tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/raqqa-22685/articlesRaqqa – The Conversation2021-03-15T12:31:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1545952021-03-15T12:31:24Z2021-03-15T12:31:24Z‘Every day is war’ – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388068/original/file-20210305-17-1cy3igf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C1049%2C759&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The city of Homs has been ravaged by war, leaving millions of people homeless and displaced. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abduljalil Achraf</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abduljalil sent me a photo of his ruined home in Homs, Syria. “It is the third floor”, he told me over WhatsApp. The building still stands but it looks like an empty skeleton. Most of its facade has been destroyed, while piles of debris surround it. Residents have not been able to return, as they fear it could collapse at any time.</p>
<p>For a decade now, conflict, violence and destruction have reshaped the lives of millions of Syrians since the start of the Syrian Revolution in March 2011. Abduljalil is just one of more than <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html">12 million</a> people who have had to flee their homes. While 5.6 million people have fled Syria to find refuge in countries such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, 6.6 million people have been internally displaced.</p>
<p>Over the past five years, I have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xT6AE8RNPymQ9PCNpge2/full?target=10.1080/13604813.2019.1575605">researching</a> the relationship between urban violence and the impact it has on cities. My research has been mainly focused on my home city of Homs where I conducted a series of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2020.1833536">interviews</a> with local people and examined the way Homs has been transformed in the past decade. The conflict has created a disorientating experience for many Homsis. People have lost some of their most cherished places, as well as many of their loved ones. </p>
<p>I want my research to help people understand how it feels to be forcibly uprooted. What does it mean to see your own country getting destroyed, to see your home – the place that gave you a sense of safety, security, belonging and identity – in ruins? </p>
<p>These questions are personal to me. I too was forced to leave my home in Homs when fighting broke out and tanks entered my city. I have not been able to return since 2011. From afar, I have seen my country crumble into ruins. I have watched the people I love struggle daily, losing their homes, their dreams, their friends and their future. I have lost people – people I coudn’t even say goodbye to.</p>
<p>As a displaced person, my life moves in parallels. Walking in London where I now live, the images of destroyed homes and shattered lives are always at the forefront of my mind. I left Syria, but Syria didn’t leave me. My life, like the lives of millions of us, has been terribly damaged – just like our cities. The past decade has been a story of loss and suffering, a landscape of grief and sorrow.</p>
<h2>Homs as it was</h2>
<p>Before the conflict started, Homs was known as a city of diversity where different communities from different religious and sectarian backgrounds lived together. It had a population of 800,000 people, but yet there was a strong sense of community – it felt as if everyone knew everyone else. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The busy city centre of Homs before the fighting began." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bustling Homs before the conflict started in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.city-analysis.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/8.-Homs-before-2011-Source-Ammar-Azzouz.jpg">Ammar Azzouz</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many neighbourhoods were divided along sectarian lines. Some were mostly inhabited by Alawites or Sunnis while others were mixed with Alawites, Sunnis and Christians living together. </p>
<p>It was a city of peace, quiet and simplicity. Its people famous for their sense of humour and generosity. The memory of this thriving and cosmopolitan city, makes the present reality even more difficult to swallow.</p>
<p>Abduljalil said the memories of old times haunt his former home like a ghost. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I remember the stars I put on the roof in my bedroom … but even the stars fell.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abduljalil and his family had no choice but to flee their home in 2013 fearing, for their lives. Their neighbourhood, Jouret al-Shayah, at the heart of Homs, was <a href="https://unhabitat.org/city-profile-homs-multi-sector-assessment">heavily targeted</a>.</p>
<p>Other cities including Mosul, Beirut, Aleppo and Raqqa have suffered too. Cities have turned into battlefields. Wars are no longer fought outside densely populated areas, but in neighbourhoods. The urbanisation of the military has made <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0267303032000087766?journalCode=chos20">everyday life</a> a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5yEOdutixw&t=18s">target</a>. </p>
<p>Even cultural heritage sites have been targeted. The shelling of places such as the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyQdng7qsCI&t=37s">Khaled Ibn al Walid Mosque</a> in Homs, the destruction of monuments, cultural artefacts and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34036644">temples</a> in Palmyra and in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/38303230">Ancient City</a> of Aleppo shocked the world. </p>
<p>But this interest in the ancient monuments has overshadowed the loss people have endured to their way of living that has collapsed in the past decade – the slow suffering. Homes, bakeries, schools and hospitals have been destroyed too. But these “ordinary” spaces have rarely been brought into the conversation.</p>
<p>Everyday life is a battle for survival, even though the fighting in Homs has ended. For many families, food – including sugar and bread – are becoming hard to obtain. Some of the people I spoke to reported long hours waiting to get rice, while many struggle to afford food due to the country’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3ccc3a7-c697-412a-9b99-18944de5c108">economic collapse</a>. The UN has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085722">reported</a> that around 60% of Syrians (12.4 million people) do not have regular access to safe and nutritious food.</p>
<p>One woman I spoke to, who asked not to be identified, lives in Mashta Al Hilu, a town between Homs and Tartus. After finishing her degree in architecture in Homs, she struggled to find a job. She told me how she felt when walking in the ruined streets. In Baba Amr she said she felt as if a “monster” had destroyed it.</p>
<p>Her dream is to improve her violin skills, but these dreams are on hold. She said she felt isolated, as many of her friends had left Syria or had been killed. She asked me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is life after war more difficult than the life at the time of war? … Every day is war.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There were hopes for change in 2011. People imagined that the future would be different. Nobody expected that Homs would be destroyed, that entire neighbourhoods would be razed to the ground, that another day could mean yet another loss. </p>
<p>Abduljalil and his family couldn’t rebuild their home. No charity or organisation helped them. They eventually decided to sell the ruins and rent outside the heart of the city. Abduljalil still visits his past life, his lost home. He told me: “I feel as a flower uprooted from its roots and planted in another place”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After ten years of conflict and destruction, what is left of Syria and what hope is there for its people?Ammar Azzouz, Short-term Research Associate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1043622018-10-18T09:25:30Z2018-10-18T09:25:30ZHow Syrian architects can start to rebuild – even in the devastation of war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240431/original/file-20181012-109219-1yoag4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Destruction in Homs.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Majd Murad</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-whos-involved-and-what-do-they-want-95002">war in Syria</a> has turned many of its cities into battlegrounds. Places like Aleppo, Homs and Raqqa have been reshaped beyond recognition by the destruction of architecture and the mass displacement of citizens.</p>
