tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/mark-arbib-2428/articlesMark Arbib – The Conversation2016-09-21T20:28:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/642372016-09-21T20:28:40Z2016-09-21T20:28:40ZThe revolving door: why politicians become lobbyists, and lobbyists become politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135448/original/image-20160825-30209-1r1d6ad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former resources and energy minister Martin Ferguson went into lobbying for that sector after retiring from politics.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Paul Miller</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The “revolving door” of politics – the means by which government officials leave office to become lobbyists, and by which lobbyists become government officials – presents problems for modern democracies that largely go unrecognised, unaccounted for and unpoliced.</p>
<p>In certain respects, the revolving door is inevitable, a natural byproduct of political tragics fulfilling a varied career in politics. But when even the most senior politicians go on to work as lobbyists, it can profoundly undermine democracy.</p>
<h2>Unprecedented access</h2>
<p>A lobbyist’s efficacy primarily depends on their ability to gain access to decision-makers. </p>
<p>Of the 538 lobbyists registered by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet at the time of writing, <a href="http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/who_register_lobbyists.cfm">191 are former government representatives</a>. </p>
<p>Working in government in any capacity provides knowledge that is invaluable to lobbyists. But the advantage is not merely informational: having worked with government officials means knowing them. It often means having had drinks with them, or knowing their loved ones’ names and birthdays, or their personal phone numbers. </p>
<p>The best lobbyists do not merely lobby a government contact: they lobby a friend. This immediately creates a conflict of interest that cannot be overcome; we are fundamentally biased toward those we like.</p>
<h2>Incompatibility with the law</h2>
<p>However, the conflict of interest does not end there. The revolving door makes it all too easy for corruption to take place, because it creates problems that aren’t adequately policed by anti-corruption laws in Australia (or in democracies generally).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00753">Commonwealth Criminal Code</a> prohibits government officials from “dishonestly” asking for, agreeing to receive or receiving a benefit, where that benefit will influence the exercise of their duties. Beyond this, a patchwork of state and federal laws and codes of conduct exist with the express purpose of preventing <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-bribes-please-were-corrupt-australians-59657">quid-pro-quo forms of corruption</a> in politics. </p>
<p>However, with rare exceptions, such as <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/verdict-eddie-obeid-found-guilty-of-misconduct-in-public-office-20160621-gpo8xz.html">the prosecution</a> of former New South Wales state MP Eddie Obeid, the laws designed to prevent corruption among government officials are rarely enforced.</p>
<p>This can be viewed two ways. One is to argue corruption isn’t occurring because the laws work as a deterrent. The better view is the law makes it almost impossible to prosecute corruption, owing to difficulties with investigation, evidentiary rules and the burden of proof. The phenomenon of the revolving door complicates these problems exponentially.</p>
<h2>Intemporal conflicts of interest</h2>
<p>Consider this hypothetical. If a minister benefits from a decision immediately, it is in breach of <a href="https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/statement_ministerial_standards.pdf">their code of conduct</a>. It may also be in breach of the law.</p>
<p>A delayed benefit, however, is more likely to escape legal restriction and scrutiny. The official is no longer bound by their code of conduct, and it is too hard to prove a criminal act.</p>
<p>The acts of receiving $1 million and thereafter conferring a political favour can be readily associated for the purposes of prosecution. However, it is far harder to associate the same political favour with a job offered many years later, following retirement, that pays $1 million as “salary”.</p>
<p>The deck is very stacked in that sense. All former government officials deserve the presumption of innocence and many may well accept private sector jobs, or positions as lobbyists, for innocuous or even altruistic reasons. But even in these scenarios, the conflict of interest remains.</p>
<p>This is in part illustrated where ministers from the most recent era of Labor governments have left their positions to work as lobbyists, often for industries directly tied to their portfolios. </p>
<p>Ministers, in particular, can use their access to help their clients, but they also create conflicts of interest that become apparent only after they leave office.</p>
<p>Take, for example, former senator Mark Arbib going to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/casino-empire-grows-with-help-from-powerful-friends-20130622-2opa0.html">lobby for Crown</a>, or the former resources and energy minister, Martin Ferguson, lobbying for … the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/union-call-to-expel-ministerturnedlobbyist-martin-ferguson-from-labor-20150327-1m9gpg.html">resources and energy sector</a>.</p>
