tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/nigeria-oil-25636/articlesNigeria oil – The Conversation2024-03-06T13:23:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245452024-03-06T13:23:20Z2024-03-06T13:23:20ZNigeria: botched economic reforms plunge the country into crisis<p>Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, is facing an economic crisis. From a botched currency redesign to the removal of fuel subsidies and a currency float, the nation has been plunged into spiralling inflation and a currency crisis with far-reaching consequences. The question now is: how long before the inferno consumes everything?</p>
<p>On October 26, 2022, the Central Bank of Nigeria announced a <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/breaking-buhari-unveils-redesigned-naira-notes">bold move</a> – that it had redesigned the country’s highest denomination notes (₦200, ₦500 and ₦1000) and would be removing all old notes from circulation. People were given a deadline of January 31, 2023 (a couple of weeks before a national election) to make this exchange, or all of the old notes would cease to be valid legal tender.</p>
<p>This initiative ostensibly aimed to curb counterfeiting, encourage cashless transactions, and limit the buying of votes during the elections. But, while the intention may have been sound, the execution proved disastrous. </p>
<p>Short deadlines, limited availability of new notes, and inadequate communication created widespread panic. It led to long queues at banks, frustration among citizens, and a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/01/18/why-nigeria-s-controversial-naira-redesign-policy-hasn-t-met-its-objectives-pub-91405">thriving black market</a> for the new notes. </p>
<p>The confusion surrounding the currency redesign had an unintended consequence: the beginnings of a loss of confidence in the naira. People began to look to other mediums as a store of value and as a medium of exchange. The obvious choices were foreign currency like the US dollar and the British pound, as well as more stable cryptocurrencies like <a href="https://businessday.ng/business-economy/article/weak-naira-cross-border-payments-drive-nigerians-into-cryptos/">Tether’s USDT</a>.</p>
<p>The currency redesign was criticised at the time by the then-presidential candidate of the ruling party, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who saw it as a move to <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/01/2023-fuel-scarcity-naira-redesign-ploy-to-sabotage-my-chances-tinubu/">derail his presidential campaign</a>. However, Tinubu won the contested election and, once in power, set out to reshape the economy immediately. </p>
<p>In his inaugural address in May 2023, Tinubu <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/601239-fuel-subsidy-is-gone-tinubu-declares.html">announced</a> that the “fuel subsidy is gone”, referring to the government’s longstanding subsidised petrol policy that ensured Nigerians enjoyed some of the lowest petrol prices in the world. Over the coming days, he would also announce the reversal of the currency redesign policy and the <a href="https://leadership.ng/tinubu-begins-monetary-policy-reforms-floats-naira/">floating of the Nigerian naira</a> on the foreign exchange market.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A compilation of Nigerian naira bank notes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579202/original/file-20240301-28-sej1lc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">When in office, Tinubu reversed the currency redesign policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/naira-currency-nigeria-200751113">Pavel Shlykov/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Fuelling the flames</h2>
<p>Other underlying economic conditions around the time of Tinubu’s inauguration included a large amount of foreign debt, dwindling foreign reserves and global economic headwinds. When the removal of the fuel subsidy was announced, it was met with a mix of surprise and elation by many Nigerians, and in particular by international donor agencies like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, who had long been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/nigeria-should-end-fuel-subsidy-speed-reforms-boost-growth-world-bank-says-2021-11-23/">advocating</a> for the removal.</p>
<p>But this was all before the effects began to bite. And bite hard they did. The price of Premium Motor Spirit (also known as gasoline or petrol), which used to retail for ₦189 (US$0.12) per litre, increased by 196% practically overnight and began to retail for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-triple-petrol-prices-after-president-says-subsidy-end-2023-05-31/">₦557 per litre</a>. </p>
<p>One challenge with developing economies like Nigeria is that a rise in fuel price tends to cause the price of everything else to rise. Many industries, particularly those in manufacturing and agriculture, tend to rely heavily on fuel for powering machinery and equipment due to the poor supply of grid electricity nationwide.</p>
<p>Many Nigerian households were significantly affected by the increased prices. But they saw an opportunity in that the savings from the fuel subsidy regime would be redistributed to improve education, healthcare provision and the general welfare of the people, as was promised during the electioneering. The regime cost the country an estimated <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/582724-fuel-subsidy-now-above-n400bn-monthly-nnpcl.html">₦400 billion</a> a month at its height, after all. </p>
<h2>Enter currency devaluation</h2>
<p>Then, on June 14, 2023, the Tinubu government ended the policy of pegging the naira to the US dollar, allowing it to float and find its true market value based on supply and demand. The idea was to stop corruption and reduce arbitrage opportunities due to the difference between official and black-market foreign exchange prices. </p>
<p>Currency arbitrage happens when people buy a currency at the lower official exchange rate and immediately sell it at the higher black market rate for a profit. This practice often occurs where there are strict currency controls and black markets offer a truer reflection of a currency’s value based on supply and demand.</p>
<p>However, this was one policy change too many. The naira lost a staggering <a href="https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/nigeria/news/exchange-rate/central-bank-sets-the-naira-free-to-fall/">25% of its value</a> in one day, and the cascading effects now push the country to the brink.</p>
<p>Nigeria depends heavily on imported commodities, including essential goods like food, fuel and medicine. So the policy escalated the inflationary crisis, pushing inflation to almost 30% (the major driver being food inflation, which <a href="https://leadership.ng/food-headline-inflation-spike-to-35-4-29-9/">reached 35.4%</a>). </p>
<p>Imports in general have become significantly more expensive, and Nigerians are finding their purchasing power being eroded. Wages in Nigeria are pretty fixed. The current minimum wage in the country is <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119133/monthly-minimum-wage-in-nigeria/">₦30,000</a> per month and the average monthly income is <a href="https://wagecentre.com/work/work-in-africa/salary-in-nigeria">₦71,185</a>. </p>
<p>Businesses are also feeling the pinch, facing difficulties accessing the <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-market-challenges">foreign exchange</a> critical for importing raw materials and equipment. </p>
<h2>Pheonix or ash?</h2>
<p>The Central Bank of Nigeria has implemented measures to counter the crisis. It recently raised interest rates from <a href="https://punchng.com/just-in-cbn-raises-interest-rate-to-22-75/">18.75% to 22.75%</a> and is selling US dollars through auctions. </p>
<p>Recovery is a possibility and there are already signs of appreciation in the currency. The <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/naira-records-first-gain-at-official-market-after-rate-hike/">naira appreciated</a> by 6.89% a day after interest rates were raised. But it will be a long, hard road. </p>
<p>These strategies often come with trade-offs. Higher interest rates can stifle already struggling economic growth, while currency interventions might deplete already strained reserves of foreign currency. </p>
<p>The bottom line is that if the current cost of living crisis continues, civil unrest is likely. Should this happen, who knows what – if anything – will be left behind when the flames are done.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kunal Sen has received funding from ESRC and DFID. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chisom Ubabukoh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s largest economy is in crisis, and unrest is growing.Chisom Ubabukoh, Assistant Professor of Economics, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityKunal Sen, Professor and Director, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056852023-05-22T14:55:29Z2023-05-22T14:55:29ZDangote launches Africa’s biggest oil refinery - 4 ways it will affect Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527542/original/file-20230522-12563-92jqzl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Aliko Dangote</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Daniel Irungu</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s new <a href="https://www.dangote.com/our-business/oil-and-gas/">Dangote petroleum refinery</a> is Africa’s biggest – it will produce 650,000 barrels a day, giving it the potential to address the country’s energy supply crisis. First product from the refinery is expected to hit the market by the end of <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/05/22/refinerys-first-product-to-hit-market-by-end-of-july-dangote/">July 2023</a>.</p>
<p>Owned by Nigerian industrialist and Africa’s richest man, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/?sh=2f3d9d7222fc">Aliko Dangote</a>, the refinery is expected to boost domestic refining capacity, getting rid of the current consumption shortfall. It will also reduce import dependency and stimulate economic growth.</p>
<p>It is the <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2016/06/24/dangote-set-to-launch-nigerias-first-private-refinery/">first</a> privately owned crude oil refinery in Nigeria. Nigeria’s existing refineries, plagued by operational inefficiencies under government control, have failed to meet the growing demand for petroleum products. Substantial imports have become necessary.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1659932605167419393"}"></div></p>
<p>Nigeria currently imports more than <a href="https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/nigerias-refining-revolution.pdf#page=3">80%</a> of its refined petroleum products. The country is the <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/refined-petroleum">largest importer</a> of refined petroleum products in Africa. Local production will therefore massively cut the country’s import bill.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2023/CCD/Governor's%20Goodwill_Remarks%20at%20the%20Commissioning%20of%20the%20Dangote%20Refinery_May%202023.pdf#page=13">Central Bank of Nigeria</a>, the cost (including freight) of petroleum products imports into Nigeria doubled over a five-year period from about US$8.4 billion in 2017 to US$16.2 billion (indicating an annual average of US$11.1 billion), before rising further to US$23.3 billion by end-2022. </p>
<p>The central bank says the average annual cost of petroleum products imports to Nigeria could reach <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2023/CCD/Governor's%20Goodwill_Remarks%20at%20the%20Commissioning%20of%20the%20Dangote%20Refinery_May%202023.pdf#page=14">US$30 billion </a> by 2027 if the country continues to rely on petroleum imports. </p>
<p>This money can now potentially be saved with Dangote refinery plugging the supply shortfall. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/12269328.2015.1083486">previous research</a>, I have found that there is a link between Nigeria’s crude oil export dependency and its weak local refining capacity. This is also the case with Mexico, which exports its crude abroad for processing. </p>
<p>Based on my experience in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-fuel-crisis-smaller-more-flexible-refineries-arent-the-full-answer-178043">sector</a>, I set out the four areas where the Dangote refinery is expected to make an impact on Nigeria’s petroleum sector and, by extension, the Nigerian economy. </p>
<h2>Reduced oil import dependence</h2>
<p>The most notable impact of Dangote refinery will be the increase in local refinery capacity, which will reduce imports.</p>
<p>Dangote refinery is expected to help Nigeria meet <a href="https://dangote.com/our-business/oil-and-gas/">100%</a> of it’s refined petroleum product needs (gasoline, 72 million litres per day; diesel, 34 million litres per day; kerosene, 10 million litres per day and aviation jet, 2 million litres per day), with surplus products for the export market. </p>
<p>The refined petroleum output from the refinery in combination with other refineries in Nigeria is expected to meet the shortfall of the estimated daily consumption of <a href="https://punchng.com/daily-fuel-consumption-jumps-to-72-million-litres-subsidy-hits-n541-66bn/#:%7E:text=Petrol%20consumption%20in%20the%20country,in%20the%20month%20of%20April.">72 million litres</a> of petrol.</p>
<p>The country has faced <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/2/shortages-causing-fury-among-nigerians-ahead-of-elections">several fuel shortages</a> in the past, which have caused <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/517393-nigerias-inflation-rises-to-15-70-as-fuel-scarcity-affects-prices.html?tztc=1">prices to surge</a> for transport and basic commodities. </p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-nigeria-2ff43cdc2014832e54255db54b89125b">Recent fuel shortages</a> have been blamed on the Russia-Ukraine war. The price of imported fuel rose more than 100%. Importers operated at a loss due to price ceilings set by the government. </p>
<p>Besides eliminating import dependency, the Dangote refinery can potentially reduce Nigeria’s crude oil export dependency as more crude oil will be refined domestically. </p>
<p>Refining crude oil locally will enable the country pay for the refined product in naira which will save scarce foreign exchange and generate revenue in exported refined petroleum products. </p>
<p>The Central Bank of Nigeria says Dangote refinery could engender foreign exchange savings of between <a href="https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2023/CCD/Governor's%20Goodwill_Remarks%20at%20the%20Commissioning%20of%20the%20Dangote%20Refinery_May%202023.pdf#page=14">US$25 billion and US$30 billion</a> annually for Nigeria.</p>
<h2>Support for allied industries</h2>
<p>The establishment of the refinery is also likely to help reduce the cost of production for industries that <a href="https://businessday.ng/energy/oilandgas/article/fresh-pain-for-manufacturers-as-diesel-tankers-face-supply-hitches/">rely on petroleum products</a> such as diesel to power their operations. In turn, this should increase their competitiveness in the global market while promoting local industry capabilities. </p>
<p>The refinery could also create an environment for allied industries to emerge in and around it. For instance, businesses in transport, housing and telecommunications will benefit from the construction and operations of the refinery. </p>
<p>And the refinery should create jobs and entrepreneurship opportunities.</p>
<p>While under construction, the refinery employed about <a href="https://www.dangote.com/57000-personnel-to-benefit-from-work-at-refinery-site-says-dangote/">40,000 workers</a> – 29,000 Nigerians and 11,000 foreigners. </p>
<p>The jobs were in engineering, construction, manufacturing and operations, among other areas. </p>
<p>In full operation, the refinery, according to media reports, is expected to create over <a href="https://guardian.ng/business-services/dangote-refinery-to-create-250000-jobs/">250,000</a> direct and indirect jobs. I believe this is a fair estimate.</p>
<p>The country’s current unemployment rate is expected to reach <a href="https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2023/03/kpmg-global-economic-outlook-h1-2023-report.pdf#page=48">40.6%</a> in 2023.</p>
<h2>Possible increase in carbon footprint</h2>
<p>The operation of Dangote refinery raises concerns about its potential impact on Nigeria’s net zero emission goals. Net zero is an ideal state where the amount of greenhouse gas emissions produced and greenhouse gas emissions taken out of the atmosphere is balanced. </p>
<p>Decarbonisation efforts are required for countries to achieve net zero but the path and time might differ as countries may want to take a gas-led approach to transition to renewable energy. </p>
<p>At the COP26 climate change meeting in 2021, President Muhammadu Buhari <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/nigeria/net-zero-targets/#:%7E:text=At%20COP26%2C%20President%20Buhari%20committed,gases%20except%20NF3%20(Article)">committed</a> to net-zero emissions by 2060. This is to protect Nigeria’s environment and ecosystem from the impact of climate change and reduce the country’s greenhouse gas emissions. </p>
<p>Nigeria has an <a href="https://energytransition.gov.ng/">Energy Transition Plan</a> to get closer to a more sustainable economy. The plan assumes greater use of natural gas as a “<a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/08/natural-gas-energy-transition-fuel-for-nigeria-fg/">transition fuel</a>”.</p>
<p>Oil refineries contribute about <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fceng.2022.804163/full">4%</a> of the global carbon emissions. </p>
<p>The Dangote refinery <a href="https://pshan.org/dangote-refinery-set-to-be-commissioned/">complies</a> with World Bank, US, European and Nigerian norms for emissions and effluents.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>The Dangote refinery is a significant step towards self-sufficiency in Nigeria’s energy sector. </p>
<p>However, the refinery is still reliant on fossil fuels, and it is not a long term solution to Nigeria’s energy needs. </p>
<p>Nigeria has significant <a href="https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/26194">renewable energy potential</a>, including solar and wind power.</p>
<p>Renewable energy can be harnessed to meet Nigeria’s energy needs in a sustainable manner. Therefore, Dangote refinery should be viewed as a stepping stone towards a transition to cleaner energy sources in the medium term. </p>
