tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/reconstruction-and-development-programme-20178/articlesReconstruction and Development Programme – The Conversation2017-09-21T17:27:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/834602017-09-21T17:27:27Z2017-09-21T17:27:27ZSouth Africa’s housing challenge seen through the lens of its third largest city<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186592/original/file-20170919-22604-yunbva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Typical mass housing units in South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr/IGN11</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As with all of South Africa’s larger urban areas, rapid urbanisation has continued to place pressure on the <a href="http://www.durban.gov.za/Pages/default.aspx">eThekwini Metro</a>. Centred around the city of Durban, on the country’s east coast, South Africa’s third largest city by population has reported that the number of households living in informal dwellings in the city has remained stubbornly high at <a href="http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/City_Vision/IDP/Documents/Final%202016_17%20IDP%2029052016.pdf">317,613</a>. </p>
<p>These informal dwellings house over one third of eThekwini’s 3.5 million residents. This backlog has persisted despite the fact that the municipality had, between 1994 and 2016, delivered 171,000 subsidised houses – an <a href="http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/City_Vision/IDP/Documents/Final%202016_17%20IDP%2029052016.pdf">average 8,100 houses a year</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa has one of the most ambitious public housing programmes in the world. Over <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/no-evidence-sa-governments-truly-amazing-house-delivery-rate/">three million public housing units</a> have been delivered since 1994. But challenges remain acute. Statistics South Africa reported, in the 2016 General Household Survey, that 13.5% of households were living in informal dwellings. This figure rose to 18.6% for <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0318&SCH=6819">metropolitan households</a>.</p>
<p>While the country’s large cities share some common settlement challenges, it’s also important to appreciate that their contexts differ. Looking at the specific circumstances in individual cities, such as eThekwini, can help provide a finer analysis to enable a better understanding of South Africa’s broader housing challenges.</p>
<p>For much of the 1990s and 2000s the eThekwini Metro led the country’s cities in delivering state housing. At its peak, between 2007 and 2010, it delivered over 16,000 subsidised <a href="http://devplan.kzncogta.gov.za/idp_reviewed_2012_13/IDPS/Durban/Adopted/eThekwini%20Housing%20Sector%20Plan%20(2012).pdf">housing units annually</a>.</p>
<p>But in recent years, its delivery of subsidised housing units has looked far less impressive. The municipality noted in its most recent (2016/17) <a href="http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/City_Vision/IDP/Documents/Final%202016_17%20IDP%2029052016.pdf">Integrated Development Plan</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Delivery against the housing and services backlog must be improved.</p>
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<p>This slowdown in public housing delivery is not unique to Durban. In fact, in response to the rising pressures of slowing housing delivery in South Africa’s cities, the national Minister of Human Settlements has urged a focus on housing mega-projects. These are scaled-up greenfield projects of 10,000-15,000 housing units or more at a time. </p>
<p>The minister has argued that they are necessary to revive the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/human-settlements-mega-project-to-address-backlogs-1720469">pace of housing delivery</a>. One of the elements of these plans is to secure improved partnerships with private sector funders and developers. It’s hoped this will help meet a wider range of housing needs, and assist the state in overcoming some of its apparent limitations.</p>
<p>The shift to mega projects has not yet generated the desired major growth in total public sector housing delivery. Annual delivery is still lower than the <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-the-housing-situation-in-south-africa/">heights of the late 1990s</a>. This suggests that major delivery obstacles remain. </p>
<p>Although government policy promotes a greater role in affordable housing by the private sector, this too is not without its challenges. Analysis of private sector housing development in eThekwini suggests that private delivery, in this city at least, might offer little in the way of support for enhanced delivery. </p>
<p>Under these circumstances, raising the scale of both public and private sector delivery of housing requires an approach that tackles issues well beyond the realm of the much vaunted focus on mega projects. Core to this would be for policy to better respond to different conditions in various cities.</p>
<h2>Absence of the private sector</h2>
<p>Using present public housing delivery rates in eThekwini, and assuming no growth, it would take three quarters of a century to eliminate the backlog. Explanations why these challenges have persisted have included the city’s <a href="http://www.kznonline.gov.za/index.php/component/k2/item/303-kzn-is-a-special-case-because-of-its-topography">complex topography</a>. It’s surrounded by undulating hills and valleys making suitable land for development scarce. Other factors that have slowed down the pace of delivery include weak inter-governmental coordination.</p>
