tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/rajoy-9700/articlesRajoy – The Conversation2019-04-21T12:46:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136012019-04-21T12:46:32Z2019-04-21T12:46:32ZWhy Spain’s upcoming election will change Spanish immigration politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267928/original/file-20190406-115766-htzpt6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators take part in a recent protest against a rally by the Spanish far-right Vox party in Barcelona, Spain. The nationalist Vox party has recently emerged onto the political scene by winning representation in regional elections in the country's south in December.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manu Fernandez)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The upcoming election in Spain will be different. </p>
<p>While the country has long been one of the few in western Europe without a populist anti-immigrant party, the legislative elections on April 28 will likely change that.</p>
<p>Vox, a party that looks very similar to the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party, will, <a href="https://pollofpolls.eu/ES">according to current polls</a>, garner about 10 per cent of the vote and rake up a sizeable number of seats in parliament. </p>
<p>If the experience in other countries offers any indication, that means anti-immigrant rhetoric will likely become a staple of Spanish politics in the indefinite future.</p>
<p>Vox was initially founded as a nationalist party opposing separatism and decentralization. Recently, however, it has become more vocal in criticizing immigration, multiculturalism, the European Union and Islam. </p>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.voxespana.es/biblioteca/espana/2018m/gal_c2d72e181103013447.pdf">party manifesto</a>, it advocates the deportation of undocumented and criminal migrants, restrictions in naturalization policies, a selective and arguably discriminatory admission process favouring immigrants from “friendly” countries and restrictions on the public expression of Islam.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.985448?casa_token=Uq6fWbea7pIAAAAA:UESiouJpABEgrc-oCp4w6myD46fSSg7USUq2eMsGgRoB92rwGGg-SDtcsBJW4ho7YV8N_jYntUU">Political scientists long predicted</a> that this type of party could not gain a foothold in Spain. Because decentralization is a more central concern than immigration, and the mainstream right-of-centre party (the Partido Popular) already takes a restrictive position on immigration, so the argument goes, there is no place for an anti-immigrant party in Spain. </p>
<h2>Why this election will be different</h2>
<p>While this type of reasoning describes Spanish politics well in normal times, it does not today. With highly volatile election results in recent years (in 2015, the net change in seats amounted to more than 70 per cent) and an ongoing constitutional crisis regarding the status of Catalonia within the Spanish state, politics are marked by uncertainty.</p>
<p>After having climbed out of the economic abyss of the 2008 financial crisis, <a href="https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-forecast.htm">the Spanish economy has been in recession since 2015</a>, and the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis has seen the annual intake of asylum-seekers in Spain skyrocket from less than 6,000 in 2014 to more than 30,000 in 2017. </p>
<p>In addition to all this economic and social turbulence, the current partisan context lends itself very well to the populist argument that there is a politically correct and self-serving elite that does not care about the concerns of “the people.” </p>
<p>The Partido Popular, usually the most obvious choice for a voter who opposes immigration, is embroiled in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44247770">a massive corruption scandal</a> that has been estimated to involve a loss of at least 120 million euros (about $180 million Canadian dollars) to the public treasury. Indeed, the very reason an election is taking place is that the scandal forced former prime minister Mariano Rajoy to resign.</p>
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<p>The interim prime minister, social democrat Pedro Sánchez, is an <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/07/09/626095187/spains-socialist-leader-sets-a-new-course-on-migrants-gender-and-catalonia">anti-populist, pro-EU intellectual</a> who tends to invoke humanitarian considerations rather than majority opinion when describing his views on immigration, and who has repeatedly offered a safe haven to migrant ships that were denied in other European countries.</p>
<p>In research that is currently under review, I demonstrate that most anti-immigrant parties in western Europe had their first electoral success under these kinds of unusual circumstances, but that they did not disappear once politics normalized afterwards. </p>
<p>When these parties break through, they are able to lock up a spot in the party system, <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/comm.2010.35.issue-2/comm.2010.008/comm.2010.008.xml">gain credibility</a> as a realistic political player, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00235.x">draw more attention</a> to the issue of immigration and obtain the <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/abstract/9781847794420/9781847794420.xml">necessary resources</a> to build their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2016.1145685?casa_token=ZFAhhv0TCkcAAAAA:ZbPeWGJ8bvFmQTH2dd2ZOMQWsQZnZeuwyLbd0j6m3ufXTEZKHkunHZlqkKf85D49SBRtFkPvRsk">party organization</a>. These are exactly the kinds of factors that previous research has shown to be crucial to anti-immigrant parties’ success.</p>