<p>It is essential that Nigeria continues to invest in renewable energy and explore ways to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels to achieve its net zero emissions goal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nnaemeka Vincent Emodi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dangote refinery will reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported petroleum products and create jobs. But it may not be the best for the environment.Nnaemeka Vincent Emodi, Research Fellow, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883792022-11-20T06:33:12Z2022-11-20T06:33:12ZTreatment of wastewater in Nigeria’s oil fields is failing, raising the risk of health hazards<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495843/original/file-20221117-25-et3y9r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stefan Heunis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People need both clean, safe water and sustainable energy. That means both resources must be properly managed. But when it comes to the oil and gas industries, there’s a problem. </p>
<p>The water that comes out of the ground along with oil and gas during <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030438940900778X?via%3Dihub">oil and gas exploration and production operations</a> is anything but clean. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494261/original/file-20221108-9155-r7iqhb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Oil Well Structure.</span>
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</figure>
<p>This wastewater, known as “produced water”, is often heavily contaminated with salt, oil and grease, as well as potentially dangerous compounds. Some are linked to lung, skin and bladder cancer in humans. These compounds can also harm or kill aquatic life.</p>
<p>So, the act of producing energy compromises another key element of human and environmental health: water. This won’t change any time soon. <a href="https://producedwatersociety.com/chart-data/">The Produced Water Society</a>, made up of oil and gas professionals focused on water quality, forecasts a doubling in produced water volumes globally over the next ten years. </p>
<p>Adequate wastewater treatment systems are crucial to ensure that produced water does less damage. Proper treatment means the water can be recycled and reused for irrigation, livestock and in other industries. In this way, it won’t be entirely wasted and humans will be far safer. </p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.epa.gov/eg/final-report-oil-and-gas-extraction-wastewater-management">global standards</a> for such systems. But in oil rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa – such as <a href="http://www.ijsei.com/archive-55116.htm">Nigeria</a> – there is little to no adherence to such standards. <a href="http://www.ijsei.com/archive-55116.htm">Studies</a> show, too, that most of the treatment systems are tailor-made for the removal of a few families of compounds, in order to achieve the specific treatment objectives of each production site in this region. </p>
<p>In recent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096249522000308#bib24">research</a>, we studied samples of produced water from an oilfield in Warri, in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region. The samples were examined before and after treatment. Our findings were troubling: dangerous compounds were present at far higher levels than permitted by global standards. The treatment process wasn’t robust enough to filter everything out.</p>
<h2>Damage done</h2>
<p>The Niger Delta region produces some 2 million barrels (320,000 cubic metres) of oil a day and has always accounted for more than 75% of Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/11/24/nigerias-petroleum-industry-act-addressing-old-problems-creating-new-ones/">export earnings</a>. Together oil and natural gas extraction comprise 97% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange revenues, 80% of government’s annual revenue and 70% of budgetary expenditure. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=872&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=872&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494435/original/file-20221109-16-dp5j38.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=872&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Map of Nigerian Niger Delta showing some oil fields and pipelines.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But despite the fact that the oil industry has contributed significantly to the nation’s prosperity, the producing regions have suffered severe environmental damage. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-delta-young-men-face-exclusion-and-violence-in-one-of-the-most-polluted-places-on-earth-142109">people who live there</a> have been subjected to untold <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-oil-and-water-create-a-complex-conflict-in-the-niger-delta-135105">hardship</a> through oil pollution, environmental degradation, destruction of aquatic life, and other negative activities as a result of unhealthy extraction and treatment of oilfield waste.</p>
<p>A number of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468227620301988">studies</a> have reported various effects of exposure to heavy metals and organic pollutants from produced water discharge. There have been numerous anecdotal reports of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0013935121000190">health complications</a> that are attributed to oil and gas operations in this region.</p>
<p>Most <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351020228_Evaluation_of_Matured_Oil_Field_Rim_through_Fluid_Contacts_Movement">reservoirs in the Niger Delta oil fields</a> are in a mature stage of their productive life. This means they tend to produce less oil and more water. So they could discharge more toxic contaminants into the environment, doing more ecological harm.</p>
<p>There are no regulatory guidelines to guarantee that an increase in produced water does not cause additional environmental and health hazards. There is also very little data available about the quality of existing produced water. Without this sort of information, it’s impossible to scientifically evaluate the risks and potentially negative effects of produced water in the region. That’s what prompted our research.</p>
<h2>Worrying findings</h2>
<p>We took samples of untreated and treated produced water from an onshore operational production facility situated at Warri, Delta State in accordance with <a href="https://www.iea.org/policies/8676-environmental-guidelines-and-standards-for-the-petroleum-industry-in-nigeria-egaspin">Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industries in Nigeria</a>. Then we analysed levels of heavy metals, organic compounds and aromatic compounds in the water. </p>
<p>The comparison of the concentration with allowable discharge standards showed that produced water contained several different contaminants with varying concentrations before and after treatment as a result of inadequate treatment from the treatment facility. </p>
<p>One worrying finding was that phenol discharge was four times greater than the globally set limit. Phenols are aromatic compounds that act as carcinogens in the human body; even at low concentrations they can damage red blood cells and the liver. They’re also potentially deadly for aquatic creatures. </p>
<p>Heavy metals like iron and nickel were also present in far higher quantities than global allowable limits of discharge. That poses a serious threat to the aquatic environment and agricultural resources, which in turn affects the livelihoods of people in the Niger Delta region. </p>
<p>Additional findings indicate that the treatment technology mainly focused on just one group of hazardous components and was specific to each production site. </p>
<p>Operational discharges from the oilfield remain a public concern because contaminants continue to flow into the sea, creeks and farmlands from many widely dispersed sources. </p>
<p>The solution in the Niger Delta Region could be to apply integrated water treatment processes that address a variety of pollutants.</p>
<p>Environmental bodies should collaborate, as they do in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, to ensure that produced water in Nigeria is properly managed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kingsley Amakiri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Adequate wastewater treatment systems are crucial to ensure that wastewater from the oil industry does less damage.Kingsley Amakiri, Postdoctoral researcher, University of HuddersfieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1469432020-10-01T14:41:05Z2020-10-01T14:41:05ZNigeria is still struggling at 60. But hope is still alive<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361095/original/file-20201001-24-1r8ru5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sixty years after independence, Nigeria has yet to achieve its potential</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s population is <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/">estimated at over 200 million</a>, which means the country has skilled and unskilled labour in abundance. The population also makes it a fertile ground for global trade. Nigeria is also rich in mineral resources. It is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest, and the world’s 13th largest, producer and exporter of oil.</p>
<p>These endowments should have made Nigeria one of the key destinations for global investment. And with its wealth in <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm">petroleum and natural resources</a> as well as its vast agricultural potential, Nigeria should have by now become Africa’s undisputed economic giant.</p>
<p>However, 60 years after independence, Nigeria, like a vehicle struggling to climb a hilly road, has yet to achieve its potential. Its large population has thus become a source of weakness, not strength.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1892237/nigerias-unemployment-rate-tripled-in-five-years/#:%7E:text=While%20Nigeria's%20unemployment%20rate%20has,%E2%80%94has%20increased%20to%2028.6%25.">mass unemployment</a> and overstretching of <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Menace-of-Inadequate-Infrastructure-in-Nigeria-Akinwale/0cc821d9d6407f6cc2a403a5a8dc62769d1bc012">inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure</a>, many Nigerians have had to seek their fortunes abroad.</p>
<p>Smaller nations such as Ghana, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are beginning to catch up. At the same time big corporations from industrialised and wealthy countries in Europe and South Asia find the Nigerian business climate inauspicious. That’s largely due to decaying infrastructure, corruption and insecurity. Big European corporations have over the years shut down or <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/General/Why-companies-will-continue-to-leave-Nigeria-for-Ghana-/7324#">relocated</a> their Nigerian manufacturing plants. They point to a lack of stable electricity supply and endemic corruption, both of which impede their smooth operations.</p>
<h2>There was a giant</h2>
<p>At independence, all eyes were on the most populous black country on earth. For good reason. Nigerians were high flyers in intellectual and educational endeavours, business, international diplomacy, and in military and political leadership. In continental leadership, only Ghana rivalled Nigeria just before independence. When <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a coup</a>, attention shifted to <a href="https://www.thejournalist.org.za/pioneers/nnamdi-azikiwe-african-philosopher-scholar-and-eminent-journalist/">Nnamdi Azikiwe</a>, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261949131_Obafemi_Awolowo_and_the_Making_of_Remo_The_local_politics_of_a_Nigerian_Nationalist">Obafemi Awolowo</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-137-56686-7_8">Ahmadu Bello</a> – Nigerian political leaders who were also great leaders of thought.</p>
<p>Nigeria <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/02/1002901">provided leadership and enormous support</a> to the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Congo and other countries. It <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6432757/Visibility_and_Relevance_in_International_Politics_National_Role_Conceptions_and_Nigerias_Foreign_Policy_in_Africa">led the movement</a> for the end to apartheid rule in Southern African countries, including South Africa, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It supported other liberation movements, including those of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria’s influence in the <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Organization%20of%20the%20Petroleum,Kuwait%2C%20Saudi%20Arabia%20and%20Venezuela.">Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</a> was so monumental that it rose to the leadership for decades. The country’s <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3256/1/Folarin%2017.pdf">economic muscle</a> made it more politically relevant in Africa and by the mid-1980s, its voice was always sought on resolution of intra-state conflicts. The African Union and Economic Community of West African States <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3256/1/Folarin%2017.pdf">regarded the country as their livewire</a> – and to some extent, they still do. </p>
<h2>The fall</h2>
<p>The journalist and author Karl Maier, in his classic, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/This-House-Fallen-Karl-Maier/dp/0813340454">“This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis”</a>, cites a litany of problems as remote causes of the fall of Nigeria. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>succession of failed administrations;</p></li>
<li><p>political instability; </p></li>
<li><p>structural adjustment programme (which destroyed the local economy);</p></li>
<li><p>moral bankruptcy in public institutions; </p></li>
<li><p>military misadventure up to 1993; </p></li>
<li><p>the season of anomie occasioned by the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections and the international backlash; and</p></li>
<li><p>religious and ethnic bigotry. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Nigerian scholar Eghosa Osaghae, author of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318530057_Crippled_Giant_Nigeria_Since_Independence">“Crippled Giant”</a>, agrees with Maier. He also identifies immediate triggers of state failure which include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the growing rot in public bureaucracy;</p></li>
<li><p>sleaze in the oil sector and overdependence on oil revenue; </p></li>
<li><p>public office allure – which has attracted more thieves and charlatans to politics; </p></li>
<li><p>the ceaseless plunder of the national treasury; and </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of public accountability.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A lack of commitment by leaders and the people to the Nigerian project – a united, stable, developed and prosperous country – and flooding of the polity with hard-line ethnic or proto-nationalists in a country of over 250 groups – will inexorably land the country in destruction.</p>
<p>Then there is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/nigeria">insecurity</a>, which, for the past 10 years, has been intractable. Insecurity refers to the absence of internal stability or safety and a state of vulnerability to internal danger and threats. Insecurity arises from a weak and compromised national security architecture, which has been one of the stumbling blocks to Nigeria’s realisation of its development potential. </p>
<p>Put differently, while several other factors have combined over the decades to hold Nigeria down, the horrific state of security in the past 10 years has weakened the fabric of the state. </p>
<p>Our <a href="http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-96137766-d334-424d-aeb5-4e531d5af8a0?q=9cb9f82d-7d61-47a2-add6-287e53cbe2ae$2&qt=IN_PAGE">study</a> shows that the frequency of insurgent attacks has resulted in collateral damage to the peace, stability, development and sovereignty of Nigeria. We also discovered that the present government has not been decisive enough in tackling insecurity.</p>
<p>The overused and poorly trained military is becoming less fit to fight Boko Haram, secure the borders or sustain the country’s previously enviable image. The police secures little or nothing, is corrupt and inefficient and has become a big burden to the state. Ordinary citizens resort to legitimate self-help or criminal ways to survive. At home and abroad. No one cares. The image problem soars.</p>
<p>Can Nigeria reverse the decline and spring up again?</p>
<h2>‘Happily ever after’ is possible</h2>
<p>“No condition is permanent,” scream inscriptions on many commercial vehicles on the streets of Lagos. </p>
<p>So, change is possible. But first, there has to be a mental and moral reorientation. Who will start it? If the government is irresponsibly disconnected from its role, civil society organisations should take up the task. Religious organisations with their massive and committed followers have a role to play in reorientation and rebirth.</p>
<p>Closely following this will be a social revolution. This will flow from a reborn mind. Mental reorientation produces a decent moral consciousness and when it is on a massive scale, society will change. </p>
<p>For its part, government has to truly commit to fight corruption. Corruption has <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/8519/1/Untitled%204.pdf">bled Nigeria</a> to a near-death. It could <a href="https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/press-room/impact-of-corruption-on-nigeria-s-economy.html">cost up to 37% of gross domestic product</a> by 2030 if not dealt with immediately. </p>
<p>When honesty is rewarded and corrupt acts are publicly punished, more Nigerians will more likely embrace honesty in their endeavours. Government should purge itself of corrupt elements and prosecute those found culpable. This internal purge will not only show commitment and the will to fight corruption, but will also serve as a deterrent to others across the country. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>A <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3242/1/Dr%20Edewor.pdf">paper</a> I coauthored argues that national integration and its benefits can be realised only with the development and entrenchment of a supportive public culture. Nigerians must understand, respect and tolerate differences occasioned by socio-cultural diversity and also develop new institutions and mechanisms that address poverty, revenue allocation and other national issues peacefully.</p>
