tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/nenegate-30331/articlesNenegate – The Conversation2018-03-22T10:17:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937952018-03-22T10:17:24Z2018-03-22T10:17:24ZZuma trial means that his toxic legacy will haunt South Africa for some time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211518/original/file-20180322-165580-536a1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's former president Jacob Zuma.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest instalment in South Africa’s longest running political soap opera played out dramatically on 16 March when Shaun Abrahams, the head of South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-south-africa-zuma-charges-20180316-story.html">announced</a> that 16 criminal charges against former president Jacob Zuma must stand and be tested in court. </p>
<p>The charges relate to 783 counts of corruption, fraud, money laundering and racketeering. The charges were controversially dropped in 2009 but reinstated by the country’s High Court in 2016. The Supreme Court of Appeal went on to <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/13/sca-upholds-high-court-decision-on-zuma-charges">uphold this judgment in 2017</a>.</p>
<p>This is merely one instalment in a drama that may still have some years to run. It can be traced back to the sleaze and kickbacks surrounding the <a href="http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">arms procurement package</a> of the late 1990s. The allegations were that Zuma was a beneficiary of largesse from certain arms companies in exchange for exerting his influence on their behalf. </p>
<p>The Abrahams decision – made despite opposition fears that, as a Zuma appointee, he might flinch from the challenge - is of enormous significance. A former president is now likely to find himself in the dock at a criminal trial, an unprecedented event in South African history.</p>
<h2>A different political atmosphere</h2>
<p>Looking beyond the groundbreaking historical nature of the decision and its implications for Zuma personally, it seems unlikely that Abrahams’ decision will generate the same passions as the issue did in the 2007-2009 period. At that point Zuma’s standing in the ANC alliance was at an all time high and attempts to prosecute him for corruption were viewed as part of a wider ‘dirty tricks’ campaign to sabotage his rise to the presidencies of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-07-04-anc-boss-accuses-judges-of-conspiracy-against-zuma">both party and state</a>. This included the Thabo Mbeki camp inside the ANC and others outside the party. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-decade-on-a-new-book-on-zumas-rape-trial-has-finally-hit-home-85262">2006 rape trial</a> had been viewed in similar terms by his <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-06-17-kill-for-zuma-i-can-explain-says-malema">staunchest backers</a> such as then ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, who subsequently, and rather shamelessly, would reinvent himself as Zuma’s <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/111769/eff-slams-zuma-and-gupta-criminal-enterprises/">chief critic</a>. </p>
<p>Pro-Zuma sentiment was particularly strong on the left of the ANC-led alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party uncritically and unconditionally buying <a href="https://theconversation.com/those-who-brought-zuma-to-power-shouldnt-be-forgotten-or-forgiven-82858">into the mythology around Zuma</a> . They viewed his presidency as an opportunity to engineer a leftwards shift in South Africa’s general political direction after the supposed ‘neo-liberalism’ of the Mbeki years. </p>
<p>Now, in 2018, the left is older and wiser. In the aftermath of a scandal ridden presidency disfigured by <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">endemic corruption</a> and allegations of state capture by private interests close to Zuma, the trade union federation and the Communist Party are more likely to support his prosecution than contest it.</p>
<p>Equally, the broader politics of the issue are now less highly charged. In 2009, Zuma was the president-in-waiting. There was limited enthusiasm, even among his many critics in the movement, to see a South African president inaugurated who faced the realistic prospect of a criminal trial in the foreseeable future. It was felt this would provide a fatal distraction from the responsibilities of government. </p>
<p>As it turned out, he was fatally distracted from those responsibilities anyway by a succession of new scandals which arrived with alarming frequency to paralyse his presidency. These included <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Public%20Protector's%20Report%20on%20Nkandla_a.pdf">Nkandla</a> (2013/2014), <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">Nenegate</a> (December 2015), the sacking of Finance Minister, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/zuma-says-reshuffled-cabinet-to-improve-efficiency-and-effectiveness">Pravin Gordhan </a>(March 2017), and the various <a href="http://www.gupta-leaks.com/">state capture reports</a> of 2016/17. </p>