<p>While these obstacles are widely cited in eThekwini municipal documents, matters of private sector delivery get scant attention. In fact, policy reflection on private sector participation in housing is largely confined to the city’s one housing <a href="http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/housing/Pages/Cornubia.aspx">mega project at Cornubia</a>. But the fact that eThekwini has seen substantially less private sector investment in housing than any of the other large metros cannot be ignored. </p>
<p>An analysis of data on building plans completed from <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=Report-50-11-01&SCH=6886">Statistics South Africa</a>, shed some light on elements of this issue. Notably, of the largest South African metros eThekwini only secured 8% of private sector residential development by area of completed buildings (m2), between 2008 and 2015.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184936/original/file-20170906-9820-zbsxtt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Chart of major metro p sector housing m.</span>
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<p>Almost none of this private residential delivery was in more affordable stand-alone units under 81m2: eThekwini only secured 3% of the area (m2) of large metro investment in this category. While its share of private sector delivered flats and townhouses was slightly better, at around 13% for the two categories combined, this was substantially less than Johannesburg (20%), Tshwane (24%) and Cape Town (28%). </p>
<p>These figures don’t cast a lot of light on the affordability of private sector delivered housing in South Africa. But they do suggest that eThekwini’s housing challenges also extend into private sector housing delivery. After all, drawing again on the data on building plans completed, between 2008 and 2015, only 0.6m2 of private sector residential delivery took place for every one eThekwini resident (using 2011 Census population figures). For the other four large metros the per capita average was more than double at 1.7m2.</p>
<h2>Longer-term solutions</h2>
<p>Further research needs to explore some of the factors influencing these patterns of uneven private development. For instance, eThekwini’s higher share of households in lower-income categories and large proportion of <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211">people not working</a> are both likely to depress private demand.</p>
<p>Beyond these factors, it would also be useful to examine other possible constraints. Issues such as municipal investment and regulatory decisions as well as the basket of municipal costs also deserve attention. These can influence private sector housing delivery.</p>
<p>Finding longer term solutions to eThekwini’s complex housing challenges will undoubtedly take a substantial re-energising of government-led delivery. This would include efforts such as the widely lauded programme to attend to service-delivery in <a href="http://informalcity.co.za/ethekwini">informal settlements</a>. </p>
<p>The municipality, and other spheres of government, must also find ways to work with other partners who influence private sector delivery. This will be essential to finding ways to ensure a greater diversity of housing stock, especially in terms of more affordable developments in well-located areas. </p>
<p>Finding such solutions in eThekwini, with its <a href="http://www.sacities.net/state-of-cities-reporting/socr-2016">very high poverty</a> and low levels of employment, could provide pointers for more inclusive housing arrangements with the private sector in South Africa’s cities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83460/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Glen Robbins is a member of the eThekwini City Planning Commission - an advisory body to the eThekwini Municipality. He receives remuneration for participation in the meetings and related activities of the Commission. The research informing this article has been conducted independently by Mr Robbins, whilst based at the Urban Futures Centre (Durban University of Technology). The work forms part of regular expert inputs directed towards the efforts of the eThekwini City Planning Commission. The inputs are aimed at providing guidance on long term development challenges needing attention in the eThekwini Municipal area.</span></em></p>Durban one of South Africa’s third largest cities, by population has reported that the number of people living in informal dwellings has remained stubbornly high.Glen Robbins, Researcher in urban economic development and Research Associate, Urban Futures Centre, Durban University of Technology., University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/820982017-08-14T16:24:56Z2017-08-14T16:24:56ZWhy title deeds aren’t the solution to South Africa’s land tenure problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181042/original/file-20170804-4092-o2v878.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nearly 60% of all South Africans, live on land or in dwellings outside of the land titling system.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr/Icrisat</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conventional view is that insecurity of land tenure results from the lack of a registered title deed which records the property rights of occupants of land or housing. Across Africa, many governments and international development agencies are <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2016/08/22/land-and-poverty-conference-2017-responsible-land-governance-towards-an-evidence-based-approach">promoting large-scale land titling</a> as the solution.</p>
<p>In the South African context, some commentators <a href="http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/focus/focus-70-on-focus/Focus%2070%20-%20On%20Land/view">suggest</a> that a key legacy of the apartheid past is the continued tenure insecurity of the third of the population who live in “communal areas”, under unelected chiefs or of traditional councils. The remedy, they suggest, is simple: extend the system of title deeds to all South Africans.</p>
