tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/sierra-leone-2953/articlesSierra Leone – The Conversation2023-09-24T12:01:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134152023-09-24T12:01:18Z2023-09-24T12:01:18ZThe global approach to serious crimes is shifting to domestic trials – here’s what I found in three African countries<p>Domestic trials of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are considered quicker, cheaper and more responsive to victims’ needs than the International Criminal Court’s trials in The Hague. </p>
<p>But prioritising domestic accountability for the most serious crimes has both advantages and disadvantages.</p>
<p>In a recently published book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/international-criminal-tribunals-and-domestic-accountability-9780198868842?cc=uk&lang=en&">International Criminal Tribunals and Domestic Accountability: In The Court’s Shadow</a>, I analyse the complex relationship between international and domestic accountability initiatives. I also look at how an ongoing shift from international to domestic trials has impacted the global fight against impunity.</p>
<p>I drew on the experiences of three African countries – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Sierra Leone. I argue that national justice systems are likely to be the primary forum for trials of serious crimes in the foreseeable future. However, there’s a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/22/1/26/5253596">growing tendency to romanticise</a> what can be accomplished at the national level. Meanwhile, the ability of international criminal tribunals to serve the wider cause of human rights is being downplayed. </p>
<p>Going forward, I hope to spur a more nuanced conversation about how international and domestic justice should work together. </p>
<h2>Domestic justice</h2>
<p>International criminal justice is still associated with high-profile cases. One of these is the International Criminal Court’s recent <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">arrest warrant against Russian president Vladimir Putin</a>. </p>
<p>However, national courts now prosecute far more people for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This is true for most countries. Whether it be in the <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/91073-kasai-justice-against-all-odds.html">DRC</a>, <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/109654-map-of-war-crimes-trials-in-ukraine.html">Ukraine</a> or <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/44105-transitional-justice-the-fascinating-colombian-challenge.html">Colombia</a>, the International Criminal Court plays a backup role. And it’s had only a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases">handful of convictions</a> over 20 years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-and-the-icc-history-shows-just-how-hard-it-is-to-bring-a-head-of-state-to-justice-202247">Putin and the ICC: history shows just how hard it is to bring a head of state to justice</a>
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<p>This is one of the reasons that domestic justice is now celebrated as quicker, cheaper and more victim-friendly. Just two decades after the International Criminal Court was created, many stakeholders now argue that “<a href="https://www.nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/user_upload/05_12-14_Concept_Note.pdf#page=1">the future of international criminal justice is domestic</a>”.</p>
<p>To better understand the relationship between international and domestic trials, I studied three African cases. I analysed the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc">International Criminal Court’s work in the DRC</a>, the <a href="https://rscsl.org/">Special Court for Sierra Leone</a> and the <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>Drawing on more than 200 interviews with civil servants, magistrates, diplomats and civil society representatives, I assessed what kind of “shadow effects” the three international tribunals had on prosecutions of serious crimes at the national level.</p>
<p>My findings confirm that the pursuit of accountability for serious crimes is complex. One shouldn’t expect quick and simple fixes when thousands of people suffer serious human rights violations. But based on 30 years of international criminal justice interventions on the African continent, I identified four trends. These reveal opportunities and challenges in the global fight against impunity.</p>
<h2>Trends shaping international interventions</h2>
<p>First, the numbers illustrate the declining importance of international trials. The Rwanda and <a href="https://www.icty.org/">Yugoslav</a> tribunals indicted hundreds of people starting in the mid-1990s. Sierra Leone’s special court prosecuted 13 suspects in the 2000s. Today, the International Criminal Court handles between one and four international cases per country. </p>
<p>Second, with international criminal tribunals <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13642980500170782">facing criticism</a> in the 1990s and 2000s, the international community shifted attention to state-level accountability processes. As the number of international trials decreased, domestic prosecutions increased in some countries. But the track record is mixed. Hundreds of national trials in Rwanda and the DRC can be contrasted with the (near) absence of cases in Sierra Leone. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecution-or-compensation-what-kenyan-choices-tell-us-about-international-justice-187941">Prosecution or compensation? What Kenyan choices tell us about international justice</a>
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<p>Third, there’s still little evidence that domestic justice performs better than international criminal tribunals. Donors and NGOs increasingly prioritise capacity-building initiatives for national magistrates and attorneys. But they avoid the political dimensions of state-led justice efforts. The difficult questions they need to address include: why are some perpetrators prosecuted domestically but not others? Which national trials are unfair? What effects do selective national prosecutions have on nation-building?</p>
<p>For instance, hundreds of trials before Congolese mobile courts are rightly celebrated. But the Congolese army has used international support to <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/86538-transitional-justice-drc-congo-how-un-united-nations-put-in-drawer.html">consolidate its power</a> at the expense of the civilian justice sector. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2725915">Scholars</a> have expressed similar concerns about the unintended consequences of Rwanda’s domestic justice process.</p>
<p>Fourth, the International Criminal Court was expected to encourage a domestic reckoning with serious crimes by casting a “positive shadow” over national judges, prosecutors and attorneys. Instead, international prosecutors and judges in The Hague have often adopted risk-averse readings of their powers. And they have often ignored the work – good and bad – of their domestic counterparts. This practice may promote selective national prosecutions that entrench the (authoritarian) power of ruling elites in countries like the DRC, Central African Republic, Libya or Mali. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>There are two main takeaways. First, international criminal tribunals sometimes unintentionally cast an “authoritarian shadow” over domestic justice efforts. Second, too much emphasis on national trials may promote illiberal tendencies in some contexts. I encourage a more critical look at how international and domestic justice relate to one another. Simple formulas like “the future of international criminal justice is domestic” don’t always help. </p>
<p>But the book is an appeal for action rather than despair. It proposes strategies to overcome obstacles to domestic accountability. These include greater civil society engagement, cooperation with domestic law enforcement actors and trial monitoring. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the global fight against impunity remains a work in progress. The search for a balance between international and domestic accountability efforts will require further study.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patryk Labuda received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation for this research (grant no. 165419). </span></em></p>The push for national trials reflects a disappointment with the slow pace and high costs of international justice.Patryk I. Labuda, Research Fellow, University of ZurichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
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<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
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<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
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<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
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<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2100922023-07-20T14:15:44Z2023-07-20T14:15:44ZSurviving heat waves in Africa – three essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538513/original/file-20230720-15-nemax3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man pours water on his head to cool off in Algiers, during a heat wave on 18 July 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around the world, temperature records are being broken in countries in Africa, Europe, America and Asia. The planet experienced its <a href="https://climatereanalyzer.org/clim/t2_daily/">hottest day</a> on record at the beginning of July 2023. </p>
<p>This is not totally unexpected. Scientists had warned that if the rise in global temperature was not limited to 1.5°C, the world could face a severe threat from extreme heat. As it is, the 1.5°C target seems unattainable. A recent <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022">UN report</a> did not see a credible pathway to achieving this goal. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-europe-faces-biggest-relative-increase-in-uncomfortable-heat-and-is-dangerously-unprepared-new-research-209745">recent article</a> for The Conversation UK, scientists Jesus Lizana, Nicole Miranda and Radhika Khosla described how countries in the tropics would see the largest absolute increase in extreme heat if the global temperature rise moved from 1.5°C to 2°C. </p>
<p>In their <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372342472_Change_in_cooling_degree_days_with_global_mean_temperature_increasing_from_15_C_to_20_C">published research</a>, they indicated that countries in central and sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Mali, South Sudan, Chad, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, would be hit the hardest.</p>
<p>Experts writing for The Conversation Africa have also touched on these issues and how to survive them. Here, we’ve collated three of these articles. </p>
<h2>1. Heat officer to the rescue</h2>
<p>Increasingly threatened by dangerous temperatures, Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital, appointed a chief heat officer earlier in the year. </p>
<p>The chief heat officer – the first in Africa – has the responsibility of raising awareness about extreme heat, improving responses to heat waves, and collecting, analysing and visualising heat impact data for the city, which is home to <a href="https://populationstat.com/sierra-leone/freetown">1.2 million people</a>.</p>
<p>Architect and researcher Olumuyiwa Adegun explains that Sierra Leone had to take steps because in 2017, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://chinadialogueocean.net/en/governance/19162-sea-level-rise-sierra-leone-sinking-islands/">ranked the west African country third</a>, after Bangladesh and Guinea Bissau, on its list of countries most vulnerable to climate change.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-first-heat-officer-is-based-in-freetown-5-things-that-should-be-on-her-agenda-199274">Africa's first heat officer is based in Freetown – 5 things that should be on her agenda</a>
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<h2>2. Knowing where and when it’s too hot in southern Africa</h2>
<p>Heat stress is not just uncomfortable; it can be dangerous. To create a detailed picture of when and where heat stress occurs in southern Africa, a group of scientists – Sarah Roffe, Adriaan van der Walt and Jennifer Fitchett – applied a human thermal comfort index to regional data. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.8009">They found</a> that there has been a consistent change in thermal comfort – the human body’s experience of the outdoor thermal environment – from the 1970s to today. </p>
<p>Their findings confirm that southern Africans are experiencing heat stress more often than in 1979.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heat-stress-is-rising-in-southern-africa-climate-experts-show-where-and-when-its-worst-198455">Heat stress is rising in southern Africa – climate experts show where and when it’s worst</a>
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<h2>3. A vote for climate resilient primary healthcare</h2>
<p>Climate change events in Africa have implications not just for the environment but for people. Impacts include injuries, diseases and death. </p>
<p>Considering that climate events place the health systems of affected countries under strain, scientists Bob Mash and Christian Lueme Lokotola reviewed the level of preparedness of African primary healthcare systems. They found these systems were poorly prepared for the impacts of climate change. </p>
<p>The scientists then identified five key questions that health systems must answer in order to build more resilient primary healthcare in the face of climate change. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-questions-for-african-countries-that-want-to-build-climate-resilient-health-systems-206783">Five questions for African countries that want to build climate-resilient health systems</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Temperature records are being broken in Africa and around the world.Adejuwon Soyinka, Regional Editor West AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097402023-07-17T14:08:21Z2023-07-17T14:08:21ZIt’s time for Ghana to enshrine its respect for the right to life – by abolishing the death penalty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537450/original/file-20230714-17-ymm8xc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The death penalty has not been enforced in Ghana for over three decades</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thirty years have now gone by since Ghana used its gallows, a fact that indicates the country’s respect for human life. It also means that Ghana is one of <a href="https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/international/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries">about 42 nations</a> – many of which are in Africa – that the United Nations calls <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/migrated/field/field_document/56_hood_roger_libro_homenaje.pdf">abolitionist de facto</a> because they have not executed anyone for at least a decade. </p>
<p>However, there is a paradox. Not only does Ghana retain the death penalty as a sentence for three crimes (murder, treason and genocide), death is the mandatory punishment for them. The law gives the judges no choice in sentencing for these crimes. Last year, the courts sentenced seven people to death. At the end of 2022, there were <a href="https://ghanaprisons.gov.gh/about-us/statistics.cits">176 inmates</a> on death row, and the list grows every year. </p>
<p>It could be argued that by continuing to hand down mandatory death sentences, Ghana’s courts are unusually harsh, for, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/6548/2023/en/#page=4">according</a> to Amnesty International, only ten countries did so last year. </p>
<p>But Ghanaian policymakers and civil society are making a renewed effort to resolve the contradictions on the death penalty. These efforts have led to <a href="http://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/2385/Criminal%20Offence%20%28Amendment%29Bill%2c2022.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">two new bills</a> due to be debated by parliament. They would enable Ghana to abolish capital punishment in law, as well as in practice. </p>
<p>As academic and legal experts on capital punishment for more than 30 years, we have been assisting Ghanaian policymakers and civil society groups. The latest initiative to end the use of the death penalty is firmly rooted in human rights principles and evidence based research. </p>