<p>Arbib and Ferguson are not alone; the problem is rife. Former Howard government ministers went on to work as lobbyists in prolific numbers: <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/fedral-politics/political-news/former-coalition-figures-in-demand-by-lobbying-industry-20140126-31gux.html">Nick Minchin</a>, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/csg-industry-hires-wellconnected-staffers-20150515-gh2rg3.html">Mark Vaile</a>, <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/news/big-pharma-foxes-in-the-hen-house/">Michael Wooldridge</a>, <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/politics/national/costello-puts-on-new-hat-at-ecg-advisory-20130206-ji7ft">Peter Costello</a>, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/business/making-sure-pills-go-down-and-money-flows-20100226-p96y.html">Richard Alston</a> and <a href="http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/register/view_agency.cfm?id=563">Peter Reith</a>, <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2004/07/20/where-220-ex-howard-staffers-are-now/">among others</a>, went on to become lobbyists despite these delayed conflicts of interest.</p>
<p>Reith, a former defence minister, offers a most interesting example. <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/19/1040174338094.html">He joined Tenix</a>, a defence and logistics firm, after retiring in 2002. Tenix had won an <a href="http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/4536/tenix-wins-australian-ew-contracts-(feb.-23).html">important supply contract</a> when he was minister in 2001. It went on to <a href="https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Gallop/2005/02/Gallop-Government-congratulates-Tenix-Defence-on-$60million-contract.aspx">secure numerous other defence contracts</a> <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/defence-gear-gone-public-pays-the-bill-20120929-26sa2.html">while he lobbied for the firm</a>. </p>
<p>We assume Reith acted perfectly legally. But that’s the problem – the law is inadequate.</p>
<h2>(Partially) closing the door</h2>
<p>In a representative system, lobbyists fill an inevitable and important role. </p>
<p>However, their ability to gain disproportional access to decision-makers means non-profit organisations, let alone the hoi polloi of the Australian electorate, are not given <a href="http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/who_register_clients.cfm">anywhere near the same ability</a> to converse, dine and wine with their own government. The revolving door dramatically compounds this problem. </p>
<p>And while politicians decide on contracts worth billions of dollars, there is significant incentive (however fulfilled or unfulfilled it may be) for corporations to act nefariously and try to use government for their own gain. </p>
<p>The proliferation of lobbying, the loopholes that allow conflict of interests, and the lack of rigorous regulation and oversight make it impossible to calculate just how much money the taxpayer loses when officials decide to put their self-interest ahead of public duty.</p>
<p>As radical as it may sound, the revolving door may need to be legislatively closed, at least for ministers. Those who take high elected office, well-paid and prestigious as it is, must remember they are public servants. They should not then accept positions that create clear conflicts of interest. </p>
<p>If that means forgoing the astronomical financial windfall of accepting work as a lobbyist at their retirement, the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/bn/1011/superannuationbenefits">parliamentary pension</a> is hardly cold comfort.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Rennie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When even the most senior politicians go on to work as lobbyists, it can profoundly undermine democracy.George Rennie, PhD Candidate, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/311892014-09-08T05:05:49Z2014-09-08T05:05:49ZInsulation royal commission exposes fatal market flaws<p>The most important finding in the final report of the <a href="http://www.homeinsulationroyalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx">Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program</a> is the one the Abbott government is least likely to heed. One of the two crucial flaws Commissioner Ian Hanger identified was the decision to build the Home Insulation Program (HIP) around a laissez-faire market-delivery model. By offering an easily accessed rebate, the Rudd government decided that start-up companies, not the public service, would have oversight of the program.</p>
<p>Hanger’s report also exposes the fact that this choice of business model, a “turning point in the [Home Insulation Program]”, was imposed on the then Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA) by forces close to then prime minister Kevin Rudd: the <a href="http://www.dpmc.gov.au/annual_reports/2009-10/html/chapter-3-domestic-policy/office-of-the-coordinator-general/">Office of the Coordinator-General</a> (a role Rudd created to oversee the stimulus measures) and Senator <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/insulation-blame-sheeted-home-to-alp-by-royal-commission/story-fn59niix-1227044453748">Mark Arbib</a>.</p>
<p>Former Labor attorney-general <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2014/s4078838.htm">Mark Dreyfus is right to say</a> that the A$20 million spent on the Royal Commission has not vastly altered the account of the insulation scheme that the previous eight inquiries had provided. The picture of a rushed program run by public servants with little understanding of the potential hazards of working in ceiling spaces was well-established.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott must also be lamenting the failure of the Royal Commission to confirm the multiple <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/insulation-blame-sheeted-home-to-alp-by-royal-commission/story-fn59niix-1227044453748">“direct personal warnings”</a> that Coalition MPs had claimed were issued to Rudd and Environment Minister <a href="http://www.petergarrett.com.au/">Peter Garrett</a>.</p>