<p>We have just published a book which disputes this view. <a href="http://ukznpress.bookslive.co.za/blog/2017/06/19/book-launch-untitled-securing-land-tenure-in-urban-and-rural-south-africa/">Untitled. Securing land tenure in urban and rural South Africa</a> contains case studies of a wide range of land tenure systems found in different parts of the country. These include informal settlements, inner city buildings in Johannesburg, “deep rural” communal systems, land reform projects, and examples of systems of freehold rights held by black South Africans since the 19th century. </p>
<p>With the exception of systems of freehold rights, most people who occupy land or dwellings in these areas are “untitled”, and occupy land or dwellings under a very different kind of property regime. We term these social or off-register tenures.</p>
<p>But we argue that, fundamentally, South Africans need to question the assumption that the sole solution to the problem of tenure insecurity is a system of title deeds. Alternative approaches are needed, which we set out to explore. </p>
<h2>Social tenures</h2>
<p>The book offers an analysis of social tenures, which are regulated by a different logic and set of norms than those underpinning private property. Such tenures are diverse but share some key features. As is the case across the developing world, including Africa, land tenure is directly embedded in social identities and relations. </p>
<p>Rights are often shared and overlapping in character and generally derive from accepted membership of a community or kinship group. Processes of land allocation and dispute resolution are overseen by local institutional structures. </p>
<p>In these contexts, decisions are often informed by norms and values that stress the importance of reciprocal social relationships rather than buying power as the basis for land allocation. They involve flexible processes of asserting, negotiating and defending land rights, rather than the enforcement of legally defined rules.</p>
<p>It’s estimated that in 2011 some 1.5 million people lived in low-cost dwellings provided to the poor by government’s, so-called <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">“Reconstruction and Development Programme” (RDP)</a> houses, with inaccurate or outdated titles, in most cases due to transfers outside of the formal system. </p>
<p>Another 5 million lived in RDP houses where no titles had yet been issued due to systemic inefficiencies. Along with 1.9 million people in backyard shacks, 2 million on commercial farms, and 17 million in communal areas, this means that in that year around 30 million people, nearly 60% of all South Africans, lived on land or in dwellings held outside of the land titling system.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181043/original/file-20170804-7516-3zg7la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">RDP housing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span>
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<h2>The edifice of title deeds</h2>
<p>The book contrasts social tenures with the conventional system of title deeds, which constitutes a key element of an imposing “edifice”. The current system of rates, services and processes of development assumes that land tenure equals a surveyed plot with a singular registered owner, which may be persons or corporate bodies. </p>
<p>The system is serviced by a Deeds Registry, private sector surveyors and conveyancers, as well as municipal officials, all governed by a range of laws and regulations in a complex and interlocking manner. </p>
<p>One key problem facing those in social tenures is the discrimination they suffer at the hands of the state and the private sector. Despite some protection under laws such as the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Acts/interim%20protection%20of%20informal%20land%20rights%20act%2031%20of%201996.pdf">Act of 1996</a>, people living in social tenures are severely disadvantaged. They may have to go to court to have their rights legally enforced, but most cannot afford to do so. </p>
<p>Development and land use planning, public investment and service delivery are constrained under these systems of tenure. Elite capture or abuse by unaccountable leaders can also take place, as in communal areas where minerals are found and chiefs and councils enter into business deals with mining companies that benefit only a few.</p>
<p>Titling enthusiasts argue that another problem with social tenures is the fact that banks do not accept untitled land or dwellings as security for bank loans. This constrains the poor from borrowing capital to invest in businesses of their own. But research indicates that few of the poor are willing to risk their homes in this way, since small enterprises often fail. </p>
<h2>Tenure reform policy options</h2>
<p>How then to proceed with pro-poor tenure reform? Our research indicates that it is not realistic to extend land titling to all; the system may be at breaking point, and is inadequate even for the emerging middle class.</p>
<p>Another option is to adapt elements of the edifice to provide a degree of official and legal recognition of rights within social tenures. Lawyers and planners working with communities and officials have developed a range of innovative practices, concepts and instruments aimed at securing such rights in an incremental manner. This includes special land use zones, recognising occupation rights in informal settlements, and recording rights using locally accepted forms of evidence. </p>
<p>A third option is a more radical overhaul of land tenure, leading to systematic recognition of and large scale support for social tenures. This would involve stronger laws protecting rights holders, an adjudication system that allows new forms of evidence to be considered in determining who holds rights, and new institutions for negotiating, recording and registering rights under social tenures. The system could include the office of a Land Rights Protector. </p>