<p>Residents are trapped in a war zone, struggling to cope with everyday activities. Their daily routines involve checkpoints, security zones and besieged neighbourhoods. They live between ruins and are disoriented within their own homeland. Amid mass destruction, they have lost a sense of belonging in the cities they used to know.</p>
<p>In Syria, where the war has entered its eighth year, architects and urban planners can no longer wait for “post-war reconstruction” plans or “peace resolution”. Instead they are already working to save their heritage, preserve their identity, and protect their history from being erased by extreme violence.</p>
<p>This is happening in a variety of ways. Some are hiding cultural artefacts in secret graveyards to protect them from demolition and looting. Some are trying to rebuild destroyed houses and souks, and provide shelter for internally displaced populations. Some are travelling to other countries – Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey – to receive training on the best ways to save their cities and heritage. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240435/original/file-20181012-109216-1ch07wr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A destroyed neighbourhood in Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Majd Murad</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The war has made it vital for architects to shift their thinking in an attempt to respond to the changing dynamics of war. As part of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.architecture.com/awards-and-competitions-landing-page/awards/riba-presidents-awards-for-research/2018/architects-at-the-time-of-war&ust=1539441900000000&usg=AFQjCNHJkKN44xj9PfCj8JeTTCBb5ODGSw&hl=en&source=gmail">my own research</a>, I have spoken to Syrian architects based inside and outside the country about how work to rebuild these cities can be supported from afar. Several ideas have emerged, including the creation of mentoring programmes, research collaborations with academics, and providing online learning materials on architecture, construction and project management.</p>
<p>One of the most common themes was the need for resources – on rebuilding, on bringing communities back together – to be published in Arabic. I am now working on a translation project of ten briefing papers from the “<a href="https://www.urbanconflicts.arct.cam.ac.uk/publications/copy_of_briefing-papers">Conflict in Cities</a>” project of the Urban Conflicts Research Centre (UCR) at the University of Cambridge with <a href="https://www.urbanconflicts.arct.cam.ac.uk/people/dr-wendy-pullan">Professor Wendy Pullan</a>.</p>
<p>The Arabic materials will be openly shared in early 2019 with audiences in the Middle East to share knowledge about topics such as urban regeneration, politics of heritage and the role of cities in reducing conflicts. </p>
<p>But we must also remember what any future reconstruction is for. Architects, academics, politicians, economists and developers each have their own agenda and interests. For some, the reconstruction is a financial opportunity to invest and make money. For others it is a place for foreign designers to experiment with new ideas.</p>
<p>There are already fears that the last to participate in these emerging plans and conversations will be the Syrians themselves – and that such plans might not put the Syrians at the heart of the reconstruction. </p>
<p>After all, many of those interested in the “reconstruction” of Syria have little knowledge about the country, the way of life, and its social and cultural landscapes. We must remember that any construction that does take place will be upon land that is soaked with the blood of Syrian men, women and children.</p>
<p>We must also be wary of a lack of balance in the plans for reconstruction and the building of urban resilience – the capacity of the city, its systems and its inhabitants to adapt to different shocks and stresses. </p>
<h2>The power of building</h2>
<p>In some cities, reconstruction and resilience are only focused on a few spots of the city, and benefit only particular communities. Some disadvantaged communities are overlooked. As the urban design expert Lawrence J Vale <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Resilient-City-Modern-Recover-Disaster/dp/0195175832/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1539765275&sr=1-4&keywords=Lawrence+J.Vale">notes</a>, uneven resilience threatens the ability of cities as a whole to function economically, socially and politically.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240436/original/file-20181012-109222-1adb7ik.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ruined residential area in Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But there is also hope. Architecture could bring huge positives to a devastated Syrian society. It can be symbolic and powerful when architects have the opportunity to face history, instead of whitewashing it – when architecture can contribute to creating spaces and places for everyone, and not only for the elite.</p>
<p>In his book, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Building-Post-War-Textbook-Nicholas-Bullock/dp/041522179X">Building the Post-War World</a>, Professor Nick Bullock explains how after World War II, rebuilding created an opportunity for the spirit of innovation and experimentation linked to the hopes of a new and better world and architecture.</p>
<p>In Syria, with such huge loss of the fabric of cities and countryside, architects are searching for the “Syrianess” of Syrian architecture. Many of the architects I spoke with emphasised the need to build a new Syria, for Syrians, by Syrians. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240433/original/file-20181012-109233-m8fpgf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Julia Domna Palace rebuilt in the Old City of Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yvonne M. Al-Abdi</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They do not want to apply an international architectural language in their cities, or a Beirut-like reconstruction plan that does not reflect the identity of the country. Instead, they are looking towards a Syrian identity through architecture – architecture that can bring a sense of social justice and cohesion to all Syrians. To the displaced, to the poor, and to the disadvantaged – rebuilding a Syria for everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Work to preserve the country’s heritage is already happening.Ammar Azzouz, Visiting Scholar, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866262017-12-04T09:05:46Z2017-12-04T09:05:46ZOn social media, ISIS uses fantastical propaganda to recruit members<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196127/original/file-20171123-17985-4tetx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ISIS has been using fantastical propaganda on social media that describes the Islamic State as a land that is full of happiness to recruit supporters.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>ISIS has now <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-on-the-run-caliphate-land-lost-2017-11/?IR=T">lost much of the territory they occupied</a>, including the onetime capital of the Islamic State, Raqqa. Some Indonesians who had travelled to Syria to join ISIS managed to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40288296">flee from Raqqa when the city was attacked by anti-ISIS militias</a>.</p>
<p>In September, the Indonesian police said that around 600 Indonesians have joined ISIS. What pulled them to uproot their lives life and join ISIS? </p>
<p>The stories of two Indonesian women, Leefa and Nur, who returned home after joining ISIS, can provide some clues. </p>
<p>Both said they flew to Raqqa after they saw ISIS’s photos and videos about Islamic State on the internet. Leefa said that from the videos she imagined it to be a better place to live.</p>
