original/file-20231002-21-9nvrqz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C10%2C3456%2C2286&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A general view of Wadi Gharandal riverine wetland, along the Jordan Rift Valley, showing palm trees concentrated at the centre of the wadi near the active spring.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmoud Abbas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Our species, <em>Homo sapiens</em>, migrated out of Africa multiple times – reaching the Levant and Arabia between 130,000 and 70,000 years ago, as exemplified by human fossils and archaeological sites found at various locations. </p>
<p>Little is known, however, about the pathways of these migrations. In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.adi6838">study</a> published today in Science Advances, we find the now inhospitable and hyper-arid zone of the southern Jordan Rift Valley was frequently lush and well-watered in the past. </p>
<p>Our evidence suggests this valley had a riverine and wetland zone that would have provided ideal passage for hunter-gatherers as they moved out of Africa and deep into the Levant and Arabia.</p>
<h2>Wandering out of Africa</h2>
<p>Researchers hypothesise humans migrating <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277379116301494">out of Africa</a> would have used platforms in the eastern Sahara, the Nile River Valley, or the margins of the western Red Sea. </p>
<p>From there, these small bands of hunter-gatherers would have passed into the Sinai – a land bridge connecting Africa with the rest of Asia – following migrating animals and hunting a variety of them for sustenance. </p>
<p>For many of these hunter-gatherers, the next stop on the journey would have been the southern portion of the Jordan Rift Valley. This valley is situated in a strategic zone, with the Dead Sea to the north and the Gulf of Aqaba in the south. </p>
<p>Our field work was concentrated on three sites. The first two were <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344122987_A_wetland_oasis_at_Wadi_Gharandal_spanning_125-70_ka_on_the_human_migration_trail_in_southern_Jordan">Wadi Gharandal</a> and an area near the village of Gregra – both in the valley itself. The third site, <a href="https://livinginjordanasexpat.com/2019/08/21/hiking-wadi-al-hasa-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7/">Wadi Hasa</a>, is located in the more elevated areas of the Jordan plateau. </p>
<p>“Wadi” is an Arabic word describing a temporary riverbed that only contains water during heavy rains.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=691&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=691&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551922/original/file-20231003-21-di5gym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=691&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">We researched three sites, including two wadis and an area near a village called Gregra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmoud Abbas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When Arabia was a verdant land</h2>
<p>Our goal was to reconstruct the region’s past environmental settings by accurately dating various sections of sediment. We used a technique called luminescence dating to estimate how long sediment grains had been shielded from sunlight, thereby allowing us to calculate how old they were.</p>
<p>Our findings from sedimentary sections ranging 5 to 12 metres in thickness showed ecosystem fluctuations over time, including cycles of dry and humid environments. We also found evidence for the presence of ancient rivers and wetlands.</p>
<p>Luminescence dating showed the sedimentary environments formed between 125,000 and 43,000 years ago, suggesting there had been multiple wet intervals.</p>
<p>At Wadi Gharandal, our team recovered three stone tools associated with a wetland environment. Two of these were made using the <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-47829-6_391-1">Levallois method</a> – a characteristic manufacturing technique known to have been used by both Neanderthals and <em>Homo sapiens</em>. We dated the tools to 84,000 years ago. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551928/original/file-20231004-29-i2gfqe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">We collected samples for luminescence dating from the Wadi Hasa area in West Jordan. Pictured are Mahmoud Abbas, Mohammed Alqudah and Yuansen Lai.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zhongping Lai/Shantou University</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Collectively, our fieldwork in the Jordan Rift Valley demonstrates the valley once functioned as a 360-kilometre-long freshwater corridor that helped funnel humans northward into Western Asia and southward into the Arabian Peninsula. </p>
<p>Further evidence for a northward expansion comes from the famous <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skhul_and_Qafzeh_hominins">Skhul and Qafzeh</a> cave sites in Israel. Fossils of <em>Homo sapiens</em> and Levallois stone tools have been found here. </p>
<p>Towards the south, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03863-;y">fieldwork</a> in northern Saudi Arabia has also demonstrated a network of rivers and lakes was once present in the region. This allowed humans to penetrate a green Nefud Desert replete with savannahs and grassland.</p>
<p>In the heart of the Nefud, the lakeside site of Al Wusta has produced a <a href="https://theconversation.com/our-fossil-finger-discovery-points-to-earlier-human-migration-in-arabia-94670">human fossil and Levallois stone tools</a> dating to 85,000 years ago. These dates coincide with the 84,000-year-old Levallois stone tools found at Wadi Gharandal. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/major-new-research-claims-smaller-brained-homo-naledi-made-rock-art-and-buried-the-dead-but-the-evidence-is-lacking-207000">Major new research claims smaller-brained _Homo naledi_ made rock art and buried the dead. But the evidence is lacking</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Multiple migrations into South-West Asia</h2>
<p>Our findings from the Jordan Rift Valley indicate there were multiple early human migrations from Africa, and into Asia, during favourable conditions. This opposes the <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/almost-all-living-people-outside-africa-trace-back-single-migration-more-50000-years">theory of a single</a>, rapid wave of human movement out of Africa <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/global-human-journey/">60,000 years ago</a>. </p>
<p>Our results also suggest, together with the Levantine and Arabian evidence, that hunter-gatherers used inland river and wetland systems as they crossed South-West Asia. This contradicts a popular model <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18625005-200-humans-took-the-scenic-route-out-of-africa/">suggesting they mainly used</a> coastal routes as super-highways.</p>
<p>Although ancient DNA evidence indicates <em>Homo sapiens</em> interbred with Neanderthals and Denisovans multiple times as they spread into Asia, on-the-ground evidence for these encounters has generally been lacking. Our findings provide further evidence this area served as the ground for these encounters.</p>
<p>Yet numerous questions remain unanswered. Large swathes of territory in South-West Asia have not yet been surveyed or dated – and few fossils of our <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aai9067">ancestors have been found</a> to shore up arguments about how early humans really dispersed.</p>
<p>We’ll need to closely investigate more long-neglected areas such as the Jordan Rift Valley to accurately portray how humankind’s voyage out of Africa unfolded. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/research-reveals-humans-ventured-out-of-africa-repeatedly-as-early-as-400-000-years-ago-to-visit-the-rolling-grasslands-of-arabia-167050">Research reveals humans ventured out of Africa repeatedly as early as 400,000 years ago, to visit the rolling grasslands of Arabia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zhongping Lai receives funding from the China Natural Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahmoud Abbas and Michael Petraglia do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The findings reveal a close association between climatic conditions and early human migrations out of Africa.
Michael Petraglia, Director, Australian Research Centre for Human Evolution, Griffith University
Mahmoud Abbas, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute of Marine Sciences, Shantou University
Zhongping Lai, Professor, Institute of Marine Sciences, Shantou University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/197841
2023-01-18T17:02:06Z
2023-01-18T17:02:06Z
Desalination could give the Middle East water without damaging marine life – but it must be managed carefully
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504863/original/file-20230117-20-8ur47l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=48%2C0%2C5400%2C3581&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A saltier Red Sea could threaten its marine life. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/two-free-divers-swimming-over-vivid-222885136">Dudarev Mikhail/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than <a href="https://www.unwater.org/sites/default/files/app/uploads/2021/12/SDG-6-Summary-Progress-Update-2021_Version-July-2021a.pdf">2 billion people</a> live in <a href="https://www.unwater.org/water-facts/water-scarcity#:%7E:text=When%20a%20territory%20withdraws%2025%25%20or%20more%20of%20its%20renewable,UN%2DWater%202021">“water stressed”</a> countries. These are territories where more than 25% of the available freshwater resources are withdrawn for human use each year. </p>
<p>Desalination - the process of removing salt from seawater - is increasingly being used to tackle water scarcity worldwide. Roughly <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0048969718349167">16,000 desalination plants</a> now produce 35 trillion litres of freshwater annually. And Jordan, a country located north of the Red Sea, is <a href="https://jordantimes.com/news/local/water-ministry-launches-first-phase-aqaba-amman-water-conveyance-national-project">planning</a> a major desalination plant on the Gulf of Aqaba that will increase its desalination capacity from 4 billion to 350 billion litres each year. </p>
<p>But desalination tends to be energy intensive and produces saline wastewater called brine. On its return to the sea, brine can damage marine ecosystems. <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/desalination-breakthrough-saving-the-sea-from-salt/">Research</a> suggests that desalination may be making some water bodies, including the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean, saltier.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0011916421005932">We analysed</a> whether current and future desalination plans present a threat to salinity levels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. For both water bodies, the increase in salinity will likely be undetectable and less than natural seasonal variations, in which case it would not harm marine life.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/desalination-may-be-key-to-averting-global-water-shortage-but-it-will-take-time-189169">Desalination may be key to averting global water shortage, but it will take time</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An important marine habitat</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of the region surrounding the Red Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504665/original/file-20230116-26-tgjeta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Red Sea region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/red-sea-region-political-map-capitals-663310681">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Red Sea is connected to the Indian Ocean at its southern end via a narrow and shallow strait. The Gulf of Aqaba branches off its northern end and is connected to the Indian Ocean only through the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Neither water body has a freshwater inflow, so salinity levels are determined by evaporation and the inward and outward flow of water from the Indian Ocean. Water entering the Red Sea flows north where it evaporates and cools, raising its salinity and density. At the head of the Red Sea, this more saline water sinks and flows southwards as a deeper water layer back to the Indian Ocean. </p>
<p>Between where water enters the Red Sea and where salinity peaks at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba, salinity <a href="https://www.io-warnemuende.de/tl_files/forschung/meereswissenschaftliche-berichte/mebe50_2002_manasreh.pdf">rises naturally by 10%</a> from roughly 36.8 to 40.6 practical salinity units (psu). One psu is equivalent to 1g of salt dissolved in 1000g of water. Marine life in the region has adapted to the natural salinity level of their location. </p>
<p>Several <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/262">Unesco Natural Heritage Sites</a> are located in the northern Red Sea, including Sanganeb and Dungonab Bay and Mukkawar Island Marine National Parks. The national parks are home to coral reefs, seagrass beds, mudflats, mangroves and beaches. These habitats hold significant scientific and conservation value as they support a diverse range of marine species, including the endangered <a href="https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/dugong">dugong</a>. </p>
<p>Most marine species can tolerate minor variations in salinity, but they cannot withstand significant and sustained change. <a href="https://www.int-res.com/abstracts/meps/v181/p309-314/">Research</a> reveals that rates of photosynthesis and respiration in <em>Stylophora pistillata</em>, a species of Red Sea coral, falls by as much as 50% when salinity levels are raised from 38 psu to 40 psu. Most colonies of this coral will die if salinity is kept at this level for a sustained period. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A male dugong swimming along the sea floor alongside small yellow fish." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504865/original/file-20230117-20-5a68sl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sanganeb Marine National Park is home to the endangered dugong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/rare-big-dugong-male-sea-cow-2195272247">Ivanenko Vladimir/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Making the sea even saltier</h2>
<p>Our research used scenario analysis. This is where a number of plausible future scenarios are modelled and their consequences explored. </p>
<p>The most extreme scenario we developed involved high population growth, rapid economic development and falling desalination costs in the Middle East. Nearly 10 trillion litres of water could be desalinated on the Red Sea coast by 2050 and over 2.5 trillion litres along the Gulf of Aqaba in this case. </p>
<p>A less extreme scenario assumed limited population growth and restrained household water consumption. Nearly 2 trillion litres of water could be desalinated by the Red Sea and over 560 billion litres by the Gulf of Aqaba by 2050. </p>
<p>For both scenarios, salinity in the Red Sea increased by less than 0.1%. This increase would be less than the natural seasonal variation in salinity levels and would likely be undetectable. </p>
<p>The Gulf of Aqaba, however, is smaller and more isolated from the Indian Ocean. Salinity in the north of the Gulf therefore <a href="https://www.io-warnemuende.de/tl_files/forschung/meereswissenschaftliche-berichte/mebe50_2002_manasreh.pdf">varies naturally</a> between 40.2 psu and 40.75 psu. We found that the high growth scenario could increase salinity at the head of the Gulf by 0.5%, from approximately 40.6 psu to 40.8 psu. But even this increase is close to the maximum increase in salinity caused by natural variability. </p>
<p>The medium growth scenario would instead produce a change less than natural seasonal variation and would again be undetectable.</p>
<h2>Tackling water scarcity in the Middle East</h2>
<p>Our research suggests that, if carefully managed, rising rates of desalination may not harm the region’s marine ecosystems. This is particularly important as a considerable growth in desalination is likely to occur in the Middle East</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia plan to construct an entire new city in the country’s north west, called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neom">Neom</a>, to accommodate <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-says-zero-carbon-city-neom-will-likely-be-listed-2024-2022-07-25/">9 million people</a> and water intensive sectors like agriculture by 2045. The city will depend on water desalinated from the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/0kz5vEqdaSc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Neom will accomodate 9 million people by 2045.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beyond the vicinity of each desalination plant, increased rates of desalination are unlikely to affect broader salinity levels in the region. But <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0011916417307750">good plant design</a> and strict environmental regulations will remain critical to avoid environmental harm. </p>
<p>Plant outfalls, through which brine is channelled towards the sea, must ensure rapid dilution by dispersing brine into the Red Sea’s deeper water layer. Ocean currents can then carry the brine out to the Indian Ocean, where it will be further diluted. </p>
<p>Desalination will continue to grow worldwide. If carefully implemented it can be a crucial tool to tackle water scarcity without damaging fragile marine ecosystems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Jordan is planning a major desalination plant on the Gulf of Aqaba – but will it damage nearby marine ecosystems?
