tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/one-belt-one-road-33049/articlesOne Belt One Road – The Conversation2019-10-03T12:48:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1209192019-10-03T12:48:48Z2019-10-03T12:48:48ZSolar power could stop China’s Belt and Road Initiative from unleashing huge carbon emissions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295438/original/file-20191003-52852-5xwd91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/two-engineers-conducting-outdoor-inspection-solar-737424406?src=Mq_RlgQiBB1s_xGjOnZz_A-1-2">Jenson/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China has invested <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/belt-and-road-by-the-numbers-where-xi-s-project-stands-now">US$90 billion</a> in the countries involved in its <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-silk-road-is-laying-ground-for-a-new-eurasian-order-105991">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI) since 2013. The BRI involves developing infrastructure in <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/gbjj.htm">126 partner countries</a> to boost trade within a region stretching from Indonesia to Western Europe via the Middle East and East Africa, inspired by the historical <a href="https://reconasia-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/e0/22/e0228017-7463-46fc-9094-0465a6f1ca23/vision_and_actions_on_jointly_building_silk_road_economic_belt_and_21st-century_maritime_silk_road.pdf">Silk Road</a>.</p>
<p>While this economic development could help raise living standards in participating countries, it could also come with a huge potential increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. But <a href="https://www.cell.com/joule/fulltext/S2542-4351(19)30275-2#secsectitle0025">our research</a> demonstrates the region has huge potential for generating solar power. This could decouple economic growth from increasing carbon emissions. </p>
<p>Currently, over 55% of global GHG emissions come from the entire BRI region, and this number is expected to <a href="https://www.cell.com/joule/fulltext/S2542-4351(19)30275-2">rise to above 65% by 2030</a> if their growth rates of emissions remain at current levels. Four countries in particular – China, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia – are among the <a href="https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html">top ten CO₂ emitters in the world</a> and were responsible for 39.4% of the global emissions in 2017. Those emissions are likely to rise unless substantial efforts are made.</p>
<p>Yet the region also has huge potential to reduce emissions and become a major source of solar energy. Little research has been done specifically on the BRI region. So we evaluated the potential for solar electricity across 66 adjoining countries within the main BRI region, considering all the factors that might impact output.</p>
<p>Our study suggests solar generation in the BRI region could provide a total of 448.9 petawatt hours of electricity annually, which is the equivalent of 41.3 times the area’s total 2016 electricity demand. Just 3.7% of this would provide enough annual electricity to power the entire region in 2030 based on projected demand, requiring land equivalent to approximately 0.9% of China’s total area.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=680&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=680&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=680&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286787/original/file-20190802-117871-ocjl83.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The BRI Countries (Chen & Lu et al,. 2019)</span>
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<p>The four top emitters have an estimated solar potential of up to 238.2 petawatt hours, representing 53.1% of the total for the BRI region we studied. If these countries could use solar power to generate just 30% of their electricity demand, it could save approximately <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.CO2.ETOT.ZS">2.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide</a>, equivalent to a reduction in global carbon emissions of 7.2%.</p>
<p>We also found that 63 out of the 66 countries consume a total of just 30.1% of the region’s electricity, but together could produce as much as 70.7% of its solar power. However, this highlights one of the challenges with any plans to make the most of solar power in the BRI region. Countries need to cooperate over technology or even link their electricity grids together in order to share their green power.</p>
<h2>Building connections</h2>
<p>For many countries in the BRI, energy interconnection can be achieved by upgrading and expanding existing local interconnected grids within each individual country rather than by creating new infrastructure. This may make interconnection easier, cheaper and have less environmental impact. For example, countries such as Kazakhstan could upgrade the Soviet-era <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Future-Of-Central-Asias-Unified-Power-Grid.html">Central Asian Unified Power System</a> designed to share hydro power between countries in the region.</p>
<p>Because solar power is intermittent, countries need to build their solar infrastructure to supply electricity created in times and places where the sun shines most, to when and where it is most needed. For example, connecting rural areas to more highly populated urban areas, which could be done across country borders to maximise the outputs.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285703/original/file-20190725-136764-j21yx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Belt and Road Initiative (Chen & Lu et al,. 2019)</span>
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<p>There are also barriers to introducing a massive solar generating programme in the first place. Although solar energy has become <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2019/04/26/falling-costs-make-wind-solar-more-affordable/">a lot cheaper</a> in recent years, the cost of building, operating and maintaining large amounts of solar infrastructure could still be prohibitive for many of the lower income countries in the BRI region, and the industry might need subsidies to make it happen.</p>
<p>The relatively poor condition of the electricity grids in many of these countries will also make it harder to integrate a variable source of energy such as solar power. This is due to the lack of modern technologies within some of these countries, especially in regions with a poor electricity network. </p>
<p>These challenges mean that governments and industry need to work together effectively and cooperate across borders in order to reduce the risks of investing heavily in solar. If they get it right, these countries could jump from their carbon-intensive trajectories to a low-carbon future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathryn G Logan received funding from the Natural Environment Research Council through the UK Energy Research Centre's ADVENT project. Funding was also received from the School of Biological Sciences, University of Aberdeen, the Santander Mobility Award and the Energy Technology Partnership Postgraduate and Early Career Researcher Grant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shi Chen has received funding from the National Key R&D Program (2016YFC0208901), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71690244 and 71722003) and Volvo Group in a research project of the Research Center for Green Economy and Sustainable Development, Tsinghua University, and a grant from the Harvard Global Institute to the Harvard-China Project titled “China 2030/2050: Energy and Environmental Challenges for the Future”.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Xi Lu is a tenured associate professor at Tsinghua University. He received the National Science Fund for Excellent Young Scholars in 2017.</span></em></p>Tapping just 3.7% of solar potential in countries in China’s intercontinental infrastructure programme could power the entire region.Kathryn G. Logan, PhD Candidate in Environmental Science, University of AberdeenShi Chen, PhD Candidate in Environmental Science and Engineering, Tsinghua UniversityXi Lu, Associate Professor, School of Environment, Tsinghua UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140392019-03-22T11:57:42Z2019-03-22T11:57:42ZItaly joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative – here’s how it exposes cracks in Europe and the G7<p>Italy is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-47640196">projected</a> to be the first G7 nation to officially endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). And that’s raising the ire of both the European Union and the United States. </p>
<p>Having re-entered a recession at the end of 2018, the eurozone’s third largest economy is welcoming China’s President Xi Jinping for a three-day state visit. While there, Italy is expected to sign a memorandum of understanding – making it the 124th nation to sign up for this geographically expansive infrastructure and investment strategy.</p>
<p>Proposed in 2013, China’s BRI is a transcontinental project that focuses on infrastructure investment and projects that promote regional cooperation, development and connectivity. It offers participants a means to secure their trade, energy and transport network. China presents it as a win-win relationship aimed at mutual growth. But there are suspicions regarding China’s motivations – it’s seen as a way for China to embed its global influence – and it could make participants dependent on China. Today the BRI is linked to two-thirds of the world’s population, and has to-date seen investment of more than <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/explained/article/2187162/explained-belt-and-road-initiative">US$1 trillion</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-silk-road-is-all-part-of-its-grand-strategy-for-global-influence-70862">China's new Silk Road is all part of its grand strategy for global influence</a>
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<h2>The Italian job</h2>
<p>While the current Italian government has not been fully unified toward China, a severe economic downturn has made the world’s second largest economy look more appealing to it. Alberto Bradanini, Italy’s former ambassador to China, has <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3001374/german-opposition-italys-belt-and-road-deal-china-unfair-says">stressed</a> that Europe’s own indecision and inability to tackle trade deficits with China (of which Italy contributed approximately €176m, or an eighth of the EU’s total trade deficit) is a key motivator behind this decision. </p>
<p>Italy wants to enhance its “Made in Italy” brand through increasing trade – especially in the form of exports – to China. The BRI is seen as a vehicle to achieve this. Italy offers goods (in particular luxury goods and foodstuffs) that are attractive to China’s growing middle class and increasingly affluent population. </p>
<p>China is also interested in investing in Italian firms. More significant, however, are Italy’s key infrastructure assets. This would enhance the transport and trading network of the BRI, giving it strategic access to Europe. Less than 2% of Italy’s sea imports come from China so there are substantial prospects for growth in that area.</p>
<p>A deal between Genoa’s port authority and shipping firm China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) has already been <a href="http://www.themeditelegraph.com/en/shipping/shipowners/2019/03/09/italian-government-approves-the-agreement-between-port-genoa-and-cccc-mATmTv0fVOUZqaQuBsOw3K/index.html">approved</a> by the Italian government. And the port city of Trieste <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/world/europe/italy-trieste-china-belt-road.html">hopes for something similar</a>. This would offer China and the BRI a more direct route to move goods onto the European continent and an ideal hub for accessing new rail lines and transport networks to Germany, Austria, Slovenia and other regional economies. By giving China access to its ports, Italy is hoping for infrastructure investment from China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – something the Italian government is trying to link to its role in the BRI.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265134/original/file-20190321-93054-bdl9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The port of Genoa could soon be the scene of Chinese investment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/runneralan/17030089127/in/photolist-rWTEbk-deRN6r-aVHRZX-djya5d-W8QSMA-9hfpT6-9iPpW3-dEsmVb-g8F35f-22thXDw-NZMKxi-8AW8tW-rP8nYa-ovaXA7-ognRMX-cEuEkG-9iL2wr-oQsgTc-9r32zC-2bDWTXC-otEc5X-NZPLUc-PJmNTL-9heyGx-2bDWE5s-p8WNtX-K6cqKt-fMsQ4V-vkKyT-8VHyNj-HzJQg-bd3FmB-jEmB39-2dy6R2N-p8Xx7G-9iNZvJ-ftJMnd-9hebqk-5P62ce-bdcDBr-9hesaM-rUromM-oPFAFc-9hfn1p-ohm6Tv-7kxDYt-aVJ2C2-azGh6L-pvRoKu-p8XZQF">Alan Kotok / flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>With the port city of Palermo due to be part of Xi’s itinerary, it is clear that China is focused on European shipping terminal options. Following Algeria’s <a href="http://northafricapost.com/25232-algeria-joins-belt-and-road-initiative.html">joining of the BRI in mid-2018</a>, Palermo could help establish a new North African trade corridor.</p>
<h2>Disunity and discontent</h2>
<p>The international response to Italy’s decision has been, at best, mixed. Germany and France have led the charge, raising concerns of China’s poor reputation regarding transparency, unfair BRI practices of favouring Chinese firms, as well as Chinese protectionism restricting European firms from Chinese projects. </p>
<p>The EU is clearly particularly concerned about what Italy’s decision means for the bloc’s China Policy. It is important to note, however, that when it comes to the BRI, Europe’s unified China’s Policy fell as early as 2017. It was then that Premier Li Keqiang’s <a href="https://www.merics.org/cn/node/4621">visited Hungary</a> and the coalition of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), also including Poland and the Czech Republic, signed up to the BRI. Greece, Portugal and Croatia then followed suit.</p>
<p>The US has also derided Italy’s decision to break the G7 position on the BRI. The Trump government has labelled the BRI as a vehicle for debt trap diplomacy and accused the BRI of being nothing but a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-possible-impact-of-chinas-belt-and-road-agreement-with-italy/a-47921042">vanity project</a>. </p>
<p>The growing tensions between China and the US do not help matters. The two sides are locked in a trade war and US <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-case-signals-new-us-china-cold-war-tech/">charges of espionage</a> against Chinese tech firm Huawei encapsulate its fears over Chinese investment in strategic industries and acquisitions. But traditional alliances seem to have fallen to the wayside, as Telecom Italia has agreed to remain partnered with Huawei.</p>
<p>The full impact of Xi’s visit to Italy will become more clear come April 9 when Brussels is scheduled to host an EU-China summit. In the build up however, the EU’s increasingly China-sceptic leadership has published an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf">official strategy document</a> labelling China a “systemic rival”. Targeting the BRI specifically, it calls upon member states to work together to pressure the Chinese for more accountability and greater transparency in the area of infrastructure and investment projects. Furthermore, on March 18th the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-accelerates-moves-to-block-chinas-market-access/">EU tabled a proposal</a> calling upon all member states to ban Chinese firms from bidding on public procurement projects. </p>
<p>Italy’s status as a G7 country is a coup for the Chinese leadership and the legitimacy of the BRI. While the prospect of Italy’s participation underscores growing fault lines in the EU’s joint approach to China, China has also been effective at dividing and conquering EU member states by targeting them individually. </p>
<p>So Italy’s decision to join the BRI is significant. But four years ago we saw Italy, France and Germany join China’s AIIB, contrary to US wishes. Therefore, Italy is neither the first, nor will it be the last European economy that will “go rogue” and follow its own national interest with regard to China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Winnie King does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy is neither the first, nor will it be the last European economy to follow its own national interest and look for Chinese support.Winnie King, Teaching Fellow East Asian and International Political Economy, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1096632019-01-14T19:10:51Z2019-01-14T19:10:51ZWhy the Indian Ocean region might soon play a lead role in world affairs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253477/original/file-20190112-43532-1q1wnya.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The economics of countries in the Indian Ocean region are rapidly growing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent days, Australia’s foreign minister Marise Payne announced efforts to strengthen Australia’s involvement in the Indian Ocean region, and the importance of working with India in defence and other activities. Speaking at the <a href="https://foreignminister.gov.au/articles/Pages/2019/mp_ar_190108.aspx">Raisina Dialogue in Delhi</a> – a geopolitical conference co-hosted by the Indian government – Payne <a href="https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2019/mp_sp_190109.aspx">said</a>:</p>
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<p>Our respective futures are intertwined and heavily dependent on how well we cooperate on the challenges and opportunities in the Indian Ocean in the decades ahead.</p>
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<p>Among <a href="https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2019/mp_sp_190109.aspx">Payne’s announcements</a> was A$25 million for a four-year infrastructure program in South Asia (The South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity initiative, or SARIC), which will primarily focus on the transport and energy sectors. </p>
