tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/moon-jae-in-37395/articlesMoon Jae-in – The Conversation2024-02-14T20:50:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226412024-02-14T20:50:30Z2024-02-14T20:50:30ZHow policy in North Korea is affected by politics in South Korea – and vice versa<p>In a speech delivered at the Supreme People’s Assembly in January, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Un, stated that reunification with South Korea was no longer possible and that their neighbour should now represent the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-67990948">“primary foe and invariable principal enemy”</a>.</p>
<p>This amounted to a rare foreign policy pivot by Pyongyang, which consistently aimed for reunification of the peninsula since it was divided in the armistice that ended the 1950-1953 war.</p>
<p>Pyongyang’s new position towards the South has been widely interpreted as evidence of warmongering on the part of the North. The South, by contrast, is almost always portrayed as a benign neighbour and an unwilling target for threats of aggression. But it’s not as simple as that. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-nuclear-proliferation-and-why-the-madman-theory-is-wrong-about-kim-jong-un-167939">North Korea, nuclear proliferation and why the 'madman theory' is wrong about Kim Jong-un</a>
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<p>When it comes to North Korea’s foreign policy shifts, political developments and public opinion in the South plays a key – if often understated – role. Pyongyang must also take domestic factors into consideration when making statements about peninsular relations.</p>
<h2>Politics in South Korea</h2>
<p>Relations with the North are one of the most contentious issues in South Korean politics. Changes in power between political parties can often result in policy pivots in Seoul from hostility to reconciliation and back to hostility. Efforts towards friendlier peninsular relations are known as the “sunshine policy” in Seoul.</p>
<p>South Korea’s presidential system limits presidents to a single five-year term. This means that presidents interested in improving relations with Pyongyang only have a few years to make progress before leaving office. For continuity to be guaranteed, the incumbent president is reliant upon their successor being similarly minded and possibly even part of the diplomatic team in a junior or advisory role and so already known to North Koreans. </p>
<p>These circumstances are difficult to manufacture though. Meaning that most of what is agreed by the South during friendlier times amounts to minor or temporary bridge building, which is a considerable frustration to the North.</p>
<p>For example, Pyongyang and Seoul made strides towards better relations during the recent five-year presidency of Moon Jae-in between 2017 and 2022. This led to the landmark moment in April 2018 when the two leaders met at the Demilitarised Zone along the 38th parallel. Each leader <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43920740">stepped into the other’s country</a>. Indeed, at the subsequent press event Kim spoke – albeit clumsily from notes and with his head down – of the two Koreas as “one nation” and of his personal desire to see reunification. Moon made similar utterances of further cooperation.</p>
<p>Moon’s efforts towards dialogue with the North – without receiving from Pyongyang any concrete commitments to denuclearisation in return – was widely criticised as weakness by his opponents. It was one of the main reasons his democratic party lost the 2022 presidential election. Critics even referred to Moon’s efforts as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-missiles-southkorea-moon-idINKCN1BF1L7/">“moonshine policy”</a> in reference to the illegal homemade liquor guaranteed to induce intoxication.</p>
<p>When it comes to the South’s attitude towards the North, it’s important to realise that weapons manufacturers engage in sophisticated and well-funded <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/06/geoff-hoon-accused-of-directing-illegal-south-korea-lobbying">lobbying efforts</a> around the world. These are usually accompanied by mainstream news and social media campaigns and thinktank reports, reflecting a vested interest for some in keeping tensions high for financial gain.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of Moon’s presidency, the new administration of Yoon Suk Yeol of the People Power Party (from 2022 to the present) has taken a much tougher stance on North Korea. He has demanded “denuclearization first”, before any warming of relations. Yoon has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-64100974">been critical</a> of the South’s military capacity to deal with North Korean aggression and has pledged to increasing spending on technological advancements.</p>
<p>To this end, the fluctuating position of the South towards the North, alongside the limitations to progress caused by its political system, ought to receive greater recognition as a contributing factor to Pyongyang’s decision to declare the prospect of reunification to be dead.</p>
<h2>Domestic concerns in the North</h2>
<p>North Korea is one of the <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300217810/">most militarised societies</a> in the world. This occurs in two ways. First, on account of the number of people whose livelihoods are attached to a thriving military in one form or another. And second, in terms of the important cultural space that the military takes within public life.</p>
<p>The North Korean military is widely revered and adored inside the country. The state-controlled mainstream media do not criticise the military, although they will acknowledge when missile tests, for example, are unsuccessful. Evening entertainment on North Korean television is regularly an assemble of military choirs or military personnel completing assault courses and other athletic challenges. </p>
<p>Public holidays such as September 9 (the anniversary of the founding of the Republic in 1948) are usually accompanied by military pageantry and news of a substantial military development – like the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37314927">successful test</a> of a nuclear bomb on September 9 2016.</p>
<p>Estimates are that around 20% to 25% of North Korea’s GDP is <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/northkorea/26220.htm#:%7E:text=North%20Korea%20now%20has%20the,in%20the%20regular%20armed%20forces.">taken up by military expenditure</a>, with more then spent by the state manufacturing military prestige through popular culture media content and the broadcasting of pageantry. By comparison, most western European countries spend between <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/feb/01/europe-defence-army-us-donald-trump-eu">1% and 3% of GDP per annum</a> in peacetime on military matters and there is greater cultural space for a range of views on the military.</p>
<p>Therefore, it should be acknowledged that Kim Jong-un faces domestic pressures if he is to preserve the power of his family’s dynasty. He must be seen to act decisively and he must have a prestigious military announcement for high-profile speeches on national holidays. </p>
<p>This is a situation that he inherited from his father and grandfather. But he has shown no sign of wanting it to change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Alexander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The two countries watch each other’s policy shifts very carefully and respond accordingly.Colin Alexander, Senior Lecturer in Political Communications, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1875602022-07-22T15:23:35Z2022-07-22T15:23:35ZPersuasion: why the Netflix adaptation is actually worth a watch, according to a romantic literature expert<p><em>SPOILER ALERT: this article contains plot references to Persuasion.</em></p>
<p>So, the jury’s in. People really, really hate Netflix’s adaptation of Jane Austen’s Persuasion. Austen’s last novel, the book follows the story of 27-year-old Anne Elliot eight years after she was persuaded to break off her engagement to the dashing navy captain Frederick Wentworth because of his humble background. Wentworth has returned and Anne is now faced with the tough decision of revisiting the past or pursuing a new love.</p>
<p>Audiences and critics alike would be happy to see all those involved in director <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/everyone-involved-should-be-in-prison-netflixs-persuasion-reviewed">Carrie Cracknell’s film version imprisoned</a>. It’s been denounced as an <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/persuasion-netflix-dakota-johnson-b2124080.html">empty Instagram adaptation</a>, ruined by “cringey dialogue” and – top of the charge sheet – for aping the fourth-wall breaking style of narration from the award-winning and much-loved British series Fleabag.</p>
<p>Is it too late to plead on the film’s behalf?</p>
<p>Granted, it is Fleabag-y. Yes, it plays fast and loose – mostly loose – with period speech patterns. But, as someone who’s spent years studying romantic literature, I can tell you that in its adoption of contemporary popular storytelling techniques the film is Austen in spirit – and there is a lot to enjoy.</p>
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<h2>No disregard for the book</h2>
<p>If Jane Austen were writing today, she wouldn’t be producing “classic” Austen novels. Far from it. Just as she drew on the popularity of Georgian-period tropes like sending letters between characters, writing today she would be making full use of contemporary stylistic tics – including knowing asides wryly delivered straight to camera.</p>
<p>She’d also be using contemporary lingo. Mary Musgrove, Anne’s youngest sister, might, like the film’s iteration of the character, anachronistically declare she’s an “empath”. Captain Wentworth might tell Louisa Musgrove that being seated next to her at dinner is “quite the upgrade”. Anne Elliot might refer to her handsome cousin, the nefarious Mr Elliot, as a “10”. </p>
<p>The fact that all this happens in the film doesn’t amount to an “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/0/persuasion-review-erroneous-austen-update-woke-washing-worst/">almost total disregard</a>” for the film’s source material. Austen’s novels are stuffed with fashionable expressions. </p>
<p>Take Mansfield Park, for instance, where, frowning at four dubiously acquired pheasant eggs, the young lady of the house Maria Bertram, asks her aunt Mrs Norris: “What else have you been spunging?” In the same novel, a female character – punning on different ranks of admirals – makes an unspeakably rude joke about “rears and vices” in the navy. Women saying such things would have been almost unthinkably shocking.</p>
<p>Cracknell has updated Persuasion’s idiom. It’s not that big of a deal.</p>
<p>Aside from the dialogue, the performances in Cracknell’s film are terrific. Como Jarvis’s Captain Wentworth – all bluff physicality and bruising side-to-side gait – is perfect for the naval captain returned to shore, not so much taciturn as tongue-tied around his lost love, Anne Elliot. Especially winning is the slow-eyed, Sylvester Stallone-like vulnerability with which Jarvis plays Wentworth.</p>
<p>Richard E Grant is also wonderful as the dandyish, indebted baronet Sir Walter Elliot, Anne’s father, on his way down in the world just as self-made men like Captain Wentworth are on the way up. In addition, the set design and costumes are exquisite, and the film’s colour palette is bright and vibrantly arresting.</p>
<h2>Lacking the novel’s darkness</h2>
<p>If there is a problem with the film it’s not lack of deference to Austen, austere face of the £10 note, but rather that Cracknell is uninterested in Persuasion’s darkness. </p>
<p>The novel, published in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, is set three years earlier in the summer of 1814, during a lull in the fighting. Napoleon had been exiled to the Mediterranean island of Elba, and hundreds of thousands of relieved soldiers and sailors began to demobilise. That’s why Wentworth has returned to shore. </p>
<p>What Austen’s readers would also have known, but crucially the characters in Persuasion do not, is that by the time the novel opens, Napoleon had already escaped and was raising a new army. Wentworth and Anne Elliot get an apparently happy ending, but in a matter of months the naval officer would have set sail again, perhaps never to return.</p>
<p>Persuasion also registers the trauma of war while the film doesn’t. When Nia Towle’s Louisa Musgrove falls from the harbour wall, known as the Cobb in Lyme, Wentworth unexpectedly goes to pieces. “Is there no one to help me?” he utters in despair. </p>
<p>In his head, Wentworth is back at sea, trying to direct and contain the carnage on deck. Louisa’s head injury recalls the trauma of standing among injured, groaning men. Wentworth is suffering from PTSD. Yet Cracknell’s film version busies itself solely with the ins and outs of courtship and the manoeuvrings of matchmaking.</p>
<p>While it does eschew the darkness there is plenty else to enjoy. Cracknell offers us several women who break with convention, including Anne Elliot herself, who’s perfectly willing to hitch up her skirts and relieve herself beneath a tree.</p>
<p>The film also gives us a scene that hasn’t been bettered in any other screen adaptation of Austen, namely the dance Wentworth and Louisa Musgrove perform to Anne’s piano accompaniment. It’s a stunningly intimate, achingly tender, highly erotic tangle of entwined arms, in which Louisa’s ingenué charm is matched by the battle-damaged Wentworth’s clumsy grace. As the camera tightens, for the briefest of moments Wentworth seems to shed the weight of the horror of war. It is superb.</p>
<p>Austen’s novels are full of curates. Captain Wentworth is himself the son of a “country curate, without bread to eat”, as the snooty Sir Walter Elliot says dismissively during Anne’s and Wentworth’s first courtship. Appropriately enough, then, Carrie Cracknell’s film is a curate’s egg – a thing that is partly good and partly bad. </p>
<p>But it’s nowhere near as bad as the tsunami of snobbish, Sir Walter Elliot-y, appalled broadsheet reviews would have you believe. That dance at Kellynch Hall alone is worth watching for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187560/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Marggraf-Turley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Slated by critics, Netflix’s Persuasion isn’t as bad as it’s been made out to be.Richard Marggraf-Turley, Professor of English Literature, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1737372021-12-14T02:35:43Z2021-12-14T02:35:43ZIn a changing region, Australia’s relationship with South Korea has been ignored for too long<p>South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Australia this week comes at a critical point in the relationship between the countries.</p>
<p>Moon is the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-13/australia-and-south-korea-billion-dollar-defence-contract/100694638">first world leader</a> to visit Australia since the COVID pandemic began and the federal government shut the country’s borders.</p>
<p>The two countries have signed a billion-dollar weapons contract, which has dominated the headlines in Australia. But while this contract is significant, it is only a very small step - there is much more to do.</p>
<h2>A relationship on the back burner</h2>
<p>Australia and South Korea haven’t really paid attention to the relationship in recent years. It’s basically been ignored for at least a decade, if not longer.</p>
<p>The problem is, the relationship is a victim of its own success. Australia and South Korea have a highly complimentary trade relationship and there are no major problems. As a result, they’ve just let it linger. </p>
<p>This means they are starting from an empty chair in terms of improving the relationship, so this visit is an important first step. </p>
<p>In South Korea, not many people think about Australia. There isn’t an option for students to focus on Australia in high school or university and see Australia as a place to invest their time and efforts for future careers.</p>
<p>As a result, there are cohorts of students going into government and business with absolutely no knowledge of, or interest in, Australia. </p>
<p>If you compare this to Australia, there are students who are studying Korean or are focused on Korean studies for business, defence, and pop culture, of course. But Australia isn’t doing anything to promote itself in South Korea.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/tensions-rise-on-the-korean-peninsula-and-they-are-unlikely-to-recede-any-time-soon-140935">Tensions rise on the Korean peninsula – and they are unlikely to recede any time soon</a>
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<h2>Finding common ground</h2>
<p>There are some commonalities on which to build a stronger relationship. Both Australia and South Korea are mid-sized, secondary powers. This is important, as they are both facing similar challenges negotiating between major powers and with other regional powers. </p>
<p>They are also both advanced societies facing similar challenges on health care, the environment and governance. So, there are lots of areas where they can work together.</p>
<p>On strategic issues, the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-13/australia-and-south-korea-billion-dollar-defence-contract/100694638">major defence contract</a> announced this week is going to the South Korean defence giant Hanwha to build 30 self-propelled howitzers and 15 armoured ammunition resupply vehicles for the Australian army.</p>
<p>It’s part of a new <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211213000628">memorandum of understanding</a> on defence industry and materials cooperation, which comes after the previous agreement between the two nations lapsed a decade ago. </p>
<p>The Hanwha contract is certainly large, but there’s a big difference in the way South Koreans and Australians see the deal. </p>
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<p>Australians believe it’s of great strategic consequence, tied to regional tensions and China’s rising influence. But South Koreans don’t see it that way. They are viewing it as a commercial transaction that has nothing to do with China at all.</p>
<p>In fact, if you look at the <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211213000628">South Korean press</a> – and particularly the Korean language press – it doesn’t mention China in relation to Moon’s trip to Australia. Rather, it is focused on securing resources – <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211115000770">in particular urea</a> – and maintaining those resource supplies. </p>
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<h2>South Korea’s future role in the region</h2>
<p>This shows the countries are on fundamentally different pages when it comes to regional security, and this is going to become more of an issue in the future.</p>
<p>A lot of it depends on what happens in the <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/12/05/tough-tests-for-south-koreas-next-president/">South Korean presidential elections</a> next year. If a conservative leader is elected, South Korea will be more willing to cooperate with Australia and the US, and play a larger role alongside the two of them (to a degree). This won’t happen if there’s a progressive administration.</p>
<p>But even if there’s a conservative leader, South Korea will never go as far as Australia in condemning China’s actions. It’s not in South Korea’s interests to do that. Not only does Seoul need China to help in its negotiations with North Korea, but South Korea’s largest businesses are heavily invested in China, and they won’t want to damage the relationship.</p>
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<p>So, the long-term trend of South Korea’s position is not towards lining up with Australia and the US.</p>
<p>However, South Korea will be making some major decisions over the next ten years or so, and these include reassessing its relationship with both the US and China and potentially securing its own independent nuclear weapons capacity. </p>
<p>South Korea has been reassessing its relationship with the US for some time. One issue, for instance, is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/21/why-doesn-t-south-korea-have-full-control-over-its-military-pub-79702">returning wartime operational command</a> of South Korean troops from the United States Forces Korea to the South Korean military. This is a small step towards South Korea becoming more independent from the US.</p>
<p>There’s even talk in security circles of South Korea aiming for a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/coming-soon-neutral-south-korea">neutral role</a> in the region, becoming the Switzerland of North Asia. Ten years ago, this wasn’t even talked about. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-century-old-dispute-between-japan-and-south-korea-threatens-the-global-supply-of-smartphones-122502">How a century-old dispute between Japan and South Korea threatens the global supply of smartphones</a>
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<h2>Where Australia fits in</h2>
<p>South Korea doesn’t view Australia as an important actor in its decisions. But there’s an important role for them to play together in the region, which is why these strategic discussions are so vital. Australia needs to increase its voice in South Korean policy circles and make its opinions heard.</p>
<p>This problem goes back to the Howard years, when Australian foreign policy decisions basically just followed the US. During the Rudd years, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-08-11/rudd-talks-with-s-korean-president-on-education/471930">there was some good collaboration</a> between Australia and South Korea, but at the end of those administrations, this deteriorated somewhat.</p>
<p>Now, there’s an opportunity for Australia to do much more. For instance, it should open a formal Australian Studies Institute in South Korea, similar to the ones it has in China and Japan, and try to establish more joint university degrees programs between the countries.</p>
<p>The Australian Strategic Policy Institute could also do more work on South Korea and translate this into Korean. These sorts of things can raise the profile of Australia as an independent thinker and actor in the region. Importantly, it could also make it more visible in South Korean policy circles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Robertson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The two countries are on fundamentally different pages when it comes to regional security, and this is going to become more of an issue in the future.Jeffrey Robertson, Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies, Yonsei UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680542021-11-15T13:11:34Z2021-11-15T13:11:34ZDisinformation is spreading beyond the realm of spycraft to become a shady industry – lessons from South Korea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431735/original/file-20211112-15738-1loyh8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4907%2C3261&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Efforts to reduce tensions between the Koreas, like the 2018 inter-Korean summit, are frequently the target of disinformation campaigns in South Korea.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SouthKoreaKoreasTensions/3e5e17d7705a4d6983af18f5eb94e8f3/photo?Query=Korea%20border&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5441&currentItemNo=10">AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Disinformation, the practice of blending real and fake information with the goal of duping a government or influencing public opinion, has its origins in the Soviet Union. But disinformation is no longer the exclusive domain of government intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>Today’s disinformation scene has evolved into a marketplace in which services are contracted, laborers are paid and shameless opinions and fake readers are bought and sold. This industry is emerging around the world. Some of the private-sector players are driven by political motives, some by profit and others by a mix of the two.</p>
<p>Public relations firms have recruited social media influencers in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/25/world/europe/disinformation-social-media.html">France and Germany</a> to spread falsehoods. Politicians have hired staff to create fake Facebook accounts in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/apr/13/facebook-honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez-fake-engagement">Honduras</a>. And <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-in-kenya-influencers-are-hired-to-spread-disinformation/">Kenyan Twitter influencers</a> are paid 15 times more than many people make in a day for promoting political hashtags. Researchers at the University of Oxford have tracked government-sponsored disinformation activities in 81 countries and <a href="https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/">private-sector disinformation operations in 48 countries</a>.</p>
<p>South Korea has been at the forefront of online disinformation. Western societies began to raise concerns about disinformation in 2016, triggered by disinformation related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit. But in South Korea, media reported the first formal disinformation operation in 2008. As a researcher who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=QpNFdIEAAAAJ&hl=en">studies digital audiences</a>, I’ve found that South Korea’s 13-year-long disinformation history demonstrates how technology, economics and culture interact to enable the disinformation industry. </p>
<p>Most importantly, South Korea’s experience offers a lesson for the U.S. and other countries. The ultimate power of disinformation is found more in the ideas and memories that a given society is vulnerable to and how prone it is to fueling the rumor mill than it is in the people perpetrating the disinformation or the techniques they use.</p>
<h2>From dirty politics to dirty business</h2>
<p>The origin of South Korean disinformation can be traced back to the nation’s National Intelligence Service, which is equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The NIS formed teams in 2010 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/04/south-koreas-spy-agency-admits-trying-rig-election-national-intelligence-service-2012">to interfere in domestic elections</a> by attacking a political candidate it opposed. </p>
<p>The NIS hired more than 70 full-time workers who managed fake, or so-called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3308560.3317598">sock puppet</a>, accounts. The agency recruited a group called Team Alpha, which was composed of civilian part-timers who had ideological and financial interests in working for the NIS. By 2012, the scale of the operation had grown to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/lessons-from-south-koreas-approach-to-tackling-disinformation/">3,500 part-time workers</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men, one in a suit jacket in the other a windbreaker jacket, stand shoulder to shoulder in a stairwell, photographers behind them" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431745/original/file-20211112-13043-8xui0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Korean President Moon Jae-in (left) campaigning in 2014 for Kim Kyoung-soo (right), who became governor of South Gyeongsang Province in 2018 but was subsequently convicted of opinion rigging.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:KimKyoung-soo.jpg">Udenjan/WikiCommons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since then the private sector has moved into the disinformation business. For example, a shadowy publishing company led by an influential blogger was involved in a high-profile <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210721000615">opinion-rigging scandal</a> between 2016 and 2018. The company’s client was a close political aide of the current president, Moon Jae-in. </p>