<p>We believe that these alternatives all pose their own challenges. But we also believe that pursuing alternatives to a system of title deeds is not an impossible task.</p>
<p><em>The <a href="http://ukznpress.bookslive.co.za/blog/2017/06/19/book-launch-untitled-securing-land-tenure-in-urban-and-rural-south-africa/">book</a> was co-authored with Dona Hornby, a post-doctoral student at the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies <a href="http://www.plaas.org.za/">(PLAAS)</a> at the University of the Western Cape; Rosalie Kingwill, at the institute and Lauren Royston, a researcher at the <a href="http://www.seri-sa.org/">Socio-Economic Rights Institute</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The conventional view is that insecurity of land tenure results from the lack of a registered title deed which records the property rights of occupants of land or housing.Ben Cousins, Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/786282017-06-04T12:11:38Z2017-06-04T12:11:38ZSouth Africa urgently needs to rethink its approach to housing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171794/original/file-20170601-25664-1u2rw2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protests over housing at, an informal settlement near Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Cornell Tukiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/31/eldorado-park-residents-shed-light-on-protests">recent protests</a> over housing shortages in Gauteng, South Africa’s richest province and economic hub, have put the spotlight on the problem and the role of the government in providing it.</p>
<p>Housing is a contentious political issue in the country. Strict social engineering during apartheid meant that black people were disadvantaged. Cities were racially divided, and the black population forced to live far from places of economic activity and without public amenities. </p>
<p>When it came into power in 1994 the new government tried to address these issues through various strategies, initially focusing on building houses, then attempting to shift the focus from “housing” to “human settlements”. A new plan was announced <a href="https://www.thehda.co.za/uploads/files/BREAKING_NEW_GROUND_DOC_copy-2_1.pdf">in 2004</a>, designed to address problems arising from the policies of the first ten years of democracy. </p>
<p>But problems have persisted, leading to protests <a href="http://www.gov.za/speeches/fourth-day-schooling-missed-due-protests-regarding-housing-10-may-2017-0000">across the country</a>. This article focuses on Gauteng where the housing backlog is big and tensions have been running high. </p>
<p>Gauteng has a backlog of a million houses. The problem has been <a href="http://da-gpl.co.za/housing-budget-diminished-funds-more-demands/">exacerbated</a> by budget cuts. In addition, it is said that more than 100 000 people move to Johannesburg a year, making it impossible to address the scale of <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/97211/south-africas-fastest-growing-cities/">demand</a>.</p>
<p>Recent events seem to imply that the government may be resorting to <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/15/lindiwe-sisulu-hope-housing-protests">short-term measures</a> to pacify anger and protest. But a major overhaul of housing policy is what’s actually needed. </p>
<h2>The government’s response to housing protests</h2>
<p>Pinning down the exact size of the housing backlog <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-the-housing-situation-in-south-africa/">is difficult</a>. What’s clear is that the government’s ability to deliver has <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/minister-sisulu-is-right-sas-housing-delivery-has-almost-halved-since-200607/">declined</a>. Protesters point out that they have been on housing waiting lists for <a href="http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/protesters-over-lack-of-jobs--houses-clash-with-south-african-police-8832230">many years</a>. Extreme frustration has given rise to violent protests which have been growing in intensity.</p>
<p>People are unhappy with unclear time frames about when developments <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/14/commotion-as-protesting-communities-fight-to-be-heard-by-sisulu">will take place</a>. Tired of empty promises, they now want <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/eldos-residents-had-just-had-enough-of-the-neglect-9120279">“timelines and commitments”</a>. </p>
<p>The Gauteng government initially responded by outlining <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/248056/gauteng-mec-paul-mashatile-updates-on-reiger-park-housing-developments">the projects it was planning</a>. But these longer term visions are starting to give way to unrealistic promises being made at <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/11/Joburg-mayor-to-meet-Sisulu%E2%80%9A-Mashatile-as-housing-protests-erupt">community meetings</a>. These include plans to quickly initiate land distribution and <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/15/lindiwe-sisulu-hope-housing-protests">housing projects</a>.</p>
<p>The danger is that government runs the risk of deviating from designing innovative, lasting solutions. Despite claiming that it’s committed to changing the way in which it manages demand; the more vocal residents are, the more the pressure piles up to continue providing houses in the same way.</p>
<p>This further delays the need to shift its focus from greenfields, peripheral locations to “corridors” that connect different parts of the disjointed city. </p>
<h2>Successes and failures</h2>