<p>She also pointed to increasing defence activities in the Indian Ocean, noting that in 2014, Australia and India had conducted 11 defence activities together, with the figure reaching 38 in 2018.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/government-report-provides-important-opportunity-to-rethink-australias-relationship-with-india-100319">Government report provides important opportunity to rethink Australia's relationship with India</a>
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<p>Payne’s speech highlights the emergent power of the Indian Ocean region in world affairs. The region comprises the ocean itself and the countries that border it. These include Australia, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Somalia, Tanzania, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.</p>
<p>In terms of global political significance, the Atlantic Ocean can be viewed as the ocean of our grandparents and parents; the Pacific Ocean as the ocean of us and our children; and the Indian Ocean as the ocean of our children and grandchildren. </p>
<p>There is an obvious sense in which the region is the future. The <a href="https://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/newsroom/indian-ocean-countries-come-together-to-boost-prosperity-and-security">average age of people</a> in the region’s countries is under 30, compared to 38 in the US and 46 in Japan. The countries bordering the Indian Ocean are home to 2.5 billion people, which is one-third of the world’s population. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253474/original/file-20190112-43514-1lo10rj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The countries in the Indian Ocean region host a wide variety of races, cultures, and religions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span>
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<p>But there is also a strong economic and political logic to spotlighting the Indian Ocean as a key emerging region in world affairs and strategic priority for Australia. </p>
<p>Some 80% of the <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/10054-china-faces-barriers-in-the-indian-ocean">world’s maritime oil trade</a> flows through three narrow passages of water, known as choke points, in the Indian Ocean. This includes the Strait of Hormuz – located between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman – which provides the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean.</p>
<p>The economies of many Indian Ocean countries are expanding rapidly as investors seek new opportunities. Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Tanzania witnessed <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG">economic growth</a> in excess of 5% in 2017 – well above the global average of 3.2%.</p>
<p>India is the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/05/29/india-economic-fundamentals-remain-strong-investment-pick-up-needed-sustained-growth-says-new-world-bank-report">fastest growing major economy</a> in the world. With a population expected to become the world’s largest in the coming decades, it is also the one with the most potential.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/253475/original/file-20190112-43525-40ixl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically important choke points.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Politically, the Indian Ocean is becoming a pivotal zone of strategic competition. China is investing hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure projects across the region as part of its <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad">One Belt One Road</a> initiative. </p>
<p>For instance, China <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/10/08/641625157/a-new-chinese-funded-railway-in-kenya-sparks-debt-trap-fears">gave Kenya a US$3.2 billion</a> loan to construct a 470 kilometre railway (Kenya’s biggest infrastructure project in over 50 years) linking the capital Nairobi to the Indian Ocean port city of Mombasa. </p>
<p>Chinese state-backed firms are also <a href="https://www.ibtimes.co.in/after-sri-lanka-maldives-china-fund-major-infrastructure-project-bangladesh-677345">investing in infrastructure and ports</a> in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bangladesh. Western powers, including Australia and the United States, have sought to <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm">counter-balance China’s growing influence</a> across the region by launching their own infrastructure funds – such as the US$113 million US fund announced last August for digital economy, energy, and infrastructure projects.</p>
<p>In security terms, piracy, unregulated migration, and the continued presence of extremist groups in Somalia, Bangladesh and parts of Indonesia pose significant threats to Indian ocean countries.</p>
<p>Countries in the region need to collaborate to build economic strength and address geopolitical risks, and there is a logical leadership role for India, being the largest player in the region. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Narendra Modi told the Shangri La Dialogue in June, 2008:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Indo-Pacific is a natural region. It is also home to a vast array of global opportunities and challenges. I am increasingly convinced with each passing day that the destinies of those of us who live in the region are linked.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>More than previous Indian Prime Ministers, Modi has travelled up and down the east coast of Africa to promote cooperation and strengthen trade and investment ties, and he has <a href="https://www.livemint.com/Politics/nYzBEWMFuwAdAgxeb2BBKM/Narendra-Modis-10-guiding-principles-for-India-Africa-ties.html">articulated strong visions</a> of India-Africa cooperative interest.</p>
<p>Broader groups are also emerging. In 1997, nations bordering the Bay of Bengal established the <a href="https://bimstec.org/">Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation </a> (BIMSTEC), which works to promote trade links and is currently negotiating a free trade agreement. Australia, along with 21 other border states, is a member of the <a href="https://www.iora.int/en">Indian Ocean Rim Association</a> (IORA) which seeks to promote sustainable economic growth, trade liberalisation and security.</p>
<p>But, notwithstanding India’s energy and this organisational growth, Indian Ocean cooperation is weak relative to Atlantic and Pacific initiatives.</p>
<p><hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cooperation-is-key-to-securing-maritime-security-in-the-indian-ocean-67989">Cooperation is key to securing maritime security in the Indian Ocean</a>
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</em>
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</p>
<p>Australia’s 2017 <a href="https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper">Foreign Policy White Paper</a> seeks to support IORA in areas such as maritime security and international law. Private organisations, such as the Minderoo Foundation, are doing impressive research – as part of the <a href="https://www.minderoo.com.au/flourishing-oceans/">Flourishing Oceans intiative</a> – on the migration of sea life in an effort to advance environmental sustainability and conservation. </p>
<p>But Australia could focus more on how to promote the Indian Ocean. In Australia’s foreign affairs circles, there used to be a sense Asia stopped at Malta. But it seems the current general understanding of the “Indo-Pacific” extends west only as far as India. </p>
<p>What this misses – apart from the historical relevance and contemporary economic and political significance of the Indian Ocean region generously defined – is the importance of the ocean itself. </p>
<h2>Not just important for trade and ties</h2>
<p>If the Ocean was a rainforest, and widely acknowledged as a repository of enormous biodiversity, imagine the uproar at its current contamination and the clamour around collaborating across all countries bordering the ocean to protect it. </p>
<p>The reefs, mangroves, and marine species that live in the Ocean are under imminent threat. According to some estimates, the Indian Ocean is warming <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00382-010-0984-y">three times faster</a> than the Pacific Ocean . </p>
<p>Overfishing, coastal degradation, and pollution are also harming the ocean. This could have catastrophic implications for the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2012/08/plenty-of-fish-in-the-sea-food-security-in-the-indian-ocean/">tens of millions of fishermen</a> dependent on the region’s marine resources and the enormous population who rely on the Indian Ocean for their protein. </p>
<p>Australia must continue to strengthen its ties in the region - such as with India and Indonesia - and also build new connections, particularly in Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Jeffrey receives funding from the Australian Research Council. The Australia India Institute receives funding from the Commonwealth Government of Australia and Victorian Government.</span></em></p>Around 80% of the world’s maritime oil trade passes through the Indian Ocean. And the economic and political might of the region is growing.Craig Jeffrey, Director and CEO of the Australia India Institute; Professor of Development Geography, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/982632018-06-29T10:31:04Z2018-06-29T10:31:04ZCentral Asia is the new economic battleground for the US, China and Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225470/original/file-20180629-117385-l1wiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the threat of a trade war escalates between the US and China, all the talk has centred on the tariffs that each side might impose on the other. But another important battleground is in Central Asia where both are fighting for strategic control.</p>
<p>Central Asia offers an array of economic opportunities for major powers, including access and control of valuable natural resources, favourable terms of trade and efficient trade routes. In seeking to shape the region, the US, China and Russia are all trying to regulate the international order in their image. The region might be more commonly associated with <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00992.x">danger and security interests</a>, such as Islamic radicalism, but what gets ignored is the region’s role as a strategic economic battleground.</p>
<p>Central Asia is at the centre of two new initiatives for regional economic integration by China and Russia that run against a longstanding economic vision of the US.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651630001X">Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)</a>, was established in 2015. It consists of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, and is modelled on the European Union. There is free movement of goods, capital, labour and services, and common economic and industrial policies.</p>
<p>Second, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415">China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)</a> was proposed in 2013 and aims to create a trade and infrastructure network connecting Asia with Europe and Africa along ancient trade routes, such as the land and maritime Silk Road. Since then, many Central and South Asian countries have signed <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_Book_.pdf">cooperation agreements with China</a> to invest in energy and transport infrastructure.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225467/original/file-20180629-117385-rtlibn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s Belt and Road trade route.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia’s EEU and China’s BRI contrast with the dominant Washington Consensus model of free market economic thinking. This is promoted by <a href="http://www.kentikelenis.net/uploads/3/1/8/9/31894609/babbkentikelenis2018-international_financial_institutions_as_agents_of_neoliberalism.pdf">US-backed international financial institutions</a>, such as the International Monetary Fund. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, neoliberal reforms have been <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/Transition+Economies:+Political+Economy+in+Russia,+Eastern+Europe,+and+Central+Asia-p-9780470596197">standard economic prescriptions</a> in Central Asia and other parts of the world.</p>
<h2>Different motives</h2>
<p>These three ways of imagining the economic future of Central Asia are attempts by the major powers to address specific economic contradictions and crises at home. The US has been trying to open up other countries to its trade, investment and finance since <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309816812472968?journalCode=cnca">its post-war economic model</a> began to unravel in the early 1970s. </p>
<p>Russia’s strategy evolved in response to the devastating economic and political effects of <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137472960_1">radical neoliberal reforms (or “shock therapy”)</a>, which were implemented after 1991. China, meanwhile, has sought to invest its vast amounts of surplus capital into other countries’ infrastructure and productive projects, largely in response to fewer profitable opportunities at home.</p>
<p>Each economic strategy seeks a different outcome. The US and other Western countries want to <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/balihar-sanghera/economic-dystopia-in-kyrgyzstan">extract wealth</a> through the ownership and control of valuable assets, including natural resources and money. </p>
<p>In creating a customs union, Russia hopes to gain a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00128775.2015.1105672">competitive advantage</a> over other trading partners, so as to protect its faltering industries. China wants to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415">shorten delivery times</a> and to access emerging markets.</p>
<p>Each great power has had varying degrees of economic success. Meanwhile, their political legitimacy has been weakened in different ways due to their negative effects in the region. </p>
<p>For instance, there has been a backlash of social discontent <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/balihar-sanghera/economic-dystopia-in-kyrgyzstan">in Kyrgyzstan</a> over foreign and elite acquisition of assets, predatory lending practices and household indebtedness. And, after entering the EEU, Kazakhstan experienced <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/putins-eurasian-dream-is-over-before-it-began/">economic difficulties</a>, resulting in strained relationships with Russia. In Tajikistan, some Chinese-financed projects have been <a href="https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/one-belt-one-road-a-new-source-of-rent-for-ruling-elites-in-central-asia">embroiled in controversies</a> over kleptocracy.</p>
<h2>US upper hand</h2>
<p>There are also various <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17405900410001674506">non-economic elements</a> at play. Despite ethnic and religious differences, Russia’s EEU member countries have strong cultural, linguistic and symbolic ties because of their shared Soviet history. China, meanwhile, has reinvented the historical connections between China and Central Asia, by comparing the BRI to the Silk Road’s ancient network of trade routes.</p>
<p>But there are three reasons why the US is likely to be more successful than Russia and China. First, the US has considerable economic and financial resources to make cooperation beneficial for Central Asian elites. Recently Kazakhstan’s president <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/nazarbayev-goes-to-washington/">Nursultan Nazarbayev met the US president, Donald Trump</a>, and business leaders in Washington DC to appeal for more American investment and technology.</p>
<p>Secondly, the US also has the political and military power to sabotage its rivals’ plans. For instance, the US and the European Union were instrumental in pulling Ukraine away from Russia’s orbit. <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Geopolitics-of-Eurasian-Economic-Intergration.pdf">Without Ukraine’s participation</a>, the EEU is considerably weakened. Plus, the US navy poses a threat to China’s trade routes through <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/">the South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the US has been able to manage its economic contradictions and crises by drawing upon wider economic governing structures, including <a href="http://www.kentikelenis.net/uploads/3/1/8/9/31894609/babbkentikelenis2018-international_financial_institutions_as_agents_of_neoliberalism.pdf">international financial institutions</a> like the IMF and the World Bank. The <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5790">US dollar as the world currency</a> has also enabled the US to sustain an excessive military and consumer spending without undertaking austerity cuts.</p>
<p>The power that wins in Central Asia will shape the nature of global capitalism in the future and the economic and political crises the world will face. The 2007-08 global financial crisis, for example, showed how destructive and damaging American capitalism can be – and its full ramifications are still to be felt. </p>