<p>ISIS has been using fantastical propaganda on social media that describes the Islamic State as a land that is full of happiness to recruit supporters. </p>
<h2>Islamic utopia</h2>
<p>Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), in his <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">report</a>, Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate” (2015), wrote that ISIS has six instruments to improve its existence and strategic goals. One of them is Islamic utopia. The others are brutality, mercy, victimhood, war and belonging.</p>
<p>Islamic utopia is the basis of ISIS’s fantastical propaganda. <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">According to Winter</a>, this is ISIS’s most important instrument. They develop stories on how Muslims will live full of joy and happiness under the ISIS caliphate and Islamic law. </p>
<p>ISIS develops its fantasy of Islamic State from seven themes, namely religion, economic activity, governance, justice, social life, expansion, and nature and landscapes. <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">Among those, governance, religion and economy are the top three themes</a>. </p>
<p>ISIS builds narratives that its Islamic State is an effective governmental system that is equipped with good social facilities and a flourishing economy. ISIS also claims that its “state” is the only implementer of true Islam. This narrative is depicted through videos showing people jointly practising religious activities, such as praying and breaking fast.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445/html">Aaron Zelin</a>, a Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, looked at ISIS media releases between April 18 and April 24 2015. He found 32 media releases that depict fantastical ideas around government, <em>hisba</em> (moral policing) and the promotion of the caliphate. In those releases ISIS describes its Islamic state as a naturally beautiful caliphate with high-quality social services as well as respect for justice. </p>
<h2>Fantasy</h2>
<p>Fantasy, pleasant imagination that is not based on reality, is an important element of the human mind. As humans, we not only make sense of our world based on what we see and feel but also based on what we think or imagine. An individual or a group of people can create fantasies for political and strategic purposes. </p>
<p>Potential targets for ISIS recruitment are usually individuals who have a <a href="https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865632100/The-personality-thats-most-vulnerable-to-Islamic-State-recruitment-in-the-West.html">black-and-white view of the world</a>. They tend to think in categorical terms, such as good and bad, or right and wrong. They also usually harbor feelings of being <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-graham/who-joins-isis-and-why_b_8881810.html">“inadequate, disrespected, full of unfulfilled ambitions, angry at real or perceived injustices, and who are blaming other people or institutions for their woes”</a>. </p>
<p>Some others dream of having better religious experiences. By exploiting their grievances and black-white mentality, ISIS potentially transforms this kind of people into supporters.</p>
<h2>Attracting Indonesians</h2>
<p>To attract Indonesian audiences, <a href="https://geotimes.co.id/kolom/indonesia-dan-pintu-jihad-isis-di-luar-suriah/">ISIS released online videos of ISIS members from Indonesia</a> inviting Indonesians to join them.</p>
<p>Leefa said she later regretted joining ISIS. Leefa explained she travelled to Raqqa because <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/indonesians-decry-isis-lies-after-fleeing-bastion-of-raqqa-as-coalition-forces">she imagined ISIS territory was a better place to live</a> and to become a real Muslim. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40288296">She had hoped to get good health services</a> as well as to have surgery for her neck problem. </p>
<p>Leefa said <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/indonesians-decry-isis-lies-after-fleeing-bastion-of-raqqa-as-coalition-forces">she had talked to ISIS members</a> before deciding to travel to Syria and to join ISIS. One-on-one chats with potential recruits are part of ISIS recruitment strategies because ISIS understands that <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541801/fighting-isis-online/">personal or private messages are more effective in persuading people</a>. </p>
<p>ISIS members also hold <a href="http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/indonesian/2016-02-22/isis-aktif-sebar-propaganda-di-sejumlah-masjid-di-jakarta/1550618">religious meetings at mosques</a> to spread their fantastical propaganda. </p>
<p>They promised everyone who travelled to Islamic State territory would have a better life and be provided with free public services, such as water, electricity and houses. They even promised all people would get monthly allowances as well as free food and health services.</p>
<p>However, the reality shows otherwise. Leefa and Nur acknowledged that once they arrived in ISIS territory <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40288296">they discovered</a> that the information as well as the Islamic State they imagined was completely different from the reality. </p>
<p>Leefa, Nur and other Indonesians only heard the stories from one side, the ISIS side. They lacked accurate information about ISIS for two reasons. </p>
<p>In the current post-truth era facts have become less important than personal beliefs. People tend only to want to hear information that is in line with their beliefs. To cherry-pick information and to selectively read media/news are common in this kind of society. Hence, people only get one side of the story.</p>
<p>The distance between Indonesia and ISIS territory in the Middle East also makes it difficult for Indonesians to acquire direct and accurate information about ISIS and the real situation in their controlled land.</p>
<p>ISIS may have lost most of their territory, but it’s important to be aware that ISIS can still utilise the Internet and social media to recruit people and to spread their fantastical propaganda.</p>
<p>This recruitment method has been proved effective to attract lots of people to join ISIS. So, this is the time for us to find ways to counter this kind of propaganda as well as to safeguard people from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Andhika Prajuli tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>ISIS may have lost most of their territory, but it’s important to be aware that ISIS can still utilise the Internet and social media to recruit people and to spread their fantastical propaganda.Wendy Andhika Prajuli, Lecturer in International Relations, Binus UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/869172017-11-05T23:38:20Z2017-11-05T23:38:20ZHow the Islamic State uses ‘virtual lessons’ to build loyalty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193289/original/file-20171104-1032-9b54zs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A nine-year-old boy plays on his damaged street in Mosul, Iraq in this July 2017 photo. U.S.-backed forces have wrested Mosul from the Islamic State, and the terrorist group lost Raqqa, in northern Syria, last month. Nonetheless the Islamic State is using virtual information sessions to keep its members committed to the cause.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Felipe Dana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Islamic State has lost <a href="https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/8/14/16125970/isis-syria-after-iraq-mosul">most of its territory</a> and key cities like <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-loses-mosul-al-nuri-mosque-al-hadba-minaret-iraq-forces/">Mosul</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/raqqa-recaptured-from-islamic-state-us-backed-forces-announce">Raqqa</a>, and more recently <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41856330">Deir al-Zour and al-Qaim</a>, have fallen to the global coalition fighting the terrorist group. In the face of such challenges, it’s tried to maintain legitimacy through what some have called a <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">virtual caliphate</a>.</p>