<p>While prosecutors technically make their decisions on narrow legal grounds, one should not assume they are entirely insulated from broader political and societal pressures in their decision making. Now, however, Zuma is merely a former president and an ANC member. Consequently, the protective shield previously extended by the governing party will not be there. And, given the other scandals mentioned above and with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">new leader in place</a>, he may only be able to draw on very modest support from within the ANC’s ranks.</p>
<h2>The double-edged sword</h2>
<p>Zuma’s proposed prosecution is a welcome reaffirmation of the principle that all are equal before the law. But a trial carries with it very real dangers for the ANC. </p>
<p>First, it will serve to remind a wider South African audience that Zuma did not emerge in a vacuum. He is a product of the ANC. The party elected him twice as its president and, before recalling him in February 2017, <a href="https://theconversation.com/survey-shows-zuma-and-ancs-mutual-dance-to-the-bottom-92126">rallied round</a> him during the Nkandla saga and in numerous parliamentary <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-zuma-survives-vote-of-no-confidence-20170808">votes of no-confidence</a>. Its own National Executive Committee also <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-11-29-zuma-avoids-nec-recall-as-anc-turns-to-unity/#.WrLNTkx2vmI">rejected demands</a> for his recall on several occasions. It will be difficult if not impossible for the ANC to avoid some collateral damage as it was unquestionably the chief facilitator and enabler of that discredited era.</p>
<p>Second, there is always the risk that a trial will see the movement’s dirty laundry being aired in public by Zuma. This will be particularly true if he believes his fate is sealed, taking the opportunity for a wider settling of scores with others in the ANC. The trial could then become an endurance test for the ANC and a propaganda windfall for its opponents reminding South Africans in graphic detail of the looting and embezzlement over which the movement has presided. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa will hope that Zuma’s lawyers revisit their earlier so-called ‘Stalingrad strategy’ of delays and prevarication so that when it finally commences it does so after – and not before – the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/newsmaker-2019-elections-results-will-be-credible-20171015-2">2019 election</a>. On past evidence there are likely <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-03-18-anc-facing-charges-can-zuma-still-split-the-party/">to be numerous attempts</a> by his lawyers to actually prevent the case from ever coming to court.</p>
<p>For the trial to take place in the run up to, and during that election campaign, would be extremely unwelcome for the new leadership. It will blunt the Ramaphosa message that he is ‘purifying’ the movement, restoring its traditional values, and seeking closure on a discredited era. </p>
<p>Moreover, even in the aftermath of an election, the issue will return to the top of Ramaphosa’s agenda if Zuma is eventually found guilty. The question of granting or not granting him a pardon will then arise. This will test the credentials of a leader supposedly making a definitive break with a sordid past. </p>
<p>It is also possible <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/23/zondo-inquiry-will-investigate-everybody-and-anybody_a_23341033/">that further charges </a> could be brought against Zuma once the whole state capture phenomenon is laid bare by an <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-zondo-to-reveal-team-to-tackle-claims-of-state-capture-20180307">official commission of inquiry</a> headed by <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/10/raymond-zondo-who-is-the-man-behind-sas-biggest-probe_a_23329381/">Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo</a>. The state capture saga makes the existing charges against Zuma look insubstantial by comparison. </p>
<p>Zuma’s presidency may be over, but his toxic legacy seems likely to haunt the ANC – and through it South Africa - for some considerable time yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Former South African president Jacob Zuma’s proposed prosecution is a welcome reaffirmation of the principle that all are equal before the law.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/695172016-11-29T09:48:26Z2016-11-29T09:48:26ZA new centre of power through mass mobilisation is needed in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/147900/original/image-20161129-10975-ppguyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demands to recall South African President Jacob Zuma reached a climax at the governing ANC's national executive meeting.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a> has long argued that the elected president of the party should also be the executive head of the country to avoid creating <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-27-anc-debates-two-centres-of-power">two centres of power</a>. Otherwise the centre of power in the party would inevitably be at odds with that of the president of the country. </p>