<p>Nigeria can transform its potential into success. With a huge population, its citizens can be mobilised and empowered to engage in manufacturing as China, Singapore and South Korea have done. This will change the society from a consuming country to a powerhouse in manufacturing and exportation. </p>
<p>At 60, Nigeria should not be groping in the dark. There have been numerous wasted opportunities, no doubt, but it takes just a right turn at any second for a vehicle in the middle of nowhere to find its bearing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sheriff Folarin receives funding from US Dept of State, Carnegie. </span></em></p>Sixty years after political independence, it is clear that Nigeria has not fulfilled its huge potential, but with a supportive public culture it can transform that into success.Sheriff Folarin, Professor of International Relations, Covenant UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1436422020-08-10T12:59:47Z2020-08-10T12:59:47ZHow young people in the Niger Delta are being left out of development<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351592/original/file-20200806-16-153omon.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people's lives in Niger Delta have not improved despite the setting up of development agencies </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ijaw-youths-beat-drums-in-kaiama-16-may-2005-during-a-news-photo/52857803?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twenty years ago, local resistance arose in the Niger Delta because of the way oil revenue was being shared and how <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-depleting-fish-stocks-may-pose-a-threat-to-regional-security-105168">oil pollution</a> was undermining local livelihoods.</p>
<p>Young people helped bring development agencies to the region through their <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hl1tCDEHADI">activism for social justice</a>. The government eventually created the <a href="https://www.nddc.gov.ng/">Niger Delta Development Commission </a>(NDDC) to bring development closer to the region in response to local demands. Local people welcomed it with a renewed sense of belonging within the national community. But now, 20 years later, <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-delta-young-men-face-exclusion-and-violence-in-one-of-the-most-polluted-places-on-earth-142109">they have been left behind in regional development</a>and young people’s lives, in particular, have not improved. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14725843.2014.885779?needAccess=true">Local elites have hijacked</a> the Commission, and the agency is seriously under-performing. But these elites claim that’s the fault of <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202007190015.html">national-level politicians</a> who take a larger slice of the NDDC contracts. Since inception, the commission has received <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202007190015.html">$40 billion</a> to invest in development projects. These include road construction, health care, education and job creation. But there is very little on the ground to account for this money. </p>
<p>Contracts are often inflated. Projects get abandoned. And shoddiness is normal. Young people will have to live with the fallout. They are already suffering the impact of political corruption, because the money that should have been used to improve their lives has simply disappeared. </p>
<p>Unlike many young people, local leaders live a life of luxury. </p>
<p>Similarly the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-amnesty-efforts-in-the-niger-delta-triggered-new-violence-74085">Amnesty Programme</a>, implemented more recently to end violence in the Niger Delta and benefit young people, has been hijacked by elites and local politicians. Funds meant for youth development projects are often <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342919662_CORRUPTION_NATIONAL_SECURITY_AND_AMNESTY_PROGRAMME_IN_THE_NIGER_DELTA_REGION_NIGERIA_FROM_2009-2019">embezzled</a>. Inflated contracts are awarded to the elite youths, and while the youths who enrolled as ‘ex-militants’ get monthly cash payments, their non-violent counterparts have nothing. </p>
<p>But this is not the whole story, as my <a href="https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.798710">research</a> reveals. I wanted to understand young people’s perspectives of violence in the Niger delta, and to compare their perspectives with the explanations of institutional leaders. This comparison helped me to produce an analysis of youth violence that locates young people’s experiences within the institutional structures that contours their lives.</p>
<h2>Research findings</h2>
<p>My research found that while the local leaders undermine young people’s well-being through political corruption, they conceal their complicity, and maintain this inequality, through the way they explain youth violence. In sociological terms, these explanations are called doxa – meaning assumptions about people and explanations about reality which are popular, but not always true, and which reproduce exclusion. While direct violence in the form of deaths and bodily harm has declined in the Niger Delta because of the Amnesty programme, indirect violence in the form of exclusion has continued. </p>
<p>Local leaders explained that young people embrace violence because they are lazy and unwilling to work. ‘These youths are lazy, they think they have oil so if you give them job they don’t want it, just militancy’ an official from the Niger Delta Development Commission told me. This presents local leaders as hardworking people deserving of their wealth, while portraying young people as the lazy, undeserving poor. Attributing youth violence to laziness ignores the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Unemployment-Rates-by-States-in-the-Niger-Delta_tbl2_284047257">high unemployment rate</a> in the Niger Delta. It also absolves the local leaders from failing to create jobs. </p>
<p>Local leaders also said youth violence occurs because young people are deviants and always ready to fight. ‘After taking Igbo (weed) and alcohol they want to fight everybody.’ ‘They are yahoo-yahoo (cyber fraud) boys, always clubbing.’ These are some of the common portrayals of young people by institutional leaders. </p>
<p>I visited many clubs for my research in the Niger Delta and saw young people laughing, dancing, sharing liquor and discussing plans on how ‘to leave this nonsense country’, as one of my respondents put it. Clubs serve as a space of solidarity for young people in a world where they feel left behind, and social drinking is their way of escaping boredom and the many frustrations of their daily life. </p>
<p>A director at the Commission said young people are incapable of good leadership while older people are wiser, and therefore better leaders. He was responding to my question about what he thinks of young people’s complaints that old people dominate leadership positions within development agencies, and this was a typical response. The idea that older people are better leaders legitimises the political domination of the older generation. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>By portraying young people as lazy, unwise and deviant, local leaders preserve their political, economic and social power and maintain their domination over young people. </p>
<p>It is not accidental that young people are the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03056240701819517?casa_token=678Thx7p9fAAAAAA:zThAhjSJ9p5OSO1MNWohJ1QXNashLaaIeD1lPsKaLYNjLaKu4qvZdWTgcs1x94E8LCSAQBWsQGo">main perpetrators</a> of violence in the Niger Delta, because <a href="https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.798710">many of them feel</a> that Nigeria does not work for them. Hence, they use violence to get by in life. Yet by using violence, young people also undermine the very development they yearn to have. Violence leads to the loss of lives and destruction of valuable assets, which slows down development. </p>
<p>To address youth violence in the Niger Delta, it’s necessary to demand accountability from institutions and to challenge the common ideas used to exclude young people from the development process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143642/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Modesta Tochukwu Alozie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young people’s lives in the Niger Delta have not improved because development agencies have been hijacked by local leadersModesta Tochukwu Alozie, Researcher at the Urban Insititute, University of Sheffield, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1351052020-04-21T13:35:24Z2020-04-21T13:35:24ZHow oil and water create a complex conflict in the Niger Delta<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/328361/original/file-20200416-192762-mj1am2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oil smeared fishboats on oily mud in the river during low tide at K-Dere, near Bodo in the Niger Delta region </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-february-20-2019-shows-oil-smeared-news-photo/1126236353?adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the Niger Delta’s coastal communities, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/04/niger-delta-oil-spill-clean-up-un">oil pollution</a> of the marine environment has depleted the fishing and water resources that people have traditionally depended on for their livelihoods. This has led to a complex pattern of conflicts in the region since the late 1990s. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/bad-information-oil-spill-investigations-in-the-niger-delta/">Oil spills</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/gas-flaring-continues-scorching-niger-delta/a-46088235">gas flaring</a>, and other activities of oil companies have led to massive degradation of land and marine resources. <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/dossier/eco-crimes-shell-and-the-niger-delta/the-hidden-cost-of-shell-oil-spill-in-niger-delta/">Environmentalists</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/nov/06/niger-delta-oil-spills-linked-infant-deaths">scientists</a> have provided varying estimates of the magnitude and frequency of oil spills in the region. </p>
<p>Local people blame the oil multinationals and the Nigerian government for the environmental degradation, and feel they have not been properly compensated for its impact. Communities have also developed conflicts within and between themselves over these issues.</p>
<p>The Nigerian government has failed to compel oil multinationals to adhere to local environmental protection regulations. This is not surprising since the government benefits from oil revenue, the <a href="https://home.kpmg/ng/en/home/insights/2019/04/Nigerian-Oil-and-Gas-Update.html">mainstay</a> of the Nigerian economy. But the damage to the natural environment has exposed the region’s people to poverty. The high rate of poverty in the Niger Delta in contrast to the enormous oil wealth has been clearly depicted in the 2015 United Nations’ <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_national_human_development_report_for_nigeria.pdf">Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index</a>. Oil-related activities have also damaged sources of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4491722018ENGLISH.pdf">clean water</a>. This has fuelled conflict over the limited available resources. </p>
<p>The actions of aggrieved locals – including <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/attacks-on-oil-facilities-in-niger-delta-threaten-spdc-jv-assets/">attacks</a> on oil facilities and <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Oil-Pipeline-Vandalism-In-Nigeria-Soars-77.html">pipeline vandalism</a> – have made the situation even worse. </p>
<p>And there’s another dimension: the complicity of local elites and elders. Their quest for monetary gain through oil benefits, including contracts to clean up oil spills and monitor pipelines, has complicated the environmental problems. </p>
<p>The roles of diverse local actors in this environmental and conflict landscape have been downplayed by analysts. But it is important to grasp how all the players – locals, oil companies and government – have contributed to the protracted insecurity. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2020.1730310?journalCode=cjca20#.XlUz39RhydA.twitte">studied</a> oil communities in Ondo, Delta and Rivers states between 2010 and 2016, focusing on how the interactions among these players aggravate environmental pollution and conflicts in local communities. A nuanced analysis like this is necessary, in my view, if solutions are to be found.</p>
<h2>Complex connections</h2>
<p>My fieldwork took place in states that have experienced oil-induced environmental problems and destructive conflicts. </p>
<p>I selected the following coastal communities: Awoye and Ayetoro in Ondo state, Owodokpokpo-Igbide and Isoko South LGA in Delta state, and Goi in Rivers state. I conducted in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with a diverse group. They included traditional and community leaders, farmers, fishers, and representatives of women and youth associations. I also interviewed officials from government, oil companies and the <a href="https://www.nddc.gov.ng/">Niger Delta Development Commission</a> (whose mission is to advance economic, social and ecological goals). </p>
<p>The respondents provided deeper insights into the connections between global, national and local actors. They showed how the actions of these players have fuelled a cycle of environmental degradation, conflict and insecurity in the oil communities.</p>
<p>Oil spills, gas flaring and other activities of oil companies have had a huge <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/dec/06/this-place-used-to-be-green-the-brutal-impact-of-oil-in-the-niger-delta">environmental impact</a> on fishing and subsistence farming. Rivers are polluted and fishing nets and boats are damaged by oil. The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02589001.2020.1730310?casa_token=Ayzc6lroqSUAAAAA:1_yguF9jsZJvIgYjd4RUgVlhbwyY5UPG6FNC_ogHehl6gQ-OjwSYhOKYfnj9A0v2Meji86iPgEtoG3U">pressure</a> on land has increased, leading to deforestation and exploitation of marginal land. People have lost sources of income and have few alternatives. </p>
<p>This has led to multifaceted conflicts. The initial conflict between oil communities, oil companies and the Nigerian government has escalated to conflict within and among oil communities. People are pitted against one another in the quest for oil-related benefits or means of livelihood. </p>
<p>Oil benefits can take the form of contracts for oil spill clean-ups, pipeline surveillance and development projects. A few local actors control what little benefit trickles to communities from the oil companies and government. But the majority are sidelined and looking for ways to challenge their exclusion or to survive. </p>
<p>The coping strategies of the alienated local actors tend to wreak further havoc on the fragile environment and marine resources. They include criminal activities like pipeline vandalism, in retaliation against being excluded from oil benefits. This also creates the need for cleanup contracts. Some locals also siphon oil and refine it artisanally to sell on the black market. These activities result in a vicious cycle of environmental degradation, poverty and conflict.</p>
<h2>Solving the problem</h2>
<p>A nuanced analysis of this network of global, national and local interactions and their consequences is critical when looking for ways to tackle the conflict in the Niger Delta region. </p>
<p>The problem calls for a joint approach to a solution: broad consultation, collaboration and effective dialogue. The stakeholders are not just the oil companies, Nigerian government and local elites, but also the local fishers, farmers, traders, youth and women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abosede Omowumi Babatunde received funding for this study from the African Humanities Program, American Council of Learned Societies, AHP/ACLS and African Peacebuilding Network of the Social Science Research Council (APN-SSCR) A longer version of this article was published in the Journal of Contemporary African Studies.</span></em></p>The Niger Delta oil conflict requires broad consultation and effective dialogue between communities, oil companies and the Nigerian government.Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies , University of IlorinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/993042018-09-10T15:12:35Z2018-09-10T15:12:35ZWhy Nigeria urgently needs to grow non-oil exports<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234235/original/file-20180830-195304-1abwopm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The economy of Nigeria has had to navigate a major crisis that started with the collapse of oil prices in 2014 and was worsened by the <strong>_recurring youth restiveness</strong>_<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2018/03/20/amnesty-and-new-violence-in-the-niger-delta/#7bfdae30263f">ongoing restiveness</a> in the oil rich Niger-Delta region. </p>
<p>The crisis of the past four years <strong>reaffirms</strong> the vulnerability of the Nigerian economy to oil <strong>related shocks</strong>. It underscores the need for Nigeria to look outward, diversifying its export base away from the volatile commodity if the country is to win its battles against poverty and inequality.</p>
<p>Oil accounts for 90% or more of <a href="http://www.worldstopexports.com/nigerias-top-10-exports/">Nigerian merchandise exports</a>. This heavy dependence of the Nigerian economy on oil as the dominant source of foreign exchange is widely <strong>acknowledged</strong>. But the mechanisms through which oil price changes affect the economy and the measures (or lack of them) available to the Nigerian authorities to counter oil price declines are less commonly understood. </p>
<p>We traced the impact of the recent price declines and considered what policy options were available to the Nigerian authorities to come up with counter measures. </p>