<p>The following figure illustrates this pattern:</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Electoral breakthroughs of anti-immigrant parties in western Europe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because their electoral breakthrough depends on an unusual set of circumstances, the timing of anti-immigrant parties’ arrival has been quite different from one western European country to the next. </p>
<p>But once that unusual election occurs, anti-immigrant parties tend to stick around. In all countries, anti-immigrant parties have had considerable success after breaking through, and only in Belgium do we see a recent decline in their electoral fortunes. </p>
<p>It would be a grave mistake to assume these parties are inconsequential: across western Europe, they have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782804.2013.766473?casa_token=H7O3K9ED9NUAAAAA:usLmXXvPiWnEnTM7GMdM4WeIqSORtkl7-nJZ60FxWboKN7T8pf09OH6qBLB40HzaAwZHiwxAcxY">affected public policy</a>, incentivized mainstream parties to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354068809346002?casa_token=XhHvuwVE2aAAAAAA:xHSqpmQzJWwVjDZ7RFyizQfzFQ0PrG9fVI_HdoZybwF3s0OVVvLNHMbYjEnL4o-62DBov6ASPLs">take a harsher stance on immigration</a> and made anti-immigrant sentiment more <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gTxdDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA268&dq=koning+making+xenophobia+matter&ots=sgQzLrTy3a&sig=NAjbvcjUB_4ArIg-7tIrqHGPYsQ#v=onepage&q=koning%20making%20xenophobia%20matter&f=false">politically consequential</a>.</p>
<p>The election in Spain, therefore, is not only important because it changes the political landscape for the next legislative term. The success of Vox will likely secure a place for anti-immigrant parties in the Spanish party system for the indefinite future, with important implications for the future of immigration politics in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Koning receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p>The upcoming Spanish election will not only change the political landscape in the short term. The success of Vox will likely secure a place for anti-immigrant parties for the indefinite future.Edward Koning, Associate professor, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/865282017-11-02T02:54:04Z2017-11-02T02:54:04ZHow the crisis in Catalonia is helping Rajoy consolidate power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192706/original/file-20171031-18738-j12wxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rajoy leaves the Spanish Parliament in Madrid on Oct. 25, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Francisco Seco</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The news from Catalonia is alarming and confusing. How did things come to this, in a European Union member state, in 2017?</p>
<p>First came <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/oct/01/catalan-independence-referendum-spain-catalonia-vote-live">a referendum vote in favor of secession</a> with <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-41463955/catalonia-referendum-violence-as-police-block-voting">police blocking voters from balloting</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41780116">a declaration of independence</a>.</p>
<p>The backlash swiftly followed: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-19/spanish-government-to-proceed-with-suspending-catalan-autonomy-j8y73fog">The autonomous government of Catalonia was suspended by the Spanish government in Madrid</a>, huge crowds demonstrated in Barcelona <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41794087">against</a> Catalan independence and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/spanish-prosecutor-calls-for-rebellion-charges-against-catalan-leaders">independence leaders were threatened with arrest</a> <a href="http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20171031/432503997774/lamela-investigacion-rebelion-puigdemont-declarar.html">for sedition and rebellion</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=9KJ4VN4HxosC&printsec=frontcover&dq=greer+nationalism+and+self-government&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-sunhj5nXAhXCPZoKHXa7AKIQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q&f=false">a student of the political history</a> of Catalonia, especially the region’s relationship with Spain, I’m alarmed by these unprecedented events. The key question is: Why now?</p>
<h2>Changing the rules</h2>
<p>After all, Catalan nationalism and the Spanish state are not new. Catalonia has been a nation with a distinctive culture for centuries. It was the center of the Crown of Aragon, then united with Castille in 1492 to create Spain as we know it. Spain and Catalonia also have a long history of pragmatic accommodation. Spanish political culture is marked by memories of the nation’s Civil War and the dictator Francisco Franco. That means there is little popular support for conflict, unilateral declarations of independence or police action. </p>
<p>And yet, I don’t find the test of wills surprising. What’s surprising is the extent to which leaders are breaking “rules” of conflict between the Spanish government and Catalan nationalists. Under the old rules, the game would start with dramatic claims, divert into dialogue and end in complex pacts. One example of such an approach is the democratic Spanish constitution adopted in 1978 after Franco’s death and Spain’s democratic transition. </p>