<p>But the idea that by taking this route it would avoid conflict has come to nought. Jacob Zuma is president of the party as well as the country. But the ANC and the government, the executive in particular, <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-27-zuma-to-launch-fight-back-as-anc-nec-present-motion-for-the-president-to-step-down">are at war</a>. </p>
<p>Senior members of the national executive committee of the ANC tabled a motion for Zuma <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/motion-for-zuma-to-step-down-tabled-at-anc-nec-meeting-reports">to step down</a>, echoing similar calls by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/anc-icons-demand-jacob-zuma-resignation-vote-161109132942397.html">party stalwarts</a>. It is now evident that South Africa has two centres of political power. </p>
<p>One can speculate as to who holds the reins within the ANC and is increasingly at odds with the presidency. What is clear is that all is not well in the party structures. </p>
<p>Because of this my contention is that South Africa needs a third centre of power. The country needs a mass democratic movement to confront the mismanagement that will otherwise beset it. </p>
<p>To an extent South Africa has been down this road before, to great effect. In the 1980s leaders such as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cheryl-carolus">Cheryl Carolus</a> and Reverend <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/reverend-allan-aubrey-boesak">Allan Boasak</a> were instrumental in creating the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a> which rallied diverse people around a single purpose: co-ordinated mass action to oppose the apartheid regime. This time such a movement will need to focus on enhancing good governance to ensure socio-economic development. </p>
<p>This should draw together a host of players ranging from not-for-profit organisations to religious bodies and active citizens who want to save the country.</p>
<h2>Business is powerful, but not organised</h2>
<p>The business community has held a significant amount of sway over the direction the country has taken since democracy <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/business/2016/11/15/government-and-business---where-did-it-all-go-wrong">in 1994</a>. At its core, the policy regime of the last two decades has been a <em>de facto</em> settlement by way of compromise between political elites and big capital.</p>
<p>Organised labour, through the guise of its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/kids/tripartite-alliance">alliance partnership</a> with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, has served to cement this corporatist pact between the <a href="http://unbc.arcabc.ca/islandora/object/unbc%3A6679/datastream/PDF/view">private and public sectors</a>. So while the business sector remains an influential actor on the national scene, the lack of unity and coordinated effort by business has neutralised its capacity to steer the state.</p>
<p>The country’s business sector is led by two main bodies; <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/busa-warns-eskom-on-nuclear-plans-2093258">Business Unity South Africa</a> and <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/blsa-appoints-mabuza-as-chair-as-it-unveils-new-leaders-2016-10-21/rep_id:4136">Business Leadership South Africa</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://cajnewsafrica.com/2016/11/25/exclusive-council-fears-lack-of-sa-transformation-could-spark-turmoil/">Contending voices</a> such as those of the Black Business Council and upstart Progressive Professionals Forum are eroding <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/05/some-relief-for-eskom-as-2-organisations-show-it-support">the voice of business</a>. The latter groupings are breakaway factions of <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2011-09-12-black-business-council-wrong-step-in-the-right-direction/">organised business</a> who favour a more aggressive <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/bbc-calls-for-radical-economic-transformation/">transformation</a> agenda and stronger alignment with President Zuma’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHKaIvMZqKg">administration</a>. </p>
<p>This erosion is laid bare by the fact that business only mobilised and <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/banks-showed-zuma-his-limits-1960890">reacted</a> once international markets had punished the president and the country after <a href="http://nenegate.biznews.com">Nenegate</a>. This was the scandalous expulsion of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015. Zuma’s appointment of a new finance minister has historically been handled with due care for the management of business confidence and <a href="http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2015/12/10/zuma-fires-finance-minister-nene-rand-crashes-to-record-r1538us">perceptions</a>, but BLSA and BUSA groupings were caught entirely unaware of the <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00040315.html">impending change</a>. </p>