<p>South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution emphasised the right of everyone to <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/images/a108-96.pdf">adequate housing</a>. This has been reaffirmed in subsequent Constitutional Court judgements, such as the celebrated <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.pdf">Grootboom Case of 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The housing programme is based on the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/governmentgazetteid16085.pdf">Reconstruction and Development Programme</a> of 1994. “RDP” houses became a colloquial term for free houses provided by the government under a subsidy programme. </p>
<p>South Africa’s mass housing programme has been hugely successful in terms of the number of houses built: nearly four million <a href="http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/default/files/documents/statistics/20%20Year%20delivery%20Sites%20%26%20Houses%20HSDG%20finalised%20ver.%2029052014.pdf">“housing opportunities”</a> – serviced stands, houses or social housing units – have been built since democracy in 1994. </p>
<p>Yet the supply of houses has not been able to keep up with the increase in <a href="https://www.thehda.co.za/uploads/files/BREAKING_NEW_GROUND_DOC_copy-2_1.pdf">demand in urban areas</a>. </p>
<p>And the government’s approach has given rise to rows upon rows of “one-size-fits all” houses located at the periphery of cities, far from <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/mr-president-s-africa-is-not-the-only-country-giving-free-housing-to-the-poor/">work opportunities and services</a>, reinforcing apartheid’s spatial patterns. </p>
<p>While it’s acknowledged that the country must think beyond free houses, and that sustainable human settlements must include socio-cultural amenities and jobs, not much has been done to make this a reality. </p>
<p>Government is fully aware of this challenge. According to Paul Mashatile, the former minister in charge of housing for Gauteng:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>RDP houses used to be built far away from anything. Today we are bringing RDP, bonded houses and rental stock together. We want poor people to live in the same space as <a href="http://www.gdhs.gpg.gov.za/Pages/Government-to%20pump-R6-billion-in%20-Clayville-Mega-Human-Settlements-Project.aspx">everyone else</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In a bid to achieve this objective, and to increase the supply of houses, the government announced a programme to deliver <a href="http://www.gov.za/speeches/gpg-break-new-ground-launching-mega-housing-projects-1-apr-2015-0000">mega housing projects</a>. These and other government plans will, over the next few years, see people being housed in new developments.</p>
<p>But corridor developments and mega projects bring new layers of complexity. Can these be managed? Can demand be addressed and anger reduced? Can this be done fast enough? </p>
<h2>Time for change</h2>
<p>Models of delivery can’t continue to depend on the government. Instead, it should see its role as facilitating a diverse and multifaceted approach to ensure the involvement of many role players. This would result in different types of housing products and housing delivery methods that are less reliant on subsidies. </p>
<p>There are potential solutions that the government could pursue. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Rethinking government’s role as the sole funder. Diverse funding streams and the involvement of a range of stakeholders would allow for low cost and affordable housing to be an integral part of all city developments in well located, mixed income, mixed function, mixed community settings.</p></li>
<li><p>There should be a shift away from ownership and more focus on rental options. Private developers must be supported to operate in the field. </p></li>
<li><p>Delivery needs to be quick and efficient with minimal bureaucracy and delay, and must acknowledge the social as well as the technical aspects of housing. </p></li>
<li><p>Policymakers must revisit the questions of who should be targeted, what housing products should be delivered and how they should be delivered. For example, there needs to be a shift away from individual subsidies and products to collective models of housing. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>There has been surprisingly little innovation in the field of housing. It’s time for that to change, before it’s too late.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amira Osman receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Recent events suggest that South Africa’s government may be resorting to short-term measures to pacify anger over lack of housing. But what’s needed is a major overhaul of the housing policy.Amira Osman, Professor of Architecture, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/630222016-07-28T10:12:25Z2016-07-28T10:12:25ZCracks in South Africa’s governing alliance could cost the ANC dearly<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131960/original/image-20160726-7023-wr02n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of South Africa's governing ANC during campaigning for upcoming local election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has been governed by the African National Congress (ANC) since 1994. The party has operated in an alliance with two other players – the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), known as the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">Tripartite Alliance</a>. But the arrangement has become increasingly fractious, so much so that it could, for the first time, badly damage the ANC’s performance in the upcoming <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/2016-Municipal-Elections/Home/">local elections</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa’s governing alliance should be understood as a product of history. The ANC and Communist Party formed a partnership in the late 1940s and the trade union body the South African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), the pre-cursor to the current union federation Cosatu, joined them in 1955 to form the Congress Alliance. They united to produce the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/congress-people-kliptown-1955">Freedom Charter</a>, viewed as the ANC-led alliance’s blueprint for an equal, nonracial and democratic society.</p>