<p>But now key players have stopped playing by these rules. A previous Spanish government, led by the Socialists, agreed to give Catalonia <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=h0sECbWJrfEC&lpg=PA81&ots=OXgawDoVnt&dq=catalan%20statute%20of%20autonomy%202006&lr&hl=sv&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false">more autonomy</a> in 2006. The current ruling party – Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular – contested this agreement to the Constitutional Tribunal in 2010 and won. The move fit with the traditional view of the Partido Popular as supporting Spanish unity. Then came a nonbinding vote in Catalonia, sponsored by the Catalan government, which led to the president of Catalonia, Artur Mas, being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/catalan-ex-president-artur-mas-barred-from-holding-public-office">removed from office</a> by Spanish courts. </p>
<p>Frustration in Catalonia – frustration with a Spanish state that first agreed to autonomy, then repudiated the agreement, and finally elected the Partido Popular – set in motion the events of this year. </p>
<p>Catalonia’s nationalist leaders, including President Carles Puigdemont, have tried to abide by the old rules. They do something dramatic that shores up their base and might strengthen their hand in negotiations, and then they wait for the government in Madrid to enter negotiations. If Madrid played its expected role, there would be dialogue and a pact and business would then continue as normal, with everybody’s dignity intact.</p>
<p>Instead, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-02/spain-can-blame-only-itself-for-catalonia-s-resistance">keeps choosing</a> a strategy of confrontation. Each time he ignored or rejected a Catalan offer to negotiate, he boxed the Catalan nationalists into going further. Even now, it is not clear that most Catalan nationalists actually want independence. <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-spain-and-catalonia-out-with-them-all/a-40776495">No survey has shown</a> a majority support it. Nationalist leader Artur Mas, the same leader who was banned from politics and fined for his nationalism, has said Catalonia is not ready for <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7347414c-aa6f-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c">“real independence.”</a> That is a signal he still wants negotiations.</p>
<p>But Rajoy continues to escalate the situation. </p>
<h2>Why this, why now?</h2>
<p>I see two plausible reasons Rajoy is doing this, and they both lie in party politics. </p>
<p>One is the heritage and beliefs of his party, the <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=WTjRA4cDP4gC&lpg=PA166&dq=partido%20popular%20historia&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q=reinvention&f=false">Partido Popular</a>. Founded by Francoists, senior officials of the old dictatorship, its ideology has authoritarian tones and focuses on order and Spanish unity. They don’t recognize a Catalan national right to self-determination, and believe all of Spain would have to agree on Catalan secession since Catalans are Spanish. </p>
<p>The other reason is that Rajoy’s Partido Popular is weak, which makes him weak. No party received a majority in the 2015 elections. During snap elections in 2016, the Partido Popular won only a small plurality and had to depend on temporary support from other parties to enter office. </p>
<p>Conflict with Catalonia strengthens Rajoy and the Partido Popular. It frames political conflict around national issues rather than inequality, unemployment and the structural, long-term decline of the Spanish economy. It also puts every one of his three big rival parties in a fix by forcing them to choose sides between Spanish unity or Catalan nationalism. </p>
<p>Unike its rivals, the Partido Popular doesn’t have many voters to lose in Catalonia – its Francoist past already significantly limits its appeal there.</p>
<p>It’s a different story for the center-right Ciudadanos, or the Citizens Party, which is the new alternative to a Partido Popular badly damaged by corruption and the economic crisis. Ciudadanos now looks like an annex of the Partido Popular. Weakening them strengthens the Partido Popular position as the party of the Spanish right - voters who value Spanish unity might come to see the Partido Popular as their champion. The Partido Popular’s historic but declining rivals, the Socialists, will also likely be badly damaged in the next election. The Socialists have supported the Partido Popular against Catalan nationalism, costing them their credibility as supporters of Catalan nationhood. </p>
<p>Outside of Catalonia, the conflict has sucked the oxygen from the issues of corruption and economic decline that had fueled the rise of Ciudadanos, the new left party Podemos and given the Socialists some hope. Podemos, which has supported the referendum, might lose Spanish nationalist voters to the Socialists. It will now be associated not just with left-wing anger at Spain’s inequality and economic underperformance, its preferred issues, but also with its sympathy for Catalan nationalism.</p>
<p>Rajoy and Spain are winning in the sense that a state which refuses to negotiate can defeat any peaceful challenge. But the political leaders in Barcelona and Madrid who created this confrontation have done great damage by creating a fracture between Spain and Catalonia.</p>