<p>A broad engagement in Ghana over a sustained period with a diverse range of stakeholders has enabled members of parliament to consider key aspects of capital punishment objectively. Previous attempts to abolish the death penalty in Ghana have involved complex constitutional amendments. The current moves require only amendments to criminal statutes: a majority of MPs need to vote for abolition. </p>
<h2>A chance for change</h2>
<p>The two new bills before parliament create a golden opportunity to bring the contradictions to an end. One covers the military, the other the civilian courts. </p>
<p>This opportunity follows a recent wave of abolition across sub-Saharan Africa. In the last ten years, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zambia have all abolished the death penalty. Despite their vastly different histories and legal contexts, through political will and leadership these countries all reached a recognition of the cruelty, inhumanity and injustice inherent in capital punishment. In doing so, they joined over 100 other countries worldwide which have now fully abolished. </p>
<p>Ghana’s <a href="https://www.parliament.gh/committees?com=15">Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs</a>, assisted by senior justice officials, has been scrutinising the new bills carefully. We also had the privilege of being able to offer the committee advice. Its reports are now in, recommending that the House should pass the bills and replace the sentence of death with life imprisonment.</p>
<p>The committee’s reports note a further contradiction in Ghana’s current stance: it has ratified international human rights treaties and conventions, including the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human Rights</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>. These, the committee says, “oblige the country to guarantee its citizens the right to life, and to live free from torture or cruelty.” </p>
<p>The reports deploy further, persuasive arguments. </p>
<p>One is that no criminal process can ever achieve certainty or perfection, so that retaining the death penalty will always carry the risk that an innocent person could be executed. </p>
<p>Another examines the claim that capital punishment is a deterrent to offending. The committee says there is no empirical evidence for this. In the United States, the murder rate is <a href="https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/states-with-no-death-penalty-share-lower-homicide-rates">consistently higher</a> in states that use capital punishment than in those that don’t. The seven <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">least violent</a> countries in the world have all abolished it. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-has-kenya-not-abolished-the-death-penalty-habit-and-inertia-189955">Why has Kenya not abolished the death penalty? Habit and inertia</a>
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<p>It is now up to parliament. Abolishing the death penalty in law would place Ghana squarely within a worldwide trend, which is especially noticeable in Africa at the moment. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ACT5011622019ENGLISH.pdf#page=9">Movements</a> to do the same are gathering pace in other jurisdictions on the continent. </p>
<h2>A willing public</h2>
<p>The latest effort at abolishing the death penalty is not the first. In 2012, Ghana came close to abolishing the death penalty altogether, following a <a href="https://rodra.co.za/images/countries/ghana/research/WHITE%20PAPER%20%20ON%20THE%20REPORT%20OF%20THE%20CONSTITUTION%20REVIEW%20COMMISSION%20PRESENTED%20TO%20THE%20PRESIDENT%20.pdf#page=42">recommendation</a> by the Constitution Review Commission that was accepted by the then-government. Unfortunately, the path it tried to adopt, amending the constitution, is complex and challenging and in the end it failed.</p>
<p>Although its courts are still sentencing people to death, Ghana supported a UN General Assembly <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/764/50/PDF/N2276450.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> last December calling for an indefinite, worldwide moratorium on the death penalty “with a view to abolition”. Similar resolutions have been carried repeatedly with steadily increasing majorities since 2007. In 2022, almost two-thirds of the world’s nations voted in favour. For the first time, Ghana was among them, having abstained previously.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, although politicians sometimes <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/death-penalty-appeals-more-to-victims-families-than-life-imprisonment-cletus-avoka.html#:%7E:text=In%20a%20radio%20interview%20monitored,family%20than%20the%20life%20imprisonment.%22">express</a> the fear that abolishing the death penalty would be unpopular, there is good evidence that in Ghana the opposite is true. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/702009/1/Public-Opinion-on-the-Death-Penalty-in-Ghana-Final.pdf">study</a> published in 2015, there are clear majorities against the death penalty for all three of the crimes to which it is applicable. Just 8.6% of those surveyed said they were “strongly in favour” of it. In all, 71% were against. Based on interviews with more than 2,000 people who reflected Ghana’s socio-economic and ethnic composition, this survey was described by the late Professor Roger Hood of the University of Oxford in his <a href="https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/702009/1/Public-Opinion-on-the-Death-Penalty-in-Ghana-Final.pdf">foreword</a> to the report as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the first methodologically sound study of public opinion on the death penalty in an African state.</p>
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<p>Some might argue that since Ghana is an abolitionist de facto nation, there is no pressing need for legal abolition. In practice, what difference would it make? To this argument, we would say: look at Myanmar, which having been abolitionist de facto since the 1980s, resumed executions last year. No state can ever be entirely immune from the political upheaval that caused this shift. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyan-prisoners-on-death-row-werent-deterred-by-the-threat-of-the-death-penalty-new-research-findings-197701">Kenyan prisoners on death row weren’t deterred by the threat of the death penalty: new research findings</a>
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<p>Back in 1992, Ghana’s <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/political-developmental-constitution-report-constitutional-review-commission-ghana-2011">Constitutional Review Commission</a> observed that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the sanctity of life is a value so much engrained in the Ghanaian social psyche that it cannot be gambled away with judicial uncertainties. </p>
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<p>The best way to protect that value now is for parliament to accept the committee’s reports, and vote for abolition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana is a signatory to several international conventions that oblige it to guarantee the right to life.Saul Lehrfreund, Visiting Professor, School of Law, University of ReadingCarolyn Hoyle, Director of the University of Oxford Death Penalty Research Unit, Centre for Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085362023-06-30T13:09:22Z2023-06-30T13:09:22ZSierra Leone election: voter trust has been shaken, and will need to be regained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534420/original/file-20230627-19-x4x237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of the Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone, Mohamed Konneh announcing partial election results in Freetown on June 26, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Julius Maada Bio, a 59-year-old former soldier, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/27/africa/maada-bio-reelected-sierra-leone-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CBy%20the%20powers%20vested%20in,Chief%20Electoral%20Commissioner%20Mohamed%20Konneh.&text=Just%20hours%20after%20the%20results,their%20%E2%80%9Ctrust%20and%20dedication.%E2%80%9D">sworn in</a> for his second and final five-year term as president of Sierra Leone on 27 June. With <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-27/sierra-leonean-president-bio-wins-reelection-with-56-of-votes?srnd=fixed-income#xj4y7vzkg">56%</a> of votes cast in the election on 24 June, Bio was declared winner ahead of his main rival, Samura Kamara, who polled 41%.</em> </p>
<p><em>Kamara rejected the result and international election observers have highlighted some problems with the way votes were counted. There has been relative calm across Sierra Leone since Bio was sworn in. Earlier, the opposition All People’s Congress <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/26/police-fire-tear-gas-at-sierra-leone-opposition-after-vote">alleged</a> that the police had killed one of its supporters by firing live shots into their party offices a day after the polls. Police have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66030749">denied</a> this.</em> </p>
<p><em>In this interview, Catherine Bolten, Professor of Anthropology and Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, fielded questions on lessons learnt from the poll and the future of democracy in Sierra Leone. As an <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/catherine-bolten-1450652/edit">anthropologist</a>, Bolten studies politics as a social practice, which means analysing how “democracy” manifests in campaigning, elections, and policy-making, and how people imagine democratic processes in their own lives. She has conducted research in Sierra Leone since 2003, and published a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=mB6TeugAAAAJ&citation_for_view=mB6TeugAAAAJ:Se3iqnhoufwC">2016 paper</a> that focused on how the country managed the first election it ran on its own in 2012.</em> </p>
<hr>
<h2>What did you learn from the outcome of this election?</h2>
<p>Sierra Leoneans expect that the election process is potentially corrupt unless there is full transparency in the whole process. This means from the moment the electoral commission is appointed to the selection criteria for the ballot design, the selection and training of poll workers, the invitation to the international community for electoral observers, and every other decision that might affect the outcome. </p>
<p>The public had very <a href="https://www.iri.org/resources/sierra-leone-poll-shows-high-levels-of-trust-in-most-national-institutions-concern-over-economy-and-education/">high levels</a> of trust in the two elections immediately after the civil war, which ended in 2002, because the United Nations was heavily involved. It was <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/11/425872">involved </a> in the planning and execution of the 2002 election and, to a lesser degree, the 2007 elections. </p>
<p>The 2012 election was the country’s <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/democracy/sierra-leone-2012-elections.html">first self-administered election</a> since the war began. The whole population was committed to it being free, fair and without violence. They succeeded. </p>
<p>Since then, bad <a href="https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sierra-leone/democracy-governance-and-human-rights#:%7E:text=Despite%20increasing%20its%20stature%20as,uphold%20the%20rule%20of%20law.">old habits</a> of nepotism, cronyism, and back-room deals have reappeared. Whether corruption is as bad as opposition party members claim is not as important as the perception that the election is corrupt. </p>
<p>If there is any lesson to be learned, it is the necessity of rebuilding public trust in every election by maintaining a transparent process.</p>
<h2>What has changed between 2012 and 2023 to result in the return of nepotism and cronyism?</h2>
<p>2012 may have been a special moment, when the country came together in a concerted effort to ensure that the elections were conducted without violence, with no questions about the legitimacy of the polling, and with full knowledge that the world was watching. </p>
<p>As I wrote in my <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=mB6TeugAAAAJ&citation_for_view=mB6TeugAAAAJ:Se3iqnhoufwC">2016 paper</a>, drastic measures such as restricting freedom of movement, work, association, and even dress in the months and days leading up to the election and on election day were imposed. The citizens complied without complaint, even as these were technically violations of basic human rights. This is because the people were so committed to ensuring a free and fair election. </p>
<p>Once these restrictions were allowed to loosen in succeeding elections, it portended a return to lack of transparency in the process, and thus to the powerful exerting themselves behind the scenes, because they were no longer also committed to these restrictions.</p>
<h2>Who has been responsible for the pre-election violence?</h2>
<p>Any whiff of corruption that could affect the outcome leads to accusations of democratic backsliding. A standard-bearer who considers themselves wronged will call on the party’s followers to “demonstrate”. This is to ensure that those who are potentially corrupt see that others are trying to hold them to account.</p>
<p>Any call for a “peaceful demonstration” is a challenge to the legitimacy of the claims being made by the other side. No political leader accuses their opposition of corruption and calls for “peaceful demonstrations” without knowing that violence will occur, no matter who throws the first stone or fires the first shot. </p>
<p>Rhetoric is powerful, and a hint of grumbling about corruption will fan the flames of violence.</p>
<h2>What factors determine voter turnout?</h2>
<p>There is an <a href="https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/sierra-leoneans-in-europe-protesting-against-president-bio-at-the-london-black-in-the-park/">old saying</a> in Sierra Leone politics: “same taxi, different driver”. It describes presidential candidates promising change when they get into office. The new president will do essentially what the last president did, with minor variations. </p>
<p>People are also well aware that their leaders are, by and large, <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SLE">corrupt</a>. There is plenty of <a href="https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/sierra-leone-is-losing-over-one-hundred-million-dollars-from-its-fishing-industry/">evidence</a> for this, from the fisheries ministry officials turning a blind eye to illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers, to the “<a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SLE">trickle-down corruption</a>” that occurs in regular public life because public servants such as police officers and teachers are not being paid, and so demand bribes and tips from the community. This “everyday corruption” is blamed firmly on the cabinet ministers. The <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/arts-culture/music/meet-sierra-leone-s-people-s-popstar-emmerson-bockarie-1.717088">local artist Emerson</a>, for example, consistently lambasts politicians in his music.</p>
<p>This does not dissuade people from turning out in numbers to cast votes for their preferred candidate. They have a sense of two things: one which is extremely likely, and the other which might happen. </p>
<p>What’s extremely likely is that if their ethnic or preferred candidate does not win, their region and their ethnic people will be neglected or harassed by the ruling party, or they will simply “stand still” and receive no development. They feel voting is the only real power they have to be a part of any decision-making process, and so turnout is consistently high.</p>
<p>What might happen is that, if their candidate wins, they will they reap the benefits of foreign direct investment, NGO relief, humanitarian distribution and infrastructure. </p>
<p>So they turn out to vote for the candidate who will hurt them the least, and might actually help them.</p>
<h2>What does the 2023 election outcome portend for democracy?</h2>
<p>It is clear that the fact that a candidate is declared a winner and then immediately sworn in does not protect the country from violence or democratic backsliding. </p>
<p>There may still be violence, and there may be a crackdown on protest, which starts down a dangerous road to authoritarianism or potentially wider violence. </p>
<p>I am not sure how this will affect the future of democracy in Sierra Leone. But I believe that the international community has a duty to send observers, if only to let a country’s citizens know that their election matters, and that they are part of the foundation of the international cause of democracy. </p>