<p>In contrast to NIS-driven disinformation campaigns, which use disinformation as a propaganda tool for the government, some of the private-sector players are chameleonlike, changing ideological and topical positions in pursuit of their business interests. These private-sector operations have achieved greater cost effectiveness than government operations by skillfully <a href="https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/7301">using bots to amplify fake engagements</a>, involving social media entrepreneurs like <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/elderly-conservatives-in-south-korea-turn-to-youtube-and-conspiracy-theories/">YouTubers</a> and <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2012/11/19/confessions-of-paid-political-trolls-in-south-korea/">outsourcing trolling to cheap laborers</a>.</p>
<h2>Narratives that strike a nerve</h2>
<p>In South Korea, Cold War rhetoric has been particularly visible across all types of disinformation operations. The campaigns typically portray the conflict with North Korea and the battle against Communism as being at the center of public discourse in South Korea. In reality, nationwide polls have painted a very different picture. For example, even when North Korea’s nuclear threat was at a peak in 2017, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/asia/north-korea-south-tensions.html">fewer than 10 percent of respondents</a> picked North Korea’s saber-rattling as their priority concern, compared with more than 45 percent who selected economic policy.</p>
<p>Across all types of purveyors and techniques, political disinformation in South Korea has amplified anti-Communist nationalism and denigrated the nation’s dovish diplomacy toward North Korea. My research on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2015.1130157">South Korean social media rumors</a> in 2013 showed that the disinformation rhetoric continued on social media even after the formal disinformation campaign ended, which indicates how powerful these themes are. Today I and my research team continue to see references to the same themes.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man standing on a stage while holding a microphone tears a flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431748/original/file-20211112-15-13ynxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Much of the disinformation trafficked in South Korea involves nationalistic anti-Communist narratives similar to this protester’s anti-North Korea message.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/south-korean-protester-tears-a-north-korean-flag-during-a-news-photo/1233640604">Photo by Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The dangers of a disinformation industry</h2>
<p>The disinformation industry is enabled by the three prongs of today’s digital media industry: an attention economy, algorithm and computational technologies and a participatory culture. In online media, the most important currency is audience attention. Metrics such as the number of page views, likes, shares and comments quantify attention, which is then converted into economic and social capital. </p>
<p>Ideally, these metrics should be a product of networked users’ spontaneous and voluntary participation. Disinformation operations more often than not manufacture these metrics by using bots, hiring influencers, paying for crowdsourcing and developing computational tricks to game a platform’s algorithms. </p>
<p>The expansion of the disinformation industry is troubling because it distorts how public opinion is perceived by researchers, the media and the public itself. Historically, democracies have relied on polls to understand public opinion. Despite their limitations, nationwide polls conducted by credible organizations, such as <a href="https://www.gallup.com/224855/gallup-poll-work.aspx">Gallup</a> and <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/our-methods/u-s-surveys/u-s-survey-methodology/">Pew Research</a>, follow rigorous methodological standards to represent the distribution of opinions in society in as representative a manner as possible. </p>
<p>Public discourse on social media has emerged as an alternative means of assessing public opinion. Digital audience and web traffic analytic tools are widely available to measure the trends of online discourse. However, people can be misled when purveyors of disinformation manufacturer opinions expressed online and falsely amplify the metrics about the opinions. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the persistence of anti-Communist nationalist narratives in South Korea shows that disinformation purveyors’ rhetorical choices are not random. To counter the disinformation industry wherever it emerges, governments, media and the public need to understand not just the who and the how, but also the what – a society’s controversial ideologies and collective memories. These are the most valuable currency in the disinformation marketplace.</p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s science, health and technology editors pick their favorite stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-favorite">Weekly on Wednesdays</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168054/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>K. Hazel Kwon is a U.S.-Korea NextGen Scholar under the sponsorship of the Korea Foundation. Her work was supported by the National Science Foundation (Award #2027387), Army Research Laboratory-Army Research Office (Award #W911NF1910066), and MIT Lincoln Laboratory (Award #PO 7000506684). </span></em></p>Disinformation is being privatized around the world. This new industry is built on a dangerous combination of cheap labor, high-tech algorithms and emotional national narratives.K. Hazel Kwon, Associate Professor of Journalism and Digital Audiences, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1450322020-09-09T04:56:21Z2020-09-09T04:56:21ZSouth Korea’s Green New Deal shows the world what a smart economic recovery looks like<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357088/original/file-20200909-16-129eh6y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1488%2C994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yonhap/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the COVID-19 pandemic devastates the global economy, there’s an opportunity for governments to support a green-led recovery. This involves spending fiscal stimulus on renewable energy and other clean technologies to create jobs while addressing climate change.</p>
<p>The chorus calling for such a move is strong and diverse: <a href="https://institutional.anz.com/insight-and-research/Jun-20/a-green-led-recovery">banks</a>, <a href="https://www.aap.com.au/calls-for-virus-recovery-to-be-green-led/">investors</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-an-economic-tonic-mr-morrison-use-that-stimulus-money-to-turbocharge-renewables-137074">academics</a>, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/energy-firms-rally-behind-green-stimulus-call/">energy companies</a>, <a href="https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/resources/primed-for-action/">climate advocates</a> and <a href="https://www.businessgreen.com/news/4015783/boris-johnson-owe-future-generations-build">politicians</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, some national governments have not heeded the calls. This includes Australia, where the Morrison government is spruiking a “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-13/coronavirus-recovery-to-push-australia-towards-gas-future/12239978">gas-led recovery</a>” and talking up <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/14/australias-dangerous-dirty-hydrogen-plans/">fossil fuel-derived hydrogen</a>. At the same time, our government is <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-met-its-renewable-energy-target-but-dont-pop-the-champagne-122939">refusing to extend</a> the renewable energy target beyond 2020, and there are <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/government-to-fund-gas-and-carbon-storage-via-clean-energy-programs-20200906-p55svj.html">strong signs</a> it wants to change the investment mandates of Australia’s clean energy agencies to encourage funding of gas projects.</p>
<p>However some countries, such as South Korea, are using the crisis to kickstart environmentally sustainable economic growth. Australia can learn a lot from the smart strategy of our Asian neighbour.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People in South Korea walk wearing face masks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357089/original/file-20200909-16-en66wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The South Korean government is spending big to encourage a green-led recovery from COVID-19.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Koki Kataoka/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rising from a COVID battering</h2>
<p>South Korea’s economy, like those across the world, has been hit hard by the pandemic. In particular, its export industries dropped by 24% in May as demand for the nation’s mainstay products, such as <a href="http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=47152">cars, semiconductors, machinery, petrochemicals and steel</a>, fell away.</p>
<p>In April, 26.93 million Koreans were <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200610000707">reportedly</a> employed – 392,000 fewer than a year earlier. Job losses were highest in the wholesale and retail sectors, accommodation and food services. </p>
<p>In response, Korean President Moon Jae-in in July <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200714000951">launched</a> the Korean New Deal or “K-New Deal”. The US$135 billion investment in green and digital technology comprises:</p>
<ul>
<li>US$96.3 billion from Treasury</li>
<li>US$21.2 billion from local governments</li>
<li>US$17.3 billion from the private sector.</li>
</ul>
<p>The “green” part of the plan is known as the Green New Deal (not to be confused with the US’ proposed package of climate policies, of the same name). The Korean green plan involves US$61.9 billion targeting the creation of 319,000 jobs by 2022 and 659,000 by 2025.</p>
<p>President Moon will personally chair a monthly strategy meeting on the K-New Deal to monitor the performance of government ministers, and ensure the private sector meets its commitments.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="South Korean President Moon Jae-in, centre, discussing the K-New Deal" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357090/original/file-20200909-17-1rqapmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Korean President Moon Jae-in, centre, discussing the K-New Deal. It includes huge investment in green technology.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yonhap/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the green recovery looks like</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=4948">Green New Deal</a> involves investing in advanced technology initiatives to create jobs. </p>
<p>The plan calls for an <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/090420-feature-south-koreas-green-new-deal-faces-cost-political-hurdles">expansion</a> of solar panels and wind turbines to 42.7 gigawatts in 2025, up from 12.7 gigawatts last year. The government will also install solar panels on 225,000 public buildings.</p>
<p>Central to the plan are so-called “smart grids” – digital technology that allows an energy utility to communicate with and respond to its customers, and vice-versa. Korea plans to install “smart meters” in <a href="http://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=4948">five million more apartments</a>, to help consumers reduce their electricity use.</p>
<p>The government will also invest in <a href="http://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=4948">microgrid communities</a>. This involves using renewable energy and energy storage systems in regional areas, and those with <a href="https://apjjf.org/-Sung-Young-Kim--John-A--Mathews/4987/article.pdf">many islands</a>, creating decentralised, low-carbon energy systems.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/4-reasons-why-a-gas-led-economic-recovery-is-a-terrible-na-ve-idea-145009">4 reasons why a gas-led economic recovery is a terrible, naïve idea</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Green New Deal also <a href="http://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=4948">sets a target</a> of 1.13 million electric vehicles and 200,000 hydrogen-powered fuel-cell electric vehicles on Korean roads by 2025. This creates a domestic market for Korean car manufacturers such as <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2020/07/419_292495.html">Hyundai</a>.</p>
<p>Money will also be spent building electric vehicle recharging stations (15,000 rapid and 30,000 standard). About 450 hydrogen refuelling units will also be built, benefiting homegrown firms such as <a href="http://www.yesemk.com/eng/about/overview.html">EM Korea</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/news/circular-economy-lessons-from-china-1.19593">Circular economy</a> initiatives will also be implemented such as reducing and <a href="http://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=4948">recycling energy</a> using advanced computerised power grids in factories. The plan also involves technology to capture and store carbon emitted from industrial processes and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0008125617752692">re-using </a> industrial materials.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Wind turbines in South Korea" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357091/original/file-20200909-15-1c86ez1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Wind turbines along South Korea’s Mount Taegi range. The Green New Deal involves big investment in renewable technology.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yonhap/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>More grey than green?</h2>
<p>Critics have cast the K-New Deal as more <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/how-green-is-south-koreas-green-new-deal/">grey than green</a>. For example, they argue while the dirtiest fossil fuels, such as coal, are being <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200908000676">phased out</a>, they’ve been replaced with ‘cleaner’ fossil fuels such as liquified natural gas, or <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/how-green-is-south-koreas-green-new-deal/">LNG</a>. </p>
<p>LNG will be used to provide baseload power, but it is intended only as a “<a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/south-korea-taiwan-end-nuclear-power-by-sung-young-kim-and-john-a--mathews-2017-08?barrier=accesspay">bridging fuel</a>”. Importantly, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/14/australias-dangerous-dirty-hydrogen-plans/">unlike Australia</a>, the Korean government has set an end date to the use of fossil fuels, aiming for <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/south-korea/">zero net emissions by 2050</a>. Korea has already gone far towards meeting its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2020.1755245">renewables targets</a> of 20% by 2030 and 30-35% by 2040.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/time-to-get-real-amid-the-hydrogen-hype-lets-talk-about-what-will-actually-work-144579">Time to get real: amid the hydrogen hype, let's talk about what will actually work</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Critics also question if hydrogen is a realistic and affordable way to decarbonise transport. The scepticism is valid. But around the world, there is enormous investment into research, development and demonstration of hydrogen projects, including in <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/australias-national-hydrogen-strategy">Australia</a>. Hydrogen produced using renewables is expected to be competitive with fossil fuel-derived hydrogen by <a href="https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/green-hydrogen-costs-to-fall-by-up-to-64-by-2040/">2040, if not earlier</a>.</p>
<p>Korea’s focus on controversial <a href="https://theconversation.com/carbon-capture-and-storage-is-becoming-a-green-strategy-11199">carbon capture and storage </a>technologies may also come under scrutiny, for good reason. And the recent government <a href="https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2020&no=564186">bail-out</a> of a nuclear reactor and coal power plant manufacturer shows Korea cannot yet claim it has perfect green credentials.</p>
<h2>Lessons for Australia</h2>
<p>Throughout the developed world, many voices are calling for a green-led recovery. South Korea stands out for its decisiveness, despite some valid criticism of its approach. Its Green New Deal is an opportunity to build the high-tech, high-wage green industries <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-an-economic-tonic-mr-morrison-use-that-stimulus-money-to-turbocharge-renewables-137074">of the future</a>, with massive export and job creation potential. </p>
<p>The Morrison government should take note: this is what a real green-led recovery looks like. With a bit of political vision, risk-taking and a national strategy led by government, Australia too can kickstart green investment in the post-COVID recovery.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/want-an-economic-tonic-mr-morrison-use-that-stimulus-money-to-turbocharge-renewables-137074">Want an economic tonic, Mr Morrison? Use that stimulus money to turbocharge renewables</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sung-Young Kim receives funding from the Australia Research Council (ARC) and has previously received funding from the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS). He is a member of the Executive Committee of the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) and is Treasurer and member of the Executive Committee of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Thurbon currently receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the Academy of Korean Studies. She has previously received funding from the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and the Korea Foundation. She is an elected member of the Executive Council of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE) and a Research Committee member and Board member of the Jubilee Australia Research Centre (JARC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hao Tan receives funding from the Australia Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project 2019-2021. He previously received funding from the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and funding from the Confucius Institute Headquarters under the "Understanding China Fellowship" in 2017.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mathews receives funding from the ARC</span></em></p>With a bit of political vision, risk-taking and a national strategy led by government, Australia too can kickstart investment in the post-COVID recovery.Sung-Young Kim, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Discipline of Politics & International Relations, Macquarie School of Social Sciences, Macquarie UniversityElizabeth Thurbon, Scientia Fellow and Associate Professor in International Relations / International Political Economy, UNSW SydneyHao Tan, Associate professor, University of NewcastleJohn Mathews, Professor Emeritus, Macquarie Business School, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1409352020-06-17T08:36:03Z2020-06-17T08:36:03ZTensions rise on the Korean peninsula – and they are unlikely to recede any time soon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342359/original/file-20200617-94049-1nhpj2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Yonhap</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a period of relative quiet, North Korea again commandeered news headlines with the dramatic, if symbolic, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53060620">demolition of the Inter-Korean Liaison Office</a> in the city of Kaesong, just north of the demilitarised zone.</p>
<p>The office was refurbished at considerable cost to South Korea following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/26/korean-summit-everything-you-need-to-know">2018 inter-Korean Summit</a>, and was intended to function as a virtual embassy between the two Koreas. Its destruction was an unmistakable indication of North Korea’s displeasure with its neighbour, and a dramatic end to two years of pageantry and hope. </p>
<p>Tensions between the Koreas have been rising after the north protested the launch of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/north-korea-escalates-military-threats-defector-leaflet-spat-200616031254684.html">anti-North Korean propaganda-filled balloons</a> and plastic bottles into North Korea by South Korean civic groups. Just three days before the liaison office’s demolition, Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s powerful sister, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/04/kim-yo-jong-warns-south-korea-to-tackle-evil-propaganda-balloons">specifically threatened</a> its destruction.</p>
<p>North Korea, clearly sensitive to the anti-regime flyers, has abandoned expectations of meaningful sanctions relief or economic benefits from South Korea. It may also be trying to bolster the credentials of Kim Yo-jong, just months after she was speculated to be a potential successor to Kim Jong-un following <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52511812">rumours of his demise</a>.</p>
<p>However, these alone do not fully explain what appears to be a deliberate series of actions intended by North Korea to draw attention by ratcheting up tensions on the peninsula.</p>
<p>To fully comprehend the current situation in North Korea, one must understand developments over the past two years. In late 2017, it appeared increasingly possible there would be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html">some form of conflagration</a> between the United States and North Korea.</p>
<p>This stemmed from a series of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html">North Korean missile and nuclear tests</a> that had, both in their range and demonstrated capability, convinced White House national security planners that North Korea posed an unacceptably high direct risk to the American homeland.</p>
<p>US President Donald Trump openly derided the North Korean leader as “little rocket man”, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8p1JIgTuKQk">threatened</a> “fire and fury like the world has never seen”. It was this that led Kim Beazley and me to warn of the potentially dire consequences.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-with-north-korea-from-unthinkable-to-unavoidable-92654">War with North Korea: from unthinkable to unavoidable?</a>
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<p>Instead, South Korean President Moon Jae-in, facing the risk of a conflict that could draw the Korean peninsula into war, and an escalatory cycle over which he would have little direct influence, scrambled to diffuse the situation.</p>
<p>Latching onto a few positive elements in Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s speech, South Korea welcomed a North Korean cheering team led by none other than Kim Yo-jong to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/11/kim-yo-jong-north-korea-south-media-regime-olympics">attend the 2018 Winter Olympics</a>.</p>
<p>This in turn opened the door to the full-body embrace between the two Korean leaders at the inter-Korean Summit two months later, and the Singapore-based <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44435035">US-North Korean Summit in June 2018</a>.</p>
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<span class="caption">Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in greet each other at the 2018 inter-Korean summit.</span>
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<p>But despite a small number of follow-on meetings, that is where the progress ended.<br>
Trump, always more concerned with theatrics than substance, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2150382/handshakes-and-history-donald-trump-and-kim-jong-un-sign">asserted</a> a North Korean commitment to denuclearisation that was not apparent to anyone outside his administration, and returned home.</p>
<p>The question is, what does North Korea want?</p>
<p>It wants to be accepted and recognised as a nuclear power. It also wants to secure sanctions release and economic benefits, despite having reversed none of the actions or policies that led to the imposition of those sanctions in the first place.</p>
<p>In addition, there is <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vietnam-north-korea-politics-and-covid-19-numbers-tell-story">increasing evidence</a> that North Korea has not been immune from the ravages of coronavirus pandemic. Perhaps more importantly, the economic global economic downturn will also have an impact on an already weak North Korean economy.</p>
<p>In this context, North Korea appears to be returning to its tried and true approach of instigating international tensions as a way of forging greater domestic solidarity in the face of ongoing economic privation.</p>
<p>The danger now, as always, is the risk of a North Korean miscalculation, particularly in an uncertain international environment. There is evidence Pyongyang had already dismissed the US, and had no expectations for further progress until after the US elections. This latest act of aggression indicates they have likewise now written off South Korea.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the longer-term questions surrounding North Korea remain unsolved by the summits with South Korea or the US. It is increasingly apparent that even if we get through 2020 without further incident, we will still be facing a North Korea that is more capable and more dangerous.</p>
<p>If the most recent actions are any indication, it may also be more desperate than it was when we issued a stark warning two years ago.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140935/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Perth USAsia Centre is supported by the Australian Federal Government, the West Australian State Government, and the University of Western Australia, along with supplemental support from corporate partners in Western Australia. Mr. Flake serves on the Board of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and as Co-Chairman on the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.</span></em></p>With signs North Korea has suffered in the coronavirus pandemic and is now facing a further threat to its shaky economy, the ratcheted up of tension with the South is ominous.L Gordon Flake, CEO, Perth USAsia Centre, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1372082020-05-29T10:25:01Z2020-05-29T10:25:01ZTwo North Korean defectors just got elected to South Korea’s National Assembly – but are already fighting for their credibility<p>Two North Korean defectors, Thae Yong-ho and Ji Seong-ho, will be sworn in as members of South Korea’s National Assembly on May 30 after winning seats in the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-52304781">April general election</a>. Yet the road from election to parliament has not been smooth, thanks to the ongoing challenges faced by North Korean defectors in winning the trust of South Korean society. </p>