<p>Since then, two alternative forms of economic arrangements have been built by Russia and China which could prevent history repeating itself. Inadvertently, Central Asia finds itself at the centre, as rival great powers seek to stamp their form of capitalism on the region and the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balihar Sanghera was a George F. Kennan Scholar from September to December 2017. The authors are grateful to the staff at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. for their generosity and support during their stay at the Center.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elmira Satybaldieva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Central Asia is at the centre of two new initiatives by China and Russia that run against a longstanding economic vision of the US.Balihar Sanghera, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of KentElmira Satybaldieva, Research Fellow, Conflict Analysis Research Centre, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973612018-05-29T22:58:41Z2018-05-29T22:58:41ZCanada’s disturbing lack of vision on dealing with a rising China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220838/original/file-20180529-80661-1lhznkf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ambassador of China to Canada Lu Shaye is photographed at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ottawa on May 24, 2018, following the announcement that Canada had turned down China's takeover bid for Aecon.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Justin Tang</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Canadian government’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-23/trudeau-blocks-chinese-takeover-of-aecon-on-security-grounds">rejection</a> of the proposed takeover by a Chinese company of the Toronto-based construction giant Aecon on the grounds of “national security” reflects Canada’s vulnerability in an increasingly complicated era that’s been dubbed the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/are-we-living-in-a-chinese-century/"><em>China Century</em></a>.</p>
<p>Canada’s construction industry went to great lengths to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/construction-group-warns-of-price-cutting-if-aecon-sold-to-china/article37850620/">lobby Ottawa</a>, even <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/news-polls/cccc-acquisition-of-aecon-group">commissioning opinion polls</a>, in the hopes of influencing the fate of the proposed $1.5 billion bid. For good reason, segments of the Canadian private sector are terrified that their Chinese competitors will outperform, undercut and win favour with Canadian political leaders.</p>
<p>Corporate activists, backed by a stream of opinion from ex-national security officials, political opportunists and academic ideologues, have weighed in. To their credit, the campaign worked on Innovation Minister Navdeep Bains, who rejected the deal in a <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2018/05/minister-bains-statement-on-cccis-proposed-acquisition-of-aecon.html">noticeably vague statement</a>.</p>
<p>The stakes are high for many of Canada’s special interest groups, and Ottawa’s decision was therefore a welcome one to those stakeholders.</p>
<p>This of course is unsurprising, and in some ways Canadians are lucky to have officials publicly going to bat to defend their interests. Yet this discussion must evolve. Those who rejected the Aecon bid on grounds of national security, environmental threats and labour rights amid a modern-day <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/red-scare">Red Scare</a> need to be more honest about what’s happening.</p>
<p>The truth is Canadian businesses simply can’t compete against Beijing’s giant state-backed corporations.</p>
<h2>China excels at infrastructure</h2>
<p>Canada’s construction industry is particularly vulnerable given China’s long history of expertise in engineering and infrastructure development. In fact, China is so good at building infrastructure that it’s become a principle export strategy within the Chinese government’s trillion-dollar <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-belt-and-road-china-infrastructure-project-2018-1">One Belt One Road</a> policy.</p>
<p>The failed Aecon deal represents a difficult and structural challenge for Canada and its Western allies. How do liberal trading nations work with a politically socialist state that has ironically become a <a href="https://www.policyforum.net/china-is-reshaping-the-liberal-order-and-its-for-the-better/">champion of the liberal trading order</a>?</p>
<p>This is a question Ottawa has yet to answer.</p>
<p>As Canadians debate on how to engage a rising China, Beijing has been aggressively positioning itself as a viable and pragmatic alternative to the West’s development model. The past five years has seen China take leading roles in multilateral institutions such as the <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a> and the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a> while investing heavily in the developing world.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping is seen here in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in August 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andy Wong, Pool)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And despite Western fears around President Xi Jinping’s so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html">China Dream</a> philosophy and a recent <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43361276">constitutional amendment</a> that allows him to hold on to power indefinitely, Beijing still needs friends. And it’s actively pursuing investment partners, including those in Canada.</p>
<p>But the most recent attempt via the Aecon takeover goes well beyond any one company. </p>
<p>Beijing is scouring the planet for resources and opportunities to meet its domestic consumption needs. Chinese state-owned enterprises will continue to seek out large-scale takeovers, business partnerships and resource accumulation investments. </p>
<p>How then does Canada operate in an increasingly relevant liberal trading system that is taking on some distinct Chinese characteristics?</p>
<h2>Anti-China rhetoric doesn’t accomplish much</h2>
<p>To start, the anti-China investment narrative found in some public policy circles does little to address this question. While takeover bids will continue, rejecting them on unclear grounds of threats and national security can only go so far. Pundits and think tanks need to drop the anti-China rhetoric and give serious thought to how the global trading order has evolved.</p>
<p>Second, Ottawa must develop a clear non-partisan policy, one that can cut across party lines, on how to work with a rising China that still aligns with Canada’s national interests. This will be difficult, something no federal government has yet to achieve. Still, developing a national task force on building and advocating a clear long-term China policy has never been more important.</p>
<p>Finally, Canadians need to have an honest conversation on what type of trading nation we want to build. Canada has significant investments in China, including a recent <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/cppib-china-longfor-property-1.4508416">$800 million venture</a> by our state-owned Canada Pension Plan in Chengdu. Beijing has options to retaliate should they believe Canada is behaving unfairly. </p>
<p>Although rejecting the Aecon bid may have been in our national interest, Canadians must find a way to cut through the anti-China cacophony. As talks on possible <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/obstacles-ahead-canada-china-trade">Canada-China free trade deal</a> move forward, there must be a sophisticated understanding of how global trade networks are evolving.</p>
<p>Indulging in Red Scare rhetoric and continuing to ignore the new global trade realities is a bigger threat to Canada’s economic security than China itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97361/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert J. Hanlon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the wake of the Canadian government’s rejection of a Chinese takeover bid for construction company Aecon, Canada must drop the ‘Red Scare’ rhetoric and figure out how to engage with a rising China.Robert J. Hanlon, Assistant Professor of International Relations and Asian Politics, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/958742018-05-03T20:23:43Z2018-05-03T20:23:43ZChina-backed Sumatran dam threatens the rarest ape in the world<p>The plan to build a massive hydropower dam in Sumatra as part of China’s immense <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad">Belt and Road Initiative</a> threatens the habitat of the rarest ape in the world, which has only 800 remaining members. </p>
<p>This is merely the beginning of an <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/358/6362/442.full">avalanche of environmental crises</a> and broader social and economic risks that will be provoked by the BRI scheme.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-we-discovered-a-new-species-of-orangutan-in-northern-sumatra-86843">How we discovered a new species of orangutan in northern Sumatra</a>
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<p>The orangutan’s story began in November 2017, when scientists made a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-we-discovered-a-new-species-of-orangutan-in-northern-sumatra-86843">stunning announcement</a>: they had discovered a seventh species of Great Ape, called the Tapanuli Orangutan, in a remote corner of Sumatra, Indonesia. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.04.082">an article</a> published in Current Biology today, my colleagues and I show that this ape is perilously close to extinction – and that a Chinese-sponsored megaproject could be the final nail in its coffin.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=749&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=749&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=749&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217363/original/file-20180502-153900-1hf6gcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=942&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Forest clearing for the Chinese-funded development has already begun.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sumatran Orangutan Society</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ambitious but ‘nightmarishly complicated’</h2>
<p>The BRI is an ambitious but nightmarishly complicated venture, and far less organised than many believe. The hundreds of road, port, rail, and energy projects will ultimately span some 70 nations across Asia, Africa, Europe and the Pacific region. It will link those nations economically and often geopolitically to China, while catalysing sweeping expansion of land-use and extractive industries, and will have myriad knock-on effects. </p>
<p>Up to 2015, the hundreds of BRI projects were reviewed by the powerful <a href="http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/">National Development and Reform Commission</a>, which is directly under China’s State Council. Many observers have assumed that the NDRC will help coordinate the projects, but the only real leverage they have is over projects funded by the big Chinese policy banks – the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Development_Bank">China Development Bank</a> and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exim_Bank_of_China">Export-Import Bank of China</a> – which they directly control. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217365/original/file-20180502-153895-8e3ujj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s Belt & Road Initiative will sweep across some 70 nations in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Pacific region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mercator Institute for China Studies</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most big projects – many of which are cross-national – will have a mix of funding from various sources and nations, meaning that no single entity will be in charge or ultimately responsible. An informed colleague in China describes this model as “anarchy”. </p>
<h2>Tapanuli Orangutan</h2>
<p>The dangerous potential of the BRI becomes apparent when one examines the Tapanuli Orangutan. With fewer than 800 individuals, it is one of the rarest animals on Earth. It survives in just a speck of rainforest, less than a tenth the size of Sydney, that is being eroded by illegal deforestation, logging, and poaching. </p>
<p>All of these threats <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-road-building-explosion-is-shattering-nature-70489">propagate around roads</a>. When a new road appears, the ape usually disappears, along with many other rare species sharing its habitat, such as Hornbills and the endangered Sumatran Tiger.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217361/original/file-20180502-153908-n4ubed.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Tapanuli Orangutan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maxime Aliaga</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most imminent threat to the ape is a <a href="http://www.batangtoru.org/threats/hydro-electric-dam/">US$1.6 billion hydropower project</a> that Sinohydro (China’s state-owned hydroelectric corporation) intends to build with funding from the Bank of China and other Chinese financiers. If the project proceeds as planned, it will flood the heart of the ape’s habitat and crisscross the remainder with many new roads and powerline clearings. </p>
<p>It’s a recipe for ecological Armageddon for one of our closest living relatives. Other major lenders such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank aren’t touching the project, but that isn’t slowing down China’s developers. </p>
<h2>What environmental safeguards?</h2>
<p>China has produced a small flood of documents describing <a href="https://foe.org/resources/investing-green-belt-road-assessing-implementation-chinas-green-credit-guidelines-abroad/">sustainable lending principles</a> for its banks and <a href="https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201705/201705161104041.pd">broad environmental and social safeguards</a> for the BRI, but I believe many of these documents are mere paper tigers or “greenwashing” designed to quell anxieties.</p>
<p>According to insiders, a heated debate in Beijing right now revolves around eco-safeguards for the BRI. Big corporations (with international ambitions and assets that overseas courts can confiscate) want clear guidelines to minimise their liability. Smaller companies, of which there are many, want the weakest standards possible. </p>
<p>The argument isn’t settled yet, but it’s clear that the Chinese government doesn’t want to exclude its thousands of smaller companies from the potential BRI riches. Most likely, it will do what it has in the past: issue lofty guidelines that a few Chinese companies will attempt to abide by, but that most will ignore. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BtbKfC9HVYk?wmode=transparent&start=1" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Greater Leuser Ecosystem in northern Sumatra is the last place on Earth where Orangutans, Tigers, Elephants and Rhinos still persist together.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stacked deck</h2>
<p>There are three alarming realities about China, of special relevance to the BRI.</p>
<p>First, China’s explosive economic growth has arisen from giving its overseas corporations and financiers enormous freedom. Opportunism, graft and corruption are embedded, and they are unlikely to yield economically, socially or environmentally equitable development for their host nations. I detailed many of these specifics in <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/features/the-dark-legacy-of-chinas-drive-for-global-resources">an article</a> published by Yale University last year.</p>
<p>Second, China is experiencing a perfect storm of trends that ensures the harsher realities of the BRI are not publicly aired or even understood in China. China has a notoriously closed domestic media – <a href="https://asiancorrespondent.com/2018/04/china-model-threatens-press-freedom-in-asia-pacific/#wvflezrfe5mdMDjr.97">ranked near the bottom</a> in press freedom globally – that is intolerant of government criticism. </p>
<p>Beyond this, the BRI is the signature enterprise of President Xi Jinping, who has become the de-facto ruler of China for life. Thanks to President Xi, the BRI is now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-silkroad/pressure-on-as-xis-belt-and-road-enshrined-in-chinese-party-charter-idUSKBN1CT1IW">formally enshrined</a> in the constitution of China’s Communist Party, making it a crime for any Chinese national to criticise the program. This has had an obvious chilling effect on public discourse. Indeed, I have had Chinese colleagues withdraw as coauthors of scientific papers that were even mildly critical of the BRI.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217367/original/file-20180502-153900-1wm3oyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Xi Jinpeng at the 19th People’s Congress, where the BRI was formally inscribed into China’s national constitution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Foreign Policy Journal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Third, China is becoming increasingly heavy-handed internationally, willing to overtly bully or covertly pull strings to achieve its objectives. Professor Clive Hamilton of Charles Sturt University has warned that <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/australian-universities-fear-offending-chinese-backers-clive-hamilton/news-story/984a9cdadc8f9f7b1d16d47a8d1645cd">Australia has become a target</a> for Chinese attempts to stifle criticism. </p>
<h2>Remember the ape</h2>
<p>It is time for a clarion call for greater caution. While led by China, the BRI will also involve large financial commitments from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Infrastructure_Investment_Bank">more than 60 nations</a> that are parties to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, including Australia and many other Western nations. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-growing-footprint-on-the-globe-threatens-to-trample-the-natural-world-88312">China’s growing footprint on the globe threatens to trample the natural world</a>
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<p>We all have a giant stake in the Belt and Road Initiative. It will bring sizeable economic gains for some, but in nearly 40 years of working internationally, I have never seen a program that raises more red flags.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95874/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Laurance receives funding from the Australian Research Council and other scientific and philanthropic organisations. He is director of the Centre for Tropical Environmental and Sustainability Science at James Cook University, and founder and director of ALERT--the Alliance of Leading Environmental Researchers & Thinkers.