Jonathan Chenoweth, Senior Lecturer of Environment and Sustainability, University of Surrey
Raya A. Al-Masri, Researcher in Resources Governance and Sustainability, University of Surrey
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/179927
2022-07-15T12:18:33Z
2022-07-15T12:18:33Z
Young people in the Middle East struggle to see a promising future
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474159/original/file-20220714-35540-d5rtyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2835%2C1888&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mahdi Shaban, a Palestinian living in Gaza, paid for his master's degree with earnings from digging graves.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mahdi-shaban-who-completed-his-masters-degree-with-earnings-news-photo/1241050988">Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Middle East’s population is growing <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">almost twice as fast</a> as the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default">world overall</a>, and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">one-third of its people</a> are under the age of 15.</p>
<p>As Joe Biden takes his first trip to the region as president, he plans to focus on the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/13/biden-visit-saudi-arabia-mbs-israel-palestinians">prospects for peaceful international relations</a>. A key factor often overlooked is the Middle East’s lack of opportunities for young people.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has spent almost 20 years studying <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=GaXIwTYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">conflict, migration and youth in the Middle East</a>, I believe their frustration could ultimately lead to an international crisis way beyond the borders of the region. </p>
<h2>A rapidly changing situation</h2>
<p>The region encompassing the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena">Middle East and North Africa</a> is diverse economically, geographically, historically, politically and socially, and often fraught with tension. <a href="https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2021/04/24/learning-long-term-consequences-armed-conflict/">Most of the major</a> armed conflicts in the last decade have occurred there – apart, obviously, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/conflict-trends-middle-east-1989-2019">Since the pro-democracy protests and uprisings of the Arab Spring</a> in 2010, the region has experienced some sort of <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">significant conflict</a> in eight of its 21 countries: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. </p>
<p>In addition, the region’s population is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZQ">growing at a much faster rate</a> than the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?contextual=default&locations=ZQ">global average</a> – and has been since the World Bank began keeping records in 1961. Its people now number <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZQ">over 450 million</a>, up from 300 million in 2001.</p>
<h2>Widespread youth unemployment</h2>
<p>The region’s young workers – those from ages 15 to 24 – already struggle with the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ">highest unemployment rates</a> in the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/269640/youth-unemployment-rate-in-selected-world-regions/">world</a>, averaging 25%. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ&most_recent_value_desc=true">Thirteen</a> countries in the region have a youth unemployment rate of at least 20%, with the rate above 50% in Libya, above 40% in Jordan and Palestine, and above 30% in Algeria and Tunisia. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=ZQ">more young workers</a> are on the way.</p>
<p>The World Bank estimates that to provide employment for those currently out of a job and those who will soon be seeking work, Middle Eastern and North African nations need to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2018/11/13/fixing-the-education-crisis-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa">create more than 300 million new jobs</a> by 2050. This number is almost <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm">twice</a> as many jobs as are currently in the U.S.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man makes a coffee at a machine in the back of a small vehicle, while another man waits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474161/original/file-20220714-35540-t8pswp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Karrar Alaa, a 20-something Iraqi, could not find work, so he started his own small traveling coffee business in Basra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/iraqi-karrar-alaa-aged-26-sells-coffee-by-his-travelling-news-photo/977556546">Haidar Mohammed Ali/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economic struggles</h2>
<p>The struggle of high youth unemployment in the region is not a new challenge. Local and international governments and organizations have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">tried for years</a> to create more opportunities for young people, but with little success.</p>
<p>In many Middle Eastern nations, regulations and laws about hiring and firing workers <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discourage employers from creating new jobs</a> when times are good, for fear they’ll have to keep those people employed when times get worse again. Other rules <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">discriminate against young women</a> seeking work. Education and training programs <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm?id=186569">don’t always line up</a> with the jobs that are available. </p>
<p>In many countries, the government is the one of the largest employers. In Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, government jobs are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/vc061312">almost one-third</a> of all employment. In Egypt, government work accounts for 70% of nonagricultural jobs. In most countries, government jobs pay about 20% less than private industry, but in the Middle East, government jobs pay about 30% more on average. This means people will often just wait for a public sector job instead of taking available private sector jobs. </p>
<p>Even those young people who manage to get jobs say they often are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/youth-employment-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-revisiting-and-reframing-the-challenge/">searching for several years</a> before landing work. During this time, they rely on financial support from their families. This causes them to experience what has been called “<a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1087433">prolonged adolescence</a>,” in which they are unable to develop financial and social independence, such as moving out and getting married, until their 20s or even their 30s.</p>
<h2>Other compounding challenges</h2>
<p>The region faces other obstacles that make it even harder for governments to tackle youth unemployment.</p>
<p>In addition to <a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/06">internal conflict</a>, the International Monetary Fund reports that several of the region’s countries – including Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia – are facing a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2022/04/25/regional-economic-outlook-april-2022-middle-east-central-asia">slow economic recovery from the pandemic</a>, inflation in the costs of basic commodities such as energy and food, and financial and debt obligations needed to stabilize the economy.</p>
<p>Several countries across the region – including Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen – have <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/finding-the-balance-population-and-water-scarcity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">less water than their populations need</a>.</p>
<p>There are other <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/publication/environmental-challenges-middle-east-and-north-africa-region-paper">environmental concerns</a>, such as pollution, agriculture land scarcity and <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/49d6211b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/49d6211b-en">poor public infrastructure</a>, which hinder sustainable economic growth. </p>
<p>The crisis in Ukraine threatens food supplies. More than one-third of Egyptians’ diets are based on wheat, but <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">85% of Egypt’s wheat</a> comes from Russia and Ukraine. Supplies have been reduced, and <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-serious-food-security-threat-egypt">prices are expected to rise</a> on bread and other wheat-based staple foods.</p>
<p>All these problems have contributed to varying degrees of lack of public confidence in the economies in the region. For instance, <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/">in a nationally representative survey</a>, 78% of Iraqis describe the economic situation in their country to be either bad or very bad. In Yemen, that proportion is 68%.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-poses-a-serious-threat-to-egypt-the-worlds-largest-wheat-importer-179242">Russia-Ukraine crisis poses a serious threat to Egypt – the world’s largest wheat importer</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Potential effects</h2>
<p>Often the way to <a href="https://www.pesnetwork.eu/2019/09/05/lmb3-educational-attainment/">improve young people’s prospects</a> is education. But in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, university-educated young people have a <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2012/061312.htm">higher unemployment rate</a> than their less-educated peers because most of the available opportunities are for low-skill jobs.</p>
<p>Rather than bringing <a href="https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/data-on-display/education-matters.htm">higher earnings</a>, education for Middle Eastern young people <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2019/09/youth-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">can deliver frustration</a>.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise, then, that vast numbers of young people – <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/covid-19-survey/#data_sets">at least one-fourth</a> of young Egyptians, Iraqis and Yemenis, and more than <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/2022/04/what-lebanese-citizens-think-about-migration/">60% of Lebanese youth</a> – are looking to emigrate, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/libya-new-evidence-shows-refugees-and-migrants-trapped-in-horrific-cycle-of-abuses/">often to Europe</a>.</p>
<p>All these forces at work in the Middle East – economic pressures, political conflict and water shortages – have the potential to spread international tension, refugees seeking safety and opportunity, or even disease. The challenges facing Middle Eastern nations are all made more difficult by the lack of faith their young people have in the prospect of a fulfilling future at home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georges Naufal is a research fellow at the IZA Institute of Labor Economics and Economic Research Forum.
</span></em></p>
Political and economic forces across the Middle East and North Africa combine to mean well-educated young people spend years looking for work, which delays their independence and adulthood.
Georges Naufal, Associate Research Scientist, Public Policy Research Institute, Texas A&M University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/167678
2021-09-20T10:48:34Z
2021-09-20T10:48:34Z
A giant space rock demolished an ancient Middle Eastern city and everyone in it – possibly inspiring the Biblical story of Sodom
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421903/original/file-20210917-27-aguoxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C710%2C608&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Artist's evidence-based depiction of the blast, which had the power of 1,000 Hiroshimas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Allen West and Jennifer Rice</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the inhabitants of an ancient Middle Eastern city now called Tall el-Hammam went about their daily business one day about 3,600 years ago, they had no idea an unseen icy space rock was speeding toward them at about 38,000 mph (61,000 kph).</p>
<p>Flashing through the atmosphere, the rock exploded in a massive fireball about 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) above the ground. The blast was around 1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb. The shocked city dwellers who stared at it were blinded instantly. Air temperatures rapidly rose above 3,600 degrees Fahrenheit (2,000 degrees Celsius). Clothing and wood immediately burst into flames. Swords, spears, mudbricks and pottery began to melt. Almost immediately, the entire city was on fire.</p>
<p>Some seconds later, a massive shockwave smashed into the city. Moving at about 740 mph (1,200 kph), it was more powerful than the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tornado_records">worst tornado ever recorded</a>. The deadly winds ripped through the city, demolishing every building. They sheared off the top 40 feet (12 m) of the 4-story palace and blew the jumbled debris into the next valley. None of the 8,000 people or any animals within the city survived – their bodies were torn apart and their bones blasted into small fragments. </p>
<p>About a minute later, 14 miles (22 km) to the west of Tall el-Hammam, winds from the blast hit the biblical city of Jericho. Jericho’s walls came tumbling down and the city burned to the ground. </p>
<p>It all sounds like the climax of an edge-of-your-seat Hollywood disaster movie. How do we know that all of this actually happened near the Dead Sea in Jordan millennia ago? </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Satellite image showing the area with Tall el-Hammam about 7 miles (12 kilometers) northeast of the Dead Sea" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421905/original/file-20210917-31825-1drwpso.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Now called Tall el-Hammam, the city is located about 7 miles northeast of the Dead Sea in what is now Jordan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NASA</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Getting answers required nearly 15 years of painstaking excavations by hundreds of people. It also involved detailed analyses of excavated material by more than two dozen scientists in 10 states in the U.S., as well as Canada and the Czech Republic. When our group finally <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-97778-3">published the evidence</a> recently in the journal Scientific Reports, the 21 co-authors included archaeologists, geologists, geochemists, geomorphologists, mineralogists, paleobotanists, sedimentologists, cosmic-impact experts and medical doctors.</p>
<p>Here’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-97778-3">how we built up this picture</a> of devastation in the past.</p>
<h2>Firestorm throughout the city</h2>
<p>Years ago, when archaeologists looked out over excavations of the ruined city, they could see a dark, roughly 5-foot-thick (1.5 m) jumbled layer of charcoal, ash, melted mudbricks and melted pottery. It was obvious that an intense firestorm had destroyed this city long ago. This dark band came to be called the destruction layer.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Excavators stand in a dry landscape with ruins of ancient walls" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421904/original/file-20210917-48847-shp2wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Researchers stand near the ruins of ancient walls, with the destruction layer about midway down each exposed wall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Phil Silvia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>No one was exactly sure what had happened, but that layer wasn’t caused by a volcano, earthquake or warfare. None of them are capable of melting metal, mudbricks and pottery. </p>
<p>To figure out what could, our group used the <a href="https://impact.ese.ic.ac.uk/ImpactEarth/ImpactEffects/">Online Impact Calculator</a> to model scenarios that fit the evidence. Built by impact experts, this calculator allows researchers to estimate the many details of a cosmic impact event, based on known impact events and nuclear detonations.</p>
<p>It appears that the culprit at Tall el-Hammam was a small asteroid similar to the one that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1117/12.462399">knocked down 80 million trees</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/mystery-solved-meteorite-caused-tunguska-devastation-15154">in Tunguska, Russia in 1908</a>. It would have been a much smaller version of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-bad-news-for-dinosaurs-chicxulub-meteorite-impact-triggered-global-volcanic-eruptions-on-the-ocean-floor-91053">giant miles-wide rock that pushed the dinosaurs into extinction</a> 65 million ago.</p>
<p>We had a likely culprit. Now we needed proof of what happened that day at Tall el-Hammam.</p>
<h2>Finding ‘diamonds’ in the dirt</h2>
<p>Our research revealed a remarkably broad array of evidence.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="magnified images of tiny quartz grains" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=776&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=776&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421943/original/file-20210917-31825-1vbrfje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=776&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Electron microscope images of numerous small cracks in shocked quartz grains.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Allen West</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the site, there are finely fractured sand grains called shocked quartz that only form at 725,000 pounds per square inch of pressure (5 gigapascals) – imagine six <a href="https://man.fas.org/dod-101/sys/land/m1.htm">68-ton Abrams military tanks</a> stacked on your thumb.</p>
<p>The destruction layer also contains tiny <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/677046">diamonoids</a> that, as the name indicates, are as hard as diamonds. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/677046">Each one is smaller</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chroma.2016.08.056">than a flu virus</a>. It appears that wood and plants in the area were instantly turned into this diamond-like material by the fireball’s high pressures and temperatures.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421909/original/file-20210917-27-7y1o9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Diamonoids (center) inside a crater were formed by the fireball’s high temperatures and pressures on wood and plants.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Malcolm LeCompte</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Experiments with laboratory furnaces showed that the bubbled pottery and mudbricks at Tall el-Hammam liquefied at temperatures above 2,700 F (1,500 C). That’s hot enough to <a href="https://www.onlinemetals.com/en/melting-points">melt an automobile</a> within minutes.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="magnified view of spherical shapes" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=746&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=746&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421942/original/file-20210917-27-5s3b15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=746&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spherules made of melted sand (upper left), palace plaster (upper right) and melted metal (bottom two).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Malcolm LeCompte</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The destruction layer also contains tiny balls of melted material smaller than airborne dust particles. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1301760110">Called spherules</a>, they are made of vaporized iron and sand that melted at about 2,900 F (1,590 C).</p>
<p>In addition, the surfaces of the pottery and meltglass are speckled with tiny melted metallic grains, including iridium with a <a href="https://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/77/iridium">melting point of 4,435 F</a> (2,466 C), platinum that <a href="https://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/78/platinum">melts at 3,215 F</a> (1,768 C) and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zirconium(IV)_silicate">zirconium silicate at 2,800 F</a> (1,540 C).</p>
<p>Together, all this evidence shows that temperatures in the city rose higher than those of volcanoes, warfare and normal city fires. The only natural process left is a cosmic impact.</p>
<p>The same evidence is found at known impact sites, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/mystery-solved-meteorite-caused-tunguska-devastation-15154">Tunguska</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-bad-news-for-dinosaurs-chicxulub-meteorite-impact-triggered-global-volcanic-eruptions-on-the-ocean-floor-91053">Chicxulub crater</a>, created by the asteroid that triggered the dinosaur extinction.</p>
<p>One remaining puzzle is why the city and over 100 other area settlements were abandoned for several centuries after this devastation. It may be that high levels of salt deposited during the impact event made it impossible to grow crops. We’re not certain yet, but we think the explosion may have vaporized or splashed toxic levels of Dead Sea salt water across the valley. Without crops, no one could live in the valley for up to 600 years, until the minimal rainfall in this desert-like climate washed the salt out of the fields. </p>
<h2>Was there a surviving eyewitness to the blast?</h2>
<p>It’s possible that an oral description of the city’s destruction may have been handed down for generations until it was recorded as the story of Biblical Sodom. The Bible <a href="https://sarata.com/bible/chapter/Genesis.19.html#19:24">describes the devastation of an urban center</a> near the Dead Sea – <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke+17%3A28%E2%80%9330&version=NRSV">stones and fire fell from the sky</a>, more than one city was destroyed, thick smoke rose from the fires and city inhabitants were killed.</p>
<p>Could this be an ancient eyewitness account? If so, the destruction of Tall el-Hammam may be the second-oldest destruction of a human settlement by a cosmic impact event, after the village of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-60867-w">Abu Hureyra in Syria about 12,800 years ago</a>. Importantly, it may the first written record of such a catastrophic event.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 110,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The scary thing is, it almost certainly won’t be the last time a human city meets this fate.</p>
<figure>
<img src="https://d2pn8kiwq2w21t.cloudfront.net/images/imagesasteroid20180723main-animation-16.width-1320.gif">
<figcaption><span class="caption">Animation depicting the positions of known near-Earth objects at points in time for the 20 years ending in January 2018. <i>Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech</i></span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Tunguska-sized airbursts, such as the one that occurred at Tall el-Hammam, can devastate entire cities and regions, and they pose a severe modern-day hazard. As of September 2021, there are <a href="https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/stats/totals.html">more than 26,000 known near-Earth asteroids</a> and a hundred short-period near-Earth comets. One will inevitably crash into the Earth. Millions more remain undetected, and some may be headed toward the Earth now.</p>
<p>Unless orbiting or ground-based telescopes detect these rogue objects, the world may have no warning, just like the people of Tall el-Hammam.</p>
<p><em>This article was co-authored by research collaborators archaeologist <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Phillip-Silvia">Phil Silvia</a>, geophysicist <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Allen-West">Allen West</a>, geologist <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ted-Bunch-2">Ted Bunch</a> and space physicist <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Malcolm-Lecompte">Malcolm LeCompte</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher R. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
New research suggests that fire from the sky in the form of a small asteroid annihilated a city near the Dead Sea 3,600 years ago.
Christopher R. Moore, Archaeologist and Special Projects Director at the Savannah River Archaeological Research Program and South Carolina Institute for Archaeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/159952
2021-05-07T14:19:58Z
2021-05-07T14:19:58Z
Middle Eastern monarchies: how do Arab ruling families hold on to power?