<p>Thae and Ji aren’t the first North Korean defectors to be elected to parliament. <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951844">Cho Myung-chul</a> held a proportional representative seat from 2012-16. But suspicion of defectors remains an ongoing legacy of the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/is-south-korea-ready-to-say-goodbye-to-its-national-security-law/">national security threat</a> North Korea is seen to pose to the south. </p>
<p>The April general election went ahead even as South Korea was experiencing a modest number of new cases of COVID-19. Parties aligned with incumbent progressive President Moon Jae-in won strong support, affirming the success of his government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-south-koreas-success-in-controlling-disease-is-due-to-its-acceptance-of-surveillance-134068">efforts to control the outbreak</a>.</p>
<p>The North Korean refugees were elected as members of two conservative opposition sister parties – Thae for the United Future Party (UFP) and Ji for the Future Korea Party (FKP). These parties, <a href="https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=153685">which merged</a> under the UFP banner on May 29, oppose Moon’s “soft” approach to North Korea that aims to foster dialogue and engagement. </p>
<h2>Controversial figures</h2>
<p>Both men have been <a href="https://www.dailynk.com/english/thae-yong-ho-shares-insights-on-in/">critics of Moon’s policies</a>, expressing scepticism about progress towards denuclearisation or a formal inter-Korean peace agreement. They also question the utility of restoring inter-Korean cooperation to the levels made possible under South Korea’s pro-engagement <a href="https://beyondparallel.csis.org/5-theories-of-unification/">Sunshine Policy</a> of the 2000s.</p>
<p>Thae is known for his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/17/friends-of-north-korean-defectors-son-speak-of-their-worries">high-profile defection</a> from the North Korean embassy in London, where he served as the deputy ambassador between 2006 and 2016. A confident English speaker, he has widely discussed the inner workings of the regime since his escape.</p>
<p>While Thae epitomises the privilege of the North Korean elite, along with the political savviness that comes with such experience, Ji comes from a much less distinguished and arguably more traumatic background. He left North Korea in 2006 in a harrowing escape, made all the more challenging by the fact that he is missing one leg and an arm after an accident in North Korea. </p>
<p>After arriving in South Korea, he founded a non-governmental organisation, <a href="https://nauh.or.kr/">Now Action and Unity for NK Human Rights</a>, and has advocated widely on human rights and other issues regarding North Korea, including as a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/he-helped-trump-confront-north-korea-now-ji-seong-ho-wonders-whether-human-rights-will-be-left-behind/2019/02/03/b5bdbee2-257b-11e9-81fd-b7b05d5bed90_story.html">guest of President Donald Trump</a> at the 2018 US State of the Union address. </p>
<p>Yet the election of these two candidates doesn’t necessarily mark a major improvement in South Korean society’s acceptance of North Korean defectors. Some commentators argued that Thae’s election was <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-thae-yong-ho%E2%80%99s-election-isnt-model-north-korean-defectors-follow-149321">not a sign of radical inclusiveness</a>. The Gangnam-A constituency to which he was elected outright is home to many of the traditionally conservative, affluent elite who would have voted for whomever the UFP nominated as their candidate. </p>
<p>Ji was elected on the basis of proportional representation and doesn’t have a specific constituency. But his election was fairly certain as long as the FKP secured enough votes overall to allocate him a seat. And given that the number of North Korean defectors who have come to South Korea now <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/">exceeds 33,000</a>, it’s unsurprising the party deemed it worthwhile to designate a seat for a North Korean defector candidate. </p>
<h2>Kim Jong-un’s disappearance</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, the period since the election of the two men has been a rocky one, thanks to recent events in North Korea. Between April 12 and May 1, North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, was conspicuously absent from the public eye, leading to speculation that he was ill or had even died. </p>
<p>Ji said in a media interview on April 30 that he was <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/north-korean-diplomat-elected-lawmaker-south-korea/story?id=70163962">“99% certain”</a> that Kim was dead. Thae, meanwhile, told reporters that while Kim’s personal health is always the state’s <a href="https://www.nbc-2.com/story/42058606/former-north-korean-diplomat-says-kim-jong-un-rumors-are-not-based-on-fact">most closely guarded secret</a>, he suspected <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200504004651315?section=national/politics">Kim was unwell</a>.</p>
<p>After Kim <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-06/north-korea-kim-jong-un-return-carefully-orchestrated/12215934">reappeared</a> apparently alive and well on May 1, Thae and Ji <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200504004651315?section=national/politics">duly apologised</a>. Thae said he had been “feeling the impact of his words keenly” and Ji likewise claimed to feel deeply the “weight of his post”. </p>
<p>But the progressive ruling party expressed anger towards them for allegedly sowing seeds of uncertainty with <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0siL4tLj1k">“unconfirmed information”</a> and demanded their apologies. Some also called for Thae and Ji’s exclusion from any parliamentary committees dealing with information <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200504004651315?section=national/politics">crucial to South Korea’s national security</a>.</p>
<h2>Ongoing stigma</h2>
<p>The stigmatisation of these two democratically elected officials can be attributed to party politics. But it also points to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14631369.2016.1151236?journalCode=caet20">persisting distrust</a> in South Korean society towards North Korean defectors, despite their best efforts to carve out a new existence in a society very different from the one they left. </p>
<p>Such sentiment will not easily be overturned while North Korea continues to be viewed as a threat to global peace and security, and while South Korean politics remains <a href="https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/north_korea_and_identity_politics_in_south_korea">deeply divided over its approach to the North</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, fighting the stigma associated with where they come from will likely be the prevailing focus of Thae’s and Ji’s time in office. Yet if they can last the distance, especially under Moon’s progressive government, they will have gone some way to proving to society that they deserve a place in South Korea’s democracy, while perhaps also chipping away at the daily prejudice faced by defectors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah A. Son is affiliated with the Transitional Justice Working Group, Seoul. </span></em></p>Does the election of two North Korean defectors to the South Korean National Assembly signal a breakthrough in public acceptance of this politically significant minority?Sarah A. Son, Lecturer in Korean Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1035982018-09-25T01:51:23Z2018-09-25T01:51:23ZEconomic growth and ‘Trump-proofing’ – why the latest inter-Korea summit matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237684/original/file-20180924-7728-1ittlg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The detente between North and South Korea continues, with South Korean President Moon Jae-in (right) pushing on regardless of the United States.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Pyongyang Press Corps / Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/18/kim-jong-un-greets-moon-jae-in-as-inter-korean-summit-starts">fifth inter-Korean summit</a> provided another round of iconic moments in a year of extraordinary drama in Korean Peninsula politics.</p>
<p>From Moon Jae-in’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33CJ-KJ6vrY">address at the Arirang Mass Games</a> to the leaders’ photo-op on the shores of the crater lake at Paekdusan, the three-day summit produced plenty of symbolism. More importantly, it increased the detail and scope of confidence-building measures agreed in the earlier <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-27/panmunjom-declaration-for-peace2c-prosperity-and-unification-o/9705794">Panmunjom Declaration</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-north-korea-summit-agreement-is-most-revealing-for-what-it-leaves-out-98094">US-North Korea summit agreement is most revealing for what it leaves out</a>
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<p>Much of the commentary in the wake of the summit has focused on what the <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/09/103_255848.html">Pyongyang Declaration</a> means for the potential denuclearisation of North Korea. To view the summit through the narrow lens of nuclear politics would be to overlook the significance of deeper patterns that are emerging from inter-Korean détente.</p>
<h2>Filling in the details</h2>
<p>The first notable feature of the Pyongyang Declaration is the increased depth of military-to-military confidence-building measures, as articulated in its <a href="https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Historic%20Panmunjom%20Declaration%20in%20the%20Military%20Domain.pdf">attached annex</a>. One of the questions emerging from the Panmunjom Declaration related to how that document’s vague commitments to cooperation would be fleshed out in detail.</p>
<p>In the Pyongyang Declaration are measures for increased conflict management procedures and greater operational level consultation. This includes a series of measures along the demilitarised zone (DMZ) and Northern Limit Line maritime boundary to reduce the risk of confrontation. </p>
<h2>A holistic approach to security</h2>
<p>There is a clear human security focus in the breadth and depth of the Pyongyang Declaration that has moved inter-Korean engagement well beyond denuclearisation. <a href="https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/">Human security</a> is about protecting individuals and communities from threats to their well-being and survival. This might be from traditional security threats of war or persecution, or from non-traditional threats such as food insecurity, inadequate housing and sanitation, environmental degradation, or pandemic disease.</p>
<p>Growing the web of inter-Korean economic links can improve economic opportunities for North Korean citizens and create mutual interests that decrease the appetite of both governments for conflict. Breaking ground on the construction of east and west transportation corridors was an example of this, along with reopening the Kaesong industrial zone and Geumgangsan tourist precinct.</p>
<p>What’s new here is the establishment of special economic zones and tourist precincts. A <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/South-Korean-tycoons-join-Moon-in-Pyongyang">large number of South Korean firms</a> are ready to seize on new business opportunities in the North that may result from these openings. For the North, these projects fit within Kim Jong-un’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/opinion/kim-jong-un-moon-economic-development-north-korea-denuclearization.html">objective of economic modernisation</a>.</p>
<p>Also of interest is the addition of cooperation on environmental capacity-building and public health. As <a href="http://library.kei.re.kr/dmme/img/001/011/007/%EC%88%98%EC%8B%9C2017_09_%EB%AA%85%EC%88%98%EC%A0%95_%EC%B5%9C%EC%A2%85.pdf">Myeong Soojeong from the Korea Environment Institute</a> has argued, South and North Korea share connected ecosystems (ecology transcends borders). Environmental degradation in North Korea is likely to increase the cost to South Korea in the event of reunification. </p>
<p>Cooperation on public health and pandemic disease prevention would also benefit the well-being of North Korean people, especially given the North’s well-documented <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/12/north-korea-has-a-big-tuberculosis-problem-its-about-to-get-worse/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a6d1f41cdfec">outbreaks of tuberculosis</a>.</p>
<p>From a South Korean perspective, the thinking behind broad-based engagement is that a comprehensive security strategy that improves the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/23595">human well-being of North Korean citizens</a> can reduce the threat posed by North Korea. By building on these mutual interests, the two Koreas give themselves space to pull back from the dangerous insecurity spirals that have made Korean Peninsula politics so volatile.</p>
<h2>Appealing to multiple audiences</h2>
<p>The expansion of the scope of engagement plays well politically for domestic constituencies on both sides of the DMZ. Moon has staked enormous political capital on rapprochement with the North, while Kim needs to bring the people with him to legitimise his economic modernisation program and see off internal factions.</p>
<p>From this perspective, the expansion of the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-20/south-korean-and-north-korean-families-reunite/10144520">family reunion program</a> will be popular on both sides of the DMZ and provide valuable opportunities for separated families to reconnect.</p>
<p>The cultural and sports exchanges are largely symbolic trust-building activities. But these are also an important piece of diplomatic signalling to the international community that the process is serious and now is not a time for confrontation.</p>
<p>The announcement of a joint bid to host the 2032 Summer Olympic Games is particularly poignant, given the importance of this year’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/2018-winter-olympics-set-to-begin-against-the-backdrop-of-warm-words-and-cold-politics-89967">Pyeongchang Winter Olympics</a> in helping to defuse red-hot tensions that had bubbled up through 2017. </p>
<p>We should also not forget the <a href="https://www.38north.org/2018/02/aoneill020818/">influence of the 1988 Seoul Olympics</a> in opening a greater window of political opportunity for democratisation in South Korea.</p>
<h2>Power transitions</h2>
<p>It is intriguing that confidence-building measures related to the North’s nuclear program are not mentioned until well into the Pyongyang Declaration. North Korea’s agreement to independently verified dismantlement of its missile launch platform at Dongchang-ri/Sohae is noteworthy. But promises to dismantle infrastructure at the Yongbyon nuclear site are conditional on reciprocal action from the United States, which is far from certain.</p>
<p>Indeed, apart from these two concessions, the Pyongyang Declaration is not really about denuclearisation at all. What’s increasingly clear is that inter-Korean détente is now driving Korean Peninsula politics, and increasingly shaping the agenda of US interactions with the DPRK. The US-ROK alliance remains in place, but the goalposts of this relationship are moving.</p>
<p>All the hype surrounding inter-Korean economic integration notwithstanding, North Korea is not a virgin territory that South Korea can lay claim to. The <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/north-korea-and-china-friends-again/">DPRK is already strongly integrated into China’s economic orbit</a> through trade corridors, Chinese direct investment and the reality of the Chinese yuan as the North’s de facto currency.</p>
<p>By connecting to North Korea through greater infrastructure links, the South will also be opening a connection with China’s vast land-based transportation network and beyond. The geopolitical implications of inter-Korean economic cooperation bringing South Korea closer to the Sinosphere have not received as much attention as they might.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/summit-on-then-off-now-on-again-the-seemingly-endless-game-playing-of-us-north-korea-relations-96785">Summit on, then off, now on again? The seemingly endless game-playing of US-North Korea relations</a>
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<p>That the inter-Korean process might need to be Trump-proofed illustrates a growing distance between South Korea and the United States in the Trump era. One could indeed make the case that both the South and North Korean governments may not see the US as a credible negotiating partner at this time, given US President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/the-many-north-korea-policies-of-rex-w-tillerson/524736/">elastic foreign policy positions</a>, his record of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/world/g7-trump-russia.html">alienating allies</a>, and the likely <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/trumps-north-korea-policy-treating-reality-like-reality-television/">lack of domestic support</a> for engagement in US foreign policy circles. This was well illustrated by the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2165307/us-ambassador-south-korea-harry-harris-takes-hard-line-norths">recent address</a> by Harry Harris, US ambassador to the ROK, stressing “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation” (CVID).</p>
<p>Extraordinarily, Washington’s insistence on CVID now seems out of date given the growing momentum of inter-Korean détente. Moon appears determined to push on with engagement regardless of the US position. </p>
<p>This would have been unthinkable under previous American administrations. Such are the shifting goalposts of power in world affairs in the Trump era.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103598/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Pyongyang Declaration between the two Koreas is about much more than nuclear power – and leaves the US on the outer.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/980402018-06-12T10:06:42Z2018-06-12T10:06:42ZTrump-Kim deal: why the two Koreas will probably never become one country again<p>It seems ages since a lingering handshake began across the demarcation line that separates North and South Korea. Much has happened since – and now, the once unthinkable has happened with a summit between North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and the US’s Donald Trump. But in all the frenzied coverage of that summit – which yielded an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44450739">agreement</a> widely considered anaemic – it’s easy to forget that the unprecedented peace process between the Koreas was already underway.</p>
<p>A number of pledges were made at the April 2018 <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/four-things-you-should-know-about-the-inter-korean-summit/4373903.html">Inter-Korean Summit</a> between Moon Jae-in, president of South Korea, and Kim Jong-un, supreme leader of North Korea. Among their promises were an agreement to work towards the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and to convert the Korean Armistice Agreement into a full peace treaty that would formally end the Korean War after 65 years.</p>
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<p>A Korean peace treaty would most likely do three things: formally designate the two Korea’s borders (probably as they currently stand), put in place certain processes that would resolve any future disputes, and potentially open the North for economic investment and cease current sanctions. But what about unification? Would a peace treaty end any prospects of unification, with each country recognising the other’s existence, or might it install a system of governance that the two countries could share – a federal system, for example? </p>
<p>The key question is what Kim really wants. If all he really desires is a ceremonial role – devoid of power, but with all the pomp and circumstance befitting a “supreme leader” – a unified Korea might look something like a constitutional monarchy. Kim could be granted discretionary powers, as is Morocco’s Mohammed VI, or hold no formal authority at all, as does Japan’s Emperor Akihito. As in the UK and the Commonwealth, he could be “a sovereign who reigns but does not rule”.</p>
<p>For many reasons, this is highly unlikely. </p>
<h2>Striking a balance</h2>
<p>Kim has given no indication that he is interested in relinquishing any power over his part of the peninsula; nor has Moon. As such, the most likely outcome is still a peninsula of two Koreas, however cordial their relationship.</p>
<p>After all, it has been more than 65 years since Korea was unified in any form. And even then, it was never really formalised after the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II. Today’s younger Koreans have no memory of the “unifed” state, and more and more young people in South Korea seem content with the idea of two Koreas. After all, it’s perfectly normal for two countries to share historical heritage and linguistic background without thinking of themselves as a single “divided nation”.</p>
<p>This fits a global trend towards a world of more smaller countries, not new larger ones. The only countries growing in size are taking their new territory by force or subterfuge, as did Russia in its annexation <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-can-ukraine-crimea-and-russia-secure-a-stable-future-23947">of the Crimea</a>. </p>
<p>If a stable two-country system was to endure, the parties on all sides would need to accept some inconvenient truths. For a start, North Korea is a nuclear state, and in a sense always will be; “full” denuclearisation is not possible, because it already knows how to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The US will also not leave the Korean Peninsula entirely because it has another reason to stay there: to keep a strategic foothold in East Asia so as to mitigate the influence of China.</p>
<h2>Holding on</h2>
<p>So what does Kim want in the short term, and what does he need? In short, a way forward for North Korea that doesn’t put his domestic supremacy at risk. Conventional wisdom has long held that as a country modernises its economy, democracy is sure to follow, as happened in both South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s. But despite initial predictions, the same effect has not taken hold in China.</p>
<p>Instead, the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rule is being consolidated. China’s current president, Xi Jinping, only this year <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-xi-jinpings-lifetime-presidency-could-change-china-for-better-or-worse-92472">announced</a> that the term limit on his office would be scrapped, potentially allowing him to rule for life. Xi’s example will surely have given Kim hope that he can modernise North Korea’s dismal economy without relaxing or losing his hold on power.</p>
<p>As the world order becomes more and more dominated by the relationship between two superpowers, North Korea may once again look play China off against its principal rival, as it did in the 1960s after the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/was-the-sino-soviet-split-borne-of-ideology-or-geostrategic-consideration/">Sino-Soviet split</a>. In so doing, Kim can reap the maximum benefit in terms of economic, political, and potentially military aid – all of which will in turn help him retain power even as North Korea grows and living conditions there improve.</p>
<p>Aligning with the US would be a bold move, but Trump’s pride in “making a deal”, however thin, is very much to Kim’s benefit. It gives him the room for manoeuvre he badly needs to move forward without putting his regime at risk. Still, nothing should be taken for granted: as the last few months have proven, everything could suddenly change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niki JP Alsford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Alongside denuclearisation, reunification is the biggest potential game-changer on the Korean peninsula. But it remains a pipe dream.Niki JP Alsford, Reader in Asia Pacific Studies, Director of the International Institute of Korean Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/980392018-06-11T10:40:52Z2018-06-11T10:40:52ZMemo to President Trump: Better ties between North and South Korea should come first – then get rid of nukes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222505/original/file-20180610-191947-p7t4cw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, left, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the border village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone, April 27, 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/Korea Summit press pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At President Donald Trump’s summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore, Kim may have promised complete denuclearization, but Trump should know this goal won’t be achieved without progress toward Korean unification and increased contact between South and North Korea.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Elynn/">a scholar</a> of comparative politics and East Asian studies, I believe that two recent developments – not just one – demand new U.S. policy. So far, the world’s attention has been on the first development: the fact that North Korea <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html">has nuclear weapons</a>. Less attention has been paid to the second one: recent displays of <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-04-27/north-and-south-korea-come-together-historic-summit">pan-Korean patriotism</a>. </p>
<p>Let me explain why this second development deserves more scrutiny.</p>
<h2>Moving toward one Korea</h2>
<p>Most South Koreans, remembering past Northern violence, welcomed the April 27, 2018, “<a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-northkorea-southkorea-summit-statemen/panmunjom-declaration-for-peace-prosperity-and-unification-of-the-korean-peninsula-idUKKBN1HY193">Panmunjom Declaration</a> for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula.” Signing it with Kim, President Moon Jae-in articulated the South’s interests – and raised his domestic popularity – while <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/27/606358775/in-south-korea-summit-with-north-korea-is-greeted-with-hope-and-skepticism">restraining the U.S.</a> from an attack on the North.</p>