<p>Backsliding anywhere is dangerous, and no election is too small to ignore. I hope that the democratic state in Sierra Leone holds up for the next five years, in order for this repair to happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Bolten receives funding from the United States Institute for Peace, the IIE Fulbright Grant (USA), and the IIE David Boren Grant.</span></em></p>Sierra Leone needs to rebuild public trust in its election by maintaining a completely transparent process.Catherine Bolten, Professor of Anthropology and Peace Studies, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077722023-06-22T14:23:54Z2023-06-22T14:23:54ZSierra Leone has been at peace for 20 years after a brutal civil war - what went right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533511/original/file-20230622-15-wlt6p9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Henry, a teenaged rebel solider, before he is disarmed in 2001. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Chris Hondros/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sierra Leone’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/13/how-do-the-sierra-leonean-elections-work-a-simple-guide">June 2023 parliamentary elections</a> are the fifth since the end of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Civil-war">civil war in 2002</a>. </p>
<p>They also mark a decade since the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2014/special-court-sierra-leone-rests-%E2%80%93-good">closure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone</a>. The court prosecuted high level commanders deemed responsible for the suffering experienced during the war. </p>
<p>The 11-year-long civil war (1991-2002) was estimated to have killed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Civil-war">over 50,000 people</a>. Thousands were maimed and their limbs amputated. Half of the population was displaced. Almost all the people of Sierra Leone were affected by the war, leaving an enduring scar on the country and the collective psyche.</p>
<p>In the late 1990s and early 2000s, academics and peacebuilders became increasingly interested in promoting transitional justice alongside other methods of peace consolidation, particularly in countries that had experienced mass violence and large-scale atrocities. These included South Africa, Rwanda, Bosnia and Peru. </p>
<h2>Transitional justice mechanisms</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/26_02_2008_background_note.pdf">Transitional justice</a> is justice adapted to societies undergoing transformation away from “normalised” human rights abuse.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone became the first in which two transitional justice mechanisms were used. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/transitional-justice-in-the-twentyfirst-century/sierra-leone-truth-and-reconciliation-commission/27970FD7B68E9C76AEDF507257B35F35">July 2002</a> and a Special Court was created. </p>
<p>The country has remained relatively peaceful in the two decades since the war ended. This is in a stark contrast to other examples such as Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://theses.flinders.edu.au/view/1d634031-048d-49f8-9dfa-d5e63146abe4/1">thesis</a> I reflected on the long-term impact and the legacy of transitional justice in Sierra Leone. I examined whether lessons learned could assist in improving the process for future use. </p>
<p>My research focused on the official transitional justice mechanisms and whether the underlying causes of the war continued to affect the people of Sierra Leone. Economic mismanagement, poor governance, abject poverty and severe disenfranchisement were some of those underlying causes. </p>
<p>Through interviews with people who worked alongside the mechanisms and in non-government organisations, as well as others in civil society, I gained a better understanding of the lasting impact of transitional justice. </p>
<h2>Transitional justice in the long term</h2>
<p>While in Sierra Leone, I had candid discussions on the implementation, limitations and legacy of the official transitional justice mechanisms. I found there were operational tensions between the Truth Commission and the Special Court, but having both gave Sierra Leoneans restorative and retributive justice. Some thought that the Special Court undermined the existing amnesty and pardon agreements while using limited resources for both mechanisms was not ideal. These led to the tensions between the two mechanisms. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/rj-jr/index.html#:%7E:text=What%20is%20Restorative%20Justice%3F,the%20aftermath%20of%20a%20crime.%E2%80%9D">Restorative justice</a> refers to “an approach to justice that seeks to repair harm by providing an opportunity for those harmed and those who take responsibility for the harm to communicate about and address their needs in the aftermath of a crime.” Retributive justice is a system of criminal justice based on the punishment of offenders rather than on rehabilitation. Considering the impact of the war, incorporating both mechanisms was essential in helping the society to reconcile and rebuild.</p>
<p>My discussions also showed there was room for improvement in the way the two mechanisms worked. Both were hampered due to limited funding, more funds could have made their work easier. There should have been wider community engagement and consultation also before both started operations. Their effectiveness and acceptance was largely the result of outreach teams at grassroots level focusing on ensuring that the process benefited as much of the population as possible. </p>
<p>The Truth Commission and the Special Court have left a legacy: they are still able to promote reconciliation and societal restoration now. This is despite the fact that access to the commission’s report has been limited. A video edition of the report was circulated widely around the country, but the number of physical copies of the report is limited. Information about the findings and recommendations is restricted to the commission’s <a href="https://www.sierraleonetrc.org/">website</a>.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, through the recommendations resulting from the victim testimonies, the report led to the establishment of an <a href="https://www.anticorruption.gov.sl/en_GB/">Anti-Corruption Commission</a>. This addresses exploitative practices in the chieftaincy system and acknowledges systematic youth disenfranchisement. The effectiveness of the recommendations is debatable, but their ongoing influence demonstrates a concerted effort to ensure that certain causes of the conflict do not resurface. </p>
<p>Similarly, through the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, which replaced the Special Court, the legacy of accountability and the rule of law continues. It still promotes societal reconstruction, reconciliation and collaboration. For example, there is a programme to reintegrate former war criminals back into the community. This acknowledges collective trauma but works towards peace in the long term. </p>
<h2>A long way forward</h2>
<p>It is vital to continue examining what transitional justice can do. This is because its mechanisms are put to work over a short period but aim at long-term and lasting peace. </p>
<p>My research also explored the current situation in a more holistic way. Particularly, it considered how socio-economic pressures continue to affect income generation and perceptions of disenfranchisement. Despite the Truth Commission’s acknowledgement of the fact that socio-economic injustice had a serious impact on the pre-war society, such issues persist. They are seen through youth disenfranchisement and underdevelopment. </p>
<p>Through this research I found that the peace which Sierra Leone has experienced in the last two decades was achieved through collaborative efforts. These are the legacy of transitional justice and its relationship to long-term peace, and the resilience of the Sierra Leonean people. </p>
<p>There is still more to learn, including how better to incorporate socio-economic aspects of peacebuilding. This might help to rectify the deeply entrenched causes of war, which current processes are not fully capable of addressing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207772/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christina Mammone receives funding from Flinders University.
While undertaking my PhD research:
2018 awarded Flinders University Overseas Travel Grant
2020 awarded Flinders University Write-up Stipend Scholarship</span></em></p>Transitional justice contributed greatly to the peace which Sierra Leone has experienced in the last two decades.Christina Mammone, Early Career Researcher in Peace and Conflict Studies, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079452023-06-22T05:54:38Z2023-06-22T05:54:38ZSierra Leone elections: survey reveals what voters care about most<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532506/original/file-20230618-134757-43c17e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man casts his vote at a polling station in Freetown during the 2018 general elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sierra Leoneans go to the polls again on <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sierra-leone-gears-presidential-election-amid-economic-crisis-100176174">24 June</a>, in the country’s fifth post-conflict electoral contest.</p>
<p>For more than two decades following its <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/sierra-leone-civil-war-1991-2002/">civil war</a>, Sierra Leone has experienced relatively free and fair multiparty elections. </p>
<p>The 2023 presidential race features a 2018 rematch with incumbent <a href="https://slembassy-germany.org/?page_id=140">president Julius Maada Bio</a> of the <a href="https://slpp.sl/">Sierra Leone People’s Party</a> squaring up against <a href="https://twitter.com/samurakamara201?lang=en">Samura Kamara</a> of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/All-Peoples-Congress">All People’s Congress</a>. Also up for grabs are 132 seats for members of parliament and local council seats. </p>
<p>We’ve drawn on recently collected <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer data</a> to offer insights into how Sierra Leoneans view democracy and government performance, and what the key election issues are. </p>
<p>There seems to be widespread agreement, across age, that economic management, food shortages, health services, infrastructure and education are the most pressing issues. </p>
<p>The country has faced <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/sierra-leone">food shortages</a>, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sierraleone/overview#:%7E:text=Headline%20inflation%20averaged%2027%25%20in,tightened%20its%20monetary%20policy%20stance.">high inflation</a> and high <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=SL">unemployment</a>. </p>
<p>President Bio has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/6/1/familiar-faces-concerns-linger-ahead-of-sierra-leones-june-vote">promised</a> a job creation programme, aimed at improving youth employment. The challenger Kamara has echoed this promise and criticised the ruling party for its poor economic stewardship. </p>
<h2>New generation of voters</h2>
<p>Afrobarometer conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society through nationally representative face-to-face interviews with 1,200 citizens in almost 40 African countries. </p>
<p>For this analysis, we mainly rely on <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer data</a> collected in June and July 2022 in Sierra Leone. We also use data going back to 2012 when describing longitudinal trends.</p>
<p>The Sierra Leone 2023 election is of particular interest as a large proportion of the post-war generation will vote for the first time since the country’s return to multi-party elections in 2002. </p>
<p>We paid particular attention to differences between citizens who became adults after the end of the civil war (18-35 years of age) and their older peers.</p>
<p>Figure X below shows the most important issue facing Sierra Leoneans, across different age groups. </p>
<p>Relative to other age groups, the younger generation do seem to be slightly more concerned about economic management and less concerned about the quality of health services. </p>
<p>One shortcoming of the Afrobarometer data is that we are unable to pinpoint the views of those 21 and younger. The survey put them in a group with those up to 35. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532803/original/file-20230620-19-lvp5er.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure X.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Support for democracy, elections, and multiparty competition</h2>
<p>Sierra Leoneans showed high levels of democratic commitment (Table 1): 84% support democracy, saying it was always preferable to other forms of government. </p>
<p>Democratic backsliding has occurred in many countries around the world. But, for the past decade, 89% of respondents in Sierra Leone have preferred to choose their leaders through regular, open and honest elections. </p>
<p>When it comes to choosing from competing parties, the evidence looks more mixed. The share of citizens who favour competition has varied over time from only 54% in 2012 to 64% in 2015. It returned to just over half of the country (54%) in 2022. But more younger people were in favour of party competition (59%) compared to older citizens (41%). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532388/original/file-20230616-17-5b29pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Table 1. Perceived demand and supply of democracy in Sierra Leone</p>
<p>Roughly eight in ten said the past national election was “free and fair” or “with minor problems only”. </p>
<p>On the other hand, only slightly more than half of respondents said they were “fairly” or “very” satisfied with the way democracy was working for them in 2022. This sentiment was virtually the same across all age groups. </p>
<h2>How is government doing?</h2>
<p>Voting decisions are often linked to government performance, specifically economic management and providing basic services. </p>
<p>Turning to popular evaluations of government performance in the past years, Table 2 illustrates the results are decidedly mixed. A majority of Sierra Leoneans said government had been doing worse compared to a decade ago on managing the economy or managing water supply. But they appeared more positive regarding government’s handling of education. </p>
<p>Since the Sierra Leone People’s Party took over in 2018, three out of four citizens have been satisfied with government performance in this sector. Their evaluation of health services has turned more positive as well, but the difference is less drastic. </p>
<p>Sierra Leoneans were split on the government’s handling of managing physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges (49% positive, 50% negative). These evaluations were very consistent across age groups (results not shown).</p>
<p>Table 2. Government handling the following issues:</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532389/original/file-20230616-15-xp61v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What issues matter most to Sierra Leoneans</h2>
<p>Elections are not only a performance evaluation of the current government, but also a vote on whether the contestants can tackle the country’s most urgent issues. </p>
<p>According to Afrobarometer data, economic issues are top in the minds of most Sierra Leoneans. (Figures 1 and 2 below) </p>
<p>In 2022, 38% of citizens had gone without food at least several times over the previous year. The World Food Programme estimates <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/sierra-leone">57%</a> of people in Sierra Leone are food insecure. </p>
<p>While healthcare (31%), infrastructure (27%) and education (23%) remain among the top issues citizens care about, all have decreased in importance over the past few years (Figure 2). Young adults largely agree with their older peers about which issues are most pressing (with the partial exception of healthcare).</p>
<p>Figure 1. Most important problem the government should address (Top 3 responses)</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532390/original/file-20230616-29-5osyxg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Top responses.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Campaign issues</h2>
<p>From his <a href="https://twitter.com/PresidentBio">Twitter profile</a>, Bio has campaigned across the country, holding rallies in all four provinces and in both the rural and urban districts of the Western Area. </p>