<p>The vulnerability of the economy to oil price shocks has been <a href="https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16319/1/MPRA_paper_16319.pdf">known for years</a>, and the case for diversification has been made many times. But, as <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/publication/nigerias-macroeconomic-crisis-explained">our paper</a> points out, development of a <strong>robust</strong> non-oil export base is, in all likelihood, no longer a policy choice, it is a growth imperative. To grow and develop over the long term, Nigeria needs very rapid growth in non-oil exports.</p>
<h2>The good times (1998 - 2014)</h2>
<p>From 1998 to 2014, <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx">an oil price boom</a> unfolded that saw the price of Nigeria’s dominant export increase in nominal dollar terms by a factor of about ten – from about USD$10 per barrel to more than USD$100. While the boom period was characterised by some volatility, most notably in 2008, on average, the oil price rose persistently for more than 15 years.</p>
<p>In other words, in 1998, Nigeria got about USD$10 worth of imports for each barrel of oil exported. In 2014, Nigeria obtained about USD$100 worth of imports for each barrel of oil exported. </p>
<p>This strong upward trend in oil prices dulled incentives to diversify. Exports provide the foreign exchange for purchasing imports. Nigerians were able to significantly expand imports over time for the same volume of oil exports.</p>
<h2>The adjustment period (2015 - present)</h2>
<p>By the end of 2015, oil prices had collapsed. At that time, Nigeria got only about USD$40 worth of imports for each barrel of oil exported. By August 2018, prices had rebounded to about USD$65 per barrel or about USD$65 worth of imports for each barrel exported. This is still well below the levels of 2014.</p>
<p>Faced with persistently lower oil prices, Nigerian policymakers had, in principle, two options: increase exports or reduce imports. In practice, because increasing exports is effectively impossible in the short term, there was only one viable option: reduce import volumes to levels consistent with Nigeria’s reduced purchasing power. </p>
<p>This is exactly what happened. Between 2014 and 2016, import volumes declined by about 44%, an enormous reduction. Reduced imports meant fewer goods available in the economy, which in turn meant less consumption by households, less investment by business, and less government service. </p>
<p>This has been painful. We estimate that total real spending on consumption, investment, and government declined by about 12% per person between 2014 and 2016, a large macroeconomic shock. </p>
<h2>Changing course</h2>
<p>Looking forward, in the absence of a long term rebound in oil production or world oil prices, foreign exchange earnings from the sale of oil will remain relatively constant. In this (likely) situation, the economy must export more, of something other than oil, in order to import more. </p>
<p>It’s hard to see how the Nigerian economy can grow consistently without more imports. Businesses in a growing economy require more capital goods and more intermediate inputs. Without progressively more exports, there cannot be progressively more imports of efficient machines, tools, and other technologies that are critical for growth. </p>
<p>The only way Nigeria can avoid this stagnant state of affairs is if it does something dramatic about increasing non-oil exports. Nigerian businesses need to develop products of export quality at globally competitive prices. They must also develop the networks to market those products abroad. </p>
<p>This is difficult, and it will take time. But there are some clear initial options. </p>
<p>Agricultural products are potentially a part of the solution. This is particularly true in the relatively near term as global agricultural markets are relatively easy to enter if quality and cost are competitive. </p>
<p>Another potential area for development is providing regional services – for example, developing Lagos as an airline hub and shipping centre. </p>
<p>Given its large domestic market and its large labour force, Nigeria should also be looking at some longer term strategies to attract foreign direct investment into manufacturing sectors as the first step to learning to compete on global markets.</p>
<p>For more than a generation, Nigerian business, outside of oil, has focused almost exclusively on the domestic market. Looking forward, a significant segment of Nigerian business must look outward to the international market. Initiating, nurturing and growing this outward looking perspective is today’s key economic challenge for business, policymakers, and civil society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The collapse of the oil price in 2014 highlighted the need for Nigeria to dilute its exposure on the commodity.Channing Arndt, Division Director, Environment and Production Technology, IFPRI,, CGIAR System OrganizationAdedeji Adeniran, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for the Studies of Economies of Africa in Nigeria. , University of the WitwatersrandChuku Chuku, Lecturer at the Department of Economics, University of UyoDr. George Mavrotas, Senior Research Fellow, IFPRI and Head of IFPRI's Country Program and Office in Nigeria, CGIAR System OrganizationMorakinyo Adetutu, Lecturer in Economics, Nottingham Trent UniversityVictor Ajayi, Research Associate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/889782018-01-04T13:16:55Z2018-01-04T13:16:55ZWhat needs to be done to make Africa politically stable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199885/original/file-20171219-27557-1b7zdsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa needs average economic growth of over 7% for several decades if it's to reduce poverty and increase income levels.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Levels of armed conflict flux and wane. In 2017, <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/african-futures-key-trends">levels of high fatality violence</a> in Africa were significantly lower than during the immediate post-Cold War period. This trend has occurred in spite of the recent increases in terrorist associated fatalities in key countries such as Nigeria and Somalia. Even terrorist fatalities have declined since 2015.</p>
<p>But the continent is still witnessing an increase in social turbulence, unrest and protest. This is being driven by development, urbanisation and modernisation, all of which are inevitably disruptive. Development has been driven by the fact that, since 1994, Africa has experienced the longest sustained period of growth since decolonialisation in the sixties.</p>
<p>The other major factor driving unrest is the fact that <a href="https://issafrica.org/events/the-future-of-democracy-in-africa">democracy is expanding on the continent</a>. Pressure is mounting on autocracies. We therefore shouldn’t be surprised by widespread violence in countries ranging from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to Burundi and Uganda. And in countries run by small elites or a family – such as Gabon, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. </p>
<p>In the long term only rapid, inclusive economic growth combined with good governance can make Africa less volatile. </p>
<p>But how can it achieve this? What’s needed is a combination of sound economic policies, an attack on corruption and theft by ruling elites, a deepening of democracy and a rethink of the approach taken to the threat of terrorism.</p>
<h2>The economics</h2>
<p>At current population growth Africa needs average economic growth rates in excess of 7% per year for several decades if it’s to reduce poverty and increase average levels of income. This is unlikely. <a href="http://pardee.du.edu/understand-interconnected-world">Current forecasts</a> estimate average rates of growth of around half of that. </p>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, Africa needs to find ways of reaping its demographic dividend – that is decreasing the number of dependants, mostly children, compared to persons of working age (15 to 65 years of age). Traditionally this is best achieved through improvements in female education, but the provision of water, sanitation and access to contraceptives can play a huge role. This is reflected in a recent study we did on <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/ethiopia-development-trends-assessment">the future of Ethiopia</a> that has seen more rapid reductions in fertility rates than other countries at similar levels of development. </p>
<p>Africa also needs to place employment in formal sector at the centre of government policy. This, in turn, requires diversification of African economies as well as much higher levels of foreign investment and engagement. </p>
<p>When it comes to investment and development aid the Institute for Security Studies <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/africa-in-the-world-report/fertility-growth-and-the-future-of-aid-in-sub-saharan-africa">found that</a> middle income countries are making progress in attracting foreign direct investment, but poor countries remain aid dependent. </p>
<p>Although aid is going out of fashion in favour of measures to involve the private sector, it will remain important for low income countries. It allows governments to deliver services such as water, sanitation and education more than they would otherwise be able to do. These investments in human capital development will deliver large benefits and will have long term positive effects.</p>
<p>Another area of focus should be on supporting the rule of law and the delivery of effective taxation systems. Basics such as national identity systems, effective border control and a functioning criminal justice systems are often absent. </p>
<h2>Democracy, extremism and security responses</h2>
<p>Many people across a wide range of countries on the continent are stepping up their <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/pp36-do-africans-still-want-democracy">demands for more democracy</a>. Despite many setbacks, democratisation continues to advance year on year. </p>
<p>Doing these two things simultaneously – building government capacity and responding to demands for democracy – is difficult. Marginalisation, a lack of voice, a lack of accountability often lies at the heart of instability in a continent that has experienced autocracy and bad governance for decades. </p>
<p>Regional organisations (such as the Southern African Development Community and the Central African Economic Monetary Community need to take accountable governance seriously.</p>
<p>Unless this happens, there’s a real danger that the draw of extremist groups will escalate. </p>
<p>Accountable governance should also extend to the security sector where reform is perhaps the single most important component in countering violent extremism. the continent’s military, policy, gendarme and intelligence systems are generally not held to account, they act with impunity and are often the source of many problems. Instead of protecting and serving they kill, loot and rape.</p>
<p>Both the <a href="https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/lessons-from-africa-on-terrorism">ISS</a> and the <a href="http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/en/reports">UNDP</a> have concluded that action by security forces – such as the killing or arrest of a family member – often serves as the tipping point that triggers the final decision to join an extremist group. </p>
<p>In addition, Africa seems to have bought into the US war on terror approach which is to rely on the military. In fact, terrorism requires an intelligence, prosecution, and rule of law approach. African countries would be well advised to revert to an intelligence and policing response rather than a military response to terrorism.</p>
<p>Radicalisation is also fuelled by corruption, theft by ruling elites and tax havens. Africa needs to work with the rest of the world to end tax havens, tax avoidance and money laundering. </p>
<h2>Fight for a rules-based world</h2>
<p>African countries need to intensify their efforts towards a rules based world, including reform of the UN Security Council, which sits at the apex of global security governance. </p>
<p>But the continent needs to stop hiding behind the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_screform_2005.pdf">Ezulwini consensus</a> – this is the common position taken by African countries on UN reform that advocates for two permanent seats with veto rights and five non-permanent seats for Africa - and start thinking <a href="http://www.electthecouncil.org">outside the box</a>. </p>
<p>Real reform is possible, but it would require a different approach, including ending the system of veto and permanent seats.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88978/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jakkie Cilliers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa is still witnessing an increase in social turbulence, unrest and protest. Only rapid, inclusive economic growth combined with good governance can make the continent less volatile.Jakkie Cilliers, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/846202017-09-27T17:03:03Z2017-09-27T17:03:03ZEconomic inequality lies behind growing calls for secession in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187777/original/file-20170927-24154-141spub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women carry goods across a makeshift bridge in the Ilaje slum in Lagos. Widening inequality is fuelling tensions across Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Finbarr O'Reilly</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rise of ethnic and religious nationalism in Nigeria in the last decade has led to such high levels of tension that it’s prompted people to ask if it will <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-03-10/roots-nigerias-religious-and-ethnic-conflict">survive as a country</a>. Or if Nigeria is on the brink of another <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2017/09/03/nigerian-christians-warn-another-civil-war/">civil war</a>. </p>
<p>What’s behind the growing tensions is <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/even-it-nigeria/nigeria-extreme-inequality-numbers">unequal</a> distribution of the country’s wealth. Inequality has caused mistrust among ethnic groups. This, in turn, has led to conflict and violence. </p>
<p>Nigeria has in fact been at war with itself for some time – a war that has become intensified in the last two decades. </p>
<p>A number of events illustrate this. For instance, militancy in the oil rich Niger Delta region started after the 2003 general elections where arms and ammunition were purchased by some politicians and handed to young people in an attempt to influence the elections. But after the elections, many young Nigerians, angered by high rates of unemployment, turned the weapons against their sponsors and the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580link">Nigerian state</a>. </p>
<p>Another example is the role played by the Oodua Peoples Congress, a group that advocated for an autonomous region for the Yoruba speaking southwest Nigeria. The congress started its agitation in 1994, a year after the annulment of the 1993 presidential election won by M.K.O Abiola, a member of the Yoruba ethnic group. Their dominant message was the alleged marginalisation of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence">Yoruba ethnic group</a>.</p>
<p>And in 2009 the Boko Haram insurgency erupted after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/aug/06/mohammed-yusuf-boko-haram-nigeria">the brutal murder</a> of Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric based in Maiduguri who had started a movement seven years earlier to push for an end to corruption and action against inequality. He also supported Islamic practices in the northeast region of Nigeria. Yusuf was arrested by the police and died in custody in 2009. Many members of his sect immediately staged a peaceful protest. Protests later became violent when they started targeting police offices and police posts across the North. </p>
<p>Now there is a resurgence of opposition in Biafra. It echoes back to 1967 when the then military governor of the Eastern region of Nigeria, Col. Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Igbo speaking East independent from Nigeria. This followed Igbos in the North being targeted after the first military coup d'etat that ended Nigeria’s first republic. The 1966 coup, mostly led by military officers from the Igbo speaking east of Nigeria, was perceived by many in the North to have specifically targeted and killed many Hausa/Fulani politicians from the Northern region. </p>
<p>Economic inequality cannot be separated from the root of all these developments. Nigerians are frustrated because they can see <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/even-it-nigeria/nigeria-extreme-inequality-numbers">economic inequality growing at a faster pace than ever before</a> and no one seems to be doing anything about it. </p>
<p>Will these agitations lead to an outright war in the scale of the 1960s civil war? There is no categorical answer to that. But I doubt that there will be another civil war on the scale of 1967-1970, although there may be large scale violence. </p>
<h2>A history of violence</h2>
<p>Violence has always been part of the history of economic and political marginalisation in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Examples can be drawn from the mass violence that led to the 1967-70 civil war as well as the ethno-religious violence of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s. These included the <a href="https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr90/fnigeria1992.htm">Zango Kataf conflict</a>, <a href="https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/maitatsine-riots">Maitatsine riots</a> in the North between 1980 and 1985, the Agbekoya farmers uprising in the West 1968-70, the first iteration of the resurgence of Biafra by the Ralph Uwazuruike-led <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/31666/262387_de.html">Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra in 2000</a> and the national protests against the annulment of the June 12, 1993 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/07/world/rioting-in-nigeria-kills-at-least-11.html?mcubz=1">presidential election</a> won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2003 picture of current Nigeria President Muhammadu Buhari with Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu who led the failed Biafran secessionist war in the 60s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Howard Burditt</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these mass actions started as protests against perceived injustice. But they were aggravated by the forceful response of the Nigerian government. The protests all paralysed state activities. But none threatened the survival of the Nigerian state more than the oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta. </p>