<p>Within this virtual space, what strategies does the Islamic State use to preserve group cohesion and sustain the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-identity-theory">social identity</a> of its members and sympathizers?</p>
<p>One of the ways influential members of the Islamic State’s digital community are involved in maintaining the organization’s group identity and sense of purpose is through “virtual” durūs (from the singular: dars) — lessons and IS propaganda shared in the context of a virtual study group. </p>
<p><a href="https://asam.sas.upenn.edu/sites/asam.sas.upenn.edu/files/The%20Dars.pdf">Durūs often centre on the study of the Qur’an</a>, but in some contexts, they are also seen as social events where one can learn about and discuss religious as well as personal issues. In the case of the Islamic State, influential members in encrypted chats lead regular durūs that advocate <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293162479_Self-categorization_theory">self-categorization</a> and group rivalry.</p>
<p>The idea is to show, both privately and publicly, that IS and its supporters are superior to all other jihadi groups worldwide, which they often characterize as being deviant from what they consider to be the true Islam.</p>
<p>What the durūs also clearly reveal is that IS influential members and sympathizers understand and apply various religious ideas differently from other jihadi groups. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/10/02/divisions-within-the-global-jihad-a-primer/">These rival interpretations of Islamic concepts</a> pose a challenge for counter-radicalization efforts, since people who embrace IS’s ideology and world view consider all other perspectives a form of deviance.</p>
<h2>How the IS virtual durūs operate</h2>
<p>In some encrypted chats, durūs take place two or three times a week. At first, the “sheik” or an influential member of the chat will temporarily restrict members of the group from writing messages in order to post an uninterrupted lesson of the day.</p>
<p>Sessions usually begin with praise to Allah: “Bismillahir Rahmānir Raheem (In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate). All praises belong to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and may peace and salutations be upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, and his Companions.” </p>
<p>The “sheik” will then either teach on a specific topic to reinforce group cohesion or respond to topics proposed by individuals in the group or to certain external events.</p>
<p>After the lesson is completed, the chat is opened to members for a Q-and-A session, followed by a brief quiz using a <a href="https://telegram-store.com/blog/telegram-polls/">Telegram poll bot</a>. Members who answer incorrectly are questioned by the “sheik” about why they answered that way, and offered corrections. The Q-and-A as well as the quiz session give the “sheik” an opportunity to interact with the group and for members to bond with each other.</p>
<h2>Issues addressed in IS virtual durūs</h2>
<p>Virtual durūs cover a wide range of topics such as aqīdah (the creed or belief system), the manner of praying, takfīr (ex-communication) and teachings about other jihadi groups. The lessons often reinforce self-categorization and group rivalry. </p>
<p>For example, there is a series of durūs that focus on worldwide jihadi groups, where the “sheik” first covers what he deems to be deviant groups and contrasts them to IS and its affiliates. In this virtual space, people learn about the origins, leaders, contributions to global jihad and belief systems of other deviant groups. The goal is to compare and contrast these “false” belief systems and actions to those of the Islamic State. </p>
<p>During one such session, for example, the teaching focused on how al-Qaida deviated from the path of Allah when it expressed reluctance to establish full sharia law after conquering territory. Al-Qaida’s insistence on seeking popular support to successfully establish sharia is, to IS supporters, a form of deviance and thus severely criticized in several durūs sessions.</p>
<p>In another context, a session can also extol the virtues of IS affiliate groups and their actions as a way to build and strengthen the social identity of their supporters.</p>
<p>In some lessons, the Islamic State is celebrated for bringing about jamaa’ah (unity of people for a common purpose) and tamkeen (stability; empowerment) in the wilāyāt (provinces; districts); something deviant groups were unable to achieve. For example, a session on the Yemeni wilāyāt contrasted the aqīdah (creed) and manhaj (method of attaining the truth) of the Islamic State to that of the deviant al-Qaida group in the Arabian Peninsula known as AQAP. The lesson noted the fact that several members of AQAP deserted their group to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of IS.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193293/original/file-20171104-1068-1147qyb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, head of the Islamic State.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Creative Commons)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The session also condemned AQAP for its weak position and treatment of the murtaddeen (apostates) in Yemen, but extolled IS for fighting against the Houthis, a predominantly Shia-led religious-political movement that emerged in northern Yemen in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Group rivalry is also an important aspect in the creation and maintenance of the Islamic State’s group identity. The main rhetorical strategy used to sustain group competition is that of declaring takfīr (ex-communication).</p>
<p>In certain durūs, for example, someone can ask what the Islamic State’s official stance is on al-Qaida and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. This type of question inevitably generates a discussion about how other groups like al-Qaida are also “deviant,” pointing out their irjā’ (postponing), a theological concept associated to the Murji’ah school of thought that favours deferred judgment about people’s beliefs; faith is a matter only between man and God.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193292/original/file-20171104-1032-1mn7k9j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida, is seen in this 2001 photo with Osama bin Laden, the 9-11 mastermind. ISIS considers al-Qaida a deviant jihadi group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Creative Commons)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Murijites, an early Islamic sect, were not in the business of killing apostates. Since al-Qaida refuses to pronounce judgment on a believer’s ’īmān (faith), it is comparable to the Murijites and therefore is seen by the Islamic State as an enemy of the faith and candidate for takfīr/ex-communication.</p>
<p>What’s it all mean? Despite the fact that IS lost Mosul in July 2017 and that its capital Raqqa just fell to the hands of the Syrian army, the group still manages to inspire, motivate and maintain the social identity and cohesion of its members.</p>
<p>Virtual durūs are used as a way to validate members within the group; if it’s not done, members will leave the group. The Islamic State caters to the members’ self-esteem in order to keep them faithful and strengthen their sense of belonging.</p>
<p>One of the greatest challenges before us is to convince people attracted by the Islamic State that the lenient treatment of murtaddeen (apostates), the rival interpretations of takfīr (ex-communication) and aqīdah (creed) and the refusal to judge the authenticity of a person’s ’īmān (faith) are not necessarily marks of deviance.</p>