<p>He has promised sustainable economic transformation, free quality education and a 30% female representation quota by law. His focus has been on agricultural productivity, health and sanitation standards, youth and gender employment, and infrastructure. </p>
<p>Kamara’s campaign <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/3/sierra-leone-ratifies-candidacy-of-president-opposition-leader">appeals</a> have largely focused on economic issues. He has put forth an inclusive political message and attacked certain political institutions for their incompetence.</p>
<p>His <a href="https://twitter.com/samurakamara201">Twitter activity</a> has been much more sporadic but he has also campaigned heavily in the rural and urban districts of the Western Area. </p>
<p>Figure 2. Change in most important issue, 2020 to 2022</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532407/original/file-20230616-19-r0m0kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Change in important issues.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>One looming issue will be the corruption trial that Kamara is facing. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sierra-leone-indicts-opposition-front-runner-alleged-corruption-2021-11-26/">Charges</a> were filed against him in November 2021 for alleged misdoings while he served as <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203140715.html">foreign affairs minister</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>The case has been <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/opposition-candidate-in-sierra-leone-clears-hurdle-for-election-bid-40edd911">adjourned</a> until after the election, allowing him to remain on the ballot. </p>
<p>Corruption is not a major issue, relatively, for most Sierra Leoneans. </p>
<p>Overall, while all age groups are committed to democracy, and younger citizens in particular seem to be in favour of a competitive party landscape, only half of the country is satisfied with democracy’s functioning. </p>
<p>Thus, it will be especially important for the upcoming elections to be free and fair, and for the winners to strengthen the country’s democratic journey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthias Krönke is affiliated with Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Isbell works for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Nyenhuis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Economic management, food shortages, health services, infrastructure and education are key issues that may shape how Sierra Leoneans vote on 24 June.Robert Nyenhuis, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, PomonaMatthias Krönke, PhD student in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape TownThomas Isbell, Post-doctoral research fellow, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2073822023-06-20T13:42:22Z2023-06-20T13:42:22ZAfrican leaders in Sierra Leone played a key role in ending the transatlantic slave trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532152/original/file-20230615-15-iuj0xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C25%2C2836%2C2149&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone and haven for thousands of free slaves.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/berwick-street-freetown-the-capital-of-sierra-leone-and-news-photo/2659536?adppopup=true">Original Artwork: Hatch Collection. Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone on the west African coast, was named for the freed slaves who were returned to Africa by British members of the movement to end slavery. Founded in 1787 by a group of 400 black Britons from London, the colony ultimately became a refuge for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108562423">nearly 100,000 people resettled</a> by the British Anti-Slavery Naval Squadron. </p>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/african-leaders-in-sierra-leone-played-a-key-role-in-ending-the-transatlantic-slave-trade-207382&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>As a historian focusing on the impact of abolitionism, I have studied <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674240988">this history</a> and the founding of modern Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>There is a misconception that Britain was the first to abolish the slave trade. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/antislavery_01.shtml">It wasn’t the first</a>, but its decision to abolish the trade was backed up by the power of its navy. Sierra Leone’s role in the story shows, however, to enforce that abolition, the British navy had to rely on the support of African states and polities that had already turned against the slave trade.</p>
<p>Africans played an overlooked <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/lourenco-da-silva-mendonca-and-the-black-atlantic-abolitionist-movement-in-the-seventeenth-century/B030B16D932D0C6A971FAC1BF9A19F5C">role in ending</a> the transatlantic slave trade. Sierra Leone’s rich history is testament to that.</p>
<h2>The founding of Sierra Leone</h2>
<p>The Atlantic Slave Trade began around the 1520s, but the area around Sierra Leone was not a major contributor to the trade before the middle of the 1700s. From 1763 onwards, the number of enslaved people shipped annually from the Sierra Leone coast by British, Portuguese and French traders rarely fell below <a href="https://www.slavevoyages.org/">1,000 and was often closer to 4,000</a>. Even then, the <a href="https://www.slavevoyages.org/">number of captives was roughly half the number being transported from the Gold Coast (Ghana)</a>, a quarter of the number being transported from the Bight of Benin, and a tenth of the number transported from the Angolan coast. </p>
<p>And yet from 1808, it was Sierra Leone – rather than one of the other sites of slave trading – that became the site of British anti-slavery operations. This was because by then, Sierra Leone was the site of an established and growing colony made up of members of the black British diaspora, many formerly enslaved. And the success of that colony was possible in part because of the interest and engagement of the Temne, the Susu, and other African people based in and around the Sierra Leone peninsula. </p>
<p><a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300217445/freedoms-debtors/">In 1787</a>, the first group of black Britons arrived on the peninsula as part of a project in self-government and with the support of the London-based abolitionist leaders Granville Sharp and Olaudah Equiano. The first settlement faced hardships and lacked support among the Temne, whose land they were renting. </p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-oThZT" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/oThZT/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<h2>The settlement grows</h2>
<p>In 1791, another group arrived in the colony and sought out a new treaty of settlement. This group chose to immigrate to Sierra Leone from inhospitable Nova Scotia (Canada), where they had been settled by the British government as <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/86852/libertys-exiles-by-maya-jasanoff/">“black loyalists”</a> after fleeing from slavery during the American Revolution (1776-1783). A new organisation, the Sierra Leone Company, took over the management of the colony from London. Their records show that by the early 1790s, the <a href="https://doi-org.ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/10.1017/9781108182010">Temne</a> saw the arrival of these colonists as an opportunity. </p>
<p>King Naimbana, for instance, who negotiated the treaty between the Sierra Leone Company and the Temne, sent his son to London for education. And in their negotiations, company officials noted that the people they were engaging with were keen for opportunities to trade for imported goods without reverting to selling other people.</p>
<h2>African role in ending slavery</h2>
<p>As I found in my research, it was African demand that was shaping the success of the colony and its mission to shift the coast’s commerce away from the slave trade. Records held at the <a href="https://huntington.org/">Huntington Library in California</a> show that local buyers paid a higher price for the “SLC” mark – a price paid in goods and currency, rather than in enslaved captives. One British representative wrote a letter in 1793 to the Sierra Leone Company to complain that “it has become practice with slave traders to bring out guns for trade marked SLC for which they get a rapid sale and a double price in the Rio Nunez” to the north of the colony. He also worried that this was happening with “SLC” <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674240988">cloths</a>. </p>
<p>Although he was unsure of their enthusiasm for the abolition of the slave trade, the British official commented that “their mouths were full of proposals to trade with us and plant cotton and coffee”. And a Susu leader’s deputy launched a verbal attack against the slave traders, telling them:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is you slave traders who cause all our palavers. It is you who set the people in this country one against another. And what do you bring us for this? We have cloth of our own if you were gone tomorrow we should not be naked. If you were gone we should want but little guns and powder. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This support of the Susu and Temne around Sierra Leone for the colony, its trade, and its African diaspora population meant that the colony seemed like a natural fit for the British when they were looking for a way of enforcing their Slave Trade Act in 1807 to end the Atlantic slave trade. The British based an anti-slave trade naval patrol in the colony, as well as a court for processing captured slave ships. </p>
<p>The Sierra Leone Company was happy to hand over control to the British government, but it was the people on the ground whose successful trading relationships had built a growing city with markets, accommodation, infrastructure and, most importantly, a sense of security for the thousands of resettled enslaved people who would soon see its population soar. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A street with buildings and cars." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532155/original/file-20230615-17-t5rpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A street in Freetown, Sierra Leon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-a-street-in-freetown-sierra-leon-news-photo/179668674?adppopup=true">Original Artwork: Hatch Collection. Hulton Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>There is a misconception that Britain was the first to abolish the slave trade and that it brought enlightened anti-slavery ideas to Africa. This misconception was used to justify the spread of colonial rule in the 19th century. But the history of Sierra Leone shows that, in order to enforce their abolition decrees, the British had to rely on African states and polities that had already turned against the slave trade.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207382/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bronwen Everill received funding from the Leverhulme Trust and the Huntington Library for this research. </span></em></p>Africans should get more credit for the abolition of the slave trade.Bronwen Everill, Director, Centre for African Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049242023-05-31T13:26:44Z2023-05-31T13:26:44ZFree secondary education in African countries is on the rise - but is it the best policy? What the evidence says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525851/original/file-20230512-29-k330gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa's secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those of other world regions'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Dorey/Contributor/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When President Salva Kiir <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/south-sudan-expands-access-free-education">announced the abolition of secondary school fees</a> in South Sudan in February 2023, he was following several fellow African leaders. </p>
<p><a href="https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/news-style2/364-president-akufo-addo-launches-free-shs-policy">Ghana</a>, <a href="https://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Gratuite-des-inscriptions-dans-les-etablissements-scolaires-publics.html">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-abolishessecondary-school-tuition-fees-full-free-education-by-jan-2019/">Malawi</a>, <a href="https://statehouse.gov.sl/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-andteachers-to-support-the-initiative/">Sierra Leone</a>, <a href="https://togobreakingnews.info/togo-gratuite-frais-de-scolarite-secondaire/">Togo</a>, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202202030616.html">Zambia</a> have all announced free secondary education policies in the last five years. Rwanda, Kenya and South Africa were early trendsetters in this regard.</p>
<p>Despite its popularity with policymakers, parents and other stakeholders, the abolition of secondary school fees in resource-constrained contexts is still a subject of debate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://southafrica.un.org/en/191051-african-leaders-launch-education-plus-initiative#:%7E:text=Education%20Plus%20calls%20for%20free,to%2Dwork%20transitions%2C%20and%20economic">African Union</a>, global NGOs like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/31/millions-children-denied-free-secondary-education">Human Rights Watch</a> and various United Nations agencies are in favour. </p>
<p>Others are sceptical. They highlight financial sustainability and equity implications, especially at the upper secondary level. A report by the Malala Fund, a global education NGO, <a href="https://r4d.org/resources/financing-upper-secondary-education-unlocking-12-years-education/">argued</a> that free upper secondary education “would be regressive in nature” and might not be affordable for low-income countries. </p>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/8fa2c.html">systematic review</a> to take stock of the evidence. We conclude that free secondary education can be costly and inequitable in the short run, especially if it diverts resources from primary education. Based on these findings, we recommend a policy of “progressive universalism”: free education should be introduced gradually, starting with the lowest levels. </p>
<h2>Setting the scene</h2>
<p>Many African countries abolished primary school fees in the 1990s and early 2000s. This led to a <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a55bc38c-5d2b-5932-83e4-debc56e30da9">major rise in enrolment</a>. But secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those in other world regions. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS?locations=ZG">Less than half</a> of children in sub-Saharan Africa complete lower secondary education, compared to around 80% in South Asia and Latin America. High fees and related costs are a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a5b40f0b6497400056a/School-fees-2012-Morgan-report.pdf">major impediment</a>, particularly for children from low-income backgrounds.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A map of Africa, marked with various shades of red to indicate which countries have free secondary education" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Free secondary education policies in sub-Saharan Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors supplied</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The number of sub-Saharan Africa countries with free secondary education policies in place has increased rapidly over the last two decades. Almost half of all African countries now offer fee-free education at the lower secondary level. Almost one in three does so at the upper secondary level. The aim of the recent wave of free secondary education policies is to raise overall education levels – and, ultimately, countries’ <a href="https://cocorioko.net/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-and-teachers-to-support-the-initiative/">broader prosperity and social conditions</a>. </p>
<p>Abolishing school fees is also <a href="https://www.ghgossip.com/ghana-election-2020-free-shs-alone-can-boost-500k-votes-to-npps-win-franklin-cudjoe/">popular with voters</a>. This may have been on the minds of politicians seeking to win or maintain power.</p>
<h2>The cost of free education</h2>