<p>Beginning with the state murder of Niger Delta rights activist <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/07/world/rioting-in-nigeria-kills-at-least-11.html?mcubz=1">Ken Saro Wiwa in November 1995</a> and crystallising in the insurgency against oil corporations and the state, protest action in the Niger Delta have affected the production and sale of oil which is the mainstay of the <a href="http://www.africafocus.org/docs06/nig0608.php">Nigerian economy</a>.</p>
<h2>How Nigeria got here</h2>
<p>The resurgence of ethno-religious protests in Nigeria can be traced to the fact that wealth circulates among a small group of elites. Although they come from all ethnic and religious <a href="https://economicconfidential.com/editors-pick/12-people-who-control-nigerias-economy/">groups</a>, they resort to fanning ethno-religious sentiments when they feel there’s a threat to their wealth. Cries of marginalisation becomes the dominant cry when they’re out of power. </p>
<p>The election of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, triggered new tensions. This is because he is considered a member of the Northern elite. Immediately after his election protests began supporting self-determination or secession by various groups from the South. These included the <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2017/09/23/biafra-police-dare-ipob-members-protest/">Indigenous People of Biafra</a> in the South East as well as groups such as the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/20/niger-delta-avengers-who-they-are-and-what-they-want.html">Niger Delta Avengers in the South-South</a>. </p>
<p>Control of Nigeria’s oil resources in the Niger Delta always comes into the mix. Recent clashes involving the Biafra group in Port Harcourt – capital city of oil rich Rivers State – must be understood in that context. It is no surprise that once again, the Niger Delta is at the heart of the current clamour for secession just as it was between 1966 and 1970 when oil extraction started taking root in Nigeria. </p>
<p>But there are important differences between today’s protests and those staged earlier in Nigeria’s history. The main ones include the fact that people are mobilised differently, and the way in which information is disseminated and consumed. </p>
<p>News travel faster than it used to and unfounded rumours spread like wildfire. Fuelling the tensions is the fact that hate speech is rife. The state is as guilty as the agitators. Voices of reason and objective analysis are lost in the noise especially now that everyone with a smart phone has become a ‘journalist’. In the confusion, the road to anarchy looms large over Nigeria. </p>
<h2>What’s to be done</h2>
<p>An inclusive economic and political system is the only solution. The current public discourse is focused on political restructuring along ethnic lines. The calls for a political arrangement where major ethnic groups will have control over their geographical areas as well as resources therein might help. The danger is that rather than unify Nigeria, it would further divide the country along <a href="http://leadership.ng/2017/06/30/politics-intrigues-behind-restructuring-debate/">ethnic and religious lines</a>.</p>
<p>What’s missing in the conversation is the fact that the environment for violence and oppression of most Nigerians has come about because of the way in which the country’s economy is structured. The elitist economy cuts across all ethnic groups. The disenfranchisement, marginalisation and exploitation defy ethnic colouration. </p>
<p>For restructuring to be meaningful, Nigeria must create an inclusive economic and political system where ethnic and religious affiliation will no longer be a defining factor in economic and political participation. What Nigerians need, and are clamouring for, is a country that will accommodate them regardless of ethnic or religious creed. Political, religious and ethnic tolerance is the key to economic and political success, therefore economic and political inclusivity must account for greater tolerance for it to be effective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84620/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omolade Adunbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Protests are raising tensions in Africa’s most populous country, with agitators and federal troops clashing on the streets. But is Nigeria on the brink of another civil war?Omolade Adunbi, Associate Professor of Afroamerican and African Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/804872017-07-12T14:18:13Z2017-07-12T14:18:13ZNigeria won’t end kidnapping without making risks outweigh rewards<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176924/original/file-20170705-5202-1aw1yny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian militants patrol the oil rich Niger delta region, the birth place of commercial kidnapping in the country.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kidnapping is an ancient crime dating back to 17th century Britain when infant children of rich families would be <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Kidnapping">“napped” (caught in their sleep)</a> and taken away for ransom. The first major case of kidnapping reported in the US was that of four-year old <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/child-kidnapping-america">Charley Brewster</a> who was lured away in Pennsylvania in 1874 by two strange men with the promise of candy and fireworks. The men later sent ransom notes to the boy’s father through the post office. His father didn’t pay, the boy was never found.</p>
<p>Kidnapping has since evolved. Today it’s a well organised and highly sophisticated crime which occurs in many parts of the world. </p>
<p>In Nigeria it has <a href="http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/viewFile/11987/12311">become quite common</a>, competing with crimes such as armed robbery, piracy and cattle rustling in frequency and in violence. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/for-nigeria-criminals-kidnapping-remains-lucrative-trade/2846383.html">grown rapidly</a> over the years and is now entrenched as a dominant form of organised crime in the country. </p>
<p>The benefits of kidnapping far outweigh its costs in the country. The legal frameworks of criminal justice aren’t efficient enough to sanction crime and ensure proper deterrence. Opportunistic Nigerians rationalise that the benefits outweigh the risks. This probably explains the high incidence and apparent intractability of kidnapping in the country. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/arrested-kidnapper-evans-buys-170k-wristwatch/">recent arrest</a> of Chukwudumeme Onwuamadike (a.k.a Evans), who has become the poster boy for kidnapping in Nigeria, has once again raised questions about what lies behind the rise in cases in the country. And what can be done about it.</p>
<h2>History of kidnapping</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.academia.edu/32278765/AN_ANALYSIS_OF_THE_CAUSES_AND_CONSEQUENCES_OF_KIDNAPPING_IN_NIGERI">Early cases of kidnappings</a> in Nigeria were abductions mainly for ritual killing, slavery and forced marriage. There were also cases where individuals were abducted during communal wars and held as bait for strategic trade-offs. These types of kidnapping have been ongoing in various places in the country for years. </p>
<p>The rise of mercantilist kidnapping – or kidnap for ransom in Nigeria – is a recent development. It began in the 1990s with the activities of Niger Delta militants who engaged in hostage taking to press their demands for fiscal federalism, resource control and environmental rights for their communities polluted by decades of oil exploration. </p>
<p>The militants, who assumed the status of activists and agitators for their region, wanted to attract attention to the plight of the region and to compel the government and oil multinationals to clean up their environment, pay compensation for years of exploitation and bring investment and development. They targeted expatriate workers of the oil firms as well as principal government functionaries for hostage taking.</p>
<p>There was a significant drop in the incidence of kidnapping in the region following the deescalation of the Niger Delta crisis at the turn of the century. By this time though, the crime was already becoming a booming franchise in nearby South-eastern Nigeria, with Abia and Anambra States as critical flash points. These states, and others in the region, became hotbeds for kidnappers who often targeted the rich and the influential for criminal economic benefit. </p>
<p>In the years that followed, kidnapping for ransom quickly spread to different parts of the country, including states like Edo, Lagos, Ogun, and some northern states of Nigeria.</p>
<p>So why is kidnapping thriving in Nigeria? There seem to be three factors driving the crime today. </p>
<p>The first is the quest for material accumulation. The <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0038038506067516">second is tough socio-economic conditions</a>. And the third is a sense of fearlessness and impunity on the part of perpetrators who feel that they will get away with the crime. </p>
<p>Kidnapping typifies a tendency towards criminal economic accumulation and social advancement which thrives in societies that have the following characteristics:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>People struggle to survive because of high levels of poverty, </p></li>
<li><p>Growing social inequality and deprivation</p></li>
<li><p>The prevalence of impunity</p></li>
<li><p>A lax and inefficient criminal code</p></li>
<li><p>Weak law enforcement procedures and capabilities, and </p></li>
<li><p>An ineffective criminal justice system. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The fall of a kidnap kingpin</h2>
<p>The media and law enforcement agencies in Nigeria refer to Chukwudumeme Onwuamadike (a.k.a Evans) as the <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/233708-how-arrested-kidnap-kingpin-evans-made-millions-of-dollars-from-ransom-police.html">kidnap kingpin</a>. </p>
<p>His capture has some critical implications. First, it has exposed the level of sophistication that kidnapping has reached in the country. Second, it has revealed that kidnapping syndicates, no matter how sophisticated, are not invincible. Third, it has buttressed the argument that, armed with an effective strategy, the police can control the incidence of kidnapping in the country. </p>
<p>And lastly, it’s shown that a lot needs to be done to control crime in Nigeria. </p>
<p>The arrest of Evans doesn’t signify the end of the crime. Far from it. Rather it marks the dawn of a new era in Nigeria’s anti-kidnapping crusade. This is an opportunity – which if properly exploited – can reduce the attraction of kidnapping, and help the country move towards making the crime history. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Nigeria must strengthen its laws for combating crime if it truly wants to fight and reduce kidnapping. Efforts must be made to ensure greater efficiency in the operations of the law to achieve greater impact. </p>
<p>I believe, like the American Economist Bryan Douglas Caplan <a href="http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2010/06/the_strange_pol.html">that</a> “the kidnapping problem is not hard to solve” and that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>kidnappers kidnap because the benefits exceed costs. The obvious solution is to raise the costs by imposing harsher, surer punishments. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>To arrest the rising spate of kidnapping, Nigeria must entrench stiffer penalties. Some states have instituted the <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/evans-may-get-death-penalty-life-imprisonment-ambode-signs-bill-law/">death penalty</a> as a punishment for the crime. I believe that the death penalty can serve as a great deterrence. </p>
<p>But first efforts must be made to tackle socio-economic conditions that make kidnapping attractive such as poverty, unemployment, deprivation, inequality. After all, sustainable criminal deterrence is scarcely possible under the atmosphere of material insecurity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chukwuma Al Okoli receives funding from Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETfund) in Nigeria.</span></em></p>Tough socio-economic conditions, among others, make kidnapping a thriving business in Nigeria. A strong justice system along with stiff punishment for the crime are needed.Al Chukwuma Okoli, Lecturer/Resident Researcher Department of Political Science, Federal University LafiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/730712017-03-28T15:07:38Z2017-03-28T15:07:38ZWhy collaboration could help the Niger Delta overcome its difficulties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162154/original/image-20170323-3548-1v374xz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria is a country that has amassed major oil wealth, but also suffers from <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3383.pdf">extreme poverty</a>. The Niger Delta, the country’s main oil producing region is one of the areas experiencing <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/niger-delta-a-region-cursed-by-oil-politics/">chronic underdevelopment</a> and <a href="https://globaljournals.org/GJSFR_Volume12/2-Environmental-Impacts-of-Oil-Exploration.pdf">environmental degradation</a>. </p>
<p>Nigeria is Africa’s <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/01/11/nigeria-reclaims-position-as-africas-top-oil-producer//">biggest oil exporter</a> and suffers from what’s known as the <a href="http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf">natural resource curse</a> – a broad term that describes how resource rich countries tend to experience less economic growth. Countries rich in resources like oil are also <a href="http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=456">fertile territory</a> for corruption. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/nigeria1007webwcover.pdf">Increased national corruption</a> in turn leads to poor development. </p>
<p>This is certainly true in the Niger Delta where money meant for development has been wasted. As a result the situation for local communities has worsened due to a lack of proper healthcare, clean water and jobs.</p>
<p>But government isn’t the only contributor to development. Oil companies are also key players through their <a href="http://www.british-assessment.co.uk/guides/an-introduction-to-corporate-social-responsibility-csr/">corporate social responsibility schemes</a>. This sees firms do the “right thing” through voluntary ethical behaviour in a range of social issues like health, education and the environment. This is particularly important in the area given that oil companies have contributed <a href="http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/winter2012/enemy-within-oil-niger-delta">significantly</a> to environmental devastation in the region. </p>
<p>But corporate social responsibility schemes have only a limited impact given that they help a small number of people. And spending more money wouldn’t help either. What’s needed is a collaborative approach involving a voluntary partnership between the state, an international development agency, business sector and civil society. </p>
<h2>Corporate social investment in the Niger Delta</h2>
<p>To explore the impact of corporate social investment initiatives I have done <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12164/abstract">research</a> looking at the practices of one of the largest oil companies in the Niger Delta: the <a href="http://www.shell.com.ng/">Shell Petroleum Development Company</a>. Its corporate social responsibility encompasses three distinct areas; business and agriculture, education and health. </p>
<p>Through a study of Shell’s <a href="http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/communities.html">website</a>,
I aimed to evaluate how successfully these schemes combat the Niger Delta’s problems, principally, by seeing how many people each scheme helped. I also wanted to understand the consequences that these policies have on Niger Delta society and the Nigerian government’s development agenda. </p>
<p>The study found that Shell has implemented some useful development initiatives, particularly within health. For example, the company has rolled out <a href="http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/communities/health-in-nigeria.html">malaria and immunisation programmes</a>, treating more than 114 000 people. Shell has also invested in <a href="http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/communities/health-in-nigeria.html">27 Niger Delta health facilities</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria has widespread <a href="https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria_49472.html">health challenges.</a> For example, it has the <a href="https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria#footnote1_9spfdru">second highest HIV</a> level in the world. The situation is worsened by a lack of hospitals or medication for patients. </p>
<p>Increased investment in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4405065/">medical support</a> as well as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QhK5CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=HIV/AID+Nigeria+more+education+required&source=bl&ots=lDgLiX9Kga&sig=9SIiQX4qLov8ZrDX7RdUyaT3R5w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjdsM_TvtbSAhXIDsAKHSEKAOwQ6AEIWDAJ#v=onepage&q=HIV%2FAID%20Nigeria%20more%20education%20required&f=false">education</a> are two of the key interventions required.</p>
<p>Shell has also invested in education through various <a href="http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/communities/education-programmes/scholarships.html">primary, secondary and university scholarships</a> which support an estimated <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12164/abstract">6,600 students a year.</a></p>
<p>But its projects affect only a few people. In education, for example, Shell only has a small impact given that primary and secondary enrolment stands at over <a href="http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002310/231081e.pdf">25 million</a> in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162155/original/image-20170323-3557-png2yg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shell’s various