<h2>A rush to outsource responsibility</h2>
<p>However, the findings do raise profound lessons for government. The dominance of market-knows-best ideology among the senior public service and Labor ministers and their staffers was critical to the mistaken and deadly assumptions behind the insulation program’s design. Linked to this, the commission has highlighted the disastrous role of private consultants and particularly the program’s <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/need-for-speed-won-over-safety-in-home-insulation-scheme/story-fn59niix-1227044309654">“external risk expert”</a>, Minter Ellison’s Margaret Coaldrake. Underpinning all these problems was the lack of program delivery experience and capacity within the environment department.</p>
<p>The Hanger report is the first to identify the abrupt imposition of a new delivery model, two months into the planning process, as a “critical” decision (page 4), “indeed the cause of later failures by the Australian government” (p. 157). Until a meeting on 31 March 2009, environment department officials had planned to contract major regional firms for recruiting, training and supervising the new insulation installer workforce.</p>
<p>This “regional brokerage” model (similar to that administered by the states in the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Building_the_Education_Revolution">Building the Education Revolution</a> school halls stimulus program) itself relied on outsourcing, albeit to experienced companies with “skin in the game”. But Minter Ellison’s first risk assessment found the department’s inexperience made it virtually impossible that the contracts would be signed off in time for the July 1 roll-out announced by Rudd. Minter Ellison’s suggested treatment for this and most other risks was to transfer “the largest risks to third parties (effective outsourcing)” (p. 117).</p>
<p>As Hanger notes, it was likely this risk report that informed the decision by the Office of the Coordinator-General (OCG) and Senator Arbib (p. 106) to push for a wholly new model for the home insulation program. The resulting “market-delivery” (p. 127) rebate model was unilaterally imposed on environment department officials without warning at a meeting that Hanger found was “structured to impose the OCG delivery model on DEWHA” (p. 136).</p>
<h2>Letting the market rip</h2>
<p>Rather than contract large companies to deliver the program, the government would provide a Medicare-administered rebate coupled with a low-barrier-to-entry online registration system. Market forces would do the rest. It was this recipe of funding and easy registration that drove the 15-fold increase in installations as the number of installation companies grew from 200 before the insulation program to 8,359 (p. 2).</p>
<p>As well as a zeal for meeting Rudd’s July 1 roll-out deadline, the OCG-Arbib model was “designed to allow market forces to work and deliver the most efficiency/effectiveness without providing a centralised solution” (p. 128). It would be a “light-touch regulatory model” (p. 131) that would “let the market operate with few restrictions” (p. 131).</p>
<p>The insulation program was constructed in response to the Global Financial Crisis, which Rudd and others categorised as a crisis of “neoliberalism”. And yet the public servants, and even Labor ministers involved in designing the scheme, were driven by the notion that public involvement should be minimised while, in the words of the public servants, they “let the market rip” (p. 144).</p>
<p>And rip it did. Every month that the program ran, a year’s worth of insulation activity was generated. The government orchestrated this situation and Hanger has found (p. 3) that the government was responsible for the results:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1.1.18 The reality is that the Australian Government conceived of, devised and implemented a program that enabled very large numbers of inexperienced workers – often engaged by unscrupulous and avaricious employers or head contractors, who were themselves inexperienced in insulation installation – to undertake potentially dangerous work. It should have done more to protect them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The commission has found that even when government outsources work, “risk cannot be abrogated” (p.309). This has profound implications for the delivery of government programs by both sides of politics.</p>
<h2>The delusion of outsourcing risk</h2>
<p>As incredible as it may now seem, the public service saw the market-driven delivery model that relied on the ballooning of start-up companies as reducing the risk profile of the program. This can only be explained because the notion of risk that prevailed among program designers had nothing to do with the provision of a safe program.</p>
<p>Risk management was instead concerned to minimise the financial, political, legal and reputational risks to the Commonwealth. While shared across the insulation program management team, this concept of risk was embodied by the Minter Ellison risk expert Margaret Coaldrake. She told (p. 111) the commission:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The focus for the project was on risks to the Commonwealth and [the insulation program’s] implementation because the Commonwealth cannot manage a risk for someone else.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hanger’s report sharply rejects Coaldrake’s understanding, saying (p. 119):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>That view is flawed … The risk to the Commonwealth of the [Home Insulation Program] includes the risk to the safety of one of its citizens undertaking work as part of the program.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite employing a “bevy” of risk experts, until the electrocution of 25-year-old insulation installer Matthew Fuller in October 2009, the risks facing installers were not mentioned in Minter Ellison’s 20-page central “Risk Register”. When questioned about this, Coaldrake told the commission that her role was merely facilitation and that no one in the department had informed her that workers could be injured as part of the program.</p>