</span></em></p>A US$1.6 billion dollar dam in Sumatra threatens the recently discovered and desperately imperilled Tapanuli Orangutan.Bill Laurance, Distinguished Research Professor and Australian Laureate, James Cook UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/942582018-04-02T22:18:13Z2018-04-02T22:18:13ZWhat Xi Jinping’s power grab means for Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212803/original/file-20180402-189824-1pfm3q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping waves as he leaves a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank <a href="https://twitter.com/AIIB_Official/status/976398132610138113?s=19">tweeted last week</a> that Canada is now officially a full member, it hasn’t exactly made headlines. </p>
<p>Yet this is ostensibly a prelude for trade talks with China in an increasingly protectionist global landscape. And admission wasn’t cheap: Chinese sources say <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html">Ottawa committed more than a billion dollars to the Beijing-based bank</a>.</p>
<p>But China-watchers are more fixated on the dramatic changes rolling out after the <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/">just-completed National People’s Congress</a>.</p>
<p>Among other moves, the annual Congress voted 2,970-to-0 to give President Xi Jinping a second five-year term and repealed a regulation barring him from seeking a third.</p>
<p>They also rubber-stamped the creation of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-corruption/china-defends-controversial-detention-measure-of-new-anti-graft-ministry-idUSKCN1GB0KY?il=0">National Supervision Commission</a> (NSC), empowered to detain people for months at secret locations without access to lawyers or due process. </p>
<p>This NSC ranks above even China’s judiciary in the newly amended Constitution. Its establishment would certainly make Chinese Congress members pause before entering a symbolic protest vote against Xi’s Machiavellian restructuring of institutions to consolidate his own power.</p>
<h2>Xi calls all the shots</h2>
<p>After last week, any charade that state institutions are somehow independent from China’s Communist Party (read: presidential) diktat is now abandoned. <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/xi-jinping-engineers-change-to-make-himself-president-for-life/news-story/d2a6f49dcf9de96a5edb5a3d1b996502">Whatever Xi says, goes</a>. </p>
<p>He chairs six top-level “leading small groups” and numerous other committees and commissions, covering every major area of policy, and has taken direct command of China’s security and intelligence apparatus. (The “authority” of Chinese State Council Premier Li Keqiang is so debased that there is little point in our prime minister meeting with him again.)</p>
<p>Xi’s <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138112/xi-jinping-tries-rally-support-chinese-dream">closing address to Congress</a>, intended to be heard around the world, was a rousing paean to the greatness of China’s civilization across its dynastic history. </p>
<p>The inventions of paper and printing, dynamite and the compass were cited, as were China’s contributions to literature and philosophy and the construction of the Great Wall. It all underscored the point that Xi will oversee the “great restoration of the Chinese nation” by 2050. The characters <em>wei da</em> — meaning “great” — were heard 35 times in the 38-minute speech.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, his wife Sophie Gregoire and daughter Ella-Grace walk along a section of the Great Wall of China, in Beijing in September 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Where does Canada’s massive financial contribution to the AIIB fit in? It’s in Xi’s promise that “China will continue to actively engage in reconstruction and transformation of the systems of global governance by contributing more Chinese wisdom, Chinese redesigns and Chinese strength.” </p>
<p>This is part and parcel of Beijing’s massive <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world">One Belt One Road</a> global infrastructure program, which China expects will lead to its development of the Canadian North and polar waters in years ahead. </p>
<p>China has already declared itself a “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/14/china-we-are-a-near-arctic-state-and-we-want-a-polar-silk-road.html">near-Arctic nation</a>,” regardless of the strictures of geography.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-all-eyes-on-china-singapore-makes-its-own-arctic-moves-92316">With all eyes on China, Singapore makes its own Arctic moves</a>
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<p>Most alarming for Canada was the news that the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, responsible for promoting China’s influence around the world, will be restructured and beefed up. Xi characterizes the UFD as the Party’s “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4">magic weapon</a>,” and indeed, its activity in Western countries has increasingly been seen as a covert, coercive or corrupt tool for China’s foreign interests.</p>
<p>China’s 2015 hack of the U.S. government’s Office of Personnel Management — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html">exposing personal data of 21 million government employees or their spouses to China’s sophisticated super-computers</a> — was likely a glimpse of a Chinese social engineering behemoth intended to induce naïve Canadians to take actions that serve Beijing’s purposes more than Canada’s own sovereign interests.</p>
<h2>‘Useful idiots’</h2>
<p>It uses up-to-the-minute cyber-technology to cultivate the equivalent of Lenin’s “useful idiots” in nations of strategic interest to China — nations like Canada.</p>
<p>Beneath all the win-win rhetoric, and sops to Canadian greed, the real goal is buttressing the rise to power of a new global order, where liberal democratic principles are eclipsed by Xi Jinping’s determined, authoritarian passion to restore China’s lost greatness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/protocol-protocole/reps.aspx?lang=eng">diplomatic lists maintained by Global Affairs Canada</a>, the United States has 138 accredited foreign representatives at its embassy and consulates in Canada. </p>
<p>But China has 169. </p>
<p>As a onetime official in the Canadian embassy in Beijing, this begs some questions. Why does China need so many more people stationed in Canada than our much more predominant economic partner and closest ally? </p>
<p>And what are the Chinese diplomats doing here that the American diplomats aren’t?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada has reportedly committed more than $1 billion to a Chinese investment bank. Is Canada unwittingly serving as a ‘useful idiot’ in Xi Jinping’s grand plans to restore China’s lost greatness?Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/897012018-01-08T14:42:24Z2018-01-08T14:42:24ZChina steps into soft power vacuum as the US retreats under Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201118/original/file-20180108-83547-hu9el1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Peter</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Soft power is the ability of a country to shape other countries’ views, attitudes, perceptions and actions without force or coercion. Its importance has been acknowledged for centuries, though the term was only <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics">coined</a> by American political scientist and author Joseph Nye in the late 1980s.</p>
<p>A country’s soft power depends on many factors, including its performance, global image and international reputation. A state can use soft power to attract supporters and partners towards its policies, views and actions. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, the case of China’s giant pandas.</p>
<p>In 685 AD <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/14/china.conservation">Empress Wu Zetian</a> of the Tang Dynasty presented two giant pandas to the Japanese emperor. More than a millennium later, in 1941, Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek gifted another pair to the Bronx Zoo in appreciation of the US’s wartime help. Pandas remain a hallmark of Chinese soft power <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8a04a532-be92-11e7-9836-b25f8adaa111">even today</a>. </p>
<p>These animals have become symbols of China’s efforts in wildlife preservation and environmental protection. They are a way for China to communicate a caring and genial approach and culture. </p>
<p>And soft power will remain a key strategy for China into the coming decades. In October 2017, at the governing party’s national congress, President Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea/chinas-xi-strikes-conciliatory-note-broadens-diplomatic-focus-idUSKCN0JE04J20141130">outlined steps</a> to enhance China’s soft power and make its culture more globally appealing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will improve our capacity for engaging in international communication so as to tell China’s stories well, present a true, multi-dimensional and panoramic view of China, and enhance our country’s soft power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>China is stepping into a soft power vacuum created by the US’s new administration. Since Donald Trump was elected president, the US has eschewed soft power. It’s withdrawn from a global climate change agreement; renegotiating a number of bilateral treaties and taken an openly “America first”, and somewhat isolationist stance. Its cordial relations with many traditional allies have become strained.</p>
<p>China has spotted the gap and is attempting to woo many countries whose US relations are wavering. One of China’s key weapons is the “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4e96e20c-e742-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da">One Belt, One Road</a>” programme, a USD$900 billion initiative that aims to strengthen land and sea transportation links through major investments in transport infrastructure in Asia, Europe and Africa.</p>
<p>This is the equivalent of the US’s <a href="http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/history-marshall-plan/">Marshall plan</a>, which significantly improved West European countries’ economies after World War II. This help was not altruistic; nor is China’s “One Belt, One Road” programme. Assisting other nations through economic growth is a way of wielding soft power and advancing a country’s global standing. This will be important for China, which needs to counter its reputation as a one party state with hegemonic intentions.</p>
<h2>How soft power has featured</h2>
<p>China’s <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/45124/1/601791185.pdf">economic success</a>, massive <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/sierens-china-speeding-ahead-of-the-rest-of-the-world/a-40303445">infrastructural development</a>, academic and research progress, cultural heritage and success in sports will continue to increase its soft power in the future. </p>
<p>Culture and tourism are always important aspects of soft power. Some 138 million tourists visited China in 2016, a <a href="https://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/2016statistics/inbound.htm">growth of 3.5%</a> over 2015
Similarly, 122 million Chinese visitors <a href="https://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/2016statistics/outbound.htm">went abroad</a> in 2016, a growth of 4.3% over 2015. This increasing interchange of the visitors will give foreigners an insight into Chinese culture, history and its economic might – all of which will further enhance China’s soft power.</p>
<p>China is also emerging as a global leader in terms of academic and research progress. High income countries’ share of global research and development (R&D) expenditure <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/how_much_do_countries_invest_in_rd_new_unesco_data_tool_re/">fell</a> from 88% to 69.3% between 1996 and 2013.</p>
<p>China alone filled this gap. It increased <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/how_much_do_countries_invest_in_rd_new_unesco_data_tool_re/">its share</a> from a paltry 2.5% to 19.6% in 17 years. Recently, China’s average annual R&D expenditure growth has been 18.3%, compared to an anaemic growth rate in upper and middle income countries of 1.4%.</p>
<p>Increased educational and research activities have ensured that the number of foreign students in China is <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/china-international-students/">increasing rapidly</a>. China now ranks third in attracting foreign students, after the US and UK. Its universities are <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/best-universities/best-universities-china">climbing the global rankings</a>. This, along with rapid internationalisation, policies that support foreign students, and affordability of study and living costs compared to the West, means China could soon become the top destination for international students.</p>
<p>And the reverse is also true. Of some <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20170530122432533">5 million</a> international students pursuing higher education outside their countries, nearly 25% are Chinese. It’s another form of cultural interchange that will contribute to China’s soft power, as are the many <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-confucius-institutes-arent-perfect-but-have-much-to-offer-africa-51596">Confucius Institutes</a> set up around the world to showcase China’s culture, history, language, economic and social development. The idea is somewhat similar to the UK’s British Councils, Germany’s Goethe Institutes and France’s Alliance Francaise. </p>
<h2>China fills gap left by US</h2>
<p>American soft power, on the other hand, is now <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2004-05-01/decline-americas-soft-power">in retreat</a>. </p>
<p>The asymmetry of views between leaders of the world’s two soft powers has made Xi the poster child for globalisation, free trade and international cooperation.</p>
<p>During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in November 2017, in Vietnam, Trump <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/">reconfirmed</a> his “America first” policy. This approach will further decrease America’s soft power. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Xi is singing from a different hymn sheet. Also in Vietnam, he noted in <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/11/c_136743492.htm">his speech</a> that globalisation is an “irreversible historical trend” and championed multilateral trading regimes. </p>
<p>He presented a vision of the future that is interconnected and invited “more countries to ride the fast train of Chinese development.”</p>
<p>China’s rise as the world’s leading soft power will not be without hurdles. It must tackle border issues with its neighbours; navigate the current South China Sea <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/outofasia/2017/08/22/making-sense-of-the-south-china-sea-dispute/#2636ae831c3b">disputes</a> and find solutions to its extensive <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/toward-green-robust-economy-asit-k-biswas">environmental pollution</a> problems, among other things.</p>
<p>Despite these challenges, the US’s many missteps and China’s demonstrated social and economic success – as well as its increasing use of soft power – mean that the Asian giant is on the rise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asit K. Biswas is Distinguishedwith Visiting Professor at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He has been studying China since 1983. 21 of his 84 books are now available in Chinese.. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cecilia Tortajada does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is stepping into a soft power vacuum created by the new US administration. Since Donald Trump was elected president, the country has eschewed soft power.Asit K. Biswas, Distinguished visiting professor, University of GlasgowCecilia Tortajada, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Water Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of SingaporeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/883122017-12-05T19:18:43Z2017-12-05T19:18:43ZChina’s growing footprint on the globe threatens to trample the natural world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197080/original/file-20171130-12035-1gkyop1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chinese road-building corporation felling rainforest in the Congo Basin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bill Laurance</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many observers of China’s escalating global program of foreign investment and infrastructure development are crossing their fingers and hoping for the best. In an ideal world, China’s unbridled ambitions will improve economic growth, food security and social development in many poor nations, as well as enriching itself.</p>
<p>Such hopes are certainly timely, given the isolationism of the US Trump
administration, which has created an international leadership vacuum that China is eager to fill.</p>
<p>But a close look reveals that China’s international agenda is <a href="http://e360.yale.edu/features/the-dark-legacy-of-chinas-drive-for-global-resources">far more exploitative than many realise</a>, especially for the global environment. And the Chinese leadership’s claims to be embracing “green development” are in many cases more propaganda than fact.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-will-need-to-be-more-transparent-to-achieve-its-development-goals-67464">China will need to be more transparent to achieve its development goals</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To help steer through the maze, I provide here a snapshot of China’s present environmental impacts. Are China’s assertions reasoned and defensible, or something else altogether?</p>
<h2>Predatory force?</h2>
<p>For a start, China is overwhelmingly the world’s <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2016/09/wild-laws-china-role-wildlife-trafficking/">biggest consumer of illegally poached wildlife</a> and wildlife products. From rhino horn, to pangolins, to shark fins, to a menagerie of wild bird species, Chinese consumption drives much of the global trade in wildlife exploitation and smuggling.</p>
<p>Over the past 15 years, China’s rapacious appetite for ivory has largely driven a <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/36/13117.abstract">global collapse of elephant populations</a>. In response to growing international criticism, China promised to <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-31/china-to-ban-domestic-ivory-trade-by-end-of-2017/8155462">shut down its domestic ivory trade</a> by the end of 2017.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197081/original/file-20171130-12075-1at9skl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The author examining a Forest Elephant gunned down by ivory poachers in central Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmoud Mahmoud</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But even before China’s ban has taken full force, a <a href="http://www.savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017-Vigne-Lao-Ivory-Report-web.pdf">black market for ivory is developing in neighbouring Laos</a>. There, Chinese entrepreneurs are churning out great quantities of carved ivory products, specifically designed for Chinese tastes and openly sold to Chinese visitors.</p>
<p>China is also the world’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-timber/china-at-the-center-of-global-illegal-timber-trade-ngo-says-idUSBRE8AS08D20121129">biggest importer of illegal timber</a>, a trade that <a href="http://e360.yale.edu/features/chinas_appetite_for_wood_takes_a_heavy_toll_on_forests">imperils forests</a> while defrauding developing nations of billions of dollars each year in timber royalties.</p>
<p>China claims to be working to reduce its illegal timber imports, but its efforts are <a href="https://www.illegal-logging.info/regions/china">half-hearted at best</a>, judging by the amount of illegal timber still <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2017/10/checkpoint-china-the-shadowy-world-of-timber-smuggling/?n3wsletter&utm_source=Mongabay+Newsletter&utm_campaign=1868686cdf-newsletter_2017_11_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_940652e1f4-1868686cdf-67241623">flowing across its border with Myanmar</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197117/original/file-20171130-30931-19uglzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A queue of logging trucks in Southeast Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeff Vincent</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Infrastructure tsunami</h2>