<h2>Two centres, no progress</h2>
<p>The implication of a split in the political centre of power is that South Africa’s national development project will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-can-expect-zero-growth-its-problems-are-largely-homemade-62943">gridlocked</a>. Except for a handful of localised multi-stakeholder projects, such as those driven by Premier David Makhura’s <a href="http://www.southafrica.info/about/government/mega-projects-080415.htm#.WDwuxncy9E5">Gauteng government on a local level</a>, very little will be achieved between the social partners of government, business and labour under these conditions. </p>
<p>It also means that these two centres will drive different agendas. The party will be steering towards immediate political imperatives such as securing votes in the 2019 national and provincial elections. On the other hand, the increasingly isolated, defensive and desperate executive is likely to close ranks and attempt to <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/11/20/how-zuma-s-securocrats-are-closing-down-the-public-space">use the security cluster</a> with increasing vigour as a weapon against its opponents.</p>
<h2>New centre of power</h2>
<p>What remains to be done by those who continue to hold a vision of a democratic, progressive and increasingly equitable society?</p>
<p>Their task is to construct from civil society a <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/politics/2016/11/24/zuma-rattled-save-south-africa-campaigns-potential-says-section27s-heywood/">new centre of power</a> – people power, citizen power, built on the power of just claims, energised by the power of righteous indignation. After all, the power of a society rests in its people and only then in its <a href="http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPol_democSocPwrAnal.html">institutions</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa again needs a mass democratic movement. The main actors in such a force for common good will inevitably have to include <a href="https://theconversation.com/dangerous-echoes-of-the-past-as-church-and-state-move-closer-in-south-africa-65985">churches, mosques and temples</a>. These civil society groups enjoy a shared representation of the vast majority of citizens, with around 81% of the population self-identifying as Christians, many of whom regularly participate in faith community practices. This force will also have to include trade unions and community organisations, NGOs and rights activists. </p>
<p>There are early signs of the emergence of just such a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-06-05-i-am-the-third-force/">third force for good</a> in the likes of the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-25-save-south-africa-whose-protest-is-it-anyway">SaveSA movement</a>, the Socio-Economic Future of South Africa convened by the <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-02-18-a-return-to-civil-action-clergy-to-spearhead-new-movement-to-tackle-crises-in-south-africa/">Archbishop of Cape Town</a>, and the public call to prayer for a change in national leadership by <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/opinion-prayer-a-weapon-to-fight-injustice-2087156">Reverend Moss Ntlha</a>. </p>
<p>For a project of mass mobilisation to succeed, South Africans who have been deeply loyal to their liberation movement masters will have to take back their agency and right of refusal. ANC membership would need to become a choice and not a <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/06/10/anc-has-been-reduced-to-a-shady-network-of-patronage-and-corruption-maimane">birthmark for privilege</a>. Liberation credentials will again have to be hard earned. But this time liberation will mean holding one’s friends in high office and those in the boardrooms to account.</p>
<p>South Africa now has two centres of power. It needs a third if it is to navigate the polar risks of <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/11/25/zuma-turns-to-high-court-to-review-state-capture-report">state capture</a> and <a href="http://www.mistra.org.za/Library/ConferencePaper/Documents/South%20Africa's%20Developmental%20Capacity.pdf">state incapacity</a> and forge a path to inclusive prosperity. Is the country’s labour movement awake to this reality? If the clergy have come to this conviction, can the men, women and young people who do not benefit from the country’s system of patronage be mobilised to shoulder this task?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marius Oosthuizen has previously received funding from faith-based Foundations such as the Maclellan Foundation, agencies such as the British High Commission and a variety of research grants. He is affiliated with SEFSA, the Socio-Economic Future of South Africa, a civil society dialogue initiative to secure the future of South Africa.