<p>In fact, the commission uncovered evidence that injury to installers had been raised at an early DEWHA risk workshop. It was listed in early drafts of Coaldrake’s own risk register. However, between 10.54am and 12.05pm on 27 March 2009, this risk disappeared from the register, and neither Coaldrake nor any of the DEWHA staff redressed its omission during the crucial next six months of the program.</p>
<h2>Governments have lost in-house expertise</h2>
<p>Hanger finds that the Commonwealth did not have the in-house expertise to purchase and manage the “expert services” of Coaldrake (p. 312) whose role in the insulation program Hanger describes as “patently inadequate” (p. 5). </p>
<p>This finding echoes that of the <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/final-report-on-school-building-the-education-revolution-released/story-e6frfku9-1226090773438">Building the Education Revolution Implementation Taskforce</a>, which found that state and territory education departments lacked the in-house skills and expertise to act as an “informed buyer” in dealing with the construction firms that delivered that program. Without in-house architects, planners and project managers, the government was open to accepting exorbitant management fees and unable to prevent sub-standard delivery.</p>
<p>Lack of public service capacity is the first point Hanger addresses in his lessons for the future. He notes (p. 301) that “the retention of outside experts did not always overcome the knowledge gaps that existed in the department”. </p>
<p>Hanger’s report paints a damning picture of the results of decades of outsourcing under the neo-liberal rubric of market efficiency and down-sizing. Unless public service capacity is rebuilt and the market-knows-best mentality inside the government replaced, it is only a matter of time before we repeat the mistakes of the home insulation program.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31189/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean Parker is affiliated with Solidarity.</span></em></p>The most important finding in the final report of the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program is the one the Abbott government is least likely to heed. One of the two crucial flaws Commissioner…Jean Parker, Assistant researcher, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/267112014-05-15T04:48:00Z2014-05-15T04:48:00ZRudd humbled, but real lessons of insulation scheme go unlearned<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/48562/original/9xk5n87p-1400120371.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C14%2C2372%2C1529&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rudd's legal wrangles: political theatre, but beside the point when it comes to improving public programs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Dan Peled</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s understandable that coverage of Kevin Rudd’s appearance before the royal commission into the home insulation program should focus on the image of a former Prime Minister humbled over a policy that led to four people’s deaths.</p>
<p>But although some will revel in Rudd’s discomfiture, the commission sits oddly with the current government’s ostensible commitment to reducing waste and duplication. The commission’s <a href="http://www.homeinsulationroyalcommission.gov.au/About/Pages/TermsofReference.aspx">terms of reference</a>, which emphasise workplace safety considerations, seem to be about allocating blame for the program’s shortcomings, rather than learning lessons for improving public administration.</p>
<p>After an afternoon of legal wrangles on Wednesday, Rudd finally won permission to give his unredacted evidence on Thursday, in which he <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/kevin-rudd-given-no-warning-insulation-program-was-going-off-the-rails">claimed that he was not notified of problems with the scheme until after the deaths</a>.</p>
<p>The focus of the hearings so far – featuring former ministers <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/home-insulation-inquiry-mark-arbib-refuses-to-say-scheme-was-rushed">Mark Arbib</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/peter-garrett-denies-home-insulation-scheme-was-flooded-with-shonks">Peter Garrett</a>, and culminating in Rudd’s appearance – has been about who knew what, and when. Entertaining political theatre, but not a productive use of public resources.</p>
<h2>Deaths already investigated</h2>
<p>The Queensland Coroner has <a href="http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/203374/cif-fuller-mj-barnes-rk-sweeney-ms-20130704.pdf">already handed down findings</a> into the deaths of three young workers (the fourth, Marcus Wilson, died in New South Wales). The brunt of the coroner’s criticism was aimed at the Commonwealth for having rushed the program, but blame was also directed to the state government, for lax enforcement of its own operations, and to businesses who probably breached the state’s <a href="https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/E/ElectricalSA02.pdf">Electrical Safety Act</a>. Why go over old ground?</p>