<p>When the Jordanian royal family <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-56676274">gathered on April 11</a> to celebrate 100 years since the kingdom’s foundation, it was a picture of dynastic unity. Alongside King Abdullah was his half-brother, the former crown prince Hamzah bin al-Hussein, who had only days ago been placed under house arrest, following what was reported in the world’s press as a “<a href="https://www.vox.com/22367819/jordan-coup-attempt-arrest-abdullah-hamzah">coup attempt</a>”. The king <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/07/jordans-king-abdullah-describes-shock-and-pain-over-alleged-coup-plot">gave interviews</a> assuring the outside world that all was well and that the former heir to the Jordanian throne had offered him his loyalty.</p>
<p>In no other area of the world do royal families dominate politics as much as in the Middle East. Six of the states on the Arabian peninsula are monarchies, as are Jordan and Morocco. Royals not only rule in these states, but in most cases members of the royal family dominate positions of influence in government and business sectors.</p>
<p>This prevalence of absolute monarchies in the Middle East has puzzled scholars for decades. Many somewhat arrogantly assumed that these modes of governance would die out as the states <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Political-Order-in-Changing-Societies-Huntington/83e4d9716aa1000be3b26e14a2e51b3b5486c263?p2df">modernised</a> and “inevitably” followed the western model, becoming republics or embracing the constitutional monarchy model. Yet the monarchies have proved to be rather resilient. </p>
<p>During the seismic regional upheaval of the Arab Spring from 2010 onwards, a number of republics were convulsed by revolution. But, while several monarchies endured significant protests, none fell – and few really looked in mortal peril.</p>
<h2>How do the monarchies hold on?</h2>
<p>Investigating the roots of this resilience has engendered a <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2012/04/understanding-the-resilience-of-monarchy-during-the-arab-spring/">burst of scholarship</a>. Some scholars have argued that monarchies were culturally or otherwise locally attuned and fit simply into prevalent tribal heritages. Others suggested that monarchies are more effective at controlling opposition or that they oppress their way to relative stability.</p>
<p>But such explanations struggle to contend with the region’s history. Any sense of a special predilection in the Middle East for monarchy is <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/resilient-royals-how-arab-monarchies-hang-on/">undercut</a> by the reality that many monarchies have fallen in the past century or so, as in Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, North Yemen, South Arabia, Libya and Iran.</p>
<p>A more compelling explanation is likely to lie elsewhere. For the Gulf monarchies, it is difficult to get away from the transformative impact of gargantuan levels of hydrocarbon resources. </p>
<p>Wealth alone is far from a panacea – just ask citizens in Iraq, Iran, or Venezuela. But the careful and effective distribution of wealth has surely been a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/resilient-royals-how-arab-monarchies-hang-on/">critical factor</a> engendering comparative stability in the monarchies. Not only that, but all monarchies occupy important geostrategic locations. As such, they arguably benefit from the support of influential external states in maintaining the status quo – including the US in the case of the Gulf monarchies and Jordan, and France in the case of Morocco.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1346394765651275777"}"></div></p>
<p>The kings and emirs of these states are not elected, and criticising them or their position is usually a bright red line that citizens do not cross. Still, neither are they despots, and they rule with often a surprising degree of support from a range of constituencies. </p>
<p>Indeed, most royal elites created systems to place themselves at the apex of wealth or favour redistribution schemes that are baked into the state’s political economy. This means they have created strong and sometimes diverse groups of individuals and structures in society who continue to be dependent on the status quo from which they benefit.</p>
<p>These benefits vary from country to country. Monarchs in the Gulf have long overseen some of the world’s most generous <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2020/07/why-are-there-different-welfare-states-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">welfare state</a> systems, as well as low rates of taxation, sometimes explicit promises of jobs in the government sector, and a litany of subsidies. Similarly, in Jordan it has long been argued that elites used government handouts and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698157">patronage</a> to boost support in key tribal constituencies.</p>
<h2>Storing up problems</h2>
<p>This system has worked for decades, but is coming under <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/01/31/The-Future-of-Oil-and-Fiscal-Sustainability-in-the-GCC-Region-48934">increasing pressure</a>. Indeed, arguably the central problem that the monarchies face, albeit to varying degrees, is that their economies are classed as rentier economies. This means that, in reality, a comparatively small percentage of the populations are involved with making the majority of the state’s income, which tends to come from extractive industries (oil, gas, minerals) or international support.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Undated photo of Dubai's Princess Latifa, wearing western clothes with her head uncovered against a mixed background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398973/original/file-20210505-21-df4b5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Princess Latifa, the daughter of Dubai’s ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, recently said in a video recording she was being held captive by her family.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abaca Press / Alamy Stock Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The obvious issues here are that these resources are finite and subject to wildly shifting demand and prices. The influence of, for example, hydrocarbons on local economies is so pervasive that it tends to inhibit the emergence of an autonomous, functioning economy. Overall, this means that the state’s GDP <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/01/31/The-Future-of-Oil-and-Fiscal-Sustainability-in-the-GCC-Region-48934">lurches around</a> according to factors well beyond the control of the state, which has long played havoc with governments striving to set a sustainable, clear, long-term budget. </p>
<p>Diversifying these economies away from a reliance on these kinds of basic sources of income has been a goal for generations. The results show that states fail to meaningfully diversify unless they are forced to – and even when the wells run practically dry, they switch, like Bahrain, to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-economy-debt-idUSKBN22G1D7">relying</a> on other monarchies for financial support.</p>
<p>The recent elite spat and mini crisis in Jordan is arguably rooted in precisely these kinds of economic concerns. But, if recent reports are to be believed, the <a href="https://www.vox.com/22367819/jordan-coup-attempt-arrest-abdullah-hamzah">family squabble</a> has been resolved, order has been restored and – for the time being at least – the status quo appears to have survived.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B Roberts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Despite often seismic political upheavals over the years, most Middle Eastern royal families have been able to weather the storms.
David B Roberts, Associate Professor, School of Security Studies, King's College London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/157847
2021-04-12T12:27:47Z
2021-04-12T12:27:47Z
How many states and provinces are in the world?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391534/original/file-20210324-17-1y77u3i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C13%2C997%2C611&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are so many different states – and provinces, districts, regions and lander!</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/state-welcome-signs?agreements=pa:91269&family=creative">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/curious-kids-us-74795">Curious Kids</a> is a series for children of all ages. If you have a question you’d like an expert to answer, send it to <a href="mailto:curiouskidsus@theconversation.com">curiouskidsus@theconversation.com</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>How many states, or provinces or other divisions, are there in the world? – Noé, 8, Minneapolis</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>The exact answer is hard to come by – for now. Your question has actually sparked scholars to start talking about compiling an official, authoritative database.</p>
<p>Right now the best estimates land somewhere between 3,600 and 5,200, across the world’s roughly 200 nations. It depends on whether you collect <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_administrative_divisions_by_country">data from specific nations’ own information</a>, the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/administrative-divisions/">CIA World Factbook</a> or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-2">International Standards Organization</a>.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership">195 national governments recognized by the United Nations</a>, but there are as many as <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/administrative-divisions/">nine other places</a> with nationlike governments, including Taiwan and Kosovo, though they are not recognized by the U.N.</p>
<p>Most of these countries are divided into smaller sections, the way the U.S. is broken up into 50 states along with territories, like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>They are not all called “states,” though: Switzerland has cantons, Bangladesh has divisions, Cameroon has regions, Germany has lander, Jordan has governorates, Montserrat has parishes, Zambia has provinces, and Japan has prefectures – among many other names.</p>
<p><iframe id="lnmnT" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lnmnT/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Most countries have some type of major subdivision – even tiny Andorra, tucked in the Pyrenees Mountains between France and Spain, has seven parishes. <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/administrative-divisions/">Slovenia has the most, with 212</a>: 201 municipalities, called “obcine” in Slovenian, and 11 urban municipalities, called “mestne obcine.” </p>
<p>Singapore, Monaco and Vatican City, all small city-states, are the three nations that have what are called “unitary” governments that are not divided into smaller sections.</p>
<p>Dividing governing power between national and subnational levels is called “<a href="http://www.forumfed.org">federalism</a>.” It lets countries organize large areas of land and large numbers of people, handling different interests of diverse groups, often with different languages, religions and ethnic identities. </p>
<p>National governments still control international relations, military power and money and banking systems – things that affect everyone in a country equally. But states, provinces, cantons and the like let more local government groups have some amount of say over health care, education, policing and other issues where needs can vary substantially from one area to another.</p>
<p>Variations in laws and regulations benefit people in a couple of different ways. First, people can leave one area and move to another that has laws or policies that are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/257839">more to their liking</a>. In addition, different regions can <a href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/steven-callander-how-make-states-laboratories-democracy">try different approaches</a> to solving particular problems – like educating all children or providing health care in rural areas, perhaps identifying which methods are more effective.</p>
<p>Federal systems also make it easier for citizens to join government by running for office, including challenging the current officeholders. It is <a href="https://ftw.fraserinstitute.org/studies/the-new-federalist">much cheaper and less complicated</a> to seek support from voters in a smaller area. Smaller government agencies can also <a href="https://ftw.fraserinstitute.org/studies/the-new-federalist">make better use of local knowledge</a> about geography or historical traditions to govern people in ways that fit their needs.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People gathered in a village in India" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391537/original/file-20210324-17-8zekx2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A village council meeting in India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:A_Gramsabha_in_a_rural_village_of_Madhyapradesh.jpg">Shagil Kannur via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are some drawbacks, too: Some regions may have laws and rules that expand business opportunities or protect the environment – while other regions may have fewer business regulations or more damaged landscapes. Problems like that can mean people who live near one another – but in different states – have <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2669275">unequal qualities of life</a>.</p>
<p>And sometimes provincial governments can <a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/50/">slow the progress of major national initiatives</a> meant to benefit everyone.</p>
<p>But most countries seem to have decided that the positives outweigh the negatives. And in fact, they’ve gone even deeper into federalism. Beyond states and provinces, there are many even smaller units of government. </p>
<p>In the U.S., states are made up of counties, which are in turn made up of towns, cities or other municipal governments. There are many more thousands of these – the <a href="https://gadm.org/data.html">Database of Global Administrative Areas tallies 386,735</a>. Brazil alone has <a href="https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americas-2017/?page_id=97">5,570 municipalities</a>. <a href="http://search.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/profile-India.pdf">India has 250,671 village councils</a>, called “gram panchayats.” But even those are <a href="https://www.pria.org/panchayathub/panchayat_text_view.php">divided into smaller districts</a> called “wards,” each of which votes for its own council member. </p>
<p>If you want some more fun, try <a href="https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/">looking for the flags</a> of each of these subnational governments!</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Hello, curious kids! Do you have a question you’d like an expert to answer? Ask an adult to send your question to <a href="mailto:curiouskidsus@theconversation.com">CuriousKidsUS@theconversation.com</a>. Please tell us your name, age and the city where you live.</em></p>
<p><em>And since curiosity has no age limit – adults, let us know what you’re wondering, too. We won’t be able to answer every question, but we will do our best.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vasabjit Banerjee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The U.S. is broken up into 50 states, plus territories like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C. Most other countries have smaller parts too.
Vasabjit Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mississippi State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/141340
2020-07-30T10:16:15Z
2020-07-30T10:16:15Z
In refugee camps as well as lockdown, gardening helps pass time in limbo
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347937/original/file-20200716-33-jfghlz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=18%2C682%2C3265%2C2329&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During lockdown, my family’s cul-de-sac became our universe. Suddenly, our neighbours became the only people we’d be guaranteed to see in the flesh for the foreseeable future, and the “good fences” that are known to rigidly force “<a href="https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44266/mending-wall">good neighbours</a>” came down, replaced by authentic forms of humanity and connection.</p>
<p>One such form of connection was in gardening. It proved an easy topic to cultivate, and return to, over the weeks that piled on top of one another. Tim, a neighbour whose name we hadn’t known until lockdown, offered our toddler daughter a (distanced) fistful of fuchsia flowers after she’d pointed to them and called them pretty. Over the following weeks, an exchange of courgette plants and Sweet Williams proceeded, and we now have both a friend, and a colourful garden.</p>
<p>I wonder what will happen to this garden. Gardens <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/05/09/852441460/pandemic-gardens-satisfy-a-hunger-for-more-than-just-good-tomatoes">simultaneously planted</a> throughout the world’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/growing-your-own-food-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-plan-for-pests-136793">backyards</a>, balconies, and urban walls – will they, like other momentary obsessions responding to news cycles, be abandoned? And what about the birds, globally united in their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/apr/25/birds-join-chorus-of-approval-as-wildlife-thrives-in-a-quieter-world">sudden singing</a>? What will happen to the lettuce on my windowsill, the tomatoes on the balcony, and the Sweet Williams in the garden, now that the world is waking up and turning the office lights back on? We can only focus on one thing at a time.</p>
<p>The gardens we so furtively grew, and might furtively abandon, remind me of other gardens planted in periods of waiting. For the last few years, I have been interviewing Syrian refugees about their experiences of displacement. One of the things that has struck me the most is the common tendency to garden. </p>
<p>At Zaatari Refugee Camp in Jordan, where I have conducted much of my research, small bushes of “<em>muknisit al janna</em>” (a tumbleweed) grow everywhere, and seeds have been planted in hope of growing tiny Persian cucumbers. I’ve found a willingness to cultivate the land that is generative in and of itself. Gardens need this willingness to care for the land to grow.</p>
<p>The tendency to garden in refugee camps is so ubiquitous that the UN has implemented a training programme in hydroponics, which has already educated over 600 people. I <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/blog/summer-showcase-2020-planting-gardens-create-home-away-home/">would guess</a> that around a third of the refugee homes in tents and caravans which I visited had small gardens planted next to them. These gardens suggest that the space of home is not necessarily confined to the uniform dwellings made of sheet metal which refugees are allocated, but to <a href="https://journalofnarrativetheory.wordpress.com/special-issues/">the earth</a> on which the dwelling sits.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="© Yasmine Shamma" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347942/original/file-20200716-15-xza7xk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A muknisit al janna bush, otherwise known as Bassia Scorporia, growing outside a tent in Zaatari Refugee Camp, Jordan, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The refugee garden is an especially noteworthy feat in Jordan, where the presence of a garden is remarkable in itself. Jordan is an arid, desert country, and refugee camps are set in its fringes; on abandoned olive groves (as in Zaatari), and or explicitly <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/echo/blog/little-garden-springs-life-jordanian-desert_en">delineated “desert” lands</a> (as in Azraq, another refugee camp in Jordan). It is a shock to find a garden in a desert, but a special one to find handfuls of them in the refugee camps, because water, like other resources, is scarce and rationed. Indeed, the pressure of the refugee population’s existence in Jordan is <a href="https://www.dec.org.uk/approaching-summer-and-syrian-refugee-influx-add-to-jordan%E2%80%99s-water-worries">acutely felt</a> in the pressures on its already limited natural resource of water — <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02600-w">a topic rife</a> with its own political history.</p>
<p>When I asked refugees about their makeshift (and often illegal) gardens, pride coloured their responses. One Syrian refugee, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UsOa9AeDPw&feature=youtu.be">who I think of often</a>, planted a peach tree from the pit of a peach offered by a relief worker on her first day in the camps. She did so despite the implications that such planting held: of intending to stay awhile. Though the refugee “waits”, as Valerie Luseilli puts it in her recent acclaimed novel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/mar/03/lost-children-archive-valeria-luiselli-review">Lost Children Archive</a>, they also find quiet, useful, ways of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg8swoxNPAI">marking time</a> in waiting. Their gardens do so, measuring time as a slow, seasonal clock.</p>
<p>On my most recent visit to Zaatari, I was told that I would no longer be permitted to ask refugees about the past (“it’s too difficult” said one of the armed officials) or the future (“it’s too difficult,” he repeated). I was left, then, with the present to deal with. I could ask about the here and now only if it was a here and now void of then and if or when. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="© Yasmine Shamma" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347945/original/file-20200716-21-155ku9r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shoes left outside to preserve the cleanliness of the inhabited interior space, with marigolds and other plants grown in the background of the man-made courtyard. Photograph taken in Zaatari Refugee Camp, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not unlike those of us who have recently experienced waiting under lockdown, the refugee who waits, gardens. And not unlike the chit-chat I made so recently with my own neighbours, I tended, on this recent visit, to resort to talk of the gardens around the tented space which these refugees so <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg8swoxNPAI">graciously</a> welcomed me (and my new entourage) into. I was left with, it seemed, a single topic for discussion: just as my daughter made easy talk with our neighbour about his fuchsias, I asked Um Mohmmad, for example, about the small tumbleweed garden that framed her caravan’s entrance: “Is this your garden? Did you have a garden in Syria?”</p>
<p>“Yes. It’s a plant called Muknisit il Janneh. And yes, we used to have olive trees back in Syria outside our house. This plant grows quickly.” There is irony in the plant itself, “summer cyprus”, or in Arabic, “heaven’s sweeper”: it is an invasive tumbleweed that can grow in the most arid of conditions.</p>
<p>“I thought of planting pumpkins,” I said to Tim recently, a manageable way of saying that I wonder if lockdown will last through an autumn harvest. That was last month. We now sit on what feels like the other side of lockdown, while the refugee still sits in her tent, her peach tree beside her offering age-old, beyond human, respite — one of the few forms available to her, and planted herself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasmine Shamma works as a Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary Literature at the University of Reading.</span></em></p>
At Jordan’s Zaatari Refugee Camp, small bushes of tumbleweed grow everywhere, and seeds have been planted in hope of growing tiny Persian cucumbers.