</span></em></p>There are early signs of the emergence of a third force for good in South Africa in the likes of the Save SA movement and Socio-Economic Future of South Africa convened by the Archbishop of Cape Town.Marius Oosthuizen, Full time faculty, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/647042016-09-01T15:35:51Z2016-09-01T15:35:51ZWhy patronage and state capture spell trouble for South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136292/original/image-20160901-1048-1i4gi2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa (L) and President Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa has described the ANC government as being at war with itself.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has caught the world’s attention with an epic battle between two powerful factions within the governing African National Congress (ANC) which has spilt into government. Cyril Ramaphosa, deputy president of the country, has aptly <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/ramaphosa-supports-gordhan-warns-against-state-at-war-with-itself-20160825">described</a> this as a government that wages “war with itself”. </p>
<p>On the one side there is the largely rural based faction of <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2016/08/31/anc-unity-deal-will-keep-patronage-faction-at-the-table">patronage politicians</a> around President Jacob Zuma. The other side is less well defined, but it can be safely assumed that the <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/Voices/gordhan-under-siege-20160828">beleaguered</a> finance minister Pravin Gordhan is among them. What makes this battle different from the usual political quarrels is the viciousness with which the patronage politicians are fighting to get the upper hand. </p>
<p>The World Bank’s Joel Hellman has <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm">defined</a> state capture as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the efforts of firms to shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit private gains to public officials.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In South Africa, obtaining government <a href="http://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">tenders</a> should be added to the channels through which unscrupulous firms and individuals can benefit from state capture. </p>
<p>It is necessary to understand the system of patronage politics and the state capture that fuels it to understand why replacing Gordhan is so important to Zuma. So important, that Zuma is willing to risk the <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/pityana-zuma-entire-leadership-of-the-anc-must-resign">unity</a> of his party and <a href="http://www.thesouthafrican.com/downgrade-junk-status-possibility-sa-according-poll/">losing</a> South Africa’s investment grade sovereign debt rating, which would have devastating effects on the economy and the budget.</p>
<p>The South African captors are <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/maimane-presses-madonsela-on-gupta-probe-2062093">reported</a> to be the wealthy Gupta family. Their capture of the government is so deep that they even dared to <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-16-guptas-offered-me-finance-minister-position-mcebisi-jonas">offer</a> finance minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">Nhlanhla Nene’s</a> job to his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136295/original/image-20160901-1039-1x009gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African finance minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy Mcebisi Jonas.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The money provided by the Guptas fuels the patronage machinery that Zuma and his <a href="http://www.financialmail.co.za/opinion/bruceslist/2016/08/24/bruce-s-list-zuma-gets-ready-to-rumble">cronies</a> use to fight for dominance in the ANC. The family has <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/gupta-family-just-caught-south-africa%E2%80%99s-political-crossfire">denied</a> the allegations against it.</p>
<p>South Africa has reached a critical point. If the patronage politicians win the battle within the ANC and complete the capture of the state the country will slip from stagnation into the abyss.</p>
<h2>Institutions that have been compromised</h2>
<p>As part of their fight for dominance, patronage politicians have attacked the freedom of press as well as the rule of law. </p>
<p>Hlaudi Motsoeneng, chief operating officer of the SABC, turned the public broadcaster into a propaganda machine by <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-18-you-can-question-anyone-except-zuma-hlaudi-reportedly-told-sabc-journalists">telling</a> its journalists “do not focus on negative stories”. The resulting <a href="http://www.msn.com/en-za/news/indepth/sabc-mess-now-in-parliaments-care-dont-hold-your-breath/ar-BBulrtO?li=AA520r">mess</a> at the SABC even triggered scathing <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-05-anc-finally-wakes-up-to-rot-at-sabc/#.V8f_G5N95E4">criticism</a> from some within the ANC’s top leadership. </p>
<p>Institutions that guarantee the rule of law have suffered severely. The reputation of the National Prosecuting Authority, for example, has been <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-23-shaun-abrahams-shreds-the-npas-reputation">shredded</a> by its decision to appeal a high court ruling to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/13/jacob-zuma-corruption-charges-appeal">reinstate</a> the 783 corruption charges against President Zuma. </p>