<p>Moon did this once before. On August 17, 2017, he announced a U.S. agreement not to take military action against the North <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/trump-doesnt-have-the-power-to-attack-north-korea-without-congress/538425/">without the South’s prior consent</a>. Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/08/17/joseph-dunford-north-korea/575327001/">confirmed that policy</a> on the same day. </p>
<p>This lessens the chance of conflict. But it also creates a danger for the U.S. If war erupts, Kim might now prefer to hit Americans at bases in Japan, rather than fellow Koreans.</p>
<h2>Conventional weapons still a hazard</h2>
<p>While these early moves toward stronger relations between the Koreas are a positive sign, the threat of the North’s conventional artillery against Seoul remains. Protecting Seoul is a key requirement for South Korea’s alliance with the United States. </p>
<p>Seoul has importance even for the North, because it is the traditional capital of the whole peninsula. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Choson-dynasty">The Joseon dynasty</a> ruled there for half a millennium. Until 1972, the North Korean constitution held that <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-real-north-korea-9780199390038?cc=us&lang=en&">Seoul rather than Pyongyang</a> was legally the capital of all Korea. </p>
<p>So the South has “Korea’s Berlin.” Additionally, <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/040515/north-korean-vs-south-korean-economies.asp">two-thirds of all Koreans live here</a> and the South’s economy is 35 times larger than the North’s. Its air force and navy <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11603665/North-Korea-v-South-Korea-How-the-countries-armed-forces-compare.html">are stronger</a>. From K-pop to electronics, the South has remarkable “soft power” too, while the North is addicted to the hard stuff. Pyongyang has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html">multiple weapons of mass destruction</a>.</p>
<p>And while the threat of combat exists, any action is unlikely. The costs of war, as distinct from rhetoric, are prohibitive. The South would suffer, as would the North, if the U.S. attacked Kim’s nuclear facilities. He might retaliate by using his artillery against Seoul. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-bolton-northkorea/trump-should-insist-on-libya-style-denuclearization-for-north-korea-bolton-idUSKBN1GZ37A">National security adviser John Bolton</a> and others in Washington neglect our Korean ally’s interests when they focus solely on eliminating North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic capacity.</p>
<p>President Moon, like leaders in Washington, Beijing and Tokyo, would prefer that Pyongyang implement <a href="https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2018/01/17/en/common-goal-complete-verifiable-and-irreversible-denuclearization-north-korea">“complete, verifiable, irreversible”</a> denuclearization.<br>
But Kim believes that Korea’s history of division by foreign powers gives him a right not to follow the usual rules.. This is more important to him than keeping promises. The fact is that Pyongyang has sporadically in past years <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html">committed to denuclearization</a>. <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron">It formally withdrew</a> from the Nonproliferation Treaty only in 2003. The Kim dynasty, in other words, did not follow through on its commitment to shed nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Total, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization is likely “a bridge too far” in the current context – Kim will not agree to it. In any case, complete verification depends on seeking violations, which is difficult in a dictatorial police state. </p>
<p>Complete denuclearization will be a matter for the future. Demanding it now will not lead to peace on the peninsula or internationally. It is Korean politics, not just Washington politics, that will affect what happens in both the short and long term. Few guess that Kim will fully surrender his only serious power, no matter what he says. </p>
<h2>First, more South-North contacts</h2>
<p>Kim cannot restrict the appeal to the North of the South’s lifestyle and prosperity forever. South-North contacts will slowly weaken Kim. His unreliability, the factor that makes him dangerous to the U.S., will be tempered as these contacts with South Korea strengthen. He, together with Moon, has let the genie of patriotism out of the bottle, and I don’t think he’ll be able to put it back.</p>
<p>Others have argued that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-goal-in-korea-should-be-peace-and-trade-not-unification-95701">a united Korea is a bigger threat</a> to the U.S., but as I see it, progress toward Korean reunification would reduce the threat to America. A unified Korea would be safer for the U.S. than Pyongyang now is as an isolated nuclear power. </p>
<p>Northern elites cannot maintain their patriotic pretenses without talking about reunification, even though some there, as in the South, do not want it any time soon. Regime change will eventually come to the North. South Koreans know that more contacts with the North can <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-tax-idUSTRE67E08K20100815">raise their taxes</a>, even as peace raises their security and reunites divided families. </p>
<p>Trump might willingly be persuaded to accept Kim’s claims about denuclearization, for the sake of advertising the best “deal” he can get. This would likely only slow Pyongyang’s program – not end it anytime soon. Negotiations would take multiple meetings, not just one “summit.” A period of South-North links should follow, according to protocols the Panmunjom Declaration has established. </p>
<p>Trump may sooner or later turn down a “denuclearization-without-sure-verification” deal, but in my opinion it is the best available for the U.S. and our allies. </p>
<p>If a future unified Korea emerges, it will still be surrounded by larger and more powerful China, Japan and Russia. And it could want good relations with the strong-but-more-distant U.S. </p>
<p>Rather than dividing the Koreans’ country, America should encourage them to re-create it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lynn T. White III does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s risky unreliability will diminish as his country builds ties with South Korea. So Korean unification may be a better focus for Tuesday’s summit than denuclearization.Lynn T. White III, Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Scholar, Woodrow Wilson School and East Asian Studies Program, Princeton, Princeton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/976932018-06-10T20:08:10Z2018-06-10T20:08:10ZAs the shaky US-North Korea summit is set to begin, the parties must search for common interest<p>US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un will meet on Tuesday for their highly anticipated summit in Singapore. For the summit to be productive, the negotiations need to converge on a lowest-common-denominator shared interest that both parties can agree on.</p>
<p>We saw this in the inter-Korean summit, where South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un settled on easy-win confidence-building measures as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-and-south-korea-met-but-what-does-it-really-mean-95755">starting point</a> for more substantive negotiations.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/summit-on-then-off-now-on-again-the-seemingly-endless-game-playing-of-us-north-korea-relations-96785">Summit on, then off, now on again? The seemingly endless game-playing of US-North Korea relations</a>
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<p>Given the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/trump-north-korea-negotiations.html">extreme and long-standing trust deficit</a> between the US and DPRK, it is not clear where Trump and Kim might find this lowest common denominator to unlock a confidence-building pathway. Because of that, this summit is shaping as compelling viewing as a spectacle, and perplexing in its ambiguous purpose.</p>
<h2>What do they have to offer each other?</h2>
<p>North Korea is not committed to denuclearisation as the concept has been understood by the Trump administration. The North Korean interpretation of a nuclear-free Korea implies the full simultaneous nuclear weapons relinquishment by all nuclear powers, including the United States.</p>
<p>Here, North Korea can <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-and-south-korean-leaders-meet-to-frankly-discuss-how-to-make-trump-kim-summit-a-success-seoul-says/2018/05/26/37a74e9c-60d7-11e8-9ee3-49d6d4814c4c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.40494a32e528">speak the language of denuclearisation</a> without ever having to commit to “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation” (CVID).</p>
<p>The problem with Trump’s insistence on CVID is that there is no mutually agreeable starting point for a discussion with North Korea on those terms. There is <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992?src=recsys&">no outcome</a> in which the regime willingly relinquishes its nuclear weapons program, because the Kim regime is so heavily invested in nuclear weapons as the foundation of its security strategy, economic development pathway, and domestic political legitimacy.</p>
<p>The only real concession of value that Washington has to offer Kim is a formal treaty to conclude the Korean War. Indeed, Trump has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-peace/trumps-north-korea-summit-may-bring-peace-declaration-but-at-a-cost-idUSKCN1J121B">hinted that the “signing of a document”</a> to close hostilities is a possibility (though he stopped short of offering a formal peace treaty).</p>
<p>What does North Korea have to offer the United States, short of denuclearisation? We have seen gestures of goodwill in the lead-up to the summit. North Korea’s recently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/24/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test-site-intl/index.html">demolished tunnels</a> at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site are a gesture of goodwill to Washington, offering up a now-obsolete facility.</p>
<p>This echoes a similar concession by Pyongyang in 2008, when it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/world/asia/28korea.html">demolished the cooling tower</a> of the obsolete reactor at Yongbyon. Negotiations may settle on a nuclear freeze and/or missile testing moratorium, in addition to other smaller security-related confidence-building measures.</p>
<p>The North <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/pompeo-north-korea-trip-trump/index.html">released three American citizens</a> to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on a recent visit to Pyongyang. The Americans had been detained in the DPRK on accusations of espionage.</p>
<p>And in a test of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-the-golden-arches-theory-of-conflict-prevention/">Thomas Friedman’s tongue-in-cheek theory</a> that no two countries with McDonald’s restaurants would ever go to war, Kim may even <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-north-korea-mcdonalds-20180604-story.html">offer to have a McDonald’s</a> open a restaurant in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>Kim may also court Trump with flattery, as <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/06/05/trumps-north-korean-nuclear-theatrics/">many other world leaders have done</a> to productive effect. </p>
<h2>Who has the negotiating leverage?</h2>
<p>Both parties have strengths and weaknesses in their bargaining positions. North Korea has (or is close enough to) a deployable nuclear weapons capability. Kim appears enthusiastic to talk now with the Americans, because in nuclear weapons his government has the strategic leverage it needs. North Korea wants to negotiate a peace agreement with the United States, but on Pyongyang’s terms.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-assumptions-we-make-about-north-korea-and-why-theyre-wrong-84771">Five assumptions we make about North Korea – and why they're wrong</a>
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<p>While it is highly unlikely that Kim begged Trump to reconvene the summit “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44393295">on hands and knees</a>,” as Rudy Giuliani has suggested, North Korea does have some incentive to make concessions.</p>
<p>Kim’s ambitions of developing the North Korean economy under the <a href="https://www.38north.org/tag/byungjin/">Byungjin</a> model are constrained by the UN Security Council and bilateral American sanctions regimes.</p>
<p>While North Korea has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2015.1095278">demonstrated an ability to persevere in spite of sanctions</a>, and even grow some niche sectors of its economy (such as the mining sector), Kim’s vision for economic development ultimately requires strategic connections with international development partners.</p>
<p>The explicit inclusion of references to transportation infrastructure linkages with South Korea in the <a href="https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/2007_North-South_%20Declaration.pdf">Panmunjom Declaration</a> from April’s inter-Korean summit illustrates this point.</p>
<p>Similarly, there are limitations on American action that <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">constrain its negotiating options</a> – most notably, the strategic vulnerability of Seoul to North Korean bombardment.</p>
<p>The absence of a substantive relationship between the US and North Korea also limits Washington’s economic and diplomatic leverage. Rightly or wrongly, the US has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2015.1095278">dealt itself out of direct influence</a> over North Korea through its various policies of strategic isolation and maximum pressure. It is ironic that US officials have consistently urged China to do more to pressure North Korea and uphold the integrity of the sanctions regime, when it has been economic interactions between the DPRK and China that have had the most demonstrable impact on politics in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>However, the clear power disparity between the US and DPRK is often overlooked. As the more powerful party with overwhelming nuclear superiority and clear capacity to deter any North Korean nuclear threat, the US does have capacity to reset the terms of the relationship by reducing the heat in negotiations.</p>
<p>Trump can do this by changing the focus of the negotiations. If it <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-beyond-all-or-nothing-ultimatum">insists on CVID to the bitter end</a>, the Trump administration will blow an opportunity to meaningfully change the strategic goalposts on the Korean Peninsula by focusing on the wrong prize.</p>
<h2>Who else is playing a role?</h2>
<p>With such ambiguity over potential outcomes from the summit, other regional players are lobbying hard around the edges to represent their interests.</p>
<p>South Korea’s diplomatic efforts in 2018 have been geared to guiding the US into a more conciliatory position with North Korea. This would make it politically safer for Trump to negotiate for an agreement with Pyongyang, knowing there are influential American officials in Trump’s ear counselling for war.</p>
<p>Moon Jae-in has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">busy maintaining the diplomatic momentum</a> generated by the inter-Korean summit, from his tactical ego-stroking comments about Trump deserving the Nobel Peace Prize to visiting Washington to lobby the president directly.</p>
<p>Moon has even flagged that he may <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-meeting-summit-north-korea-south-president-moon-jae-in-singapore-june-a8372596.html">travel to Singapore</a> for the summit, knowing South Korea is best positioned to facilitate confidence-building with the DPRK.</p>
<p>Conversely, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also been engaging in shuttle diplomacy, urging Trump to follow a tougher line. North Korea’s WMD and missile threat to Japan, and resolution of the abductee issue, are <a href="https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/224097">core interests</a> of the Abe administration.</p>
<p>Indeed, an adversarial North Korea better suits Abe’s domestic agenda for Japanese strategic “normalisation”, which would be undercut by rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang.</p>
<p>It is also interesting to see that former NBA star Dennis Rodman may be an attendee at the summit. While Rodman has been lampooned in some quarters for his sports diplomacy and relationship with Kim Jong-un, he nonetheless has a <a href="https://drbenjaminhabib.wordpress.com/2013/03/01/dennis-does-dprk/">level of access to and a unique rapport</a> with the North Korean leader that is largely unmatched by anyone else within the American foreign policy establishment.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://nypost.com/2018/06/05/dennis-rodman-will-be-in-singapore-for-trump-kim-summit/">“ambassador of goodwill”</a>, Rodman could help the parties find that common interest.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-a-us-north-korea-summit-does-happen-well-have-moon-jae-in-to-thank-for-it-96915">If a US-North Korea summit does happen, we'll have Moon Jae-in to thank for it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Also significant is the non-invitation of US National Security Advisor John Bolton. His <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/30/asia/north-korea-bolton-libya-intl/index.html">recent comments</a> comparing North Korea to Libya appear to be a <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/it-sure-looks-like-john-bolton-is-trying-to-sabotage-the-north-korea-talks.html">deliberate attempt to undercut</a> the State Department’s groundwork with Pyongyang over the past few months.</p>
<p>American hawks such as Bolton view any kind of engagement with North Korea as a “loss” or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/world/asia/moon-jae-in-trump-kim-jong-un.html">“appeasement”</a> — one of the most juvenile and misapplied terms in the international relations lexicon.</p>
<p>They are well aware of the difficulty of getting any negotiated deal ratified in a Republican-majority Congress (recalling the fate of the <a href="http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/us-dprk-agreed-framework/">Agreed Framework</a>). The irony is a deal is more likely to stick in the US if it is owned by a Republican president.</p>
<h2>What could this summit achieve?</h2>
<p>My view is that North Korea can be deterred as a nuclear power, and a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War represents the best pathway to managing regional security and ensuring the <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">safety of the people who live in the region</a>.</p>
<p>It is under the umbrella of a formalised peace regime that human rights concerns within North Korea are more likely to be addressed, coupled with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/06/07/617804581/will-trump-confront-n-koreas-human-rights-abuses-with-kim-well-see">continued pressure</a> from international human rights advocates.</p>
<p>Engagement and interaction is the best vehicle for this, based on an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09644016.2011.538165">understanding of inter-relationships of complex material, financial and ecological flows and networks</a> that are shaping <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357823.2016.1191427">social change processes</a> within the DPRK.</p>
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<p>Summits are symbols that act as markers in a much broader process of relationship-building. They are based on confidence-building measures and clear, achievable implementation steps. Through such a process, the parties could gradually evolve the level of trust necessary to progress to subsequent steps on the negotiation pathway.</p>
<p>It is unclear in the build-up to this unprecedented summit if the participants will be able to hack away the thicket of decades of mistrust and hostility to identify common interests.</p>
<p>We will find out on Tuesday if Trump and Kim can find that lowest common denominator on which to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The highly awaited summit has the potential to lead to real peace on the peninsula- but only if both countries can find a common interest on which to build an agreement.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/958452018-06-01T10:42:36Z2018-06-01T10:42:36ZFor many South Korean Christians, reunification with the North is a religious goal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221198/original/file-20180531-69521-63pi2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People pray during a special service to wish for a successful inter-Korean summit and peace on the Korea peninsular at a church in Seoul.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A lot has happened on the Korean peninsula in the last few weeks. South Korean president Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2018/apr/27/north-and-south-korean-leaders-shake-hands-at-the-border-video">met for the first time</a>; Kim took some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/30/north-korea-test-site/?utm_term=.4e0cbeeacbda">serious steps toward denuclearization</a>; and Kim and President Trump <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/03/09/trumps-meeting-with-north-koreas-kim-will-be-historic-and-logistically-complicated.html">agreed to talk</a>, but Trump abruptly <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/24/trump-says-singapore-summit-with-north-korea-leader-kim-is-cancelled-.html">canceled the historic meeting.</a> On June 1, however, following a meeting with a high ranking North Korean official, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/02/everything-you-need-to-know-about-trumps-big-envelope-from-kim-jong-un-and-the-hope-for-world-peace/?utm_term=.98de54fcd0e1">President Trump announced</a> that he plans to meet Kim Jong-un.</p>
<p>I watched these events unfold with interest since two months earlier, I had traveled to South Korea with 12 journalism students to <a href="http://thegroundtruthproject.org/projects/seoul-on-edge">report</a> on ongoing religious, political and cultural developments. </p>
<p>When we landed at Seoul’s Incheon Airport, the warm diplomatic tailwinds of the Winter Olympics had <a href="https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-08/the-pyeongchang-olympics-might-be-worth-it-due-to-north-korea-diplomacy">thawed relations</a> between the North and South. <a href="https://www.biography.com/people/kim-jong-un-21125351">Kim </a> and Moon would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/09/moon-jae-in-the-south-korean-pragmatist-who-would-be-presidentc">soon meet</a>. And there were rumors of a Trump and Kim parlay to follow. </p>
<p>My students had many questions about the role of religion in the land of <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/5/30/17404956/kpop-bts-music-netflix-explained">K-pop</a>, including Christianity’s involvement in either promoting or preventing improved relations between the North and South. Even though half of all <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/12/6-facts-about-christianity-in-south-korea/">South Koreans are religiously unaffiliated,</a> Christianity has had an outsized influence in the country. Many of the <a href="https://crcc.usc.edu/the-diplomat-south-koreas-megachurches/">world’s largest churches</a> are located there, and many South Korean political and business leaders are <a href="http://www.tuttlepublishing.com/books-by-country/korea-the-impossible-country-hardcover-with-jacket">staunch Christians</a>.</p>
<h2>Korean Christianity</h2>
<p>For the first half of the 20th century, Christianity gained little ground in Korea. <a href="http://shamanism.sgarrigues.net">Confucianism, Buddhism and shamanism persisted</a> despite efforts of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. But after the Korean War, the country’s religious landscape changed dramatically. </p>
<p>Communists in the North <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2016/10/31/north-koreas-war-on-christianity-the-globes-number-one-religious-persecutor/#67af997756e3">banned most Christian practice</a>, replacing traditional beliefs and rituals with <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Juche">Juche</a>, an official state ideology that mixes Marxism and self-reliance with veneration for <a href="https://www.biography.com/people/kim-il-sung-9364759">Kim Il-Sung</a>, the nation’s first leader.</p>
<p>The South’s experience could not have been more different. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221204/original/file-20180531-69501-7tulte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A church in South Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wilson_pumpernickel/41595816502/in/album-72157668108545758/">Alan Mittelstaedt</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>American support for the fight against Communism and its aid in postwar reconstruction boosted Christianity’s popularity. That’s because Christianity was the Americans’ religion, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/christianity-and-korea/">many South Koreans wanted what America had</a> – wealth, freedom and “divine blessings.”</p>
<p>Conversions soared and among the most successful churches were those espousing values similar to <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Korean_Confucianism">Confucianism</a>, the Chinese philosophy that migrated to Korea some 1800 years ago, and is deeply embedded in its culture. Both Confucianism and conservative Christianity emphasize traditional gender roles, strong families, and respect for authority. </p>
<p>Today, almost 30 percent of the country is either Protestant or Roman Catholic, with conservative evangelicals <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/christianity-and-korea/">playing a significant role</a> in the nation’s politics and culture.</p>
<p>Large Korean megachurches, like their American counterparts, tend to be <a href="https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/9602873">pro-democracy, pro-free market and anti-communist</a>. They support U.S policy and, like many evangelical and “prosperity” churches in the U.S., believe that <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/God_and_Donald_Trump.html?id=zHg2DwAAQBAJ">Donald Trump is God’s man</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221199/original/file-20180531-69487-1afhlsm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Almost 30 percent of South Koreans are Christians.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During our visit, we found that many Korean Christians are <a href="http://thegroundtruthproject.org/introduction-religious-divisions-south-korea-inform-attitudes-north-korea-social-issues/">wary of Kim’s overtures to Moon</a>, including talk of reconciliation. Their preference is <a href="https://www.christianpost.com/news/korean-christians-want-unification-through-gospel-willing-to-become-martyrs-for-worship-in-north-korea-138549/">reunification</a>: one democratic country where Christianity is openly practiced. </p>
<h2>Reunification not reconciliation</h2>
<p>Indeed after the Korean War, many South Koreans yearned for a reunited nation. Many had relatives in the North and could not imagine a permanent separation.