<p>There are two major problems with secondary school fee abolition in resource-constrained states. The first is that, in most African countries, the majority of children from poor households would be ineligible for free secondary education. In Somalia, Niger and Mozambique, less than one in five of the poorest children <a href="https://www.education-inequalities.org/indicators/comp_prim_v2#maxYear=2019&minYear=2014&ageGroup=%22comp_prim_v2%22&dimension=%7B%22id%22%3A%22wealth_quintile%22%2C%22filters%22%3A%5B%22Quintile+1%22%2C%22Quintile+5%22%5D%7D&countries=%5B%22BDI%22%2C%22BEN%22%2C%22BFA%22%2C%22CAF%22%2C%22CIV%22%2C%22CMR%22%2C%22COD%22%2C%22COG%22%2C%22COM%22%2C%22ETH%22%2C%22GAB%22%2C%22GHA%22%2C%22GIN%22%2C%22GMB%22%2C%22GNB%22%2C%22KEN%22%2C%22LBR%22%2C%22LSO%22%2C%22MDG%22%2C%22MLI%22%2C%22MOZ%22%2C%22MRT%22%2C%22MWI%22%2C%22NAM%22%2C%22NER%22%2C%22NGA%22%2C%22RWA%22%2C%22SEN%22%2C%22SLE%22%2C%22SOM%22%2C%22SSD%22%2C%22STP%22%2C%22SWZ%22%2C%22TCD%22%2C%22TGO%22%2C%22TZA%22%2C%22UGA%22%2C%22ZAF%22%2C%22ZMB%22%2C%22ZWE%22%5D">complete primary school</a>. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/only-1-in-3-girls-makes-it-to-secondary-school-in-senegal-heres-why-and-how-to-fix-it-200294">Only 1 in 3 girls makes it to secondary school in Senegal: here's why and how to fix it</a>
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<p>Moreover, even those eligible for free secondary education are often unable to attend. School fees constitute <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/facing-forward-schooling-for-learning-in-africa">less than half</a> of households’ education spending in most African countries. Most free secondary education policies do not cover the cost of essential non-fee expenses such as textbooks, school uniforms, meals and transport. Nominally “free” secondary education can therefore be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059311000101">unaffordable for low-income households</a>. This means the benefits of fee abolition would mainly accrue to children from relatively privileged households and not help those who needed it most.</p>
<p>The second problem is that enacting these policies is very expensive. Empirical evidence from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305764X.2020.1789066">Ghana</a>, The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/33/1/185/2420643?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Gambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775721000467">Kenya</a> and other countries shows that free secondary education policies can substantially increase secondary school enrolment and completion rates in the short run. But they do so at a very high cost: the average expense per senior secondary student is <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/node/819#:%7E:text=2015-,Pricing%20the%20right%20to%20education%3A%20The%20cost,reaching%20new%20targets%20by%202030&text=This%20paper%20shows%20there%20is,and%20lower%20middle%20income%20countries">equivalent to that of five primary school pupils</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277051/africa-sovereigns-left-exposed-to-looming-debt-crisis-afdb/">precarious financial position</a> of many African states, providing free secondary schooling to the entire population is likely to be fiscally unsustainable. </p>
<p>It may also divert scarce resources away from basic education, which is already chronically underfunded. In Malawi for example, which recently abolished secondary school fees, there are <a href="https://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/packed-classrooms-reality-educational-planners-malawi-13351">more than 70 students</a> per primary school teacher.</p>
<h2>What is to be done?</h2>
<p>Access to education is <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/human-rights/universal-declaration/translations/english">a human right</a>. In an ideal world, the global community would ensure that all children could enjoy a full cycle of free, high-quality education. </p>
<p>Most African countries are far removed from this scenario, however. Policymakers must balance the potential benefits of abolishing secondary school fees against the urgent need for investment in basic education. </p>
<p>In many cases, this would suggest a phased approach to introducing free education, which prioritises public spending on basic education in the short run, while asking wealthier households to contribute to the cost of higher levels of education. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/662580">A good example</a> is South Africa’s fee-free schools policy, which was designed to increase enrolment in the poorest districts.</p>
<p><em>Mohammed Alhassan Abango and Leslie Casely-Hayford of Associates for Change, Ghana co-authored this article and the research it is based upon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research project on which this article is based was funded by the British Academy.</span></em></p>The introduction of free education should follow a gradual process, starting with the lowest levels.Rob Gruijters, Associate Professor in Education & International Development, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062992023-05-28T08:25:08Z2023-05-28T08:25:08ZWhat makes peace talks successful? The 4 factors that matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528036/original/file-20230524-15-o7zx4n.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peace talks that seek to end armed conflicts are underway in several African countries. Because very few conflicts are resolved on the battlefield, negotiations are fundamental. But they often fail. And even when an agreement is concluded, it doesn’t always last. </p>
<p>So what are the factors that lead to successful peace talks? </p>
<p>To start, negotiating peace is complex. If it wasn’t, conflicts would be resolved more quickly and peace would last longer. Recognising this complexity is essential. </p>
<p>Significant expertise has been developed in the field of peace mediation over the past decades. The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/107-au-mediation-support-unit">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support">United Nations</a> have set up mediation teams. Several specialised non-governmental organisations have been created, like the South Africa-based organisation <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/work/peacemaking/">Accord</a> and the Switzerland-based <a href="https://hdcentre.org/about/">Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>These actors, along with regional powers and other states, often roll out several peace initiatives simultaneously. This can be helpful to deal with the complexity of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/persons/philipp-kastner/publications/">international law and peace scholar</a>, I have analysed many different peace negotiations and agreements. There have been some great successes in Africa, such as the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MZ_921004_MozambiqueGeneralPeaceAgreement.pdf">1992 peace agreement</a> that ended the 16-year long civil war in Mozambique. </p>
<p>But there have also been spectacular failures, like in Sierra Leone, where fighting flared up just after the conclusion of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf">comprehensive agreement in 1999</a>. And there are several ongoing conflicts that urgently require a peaceful resolution, for example in <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/jeddah-agreement-welcomed-but-also-met-with-scepticism-in-sudan">Sudan</a>, the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/HRC/51/59&Lang=E">Central African Republic</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. </p>
<p>Based on my research, I would argue that there are four key factors that make (or break) mediation efforts. These include a sustained commitment from several actors to building peace; serious efforts to develop trust and listen to grievances; an attunement to timing; and an acceptance of peace as a process. </p>
<h2>Building peace</h2>
<p>First, peace has a better chance when war is attacked from several sides. Multiple mediation processes can facilitate the inclusion of different stakeholders, such as civil society actors. This is crucial, precisely because more inclusive processes <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786610256/Conflict-Intervention-and-Transformation-Theory-and-Practice">increase the chances</a> of durable peace. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, it can be problematic when too many actors are involved. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan’s ongoing conflict</a>, this has led to a <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Third-Party-Mediation-in-Sudan-and-South-Sudan-Digital.pdf">piecemeal approach</a> and to <a href="https://peacerep.org/publication/third-party-mediation-in-sudan-and-south-sudan-longer-term-trends/">unhelpful competition</a> between different regional and international actors who often pursue their own interests. </p>
<p>Second, the organisation or the specific mediator in question must be trusted by the parties. A good example of this is the Catholic Community of Sant-Egidio, which facilitated the <a href="https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/34180/langID/en/Dossier-Mozambique-and-the-Community-of-Sant-Egidio.html">conclusion of the peace agreement</a> in Mozambique. </p>
<p>Building trust and listening to grievances is important. This helps find creative solutions that give guarantees to all the parties and allow them to imagine a common future.</p>
<p>But contrary to ordinary understandings of mediation, peace mediators don’t have to be perfectly neutral and unbiased. Blaise Compaoré, the former president of Burkina Faso, mediated the 2007 negotiations between the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the rebellious Forces Nouvelles, which Compaoré had <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2003-1-page-71.htm">overtly supported</a>. In the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_070304_Accord%20Politique%20de%20Ouagadougou%20%28French%29.pdf">agreement</a> that followed, the parties made Compaoré an arbitrator in the implementation phase. In other words, a mediator can be an insider who has close relationships with one of the parties.</p>
<p>A third factor for successful peace talks is timing. Since negotiations typically take place in the shadow of military gains and losses, it’s often assumed that it only makes sense to start negotiations when both sides believe that they can gain more from negotiating than from fighting. </p>
<p>But waiting for the “ripe moment” to start high-level negotiations is problematic. It can prolong a conflict unnecessarily and lead to extreme suffering. In Sudan – where the national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have been fighting each other since mid-April 2023 – more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-than-1-mln-people-displaced-by-sudan-crisis-un-refugee-agency-2023-05-19/">one million people</a> have already been displaced. And in the Ethiopian region of Tigray, a <a href="https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AU-led-Ethiopia-Peace-Agreement.pdf">ceasefire agreement</a> was concluded in November 2022, but only after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/11/joy-and-grief-as-tigray-reconnects-to-the-world">hundreds of thousands of people</a> had been killed over two years of conflict.</p>
<p>Therefore, peace actors should constantly search for entry points to create opportunities for building peace instead of waiting for the perfect conditions. They can convince the conflict parties that negotiations are not zero-sum games and don’t automatically lead to painful compromises. </p>
<p>Fourth, how “peace” is understood plays a major role. It’s often thought that no fighting means peace, and that an agreement will end violence and suffering almost instantly. This is rarely true. An agreement is only one small step in an often long process.</p>
<p>Moreover, while a ceasefire is always desirable because it means less violence and less suffering, it’s not absolutely necessary to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/peace-talks-ukraine-russias-red-lines-unchanged-2022-03-30/">negotiate substantive issues</a>. Many negotiations, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War">Bosnia</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20319583">Colombia</a>, have been held while fighting continued, and yet a substantive peace agreement was eventually concluded. </p>
<p>And it can be alright to agree to disagree: not everything can or needs to be resolved in the same deal. Some root causes of conflict, like the historical marginalisation of minority groups or of certain regions, can be difficult to tackle. But it’s possible to put in place measures and mechanisms to envisage improvements. </p>
<p>Partial agreements can be a good option, even if this approach obviously takes time. In Senegal, for example, it’s only earlier this year, after decades of conflict and many years of mediation, that one of the factions of the rebellious Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance <a href="https://hdcentre.org/news/une-faction-du-mfdc-signe-la-cessation-des-hostilites-avec-le-gouvernement-du-senegal-et-depose-definitivement-les-armes/">agreed to lay down its weapons</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s vital to do more to prevent armed conflicts in the first place. Continuously <a href="https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0">rising military expenditures</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/">few restrictions</a> on weapons sales mean that weapons are easily available in many places. The international community should, therefore, urgently make more efforts to halt the massive production and circulation of weapons. </p>
<p>And although every conflict has its own dynamics, poverty, global inequalities and exploitation are always significant factors. Tackling these issues isn’t straightforward, but it would help prevent and resolve armed conflicts, and would pay off in the long run. </p>
<p>Peace is a process, and it requires significant commitment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agreement to end conflict is only one small step in an often long process.Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2038822023-05-25T12:27:09Z2023-05-25T12:27:09ZAfrica is getting renewed attention from Washington — and some African states are courting African Americans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527594/original/file-20230522-25-4eb04j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C0%2C4283%2C3890&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden delivers remarks at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington on Dec. 15, 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-delivers-remarks-alongside-secretary-of-news-photo/1449457317?adppopup=true">Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent allegations by the U.S. ambassador to South Africa that the African nation <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/11/world/africa/us-south-africa-russia-weapons.html?searchResultPosition=1">gave ammunition and weapons to Russia</a> in December 2022, amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, illustrate the complexity of U.S.-Africa relations. </p>
<p>Even as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aa650020-030b-4ff8-9741-be1314e39eac">South Africa investigates those claims</a>, the Biden administration is trying to strengthen ties with the African Union, a continental member organization, and 49 of Africa’s 54 countries, including South Africa, on <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/">geopolitical and commercial </a> issues.</p>
<p>The only African countries the U.S. is not courting <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3773942-these-five-african-countries-were-not-invited-to-bidens-summit/">are four that were suspended</a> from the African Union, and Eritrea, a country with which the United States doesn’t have a formal relationship.</p>
<p>The U.S. is making this grand African play as it <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26301066">competes with China to influence the continent’s future</a>. And while this particular U.S.-China contest is relatively new, U.S. involvement in Africa is not. </p>
<p>The way the U.S. has been involved on the continent, though, has changed over time, depending on the era, U.S. interests and a particular African nation’s needs. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/essays/uspolicy/">In 1822, for example, the U.S. began to send freeborn African Americans</a> and emancipated former enslaved African Americans to Africa, where they settled the colony that would eventually become Liberia. That settlement was originally governed by white Americans. </p>
<p>After Liberia <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/liberian-independence-proclaimed">became a self-governing, Black republic in 1847</a>, it relied heavily on U.S. financial assistance. By 1870, that assistance came by way of high-interest loans.</p>