<p>The charges were <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/5114220/Jacob-Zuma-charges-dropped.html">dropped</a> in suspicious circumstances in 2009. This paved the way for Zuma to become president. </p>
<p>Similarly, the Directorate for Priority Crime, <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/index.php">(known as the Hawks)</a>, has been used to create a narrative that would allow Zuma to replace Gordhan with someone from the patronage camp. University of Cape Town legal expert Cathleen Powell <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-finance-minister-is-vindicating-the-law-by-ignoring-police-unit-64535">argues</a> that the Hawks’ continuing attacks on Gordhan are “not only nonsensical, but are obviously nonsensical.” The Hawks, she says, are behaving in a way that “is blatantly outside their powers under law.”</p>
<p>This week, a new front has been opened against an institution most would have believed was beyond the reach of the patronage politicians. First, ANC Deputy Secretary-General Jessie Duarte <a href="http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2016/09/01/sarb-attack-shows-zuma-now-wants-control-over-everything-including-banks/?utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_source=Twitter&utm_term=Autofeed">questioned</a> the independence of the Reserve Bank saying that its private ownership posed a “difficulty”. Then, Mineral Resources Minister Mosebenzi Zwane <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-31-minister-zwane-wanted-sa-reserve-bank-role-changed-after-gupta-blacklisting-report/?utm_source=Daily+Maverick+First+Thing&utm_campaign=d307ff125e-First_Thing_1+September&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c81900545f-d307ff125e-128215025#.V8fGxJN95E4">suggested</a> to cabinet that the right to grant banking licenses be moved from the Reserve Bank to the National Treasury. The National Treasury has been a key <a href="http://www.fin24.com/BizNews/named-van-rooyens-two-gupta-advisors-who-almost-hijacked-sa-treasury-20160215">target for capture</a> because it controls the government purse.</p>
<p>From an economic perspective, the comments by Duarte and Zwane are obvious nonsense. The Reserve Bank’s independence is <a href="http://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/7449/Statement%20on%20recent%20comments%20by%20the%20ANC's%20Deputy%20Secretary%20General.pdf">enshrined in the constitution</a>. And the bank has been <a href="http://citizen.co.za/904541/the-sarb-steady-as-a-rock/">lauded</a> for its independence, for maintaining price stability and for ensuring the health of the banking sector. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136294/original/image-20160901-1048-bac1wj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC deputy secretary general Jessie
Duarte.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To suggest, as Zwane has, that National Treasury should conduct banking supervision is contrary to international best practices and would only weaken banking supervision in the country. Through the foolishness of their suggestions Duarte and Zwane reveal their true colours. Zwane has been <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2016/05/01/Gupta-minister-on-mission-impossible">linked</a> to the Guptas since his appointment as minerals and energy minister while Duarte’s <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/duarte-didnt-get-son-in-law-a-job-1985618">son-in-law</a> has been linked to the family.</p>
<p>The economic consequences of state capture are devastating for the economy. South Africa’s dysfunctional state owned enterprises, from South African Airways to the national power utility Eskom, are weighing heavily on the economy. In a recent <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/07/11/13/25/PR16322-South-Africa-IMF-Executive-Board-Concludes-2016-Article-IV-Consultation">evaluation</a> the IMF emphasised the need for South Africa “to improve SOE performance and strengthen their governance.” </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136296/original/image-20160901-1012-kttx12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Africa’s mining minister Mosebenzi Zwane.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Hutchings/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The parlous state of the state owned enterprises was amplified this week when Futuregrowth, Africa’s biggest private fixed-income manager, <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/2016/08/31/futuregrowth-will-stop-lending-to-six-state-owned-firms-including-eskom">announced</a> that it would no longer be lending money to any of them, including Eskom. </p>
<p>Losing the confidence of Futuregrowth and other institutional investors will significantly exacerbate the country’s economic woes. South Africa will not only lose access to much needed funding for infrastructure projects. It will also increase its chances of being alienating international investors as well as rating agencies. </p>
<p>This is something it can ill afford given its large and persistent <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-08/south-africa-current-account-gap-widens-to-5-1-as-exports-drop">current account deficit</a>. Without investment, and without its current sovereign rating, the country’s currency will plummet even further, exacerbating inflationary pressures.</p>