While many of these older Koreans still want to see the two countries reunited, young people do not share the sentiment. </p>
<p>In 2017, the government’s Institute for National Unification <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/world/asia/koreas-olympics-reunification.html">found</a> that 71.2 percent of 20-something South Koreans oppose reunification. For the time being, however, young folks are a minority. So today, about 58 percent of the population <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/01/28/reunification-with-north-korea-unappealing-for-young-south-koreans.html">does favor a reunited peninsula</a>, but their numbers are falling. </p>
<p>Younger Koreans have pragmatic as well as ideological reasons for opposing reunification. North Korea is a poor, totalitarian state. South Korea is a wealthy, democratic one. The political difficulties of bridging the difference seem insurmountable, especially with Kim in power. The economic challenge is equally daunting. South Koreans have <a href="http://www.tuttlepublishing.com/books-by-country/korea-the-impossible-country-hardcover-with-jacket">worked hard for success</a> and many <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/01/28/reunification-with-north-korea-unappealing-for-young-south-koreans.html">do not want to jeopardize</a> their high standard of living to help their “poor cousins” in the North. </p>
<p>But President Moon Jae-in, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/09/moon-jae-in-the-south-korean-pragmatist-who-would-be-presidentc">son of North Korean refugees</a>, has his own ideas about <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/president-moons-north-korea-strategy/">reconciliation and reunification</a>. Unlike his conservative predecessor, Park Geun-hye, who was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/world/asia/park-geun-hye-south-korea.html">impeached and sentenced to prison</a> for abuse of power and corruption, Moon is a former human rights attorney. He is willing to start with reconciliation, but his <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/president-moons-north-korea-strategy/">long-term goal</a> is a united peninsula. </p>
<h2>Action on the ground</h2>
<p>While <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44265287">Moon Jae-in, Kim Jong-Un</a> and Trump conduct a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-summit-meetings.html">complicated diplomatic dance</a>, religiously based, grassroots initiatives take small steps forward. For some, this means sending messages over the border, for others it’s helping defectors adjust to the South, and for still others, it involves paving the way for reunification.</p>
<p>Staff at <a href="https://www.febc.org/south-korea">Far East Broadcasting System’s</a> Seoul office focus on evangelizing North Korea. They <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/north-korea-christian-radio/558755/">smuggle radios</a> into the Communist-controlled country so citizens can listen to sermons, services and shows about Christianity. The station also broadcasts in South Korea, where its content includes information on reunification.</p>
<p>“We just want to share the Christian gospel,” Chung Soo Kim, a staff member, told one of my students. Kim added that North Korean attempts to stop the programming have failed: “They cannot afford to jam our broadcasts. They do not even have enough food to feed their people.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221201/original/file-20180531-69508-1wvah6k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Korean Christians pray during a rally demanding the improvement of North Korean’s human rights situation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other Korean Christians assist North Koreans who have defected. There are about <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/north-korean-defector-sends-true-news-south-180216141628668.html">31,000 defectors in South Korea</a>, and many have trouble adjusting to their changed circumstances. The South Korean government provides some help, but clergy and churches try to fill in the gaps. According to some defectors, religion helps with acculturation. </p>
<p>The Rev. Chun Ki Won, for example, started Durihana International School in Seoul as an <a href="http://thegroundtruthproject.org/south-korean-christians-support-north-korean-defectors/">alternative for young North Koreans</a>, whose foreign accents and hand-me-down clothes make them targets of ridicule in South Korean schools.</p>
<p>“I realized after rescuing North Korean defectors from China and leading them to South Korea that they don’t settle down properly,” Chun told a student through a translator. “We teach them the purpose of their lives and their identity. We teach them why God made them to suffer, and that there is purpose in that.”</p>
<p>One of the more ambitious programs aimed at reunification is River of Life, a school run by Ben Torrey, grandson of a famous 19th century American evangelist, <a href="https://library.moody.edu/archives/biographies/reuben-archer-torrey/">Reuben A. Torrey</a>. Ben Torrey <a href="https://religionnews.com/2018/05/09/in-leery-south-korea-american-missionary-couple-works-for-reunification-of-north-and-south/">integrates reunification into the curriculum</a> for Korean Christian children.</p>
<p>Torrey’s students meet with defectors and, building on personal relationships, slowly embrace the idea of one Korea. Jin-soo (his first name), one of Torrey’s students told my student through a translator: “I went to a public elementary and middle school. In that school, at least once a year, we talked about reunification, but it was just something in the textbook, nothing that comes alive.” He explained how things changed once he had a chance to meet North Korean students. “I began thinking from their perspective,” he said. “They are the same as I am.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221205/original/file-20180531-69517-1hhtm5h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For many South Korean Christians, who support reunification, anything is possible with faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wilson_pumpernickel/41595816142/in/album-72157668108545758/">Alan Mittelstaedt</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like Torrey, Korean Christians who support reunification see it as a political and religious goal. And although it’s an uphill struggle, they believe with faith anything is possible. </p>
<p>In fact, that’s the takeaway that struck several in my class: The faith of many Korean Christians supersedes political calculation. Or, as Ben Torrey told one of the students about a united peninsula, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“God has to do it. It has to be a miracle.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>This piece, first published on June 1, was slightly updated to reflect the latest developments on North Korea.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diane Winston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With almost 30 percent of South Koreans either Protestant or Catholic, faith plays a big role in how people think about relations with the North.Diane Winston, Associate Professor and Knight Center Chair in Media & Religion, USC Annenberg School for Communication and JournalismLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/972162018-05-25T10:46:09Z2018-05-25T10:46:09ZNorth Korea: is war on the cards again?<p>It looks like the party everyone was excited about won’t take place after all. After a few days of hinting that his mooted June 12 meeting in Singapore with Kim Jong-un looked compromised, Donald Trump sent a “Dear John” letter to Kim bluntly informing him that <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-25/donald-trump-letter-kim-jong-un-north-korea-diplomacy/9799150">the meeting is off</a>. In doing so, Trump has in fact kept his word; back on April 19, he said he was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43818751">prepared to walk out</a> if there was no chance of the summit being fruitful. But while the move might not have been entirely out of the blue, the consequences could be huge. </p>
<p>The last few months had transformed the security calculus on the Korean peninsula – and the end of diplomacy may be taking it back to the brink of conflict. So what’s changed, what remains the same, and what’s next?</p>
<p>This remarkable year on the Korean peninsula has been marked by both bitter enmity and genuine goodwill. Pyongyang’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/north-korea-missile-tests-170706081545433.html">missile tests</a> not only provoked a lurid battle of insults between Trump and Kim, but also saw the US dial up the pressure on the north in the form of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-trump/u-s-imposes-more-north-korea-sanctions-trump-warns-of-phase-two-idUSKCN1G71RD">new sanctions</a> imposed via the Security Council. The north urgently needs to get those sanctions lifted if its already threadbare economy is to survive. </p>
<p>Then came South Korean president Moon’s diplomatic gamble during the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, which led to an exchange of delegations between north and south, and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-korean-peace-process-is-underway-but-it-still-depends-on-the-us-and-china-94327">remarkably successful summit</a> between the two Korean leaders. </p>
<p>To be sure, North Korea’s inclination to talk is always going to have an economic component: an opening to the US could see sanctions removed, while a thaw with South Korea could help forge new economic connections. But whatever the source of the impetus, it was remarkable to think that this deadlock, which for decades seemed intractable, might at last be coming to an end. </p>
<p>The two Korean leaders’ meeting was broadcast around the world, Kim Jong-un projecting a surprising civility and charm while Moon Jae-In enjoyed the payoff from his diplomatic gambit. On the Korean side, preparations were made for further meetings, while the Trump administration proceeded with caution – at least, at first.</p>
<h2>Falling apart</h2>
<p><a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/05/23/pompeo-north-korea-united-states-summit-kim-jong-un/636311002/">Mike Pompeo</a>, Trump’s new secretary of state, shuttled back and forth to North Korea; <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-john-bolton-donald-trump-has-an-adviser-whos-radical-even-by-neocon-standards-93883">John Bolton</a>, Trump’s supremely hawkish national security advisor, concentrated his efforts on emphasising that the US was free to act as it saw fit, and unilaterally if needed.</p>
<p>For its part, Pyongyang has made a number of concessions. It freed three long-imprisoned American citizens; it froze its missile testing, and destroyed parts of its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. And what did the US and South Korea offer in return? Not much. </p>
<p>They went ahead with their annual joint military drills, which eventually led to Kim Jong-un <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/north-korea-cancels-scheduled-meeting-with-south-korea-reports.html">cancelling a follow-up inter-Korean meeting</a>. More importantly, both Bolton and Trump’s vice president, Mike Pence, suggested that the north’s denuclearisation model could be inspired by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-north-korea-learned-from-libyas-decision-to-give-up-nuclear-weapons-95674">early 2000s climbdown by Libya</a>, which gave up a rudimentary nuclear programme in exchange for rapprochement with the West. North Korea doesn’t see much appeal in the comparison; after all, less than a decade after Libya opened up, its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was killed by rebels while NATO backed a violent uprising against him.</p>
<p>As Bolton and Pence waded in while the routine military exercises unfolded, everything slowly collapsed. The international slanging match resumed, with insults traded via Twitter and North Korea’s KCNA news agency, and the atmosphere steadily turned poisonous again.</p>
<p>It’s true that North Korea’s willingness to compromise had its limits. It never actually said it would give up its nuclear weapons, just that it would no longer need them if a peace mechanism could be implemented. But now the US has <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-backs-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what-96317">pulled out of the Iranian nuclear deal</a> – a deal that also offered relief from crippling sanctions in exchange for compliance – it is no longer able to offer North Korea a credible commitment to peace and stability.</p>
<h2>Back to the drawing board</h2>
<p>And so the Koreas – and indeed the world – find themselves in a precarious and tense situation once again. South Korea in particular has been bypassed and blindsided by Trump’s letter, which was sent just a day after Moon visited Washington. For Moon, who initiated the diplomatic process and revived a long-dead inter-Korean peace process before the news of a US-North Korea summit stole the show, just about everything needs to be started from scratch again. </p>
<p>More importantly, Seoul cannot have full confidence in the US if their crucial diplomatic relationship is untrustworthy. The US doesn’t even have a South Korean ambassador yet; outgoing Pacific Command Head Harry Harris has been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/18/politics/trump-south-korea-ambassador-harry-harris/index.html">nominated</a> to the post, but it isn’t yet clear when he will take it up.</p>
<p>The question for the Trump administration, though, is whether or not cancelling the summit means the end of engagement and a turn to hawkish moves to force the DPRK to denuclearise, or whether concerted diplomatic efforts will be made to hold lower level talks to iron out substantial issues before a symbolic summit in the future. What is clear is that the diplomatic approach will take months, if not years of engagement: there is no easy way to dispel 70 years of animosity and mistrust.</p>
<p>North Korea, meanwhile, has apparently chosen to take the high road for once. Kim is invoking humankind’s desire to see peace on the Korean peninsula, and has already communicated via long time negotiator Kim Kye-gwan that he’s still willing to meet with Trump. Perhaps Pyongyang will also attempt to salvage the new relationship it has developed with Seoul, but it remains to be seen whether the two Koreas will continue to engage with one another while faced with an unreliable US.</p>
<p>Finally, this might be the moment when others in the international community start to take the lead. If Trump sticks to his strange blend of isolationism and belligerent unilateralism, other countries and actors will need to step in to help give the Koreas a moral and financial steer.</p>
<p>United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-guterres-appeal/guterres-urges-u-s-north-korea-to-press-on-with-nerves-of-steel-idUSKCN1IP2XE">called</a> for a dialogue to continue; France’s Emmanuel Macron and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, who were meeting in St Petersburg when Trump dropped his bombshell, have both lamented the cancellation, with Putin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/24/world/putin-macron-meeting-north-korea-summit-intl/index.html">suggesting</a> that the north had done everything it promised and received nothing but scorn in return.</p>
<p>With the Trump Nobel Peace Prize dreamboat rapidly sinking, eyes will turn to China’s Xi Jinping and what he might have whispered in Kim Jong-un’s ear during <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/08/asia/kim-jong-un-xi-jinping-china-intl/index.html">their meeting earlier this month</a>. But whatever Xi does to change the game, Trump’s behaviour has thrown this promising process into chaos, and getting it back on track is of paramount importance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Virginie Grzelczyk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A remarkable year on the Korean peninsula has been marked by both bitter enmity and genuine goodwill. Now, the tension is being ratcheted up again.Virginie Grzelczyk, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/969152018-05-23T19:56:59Z2018-05-23T19:56:59ZIf a US-North Korea summit does happen, we’ll have Moon Jae-in to thank for it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220060/original/file-20180523-51141-1abmqdp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">moon</span> </figcaption></figure><p>In the wake of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s meeting yesterday with US President Donald Trump, it’s worth reflecting on the remarkable role he’s played in facilitating the opening for diplomacy that’s emerged this year between the US and North Korea.</p>
<p>During a tumultuous 2017 on the Korean peninsula, North Korea intensified its missile development program with 16 separate missile tests, and conducted its sixth nuclear weapon test, its most powerful detonation to date. For his part, Trump threatened to unleash “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html">fire and fury like the world has never seen</a>” and to “<a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/09/19/trump-we-have-no-choice-but-totally-destroy-north-korea-if-continues-nuclear-path/680329001/">totally destroy</a>” North Korea, insulting Kim Jong-un as <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-kim-jong-un-relationship-778999">“rocket man,” a “madman” and “short and fat”</a> in the process.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/19/asia/uss-carl-vinson-north-korea-timeline/index.html">eventually</a> redeployed the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier group to the Sea of Japan, as the drumbeat of war grew louder.</p>
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<p>It was a difficult environment for Moon to step into as the new leader of South Korea eager to pursue an agenda of rapprochement with the North. Yet Moon’s government has been able to craft a distinctive approach to engagement with an unpredictable leader like Kim and an American president who is equally erratic and <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/10/trump-kim-jong-un-diplomacy-217342?mc_cid=2a155312d9&mc_eid=6e193a5945">deeply uncertain about his approach to North Korea policy</a>. </p>
<p>Moon has made great strides in recent months, though we will have to hold judgement on the success of his approach until after Korea’s season of summits plays out.</p>
<h2>A history of progressive politics</h2>
<p>Moon Jae-in came from humble beginnings, born to a poor family who had fled the North during the Korean War. As a student at Kyung Hee University during the 1970s, he was involved in the emerging pro-democracy movement against the dictator Park Chung-hee. He also took part in <a href="https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-august-1976-incident-revisited-the-last-nearly-nuclear-war-in-korea/">Operation Paul Bunyan</a> during his compulsory military service, the retaliatory operation to the infamous 1976 killings of two US Army officers by North Korean soldiers (known as the “<a href="https://worldhistoryproject.org/1976/8/18/axe-murder-incident-at-the-korean-demilitarized-zone">axe murder incident</a>”). </p>
<p>Moon eventually graduated from university and passed the bar exam in 1982, but was unable to advance in the judiciary due to his pro-democracy activist history. Through the 1980s, Moon partnered in a law firm with future South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, specialising in human rights cases.</p>
<p>Moon’s relationship with Roh would later lead him into politics. He was an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/world/asia/moon-jae-in-trump-kim-jong-un.html">official in Roh’s presidential administration</a>, during which time he oversaw the opening of the Kaesong Industrial Park in North Korea in 2004 and was involved in organising the 2007 inter-Korean summit. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-north-korea-builds-a-season-of-summits-the-stakes-on-denuclearisation-remain-high-95221">As North Korea builds a season of summits, the stakes on denuclearisation remain high</a>
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<p>Moon made the jump from government official to elected representative in 2012, when he was elected to the South Korean National Assembly. He later launched an unsuccessful campaign for president against Park Geun-hye.</p>
<p>He <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150208000382">became chairperson of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy</a> in 2015, which later morphed into the Democratic Party of Korea. Then, a year later, he rose to the forefront of the protest movement against Park and emerged as a leading presidential candidate following <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/park-geun-hye-impeached-south-korea.html">her impeachment</a>. </p>
<p>He went on to <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/moon-jae-in.htm">comfortably win</a> the May 2017 presidential election, pledging to revive the engagement strategies of the <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170707000032">Sunshine Policy era</a> and seek better ties with the North.</p>
<h2>A pivotal actor</h2>
<p>Moon has advocated for a firm but patient strategy in engaging with North Korea. In his inaugural address as president, he <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/05/10/0200000000AEN20170510009100315.html">expressed a willingness</a> to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>go anywhere for the peace of the Korean peninsula. If necessary, I will fly straight to Washington. I will go to Beijing and Tokyo and under the right circumstances go to Pyongyang, as well. I will do whatever I can to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. </p>
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<p>His enthusiasm for a more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/world/asia/moon-jae-in-president-south-korea.html">activist approach</a> toward the North contrasted with the freeze in inter-Korean relations that had developed during the more conservative <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northeast-asia/2011-09-01/new-kind-korea">reciprocity-based strategy</a> favoured by presidents Park and Lee Myung-bak.</p>
<p>Moon sees his engagement strategy as part of a broader push by South Korea to <a href="http://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?clCode=P11&pblctDtaSn=13030&koreanEngSe=ENG">integrate Northeast Asia</a> via the <a href="http://www.riss.kr/search/detail/DetailView.do?p_mat_type=1a0202e37d52c72d&control_no=f8aa37e4fa32b3bcc85d2949c297615a#redirect">New Northern Policy</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy is aimed at buttressing regional security through economic and infrastructure linkages, or “<a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180319000600">nine bridges</a>” between South Korea and Russia in the form of gas pipelines, railway connections, seaports, regional electricity grid integration, Arctic shipping routes, shipbuilding, labour exchange, and the co-development of agriculture and fisheries projects. </p>
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<p>Elements of the New Northern Policy emerged in Article 1.6 of the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-27/panmunjom-declaration-for-peace2c-prosperity-and-unification-o/9705794">Panmunjom Declaration</a> from the recent inter-Korean summit, which mentioned the potential opening of railway and road corridors across the DMZ between North and South Korea. These kinds of economic incentives may be highly attractive for North Korea as it pursues its <a href="http://english.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01700&num=10453">Byungjin development model</a> (simultaneous nuclear weapons proliferation and economic development).</p>
<p>Despite taking a firm line on sanctions against North Korea following Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test, the Moon administration capitalised on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-winter-olympics-and-the-two-koreas-how-sport-diplomacy-could-save-the-world-89769">auspiciously timed Pyeongchang Winter Olympics</a> to open a new line of communication with the North Koreans. This bought much-needed time for diplomacy as tensions between the US and North Korea were reaching a boiling point.</p>
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<p>Since then, the South Korean government has been subtly attempting to corral the Trump administration into an engagement track with Pyongyang as well. Moon has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/world/asia/moon-jae-in-trump-kim-jong-un.html">taken every chance to praise Trump</a> for making the US-North Korea summit possible, and in recent days has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/05/22/613169662/trump-and-south-korean-president-plot-strategy-on-north-korean-nukes">tried to smooth over tensions</a> to keep the summit on track after <a href="http://time.com/5278763/north-korea-us-summit-nuclear-weapons/">Kim threatened to pull out</a>. </p>
<p>By accident or design, the Moon-Kim summit last month and proposed Trump-Kim summit scheduled for next month have opened a window of opportunity to move away from the status quo toward a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. </p>
<p>While Trump and Kim will inevitably grab all the headlines, Moon has been a pivotal actor in this drama. His activism in engaging the North has helped to make it politically safer for the Trump administration to negotiate with Kim, a prospect that was unthinkable only months ago.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South Korean president’s careful approach to rapprochement with the North set the stage for a possible breakthrough on the Korean peninsula.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/957012018-04-30T10:45:33Z2018-04-30T10:45:33ZThe goal in Korea should be peace and trade – not unification<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216782/original/file-20180430-135810-6fn2nb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, left, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in take a big step together on April 27, 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(KoreKorea Summit Press Pool via AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, the world witnessed a first tangible step toward a peaceful, prosperous Korean peninsula.</p>
<p>On <a href="https://www.cnn.com/asia/live-news/north-korea-south-korea-summit-intl/">April 27, 2018</a>, Kim Jong Un became the first North Korean leader to step foot in South Korea – where he was welcomed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in. </p>
<p>A few days later, the South Korean government reported that Kim had promised to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news">give up his nuclear arsenal under certain conditions</a>.</p>
<p>While some viewed the summit with skepticism and issued reminders about Kim’s villainous past, others began talking of a unified Korea – a reasonable reaction considering that the leaders signed a document called the <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/full-text-of-panmunjom-declaration-for-peace-prosperity-and-unification-of-the-korean">Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula</a>.</p>
<p>The intentions of these two leaders is key. For while Donald Trump and Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin may tweet and hold meetings, it is the nearly 80 million Koreans who will determine the future of how they will share their peninsula. </p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C7&q=alexis+dudden&btnG=">Japan</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AIwwGoUAAAAJ&hl=en">Korea</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=qOVNjyEAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&gmla=AJsN-F6EmSf0D3kaqbx5FtJhZPLdskyJ_7v9xw5dhdXPiyH7_FE7WmE1qFxURH64bSVo0N2de6Xkdgarqdr_KUIOQF6YGgucEAdoMx2YFtPaIhYyXvoFqfs">East Asia</a>, we know that the “Cold War” has always been “hot” in Asia. That’s why we suggest the focus now should be on forging new ties with North Korea. The question of how South Korea and North Korea will merge can be left for the future.</p>
<p>To understand why, it’s helpful to remember why Korea was split into two countries in the first place.</p>
<h2>Creating two Koreas</h2>
<p>In August 1945, in the basement of the State Department in Washington, D.C., <a href="http://www.modernlibrary.com/the-korean-war-a-history/">two American army officers traced a line</a> across a National Geographic map and divided the Korean peninsula – at the time colonized by Japan – at the 38th parallel. </p>
<p>This division was part of an Allied vision of Japan’s impending defeat. </p>
<p>Many – especially the Russians – had anticipated that Japan would be divided like Germany.</p>
<p>After all, it was Japan, not occupied Korea, who was the enemy combatant. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/victor-cha-giving-north-korea-a-bloody-nose-carries-a-huge-risk-to-americans/2018/01/30/43981c94-05f7-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.69393f952c74">Yet the Soviets acquiesced</a> to the American idea.</p>
<p>Ideological camps among Koreans that had taken root under Japanese oppression challenged one another for expression in the following months. Eventually, the communists gained leadership in the North and their challengers in the South.</p>
<p>Five years later the <a href="http://www.modernlibrary.com/the-korean-war-a-history/">Korean War erupted</a> to claim the lives of one in eight Koreans. Tens of thousands of international participants would also die in what <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/293667/the-cold-war-by-john-lewis-gaddis/9780143038276/">history books</a> flatly name the first major conflict of the Cold War.</p>
<p>The 1953 armistice ending the fighting in Korea more or less followed the 1945 line. Under this agreement, Koreans who had collaborated, resisted or simply endured Japanese rule prior to the Korean War (1950-1953) now found themselves assigned entirely new identities: “North Korean” and “South Korean.” The meaning of these names has diverged and morphed into new realities on both sides since then. </p>
<h2>The view from South Korea</h2>
<p>In South Korea, people often refer to the Korean War as yugio – literally 6.25 – referring to June 25, 1950 when the grandfather of today’s North Korean leader ordered his troops to cross the border and attack the South. This <a href="http://criticalasianstudies.org/issues/vol42/no4/truth-and-reconciliation-in-south-korea.html">state-sanctioned narrative</a> reinforces an antagonistic relationship. The North is framed as the aggressor, the South as an innocent victim, and the U.S. and the West as the savior of South Korea. Not unimportantly, North Koreans call the same history “The Fatherland Liberation War.”</p>
