tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/piracy-576/articlesPiracy – The Conversation2024-03-06T13:25:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228032024-03-06T13:25:54Z2024-03-06T13:25:54ZWest Africa’s coast was a haven for piracy and illegal fishing - how technology is changing the picture<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">Gulf of Guinea</a> – a coastal region that stretches from Senegal to Angola – is endowed with vast reserves of hydrocarbon, mineral and fisheries resources. It is also an important route for international commerce, making it critical to the development of countries in the region.</p>
<p>For a long time, however, countries in the Gulf of Guinea haven’t properly monitored what’s happening in their waters. This has allowed <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">security threats</a> at sea to flourish. The threats include illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery, and toxic waste dumping.</p>
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<p>For instance, in 2020, the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/icc_test/index.php/1305-latest-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-attack-alarming-warns-imb#:%7E:text=IMB%20data%20shows%20that%20the,in%202019%20from%2017%20incidents.">International Maritime Bureau</a> reported that the region had experienced the highest number of crew kidnappings ever recorded: 130 crew members taken in 22 incidents. In 2019, 121 crew members were kidnapped in 17 incidents.</p>
<p>Regional action to address these threats is being taken. In 2013, heads of state signed the <a href="https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/Declaration%20of%20the%20Heads%20of%20State%20and%20Government%20on%20Maritime%20Safety%20and%20Security.pdf">Yaoundé Code of Conduct</a> – a declaration to work together and address the threats. This also involved setting up a large hub, known as the <a href="https://icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575">Yaoundé Architecture</a> (made up of different divisions), which coordinates and shares information on what’s happening at sea. </p>
<p>Since the Yaoundé Code of Conduct was signed in 2013, there has been some progress. As we found in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=848184a42c0160f6">a new study</a>, tech-driven tools have been playing a vital role in addressing security threats at sea in west and central African countries. </p>
<p>For instance, Nigeria was once designated a piracy hotspot but, in 2022, was <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/05/nigeria-exits-nations-of-high-piracy-risks-robbery-in-international-waters-imu/#:%7E:text=For%20fighting%20Sea%20Piracy%20headlong%20through%20the%20Nigerian,has%20exited%20Nigeria%20from%20the%20IMB%20Piracy%20List.">delisted</a>. This was in large part due to the use of <a href="https://guardian.ng/business-services/maritime/nigeria-delisted-from-sea-piracy-list-says-navy/">technology</a>.</p>
<p>Tech tools have helped countries to more efficiently manage and monitor the marine environment. They also support information sharing among law enforcement agencies. This has led to successful interdictions and enabled the prosecution of pirates in the region.</p>
<h2>The tech tools</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/AIS.aspx">Cargo</a> and <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/w9633e/w9633e.pdf">fishing</a> vessels are required, under international law, to be fitted with systems that transmit data showing where they are. </p>
<p>Since the signing of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, we <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092">found</a> that new technology is now using this location data to help countries in the Gulf of Guinea monitor their waters. </p>
<p>Tools and systems – like Radar, Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System (<a href="https://www.gogin.eu/plateforme-yaris/">Yaris</a>), <a href="https://info.seavision.volpe.dot.gov/">Sea-Vision</a>, <a href="https://www.skylight.global/">Skylight</a> and <a href="https://globalfishingwatch.org/">Global Fishing Watch</a> – are integrating information from various surveillance and location monitoring systems and satellite data to identify suspicious behaviour. This has significantly helped to improve efforts to combat security threats. </p>
<p>Countries in the Gulf now have increased awareness of vessel activity in their waters and are able to make more informed responses in emergencies, like piracy or armed robbery and oil theft. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2022 the <a href="https://shipsandports.com.ng/mt-heroic-idun-captain-issued-false-piracy-alert-says-gambo/">Heroic Idun tanker</a>, evaded arrest in Nigeria for suspicious behaviour, then travelled on to Equatorial Guinea. Using the Yaoundé Architecture system, Equatorial Guinea held the vessel at Nigeria’s request and it was later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/detained-oiltanker-equatorial-guinea-return-nigeria-officials-2022-11-11/">fined</a>. </p>
<p>Without the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, and the new tech that it has introduced, the sharing of information, capture of evidence and cooperation between countries would not have been possible. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s tech advancements</h2>
<p>Nigeria is a prime example of a country where investment in technology-based infrastructure has helped it to tackle threats to security and development. </p>
<p>Over the past three years, Nigeria has deployed a range of tech tools. For instance, the navy deployed the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/regional-maritime-awareness-capability-rmac-programme-rolling-out-across-africa/">Regional Maritime Awareness Capability facility</a>, which receives, records and distributes data and the
mass surveillance <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/nigeria-commissions-falcon-eye-maritime-domain-awareness-system/#:%7E:text=Nigeria%20has%20commissioned%20the%20Israeli-designed%20Falcon%20Eye%20maritime,July%20at%20the%20Nigerian%20Naval%20Headquarters%20in%20Abuja">FALCON EYE system</a>.</p>
<p>The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency has also made advancements through its <a href="https://nimasa.gov.ng/president-buhari-launches-deep-blue-project-in-lagos/#:%7E:text=The%20Project%2C%20which%20was%20initiated%20by%20the%20Federal,Nigerian%20waters%20up%20to%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.">Deep Blue Project</a>. This includes a central intelligence and data collection centre which works with special mission vessels (like unmanned aerial vehicles) to take action against threats. </p>
<p>Nigeria has since had <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1342-new-imb-report-reveals-concerning-rise-in-maritime-piracy-incidents-in-2023#:%7E:text=Despite%20the%20continued%20restraint%20in,two%20injured%20crew%20in%202023">a reduction</a> in piracy and armed robbery at sea. Once designated a piracy hotspot, the country was <a href="https://nimasa.gov.ng/piracy-nigeria-removed-from-ibf-unsafe-waters-list/">delisted as a hotspot</a> in 2022. </p>
<h2>Cautious optimism</h2>
<p>Evidently, technology has an important role to play in enhancing safety and security at sea. But it’s not without it’s challenges, as we identified in our study.</p>
<p>First, an over-reliance on external tech tools has resulted in a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=848184a42c0160f6#sec0035">lack of ownership</a> of the technology. This affects the sustainability of the projects. For instance, once EU funding for YARIS expires, the operating costs will be transferred from the EU to Yaoundé Architecture states. But there are still no clear plans from regional states on how to sustain YARIS.</p>
<p>Second, people with specific expertise are needed to use the tech. But many countries can’t afford to hire them, or aren’t producing human resources with this expertise. Even when personnel have received training, they may not have access to the tools (which aren’t available at the country level) to apply what they have learnt. </p>
<p>Third, existing monitoring systems such as AIS and VMS can be switched off, a vulnerability that criminals continue to exploit. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9286260/pdf/pone.0269490.pdf">Radar systems</a> can fill these gaps, but there’s a lack of RADAR coverage along coastlines. Related to this, the scarcity of national <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/data-center">data centres</a> for long range vessel identification and tracking (due to lack of investment) makes using existing technology difficult.</p>
<p>Fifth, there are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=848184a42c0160f6#sec0025">challenges</a> related to communication difficulties, the absence of internet connections onboard some vessels or low internet speed. </p>
<p>Finally, private operators like the shipping industry aren’t using the services provided by the Yaoundé Architecture. This smacks of politics and lack of trust in the regional solutions. </p>
<p>Vessel operators report incidents instead to agencies outside the region, such as <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/en/agreements-supporting-the-action-of-the-mica-center/">Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade - Gulf of Guinea</a> (based in France) or the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb">International Maritime Bureau</a> in Malaysia and these agencies often broadcast the information without confirming with the regional architecture. This undermines the ability of regional agencies to do their work effectively.</p>
<p>It’s in the best interests of Atlantic nations to cooperate and coordinate on meeting maritime security challenges. </p>
<p>Technology can play a key role in this. But it’s vital that countries enhance technological know-how, and ensure that external partners and businesses use the available technological services. This will be a big step towards a secure and collaborative maritime environment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood receives funding from the Scottish Funding Council and PEW Charitable Trust. </span></em></p>Tech tools are playing a vital role in addressing security threats at sea in various west and central African countries.Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Lecturer, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217172024-01-25T13:18:54Z2024-01-25T13:18:54ZCould a court really order the destruction of ChatGPT? The New York Times thinks so, and it may be right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571252/original/file-20240124-29-abie1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C44%2C4985%2C3196&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Old media, meet new.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-the-new-york-times-logo-is-seen-news-photo/1894336797">Idrees Abbas/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Dec. 27, 2023, The New York Times <a href="https://nytco-assets.nytimes.com/2023/12/NYT_Complaint_Dec2023.pdf">filed a lawsuit</a> against OpenAI alleging that the company committed willful copyright infringement through its generative AI tool ChatGPT. The Times claimed both that ChatGPT was unlawfully trained on vast amounts of text from its articles and that ChatGPT’s output contained language directly taken from its articles.</p>
<p>To remedy this, the Times asked for more than just money: It asked a federal court to order the “destruction” of ChatGPT.</p>
<p>If granted, this request would force OpenAI to delete its trained large language models, such as GPT-4, as well as its training data, which would prevent the company from rebuilding its technology. </p>
<p>This prospect is alarming to the <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/11/6/23948386/chatgpt-active-user-count-openai-developer-conference">100 million people</a> who use ChatGPT every week. And it raises two questions that interest me as a <a href="https://law.indiana.edu/about/people/details/marinotti-jo%C3%A3o.html">law professor</a>. First, can a federal court actually order the destruction of ChatGPT? And second, if it can, will it?</p>
<h2>Destruction in the court</h2>
<p>The answer to the first question is yes. Under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/503">copyright law</a>, courts do have the power to issue destruction orders. </p>
<p>To understand why, consider vinyl records. Their <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2023/3/10/23633605/vinyl-records-surpasses-cd-music-sales-us-riaa">resurging popularity</a> has attracted <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/04/06/punk-rock-fan-uncovers-six-year-scam-that-sold-1-6-million-worth-of-counterfeit-vinyl-records-to-collectors/">counterfeiters who sell pirated records</a>. </p>
<p>If a record label sues a counterfeiter for copyright infringement and wins, what happens to the counterfeiter’s inventory? What happens to the master and stamper disks used to mass-produce the counterfeits, and the machinery used to create those disks in the first place?</p>
<p>To address these questions, copyright law grants courts the power to destroy infringing goods and the equipment used to create them. From the law’s perspective, there’s no legal use for a pirated vinyl record. There’s also no legitimate reason for a counterfeiter to keep a pirated master disk. Letting them keep these items would only enable more lawbreaking.</p>
<p>So in some cases, destruction is the only logical legal solution. And if a court decides ChatGPT is like an infringing good or pirating equipment, it could order that it be destroyed. In its complaint, the Times offered arguments that ChatGPT fits both analogies.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">NBC News reports on The New York Times’ lawsuit.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Copyright law has never been used to destroy AI models, but OpenAI shouldn’t take solace in this fact. The law has been increasingly open to the idea of targeting AI. </p>
<p>Consider the Federal Trade Commission’s recent use of <a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-coppa-settlement-requires-deletion-1217192">algorithmic disgorgement</a> as an example. The FTC has forced companies <a href="https://www.dwt.com/-/media/files/blogs/privacy-and-security-blog/2022/03/weight-watchers-kurbo-stipulated-order.pdf">such as WeightWatchers</a> to delete not only unlawfully collected data but also the algorithms and AI models trained on such data. </p>
<h2>Why ChatGPT will likely live another day</h2>
<p>It seems to be only a matter of time before copyright law is used to order the destruction of AI models and datasets. But I don’t think that’s going to happen in this case. Instead, I see three more likely outcomes.</p>
<p>The first and most straightforward is that the two parties could settle. In the case of a successful settlement, which <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/01/04/nyt-ai-copyright-lawsuit-fair-use">may be likely</a>, the lawsuit would be dismissed and no destruction would be ordered.</p>
<p>The second is that the court might side with OpenAI, agreeing that ChatGPT is protected by the copyright doctrine of “<a href="https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/#:%7E:text=Fair%20use%20is%20a%20legal,protected%20works%20in%20certain%20circumstances.">fair use</a>.” If OpenAI can argue that ChatGPT is transformative and that its service does not provide a substitute for The New York Times’ content, it just might win. </p>
<p>The third possibility is that OpenAI loses but the law saves ChatGPT anyway. Courts can order destruction only if two requirements are met: First, destruction must not prevent lawful activities, and second, it must be “<a href="https://casetext.com/case/hounddog-prods-llc-v-empire-film-grp-inc">the only remedy</a>” that could prevent infringement. </p>
<p>That means OpenAI could save ChatGPT by proving either that ChatGPT has legitimate, noninfringing uses or that destroying it isn’t necessary to prevent further copyright violations. </p>
<p>Both outcomes seem possible, but for the sake of argument, imagine that the first requirement for destruction is met. The court could conclude that, because of the articles in ChatGPT’s training data, all uses infringe on the Times’ copyrights – an argument put forth in <a href="https://copyrightalliance.org/current-ai-copyright-cases-part-1/">various other lawsuits</a> against generative AI companies. </p>
<p>In this scenario, the court would issue an injunction ordering OpenAI to stop infringing on copyrights. Would OpenAI violate this order? Probably not. A single counterfeiter in a shady warehouse might try to get away with that, but that’s less likely with a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/openai-talks-raise-new-funding-100-bln-valuation-bloomberg-news-2023-12-22/">US$100 billion company</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, it might try to retrain its AI models without using articles from the Times, or it might develop other software guardrails to prevent further problems. With these possibilities in mind, OpenAI would likely succeed on the second requirement, and the court wouldn’t order the destruction of ChatGPT. </p>
<p>Given all of these hurdles, I think it’s extremely unlikely that any court would order OpenAI to destroy ChatGPT and its training data. But developers should know that courts do have the power to destroy unlawful AI, and they seem increasingly willing to use it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>João Marinotti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It may seem extreme, but there’s a reason the law allows it.João Marinotti, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213922024-01-22T16:59:46Z2024-01-22T16:59:46ZWestern strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The United States and the United Kingdom <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">are launching ongoing missile and drone strikes</a> against the Yemeni armed group Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. A faction in the ongoing Yemen civil war, the Houthis had been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/world/middleeast/houthi-hijack-ship-galaxy-leader.html">attacking ships</a> in the Red Sea in the months preceding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">U.S.-British strikes.</a></p>
<p>These kinds of strikes, however, don’t dissuade the Houthis, a predominately Shia minority group in Yemen. They’re continuing <a href="https://time.com/6563864/us-strikes-houthis-yemen-red-sea/">to attack ships in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Continuing to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, furthermore, will undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Middle East. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">The Houthis have said</a> they’re attacking ships affiliated with Israel in response to Israel’s ground invasion and blockade of the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>With the U.S. reputation in the region already in tatters amid mass opposition to Israel’s attack on Gaza, these strikes are creating unintended consequences.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s civil war</h2>
<p>The Yemen civil war is one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It officially started in 2014 when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668">Houthis seized the capital of Sana'a</a>, but multiple entities have become involved since then.</p>
<p>Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict and subsequent blockade <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-fuel-intl/index.html">helped create ongoing famine and food insecurity</a> in Yemen.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Yemen’s civil war, the Houthis have received Iranian support. For both ideological and geopolitical reasons, Iran has helped the Houthis in their efforts to seize the country. While Iran has continually denied claims that it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/21/iran-giving-houthis-significant-and-lethal-support-us-envoy">provides military aid</a> to the Houthis, most <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/12/22/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#iran-has-helped-the-houthi-militia-target-ships-us-intelligence-says">outside observers</a> agree that it has done so in the past and continues to now.</p>
<p>The Houthis are invaluable partners to Iran because of their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This narrow channel is responsible for a significant portion of the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/bab-al-mandan-red-sea-suez-shipping-crisis-houthis-gaza">world’s cargo</a> <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073">and oil</a> shipping. While most vessels can avoid the region by sailing around Africa, this detour <a href="https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/">increases costs</a> for shipowners and, by extension, consumers.</p>
<p>The Houthis, either acting in their own interests or for Iran, escalated their attacks against ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Outside of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09">one cargo ship</a> the Houthi seized in November, however, their attacks have been <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/first-images-released-houthi-damage-153119479.html">largely unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<h2>More time needed for anti-piracy efforts</h2>
<p>Piracy in maritime shipping is not a new phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv21r3j8m">and has been a persistent scourge throughout human history</a>. In contemporary history, however, multilateral efforts to combat piracy have been largely successful in limiting its impact. </p>
<p>Multinational efforts off the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">coast of Somalia</a> and in the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/">Malacca Strait</a> in southeast Asia significantly reduced the piracy threat in those regions.</p>
<p>Given the past success of such measures, American Defense Secretary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220216698/pentagon-announces-new-international-maritime-protection-force-for-the-red-sea">Lloyd Austin’s announcement in late December</a> of an international maritime task force was both practical and had the potential to solve the issue. The problem, however, is that such efforts take time to succeed. The U.S. didn’t give the initiative the time it needed.</p>
<p>U.S.-led strikes against the Houthis in Yemen only stood a chance of success if neighbouring states, most notably Saudi Arabia, combined the American air presence with a ground threat. Saudi Arabia, however, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/">won’t get involved</a> as it seeks to extricate itself from Yemen.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-13/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-on-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say">anger towards</a> Israelis in the region, as well as the Houthi’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/how-houthi-anger-with-israel-is-reshaping-the-middle-east-conflict?ref=mc.news">avowed goal</a> to strike Israel, countering the Houthi would be politically dangerous for Riyadh’s government.</p>
<p>The Houthis know the Americans lack regional allies and therefore they’ve not been deterred, but emboldened. In the aftermath of the U.S.-U.K. strikes, Houthis have vowed to continue <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-red-sea-houthis-1.7083030">to target ships</a> in the Red Sea and are making good on the threat.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has even been forced to admit that the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/us-again-targets-yemen-s-huthis-in-new-strikes-9cac37d1">ongoing airstrikes</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/18/politics/biden-houthi-strikes/index.html">are not having the desired effect</a> of deterring the Houthis, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/us-launches-fresh-strikes-on-yemens-houthi-as-conflict-escalates">but says they’re necessary to protect merchant and military vessels</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback in the broader region</h2>
<p>International norms and laws are effective so long as everyone adheres to them. Norms and laws, furthermore, are most vulnerable immediately after a state has breached them, which the U.S. did when it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-says-us-british-attacks-on-yemen-a-clear-violation-of-the-countrys-sovereignty/ar-AA1mQIsa">violated Yemen’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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<p>Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the strikes against the Houthis.</p>
<p>Because the Houthis are a key partner of Iran, Tehran’s government apparently believed it had to take action in case their credibility became compromised. Iran <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-strikes-targets-in-northern-iraq-and-syria-as-regional-tensions-escalate/ar-AA1n1xOP">conducted strikes</a> against targets in Iraq and Syria. Iran claims the strikes in Iraq were against an Israeli spy installation. </p>
<p>While these events <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/iran-claims-it-has-attacked-an-israeli-spy-base-in-kurdistan">would have been troubling in their own right in terms of the impact on regional stability</a>, Iran followed up these strikes with ones in Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-iran-strike.html">Pakistan retaliated</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465">both Iran</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pakistan-conducts-strikes-in-iran-retaliating-for-earlier-hit-by-tehran/ar-AA1n9O2J">and Pakistan</a> are emphasizing that they’re not targeting the other country, but rather <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/paistan-cnucstrike-in-iran-in-retaliation-to-drone-and-missile-strikes-hits-baloch-separatist-groups/ar-AA1n9AwW">non-state militants</a>.</p>
<p>That said, Iran’s strike against Pakistan occurs as the country is <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/01/imran-khan-loses-his-battle-with-pakistans-army">politically vulnerable</a> in the aftermath of the army’s takedown of Prime Minister Imran Khan. With the Pakistani military unable to appear weak as the country faces crucial elections next month, the potential for events to escalate are very real.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the goal of nearly everyone involved, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/us-israel.html">particularly the U.S.</a>, has been to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. Recent events are compromising this goal, including <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-blames-israel-for-strike-that-killed-four-senior-military-officials-in-syria-as-mid-east-conflict-spirals/ar-BB1gZPbm">strikes by Israel in Syria</a> and an Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/01/21/us-troops-iraq-getting-evaluated-traumatic-brain-injuries-after-iran-backed-militia-attack.html">missile-and-rocket</a> attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.</p>
<p>By abandoning the focus on building a maritime coalition force and instead resorting to air strikes, the U.S. and its allies may have inadvertently created the situation they sought to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the West has aimed to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. But strikes on the Houthis in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. may ensure it will.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209512024-01-13T10:20:36Z2024-01-13T10:20:36ZRed Sea crisis: expert unpacks Houthi attacks and other security threats<p><em><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67938290">Recent attacks</a> on commercial vessels by Houthi militia in the Red Sea have put the vital shipping region in the spotlight. The Yemen-based rebels <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67932725">claim to be</a> targeting Israeli-linked vessels, in protest at Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. The UN Security Council recently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/11/middleeast/un-security-council-houthi-attacks-resolution-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20UN%20resolution%20condemned%20some,the%20commercial%20vessel%2C%20Galaxy%20Leader.">passed a resolution</a> demanding an immediate end to the Houthi attacks, while the US and UK <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/us-and-uk-launch-strikes-against-houthi-rebels-in-yemen#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20Britain,of%20conflict%20in%20the%20region.">have launched a series of strikes on Yemen against the rebels</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Burak Şakir Şeker, who <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371719209_Security_Environment_of_The_Red_Sea">has studied security issues in the Red Sea</a>, shares his insights on the global importance of the region, the security issues that exist and how these must be addressed.</em></p>
<h2>Why is the Red Sea such an important international area?</h2>
<p>The Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen, in the Middle East, and Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, is one of the world’s busiest oil transit points and is of great importance for the Red Sea. It’s a historically important trade transit route. Its proximity to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf reduces shipping distances and facilitates trade. About <a href="https://dg.dryadglobal.com/red-sea">33,000</a> merchant ships pass through the strait every year. </p>
<p>Because of its strategic importance, one of the greatest consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a significant increase in the cost of global trade and global energy transportation. </p>