<p>There is, unfortunately, no quick fix to the current crisis. The only way of getting rid of patronage politicians is through a political process. A government needs checks and balances from a strong civil society. The ANC, it seems, has not understood the warning <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37161530">voters sent</a> during the last municipal election. Let’s hope it will understand the warning international investors are sending before the damage to the economy becomes irreversible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Co-Pierre Georg receives funding from the Volkswagen Foundation to study the spillovers of quantitative easing in industrialized countries on emerging markets. He consults to the South African Reserve Bank. He is affiliated with Economic Research Southern Africa, a non-partisan think tank that is funded by the National Treasury. He writes in his private capacity.</span></em></p>South Africa has reached a critical point. If patronage politicians win the battle within the ruling ANC and complete the capture of the state, the country will slip from stagnation into the abyss.Co-Pierre Georg, Senior Lecturer, African Institute for Financial Markets and Risk Management and Director, UCT Financial Innovation Lab, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/629882016-08-23T17:27:23Z2016-08-23T17:27:23ZThe watchdog over South Africa’s elite police unit is in serious need of teeth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134305/original/image-20160816-13007-1rdisja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's elite police unit, the Hawks, block a street during an operation.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Independent Media/Picture:Bhekikhaya Mabaso</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Organised crime emerged as a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.1999.9628018">threat</a> to the new South African state during the political transition from apartheid to democracy in the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.1999.9628018">1990s</a>. As such, the new government, led by the African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a>, was under pressure to address the growing problem.</p>
<p>During this transition period the then South African Police <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/">(SAP)</a> changed from a police “force” that bolstered the apartheid state to a democratic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.767094">“police service”</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the new <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/">South African Police Service</a> was not equipped to tackle organised crime. This prompted then-president Thabo Mbeki to launch a specialised law enforcement unit to investigate and prosecute serious organised crime. Launched in 1999, they were known as the <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/5028672">Scorpions</a>.</p>
<p>Ten years later the Scorpions were controversially dissolved and replaced by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, known colloquially as the <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/index.php">Hawks</a>. The move, linked to a multi-billion dollar <a href="http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/timeline-of-the-arms-deal/">arms deal scandal</a> which revealed systemic bribery and corruption that implicated top ANC politicians, pointed to the politicisation of law enforcement.</p>
<p>The establishment of the Hawks, as well as various oversight mechanisms, has failed to allay fears that the country’s security apparatus are being held to account. Shortcomings in one of the oversight bodies, the <a href="http://www.dpcijudge.gov.za/">Office of the Judge</a>, is of particular concern. </p>
<p>This much became obvious in a recent stand-off between Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and the Hawks regarding investigations into the alleged rogue unit at the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-02-26-gordhan-threatens-to-go-to-court-as-tensions-with-sars-ripple">South African Revenue Services</a>. </p>
<h2>Overseeing the police</h2>
<p>It was clear to the first post-apartheid government, headed by Nelson Mandela, that political influence would weaken specialised law enforcement institutions and undermine constitutional democracy. His government understood why powerful watchdogs were crucial. </p>
<p>In a bid to increase the legitimacy of the police, the government created oversight structures to hold them accountable. In 1997 the <a href="http://www.icd.gov.za/">Independent Police Investigative Directorate</a>, previously known as the <a href="http://www.icd.gov.za/">Independent Complaints Directorate</a>, was established to investigate serious complaints of abuse by the South African Police Service. </p>
<p>In 2010 another accountability mechanism for members of the <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/index.php">Hawks</a> was set up – the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation <a href="http://www.dpcijudge.gov.za/">Judge Complaints Unit</a>, also known as the Office of the Judge.</p>
<p>The police minister <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/legislation/acts/act68of1995.pdf">is mandated</a> to elect a retired judge to receive and investigate complaints from:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>any member of the public who can provide evidence of a serious and unlawful infringement of his or her rights caused by an investigation by the Hawks; or</p></li>