Yasmine Shamma, Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary Literatures, University of Reading
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/136924
2020-05-07T12:23:04Z
2020-05-07T12:23:04Z
How disorderly democracies can outperform efficient autocracies in tackling coronavirus
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333240/original/file-20200506-49542-17d113s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=46%2C73%2C4426%2C2441&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Germany has succeeded in fighting the coronavirus in part by combing strong national leadership with regional autonomy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John MacDougal/POOL via AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, some countries have consistently received accolades for their rapid, coordinated responses, while others have been roundly condemned as laggards.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-coronavirus-example-11588026299">Taiwan</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/both-new-zealand-and-australia-contained-coronavirus-but-one-is-set-to-pay-a-heavier-price-11588158002">Australia</a>, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/18/asia/singapore-coronavirus-response-intl-hnk/index.html">Singapore</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/jordan-flattening-covid-19-curve-200422112212466.html">Jordan</a> and the <a href="https://eurasianet.org/georgia-gets-rare-plaudits-for-coronavirus-response">Republic of Georgia</a> were able to “flatten” the curve and limit the outbreak. By contrast <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/26/spain-coronavirus-response-analysis">Spain</a>, <a href="https://hbr.org/2020/03/lessons-from-italys-response-to-coronavirus">Italy</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/04/24/us/politics/ap-us-virus-outbreak-americas-failures.html">U.S.</a> have struggled to contain the virus’s spread. </p>
<p>What do the countries that have dealt effectively with COVID-19 have in common? </p>
<p>Many factors have likely contributed to their success, including <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/11/us/us-health-care-system-coronavirus/index.html">preexisting health systems</a>, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2020/04/05/why-organizational-agility-is-key-to-defeating-the-coronavirus/#149fa89f68ad">bureaucratic agility</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/democracy-autocracy-coronavirus-doesnt-care/">the decision to act early</a>. </p>
<p>Equally important, in my view as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Y58-EhUAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">political scientist</a>, are each country’s political institutions – whether top-down autocracies, federalized democracies or something else. Determining which ones work best is the tricky part.</p>
<h2>Of autocracies and democracies</h2>
<p>Some autocratic regimes have argued that they are <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1182074.shtml">uniquely equipped</a> to deal with the pandemic, prompting <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/coronavirus-empowering-dictators-and-changing-world-order-139127">a fair bit</a> of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/coronavirus-crisis-could-spark-authoritarian-revival/">soul searching</a> in the democratic world. </p>
<p>But the success of democratic countries like <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/global-leadership-coronavirus-pandemic-germany-united-states-china/">Germany</a>, combined with the failure of autocracies like <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/24/how-iran-botched-coronavirus-pandemic-response/">Iran</a>, make it clear that things are not so simple. Indeed, the crisis arose in part because autocratic China did not <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/27/the-future-is-asian-but-not-chinese-coronavirus-pandemic-china-korea-singapore-taiwan/">move swiftly enough</a> to contain it.</p>
<p>A related but more subtle argument is that <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/federalism-coronavirus-problem-government/">more centralized</a> governments are better able to confront crises like the coronavirus. According to this take, countries with strong regional and local governments – and especially <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/u-s-federalism-creates-chaos-in-fighting-coronavirus.html">federal countries</a> like the U.S. – are at a disadvantage. By contrast, strongly centralized democracies like <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/does-french-political-system-work-main-parties/">France</a> and high-functioning autocracies like <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/southeast-asia-strong-state-democratization-in-malaysia-and-singapore/">Singapore</a> are in a better position to act. </p>
<h2>The benefits of central coordination</h2>
<p>There is no question that centralized leadership – even when exercised coercively – provides certain real benefits during a public health crisis. </p>
<p>This is because pandemics are an example of a policy area with <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull04.htm">strong spillover effects</a>. A citizen could be infected in a city or state with weak social distancing rules and transmit the disease when traveling to another city or state. Or the efforts of one state to hoard masks could produce a critical shortage in another.</p>
<p>U.S. states, for example, have been <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/09/why-states-and-the-federal-government-are-bidding-on-ppe.html">forced to compete</a> for personal protective equipment, which has generated inefficiencies and a bidding war. And some places <a href="https://nypost.com/2020/04/29/georgia-coronavirus-death-rate-could-double-as-lockdown-eases/">have begun to reopen</a> businesses against the advice of experts. If this move causes a spike in transmission, it could spill over into other states that have taken more risk-adverse stances.</p>
<h2>The critical role of local governments</h2>
<p>But the results of <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781788972161/9781788972161.xml">ongoing research</a> that I’m conducting with two colleagues suggests that success during a pandemic is not just a question of strong national leadership. </p>
<p>Our findings indicate that the countries best able to provide local public goods – including primary health care, critical during a pandemic – are not those that are most centralized. Rather, they are ones that strike “a fine balance” between the powers of central governments and those at the state and local level.</p>
<p>There are several reasons for this. </p>
<p>A more decentralized approach to government will facilitate the targeting of policy to the needs of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1826343?seq=1">different locales</a>. When the pandemic is concentrated in certain areas of a single country, for example, it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/opinion/coronavirus-end-social-distancing.html">may make sense</a> for sub-national authorities to decide when to reopen. And the better information and stronger accountability enjoyed by local and regional governments are likely to matter even more during the economic recovery.</p>
<p>Germany, for its part, has enjoyed the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/04/angela-merkel-germany-coronavirus-pandemic/610225/">strong national leadership</a> of Angela Merkel, but it is relying also on the individual states to decide how to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52382196">ease social distancing</a>.</p>
<p>Decentralized and federal systems also allow states and locales <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00346.x">to learn</a> from each other and to emulate what works. They <a href="http://webarchive.urban.org/publications/204582.html">put pressure on those states and locales</a> that are doing poorly to do better. </p>
<p>Moreover, strong regional and local governments can serve as a backstop when national policy is insufficient, limiting the damage of central misgovernment. </p>
<p>The most <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/here-are-government-s-biggest-failures-coronavirus-response-n1175791">obvious example</a> of this phenomenon is the United States, where the Trump administration’s mixed signals, incorrect information and slow reaction time arguably made the U.S. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-coronavirus-actions-and-failures-timeline-and-themes/">more vulnerable</a> to the coronavirus. At the same time, states like California, Oregon and Washington have succeeded in limiting local cases enough that they are <a href="https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/04/06/california-sends-500-ventilators-back-to-national-stockpile-1272393">now shipping ventilators</a> to places where they are needed more. </p>
<p>In France, too, regional and city governments have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/world/europe/coronavirus-france-masks.html">tried to pick up the slack</a> for the perceived failures of the central government in Paris. But the country’s highly centralized political institutions have put strong limits on their freedom of action.</p>
<h2>It’s not too late</h2>
<p>It’s no surprise, then, that most countries that have succeeded in containing the virus – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/05/germanys-devolved-logic-is-helping-it-win-the-coronavirus-race">Germany</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taiwanese-authorities-stay-vigilant-virus-crisis-eases-n1188781">Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://7news.com.au/lifestyle/health-wellbeing/coronavirus-in-australia-most-of-the-country-is-effectively-in-full-lockdown-as-state-governments-help-stop-the-spread-c-902028">Australia</a> for example – combine central coordination with active regional and local involvement.</p>
<p>Of course, some centralized – and autocratic – countries are coronavirus success stories. Interestingly, however, these tend to be relatively small countries with very strong governments, for example <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-in-jordan-seemingly-kept-in-check-by-drastic-early-lockdown-measures/">Jordan</a> and especially Singapore. Larger centralized countries like China and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/europe/coronavirus-russia-putin.html">Russia</a> tend not to perform as well. Put differently, the larger a country’s territory and population, the less effective a purely top-down strategy will be.</p>
<p>While the United States and most decentralized democracies aren’t yet on the list of success stories, it’s not too late to take advantage of their inherent strengths for the recovery. To accomplish this, my research shows their leaders should guard the autonomy of local authorities, while building cooperation and trust across all levels of government.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
While some authoritarian governments have won early praise, research shows that democratic countries with a balance of power between central and regional bodies are best able to succeed.
Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/132533
2020-03-10T11:07:49Z
2020-03-10T11:07:49Z
The fragmented politics of the Syrian refugee crisis jeopardises the future of millions
<p>The Syrian province of Idlib, the remaining holdout of rebels fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad, has experienced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45403334">fierce fighting</a> in recent months as the Syrian army, supported by Russia, has pushed to reclaim the territory. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the expansionist impulses of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in north-west Syria brought Turkey into direct confrontation with Assad’s forces in Idlib and exacerbated tensions with Russia. A ceasefire was agreed in early March, but tensions in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/newsfeed/2020/03/russia-turkey-agree-idlib-ceasefire-200309083037719.html">region remain high</a>.</p>
<p>Even before the military escalation in Idlib, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/the-kurds-facts-history.html">Turkish attack</a> on Kurds in north-eastern Syria in October 2019 had added a layer of complexity to the conflict. Now the recent assaults on Syrians in Idlib have led to the exodus of an estimated <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nws_flash_update_20200305_final.pdf">1 million civilians</a>. UN officials <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un/syria-displacement-is-worst-since-conflict-began-un-idUSKBN2051MA">said</a> it was “the fastest growing displacement” they had ever seen in Syria. </p>
<p>Many people fled to Turkey, already home to around 3.5 million Syrian refugees. On February 29, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/28/tensions-rise-between-turkey-and-russia-after-killing-of-troops-in-syria">Turkey opened its border with Greece</a>, apparently to put pressure on Europe to support its operations in Idlib. </p>
<p>Sadly, this wave of migration is only the latest flashpoint in the worst humanitarian crisis since the horrors of the second world war. But even this crisis, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/turkey-erdogan-holds-talks-with-eu-leaders-over-border-opening">thousands now stuck</a> in no-man’s land on the Greek-Turkish border, hasn’t triggered a way through the regional and domestic blockages that have prevented an end to the bloodshed in Syria. This is something we’ve written about in <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030350154">a new book on the Syrian refugee crisis</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tensions-mount-at-greek-border-with-turkey-amid-contested-history-of-migration-in-the-aegean-132990">Tensions mount at Greek border with Turkey amid contested history of migration in the Aegean</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Regional inertia</h2>
<p>Since 2011, the humanitarian consequences of the Syrian crisis have spilled over several Middle Eastern countries. But there has been no collective, regional response – largely because of political fragmentation and competition for power. </p>
<p>One striking illustration of these dynamics is the inertia of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The two organisations have repeatedly failed to provide effective responses to regional issues such as the turmoil in Yemen and Libya or the rise of extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. The Syrian refugee crisis, and more recently the situation in north-west Syria, are no exceptions. </p>
<p>The Arab League has limited its intervention to support for efforts by the international community to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis. As for the GCC, its actions were overshadowed by an <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/qatar-crisis-its-regional-implications-and-us-national-interest">internal rift</a> and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/06/29/syria-war-saudi-arabia-qatar/">the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia</a> in the Syrian chaos. This means that the humanitarian burden has continued to be borne by countries that host Syrian refugees. </p>
<p>Some may have expected Arab solidarity in the face of a crisis that emerged in the context of wider Arab uprisings. Yet even in the Arab countries that have hosted the bulk of refugees from Syria, such as Jordan and Lebanon, the government and people distanced themselves from their Arab brothers as the crisis became protracted.</p>
<p>The national borders in the Middle East that were drawn up after the first world war still <a href="https://www.rienner.com/uploads/53924248e6ec6.pdf">remain contested </a> by pan-Arab, pan-Islamic and pan-Kurdish movements. Nevertheless, the Syrian refugee crisis showed how these borders and national identities are powerful drivers of everyday politics. </p>
<h2>A crisis politicised</h2>
<p>The stance of the governments in Jordan and Lebanon towards the Syrian conflict shaped the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030350154">countries’ refugee policy</a>. What started as a policy of open doors evolved from 2014 when restrictions were imposed on Syrians entering and staying in both countries. Jordan and Lebanon then began to cooperate with the international community to mitigate the refugee crisis in early 2016, and eventually began to <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/amp/news/2018/8/14/syria-says-deal-struck-with-jordan-to-return-refugees?__twitter_impression=true">actively encourage</a> the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/lebanon-syrian-refugees-return-process.html">return of refugees</a> to Syria in 2018. </p>
<p>Lebanon’s ruling elites capitalised on the humanitarian crisis by portraying the Syrian refugees as a <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030350154#">security threat</a>. Pro-Assad political parties Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement used this narrative to undermine anti-Assad political forces in Lebanon, namely a party called the Future Movement. This, in turn, created a sense of urgency which encouraged the flow of foreign aid into the country in an attempt to bring stability. But this foreign aid fed <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/politics/2015/03/lebanon-corruption-syrian-refugees-aid.html">corruption</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-remain-trapped-and-marginalised-by-lebanons-power-sharing-politics-108363">Syrian refugees remain trapped and marginalised by Lebanon's power-sharing politics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The media has also played an important role in shaping the perception of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon by circulating a twofold government-sponsored narrative about the crisis. On one hand, this narrative tried to reassure Lebanese people of a sense of normalcy and fostered patience and societal strength. On the other, the government framed the refugee crisis as an emergency to convince international donors to channel humanitarian aid to the country. But as we found in our research, it was the second narrative that dominated, causing confusion among Lebanese and Jordanians who have started to ask for their share of the foreign aid. </p>
<h2>Stuck in the middle</h2>
<p>Amid this fragmented regional landscape and the politicisation of the crisis at the regional and national levels, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-forced-to-return-to-syria-face-imprisonment-death-at-the-hands-of-assad-113159">fate of Syrian refugees</a> remains unclear. Russia has offered to facilitate dialogue between host countries – mainly Lebanon – and the Assad regime regarding the return of Syrian populations. But the ongoing process of their return to their home country might now be hampered by diplomatic tensions between Syria and its neighbours, especially Lebanon and Turkey.</p>
<p>The safe return of Syrian refugees will also be restricted by the demographic changes initiated by the Turkish government in efforts to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/19/who-exactly-is-turkey-resettling-in-syria/">eliminate the Kurdish presence</a> along its border. The fate of returnees is also jeopardised by the Assad regime’s policies against those who took part in the uprising, those who didn’t answer the conscription call during the war or those who <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law">own properties</a> in former rebel-held areas. </p>
<p>The Syrian refugee crisis will remain a major card both in the hands of the countries involved militarily in the conflict, and those hosting refugees. As for the Syrian refugees themselves, their lives, rights and future are precarious. They remain the primary victims of the regional competition for power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132533/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juline Beaujouan received funding from AHRC's Open World Research Initiative (OWRI), Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) and Higher Education Funding Council for England (hefce). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amjed Rasheed received funding from the AHRC's Open World Research Initiative (OWRI), the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (hefce).</span></em></p>
How the humanitarian consequences of the Syrian crisis have spilled across the region.