<p>More damaging still are China’s plans for infrastructure expansion that will irreparably degrade much of the natural world. </p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative">One Belt One Road</a> initiative alone will carve massive arrays of new roads, railroads, ports, and extractive industries such as mining, logging, and oil and gas projects into at least 70 nations across Asia, Europe, and Africa.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197214/original/file-20171130-30907-ikjt5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A partial representation of China’s One Belt One Road scheme, circa 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mercator Institute for China Studies</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Chinese President Xi Jinping promises that the Belt and Road initiative will be “<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-green-planning-for-the-world-starts-with-infrastructure-85438">green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable</a>”, but such a claim is profoundly divorced from reality.</p>
<p>As my colleagues and I recently argued in <a href="science.sciencemag.org/content/358/6362/442">Science</a> and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/labs/articles/29065299/">Current Biology</a>, the modern infrastructure tsunami that is largely being driven by China will open a <a href="https://theconversation.com/massive-road-and-rail-projects-could-be-africas-greatest-environmental-challenge-51188">Pandora’s box of environmental crises</a>, including large-scale deforestation, habitat fragmentation, wildlife poaching, water pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.</p>
<p>China’s pursuit of natural resources is also escalating across Latin America. In the Amazon, for example, big mining projects – many of which are feeding Chinese industries – don’t just cause serious local degradation, but also promote <a href="https://phys.org/news/2017-10-amazon-threat-deforestation.html">widespread deforestation</a> from the networks of roads bulldozed into remote areas to access the mines. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mwwlxlMoVVQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Why roads are so dangerous for nature.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, China is the most aggressive consumer of minerals on the planet, and the <a href="https://globalcanopy.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/sleeping_giants_of_deforestation_-_2016_forest_500_results.pdf">biggest driver of tropical deforestation</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond this, China is pushing to build a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/16/amazon-china-railway-plan">5,000km railroad across South America</a>, to make it cheaper for China to import timber, minerals, soy and other natural resources from ports along South America’s Pacific coast. If it proceeds, the number of critical ecosystems that would be impacted by this project is staggering.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-3505">World Bank study</a> of more than 3,000 overseas projects funded or operated by China revealed how it often treats poor nations as “pollution havens” – transferring its own environmental degradation to developing nations that are desperate for foreign investment.</p>
<p>Finally, much has been made of the fact that China is beginning to temper its appetite for domestic fossil-fuelled energy. It is now a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/05/china-invest-renewable-fuel-2020-energy">leading investor</a> in solar and wind energy, and recently <a href="http://reneweconomy.com.au/china-halts-150-coal-fired-power-plants-84937/">delayed construction</a> of more than 150 coal-fired electricity plants in China.</p>
<p>These are unquestionably pluses, but they need to be seen in their broad context. In terms of greenhouse-gas emissions, China has exploded past every other nation. It now produces <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions">more than twice the carbon emissions of the United States</a>, the second-biggest polluter, following the greatest building spree of coal, nuclear, and large-scale hydro projects in human history.</p>
<p>Despite its new post-Trump role as the world’s de facto <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-paris-retreat-is-beijings-opportunity-78804">climate leader</a>, China’s overall agenda could scarcely be described as green.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197116/original/file-20171130-30919-pdm1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A tiger relaxes along a grassy bank.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Matt Gibson/Shutterstock</span></span>
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<h2>Iceberg ahead</h2>
<p>Some would say it’s unfair to criticise China like this. They would argue that China is merely following a well-trodden path of exploitative development previously forged by other nations and colonial powers.</p>
<p>But China is not the same as any other nation. The astounding growth and size of its economy, its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/china-wrote-belt-and-road-initiative-into-the-party-constitution.html">dangerously single-minded vision for exploiting natural resources and land internationally</a>, its intolerance of internal and external criticism, and its increasingly closed media and official myopia all combine to make it unique.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/developing-countries-can-prosper-without-increasing-emissions-84044">Developing countries can prosper without increasing emissions</a>
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<p>President Xi admits that many Chinese corporations, investors and lenders operating overseas have often acted aggressively and even illegally. But he says his government is powerless to do much about it. The most notable government response to date is a series of “green papers” containing guidelines that sound good in theory but are almost universally ignored by Chinese interests overseas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197121/original/file-20171130-30896-1lw73xn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Indigenous forest people in the Congo Basin become increasingly poor and marginalised as foreign miners, loggers and poachers invade their lands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmoud Mahmoud</span></span>
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<p>Are Xi’s assertions of powerlessness believable? He increasingly <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-17/china-president-xi-jinping-communist-party-congress/9056154">rules China with an iron hand</a>. Is it really impossible for China to guide and control its overseas industries, or are they simply so profitable that the government doesn’t want to?</p>
<p>Of course, China’s huge international ambitions will have some positive effects, and could even be economically transformative for certain nations. But many other elements will benefit China while profoundly damaging our planet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Laurance receives funding from scientific and philanthropic research organisations. He is the director of the Centre for Tropical Environmental and Sustainability Science at James Cook University, and founder and director of ALERT--the Alliance of Leading Environmental Researchers & Thinkers. </span></em></p>Chinese investment is driving an unprecedented investment boom in global infrastructure. But despite its claims to be pursuing green development, China’s building bonanza is harming the planet.Bill Laurance, Distinguished Research Professor and Australian Laureate, James Cook UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794772017-06-30T09:56:07Z2017-06-30T09:56:07ZChina’s grand geopolitical project threatens a new East-West divide in Europe<p>The recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing ushered in a new phase in China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/14/china-xi-silk-road-vision-belt-and-road-claims-empire-building">global repositioning</a>. In his <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm">opening speech</a> China’s president, Xi Jinping, reaffirmed the importance of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/12/the-900bn-question-what-is-the-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI), a massive investment project launched in 2013 to dramatically expand land and sea trade across Asia and beyond.</p>
<p>At the summit, Xi called the BRI “a new kind of globalisation”, a strategy intended to win other countries over rather than coercing them. It seems to be working. The benefits of taking part in the BRI are proving irresistible to many countries – and not just in China’s immediate neighbourhood. </p>
<p>Among the 60 representatives who attended this year’s summit, Central and Eastern European (CEE) states formed the largest group of EU countries. Unlike France and Germany, who sent a senator and a minister respectively, they were represented by their <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/belt-and-road-attendees-list/">very highest state officials</a>, an indicator of just how special a role they now play in China’s European plans.</p>
<p>This special relationship began in 2012, when China explicitly renewed its ties with the CEE states via an initiative known as the <a href="http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/">16+1</a>. This immediately made the “old” EU member states <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-chinese-investment-problem-sigmar-gabriel-eu/">uncomfortable</a> about the scale of Chinese investment to their east, <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/chinas_scramble_for_europe%20">fearing</a> a “scramble for Europe” might be getting underway.</p>
<p>Indeed, Chinese state-owned enterprises’ investments in European <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/31/c_135400121.htm">nuclear energy</a>, <a href="http://www.novinite.com/articles/174354/China+to+Invest+EUR+20+M+in+Bulgaria%E2%80%99s+Burgas+Port+to+Facilitate+Trade+with+Europe">construction</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/china-pacific-construction-montenegro-idUSL3N13L3Q720151202">railway infrastructure</a> have grown <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-12-03/chinas-foreign-direct-investments-within-161-cooperation">rapidly</a> since 2012. In countries such as the <a href="http://www.radio.cz/en/section/marketplace/chinese-investment-in-czech-republic-comes-under-the-spotlight">Czech Republic</a>, <a href="http://www.thediplomat.ro/articol.php?id=7164">Romania</a> and <a href="http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/hungary-flagship-china-europe">Hungary</a>, Chinese money has flowed into key energy, telecommunications and real estate sectors. </p>
<p>Chinese goods can now get to EU markets all the way to <a href="https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/europe.html">London</a> in as little as 18 days (though few EU goods are ever <a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/61616/">sent in the other direction</a>). The Balkan states, meanwhile, are cheering the prospect of a <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-railway-diplomacy-in-the-balkans/#.V1fscDV94dU">modern train line from Belgrade to Budapest</a>, bringing crucial infrastructure to a post-Communist rust belt left undeveloped for decades. </p>
<p>But regardless of the economic benefits of China’s engagement, the EU still sees it as a threat. Already the signs are there that all this investment comes with political strings attached.</p>
<h2>Pulling away</h2>
<p>Whereas the 16+1 initiative was presented as a unifying force for the region, the reality is that it’s encouraging European countries to directly compete for Chinese cash. China has embraced this state of affairs, changed the Belt and Road’s routes and plans many times already, often to suit a higher or more loyal bidder. </p>
<p>After Lithuania and Estonia welcomed the Dalai Lama in 2011, China offered its Baltic investment to a more “politically correct” <a href="http://www.baltic-press.com/hr007_hr360_summary/05_btj66_60-62.pdf">Latvia</a>. Likewise, when <a href="http://pikio.pl/wielka-szkoda-przez-konflikt-w-rzadzie-polska-stracila-miliardy-na-handlu-z-chinami-interes-przejely/">Poland hesitated</a> to accept Chinese investments due to security concerns the same opportunities were snapped up by its neighbours. This sort of “China-courting” doesn’t just affect the balance of investment, but also the coherence of the EU’s values and foreign policy.</p>
<p>Some analysts, for instance, have shown how Chinese enterprises’ economic power <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2e98f6f4-089d-11e7-ac5a-903b21361b43?mhq5j=e1">translates</a> into political influence at the highest levels of the <a href="http://www.praguemonitor.com/2015/11/20/hn-czech-presidential-office-chinese-cefc-personally-merge">Czech government</a>. Hungary’s vocal <a href="https://bbj.hu/economy/hungary-supports-granting-china-market-economy-status_116908">support for recognition of China as a market economy</a> stands at odds with the EU common trade policy, and its president’s <a href="http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592">praise for the illiberal China model</a> goes against core European values. </p>
<p>For its part, China has done much to calm the EU’s anxieties about its motives, insisting that it would prefer Europe strong and united and <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2094309/never-mind-belt-and-road-cash-what-about-chinas-growing">contributing to various European projects</a> rather than <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/china-uses-juncker-plan-to-boost-involvement-in-europe/">competing with them</a>. Nonetheless, while the EU urgently needs a <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI%282016%29586608_EN.pdf">common policy towards China</a>, many EU states clearly think they’ll do better if they form their own bilateral ties with Beijing. Why?</p>
<h2>Pushing back</h2>
<p>Some blame the EU’s failure to invest enough in <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/948137.shtml">developing its own backyard</a>, but that doesn’t explain the u-turns by countries such as Hungary, which have benefited immensely from the EU’s regional funds. The truth is that it isn’t just economics pushing the CEE states into the Chinese investors’ arms – it’s also rising nationalism and populism. </p>
<p>These political tendencies both take a dim view of Brussels and see China as a naturally preferable backer. Whereas the EU is pressing some of the CEE states to accept <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-and-slovakia-take-eu-refugee-quota-scheme-to-court/a-38781422">asylum seeker and refugee quotas</a> and reverse their <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/meps-slam-hungary-call-on-eu-to-explore-sanctions/">democratic deterioration</a>, China’s cash seems to come without political pressure. </p>
<p>Still, for all that the BRI is presented as a purely economic project, it remains deeply political – a key element of a strategy to build <a href="https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/2401876">a new global geopolitical and normative order</a>. The regional rivalry it has created on Europe’s eastern flank perfectly fits that strategy. It not only undermines the EU’s capacity to mount a unified response towards China, but normalises the China’s model as a viable system of governance, further entrenching some of the CEE states’ illiberal ways.</p>
<p>Given the circumstances, these countries’ governments have plenty to answer for. Yes, China might accelerate the EU’s fragmentation by encouraging them to assert themselves against both each other and Brussels – but it is ultimately these governments who are choosing to engage on China’s terms. If they aren’t careful, they could themselves <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-poland-hungary-analys-idUSKCN18A0BN?il=0">lose leverage with both China and Brussels</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, a common EU strategy could empower individual CEE states in their relationship with China as it would keep in check the “divide-and-rule” politics of the BRI. In an unusually assertive move, the EU28 ultimately withdrew from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road">trade statement</a> that capped the May 2017 BRI summit. Perhaps there is more will to push back than China bargained for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Małgorzata Jakimów does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>European countries are competing against Brussels and each other for China’s affections. And that is undermining the EU.Małgorzata Jakimów, Lecturer in Chinese Politics, School of East Asian Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777052017-05-16T20:11:21Z2017-05-16T20:11:21ZThe Belt and Road Initiative: China’s vision for globalisation, Beijing-style<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169415/original/file-20170516-7015-s5nej7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">World leaders, led by Chinese President Xi Jinping, meet for the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a multifaceted economic, diplomatic and geopolitical undertaking that has morphed through various iterations, from the “New Silk Road” to “<a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad">One Belt One Road</a>”.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html">BRI imagines</a> a US$1.3 trillion Chinese-led investment program creating a web of infrastructure, including roads, railways, telecommunications, energy pipelines, and ports. This would serve to enhance economic interconnectivity and facilitate development across Eurasia, East Africa and more than 60 partner countries. </p>
<p>First proposed in September 2013, it is the signature foreign policy initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is a project of unprecedented geographical and financial scope.</p>
<p>BRI has two primary components: the overland Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and the sea-based 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Together, they form the “belt” and “road”. </p>
<p>SREB’s <a href="http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1882600/laying-foundations-chinas-one-belt-one-road">overland infrastructure network</a> encompasses the New Eurasia Land Bridge and five economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia; China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Pakistan; the China-Indochina peninsula; and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar. The SREB’s connective sinews will be high-speed rail and hydrocarbon pipeline networks.</p>
<p>The MSR is focused on developing key seaports that connect to land-based transportation routes. </p>
<p>China has <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-02/03/content_28087627.htm">been at pains to emphasise</a> the co-operative nature of the initiative and its objective of “win-win outcomes”. In his <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d59444f33677a4d/share_p.html">address</a> to the Belt and Road Forum for International Co-operation in Beijing, Xi framed the BRI in terms of “peace and co-operation”, “openness and inclusiveness”, “mutual learning”, and “mutual benefit”.</p>
<p>Yet behind the rhetoric of harmony and mutuality lies a substantive strategy for growing an emerging China-led operating system for the international economy. This could potentially succeed the US-led <a href="http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html">Washington Consensus</a> and <a href="http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-320747/">Bretton Woods system</a>.</p>
<h2>What China gets from the BRI</h2>
<p>BRI projects are likely to increase China’s economic and political leverage as a <a href="http://www.iberchina.org/files/2016/obor_economist.pdf">creditor</a>. </p>
<p>China has established the multilateral <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a> (AIIB) and the $40 billion <a href="http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23773/index.html">Silk Road Fund</a>. These are financial vehicles for BRI infrastructure projects, yet the vast bulk of funding to date has come from China’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/18db2e80-3571-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e">big state-owned investment banks</a>.</p>
<p>The prospect of access to Chinese financial largesse to fund much-needed infrastructure investments has attracted attention from many prospective partner nations. Many of these appreciate the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-belt-and-road-initiative-is-not-chinas-marshall-plan-why-not/">minimal political conditionalities</a> that come with Chinese finance, in comparison to finance on offer from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.</p>
<p>The BRI has been viewed as a way for China to productively use its enormous, $3 trillion capital reserves, internationalise the renminbi, and deal with structural issues as its economy navigates the so-called “new normal” of lower growth.</p>