<p>After the apartheid government unbanned black liberation movements and released political prisoners in the 1990s, the ANC and the largest domestic anti-apartheid organisation, the United Democratic Front, merged and Sactu was replaced by Cosatu in the alliance. In the negotiations on a new constitution for the country the alliance was represented by the ANC and SACP.</p>
<h2>The new South Africa and the alliance</h2>
<p>All alliance partners were represented in the first government that was formed after the 1994 elections. There was relative harmony at this point as all were united behind the <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">Reconstruction and Development Programme</a>. </p>
<p>The first serious policy fault-lines began to emerge two years later when the government adopted a new macroeconomic policy. The introduction of Growth, Employment and Redistribution <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf">(GEAR)</a>, plus President Thabo Mbeki’s particular style of leadership, led to the marginalisation of the SACP and Cosatu. Their members nevertheless continued to vote for the ANC.</p>
<p>The SACP always regarded itself as the vanguard of the Tripartite Alliance, in the sense of providing the ideological and intellectual <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/conf/2015/conf0709.html">leadership</a>. It was difficult to sustain this role during the Mbeki period. At the ANC’s National Conference in Polokwane in 2007, the new ANC President, Jacob Zuma, promised their rehabilitation into the mainstream.</p>
<p>The SACP’s contribution in elections is virtually impossible to quantify because of overlapping membership between the three alliance members, as well as the spillover effect it has on extended family members and acquaintances.</p>
<p>But an analysis of membership numbers and electoral support suggests that in the 2014 elections only about 10% of the ANC’s electoral support came from paid-up members of the alliance. That year more than 11 million South Africans <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-11-the-partys-over-anc-sees-decline-in-support">voted for the ANC</a>. At the time Cosatu had a membership of almost two million, the SACP 220,000 members (2015) while the ANC reached its apex in 2012 with more than a million <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-communism-appears-to-be-gaining-favour-in-south-africa-45063">members</a>.</p>
<h2>The fault-lines</h2>
<p>There are at least three fault-lines in the alliance:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>internal strains within the trade union federation, Cosatu; </p></li>
<li><p>tensions between the ANC and the SACP; and</p></li>
<li><p>fractiousness over the ANC’s succession process which will result in a new leader being elected in 2017.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The trade union federation suffered a <a href="http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/06/19/fixing-the-eastern-cape-province">major split</a> when eight unions joined the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) to support the federation’s then general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi. Unions that remained in the federation included the National Union of Mineworkers, the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union and the South African Democratic Teachers Union. Several national union leaders also remained in the federation, including its president S’dumo Dlamini. A major source of contention was around the unions’ independence in relation to political organisations.</p>
<p>The split was also partly an extension of the ANC’s <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-06-16-00-the-num-wants-ramaphosa-to-lead-the-anc-saying-a-kzn-boss-would-be-tribalistic">internal power struggles</a> between those supporting Zuma and those who are either independent or supporters of deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa.</p>
<p>There was also a regional component. Many union branches in the ANC’s traditional stronghold, the Eastern Cape, are pro-Vavi. In pro-Zuma provinces, such as KwaZulu-Natal, the Dlamini-Cosatu faction is prominent.</p>
<p>So who now has the dominant influence in the Tripartite Alliance? Traditionally the SACP assumed that role but in several recent ANC elections three provincial premiers (known as <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2015/09/29/jacob-zuma-is-behind-the-premier-league">the Premier League</a>) have come to the fore. The anti-Communist league has served as the pro-Zuma provincial lobby, effectively wanting to circumvent the alliance in favour of provincial caucusing in the ANC. SACP members are excluded from these processes.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131962/original/image-20160726-7051-9dzuck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC President Jacob Zuma on the campaign trail in Pretoria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The SACP’s power has further been eroded by tensions that have emerged around its general secretary <a href="http://www.dhet.gov.za/SiteAssets/Minister's%20Profile/Minister's%20Profile.pdf">Blade Nzimande</a> who is also the national Minister of Higher Education and Training. Attempts by student organisations to hijack the independent student movement in 2015 led to the ANC-aligned SA Students Congress (Sasco) <a href="http://www.sasco.org.za/show.php?include=pr/2015/pr0720.html">criticising Nzimande</a> for not implementing the ANC’s free education policy. The Young Communist League responded to Sasco by accusing their criticism of Nzimande as criticism of the SACP.</p>