primary, secondary and university scholarships support an estimated 6600 students a year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Would it help if Shell, and other companies like it, spent more? Not really. The reasons for this are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1731&context=tqr">Fragmentation:</a> there’s the potential for tensions over who schemes reach first. This could further fuel militancy in the <a href="http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/handle/123456789/27237">Niger Delta</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Economic stagnation: the region has an extremely <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/youth-unemployment-rate">high youth unemployment</a>. This means that Shell’s business schemes – such as helping young adults to <a href="http://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/communities/Livewire-Nigeria.html">set up and grow their business</a> – - – won’t flourish because the majority of citizens lack access to a <a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b410c26c2921c18a6839baebc9b1428fa98fa36a.pdf">basic income or secure livelihood</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Governance: corporate social responsibility cannot be expected – and <a href="http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ989820.pdf">was never designed</a> – to tackle the whole of the Niger Delta’s socio-economic underdevelopment or counter the country’s political and economic problems. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But there is a possible solution. </p>
<h2>The solution</h2>
<p>The Niger Delta’s numerous challenges could be solved by use of a <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12164/abstract">Quad Sector Development Partnership</a>. Such a voluntary partnership would bring together the state, an international development agency, business sector and civil society. The aim would be to deliver a range of development goals. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://nddc.gov.ng/">Niger Delta development agency</a> could be reorganised around such a partnership. And the <a href="http://www.ng.undp.org/">United Nations Development Programme</a> could be given the important managerial, financial and development role.</p>
<p>The UNDP has operated many development projects across the world – about <a href="http://open.undp.org/#2016">5000</a> in 2016 alone. It has also formed successful development partnerships <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/Towards_Transformational_Change_ESD_2008-2012.pdf">with governments before</a>. For example, it worked with the <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/Towards_Transformational_Change_ESD_2008-2012.pdf">government of Nicaragua</a> to combat the lack of electricity in rural areas of the country by introducing renewable hydropower. It also led the
<a href="https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/moynihan/tngo/Leveraging%20Project%20Finance%20for%20Development%20Chad-Cameroon%20Oilfield%20Project.pdf">Chad-Cameroon project</a> which set out to promote development. </p>
<p>A partnership like this could help Nigeria as the UN agency could jointly control the money allocated to development, preventing any financial mismanagement.</p>
<h2>Collaboration is key</h2>
<p>A specific set of development objectives for the Niger Delta would need to be chosen. These could be based around specific themes like health and education.</p>
<p>The development goals would be jointly coordinated by the UN and Nigeria. Active community engagement would also be essential. This could happen through formal consultation meetings to allow local people to voice and raise concerns about development priorities in their area.</p>
<p>Development contracts would need to be given to Nigerian construction firms to help stimulate the local economy. </p>
<p>There would also need to be an agreed time-frame with dedicated objectives at each stage.</p>
<p>This type of partnership would only work if there was long-term political commitment from all of Nigeria’s politicians. </p>
<p>Though a bold plan it could – combined with other <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-peace-can-be-achieved-in-the-niger-delta-55881">interventions</a> to reduce violence – combat corruption as well as promote socio-economic development in the Niger Delta.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73071/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Gonzalez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria needs a collaborative approach involving voluntary partnerships between the state, an international development agency, the business sector and civil society to solve its problems.Adrian Gonzalez, PhD Candiate in Human Geography, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671752016-12-14T14:49:32Z2016-12-14T14:49:32ZThe world needs to consider how to manage the end of the fossil fuel era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149827/original/image-20161213-1629-i9tdda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An oil rig in Angola. The country could see big reductions in export and revenue from fossil fuels as the world transitions to clean energy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the UN Climate Negotiations in Paris <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/a-readers-guide-to-the-paris-agreement/420345/">the world agreed</a> to keep global warming to well below 2°C, above pre-industrial levels. The Paris Agreement was welcome news for averting the worst impact of climate change. But it was pretty bad news for the fossil fuel industry. </p>
<p>About three-quarters of the fossil fuel industry’s coal, oil and gas reserves have to <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/carbon-briefing-making-sense-of-the-ipccs-new-carbon-budget">remain in the ground unburnt</a> if the world is to keep warming to 2°C – never mind well below it. </p>
<p>This raises a challenging question: who gets to sell the remaining burnable fossil fuels? Fossil fuel markets have historically been defined by forces like economics, <a href="https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/issue5/cartels.html">oil cartels</a>, and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40932157?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">coal barons</a>, counterbalanced against the rights of states to exploit their natural resources. But policy makers and academics are <a href="http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/05/who-should-sell-the-last-of-the-fossil-fuels-stranded-assets-equity-and-climate-change/">starting to ask</a> whether the right to sell the last fossil fuels should be allocated according to the logic of equity and justice instead. </p>
<p>The relevance of equity becomes clear when considering who will be most affected by the move away from fossil fuels. Richer Western countries have already exploited the vast majority of fossil fuels, and will be least affected by the transition away from fossil fuels. Developing countries, on the other hand, are set to potentially lose a significant percentage of their GDP from lost fossil fuel revenues. </p>
<p>For instance, sub-Saharan Africa has around 65 billion barrels of <a href="http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weo2014/">proven oil reserves</a>, 5% of the world’s total. Three-quarters are situated within Nigeria and Angola. Both are in the United Nations Development Programme’s <a href="http://www.instituto-camoes.pt/images/cooperacao/relatorio_ocde14b.pdf">low human development</a> category. Countries like Angola and Nigeria could see significant reductions in export and government revenue from fossil fuels as the world transitions to clean energy. </p>
<h2>Equity and stranded assets</h2>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-DB-2016-Equity-fossil-fuel-production-rents.pdf">a recent study by the Stockholm Environmental Institute</a>, acting in line with climate targets would see:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the loss of a sizeable revenue stream specifically for developing country regions, the magnitude of which can be a significant percentage of GDP. This is especially true of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141975/original/image-20161017-4768-1wpr0vg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alongside other developing regions, the African continent is set to be among those hardest hit by lost fossil fuel revenue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stockholm Environmental Institute</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The study shows that richer regions like North America and Western Europe are also set to see foregone fossil fuel revenue. But they have already exploited much of their burnable reserves and won’t be hit as hard as the developing world.</p>
<p>This unequal impact echoes <a href="http://watson.brown.edu/news/explore/2012/climate">broader trends of climate and global injustice</a>: the richer global north has benefited the most. The global south, meanwhile, will be hardest hit by climate change in the future unless the world acts in a more equitable way moving forward.</p>
<h2>Disruption ahead</h2>
<p>Economies that depend on fossil fuels need to act swiftly to diversify their economies. If not, they may suffer <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/4005446-venezuelas-imminent-collapse-threatens-world">a similar fate to Venezuela</a>. Its heavy reliance on oil revenues helped destabilise the country in the midst of the current oil glut. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia is taking heed. It is already planning for the <a href="http://energypost.eu/historic-moment-saudi-arabia-sees-end-oil-age-coming-opens-valves-carbon-bubble/">end of the oil age</a> by ploughing revenue from its oil reserves into diversifying its economy away from oil. </p>
<p>The speed of the transition ahead, however, may be too fast for many fossil fuel reliant countries to fully keep up. Environmental regulations and the rapid progress in clean and alternative energy are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-05-10/coal-s-stranded-assets">stranding coal assets across the globe</a>. </p>
<p>The confluence of electric vehicles, increased efficiency and alternative modes of transport means that <a href="http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/10/19/statoil-chief-rise-of-electric-cars-will-shrink-oil-industry/">oil demand could peak</a> as early as 2020. It could shrink thereafter, potentially creating <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-ev-oil-crisis/">another oil crash</a>. </p>
<p>Such trends are already <a href="http://www.alternet.org/environment/we-could-be-witnessing-death-fossil-fuel-industry-will-it-take-rest-economy-down-it">sending shockwaves</a> throughout the fossil fuel industry. They pose significant risks to countries heavily reliant on fossil fuel revenues, such as Nigeria and Venezuela. </p>
<p>If we are to act in line with the Paris Agreements, we will need to move even faster. Global emissions have <a href="http://www.iflscience.com/environment/fossil-fuel-emissions-have-stalled-global-carbon-budget/">stagnated</a> over the last three years. But to keep global warming to 1.5°C, they need to be reduced at about 8.5% a year. That, <a href="http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/10/should-we-leave-fossil-fuels-in-the-ground-when/">according to Oxfam researcher James Morrissey</a> is the equivalent of pulling about 980 coal fired power stations off-line per year. </p>
<p>For a less ambitious 2°C, emissions need to be reduced by 3.5% per year. This is a transition which could still represent close on $30 trillion in lost fossil fuel revenue in the <a href="http://www.keplercheuvreux.com/pdf/research/EG_EG_253208.pdf">next two decades</a>, and <a href="https://cleantechnica.com/2015/08/26/citigroup-predicts-100-trillion-in-stranded-assets-if-paris-summit-succeeds/">$100 trillion by 2050</a>.</p>
<p>Importantly, both the 2°C and the 1.5°C target provide major net positive economic benefits. For instance, <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/11/16/un-report-1-5-degree-limit-to-improve-growth-jobs-and-safety.html">estimates</a> show that a 1.5°C pathway would avoid major climate impacts, ensure the global economy is 10% bigger by 2050. It would also create many more jobs, improved health and access to energy than business as usual. Nonetheless, the negative impact of losses from fossil fuels raise questions of equity. </p>
<h2>An equitable way forward?</h2>
<p>According to political philosopher Simon Caney, to act <a href="https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/climate_change_equity_and_stranded_assets_backgrounder.pdf">equitably</a>, priority in the sale of fossil fuels should be given to countries with: a low level of development; who have benefited the least from past extraction; and who have the least alternative available forms of energy or resources for development.</p>
<p>The story is more complicated though. Equity does not always align with efficiency. </p>
<p>Some fossil fuel reserves are more carbon and capital intensive than others. To act efficiently and avoid wasting resources, one would give priority to the least carbon and <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v517/n7533/full/nature14016.html">capital intensive fossil fuels</a>, such as <a href="http://graphics.wsj.com/oil-barrel-breakdown/">those of Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1114&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1114&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141977/original/image-20161017-4768-18u48o3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1114&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An efficient allocation of stranded assets.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nature</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One proposal to <a href="https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/climate_change_equity_and_stranded_assets_backgrounder.pdf">combine both equity and efficiency</a> is to follow the most efficient route, and then to compensate developing countries who will be hardest hit by stranded assets. The politics surrounding such a proposal would likely be difficult. But there are no easy political answers here. </p>
<p>Ending the fossil fuel era will constitute <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176145/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_the_oil_world_in_chaos">a major shift to the current global geopolitical order</a>, one dominated by major fossil fuel producers like Russia and the United States. It’s hard to see petrostates eagerly facilitating a transition away from that order, never mind funding a globally just transition away from it. </p>
<p>Given that hard political reality, we need to be careful to not allow questions of stranded assets and equity to derail progress on climate change. It may be an injustice to not strand fossil fuels equitably. But <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sb/eng/inf08.pdf">much graver injustice and harm</a> will come from not acting on climate change, particularly for least developed and developing nations. </p>
<p>What’s clear is that the problem shouldn’t be <a href="http://keepitintheground.org/">exacerbated</a> by investing in new fossil fuel projects. There are already more than enough <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2106758-the-oil-and-gas-we-have-already-tapped-will-take-us-past-1-5c/">fossil fuel reserves and infrastructure</a> to push past climate targets. Investing in more will only exacerbate climate change, deepen the problem of stranded assets, and make an equitable solution even harder to attain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georges Alexandre Lenferna is a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Washington studying climate ethics. He has worked as a research consultant for 350.org, a volunteer fellow for Carbon Washington, and has played a leadership role within a number of fossil fuel divestment campaigns. </span></em></p>The end of fossil fuels is approaching fast. But the question remains of what to do with those that remain, waiting to be sold.Alex Lenferna, South African Fulbright Scholar, PhD Student in Philosophy, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698322016-12-12T03:40:27Z2016-12-12T03:40:27ZWhy OPEC’s gambit to raise oil prices might not work<p>After months of speculation by oil market watchers, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/press_room/OPEC%20agreement.pdf">recently announced a six-month production cut</a> of 1.2 million barrels per day (b/d) with the aim of driving up the price. It’s set to take effect on Jan. 1. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia will be responsible for a little less than half of the total, or just under 500,000 b/d, followed by 210,000 for Iraq and about 135,000 for Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates each. A nonmember, Russia, pledged to cut about 300,000 b/d as part of the deal. </p>
<p>The move, which could be extended for another six months, was in response to the expected continuation of weak oil market conditions: too much supply and too little demand. The result was that for the first time since 1998, OPEC reported a <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2016.pdf">collective current account deficit of almost US$100 billion in 2015</a>, compared with a surplus of $238 billion in 2014.</p>
<p>The crude oil price reacted as intended by <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil-idUSKBN13R02L">climbing 15 percent</a> almost immediately, <a href="http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart">settling at about $51</a>. That’s up from a low of less than $30 earlier this year.</p>
<p>The planned cuts and market reaction raise a lot of questions, however, such as why the oil price increased even though the reductions have yet to take effect and whether it will continue to rise. As an energy economist, I believe the best way to answer these and other important questions is by exploring a fundamental concept of my field: supply and demand. </p>
<h2>Economics 101</h2>
<p>Oil markets are notoriously difficult to predict because <a href="http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/thinkcorner/Think%20Corner%20factors%20impacting%20oil%20price.pdf">there are so many factors</a> that affect the price.</p>