<p>Countering the Islamic State’s ideology requires a better understanding of how it uses religious categories as a means to construct and maintain the social identity of its members, and how it ignites rivalries with other jihadi organizations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc-André Argentino received funding from the FQRSC for his PhD from 2014 to 2016</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Gagné does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the fact that the Islamic State is on the run, the terrorist group still manages to inspire, motivate and maintain the social identity and cohesion of its members. Here’s how.André Gagné, Associate Professor, Politico-Religious Extremism and Violence; Social Identity and Movements, Concordia UniversityMarc-André Argentino, PhD candidate Individualized Program, 2020-2021 Public Scholar, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/808352017-07-17T20:04:29Z2017-07-17T20:04:29ZMosul is taken back, but Islamic State is not finished yet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178195/original/file-20170714-14296-11ubgs5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iraqis celebrate the recapture of Mosul from Islamic State.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Wissm Al-Okili</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-10/battle-for-mosul-whats-been-happening-islamic-state-fighting/8693396">predictable recapture</a> of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State (IS) marks a new milestone in the tumultuous events of the Middle East. It has important ramifications for Iraq, IS and the West.</p>
<p>Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/middleeast/mosul-isis-liberated.html">wasted no time</a> claiming victory, entering the ruined city in staged jubilation. Wearing military uniform, al-Abadi was swift to capitalise on the victory, signalling his authority over the entire country. He hopes to keep Iraq united through strengthened political clout on his return to the politically polarised capital of Baghdad.</p>
<p>But the capture of Mosul may in fact accelerate the eventual break-up of Iraq into smaller states. The leader of the autonomous Kurdish regional government, Masud Barzani, has <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/15/masoud-barzani-why-its-time-for-kurdish-independence/">made clear his intentions</a> to hold a referendum on independence by the end of 2017.</p>
<p>Until now, Barzani had to collaborate with the central Iraqi government to clear the IS menace from Mosul and northern Iraq. Now he will have to tread carefully to meet the growing Kurdish expectation of independence and manage al-Abadi’s anticipation of gratitude for the liberation of Mosul.</p>
<p>Barzani and Kurds can see a historic opportunity to create a Kurdish polity in northern Iraq. The gravity of this polity is eventually expected to pull neighbouring Kurdish regions in Syria, Iran and Turkey. The Kurdish dream is to combine these regions to create a larger Kurdish state.</p>
<p>At the same time, al-Abadi will increase pressure on Barzani to remain loyal to a unitary Iraq. While the prime minister will spend most of his time in the safety of the Baghdad green zone, Barzani will collaborate with US forces and heavily armed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to oust IS from its capital, Raqqa. He will also play a key role in further clearing operations in eastern Syria in the second half of 2017 and possibly into 2018.</p>
<p>With the fall of Mosul, the impending <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-06/battle-for-raqqa-begins/8595086">capture of Raqqa</a>, and the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/islamic-state-leader-abu-bakr-albaghdadi-killed-report-20170711-gx9ca2.html">confirmed death</a> of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS’s days as a caliphate are numbered. Although <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-will-happen-after-abu-bakr-al-baghdadis-death_us_5965885be4b09be68c005641">some argue</a> that IS will transform into a virtual caliphate, without a sovereign state a caliphate is meaningless and Islamically invalid.</p>
<p>This reality has a dramatic impact on the recruiting power of IS. It was able to attract followers with its claim to have resurrected the caliphate abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924. </p>
<p>IS gained an almost miraculous aura <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states">after capturing Mosul</a> with 800 fighters. In their eyes, this was proof that God was on their side. A few weeks after the capture of Mosul, al-Baghdadi declared his caliphate in the city’s historic mosque in June 2014.</p>
<p>For as much as Mosul had symbolic value for an IS caliphate, its loss signals an irreversible trajectory of collapse. Although IS is taking huge blows, there is no reason to believe it will disappear, much like the frustrating persistence of Taliban in Afghanistan since the collapse of its government in 2001.</p>
<p>Nobody should expect mass desertions from IS ranks. Its membership is likely to remain loyal and fight to the end. What remains of IS leadership holds to the theological line that the pledge of allegiance or <em>bay’ah</em> is binding before God, and if they abandon ranks they will die in a state of disbelief.</p>
<p>While this may help retain surviving militants, IS recruiting power around the world will dramatically reduce, as the greatest attraction for recruits was the promise of a utopian Islamic state.</p>
<p>Nevertheless IS, or whatever the group will be called in the future, will adapt and look for new missions to motivate its members and attract recruits. </p>
<p>One possible trajectory is a merger with al-Qaeda. This is a real possibility, as IS emerged from al-Qaeda branches in Iraq and Syria. Without a real caliphate, the line of distinction between IS and al-Qaeda blurs to insignificance, even though their leaderships were <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/">in open hostility</a> and competed for the soul of the violent radical movement.</p>
<p>The ideology and the narrative of IS and al-Qaeda are the same: Western powers and their local collaborators are responsible for the occupation of Muslim territories and the ensuing suffering of Muslim populations; violent military response is the response these enemies understand and the only solution that works.</p>
<p>This ideology is conveniently covered by the same veneer of religious arguments to utilise the persuasive power of Islam in gaining and rallying gullible supporters to their ranks.</p>
<p>The more likely trajectory for IS is to ignore the spectacular failure of its state and cling to the alluring promise of a caliphate. Persisting with its brand of radicalism, IS could exist as a violent insurgent movement positioned in Deir ez-Zor, a Syrian town near the border with Iraq.</p>
<p>For the time being, the US administration seems determined not to leave IS any haven, Deir ez-Zor or elsewhere. </p>
<p>As IS regroups, it is likely to unleash violence on two fronts. The first is in the West. IS will attempt to use its sleeper cells and deploy social media to motivate a new generation of gullible minds to carry out terror attacks in North America, Europe and perhaps Australia.</p>
<p>The second front is where IS is based – Iraq and Syria. The conditions that gave rise to IS in the first place, such as military conflict, political instability, sectarian polarisation, ethnic divisions and corruption, continue to exist in both countries. The situation will not change overnight. </p>
<p>Through a drawn-out insurgency and waves of violence, IS will attempt to destabilise the Iraqi and Syrian governments in the hope of resurrecting its Islamic state. Ironically, the greatest victims will be Islam, Muslims and peace in Muslim lands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with ISRA Australia. </span></em></p>While Islamic State might be taking significant blows, including the recapture of the key Iraqi city, there is no reason to expect the violent and radical group will disappear.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776522017-07-11T01:08:54Z2017-07-11T01:08:54ZIs it ever a good idea to arm violent nonstate actors?<p>In May, President Donald Trump authorized a plan to <a href="https://nyti.ms/2q0Swl8">arm the YPG</a>, a Kurdish militia in Syria. A month later, the YPG and their Arab partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces began the fight to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/06/us-backed-forces-say-battle-to-retake-raqqa-from-isis-will-take-months">take the Syrian city of Raqqa</a> back from the Islamic State. While the U.S., Russia and Jordan agreed to a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ceasefire-idUSKBN19S2DG">ceasefire in southwest Syria</a> that went into effect Sunday, the intense <a href="https://apnews.com/42f2eadc8f9447f2a442854bcfdb8916/A-fraction-of-Mosul,-Syria%27s-Raqqa-no-less-challenging">battle for Raqqa</a> continues in the north of the country. </p>