<p>For example, an oil tanker leaving the Gulf would reach the port of London, 12,000km away, <a href="http://ports.com/sea-route/port-of-al-kuwayt,kuwait/port-of-londonderry,united-kingdom/">in 14 days</a> (at a speed of 22 knots) via the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. But if that route is not available the tanker would have to go around the southern tip of Africa – a 24-day journey covering 20,900km.</p>
<p>The Red Sea’s strategic importance also makes it an important geopolitical area. Countries have <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/sipripp54_0.pdf">military bases</a> here and intervene to protect oil and merchant shipping. These include military bases of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, the US, Italy, France, and Japan. </p>
<p>The Red Sea is therefore an area where complex global relations can play out. For instance, Israel’s attempt to control the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israels-sinai-dilemma">Sinai Peninsula</a>, one of the key supply routes for the Palestinian resistance, threatens the safety of merchant shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>The Red Sea is also a security hotspot, drawing in countries that sit on either side of it, such as Yemen and Eritrea, as well as countries much further afield, such as the US and China.</p>
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<h2>Who are the Houthi militia? Why are they carrying out attacks?</h2>
<p>Because of the fragility, or lack, of central government in Somalia and Yemen, non-state armed groups are becoming more active. Examples include the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep55423.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Abcad3b49f36a2209db265e84b98ac4c1&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">Houthi</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26297008.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A3e7f38c4d0743bfab84eaf4812fbb476&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">al-Hirak</a> in Yemen and Somalia’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351270.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A01204b47bdbe5fe2c9d545df0a79f99c&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">al-Shabaab</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26297736.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Abbab4fe5bcd7187fc0621ba043188061&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Ansar al-Sharia</a>. </p>
<p>The Houthi militia, also known as Ansar Allah, is a rebel group based in Yemen. Originating from the Zaidi Shia Muslim minority, they rose to prominence in the early 2000s, opposing Yemen’s central government. The group’s name comes from its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. </p>
<p>The Houthis aim to establish a Zaidi Shia-led government in Yemen. They’ve been involved in armed conflicts with the Yemeni government supported by Saudi-UAE coalition, including the Yemeni Civil War. They’re also backed by Iran. This is not to say the Houthi are a monolithic entity with a single common agenda; they are a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep40553.7.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A11e66397f6320c7d5b8b91336cd2da4e&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">complex and volatile</a> coalition. </p>
<p>The Houthis are, currently, the Red Sea basine’s most pressing security danger. </p>
<p>Houthi soldiers have hounded, assaulted and taken control of many boats <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26470495.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A6f6473f21a1081338473ca7920a79e32&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">since 2016</a>. Their earliest techniques, such as rocket-propelled grenades, were not very sophisticated, but their strategies <a href="https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/pdf/haugstvedt-and-jacobsen.pdf">have evolved</a> to be more hazardous and successful. They have employed mines, drones and anti-ship missiles. The biggest casualty of their attacks are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep38651.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A3e9f92532ab00045060bdcd43edb1719&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Saudi</a> ships and ports. </p>
<p>The Houthi have weakened Yemen and exposed the country to foreign intervention. For instance, in 2015, the United States supported <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible">Saudi Arabia’s intervention</a> to prevent the Houthis from invading all of Yemen. </p>
<h2>What are the other major security challenges facing the region?</h2>
<p>The biggest are the ongoing wars and tensions between and within each country. These include disputes over the affiliation of the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/red-sea-old-new-arena-interest/">Red Sea islands</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12602.6.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aeb6117d282db2402cdac046b5860ef76&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">border disputes</a>, <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/gray-zones-in-the-middle-east">territorial claims</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21365.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A7eada516b25619aa413ec7fb9a0242df&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">conflicting economic interests</a>, ideological differences and ethnic divisions. Examples of these include the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26165.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A86d529deede5c526ae8633abe7a04d2a&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Yemen-Saudi Arabia War</a> and tensions between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt over the <a href="https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI_Insight-2005.pdf">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</a>.</p>
<p>Regional crises – such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7864/j.ctt1657tv8.6.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ae52070930a6b2a2dc6bc03266e0cbb15&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Arab Spring</a>, the <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2031280/is-there-a-path-out-of-the-yemen-conflict-why-it-matters/">Yemen crisis</a>, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/blockade-of-port-sudan-whats-behind-it-and-what-can-end-it-169264">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17358.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A943c3408b7774a356da3014f58599b3b&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Qatar</a> blockades – also have a direct impact on the balance of power in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Another major, escalating security problem is that the Red Sea is being <a href="https://www.coursehero.com/file/140125832/IPI-Rpt-Humanitarian-Crisis-in-Yemenpdf/">used by </a>smugglers smuggling – goods as well as people. They have used the proceeds to finance civil wars and terrorist activities in the region. </p>
<p>Due to its transit point and proximity to conflict zones, the Red Sea is one of the areas with the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep25263.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Afc8929cfe214b2980f81a00ec1842cb7&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">highest concentrations</a> of arms and <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1251">human traffickers</a>. </p>
<p>The growing power of the illegal sector has <a href="https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2015.pdf">adversely</a> affected regional stability. It has paved the way for the formation of many <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/hoa_pb_april_2019_1.pdf">organised crime groups</a>. It has also claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.</p>
<h2>What must be done to better secure the Red Sea area?</h2>
<p>For a number of years, the main security issue in the wider region was Somali piracy. A major coordinated naval operation, involving key international actors, helped to address the threat and shows what can be achieved. </p>
<p>This suggests that the first approach to this regional crisis should be regional cooperation.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here's why</a>
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</p>
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<p>In 2020 the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1612471">Red Sea Council (AKA Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden)</a> was established by Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan with the aim of maintaining security and stability in the Red Sea. It was to consult and coordinate efforts to combat dangers, while not being a military group. </p>
<p>The Red Sea Council is meant to be a new regional instrument. However, the council <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202401020375.html">hasn’t been able</a> to prevent the militarisation of the Red Sea corridor – one of its mandates. This is due of a lack of support from the international community and<br>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-abiy-takes-a-page-from-russia-china-in-asserting-the-right-to-restore-historical-claim-to-strategic-waters-216237">historical tensions</a> over territorial issues. </p>
<p>It’s also <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/senior_study_group_on_peace_and_security_in_the_red_sea_arena-report.pdf#page=34">mainly dominated</a> by Saudi Arabia, based on its economic power and political authority. And so it could in fact work to limit the ability of Ethiopia, Qatar and Turkey, along with Iran, to move freely in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Ultimately, increased coordination and collaboration between adversaries and allies with shared interests are necessary to ensure the safety and security of the Red Sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Burak Şakir Şeker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One of the biggest consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a significant increase in the cost of global trade.Burak Şakir Şeker, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201642023-12-20T11:45:57Z2023-12-20T11:45:57ZUS-led taskforce deploys in Red Sea as Middle East crisis threatens to escalate beyond Gaza<p>The US is reportedly <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-joins-us-taskforce-as-houthis-attack-more-ships-in-red-sea-nzwr8mfmm">considering strikes</a> against Houthi rebels in Yemen that have been menacing commercial ships in the Red Sea since the conflict began in Gaza. The Pentagon has a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-19/us-weighs-whether-to-attack-houthis-beyond-defensive-task-force">range of options for missile attacks</a> on Houthi positions and has moved the Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group into position off the coast of Yemen.</p>
<p>Since November 2023, the Iran-backed Houthis have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-red-sea-crisis-explained-houthis-austin-israel-gaza-iran-shipping-suez-drones-yemen-task-forse-153-red-sea/">conducted several attacks</a> on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Their attacks have increased navigation risks in the region and affected risk perception in the maritime sector. The economic and geopolitical implications are felt much beyond the coast of Yemen.</p>
<p>The world economy is strongly dependent on the global maritime supply chain. About <a href="https://unctad.org/topic/transport-and-trade-logistics/review-of-maritime-transport">80% of international trade</a> by volume is transported by sea. This figure rises to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/623085988fa8f56c2614da97/board-of-trade-paper-maritime-trade-embracing-the-ocean.pdf">95% for the UK</a>. From mobile phones to clothes and from coffee to sugar, the manufactured items we use and the food we consume on a daily basis have been, at least in part, transported by sea.</p>
<h2>Supply chain vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>It does not take much to disrupt the global maritime supply chain. For instance, a simple accident that blocked the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56559073">Suez Canal for six days in 2021</a> or the shortage of labour in Chinese ports during the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/covid-19-impact-on-global-shipping-and-chinas-economy/">COVID pandemic</a> have been enough to negatively affect maritime supply chains and the global economy.</p>
<p>Intentional disruptions of the maritime supply chain by pirates or terrorists pose a challenge that goes beyond simple logistics.</p>
<p>Attacks on civilian shipping directly affect insurance premiums and deter operators from transiting through certain areas for financial and security reasons. The private maritime sector is <a href="https://assets.lloyds.com/media/35d9c95b-4e90-4be1-88a0-c05534c28ad1/Lloyds_shifting_powers_emerging_risk_report_v6.pdf">not immune to geopolitics</a>, and higher insurance premiums or the cost of rerouting ships eventually trickle down to consumers.</p>
<p>Piracy is a for-profit criminal activity that has disrupted maritime trade for decades, especially in eastern and western Africa. States have devoted <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/PiracyArmedRobberydefault.aspx">substantial resources</a> to deter and combat pirates, both at sea (for example deploying a <a href="https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/">naval task force</a> to patrol shipping lanes) and on land to address the underlying <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-pirates-attack-geospatial-evidence/#:%7E:text=Lawlessness%20and%20weak%20governance%20create,encroachment%20by%20industrial%20fishing%20fleets.">socioeconomic causes</a> of piracy.</p>
<p>Politically motivated groups, including terrorist organisations, pose a different type of threat. Their primary objective is not to make money but to increase the visibility of their organisation, or to exercise leverage on other political actors at the regional or global level.</p>
<p>This is achieved by conducting attacks that increase risk and risk perception in a given area, disrupt maritime supply chains, and have disproportionate impacts on the geopolitical situation.</p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>The Houthis are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/who-are-yemens-houthis-why-are-they-attacking-red-sea-ships-2023-12-19/">politically motivated</a>. Their attacks aim to have an impact on the war in Gaza. Their location along a major sea lane of communication in the Red Sea gives them an asymmetrical advantage when it comes to attacking commercial shipping.</p>
<p>Major shipping companies and operators, from Maersk to BP, have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67748605">paused operations</a> in the Red Sea. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67758126">Oil prices</a> are expected to rise. Consequently, Houthis’ attacks affect commerce and the economy much beyond the Red Sea. But options to address the threat are limited.</p>
<p>Politically motivated groups are more difficult to deter than pirates, because they are often willing to die for their cause. They are not looking for a ransom or bounty, but are trying to destroy or damage ships and disrupt shipping, so deploying vessel protection detachments or private security companies personnel onboard will have minimal or no effect.</p>
<h2>Military response</h2>
<p>Failing to deter Houthis from attacking commercial shipping, the second-best option is to increase naval presence to patrol the Red Sea. But this is not without political risks, since a further militarisation of the crisis might be used by the Houthis and others to <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/a-precarious-moment-for-yemens-truce.html">inflame the geopolitical situation</a> in Yemen and in the whole region.</p>
<p>As part of what it has called “Operation Prosperity Guardian”, the US has assembled an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/attacks-red-sea-navy-mission-missiles-286d51bfd65e741e839e185f0f4a455b">international naval task force</a> – including UK naval assets – which will have capabilities to intercept missiles and defend commercial shipping in case of an attack. </p>
<p>But, with a limited number of warships to patrol a large area and with early warning time for missile attacks limited due to the proximity of Yemen, it will be difficult to successfully defend against absolutely all attacks and prevent any damage from occurring.</p>
<p>That said, the symbolic value of such a task force is important. The task force’s success will be evaluated based on its ability in the short-term to <a href="https://www.imscsentinel.com/news/merchant-shipping-reassurance">add to existing mechanisms</a> to reassure insurers, operators and global markets that the route is safe enough for shipping operations, without risking military escalation in an extremely turbulent region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basil Germond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A US-led naval taskforce has deployed in the Red Sea and is considering strikes on rebel positions in Yemen.Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196292023-12-12T14:42:23Z2023-12-12T14:42:23ZSomali pirates are back in action: but a full scale return isn’t likely. Here’s why<p>An Iranian fishing vessel, Almeraj 1, was reportedly hijacked by Somali pirates in <a href="https://splash247.com/somali-pirates-make-their-first-return-in-years/">November 2023</a>. According to <a href="https://x.com/MohamedDekAbdal/status/1727726532376825900?s=20">media reports</a>, the pirates demanded US$400,000 in ransom and threatened to use the Iranian ship for additional hijackings if the payment was not made.</p>
<p>Two days later, other Somali pirates <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-somalia-houthi-pentagon-ship-bfa041bf410a40d4b79a086a6f88dd92">hijacked</a> a tanker, Central Park, off the Yemeni coast. The tanker sent a distress signal during the attack. Forces from a nearby American warship <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-ship-attack-526842504dc9f6bb7ca6e1d5104f77a3">captured the pirates</a> as they tried to flee in a small boat.</p>
<p>The two attacks have led the Somali government to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/somalia-piracy-houthis-yemen-israel-hamas-fa28cb2aa8fe7048fd60fd0f4ba05e26">call</a> for greater international support to deter a resurgence of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Similar <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/25/africa/piracy-resurgence-somalia/index.html">fears</a> that Somali piracy was on the <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/news/one-month-2019s-first-piracy-attack-somali-coast">rebound</a> surfaced after five previous attacks in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=6ZYPGRsAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">studying</a> the rise and fall of <a href="https://scholar.google.dk/citations?hl=da&user=f4z0pC0AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Somali piracy</a>, and have tracked the problem for years. We do not regard a major rise in Somali piracy as likely. </p>
<h2>Addressing the threat</h2>
<p>Following previous threats, local authorities, experts and organisations tracking piracy globally warned that Somali pirates <a href="https://www.riskintelligence.eu/feature-articles/maritime-piracy-what-recent-developments-of-a-well-established-threat">retained the capacity</a> to launch attacks. This is also the <a href="https://www.steamshipmutual.com/sites/default/files/medialibrary/files/2023%20Jan%20-%20Sept%20IMB%20Piracy%20and%20Armed%20Robbery%20Report.pdf#page=2">current assessment</a> of the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre, which acts to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea.</p>
<p>The concern is not surprising. </p>
<p>Somali piracy was a major threat to the region and the world economy at its height in 2011. That year alone, Somali pirates carried out <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">212 attacks</a>. The <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/6b9570fe-2f52-546f-af4b-605e4ebf04e6">World Bank</a> estimated that these cost the world economy US$18 billion.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here's why</a>
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<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">recent analysis</a>, we concluded that a range of anti-piracy measures had put a stop to Somali piracy. The measures fall into four main categories:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>anti-piracy naval operations by the world’s most capable navies</p></li>
<li><p>costly self-protection measures, including the use of armed guards, by most flag states and shipping owners</p></li>
<li><p>a legal toolbox enabling pirate prosecution and imprisonment</p></li>
<li><p>capacity-building and the ability to imprison pirates regionally and in Somalia.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Anti-piracy measures</h2>
<p>These measures remain largely in place. </p>
<p><strong>Measure 1:</strong> The size of anti-piracy naval operations may have shrunk but some international forces remain active. Nato – an intergovernmental military alliance between 29 European and two North American member states – terminated its anti-piracy mission in <a href="https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-shield">2016</a>. However, the European Union <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/">retains</a> its mission, as does a US-led coalition. <a href="https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/">Together</a> they seek to suppress piracy outside the territorial waters of Somalia and other coastal states in the region. In addition, independent deployers like China have warships on patrol.</p>
<p><strong>Measure 2:</strong> Most commercial ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden, the Somali basin and the Indian Ocean follow many of the <a href="https://www.steamshipmutual.com/sites/default/files/downloads/loss-prevention/BMP%25205.pdf#page=17">self-protection measures</a> recommended by flag states and the main maritime industry organisations. While the number of ships carrying armed guards has dropped considerably, most commercial ships report to the maritime security centres, follow the recommended transit corridor <a href="https://safety4sea.com/eu-extension-of-naval-operation-against-piracy-off-somalia-until-2024/">protected by international naval forces</a> and join group transits. </p>
<p><strong>Measure 3:</strong> The legal toolbox and the post-trial transfer system making it possible to prosecute pirates and imprison them in Somalia remains in place. This makes jail the most likely destination for the five pirates recently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-ship-attack-526842504dc9f6bb7ca6e1d5104f77a3">apprehended by US forces</a> following their hijacking of Central Park. Successful prosecution and imprisonment would signal to other pirates that piracy remains an unprofitable undertaking off the Somali coast.</p>
<p><strong>Measure 4:</strong> International efforts continue to increase the capacity of Somalia and other regional states to patrol their national waters. The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-som_en?s=332">EU’s capacity building mission in Somalia</a>, for instance, still supports Somalia’s maritime security sector. It seeks to strengthen the sector’s capacity to <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-som/about-eucap-somalia_en?s=332">deter, capture and prosecute pirates</a>. The successful operations undertaken by the Puntland Maritime Police Force – including <a href="https://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/U121/U121231a/">securing the release of hostages</a> – indicate that these efforts are paying off.</p>
<p>These anti-piracy measures continue to be implemented by a broad coalition of state and private actors. They include states from outside the region, regional nations, Somali authorities and the international shipping industry. As long as these actors continue to invest in maintaining these measures, Somali piracy will remain unprofitable.</p>
<h2>High risks, few rewards</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen if the ransom demand for the Iranian fishing vessel Almeraj 1 will succeed. However, pirates don’t appear to have made any money from any of the other five attacks launched in the 2017-2023 period. We haven’t been able to ascertain if any ransom was paid to secure the release of a Panama-flagged ship captured in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/somali-pirates-hijack-panama-flagged-ship/a-54637865">August 2020</a>. In the other four instances, the attacks either failed or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/somali-pirates-release-oil-tanker-and-crew-after-first-hijack-for-five-years">didn’t result in ransom payments</a>. </p>
<p>Even if the US$400,000 ransom demand succeeds, it doesn’t alter the overall conclusion that piracy off the Somali coast remains a high-risk undertaking with a low probability of success. This suggests that a major increase in Somali piracy is highly unlikely. </p>
<p>If it did happen, though, it would be easy for international naval forces and the shipping industry to reduce the prospects of success by stepping up naval patrols and reintroducing armed guards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Piracy off the Somali coast remains a high-risk undertaking with a low probability of success.Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeTroels Burchall Henningsen, Associate Professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143932023-09-29T12:31:48Z2023-09-29T12:31:48ZSouth Africa has one of the strongest navies in Africa: its strengths and weaknesses<p><em>The deaths of three members of the South African Navy (<a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">SA Navy</a>) <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/media/statements/Pages/SANavyIncidentKommetjie.aspx">on 20 September 2023</a>, when a freak wave swept them off the deck of the submarine SAS Manthatisi, has put the spotlight on the organisation and its work. André Wessels is a military historian; his latest <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">book</a> is A Century of South African Naval History: The South African Navy and its Predecessors 1922-2022. The Conversation Africa asked him for insights.</em></p>
<h2>How big is South Africa’s navy? How does it compare?</h2>
<p>The South African Navy has always been one of the strongest naval forces in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Egypt has the <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">strongest navy in Africa</a>, and Algeria is the second strongest as it has been steadily building <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/algeria/navy-modernization.htm">up its</a> naval forces. The Moroccan navy is also strong, as is the Nigerian navy, which has acquired <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/nigerian-navy-commissions-large-number-of-new-vessels/">a large number of naval vessels</a>, mostly patrol ships and smaller patrol craft. </p>
<p>Thanks to its submarine capabilities, the SA Navy can be regarded as one of the strongest on the continent. However, with its present ten “major” warships, the SA Navy is not in the same league as, for example, Brazil (about 100 ships), Russia (550), India (250) and China (600).</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">sources</a> that are in the public domain, the SA Navy at the moment has three submarines, four frigates, one multi-mission inshore patrol vessel (with another to be commissioned in the near future, and a third under construction), one survey ship (with a new one under construction), one combat support ship, and a number of smaller craft (most of them in reserve). In terms of its number of warships, this is the smallest that the navy has been since the mid-1950s.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">Money has little to do with why South Africa's military is failing to do its job</a>
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<p>Severe financial restrictions have put its capabilities under strain. For example, it has had to curtail anti-piracy patrols (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/operation-copper-extension-to-cost-r154-million/">“Operation Copper”</a>) in the Mozambique Channel due to the unavailability of ships.</p>
<h2>Can it protect the country’s territorial waters?</h2>
<p>Submarines provide South Africa with a crucial deterrent potential. And the navy can also do patrol work with its surface vessels (if they are able to go to sea). But it has a limited anti-submarine warfare capability, and is not able to project much power across long distances. </p>
<p>The government needs to gradually increase defence spending from the present less than 1% of GDP to at least 1.8%, which is what countries globally on average spend on defence. That will enable the navy to increase training opportunities, send more ships out to sea, and perhaps even acquire much-needed larger offshore patrol vessels.</p>
<p>South Africa is a maritime state, given that all its borders are on the ocean bar its northern one. The country needs a small but well-equipped navy that can defend it, underpin its diplomatic efforts, and assist other state departments in various ways.</p>
<h2>What’s its role?</h2>
<p>Geographically South Africa is a large <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/peninsula/">peninsula</a> on the strategic Cape sea route. Some <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">90% of its trade</a> flows through its harbours. The navy must assist in ensuring the integrity of the country as an independent state, by patrolling its territorial waters and acting as a deterrent against foreign military aggression and maritime crime. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">core business</a> is “to fight at sea”, with its official mission “to win at sea”. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">vision</a> is</p>