Juline Beaujouan, Research Associate, Political Settlements Research Programme, The University of Edinburgh
Amjed Rasheed, Research Fellow, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/131427
2020-03-04T11:57:44Z
2020-03-04T11:57:44Z
The sharing economy helps women find new economic opportunities in Jordan
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316653/original/file-20200221-92541-1h6gezj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New technology has created new options for women in Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/jordanian?license=rf&agreements=pa:77130&family=creative&phrase=Jordanian&sort=best#license">Jasmin Merdan/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Across the world, women face <a href="https://wgac.colostate.edu/support/stalking/stalking-statistics/">online stalking</a>, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/14/men-women-experience-and-view-online-harassment-differently/">threats to their reputation</a> and <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/gender-surveillance-world-can-work-together-safer-internet/">surveillance or monitoring</a> of their online activities.</p>
<p>In many countries, threats to safety and privacy limit women’s access to information and communication technologies.</p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/people/allison-anderson/">scholar of gender and development</a>, and my forthcoming Ph.D. research with women in Jordan reveals a more complicated relationship between surveillance and freedom, as surveillance activities there often allow greater autonomy for women to work. </p>
<h2>Sharing economy platforms grow</h2>
<p>In Jordan, only 15% of women are engaged in the formal economy.</p>
<p><a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf">Jordan is near the bottom</a> of global rankings for economic participation and opportunity for women, ranking 145 out of 153 countries.</p>
<p>There are <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/859411541448063088/Hashemite-Kingdom-of-Jordan-Understanding-How-Gender-Norms-in-MNA-Impact-Female-Employment-Outcomes">many reasons women don’t work</a>, including cultural and societal norms, the time and expense of transportation to job sites, concerns about safety on public transit, the cost and availability of child care and the length of time away from home required for most jobs. </p>
<p>Because of these constraints, many women prefer working in a flexible manner through their own home-based businesses. </p>
<p>In the last few years, sharing economy platforms – also called <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gig-economy.asp">the gig</a> or <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/collaborative-economy.asp">collaborative economy</a> – have been built up around the activities that Jordanian women are involved in from home. </p>
<p>Sharing economy platforms include many of the companies that are described as the “Uber of” whatever their business is. They act as intermediaries between service providers and service seekers through a website or mobile application.</p>
<p>In Jordan, there are currently sharing economy platforms for finding <a href="http://carersapp.care/carers/en/">babysitters</a>, <a href="http://www.instatoot.me/">tutors</a>, <a href="https://www.mrayti.com/">at-home salon services</a>, <a href="https://aounservices.com/en/">home maintenance</a> and more.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316655/original/file-20200221-92551-1sbawvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Of the more than 10 million people in Jordan, only 15.1% of women there work at all.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/jordanian-workforce?license=rf&agreements=pa:77130&family=creative&page=2&phrase=Jordanian%20workforce&sort=best#license">Richmatts/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Safety and privacy</h2>
<p>New technologies can improve the lives of women by giving them new opportunities, but what does women’s involvement in the sharing economy mean for their privacy and safety?</p>
<p>In Jordan, women also face <a href="http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/90-cybercrime-victims-jordan-are-women%E2%80%99">threats to their reputation from online activities and policing and monitoring of digital activities</a>, though it is unclear how significant this problem is because it is difficult to find available gender-segregated data regarding the topic in Jordan. </p>
<p>I spent more than 10 months researching women’s work and technology in Jordan last year. The over 100 women I spoke with in Jordan suggest that sharing economy platforms address some family concerns about a woman’s safety with location settings. When a family member can track the woman’s movements and know where she is, they feel more comfortable allowing her to go to work. </p>
<p>Many of the sharing economy platform jobs are time-specific roles, such as a service seeker requesting a babysitter for a set three-hour block or providing tutoring services for a set one-hour session. In focus groups, many women expressed that their families supported their work because they knew where they were going and for how long. </p>
<p>A co-founder and CEO of a sharing economy platform explained to me that they face “some challenges because we don’t employ women from home and not all families allow daughters to work outside the home,” but that because families know where their daughters are going and there are high salaries for low amounts of time, they often let their daughters complete the requests.</p>
<h2>Brand reputation and supportive solutions</h2>
<p>Additionally, sophisticated user experience and user interface with advanced features help families feel that a brand is legitimate and help them to trust the company more.</p>
<p>This brand reputation helps support women working because there are fewer concerns about reputational risk. A different founder and CEO of a sharing economy platform told me that “technology on its own can’t solve social issues that prevent women from working, but a sophisticated UX can change behaviors and allow women to work because families are more comfortable with female family members working for legitimate and trusted brands.”</p>
<p>Finally, sharing economy platforms in Jordan often create nontechnological solutions to support women to work on their platforms. For example, the founder and CEO of the salon services platform Mrayti visits women’s families at home to build trust in the company before the woman might decide to join.</p>
<p>Other examples include a home maintenance platform that provides transportation for women to the job site and a platform for caregivers that makes visits to approve the families requesting babysitting or nursing care before they send people to work in their homes.</p>
<p>These solutions are effective because they are built on an understanding of the local culture and the importance of relationships and reputation in Jordan.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131427/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Allison J. Anderson received funding from the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board to conduct fieldwork on women's economic participation in Jordan in 2018-2019.</span></em></p>
Research reveals a complicated relationship between surveillance and freedom, as surveillance activities allow for greater autonomy for women hoping to work in Jordan.
Allison Jacobs Anderson, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Washington
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/126906
2019-12-19T11:27:00Z
2019-12-19T11:27:00Z
Israel is hoarding the Jordan River – it’s time to share the water
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303172/original/file-20191122-74572-mp7lb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3494%2C2279&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">These days, the river barely makes it to its mouth in the Dead Sea.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christopher Sprake / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two areas farmed by Israelis for more than 50 years have recently been <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191017-jordan-denies-extending-israels-lease-over-border-area/">returned to neighbouring Jordan</a>. The first, al Ghamr (known in Israel as Zofar), is located south of the Dead Sea in the Naqab/Negev desert. The second, al Baqura (Naharayim) is found at the fertile point where a major tributary joins the Jordan River.</p>
<p>The association with water bodies is no coincidence: neither land would have been occupied in the first place were it not for the water that the Israeli army and kibbutzim required to <a href="https://www.7iber.com/politics-economics/well-get-them-back-will-jordan-reclaim-its-territory-in-the-next-year/">sustain the farms</a>. </p>
<p>The return of the lands was made possible by remarkably far-sighted clauses inserted in a 1994 peace treaty between <a href="http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html">Jordan</a> and <a href="https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-jordan%20peace%20treaty.aspx">Israel</a>. Unfortunately, the parts of the same agreement concerning water could not be more myopic, and ensure that one of the most arid countries in the world – Jordan – remains parched. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=699&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=699&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=699&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=878&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=878&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304496/original/file-20191129-156077-1z00vok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=878&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Jordan River flows through Tiberias/Galilee and ends in the Dead Sea. Jordan is on one bank and Israel/the West Bank on the other.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, Palestinian farmers do not have enough water. This situation is locked in by a water agreement signed with Israel in 1995, as part of the “Oslo II” process. And as the water levels drop, tensions rise. It gets worse with every scorching summer.</p>
<p>As it controls the most water but needs it the least, Israel has the choice to negotiate fairer agreements. But what must be challenged first is the thinking that led to the agreements in the first place – an economic doctrine which sees water as nothing more than a commodity to be sold or traded, and a political ideology that is fixated on holding on to as much water as possible. </p>
<h2>Those who need water most have the least</h2>
<p>The effects of the commodification of water are crystal clear at al Baqura. There, the Yarmouk river flows westwards and used to meet the Jordan River mainstream which flows south between Jordan (the country) on one side and Israel and the Palestine West Bank on the other. But these days almost every drop of the Yarmouk not used by farmers in Syria and Jordan is <a href="http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/volume-12/v12issue3/556-a12-3-12/file">hoovered into a reservoir by farmers in Israel</a>. </p>
<p>The Jordan River itself has run dry ever since 1964, when Israel cornered sole use of Lake Tiberias (aka the Sea of Galilee, or Lake Kinneret) near the river’s source. The Dead Sea at the river’s endpoint has been (apologies) dying, ever since. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307707/original/file-20191218-11900-qntmn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israel’s ‘National Water Carrier’ transports water from Galilee/Tiberias through the country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://water.fanack.com/israel/water-infrastructure/">Fanack</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Innovators in Israel have in the meantime perfected drip irrigation techniques, implemented impressive schemes which re-use wastewater, and built so many desalination plants that some commentators suggest it now has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301540438_Undermining_Demand_Management_with_Supply_Management_Moral_Hazard_in_Israeli_Water_Policies">too much water</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile Jordan is increasingly parched, as it hosts millions of people who have fled wars in Kuwait, Iraq, and Syria. With no surface water of its own to speak of, Jordan resorts to desalination on its tiny coastline at Aqaba. It has been encouraged to pump the expensive flows from there to the neighbouring Israeli city of Eilat, in exchange for freshwater Israel is to pump back to Jordan from (the contested) Lake Tiberias. </p>
<p>The Palestinian residents of the West Bank actually have less water available now than when Oslo II was signed. In Gaza, desalination is too expensive for most, and with wastewater contaminating the groundwater, “superbugs” are creating a toxic “<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-now-has-a-toxic-biosphere-of-war-that-no-one-can-escape-95397">biosphere of war</a>”. Israel does sell a small amount of freshwater to Gaza, but most of the water it channels from Tiberias 200km to the north stops at the border – tantalisingly in view of the Gazans but out of their reach, reserved instead to grow potatoes that are exported to (a rather wetter) Europe.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304484/original/file-20191129-156090-vci3uk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Gaza strip (left) is surrounded by well-irrigated Israeli fields.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.google.com/maps/place/Gaza+Strip/@31.4972182,34.4562896,27148m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x14fd844104b258a9:0xfddcb14b194be8e7!8m2!3d31.3546763!4d34.3088255">Google Maps</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Blame ideology, not climate change</h2>
<p>There is a tendency to <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02600-w?utm_source=twt_nnc&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=naturenews&sf218879339=1">blame climate change or refugees</a> for these policy choices, probably because they cannot talk back. But those who created the mess are the ones who should and can change it.</p>
<p>While the Israeli state doesn’t <em>need</em> so much water, the distribution of control over the Jordan River and associated aquifers remains a mirror reflection of the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30524205_Power_and_Water_in_the_Middle_East_The_Hidden_Politics_of_the_Palestinian-Israeli_Water_Conflict">relative power between the rival states</a>. Israel controls more water than Jordan and the Palestinians combined, and more than double its entitlement when measured against the principles of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304487/original/file-20191129-156073-g3fla2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Desert farming: irrigation in the Negev Desert, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ChameleonsEye / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Water that Israel promised Jordan back in the 1994 peace treaty has <a href="http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/volume-12/v12issue3/556-a12-3-12/file">still not materialised</a>. In the West Bank, Israel’s choice to hoard is expressed through the Oslo-created Israeli-Palestinian joint water committee. Because the committee approves the water lines that every new settlement in the West Bank needs, but blocks projects for Palestinian villages, water becomes an effective tool of <a href="http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/volume6/v6issue1/196-a6-1-1/file">colonialism</a> or even <a href="https://issuu.com/revolve-magazine/docs/water-mediterranean/26">ethnic cleansing</a>. </p>
<h2>Challenge the ideologies, rip-up the agreements</h2>
<p>It would be straightforward to invoke guidance from the UN Watercourses Convention, if all that was required to end the Jordan River conflict was updating the agreements. The convention details how water can be shared “equitably and reasonably” and all the states involved <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en">signed up</a> – bar Israel.</p>
<p>But first we must challenge the idea that water is a commodity that can be hoarded away or sold only to the highest bidder. But given the extent to which the practice is entrenched in the political and economic systems of the region, evidence and argument are not enough on their own. Researchers can highlight the damage caused by water policy, and environmentalists may question the rationale of exporting desert-grown crops to Europe. Eventually, the task is to replace the blinding ideologies with a strong sense of justice, so that unfair water sharing comes to be seen as unacceptable as slavery. </p>
<p>The required policy and legislation will flow naturally, once this future is seen. It happened at al Baqura and al Ghamr, and it can happen with water.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The holy river is used and abused so much that it barely reaches the Dead Sea these days.
Mark Zeitoun, Professor of Water Security, University of East Anglia
Muna Dajani, PhD in Environmental Policy & Development, London School of Economics and Political Science
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/127560
2019-11-25T13:26:10Z
2019-11-25T13:26:10Z
Israel’s West Bank settlements: 4 questions answered
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302975/original/file-20191121-515-50xof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C8%2C5760%2C3819&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A new housing project in the West Bank settlement of Naale, part of the Israeli government's recent push to increase its presence in the disputed territory, Jan. 1, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Israel-Settlement-Surge/5091fb9de097488482c8a40fdb4bf458/186/0">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Nov. 18 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/trump-israel-west-bank-settlements.html">said that Israel’s settlements in the West Bank do not violate international law</a>. That pleased Israeli Jews who see the territory as rightfully theirs and infuriated the Palestinians who live there and claim it as their land.</em></p>
<p><em>Here, a <a href="https://cssh.northeastern.edu/people/faculty/dov-waxman/">professor of Israel studies</a> and the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-9780190625337?cc=us&lang=en&">author of a new primer on the Israeli-Palestinian confict</a> explains the history of the West Bank settlements – and why they’re so controversial.</em> </p>
<h2>1. Why is ownership of the West Bank so contested?</h2>
<p>In May 1967, not a single Israeli lived in the West Bank, a hilly region
about the size of Delaware. It was home to roughly a million Palestinians, who had been living under contested Jordanian control for two decades. </p>
<p>Israel conquered the West Bank during the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">Six-Day War</a> in June 1967. Soon afterwards, Israeli civilians began moving to the region, initially to areas like Kfar Etzion that had been home to Jewish communities before <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/480515israel-proclamation.html">Israel’s founding</a> in 1948.</p>
<p>In 1968, a rabbi named <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/world/middleeast/moshe-levinger-contentious-leader-of-jewish-settlers-in-hebron-dies-at-80.html">Moshe Levinger</a> and a small group of followers who embraced a messianic version of religious Zionism moved into the ancient city of Hebron, in the heartland of the West Bank. Hebron is a holy city for Jews because it is believed to be the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ashkenazic-jews-mysterious-origins-unravelled-by-scientists-thanks-to-ancient-dna-97962">burial place</a> of the Jewish patriarchs and matriarchs Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sarah, Rebecca and Leah. </p>
<p>The population of Israelis living in the West Bank has mushroomed over the years. An estimated <a href="http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/18210#.VpK885scTIU">430,000 Israeli Jews</a> now live in 132 officially recognized “settlements” and in 121 unofficial “outposts” that require, but haven’t yet received, government approval. Constituting about 15% of the West Bank’s total population, these “settlers” live in their own communities, separate from the area’s approximately 3 million Palestinian residents. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5742%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302972/original/file-20191121-515-19oh6tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The West Bank city of Hebron was one of the first places Israeli settlers moved after Israel won the West Bank from Lebanon in the 1967 war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Israel-Settlement-Superdonor/bb08a81119824f8ba1c798697e58d254/176/0">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. Why do Palestinians object to the Israeli settler movement?</h2>
<p>Though they are neighbors and sometimes co-workers, relations between Jews and Palestinians on the West Bank are <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-9780190625337?cc=us&lang=en&">seldom friendly</a>. West Bank Palestinians, who are majority Muslim, see themselves as the area’s indigenous inhabitants; many of their ancestors have <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/history/">lived and farmed in the West Bank for many centuries</a>.</p>
<p>Palestinians contend that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are built on stolen land and that the settlers’ use of water – a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15275920600840628">scarce resource</a> – is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-un/un-rights-expert-israel-depriving-palestinians-of-clean-water-idUSL8N2151O7">likewise illegal</a>. </p>
<p>Palestinians frequently experience harassment from extremist Israeli settlers, sometimes as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/world/former-israeli-soldiers-tell-of-harassment-of-palestinians.html">Israeli soldiers look on</a>. There are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/30/palestinians-rise-attacks-israeli-settlers">hundreds of reports</a> of extremist settlers, many of them armed, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/west-bank-settlers-escalate-attacks-on-arab-olive-harvesters-in-annual-violence/2019/11/11/d883ca08-ff3b-11e9-8341-cc3dce52e7de_story.html">violently attacking Palestinians</a>, burning their fields and uprooting their olive trees. </p>
<p>Additionally, Israel has appropriated West Bank land to build a network of roads connecting settlements to Israel and to each other. These <a href="https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/amet.12114">roads are generally off-limits</a> to Palestinian drivers, hampering their freedom of movement and making travel within the West Bank more difficult and time-consuming. </p>
<p>The Israeli army security checkpoints that dot the West Bank, which are meant to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298536?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">protect Israelis from terror attacks</a>, also restrict and complicate the ability of Palestinian people to move around. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302976/original/file-20191121-515-1tgabfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinians on their way to Friday prayers during Ramadan pass an Israeli checkpoint between the West Bank city of Ramallah and Jerusalem, June 8, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Palestinians-Ramadan/3836b922259b4e25bd412171fc634ea7/4/0">AP Photo/Majdi Mohammed</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3) Why do Israelis want to live in the West Bank?</h2>
<p>Israelis choose to live in the West Bank for <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-israelis-see-the-settlements-1486137717">many reasons</a>. </p>
<p>The popular stereotype of Jewish settlers as religious fanatics determined to reclaim the entire ancient homeland they believe was given to Jews by God is not quite accurate. It’s <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/facts-about-jewish-settlements-in-the-west-bank">estimated</a> that only about a quarter of West Bank settlers live there out of ideological conviction. </p>
<p>Still, these fervent settlers are a vocal and highly visible minority. They generally live in smaller settlements, located deep inside the West Bank. </p>
<p>They see their presence as a means of ensuring permanent Jewish control over the area, which they call by the biblical names “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/friedman-seeking-to-call-west-bank-judea-and-samaria-in-official-statements/">Judea and Samaria</a>.” These settlers believe that by living in the West Bank they are serving God’s will and helping to bring about the long-awaited coming of the Messiah.</p>
<p>Most Jewish settlers in the West Bank, however, live there for economic reasons.