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<h2>Consequences of the rupture</h2>
<p>These events have also fractured society within Catalonia.</p>
<p>As a result of huge migratory waves from rural Spain over the last century, only about half of people in Catalonia identify as Catalan. For decades, Catalan politics has been about <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2014.995098">managing that division</a> – promoting Catalan autonomy, language and identity without sparking a backlash by people who feel Spanish. The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a2517cb4-bca8-11e7-9836-b25f8adaa111">big demonstrations in favor of Spanish unity in Barcelona </a> mark the destruction of much of that work. </p>
<p>Catalan elites have a long tradition, at this point in crisis, of leaving their radical leaders out on a breaking limb and retreating. They tend to cut off support for nationalist politics, assert their fealty to Spain and perhaps put money into less visibly confrontational Catalan civil society. We have seen them do this during almost every political transition in modern Spanish history. Some might see this as the reputed pragmatism of Catalans, withdrawing from a conflict they can’t win into nation building that will serve them well in the future. Some will say it is the pragmatism of bankers and businesspeople who prefer not to face the turbulence of secession followed by the prospect of life in a small left-wing country. That is what is happening now, with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e91df296-b00d-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4">almost 2,000</a> businesses switching their corporate registrations out of Catalonia. There is no such clear sense of what other elites are doing behind the scenes, but most elites in Catalonia, however sentimentally nationalist, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nationalism-Self-Government-Politics-Catalonia-Identities/dp/0791470482">value stability more than nationalist adventures</a>. </p>
<p>The Spanish government, which has suspended the Catalan government, has called elections on Dec. 21 to elect a new Catalan legislature. It is hard to predict what will happen. Maybe Spanish-identified voters who often abstain will be roused to put an end to the independence movement. Maybe Rajoy has so alienated moderate Catalans as to turn them into nationalists. Maybe the two sides will continue to remain about equal with votes shifting around between parties within each camp. Maybe police action and life without self-government in Catalonia will create new forms of radicalism.</p>
<p>Two things are certain: The damage to society and politics in Spain and Catalonia will be hard to mend – and fewer people will want to try. That is a shame, since a majority of people in Catalonia and Spain never wanted any of this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott L. Greer received funding from the Social Science Research Council and Nuffield Trust.</span></em></p>Why the Spanish Prime Minister keeps choosing a strategy of confrontation.Scott L. Greer, Professor, Global Health Management and Policy and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/849222017-09-29T14:29:12Z2017-09-29T14:29:12ZSpain’s disregard for Catalan press freedom is setting a dangerous precedent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188184/original/file-20170929-21094-1ke7rej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protest in Barcelona against the Spanish government on September 21. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/barcelona-catalonia-spain-september-21-2017-720040666?src=fceMukMuLGKltsCRE06sow-1-42">Riderfoot</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the run-up to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-independence-referendum-how-the-disputed-vote-led-to-crackdown-82277">Catalan independence referendum</a> on October 1 – ahead of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/dozens-injured-as-riot-police-storm-catalan-ref-polling-stations">police attacks on voters</a> on the day – the lines between protecting the Spanish constitution and curtailing freedom of expression became increasingly blurred. More than 140 websites promoting the referendum <a href="https://comunicacio21.cat/noticies-comunicacio21/123896-la-guardia-civil-bloqueja-144-webs-pro-referendum">have been</a> closed by the Spanish government in recent weeks. </p>
<p>Reports have been rife of tensions between police and journalists – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-tax/from-new-tax-office-catalonia-hopes-to-grab-billions-from-madrid-idUSKCN1BW10A">including raids</a> on newspaper offices, broad threats of legal consequences, and an <a href="http://www.sindicatperiodistes.cat/content/m%C3%A9s-de-300-assistents-la-concentraci%C3%B3-en-defensa-de-la-llibertat-dinformaci%C3%B3">organised protest</a> by journalists against harassment. All this in parallel with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/27/europe-must-act-to-protect-rights-and-freedoms-of-catalans">the other hostilities</a> from Madrid: threats to arrest Catalan mayors, interference with civic budgets, mass police deployment and now the violence on the day itself. How do these attempts to control communication compare to other referendums – and how concerned should we be?</p>