<h2>Decolonization and US interest in Africa</h2>
<p>U.S. involvement with other African states took root after various countries, formerly governed by colonial powers, entered into self-rule. American policy objectives on the continent centered around U.S. strategic interests and came in the form of military and economic aid. </p>
<p>The U.S., for example, established diplomatic relationships with <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-egypt/">Egypt in 1922</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/">Sudan in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-ghana/">Ghana in 1957</a>, after those countries gained independence from the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>Beginning in <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d27">the late 1950s</a>, when other African countries gained independence, the U.S. formed diplomatic and commercial ties with them as well and worked to reduce the Soviet Union’s influence on the continent. In 1961 and 1962, the U.S. persuaded West African countries <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/25770/chapter-abstract/193342868?redirectedFrom=fulltext">to deny the Soviet Union commercial flyover and landing rights</a> in their territories.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.ushistory.org/us/59e.asp">the Cold War ended</a>, the U.S. <a href="https://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org/read/united-states-africa-relations-in-the-age-of-obama/section/4f22d59e-2be7-41b7-ba61-d965e80fa4bf">lacked clear policy objectives</a> toward Africa, and interaction between the superpower and the continent waned.</p>
<h2>Renewed US interest in Africa</h2>
<p>In the 21st century, the U.S. began to turn its attention back to Africa as a way of pushing its strategic interests and strengthening commercial and diplomatic ties with African countries.</p>
<p>In 2000, during the Clinton administration, Congress enacted the <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a> to open American markets to eligible African countries. </p>
<p>Then, in 2003, President George W. Bush <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/72424694-a86e-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04">launched the global health initiative</a>, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, that has been the U.S.’s most significant action on the continent since its nearly 250-year enslavement of Africans - first as Colonial America, then the U.S. - from 1619 to 1865.</p>
<p>Known as PEPFAR, the initiative is credited with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-george-w-bush-government-and-politics-1950277193678c96bbdae61db9be9687">saving 21 million lives</a>, mostly in Africa and the Caribbean. </p>
<p>More recently, the U.S. has held <a href="https://qz.com/us-africa-leaders-summit-biden-obama-1849873793">two U.S.-Africa Leaders Summits</a>. President Barack Obama <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit">hosted the first one</a> in 2014, and President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/">held the second one in 2022</a>. And, as part of the Biden administration’s Africa outreach, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/27/world/africa/kamala-harris-visit.html">Vice President Kamala Harris visited </a> Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia in March 2023 to discuss security and economic issues with leaders of those countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in a pants suit on the left and suited man on the right walk on a red carpet. Behind them on the left stands the American flag. Behind them on the right stands the Zambian flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527595/original/file-20230522-25-d55bb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vice President Kamala Harris and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema walk outside the State House in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, on March 31, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vice-president-kamala-harris-and-zambian-president-hakainde-news-photo/1250104734?adppopup=true">Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>It’s not just about diplomacy</h2>
<p>Yet, the relationships between the U.S. and African nations run deeper than government-to-government partnerships or aid.</p>
<p>As Biden said during the December 2022 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/12/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-sall-of-the-republic-of-senegal-at-the-u-s-africa-leaders-summit-dinner/">U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit dinner</a>: “Our people lie at the heart of the deep and profound connection that forever binds Africa and the United States together. We remember the stolen men and women and children who were brought to our shores in chains, subjected to unimaginable cruelty. My nation’s original sin was that period.”</p>
<p>As the U.S. courts Africa broadly, African countries, such as <a href="https://vindicatornewspapersl.com/?p=990">Sierra Leone</a>, <a href="https://frontpageafricaonline.com/news/liberia-bracing-to-welcome-thousands-home-in-greatest-reunion-since-slavery-era/">Liberia</a> and others, are courting African Americans, encouraging them to visit, set up homes and establish businesses and economic ties in their ancestral homeland. No country has made more of an effort than <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ghana-accra-barbara-oteng-gyasi-floyd-disapora-1509845">Ghana,</a> which, for example, is making <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ghana-to-black-americans-come-home-well-help-you-build-a-life-here/2020/07/03/1b11a914-b4e3-11ea-9a1d-d3db1cbe07ce_story.html">special accommodation for Americans who purchase land</a> there.</p>
<h2>Invitation to the motherland</h2>
<p>In 2000, the Ghanaian <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora">Parliament passed a Citizenship Act</a>, which grants the right of dual citizenship to people of Ghanaian descent. African Americans have been able to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-slavery-usa/an-african-american-mother-and-daughter-journey-to-their-familys-past-in-ghana-idUSKCN1VC16H">trace their ancestry to Ghana</a> and other African countries because of genetic testing. And the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora">Immigration Act,</a> passed the same year, includes a “Right of Abode” that allows anyone in the African diaspora to travel to and from the country freely.</p>
<p>In September 2018, Nana Akufo-Addo, president of Ghana, <a href="https://www.yearofreturn.com/about/">announced a campaign commemorating</a> the 400-year anniversary of the first enslaved Africans brought to Jamestown, Virginia, with a goal of spurring African American business, investment and tourism in the West African nation. Ghana has long promised African Americans and other people in the African diaspora <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/2019-year-return-african-diaspora">dual citizenship rights</a> and business opportunities. Ghanaian leaders have made it clear that they want African Americans and others to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/ghana-looks-long-relationship-african-americans-investment">invest</a> in the country.</p>
<p>Since the Year of Return, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/back-to-roots-why-african-americans-are-flocking-to-ghana/a-64403580">at least 1,500 African Americans have received citizenship rights</a> in Ghana, and some 5,000 African Americans <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/black-americans-leave-racism-in-us-to-reclaim-destiny-in-ghana/">have made Ghana their permanent home</a>.</p>
<p>The Ghanaian government launched <a href="https://beyondthereturngh.com/">another campaign in 2020</a> to increase tourism and investment in the country by people in the African diaspora, as well as to deepen social ties between Ghanaians and the diaspora.</p>
<p>Following Ghana’s playbook, in 2021, Senegal worked with African American business leaders <a href="https://qz.com/africa/2022699/senegal-launches-juneteenth-initiative-for-african-americans">to celebrate its first “The Return</a>.” Held on June 19 that year, the event was a historic Juneteenth initiative, <a href="https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories/historical-legacy-juneteenth">modeled after the American holiday</a> to commemorate the end of slavery in the United States and encourage African American investment in the country.</p>
<p>Akufo-Addo may have sparked a 21st century resurgence of trans-Atlantic African appeals to African Americans and other people in the African diaspora.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people stand on sand, near an ocean both behind and in front of a long, elevated white wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527596/original/file-20230522-4578-alwc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">African American tourists hold hands as they enter the ocean during a remembrance ceremony in Ghana, after visiting the ‘Door of No Return’ at Cape Coast Castle. It is where enslaved Africans were held before being taken by force to what would become the United States.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-african-american-tourists-hold-hands-as-they-enter-news-photo/1163080416?adppopup=true">Natalija Gormalova/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the United States government builds economic and security ties with African countries, some of those countries are encouraging African Americans to establish social and economic ties in Africa.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048902023-05-09T12:23:43Z2023-05-09T12:23:43ZPutin may not outrun the warrant for his arrest – history shows that several leaders on the run eventually face charges in court<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524945/original/file-20230508-221323-au50ge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=587%2C284%2C3797%2C2371&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin is shown in Moscow in March 2022, shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1239099202/photo/topshot-russia-belarus-diplomacy.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=3n424YJ42P5f8iJ9ypEUwoPh9b0mtpT2aAr4o6ItF7o=">Mikhaul Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warrant-against-putin-meaningless-russia-does-not-belong-icc-2023-03-17/">The Russian government</a>, U.S. President Joe Biden and <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-03-17/icc-hague-arrest-warrant-putin-ukraine-war-crimes">mainstream Western media</a> are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/13/world/europe/icc-war-crimes-russia-ukraine.html">among the observers</a> who all responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest warrant for war crimes with a shrug. </p>
<p>In March 2023, the International Criminal Court <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">announced the warrant </a> for Putin and his commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, because they allegedly directed the abduction of Ukrainian children. The court says that these charges amount to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml">war crimes</a>.</p>
<p>While Biden said the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/18/joe-biden-welcomes-icc-arrest-warrant-vladimir-putin">arrest warrant was “justified</a>,” he also noted that the International Criminal Court “is not recognized by us either.”</p>
<p>The skeptics have a point – the ICC, based in the Hague, Netherlands, does not have its own police force to execute its orders and must rely on other countries’ police to arrest the people it indicts. </p>
<p>Indeed, there are a number of barriers potentially preventing Putin’s arrest. </p>
<p>One is that Russia, like the United States, is not a member of the court – so as long as Putin does not set foot in a country that is a member of the court, he is safe from arrest. Putin also <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/#:%7E:text=Vladimir%20Putin%27s%20approval%20rating%20in%20Russia%20monthly%201999%2D2023&text=In%20April%202023%2C%20over%2080,it%20stood%20at%2077%20percent">remains popular within Russia</a> and is unlikely to soon be overthrown and turned over by his successor.</p>
<p>But it still would be rash to assume that Putin is safe from the court’s grasp. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=UharJuoAAAAJ&hl=en">am a scholar of criminal justice</a> who specializes in international courts and the creativity that prosecutors show in catching their targets, often under very difficult political circumstances. </p>
<p>History shows that it would require a little bit of good luck for prosecutors – and a few bad decisions by Putin – for the Russian autocrat to end up in handcuffs. But it’s far from impossible.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The silhouette of a phone shows the words, 'Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova/Belova' against a white, blue and red stripped backdrop, with a man's face on the right side of it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524940/original/file-20230508-40482-u4vpqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The ICC’s arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin is seen in a news release in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1248458202/photo/vladimir-putin-international-criminal-court-illustration.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=r-_uveFMIst8mPLuEHZ2rJJZCcFP5sBXeDE-JS8WwJk=">Jonathan Raa/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How international courts work</h2>
<p>A group of 60 countries established the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">International Criminal Court</a> in 2002 to prosecute people who commit the worst crimes, including genocide and wartime sexual violence, that violate international law. The court is part of a long line of international criminal tribunals going back to the military tribunal the U.S. and allies set up to prosecute Nazis at the end of World War II, as part of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Nurnberg-trials">Nuremberg Trials</a>. </p>
<p>There are other international criminal courts that prosecute war crimes, but the ICC is the largest and arguably most influential, since <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties">123 member countries</a> fund the court and abide by its rulings. </p>
<p>Since its inception, the ICC <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-international-criminal-court-2023-03-17/#:%7E:text=The%20judges%20have%20issued%2010,of%20Congo%2C%20Mali%20and%20Uganda.">has issued 38 arrest warrants</a>, arrested 21 people, convicted 10 and acquitted four. Other suspects, like Putin, remain at large or have had their charges dropped. </p>
<p>Yet there are a number of options for prosecuting war crimes outside of the ICC that have been used in the past.</p>
<p>There are also other, smaller tribunals similar to the ICC that countries have helped set up to focus on specific conflicts. In other cases, individual countries can use their own courts to prosecute international criminals who have evaded arrest abroad.</p>
<p>In the case of the Ukraine war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called for a new international tribunal to prosecute <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/04/zelensky-hague-speech-putin-ukraine-russia-icc-special-tribunal-nuremberg/">war crimes committed by Russia during the conflict</a>. Others have argued that Putin could be prosecuted in <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/prosecuting-putin/">a Ukrainian court specifically designed for this purpose</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Black man in a grey suit looks at the camera, surrounded by someone in a judge's black robe and what appear to be security guards in navy outfits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524943/original/file-20230508-195023-gjpga3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Liberian President Charles Taylor appears in court in July 2006 in the Netherlands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/71493600/photo/former-liberian-president-charles-taylor.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=fcL1dLZaJCAdx7DJFteUmx3wkfxIYpVDa1SxUYqSCfE=">Rob Keeris/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lessons for Putin</h2>
<p>There have been several long but ultimately successful efforts to arrest fallen political leaders and mass murderers. </p>