<p>Rudd’s appearance is fodder for the tabloids, and a welcome distraction for a government trying to sell a <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/federal-budget-2014">tough budget</a>. But in focusing on his personal interactions with Arbib and Garrett, the story seems to do little more than confirm what journalist and academic Philip Chubb has already pointed out in his new book <a href="http://www.blackincbooks.com/books/power-failure">Power Failure</a> – that Rudd was a lousy manager, the kind of boss who wavers between indecisiveness and excessive haste.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that many of Australia’s 28 prime ministers, including Tony Abbott, would score highly in a test of managerial ability. Winning elections isn’t about administrative competence – that is the task of the professional public service. What is emerging from the commission’s hearings confirms the findings of the <a href="http://www.anao.gov.au/%7E/media/Uploads/Documents/2010%2011_audit_report_no_12.pdf">2010 Auditor-General’s report into the HIP</a>, which found that many of the problems resulted from systemic failures in public administration.</p>
<h2>Jobs, stimulus… and tragedy</h2>
<p>Before focusing on those problems, it’s useful to consider that report. It found that 1.1 million roofs were insulated, and 6000 to 10,000 short-term jobs were created, widely dispersed geographically. As a stimulus program it succeeded, and the scheme also <a href="https://theconversation.com/pink-batts-what-did-it-teach-us-about-building-better-buildings-21644">helped to boost sustainability</a>. It also resulted in tragedy.</p>
<p>The deaths of Matthew Fuller, Rueben Barnes, Mitchell Sweeney, and Marcus Wilson should not have happened. But it should also be pointed out that the rate of ceiling fires associated with insulation installation was <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/insulation-fire-risk-was-worse-before-rebate-20100303-pivv.html">almost certainly lower under the scheme</a> (see also <a href="http://www.crikey.com.au/2010/10/19/possum-insulation-fire-risk-the-data-is-in/">here</a>) than it had been before the program was implemented, and that the program <a href="http://blogs.crikey.com.au/pollytics/2010/02/24/did-the-insulation-program-actually-reduce-fire-risk/?source=cmailer">was a catalyst for better regulation of the industry</a>. Yet fire risk is not included in the commission’s terms of reference.</p>
<p>Of course, none of this excuses the Rudd government. Had it applied the same standards as apply to road safety or pharmaceutical regulation, there would undoubtedly have been a much lower risk of fire, heat stroke or electrocution, and the insulation industry would probably not have suffered the reputational damage caused by fly-by-night operators chasing tasty subsidies. </p>
<p>Ultimately, our elected governments have to take responsibility for poor administration, even if those problems are not of their own making, but are the fault of the public servants who put the policies into practice.</p>
<h2>Lack of basic knowledge</h2>
<p>A problem clearly identified in the Auditor-General’s report, and emerging from the commission’s inquiries, is that the public servants involved simply did not realise that ceilings are risky places to work. Even if they had not heard of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/foil-insulation-given-go-ahead-despite-three-deaths-in-new-zealand">three previous deaths in New Zealand involving foil insulation secured with metal staples</a>, the presence of life-threatening risk should have been common knowledge within the bureaucracy. </p>
<p>One might expect these public servants to understand high school physics such as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohm's_law">Ohm’s Law</a> and the basic principles of conductivity and thermodynamics – or at the very least, to know better than to send workers into roof spaces armed with metal staples. </p>
<p>As Tim Roxburgh of the Centre for Policy Development <a href="http://cpd.org.au/2012/09/public-works-public-skills">points out</a>, the Commonwealth public service has lost many of the practical skills once found in outfits such as departments of public works. Practical men and women have been replaced in the senior bureaucratic ranks by generic managers, with finely honed political sensitivity, and skill in writing speeches for ministers.</p>
<p>Another problem was that the Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts tried to run the program entirely from Canberra. Apart from some people associated with conservation programs, it had no presence elsewhere. There was no one who could get in a car to go and look at some installations, no one living and working in Brisbane with good contacts in the state government and the industry. </p>
<p>As warned by a much earlier royal commission, the <a href="http://apo.org.au/research/royal-commission-australian-government-administration-report">1976 Commission of Australian Government Administration</a>, the Commonwealth bureaucracy was already then becoming too isolated in Canberra.</p>
<h2>When something goes wrong, blame the government?</h2>
<p>It is unfortunate that a partisan vendetta seems to have overridden the chance for the royal commission to look at systemic problems in public administration. There will be future occasions when governments have to respond to sharp economic downturns or other emergencies, or want to put programs in place quickly, and unless they have a competent public service there will be more tragedies and mishaps.</p>