<p>Perhaps foremost among these is the issue of <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-the-chinese-marshall-plan-strategy/">industrial over-capacity</a>. Having maxed out investment-driven growth through a frenzy of domestic infrastructure building following the 2008 global financial crisis, the BRI represents an international stimulus package that will utilise China’s idle industrial capacity and safeguard jobs in key industries such as steel and cement.<br>
This is a significant political dividend for the Chinese government. The <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/01/chinese-political-legitimacy-in-transition/">Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy</a> rests on maintaining economic growth and improving people’s standard of living. </p>
<p>In relation to energy security, the BRI will assist China in diversifying its energy sources through greater access to <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/deconstructing-chinas-energy-security-strategy/">Russian and Iranian oil and gas</a>. This will be achieved by linking with pipeline networks from Russia and Central Asia. </p>
<p>By investing in pipelines from Gwadar, on the coast of Pakistan, to Xinjiang, and from coastal Myanmar to Yunnan, China also can <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/24/chinas-strategic-interests-in-pakistans-port-at-gwadar/">diversify its transportation routes</a> for maritime energy supplies. This reduces its vulnerability to energy supply disruption at maritime choke-points in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. </p>
<p>The establishment of port facilities in the Indian Ocean will also be advantageous to the emerging blue-water capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. This would assist in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09733159.2015.1025535">keeping vulnerable critical sea lines of communication open</a> for maritime energy supplies from the Middle East. </p>
<p>Collectively, these measures could reduce the ability of the US Navy to blockade China’s energy supply routes in any future conflict scenario. </p>
<h2>Geopolitical implications of the BRI</h2>
<p>After more than a decade of conjecture about China’s increasing international assertiveness, the Chinese government has now clearly signalled its intention to assume a more prominent global leadership role through the BRI. </p>
<p>China is aiming to spur a new round of economic globalisation, but in a changed international order that it has a pivotal role in shaping.</p>
<p>The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS <a href="http://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership are the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/https:/www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/">software of integration</a>” – the financial pillars of trade and investment in this vision.</p>
<p>The BRI is the development vehicle – the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/https:/www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/">hardware of trade and investment</a>” and the final pillar on which China’s claim to global leadership rests.</p>
<p>Somewhat paradoxically, given the investment focus on hydrocarbon pipelines, the BRI also represents the vehicle through which China is likely to shape the contours of the <a href="http://asaa.asn.au/china-set-lead-global-climate-politics/">emerging international post-carbon economy</a>. The <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf">Paris Agreement</a> in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is a keystone document in this respect. </p>
<p>A combination of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/19/reasons-to-be-cheerful-full-switch-low-carbon-energy-in-sight">climate emergency and market behaviours</a> are making fossil fuel energy production increasingly uneconomic. This has spurred an accelerating transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy generation.</p>
<p>China is a world leader in <a href="http://www.wri.org.cn/en/from-commitment-to-action-signs-of-progress-since-the-paris-climate-talks">green and alternative energy technologies</a>. Through the BIR it is well-placed to be the dominant player in facilitating the transition and roll-out of renewable energy infrastructure across Eurasia. This is especially so since the Trump administration has ceded American influence in international climate politics through its <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/27/politics/trump-climate-change-executive-order/index.html">repudiation of proactive climate policies</a>. </p>
<p>Leadership on international climate action is one area in which China can develop significant soft power cache, particularly with developing countries of the global south.</p>
<p>China’s BRI announcement is also reflective of the relative decline of the US as the world’s pre-eminent power. A declaration of intent as bold as that made in Beijing over the weekend at the <a href="http://www.un.org/pga/71/2017/05/14/belt-and-road-forum-for-international-cooperation/">Belt and Road Forum for International Co-operation</a> would have been inconceivable prior to the 2016 US election. </p>
<p>The Trump administration’s clumsy foreign policy manoeuvrings have damaged US prestige, weakened the integrity of a liberal international order <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-decline-the-bretton-woods-institutions-11324">already under duress</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/12/the-united-states-is-losing-asia-to-china/">opened a window</a> for China to stake its claim. </p>
<p>The BRI also signals a deepening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. This is based on a complementary supplier-consumer energy relationship and a mutual antagonism to the US.</p>
<p>However, not all regional countries see the BRI as a boon. The Indian government <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-india-distrusts-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative">has expressed reservations</a> over the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.</p>
<p>The BRI now ups the ante for regional middle powers like Australia that have deftly attempted to hedge between the US and China. Australia’s foreign policymakers must weigh up the case for engaging with the BRI and having a seat at the table as China’s vision takes shape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese government has now clearly signalled its intention to assume a more prominent global leadership role through the Belt and Road Initiative.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, La Trobe UniversityViktor Faulknor, PhD Candidate in International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757222017-04-05T13:16:45Z2017-04-05T13:16:45ZWhy China’s $1 trillion new Silk Road plan is being greeted coolly by the West<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163873/original/image-20170404-5725-jxkgva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A bridge too far?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/two-words-china-europe-united-by-135128720?src=5Bf5oxzjnZe_-wcNh3H1-A-1-18">sibgat</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing is gearing up for a major diplomatic offensive in May as it welcomes Vladimir Putin among 20 international leaders for <a href="http://english.cctv.com/2017/01/17/ARTIdF912TLb6wOkkYQNBoTg170117.shtml">a summit</a> on building a “new Silk Road” to bring China closer to the world. This is the One Belt, One Road project – the centrepiece of Chinese international engagement. </p>
<p>It involves a US$1 trillion (£804 billion) <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">mega-investment</a> to transform China’s transport and trade links through Eurasia and South-East Asia. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-silk-road-is-all-part-of-its-grand-strategy-for-global-influence-70862">The aim</a> is for China to become a global pillar of trade and free markets and secure its place as a 21st-century superpower. </p>
<p>So far, however, no Western leaders have confirmed their attendance at the summit. What should we read into this, and what does it mean for the success of the project?</p>
<p>One Belt, One Road was <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml">unveiled by</a> Chinese president Xi Jinping four years ago. It aims to increase the country’s influence at a time when Europe is still struggling with the consequences of the financial crisis and the US is revising its role as promoter of economic liberalism under the Trump administration. </p>
<p>The project has two strands – “one road”, which is road and rail connections, and “one belt”, which is about the sea. The sea element is focused on everything from a <a href="http://www.aninews.in/newsdetail-MTY/MzA2MTcw/china-039-s-one-belt-one-road-policy-picks-up-pace.html">harbour development</a> in Malaysia to a new free trade agreement <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">with New Zealand</a>, while the land part has primarily focused on Central Asia as the most realistic route to Europe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Unlocking Central Asia</h2>
<p>China’s routes through five former Soviet states are currently beset with border delays, hefty customs fees, poor roads and railways, and formidable geographic hurdles – notably mountain ranges in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. </p>
<p>There should also be benefits to these landlocked republics from tackling these difficulties. Better links to Europe and the Middle East and potential access to seaports point to greater trading opportunities and extra revenues from transit fees to and from China. Each republic has been enthusiastic about participating, and there have so far been <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">railway lines completed</a> from China to Iran and Afghanistan via the region. </p>
<p>Other planned investments include a <a href="http://24.kg/archive/en/bigtiraj/174939-news24.html/">new highway</a> connecting the north and south of Kyrgyzstan and a <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2016-07/21/content_38929557.htm">highway</a> between it and Uzbekistan. There is also the “Angren-Pap” <a href="http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/infrastructure/single-view/view/two-presidents-open-angren-pap-railway.html">railway tunnel</a> in Uzbekistan, the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan <a href="http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2422311.html">gas pipeline</a> and the “Dushanbe-Kulyab-Khorog-Kulma-Karokurum” <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/tajik-leader-in-china-building-roads/">highway</a> in Tajikistan. </p>
<p>China’s diplomatic relations with the republics are very warm – in some cases more so than those of Russia, which can sometimes behave like the overlord it once was. Yet problems may loom for One Belt, One Road all the same. </p>
<p>Investments may be slowed down by unfinished border demarcation and disputes in several unsettled areas, especially between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There is also a cautious and sometimes hostile attitude towards Chinese migrants and workers from local people, especially <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36163103">in Kazakhstan</a>. This is a potential problem given that the price of investment from Beijing is often Chinese companies winning contracts and supplying labour and equipment. </p>
<p>The Chinese may therefore have to extend their diplomatic efforts to Central Asian people more generally. The leaders of the five republics may also need to be more transparent with their citizens about how they plan to carry One Belt, One Road forward, contrary to the frequently opaque business operations in the region. </p>
<p>Russia is closely interested despite hosting no initiatives to date. Relations between China and Russia tend to be “coldly cordial”, turning on mutual support on some international issues such as Syria, and peaceful coexistence in Eurasia. </p>
<p>Chinese investments in Central Asia are a potential flashpoint, since Russia keeps Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-tajikistan-mulls-eeu-feels-pull-of-russia/27893070.html">soon Tajikistan</a> in its orbit through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russia can benefit from improved connectivity and therefore stability in the region, but it wants guarantees that One Belt, One Road won’t undermine the economic relevance of the EEU. </p>
<p>Russia and China adopted a <a href="http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-Construction-of-Joint-Eurasian-Economic-Union-and-the-Silk-Road-Projects/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3ABV.htm">joint statement</a> on EEU and Silk Road projects in 2015, but it was vague and cautious. The Chinese will be pleased that Putin is attending next month’s summit, but his enthusiastic backing would be better. </p>
<h2>The Western dimension</h2>
<p>The EU has been remarkably silent on One Belt, One Road. This is despite the project’s obvious geopolitical and economic importance – trade with China <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2016/04/01/content_281475318738444.htm">was</a> US$593 billion in 2015 – and the existence of a <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2258_en.htm">EU-China Connectivity Platform</a>. Europe’s attitude can partly be explained by Brexit; rising nationalism in several European states; compatibility with European labour norms and standards; the still unclear degree of Chinese companies’ involvement; and the general distraction of the eurozone crisis. </p>
<p>The EU also seems unable to speak with a single voice to China, with member states usually preferring bilateralism or <a href="http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/161-framework-and-economic-relations-between-china-and-ceec/">sub-regional frameworks</a> of cooperation. And from an economic point of view, One Belt, One Road is potentially a double-edged sword. Connectivity should benefit everyone, but more competitive Chinese goods flooding Europe is a potential threat unless EU members can coordinate their response. Increased connectivity may also encourage illegal traffickers, organised crime and counterfeiters. </p>
<p>Other Western nations have been lukewarm, too. When New Zealand <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">announced</a> its involvement with One Belt, One Road last month, it was one of few Western states to have done so (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-hungary-idUSKBN0ON01W20150607">Hungary</a> and the <a href="http://www.czech.cz/cz/Aktuality/Czech-Republic-and-China-ink-investment-boosting-m">Czech Republic</a> are on board). <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e30f3122-0eae-11e7-b030-768954394623">Australia declined</a> to follow suit, despite a visit from the Chinese premier on the same trip. </p>
<p>Evidently China still has much work to do to persuade the world of the merits of its big initiative. Political and security issues could yet prove insurmountable unless Beijing can win round neighbours and major rivals alike. </p>
<p>This will need both political and diplomatic patience, and next month’s summit is more likely to be about bridge building than major new announcements. The irony is that while One Belt One Road is aimed at facilitating infrastructure and connectivity, its implementation looks like a long and very bumpy road.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filippo Costa Buranelli is affiliated with the Higher Education Academy.</span></em></p>China’s One Belt, One Road initiative is holding international summit in Beijing, but no Western leaders have said they are coming yet.Filippo Costa Buranelli, Lecturer, International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/717532017-03-01T14:51:15Z2017-03-01T14:51:15ZChina’s play for supremacy in Eurasia revives an old geopolitical vision<p>Much has been made of China’s assertiveness in its maritime sphere of influence, most notably in the light of its hotly contested claims in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-china-wont-back-off-the-south-china-sea-whatever-the-world-might-say-62248">South China Sea</a>. But the rest of the world seems to have only recently started to notice the scale of what China is doing on land. </p>
<p>China’s engagement with the rest of Asia and the wider world has come to light in the form of the initiative known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/one-belt-one-road-33049">One Belt One Road</a> (一带一路), a broad economic, diplomatic and infrastructural programme designed to transform the way China deals with its Asian neighbours – and with the world beyond.</p>
<p>This programme recently hit the shores of Britain with the arrival of a Chinese freight train, fittingly named the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/first-direct-train-china-to-uk-arrives-east-london-yiwu-city-barking-channel-tunnel-a7533726.html">East Wind</a>, at Barking, which carried Chinese goods for Western markets all the way from Yiwu. It seems that half a century after he outlined it, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FQPCDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT595#v=onepage&q&f=false">Mao’s vision</a> of “the east wind prevailing over the west wind” is finally coming into view. </p>
<p>But while the impetus for the project is largely economic, there is another more strategic dimension that has yet to be tapped into. China’s geopolitical manoeuvring on land is grounded in the great power politics of the previous century, which have lately made a comeback in Asia. The Kremlin, for one, is philosopher Aleksandr Dugin’s <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/27/geopolitics-russia-mackinder-eurasia-heartland-dugin-ukraine-eurasianism-manifest-destiny-putin/">vision</a> for Russia-centric “Eurasianism”. With the Trump administration apparently <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444321/trump-foreign-policy-isolationsim-america-first-allies-nato-trans-pacific-partnership">flirting with a form of isolationism</a> and international uncertainty reaching new heights, this initiative has only become more imperative for Beijing.</p>
<p>In language alluding to the old Silk Road that once connected east and west, the purpose of One Belt One Road is to connect Chinese trade with European markets via rail and maritime links, the latter known as the <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-increasing-overseas-ambitions-with-maritime-silk-road-a-1110735.html">maritime silk road</a>. </p>
<p>The sheer scale of this project can be seen as an expression of Beijing’s global aspirations, which Chinese premier Xi Jinping underlined in a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/67ec2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce">striking defence of globalisation</a> at the 2017 Davos summit in Switzerland. Alongside recent developments – most notably the US’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/01/withdrawal-tpp-170126092759229.html">withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> – China has an opportunity to return to the role that it once occupied in Asia and also for the wider world. In doing so, it’s reviving an idea that once dominated the power politics of the 20th century: the contest for influence in Eurasia.</p>
<h2>Go west</h2>
<p>Throughout the 20th century, the idea of Eurasia dominated geopolitical strategy. During the Cold War, the region was often the focus of the superpowers’ attention, as epitomised by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1997-11-01/grand-chessboard-american-primacy-and-its-geostrategic-imperatives">The Grand Chessboard</a>, which advocated American management of the region in order to prevent a potential challenger from emerging. Traditionally, this notion was largely bound up with Russia and the Soviet Union, but ever since the latter collapsed, China has been more and more active in its former sphere. </p>
<p>In this sense, China has fully joined the ranks of the other would-be masters of Eurasia, a clutch of states who depend on land routes over sea routes. This was first noted at the turn of the 20th century by the British academic and politician Halford J Mackinder in a paper titled <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1775498">The Geographical Pivot of History</a>. Mackinder warned the imperial British leadership that it was too dependent on sea routes in the face of rail, which in turn enhanced the power of land-focused powers such as Germany and Russia, the latter of which was where the Eurasian heartland. Both powers posed a threat to British hegemony.</p>
<p>Mackinder’s analysis influenced both German and American strategists for much of the 20th century: the Nazis developed their policy of “Lebensraum” (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_01.shtml">living space</a>) for the Germans in the east, while US foreign policy spent much of the Cold War working to contain the Soviet Union in its sphere of influence. Those eras have passed, but Makinder’s views live on in today’s Chinese power plays. </p>