<p>While the <a href="http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-attitudes-toward-north-korea-and-reunification/">2015 Asan Report</a> finds that more than 80 percent of South Koreans “dutifully” answer that Korea should be reunified, fewer than 20 percent support immediate reunification. Their sense of an ethnic bond is decreasing, and reunification is mostly seen as an economic burden. </p>
<p>In 2010, former president Lee Myung-bak proposed a “reunification tax” to support the costs of reunification, whenever it came. The tax proposal received little support from the public or among politicians, especially after the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/09/13/south.korea.cheonan.report/index.html">North’s attack on a South Korean warship Cheonan</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?pagewanted=all&mtrref=undefined&gwh=4DCB9339498C61260863CFCC8578DC7F&gwt=pay">shelling of the South’s Yeonpyeong Island</a> later that year. Speaking in 2014, former President Park Geun-hye also tried to promote a positive image of reunification, calling it a <a href="http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2983129">“jackpot” (daebak)</a>. </p>
<p>She claimed that reunification – a combination of North Korean labor and South Korean technological advancements – would create jobs and strengthen the Korean economy. </p>
<p>Despite government’s effort to reposition the reunification issue, <a href="http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-attitudes-toward-north-korea-and-reunification/">public opinion data</a> show that South Korean youth are only increasing their detachment from North Korea.</p>
<h2>An easier path</h2>
<p>So, if an older generation’s understanding of reunification is a hard sell, what is the path forward?</p>
<p>South Korea could instead seek a <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049275">peaceful coexistence</a> of two Koreas with free trade, free exchange of people and no military threats. Perhaps public support for reunification may reemerge and strengthen as ties are strengthened through increased exchanges at the civil level and greater economic independence in the North, thereby lowering the “costs of reunification.”</p>
<p>One of the main reasons there has not yet been a resolution to the “North Korea problem” has been persistent, divergent dreams of reunification. For the U.S. and South Korea, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-and-republic-korea">a reunified Korea would be a liberal, capitalist democracy</a>. For North Korea, China, and Russia, a reunified Korea would not be a close ally with the United States, and certainly would not host U.S. troops. </p>
<p>Over the last 30 years, the benefits of a divided Korea have only increased for those outside the peninsula. Initially, North Korea served as an important “<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Scobell_Written%20Testimony.pdf">buffer state</a>” between the communist China and Russia to the north and the democratic and capitalist countries of South Korea, Japan – and their ally, the United States. Even after the Cold War ended, ideological differences among these important geopolitical players has continued, reinforcing the benefits of North Korea’s liminal status.</p>
<p>If we can follow public opinion in South Korea and temporarily abandon the dream of a single Korea, it is possible to see that everyone would benefit from a peaceful, prosperous, nonnuclear North Korea. China’s economic success has demonstrated that a country can <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/10/how-china-bucked-western-expectations-and-what-it-means-for-world-order/">take advantage of markets without becoming a capitalist democracy</a>. It can offer North Korea guidance on how to develop using the Chinese model. </p>
<p>If neighboring countries opened up their markets to trade and offered targeted foreign direct investment, North Korea can experience the kind of economic miracle that Japan, South Korea and China have already enjoyed. </p>
<p>If the United States and its allies can offer security guarantees to North Korea, it should not need to hold onto its deadly nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>If North Korea can recognize that it is in everyone’s interest that North Korea not only continues to exist but becomes more prosperous, perhaps Kim Jung Un will make good on his promise to let go of his nuclear ambitions. </p>
<p>Once North Korea is more economically independent, maybe reunification can be conducted as a joyful reunion between equals. That day is far in the future, however. In the present, powerful negotiators must find the skill to chart a path toward peace and prosperity for North Korea. If they can manage it, they will have left a great legacy to the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary Alice Haddad has received funding from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the East Asian Institute, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexis Dudden and Joan E. Cho do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>You have to walk before you can run, and baby steps are the best way forward in Korea.Alexis Dudden, Professor, University of ConnecticutJoan E. Cho, Assistant Professor, East Asian Studies and Government, Wesleyan UniversityMary Alice Haddad, Professor, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/957302018-04-29T19:59:16Z2018-04-29T19:59:16ZNorth Korea wants to a strike a deal – is Trump the right man for the job?<p>After a fearful year of brinksmanship, the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-korean-peace-process-is-underway-but-it-still-depends-on-the-us-and-china-94327">summit</a> between South Korean president Moon Jae-In and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un was a beautiful moment of hope. The two leaders stepped back and forth over the Military Demarcation Line between their two countries and shared Korean cold noodles brought specially from a famed Pyongyang restaurant. They planted a tree and fed it water from two rivers, North Korea’s Taedong and South Korea’s Han. </p>
<p>Given the number of nuclear tests and missile launches the north has conducted since the last summit between two Korean leaders, <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/10/04/koreas.summit/">all the way back in 2007</a>, the spectacle of Moon and Kim smiling as they crossed their shared border has sent a wave of relief around the world. It seems Moon Jae-In’s gamble of inviting North Korea to the winter Olympics has paid off in spades.</p>
<p>Everyone has now returned safely home, but the near euphoria is still palpable. With reports that Kim apparently told his southern counterpart that giving up his nuclear weapons is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear.html">very much on the table</a>, many are staring to hail this as a new era in inter-Korean relations. Some appear to already believe that the technically-still-underway Korean War is just about over – and Donald Trump in particular is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43895428">already claiming credit</a>. </p>
<p>The idea that Trump is solely responsible for this breakthrough is, of course, preposterous. If anyone deserves primary credit it’s Moon, who staked his political career on engaging the North Koreans during the Olympics. But soon, Trump will have a chance to show his mettle, as his administration is busy <a href="https://theconversation.com/qanda-what-might-come-of-a-donald-trump-meeting-with-kim-jong-un-93149">preparing its own summit</a> with the North Korean leader. </p>
<p>It’s certainly too early to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize. But if his administration does somehow manage to normalise relations on the Korean peninsula, it will be important to ask why he has apparently succeeded where many others – including Nobel Peace Prize laureates <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34277960">Barack Obama</a>, the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/nobel-peace-prize">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, and former South Korean president <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2000/press.html">Kim Dae-jung</a> – have floundered. Unfortunately for Trump’s self-esteem, top of the list of reasons must be not his own geopolitical nous, but circumstance.</p>
<h2>Right place, right time</h2>
<p>It’s undeniable that throughout 2017, the Trump administration was heavily involved in pressing for extensive sanctions at the United Nations Security Council. Those sanctions focused on blocking most of the north’s conventional trade links, a move which had not previously been attempted in earnest. But the reality is that the Trump administration inherited a political situation that was, as renowned conflict professor <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution/">I William Zartmann</a> would say, “ripe”. </p>
<p>Sometimes called “hurting stalemate”, a “ripe moment” in a conflict comes when the suffering and costs faced by one or both sides force open a window of opportunity. This is what has happened on the Korean peninsula. For all the nuclear breakthroughs, the north’s economy has very little room to breathe thanks to the sanctions. </p>
<p>South Korea and Japan are now facing a North Korea that is equipped with a broadly credible nuclear deterrent and Trump’s mixed messages towards them have confused their once dependable security relationships with the US. It is at just these sort of moments that breakthroughs in seemingly intractable conflicts are often made.</p>
<p>North Korea is seen very differently today than it was in the aftermath of the Cold War. Back then, it was a famine-stricken country apparently on the verge of collapse, supposedly led by an irrational tyrant, and probably bluffing about its nuclear machinations. For all those reasons, talking to it wasn’t a priority. Instead, patience was needed. In the case of the Obama administration, this principle was revived and taken to the extreme as a policy of “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-patience-has-become-strategic-passivity/">strategic patience</a>”. And if stopping the north from going nuclear was the intention, that approach backfired spectacularly – Pyongyang was ultimately simply not interested in dropping its guns just to get to a negotiating table. </p>
<p>Only now, after a programme of tests that got it admitted to the world’s exclusive nuclear club, is North Korea ready to talk openly with the US about a dramatic change of course. So what kind of talks will these be?</p>
<h2>Just another deal</h2>
<p>In his own telling, Trump is a man who likes to talk and make deals – almost regardless of who is on the other side of the table. That said, judging by his first year or so in office, he is less interested in making new deals than in leaving or threatening to leave existing ones, notably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-if-trump-kills-nafta-remedies-for-canada-and-mexico-91129">North American Free Trade Agreement</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">Iranian nuclear deal</a>. </p>
<p>But a deal is not enough – what is needed is confidence building, a far more complex task. It demands clear communication lines between all sides as all the actors remove their threat mechanisms and replace them with new connections that ultimately become more important. For that to happen, Trump and his allies will have to accept the fact that, by virtue of its nuclear know-how, North Korea is no longer weak. It will not accept anything that will force it to disarm first.</p>
<p>Making deals with the North Koreans is in fact relatively easy, and many have been struck before. Among them are the 1953 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/10165796">Korean Armistice</a>; the 1972 <a href="http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/74js-en.htm">North-South Joint Statement</a>, which set out principles for reunification; the 1994 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578">Agreed Framework</a>, which provided a complex mechanism to manage the north’s nuclear energy needs; the 2000 <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/791691.stm">North-South Joint Declaration</a>, which sought to end the armistice; the 2007 <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/791691.stm">Inter-Korean Eight-Point Agreement</a>, calling for new peace talks; and the 2012 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa-leap/insight-obamas-north-korean-leap-of-faith-falls-short-idUSBRE82T06T20120330">Leap Day</a> agreement with the US, where Pyongyang agreed to stop its missile and nuclear tests.</p>
<p>That the list of deals is this long proves that adding yet another entry won’t in itself mean much. Trump needs to offer the north, not just a friendly handshake, but concrete measures and guarantees – and those will have to go well beyond what we’ve seen in the last week. </p>
<p>Turning off the speakers that blast propaganda across the border from both sides is a nice gesture, while reopening a telephone hotline between the two Koreas is useful – and sending Mike Pompeo (now Trump’s secretary of state) to Pyongyang paved the way for further discussion. But none of these steps has cost any of the parties anything substantial. More importantly, the north has not publicly promised to unconditionally renounce its nuclear weapons programme – it has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear.html">offered to dismantle the programme</a>, but only if the US promises never to invade it. </p>
<p>Even if a concrete deal of some kind is struck, the test will be whether, once it is done, the US can project the confidence and stability needed for all parties to actually fulfil their commitments. And that would demand the Trump administration exercise clear, stable leadership of a calibre it has yet to muster on any front.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Virginie Grzelczyk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump has always traded on his image as a master dealmaker – but many deals have been done with North Korea before.Virginie Grzelczyk, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/957552018-04-29T11:51:55Z2018-04-29T11:51:55ZNorth and South Korea met - but what does it really mean?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216744/original/file-20180429-135817-16edfp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There was much public goodwill at the meeting, but there is much yet to be resolved.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/ Korea summit press pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The moving footage of South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un provided rich symbolism for the negotiations of the third inter-Korean summit, held at Panmunjom on Friday.</p>
<p>While there was no agreement on any substantive outcomes at the summit, the resultant <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-27/panmunjom-declaration-for-peace2c-prosperity-and-unification-o/9705794">Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula</a> established a foundation for further inter-Korean engagement and set the scene for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/29/donald-trump-expects-to-meet-kim-jong-un-in-three-or-four-weeks">upcoming summit</a> between the US and North Korea.</p>
<p>There has been much media conjecture over what exactly the two parties have agreed to at the Panmunjom summit. It is therefore worth examining the declaration article-by-article to ascertain what is and isn’t on the table.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-north-korea-builds-a-season-of-summits-the-stakes-on-denuclearisation-remain-high-95221">As North Korea builds a season of summits, the stakes on denuclearisation remain high</a>
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<p>The Panmunjom Agreement is built around three core articles that identify points of agreement between the two parties, address potential local-level security flashpoints, and call for the negotiation of a treaty to formally conclude the Korean War.</p>
<p>Much of what has been agreed to here is not new, having been restated from previous inter-Korean agreements. However, in the context of the heightened tension that has surround the Korean Peninsula over the past year, this material takes on fresh meaning.</p>
<h2>Identifying points of agreement</h2>
<p>The clauses of Article 1 build on existing points of agreement between South Korea and the DPRK that were established during the <a href="http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/">Sunshine Policy</a> period of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidencies.</p>
<p>In calling on both sides to implement existing inter-Korean agreements, Article I attempts to marshal the authority of the previous agreements as the foundation to legitimise this declaration.</p>
<p>Specifically, these include the <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf">June 15th Joint Declaration</a> that emerged from the 2000 summit in Pyongyang between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, and the <a href="https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/2007_North-South_%20Declaration.pdf">Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace, and Prosperity</a> agreed to by Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun in October, 2007. </p>
<p>Articles 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 call for continued South-North dialogue and the establishment of a joint liaison office in Gaeseong: a quasi-embassy to more smoothly facilitate those interactions than is currently possible.</p>
<p>With the diplomatic success of the <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/19/after-the-olympic-detente-what-next-on-the-korean-peninsula/">joint Korean team</a> at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in mind, the declaration calls for another joint Korean team at the upcoming Asian Games.</p>
<p>Article 1.5 calls for the restarting of the family reunion program to reunite family members separated by the Korean War. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/korean-family-reunions-idUSRTXU7J2">Family reunions</a> have been a staple confidence-building measures between the two parties, as reunions satisfy a genuine need for the affected families, are good PR and relatively easy to facilitate.</p>
<p>Most intriguingly, Article 1.6 mentions potential work on railway and road corridors across the demilitarised zone (DMZ). This would link not only North and South Korea but also China via the western transportation route from Seoul to Gaeseong and north to Sinuiju, at the Yalu River crossing point.</p>
<p>Establishing infrastructure connections between China and South Korea, through the DPRK, has been a long-held objective dating back to the <a href="http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2015/11/12/tumen-triangle-tribulations-the-unfulfilled-promise-of-chinese-russian-and-north-korean-cooperation/">Tumen River development zone</a> of the early 1990s.</p>
<h2>Dampen the security pressure points</h2>
<p>Article 2 of the Panmunjom Declaration signals possible security-related confidence-building measures on issues of ongoing irritation between the two. These are lowest-common-denominator actions that both sides can agree to, and signal a greater commitment to cooperation.</p>
<p>While they are easy-win measures, they also address friction points in the day-to-day management of the demarcation line. Preventing local-level flashpoints is particularly important given the pressurised security environment of the past year, when military confrontation looked like a real possibility. </p>
<p>The cessation of “hostile acts against each other” around and across the demarcation line articulated in Article 2.1 does not mean there will be any demobilisation of military forces on either side. Rather, that pinprick provocations such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/world/asia/north-korea-attack-on-south-triggered-by-propaganda-loudspeakers.html">propaganda battles by loudspeaker</a> across the DMZ and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/world/asia/south-north-korea-balloon-drop.html">floating of leaflets into DPRK territory by balloon</a> will cease. These are easy measures for each side to agree to without compromising their security posture.</p>
<p>Article 2.2 revisits the concept of a maritime peace zone in the West Sea around the Northern Limit Line, flagged previously in the October 2007 joint declaration.</p>
<p>The two most serious flashpoints of actual military engagement over the past decade— the sinking of the South’s naval corvette Cheonan, and the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island — have occurred in this contested maritime space. If the two Koreas were to stumble into a shooting war by accident, this would be the likely flashpoint.</p>
<p>Article 2.3 calls for military-to-military level engagement. This could potentially keep future flashpoint situations in check, although agreement to talk doesn’t signal much more than a discussion at this front end of the confidence-building process.</p>
<h2>A permanent peace regime for the Korean Peninsula</h2>
<p>Stating a commitment to a permanent peace treaty to end the Korean War is a feature of previous inter-Korean summit declarations. But in this case, the call has added impetus, as a peace treaty might be the only way forward in an expanded round of engagement that included the United States.</p>
<p>If North Korea refused to relinquish its nuclear weapons, and there is little evidence to suggest otherwise, there is no other goal toward which negotiations between the three parties could focus. </p>
<p>In Article 3.1, the two Koreas have reaffirmed their non-aggression pact from the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-reconciliation-nonaggression91">1992 Agreement</a> on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation. While the non-aggression clause has been standard fare in joint declarations since that time, this clause has added resonance in the context of the threats of war emanating from the Trump administration over the past year.</p>
<p>Article 3.2 discusses phased disarmament. However, this relates to conventional forces mobilised against each other, and not to nuclear weapons, with the added caveat that other confidence-building measures have been implemented and that “military tensions” (read “the US threat”) have been alleviated.</p>
<p>Like most of the clauses in the Panmunjom Declaration, the veiled reference to the United States in this article is a good example of the negotiated compromise and coded language of the final text.</p>
<p>Article 3.3 talks to the larger great power context by calling for the participation of the original signatories of the Korean War armistice in negotiating a peace treaty. That objective is complicated by the Republic of Korea not being a signatory to the <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31006.htm">armistice agreement</a>.</p>
<p>The South was represented by the United States in those negotiations, which acted on behalf of the United Nations forces. South Korea will need to be included as a sovereign signatory to a formal treaty to end the Korean War.</p>
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<p>Most media attention has focused on Article 3.4, which calls for “complete denuclearisation” and “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula”. This is in addition to the call in Article 1.1 for both parties to work together on implementing the <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/dslbj_665832/t212707.shtml">2005 Joint Statement</a> on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-02/13/content_808419.htm">13 February Agreement</a> of 2007.</p>
<p>However, this clause does not mean North Korea has committed to denuclearisation as that concept is understood by the Trump administration (CVID, or “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation”). The North Korean interpretation of a nuclear-free Korea includes the full nuclear weapons relinquishment of the United States as well – something that is obviously not going to fly in Washington.</p>
<p>In stating that “South and North Korea shared the view that the <em>measures being initiated by North Korea</em> [my emphasis] are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,” this article looks more like a statement of goodwill to Washington with an eye toward the upcoming US-DPRK summit than a substantive commitment. </p>
<p>It will be interesting to see if Moon Jae-in accepts the invitation in the conclusion of the declaration to visit Pyongyang later in the year. That will depend on the outcome of the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.</p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>There is little evidence in the Panmunjom Declaration that the South Koreans have attempted to test the waters for an aggressive American negotiating agenda at the upcoming Trump-Kim summit. There was no statement on specifics like a nuclear weapons freeze or missile testing moratorium. Instead, there seems to be more evidence here of an attempt to firewall the Korean Peninsula against an overly aggressive Trump gambit. </p>
<p>A US-DPRK summit based solely around the US-CVID agenda is doomed for failure, as there are no points of convergence between Washington and Pyongyang. A negotiating agenda that includes a pathway to a formal treaty to end the Korean War has a more realistic chance of progress.</p>
<p>Either way, with the inter-Korean summit concluded, it feels like we are at half time of a hotly contested, high-stakes game of summits in which the second half action is only going to get hotter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There was much that was agreed to at the Korean summit - but still a lot yet to be worked out. The will now shift to the hotly-anticipated meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/943272018-04-27T15:49:57Z2018-04-27T15:49:57ZA Korean peace process is underway – but it still depends on the US and China<p>The meeting between North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in is certainly one of the most dramatic and momentous events in the recent history of East Asia. Beyond the symbolism of cross-border handshakes and tree planting (not to mention <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-japan-dessert/unjust-dessert-japan-demands-koreans-wipe-map-off-summit-dinner-mousse-idUSKBN1HW0J2">a controversially decorated mango mousse</a> that briefly ticked off Japan), the joint declaration that a peace treaty will be agreed this year and that the two countries share a goal of denuclearisation marks the most important development in inter-Korean relations since the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KP%2BKR_530727_AgreementConcerningMilitaryArmistice.pdf">Armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953</a>.</p>
<p>The first real opportunity for this dialogue seemed to come when South Korea <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-and-south-korea-extend-hands-of-peace-after-symbolic-olympic-opening-ceremony-90569">hosted the Winter Olympics</a> in Pyeongchang in February this year. But in practice, it’s unlikely that a conveniently located sporting event was the only catalyst for such a dramatic shift in North Korean foreign policy.</p>
<p>Among <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-and-south-korea-could-start-negotiating-again-heres-how-they-got-there-92957">analysts</a> of Korean affairs, a few theories are circulating. Some think that the Kim government made its overtures because it genuinely fears that economic sanctions could become an existential threat; others surmise that the regime’s programme of weapons testing has now provided it with <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-we-really-be-so-afraid-of-a-nuclear-north-korea-71855">sufficient reassurance</a> that it could deter a serious attack. A third theory suggests that Donald Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-trumps-unpredictability-changes-the-game-on-north-korea-77908">unpredictable approach to international relations</a> gave the north a sense of urgency.</p>
<p>But whatever the precise stimulus or concatenation of circumstances, the north has turned out to be rather more diplomatically sophisticated than many observers thought. When Pyongyang first <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-northkorea-invitation/north-korean-leader-invites-south-koreas-moon-to-the-north-presidents-office-idUSKBN1FU096">reached out to Seoul</a> about the possibility of a meeting via its emissaries to the Winter Olympics, it was unclear how such a historic summit could be organised in such a short space of time. Such events ordinarily take months of planning and negotiation over the finest of details, yet the two sides gave themselves just a matter of weeks in which to arrange it.</p>
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<p>Kim Jong-un’s visit to Beijing – his first overseas trip as North Korea’s leader – proved to be pivotal. Kim left reassured of his most important ally’s support, and he eased Beijing’s growing fear of being <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/28/what-we-know-and-dont-about-the-meeting-between-kim-jong-un-and-xi-jinping/">sidelined</a> in the process. This summit also provided the first example of Kim’s previously unappreciated diplomatic skills as he played the role of junior partner perfectly with Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>Still, for all the outpouring of emotion on all sides, a dose of realism is in order.</p>
<h2>The long game</h2>
<p>Despite the declaration of Kim and Moon that the complete denuclearisation of the peninsula is the goal, it’s not yet clear whether two sides take that phrase to mean the same thing. Whether or not Pyongyang is willing to accept a reduction in its capability of any level is unclear, but even if it engaged to the fullest extent in a denuclearisation deal, its weapons programme is ultimately irreversible: North Korea now knows how to produce these weapons, and it will still know how even if the ones it has are destroyed. </p>
<p>Another notable declaration at the summit was the two leaders’ <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_04_2018_korean_declaration.pdf">undertaking</a> to “actively pursue” meetings either with the US or with the US and China. This nods to an uncomfortable truth: any discussion about inter-Korean relations can never be purely bilateral. As historic as this summit was, the issues at the core of Korea’s division cannot be resolved without the direct involvement of the US and China. </p>