<p>Ahead of the independence referendums in Scotland <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">in 2014</a> and Quebec <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-29077213">in 1980 and 1995</a>, there were certainly accusations of media bias. In Scotland pro-independence activists <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29196912">gathered</a> outside BBC Scotland a couple of days before the vote to protest against alleged institutional bias in favour of the union with England. Meanwhile, independence campaigners were <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11102194/Threats-intimidation-and-abuse-the-dark-side-of-the-Yes-campaign-exposed.html">continually accused</a> of being abusive on social media. </p>
<p>In Quebec’s second referendum, the French-speaking public broadcaster <a href="http://reporter-archive.mcgill.ca/Rep/r3113/media.html">was accused</a> of favouring the pro-independence vote and a parliamentary commission investigated possible bias. But for all the political conflict in these referendums, freedom of expression was never called into question – neither in the actions of the authorities nor <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/catalonia-the-messy-reality-of-the-referendum-spain-wants-shut-down-11057965">by putting up</a> potential legal obstacles to a referendum taking place. </p>
<p>To be sure, there has also been a row about media bias in Catalonia. This has been magnified by the fact that only the pro-independence side is campaigning – the referendum is not recognised by those opposed to independence and is regarded as illegitimate by Madrid. </p>
<p>Media outlets sympathetic to independence look more partisan because they only have one campaign to cover, while unionist outlets positioned against the referendum – which are roughly comparable in number – fall equally foul because they report the situation as a political dispute and not as a campaign at all. This reporting goes way beyond presenting two political options for Catalans. The unionist media talk openly about “the pro-independence offensive”, while the pro-referendum media focus on the “state challenge to Catalonia”.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188183/original/file-20170929-21094-3z49gq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=733&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monica Terribas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mònica_Terribas_2017.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, anti-referendum activists and others <a href="http://www.elnacional.cat/ca/politica/concentracio-ultra-terribas-catalunya-radio_195705_102.html">gathered outside</a> the Catalan Public Radio Station on September 27 chanting against pro-referendum editorial lines and carrying threatening signs against prominent news anchor Mònica Terribas, whom they regard as one of the key culprits. At pro-referendum events, meanwhile, activists <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2017/09/22/lo-que-le-hicieron-a-una-reportera-de-lasexta-en-barcelona-tras-boicotear-su-directo_a_23219325/">have carried</a> signs saying that the generally unionist Spanish media does not represent them. </p>
<h2>Media neutering</h2>
<p>The activities of the Spanish authorities have taken things to a whole different level, however. Earlier in September, Spanish police <a href="http://www.ara.cat/en/Spanish-HQ-several-Catalan-newspapers_0_1870613118.html">visited or wrote to</a> a number of Catalan news organisations which had aired the <a href="http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170904/431057749241/emitido-tv3-primer-anuncio-oficial-referendum.html">official referendum campaign advertisement</a> to give them a letter from the Catalan Superior Court of Justice. The letter, which also went to all Catalan public institutions, did not forbid the adverts or declare them illegal, or even say explicitly that it was illegal to inform people about the referendum. </p>
<p>Instead it warned of possible criminal consequences from helping to bring the referendum about, without specifying what types of actions could fall into that category. The problem with such loose warnings has been the censorship that has come about: the daily newspaper <a href="http://www.ara.cat/media/Als-nostres-lectors_0_1866413587.html">Ara</a> decided not to publish any more campaign adverts, for example. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188185/original/file-20170929-23041-1s9iwcw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Omnium Cultural.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Network of Local Television (La Xarxa de Comunicació Local) <a href="https://comunicacio21.cat/noticies-comunicacio21/123807-la-direccio-de-la-xarxa-ordena-no-entrevistar-alcaldes-fins-a-l-1-o">told its journalists</a> not to ask politicians questions about the referendum until the day after it had taken place. Acting on similar fears, Spanish public mail company Correos <a href="http://www.elnacional.cat/es/politica/omnium-correos-revista-referendum_191976_102.html">stopped distributing</a> the news magazine Omnium Cultural to its subscribers because it contained pro-referendum advertising. </p>
<p>Of the 144 websites that have been blocked, most belong to cultural and political associations campaigning for an independence vote. Fourteen individuals <a href="http://www.catalannews.com/society-science/item/14-people-summoned-to-court-for-duplicating-referendum-website">have been</a> called before a judge for copying the codes of some of the sites in question. </p>