<p>In keeping with Mackinder’s theories, the Chinese are now developing rail routes to take strategic pressure off maritime routes, a crucial step in the face of the South China Sea crisis. Trump’s secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congress-tillerson-china-idUSKBN14V2KZ">threatened</a> to blockade Chinese trade routes if its activities in the sea go too far; extensive rail routes to the west are an excellent way to render any such tactics moot.</p>
<p>In a more political sense, the steady extension of One Belt One Road promotes China as the supreme power guarding global free trade against the US’s isolationism and protectionism. The rhetoric of China’s golden age is back, and the country’s goals more ambitious than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The One Belt One Road programme is much more than just a freight line to new customers in the West.Tom Harper, Doctoral Researcher in Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/727392017-02-14T07:28:16Z2017-02-14T07:28:16ZHas Abe got Trump’s measure? Golf diplomacy puts Japan back on the green<p>Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managed to be the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/donald-trump-election-latest-japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-meeting-a7424106.html">first foreign leader to visit then president-elect Donald Trump</a> last November. He was already embarking on his activist personal diplomacy to counter the <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2016/05/22/donald-trumps-plan-to-make-americans-poor-again/#3b98d7b02db0">bellicose rhetoric Trump occasionally aimed at Japan</a> during his election campaign, accusing the country of unfair trade practices and currency manipulation, and threatening tariffs against imports.</p>
<p>Trump even implied an end to the US-Japan alliance, stating that Japan, along with other US allies, <a href="http://time.com/4437089/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-nukes/">should develop its own nuclear weapons</a>. But Abe’s first official meeting with President Trump last week – the second world leader after British Prime Minister Theresa May – has already achieved Japan’s most fundamental diplomatic goal: ensuring the continuity its security alliance with America.</p>
<p>The trip follows a <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/">successful preliminary visit to Japan</a> the previous week by the US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and a <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000339.html">similarly positive phone call</a> between Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.</p>
<p>Mattis praised the country’s financial contribution to the hosting of US bases in Japan (around 75%, with most bases in Okinawa) as a “<a href="http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003502433">model of cost-sharing</a>”. And he issued a statement that the US would continue to defend Japan’s claims over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (claimed as the Daioyus by China), under the US-Japan Security Treaty.</p>
<h2>Maintaining the status quo</h2>
<p>Reassured by his firm endorsement of the value of Japan’s contribution to the expense of the alliance, the first stage of Abe’s trip to the US produced exactly what was hoped for. In a joint press conference following talks after Abe’s arrival in Washington DC, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/remarks-president-trump-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press">Trump said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control and to further strengthening our crucial alliance. The bond between our two nations and the friendship between our two peoples runs very, very deep. This administration is committed to bringing those ties even closer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe">A joint statement released afterwards</a> confirmed the US remains committed to defending Japan’s claims over the Senkaku Islands under Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, including use of conventional and nuclear military capabilities, if necessary. </p>
<p>The controversial relocation of the main US military air base on Okinawa will also continue. While maintaining rights to international freedom of flight and navigation in the East China Sea, Abe and Trump also hoped <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-11/trump-committed-to-us-japan-security-after-abe-meeting/8261620">any actions that would escalate tensions</a> in the South China Sea could be avoided.</p>
<p>But, in the first such encounter under the Trump administration, the US Navy has already reported an “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/south-china-sea-us-navy-aircraft-encounter">unsafe interaction</a>” between one of its reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese aircraft during a patrol over the South China Sea.</p>
<p>And this is despite Trump having followed up his greeting letter to Xi Jinping, where he expressed hope they can work productively together, with his first phone call to the Chinese leader. During the call, he reiterated the <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2017/2/10/14575442/trump-accept-one-china">USA’s long-held adherence to the “One China” policy</a> after all.</p>
<h2>The problem of trade</h2>
<p>Before and during the visit, ignoring criticism from opposition parties in Japan, <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701310048.html">Abe remained uncritical of Trump’s controversial</a> – and possibly unconstitutional – immigration ban. Abe is hardly in any position to criticise it, given Japan’s own paltry record of accepting refugees. Despite a record number of over 10,000 applications, <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/10/national/record-10910-refugee-applicants-face-abysmal-odds-acceptance-japan/#.WKA43X82VOY">Japan only accepted 28 refugees in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>North Korea’s first missile launch test of the year, <a href="https://theconversation.com/forget-sanctions-reining-in-north-korea-will-need-a-whole-new-approach-70431">held in the middle of Abe’s US visit</a>, also gave the two leaders an immediate opportunity to display the ongoing strength of the alliance. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38947451">In a joint news conference</a>, Abe condemned the test as “absolutely intolerable”, while Trump declared “the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.”</p>
<p>While the defence relationship may have been secured, trade remains the main area of contention. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Japan strongly supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-trans-pacific-partnership-survive-after-trump-71821">is now likely to be doomed</a>, due to Trump’s condemnation of multilateral trade pacts. </p>
<p>Abe hopes Trump’s hostile campaign rhetoric against Japan over trade can also be mollified. </p>
<p>Appealing to Trump’s populist economic nationalism, Abe brought along a plan called the <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-japan-trade-exclusive-idINKBN15F0LD">US-Japan Growth and Employment Initiative</a>. Projected to be worth around US$450 billion, it pledges potential investment by Japanese corporations in the US – in infrastructure, energy, and robots. The package, which promises the <a href="http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003498622">creation of more than 700,000 jobs</a> in America over ten years, could be incorporated into a potential bilateral trade deal with Japan. </p>
<p>At their Washington meeting, Abe and Trump <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170211/p2g/00m/0dm/005000c">agreed to commence talks on a bilateral trade agreement</a>, in place of the TPP. A new US-Japan economic dialogue group is to be established toward that end, to be led by US Vice President Mike Pence and Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, who also held their first separate meeting in Washington.</p>
<p>As with the TPP though, concluding a bilateral trade treaty is likely to be long, complex, fraught process, particularly over agriculture.</p>
<h2>Work and play</h2>
<p>After the formal Washington meetings, Abe flew to Florida with Trump on Air Force One, accompanied by first ladies Melania Trump and Akie Abe, to the president’s extravagantly luxurious Mar-a-Largo resort, <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2842627/donald-trump-golfing-japanese-prime-minister-abe/">to play golf for the weekend</a>. The White House stated the cost of Abe’s visit to the resort, including golfing fees, would be paid for by Trump as a personal gift. </p>
<p>This is a further sign of the apparently warm personal ties that Abe has managed to cultivate; Trump has already accepted an invitation to visit Japan later this year.<br>
If Abe returns with US trade relations relatively intact, as well as the military alliance, he will have taken advantage of the erratic and turbulent first weeks of the Trump administration to <a href="https://theconversation.com/japans-australian-sub-bid-fits-with-its-strategic-and-economic-transformation-48156">secure favourable strategic and economic relations</a>. His government is likely to be supported by the Trump administration, as it was by president Barack Obama’s, to continue increasing defence spending, and pursuing further constitutional change.</p>
<p>In return, Abe is likely to encourage the US to challenge China’s recent domination of the South China Sea, and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-09/could-the-indian-ocean-become-south-china-sea/8257204">compete with the expansion of Chinese influence into the Indian Ocean region</a>, through its planned massive “One Belt, One Road” land and sea transport infrastructure project. </p>
<p>Abe’s US visit could, in fact, eventually turn out to have been an important step in reviving his long-held ambition for <a href="http://www.nippon.com/en/column/g00339/">a “security diamond” between Japan, the US, India and Australia</a>, which he proposed during his first term as prime minister in 2006-2007. </p>
<p>These four states may now be more willing to revive this idea for a strategic alliance, but if it does proceed, this could threaten a Cold War-style hegemonic confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. And it could have potentially catastrophic consequences if armed conflict breaks out over territorial disputes.</p>
<p>Abe is one of the most energetic practitioners of diplomacy among modern Japanese prime ministers. By flattering Trump’s ego, he has proved adept at handling Trump’s inexperience in foreign policy. He has managed to successfully challenge one of Trump’s strongest held attitudes, publicly expressed as long ago as 1987, that <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/">the US is being exploited by its allies</a> in providing for their military protection. </p>
<p>Abe has demonstrated to other world leaders how to approach President Donald Trump: pay the price to strike a deal that panders to corporate interests and geostrategic nationalism of both sides. </p>
<p>This first official US visit has thus potentially become Abe’s most far-reaching diplomatic achievement so far. That is, if the notoriously temperamental, inconsistent and contradictory Trump can be counted on to stick to his deals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may have just demonstrated to other world leaders how to possibly approach President Donald Trump.Craig Mark, Professor, Kyoritsu Women's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/708622017-01-05T14:21:22Z2017-01-05T14:21:22ZChina’s new Silk Road is all part of its grand strategy for global influence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151818/original/image-20170105-18659-ghkw7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">beibaoke / Shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-38497997">first freight train from China to the UK</a> has started its 12,000 mile journey from the industrial city of Yiwu in the east of China to London. Part of China’s “One Belt, One Road” project to link east and west, it is all geared toward strengthening its global influence. </p>
<p>London is the final stop on a long and complex network of trade routes that China has forged in recent years. Central Asia – along similar lines of the old Silk Road trading route – has been the main focus of infrastructure development. But China is also intent on developing its trade and investment ties with Europe. With 39 routes <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/02/china-launches-freight-train-britain/">linking 16 Chinese cities to 15 European ones</a>, it includes a rail network that cuts across Central Asia to Iran, through Turkey to Russia, Poland and Spain.</p>
<p>After adopting the mantle of the “workshop of the world”, China shifted from rejecting US-led capitalism to fully embracing it. Its new Silk Road trade routes now serve to export many of its goods, but are also used to bring meats from Germany, wine from France and wood from Russia back in return.</p>
<iframe width="100%" height="400" frameborder="0" src="https://widgets.scribblemaps.com/sm/?d&z&l&mc&lat=51.391477875399&lng=45.077785500000005&vz=2&type=terrain&ti&s&width=550&height=400&id=1He6X4eSzq" style="border:0; max-width: 100%;" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<p>But the routes serve more than just trade. They are embedded in China’s strategy of building an international Asian society and its concerted geopolitical push across the whole of continental Asia.</p>
<h2>Taking a lead in Asia</h2>
<p>China is getting more assertive. Its growing economic <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-china-wont-back-off-the-south-china-sea-whatever-the-world-might-say-62248">and military presence around the South China Sea</a> show it is intent on building for itself a robust sphere of influence, based on interlinking economic and military relationships.</p>
<p>So the new One Belt, One Road project sits alongside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a major regional security organisation, and the building of relations with countries around the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, China is also working toward signing a large free trade agreement with the Association of South-East Asian countries, Australia, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and New Zealand.</p>
<p>The project is the focus for China’s westward strategy and foreign direct investment. It provides a vehicle for the mobilisation of Chinese businesses throughout Asia. In 2015, 44% of China’s engineering projects outside of China were in countries along the new Silk Road, <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137539786">rising to more than 52% in 2016</a>. With US$4 trillion behind the project, this is soft power on a massive scale. Asian rival India is, of course, wary of China’s growing influence on its doorstep – particularly the highway it has plans to build to Pakistan through the contested region of Kashmir.</p>
<h2>Interests intertwined</h2>
<p>Despite being the project lead – and underwriting it entirely – China is keen to present One Belt, One Road as part of its its <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_analysis_chinas_neighbourhood_policy">“neighbourhood policy”</a> of developing a favourable regional environment. Chinese leaders maintain that they are pursuing common goals across the region, with no ideological aims of their own.</p>
<p>Instead, China’s focus is practical inter-state engagement. Investment projects use up abundant Chinese steel, concrete and other engineering products, and also use China-sourced goods and services in the interest of developing neighbouring countries, all the while encouraging enterprise in the country.</p>
<p>China also sees its interests and those of its neighbours as increasingly intertwined. So, across central Asia, there is a desire for investment in infrastructure, development of natural resources (starting with hydrocarbons), raising skills and employment opportunities, and of course building trade networks. For these states, inward investment not only helps enhance national security, but also improves their stability. China is not only recognising these interests but is in fact giving them a set of common platforms. </p>
<p>Integration through investment, construction, extraction and trade has been key for creating new orbits of economic influence. With 60 countries involved, China is working to turn Asia into a giant, interconnected entity. </p>
<p>Smaller regions will remain, but there now exists the real prospect of a super-Asian region emerging before the end of the 21st century. This, were it to emerge, could dwarf the European Union in scale, size and economic potential. Trade across the One Belt, One Road region is already anticipated to be <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137539786">more than US$2.2 trillion in ten years</a> (catching up with the EU’s trade in goods of US$3.1 trillion).</p>
<h2>Far-reaching consequences</h2>
<p>The success of the initiative could have far-reaching consequences for the Asian countries involved and also the wider international order. As China pushes westwards into Asia so it will be able to exploit inner Asia’s vast natural sources and at the same time lock into its own orbit the world’s big energy zones around the Caspian sea and the Persian Gulf. </p>
<p>That China has embarked upon its One Belt, One Road project is a measure of its new self-confidence and a public expression of its efforts to become the heart of Asia. It dovetails with China’s strategic priorities in Asia, which combines a <a href="http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/27th-summit/ASEAN-China%20POA%20%202016-2020.pdf">partnership with the Association of South-East Asian Nations</a> (ASEAN) and the strengthening of the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a> security group which it co-leads with Russia. Together, these spheres form China’s three circles of influence in Asia. </p>
<p>These, in different but complementary ways, contribute to China’s efforts to build security and economic bonds across its neighbourhood. The different mechanisms enhance its strategic reach as each of these circles has the basis for shaping related countries and regions. Together they multiply China’s strength and give it a credible, though perhaps not always a welcome voice, from the Pacific to the Atlantic Oceans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anoush Ehteshami received funding from RCUK and Horizon 2020 for research projects. </span></em></p>China’s new freight train line to London is part of an increasing web of trade routes designed to boost the country’s influence abroad.Anoush Ehteshami, Professor, Director of the Al-Sabah Programme and Joint Director of the RCUK Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/685842016-11-15T07:21:49Z2016-11-15T07:21:49ZAfter Trump’s win, can China dislodge Asian nations from the US orbit?<p>It will be in Asia – the economic centre of the 21st century – where the future of <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/">Pax Americana</a> (the peace that has ensued as a result of US hegemony) will be decided. </p>
<p>This continued existence of this peace will depend, to a significant extent, on Washington’s capacity to show that it remains a vital actor in the region despite China’s ascendancy. And, above all, that it is still the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437">provider of security guarantees</a> to several of China’s neighbours, such as Japan and South Korea.</p>
<p>If Beijing can bring its neighbours to accept its regional leadership (including its claims in the South China Sea), China could dramatically reduce US influence in a region that holds <a href="http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/asia-population/">more than half of the world’s population</a>.</p>
<p>That this desire would emerge in Beijing is far from surprising. No aspiring great power gains status or respect by ceding responsibility for security in its backyard to a far away foreign nation.</p>
<h2>Chinese initiative and US pushback</h2>
<p>To garner regional support, China has launched a series of high-profile initiatives that involve its neighbours in institutional setups: the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-investment-idUSKCN0UU03Y">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a>, the <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2015/03/21/cica-american-security-architecture/">Conference on Confidence Building Measures in Asia</a> security architecture, and economic corridors through Pakistan and Myanmar to the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>Beijing’s efforts have been derided as “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/abb35db2-a4cc-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1">chequebook diplomacy</a>” and China has been accused of trying to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/23968248-43a0-11e6-b22f-79eb4891c97d">buy friends</a>. But if successful, the country’s endeavours will contribute to the creation of an increasingly <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2014/11/21/chinas-towards-sinocentric/">Sinocentric Asia</a>. </p>