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<p>to be unchallenged at sea. </p>
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<p>The navy can also play a role in humanitarian relief operations, search-and-rescue operations and <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">peace support operations</a>. </p>
<p>In the course of its history, the SA Navy has performed these and many other tasks. For example, in 1993 it facilitated the <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/disaster-response/bosnia/726/">sending of a mobile hospital and relief supplies</a> to Bosnia-Herzegovina, by <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/">Gift of the Givers</a>, the disaster response NGO. The navy has also helped provide food and medical aid to countries ravaged by conflict or drought, for example when the combat support ship SAS Drakensberg took supplies to Bangladesh <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">in 1991</a>. The navy has also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/final-voyage-for-veteran-ship-20011010">rescued the crew members</a> of many yachts that have been caught in storms or were in need of other assistance off the South African coast and elsewhere, for example during the 2014 Cape-to-Rio Transatlantic Yacht Race. </p>
<p>The navy is also responsible for hydrographic survey work along the South African coast. It maps the ocean floor so that reliable charts can be drawn up, making it safe for merchant and other ships to sail along the coast and visit ports. </p>
<p>In addition, the navy has an important diplomatic role in sending warships (<a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">“grey diplomats”</a>) on flag-showing visits to other countries. </p>
<p>But under <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">financial constraints</a>, the navy has been hard-pressed to fulfil its obligations. For example, it has for several years not been able to take part in flag-showing visits to other countries because of the unavailability of ships. In general, less time has also been spent at sea. </p>
<h2>What is the history of the SA Navy?</h2>
<p>The navy can trace its history back to <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">1 April 1922</a>, when the SA Naval Service was established. This became the Seaward Defence Force in 1939 when the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">Second World War</a> broke out, and the SA Naval Forces in 1942. It played a <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">small but important role</a> in the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany, patrolling the South African coastal waters. It also sent warships to the Mediterranean and Far Eastern war zones.</p>
<p>On 1 January 1951, the Naval Forces were renamed the SA Navy. In accordance with the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230376366_5">Simon’s Town Agreement</a> (1955), the navy <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">acquired</a> the Simon’s Town Naval Base from Britain (1957), and was strengthened by the acquisition of a number of destroyers, frigates, patrol boats and minesweepers, and later also a replenishment ship (1967) and three submarines (1970-1971). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-set-for-personnel-reforms-why-it-matters-178064">South Africa's military is set for personnel reforms. Why it matters</a>
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<p>But by then, the ruling National Party’s apartheid policy had led to South Africa’s growing international isolation. The United Nations’ <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa/un-arms-embargo-on-south-africa">mandatory arms embargo</a> against the country (1977) had obvious detrimental consequences for the then South African Defence Force (SADF), and in particular the navy. For example, it did not receive the submarines and frigates that it had ordered from France.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the navy <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027#page=5">assisted the other arms of the defence force</a>, in particular the SA Army’s Special Forces, during the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/namibian-struggle-independence-1966-1990-historical-background">Namibian war of independence</a>, which spilled over into Angola. The navy’s submarines and strike craft, as well as other ships, assisted the South African Special Forces <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080013-8.pdf">in operations</a> “behind enemy lines”.</p>
<p>The end of this conflict in 1989, and of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">freedom struggle in South Africa in 1994</a>, led to a new dawn. On the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346383?seq=4">eve of the 1994 elections</a> the SADF was renamed the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). </p>
<p>In due course the navy was transformed into a navy of and for all the people of South Africa. All cultural groups, as well as an increasing number of women, would henceforth be represented in the navy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Wessels in the years c 2012-2017 received funding from the NRF, but at the moment no longer receives any funds from the NRF. </span></em></p>South Africa is a large peninsula on the strategic Cape sea route. Some 90% of its trade flows through its harbours. The navy defends the country’s sovereignty and national interests.André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146372023-09-29T08:22:31Z2023-09-29T08:22:31ZBooks 3 has revealed thousands of pirated Australian books. In the age of AI, is copyright law still fit for purpose?<p>Thousands of Australian books <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-09-29/australian-authors-copyright-books3-generative-i-chatgpt/102914538">have been found</a> on a pirated dataset of ebooks, known as Books3, used to train generative AI. Richard Flanagan, Helen Garner, Tim Winton and Tim Flannery are among the leading local authors affected – along, of course, with writers from around the world. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://full-stack-search-prod.vercel.app/">search tool</a> published by <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2023/09/books3-database-generative-ai-training-copyright-infringement/675363/">the Atlantic</a> makes it possible for authors to find out whether their books are among the nearly 200,000 in the Books3 dataset.</p>
<p>Many of these writers have reacted angrily about their works being included in these datasets without their knowledge or consent. Flanagan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/sep/28/australian-books-training-ai-books3-stolen-pirated">told the Guardian</a>, “I felt as if my soul had been strip mined and I was powerless to stop it”.</p>
<p>“Turning a blind eye to the legitimate rights of copyright owners threatens to diminish already-precarious creative careers,” said Olivia Lanchester, chief executive of the Australian Society of Authors, in <a href="https://www.asauthors.org.au/news/asa-response-to-use-of-australian-books-to-train-ai/">an official response</a> this week.</p>
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<h2>AI moving at speed</h2>
<p>Authors have turned to copyright law because it is the body of law that has traditionally protected authors and other creators from the appropriation of their works. </p>
<p>However, laws designed for the pre-AI era have little meaning in the post-OpenAI world.</p>
<p>Just last year, the issue of AI was only faintly on the cultural radar. But while AI technology is moving at high speed, the law moves slowly. </p>
<p>It took a very significant amount of time for copyright law to first appear. The first copyright law, the <a href="https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?entryid=3389">Statute of Anne</a>, emerged in 1710 after protracted lobbying by stationers (publishers).</p>
<p>In a more modern context, it took 20 years from the time Australian courts first recognised a system of Aboriginal law existed, with the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milirrpum_v_Nabalco_Pt">Milirrpum decision</a> in 1971 – meaning <em>terra nullius</em> was implausible – to the High Court handing down the <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-mabo-decision-and-native-title-74147">landmark Mabo decision</a> that erased <em>terra nullius</em>, in June 1992. In the interim, injustice reigned.</p>
<p>The question that now confronts us is whether we can wait for the law to catch up with the rapid advances of technology – or whether we must jumpstart the process. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/authors-are-resisting-ai-with-petitions-and-lawsuits-but-they-have-an-advantage-we-read-to-form-relationships-with-writers-208046">Authors are resisting AI with petitions and lawsuits. But they have an advantage: we read to form relationships with writers</a>
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<h2>A spate of copyright disputes</h2>
<p>There has been a spate of copyright disputes around AI datasets and copyright-protected works. </p>
<p>Earlier this month, the US Authors Guild <a href="https://authorsguild.org/news/ag-and-authors-file-class-action-suit-against-openai/">filed a class action</a>, with 17 authors including Jonathan Franzen and Jodi Picoult, against OpenAI for copyright infringement.</p>
<p>This followed <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-authors-are-suing-openai-for-training-chatgpt-with-their-books-could-they-win-209227">the first copyright lawsuit</a> against OpenAI in July. It was filed by authors Mona Awad and Paul Tremblay, for using their books to train its AI, ChatGPT, without their consent. </p>
<p>And in August, Benji Smith was <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecraft-has-infuriated-authors-by-using-their-books-without-consent-but-what-does-copyright-law-say-211187">forced to take down</a> his website Prosecraft, which used an algorithm to trawl through more than 25,000 books (again, without authors’ consent) to produce analysis designed to give writing advice.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/two-authors-are-suing-openai-for-training-chatgpt-with-their-books-could-they-win-209227">Two authors are suing OpenAI for training ChatGPT with their books. Could they win?</a>
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<h2>Copyright is not the answer</h2>
<p>While it’s true that the uploading of works into a dataset is an act of copyright infringement, that only pertains to a one-off act of infringement. </p>
<p>No doubt, the liability would be large if thousands of works were involved and thousands of authors were to sue (as with the US Authors Guild class action), but the damages obtained by an individual author would be relatively small, making it not worth suing. The large commercial interests driving the development of the datasets and related AI tools are likely to withstand these lawsuits even if they are found liable.</p>
<p>Likewise, copyright law’s rules on <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-fair-dealing-and-when-can-you-copy-without-permission-80745">fair dealing</a> in Australia and fair use in the United States would likely protect some uses. </p>
<p>Further, the outputs from AI that have been trained on these datasets are not likely to result in works that satisfy the substantial similarity threshold (which means that when the two works are compared side by side, they must be similar) for copyright infringement in most jurisdictions, including Australia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecraft-has-infuriated-authors-by-using-their-books-without-consent-but-what-does-copyright-law-say-211187">Prosecraft has infuriated authors by using their books without consent – but what does copyright law say?</a>
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<h2>‘A type of market failure’</h2>
<p>Copyright law has previously had to balance the interests of creators with those of technology developers. </p>
<p>This happened when the photocopier was invented, when video cassette recorders were developed, when blank tapes became widely available and when peer-to-peer copyright infringement took off during the digital era.</p>
<p>The difference then was that these technologies did not fundamentally threaten artistic and creative labour in the way AI does.</p>
<p>To appropriate a part of someone’s market is a radically different thing to producing a product that could entirely displace them in that market.</p>
<p>Yet this is the direction we’re heading in. And it requires a very significant rethink about the regulation of technology.</p>
<p>A type of market failure is occurring here, because authors are not being compensated even though their works, collectively, are the basis for new and commercially viable AI products. </p>
<p>When the sale of blank tapes began, <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/1994/38.html">the government responded</a> with a levy on every blank tape sale, which sent money back to copyright owners. </p>
<p>Something like the blank tape levy might need to be considered for AI. This would mean every time somebody uses an OpenAI-type tool for which they pay a fee, some small portion of the fee would revert to copyright owners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214637/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dilan Thampapillai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Authors are furious about finding their works on pirated dataset Books3. Copyright is the usual avenue for redress, but while AI moves at speed, the law is slow – and not designed to combat AI issues.Dilan Thampapillai, Dean of Law, University of Wollongong, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138722023-09-27T13:57:00Z2023-09-27T13:57:00ZSomali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here’s why<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>In 2011, pirates carried out <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">212 attacks</a> in a vast area spanning Somali waters, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, actions that the World Bank said cost the world economy <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/6b9570fe-2f52-546f-af4b-605e4ebf04e6">US$18 billion a year</a>.</p>
<p>Armed pirates hijacked ships as far away as 1,000 nautical miles from the Somali coast. They held the ships and crews for ransom. The World Bank estimates that Somali pirates received <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/publication/pirate-trails-tracking-the-illicit-financial-flows-from-piracy-off-the-horn-of-africa">more than US$400 million</a> in ransom payments between 2005 and 2012.</p>
<p>The piracy problem appeared unsolvable. Anti-piracy naval missions undertaken by the world’s most formidable navies, and self-protection measures adopted by the shipping industry, didn’t seem to work. It was, therefore, generally held that the solution lay ashore: major state-building in Somalia to remove the root causes of piracy. </p>
<p>The only problem was that no one was willing to undertake such a mission in the wake of America’s failures in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/11/23/142699506/u-s-easing-out-of-nation-building-business">Afghanistan and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>And then there was an astonishing turnaround. The number of attacks fell to 10 in 2012 and only <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">two ships were hijacked</a> between 2013 and 2023. </p>
<p>For three decades, I have conducted research on international diplomacy, military strategy, use of force and peacebuilding. Together with a colleague specialising in military strategy, I <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">analysed the Somali piracy case</a>. Academics and practitioners agree that four factors interacted to stop the pirates:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>the conduct and coordination of several anti-piracy naval operations by the world’s most capable navies, including all <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members">five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council</a>: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China</p></li>
<li><p>the implementation of costly self-protection measures, not least the use of armed guards, by most flag states and shipping owners</p></li>
<li><p>development of a comprehensive legal toolbox enabling pirate prosecution and imprisonment</p></li>
<li><p>regional capacity-building making it possible to imprison pirates regionally and in Somalia.</p></li>
</ol>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lift-for-maritime-sector-in-kenya-and-djibouti-after-fall-in-piracy-128073">Lift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy</a>
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<p>The surprising thing is not that the four measures on their own proved sufficient to stop Somali piracy. What makes the Somali case special is the international community’s ability to agree to them and pay for their implementation. </p>
<p>The Somali case is important because it’s one of the few success stories in recent years where the use of limited force contributed to a sustainable outcome. Further, Somali pirates were stopped even though the conditions onshore in Somalia didn’t improve in any major way.</p>
<h2>Collective action</h2>
<p>Theoretically, the international community’s collective effort shouldn’t have happened because safety from piracy is a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2021/12/Global-Public-Goods-Chin-basics">costly public good</a>. </p>
<p>This means that it’s very expensive to provide but no one can be prevented from enjoying it once it has been produced. The result is a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/collective-action">collective action problem</a> that’s rarely overcome in international politics. Most actors prefer to free-ride rather than contribute to the production of the public good. </p>
<p>With respect to Somali piracy, all states and shipping owners had an incentive to leave it to others to solve the problem for them. The implementation of the four factors was very expensive for the states contributing to naval operations, and for shipowners who had to pay for self-protection measures, including hiring of armed guards.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">Our study</a> sought to understand how and why the collective action problem was overcome. The hope was to learn something that could help with overcoming similar problems in the future.</p>
<h2>What worked</h2>
<p>We found that three factors explain why the amount of free-riding was minimised in the Somali case. </p>
<p>The first was that the Somali pirates attacked ships belonging to all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all the major shipping companies. This induced France to take the lead in military action against the pirates. The US subsequently led with respect to formulating a comprehensive strategy to implement the four factors presented earlier. </p>
<p>The involvement of European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in the anti-piracy naval operations made it hard for member states not to contribute. A total of 18 member states contributed ships. China and Russia supported the American-led strategy and launched their own naval operations because their ships were attacked as well.</p>
<p>Second, the US established an institution, the Contact Group on Somali Piracy, tailor-made to formulate and implement a broad anti-piracy strategy. The US handpicked who would lead various working groups so that it contained all the actors – state and non-state – that were required to implement the necessary measures. These actors provided the expertise and the material resources required to implement the four factors presented earlier.</p>
<p>Third, the Somalia federal government and federal member states cooperated closely with anti-piracy efforts. They allowed the use of force against pirates in its national waters and on land. Somali authorities also cooperated with respect to the construction and running of pirate prisons paid for by international donors. This made it possible to overcome the piracy problem without engaging in the major state-building operation that had generally been viewed as a necessary condition for success when the piracy problem peaked in 2011.</p>
<h2>Shared interests</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this success story will be hard to replicate. Somali piracy aligned great power, as well as private sector, regional and local state interests to an unusual degree. This is, for example, not the case in the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-06/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-2.php">Gulf of Guinea</a> off the west African coast. Here, local states are less cooperative with respect to tackling piracy than Somali governmental actors were. </p>
<p>It’s also not the case with respect to tackling the <a href="https://africacenter.org/in-focus/africa-crisis-coups/">coups in west Africa</a>, where Russia, the three western members of the UN Security Council and regional states have conflicting interests. </p>
<p>It was the high degree of shared interests among the many actors involved that made the Somali anti-piracy campaign so effective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Viggo Jakobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The success of the Somali case illustrates what a high degree of shared interests among international actors can achieve.Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2103792023-08-01T20:13:07Z2023-08-01T20:13:07ZIs it OK to pirate TV shows and movies from streaming services that exploit artists? An ethicist weighs in<p>You’ve probably heard that Hollywood writers and actors are striking. </p>
<p>One of the main revelations to outside observers is the hard treatment meted out by production companies (in concert with streaming giants) to artists. Even very <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/07/18/the-bear-writer-who-lived-below-the-poverty-line-rips-disney-ceo/">successful</a> and sometimes <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/sag-strike-residuals-explainer-mandy-moore-sanaa-lathan-orange-is-the-new-black-210639209.html">famous</a> writers or actors can struggle to make a <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/writers-guild-streaming-report-members-falling-behind-1235352341/">living wage</a>, with residuals – the money these artists make when their work is re-aired – dropping precipitously in the streaming era. </p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=O2KsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA154&lpg=PA154&dq=hollywood+defends+copyright&source=bl&ots=6vtFZzM6yT&sig=ACfU3U1er3ABl7KYfqLAO1OUnwjmsUBqAQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj8-NuZhLCAAxVocGwGHQ6lCBAQ6AF6BAhyEAM#v=onepage&q=hollywood%20defends%20copyright&f=false">key reasons</a> the entertainment industry urges us to support copyright and avoid piracy is to support artists. So what happens to our moral calculations when it turns out industries direct so little revenue to creative workers? Should we really feel morally beholden to pay streaming services that exploit artists? </p>
<p>The strike presents a worthwhile moment to think about why we have copyright, and whether it is a law worthy of respect.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ronald-reagan-led-the-1960-actors-strike-and-then-became-an-anti-union-president-209800">How Ronald Reagan led the 1960 actors' strike – and then became an anti-union president</a>
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<h2>What is piracy?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/piracy-copyright-crime">Piracy</a> refers to the illegal copying, accessing, downloading, streaming or distributing of another’s created work of entertainment, without transforming that work. (For example, <a href="https://legalvision.com.au/does-fanfiction-infringe-copyright/">fan fiction</a> often violates copyright, but because it transforms the work, it isn’t piracy.)</p>
<p>Content industries tend to stereotype pirates as rapacious, remorseless thieves. But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25482147">many pirates</a> pay respect to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0196859909333697">copyright law’s spirit</a>, if not its black-letter obligations.</p>
<p>Consider four different types of pirates:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>takers</strong> take whatever they want without compunction</li>
<li><strong>samplers</strong> pirate only to sample works. Once they find something they enjoy, they purchase it</li>
<li><strong>finders</strong> only pirate works that aren’t otherwise available</li>
<li><strong>non-payers</strong> only pirate works they would never otherwise have purchased (for example, because they do not have the money to pay for it).</li>
</ul>
<p>These four types of pirates raise different moral concerns, and it can be tricky to <a href="https://hughbreakey.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Breakey-2018-Ethics-of-Digital-Piracy-ONLINE.pdf">tease out the ethics</a> of each. Let’s confine our attention here to <em>taking</em>, which is the most concerning type of piracy.</p>
<p>Is piratical taking of copyrighted works ethical?</p>
<h2>Is copyright law morally right?</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most obvious question to consider will be whether we agree with copyright. Copyright law has <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intellectual-property/">two main moral justifications</a>.</p>
<p>First, copyright might be justified on the basis that it provides incentives to artists to develop their work. The production of new art usually requires significant labour. Without some way of supporting artists for what they do, there would be less art and entertainment for us all to enjoy. This “<a href="https://utilitarianism.net/">utilitarian</a>” argument justifies copyright because of its good consequences.</p>
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<p>Second, we might think artists <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2856883">deserve to be compensated</a>. If through hard work and talent someone creates something that gives enjoyment and fulfilment to millions, then it seems unfair if they don’t get rewarded. This is a rights-based or desert-based moral justification.</p>
<p>When industry bodies <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt3fk848wz/qt3fk848wz_noSplash_3c19eb9dc89e79675946515dd1b1e8e4.pdf?t=oo6uou">appeal</a> to the need for copyright law to protect and support artists, they are tapping into the moral force of these arguments. </p>
<p>Still, both these justifications are controversial. <a href="http://tomgpalmer.com/wp-content/uploads/papers/morallyjustified.pdf">Reasonable</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Uneasy_Case_for_Copyright">informed</a> people can disagree with them.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-convicts-to-pirates-australias-dubious-legacy-of-illegal-downloading-39912">From convicts to pirates: Australia's dubious legacy of illegal downloading</a>
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<h2>Understanding legitimacy</h2>
<p>Suppose we disagree with a law. Do we have the right to ignore it? There are two good reasons to think we don’t have that right.</p>
<p>First, if people only respected laws they already agreed with, then law itself would cease to function. The main reason we have the <a href="https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/what-is-the-rule-of-law/">rule of law</a> is to avoid everyone simply doing whatever they want. </p>
<p>As political theorists such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Locke">John Locke</a> argued, such situations quickly descend to violence, as everyone enforces their chosen understanding of rights and obligations. Lawless societies are not nice places to live.</p>
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<p>Second, democratically made laws have a <a href="https://resume.uni.lu/story/democratic-legitimacy">special claim</a> to legitimacy. As human institutions, democracies are inevitably flawed. Yet they provide an important way that everyone in a community can come together as equals and play a role in deciding the laws that will bind them. </p>
<p>These two arguments show we can disagree with a law, but still think it should be respected.</p>
<h2>So, should we turn to piracy?</h2>
<p>Where, then, are we left when we find that many entertainment industries exploit artists, and that little of the money from our purchases trickles through to the artists who created it?</p>
<p>For a start, we have reason to think that such industry bodies are not just being exploitative. They are also being hypocritical and manipulative when they appeal to artists to persuade us to support copyright. </p>
<p>If they really were morally committed to supporting artists, their own behaviour would reflect this. </p>
<p>The lack of support to artists may also prompt us to rethink how well copyright law really serves the justifications presented for it.</p>
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<p>Can we go a step further, and say that if entertainment industries are such exploitative hypocrites, we’re entitled to stop handing over our hard-earned cash to access their shows?</p>
<p>If the above arguments are on the right track, then the answer is “no”.</p>
<p>For one thing, copyright law is still the democratically created law of the land. We wouldn’t want other people dispensing with laws and entitlements we cherish and rely on. So we have reason not to break laws that are important to other people.</p>