<p>The Spanish military police association, the Guardia Civil, meanwhile, <a href="http://www.catalannews.com/society-science/item/guardia-civil-officers-sue-catalan-public-radio-news-anchor">is suing</a> Mònica Terribas. It accuses the news anchor of endangering police operations by asking listeners to report on anti-referendum raids by the forces. In all, media observer media.cat <a href="https://twitter.com/GrupBarnils/status/913715948774940672">has reported</a> than 64 situations where freedom of expression has been affected or disrupted in relation to the referendum. </p>
<p>Faced with such accusations, the Spanish government <a href="http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20170928/gobierno-dice-no-pretende-limitar-libertad-expresion-1-sino-evitar-acto-ilegal/1623620.shtml">has said</a> it does not want to restrict freedom of expression in Catalonia. Its actions, it says, are aimed at guaranteeing the order against a referendum which was <a href="http://time.com/4933069/catalonia-independence-vote-spain-suspended/">laid down by</a> the Spanish constitutional court a few weeks ago. </p>
<p>But even before the outbreak of referendum day violence, Spain already found itself in territory for which it is hard to find comparisons in the West. Article 10 of the <a href="http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights</a>, to which Spain is of course a signatory, lays down the principle of freedom of expression quite clearly. It talks about the right of people to “receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. </p>
<p>Yet little or nothing has been said by the international community in this regard. The situation is troubling to say the least. If there are no consequences, particularly in light of the latest developments on the ground, it will set a dangerous precedent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84922/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariola Tarrega does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When you put together the efforts of the Spanish authorities to curb media coverage of the Catalan referendum, you have a deeply worrying picture.Mariola Tarrega, Teaching fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/558842016-03-07T15:18:47Z2016-03-07T15:18:47ZJust a reminder that Spain still doesn’t have a government<p>There appears to be little chance of Spain’s political stalemate being broken any time soon. Just listen to the divisive tone of <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/parliament-rejects-socialist-sanchezs-bid-to-form-spains-government-1456948996">parliamentary debates</a> held in the first week of March – two-and-a-half-months after a <a href="http://nottspolitics.org/2015/12/14/the-2015-spanish-general-election-how-a-sea-change-may-not-yet-have-reached-the-shore-of-spanish-politics/">national election</a> failed to deliver a government. </p>
<p>Pedro Sánchez, leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) had sought to form a coalition government with the centre-right <a href="http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/02/24/inenglish/1456308182_056329.html">Ciudadanos</a> (Citizens) Party. He secured the backing of his own party and his proposed coalition partner but failed to get enough support from other MPs following heated debate in the chamber. </p>
<p>In the end, he gathered just 131 votes – well short of the simple majority required to pass a vote in the 350-seat parliament. Crucially, the 69 deputies from left-wing collective <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/podemos">Podemos</a> blocked Sánchez’s bid to become prime minister by voting against him.</p>
<p>This is the first time in Spain’s 40 years as a democracy that a candidate standing for prime minister has failed to win the necessary parliamentary support. It now seems likely that fresh elections will be held in June. The only other option would be for the country’s politicians to display a capacity for compromise that has so far evaded them.</p>
<h2>Why the stalemate?</h2>
<p>At first glance, it’s surprising that the largest party, Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP), has not been able to piece together a coalition with smaller party Ciudadanos.</p>
<p>Rajoy was prime minister between 2011 and 2015 and has been acting as a caretaker in the role since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-votes-for-change-but-has-no-idea-what-government-itll-end-up-with-52583">December election</a>. Together the two parties have 163 seats – just 13 short of the 176 needed for an overall majority.</p>
<p>In the past, this shortfall might have been made good by calling on the support of the centre-right Catalan nationalists. They provided vital backing to minority PSOE and Popular Party governments in the 1990s, for example. </p>
<p>But those same Catalan nationalists have started to push so hard for <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalan-election-a-leap-into-the-unknown-48262">independence</a> from Spain that they cannot be considered acceptable allies for any of the parties hoping to form a Spanish government. </p>
<p>A PP-Ciudadanos coalition has also been scuppered by the antipathy displayed by Ciudadanos leader Albert Rivera towards Rajoy. It now looks like Rajoy’s resignation would be a prerequisite of any future understanding between the two parties.</p>
<p>A seemingly never-ending stream of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/27/mariano-rajoy-spaniards-cant-stomach-stench-of-corruption-peoples-party">corruption allegations</a>, implicating senior members of the PP, up to and including Rajoy himself, has also deterred other parties from seeking an agreement with the party.</p>