<p>Turkey, a NATO ally and U.S. partner, is <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article149617089.html">fiercely opposed</a> to providing weapons to the YPG because Turkey considers the fighters to be terrorists. But the Pentagon insists arming the Kurdish fighters is essential to beating IS in Syria.</p>
<p>Is the Pentagon right that the benefits outweigh the risks? Is it ever a good idea to increase the lethality of violent nonstate actors? These are questions I address in <a href="http://publicpolicy.unc.edu/people/patricia-l-sullivan">my research</a> on the long-term effects of providing such aid. </p>
<h2>Security assistance as foreign policy</h2>
<p>Arming Kurdish and Arab fighters with heavy machine guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons to support operations against IS is not an entirely new development. U.S. Special Forces have been training and <a href="http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/syrian-kurds-ypg-us-military-weapons">equipping</a> the Syrian Democratic Forces <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article38868126.html">since at least 2015</a>.</p>
<p>This is also just one recent example of U.S. <a href="https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/army_strategic_planning_guidance.pdf">security assistance to partner forces</a> around the world. The United States is turning to this foreign policy tool with <a href="http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-military-and-police-aid-programs-basic-guide-purpose-type-recipient">increasing frequency</a>, but the U.S. has a long history of arming proxy forces in a wide range of locations around the world.</p>
<p>Most security assistance goes to the regular armed forces of recognized states like Egypt and Israel. But, according to the <a href="http://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard">Security Assistance Monitor</a>, approximately 14 percent of publicly disclosed security assistance, and an unknown amount of covert assistance, currently goes to irregular forces – rebels, mercenaries and other nonstate groups. Over the past two decades, the U.S. Department of Defense, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency have trained, armed and advised nonstate armed groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Angola and elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Considering the risks</h2>
<p>So what are the risks of transferring military capabilities to nonstate armed groups? </p>
<p>One serious concern is that weaponry provided to a sympathetic group will end up in the hands of hostile actors. For example, weapons, ammunition and vehicles given by the U.S. to Syrian rebels have been found in the possession of the al-Qaida affiliated <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/under-fire-u-s-suspends-part-of-syrian-rebel-training-program/">al Nusra Front</a>. And a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/islamic-state-atrocities-fuelled-by-decades-of-reckless-arms-trading/">2015 report</a> from Amnesty International claims that IS built much of its arsenal by capturing weapons manufactured in the U.S. and Russia from the U.S.-allied Iraqi military and Syrian rebels. </p>
<p>Armed groups can also use their training and weapons to commit atrocities against innocent civilians. Afghan leaders trained and equipped by the U.S. to fight the Taliban are now heading militias accused of kidnapping, extortion and <a href="https://nyti.ms/2qzljet">human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Another risk is that members of the armed group can switch sides. Hundreds of Sunni fighters put on the Department of Defense payroll between 2006 and 2008 to fight al-Qaida in Iraq were reported to have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.html">rejoined the insurgent movement</a> after U.S. troops began to withdraw in 2009. </p>
<h2>Competing interests</h2>
<p>These negative outcomes are not simply bad luck or a result of the clumsy execution of particular security assistance programs. Providing weapons to violent nonstate actors creates textbook conditions for what social scientists call <a href="http://amr.aom.org/content/14/1/57.short">principal-agent problems</a>. </p>
<p>Principals – like the U.S. – employ agents – like the YPG – to perform some task on the principal’s behalf. Problems arise when the principal cannot be sure that the agent’s actions will be consistent with <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912246">the principal’s interests</a>. </p>
<p>Principal-agent problems are most severe when the parties’ motivations and goals are not the same. Uncertainty about the motives of the agent and circumstances that make it difficult for the principal to monitor the agent’s behavior make the problems worse. If the principal is also unable or unwilling to fire the agent for poor performance, the agent is free to use the principal’s resources to do as she pleases.</p>
<p>The priorities and motivations of violent nonstate actors in foreign countries will rarely be closely aligned with those of the U.S., even if they share a common adversary. While the U.S. is arming Kurdish fighters to combat IS, many of the Kurdish militia’s leaders see Turkey as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-isis-turkey.html">greater threat</a>. In addition, if the Syrian Democratic Forces capture Raqqa from IS, American and Kurdish interests are likely to diverge over <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-post-caliphate-gauntlet-in-eastern-syria/">who will govern</a> the Arab majority city. </p>
<p>Moreover, by design, rebel groups, paramilitary organizations and other violent nonstate actors are difficult to monitor. Constantly shifting membership, leadership and alliances are typical of militant organizations. This also makes it extraordinarily difficult to screen potential aid recipients to make sure leaders will maintain control of weapons stockpiles and foot soldiers. </p>
<p>Finally, even if a state becomes aware that its agent is behaving badly, governments providing lethal aid are slow to cut ties. Although the state holds the purse strings, it has <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00138.x/full">limited leverage</a> over the agents it arms. This may sound surprising. But it makes sense if you consider armed groups have many ways to get weapons, but states have fewer options if they want to combat a threat in a foreign country without committing their own troops to the fight. Proxy warfare almost always involves choosing local allies from a limited set of imperfect options.</p>
<p>In fact, military aid can create perverse incentives – encouraging recipients to act recklessly or shirk on fulfillment of tasks knowing they are unlikely to lose funding for behaving badly, but will lose the contract when <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343310394472">their tasks are fulfilled</a>. </p>
<h2>Difficult choices</h2>
<p>Despite the risks, the U.S. and its allies will continue to provide assistance to nonstate armed groups. Providing military assistance to a domestic opposition group is a means, however imperfect, of combating foreign threats without the human, material and political costs of committing large numbers of troops to combat. Partnering with local forces is playing a larger role in U.S. security strategy because perceived threats to American interests are dispersed across the globe and public <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf">support for large-scale military deployments is low</a>. In addition, evolving U.S. military doctrine recognizes that local forces can have levels of local knowledge, cultural sensitivity and legitimacy a foreign force could never attain. </p>
<p>Moreover, there are situations in which providing lethal assistance to a nonstate actor could be the least-bad feasible policy option. Syria, for example, presents the leadership of the U.S. and other capable states with practical, political and moral dilemmas – and no good options. Arming the YPG runs all the risks outlined above, plus it angers a key ally. On the other hand, a brutal dictator is indiscriminately massacring his own population and the Islamic State is terrorizing innocent civilians. Over 400,000 have died and up to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria">five million people are seeking refuge in other countries</a>.</p>