<p>China will not tolerate being marginalised by the US, and will do all it can to ensure that the next step is a four-way dialogue. Similarly, North Korea will need the support of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship">its most significant economic partner</a> if it is to rebuild its economy. Ultimately, China’s interests are best served by peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas rather than reunification, which would deprive it of a buffer state between its border and that of a US military ally. It is likely that Xi will continue to support Kim and provide assistance in economic development rather than encourage a formal dissolution of the border with the south.</p>
<p>Similarly, regardless of the wishes of those south of the border, concrete progress with the north cannot be achieved without the US’s contribution. As things stand, the south needs Washington’s security guarantees, and the north’s various priorities all revolve around safeguarding itself against hypothetical US military action.</p>
<p>So, as momentous as the Kim-Moon meeting was, the two men alone do not hold the key to their countries’ futures. But despite this stark geopolitical reality, it would be wrong not to acknowledge the magnitude of this tremendous step forward. That the two Koreas are talking again is progress in itself – and that it seems likely they will keep talking and building trust is the very best anyone could have hoped for from this unprecedented meeting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94327/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Griffith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The astonishing sight of two Korean leaders crossing the border that divides them is just a first step.Ed Griffith, Senior Lecturer in Asia Pacific Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/952212018-04-23T20:12:15Z2018-04-23T20:12:15ZAs North Korea builds a season of summits, the stakes on denuclearisation remain high<p>This week’s high-stakes summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un heralds a new period of negotiations in which regional states attempt to manage a northeast Asian security environment that includes a nuclear North Korea. </p>
<p>Several analysts, myself included, have long postulated that a primary objective of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development was to enter a new phase of security negotiations with the United States from a position of increased strength.</p>
<p>Pyongyang’s willingness to engage in a fresh round of summits with Seoul and Washington is a good indicator that it has completed the technical development of its nuclear weapons capability and has a nuclear deterrent ready (or nearly ready) to deploy. </p>
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<p>Official statements coming out of Pyongyang indicate as much. In a statement on April 20, <a href="http://textuploader.com/du8in">reported by Korean Central News Agency</a>, Kim Jong-un said North Korea will “discontinue nuclear testing and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire” as “technology for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets has been reliably realised”. </p>
<p>The completion of its nuclear development gambit has implications for the timing and direction of North Korea’s summits with South Korea and the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-23/donald-trump-strikes-cautious-note-on-north-korea-crisis/9686426">United States</a>.</p>
<h2>Concessions and confidence-building</h2>
<p>With denuclearisation in the rear-view mirror, could we see a pathway toward a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-meetings">treaty to formally end the Korean War</a>? That would seem to be an objective for North Korea, but remains a long way off. It would require a long period of mutual confidence-building to establish the trust necessary to make a treaty possible.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215862/original/file-20180423-119528-14msqz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has announced an end to the North’s nuclear testing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/KCNA</span></span>
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<p>So, what of substance is North Korea willing to concede? Kim’s statement on a nuclear and missile test moratorium, and closing the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, is the most prominent concession made yet.</p>
<p>However, we should be clear that this does not mean North Korea has any interest in denuclearising. Punggye-ri is a superfluous asset if testing is no longer required for technical analysis. The site is also reported to be no longer fit for purpose, having been <a href="https://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/">geologically destabilised</a> by six nuclear tests.</p>
<p>The North will continue to produce fissile material. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.feff21355b73">oft-cited</a> US Defense Intelligence Agency assessment released last year estimates a stockpile of fissile material sufficient for 40-60 nuclear warheads, increasing at a rate of about 12 warheads per year at current estimated rates of production.</p>
<p>North Korea also has a history of circumventing commitments agreed to in the past. This includes its development of a highly enriched uranium program in contravention of the Agreed Framework in the late 1990s, its violation in July 2006 of the 1999 missile testing moratorium, and its 2008 abandonment of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16-north-korea-denuclearization-revere-paper.pdf">Six-Party Talks</a>.</p>
<p>Information is the key to international co-operation, reducing the uncertainty that countries have about each other’s actions. It remains unclear what North Korea can offer to assuage American scepticism that it will honour a deal. </p>
<p>On the other side of the table, what is the negotiating goal for the United States? Some analysts worry Trump may be entering negotiations with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-definition-ofdenuclearization-is-very-different-from-trumps/2018/04/09/55bf9c06-3bc8-11e8-912d-16c9e9b37800_story.html?utm_term=.8f73a76a1f3d">unrealistic expectations</a> of a denuclearisation deal. There is a fear he will offer too much to North Korea, or that negotiations will fall in a heap when the reality of the demise of “<a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2018/04/02/0301000000AEN20180402008300315.html">complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation</a>” sinks in.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/north-korea-kim-jong-un-trump-nuclear-summit-weapons-missiles/558620/?utm_source=fbb">hard cap</a> on North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability could be the new negotiating point. Now that the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, constraining the Nort’s nuclear weapons capability is shaping as the most practical goal for the US in terms of its commitments to protecting its regional allies and maintaining the integrity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Trump administration could use the summit as a straw man to mobilise a case for attacking North Korea. The appointment of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/opinion/john-bolton-trump-national-security-adviser.html">ultra-hawkish John Bolton</a> as national security adviser would seem to signal a tough line, given his long record of advocacy for the use of force against the North. </p>
<p>For reasons I outlined at length last year (<a href="https://theconversation.com/attacking-north-korea-surely-donald-trump-couldnt-be-that-foolish-76144">here</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-north-korea-military-action-will-be-a-disaster-so-a-more-patient-thoughtful-solution-is-required-76318">here</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-cant-win-the-north-korea-crisis-is-a-lose-lose-proposition-for-the-us-83419">here</a>), war on the Korean Peninsula remains a terrible option.</p>
<h2>The Moon-Kim summit</h2>
<p>Moon Jae-in’s meeting this week with Kim Jong-un is arguably the more important of the two summits. This meeting could help shape the negotiating agenda for the US-North Korea summit later this year.</p>
<p>A successful summit between Moon and Kim will need to produce some substantive points of agreement on key security issues. These include negotiation of a nuclear freeze and/or missile testing moratorium, in addition to smaller confidence-building measures. The summit will allow Moon to “road test” a negotiating agenda, as <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/04/08/the-moon-kim-summit-is-the-main-event/">David Kang has argued</a>, for the later Trump-Kim meeting.</p>
<p>However, a nascent South-North détente emerging from the summit could constrain the US bargaining position. It will be much harder for Trump to play a game of high-stakes brinkmanship with the Kim regime if Kim and Moon have agreed to a clear pathway of confidence-building measures. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-assumptions-we-make-about-north-korea-and-why-theyre-wrong-84771">Five assumptions we make about North Korea – and why they're wrong</a>
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<p>The South Korean government will be keen to railroad the Trump administration into an engagement track with Pyongyang. Some within the South Korean establishment see Trump as a loose cannon and his administration as an unreliable variable in Korean Peninsula security. </p>
<p>Trump’s lack of consultation with South Korea during his escalations of 2017, the continued absence of a permanent US ambassador to South Korea, and the <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/10/trump-kim-jong-un-diplomacy-217342?mc_cid=2a155312d9&mc_eid=6e193a5945">lack of a coherent North Korea policy</a> in Washington are seen as evidence that Seoul needs to be more activist in pursuing its own agenda.</p>
<p>Inter-Korean co-operation on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics earlier this year was <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/19/after-the-olympic-detente-what-next-on-the-korean-peninsula/">successful in dialling down tensions</a> on the Peninsula and closing the window, at least for the time being, on American military action against the North.</p>
<p>The end of denuclearisation politics has opened new possibilities for the direction of the Korean Peninsula. The tensions of 2017 showed us a glimpse of disaster. The summits of 2018 may represent a doorway to a new arrangement for collective management of Korean Peninsula security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The end of denuclearisation politics has opened new possibilities for the direction of the Korean Peninsula, but the tensions of 2017 remind us of the possibility of disaster.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/929572018-03-07T13:05:03Z2018-03-07T13:05:03ZNorth and South Korea could start negotiating again – here’s how they got there<p>As South Korea relays the news that North Korea <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/world/asia/north-korea-south-nuclear-weapons.html">may be ready</a> to open new negotiations over its nuclear weapons, it’s important to keep track of just how quickly this long-running crisis has changed.</p>
<p>Less than a year ago, the world seemed to be steeling for a full-on war with North Korea. Kim Jong-nam, half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43312052">assassinated under mysterious circumstances</a> in Malaysia. As fingers pointed to Pyongyang as the likely culprit, the Kim regime’s ongoing nuclear weapons programme drew <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-of-fire-and-fury-is-a-gift-to-north-koreas-propaganda-machine-82275">furious ire</a> from the newly-inaugurated US president, Donald Trump, with <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-panics-the-world-but-h-bomb-test-changes-little-83413">tit-for-tat sanctions and weapons tests</a> alternating at breakneck speed.</p>
<p>But with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-diplomacy-might-just-get-the-koreas-to-the-negotiating-table-92199">South Korean Winter Olympics</a>, a warm wind started to blow. The games could have been a political and security nightmare, but it turned into a stunning picture: Korean athletes walked under one flag, while Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim Yo-yong and Kim Yong-nam, the north’s head of state, watched the opening festivities next to South Korean president Moon Jae-In. (The American vice-president, Mike Pence, sat and ignored the northern delegation in stony silence.)</p>
<p>Once the remarkable Olympic moment had passed, the world waited to see if the north would simply collect its athletes and revel in the attention, or reciprocate an invitation from the south to launch a new dialogue. In the end, it chose the latter path. Now, not only is there new hope for the first full inter-Korean summit in 10 years, but the north might just might have hinted at the possibility of denuclearisation.</p>
<p>But the operative word here is “might”. When it comes to Korean affairs, semantics have always been crucial. </p>
<h2>Reading the runes</h2>
<p>For example, the September 19, 2005 deal negotiated within the Six-Party Talks collapsed partly because of the clause that stated so-called “light water reactors” would need to be discussed at an “appropriate” time. For the north, “appropriate time” meant September 20, while for the US, “appropriate time” meant as late as possible, and preferably never. </p>
<p>Similarly, for the north, the “denuclearisation” of the Korean peninsula has always meant the removal of all nuclear weapons from the entire peninsula, which would extend to any potential American nuclear weapons stationed in the south. The US, however, has usually understood it to apply solely to the north’s weapons, and not as a binding agreement on future American deployments.</p>
<p>The Olympics and their aftermath do not change the fundamental security dilemma on the Korean peninsula. The structure of the problem is the same: a combination of unfinished inter-Korean business (starting with the 1953 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/10165796">armistice</a>), the US’s continued <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/u-s-south-korea-plan-massive-joint-military-exercise-start-n854071">military presence</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/10/forecasting-u-s-asia-relations-under-trump/">strategic role</a> in East Asia, and the north’s dramatic development of <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-panics-the-world-but-h-bomb-test-changes-little-83413">nuclear weapons</a>. What has changed, however, are the diplomatic conditions. </p>
<p>The North Koreans are neither simplistic nor omniscient. Just like any other country, they rely on intelligence, diplomatic contacts, and general event analysis to make sense of the world around them, and especially their nemesis, the US. And the picture they currently see is very confused.</p>
<h2>Empty chairs</h2>
<p>There is currently no American ambassador to South Korea as the Trump administration has been unable to appoint one and the White House has ultimately decided that the one potential nominee, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/30/politics/victor-cha-ambassador-to-south-korea/index.html">Victor Cha</a>, a North Korea expert who served under the Bush administration, was not “hawk” enough. </p>
<p>There also isn’t a lead American negotiator. Until he resigned a few days ago, the principal figure was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/27/joseph-yun-us-north-korea-diplomat">Joseph Yun</a>, a longtime career diplomat and Asia specialist who served first under Barack Obama and then under Trump. </p>
<p>Yun was recently most influential in negotiating the release of American student <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/fred-cindy-warmbier-parents-otto-north-korea-brooke-baldwin-cnn-newsroom-cnntv/index.html">Otto Warmbier</a>, who was returned to the US after a lengthy incarceration in the north and died shortly thereafter. Given the Trump administration’s high rate of personnel churn, it seems unlikely that many qualified diplomats and experts want to take on these extremely challenging jobs.</p>
<p>To cap it all, the north has started to answer Trump’s offhand comments and tweets <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-of-fire-and-fury-is-a-gift-to-north-koreas-propaganda-machine-82275">via its official state media</a>, the Korean Central News Agency. With Pyongyang’s bellicose rhetoric now fully engaged with Trump’s embellishment and vagueness, this could be a recipe for disaster. </p>
<h2>Fingers crossed</h2>
<p>The promise of a north-south summit in April is an exciting event in itself, and might allow the two Koreas to resume an in-depth dialogue that has been chaotic for many years. But at the same time, we can expect the north to get up to some of its old tricks. </p>
<p>For starters, Pyongyang will probably fully exploit any wobbles in the south’s relationship with the US. It played a similar game in the 1950s and 1960s when it exploited the ideological schism between Russia and China, playing them off against one another to attract support and concessions. We can also expect a lot of frantic parsing of North Korea’s every statement, and plenty of misinterpretation and misapprehension. </p>
<p>This has already begun. A day after the official South Korean delegation left Pyongyang and returned to Seoul, the story was that the north had suddenly opened up to denuclearisation and direct talks with the US. But the north is always seeking engagement with the US one way or another, and has stated numerous times that, just as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/world/asia/north-korea-south-nuclear-weapons.html">South Korean statement</a> published in the New York Times said, “it would have no reason to keep nuclear weapons if the military threat to the north was eliminated and its security guaranteed”. </p>
<p>And there’s the rub. North Korea will not consider its security “guaranteed” until the US withdraws from the Korean peninsula and the armistice is transformed into a permanent settlement. The north will not entertain denuclearisation as a precondition for talks, since its very survival depends on its nuclear deterrent. It might not even freeze its programme while talks are underway: even as the 2003-7 Six-Party Talks were taking place, Pyongyang tested its first nuclear weapons in 2006. </p>
<p>But today, something crucial is different: the talks will not revolve around an overbearing, coherent and predictable US. Instead, the north and the south are centre stage – and they might finally have the breathing room they need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92957/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Virginie Grzelczyk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A year ago, productive north-south talks seemed inconceivable – but with the US tripping over its own feet, things are changing.Virginie Grzelczyk, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/910912018-02-19T00:47:03Z2018-02-19T00:47:03ZWhy sport hasn’t made much progress on LGBTI+ rights since the Sochi Olympics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204597/original/file-20180202-162087-1uoh7kt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">American skiier Gus Kenworthy is one of many openly gay athletes competing in Pyeongchang.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.newnownext.com/gus-kenworthy-head-shoulders-commercial/01/2018/">Head & Shoulders</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Athletes from Western nations have various protections, and many now share equal rights in most aspects of the law. But when they travel to compete in countries with regressive human rights records, these protections can be lost.</p>
<p>Australia competed at the 2014 Winter Olympics and the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup, both of which were held in Russia. It will again send a team to Russia to play in this year’s FIFA World Cup and aims to compete in the 2022 edition in Qatar. Both countries have poor human rights records, particularly on LGBTI+ issues.</p>
<p>Sport is often lauded as a platform to advance human rights. But, for LGBTI+ individuals and athletes, this may not necessarily be true. The continued hosting of mega sporting events in countries with anti-LGBTI+ laws brings the role of sport in campaigns to advance human rights into focus.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-finally-achieved-marriage-equality-but-theres-a-lot-more-to-be-done-on-lgbti-rights-88488">Australia has finally achieved marriage equality, but there's a lot more to be done on LGBTI rights</a>
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<h2>LGBTI+ rights and the Winter Olympics</h2>
<p>Sochi became a platform for LGBTI+ rights when Western activists called for a boycott based on several human rights concerns. Their resistance increased in direct response to the implementation of laws in Russia <a href="https://theadvocatespost.org/2014/02/18/russias-gay-propaganda-law-how-u-s-extremists-are-fueling-the-fight-against-lgbti-rights/">outlawing sexual minorities</a>. </p>
<p>Principle 4 of the <a href="https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=2.133354314.537528641.1517495712-1055478812.1443790906">Fundamental Principles of Olympism</a> was often referred to amid concerns for the safety of LGBTI+ athletes at Sochi: </p>
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<p>The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.</p>
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<p>Athlete activists have begun to challenge the hosting of mega sporting events in countries like Russia that ignore human rights and reinforce systems of oppression. But what has really changed since Sochi for Olympians?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sport-sochi-and-the-rising-challenge-of-the-activist-athlete-22491">Sport, Sochi and the rising challenge of the activist athlete</a>
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<p>This year a country with a questionable stance on LGBTI+ rights is again hosting the Winter Olympics. South Korea scores only 13% on the <a href="http://annual.sogilaw.org/rainbowIndex/english.html">Rainbow Index</a>, which measures the impacts of a country’s laws and policies on the lives of LGBTI+ people. This is only a marginally better score than Russia’s 8%.</p>
<p>Although homosexuality is legal in South Korea, LGBTI+ rights remain highly volatile. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has courted controversy with comments <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-26/south-koreas-presidential-frontrunner-angers-lgbt-activists/8474332">opposing homosexuality</a>, and sexual minorities continue to face significant stigma in the region.</p>
<p>Australia is taking 51 athletes to compete in South Korea, with two openly gay women on the team. One, Belle Brockhoff, has criticised the anti-LGBTI+ laws in host countries. She joined 26 other athletes who <a href="http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/national-news/second-openly-gay-winter-olympics-team-member-named/165847">signed a letter</a> opposing Kazakhstan’s bid to host the 2022 Winter Olympics due to its anti-LGBTI+ policies.</p>
<p>However, it is not only host nations that can be called to account for their poor LGBTI+ records. Adam Rippon, an openly gay figure skater who has <a href="http://www.espn.com.au/skiing/winter18/story/_/id/22404750/winter-olympics-2018-adam-rippon-helps-united-states-take-home-bronze-team-figure-skating-event">won bronze in Pyeongchang</a>, recently said he did not want to meet Vice President Mike Pence as part of an official reception for the US team. <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/christinebrennan/2018/01/17/gay-olympian-adam-rippon-blasts-selection-mike-pence-lead-u-s-delegation/1040610001/">Rippon argued</a> the Trump administration does not “represent the values that [he] was taught growing up”. </p>
<p>A Fox News executive has criticised the inclusion of “African-Americans, Asians and openly gay athletes” in the US team. He claimed that “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/winter-olympics-fox-news-john-moody-us-committee-darker-gayer-different-a8203566.html?amp">Darker, Gayer, Different</a>” was now a more suitable Olympic motto than “Faster, Higher, Stronger”.</p>
<p>Current evidence suggests that anti-LGBTI+ discrimination is rising. Stonewall, the UK’s leading LGBTI+ charity, reports hate crimes toward the LGBTI+ community have increased: <a href="http://www.stonewall.org.uk/comeoutforLGBT/lgbt-in-britain/hate-crime">one in five</a> LGBTI+ people have experienced a hate crime due to their sexual orientation or gender identity in the last year. </p>
<p>In the US, Donald Trump tried to ban transgender people from serving in the military. Several states have attempted to pass laws to restrict access to bathrooms for people who are trans or gender-diverse.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204554/original/file-20180202-162101-7l80fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian snowboarder Belle Brockhoff has publicly criticised the anti-LGBTI+ laws in Olympic host countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Robert Cianflone/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>With increased visibility comes increased risk</h2>
<p>An increasing number of athletes now openly <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/olympics/2016/08/10/rio-olympics-feature-the-most-out-lgbtq-athletes-ever/">demonstrate their sexual orientation</a>, but many acknowledge it leaves them open to homophobic abuse – especially on social media platforms. </p>
<p>American Olympic skier <a href="http://www.bbc.com/sport/winter-sports/43015188">Gus Kenworthy</a> referred to social media as a space that serves to reinforce the presence of <a href="http://www.espn.co.uk/olympics/story/_/id/13942305/olympic-freeskier-x-games-star-gus-kenworthy-first-openly-gay-action-sports-athlete">casual and aggressive homophobia</a>. British Olympian Tom Bosworth said he believed fear of <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/sport/social-media-trolls-are-stopping-gay-sports-stars-coming-out-says-olympian-tom-bosworth-a3398236.html">abuse on social media</a> could be preventing athletes from coming out.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"961989267911098368"}"></div></p>
<p>Mega sporting events can be problematic for LGBTI+ athletes as many may not be “out” and there can be serious implications if they were to do so. </p>
<p>The safety and welfare of LGBTI+ athletes made headlines when a journalist went undercover in the athletes’ village at the 2016 Rio Olympics to identify out or closeted athletes. Several athletes who were identified were from countries where being gay is criminalised or even punishable by death.</p>
<p>Sport is responding at a notably slow pace to the advancement of LGBTI+ human rights.</p>
<p>Major sporting codes have shown they are not ready to tackle trans and gender diversity. For example, the Australian Football League recently banned <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-excluding-hannah-mouncey-the-afls-inclusion-policy-has-failed-a-key-test-85900">transgender player Hannah Mouncey</a> from joining its women’s competition.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/by-excluding-hannah-mouncey-the-afls-inclusion-policy-has-failed-a-key-test-85900">By excluding Hannah Mouncey, the AFL's inclusion policy has failed a key test</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There is still much work to be done around athletes with intersex variations, sex testing in elite-level competition, and transgender and transitioned athletes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204555/original/file-20180202-162077-vz5xgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ice skater Adam Rippon said he did want to meet US Vice President Mike Pence due to the Trump administration’s record on LGBTI+ rights.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Matthew Stockman/Getty</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hope for the future?</h2>
<p>One particular social inclusion legacy to come from a mega sporting event is <a href="http://www.pridehouseinternational.org/index.php/history/">Pride House International</a>. This initiative provides a safe space for the LGBTI+ community to engage with a sporting event.</p>
<p>In addition, the <a href="http://www.principle6.org/">Principle 6 campaign</a>, launched in response to Russia’s anti-LGBT laws, led to the expansion of that particular part of the Olympic Charter to include sexual orientation as something sport should be free from discrimination on.</p>
<p>It will be interesting to see whether the 2018 Winter Olympics can contribute to the advancement of LGBTI+ rights within South Korea and beyond. However, more scrutiny must be directed to the human rights records of potential host nations when awarding mega sporting events.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91091/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan Storr consults for Proud 2 Play. He is affiliated with the 2018 Gold Coast Pride House. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Kavanagh and Keith Parry do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A country with a questionable stance on LGBTI+ rights is again hosting the Winter Olympics.Keith Parry, Senior Lecturer in Sport Management, Western Sydney UniversityEmma Kavanagh, Senior Lecturer in Sports Psychology and Coaching Sciences, Bournemouth UniversityRyan Storr, Lecturer in Sport Development, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909312018-02-09T02:07:11Z2018-02-09T02:07:11ZTwo Koreas working together on Winter Olympics is a small but important step toward peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205010/original/file-20180206-14111-14fs17j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korean President Moon Jae-in is pushing for a thawing of the relationship between the Koreas through events such as the Winter Olympics.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Jeon Heon-Kyun</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Korean President Moon Jae-in <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/moon-jae-ins-olympic-realpolitik/">wants to use</a> his country’s hosting of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang to renew the inter-Korean relations that have become strained over the past ten years under two conservative governments. There are calls for all parties to maintain the peaceful momentum beyond the Games.</p>