<p>Supply-side factors include crude quality, cost of resource development and production, access to resources, availability of infrastructure, environmental and economic regulations, and the behavior of suppliers such as OPEC. </p>
<p>Probably more complex are demand-side factors: demand growth in various markets for various petroleum products, the state of the refining industry, pricing policies (taxes and subsidies) for different products in different countries, environmental regulations for end use, and energy policies regarding efficiency and alternatives.</p>
<p>While financial trading is the most important factor influencing the oil price in the short-term, whether the price continues to rise or not in the coming weeks and months will depend on fundamental supply/demand dynamics. </p>
<h2>Will members comply?</h2>
<p>First, OPEC members have a mixed record complying with previous agreements to cut production levels. </p>
<p>When OPEC first started the quota system in the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia had to reduce production by up to 6 million b/d to maintain the organization’s quota as other members flouted their commitments. From 2009 to 2013, OPEC production has been typically <a href="https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/ip0Au96J5o_8/v4/-1x-1.png">1 million to 2 million b/d above the quota</a>. </p>
<p>Thus verification of compliance with the cuts will be important if markets will have any faith that they’ll actually materialize. </p>
<p>Also, oil data, especially short-term production and storage data by state-owned entities, tend to be opaque. The “reference” production levels for some countries (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Venezuela) might be higher than how much they can sustainably produce. The reference level is the base amount from which cuts will be made. </p>
<p>Although Iran’s October production was reported at about 3.7 million b/d, for example, the reference level was accepted as 3.975 million b/d, the <a href="http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/opec-deal-expected-tighten-oil-market-2017-production-cut-750000-1-million-bpd-seen/">amount it produced at its peak in 2005</a>. </p>
<p>Russian production – which won’t be subject to monitoring – may be down during the winter months due to scheduled maintenance or by focusing on drilling.</p>
<p>In other words, cuts may appear to be compliant with the agreement, but the actual supply to global markets may not be much different than what it would be without it.</p>
<h2>Will the US get back in the game?</h2>
<p>Second, whether U.S. producers of unconventional oil fields like shale in North Dakota are capable and willing to respond to higher prices by drilling more wells and increasing production is crucial. </p>
<p>Coincidentally, U.S. production fell a little over 1 million b/d after the price of oil plunged early last year. So if they do boost production to take advantage of higher prices, the increase could make the cuts a wash. The question then becomes, would a higher price tempt them to begin drilling again? </p>
<p>Since the price collapse, drilling in the U.S. has focused on the Permian Basin in west Texas and New Mexico. The number of rigs operating in the Permian has increased by about 100 since April to reach 235, or <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=79687&p=irol-reportsother">a little under half of the 477 rigs actively drilling for oil across the U.S.</a> Another 119 rigs are drilling for gas. At the peak in October 2014, <a href="http://fuelfix.com/blog/2016/08/12/permian-basin-leads-big-jump-in-rig-count/">1,609 rigs were operating in oil basins</a> in the U.S.</p>
<p>Sustained prices above $50 should encourage more drilling.</p>
<p>However, “upstream” operators (explorers and producers), oilfield services companies and “midstream” transportation and storage businesses have been going through a period of adjustment, having idled hundreds of rigs and laid off <a href="http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Fed-U-S-oil-job-cuts-reach-about-118-000-7237605.php">tens of thousands of employees</a>. It will not be easy to mobilize these resources quickly. Nor is it clear that it makes financial sense to do so. </p>
<p>The availability of cheap loans during the post-financial crisis era of ultra-low interest rates was instrumental in encouraging too many companies to drill too many wells too quickly, which led to the collapse of <a href="http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_fut_s1_d.htm">natural gas prices in the U.S. in the early 2010s</a> and that of <a href="http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm">oil prices in late 2014</a>. Many companies are still burdened by those debts. </p>
<p>If prices fall after billions of dollars of new investment, the financial recovery of many companies will be stunted. Combined with the uncertainty associated with the expected rise in interest rates and the high costs of remobilization rigs and crews, it is difficult to imagine U.S. oil companies overreacting to the OPEC cuts.</p>
<h2>Libya and Nigeria</h2>
<p>Third, Libya and Nigeria, though members of OPEC, are not part of the announced agreement. </p>
<p>Libyan production has been recovering from 250,000 b/d in August and reached almost 600,000 b/d in late November. Libya’s <a href="https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Libya/images/crude_oil_production.png">long-term goal</a> is to pump 1.6 million b/d, the level before the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi, and the country might be able to pass the halfway mark next year.</p>
<p>Nigeria should be capable of producing close to 2 million b/d, but pipeline disruptions caused by conflict in the Niger Delta have reduced that to 1.5 million. The resolution of the conflict, albeit not an easy task given the longevity of it, could bring more supplies to the market and thus undercut prices.</p>
<h2>Macroeconomic malaise</h2>
<p>Finally, the world economy has been anemic in recent years despite low oil prices, which have historically been a driver of economic growth. Oil demand growth has been muted.</p>
<p>One potential reason is the reduction in fuel subsidies in recent years in some key countries <a href="https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8709-Prices-at-China-s-petrol-pumps-stoke-debate-on-fossil-fuel-subsidy-reform-">such as China</a>. So consumers in many countries may be paying the same price for petroleum products now as they did in 2014 when the oil was $90 a barrel and will continue to do so unless governments reinstitute some subsidies. This might be difficult because macroeconomic policies in many countries seem to be failing to stimulate their economies. </p>
<p>Also, years of supporting energy efficiency and alternative fuels or technologies along with regulating emissions might be dampening oil demand growth in some countries. One can only speculate that a sustained and significant increase in the price of oil would encourage these policies. </p>
<p>Overall, OPEC’s production cuts are not building on strong demand growth. To the extent it succeeds in raising the price, it can end up undermining demand. </p>
<h2>Back to the fundamentals</h2>
<p>It is difficult to do justice to the complexity of oil market dynamics in such a short article. </p>
<p>In short, though, the planned OPEC cuts have already provided some respite for oil producers, in terms of higher prices, thanks to the eagerness of financial traders. But once the excitement of the news passes, these and other demand-supply fundamentals will once again govern the oil price.</p>
<p>Although these higher prices will enhance producer revenues and slow the buildup of oil inventories, they can also dampen demand growth and encourage too much production too soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gürcan Gülen works for a university research unit that receives funding from various organizations. For details see <a href="http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/">http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/</a>.</span></em></p>To see why, one must only consider the core economic principle of supply and demand.Gürcan Gülen, Research Scientist, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/619182016-07-18T19:53:52Z2016-07-18T19:53:52ZHow revenues from oil and gas in Africa can be made to work for ordinary people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130881/original/image-20160718-2153-g3x8py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Barrels in Nigeria used for transporting oil to communities.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/127688197@N07/15467016505/in/photolist-pyLv9n-phguhw-pyLtTg-phgyYW-pyujpz-pyuo1x-pyLpk8-pyujUn-phgsMY-pyLoYB-phgxiS-7WXdw8-phgWp9-pyJD5o-phfxWg-7X1c2U-pyLsS8-phgvVG-fmChWf-phgyCq-pyugnT-74eWMf-pyunAV-cwvvhm-phhhHp-gUB68D-pyLrJX-cwvzUU-5jQVjm-7WxtGc-89Dfvh-51ywWG-gUB8Um-6fwZfS-hjcd3z-4REjh8-d5puwq-pyugpg-rmjnhD-7fGRV-kJbkaT-4REoLF-74j238-cwvsmY-4LgBCr-kJd1aL-7fGtG-fmo8yD-7WXcZM-4REpnv">Stakeholder Democracy/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Critics point out that ordinary people have not benefited from oil and gas exploitation in many African states. Billions of dollars in revenue have had little positive impact on the lives of most people in countries like <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-luandas-residents-are-asking-where-did-all-the-oil-riches-go-49772">Angola</a> and Nigeria. Local content policies have been <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420716300502">expanding</a> across Africa and are currently being drafted in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique. In a new book, <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/petro-developmental-state-africa/">The Petro-Developmental State in Africa</a>, Jesse Salah Ovadia argues that this needn’t be the case and that a different approach focused on local content is possible. This involves regulations that encourage employment and nurture local companies to increase domestic participation in the industry. I asked him whether his proposed approach could be a game changer for economic development in Africa’s oil producing states.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the petro-developmental state and why does it matter now?</strong></p>
<p>The petro-developmental state is a vision of what sub-Saharan countries can achieve through their oil and gas resources. It is tapping non-renewable resources for <a href="http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/theme/structural-transformation-and-natural-resources">structural transformation</a> and improving people’s lives in the long term for an eventual transition to post-carbon economies.</p>
<p>In a petro-developmental state, local content policies support infant industries. The approach is anchored in oil and gas due to the state’s leverage with this commodity to regulate local participation. These industries can grow and develop comparative advantage over time in areas of economic activity that have non-oil applications and eventually employ large numbers of people and contribute to building a more robust economy.</p>
<p>In fact, it’s a vision of state-led industrialisation and job creation anchored in oil that actually diversifies economies away from oil. The value of local content is <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X14000604">just as great as the revenues from oil</a>, while the benefits are much more <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/10/is-natural-resource-based-development-still-realistic-for-africa/">important for long-term development</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Is local content the way forward following the oil price shock?</strong></p>
<p>The oil price shock has actually deepened my belief that local content is the key to how petroleum resources can be developmental. Oil prices will always be volatile and have provoked economic crises in Angola and Nigeria. That’s one of many reasons a development strategy cannot be based on use of petroleum revenues alone. </p>
<p>Even when prices drop, oil production continues. So the opportunities for development through local content remain because the companies producing the oil still require all of the same goods and services from local suppliers. The benefits are much more consistent and they also reduce the reliance on oil over the long term as local companies expand and diversify from the oil sector into the non-oil economy.</p>
<p><strong>What are the possible benefits of local content for communities in areas of oil and gas production?</strong></p>
<p>There are a number of different things meant when people talk about local content. In Ghana, Kenya and other new oil states in Africa, local content is often understood to direct benefits to communities. I don’t really see it that way, for me it’s about national development through expanded manufacturing and services sectors.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130864/original/image-20160718-2150-1ng07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A focus on local content, in countries like Angola, can see communities benefit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There may be some ways communities can participate in the industry in lower-skilled jobs and supplying basic services and this should be encouraged. But other policies are needed by governments to redistribute the revenues and benefits from petroleum and for companies to obtain their social licence to operate by giving back to the communities they work in.</p>
<p><strong>How might Africa’s new oil producers approach local content?</strong></p>
<p>There are a variety of factors to consider as Africa’s new oil producers <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420716300502">set up their approaches</a> to local content. The days of high oil prices are gone and we have to remember that local content involves a cost to both government and the private sector. </p>
<p>Governments should start by evaluating the existing levels of education and skills as well as industrial development. These factors, combined with the amount of oil the country has, how hard it is to extract and how long it will last, are important to consider when determining how to promote local content.</p>
<p>Setting unrealistic targets for local content will reduce the benefit. Rather than creating hard targets across all oil service activities, it would be better to try to build comparative advantage in selected areas. It is worth sacrificing some oil revenues in order to maximise local content if additional regulation would increase in-country value creation. </p>
<p>I worry though that over time as new producers develop their local content policies, they are bowing to pressure to take a less regulatory and more voluntary approach – something I call “soft local content policies”. This doesn’t work because local content is about national development, not creating shared value or win-win outcomes.</p>
<p><strong>What is meant by the dual nature of local content? How can it be reconciled with development objectives?</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2012.701846">Dual nature</a> is the idea that local content can both benefit local elites and have positive developmental effects. But I think it will be a struggle in Angola and Nigeria as well as newer oil producing countries like Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique to have the positive effects outweigh the negative ones.</p>
<p>Angola’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/angola-president-appoints-daughter-as-head-of-state-run-oil-firm">recent appointment of Isabel dos Santos</a>, the president’s daughter, as the head of the state’s oil company has a dual nature. Clearly she’s there to ensure her father’s continued access to a key source of rent and patronage. But paradoxically she’s also there to reform and professionalise the company as it struggles to deal with the low oil price environment. I think she was put there for both of these reasons. This demonstrates the dual nature of Angola’s attempt to build a developmental state.</p>
<p>Angola’s top-down approach requires significant political reform to be successful because the balance between elite benefit and national development is so one-sided. The lesson for the citizens of Africa’s new oil states is to pay attention, engage on the issues and make their voices heard on questions of petroleum management and oil-backed development.</p>
<p><strong>How much of a game changer could local content be for the emergence of a petro-developmental state?</strong></p>
<p>I’m often accused of being overly optimistic on this matter, as there is a lack of evidence about the impact of various local content policies. But I believe I’m making a more nuanced argument about a shift in the limits of the possible and a new opportunity for petro-development. Obviously an actually-existing petro-developmental state would be game changing.</p>
<p>It’s a vision though that I theorise alongside a less optimistic vision of new forms of elite accumulation and rent-seeking. There is an open question about how successful old and new African oil producers will be in using local content to bring about developmental outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Lind receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). </span></em></p>It is important to nurture local companies and increase domestic participation in Africa’s emerging oil economies.Jeremy Lind, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616012016-06-30T14:19:37Z2016-06-30T14:19:37ZWhat President Buhari can do to help Ogoniland clean up oil pollution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128815/original/image-20160630-30649-vezb1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has moved to address environmental pollution and improve the livelihoods of the Ogoni people. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Akintunde Akinleye/ Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Nigerian government has finally started the clean-up of <a href="http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=27076&ArticleID=36199">oil-soaked Ogoniland</a> after years of inaction. A billion dollars has been committed to what has been described as one of the world’s most wide-ranging and long-term oil <a href="http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/370/articles/ogoniland-oil-spills-clean-up-will-take-up-to-30-years.html">clean-up exercises</a>. </p>