<p>Rajoy has nevertheless indicated that he has no intention of stepping down. For the time being, he insists that being the leader of the largest party entitles him to stay on as caretaker prime minister, or at the head of a “grand coalition” of the PP, the PSOE and Ciudadanos.</p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>The PP has 123 seats in parliament, which makes it difficult for any of the other parties to form a coalition government. As has been noted, Podemos’s willingness to vote alongside the PP against a PSOE-Ciudadanos coalition was sufficient to put an end to that initiative.</p>
<p>The obvious alternative is therefore a coalition of the left, the option favoured by Podemos. If the PSOE was able to put together a deal with Podemos and United Left (IU), it would have 161 seats. That would still be short of the 176 needed for an overall majority but would make a minority administration possible. But Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias is hostile towards doing a deal with the PSOE. At any rate, Podemos’s insistence that a referendum on Catalan independence be included in any coalition agreement effectively renders any accord between Sánchez and Iglesias impossible.</p>
<p>Sánchez, for his part, maintains that a cross-party deal of left and right – excluding the PP – is the only means of forming a viable government.</p>
<p>And so the deadlock continues. Either the parties form a government within the next two months, and by 2 May at the very latest, or new elections will have to take place on 26 June. Based on their failure so far to put their differences aside, it seems unlikely that a government will be formed in that time. </p>
<p>Even then, polling suggests that fresh elections won’t break the deadlock either. It currently looks as though the PSOE will once again win fewer seats than the PP. It will, however, be interesting to see if voters reward Ciudadanos with greater support after its attempts to form a government with the PSOE. Similarly, Podemos could be punished by the electorate for blocking a government from being formed. </p>
<p>Spain is facing an uncertain future. The electorate has opted for change – albeit on the basis of a spectacularly fragmented set of general election results – but the bitter divisions between the major parties are preventing that change from taking place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Parliamentarians have again failed to form a coalition, nearly three months after the election.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/251012014-04-02T05:04:48Z2014-04-02T05:04:48ZCatalonia deadlocked as nationalists plan new offensive<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45306/original/fxbtt8vn-1396358144.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Catalans want an independence referendum in November</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/97352149@N00/9724515227/in/photolist-fPjFzD-fPBaGL-fPm22r-fPkg6x-fPjF52-fPBJjL-fPBacN-fPBbb1-fPB3Ku-fPjrdR-fPBRHG-fPAW7j-fPB9Ey-fPB6KS-fPk2Mn-fPjEGV-fPjsGT-fPBPuA-fPjGCz-fPAVcU-fPjoBa-fPjp2K-fPjyqB-fPB3ko-fPjDwT-fPkN7g-fPBbDf-fPAXko-fPjnGV-fPjwhR-fPjE9R-fPjmRe-fPkanF-fPjrE6-fPBf13-fPjvtM-fPjvTX-fPCtf7-fPBHLU-fPB8sf-fPAYdq-fPjqNr-fPkLxp-fPjtav-fPAXQb-fPjxoH-fPAZUs-fPka74-5kG2ji-7VLHGx-4aXok9">Liz Castro</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Welcome to Breaking Nations, a series of articles that examines independence movements across the globe ahead of the Scottish referendum in September. To begin, Dani Cetrà gives us the view from Catalonia.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy insists that a referendum on Catalonian independence is not going to be held. But that didn’t stop Artur Mas, president of the Catalan Government and head of centre-right party <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/135719/Convergence-and-Union">Convergence and Union</a> (CiU), announcing <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/12/catalonia-independence-referendum-madrid-block">an agreement</a> with the leaders of the <a href="http://www.esquerra.cat/language/english">Republican Left of Catalonia</a> (ERC), the <a href="http://europeangreens.eu/parties/iniciativa-catalunya-verds-icv">Initiative for Catalonia Greens</a> (IC-V) and the radical left-wing <a href="http://cup.cat/">Popular Unity Candidates</a> (CUP) concerning the date and the questions for a vote. </p>
<p>Mas announced that the voting would be held on 9 November 2014 and that the following questions would be posed to Catalans: “Do you want Catalonia to be a state?”, and for those respondents answering yes, “Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state?”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45307/original/xdzmwwhx-1396358298.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Artur Mas, leader of Catalan centre-right separatist party CiU.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/40744245@N02/4906500521/in/photolist-8tz6Ez-8tC7pL-8tC7sW-droDzd-bqr7m2-8tjiGK-8tnjYY-8tnjXw-8tjiHP-8tnk7o-8tjiMB-8tnk5W-8tjiBX-8tnk1s-8tnk6Q-8tjiDz-8tjiG6-dNJiba-9kV6kn-9kYap9-9kYaJG-9kYatj-9kV6yH-9kV6pk-bpz1ab-bCtVWp-bCtW5H-bCtVKZ-8TWzXs-byehHg-8ScW9U-8S9QdD-8ScRRE-8ScRNh-8G1LT6-95CEw3-87Bkny-87Bipf-87y9Hx-87Boem-87y764-87y7nZ-87BtuA-87ydAK-87BoSq-87yczv-87ybRP-87ygq8-87Bn3s-87yeFt-87ygbH">ACN</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rajoy puts forward two complementary arguments about why the vote won’t happen. First, under the current Spanish constitution, referendums can only be called by the central government in Madrid. Second, the constitution enshrines the indivisibility of the Spanish nation and establishes that national sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people. As a result, even if there were to be a referendum it should be all across Spain.</p>