<p>North Korea <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/09/north-south-korea-talks-winter-olympics-nuclear">sending multiple delegations</a> to the Olympics is also welcome, especially after its <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-assumptions-we-make-about-north-korea-and-why-theyre-wrong-84771">series of military provocations</a> in 2017. But the mistrust between the two nations is so deep that there are more sceptics than enthusiasts as the Games begin.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-assumptions-we-make-about-north-korea-and-why-theyre-wrong-84771">Five assumptions we make about North Korea – and why they're wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A backlash to North Korea’s involvement</h2>
<p>Several joint events between the two Koreas will take place in Pyeongchang. Among these are the two teams marching together at the opening ceremony. This is expected to be a highlight.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205001/original/file-20180206-14083-1brp0hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Athletes from the two Koreas marched under the unified Korean flag at the Sydney Olympics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Blake</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I remember the teary moments when the North and South Korean athletes entered the stadium together <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/11/northkorea.sydney">at the 2000 Sydney Olympics</a>, bearing the big blue unified Korean flag. It was as if the two Koreas had finally ended five decades of conflict and hatred after the 1953 armistice. </p>
<p>The overwhelming emotion was felt not only among Koreans, but also the international audience tuned into the ceremony.</p>
<p>In the same year, the two Koreas’ leaders – South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung and the north’s Kim Jong-il – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/14/northkorea3">met for the first time</a>.</p>
<p>Eighteen years on, the mood has totally changed. While Moon’s domestic supporters welcome the government’s efforts to bring about peace through sport, critics are mocking the event as the <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/-pyongyang-olympics---protests-over-joint-korean-hockey-team-9926260">“Pyongyang Olympics”</a>. They believe North Korea is deciding the terms of their participation, and that it is manipulating South Korea.</p>
<p>Conservative newspaper The Chosun Ilbo <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/01/24/2018012401363.html">has reported</a> the South Korean government is censoring speeches by Thae Yong-ho, the highest-ranking North Korean refugee living in Seoul – an allegation that has been denied. </p>
<p>Others have alleged the Moon administration is silencing pessimism about the prospect of improved inter-Korean relations after the Olympics.</p>
<p>But, contrary to the critics’ claim on media censorship, the open criticism and pessimism is in itself proof of a free media. South Korea is a democracy – and that democracy was only won back last year after <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/26/hundreds-thousands-gather-south-korea-protest-against-president/">peaceful candlelight demonstrations</a> helped lead to the ouster of then-president Park Geun-hye, who is now in jail awaiting trial on corruption charges. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205003/original/file-20180206-14096-1pw2lxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protestors against North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics burned the north’s flag.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Yonhap</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Small steps toward peace</h2>
<p>What’s being missed is the considerable amount of support from South Koreans.</p>
<p>I arrived in Seoul on the evening of February 1, when the North Korean athletes were arriving at Yangyang Airport near Pyeongchang. I’ve spoken to street food vendors, shop owners, and young workers about how they feel about North Korea’s participation in the Olympics, and all said it was welcome news.</p>
<p>The 50-year-old Asiana pilot who flew South Korean athletes to a North Korean ski resort said it was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… personally an overwhelming experience but also a good opportunity for the country and the nation. Before we talk about unification, we need to do exchanges first so that we overcome our differences. I wish there will be more inter-Korean exchanges and we can travel to each other’s side freely.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The role of women in improving inter-Korean relations is also noticeable. The decision to form a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-06/winter-olympics-language-problems-unified-korea-ice-hockey-team/9399410">joint women’s ice hockey team</a> may be seen as a government intervention, but it is also a rare opportunity for North and South Korean athletes to try working together as a team. Korean women have shown a great deal of pragmatism in difficult times. </p>
<p>I am in Pyeongchang for the Games. I welcome the North Korean athletes and delegation’s participation at the Olympics and am looking forward to their performance. It’s the North Korean people who need to be engaged with whenever an opportunity rises, and the regime that should be punished for bad behaviour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay Song does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mistrust between the two Koreas is so deep that there are more sceptics than enthusiasts over North Korea’s involvement in the Winter Olympics.Jay Song, Senior Lecturer, Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/896562018-01-07T21:29:28Z2018-01-07T21:29:28ZKim Jong-un is a gangster: Here’s how to sort him out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201061/original/file-20180107-26151-xqxlp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this recent photo, South Koreans watch a TV news program showing North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's New Year's speech. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un should never talk to each other <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-northkorea/trump-says-he-would-absolutely-talk-to-north-koreas-kim-on-phone-idUSKBN1EV0OC">on the phone</a>, or through Twitter. Two unpredictable, nuclear-armed egotists are a threat to themselves and to the world, regardless of the size of their buttons.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"948355557022420992"}"></div></p>
<p>Fortunately, cooler heads are now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea/north-korea-agrees-to-talk-to-south-after-u-s-south-korea-postpone-drills-idUSKBN1EU06O">communicating between North and South Korea</a>. Still, this is no time for South Korean President Moon Jae-in, nor the international community, to get comfortable with Kim Jong-un. </p>
<p>North Korea flouts international agreements, bolsters its economy through <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea%27s_illicit_activities">sordid means</a> and is responsible for <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx">ghastly human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>As a researcher on social justice and human security in North Korea, I have a reminder for Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson as they prepare to <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rex-tillerson-ottawa-visit-1.4456579">meet in Vancouver next week to discuss North Korea</a>: Kim Jong-un runs a feudal gangland, not a nation state. The rules of diplomacy do not apply to the Hermit Kingdom. </p>
<p>North Korea is isolated, hungry, without power and without allies. Yet Kim gathers resources for nuclear proliferation, missiles and prison camps. This is thanks to his <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/06/news/north-korea-sanctions-countries-violation/index.html">business partners</a>. The international community has mistakenly ignored them.</p>
<p>How to deal with Kim’s belligerence? View him as a thug. And like any gangster, understand how he makes money and what really scares him.</p>
<p>First, target those who profit with Kim. Second, empower <a href="http://www.hanvoice.ca/">defectors who can speak</a> to North Korea’s grim reality. Their voices matter both within and outside of North Korea. </p>
<p>Kim acquires weapons by sea, he pays for them with <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-ramps-up-manufacture-of-illegal-drugs-amid-sanctions/a-40169753">narcotics</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-northkorea/u-s-blames-north-korea-for-wannacry-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1ED00Q">cyber-attacks</a> and cryptocurrency. Masterful smugglers, North Korean vessels <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-november-7-2017-the-current-1.4389786/north-korea-circumvents-sanctions-through-maritime-trade-says-professor-1.4389926">run under flags of convenience</a>, shell companies process the funds, and other vessels entering North Korean waters deceptively turn off their broadcast identifiers.</p>
<h2>‘Protector’ of North Koreans</h2>
<p>I interviewed numerous North Korean defectors for three years. <a href="http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=926">I also tracked vessels doing business with Mr. Kim</a>. <a href="http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol13num2/vol13num2art1.pdf">From this work,</a> I make two conclusions about how the international community should approach North Korea. </p>
<p>First, Kim holds power through a projected <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/books/review/the-great-leader-and-the-fighter-pilot-by-blaine-harden.html">image of ordained invincibility</a>. He is the protector of the North Korean people. He may not provide enough food, and he may send them to prison camps, but only he can protect against pending violence from the United States.</p>
<p>Missile launches and nuclear tests pose little threat to the West. They are symbolic demonstrations of power for his compatriots. </p>
<p>Second, in order to prop up his image as the Great Marshal, Kim collects his military resources below the radar. Illegal <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/north-korea-defector-ri-jong-ho/index.html">smuggling</a>, <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-criminal-empire-drugs-trafficking-1.4435265">counterfeiting</a>, <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/01/13/Ex-North-Korea-diplomat-Pyongyang-makes-a-fortune-in-insurance-fraud/5721484323375/">insurance scams</a>, <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/14/news/north-korea-small-arms-trade/index.html">weapons sales</a>, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/18/politics/white-house-tom-bossert-north-korea-wannacry/index.html">cyber attacks</a>, <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/north-koreas-meth-export-67869">narcotics production</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/world/europe/north-korea-russia-migrants.html">forced labour abroad</a> bring in cash. And there are global markets for all, accessed through shady diplomats and shadowy shell companies. They skirt sanctions with impunity. </p>
<p>Formal diplomacy fails as North Korea relies more on the illicit, rather than the legitimate, international community. Until now.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201062/original/file-20180107-26163-19vbufg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson take part in a joint media availability on Parliament Hill in Ottawa in December. The two will soon be meeting in Vancouver to discuss how to handle North Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
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<p>Recent <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx">sanctions by the United States</a>, the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/un-us-north-korea-resolution/index.html">United Nations</a> and the European Union are smarter. They target Kim’s financial environment. Instead of sanctioning the target, new sanctions attack the banks and maritime operators that help him.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/thenational/the-national-today-matt-lauer-war-crime-poison-north-korea-1.4421416">Already, maritime traffic into North Korea has dropped significantly</a> and the regime is taking to <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/29/574508075/south-korea-seizes-ship-suspected-of-at-sea-oil-transfer-to-benefit-north-korea">sea-to-sea transfers</a> to acquire goods — a high-risk, low-return operation. Kim’s options are getting fewer. </p>
<p>It’s a start, but not enough. </p>
<p>Targeting Kim’s markets for missile tests and nuclear proliferation is good policy. It is easier, and safer, to prevent missiles getting in to North Korea than it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-crisis-echoes-israels-anti-rocket-strategy-82415">to shoot them down</a> once they’re flying out.</p>
<p>However, North Korea’s trading partners are widespread and include businesses around the world, notably in <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/09/04/north-korea-countries-trade-partners-nuclear-tests/">Europe</a>, <a href="https://thewire.in/190910/mea-india-us-ties-sushma-swaraj-res-tillerson-north-korea-china-iran-rohingya-pakistan/">India</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-30/north-korean-arms-trade-among-loopholes-un-struggling-to-close">Africa</a> and even <a href="http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/03312017/AsiaPolicy23_Huish_January2017.pdf">New Zealand</a>. </p>
<p>Recognize that Kim’s greatest fear is having his compatriots and the world know how weak he is. The missiles are more show than threat. It’s why Kim is not fazed by Donald Trump’s half-baked tweets.</p>
<h2>Kim nervous about defectors’s stories</h2>
<p>He is, however, deeply frightened of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/north-korea-defector-jung/496082/">defectors telling their stories</a>. Their testimony will shatter his reputation and possibly land him in the International Court of Justice. </p>
<p>North Koreans are unlikely to oust Kim themselves and rebel against <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juche">Juche</a>, the regime’s rigid social control system. China also fears the thought of any civil conflict in North Korea that could lead to a massive <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/12/china-refugee-camps-border-north-korea">refugee crisis at its borders</a>. </p>
<p>Strategic sanctions against North Korea are starting to put Kim in a bind. <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/12/04/hunger-adds-to-the-misery-of-a-cold-north-korean-winter.html">Winter is a hungry time</a> in North Korea, and Kim will blame sanctions for upcoming food shortages. </p>
<p>Freeland, Tillerson and Moon must remain vigilant with smart sanctions and not trust Kim to make good on any agreement. </p>
<p>Instead, they must identify those who finance Kim, block their revenues and deal with him like an international criminal, not as a head of state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Huish receives funding from The Social Science Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Chrystia Freeland and Rex Tillerson should remember one point when they meet in Vancouver soon to discuss North Korea: Kim Jong-un runs a feudal gangland, not a nation state.Robert Huish, Associate Professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855932017-10-26T19:09:17Z2017-10-26T19:09:17ZSouth Korea’s public broadcasters are in an impossible political position<p>Compared with their counterparts in other democratic countries, South Korea’s national public broadcasters are politically vulnerable.</p>
<p>Tied to whichever government is in power, they are saddled with a compromised board system and limited options for editorial independence across TV, radio and online content. </p>
<p>This has led to strikes demanding freedom from political influence. Most recently, the unionised staff at two of Korea’s largest broadcasters – the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) – <a href="http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2017/09/137_236151.html">walked off the job</a> in September.</p>
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<p>Although a version of KBS launched in the 1920s under the Japanese colonial government, KBS TV was established in 1961 by the Korean military dictator Park Jung-Hee. It was owned and operated by the state until 1973, when it transformed into a national public broadcaster.</p>
<p>MBC, on the other hand, started as a commercial entity in the 1960s. It was forced to become a public broadcaster during the 1980 media reforms. These placed all existing broadcasters under the umbrella of “public service broadcasting”. </p>
<p>Not currently run by the government, it is majority-owned by the Foundation of Broadcast Culture (FBC), which is subject to political influence. For this reason, it is widely seen as a public broadcaster.</p>
<p>From this patchwork of businesses, Korean television broadcasting has become a highly politicised industry – one that is troublingly susceptible to state intervention. </p>
<h2>A lack of mission</h2>
<p>From the beginning, public service broadcasting in Korea has operated without a clear justification for its existence as a non-commercial nor non-politically-influenced institution. </p>
<p>This is especially true when it comes to funding. KBS’s revenue comes from licence fees and advertising, while MBC’s funding is solely from advertising. </p>
<p>The board members of KBS and the MBC are selected on the basis of their political and ideological stance. This is not always the case in other regions. For example, the board members of Australia’s public broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), are appointed as part of an arguably merit-based and transparent <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014C00721">selection process</a>.</p>
<p>In South Korea, the board members of KBS and FBC, the public organisation responsible for MBC management, are all directly or indirectly appointed by the Korean president at the recommendation of the National Assembly, the country’s legislature. </p>
<p>For KBS, this includes seven members associated with the ruling party and four from the opposition party. For FBC, there are six and three, respectively. </p>
<p>Also, unlike <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014C00721">in Australia</a>, no laws specify the role of public service broadcasting. The absence of legal guidelines has created a situation where both KBS and MBC are in competition with each other, and with other commercial broadcasters like the Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS). </p>
<h2>The political lapdogs</h2>
<p>Korea’s public broadcasters have periodically attempted “self-censorship” in support of the government of the day. </p>
<p>During progressive governments (1998-2007), the presidents of the two public broadcasters were more or less handpicked by the progressive presidents, and their boards were controlled by party-supported members.</p>
<p>During recent conservative governments (from 2008 to April 2017), the conservative-supported presidents and board members largely dictated programming.</p>
<p>In this sense, Korea’s public broadcasters have operated more like an arm of government than as independent public broadcasters.</p>
<p>For example, during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-you-should-know-about-south-koreas-political-scandal-the-same-old-story-but-with-a-twist-68722">Choi Soon-Sil scandal</a> – a case of political corruption that emerged in 2016 and led to President Park Keun-Hye’s impeachment in March 2017 – both KBS and MBC failed to provide accurate, objective news. </p>
<p>In particular, at the initial stage of the scandal, their coverage was biased in favour of President Park.</p>
<p>Likewise, in 2004 when the progressive President Rho Mu-Hyun was impeached, KBS and MBC coverage was biased in favour of the incumbent president and the ruling progressive party.</p>
<h2>No will to change</h2>
<p>The politicisation of the public broadcasters in Korea has created profound internal conflicts. </p>
<p>Encouraged by the progressive candidate’s victory in the 2017 presidential election, the progressive unions within KBS and MBC went <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/371_235931.html">on strike</a> in September. They demand the resignation of the president of each of the two stations and editorial independence. </p>
<p>It is not the first time that the unions have staged strikes against alleged management interference in news coverage. The same unions held a strike <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/10/world/la-fg-korea-media-strike-20120711">for several months in 2012</a> in protest of the conservative President Lee Myung-Bak government’s attempt to control the media, but it subsided without success. </p>
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<p>The current Moon Jae-In government – via the unions and the government regulator, the Korean Communication Commission – is pressuring the conservative-supported board members of KBS and FBC to stand down. They are also attempting to oust the presidents of KBS and MBC, who had been handpicked by former President Park.</p>
<p>This time around, the government and ruling progressive party support the strike. It’s likely to achieve some of its aims: two conservative-supported board members of FBC have already stepped down in recent weeks.</p>
<p>Yet we have seen this before. In 2008, the conservative president Lee Myung-Bak and his administration also forced the progressive president of KBS and board members to resign. </p>
<p>This is the key problem: the presidency will continue changing hands. If the government and ruling party control the appointment of personnel, and have a say in the editorial process, Korea’s public broadcasters will always be compromised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ki-Sung Kwak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Compared with their counterparts in other democratic countries, South Korea’s national public broadcasters are politically vulnerable.Ki-Sung Kwak, Associate Professor, Department of Korean Studies, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/810472017-08-01T12:57:42Z2017-08-01T12:57:42ZSouth Korea’s president is getting his North Korea policy badly wrong<p>In the wake of Pyongyang’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/28/north-korea-fires-missile-japan-reports-say">latest missile test</a>, it’s clear that neither South Korea nor the US is making much headway in tackling the North Korean nuclear question. The south’s president, Moon Jae-in, is yet to achieve his promised <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/korea-trump-china-xi-jinping-nuclear-moon-jae-in/533811/">dialogue</a> with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-un. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is oscillating between posturing and <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-bandow-north-korea-china-20170707-story.html">openly demanding that China</a> intervene to “solve” the nuclear problem.</p>
<p>The pattern continued with the north’s latest test of an upgraded intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Moon responded by calling for harsher sanctions, an upgrade to his country’s ballistic missile systems, and the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-thaad-idUSKBN1AD2ES?il=0">deployment of more THAAD</a> (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) launchers; Trump <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-threatens-trade-with-china-over-its-relations-with-north-korea">tweeted</a> his “disappointment in China”, which could “easily solve this problem”. </p>
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<p>Of the parties involved, only the north seems to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/opinion/kim-jong-un-north-korea-sanctions.html">making progress towards its objective</a>: developing a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. It has more than once managed to dispel any creeping sense of optimism. As recently as late June, with the international community anticipating Moon and Trump’s <a href="http://time.com/4839458/moon-jae-in-south-korea-donald-trump/">first meeting</a> – still pending – Pyongyang seized the moment to successfully test its first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2017/jul/04/north-korea-announces-successful-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test-video">ICBM</a>, which was reportedly capable of hitting <a href="mailto:http://uk.businessinsider.com/north-korea-claims-it-has-successfully-tested-its-first-ever-icbm-2017-7%3Fr=US%26IR=T">Alaska</a>. The <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/north-korea-missile-test/index.html">most recent missile tested</a> could apparently hit <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/29/asia/north-korea-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test/index.html">Los Angeles or even Chicago</a>. </p>
<p>The stalemate continues. So why have Moon’s efforts to break the stalemate met with North Korean stonewalling?</p>
<h2>Tangled up</h2>
<p>Moon has tried hard to differentiate his North Korea policy from his predecessor’s, focusing on <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southkorea-election-idUKKBN18425M">co-operation and dialogue</a> with Pyongyang instead of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/13/south-korea-says-time-for-tough-action-after-norths-nuclear-test">punitive</a> sanctions; initial plans even included <a href="mailto:http://uk.businessinsider.com/south-korea-north-korea-host-2018-winter-olympics-world-cup-2017-6%3Fr=US%26IR=T">sharing the next winter Olympics</a>. But Moon’s “dual-track” policy of seeking North Korea’s denuclearisation while <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/06/356_229867.html">also calling for dialogue</a>, is preventing gains on either. </p>
<p>Although Moon stated that he has convinced Trump to <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20170701005500315">align US and South Korean policy</a>, in reality, he has put Seoul even more in line with the Trump administration’s <a href="https://apnews.com/86626d21ea2b45c79457a873a747c452">approach</a> of “maximum pressure and engagement”, apparently premised on using all means possible to cajole the north into dialling its programme back. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/30/joint-statement-between-united-states-and-republic-korea">joint statement</a> that followed the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f80beca4-5ca2-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b">summit</a> emphasised the commitment of the US and South Korea to tightening the screws on Pyongyang, including the possibility of new sanctions.</p>
<p>But Pyongyang refuses to talk to a South Korean government that supports both the United Nations Security Council <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/un-security-council-increases-sanctions-on-north-korea/529086/">sanctions</a> and the joint US-Korea <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/whats-the-big-deal-about-these-us-south-korea-military-exercises/">military exercises</a>. </p>
<p>Moon seems unable to separate the nuclear issue from inter-Korean co-operation. In a July <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170707000032">speech</a> delivered in Berlin, Moon said that North Korea had made a “disappointing and misguided decision” in testing an ICBM, but underlined the need for dialogue and a peace treaty to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578">formally end the Korean War</a>. At the same time, he cited the nuclear programme as the Koreas’ biggest challenge.</p>
<p>By explicitly connecting these two issues, he effectively relegated inter-Korean co-operation on myriad other problems to the sidelines. This is a big mistake.</p>
<h2>A supporting role</h2>
<p>Moon seems convinced that South Korea should lead future denuclearisation negotiations. This ignores the reality that South Korea is simply not a key actor on that front. North Korea’s nuclear threats are directed at the US; the nuclear issue is a matter principally for Washington, with Beijing as mediator. </p>
<p>With this structure unlikely to fundamentally change, Seoul simply doesn’t need to take the lead. Beyond being redundant, that would also be counterproductive: the two Koreas badly need to restart their relationship, and the nuclear issue mustn’t be allowed to get in the way.</p>
<p>This balance was struck with some success during the administration of <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/13726814">Roh Moo-hyun</a>, in which Moon served as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39860158">chief of staff</a>. The nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations followed parallel paths; the two Koreas had a relatively functional relationship at the time, and denuclearisation negotiations were confined to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program">Six Party Talks</a>, in which South Korea was at most a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704654?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">facilitator</a>.</p>
<p>Whenever the nuclear issue is allowed to overshadow inter-Korean relations, only North Korea benefits. It’s time for Seoul to correct course away from the nuclear trap that has confounded previous administrations. It could instead consider externally mediated options such as China’s <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/07/07/0200000000AEN20170707000400315.html">freeze-for-freeze proposal</a>, under which North Korea would freeze its nuclear programme in return for the US South Korea ending their large-scale joint military exercises.</p>
<p>Instead, Moon is stubbornly treating the nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations as inextricably entwined. By doing so, he’s passing up crucial opportunities, diminishing his country’s role in the region while Pyongyang marches unconstrained towards its nuclear goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Korea has a very particular part to play in handling Pyongyang, but Moon Jae-in has a different one in mind.Markus Bell, Social Anthropologist and Lecturer, University of SheffieldMarco Milani, Postdoctoral Scholar, Korean Studies Institute, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.