<p>More specifically, many artists at least make <em>some</em> money from the present system. If we are morally outraged at how little our purchases contribute to their wages, it would be a wildly inappropriate response to <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/4/20/11393162/piracy-arthouse-film-extinct-jason-blum">stop paying altogether</a> (and thereby strip our contribution to artists down to zero!).</p>
<p>While we should resist resorting to piracy, the Hollywood strikes do invite us to think critically about how well our current laws live up to their justifications, and whether there are other ways we can support artists.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/computer-written-scripts-and-deepfake-actors-whats-at-the-heart-of-the-hollywood-strikes-against-generative-ai-210191">Computer-written scripts and deepfake actors: what’s at the heart of the Hollywood strikes against generative AI</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh Breakey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Given the hypocritical and exploitative treatment of artists by entertainment industries, do we really have moral obligations to pay for streaming services?Hugh Breakey, Deputy Director, Institute for Ethics, Governance & Law. President, Australian Association for Professional & Applied Ethics., Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2006242023-03-05T17:20:15Z2023-03-05T17:20:15ZCanada needs a strategic plan to safeguard consumers against counterfeit and pirated goods<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513290/original/file-20230302-17-u4h5cy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C17%2C2982%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Counterfeiting has become a billion-dollar problem for countries all around the world.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Counterfeiting is a chronic problem faced by Canadian consumers. According to Canadian manufacturers
and exporters, counterfeiting — or the sale of products that purport to be something they are not — <a href="https://bc.ctvnews.ca/crime-stoppers-warns-tens-of-billions-of-dollars-in-counterfeit-goods-imported-into-canada-every-year-1.5348127">costs Canada between $20 billion and $30 billion annually</a>. </p>
<p>Canada is not the only country struggling with counterfeiting — the practice is prevalent in many other countries and across different industries. A 2017 World Health Organization study found that <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/28-11-2017-1-in-10-medical-products-in-developing-countries-is-substandard-or-falsified">around 10 per cent of medicines sold in developing countries may be deceptively counterfeit</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that 20 of 47 items purchased from third-party sellers such as Amazon, eBay and Sears Marketplace <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-216.pdf">were counterfeits</a>. Examples included <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/3m-files-lawsuit-against-merchant-selling-masks-on-amazon-for-18-times-list-price-11591642637">counterfeit versions of 3M N95 masks on Amazon</a>.</p>
<p>Given the scale of this ongoing issue, Canadian governments and industries must come together to design new strategies that will protect Canadians while maintaining <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/key_facts-2022-01-faits_saillants.aspx?lang=eng">the country’s competitive advantage</a> in the global marketplace.</p>
<h2>Contributing factors</h2>
<p>Several diverse factors contribute to the persistence of counterfeit goods in Canada. The first relates to consumer behaviour, as some buyers may intentionally buy (or fail to avoid) counterfeit goods out of shrewdness or economic necessity. </p>
<p>Second, in terms of product quality, fakes can be very similar to the real thing. For example, the Canadian Intellectual Property Council reported that <a href="https://silo.tips/download/counterfeiting-in-the-canadian-market-how-do-we-stop-it-june-2012">a counterfeit version of a particular Procter & Gamble shampoo was so close to the original</a> even the company’s own sales force couldn’t tell the difference.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A row of sneakers sitting on a table" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513284/original/file-20230302-1990-23hdik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Seized counterfeit footwear, including copies of Adidas and Kanye West Yeezy Boost trainers, are displayed at U.K. Border Force offices in London in February 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Matt Dunham)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Third, <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/economy/why-canada-is-a-haven-for-knock-off-goods/">Canadian laws on counterfeit goods are notoriously lax</a>, hindering effective enforcement. In fact, <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/april/ustr-releases-2022-special-301-report-intellectual-property-protection-and-enforcement">the Office of the United States Trade Representative has placed Canada on its watchlist</a> of countries offering the weakest intellectual property (IP) protections.</p>
<p>A fourth factor stems from outsourcing production to overseas suppliers. This leads to a form of counterfeiting called the “third shift.” After a business outsources production, the supplier uses the business’ IP rights to produce counterfeit products in the same factory the original product is made.</p>
<p>Canadian home product manufacturer <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/umbra-struggles-with-copycats-worldwide/article24863725/">Umbra has been plagued by numerous suppliers</a> using a third shift to reproduce its products.</p>
<p>Finally, although some customers may rely on review systems to assess the authenticity of items they buy online, these systems are far from reliable. Counterfeit sellers have found ways to manipulate the review system — <a href="https://hbr.org/2020/11/how-fake-customer-reviews-do-and-dont-work">by purchasing fraudulent five-star reviews</a>, for example.</p>
<p>In light of these difficulties, Canada needs a carefully thought-out approach to mitigate counterfeiting.</p>
<h2>Combating counterfeits</h2>
<p>Because the source of counterfeit products is often the same factory that produces the original product, one remedy is to provide supplier factories with limited quantities of raw materials. Hewlett-Packard does this by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-21407916">providing its suppliers with a certain number of printheads</a> that are used to manufacture ink cartridges for the company.</p>
<p>Another solution is to allocate parts to different suppliers so that no one supplier has all the parts needed to build a particular product.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A hand peels down the tread on the sole of a boot to reveal a second tread beneath" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513288/original/file-20230302-16-ag2qer.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.S. Customs and Border Protection deputy chief officer shows how a Timberland brand on a counterfeit boot is hidden at a warehouse in Kearney, N.J. in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Richard Drew)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, many emerging market governments are stepping up enforcement efforts to strengthen IP protections. In 2020, China’s State Administration for Market Regulation released an <a href="https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/NDM0NjM2NzQ2">IP enforcement plan called Iron Fist</a> to better protect the IP rights of various manufacturers. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/e-commerce-battling-over-%20copycat-brands-and-trademarks/articleshow/67399720.cms">India’s IP strategy</a> is to “put greater emphasis on trademark enforcement.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ipophil.gov.ph/news/supreme-courts-revised-rules-on-ip-cases-improves-litigation-driving-innovation-and-creativity/">Philippine government’s recent IP legislation</a> aims to “ensure efficient and expeditious adjudication of IP cases” and make “IP litigation less costly and faster.”</p>
<p>For these governments, addressing IP protection is critical to ensuring manufacturers continue to feel comfortable outsourcing operations to their countries. As such, Canada should prioritize and incentivize outsourcing to countries that embrace IP protections.</p>
<h2>Using technology</h2>
<p>Businesses can also use technologies, such as radio-frequency identification or holograms, on their products to help customers identify counterfeits. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://intellectual-property-helpdesk.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/use-blockchain-protect-against-counterfeiting-2022-09-16_en">blockchain technology has been considered as a promising solution</a> to counterfeiting. Several blockchain-based applications have been launched with the aim of tagging products with unique identifiers that can’t be duplicated. </p>
<p><a href="https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3067/paper18.pdf">Blockchain solution provider BlockPharma</a> helps patients check the authenticity of their medicines, while luxury goods giant <a href="https://consensys.net/blog/press-release/lvmh-microsoft-consensys-announce-aura-to-power-luxury-industry/">LVMH Group has partnered with blockchain firm ConsenSys and Microsoft</a> to authenticate products. </p>
<p>This tech-focused strategy aligns with the fact that governments around the world are increasingly encouraging blockchain adoption. The U.K. government, through Innovate UK, has <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/innovate-uk-offers-15-mln-grants-to-develop-blockchain-solutions">pledged the equivalent of C$24 million to fund blockchain companies</a> and the <a href="https://www.ledgerinsights.com/eu-intellectual-property-office-euipo-blockchain-anti-counterfeit/">European Union Intellectual Property Office uses blockchain for anti-counterfeit</a>.</p>
<h2>A joint approach is key</h2>
<p>The many factors that increase Canada’s risk concerning counterfeits, including weak laws and IP protections, make this a challenging policy issue. </p>
<p>However, anti-counterfeit strategies and the advent of new technologies like blockchain present opportunities for Canadian policymakers and industry leaders to develop an effective plan to combat counterfeiting. </p>
<p>Together, Canada’s business and political leaders can build consumer trust while further building Canada’s global advantage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hubert Pun receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Grants (No. 430-2022-00517 and No. 435-2022-0271)</span></em></p>The global trade of counterfeit and pirated products costs countries like Canada billions a year. Governments and industries must come together to protect Canadians.Hubert Pun, Professor, Ivey Business School, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1966942022-12-21T13:41:01Z2022-12-21T13:41:01ZWhen fishing boats go dark at sea, they’re often committing crimes – we mapped where it happens<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502060/original/file-20221220-22-3bbpfo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C7%2C5152%2C3430&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Workers flood a Vietnamese-flagged boat caught operating illegally off West Kalimantan, Indonesia on May 4, 2019 in order to sink it.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaIllegalFishing/495acf8677984e80b8f47d00e0ee4d35/photo">AP Photos/William Pasaribu</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 2019, the Korean-flagged fishing vessel Oyang 77 sailed south toward international waters off Argentina. The vessel had a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2019/oct/14/ship-of-horrors-life-and-death-on-the-lawless-high-seas-podcast">known history of nefarious activities</a>, including underreporting its catch and illegally dumping low-value fish to make room in its hold for more lucrative catch. </p>
<p>At 2 a.m. on Jan. 10, the Oyang 77 turned off its location transponder at the edge of Argentina’s <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html">exclusive economic zone</a> – a political boundary that divides Argentina’s national waters from international waters, or the high seas. At 9 p.m. on Jan. 11, the Oyang 77 turned its transponder back on and reappeared on the high seas. For the 19 hours when the ship was dark, no information was available about where it had gone or what it did.</p>
<p>In a study published in Nov. 2022, I worked with colleagues at <a href="https://globalfishingwatch.org/">Global Fishing Watch</a>, a nonprofit that works to advance ocean governance by increasing transparency of human activity at sea, to show that these periods of missing transponder data actually <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abq2109">contain useful information</a> on where ships go and what they do. And authorities like the <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/IIIS/Pages/IUU-FISHING.aspx">International Maritime Organization</a> can use this missing data to help combat illegal activities at sea, such as overfishing and exploiting workers on fishing boats. </p>
<p>Illegal fishing causes economic losses <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004570">estimated at $US10 billion to $25 billion annually</a>. It also has been linked to human rights violations, such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07118-9">forced labor</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.589000">human trafficking</a>. Better information about how often boats go dark at sea can help governments figure out where and when these activities may be taking place.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Go1FVcV2PJ8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Countries can combat illegal, unreported and unauthorized fishing by checking paperwork, verifying catches and sharing information across borders.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Going dark at sea</h2>
<p>The high seas are the modern world’s Wild West – a vast expanse of water far from oversight and authority, where outlaws engage in illegal activities like <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/538736/the-outlaw-ocean-by-ian-urbina/">unauthorized fishing and human trafficking</a>. Surveillance there is aided by location transponders, called the <a href="https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/automatic-identification-system-overview">Automatic Identification System</a>, or AIS, which works like the <a href="https://apps.apple.com/us/app/find-my-iphone/id376101648">Find My iPhone app</a>.</p>
<p>Just as thieves can turn off phone location tracking, ships can disable their AIS transponders, effectively hiding their activities from oversight. Often it’s unclear whether going dark in this way is legal. AIS requirements are based on many factors, including vessel size, what country the vessel is flagged to, its location in the ocean and what species its crew is trying to catch.</p>
<p>A ship that disables its AIS transponder <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/world/middleeast/china-oil-iran-sanctions.html">disappears from the view</a> of whomever may be watching, including authorities, scientists and other vessels. For our study, we reviewed data from two private companies that combine AIS data with other signals to track assets at sea. <a href="https://spire.com/spirepedia/automatic-identification-system/#:%7E:text=Automatic%20Identification%20System%20(AIS)%20is,domain%20awareness%20through%20vessel%20tracking.">Spire</a> is a constellation of nanosatellites that pick up AIS signals to increase visibility of vessels in remote areas of the world. <a href="https://www.orbcomm.com/en/solutions/maritime">Orbcomm</a> tracks ships, trucks and other heavy equipment using internet-enabled devices. Then, we used machine learning models to understand what drove vessels to disable their AIS devices.</p>
<p>Examining where and how often such episodes occurred between 2017 and 2019, we found that ships disabled their transponders for around 1.6 million hours each year. This represented roughly 6% of global fishing vessel activity, which as a result is not reflected in global tallies of what types of fish are being caught where. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="World map showing zones where large shares of boats disable their transponders" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501996/original/file-20221219-24-ip2srh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This map shows the fraction of fishing vessel activity hidden by AIS disabling events from 2017 to 2019. Heavy AIS disabling occurred adjacent to Argentina, West African nations and in the northwest Pacific – three regions where illegal fishing is common. In contrast, the disabling hot spot near Alaska occurs on intensively managed fishing grounds and likely represents vessels going dark to avoid competition with other boats.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Global Fishing Watch</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Vessels frequently went dark on the high-seas edge of exclusive economic zone boundaries, which can obscure illegal fishing in unauthorized locations. That’s what the Oyang 77 was doing in January 2019. </p>
<h2>Laundering illegal catch</h2>
<p>The AIS data we reviewed showed that the Oyang 77 disabled its AIS transponder a total of nine times during January and February 2019. Each time, it went dark at the edge of Argentinean national waters and reappeared several days later back on the high seas. </p>
<p>During the ninth disabling event, the vessel was spotted <a href="https://fiskerforum.com/korean-trawler-detained-by-argentina/">fishing without permission in Argentina’s waters</a>, where the Argentinean coast guard intercepted it and escorted it to the port of Comodoro Rivadavia. The vessel’s owners were later fined for illegally fishing in Argentina’s national waters, and their <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31230/osf.io/juh98">fishing gear was confiscated</a>.</p>
<p>AIS disabling is also strongly correlated with transshipment events – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america.html">exchanging catch, personnel and supplies</a> between fishing vessels and refrigerated cargo vessels, or “reefers,” at sea. Reefers also have AIS transponders, and researchers can use their data to <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2018.00240">identify loitering events</a>, when reefers are in one place long enough to receive cargo from a fishing vessel.</p>
<p>It’s not unusual to see fishing vessels disable their AIS transponders near loitering reefers, which suggests that they want to hide these transfers from oversight. While transferring people or cargo can be legal, when it is poorly monitored it can become a means of laundering illegal catch. It has been <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_in_the_Fishing_Industry.pdf">linked to forced labor and human trafficking</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1135458346310389760"}"></div></p>
<h2>Valid reasons to turn off transponders</h2>
<p>Making it illegal for vessels to disable AIS transponders might seem like an obvious solution to this problem. But just as people may have legitimate reasons for not wanting the government to monitor their phones, fishing vessels may have legitimate reasons not to want their movements monitored. </p>
<p>Many vessels disable their transponders in high-quality fishing grounds to hide their activities from competitors. Although the ocean is huge, certain species and fishing methods are highly concentrated. For example, <a href="https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/bycatch/fishing-gear-bottom-trawls">bottom trawlers</a> fish by dragging nets along the seafloor and can operate only over continental shelves where the bottom is shallow enough for their gear to reach. </p>
<p>Modern-day pirates also use AIS data to intercept and attack vessels. In response, ships frequently disable their transponders in historically dangerous waters of the <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/indian-ocean-high-risk-designation-to-be-withdrawn-at-end-of-2022">Indian Ocean</a> and the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-11/gulf-of-guinea-piracy.php">Gulf of Guinea</a>. Making AIS disabling illegal would leave fishing vessels more vulnerable to piracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An electronic screen shows triangles, representing nearby ships, within concentric circles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502002/original/file-20221219-20-juvhft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An AIS-equipped system on board a ship presents the bearing and distance of nearby vessels in a radarlike display format.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_identification_system#/media/File:Ais_dcu_bridge.jpg">Clipper/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Instead, in my view, researchers and maritime authorities can use these AIS disabling events to make inferences about which vessels are behaving illegally.</p>
<p>Our study reveals that AIS disabling near exclusive economic zones and loitering reefers is a risk factor for unauthorized fishing and transshipments. At sea, real-time data on where vessels disable their AIS transponders or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html">change their apparent position using fake GPS coordinates</a> could be used to focus patrols on illegal activities near political boundaries or in transshipment hot spots. Port authorities could also use this information onshore to target the most suspect vessels for inspection. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden signed a national security memorandum in 2022 pledging U.S. support for <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/27/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-national-security-memorandum-to-combat-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-associated-labor-abuses/">combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing</a> and associated labor abuses. Our study points toward a strategy for using phases when ships go dark to fight illegal activities at sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heather Welch received funding from Catena and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Office of Law Enforcement for this work.</span></em></p>Understanding when, where and why fishing vessels sometimes turn off their transponders is a key step toward curbing illegal fishing and other crimes on the high seas.Heather Welch, Researcher in Ecosystem Dynamics, University of California, Santa CruzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883812022-08-18T14:14:58Z2022-08-18T14:14:58ZGhana has developed a maritime policy. Here is what it means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478740/original/file-20220811-19-caf7sd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's maritime space is key to its economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana has an abundance of marine resources. They include fisheries, hydrocarbon reserves, inland waterways and ports that are located along important international shipping lanes. These present the country with a wide range of opportunities for ensuring food security, bridging income inequalities, attracting foreign direct investment, increasing domestic productivity, and enhancing trading conditions. </p>
<p>This underscores the imperative to harness and safeguard them wisely.</p>
<p>About <a href="https://en.unesco.org/courier/2021-1/ghanas-coastline-swallowed-sea">7.5 million people</a> in Ghana live in coastal areas and double that number live about 50km away from the coast. Like many other coastal African countries, Ghana significantly relies on its blue economy for income, employment and food. The oil and gas sector has <a href="https://www.piacghana.org/portal/12/13/546/ghana-earns-unimpressive-$65b-from-oil-in-10-years#:%7E:text=He%20added%20that%3A%20%E2%80%9CThe%20Ghana,total%20%246.55%20billion%20revenue%20earned">generated over $4 billion</a>.) in revenue since commercial operations began in 2010. And about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277775952_Fishery_and_aquaculture_industry_in_Ghana">10% of Ghana’s workforce</a> is employed in the fishing sector, which also accounts for 4.5% of the country’s GDP.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://arbiterz.com/ghana-port-tipped-to-become-largest-in-west-and-central-africa/">70%</a> of Ghana’s trade is carried by sea through its ports in Tema and Takoradi. The <a href="https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/6-major-ports-in-ghana/">Port of Tema</a> is the largest container port in West Africa and Ghana. </p>
<p>But Ghana’s coastal areas also faces significant challenges in the form of what are referred to as “blue crimes”. These include ocean dumping, piracy, stowing away, drug and human trafficking, smuggling of arms, blue cyber threats and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Piracy has taken the centre-stage in Ghana and other Gulf of Guinea countries. But the other crimes also have a significant impact on the trade, government revenue and the potential developments that can accrue from the blue economy.</p>
<p>Certainly, Ghana cannot afford the consequences of ignoring its maritime domain. That’s why it’s developed a comprehensive <a href="https://www.gna.org.gh/1.21217943">National Integrated Maritime Strategy </a>.</p>
<p>In a recently <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Pages/Research-Briefs-2022.aspx">published paper</a> we analyse the strategy. One thing is certainly clear: it is destined for failure without adequate political will from the highest echelons of government and without the necessary resources (financial, human resource, equipment and technology) to support strategies and actions plans.</p>
<h2>A policy is born</h2>
<p>The vision of the strategy is to ensure that by 2040, Ghana’s maritime space will be safe and secure with a thriving blue economy that benefits every Ghanaian. It presents an integrated approach towards achieving this vision.</p>
<p>The document outlines six strategic objectives that focus on safety, security, marine environmental protection, blue economy development, capacity building and cooperation. It also provides a framework for implementation and sustainability. This includes calls for the allocation of resources funded from the national budget.</p>
<p>The origins of the strategy can be traced to the work of the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiSzcO63cj5AhVOdcAKHRPSCOsQFnoECAUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2F2009-2017.state.gov%2Fdocuments%2Forganization%2F254115.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1yTz1c9_5UUs5R1i2RZ8bw">Security Governance Initiative</a>. This is an international security initiative signed in 2016 between the US and five partner African countries. They are Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia. Its objective is to facilitate the development of expertise on national security issues to assist with key reforms in some sectors. </p>
<p>There was an initial focus on maritime security threats and transnational blue crimes spanning maritime, border and cyber. However, this changed after the settlement of Ghana’s<a href="https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/23_published_texts/C23_Judgment_20170923.pdf"> maritime border dispute</a> with Cote d'Ivoire by the <a href="https://wcl.american.libguides.com/c.php?g=563260&p=3877828#:%7E:text=The%20International%20Tribunal%20for%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20is,and%20application%20of%20the%20Convention.">International Tribunal of the law of the Sea</a> in 2017. The settlement allowed Ghana to retain ownership of its lucrative offshore oil fields.</p>
<p>With Ghana’s maritime space now exceeding its landscape, there was a need to replace the existing policy with a more expansive framework. Thus the National Integrated Maritime Strategy was born.</p>
<h2>Two drivers</h2>
<p>The initial drivers of the strategy were both maritime security and blue economy development. Yet at the implementation workshop, some stakeholders were of the view that it seemed to be a maritime security strategy that attempted to integrate other sectors of the blue economy. </p>
<p>When the initial draft was being reviewed by stakeholders, this resulted in heated debates by breakout teams about prioritisation of activities. At the heart of this is the extent to which development-related stakeholders were initially involved. Stakeholder representation is crucial, particularly when there is unavailability or little use of national maritime data.</p>
<p>In Ghana, some stakeholders also argue that the driver for the maritime strategy must be economic in nature and not security focused. This is because safety and security play a cross-sectional role in the marine space. They further argue that economic issues including oil and gas activities, fishing, tourism, port expansion, coastal erosion and flooding due to climate change directly affect livelihoods. Therefore, the stakeholders assert that development should have been the focus and driver of the strategy from the onset. Security strategies could then be developed from threat assessments linked to the economic issues.</p>
<h2>Important new tool</h2>
<p>Ghana is a relatively young maritime nation. Traditionally, the ocean has been used for fishing but there is now increased multiple use of the marine space. Hence the integrated strategy is crucial to the development, safety and security of the blue economy. </p>
<p>In the regional context, it is an essential linchpin for the <a href="https://www.stableseas.org/post/gauging-maritime-security-in-west-and-central-africa">Yaounde Code of Conduct Architecture</a>. This was signed in 2013 by 25 countries in the West and Central African region with the aim of assisting the regions in addressing an array of maritime crimes affecting the region. </p>