<p>How can policymakers anticipate the unintended consequences of a decision to arm a nonstate actor, or weigh the costs and benefits of providing lethal aid against those of withholding such assistance? Unfortunately, empirical evidence is thin because the data required to do systematic, unbiased analyses are so hard to attain. </p>
<p>My own research suggests that the arms and ammunition supplied to a combatant in wartime can perpetuate a state of insecurity in the region long after the war has officially ended. A recent study concludes that security force assistance <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745">can achieve some limited goals</a>, but only if states make aid conditional and intrusively monitor recipients. The reality is the conditions under which the U.S. trains, equips and advises armed opposition groups are seldom conducive to either.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Sullivan receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. </span></em></p>The US is doing so with increasing frequency around the world – most recently with Kurdish fighters in Syria. A scholar explains what can go wrong, and why this approach is likely to continue.Patricia Sullivan, Associate Professor of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793702017-06-15T07:39:23Z2017-06-15T07:39:23ZEven if Raqqa and Mosul fall, Islamic State is far from finished<p>A long-awaited military <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/08/us-backed-forces-fighting-islamic-state-enter-syria-stronghold-of-raqqa?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%206.9.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">campaign</a> is underway to retake the key northern Syrian city of Raqqa from the so-called Islamic State (IS). With the group apparently <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-38641509">losing territory</a> and its de facto central hub now under heavy attack, there arises an obvious question: is this the end of IS?</p>
<p>Alas, the answer has to be a resounding “no”. There is increasing evidence that IS is transforming itself into a long-term insurgency in Iraq and Syria, but also developing into a movement with worldwide reach.</p>
<p>The seriousness of the problem can be gauged by the scale of the assault on Raqqa, which is underway even as IS stubbornly clings on to the Iraqi city of Mosul. The US-led military coalition, with all its resources, is now playing a much more substantial role in both battles.</p>
<p>The Raqqa operation’s frontline paramilitaries are organised by the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) and drawn from Kurdish militias of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) together with a range of Syrian non-Kurdish militias, both strongly supported by the US. The level of support has increased substantially in recent months; Reuters has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/08/us-backed-forces-fighting-islamic-state-enter-syria-stronghold-of-raqqa?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%206.9.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">reported</a> that as the opposition forces move slowly towards Raqqa, they are having to closely coordinate with the US to avoid “friendly fire” casualties.</p>
<p>Their tactics focus on the careful movement of forces, often on foot, towards the inner city areas IS has fortified and protected, with coalition air power and artillery fire clearing the way. The anti-IS forces are being met with sniper and mortar fire, even though the city’s outer districts are only lightly defended.</p>
<p>The extent of the coalition forces’ involvement is only now becoming clear. The West is now directly and closely involved in the war on the ground as well as in the air; many of these troops might be special forces who prefer to keep a low profile, but nonetheless, the Middle East is once again becoming host to thousands of Western “boots on the ground”.</p>
<h2>On the march</h2>
<p>US forces are deeply involved in the battle for Mosul. As Military Times lately <a href="http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/navy-seals-special-forces-syria-raqqa-islamic-state?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2006.12.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">reported</a>: </p>
<p>As the battle to liberate Mosul in Iraq moved deeper into the city, Navy SEALs began wearing black fatigues to blend in with Iraqi counter-terror operatives going street by street, and house by house, to flush IS fighters into the open.</p>
<p>The same source reports that US special forces are directly engaged alongside the SDF in Raqqa. Part of the reason for this, as well as the extensive use of air power and artillery support, is that IS is proving tenacious in the extreme when defending its main bases. </p>
<p>The under-reported battle for Mosul remains the prime example. In March 2017, when the operation had already lasted more than twice as long as expected, I <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-prepares-for-life-after-mosul-as-iraqi-morale-runs-low-74869">questioned</a> what might come next: “Is the looming loss of the Grand Mosque the beginning of the end for IS – or is it just another turning point in a long drawn-out war?” Three months later, the “end” is nowhere in sight.</p>
<p>IS forces are still <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/12/isis-clings-mosul-3rd-anniversary-invading-iraq/102781820/">laagered in the old city</a>, and even control three outer districts. During the fighting, they have crippled the Iraqi Army’s Counter Terror Service, or <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/embedded-with-iraqs-golden-division-as-they-pushed-into-mosul">Golden Division</a> – the very force the Baghdad government will depend on to control an expected post-Mosul insurgency. </p>
<p>Sometime later this year, IS will most likely lose Raqqa and Mosul, but it will already have moved towards long-term guerrilla campaigns in both countries. And even more significantly, it will have rapidly extended its global reach. </p>
<h2>New fronts</h2>
<p>All of 2016’s six US combat deaths in Afghanistan were sustained while fighting the local IS affiliate, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/world/asia/afghanistan-military-american-soldiers-deaths.html?rref=collection/sectioncollection/asia&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2006.12.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief&_r=1">Islamic State in Khorasan</a>, not the Taliban. The group is also believed to be responsible for some of the high-profile attacks in Kabul, adding to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/deadly-kabul-bombing-heralds-a-new-western-surge-in-afghanistan-77041">overall deterioration</a> in the country’s security situation.</p>
<p>But the problem goes even further. In the Philippines, president Rodrigo Durtete was so fixated on his war against drugs that he ignored the rise of the IS-linked <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-maute-idUSKBN19302Q">Maute Group</a> near the southern city of Maerawi. The group subsequently took over the city, igniting an intense conflict that has lasted three weeks. Because of the extent of the problem, US surveillance aircraft, drones and special forces are now <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-aircraft-in-philippines-in-battle-against-isis?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2006.12.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">supporting the Philippine army</a> as it tries to take back control. </p>
<p>This rise in IS influence is part of a wider concern at the growth of paramilitary movements across <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/06/11/530949383/how-big-a-threat-is-extremism-in-southeast-asia?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2006.12.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">South-east Asia</a>, not least in Indonesia and Thailand.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, IS is also increasing its attempts to encourage, incite and even help organise attacks on the “far enemy” states, especially in western Europe, as well as “near enemy” states such as Iran. IS recently made a show of claiming responsibility for deadly attacks in <a href="https://theconversation.com/manchester-attack-a-sophisticated-operation-that-increases-pressure-on-security-services-78206">Manchester</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/eight-minutes-on-london-bridge-years-of-training-led-to-lightning-police-response-78815">London</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/fallout-from-iran-attacks-spells-trouble-to-come-in-wider-middle-east-79076">Iran</a> – part of a strategy to signal that its much-vaunted “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria is not its only goal.</p>