Israeli government investment and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israeli-govt-offers-incentives-to-settlers/">incentives</a> aimed at encouraging Jews to settle there make the cost of living lower than inside Israel.</p>
<p>Many Jews in the West Bank are secular, particularly those who emigrated from the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Others, <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7835002">like the growing number of ultra-Orthodox Jews living in the West Bank</a>, may believe that God gave the West Bank to Israel – but they move there primarily because they can find affordable housing and a better quality of life. </p>
<h2>4) Are Israel’s West Bank settlements legal or not?</h2>
<p>Most legal experts and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1051711">the United Nations</a> agree that Israeli settlements in the West Bank <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1051781">violate international law</a>. </p>
<p>The 1949 <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Convention</a>, which Israel signed, prohibits an occupying state from moving its own civilians into the territory it occupies. <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/icj616.doc.htm">According to the International Court of Justice</a>, the UN’s main judicial body, the West Bank is considered occupied territory because it was not part of Israel before the Israeli army conquered it in 1967. Territorial conquest is also <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/annexation-prohibition">forbidden by international law</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israel-defends-right-to-West-Bank-settlements-at-UNSC-watch-live-588178">Israeli government says</a> that the Geneva Convention is not applicable to the West Bank because it only refers to a state occupying another state’s land. Israel considers the West Bank “disputed territory,” not occupied territory.</p>
<p>Further, Israel’s government has argued, even if the Geneva Convention did apply, it would only prohibit forcible population transfers, like the mass deportations carried out by Nazi Germany – not the voluntarily movement of people into occupied territories.</p>
<p>The Trump administration’s new position that Israeli settlements are not illegal boosts Israel’s claims about the West Bank. But it’s unlikely to legitimize Israeli settlements in the eyes of the international community.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">latest version is available here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127560/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The US delighted Israel and outraged Palestinians by announcing it sees nothing illegal with Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Here, a brief history of this hotly disputed land.
Dov Waxman, Director of the UCLA Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies and The Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Chair in Israel Studies, University of California, Los Angeles
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/121511
2019-09-02T14:16:14Z
2019-09-02T14:16:14Z
Why Syrian refugees have no negative effects on Jordan’s labour market
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290525/original/file-20190902-175663-3s21tn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MikeDotta / Shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Forced displacement is a global challenge. The number of displaced people rose from 43m to 69m between 2007 and 2017, with the highest growth primarily due to the Syrian conflict, which started in 2011. Since then, more than 6.3m Syrians have fled <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/">to neighbouring countries and beyond</a>. This humanitarian crisis has generated public sympathy as well as concern about the implications of such a massive flow of people. </p>
<p>Jordan, which shares a border with Syria, has experienced a substantial influx of refugees. Around 1.3m Syrians live in Jordan, which has a total <a href="http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_a/main/population/census2015/Non-Jordanians/Non-jordanian_8.1.pdf">population of just 6.6m</a>. The impact of so many people on members of the host community is a subject of great importance and debate. </p>
<p>One area of particular concern tends to be the job market. Jordan gives a unique insight into this as it <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/jordan-compact.pdf">signed an agreement with the EU</a> in 2016, agreeing to allow Syrian refugees to enter legal employment in return for humanitarian aid, financial assistance and trade concessions from the EU. Known as the Jordan Compact, I studied <a href="https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0304387818310344?token=D96FAF18C69FEA44843C69DBD31D821F31EB2DC858B5835BDD5BC580D50684D0E62619FE9BEA24F51941BC882AEB8A18">its effect on the Jordanian labour market</a> with colleagues Belal Fallah and Caroline Krafft. We found that the compact did not have a negative effect on Jordanian jobs or wages.</p>
<p>Using data that represented the whole country, combined with information on where most refugees live (which is fairly concentrated in certain areas of the country), we were able to identify the effects that Syrians had on Jordanians’ job prospects by comparing Jordanians’ labour market outcomes before and after the Syrian influx.</p>
<p>We found that Jordanians living in areas with high concentrations of refugees had no worse labour market outcomes than Jordanians with less exposure to the refugee influx. This result held across all labour market outcomes, including unemployment levels, hours, wages and characteristics of employment (such as sector, occupation and whether the work was formal or informal). </p>
<p>Our findings contrast with most of the very recent literature on the impact of the Syrian refugee influx, which to date had been limited to <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20161065">evidence from Turkey</a>. Here, research found that natives who were employed informally were affected by Syrian refugees. But the global literature <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/676458">generally</a> <a href="https://academic.oup.com/joeg/article-abstract/16/3/667/2450149">finds</a> a similar mix to our findings of refugees having no or small specific negative effects on native job markets. This could be due to the demographics of refugees in Turkey and the fact that refugees aren’t legally allowed to work there, among other reasons.</p>
<h2>Little competition</h2>
<p>There are several reasons why the massive influx of Syrian refugees has had a minimal impact on the job situation in Jordan. The <a href="http://erf.org.eg/publications/syrian-refugees-in-jordan-demographics-livelihoods-education-and-health/">demographics of the Syrians in Jordan</a> may have played an important role. Almost half are under the age of 15 and only 23% of Syrian refugees in Jordan are in the labour force (45% of men and 4% of women). </p>
<p>The aim of the Jordan Compact was to provide 200,000 Syrian refugees access to work permits and formal work. But the take up of work permits by Syrians has been very low. According to Jordan’s Ministry of Labour, by the end of 2017 <a href="https://www.alnap.org/help-library/syrian-refugee-unit-work-permit-progress-report-january-2018">only 87,141 work permits to Syrians were issued</a>. This means there are few Syrians competing in Jordan’s (formal) labour market, making their effect on the labour supply relatively small. </p>
<p>Despite the massive inflow of Syrian refugees, the number of non-Syrian immigrants has not decreased in Jordan over the same period of time. According to <a href="http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/censuses/population_housing/census2015/">Jordan’s 2015 population census</a>, Jordan hosted an additional 1.6m non-Syrian foreigners. Other <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/erg/wpaper/1194.html">research has shown that</a> Syrians mainly compete with economic immigrants in the informal sector where they don’t get given contracts, such as construction and some sales jobs. Here there is limited competition between refugees and Jordanians. </p>
<h2>Demand and supply</h2>
<p>The inflow of foreign aid has also been a potential mechanism for creating jobs for Jordanians. To help address the needs of the Syrian refugees, Jordan has received foreign aid from multiple sources. This aid has been channelled to help offset the budget deficit, finance public projects and support public services such as schools, hospitals and transport nationwide. Both direct assistance to refugees and aid to the government can create jobs, the latter disproportionately in the government and public sectors. </p>
<p>Finally, the increase in demand for public services by refugees, in particular education and health, has resulted in the Jordanian government increasing the provision of those services, which in turn increased the demand for workers (almost exclusively Jordanians) in these sectors. </p>
<p>Overall our results suggest that providing legal work opportunities to refugees is not detrimental to the native job market. The inflow of foreign aid to Jordan to assist with some of the needs of refugees, as well as the conditions of the Jordan Compact, which included aid and trade concessions and employment support for Jordanians, may have played an important role in creating labour demand for Jordanians. So it is vital to ensure sufficient resources and public services are in place to support refugees and the host economy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research mentioned in this article was supported by the British Academy (GF160031).</span></em></p>
Jordan has a huge number of Syrian refugees and since 2016 it has let them legally enter the workforce.
Jackline Wahba, Professor of Economics, University of Southampton
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/113159
2019-03-08T11:43:32Z
2019-03-08T11:43:32Z
Refugees forced to return to Syria face imprisonment, death at the hands of Assad
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262723/original/file-20190307-82669-1e1ka1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Aid from UNICEF being distributed to Syrian refugees at a flooded camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, Jan. 10, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Lebanon-Syrian-Refugees/766b4b7cab6444b29c09f1c2833d65ac/63/0">AP/Bilal Hussein</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>I worked on the Syrian-Turkish border from 2012-16, leading the <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/bureau/194564.htm">U.S. government team</a> that was pushing hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian and other aid into northwest Syria. We were helping communities that had been cut off by the Syrian government.</p>
<p>Maybe no American official heard more about the suffering inside Syria at the hands of the Syrian regime than I did. </p>
<p>More than 3.5 million Syrian refugees <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-time-to-dispel-some-myths-80996">fled violence and persecution</a> in Syria for Turkey. Some faced <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-syrian-refugees-fear-of-conscription-prevents-return-home/">forced conscription into the army</a> to fight their fellow Syrians. Some <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/pay-a-hefty-bribe-or-risk-being-felled-by-assads-snipers/">paid huge bribes</a> to escape torture for demonstrating peacefully against the regime. </p>
<p>Most couldn’t take another day of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/middleeast/syria-weapons-against-civilians/index.html">indiscriminate bombing of innocent civilians</a> in schools, hospitals and markets.</p>
<p>I left Turkey in 2016, retired from the U.S. government in 2017 and follow Syria as a private American citizen. I also teach about foreign aid at the University of Washington.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262744/original/file-20190307-82695-45146w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Syrian government shelled its own people during the civil war. Here, a victim in a hospital bed in 2014, Aleppo, Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Syria-Brutal-War/94fe34aed47f43e48115b0d19af918f4/6/0">AP/Muhammed Muheisen</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Last month I was in Berlin for two days, coaching a group of Syrian civil society organizations about how to make themselves heard at an upcoming meeting of European Union nations <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/57556/brussels-host-third-conference-supporting-future-syria-and-region_en">in Brussels on the future of Syria</a>. </p>
<p>These Syrian activists know the civil war is lost, that Bashar al-Assad will remain in power for the foreseeable future (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/world/middleeast/syria-future.html">thanks to his Russian and Iranian backers</a>) and that the West did very little when it came to backing real change in Syria. </p>
<p>But they know there is one battle left to fight: the battle to stop Syrian refugees from being forced to return to Syria against their will.</p>
<h2>Millions fled</h2>
<p>The burden the refugees put on Syria’s neighbors is clear. </p>
<p>There are half a million Syrian refugees <a href="http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Jordan%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20June%202018.pdf">living in towns and cities across Jordan</a>, a country already hosting tens of thousands of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. In Lebanon, there are <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71">nearly a million Syrian refugees</a> – that’s one-sixth of the population. More than 3 million are living in Turkey.</p>
<p>A small percentage live in camps in Jordan and Turkey; there are no refugee camps in Lebanon. Most refugees are living in Jordanian, Lebanese and Turkish communities, sharing services with local populations. </p>
<p>The governments and people of these countries deserve the world’s thanks for the hospitality they’ve shown. </p>
<p>Some other countries have tried to help. The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/addressing-impact-syria-crisis-jordan">spent hundreds of millions in Jordan</a> to help communities near the Syrian border cope with increased demands for education and medical care. </p>
<p>I saw the <a href="https://www.zakat.org/en/">Zakat Foundation</a>, a private American charity from Chicago, running “second-shift schools” for Syrian children in Turkey, after the Turkish children had left their schools for the day. </p>
<p>But this work pales in comparison with the generosity extended by the neighboring countries themselves.</p>
<h2>Danger in returning</h2>
<p>As grateful as they are for the welcome in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the refugees want to go home and try to put their lives back together. Their homes, their property, their cemeteries and loved ones are inside Syria. </p>
<p>But as a longtime humanitarian aid official, I believe that now is not the time. </p>
<p>Syria’s security services were always strong. They suspect nearly everyone who left the country of loyalty to the opposition. No one should trust a regime that bombed innocent civilians for years, probably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jul/04/families-syria-disappeared-demand-answers-un">detained more than 200,000</a> without trial and is <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">reported to have killed its own civilians</a> with chemical weapons. </p>
<p>Without strong international oversight, I foresee that premature refugee returns will mean many thousands more in prison, tortured, conscripted and missing.</p>
<p>What’s the alternative to forcing refugees to return too soon? </p>
<p>Providing more support to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon to expand services for the refugees and the communities that host them is one way to help these refugees during this period. </p>
<p>Europe can expand the European Union’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/content/home_en">Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syria Crisis</a>, or MADAD (Arabic for expand), project. MADAD supports countries hosting refugees by investing in health and education, economic development and job creation.</p>
<p>All countries can help Syria’s neighbors through multilateral programs like the <a href="http://www.srtfund.org/">Syria Recovery Trust Fund</a>. The fund assists Syrian communities in opposition-controlled areas by paying for basic services like water and power. </p>
<p>Refugees will not return <a href="https://theconversation.com/garbage-collection-in-syria-is-crucial-to-fighting-the-islamic-state-109396">before these services are restored</a>. With a mandate to work in Syria’s neighboring countries too, and with greater resources, the SRTF could also help Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan cope with the refugee numbers.</p>
<p>Helping Syria’s refugees where they are won’t be cheap, but it will be cheaper than rebuilding Syria. Until there is a realistic political settlement of the conflict, with enforceable legal rights for returning refugees, rebuilding Syria should be left to the Syrian government. </p>
<h2>‘Not yet’</h2>
<p>At the conference in Brussels next week, attendees could focus on the usual response to Syria’s problems by providing more short-term fixes, like safe zones inside Syria – safe from Syrian government attack – to which refugees could return safely. But these would not come with a long-term commitment to protect the refugees who return there. </p>
<p>And that approach will just kick the problem down the road. It may turn parts of Syria into a “no-man’s land” someday and <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282849.htm">a haven for terrorists</a>.</p>
<p>I had dinner with some Syrian friends on my last night in Berlin, seven brave young people who are trying to help communities cut off by the regime. They love their country, want to go back and help rebuild it. </p>
<p>I asked them if they would go back now, when the bombing has mostly stopped and countries are beginning to resume diplomatic relations with Damascus. </p>
<p>They smiled sadly, shook their heads and said, “Not yet.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Ward does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Syrian civil war has ended, but there are millions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. With danger from a hostile regime back in Syria, what will happen to them now?