<p>The debate is partly about competing visions of democracy. Rajoy and other political leaders believe the constitution guarantees democracy. Pro-referendum politicians argue that Catalans have the right to decide their political future and that this democratic principle should be given priority over strict readings of the constitution. </p>
<p>There are also competing visions on nationhood and sovereignty. There is an implicit and unsolved disagreement about whether Spain contains one or more “nations”. This leads to another disagreement over which is the relevant political unit entitled to self-determination - Catalans, in this case, or the Spanish people as a whole. Note that this is an important difference to the Scottish referendum. Scotland’s recognition as a nation was arguably a precondition for the October 2012 <a href="http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence">Edinburgh Agreement</a>.</p>
<p>Aside from the arguments about Spain and the constitution, there is much discussion about how independence would affect Catalonia. Mas argues that Catalonia would be in a better economic position if it had the tools of a state, while Rajoy maintains it would be poorer and would be left out of organisations such as the EU. </p>
<p>These arguments may sound familiar to readers who follow the Scottish debate. But by and large the discussion on Catalonia’s political future lacks detail and depth. Key issues such as the political structure of an independent Catalonia are not being properly addressed. This can mostly be explained by the fact that the debate has largely focused on whether there should be a vote. </p>
<p>And even this has officially come to a halt. On <a href="http://www.thelocal.es/20140220/spain-blocks-catalan-independence-plans">21 February</a> the Spanish Parliament voted overwhelmingly against “the secessionist plan of the Catalan government,” and on <a href="http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Presidente/News/2014/20140311_UpperHouse_ControlSession.htm">11 March</a> Rajoy declared in the senate that he is not “willing to discuss the annihilation of the national sovereignty.” </p>
<p>That is certainly not the end of the matter, though. On 8 April a delegation of Catalan leaders will call on the Spanish government to hand the Catalan Parliament legal powers to hold a referendum, but the plea is expected to be rejected.</p>
<p>Does this mean this is a dead-end street? When the request is rejected, the Catalan Parliament will pass its own bill to hold what could be described as a “popular consultation”, given that the result would not be legally binding. </p>
<p>In the event that the consultation is not allowed to take place, Mas’ Plan B is to call for a plebiscitary election that would be held between the end of 2014 and the end of 2016. But this is also uncertain, as CiU does not have a unanimous position and anti-referendum parties have already made clear that they will take it as a regular election.</p>
<p>Third ways are still possible, of course. Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, the leader of the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/558200/Spanish-Socialist-Workers-Party">Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party</a> (PSOE) has made several calls for the constitution to be amended to allow for a federal system of government, but this proposal so far includes little content. </p>
<p>Some commentators suggest that Rajoy might be more inclined to make political offers to Catalonia after the campaign for the May <a href="http://www.elections2014.eu/en">European elections</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/45309/original/jznvz2yx-1396358832.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Roadblock: Spanish leader Mariano Rajoy not giving ground</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/46733489@N05/5117064173/in/photolist-8NbhUn-75kMsH-2r6R9R-a8csHv-8NenLb-2rbbQ9-8NbRJn-8NbUvT-8Nf4sG-8NeWY1-8NeYm1-8NbZTV-8NbVsi-8Nc1aK-8NeZr9-8NbXti-8Nf6Yh-8Nf4Xd-8Nf3sQ-8Nf6FN-8NbSmg-8Nf5RS-8Nf2tE-8Nf2Fs-8NbRiD-8NeYK3-8NbTDc-8NeY3S-8Nf2TY-8Nf1xo-8NbUVc-8NbS88-8NbYqa-8Nf37s-8NeWvG-8Nf5nA-8NbRVv-8Nf22d-8ZP67t-aEhxeD-7CouDw-dXN3Hh-dXGjYe-dF2FcU-dF2F9j-9HJstq-9HJpb9-dCh8Ni-dCnyPE-71ftyk-dwZKVJ">PPC</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It also remains to be seen how things will be affected by the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/26/us-spain-catalonia-idUSBREA2O1R020140326">25 March</a>. The Court ambiguously said that there is no differentiated Catalan political sovereignty but the right to decide can be constitutional as long as it is understood as a political aspiration to be achieved within the framework of the constitution. </p>
<p>As things stand it is far from clear how the Catalan situation will develop. Much will depend on the two governments’ willingness to talk to one another during the next few months. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dani Cetrà is a University of Aberdeen research fellow at the Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change</span></em></p>Welcome to Breaking Nations, a series of articles that examines independence movements across the globe ahead of the Scottish referendum in September. To begin, Dani Cetrà gives us the view from Catalonia…Daniel Cetrà, PhD student, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.