<p>For example, Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia who helped instigate a civil war in neighboring Sierra Leone in the 1990s, is now serving a 50-year prison sentence in the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>Prosecutors from an international tribunal set up in Sierra Leone announced Taylor’s indictment when he was in Ghana in 2002, forcing him to quickly flee a political conference and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/05/world/war-crimes-indictment-of-liberian-president-is-disclosed.html?searchResultPosition=4">head home for safety</a>. But Taylor then <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/former-liberian-president-charles-taylor-found-guilty-of-war-crimes#:%7E:text=After%20a%20peace%20deal%20was,was%20forced%20out%20in%202003.">fell from power</a> in 2003, in the midst of a rebel insurgency. He then fled to Nigeria. </p>
<p>Eventually, Nigerian authorities <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/73802/liberia-15-years-later-we-remember-the-long-hunt-for-charles-taylor/">arrested Taylor and handed him back to Liberia, which quickly passed him off to Sierra Leone for trial</a> in 2006. He was then <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/26/world/africa/netherlands-taylor-sentencing/index.html">convicted in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Slobodan Milošević, the late president of Yugoslavia, was <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan_en.pdf">indicted by an international tribunal</a> that addressed the Balkans wars – along with two of his cronies, <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf">Ratko Mladić</a> and <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf">Radovan Karadžić</a> –- for crimes committed against civilians during the wars in the 1990s. </p>
<p>They, too, initially evaded jurisdiction - Milošević initially remained in power, while Mladić and Karadžić went into hiding. Serbian authorities ultimately <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/06/29/serb-leaders-hand-over-milosevic-for-trial-by-war-crimes-tribunal/a209e0ed-e7d5-428e-a462-d0999d29961c/#:%7E:text=The%20decision%20to%20relinquish%20Milosevic,a%20historic%20battlefield%20in%20Kosovo.">handed Milošević over</a> to the International Criminal Court in 2001, months after he stepped down from his post in 2000. Serbian police arrested Mladić and Karadžić about a decade later. </p>
<p>All three faced trial in the Hague. Milošević died while on trial in 2006. <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/06/1093582">Mladić and Karadžić </a> are now serving <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47642327#:%7E:text=After%20the%20war%2C%20Karadzic%20hid,and%20genocide%20in%20November%202017">life sentences</a>. </p>
<p>And in Finland, former Sierra Leone rebel group leader <a href="https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/gibril-massaquoi/">Gibril Massaquoi</a> is facing trial for <a href="https://civitas-maxima.org/2021/01/25/trial-of-former-ruf-commander-set-to-begin-before-finnish-court/">war crimes</a> he committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war from 1991 to 2002. </p>
<p>Prosecutors at a Sierra Leone tribunal granted Massaquoi immunity in 2009 in exchange for his testimony against other rebels. He then relocated to Finland under a witness protection program. </p>
<p>But that did not stop Finnish prosecutors, who <a href="https://civitas-maxima.org/legal-work/our-cases/gibril-massaquoi/">arrested Massaquoi in March 2020</a>. His trial is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finnish-appeals-court-begins-liberia-war-crime-hearing-2023-01-10/">currently under appeal</a> in Finnish court system following Massaquoi’s acquittal by a lower Finish court in 2022.</p>
<h2>Even without prosecution, life won’t be good</h2>
<p>There are people such as Omar Al-Bashir, the former president of Sudan, who have so far avoided extradition to an international court. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir in 2009 for allegedly committing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan</a>. Al-Bashir <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/26/sudan-former-president-accused-of-genocide-may-be-free-after-prison-attack">remains in Sudan</a> and has continued to avoid the ICC’s arrest warrant. But with the current <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65495539">civil war in Sudan</a>, the warring powers may yet conclude that they’re better off with Al-Bashir in the Hague and away from Sudan.</p>
<p>But even if Putin isn’t prosecuted, his life will probably get much more difficult as a result of the arrest warrant. </p>
<p>When the late Chilean dictator <a href="https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1285&context=ilsajournal">Augusto Pinochet</a> left office in 1998, he declared himself “Senator for Life,” ensuring under Chilean law that he would never be prosecuted for the tortures, killings and disappearances of leftist political opponents that <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chile-dictator-augusto-pinochet-atrocities-secrects/">took place on his watch</a>. </p>
<p>But while Pinochet was receiving care for a back injury in London, a Spanish judge requested his extradition to Spain, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1998/oct/18/pinochet.chile">he was arrested by British police</a> in 1998.</p>
<p>After over a year of legal limbo, the British government declared that Pinochet was mentally unfit for extradition and returned him to Chile. By then, he was a very diminished man and the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna16139367">target of many lawsuits</a> before his death in 2006. </p>
<p>Putin may ultimately elude prosecution, but not the effects of the charges against him. </p>
<p>History shows that prosecutors are willing to wait for years for their targets to either fall from power or make that crucial mistake that exposes them to arrest, such as a medical emergency abroad or a visit to a country that is willing to cooperate with international prosecutors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron Fichtelberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The International Criminal Court announced an arrest warrant for Putin and his children’s rights commissioner in March 2023, alleging the illegal abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children.Aaron Fichtelberg, Associate Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of DelawareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992742023-02-23T13:42:14Z2023-02-23T13:42:14ZAfrica’s first heat officer is based in Freetown – 5 things that should be on her agenda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511378/original/file-20230221-22-2abbei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Eugenia Kargbo has an unusual job: she is the city of Freetown’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/06/world/africa/eugenia-kargbo-chief-heat-officer-africa.html">chief heat officer</a>. Her role in Sierra Leone’s capital is the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-01-21/how-africa-s-first-heat-officer-confronts-climate-change">first of its kind in Africa</a>. She has been tasked with raising public awareness about extreme heat, improving responses to heat waves, and collecting, analysing and visualising heat impact data for the city, which is home to <a href="https://populationstat.com/sierra-leone/freetown">1.2 million people</a>. </p>
<p>Freetown is increasingly threatened by dangerous temperatures. In 2017, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://chinadialogueocean.net/en/governance/19162-sea-level-rise-sierra-leone-sinking-islands/">ranked Sierra Leone third</a>, after Bangladesh and Guinea Bissau, on its list of countries most vulnerable to climate change. </p>
<p>The risks are concentrated in its capital and largest city, Freetown, where some <a href="https://www.mayorsmigrationcouncil.org/gcf-res/freetown-sierra-leone">35%</a> of the population live in 74 informal settlements like Kroo Bay, often in disaster-prone areas like the seafront or hillsides. Houses are densely built and typically temporary structures made of “heat traping” materials. Services that supports cooling, such as water and electricity, are usually inadequate. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.acu.ac.uk/get-involved/commonwealth-climate-research-cohort/theme-cities/dr-olumuyiwa-adegun/">architect</a> whose work includes <a href="https://theconversation.com/growing-plants-on-buildings-can-reduce-heat-and-produce-healthy-food-in-african-cities-191190">researching ways to reduce heat in African cities</a>, I think the creation of an Heat Officer position is a good move. The world’s cities are almost all getting hotter – and, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/">has warned</a>, temperatures will only keep rising. </p>
<p>But, while this is a global challenge, African cities are unique. The significant proportion of urban dwellers who are poor and those whose living conditions do not provide adequate shelter from the elements make the African context unique and deserving special attention. </p>
<p>With these realities in mind, here are five things I’d suggest should be on the agenda of both Kargbo and any other heat officer appointed elsewhere on the continent in future. </p>
<h2>1. Take a diverse approach to urban greening</h2>
<p>Nature-based approaches are a great way to address increasing temperatures linked to climate change. <a href="https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/en/publications/african-urbanism-the-geography-of-urban-greenery">Scholars have established</a> positive links between green infrastructure, temperature moderation and even health outcomes in African cities as well as elsewhere in the world.</p>
<p>This has informed a growing number of tree-planting initiatives and the development of urban parks. But it is important that municipalities move beyond only these kinds of spaces. African cities are becoming densely populated; that means less space will be available for greening initiatives on land. </p>
<p>Vertical systems of building (for example on walls, roofs, columns) and urban infrastructure (for example on bridges, road furniture) should be explored to make up for the lack of space on the ground.</p>
<p>In the last few years, <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbuil.2022.874751/full">I have led the design and development of experimental vertical gardens</a> in low-income areas of Nigeria and Tanzania. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jue/article/8/1/juac016/6726544">We have shown </a> that these vertical gardens reduce wall temperature of residential buildings by as much as 5°C in Dar es Salaam. The gardens have other benefits like providing fresh vegetables for household consumption. Similar ways of growing vegetation vertically have been seen elsewhere in the world, including in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/oct/30/mexico-city-via-verde-vertical-gardens-pollution-climate-change">Mexico City</a>.</p>
<h2>2. Strengthen the link between heat and health</h2>
<p>Exposure to extreme heat usually comes with health problems – and can even kill people, <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbuil.2022.874751/full">as I</a> and many other scholars <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34846569/">have documented</a>. It exacerbates underlying health conditions. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heat-stress-is-rising-in-southern-africa-climate-experts-show-where-and-when-its-worst-198455">Heat stress is rising in southern Africa – climate experts show where and when it’s worst</a>
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<p>One area of concern when it comes to the heat-health nexus in African countries is that <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32584659/">mosquito numbers increase in higher temperatures</a>. This means malaria and other diseases transmitted by mosquitoes might become <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2542519621001327">significant problems</a> for Freetown and other African cities. </p>
<p>These health problems are further complicated by the fact that many city dwellers across the continent <a href="https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article/27/suppl_1/i46/603713">can’t access adequate and affordable health care</a>. Community health initiatives within cities and efforts to ramp up health services in qualitative and quantitative terms must be integral to heat adaptation plans and actions. </p>
<h2>3. Focus on early warning and improved awareness</h2>
<p>It is far better to be proactive than reactive. Heat vulnerability patterns within Freetown and other African cities must be studied and used to make sense of weather predictions in order to inform warning systems. </p>
<p>In the warning systems, for example, an alert level can be triggered when the weather forecast shows three or more consecutive days with daytime maximum temperature and humidity above a threshold of, say, 30°C. Other levels of alerts can correspond with higher temperatures. This sort of system has been <a href="https://www.toronto.ca/community-people/health-wellness-care/health-programs-advice/hot-weather/about-torontos-heat-relief-strategy/">implemented</a> in Toronto, Canada, with good outcomes. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.17269/s41997-022-00665-1">A recent study</a> of urban areas in Ontario (the province where Toronto is located) shows that early warnings may have meant fewer heat-related illnesses severe enough to warrant hospital or clinic visits. </p>
<h2>4. Encourage the transfer of knowledge</h2>
<p>Cities can adapt to heat faster when they share knowledge and experiences. Some scholars <a href="https://en.x-mol.com/paper/article/1481026728131448832">argue</a> that inter-city collaboration and knowledge-sharing can enhance municipalities’ resilience and improve urban residents’ skills to deal with heat-related issues.</p>
<p>Kargbo’s work will generate many lessons that can be shared with other African cities; she, too, will learn from other cities’ successes and failures</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/growing-more-plants-and-trees-can-cut-down-the-heat-in-nigerian-cities-82185">Growing more plants and trees can cut down the heat in Nigerian cities</a>
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<p>. </p>
<h2>5. Let locals lead</h2>
<p>While there is plenty to learn from more developed countries outside Africa, it is important to also draw from local indigenous knowledge and practices. An examination of knowledge and awareness about climate-related and environmental problems in African traditional society <a href="https://pubag.nal.usda.gov/catalog/6017059">shows</a> there is much to be learned from indigenous systems.</p>
<p>Top-down approaches are not enough. They must be complemented by bottom-up approaches in the planning, funding, execution and assessment of heat adaptation initiatives. </p>
<p>Inclusion is also important because it shifts power to those who are most affected by heat – people living in low-income and informal areas <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004221012177">are disproportionately affected</a>. Involving them enhances the impacts of initiatives and interventions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumuyiwa Adegun previously received funding from African Academy of Sciences; DAAD ClimapAfrica Program; Commonwealth Futures Climate Research Cohort Programme</span></em></p>Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone, has a chief heat officer, the first in Africa. She has her work cut out for her.Olumuyiwa Adegun, Senior Lecturer, Department of Architecture, Federal University of Technology, AkureLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956642022-12-22T06:14:50Z2022-12-22T06:14:50ZWest Africa has experienced a wave of coups - superficial democracy is to blame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501303/original/file-20221215-19-ea9qw6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small group of protesters holds Russia and Burkina flags as they protest against the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa has seen <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> and military takeovers in three countries in 2022. Like those of the past, they came with promises of a quick return to civilian regimes once socio-economic and political challenges had been met. The challenges are usually listed as inept governance, corruption, rising insecurity and popular revolts amid economic hardship.</p>
<p>One <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_1">view</a> of governance on the African continent is that liberal democracy has spread since the 2000s, bringing an end to dictatorships. Most African countries, it’s argued, have multiparty democracies with elected governments.</p>