<p>The progress of Ghana with this policy will be a learning platform for other African countries. For example, South Africa is in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287050931_Maritime_security_challenges_for_South_Africa_in_the_Indian_ocean_region_IOR_The_southern_and_east_coast_of_Africa">process of addressing</a> its own maritime security interests. Of particular importance is how the process Ghana followed serves as a catalyst to advance and direct the South African endeavour.</p>
<p>As both the process, as well as the eventual strategy each holds its own intrinsic values for success, it is the consultative process Ghana followed and situating the integrated strategy at high political office that serve as good guidance for South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Kobina vanDyck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana’s maritime economy faces significant challenges in becoming viable.George Kobina vanDyck, Dean of Maritime Studies, Regional Maritime UniversityFrancois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1873092022-08-08T13:43:17Z2022-08-08T13:43:17ZChinese private security firms are growing their presence in Africa: why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476343/original/file-20220727-13-o052ct.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese and Ivorian workers at the site of a container terminal at the port of Abidjan. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese private security companies have found a profitable niche market in Africa: guarding Chinese executives and construction sites. They’re also securing Chinese vessels at sea against piracy.</p>
<p>The growing presence of Chinese private security companies in Africa comes against the backdrop of a global security architecture that’s in transition. </p>
<p>These changes reflect the US moving away from being the world’s sheriff to its <a href="https://www.geopolitica.info/us-offshore-balancing/">offshore security balancer</a>. America is using its strategic alliances and intervening to protect its interests abroad only when necessary. </p>
<p>Today, regional recalibration is the name of the game.</p>
<p>The demand for Chinese security services in Africa has <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5e7a733475a31172316a05d5/1585083189926/WP+35+-+Arduino+-+Chinese+Private+Security+Companies.pdf">increased significantly</a> since the 2013 launch of China’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>. This is the country’s blueprint for its engagement with the continent. </p>
<p>But private security companies have captured less attention than the rise of private military companies and mercenaries like the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/23/russia-putin-wagner-group-mercenaries-africa">Wagner Group</a>. </p>
<p>The growth of Chinese private security companies comes as Beijing increases its investment in large infrastructure projects in Africa. China is also investing in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/mapping-africas-natural-resources#:%7E:text=Metals%20including%20gold%2C%20iron%2C%20titanium,commodity%20for%2013%20African%20countries.">mining projects</a> across the continent. However, in nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan, ongoing political unrest means government security services are wanting.</p>
<p>China’s reliance on these countries for resources explains why it’s become more anxious about security in Africa. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-and-security-in-africa-how-china-can-help-address-weaknesses-156219">Peace and security in Africa: how China can help address weaknesses</a>
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<p>This highlights the need for bilateral and multilateral agreements on the private security sector between China and African nations. They need to agree on codes of conduct for oversight, regulation and cooperation. Increased sector scrutiny, based on best practices, would also help prevent the growth of unregulated private security firms. </p>
<p>Failing to establish these regulations could lead to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-10-05-threat-to-security-five-chinese-nationals-arrested-in-lavington/">negative spillovers</a>. Private security companies could abuse authority or fail to operate along clear guidelines. It could also lead to unaccountable mercenaries and rogue foreign militia. This would affect African populations and the viability of the Belt and Road Initiative.</p>
<h2>Three pecularities</h2>
<p>Africa’s private security sector is characterised by three peculiarities. </p>
<p>First, the continent still carries the stigma associated with <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13688.doc.htm">mercenaries’ actions</a> during post-colonial conflicts. The kind of heavily armed soldiers that wrought havoc over the last three decades may no longer be the norm. But the stigma persists.</p>
<p>Second, well before the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s focus on private security companies, several Chinese companies operating in Africa organised a sort of armed militia. These were established to <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/12/25/6-illegal-miners-shot-breaking-chinese-owned-mine/">protect Chinese interests</a> from criminal or political violence. These ranged from natural resource extraction to small businesses.</p>
<p>Third, Africa is witnessing the return of well-structured groups of international private military companies. These companies support local governments and international interests, such as <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/beyond-syria-and-ukraine-wagner-pmc-expands-its-operations-to-africa/">Moscow’s muscular return</a> to the African continent. </p>
<p>As a result, the expansion of Chinese private security companies – and their implications for the continent’s security landscape – has drawn less scrutiny.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-chinas-role-in-africa-say-about-its-growing-global-footprint-49474">What does China's role in Africa say about its growing global footprint?</a>
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<p>Private security companies are not new to Africa. However, the Chinese ones are still <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/602ab2f4750e046ac9620127/1613411061832/WP+44+Zheng+and+Xia+PSCs+in+Kenya.pdf">establishing themselves</a>. In response to increasing criminal and militant violence <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/chinese-nationals-have-become-targets-violence-china-deepens">against Chinese individuals and infrastructure abroad</a>, their role is expanding from securing fixed structures to providing high-tech surveillance.</p>
<p>In the last decade, China has recognised that sole reliance on the economic development of African countries isn’t enough to protect its workers and projects. Bursts of violence and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/30/20-years-after-9-11-jihadi-terrorism-rises-in-africa/">terrorist expansion</a> from the Sahel to Somalia are putting Chinese workers and investments in the cross-hairs. </p>
<h2>China’s regulatory response</h2>
<p>In 2018, the Chinese government drew up a set of security regulations for companies operating overseas. These are detailed in the <a href="http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/201803/20180323112639296.pdf">Security Management Guideline for Overseas Chinese-Funded Companies, Institutions and Personnel</a>. </p>
<p>The document outlines training requirements, security assessments and risk mitigation procedures. Companies, for instance, need to provide the Chinese government with risk assessments to get the green light to invest abroad. It also addresses procedures on data sharing and reporting on local security developments. </p>
<p>These guidelines have been well received among the dozens of Chinese private security companies already operating efficiently abroad. But it’s yet to be seen how the estimated 10,000 local Chinese companies with limited knowledge of international security requirements will operate if they want to work in Africa.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s important to consider how Chinese private security companies interact with local government security forces and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-approach-to-peace-in-africa-is-different-how-and-why-129467">substantial Chinese peacekeeping presence</a> on the continent. </p>
<p>Proper integration of foreign private security services will benefit host governments, especially as security threats rise. But, in China, it’s not easy to know where the public ends and the private starts. Checks and balances are needed to prevent private security firms from becoming political pressure tools.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-approach-to-peace-in-africa-is-different-how-and-why-129467">China's approach to peace in Africa is different. How and why</a>
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<p>As it is, China’s private security companies are still evolving. This increases the likelihood of private firms moving overseas without proper training, operational capabilities or an understanding of the threats. </p>
<p>Prepared or not, Chinese companies are <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5f689c0adc971b471088a419/1600691210873/WP+40+-+Benabdallah+%26+Large+-+Dev+Security+China+Role+in+Mali.pdf">extending feelers</a> in African countries to establish security business partnerships. This has been seen in Mali, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the race for the cheapest contract still plagues the internationalisation of the Chinese security sector. To counter this, it’s necessary to partner efficient Chinese private security companies with local security providers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>China’s need for private security services in Africa has grown significantly as Beijing increases its investment in the continent.Alessandro Arduino, Principal Research Fellow, National University of SingaporeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819452022-05-02T20:43:46Z2022-05-02T20:43:46ZGentleman pirates, shipwrecks and Stede Bonnet: what Our Flag Means Death gets right about the Golden Age of Piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460225/original/file-20220428-26-nh3jb8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1597%2C891&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IMDB</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>HBO’s new show <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2022/03/31/you-should-be-watching-our-flag-means-death-hbos-new-most-popular-show/?sh=5bcb595f2c3c">Our Flag Means Death</a> has brought the Golden Age of Piracy to life on TV, chronicling the life of the bumbling gentleman pirate, Stede Bonnet. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ign.com/articles/our-flag-means-death-season-1-review">Season one</a> mostly focuses on the fictional Stede’s momentous and oddly romantic meeting with the infamous Blackbeard, told through absurd comedy that softens and makes light of the brutality of real piracy.</p>
<p>Stede Bonnet in Our Flag Means Death is a hilarious and sympathetic figure – but who was the real Stede Bonnet from history and just how accurate is the series in depicting the life and times of “the gentleman pirate”?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460696/original/file-20220502-23-3i7e74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Our Flag Means Death depicts the historical pirate Stede Bonnet as a foolish, somewhat harmless figure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IMDB</span></span>
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<h2>What was the golden age of piracy?</h2>
<p>Pirates have been around since ancient times and still exist today. Julius Caesar was captured by Cilician pirates in 75BC. He was ransomed and released and later returned and defeated the pirates and crucified them as punishment. Piracy still exists today with <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/266292/number-of-pirate-attacks-worldwide-since-2006/">more than 100 attacks taking place in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.rmg.co.uk/stories/topics/golden-age-piracy">Golden Age of Piracy</a>, in which Our Flag Means Death is set, is generally accepted to be the period from the start of the 18th century until around 1730. </p>
<p>It was in this period that there was a marked increase in the pirate attacks in the seas of the Indian ocean, and off the coasts of the Americas and Africa, due to a range of factors including a rise in quantities of valuable cargoes being shipped to Europe over vast ocean areas, a decrease in navies policing those waters, and corrupt and inefficient European colonial governments.</p>
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<h2>Who was Stede Bonnet?</h2>
<p>The historical <a href="https://www.ncdcr.gov/blog/2015/09/27/a-pirates-life-was-his-stede-bonnets">Stede Bonnet</a> was a prosperous plantation owner in Barbados in the early 1700s. Also known as the “Gentleman Pirate”, <a href="https://www.ncpedia.org/biography/bonnet-stede">Stede was described</a> as: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A gentleman that has had the advantage of of a liberal education and being generally esteemed as a Man of Letters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For reasons unknown, Bonnet in 1717 decided the life of a plantation owner was no longer for him and purchased a small ten-gun sailing vessel, called it the Revenge, and embarked on a career of piracy.</p>
<p>Bonnet immediately distinguished himself by hiring a crew and paying them a wage, something unheard of in the pirate world, where most relied on a share of the booty seized as payment. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-gentleman-pirate-159418520/">Bonnet sailed around the American colonies and captured a number of ships</a> off the Virginia Capes before heading back to the Bahamas. It was then that Bonnet had his fateful meeting with Edward Teach, who is infamously known to history as the <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/three-centuries-after-his-beheading-kinder-gentler-blackbeard-emerges-180970782/">villainous Blackbeard</a>. </p>
<h2>His relationship with Blackbeard</h2>
<p>A news story of the day claimed that on the way to Nassau, Bonnet was involved in a fight with a Spanish <a href="https://goldenageofpiracy.org/pirate-ships/pirate-ship-types/british-man-o-war.php">man-of-war</a> and his ship was damaged and Bonnet seriously wounded. But some authors discount this, as <a href="https://ospreypublishing.com/the-pirate-world">accounts of such a fight are not recorded</a> in Spanish archives. </p>
<p>Recovering from his wounds, Bonnet ceded command of the Revenge to Blackbeard, who took the ship out raiding to Delaware Bay, where they plundered a number of ships. Authors have <a href="https://archive.org/details/piratesprivateer00butl_0">described accounts of Bonnet as essentially a passenger</a> on his own ship, playing no role and dressed in a morning gown.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459923/original/file-20220427-19879-8gqn85.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=537&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Capture of the Pirate, Blackbeard, 1718, Jean Leon Gerome Ferris, painted in 1920.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
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<p>Bonnet and Blackbeard separated for a short time, only to link up again. By now Blackbeard had his own ship, <a href="https://www.qaronline.org/">Queen Anne’s Revenge</a>. The wreck of this ship was located in coastal waters off North Carolina in 1996. Bonnet’s crew deserted him to serve under Blackbeard, who put one of his men in charge of the Revenge and kept Bonnet on the Queen Anne’s Revenge a virtual prisoner.</p>
<p>Bonnet was present when <a href="http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1860715_1860714_1860711,00.html">Blackbeard blockaded the port of Charles Town</a> in 1718. After leaving Charles Town, Blackbeard and Bonnet travelled to Bath Town where they were granted a pardon by the governor of North Carolina. </p>
<p>Bonnet returned to find that Blackbeard had double-crossed him and dumped most of Bonnet’s crew, stripped the Revenge of supplies and sailed off with the loot.</p>
<p>While history has portrayed Blackbeard as bloodthirsty murderer, the character in this series is more nuanced and complex. More recently, researchers have <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/three-centuries-after-his-beheading-kinder-gentler-blackbeard-emerges-180970782/">questioned the murderous portrayal of Blackbeard</a> and suggested he was a literate, well-educated man of social grace – which perhaps gives some credence to Taika Waititi’s portrayal of the pirate in Our Flag Means Death.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460687/original/file-20220502-16-37ku31.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rhys darby Taika Waititi as Blackbeard (left) and Rhys Darby as Stede Bonnet (right).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IMDB</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Back to pirating</h2>
<p>Seeking revenge but unable to locate Blackbeard, Bonnet returned to his life of piracy. Bonnet hoped to preserve his pardon using an alias and changing the name of his ship. After capturing a number of ships, Bonnet sailed to Delaware Bay with the Revenge and two other ships. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459951/original/file-20220427-12-dsn1pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Surrender of Bonnet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Authorities learnt that Bonnet had moored in Cape Fear River and the governor of South Carolina sent a naval force. In <a href="https://www.ncdcr.gov/blog/2015/09/27/a-pirates-life-was-his-stede-bonnets">the ensuing battle</a>, both Bonnet and the naval forces sent to capture him ran aground and sat immobilised for hours, taking pot shots at each other while waiting for the tide to rise. With the rising of the tide, the naval force captured Bonnet and his crew.</p>
<h2>Arrest and trial</h2>
<p>Bonnet and his crew were taken to <a href="https://schistory.org/december-1718-the-pirate-stede-bonnet-is-hung-in-charleston/">Charles Town</a>. Bonnet, being a gentleman, was separated from his crew and with two of his officers was held in loose detention at the home of the town marshal. Some days later Bonnet escaped and went on the run for 12 days before being recaptured. This time he was imprisoned with his crew. </p>
<p>Bonnet was charged with two counts of piracy; he pleaded not guilty and conducted his own defence. He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to death. <a href="https://www.ncdcr.gov/blog/2013/12/10/until-he-be-dead-the-end-of-stede-bonnet">Bonnet was hung in Charles Town on 10 December 1718</a>. </p>
<p>As for the treacherous sea dog, Blackbeard, on November 22 1718 <a href="https://time.com/5457008/blackbeard-death/">he met his own end</a> when he was killed in a fight with naval forces. His head was taken as proof of his death, and displayed by the Virginia governor as a warning to other would-be pirates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The life of the famous pirate Stede Bonnet has been turned into a ridiculous comedy in Our Flag Means Death – but who was the real gentleman pirate from history?Terry Goldsworthy, Associate Professor in Criminal Justice and Criminology, Bond UniversityGaelle Brotto, Assistant Professor Criminology and Criminal JusticeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661382021-08-29T07:49:22Z2021-08-29T07:49:22ZMozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418068/original/file-20210826-6524-fyv73z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican soldiers on patrol in Palma,
Cabo Delgado, following the terrorist attack in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique has been placed firmly in the international spotlight since radicals linked to Islamic State launched their audacious attack on the town of Palma <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">in March</a>, killing over 50 people.</p>
<p>A large <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/mozambique/all-news/mozambique-nyusi-confirms-arrival-of-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado-watch">Rwandan military and police contingent</a> and <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/tanzania-air-force-freighter-unloads-military-logistics-at-pemba-airport-noticias-198278/">troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> have entered the theatre. These are helping Mozambique’s army and police to stem the tide and step up their act over the longer term.</p>
<p>There is also support from the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/us-military-providing-additional-training-to-mozambican-armed-forces">US and the European Union</a>, largely in the form of training assistance. This adds to training support promised by Angola and Zimbabwe as part of the <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/64130-latest-on-deployment-of-zimbabwean-special-soldiers-in-mozambique-story-fresh-details-emerge.html">SADC contingent arriving in Cabo Delgado</a>. </p>
<p>But there’s a problem. </p>
<p>The combined military response against the insurgents is primarily on land, with very limited maritime response capabilities. But the insurgent threat is not limited to the interior. Insurgents stormed and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 and attacked communities on nearby <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-terrorists-attack-island-off-palma-coast-aim-report-171133/">islands off Palma, halting its tourism flows</a>.</p>
<p>The fixation on landward efforts ignores the fact that the insurgency also poses a maritime threat. Significantly, the insurgency has hobbled the energy sector. This was set to make Mozambique an important global energy player following the discovery of <a href="https://www.africanglobe.net/business/oil-gas-discoveries-mozambique">large offshore gas fields</a>. The discoveries hold regional and global implications. Mozambique could well become a gas emirate in southern Africa, and bringing the industry on line could propel Mozambique into the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">top seven global gas producing countries</a>. </p>
<p>These optimistic outlooks all depend on whether Mozambique can contain the impact of the ongoing violent insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This precondition extends offshore.</p>
<h2>Maritime security</h2>
<p>Mozambique’s future economy relies heavily on maintaining a safe offshore domain. To this end the government must make use of every opportunity to build the required <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2019/08/an-analysis-of-mozambiques-maritime-security/">capacity and partnerships</a> to maintain the rule of law at sea.</p>
<p>Bringing gas production on line has been severely disrupted because of the insurgency. Much of the landward activity and construction of infrastructure has come to a standstill.</p>
<p>In April, <a href="https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project">Totalenergies</a>, the French energy multinational, declared a force majeure. This was after the insurgents occupied and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 and attacked Palma early in 2021. </p>
<p>The port is of significance for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">delivery of goods by sea and air</a> for the construction projects under way to develop onshore infrastructure in support of the gas industry. It has since been reclaimed by the <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/africa/mozambican-rwandan-forces-retake-port-town-from-insurgents/">Mozambique and Rwandan forces</a>. But given how risk perception unfolds, construction remains stalled. </p>
<p>In my view Mozambique’s ocean territories must receive due attention for three reasons. These are: events on land spilling offshore, perceptions of dangerous seas off Mozambique, and criminality at sea left unchecked.</p>
<h2>Cost of insecurity at sea</h2>
<p>First, insecurity on land has maritime repercussions. This is the reality in the waters off Somalia, Nigeria, Libya and Yemen. Weak security governance on land affects the maritime economy, with shipping and resource extraction particularly vulnerable. </p>
<p>This land and sea interplay is a potential risk facing Mozambique’s decision-makers.</p>
<p>Second, perceptions of dangers in the waters off Mozambique hold negative repercussions. This is even more so if international measures are implemented to mitigate a threat to shipping. A <a href="https://maritimecyprus.com/2015/12/18/anti-piracy-update-updated-chart-for-hra-available-to-download/">high risk area</a> at sea akin to those off Somalia and Nigeria directs shipping to take preventive actions. This has multiple knock-on effects.</p>
<p>Higher insurance costs are incured; shipping must follow longer routes, increasing the cost of doing business; private security personnel are often taken on; and the safety and livelihoods of crews are at higher risk. All this is evident in the demarcated danger zone now operational off Nigeria. </p>
<p>Third, the waters off Cabo Delgado must not be allowed to become a playground for criminals to enter and exploit. If ungoverned, this sea space offers the potential for criminal syndicates and insurgents to prosper side by side. </p>
<h2>Connecting the dots: five risks to mitigate</h2>
<p>The insurgency has resulted in or compounded the following problems: </p>
<p><strong>Transnational criminal syndicates:</strong> These already operate into Cabo Delgado. If weak governance on land is mirrored at sea, syndicates become dangerous competitors, and even more so if allied with insurgent elements as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.</p>
<p><strong>Illegal oil trafficking:</strong> Energy infrastructure for gas and oil are difficult to take over. Nevertheless illegal oil trafficking from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/26/libya-calls-on-un-to-block-illegal-oil-sale">rebel-held territories in the east of Libya</a> shows how brazen non-state actors can take over or infiltrate energy infrastructure and port facilities and use this to join an illegal industry.</p>
<p><strong>Attacks on infrastructure and shipping at sea:</strong> Sri Lanka provides a good example. The Sea Tiger wing of the insurgent movement <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">attacked</a> Sri Lanka’s navy with suicide vessels for several years. </p>
<p><strong>Drone attacks:</strong> The <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gulf-shipping-attacks-leave-global-economy-vulnerable-trade/">recent drone attack</a> on a commercial vessel passing through the Gulf of Oman, with Yemen and Iranian connections, must also serve as a warning. There have been allegations of the presence of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/iss-drones-in-the-hands-of-insurgents-how-africa-can-prepare/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo%2C%20insurgents,drones%20for%20precision%20targeting%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province">drones in Cabo Delgado</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Drug smuggling:</strong> Insecurity at sea off Cabo Delgado carries the risk of compounding the problem posed by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006080902.html">drug smuggling networks</a> operating in the area. No effort should be spared to prevent the insurgents and the smugglers cooperating.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Children attend a class sitting on the ground under a tree." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Displaced children in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, learn under a tree.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joao Relvas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, the tactics I’ve outlined call for a comprehensive response, one most probably beyond anything the Mozambique authorities can mobilise on their own. </p>
<p>Some small steps with a maritime focus have taken place.</p>
<p>Two small, lightly armed <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-equipment-spotted-in-mozambique/#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20vehicles%20on%20land%2C%20naval%20vessels,Development%20Community%E2%80%99s%20intervention%20brigade%20%28SADC%20Mission%20in%20Mozambique%29.">South African naval patrol vessels</a> arrived in Pemba harbour for patrols off Cabo Delgado.</p>
<p>A training team from the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2021/August/unodc-and-mozambique-cooperate-to-promote-maritime-security.html">United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</a> recently arrived to help train maritime personnel from Mozambique to increase maritime security governance.</p>
<p>The Rwandan military contingent includes a <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Rwandan-Mozambican-forces-retake-port-from-16374076.php">limited small boat capability</a> to extend their presence off the coast, albeit only near harbour patrols. </p>
<p>Fourth – in recapturing Mocímboa da Praia from the insurgents in early August 2021, the operation included a <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-most-important-mission-yet-to-come-says-army-commander-aim-198891/">surprise attack by a small contingent of Mozambique soldiers from the sea</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward: what needs to happen</h2>
<p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia and the rebel-held territories in Libya. Allowing this would hold dire implications for international shipping and subsequently for Mozambique and the landlocked countries in the region. </p>