Mark Ward, Lecturer, University of Washington
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/103698
2018-10-10T15:23:36Z
2018-10-10T15:23:36Z
Facebook and feuds – the impact of social media on traditional tribal justice in Jordan
<p>There is a saying among Jordan’s Bedouin tribesmen that “prison is loss”. Victims of violence in rural Jordan have told me that they do not want the perpetrator to face prison – but rather the truces, blood money payments, feasts and reconciliations of traditional Bedouin justice. They tell me that while Bedouin justice can bring revenge, it also brings restitution, and ultimately, new relationships.</p>
<p>From a certain Bedouin perspective then, concepts of the state, “civilization” and “modernity” are not technical or humanitarian advances. Instead they are considered as mere decadence – at odds with a wholly rational and principled tradition.</p>
<p>Of course, these sentiments are not completely consistent with developments on the ground. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is, if anything, a net exporter of cutting-edge expertise in policing and security. It produces highly sought after <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/iraq-jordan-security-anbar-tarbil.html">trainers</a> and <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/jordan">peacekeepers</a> who work around the globe. </p>
<p>Indeed, Jordan’s security services are <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/jordan-special-forces-training-center-kasotc-tour-2018-3?r=US&IR=T">well-equipped</a> and <a href="http://faculty.nps.edu/ambaylou/Baylouny%20military%20welfare.pdf">relatively well-remunerated</a>. So for many well-educated urbanites, the existence of tribes and a parallel system of justice is a source of embarrassment – if not outrage.</p>
<p>Yet when it comes to some of the most serious crimes – murder, rape, and the breaking of tribal truces (crimes known respectively as “blood”, “honour”, and “cutting the face”) – many people in Jordan <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/seeking-justice-tribal-dispute-resolution-and-societal-transformation-in-jordan/193AFB8691431643C90BD69482F1ECFF">prefer the old oral code</a>, known as “customs and traditions”. A recent survey found that only <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/28/do-jordans-tribes-challenge-or-strengthen-the-state/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6cc34b595a30">12% of Jordanians</a> thought that murders should be handled exclusively by the formal court system without recourse to tribal custom. </p>
<p>And it seems as if the two systems can indeed work side by side. Security professionals are often effusive about the role that tribes and their “customs and traditions” play in strengthening Jordan’s peace and stability. One senior officer told me enthusiastically that his work with tribal leaders was merely an extension of <a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf">community policing</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://archive.org/details/20274301MassadColonialEffectsTheMakingOfNationalIdentityInJordan">Historians</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Qfn96G60emMC&source=gbs_book_other_versions">anthropologists</a> have long argued that “customs and traditions” can be quite malleable and adaptable after centuries of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858340?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">accommodation</a>. For instance, elders spoke of attempts to limit the number of people banished following a homicide to three generations rather than five after the arrival of cars led to an increase in unintentional homicides. And, in a new twist, social media is increasingly part of the architecture of Bedouin justice – a process I have recently <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/abstract/journals/jla/2/1/jla020104.xml?">written about</a>.</p>
<p>By far the biggest concern among people I spoke to was that social media is upending generational and gendered hierarchies. There is a widely held fear that “tribal” discourse is slipping out of formal meeting spaces (and the hands of the senior men who control them) and into the online world – allowing anyone to express their opinions freely and anonymously. The older generation complained bitterly about online attempts to humiliate elders and disrupt existing lines of hierarchy within families. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239489/original/file-20181005-72127-12lv9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A goat hair tent in downtown Amman is used as a backdrop for reconciliations that are then posted online.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Geoffrey Hughes</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, these same tools also offer a critical platform to women and younger men. Indeed, the senior men I spoke to were most concerned with young men whipping up fresh conflict on social media over “old blood” (supposedly long settled homicides). The consequences of these new online interventions, many of which I have seen first hand, include physical injury, property destruction and even death.</p>
<p>With its inherent tendency to do away with physical distance, social media further exacerbates conflicts by working against one of the most basic principles of Bedouin justice. This is the idea that the opposing sides should be separated – and out of contact – during an initial period (often associated with what is termed “boiling blood”) until cooler heads can prevail. This usually involves the banishment of the perpetrator’s whole family from their homes. </p>
<p>The determined reporting of local journalists such as <a href="https://www.7iber.com/author/dana-gibreel/">Dana Gibreel</a> has revealed that Jordan’s security apparatus has increasingly allowed or enabled <a href="http://www.7iber.com/2013/03/tribal-jalwa/">the mass-banishment of alleged criminals’ families</a> in the name of public order since 2011.</p>
<p>Such practices raise troubling questions about the line between preventative security measures and collective punishment. <a href="http://www.hayatcenter.org/publications/the-tribal-evacuation-costum-jalwah-and-violation-of-human-rights-in-jordan/">Activists point out</a> that such banishments interfere with the rights of family members to education, employment – and even the right to vote.</p>
<h2>Connecting people</h2>
<p>But a new generation of Jordanian tribal leaders is making the most of the opportunities that social media can bring. They use it to show off their successful work in reconciliation and advertise their services all the more widely. </p>
<p>Even if increased publicity has the potential to backfire by inflaming tensions and upsetting fragile truces, that’s not always the case. One such “Facebook sheikh” claimed that people from as far away as Saudi Arabia were learning about tribal disagreements and offering to contribute to blood money payments to earn religious merit and reanimate old bonds of kinship. </p>
<p>For its part, the Jordanian government has <a href="https://www.7iber.com/2016/06/interview-with-sayel-abu-tayeh/">long denied that it encourages tribal justice</a> in any official capacity. Many commentators both from <a href="https://jordaniandissent.wordpress.com/2011/04/27/tribalism-in-jordan-and-its-importance/">inside</a> and <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/07/16/tribes-and-tribalism-in-a-neo-liberal-jordan/">outside</a> Jordan would disagree, pointing to the obvious ways in which tribal law promotes social control by strengthening hierarchies of gender, generation, class and lineage. </p>
<p>However, Bedouin justice also offers avenues for upending those hierarchies and revealing the weakness of supposedly powerful leaders – most dramatically in cases of “cutting the face” where their truces are flagrantly violated. In this way, social media feuds are no rupture with tradition at all. They are better seen as a modern continuation of a dynamism that accompanies “tradition” in many of its contemporary guises.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoffrey Hughes does not consult with or own shares in any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. His research was made possible by the generous support of the University of Michigan, London School of Economics and Political Science, the US National Endowment for the Humanities, the US National Science Foundation and the American Center of Oriental Research in Amman, Jordan. The views expressed, however, are his alone.</span></em></p>
The old ways of doing things still matter – it’s just that some of it now takes place online.
Geoffrey Hughes, Lecturer in Anthropology, University of Exeter
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/94160
2018-05-18T10:42:14Z
2018-05-18T10:42:14Z
I teach refugees to map their world
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216696/original/file-20180427-135830-1aum3yd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from Zaatari refugee camp, Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brian Tomaszewski</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>I first visited the Zaatari refugee camp in early 2015. Located in northern Jordan, the camp is home to more than 80,000 Syrian refugees. I was there as part of a <a href="https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1427873">research study on refugee camp wireless and information infrastructure</a>. </p>
<p>It’s one thing to read about refugees in the news. It’s a whole different thing to actually go visit a camp. I saw people living in metal caravans, mixed with tents and other materials to create a sense of home. Many used improvised electrical systems to keep the power going. People are rebuilding their lives to create a better future for their families and themselves, just like any of us would if faced with a similar situation.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=hcIpln4AAAAJ&hl=en">As a geographer</a>, I was quickly struck by how geographically complex Zaatari camp was. The camp management staff faced serious spatial challenges. By “spatial challenges,” I mean issues that any small city might face, such as keeping track of the electrical grid; understanding where people live within the camp; and locating other important resources, such as schools, mosques and health centers. Officials at Zaatari had some maps of the camp, but they struggled to keep up with its ever-changing nature. </p>
<p>An experiment I launched there led to up-to-date maps of the camp and, I hope, valuable training for some of its residents.</p>
<h2>The power of maps</h2>
<p>Like many other refugee camps, Zaatari developed quickly in response to a humanitarian emergency. In rapid onset emergencies, mapping often isn’t as high of a priority as basic necessities like food, water and shelter. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2014-0082">my research shows</a> that maps can be an invaluable tool in a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis. Modern digital mapping tools have been essential for locating resources and making decisions in a number of crises, from the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/map/haiti/haiti-earthquake-damage-map-january-12-2010">2010 earthquake in Haiti</a> to <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/62995">the refugee influx in Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>This got me thinking that the refugees themselves could be the best people to map Zaatari. They have intimate knowledge of the camp’s layout, understand where important resources are located and benefit most from camp maps. </p>
<p>With these ideas in mind, <a href="https://www.rit.edu/gccis/geoinfosciencecenter/">my lab</a> teamed up with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Al-Balqa and Princess Sumaya universities in Jordan. </p>
<p>Modern maps are often made with a technology known as Geographic Information Systems, or GIS. Using funding from <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/innovation/tag/innovation-fund/">the UNHCR Innovation Fund</a>, we acquired the computer hardware to create a GIS lab. From corporate partner Esri, we were obtained <a href="http://www.esri.com/nonprofit">low-cost, professional GIS software</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/216677/original/file-20180427-135840-wtt2af.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">RefuGIS team member Yusuf Hamad and his son Abdullah – who was born in Zaatari refugee camp – learning about GIS.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brian Tomaszewski</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over a period of about 18 months, we trained 10 Syrian refugees. Students in the RefuGIS class ranged in age from 17 to 60. Their backgrounds from when they lived in Syria ranged from being a math teacher to a tour operator to a civil engineer. I was extremely fortunate that one of my students, Yusuf Hamad, spoke fluent English and was able translate my instructions into Arabic for the other students. </p>
<p>We taught concepts such as coordinate systems, map projections, map design and geographic visualization; we also taught how to collect spatial data in the field using GPS. The class then used this knowledge to map places of interest in the camp, such as the locations of schools, mosques and shops.</p>
<p>The class also learned how to map data using mobile phones. The data has been used to update camp reference maps and to support a wide range of camp activities. </p>
<p>I made a particular point to ensure the class could learn how to do these tasks on their own. This was important: No matter how well-intentioned a technological intervention is, it will often fall apart if the displaced community relies completely on outside people to make it work. </p>
<p>As a teacher, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/GHTC.2017.8239276">this class</a> was my most satisfying educational experience. This was perhaps my finest group of GIS students across all the types of students I have taught over my 15 years of teaching. Within a relatively short amount of time, <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/55994">they were able to create professional maps</a> that now serve camp management staff and refugees themselves. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218500/original/file-20180510-34006-1gt8yv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A map created with geographic information collected by students in the RefuGIS program.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UNHCR</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Jobs for refugees</h2>
<p>My experiences training refugees and humanitarian professionals in Jordan <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/unhcr-rwanda-factsheet-february-2015">and Rwanda</a> have made me reflect upon the broader possibilities that GIS can bring to the over <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html">65 million refugees in the world today</a>. </p>
<p>It’s challenging for <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/refugee-livelihoods-jordan-september-2017">refugees to develop livelihoods at a camp</a>. Many struggle to find employment after leaving. </p>
<p>GIS could help refugees create a better future for themselves and their future homes. If people return to their home countries, maps – essential to activities like construction and transportation – can aid the rebuilding process. If they adopt a new home country, they may find they have marketable skills. The worldwide geospatial industry is worth an estimated <a href="https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/geospatial-industrys-value-world-economy/">US$400 billion</a> and <a href="https://www.doleta.gov/brg/indprof/geospatial.cfm">geospatial jobs</a> are expected to <a href="https://www.doleta.gov/brg/indprof/geospatial_profile.cfm">grow over the coming years</a>. </p>
<p>Our team is currently helping some of the refugees get <a href="https://www.esri.com/training/certification/">GIS industry certifications</a>. This can further expand their career opportunities when they leave the camp and begin to rebuild their lives. </p>
<p>Technology training interventions for refugees often focus on things like <a href="http://refugeecodeweek.org/">computer programming</a>, <a href="https://medium.freecodecamp.org/how-we-taught-dozens-of-refugees-to-code-then-helped-them-get-developer-jobs-fd37036c13b0">web development</a> and other traditional IT skills. However, I would argue that GIS should be given equal importance. It offers a rich and interactive way to learn about people, places and spatial skills – things that I think the world in general needs more of. Refugees could help lead the way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Tomaszewski receives funding from UNHCR and US NSF. </span></em></p>
Maps can be an invaluable tool in a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis. A pilot project trained Syrian refugees at a Jordan camp to create their own.
Brian Tomaszewski, Associate Professor of Information Sciences and Technologies, Rochester Institute of Technology
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/94213
2018-05-02T10:24:49Z
2018-05-02T10:24:49Z
How tech can bring dignity to refugees in humanitarian crises
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216692/original/file-20180427-135814-1a92hp7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iris scanning technology in use in Jordan. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Dy5Wt_Vd9M">UNHCR via YouTube</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The term “refugee camp” is often misleading. Many of the facilities housing some of the world’s 65m people fleeing war and disasters resemble small cities rather than comfortable campgrounds. With tents and caravans crammed together in urban-style grids that sometimes stretch for miles, aid organisations and governments commonly use satellite imagery and other surveillance technologies to control movement in and out of these sprawling installations. </p>
<p>While new technologies are now being used more frequently in the management of humanitarian crises, data infringements of digital records to monitor refugees have also <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2017/12/08/humanitarian-data-breaches-real-scandal-our-collective-inaction">created new risks</a>. Collecting data on marginalised groups in conflict zones is known to be a risky undertaking if it falls into the wrong hands – yet the development of digital databases on Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has recently been <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2017/10/23/irresponsible-data-risks-registering-rohingya">linked to further discrimination</a> and persecution. </p>
<p>In humanitarian crises, technological innovations do not easily translate into ethical advances and can at times resemble an Orwellian tale of tight control over undesired populations. This serves as another unwelcome reminder to refugees of what they have often lost: their homes, livelihoods, families, freedom of movement – and their privacy.</p>
<p>While all these factors are of serious concern, aid agencies have also shown that technology can be fused with ethical ideas to move towards a more flexible and human-centred emergency relief system. We believe that there is plenty of potential to use technology in ways that provide more dignity to refugees.</p>
<h2>Choice and autonomy</h2>
<p>Given the remoteness of many refugee camps in places such as Uganda, Bangladesh and Kenya, technology can help to address some of the enormous issues facing the world’s refugees. It is already being used to improve refugees’ access to finance, to support their individual autonomy and offer them new choices.</p>
<p>While providing blankets and food inside a camp may have its uses in some situations, such in-kind handouts often create relationships of dependency while confining people to the camps themselves. In Jordan, a <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-introduces-innovative-iris-scan-technology-provide-food-assistance-syrian-refu">partnership</a> between humanitarian organisations and financial institutions uses eye-scanning technology to allow refugees to receive cash aid outside the camps. This <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/innovation/using-biometrics-bring-assistance-refugees-jordan/">helps to cut</a> overhead costs and reduce the role of financial intermediaries, which means that more money can go to refugees.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8Dy5Wt_Vd9M?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Eye-scanning equipment has been placed at many local banks and supermarkets throughout Jordan, where refugees can collect the cash hand-outs – which average between $US 125-150 per month – without being confined to the camps. This approach – which uses <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-refugees-blockchain/u-n-glimpses-into-blockchain-future-with-eye-scan-payments-for-refugees-idUSKBN19C0BB">blockchain technology</a> to manage aid payments provided by the UN’s World Food Program – allows refugees to move more freely than before and maintain contact with relatives in other places. This helps to cement social and economic support networks that are important for individual well-being and long-term resilience.</p>
<p>Other uses of technology in humanitarian crises often revolve around mobile phones. In facilities such as Kenya’s Dadaab and Jordan’s Zaatari camps, this offers support to refugees gaining knowledge to start businesses, communicating with customers and suppliers, and arranging payments. </p>
<p>Technology has also been used in camps such as Azraq in Jordan and Kakuma in Kenya to <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2017/9/59c391214/online-study-scheme-gives-refugee-students-degree-hope.html">provide online higher education</a> with support from universities such as Geneva and Princeton. </p>
<p>3-D printing is also being explored to help refugees access important supplies. The Jordanian organisation <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/technology-to-empower-refugees">Refugee Open Ware</a> is trying to bring important medical equipment, including prosthetic limbs, to injured survivors of the Syrian civil war. The aim is to create an open source movement around 3-D printing prosthetics for refugees and to help bring innovation into the humanitarian sector. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZSFL2aS6tow?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Humanitarian relief is not just about helping people survive in hostile settlements – it is also about re-establishing hope and self-respect in those who have suffered due to conflict, economic upheaval or natural disaster. Applied responsibly, technology can give humanitarian ethical ideals new life. In the process, it can disrupt the aid system by bringing new ideas, approaches and organisations into the sector to empower refugees and rebuild their livelihoods.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ai-will-be-used-by-humanitarian-organisations-this-could-deepen-neocolonial-tendencies-92547">AI will be used by humanitarian organisations – this could deepen neocolonial tendencies</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The novelty of these examples is not due to technological innovation alone – which can also serve more sinister purposes, whether in refugee camps or the most modern of cities, given the different ways in which <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-shine-a-light-on-the-unseen-algorithms-that-power-big-brother-51373">technology and data</a> can reinforce conscious or unconscious biases. Instead, we should seek to harness the good that technology can bring by creatively fusing new technologies with ethics to bring ideals of human dignity, participation and autonomy back to some of the world’s most disenfranchised people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94213/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Corinna Frey received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Cambridge University Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marian Gatzweiler received funding from the University of Edinburgh Business School. </span></em></p>
From eye-scanners to 3D printers, technology in humanitarian crises can be a positive force for disenfranchised people.