<li><p>any member of the Hawks who can provide evidence of any improper influence or interference, whether of a political or any other nature, exerted upon him or her regarding the conducting of an investigation.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>It was important to allow members of the public to lay complaints as the police service has struggled to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.767094">overcome its apartheid legacy</a>. Deputy police minister Makhotso Maggie Sotyu <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/police_mag/police_jan_2015.pdf">said as much</a> when she commented that the Office of the Judge was important for the South African Police Services to gain legitimacy in the eyes of society:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must create an environment in which the community can trust the police.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Apart from the presiding judge, the office has two investigators, a professional assistant and an administrator.</p>
<h2>New mechanism, old problem?</h2>
<p>The main criticism of the Office of the Judge is that it lacks the power to initiate investigations. Investigations only commence on <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/legislation/acts/act68of1995.pdf">“receipt of a complaint”</a>. This is unlike another watchdog, the Office of the <a href="http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/pubprotect.htm#.V7LLC0197IU">Public Protector</a>, which has the authority to take up cases based on complaints, as well as to initiate investigations itself. </p>
<p>The recent controversial stand-off between Gordhan and the Hawks about investigations into the so-called rogue unit at <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2016/05/15/Pravin-Gordhan-faces-imminent-arrest">South African Revenue Services</a> highlights the limitations of the judge’s lack of powers to initiate investigations.</p>
<p>Gordhan claimed that the Hawks were being used to <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2016/2016031501%20-%20HawksResponse.pdf">malign</a> him over events that took place under his watch as the former head of the revenue body. At the time he was trying to reestablish confidence in the National Treasury following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">“Nenegate scandal”</a> amid allegations it had been targeted for state capture with the help of President Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>In the absence of Gordhan laying a complaint, the judge’s hands were tied as he could not, off his own bat, investigate the minister’s claim. The fact that Gordhan did not complain to the Office of the Judge speaks volumes about the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gordhan-can-approach-hawks-watchdog-judge-20160315">lack of confidence in its effectiveness</a>. It also shows why it’s important that the office be able to initiate investigations.</p>
<p>Another problem is that the office receives too few complaints to be effective. Over the 2013-14 period it received only five complaints, one of which fell outside its mandate. </p>
<p>This may be due to the overlap between the mandate of the Office of the Judge and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate. As Judge Moosa said in an interview with the author in 2015:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There should be proper co-ordination and rationalisation between these structures in order to serve the public efficiently and effectively. The public should also be educated and informed of the mandate of these structures to empower them to lay complaints with the right institution.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Political interference and oversight</h2>
<p>There are other shortcomings too. The appointment process does not provide sufficient safeguards against political interference. The judge is appointed by the police minister in consultation with the justice minister and the <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/legislation/acts/act68of1995.pdf">chief justice</a>. It is not clear what form the consultation should take, nor how has veto power over whom.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.saps.gov.za/legislation/acts/act68of1995.pdf">SAPS Act</a> says the judge “shall report the outcome of any investigation undertaken by him or her or any referral to the minister”. This fails to clarify two important points that have an effect on the office’s functioning. </p>
<p>First, it is not clear how the results of the investigations will be determined. </p>
<p>Second, the judge has no powers to enforce findings and can only give the minister a report with recommendations. The inability to enforce its findings arguably makes the Office of the Judge a toothless oversight body. </p>
<p>The enabling act mandates the judge to report to parliament annually. Even though this may provide the opportunity for all political parties to debate the performance or non performance of the judge, they have no jurisdiction over the incumbent. </p>
<p>Another shortcoming is that the act does not specify the term of office for the judge. It also does not outline a procedure for the judge’s removal from office. This is highly disconcerting given the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-17-mcbride-dramat-pillay-claim-there-is-a-political-conspiracy">politicisation</a> of law enforcement in South Africa. </p>
<p>Specialised law enforcement agencies such as the Hawks are invaluable in the fight against serious organised crime and corruption. But it is just as important that they go about their work in ways that are above board. It is thus crucially important to address the shortcomings of the Office of the Judge so that it can effectively carry out its oversight role.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mafaro Kasipo receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The main criticism leveled at the body that oversees the work of South Africa’s elite police unit, the Hawks, is that it lacks the power to initiate investigations, making it ineffective.Mafaro Kasipo, PhD Candidate, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.