<p>Politicising the program’s shortcomings also reinforces the message that whenever something goes wrong, it’s the government’s fault. The attempt to sheet all blame on to the government of the day dulls any message about individual responsibility on the part of businesses, households and workers. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Joe Hockey has just delivered a budget speech telling us all about the importance of taking individual responsibility. That’s much more the type of message that a government of right-of-centre persuasion would want to reinforce.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian McAuley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s understandable that coverage of Kevin Rudd’s appearance before the royal commission into the home insulation program should focus on the image of a former Prime Minister humbled over a policy that…Ian McAuley, Lecturer, Public Sector Finance , University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/55972012-02-27T19:37:24Z2012-02-27T19:37:24ZCautious optimism for Gillard on one of Canberra’s strangest days<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8125/original/5s8hywnf-1330324066.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=291%2C55%2C3720%2C2695&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gillard had a strong performance after yesterday's leadership ballot, but there's still a long way to go.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Alan Porritt</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of Julia Gillard’s better days in Australian politics was nonetheless brought to an unusual end yesterday with the <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/arbib-resigns-as-minister-and-senator-20120227-1tyar.html">resignation</a> of Mark Arbib.</p>
<p>The former right faction leader, who most recently served as Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Sport, stood down from both his ministery and his senate position, citing family reasons. He also said the party needed to “heal” following the ballot.</p>
<p>That development aside, with a <a href="http://resources.news.com.au/files/2012/02/27/1226282/654936-aus-pdf-newspoll-ii.pdf">Newspoll</a> surprising commentators in the morning by finding of a swing back to the government, the prime minister saw off a challenge to her leadership of the Labor party by her former foreign minister, Kevin Rudd. </p>
<p>With Rudd indicating his willingness to go to the backbench with magnanimity (at least for now) and the Opposition floundering in yesterday afternoon’s parliamentary question time, Gillard may well feel satisfied with the day’s outcome.</p>
<h2>Resolving the Rudd question</h2>
<p>The Labor spill resolves the Rudd-versus-Gillard leadership dynamic for now, but the fundamental problems for the government have not really gone away. Without a lower house majority, Labor cannot afford to lose a single seat next election. Rather, it must <em>find</em> seats to win from the Liberal-National coalition in order to regain control of the House of Representatives. </p>
<p>The polls may be improving for the government, but the fact is that it is still languishing behind the opposition as the voters’ preferred choice. With the carbon tax due for implementation on 1 July, there is a real prospect of a fall in voter support occurring and Gillard’s leadership may be under pressure yet again. </p>
<p>Rudd now goes to the backbench where he can work on addressing his core problem – specifically, his lack of support in the caucus. Conditions for a leadership change may not be opportune at the moment, but that could change in the future. </p>
<h2>No walk in the park </h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8124/original/hccwb52h-1330323818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Labor’s chief returning officer Chris Hayes announcing the result of the leadership ballot in a frenzied media pack yesterday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/ Samuel Cardwell</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And it’s not all good news for the Coalition. In the House of Representatives sessions after the caucus meeting, the Liberal-National opposition floundered badly in its first opportunity to attack the government and its leader. There is a sense that, in the immediate aftermath of the Gillard-Rudd battle, it is opposition leader Tony Abbott who is under pressure. </p>
<p>Tony Abbott has also struggled to win over the support of the Australian voters as measured by the polls. His problem now is that the Labor party’s recent behaviour ought to set his side of politics up for a very easy victory at the next election. </p>
<p>Any sense that this might not transpire could be dangerous for Abbott’s leadership of the Liberal party. The failure of his team to exploit Labor’s problems in question time hints at a possibility that Abbott might struggle to fully exploit the opportunities being presented to him. </p>
<h2>The long road to the polls</h2>
<p>Although it’s not clear whether this is a problem for Abbott or not, the fact is that the next election isn’t due – and probably won’t be called – until the latter half of 2013. </p>
<p>Gillard has time to try to reverse polling trends (yesterday’s Newspoll notwithstanding), but it also means Abbott still has time to mount an effective campaign against her. </p>
<p>What’s also not clear is whether Gillard or Abbott will be at the helm of their respective parties when that election is held. </p>
<p>The first round of the leadership battle may be over, but there may be more to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/5597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Economou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One of Julia Gillard’s better days in Australian politics was nonetheless brought to an unusual end yesterday with the resignation of Mark Arbib. The former right faction leader, who most recently served…Nick Economou, Senior Lecturer, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.