<p>IS and its related groups are in it for the long haul. Any idea that military suppression by the US or anyone else will work is wishful thinking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79370/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sustained assault on IS’s two main strongholds could be followed by years of local and global insurgency.Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/506172015-11-17T11:28:38Z2015-11-17T11:28:38ZWhile Paris mourns, opportunity knocks for Assad in Syria<p>While so many count their losses after the appalling terrorist attacks on Paris, one man might just be wondering if he’ll find himself on the right side of history. Over the last few days, Bashar al-Assad’s removal from power in Syria has fallen sharply down the list of international priorities. </p>
<p>On November 14, the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-14/syrian-transition-plan-achieved-by-u-s-allies-kerry-says">Syria talks</a> in Vienna recognised the imperative of joint military action against Islamic State, the group that has taken responsibility for the Paris atrocities that have so far killed 129 people. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/g20-barack-obama-and-vladimir-putin-agree-to-syrian-led-transition">Informal talks</a> between presidents Putin and Obama at the G20 summit in Turkey continued on this theme, while <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1588643/france-will-intensify-is-bombing-in-syria">France redoubled</a> its airstrikes against Islamic State in Syria. </p>
<p>These developments have come as the Syrian dictator is on the ascendant. Days before the Paris attacks, his troops scored their first big victory since the Russians intervened in Syria at the end of September. They <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/10/syrian-army-breaks-two-year-siege-at-aleppo-air-base.html">broke the</a> siege on the Kweires air base in Aleppo province in the north of the country, which had been surrounded by IS for almost two years. Omran al-Zoubi, the Syrian information minister, spoke of defying the “terrorists”, a category that in government rhetoric includes both IS and the other rebel groups against which Assad has been fighting for the past four years. </p>
<p>Prior to this victory, Assad’s position had looked very weak. The territory the Syrian government controls is down to a strip of land in the west of the country (see rose area in map below). The area still includes Damascus and a few important military bases, but represents only a fraction of the country. </p>
<p>In Assad’s favour, the Western-backed rebel forces are scattered and divided. Their different interests and motivations lack the necessary political identity to build a stable government coalition. One thing the Arab Spring taught us is that a common goal is not always enough to create a stable country – <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options">Libya being the obvious example</a>. </p>
<p>So far the only force that has looked capable of achieving strategic military objectives bears the banner of the caliphate: IS’s <a href="http://freebeacon.com/national-security/islamic-state-gains-ground-in-syria/">conquest of Mahin</a> in central Syria earlier this month opened a clear path to the capital, for instance, and deprived the government of important arms depots. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://iswresearch.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/posture-of-syrian-regime-and-allies.html">Institute for the Study of War</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shifting sands</h2>
<p>So what happens now? The <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-14/syrian-transition-plan-achieved-by-u-s-allies-kerry-says">Vienna agreement calls</a> on the warring Syrian parties to start talking by January 1 2016 and reach a ceasefire within six months. They are then to focus on drafting a new constitution with a view to holding elections in 2017 which will be closely monitored and will need to be free and fair. </p>
<p>This is likely to make a lot of difference. The nations involved – the US, UK, Russia, China, Germany and France – <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Momentum-in-Vienna-talks-on-Syria-after-Paris-massacre-433057">agreed</a> to support a “UN-endorsed ceasefire-monitoring mission” to ensure that both Assad’s supporters and those standing in opposition to him abide by it. This means that Russia and China agreed to go in under the UN blue helmets – having always been opposed to such coordinated efforts in the past. </p>
<p>The fact that Russia and the US appear to be setting aside their differences looks massive and should mean the Russians and the NATO states will cooperate. The proposed peace talks would exclude IS, which would still be open to military attacks even after a ceasefire between Assad and the rebels had been put in place. Though the Russians and US still disagree on whether Assad would lead an interim government ahead of the 2017 elections, they are mainly focused on neutralising IS before the situation gets any more critical. </p>
<p>In the weeks ahead, it looks as though Assad loyalists will now try to take the south-western part of the country from the non-IS rebels, perhaps still backed by Russian air raids. This would give the psychological boost of reversing a failed offensive earlier in the year and ensure that Assad’s forces control a continuous strip of land all the way to the Jordanian and Israeli borders. Assad’s other focus will be to secure the city of Aleppo, Syria’s largest. Where the south-west is a battle against the rebels, Aleppo is partly rebel-held and partly the domain of IS. Both battles look more achievable than before, though it could be especially drawn out – city struggles often are. </p>
<p>On the question of dealing with IS as a whole, its troops are well organised and mostly led by trained generals and officials from the former Iraqi army. Assad will need a tailor-made strategy to push them back over the Syrian-Iraqi border. Into this situation come the French IS airstrikes, which have so far concentrated on the city of Raqqa in the central north. They were backed up on Monday, November 16 by US air raids both on Raqqa and in nearby ISIS areas. </p>
<p>With French president, Francois Hollande, declaring his country at war with IS, France’s UK and German allies are now more likely to follow suit. If so, Assad will get more firepower against his enemies – and note that several groups of other moderate Syrian groups have been joining IS, which presents a wider target than IS was a few months ago. </p>
<p>The downside for Assad is that he will have to take more account of Western requests for a ceasefire against his non-IS enemies, and then the elections. If he looks more likely to defeat his enemies by military means, his bigger challenge will be to keep control of the country. He will need to gain the support of enough moderate groups by committing to a wide reform of the system and to woo the West by talking tough on IS. </p>
<p>The situation is now so much in flux that it is even harder to see what will happen in Syria than it was before Paris. But Assad has certainly been handed a big opportunity. Whether he can use it to shore up his power base will be one of the big questions in the coming months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabrizio Longarzo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Paris atrocities came just as Assad’s military position was improving. Can the dictator harness international fury at Islamic State to strengthen his position in Syria?Fabrizio Longarzo, Pre-doctoral researcher, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.