<p>China’s most ambitious project is the New Silk Road Economic Belt, usually referred to as <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2016/11/06/political-economy-chinas/">One Belt One Road</a>. This proposed economic corridor will stretch across Eurasia to connect China not only to the Middle East and Europe but also embed it within the region. </p>
<p>One Belt One Road is said to <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2016/11/06/political-economy-chinas/">involve Chinese investments</a> of between US$800 billion and US$1 trillion, covering almost 900 projects in more than 60 partner countries – a truly monumental initiative. Several <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-07/china-s-marshall-plan">commentators have drawn parallels</a> between the policy and the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan">1948 US Marshall Plan</a> that helped rebuild postwar Europe. </p>
<p>The US reaction to China’s initiatives has been on two tracks. First, it sought to thwart the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2014/11/09/washingtons-opposition-development/">pressuring other countries not to join</a>. This effort failed spectacularly when the United Kingdom, the most important US ally, became <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2015/03/14/camerons-masterstroke-development/">the first to break ranks</a>. The bank now has 50 members, including many US allies from around the world. </p>
<p>US policymakers also promoted <a href="https://theconversation.com/tpp-revealed-at-last-we-have-the-details-and-a-democratic-deficit-to-be-fixed-50232">the Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP), a trade agreement linking the United States, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru. If ratified by all participating countries’ legislatures, it will be the first real manifestation of President Barack <a href="https://theconversation.com/uncertainty-on-security-and-trade-worry-allies-in-asia-as-us-election-approaches-67868">Obama’s “pivot to Asia”</a>, which has so far consisted of little more than rhetoric.</p>
<p>China, which is excluded from the TPP, responded by promoting the <a href="http://www.postwesternworld.com/2015/08/21/tussle-regional-influence/">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</a> (RCEP), which excludes the United States, and which would promote rapprochement between Beijing and Tokyo. The RCEP includes a vast array of rules concerning investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute settlement, and government regulation.</p>
<h2>Exceptional allies</h2>
<p>This jostling between the US and China for influence in Asia explains why alarm bells started ringing in Washington when the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-separation-impression-americans-2016-10">announced a “separation” from the United States</a>. Indeed, quite a lot of Duterte’s rhetoric since his election has brought into question his nations’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/he-may-have-insulted-obama-but-duterte-held-up-a-long-hidden-looking-glass-to-the-us-65085">decades-long partnership with Washington</a>. </p>
<p>A month later, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-are-the-philippines-malaysia-doing-when-it-comes-china-18298">initiated what seemed like a rapprochement</a> with Beijing when he announced the purchase of coastal patrol ships from China. This is the first substantial defense contract between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing and a significant signal, given the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/76e53d98-a031-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2">US had also hoped for a deal</a> with Malaysia.</p>
<p>These moves were particularly surprising because both the Philippines and Malaysia are claimants to disputed islands and reefs in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-legal-implications-of-the-south-china-sea-ruling-62421">South China Sea</a>. Washington had hoped that the tension there could be used to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/76e53d98-a031-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2">build an alliance to contain Beijing</a> in the region and put international pressure on China.</p>
<p>The Philippines is the only South China Sea claimant that is <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-philippines-set-south-china-sea-dispute-aside-1476959210">also a US treaty ally</a>. The two countries recently concluded the <a href="http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/01/13/what-you-need-to-know-about-edca.html">Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement</a>, allowing Washington access to five Philippines military sites.</p>
<p>But there are several reasons why the Philippines and Malaysia can be seen as outliers. Their leaders have specific reasons to tilt towards Beijing that don’t apply to other US allies in the region. </p>
<p>Duterte’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-cannot-build-a-nation-over-the-bodies-of-100-000-dead-in-dutertes-war-on-drugs-64053">controversial “war on drugs”</a>, involving systematic human rights violations, has generated US criticism. And, in Malaysia, Najib has been under pressure after US investigations revealed a giant fraud committed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/malaysia-in-turmoil-as-pm-focuses-on-survival-45422">1MDB</a>, a state investment fund.</p>
<h2>Where to now?</h2>
<p>It’s important to also keep in mind that pro-China rhetoric doesn’t always match actions. Malaysia now conducts military exercises with Beijing, but its ties to the US <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/malaysia-is-not-pivoting-to-china-with-najibs-visit/">are still stronger</a>. With the exception of North Korea, Laos and Cambodia, China’s neighbours are all still closer to Washington than Beijin. </p>
<p>And the United States remains far more popular than China among Asian people, reflected by the far larger number of Asians who aspire to move to the United States than to the Middle Kingdom. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the US plan to maintain strong political influence in Asia and build alliances to contain China faces significant obstacles. Many US allies not trust each other (Japan and South Korea, for instance). And this may lead to collective action problems, such as what’s know in international relations theory as “<a href="https://blog.richmond.edu/fall10plsc250/2010/11/22/free-rider-problem-and-alliances/">free-riding</a>” – when actors benefit from public goods without making a contribution.</p>
<p>What’s more, many countries in the region are increasingly dependent on China’s economy, reducing their willingness to oppose Beijing. Even though, in principle, they are more likely to oppose China than support it, given its proximity and regional leadership ambitions.</p>
<p>As president-elect <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-presidency-could-be-a-disaster-for-the-global-economy-68551">Donald Trump’s support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> is very unlikely, and with China’s initiatives entangling the region’s economies with its own, time is clearly on Beijing’s side.</p>
<p>Countries in the region will <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/the-post-western-world-and-the-rise-of-a-parallel-order/">probably opt for a hedging strategy</a>: maintaining the United States as a security ally, but benefiting from broader economic integration with China. </p>
<p>Some of these, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, could emerge as the greatest beneficiaries of this dynamic, provided they play their cards right. Duterte, for instance, may <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/28eb69ca-99cc-11e6-b8c6-568a43813464">simply be trying to extract</a> stronger security guarantees from the United States, while obtaining more Chinese aid. </p>
<p>While mounting tensions between the West and Russia and continued instability in the Middle East remain relevant and will require US attention, it’s in China’s neighbourhood where the future of global order will be determined.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oliver Stuenkel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Beijing can bring its neighbours to accept its regional leadership, China would have successfully achieved a dramatic reduction of US influence.Oliver Stuenkel, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Fundação Getulio VargasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/679322016-11-08T07:41:14Z2016-11-08T07:41:14ZGoodbye Barack Obama, the first ‘Indonesian’ US president<p>When Barack Obama was first elected in 2008, many Indonesians were swept away in the euphoria. Someone who had spent four years in their country as a boy had become president of the United States. </p>
<p>Public opinion of the US <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/03/18/indonesia-the-obama-effect/">improved dramatically</a>. And, as Obama was about to accept his <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html">Nobel Peace prize in 2009</a>, a group of locals commissioned a statue of the child Obama, and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/10/indonesia.obama.statue/">erected it in a Jakarta park</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2013/10/04/obama_cancels_asia_trip_the_president_s_difficulties_in_traveling_to_indonesia.html">The postponements of Obama’s 2010 visit</a> to the country – the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/health/policy/18health.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">first two due to debates about the Affordable Care Act</a> and a third <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/7803526/Barack-Obama-cancels-trip-to-Australia-and-Indonesia-over-BP-oil-spill.html">due to the BP oil spill</a> in the Gulf of Mexico – dampened some of the enthusiasm. But <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09indo.,html">his visit in November 2010 was still well received</a>. </p>
<p>One religiously conservative minister even found himself <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/michelle-obama-handshake-indonesian-minister-sparks-controversy-touching-violated-muslim-vow-article-1.453069">in a hot water</a> due to his enthusiasm, after he shook hands with First Lady Michelle Obama despite having previously said he didn’t touch women who weren’t related to him.</p>
<p>The US president’s next visit in November 2011 was not <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/obama-wants-to-strengthen-ties-with-indonesia/a-6661721">as well received</a>. But even as the afterglow of Obama’s election <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/04/obama-indonesia/2922825/">began to fade</a>, he remained quite popular in Indonesia and in the Southeast Asia as a whole. </p>
<p>Some Indonesians were disillusioned with <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/04/obama-indonesia/2922825/">Obama’s policies in the Middle East</a>, and this was reflected in <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/6/country/101/">slight decrease in his popularity</a>. But it rebounded after his reelection, as memories of the Arab Spring faded and the conflict in Syria had dragged on. </p>
<p>By the 2014 Indonesian parliamentary election, a couple of candidates clearly believed that they would attract voter attention by putting images or photos with Obama in their campaign posters. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143852/original/image-20161031-15799-13phjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candidates in the 2014 Indonesian election used images of Obama in their campaign posters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">http://www.kaskus.co.id/thread/555405bbd89b09472d8b4567/kumpulan-poster-failed-kampanye-caleg/</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One such poster even brought together Obama and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, with the candidate as the peacemaker in the middle.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143853/original/image-20161031-15775-1kndcx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Making peace between traditional enemies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">http://www.kaskus.co.id/thread/555405bbd89b09472d8b4567/kumpulan-poster-failed-kampanye-caleg/</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But expectations that the Obama administration <a href="http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2008/10/31/10023283/Kemenangan.Obama.Bagus.bagi.Indonesia">was going to be favourable</a> to Indonesia’s interests <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0416228f94f14b6d8751bd69de9a4f4b">were not met</a>. While Obama recalled the childhood years spent in the country fondly, Indonesians soon realised that they wouldn’t receive as much attention as they’d expected. </p>
<h2>Losing the initiative</h2>
<p>Under Obama, the United States embraced a “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/">pivot to Asia</a>” policy, which entailed a military and diplomatic rebalancing. It sought to move more US naval assets to the region by 2020, to deal with China’s growing threat. But this policy wasn’t entirely new. Even under the George W Bush administration, the United States had <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/bushasia2rpt.pdf">realised the importance of East Asia</a>, and engaged these regions while it fought a war in Iraq. </p>
<p>But Obama benefited from the fact that he was not Bush, who was widely seen as a unilateralist and a warmonger. Instead, he was seen a fresh face who stressed the limits of US unilateralism, embraced multilateralism, and brought in hope and change. </p>
<p>In 2011, he pulled the last US troops out of Iraq, and less burdened with the war there, he could focus more on East Asia. Thus, Obama was able to strengthen US ties to <a href="http://earp.in/en/indias-response-to-the-us-pivot-and-asian-geopolitics/">India</a>, <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SU13-1-Japan-USPivot-LoRes.pdf">Japan</a>, <a href="http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/Emerging-Asia-Reports/Myanmar_and_the_US.pdf">Myanmar</a>, and <a href="http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/Emerging-Asia-Reports/MacArthur-Vietnam-ONLINE.pdf">Vietnam</a>, by taking advantage the <a href="http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-pivot-in-us-china-relations/">region’s unease</a> about China’s growing assertiveness. </p>
<p>Still, Obama was a <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/obama-biggest-achievements-213487">domestic-oriented president</a>, very conscious of the limits of the US tendency to try to influence – or rather, intervene – in world politics. Based on his experience as a child in Indonesia, he observed <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">the resentment in countries where the US had interfered</a>, and, in an interview in The Atlantic magazine, noted, “you can’t fix everything.” </p>
<p>He has, as a result, been very hesitant to take foreign policy initiatives without support from other countries. This led to one of his advisers to state Obama’s approach to Libya was “<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist">leading from behind</a>”. Obama himself remarked that his foreign policy could be summed up as “<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/04/obamas-dont-do-stupid-shit-foreign-policy/">don’t do stupid shit</a>,” even though during the same interview, he argued that the US still had to set the international agenda.</p>
<p>But other countries, especially China, <em>did</em> take such initiatives. A case in point is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which well illustrates China’s growing <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-investment-idUSKCN0UU03Y">influence in its region</a>. Despite US opposition, China managed to attract virtually every single US ally in the region, except Japan, to join the bank. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the 12-nation free trade agreement, the Trans Pacific Partnership, which was supposed to be the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/07/28/why-the-tpp-is-the-linchpin-of-the-asia-rebalance/">linchpin of Obama’s pivot</a>, is wobbling due to domestic politics. It has been condemned – to differing degrees – by both candidates for the 2016 US presidential election, <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/27/politics/tpp-what-you-need-to-know/">Democrat Hillary Clinton</a> and <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/28/donald-trump-vows-to-cancel-trans-pacific-partners/">Republican Donald Trump</a>. </p>
<p>China has also been growing more assertive in the South China Sea, projecting power in the region by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37031049">building military bases on disputed islands</a>. While the United States, launched <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/freedom-of-navigation-operations-in-the-south-china-sea-arent-enough-unclos-fonop-philippines-tribunal/">freedom of navigation operations</a> in the sea in reaction, it’s clear that, for some countries in the region, the US has lost the initiative. </p>
<p>With its growing military presence and economic diplomacy under the “<a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/02/whats-driving-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/">One Belt One Road</a>” policy, China’s answer to Obama’s pivot seems to be the future.</p>
<p>Thus, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte could well feel justified in declaring that “<a href="http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/10/21/rodrigo-duterte-announces-splist-with-united-states.html">America has lost</a>”, regardless of his personal dislike of the United States. Granted that his officials <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/20/politics/rodrigo-duterte-us-interests-philippines/">tried to backtrack</a> from that remark later, and the fact that the US remains <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/22/forget-duterte-the-philippines-loves-the-u-s/">wildly popular</a> in the Philippines, it’s doubtful whether Duterte could pushed the envelope as far as he has done had the United States been on the front foot in the region.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, other ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, in the end simply hedged their bets. They’re afraid of China but, at the same time, they are open to economic benefits stemming from one of the world’s largest economies. They know that, while the US will always try to contain China militarily, it moves too slowly to challenge Chinese economic initiatives. </p>
<p><a href="http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/sunnylands-or-rancho-mirage-asean-and-south-china-sea">Stanford University professor emeritus Donald Emmerson</a> has neatly captured this attitude, with the rhetorical question:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Why not prolong the happy combination of American ships for deterrence and Chinese markets for profit?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What lies ahead</h2>
<p>The next president of the United States will inherit a huge burden. After a series of campaign messages that managed to offend many people, Trump doesn’t have much goodwill in the region. His anti-Muslim rhetoric alienates many moderates in Indonesia, which has the world’s largest Muslim population (<a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-think/">more than the entire Middle East combined</a>). </p>
<p>But Indonesians are very pragmatic. As long as Trump manages to offer some good deals, they will ignore his past trespasses. Still, if he becomes president, he shouldn’t expect a smooth ride in the region.</p>
<p>Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, will most likely continue Obama’s policies to prop up, strengthen and expand the liberal order in Asia. Like Obama, expectations of her are high, and meeting them will be difficult. People will expect her to keep or to “improve” the Trans Pacific Partnership, for instance, despite of her opposition to it during the campaign. Should she be unable to deliver, she will have much bumpier road ahead.</p>
<p><em>The author would like to thank Bradley Nelson, adjunct instructor of political science at Saint Xavier University, for his suggestions during the writing of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67932/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohanes Sulaiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Obama managed to build stronger rapport with many countries in Southeast Asia,but lacked foreign policy initiatives. China neatly plugged that gap.Yohanes Sulaiman, Visting Lecturer in International Relations and Political Science at Indonesian Defense University & Lecturer, Universitas Jendral Achmad YaniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.