<p>The 2017 national succession considerations also constitute a fault-line in the alliance. It has already developed into a contest between Zuma’s and Ramaphosa’s supporters. The Zuma group includes the ANC Youth and Women’s Leagues, the Dlamini-Cosatu group, the Umkhonto we Sizwe Veterans’ League and provinces linked to the <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-05-25-on-the-chopping-block-why-a-slashed-anc-suits-zuma-and-the-premier-league/">Premier League</a>. The Ramaphosa group includes provinces like Gauteng, Western Cape and Limpopo, most of the SACP and some unions in Cosatu.</p>
<h2>The chances at the polls</h2>
<p>These fault-lines and ANC factionalism are clearly not new developments. What might be new is that they can start to influence the voting patterns of alliance supporters.</p>
<p>For the 2016 local elections the SACP has publicly called its supporters to vote for the ANC. It is unpredictable what the members of <a href="http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/06/19/fixing-the-eastern-cape-province">Numsa</a>, which enjoys enormous support among unionised workers in the motor industry, will do but it could have a significant impact on the results in the automotive centres like Tshwane (Rosslyn) and the Eastern Cape (Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay). These metropolitan areas are generally regarded as the <a href="http://www.enca.com/elections2016/">most contested points</a> for the ANC. Most unionised workers in the huge industry, which includes Volkswagen, General Motors, BMW and Mercedes Benz, belong to Numsa. </p>
<p>It is likely that the ANC’s national average will for the first time decline to below 60%. An unknown factor is the <a href="http://effighters.org.za/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> (EFF). It is the <a href="http://businesstech.co.za/news/general/122547/these-are-the-eff-strongholds-across-south-africa/">strongest</a> in Gauteng, Limpopo and the North West. The EFF’s voter turnout is still unknown but it might follow the ANC’s pattern. With anything more than 15% in Gauteng it can play a key role in local coalition governments.</p>
<p>In the past the Tripartite Alliance provided the diversity of support for the ANC which secured its majority. Lately the fault-lines in the alliance reinforce much of the factionalism in the ANC, while the ANC’s internal power struggles are also duplicated in the alliance members. Many would argue that the alliance effectively came to an end with the split in Cosatu and the emergence of the so-called Premier League. As a result Cosatu and the ANC lost almost a million members in total between 2012 and 2015.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Tripartite Alliance in South Africa has previously provided the governing African National Congress with diverse support, securing it victory at the polls. It is now riven with dissension.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/470152015-09-10T04:03:20Z2015-09-10T04:03:20ZWaiting for the state: politics of public housing in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94119/original/image-20150908-4365-1gudw21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demand for housing in South Africa continues to outstrip supply despite the government having made more than three million houses to poor households.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf">Bill of Rights</a> states that citizens have a right “to adequate housing” and that housing is a basic need. The state is obligated to take reasonable measures to realise this right, confirmed through the Constitutional Court qualification in regard to <a href="http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/5th_esr_housing.pdf">available resources</a>.</p>
<p>The funding and building of more than <a href="http://www.poa.gov.za/news/Documents/NPC%20National%20Development%20Plan%20Vision%202030%20-lo-res.pdf">3 million housing units</a> in the post-apartheid era to date reflects this national commitment. Yet, for the majority, waiting to access housing is the norm. </p>
<p>Human Settlements Minister Lindiwe Sisulu has <a href="http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/default/files/speeches/Dev_workshop.pdf">noted</a> that there are 2.2 million households living in 2700 informal settlements and backyard shacks across the country. As the number of households increase by 350,000 annually, the yearly delivery of 140,000 houses leaves a significant deficit.</p>
<p>Given these numbers, Sisulu stressed that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our response has been dismally slow. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The consequence of this dismally slow delivery of housing is very simple: people wait. It is a harsh, often overlooked reality, as well as an institutional and bureaucratic challenge that shapes housing politics in South Africa. </p>
<p>Waiting can take decades and does not guarantee access. In our <a href="http://epn.sagepub.com/content/47/5/1100.abstract">research</a>, households reported being registered for housing for as short as a few months to as long as more than 25 years, predating multiparty democracy. This means that like the 2.2 million Sisulu refers to, and many others, families across South Africa continue to wait for housing. </p>
<h2>Precarious options</h2>
<p>Housing options while waiting are limited and often precarious. They include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Living in overcrowded conditions with family members in rented and private accommodation;</p></li>
<li><p>Making do in a backyard shack, perhaps with access to rudimentary services; or</p></li>