Corinna Frey, PhD Candidate, Cambridge Judge Business School
Marian Gatzweiler, Early Career Fellow, The University of Edinburgh
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/93425
2018-03-26T23:01:51Z
2018-03-26T23:01:51Z
The dismal failure of efforts to empower people in the Arab world
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211252/original/file-20180320-80615-pvr2k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protestors stand behind burning barricades during clashes with riot police near the Tunisian capital of Tunis in January 2018. Violent protests over price hikes raised fears of broader unrest in the country that was the birthplace of the Arab Spring.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Amine Landoulsi)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The protests that caused the overthrow of Tunisia’s authoritarian ruler in 2011 were triggered by a street vendor with no municipal permit to sell his produce who then <a href="http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html">set himself on fire</a> after being harassed by local bureaucrats.</p>
<p>Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, poor municipal governance and service delivery contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings. These uprisings ultimately <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2015/jan/03/arab-spring-migrant-wave-instability-war">led to the arrival of a million refugees on Western shores.</a> </p>
<p>This May, Tunisia will hold its first municipal elections since 2010. <a href="http://democracy-reporting.org/tunisia-should-pass-the-decentralisation-law-before-the-local-elections/">Experts are debating</a> whether Tunisia’s decentralization law should be passed before the elections to make sure municipal governments have the powers and resources to meet their citizens’ needs.</p>
<p>The World Bank and other international financial institutions are implementing <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01418/WEB/IMAGES/FINALWOR.PDF">decentralization programs</a> to improve municipal political participation and service delivery throughout the region.</p>
<p>But are they working?</p>
<h2>Decisions remain in hands of elites</h2>
<p><a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/local-politics-in-jordan-and-morocco/9780231183581">My research</a> on authoritarian states in the region finds that decentralization programs simply help keep authoritarian regimes in power and, in municipalities, keep decisions and services in hands of elites.</p>
<p>Political decentralization is the transfer of decision-making powers and responsibilities from central to lower-level governments, including municipal elected officials.</p>
<p>It’s also meant to bring public input into municipal decision-making processes. With improved public participation in decision-making, the thinking goes, policies should better support local needs and provide services equally to everyone.</p>
<p>The World Bank and other international financial institutions <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/310921468753023954/Decentralization-in-Latin-America-learning-through-experience">first promoted decentralization in Latin America</a> after the fall of authoritarian rulers in the 1980s. Decentralization followed democratization.</p>
<p>Yet in most states of the Middle East and North Africa, decentralization programs are being implemented while authoritarian regimes are still in place. Authoritarian rulers have long manipulated democratic institutions, such as elections, to stay in power. </p>
<h2>Why would authoritarian rulers give up power?</h2>
<p>The answer is that they don’t. To stay in power, authoritarian regimes use several clever strategies. Two are particularly important in regards to decentralization. </p>
<p>The first strategy is an unelected administrative system that oversees elected institutions. </p>
<p>Moroccan municipalities are under the jurisdiction of the <a href="https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_11.2017.pdf">Ministry of the Interior</a> that approves municipal council decisions. The ministry justifies this supervisory role based on its expertise. But in fact, it allows the ministry to facilitate mayors who are supportive of the regime and obstruct those who are not. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211619/original/file-20180322-54872-1ctk8v0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this March 2017 photo, Moroccan King Mohammed VI, right, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II, centre, review royal guard at the king’s palace in Rabat, Morocco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/ Abdeljalil Bounhar)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second strategy is the use of patronage. Authoritarian rulers grant privileges and resources to key constituencies or political parties to ensure their support. </p>
<p>In Jordan, <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/06/10/survivor_jordan_how_king_abdullah_has_kept_his_crown_amid_the_arab_uprisings.html">certain tribes</a> receive privileges. </p>
<p>In Morocco, privileges go to specific political parties. These privileges trickle down through a party. </p>
<h2>Accountable to the Moroccan king</h2>
<p>The system works both ways. Municipal politicians promise votes to those higher up in the party in exchange for services they can give to those who voted for them. Services are denied to those who did not vote for them.</p>
<p>Decentralization need not, and does not, affect these strategies. Nor does it necessarily result in less municipal supervision. Instead, supervision is “decentralized” to a lower administrative level.</p>
<p>Here’s how it works in Morocco, where the greatest degree of decentralization in the region has occurred: The minister of the interior is no longer responsible for actually reviewing municipal decisions. But governors who are appointed by and accountable to the minister of the interior —and ultimately, the king — do that job. </p>
<p>Responsibilities are either not handed down to municipal governments, or municipal governments only gain partial authority over them. </p>
<h2>Only have the power to recommend</h2>
<p>Jordan recently passed a <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/72905">decentralization law and a municipalities law</a> that created new elected provincial and local councils. </p>
<p>But the laws removed authority from municipal councils. </p>
<p>Citizens no longer vote for those municipal councils. Instead they vote for mayors and local councils that are smaller than municipal councils, and have fewer powers. Municipal councils are now composed of local council heads and have fewer powers than previously. Local councils, meantime, largely only have the power to recommend. </p>
<p>The real authority belongs to the executive director, who is appointed by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. He determines the annual budget and sends it to the elected mayor. </p>
<p>And under Morocco’s decentralization, approximately 70 per cent of the roles and responsibilities of the regions, provinces and municipalities overlap. This confusion gives appointed governors authority over areas that, according to the municipal charter, belong to municipal governments. </p>
<h2>Is the public really included?</h2>
<p>Decentralization programs aim to bring the public into municipal decision-making processes. But neither public participation nor service delivery are necessarily improved. </p>
<p>Moroccan municipalities must create committees for “equity and equal opportunities.” Members of the public must be on the committees. The committees’ views must be included in municipalities’ development plans. </p>
<p>Yet many elected officials are at the same time also heads of civil society organizations such as a neighbourhood development association. They take advantage of this dual role by dominating the committees at the expense of other representatives.</p>
<p>By dominating the committees, councillors are able to put projects into development plans for their own political advantage. Favouritism and inequitable service delivery continue to exist. </p>
<h2>The danger of decentralization</h2>
<p>Decentralization can in fact strengthen authoritarianism. While authoritarian rulers can call themselves political reformers, in the eyes of citizens, elected officials appear corrupt and unwilling to improve public participation or service delivery. </p>
<p>Decentralization justifies administrative supervision over elected bodies. The authoritarian regime is strengthened while elected officials and democratic institutions seem ineffective. </p>
<p>International donors like Canada support decentralization by implementing projects to strengthen municipal leadership and administrative capacity. </p>
<p>But are we, in fact, strengthening authoritarianism?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janine A. Clark receives funding from the Social Science and Research Council of Canada</span></em></p>
Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa is supposed to lead to greater public representation in municipal politics. In fact, it is largely strengthening authoritarianism.
Janine A. Clark, Professor of Political Science, University of Guelph
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/93518
2018-03-26T12:57:35Z
2018-03-26T12:57:35Z
Al-Sisi poised for empty victory in Egypt as signs of unrest grow across the region
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211353/original/file-20180321-165568-19ehdkk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protester mocking President al-Sisi. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/22422195819">Alisdare Hickson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Egyptians are voting in presidential elections on March 26-28. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who grabbed power in 2013, is set to win another term by a landslide. Yet this is far from a sign of strength: opposition candidates <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-sisi/sisi-says-he-wanted-more-challengers-in-egyptian-election-idUSKBN1GW33P">have been</a> silenced, and even pro-government media <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/3/18/egypt-muffles-press-with-fake-news-charges">are being</a> purged of the slightest undertone of dissent. </p>
<p>Al-Sisi’s grip on power may appear firm, but his country’s <a href="http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Interface-4-1-Teti-and-Gervasio.pdf">problems</a> can’t be thrown into jail like his opponents. His predecessors <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12301713">Hosni Mubarak</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhu-YgCyPz4">Anwar Sadat</a> learned this the hard way.</p>
<p>Yet don’t expect much hand-wringing from the West about Egypt’s stability in the coming days – despite its having been through <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution">a revolution</a> and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/23/egypt-spring-2014-counter-revolution">coup</a> already this decade. Governments and other strategists only appear to worry about countries in this region once discontent turns “hot” – like in Syria, Yemen, Libya or Iraq. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320170921_Sinkholes_of_Insecurity_The_Structural_Causes_of_Weaknesses_in_Six_Arab_Countries_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_11">shows that</a> this may be a serious and costly mistake. The whole region is suffering from exactly the same deep-seated problems as before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/recovery-from-the-arab-spring-will-take-a-generation-or-more-20522">Arab Spring</a> of 2010-11. In Egypt and various other apparently stable countries, there are very high levels of discontent that could easily boil over. </p>
<h2>Then and now</h2>
<p>The uprisings earlier in the decade were not simply demands for Western-style democracy. Protesters may have been disillusioned by all the election rhetoric from these authoritarian regimes in democratic clothing, but they were primarily disgusted by corruption, abuse of power and economic inequality. They wanted governments that would <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315837128_What_do_the_People_Still_Want_Conceptions_of_Democracy_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_1">address these concerns</a> rather than lining their own pockets and those of their cronies. </p>
<p>Unfortunately little has changed, as newly released <a href="http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files">opinion polls show</a> for Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia – with upwards of 1,000 people surveyed in each country. While citizens worry about issues their governments prioritise, such as security, terrorism and religious extremism, their main concerns are the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">same as</a> in 2010 – decent jobs, inflation, inequality and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315713451_The_Integrity_of_States_Corruption_in_the_EU%27s_Southern_Neighbourhood_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_6">corruption</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Top two challenges by country</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>People don’t believe their governments are responsive to their <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315837128_What_do_the_People_Still_Want_Conceptions_of_Democracy_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_1">priorities</a>. Fewer than one third of Egyptians think so, while in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan that figure drops to a quarter or less. In Lebanon it is a mere 7%. </p>
<p>Across all six countries an astonishing 85% or more think their governments are not making a serious effort to tackle corruption. Meanwhile, 75% or more are not satisfied with their governments’ efforts to create jobs or fight inflation. </p>
<p><strong>Views on economy, corruption and terrorism</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The discontent is worst in Lebanon, where fewer than 5% of people approve of the government’s work. Even the performance on internal security – the one area where citizens in the other five countries are relatively satisfied – was considered adequate by only a quarter of Lebanese respondents. </p>
<p>This region-wide disenchantment translates into low confidence in parliaments and political parties, the key institutions which ought to be representing citizens’ interests. Confidence varies from country to country: Lebanon again scores poorly. Egypt fares better than others, but this owes more to intense government propaganda than any real effectiveness. </p>
<p><strong>Trust in state institutions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Citizens also don’t feel they have the civil and political rights necessary to legitimately express their grievances and push their governments for reforms. When people are unable to adequately express their unhappiness, it inevitably increases the potential for radicalisation. </p>
<p><strong>Views on civil rights</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Little changed</h2>
<p>As a result of the Arab uprisings, governments fell in <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245">Tunisia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-years-on-the-spirit-of-tahrir-square-has-been-all-but-crushed-53461">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/explained-how-the-arab-spring-led-to-an-increasingly-vicious-civil-war-in-yemen-55968">Yemen</a> and eventually <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/23/gaddafi-last-words-begged-mercy">Libya</a>, while there were more limited political changes in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482679">Jordan</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19401680">Kuwait</a>. Governments in other countries announced political concessions, including <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-d-hirst/morocco-constitution_b_884430.html">Morocco</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-algeria-really-spring-cleaning-its-deep-state-51615">Algeria</a>, <a href="http://www.mepc.org/oman-forgotten-corner-arab-spring">Oman</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-executions-business-as-usual-in-a-post-arab-spring-world-52690">Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>Yet since the issues which drove many of these protesters to the streets have not been addressed, their governments remain vulnerable both to mass mobilisation and to less obvious forms of radicalisation – as recent protests <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245">in Tunisia</a> show. </p>
<p>Western policymakers and academics concerned with security are at risk of missing this. They do not seem to have learned the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1370559/Lessons_from_the_Arab_Uprisings">lessons</a> of the Arab uprisings. Absent armed conflict, they <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315836965_From_Ring_of_Friends_to_Ring_of_Fire_Challenges_to_Stability_and_Legitimacy_in_MENA_States_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_4">still tend</a> to dismiss the importance to stability of social cohesion, inequality and poor political representation.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sisi or Sisiphus?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi_in_2017.jpg#/media/File:Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi_in_2017.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We must therefore <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061014">reassess the stability</a> of countries like Egypt. We must stop assuming their leaders will forever be able to simply repress dissent, and stop assuming that such repression doesn’t come with costs and risks, both human and political. </p>
<p>These countries are in fact security “sinkholes”: regimes whose foundations erode while apparently seeming stable, often to the point of collapse. Far from being a sign of strength or stability, remaining deaf to the needs of the people make things worse in the long run. </p>
<p>As al-Sisi makes his inevitable victory speech, we would be wise not to ignore these warning signs. Until we learn that conflict must be dealt with at its roots, history is liable to just keep repeating itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the European Commission 7th Framework Programme for the ArabTransformations Project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme for the ArabTransformations Project. He is affiliated with the European Centre for International Affairs. </span></em></p>
Public disaffection in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries betrays deep-seated tensions beneath the surface.
Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of Aberdeen
Andrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Aberdeen
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.