<p>It is precisely this threat that underscored <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/14632/">the need for cooperation</a> between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania to prevent piracy from gaining a foothold in Mozambique. Ongoing maritime operations between South Africa and Mozambique also need to be maintained.</p>
<p>Cooperation with a wide array of partners to promote maritime security governance over the longer term must remain a priority. This is a long term objective to be addressed in the context of the current armed insurgency, and sustained beyond the present volatility. </p>
<p>Stability on land and at sea must be addressed simultaneously.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://news.africa.com/south-african-military-deploys-troops-to-pemba-northern-mozambique-1635.html">South African Navy</a> and UN Office on Drugs and Crime are the first naval and capacity building respondents to arrive. But the SADC should seriously consider using its Standing Maritime Committee to assist Mozambique. The aim would be to bring about a formal regional arrangement for cooperation to secure regional economic and security interests in the southwestern Indian Ocean over the longer term.</p>
<p>Mozambique is in no position to contribute significantly to the broader array of maritime security endeavours. That’s why international partners need to play a role. </p>
<p>The SADC must now pass the acid test of stemming the insurgent threats from spilling over and threatening the region’s wider landward and maritime interests.</p>
<p>The intervention forces currently fighting the insurgents should extend their role offshore to prevent a collapse of security at sea off Mozambique or at the minimum, any such perception among the international maritime community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University and the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia, and the rebel-held territories in Libya.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1639892021-07-21T15:02:30Z2021-07-21T15:02:30ZNigeria’s ambitious new maritime security project must avoid old traps<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411959/original/file-20210719-25-1a05kg9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian naval members sit in a vessel during a multinational maritime exercise.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nigerian-naval-members-sit-in-a-vessel-during-obangame-news-photo/1131719311?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Muhammadu Buhari recently <a href="https://punchng.com/buhari-inaugurates-deep-blue-project/">inaugurated</a> a project <a href="https://nimasa.gov.ng/president-buhari-launches-deep-blue-project-in-lagos/">designed</a> to prevent illegal activities in Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/NGA.htm">coastal waters</a> and enforce maritime regulations. It also aims to prevent illegal activities on inland waterways. </p>
<p>Known as the Deep Blue Project, it was initiated by the federal ministries of transportation and defence in 2017. It’s being implemented by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency. Personnel have been hired from the navy, army, air force, police, and Department of State Services. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://punchng.com/fg-to-launch-195m-deep-blue-project-june-10/?utm_source=auto-read-also&utm_medium=web">$195 million project</a> is said to be <a href="https://nimasa.gov.ng/president-buhari-launches-deep-blue-project-in-lagos/">the first</a> integrated maritime security strategy for West and Central Africa. It’s designed to tackle piracy, sea robbery, and other crimes at sea in Nigerian waters and up to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Gulf-of-Guinea">the Gulf of Guinea</a>. </p>
<p>The Gulf encompasses over 12 countries from Senegal to Angola. It’s a strategic maritime domain with huge natural resources, and provides a critical route for international shipping. </p>
<p>But the region, and Nigeria in particular, has recorded frequent vicious attacks against vessels and multiple kidnapping of seafarers for ransom by <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012612123210113333.html">pirate gangs</a>. The gangs <a href="https://www.offshore-energy.biz/global-shipping-industry-signs-declaration-to-curb-privacy-in-gulf-of-guinea/">have evolved</a> in sophistication. They have also extended attacks as far as 200 nautical miles from shore.</p>
<p>Most studies, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344126775_Socio-Economic_Development_and_Maritime_InSecurity_in_the_Gulf_of_Guinea">including mine</a>, affirm that the root of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea stems primarily from bad governance. Despite endowment with vast natural resources, most of the states parade some of the worst indices of human development. These include environmental devastation, high unemployment rates and widespread poverty generated by corruption and bad governance.</p>
<p>I also found that unsustainable practices of oil companies have destroyed traditional farming and fishing livelihood systems in coastal communities. This has forced some people to make desperate choices. With declining opportunities for legitimate livelihood amid affluence, some young people in the region take to criminality for survival.</p>
<p>Pervasive corruption among maritime security forces has made them unequipped to deal with security threats. The Deep Blue Project is obviously designed as a reactive intervention against piracy. Yet successfully countering the evolving threat depends on addressing enabling factors rather than just reacting to events. It also, crucially, must include avoiding mistakes made in the past.</p>
<h2>The project’s importance</h2>
<p>Nigeria depends primarily on oil export through the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime corridor for much of its revenue and foreign exchange earning. However, maritime threats cost it an estimated <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/07/nigeria-loses-26-3bn-annually-to-piracy-sea-robbery-others-buhari/amp/">$26.3 billion</a> annually.</p>
<p>Nigeria also <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/nigeria-accounts-for-75-crime-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-fg/">accounts</a> for 75% of crime in terms of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly piracy. The International Maritime Bureau said 135 crew were kidnapped from their vessels worldwide in 2020. The <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1301-gulf-of-guinea-records-highest-ever-number-of-crew-kidnapped-in-2020-according-to-imb-s-annual-piracy-report">Gulf of Guinea accounted for over 95%</a>. </p>
<p>In the first <a href="https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/gulf-of-guinea-remains-worlds-piracy-hotspot-in-2021-according-to-imbs-latest-figures/">three months of 2021</a>, the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 43% of all reported piracy incidents and 40 crew kidnapped. The pirate gangs originate <a href="https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2021/01/26/598824.htm">almost exclusively</a> from Nigeria.</p>
<p>As a result the global maritime community has consistently called for enhanced efforts to tackle piracy and maritime insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>This has led to the adoption of a host of national, regional and international initiatives. There is equally <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-approach-address-growing-maritime-insecurity-gulf-guinea">increasing</a> deployment of naval forces by Denmark, France, Italy and the US. </p>
<h2>How far can the project go?</h2>
<p>How far the project will go in deepening maritime security depends on several factors. </p>
<p>The first is whether mistakes of the past are avoided. These have included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>an overtly militarised response to threat, </p></li>
<li><p>negligence of the driving or enabling factors of criminality, </p></li>
<li><p>dearth of accountability mechanisms in response initiatives, and </p></li>
<li><p>poor appreciation of the dynamics of the wider criminal space.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Already, the project’s largely military-centric approach has been <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/the-key-to-success-of-the-nigerian-deep-blue-project-does-not-lie-offshore-dryad/">criticised</a>. This means that the intricate drivers of maritime insecurity, especially piracy, are ignored. These include socio-economic, environmental and governance factors that enable piracy to fester. </p>
<p>Much of the problem stems from state corruption, declining job opportunities, hollow maritime security forces, and weak law enforcement. Opportunistic foreign, corporate or individual interests that emerge afterwards only help to expand and perpetuate criminality.</p>
<p>A related factor is the inter-agency rivalry which has undermined multi-agency interventions during successive administrations. The multi-agency nature of the new project holds great promise. But in it lies a peril common to Nigeria’s approach to security. <a href="https://leadership.ng/igp-blames-rivalry-among-security-agencies-for-worsening-insecurity/">Rivalry</a> and mistrust manifest among Nigeria’s agencies. This results in weak coordination, limited intelligence sharing and sub-optimal performance.</p>
<p>There are also concerns over robust internal mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability. These are paramount to the project’s success.
Projects such as this <a href="https://businessandmaritimewestafrica.com/maritime-security-how-picomms-chieftains-looted-nigeria/">have in the past</a> served as avenues for vested interests to divert or misappropriate public funds. Politicians, government officials and corporate firms have been involved.</p>
<p>The Olusegun Obasanjo administration was <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/amaechi-obasanjo-spent-e400m-on-maritime-equipment-but-it-all-disappeared">accused</a> of spending between $300 million and $400 million on equipment for fighting maritime insecurity with nothing to show for it.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Goodluck Jonathan administration <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/evi-constance-omagbemi-18745b13_maritimesecurity-shipping-transportation-activity-6813426238980427776-ddlk/">used</a> the public-private partnership model. It <a href="https://www.gistmania.com/talk/topic,269783.msg4403528.html">committed</a> resources towards acquisition of assets to fight maritime insecurity. But it was not sustainable. </p>
<p>These concerns are fundamental given that Nigeria’s finance minister, Zainab Ahmed, recently disclosed that Nigeria will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-budget-idINL2N2NR1YG">borrow</a> $1.76 billion from the domestic markets to fund the fight against insecurity. Thus, lack of transparency may mean that revenue generated through the project may not be used judiciously. </p>
<p>Poor maintenance culture as seen in the aviation, energy, health and transportation sectors may also mean that the recently acquired assets will grind to a halt sooner than expected. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>land assets (a new intelligence centre, 16 armoured vehicles for coastal patrol and 600 specially trained troops); </p></li>
<li><p>sea assets (two special mission vessels and 17 fast interceptor boats); </p></li>
<li><p>air assets (two special mission aircraft for surveillance, three special mission helicopters and four unmanned aerial vehicles).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Another factor is the project’s interface with other regional initiatives to counter the vested interests that sustain piracy. Ransom payment has made piracy extremely lucrative. This has entrenched a network of interests of both foreign and local state and non-state actors. Some global shipping companies and foreign actors are using cash and bypassing local authorities in the region to negotiate directly with pirates. </p>
<p>While it costs a pirate gang between $5,000 and $10,000 to mount an operation at sea, <a href="https://www.pangea-risk.com/gulf-of-guinea-trends-and-commercial-impact-of-piracy-attacks/">ransoms paid</a> for kidnapped crew typically range from $18,000 per person to as much as $500,000. </p>
<p>Without the government’s commitment in addressing these factors, the project will only be an addition to maritime security initiatives in the troubled region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Freedom C. Onuoha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For the Deep Blue Project to work the government must address the factors that enable piracy and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.Freedom C. Onuoha, Senior Lecturer, Political Science , University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1605532021-06-01T15:10:18Z2021-06-01T15:10:18ZHow illegal fishing harms Nigeria and what to do about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403578/original/file-20210531-15-3lacp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Illegal fishing increases food and economic insecurities in Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fishermen-display-their-catch-at-the-revived-argungu-news-photo/1207148780?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like most countries in West Africa, Nigeria’s coastal waters contain diverse species of fish, which <a href="https://fish.cgiar.org/publications/fish-food-systems-nigeria-review-0">contribute to the food and economic security of its people</a>. </p>
<p>Small-scale fishing operations contribute <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/NGA/en">80% of locally produced fish</a> and <a href="https://juniperpublishers.com/ofoaj/OFOAJ.MS.ID.555677.php#:%7E:text=Artisanal%20fishing%20includes%2090%25%20of,for%20their%20livelihood%20%5B14%5D">support</a> the livelihoods of 24 million Nigerians. <a href="https://theconversation.com/women-are-a-mainstay-of-fishing-in-west-africa-but-they-get-a-raw-deal-159283">Seventy three percent</a> of those involved in fisheries in Nigeria are women. </p>
<p>The overall GDP contribution from fishing – small scale and industrial – was <a href="https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/download/1229">0.84% in 2019 and 1.09% in 2020</a>. </p>
<p>The fisheries sector is therefore a route to socioeconomic development in Nigeria. But it also faces threats. </p>
<p>One of these is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20414005.2018.1562287?journalCode=rtlt20">environmental pollution</a>, primarily from the oil industry. Pollution degrades the maritime environment, destroys fish stocks and reduces the catch. </p>
<p>Another threat is illegal fishing, as our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2020.1724432?journalCode=uafs20&#.XljN4Cgt3I0">previous research </a> has found. Our current <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/geography-sustainable-development/people/imoy1">research</a> continues to explore how women, in particular, are affected by and responding to these threats.</p>
<p>The first step is to understand the scale and complexity of illegal fishing and associated crime, and why it is happening.</p>
<h2>Scale and costs</h2>
<p>Recently, the Nigerian House of Representatives <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/nigeria-loses-70m-to-illegal-fishing/">noted</a> that the country loses $70 million each year to illegal fishing. This includes loss of licence fees, revenue from taxation and the value that could have been accrued from legitimate fishing by local vessels.</p>
<p>Other sources estimate the cost of illegal fishing in Nigeria as much higher, citing anywhere between <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/16/report-nigeria-loses-600m-annually-to-illegal-fishing/">$600 million</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012612123210113333.html">$800 million</a> each year. </p>
<p>The variation in these figures reveals the difficulties in calculating the costs of clandestine activity. It’s also a result of budgetary neglect of the Nigerian Federal Fisheries Department. The department lacks the capacity to monitor, survey and control vessels operating in Nigeria.</p>
<p>Vessels from <a href="https://chinadialogueocean.net/8338-nigeria-fishers-criminals-imports-climate-change/">China, the European Union</a>, and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/faf.12436">Belize</a> are notable for illegally exploiting Nigerian waters. </p>
<p>Despite varying estimates, all sources agree that the economic losses caused by illegal fishing in Nigeria are high. But the figures alone paint a superficial picture of the true costs of illegal fishing. Illegal fishing does not occur in isolation. </p>
<h2>Fisheries crime</h2>
<p>Fisheries crime denotes a vast and diverse <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2913-5">category</a> of illegality and criminality that aids or accompanies illegal fishing. Such crimes can include corruption, customs fraud, human and drugs trafficking and piracy. Illegal fishing and fisheries crime also threaten <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/we-have-the-tools-to-tackle-illegal-fishing-lets-use-them">human rights</a>. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2020.1724432?journalCode=uafs20&#.XljN4Cgt3I0">previous research </a> found that illegal fishing was undermining people’s livelihoods. The lack of government support to address illegal fishing and protect livelihoods within fishing communities further pushes people into poverty. This makes them vulnerable to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2020.1724432?journalCode=uafs20&#.XljN4Cgt3I0">criminal networks</a>. </p>
<p>Fisherfolks may end up <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/blog/countering-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-towards-2025">participating in</a>, and being victimised by, fisheries crime as a result. This is <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/reports/2020_Annual_Piracy_Report.pdf">evidenced</a> in increasing criminality through rising incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea throughout Nigeria’s coastal communities. </p>
<p>Maritime insecurity also has a gender dimension. <a href="https://theconversation.com/women-are-a-mainstay-of-fishing-in-west-africa-but-they-get-a-raw-deal-159283">Women in West African fisheries</a> face unique challenges and risks such as poor access to capital, growing competition for access to depleting fish stocks, and policy exclusion. </p>
<h2>Neglect and poor regulations</h2>
<p>Despite the important contribution that fishing makes to the livelihoods of Nigerians, government neglects this sector. This is evident in the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/416939-less-than-2-of-nigerias-budget-allocated-to-capital-agriculture-projects-official.html">marginal budgetary allocation</a> the sector receives yearly. </p>
<p>The Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Department of Nigeria’s Federal Fisheries Department is critical to managing Nigeria’s fisheries. Yet no <a href="https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.789143">budgetary allocation</a> has been made to it in the last 15 years. </p>
<p>The Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Department lacks patrol vessels, and is therefore unable to monitor the activities of vessels operating in Nigeria. In 2017, the government <a href="https://punchng.com/govt-to-purchase-patrol-vessels-to-protect-waterways/">announced plans</a> to purchase patrol vessels, but it hasn’t done so yet.</p>
<p>The sector doesn’t receive enough funding to function effectively. Nigeria’s Fisheries Department operates within the country’s Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, which was allocated less than <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/416939-less-than-2-of-nigerias-budget-allocated-to-capital-agriculture-projects-official.html">2%</a> of the national budget in 2019. </p>
<p>Existing fisheries regulation is also inadequate. Nigeria’s fisheries are governed by the <a href="http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig18399.pdf">Sea Fisheries Act of 1992</a>. These regulations are outdated and ill-equipped to address the current scale and severity of growing fisheries crime. </p>
<p>For example, in June 2020, a vessel, Hai Lu Feng 11, was fined <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/06/arrested-chinese-vessel-slammed-n3million-fine/#:%7E:text=THE%20recently%20arrested%20and%20released%20Chinese%20fishing%20vessel,Maritime%20Administration%20and%20Safety%20Agency%2C%20NIMASA%2C%20has%20said.">₦3 million </a> (under $7,300) for switching off its Vessel Monitoring System while in <a href="https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NGA_1978_Decree.pdf">Nigeria’s Exclusive Economic Zone</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/w9633e/w9633e.pdf">Vessel Monitoring System</a> is designed to provide estimates of fishing activity in near real time. Switching the system off suggests an intent to evade detection by the authorities. But this fine is tiny when considering the millions of dollars that illegal fishing costs the Nigerian economy each year.</p>
<h2>Solutions to illegal fishing</h2>
<p>Solving the problem of illegal fishing in Nigeria requires that the Federal Department of Fisheries is supported to operate effectively. As the agency charged to ensure the sustainable exploitation of Nigeria’s fisheries, it must be adequately funded. </p>
<p>Current fisheries regulations must also be updated to reflect the current realities and impacts of fisheries crime.</p>
<p>A holistic and collaborative approach is critical to addressing fisheries crime. A national maritime security strategy is needed to guide and facilitate inter-agency and regional cooperation. The strategy should include the establishment of an information-sharing platform. </p>
<p>The capture of the pirates that targeted Hai Lu Feng 11 vessel by the Nigeria navy was <a href="https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/fcwc-regions-interagency-cooperation-leads-to-arrest-of-vessel-hijackers">supported</a> by the <a href="https://fcwc-fish.org/">Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea</a>. This was through the regional online communications platform established under the <a href="https://fcwc-fish.org/projects/watf">West Africa Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>This shows that cooperation between fisheries agencies and other maritime enforcement agencies is critical to stemming the tide of illegal fishing – and other crime at sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood receives funding from the Scottish Funding Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sayra van den Berg Bhagwandas receives funding from the Scottish Funding Council. </span></em></p>Nigeria must address illegal fishing, which depletes the country’s fish stocks, undermines livelihoods and pushes people into poverty.Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Lecturer, University of St AndrewsSayra van den Berg Bhagwandas, Postdoctoral researcher, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1579812021-03-31T13:34:35Z2021-03-31T13:34:35ZHas ECOWAS made West Africa a safer place? Yes, but its track record is lumpy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392569/original/file-20210330-19-1na56za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's president Buhari chairing the 55th ordinary session of the ECOWAS.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Adam Abu Bashal/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In an article published in 1994 titled <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/">The Coming Anarchy</a>, the American journalist Robert Kaplan predicted an impending Armageddon for West Africa due to what he considered its notoriety for breeding crime, coups and tyrannical regimes. Twenty-six years later, it bears examining whether the region has measured up to this grim forecast.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615570951">paper</a>, I examined how the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had fared in the context of some emerging and recurring security threats in the region. These included jihadist terrorism, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">drug trafficking and piracy</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/">unconstitutional changes of government</a>. </p>
<p>ECOWAS was <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/">formed in 1975</a> by West African states to accelerate economic growth and development in the region. Its member states include Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Nigeria. The adoption of the Accord on Non-aggression and Defence in 1978 marked the inroads of ECOWAS into security <a href="https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/sesay.pdf">regionalism</a> as a prerequisite for the attainment of economic integration. </p>
<p>I assessed the progress of ECOWAS in resolving the main security challenges in the region. I concluded that there are reasons to be optimistic. But recent conflict trends have reignited a great deal of concern about the political stability of the region. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615570951">concluded</a> that ECOWAS is limited in what it can achieve. Nonetheless, it needs to be decisive in enforcing its protocols and policies and sanctioning member states and governing elites who flout them. </p>
<h2>Democracy landscape</h2>
<p>I reviewed the period between 1989 and 2020. </p>
<p>One of the categories of political instability I looked at was trends in constitutional coups. </p>
<p>Within this period, unconstitutional changes of government accounted for a high percentage of the conflicts in the region. These <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26295349?seq=1%22">included</a> Liberia (1989–2005), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), Cote d’Ivoire (1992–2002; 2010–2011), Guinea Conakry (2007–2010), and Guinea Bissau (2005–2009). </p>
<p>Only <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/38961785.pdf">Cape Verde and Senegal</a> were spared a military coup. Even so, the erstwhile president of Senegal, the then 86-year-old Abdoulaye Wade, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/1/28/controversy-of-abdoulaye-wades-presidential-bid">did attempt a constitutional coup in 2012</a> to run for a third term. </p>
<p>In response to many of these developments, ECOWAS deployed both military and diplomatic tactics at different times. For instance, ECOWAS deployed the military in the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts and recorded a modicum of success, but this intervention was controversial because of alleged <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/">human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>Diplomacy was deployed in 2012, when a festering <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087813515979">terrorist challenge and Tuareg rebellion</a> in Mali led to the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Touré in a putsch. ECOWAS initiated a <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/52122968.pdf">mediated</a> settlement with the junta to restore constitutional order while granting them amnesty. It failed to deploy a military tactic due to lack of capacity and disagreements by member states. </p>
<p>However, the use of Blaise Compaoré as mediator in the Mali intervention contradicted the organisation’s protocols given his despotic tactics at home. Compaoré was eventually <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/blaise-compaore-burkina-faso-president-resigns-after-violent-protests-1.2819254">toppled by a popular protest</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>After a military coup in Burkina Faso in 2015, ECOWAS returned the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">interim president</a>, Michel Kafando, to office. And it facilitated a political transition in the Gambia in 2017. </p>
<p>Yet it has been ineffectual in dismantling the Gnassingbé dynasty in Togo. And it failed to deplore the move by Alpha Condé of Guinea to push through a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/defusing-political-crisis-guinea/">constitutional referendum</a> in March 2020. This saw him return to power for a third term as president.</p>
<p>Similarly, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire capitalised on a new constitution and ran for a third term in 2020 amid some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/7/ivory-coast-president-alassane-ouattara-to-run-for-third-term">violent protests in the country</a>. According to Adam K. Abebe in the Africa Report, the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/34674/cote-divoire-ouattaras-bid-for-3rd-term-opens-up-a-can-of-worms/">new constitution</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“retains the two-term limit on presidential aspirants but says nothing about terms served prior to its adoption”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2020, Mali was back in the spotlight when a popular <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54134614">uprising and coup</a> ended the administration of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This time, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/62698/mali-a-whos-who-of-bah-ndaws-transitional-government-cabinet">ECOWAS imposed</a> economic sanctions and gave a deadline for the military to hand over to a transitional government.</p>
<p>Overall, I found that ECOWAS’s achievements in responding to the crises of governance wrecking the region have been strained by the non-compliance of its own leaders with its <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf">good governance protocol</a>. </p>
<h2>Drugs, piracy and terrorism</h2>