<p>This part of southeastern Nigeria is known to have been affected by widespread oil pollution largely caused by the Shell oil company for more than <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90b2a612-dfc4-11e5-b072-006d8d362ba3.html#axzz4D2tTQAbZ">five decades</a>. A report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) <a href="http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmentofOgonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx">catalogues the damage</a> inflicted on <a href="http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/AboutOgoniland/tabid/54219/Default.aspx">Ogoniland</a>. It includes contaminated groundwater, oil-soaked soils and a polluted environment. There has also been lasting damage to important ecosystems like mangroves.</p>
<p>Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan failed to act on the results of the <a href="http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf">2011 United Nations report</a>. It is commendable that President Muhammadu Buhari has moved to address the environmental pollution and improve the livelihoods of the Ogoni people. </p>
<p>But there are four fundamental omissions that could undermine the clean-up. These could also prolong the 20- to 30-year target of recovering and cleaning up the region. These fundamental omissions are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the limited involvement of Nigerian experts in the assessment;</p></li>
<li><p>the lack of a socioeconomic study of Ogoniland;</p></li>
<li><p>an absence of comprehensive data on the full extent of damage on livelihoods and its long-term costs; and</p></li>
<li><p>the lack of clarity on who is responsible to pay for the clean-up between the oil companies and Nigerian government.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Overlooking many Nigerian experts</h2>
<p>The report was based on environmental assessment of contamination of four thematic areas. These were land, health, vegetation and water. The recommendations cut across vital issues including operations, technicality, monitoring and public health for cleaning up the region. </p>
<p>But the assessment lacked the input of many experts from Nigerian research institutes. The role of international experts cannot be ignored but the exclusion of local expertise can be costly. Many of the stakeholders involved came from government and the oil industry. These stakeholders lack the knowledge acquired by Nigerian academics involved in research related to Ogoniland over the years. </p>
<p>The few Nigerian researchers named in the report were from the River State University of Science and Technology. This gave the impression that no other academics were involved in researching the region. In fact, a good number of Nigerian <a href="http://www.niomr.gov.ng/">research institutes </a>and universities have conducted <a href="http://oceanunical.org/">research in the region</a>. These include the universities of <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/rem.20137/abstract">Port Harcourt</a> and <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0013932778900046">Ibadan</a>. This research dates back to the 1970s and has been undertaken in collaboration with European entities. </p>
<p>The absence of key stakeholders from the research community could potentially frustrate government efforts in establishing new institutions to oversee and implement the recommendations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128816/original/image-20160630-30638-se7cmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The lack of socioeconomic concern by government has caused agitation among the Ogoni people.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Akintunde Akinleye/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Socioeconomic study</h2>
<p>The United Nations assessment did not include a socioeconomic study of Ogoniland. This would estimate the socioeconomic costs of environmental damage due to oil pollution. The report documented a number of socioeconomic experts but no data were provided. </p>
<p>This integration is crucial and could have enhanced the findings of the report. Rather, this study was left to a transition phase that will ensure the activities of the United Nations assessment are carried out. Without this, the real cost valuation of the environmental restoration and clean-up cannot be accurately estimated.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0143622811001470">Studies</a> suggest that social disharmony, sabotage, militancy, water contamination and low food production among the people is largely driven by oil pollution. But there is an absence of comprehensive data on economic assessment due to environmental pollution. This would in turn show the full extent of damage on livelihoods and its long-term costs in Ogoniland. </p>
<p>If the government does not consider the socioeconomic impact of implementing the recommendations it will incur more agitation from the Ogoni people, as is <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36641153">already happening.</a> </p>
<p>Socioeconomic losses are huge in the region and the United Nations report does not provide costs related to these losses. As a result, the people of Ogoniland have already started demanding their share of allocation from the government based on the information from the report. </p>
<p>The key question is: what is the environmental damage cost of underpinning factors of socioeconomic activities, including agricultural production, education and property in Ogoniland? The lack of an estimate for the total oil spill cost and lack of formula for compensation could further aggravate tension in the region.</p>
<p>The origins of the conflict goes back to the <a href="http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmentofOgonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx">2011 report</a>, which was based on an independent assessment on the impact of oil pollution in the region. Its main recommendations were operational, technical, public health and follow-up monitoring for the clean-up. This is far from solving the problem in the region without aggregating the oil spill cost with full extent of damage.</p>
<p>The current estimate for the operational costs of the clean-up is estimated at US$1 billion. But with a proper socioeconomic analysis, the cost could double or triple.</p>
<h2>Who pays for the clean-up?</h2>
<p>Another issue lies in who is responsible to pay for the clean-up. It is not clear in the report who between the oil companies and Nigerian government is responsible. This may be partly attributed to the absence of socioeconomic data. The availability of this kind of information could see the oil companies pay a very significant amount as compensation due to their oil pollution activities. This can be seen as a deliberate <a href="https://secured-static.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2001/4/contamination-in-paul-nia-by-a.pdf">attempt</a> to avoid further debate about holding oil companies responsible for oil pollution in the region. </p>
<p>One of the significant findings was that several years of oil exploration have led to public health and safety issues. This was especially true in relation to water contamination. Benzene, which causes cancer, was found standing at 900 times recommended levels. This was indirectly attributed to the activities of oil companies.</p>
<h2>What Nigeria now needs to do</h2>
<p>The Nigerian government must take urgent steps to correct the omissions identified in the report. A technical body of local experts should be set up to coordinate new institutions that can be complemented by international expertise and skills.</p>
<p>In addition, a socioeconomic analysis of the impact of oil pollution in the region is needed to make informed decisions. This analysis must capture the underlying causes, and the impact of oil pollution and its associated cost.</p>
<p>An independent organisation must be set up to lead the socioeconomic study. This can be done in partnership with local academic institutions, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. The results should form a rational basis for making decisions to speed up the implementation process.</p>
<p>A set of clear indicators must be developed to monitor and evaluate the activities of new institutions. This must be supported by a clear legal framework based on transparency and openness. This approach should make individuals or groups accountable at every stage of the implementation process and must be well communicated to the public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ademola Adenle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oil spills have long plagued the Ogoni people living in the Niger Delta. President Buhari is finally doing something about the pollution. But there are flaws in the government’s approach.Ademola Adenle, Fellow at the School of Global Environmental Sustainability, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/558812016-03-09T04:41:22Z2016-03-09T04:41:22ZHow peace can be achieved in the Niger Delta<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114286/original/image-20160308-22135-ghchu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The oil fields in the Niger Delta are regularly sabotaged by people living in communities surrounding the fields.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Niger Delta is a region where violence and instability <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0ea77f2e-def4-11e5-b072-006d8d362ba3.html#axzz41q9qIzcZ">never seems to stop</a>. There are many deeply rooted problems that drive this instability: frequent low-level violence often in the form of oil field sabotage organised by criminal gangs and ordinary citizens, constant-low level, environmental degradation, endemic corruption and a poor socioeconomic environment for the region’s citizens. </p>
<p>Countries that are rich in natural resources like oil or gas are more prone to <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15047/282450Natural0resources0violent0conflict.pdf?sequence=1">violence and instability</a>, a situation known as the <a href="http://gga.org/publications/africa-in-fact-august-2012">resource curse</a>. This can disrupt national governance through state and societal corruption.</p>
<p>Nigeria is certainly resource rich: it has amassed more than US$600 billion in oil revenue <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SVymAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=nigeria+oil+wealth+600+billion+since+1970s&source=bl&ots=OIQvrTgF6B&sig=yYg4KQzIAQ1yPGC-B6XO-uN8G88&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi47O2MpqLLAhVBoBQKHVkAAmkQ6AEIKjAD#v=onepage&q=nigeria%20oil%20wealth%20600%20billion%20since%201970s&f=false">since the 1960s</a>. But it also bedevilled by weak state institutions and massive, widespread <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21689905-most-nigerians-live-poverty-millions-would-be-spared-if-officials-stopped">corruption</a>. This leaves areas like the Niger Delta vulnerable despite its resource wealth. </p>
<p>How can this situation be changed?</p>
<h2>Mapping a policy path</h2>
<p>One possible <a href="http://cogentoa.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2015.1126423">answer</a> can be based on the policies pursued by other resource-rich countries. Such examples can be found in Bolivia, Norway, Mexico and Venezuela. They have all established government-run non-renewable trust funds to manage natural resource revenue and help insulate their countries from variations in non-renewable energy prices. </p>
<p>These are often funded through a proportion of non-renewable revenue channelled directly into the fund like <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-oil-idUSKCN0QP0X020150820">Mexico</a>, for example. But government mismanagement has caused problems in some cases like in <a href="http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/02/09/guest-post-venezuelas-collapse-has-nothing-to-do-with-falling-oil-prices/">Venezuela</a>. </p>
<p>To combat the massive corruption problem, a <a href="http://cogentoa.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2015.1126423">Nigerian trust fund</a> would require the involvement of an exterior agency which could run it in partnership with the Nigerian government. The United Nations Development Program represents an obvious candidate. It has experience running development projects, currently totalling <a href="http://open.undp.org/#2016">more than 3000</a> in <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html">170 countries</a>. </p>
<p>A steering committee incorporating a majority of UN staff alongside political representatives from Nigeria’s federal and state mechanisms and civic society would help plan and implement socioeconomic development. This must be in tandem with local societal consultation meetings. </p>
<p>Where possible, projects would be awarded to the region’s craftsmen whilst revenue would also be set aside for youth training. The fund would be financed through an excess revenue allocation scheme similar to Mexico. This will generate revenue for development at a level which would not significantly hamper state expenditure in other areas.</p>
<p>The road to the funds potential implementation lies in government efforts at combating corruption. The removal of constitutionally enshrined political immunity <a href="http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/29988/17770">clauses</a> for key figures and strengthening <a href="https://www.britishcouncil.org.ng/justice-for-all-nigeria/about/anti-corruption/strategic-operational-capacity-acas">anti-corruption agencies</a> and <a href="http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/nigerias_corruption_challenge">laws</a> would help create a political environment that could potentially be more conducive to the idea of a Nigerian trust fund.</p>
<p>Overall, while this is a bold scheme, the problems in the Niger Delta require a radical solution. It must take into account the destabilising impact of corruption and the ability to deliver sustained socioeconomic for citizens through oil revenue that is utilised for the benefit of wider society and not for the few.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114288/original/image-20160308-22138-xtz337.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The ability to deliver economic benefits for citizens through oil revenue will play a role in stopping the sabotage of these fields.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Niger Delta’s problems</h2>
<p>Oil field sabotage is not new in the Niger Delta.</p>
<p>Since the 1960s, development agencies in the Niger Delta have been plagued by endemic <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qzL0-nBbMCQC&pg=PA175&lpg=PA175&dq=OMPADEC+CORRUPTION&source=bl&ots=UQzyFRc-2C&sig=ClK-YGeVJjsP3QJv7zwmIeU2jUg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjurarx-qbLAhWIShQKHYkZAWUQ6AEIODAG#v=onepage&q=OMPADEC%20CORRUPTION&f=false">corruption</a>. The situation was apparent in the most recent Niger Delta <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=3IyzV5XOCmwC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=niger+delta+development+commission+corruption&source=bl&ots=4Zf_BwaO0g&sig=tWmmOxpBnrC5ILiLI5B3ZcvnoOA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjr-YfK-abLAhUDThQKHbHvDuA4ChDoAQgiMAE#v=onepage&q=niger%20delta%20development%20commission%20corruption&f=false">development commission</a>.</p>
<p>These problems show that the amnesty programme cannot be utilised as a penicillin-style policy prescription that could somehow successfully combat these other underlying symptoms. But the ongoing sabotage incidents reflect the failure of numerous federal government development agencies to achieve widespread socioeconomic development for the region’s citizens. </p>
<p>Not much has changed since the amnesty programme was introduced in 2009. Sabotage remains <a href="http://cogentoa.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2015.1126423">extremely common</a> and frequent in the Niger Delta’s oil fields. Some of the attacks are carried out by <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil_es.pdf">organised criminal gangs</a>; others are spearheaded by ordinary citizens of the region. Several factors influence the citizens’ behaviour and animosity towards the oil fields.</p>
<p>These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the federal government’s <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=marGAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA97&lpg=PA97&dq=niger+delta+federal+government+control+of+revenue&source=bl&ots=d5fLoT01qD&sig=kqvD9mXRa23ljlZQp_wS3bprKbU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjhzemaqKXLAhUDRhQKHTM_BCIQ6AEIODAE#v=onepage&q=niger%20delta%20federal%20government%20control%20of%20revenue&f=false">control</a> of natural resources;</p></li>
<li><p>the ongoing environmental degradation <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=v6JDANiswUcC&pg=PA84&lpg=PA84&dq=niger+delta+socio-economic+situation&source=bl&ots=JRaaQCiEBF&sig=RRqoSNBjwtUXlVoSPiKsPwaoatY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwidmPmY_qTLAhVIVxQKHYp1Dt44ChDoAQhMMAg#v=onepage&q=niger%20delta%20socio-economic%20situation&f=false">caused</a> through oil exploitation;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/nigerias-illegal-oil-bunkerers">illegal siphoning</a> from oil pipelines; and</p></li>
<li><p>the region’s poor socioeconomic <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YUUeY4dBxIUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA6&dq=niger+delta+illegal+siphoning+of+oil&ots=YgaWXNzPU9&sig=o3CIJfEWPPk3FPYbydtbrlvXAi0&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">situation</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Clearly communities feel marginalised and neglected. Issues from as far back as the 1960s have not been resolved and the amnesty programme did not come with any concrete plans to improve residents’ daily lives. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate/forecast">High unemployment</a>, particularly among young Nigerians, has driven some people to turn to <a href="http://thegroundtruthproject.org/five-years-after-ceasefire-niger-deltas-retired-militants-warn-of-new-violence/">crime and violence</a>. This is their only means of survival and an expression of their anger at the situation.</p>
<p>The Niger Delta’s story sounds hopeless. It’s not. Policy interventions and a series of lessons from elsewhere in the world can hopefully not only address corruption but also tackle the region’s social and economic development issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Gonzalez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria must work together with its people to help keep the peace in the Niger Delta.Adrian Gonzalez, PhD Candiate in Human Geography, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.