<li><p>Building a home in an informal settlement, which may or may not be legal, and may or may not have some services and infrastructure in place.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At a glance, applying to be on the housing database, commonly referred to as housing waiting lists, is formulaic. Applicants fill in a form and present proof of their income to be included on a register for access to state-owned rental property or to a new housing opportunity. </p>
<p>The latter option typically uses the one-off government capital subsidy grant that enables beneficiaries to become owners of their own home. For each of these options, there is a list of set <a href="http://www.seri-sa.org/images/stories/SERI_Housing_Resource_Guide_Feb11.pdf">criteria</a>. </p>
<p>The integrated housing database, however, is complicated. Information on how it actually functions is not easily accessible. And, many administrative changes have been made to housing databases since the end of the apartheid in 1994. Even housing officials have also found it difficult to explain and navigate this shift from waiting lists to housing databases. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94152/original/image-20150908-4358-mtdnmz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Typical houses built as part of the government’s housing programme.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pretoria News/Masi Losi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While commonsense explanations of the process were largely based on how allocation happened in the past – for instance, that houses are allocated strictly on a first-come-first-served basis – this is also no longer the case.</p>
<p>Housing allocation instead responds to a variety of indices in the database, such as income, the applicant’s housing area preference, the location and “catchment” for a housing project itself. Only after these criteria are considered is the applicant’s time spent waiting for housing <a href="http://www.seri-sa.org/images/stories/SERI_Housing_Resource_Guide_Feb11.pdf">taken into account</a>.</p>
<p>In practice, families in need of housing struggle to understand the policies that regulate waiting because it is more than a matter of registering with government. It shapes families’ everyday lives and their encounters with government in the short and long term. It requires individuals to be present and accountable through registration on housing databases, part of the state’s project after apartheid. </p>
<p>In the meanwhile, families live precariously in environments that are often overlooked, and, sometimes targeted for eradication, by the state. Sharing experiences of waiting, families stressed instability, the challenges of having to move frequently, of not being rooted. </p>
<p>They spoke too of the tensions of being a dependent, feeling like a “child” in a house despite being an adult. Waiting for a long dreamed of home can be what author and academic <a href="http://www.apc.uct.ac.za/apc/researchers/arf/professor-njabulo-ndebele">Njabulo Ndebele</a> describes in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=20sJq6243fkC&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=A+tense+endlessness,+where+something&source=bl&ots=KVmoQzb3MN&sig=J9Yt2D5pn9ruJTiALBDOJ4A9lgc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAGoVChMIu_WX1tfnxwIVARceCh1qlADe#v=onepage&q=A%20tense%20endlessness%2C%20where%20something&f=false">The Cry of Winnie Mandela</a> as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a tense endlessness, where something is always about to happen.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the context of this “permanent temporariness”, sometimes individual solutions emerge. </p>
<h2>Legitimate yet contentious</h2>
<p>Families sometimes take strategic decisions, moving to areas where housing developments are in process, making the most of opportunities to benefit from government housing. </p>
<p>Sometimes <a href="https://westerncapeantieviction.wordpress.com/">organisations</a> representing the homeless mobilise to participate in and, at times, contest city-led housing allocation processes. Activists and community leaders keep their neighbourhood on the relevant city’s agenda, to try to ensure that the promised housing materialises.</p>
<p>Individual families might try to negotiate with neighbourhood housing officials. The area councillor, the elected politician, can be petitioned and bargained with, special requests sent to the city mayor. </p>
<p>These practices shape an everyday housing politics that is both legitimate and contentious. At times it is vigilant, mobilised and public; and, at others, more often, this politics of waiting is invisible, quiet, and private.</p>
<p>In the context of high levels of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-current-measures-underestimate-the-level-of-poverty-in-south-africa-46704">poverty</a> and unemployment, and sustained and repeated promises from the state, putting yourself on the housing database remains the most probable route to obtain a formal house in the future. </p>
<p>In the meantime, waiting for housing is an often overlooked reality, as well as an institutional and bureaucratic challenge that underpins housing politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47015/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saskia Greyling receives funding from the National Research Foundation and Mistra Urban Futures.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Oldfield receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The dismally slow provision of housing in South Africa is such that more than 2.2 million households live in 2700 informal settlements. Waiting is the norm and can take years, even decades.Saskia Greyling, Researcher, University of Cape TownSophie Oldfield, Associate Professor, Department of Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.