<p>One of the major security threats in the region is drug trafficking. Coastal states of Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Senegal have become major transit routes for <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/abstract/10.5334/sta.df/">drug traffickers</a>. And <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_COCAINE.pdf">substantial seizures of drugs</a> were made between 2005 and 2007. This challenge has been coupled with alarming <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">kidnappings at sea</a> in the Gulf of Guinea.</p>
<p>ECOWAS tried to address the drug crime through <a href="https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/ecowasresponseactionplan.html">the adoption of a policy in 2009</a> and a year later agreeing <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/November/new-initiative-to-improve-airport-intelligence-sharing-on-drug-trafficking-in-west-africa.html">the Dakar Initiative</a>. Most of its efforts have focused on <a href="https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/WACD_En_Report_WEB_051114.pdf">restricting the flow of drugs, strengthening borders, and prosecuting culprits</a>. </p>
<p>Then there is the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/world/africa/terrorism-west-africa.html">ongoing terrorism of Boko Haram</a> and its splinter sects in Nigeria. This has become a normalised phenomenon with seismic reverberations in neighbouring states. The challenge is compounded by the activities of armed bandits and kidnappers.</p>
<p>ECOWAS adopted a counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan in 2013. This outlined <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN-CT.pdf">three main pillars: prevent, pursue, reconstruct</a>. </p>
<p>The priority of member states has been to pursue culprits, with little investment in addressing the ideological and political conditions of violence. </p>
<p>There are also major shortfalls when it comes to the organisation’s military unit. The most pressing are corruption and a lack of sustained and improved training.</p>
<p>And, despite its measured progress, ECOWAS still has the critical challenge of resource scarcity. There is also the lack of will to follow through on the implementation of protocols, non-compliance with the protocols, a lack of leadership by members, the brutality of state forces and a general disconnect with the realities of people on the ground. </p>
<h2>The way ahead</h2>
<p>The decline of interstate violence and civil wars in West Africa, and the greater prominence of ECOWAS in conflict management, are perhaps indications that the security situation of West Africa didn’t turn out to be as gloomy as Kaplan forecast two decades ago. But there are important lessons that have been learnt. </p>
<p>The organisation should support and safeguard the rights of its citizens to stage peaceful protest as a way of balancing the excesses of politicians.</p>
<p>The people should use their rights granted by <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5546&context=faculty_scholarship">Article 4 of the 2005 revised protocol</a> under the ECOWAS Court to seek justice in situations where they have been abused by the state or other oppressive groups.</p>
<p>ECOWAS should appoint individuals who are not former heads of state and do not hold political office as regional mediators. Given Nigeria’s mammoth internal challenges and weakened political clout, other countries within the region must step up and drive the organisation to achieve its mandate of becoming a <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/vision-2020/">community of people</a> rather than an institution that enhances the status and profile of <a href="https://gup.ub.gu.se/file/119483">subversive regimes</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Maiangwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ECOWAS needs to be decisive in enforcing its protocols and sanctioning members that flout the provisions of its protocols and policies.Benjamin Maiangwa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lakehead UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1580342021-03-29T14:00:54Z2021-03-29T14:00:54ZTop three take-away lessons from the Suez Canal blockage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392216/original/file-20210329-17-1epk7ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Suez Canal on a normal day. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Camille Delbos/Art In All of Us/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>For a week the world was gripped by the extraordinary sight of a massive container ship that had run aground in the Suez Canal in Egypt. The Ever Given is 400m long (1,312ft) and weighs 200,000 tonnes, with a maximum capacity of 20,000 containers. It was carrying 18,300 containers when it became wedged in the canal, blocking all shipping traffic. Efforts to free it <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56559073">finally paid off when it was partially dislodged in the early hours of Monday 29 March</a>. Adejuwon Soyinka asked maritime security expert Dirk Siebels to unpack lessons learnt from the incident.</em></p>
<h2>What maritime lessons can be learnt from this incident?</h2>
<p><strong>Choke points:</strong> The shipping industry provides an extremely efficient link to ensure just-in-time deliveries. This link, however, is largely invisible, underlined by the time it took most countries to classify seafarers as <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-1573.aspx">key workers</a> during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>When choke points are blocked, trade doesn’t necessarily come to a standstill. Under normal circumstances, it is <a href="https://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-fact/shipping-and-world-trade-driving-prosperity/">extremely cheap</a> to transport all types of cargo over long distances on ships. Freight rates are barely noticeable in the price of most goods, so higher freight rates are unlikely to be a significant issue for economies as a whole. Nevertheless, the implications of a blockage as we’ve seen in the Suez Canal will have been felt in many sectors. For example, refineries need crude oil, factories need raw materials, shops need goods to sell. </p>
<p><strong>Security threats:</strong> These are easy to exaggerate, but complicated to understand. Concerns about additional piracy threats on the route around Africa are, in my view exaggerated. In addition, there have been alarming headlines about ships waiting at the southern end of the Suez Canal, describing them as <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/suez-canal-security-ever-given-b1822825.html">“sitting ducks”</a> in a volatile region. </p>
<p>While there are certain threats for operations in the Red Sea, these have not changed overnight. Ships always have to wait in the area as Suez Canal transits are conducted in convoys. Moreover, the threat level is the same for all ships but the resulting risk is different for individual vessels, depending on factors such as ship type, cargo or even the owner’s nationality. </p>
<p>Situational awareness is therefore important to ensure appropriate preparations and to avoid unwarranted alarmism.</p>
<p><strong>Security and safety:</strong> These threats should receive similar attention. <a href="https://www.stableseas.org/publications/maritime-terrorism/soft-targets-black-markets-maritime-terrorism">Potential security</a> threats are often highlighted as worst-case scenarios, namely terrorist attacks which could cause high levels of economic disruption. These have often been identified as a <a href="https://cimsec.org/breaking-the-bottleneck-maritime-terrorism-and-economic-chokepoints-part-1/">particular threat</a> for choke points such as the <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/attacks-in-the-suez-security-of-the-canal-at-risk/">Suez Canal</a>. Safety threats, on the other hand, are not as headline-grabbing. <a href="https://theloadstar.com/cscl-indian-ocean-finally-refloated-running-aground-elbe/">Accidents</a> are much more likely to occur but are much less discussed. </p>
<p>In many cases, however, the actual implications of safety and security incidents are very similar. Countermeasures that are designed to increase resilience should therefore receive more attention. Better awareness of all types of threats is vital in this area as well because safety threats are largely static while security threats are much more dynamic.</p>
<h2>Were there any maritime security implications from the incident?</h2>
<p>This <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/world/middleeast/suez-canal-blocked-ship.html">was a rare</a> accident that has highlighted how much the world’s economy relies on shipping. This has been the case for many years. But the global shipping industry is almost invisible most of the time. </p>
<p>While the Ever Given’s grounding was not a security-related incident, the <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32292">critical nature</a> of certain choke points around the world has been discussed for many years.</p>
<p>These narrow channels – including man-made ones like the Suez Canal, but also natural ones like the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Strait-of-Hormuz">Strait of Hormuz</a> in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman or the <a href="https://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-5/living-with-the-coasts/coastal-functions/the-strait-of-malacca-a-historical-shipping-metropolis/">Strait of Malacca</a> between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra – are part of the most important global sea routes. When merchant ships can no longer navigate through such a choke point, it may lead to supply delays and higher freight rates. These effects are already visible in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-suezcanal-ship/suez-blockage-sets-shipping-rates-racing-oil-and-gas-tankers-diverted-away-idUKKBN2BI0GZ">tanker market</a>. </p>
<p>For container ships, the impact could exacerbate an already <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/business/global-shipping.html">chaotic situation</a> in the wake of COVID 19-related disruptions of long-established trading patterns.</p>
<p>Overall, direct implications on maritime security are unlikely. The commercial implications for the shipping industry – and, by extension, for global trade – are already significant and the ripple effects will be felt in many sectors beyond shipping.</p>
<h2>What does the incident tell us about other sea routes around Africa?</h2>
<p>The only alternative to a transit through the Suez Canal is the much longer passage around the African continent. Piracy in particular has been a significant concern for operators of merchant ships in recent years, first off the Somali coastline and more recently in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacks-at-sea-arent-all-linked-to-piracy-why-its-important-to-unpick-whats-what-153591">Gulf of Guinea</a>.</p>
<p>Some shipping companies have already voiced <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/03/26/shipping-companies-stuck-near-suez-are-reportedly-alerting-us-navy-over-piracy-risks/?sh=12f23bb13e36">concerns</a> over piracy threats on the alternative route, even prompting inquiries to the US Navy. One of the largest industry organisations, <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/security/20210326-security-guidance-on-diverting-around-the-cape-of-good-hope-to-avoid-suez.aspx">BIMCO</a>, recently published a related security guidance. </p>
<p>In recent years shipping industry associations as well as international navies have often pointed out that Somalia-based piracy has merely been suppressed, not defeated. In December, the European Union’s naval mission in the western Indian Ocean was extended until <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/23/operation-atalanta-eutm-somalia-and-eucap-somalia-mandates-extended-for-two-more-years/">31 December 2022</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, it should be noted that the threat of piracy for a transit through the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal is not significantly different from a voyage through the Indian Ocean towards South Africa. After passing the Cape of Good Hope, a ship with a destination in Europe is very likely to steam on a straight course and pass between Senegal and Cabo Verde. Any such transit will not be affected by the piracy threat in West Africa, which is significant in the inner Gulf of Guinea, but limited to an area around 250 nautical miles from the Nigerian coastline. Taking the shortest route around Africa means that ships will be almost 1,000 nautical miles away from Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Direct implications for maritime security are unlikely. But there will be ripple effects in the shipping industry and in many commercial sectors.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1535912021-01-26T14:17:44Z2021-01-26T14:17:44ZAttacks at sea aren’t all linked to piracy. Why it’s important to unpick what’s what<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379951/original/file-20210121-13-187c0s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian Navy Special forces pretend to arrest pirates during a joint military exercise with the French navy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/four-attacks-in-one-week-show-the-rising-risk-of-west-african-piracy">Pirate attacks</a> against merchant ships off the African coast have been reported regularly over the past decade. And despite measures to suppress it, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259425417_Piracy_in_Somalia_A_Challenge_to_The_International_Community">Somalia-based piracy</a> remains a concern. On the other side of the continent, the <a href="https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/imb-piracy-report-2020/">Gulf of Guinea</a> is now viewed as presenting a much more serious piracy problem. </p>
<p>Last year a record 130 crew members were kidnapped in 22 separate incidents, according to the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1301-gulf-of-guinea-records-highest-ever-number-of-crew-kidnapped-in-2020-according-to-imb-s-annual-piracy-report">International Maritime Bureau</a>. The cluster of attacks in November and December has once again led to alarming headlines about the <a href="http://portfolio.cpl.co.uk/BIMCO/202012/cover/">Gulf of Guinea</a> being the world’s <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/gulf-of-guinea-confirmed-as-world-piracy-hotspot/">piracy hotspot</a>.</p>
<p>But an increase in officially reported attacks does not necessarily mean that the actual number of attacks has increased. And individual cases must be <a href="https://www.dirksiebels.eu/publications/2021/01/04/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-in-2020/">analysed</a> carefully. Attacks against small cargo ships trading solely in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, are often linked to criminal disputes or other illicit activities at sea. These incidents are very different from random attacks targeting merchant ships in international trade which are solely aimed at kidnapping seafarers to collect a large ransom and are, therefore, a profit-driven crime.</p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://safety4sea.com/two-suspicious-approaches-in-gulf-of-aden-in-24-hours/">reports</a> about suspicious approaches against merchant ships off Somalia are still frequent. Most are related to smuggling operations between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian peninsula or simply to everyday fishing activities.</p>
<p>Pirate attacks may grab most headlines, but maritime security is important for wider reasons. Illicit activities at sea limit the potential benefits of economic activities linked to the sea – what’s referred to as the “blue economy”. This includes maritime trade, fishing activities, offshore oil and gas production or coastal tourism. Also, criminality at sea and on land are closely linked. Government agencies need to recognise this if security is to be improved.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gulf-of-guinea-fighting-criminal-groups-in-the-niger-delta-is-key-to-defeating-piracy-130480">Gulf of Guinea: fighting criminal groups in the Niger Delta is key to defeating piracy</a>
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<h2>Many problems, few resources</h2>
<p>Piracy remains arguably the most visible symptom of <a href="https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/the-challenge-of-governance-in-the-gulf-of-guinea">insecurity at sea</a>. But coastal states also have other reasons to be concerned about it.</p>
<p>Illegal fishing, for example, has a direct impact on coastal communities where artisanal fishing is one of the few opportunities to earn a living. Smuggling on maritime routes even affects government income directly. Virtually all African countries rely heavily on customs revenues. When fuel, cigarettes or agricultural goods are smuggled, no import or export duties are paid. Less money can then be spent on schools, roads or hospitals, as <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">my research</a> has shown.</p>
<p>Governments are also concerned about drug trafficking or weapons smuggling at sea, underlined by <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/africa-new-regional-anti-piracy-agreement/">international agreements</a> which have been adopted by the majority of African coastal states. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">Limited monitoring</a> of maritime trade allows for a steady flow of pharmaceutical products – including fake drugs – into Africa as well as lucrative exports of unlicensed timber or illegal wildlife products.</p>
<p>Despite the widespread impacts, maritime security has only come into the political focus over the past decade. African countries have <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/promising-signs-of-africas-global-leadership-on-maritime-security">initiated</a> international meetings about it. The African Union adopted a maritime <a href="https://au.int/en/maritime">strategy</a> in 2014 and held a follow-up summit in Togo’s capital Lomé in 2016. But progress has been <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/maritime-security-implementing-aus-aim-strategy/">limited</a>. National governments have largely failed to take concrete actions. Strategies aren’t supported by financial and human resources.</p>
<p>Even Ghana, where a comprehensive <a href="https://996227d1-de16-4875-a76e-7ece4d3917bc.filesusr.com/ugd/a5e83a_ffc206114be34849b92d89655812abd7.pdf">maritime strategy</a> has been under development for years, is still unable to provide reliable <a href="https://safety4sea.com/ghana-wants-more-investment-to-improve-maritime-security/">funding</a> for patrol boat operations. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Some examples highlight that it is possible to provide more security at sea. In West Africa, Nigeria is leading the way with its $195 million <a href="http://www.apanews.net/en/news/nigerian-press-focuses-on-plans-to-commence-195m-deep-blue-project-in-2021-others">Deep Blue project</a>, scheduled to be fully operational in the coming months. This project is primarily aimed at better surveillance and enforcement across the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, an area that stretches out up to 200 nautical miles (around 360 kilometres) from the coastline.</p>
<p>Benin, Gabon and Tanzania have partnered with environmental organisations like <a href="https://www.seashepherdglobal.org/our-campaigns/iuu-fishing/">Sea Shepherd</a> to combat illegal fishing in their waters. Such non-traditional partnerships may help overcome short-term challenges and focus on urgent problems.</p>
<p>But it’s necessary to build capacity for the long term.</p>
<p>In many African countries, the blue economy could help to increase economic growth and development, although it should not be limited to <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.00586/full">economic gains</a>. Acknowledging the needs of local communities and environmental sustainability are equally important. Investments can yield direct benefits which are five times higher than the initial outlay, according to a <a href="https://oceanpanel.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Ocean%20Panel_Economic%20Analysis_FINAL.pdf">recent study</a>. And the inclusion of <a href="https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/covid-19-four-sustainable-development-goals-help-future-proof-global">Sustainable Development Goal 14</a> on ocean resources could strengthen efforts to recover from the economic impacts of COVID-19.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lift-for-maritime-sector-in-kenya-and-djibouti-after-fall-in-piracy-128073">Lift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy</a>
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<p>Despite some alarming <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/global-sea-piracy-coronavirus-covid19/">headlines</a>, there is no evidence to suggest that the coronavirus pandemic has had an immediate <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f3f8460cb3933732c1b3650/t/5f984316e606836d108ed586/1603814171548/Whitepaper+Maritime+Security+Post+Covid+Sep+2020_sml.pdf">impact</a> on security threats at sea. But growth forecasts have been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/12/30/covid-19-takes-its-toll-on-african-economy/">slashed</a> and governments are unlikely to prioritise spending on navies and other maritime agencies. </p>
<p>Security concerns <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/elections-and-instability-as-africa-enters-2021">on land</a> are much more immediate threats, and even relatively limited <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/The-evolving-fiscal-and-liquidity-stimulus-packages-in-response-to-COVID-19-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf">stimulus packages</a> are another burden for government budgets.</p>
<p>A closer analysis of sea piracy is important for law enforcement and longer-term prevention whether these are solely aimed at pirates or at organised criminal groups. It is also important for shipping companies because it affects the threat assessment when attacks are linked to criminal activities and aimed at specific ships rather than random targets.</p>
<p>Short-term solutions for long-standing problems are impossible. Even small steps, however, are important to improve maritime security in the medium to long term. That would be in line with the <a href="https://au.int/en/maritime">AU’s maritime strategy</a> which highlights the blue economy’s potential contribution to economic growth and development across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sea piracy often grabs the headlines, but it is just one of many symptoms of insecurity at sea.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1375862020-05-05T12:19:31Z2020-05-05T12:19:31ZGlobal sea piracy ticks upward, and the coronavirus may make it worse<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332466/original/file-20200504-83725-j37t37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C1019%2C541&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Suspected pirates surrender to the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Somalia in 2009.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/03/history-the-piracy-mission-then-and-now/">LCDR Tyson Weinert/U.S. Coast Guard</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early April, eight armed raiders boarded the container ship Fouma as it entered the port of Guayaquil, Ecuador. They fired warning shots toward the ship’s bridge, boarded the ship and <a href="https://www.maritimebulletin.net/2020/04/16/unusual-piracy-attack-on-container-ship/">opened several shipping containers</a>, removing unknown items before escaping in two speedboats. Nobody was harmed. </p>
<p>Ecuador isn’t exactly a hot spot of global piracy, but <a href="https://www.intelligencefusion.co.uk/blog/maritime-threats-in-south-america-piracy-and-drug-trafficking">armed robbers regularly attack ships</a> in and around the port of Guayaquil. It’s the <a href="https://www.cepal.org/en/notes/port-activity-report-latin-america-and-caribbean-2018">seventh-busiest port</a> in Latin America, handling most of Ecuador’s agricultural and industrial imports and exports. Ships moored along the port’s quays or, like the Fouma, transiting its narrow river passages are easy prey for local criminal gangs.</p>
<p>Only a few short years ago the international community was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1092281">celebrating the end</a> of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/23/the-world-beat-somali-pirates-why-cant-it-stop-west-african-piracy/">maritime piracy</a>. Worldwide in 2019, there were fewer attacks and attempted attacks on ships than there had been in 25 years.</p>
<p>But as the Guayaquil attack hints, pirates may be getting more active. Already, the first three months of 2020 have seen a <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map">24% increase in pirate attacks and attempted attacks</a>, over the same period in 2019. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=R-qc3U8AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=sra">scholar of sea piracy</a>, I worry that the coronavirus pandemic may make piracy even more of a problem in the coming months and years. </p>
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<span class="caption">In a photo from 2012, masked Somali pirate Hassan stands near a Taiwanese fishing vessel that washed up on a Somali shore after the pirates were paid a ransom and released the crew.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/AP-Piracy/a68502733d1447abbe538313ec65b331/38/0">AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh</a></span>
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<h2>Counter-piracy successes</h2>
<p>Modern sea piracy often involves pirates in small fast boats approaching and boarding larger, slower-moving ships to rob them of cargo – such as car parts, oil, crew valuables, communication equipment – or to seize the ship and crew for ransom.</p>
<p>Beginning in 2008, the greater Gulf of Aden area off the coast of East Africa became the most dangerous waters in the world for pirate attacks. Somali pirates like those portrayed in the 2013 Tom Hanks movie “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1535109/">Captain Phillips</a>” spent five years regularly hijacking large commercial vessels. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/june/end-piracy-gulf-aden">Three international naval efforts</a>, and industry-wide efforts to <a href="https://www.ocimf.org/media/92018/Guidelines-to-Harden-Vessels.pdf">make ships harder to attack and easier to defend</a>, helped reduce the threat – as did <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/12/09/world-bank-approves-112-million-to-strengthen-local-government-capacity-and-provide-urban-infrastructure-for-somalis">improved local government on land</a>, such as <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Public_Strategy_USAID.Somalia_03.29.2017_3.pdf">enhanced security and better health and education services</a>. By 2019, the International Maritime Bureau reported <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre">no successful hijackings</a> in the Greater Gulf of Aden.</p>
<p>In Southeast Asia, better aerial and naval surveillance has curbed pirate threats, with the help of improved <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/indonesia-malaysia-and-philippines-launch-joint-operations-in-sulu-sea-to-tackle-terrorism">coordination between national governments</a> that <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/21042016-the-malacca-strait-patrols-finding-common-ground-analysis/">share jurisdiction</a> of the region’s busy shipping lanes.</p>
<p>As a result of these efforts, the global number of attacks and attempted attacks dropped significantly over the past decade, from a high of nearly 450 incidents in 2010 to fewer than 165 incidents in 2019 – the lowest number of <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre">actual and attempted pirate attacks</a> since 1994. Ship hijackings, the most severe and visible manifestation of sea piracy, also <a href="http://brandonprins.weebly.com/minervaresearch.html">have declined since 2010</a>.</p>
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<h2>A return of pirates?</h2>
<p>However, the Fouma attack is a troubling sign. The sea robbers seem to have had detailed advance knowledge of the ship’s cargo, as well as its course and the personnel on board. Those are clues that the pirates planned the attack, likely with help from the crew or others with specific information about the ship.</p>
<p>That sort of insider information is relatively rare in pirate attacks in general, but is <a href="https://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait">common when pirates go after large cargo vessels</a> and tanker ships, as happens in <a href="http://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.522">about one-third of pirate attacks</a>.</p>
<p>Piracy in the waters off of South America – and off West Africa – has been increasing somewhat in recent years. Some of the conditions in those regions are similar to the ones that drove the Somali spike a decade ago: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002712453709">weak governments embroiled in political violence</a>, <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300180749/pirates">widespread economic hardship and easy access to weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Most piracy ultimately affects poor countries with weak governments. That’s because criminals, insurgents and other groups <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343316683436">see opportunities</a> to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/25/what-do-pirates-want-to-steal-riches-at-sea-so-they-can-pay-for-wars-on-land/">raise money for their land-based battles</a> by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2233865919833975">stealing from passing ships</a>. For instance, militant groups in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger River Delta region and the Gulf of Guinea, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2018/03/20/amnesty-and-new-violence-in-the-niger-delta/#53bf70a6263f">siphon oil off tanker ships</a> and resell it on the black market.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877">economic hardship</a> striking <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48386415">Venezuela and Brazil</a>, poor and jobless citizens may see opportunities offshore. <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/the-home-visit-people-dread-a545e84a75d8">Weak police</a> and <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/threats-against-anti-corruption-framework-in-brazil-multiply-d6c4acfbfd4c">corrupt officials</a> only exacerbate the economic problems.</p>
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<h2>The coronavirus weakens nations – and ships</h2>
<p>The medical and economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic seems likely to pose severe challenges for countries with few resources and weak governments. West African and South American countries already struggle to police their territorial waters. Those regions have <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-covid-cases-region">not yet been severely affected by the coronavirus</a>, though infections are growing on both continents. </p>
<p>As hospitals fill with COVID-19 patients, the regions’ governments will almost certainly shift their public safety efforts away from sea piracy and toward <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/ticking-time-bomb-scientists-worry-about-coronavirus-spread-africa">more immediate concerns on land</a>. That will create opportunities for pirates.</p>
<p>The disease may make it harder for crews to protect ships as well. Most merchant vessel crews are already <a href="https://www.rosegeorge.com/ninety-percent-of-everything">stretched thin</a>. If crew members get sick, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ships-are-moving-but-exhausted-sailors-are-stuck-at-sea-under-coronavirus-restrictions-11586084402">restrictions on international travel</a> prevent their replacements from meeting the ship in whatever port it’s in.</p>
<p>Slowing consumer spending around the globe means less trade, which brings less revenue for shipping companies to spend on armed guards or <a href="https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Intercargo-Best-Management-Practices-to-Deter-Piracy-and-Enhance-Maritime-Security-in-the-Red-Sea-Gulf-of-Aden-Indian-Ocean-and-Arabian-Sea-2018_06.pdf">other methods of protecting ships against pirates</a>. As a result, ships will likely become easier targets for pirates.</p>
<p>Even with the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map">early numbers suggesting an increase for 2020</a>, global piracy still isn’t as high as it was during the Somali peak from 2009 to 2012. But if economic conditions worsen around the globe and ships look like easy targets, more desperate people may turn to piracy, or ramp up their existing efforts in an attempt to survive.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brandon Prins received funding for this research project from the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Naval Research, through the Minerva Initiative.</span></em></p>In 2019, there were fewer attacks and attempted attacks on ships than there had been in 25 years. The coronavirus may bring economic and political changes that make piracy worse in the coming years.Brandon Prins, Professor of Political Science & Global Security Fellow at the Howard Baker Center, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1304802020-02-03T13:51:44Z2020-02-03T13:51:44ZGulf of Guinea: fighting criminal groups in the Niger Delta is key to defeating piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313087/original/file-20200131-41490-3adlyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Different reports have recently highlighted security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. One was published by the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">International Maritime Bureau</a>, another by the French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a> and another by the <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">US Maritime Administration</a>. </p>
<p>These reports come against a backdrop of pirate attacks against merchant ships in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea between Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. They have also led to attention-grabbing headlines about a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/piracy-surges-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-with-spate-of-deadly-attacks/">“piracy surge”</a> or even <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/waves-terror">“waves of terror”</a>. </p>
<p>In 2019, kidnappings of seafarers in the Gulf of Guinea reached an unprecedented number. Attacks against merchant ships were recorded off Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The area is often described as “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48581197">the world’s most dangerous seas</a>”. </p>
<p>Piracy is a significant threat for shipping companies operating in the region. Industry organisations have pointed out that urgent action is required and that seafarers should not be <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190610-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-continues-to-threaten-seafarers">“exposed to such appalling dangers”</a>.</p>
<p>The human cost is significant and hostages aren’t the only victims. Representatives from seafarers’ unions <a href="https://www.nautilusint.org/en/news-insight/news/latest-gulf-of-guinea-kidnapping-prompts-union-call-for-international-action-on-piracy/">have pointed out</a> that their members are at considerable risk for just doing their jobs, and even crews on ships that are merely transiting are on edge.</p>
<p>Based on a thorough analysis of attack patterns and overall maritime activities in the region, I am convinced that it will be impossible for navies and other security agencies to improve maritime security as long as root causes are not addressed. Many security incidents at sea, and notably kidnappings of seafarers, are merely an extension of land-based issues.</p>
<p>At the heart of the problem are activities by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta where kidnappings on land have long been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">security challenge</a>. Unless the massive security problems in the Delta are resolved, no significant headway will be made at sea.</p>
<h2>The numbers</h2>
<p>Beyond attention-grabbing headlines there’s no consensus on figures. Not even the reports mentioned above include the same numbers. That matters because shipping companies make commercial decisions based on official statistics, and budgets for security agencies are allocated depending on the scope and scale of the problem. </p>
<p>For example, the International Maritime Bureau reported that <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">121 seafarers</a> were taken as hostages during attacks in the Gulf of Guinea in 2019. This represented more than 90% of global kidnappings at sea recorded by the centre.</p>
<p>At the same time, the organisation only reported 64 attacks in the Gulf of Guinea last year. This was a decrease of 19% compared with 2018. </p>
<p>The US Maritime Administration highlighted a similar trend in a <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">recent advisory</a> even though the overall numbers are much higher. It reported that there were 129 attacks in 2019 after 145 attacks in 2018, representing an 11% drop. </p>
<p>The French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a>, on the other hand, reported a 20% increase in attacks against ships across the Gulf of Guinea between 2018 and 2019 (from 90 to 111 incidents).</p>
<p>Overall, numbers differ due to reporting standards and categorisations aren’t comparable. Similar events are often classified in different ways. For example, the IMB recorded four hijacked ships in 2019, the US Maritime Administration noted six, and the MICA centre classified 26 incidents as hijackings. </p>
<p>Annual statistics are further complicated by increased awareness. Incidents that would not have been reported a few years ago are now included in publicly available data, even though they may be linked to other criminal activities at sea.</p>
<p>During my <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">own research</a>, I have come across many cases where such activities were linked to incidents broadly described as “pirate attacks”, without a detailed analysis of individual circumstances.</p>
<p>Such differences <a href="https://www.dirksiebels.eu/publications/2020/01/16/piracy-in-west-africa-annual-reports/">underline</a> that annual statistics are not necessarily a valuable tool for understanding issues in the Gulf of Guinea. Rather, security agencies have to gain a broad understanding of all maritime security challenges. Based on such knowledge, a transparent analysis of incidents is possible, providing the necessary background for commercial decisions or law enforcement operations. </p>
<h2>Extension of a land problem</h2>
<p>Attacks at sea are generally conducted by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta. Throughout the region, there is an ample supply of foot soldiers and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/mumbai-pirates-forced-18-indian-seafarers-to-camp-near-crocodile-infested-swamp-in-nigeria/articleshow/73239638.cms">camps</a> in remote locations where hostages can be held during negotiations, the prerequisites for a lucrative business model.</p>
<p>Violent attacks <a href="https://splash247.com/abducted-jj-ugland-bulker-crew-released-by-pirates">affected various countries in 2019</a>. These are almost exclusively linked to Nigerian perpetrators.</p>
<p>Highlighting the direct link with Nigeria is important. On the one hand, neighbouring countries are unable to solve the problem unless security on land in the Niger Delta improves. On the other hand, spikes in attacks are possible at any time. For operators of merchant ships, the threat level can change within weeks, depending on factors such as weather, changes in traffic patterns or naval operations as well as the general situation on land in certain areas in the Niger Delta.</p>
<p>Furthermore, insecurity at sea is an overarching problem for regional governments. Pirate attacks may be particularly visible. But other concerns, such as <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/illegal-smuggling-for-oil-in-ghana/">fuel smuggling</a>, <a href="https://www.icsf.net/images/samudra/pdf/english/issue_77/4319_art_Sam77_e_art06.pdf">illegal fishing</a> or <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2019/08/west-africa-opioid-crisis-190827135612104.html">unregulated shipments</a> of pharmaceuticals like Tramadol, are usually more pressing for government agencies. </p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>The West and Central African region has made significant progress in fighting all types of illicit activities at sea. Various types of maritime security issues are mentioned in the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code</a> of Conduct, adopted in 2013 and aimed at improving maritime security in West and Central Africa. </p>
<p>However, human and financial resources are scarce and maritime security is generally regarded as less important than land-based security challenges which directly affect domestic populations. </p>
<p>But insecurity at sea has a significant economic impact by hurting activities related to the maritime environment. Maritime business plans therefore must include security-related expenditures for navies, coastguards and other government agencies. These are needed to maximise the potential of the maritime environment. This, in turn, would show that better maritime security has direct benefits for economic growth and development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>Navies, and other security agencies, won’t be able to improve maritime security as long as root causes on land are not addressed.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1280732019-12-15T08:03:56Z2019-12-15T08:03:56ZLift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305214/original/file-20191204-70133-m8zij.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US service members practising water rescue techniques during a routine training exercise off the coast of Djibouti in 2007.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/US NAVY/MC1 MICHAEL R. MCCORMICK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The upsurge of Somali piracy <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/1_0.pdf">after 2005</a> led to significant international activity in the Horn of Africa. Naval missions, training programmes, capital investment and capacity building projects were among the responses to the threat. States in the region also started to focus on the dangers and opportunities associated with the sea.</p>
<p>Kenya and Djibouti, two states directly affected by piracy, achieved widespread reform of their domestic maritime sectors through new national initiatives and assistance from external partners. Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelleh recently <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/09/c_137167464.htm">commented</a> during talks with Kenya on security and trade links that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>What happens in Somalia has an immediate impact on all of us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At its height, between 2008 and 2012, it is estimated that Somali piracy cost the Kenyan shipping industry between <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2012_22Feb.pdf">US$300 million and $400 million</a> every year. This was as a result of increased costs (including insurance) and a decline in coastal tourism. It also damaged Djibouti’s maritime industry, financial sector and international trade. </p>
<p>The upsurge of piracy after 2005 had a number of causes. It grew from poverty and lawlessness in Somalia alongside opportunity and a low risk of getting caught. By 2013 the threat had been <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ten-years-on-is-somali-piracy-still-a-threat">reduced</a>. This was due to a combination of naval patrols, private armed guards, self defence measures on board ships and capacity building efforts ashore.</p>
<p>Historically, most states in the Horn of Africa have struggled with limited capacity to address maritime insecurity. Their naval assets, training, human resources, institutional and judicial structures, monitoring and surveillance have all been critically underfunded.</p>
<p>But the international response to piracy – and the investments and partnerships that emerged – have helped some states to improve in these areas. </p>
<p>More importantly perhaps, since the decline in piracy attacks, Kenya and Djibouti have been paying more attention to policies around maritime governance and “blue” economic development. This relates to <a href="https://www.unenvironment.org/nairobiconvention/kenya-promoting-blue-economy-home-and-abroad">sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, job creation and ocean ecosystem health</a>. The refocus marks a shift from traditional investments related to land based conflict and land borders.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2019.1667053">recent article</a>, I examine how Kenya and Djibouti reformed their domestic maritime sectors following a decline in acts of piracy. The study sheds new light on the limitations and challenges facing domestic maritime sectors in Africa as well as some of the innovative approaches taken. </p>
<p>A key point is that blue economic growth is not possible without addressing security threats at sea. This includes building a robust maritime security sector, improving ocean health and regulating human activity at sea in a more sustainable way.</p>
<h2>International partnerships</h2>
<p>Many of the new developments in the region have been supported by international partners. The Djibouti Navy and Coastguard <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1162342/us-uk-france-complete-exercise-alligator-dagger-17/">work closely with the US Navy</a>. Together, for example, they are developing capacity for stopping and searching suspicious vessels. This is important in countering the illicit trafficking in people and smuggling of migrants through Djiboutian waters. </p>
<p>Djibouti has also benefited from Chinese direct investment, which accounts for nearly <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038215.pdf">40% of the funding for its major investment projects</a>. Chinese state-owned firms have built some of Djibouti’s largest maritime related infrastructure projects. These include the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, a new railway connection between Djibouti and Addis Ababa, and the opening of China’s first foreign military facility. </p>
<p>This is a clear example of Beijing prioritising its growing economic and security interests in Africa. And advancing its “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13567888.2018.1436801">massive and geopolitically ambitious</a>” Belt and Road Initiative.</p>
<p>Kenya, too, has received international assistance and investment. This includes support to set up the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Mombasa. Organisations like the International Maritime Organisation have led training for staff from the centre and for the Kenyan Navy. </p>
<p>The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has provided law enforcement training for the Kenyan Maritime Police Unit. It also opened a new high-security courtroom in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa, for cases of maritime piracy and other serious criminal offences.</p>
<h2>National refocus</h2>
<p>At a national level, there is evidence of a fundamental shift towards building a more secure and sustainable domestic maritime sector. </p>
<p>For example, Kenya has created a new coastguard service. Its job is to police the country’s ocean territory and to ensure that Kenya <a href="http://www.president.go.ke/2018/11/26/president-kenyatta-leads-the-world-in-pledging-support-for-sustainable-blue-economy/">benefits from its water resources</a>. The country has new naval training partnerships, maritime capacity building projects and an <a href="https://kippra.or.ke/kenyas-agenda-in-developing-the-blue-economy/">implementation committee</a> to coordinate “blue economic” activities. These include fisheries, shipping, port infrastructure, tourism and environmental protection.</p>
<p>For its part, Djibouti has rapidly developed its maritime sector and recognised the financial benefits of leasing coastal real estate. The country has an ambitious development plan titled “Djibouti Vision 2035”. This sets out its aspiration to become a maritime hub and the “<a href="https://www.gulf-times.com/story/415602/Djibouti-wants-to-become-the-Singapore-of-Africa">Singapore of Africa</a>”. It’s trading on the fact that it has a similar strategic position along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. </p>
<p>All of these approaches require robust laws and regulations governing human activities at sea. They also call for a capable and flexible coastguard and navy to enforce these regulations and secure coastal waters against threats such as piracy, fisheries crime and the illicit smuggling of drugs, weapons and people.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>There are lessons in the Horn of Africa experience for other regions of Africa facing similar maritime insecurities. One example is <a href="https://icc-ccs.org/index.php/1268-maritime-piracy-incidents-down-in-q1-2019-but-kidnapping-risk-in-gulf-of-guinea-persists">the Gulf of Guinea</a>. </p>
<p>The first lesson is that there’s a need to convince coastal states with weak maritime capacities of the untapped potential of the blue economy. Even reputational damage can harm tourism, development and investment in coastal regions. This was clearly illustrated in the <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2012_22Feb.pdf">case of Kenya</a>.</p>
<p>Blue economic growth needs a safe and secure maritime environment for merchant shipping in particular. It can also help alleviate poverty in coastal regions, provide alternatives to criminal livelihoods, and allow local communities more ownership of issues that affect them.</p>
<p>Ultimately, maritime security and blue economic growth need to be considered as a unified policy issue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128073/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert McCabe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya and Djibouti are building a more secure and sustainable domestic maritime sector.Robert McCabe, Assistant Professor, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1282412019-12-04T08:55:54Z2019-12-04T08:55:54ZSwapo’s unassailable position shattered: what next for Namibia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304896/original/file-20191203-67028-zkby3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The results of the Namibian election reflect growing discontent among voters with the way the country is being run. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The level of uncertainty that surrounded the sixth Namibian elections since the country’s independence in 1990 was unprecedented. Held late <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/incumbent-party-wins-namibian-election-amid-corruption-scandal-20191201">last month</a>, the poll combined voting for the country’s president and for the national assembly.</p>
<p>Two issues dominated the debate until right before election day. The first was that an independent candidate, Panduleni Itula, was expected to split the presidential vote for the ruling party, South West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo). </p>
<p>The second was a major corruption scandal around the allocation of fishing quotas. This erupted two weeks before the poll, and involved the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/officials-namibia-corruption-scheme-remain-custody-191202140206392.html">arrest of two cabinet ministers</a>.</p>
<p>A further feature of the poll was the controversy around electronic voting machines. Questions around their efficacy highlighted an erosion of trust in the state apparatus. Even on election day, independent candidate Itula continued to express misgivings about this central feature of the <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/apprehensive-of-evms-itula-casts-his-vote">electoral process</a>. </p>
<p>These issues shrouded further reasons for rising discontent in the country. These include staggering unemployment rates, particularly among young people, a persistent economic crisis and gross social inequality. Another conflict-ridden issue is the unresolved land question. These crises are compounded by rising constraints on the state budget. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.elections.na/PresidentialRace.aspx">election results</a> showed voters registering their demand for dramatic changes. This was most evident in the sharp drop in support for incumbent President Hage Geingob. Five years ago he <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibian-elections-the-sands-are-shifting-slowly-127656">garnered 87%</a>. This time he scraped through with just 56.3%, helped by voters in the preponderantly rural north, where he could rely on a loyal Swapo power base. </p>
<p>Itula insisted throughout the election campaign that he remained a Swapo member. Using a loophole in the party constitution, Itula and his supporters apparently hoped to tap Swapo support. His candidature reflected a persistent split in the ruling party, which seems to include ethnic resentment against “Damara” Geingob. Itula came in with just under 30%, after a strong showing particularly in urban areas and among youth, much less though in the populous north.</p>
<p>In the national assembly, opposition parties, including the newly formed <a href="https://www.politicalanalysis.co.za/listen-namibias-landless-peoples-movement-on-its-2019-priorities/">Landless People’s Movement</a>, saw their positions strengthened. The final result gave Swapo 65.5%, just short of a two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. This was a massive loss of some 15 percentage points against the resounding 80% of 2014. It is the first time that Swapo has dipped below the magic 66% since 1994.</p>
<p>Voter participation also fell, from over 70% in 2014 <a href="http://www.elections.na/RaceForVotes.aspx">to 60%</a> of registered voters. </p>
<p>Swapo’s seemingly unassailable position has been shattered. The outcome of these elections may well go further than a slight erosion of Swapo’s power position. It may lead to a situation where discontent by frustrated voters is channelled into directions other than formal politics. Thus, a latent crisis of legitimacy of the postcolonial state might break into the open.</p>
<h2>Trust in tatters</h2>
<p>But will the result mean that the government deals with the country’s massive challenges? Besides the long-term issues of persistent gross inequality and the worsening crisis of state finance as well as a bleak economic outlook, these also include the interrelated issues of corruption and transparency in government and politics.</p>
<p>A huge corruption scandal over the allocation of fishing quotas broke only weeks before the elections. <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86051/read/Shanghala-dodges-N$4m-Fishrot-payment-questions">“Fishrot”</a> involves culprits from Namibia as well as Angola, Iceland and Norway. It revolves around kickbacks for the allocation of Namibian fishing quotas, which are given out by the responsible line ministry. Among those arrested are two former cabinet ministers.</p>
<p>Corruption in high places is well known. It’s common cause in the country that fishing rights are dished out to people who are not connected to fisheries in any way, only to pass them on for a hefty fee. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/namibian-elections-the-sands-are-shifting-slowly-127656">Namibian elections: the sands are shifting -- slowly</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The most recent case was unusually dramatic with the arrest of top politicians shortly before the elections. But it’s widely considered to be the tip of the iceberg. Both former ministers were due to be back in the national assembly after the elections, but have now been removed from the Swapo list.</p>
<p>The corruption cases may well add to the lack of trust in the institutional set-up, which appears severely shaken in the aftermath of the elections. </p>
<p>Prior to the polls expectations were running high for the independent presidential candidate and for opposition parties. This was particularly true among young urban people. </p>
<p>Publication of the official results engendered not just disappointment but chagrin. One cause was the delay of more than 72 hours in the announcement of the results. This was despite the use of new electronic voting machines which should have expedited the process. In the event, it increased suspicions about manipulation, adding significantly to these concerns.</p>
<p>The leader of the newly formed Landless People’s Movement, Bernardus Swartbooi, went as far as to call the election results <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/opposition-question-poll-outcome">rigged</a>. He also bemoaned the fact that recourse to the justice system appeared to be meaningless, as the courts had in the past repeatedly sided with the electoral commission, as he stressed at a press conference on November 28 where the present author attended. </p>
<p>For the first time since independence, Namibia’s institutional set-up has been called into question. Within the system, there is seemingly no chance to appeal against shortcomings or intentional abuse. The unresponsive <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86036/read/ECN-officials-refuse-to-take-media-questions">attitude taken by the electoral commission</a> added to the misgivings. A range of opposition parties have announced they will consider <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/lpm-rdp-claim-daylight-robbery2019-12-03/">legal action against the election results</a>.</p>
<p>Swapo faces serious challenges. The perennial issue of gross social inequality is articulated in demands for land, not only for farming, but above all for <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?page=archive-read&id=144771">urban housing</a>; the Fishrot scandal has already rekindled <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86105/read/Namibians-reel-over-Fishrot-revelations">workers’ resistance at the coast</a>. The break-up of Swapo’s two-thirds majority has been hailed by the leader of the official opposition, McHenry Venaani of the Popular Democratic Movement, as a chance to <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/86045/read/Reduced-victory--Swapo-Geingob-drop-votes">“sanitise the debate in the house”</a>. But formal politics also suffers from an inflated cabinet and attendant spoils system which permeates the state apparatus. Again, this is related to a budgetary crisis in the face of a persistent economic downswing. </p>
<p>Swapo’s clinging to power in this election may prove to be the opening of a much more dramatic period than has been seen over the three decades since the much-lauded transition to independence in 1990.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reinhart Kössler has used research funds of the NRF available through his position as a Visiting Professor and Research Associate at the Institute of Reconciliation and Social Justice, The University of the Free State</span></em></p>For the first time since independence, Namibia’s ruling party has suffered electoral setbacks in the midst of economic and political crisis.Reinhart Kössler, Professor in Political Science, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.