<p>My own <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">view</a> is that a mere introduction of electoral democracy is not sufficient. A strong democracy needs strong institutions to build resilience against fragility. Poverty and insecurity are an indication of fragility. They show that institutions are not efficiently distributing wealth. Civil rule is under threat as long as institutions remain fragile.</p>
<p>In my opinion, based on <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49348-6_2">my research</a>, is that the failure of civilian governments to improve living conditions, provide leadership and protect citizens is a major threat to democracy in the west African sub-region.</p>
<h2>The military never left</h2>
<p>The military continues to wield huge influence in governance in the region. Citizens don’t seem willing or able to challenge this.<br>
In Nigeria, for example, since the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/abacha-abiola-and-nigerias-1999-transition-civilian-rule">return to civil rule in 1999</a>, former military generals have largely led the country. By the end of the current regime in May 2023, former military rulers will have been civilian presidents too for 16 out of 24 years of civil rule. </p>
<p>Similarly, in Sierra Leone, former military head of state <a href="https://embassyofsierraleone.net/about-embassy/brig-rtd-julius-maada-wonie-bio-president-republic-sierra-leone">Brigadier Maada Bio</a> returned as elected civilian president in 2018.</p>
<p>Election periods in these countries see frequent trips by candidates to the homes of previous military or autocratic leaders, seeking their endorsement. </p>
<p>An example is the move by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adama-Barrow">Gambian president Adama Barrow</a> to form an alliance with the hitherto sit-tight dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58924630">Yahya Jammeh</a>. Jammeh ruled the country for 22 years, starting with a 1994 coup, and sustained himself in office through incessant <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/24/gambia-commission-uncovered-ex-presidents-alleged-crimes">human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Barrow gave Jammeh a soft landing before going on to renege on his agreement to resign and transfer power. He is now relying on support from the old order to stay in power, knowing that his popularity with the people has diminished. </p>
<h2>A toothless regional bloc</h2>
<p>The return of civil rule to Nigeria in 1999 ushered in a sense that military coups and autocratic regimes in the region would end. </p>
<p>The presidency of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Olusegun-Obasanjo">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> and the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (ECOWAS) were diplomatically active against military coups. But more recently it appears that the regional bloc is <a href="https://dailytrust.com/of-coup-detat-and-political-fragility-in-west-africa/">relatively weak and individual countries are challenged by economic, social, political and security issues</a>. </p>
<p>Citizens are dissatisfied with multilateral institutions – such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2018.1417899?journalCode=rsaj20">ECOWAS</a> and the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>. These bodies may be quick to condemn military takeovers, but they are slow to express concern about poor governance, such as altering of constitutions for regime survival. </p>
<p>Governments have failed to deliver on the promises that got them elected. This failure has led to growing dissatisfaction and a quest for alternatives. In some cases, citizens welcome the military, as witnessed in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-crowd-celebrates-west-africas-latest-coup-2022-01-25/">Burkina Faso</a>.</p>
<p>Common to most of the military takeovers in the sub-region is the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa">failure of the civilian regimes to deliver</a>. Rising insecurity and worsening living conditions remain the fate of the people. These factors have acted as incubators for the return of the military. </p>
<p>In the last 24 months, governments in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup">Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58461971">Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> were toppled in quick succession. </p>
<p>In Mali, outrage over the erstwhile <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60015898">president Ibrahim Keita’s</a> ineffective leadership in the face of rising insecurity and corruption led to his ousting. </p>
<p>In Guinea, the attempt to stay in power by altering the constitution, even in the face of rising inequality, corruption, gross under-performance and human rights violations, led to the ousting of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alpha-Conde">President Alpha Conde</a>. </p>
<p>In Burkina Faso, civilian <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roch-Marc-Christian-Kabore">president Roch Marc Christian Kabore</a> was removed because of rising internal displacement, widespread poverty, inequality and insecurity. Security forces were also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60112043">discontented</a> over his failure to adequately support them against militants linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.</p>
<h2>Democracy is not necessarily good governance</h2>
<p>Although the region has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, it remains superficial. Its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive. </p>
<p>Periodic elections are held, which legitimises civilians in power. But the critical fundamentals that foster democracy are missing: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>informed and active participation</p></li>
<li><p>separation of powers</p></li>
<li><p>respect for the rule of law</p></li>
<li><p>fundamental human rights</p></li>
<li><p>accountability. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>As insecurity rises and living conditions worsen, will the region experience more military takeovers? </p>
<p>Democracy appears to have come to stay in parts of the region, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Others still have work to do in getting the military back to the barracks permanently. </p>
<p>Even governments in the rather more stable nations cannot afford to be complacent. They will have to intensify efforts to deliver the dividends of democracy, if they are to avoid civil unrest or military incursion. </p>
<h2>What will shape the future of democracy in the region</h2>
<p>Nigeria still exhibits fault lines of religion and ethnicity, as well as abuse of privilege by the elites over the rest of the citizens. </p>
<p>Failure to protect the lives, property and rights of citizens fuelled the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2021/02/nigeria-end-impunity-for-police-violence-by-sars-endsars/">“EndSARS” protest</a>, which is fast crystallising into a social movement with potential to make a strong political statement in the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/514001-updated-inec-changes-dates-for-2023-general-elections.html">February 2023</a> elections. </p>
<p>In Ghana, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/police-disperse-protest-over-economic-hardship-ghana-2022-06-28/">local lobby groups have staged street protests</a> amid growing anxiety over <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/560180-ghanaian-cedi-world-worst-performing-currency-as-naira-also-struggles.html">economic conditions</a> in the country and rising allegations of corruption and government lethargy.</p>
<p>The future of democracy in the region will depend on the level of development in democratic institutions, level of military sophistication and professionalism, level of literacy, and presence of a broad based elite class that is not self-serving. </p>
<p>Elected civilians need to respect their social contracts with citizens. Citizens need to feel better off with civilians in power. </p>
<p>Nepotism, graft, outright theft of public funds and constitutional manipulations create grounds for military coups.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Temitope J. Laniran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although West Africa has made some headway with efforts to propagate democracy, its dividends, in the form of good governance, remain elusive.Temitope J. Laniran, Research Associate, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1929752022-10-23T08:35:17Z2022-10-23T08:35:17ZEbola in Uganda: why women must be central to the response<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490859/original/file-20221020-15-uvpf97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women need to be involved at every level of decision-making.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/601/6180992">“No time for that”</a> was the constant refrain heard by gender and women’s health experts working in the 2014/16 Ebola response. This was an emergency and the main thing was to deal with the crisis. </p>
<p>It was the Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone outbreak of Ebola that signalled what was to come for women around the world in the COVID-19 outbreak. Quarantines saw a <a href="https://eca.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/07/spotlight-on-gender-covid-19-and-the-sdgs-0">rise</a> in domestic and intimate partner violence. Girls were <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/sierra-leone-discriminatory-ban-on-pregnant-girls/">banned from school</a> when they returned pregnant. Fear of health centres and hospitals and closures led to increases in other health issues. <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/1/3/e000065">More</a> women died from maternal mortality than from Ebola.</p>
<p>In early 2020 I worked with women around the world to raise the flag of <a href="https://eca.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/07/spotlight-on-gender-covid-19-and-the-sdgs-0">the potential gendered impact of COVID-19</a>. But few people wanted to listen. No time for that. As with Ebola, it is often only when the harm is done that people working on the response realise two crucial things. First, health emergencies do immediate and long term harm to women, disproportionately. And second, women are essential to responding to health emergencies.</p>
<p>Ebola outbreaks are scary. We’ve come along way from 2014/16 and the Ugandan government is doing all the right things – alerting the world, contact tracing, protecting frontline health workers, working with traditional healers, and working on communications to avert stigma. But there is a real risk that once again the issues that affect women and girls during a health emergency will be missed.</p>
<p>“Lessons learned” is a tired global health trope. But when it comes to the impact on women, we need to take action and here’s how.</p>
<h2>5 steps to take to centre women</h2>
<p>First, no-one likes lockdowns. But quarantines and lockdowns are specifically a feminist issue. They harm women and put an increased burden on their <a href="https://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/the-impacts-of-coronavirus-on-women">time and labour</a>. If necessary, any quarantine measures should be accompanied by a full support package for vulnerable women. This means the government needs to be working with the women’s sector, particularly those working on violence against women from the onset – not as an afterthought. Any quarantine measures need to be met with full social and welfare support. International donors need to support the Ugandan government to make this work.</p>
<p>Second, women health workers tend to be <a href="https://www.who.int/activities/value-gender-and-equity-in-the-global-health-workforce">clustered</a> in community health work. This involves door-to-door work on information communication, care and contact tracing. During an Ebola outbreak this is high risk. Their personal protection equipment requirements need to be prioritised alongside medical professionals. Moreover, lots of community health workers are volunteers, yet they are the bedrock of finding information in the Ebola response. They need to be paid. Health workers need to be protected, not stigmatised or subject to violence.</p>
<p>Third, everyone involved in the Ebola response should have training to detect and report sexual exploitation and abuse, including the international community. We do not want a repeat of what happened in the Democratic Republic of Congo – what experts <a href="https://apnews.com/article/business-health-united-nations-world-health-organization-ebola-virus-36ceb41d266190d149a74e400332e1ed">called</a> the worst case of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN history – where 82 alleged perpetrators, 21 with direct links to the World Health Organisation, were accused of the abuse and exploitation of girls and women – as young as 13.</p>
<p>Health emergencies bring a mass influx of resources to a vulnerable situation: this is ripe territory for exploitation. Tackling abuse and exploitation should never be an afterthought; often thought about when it is too late. Instead, it should be addressed as an ever-present risk when responding to health emergencies.</p>
<p>Fourth, we need good data. During the Ebola outbreak in 2014/16 I developed the idea of women being <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1108827">conspicuously invisible</a>. They were everywhere in frontline community health work – but were totally invisible in decision-making or official data. Data should detect not only where and how Ebola is spreading but who is most vulnerable. This means counting how many men and how many women are getting and dying of Ebola. Data informs what measures need to be put in place to help people. Sex disaggregated data is not perfect (most systems fail to account for non-binary people for example), but it is a start.</p>
<p>Finally, and I cannot stress this enough: women need to be involved at every level of decision-making. From the high profile <a href="https://twitter.com/JaneRuth_Aceng?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Jane Ruth Aceng</a>, Minister of Health in Uganda, to the contact tracing teams, to the surveillance squads. Women leaders do not necessarily mean greater representation of women’s issues or women friendly policies. However, given that the health sector is highly feminised, women must sit around the tables that matter.</p>
<h2>Learning from the past</h2>
<p>I’ve seen at first hand the harm that health emergencies did to women in Sierra Leone in the 2014/16 outbreak. </p>
<p>When I started shouting about it during the COVID-19 response, “No time for that” was accompanied by, “Where’s the evidence and data?”.</p>
<p>Thanks to tireless work and mobilisation of gender and global health experts around the world, we have the evidence that health emergencies harm women. Now we must act so that this does not happen again in Uganda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Harman receives funding from The Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p>As with Ebola, it is often only when the harm is done that people working on the response realise health emergencies disproportionately harm women.Sophie Harman, Professor of International Politics, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915062022-09-29T14:13:28Z2022-09-29T14:13:28Z5 steps to stop Ebola spreading in East Africa – a frontline expert advises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487036/original/file-20220928-16-2bwv9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Staff from South Sudan's Health Ministry pose with protective suits during a drill for Ebola preparedness.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by PATRICK MEINHARDT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The biggest Ebola outbreak in human history happened in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html#:%7E:text=On%20March%2023%2C%202014%2C%20the,epidemic%2C%20the%20largest%20in%20history.">West Africa</a> from 2014 to 2015. I was on the front lines in Liberia serving as the head of case detection for the National Ebola Response team and administering critical aspects of Liberia’s Ebola response.</p>
<p>The outbreak affected Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. It <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002508#:%7E:text=The%202014%E2%80%932015%20Ebola%20virus%20disease%20(EVD)%20outbreak%20across,in%204%2C809%20deaths%20%5B1%5D.">claimed 11,310</a> lives and took <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876034120304275">36 months</a> to contain. It made its way along major highways from Guinea into Liberia and Sierra Leone, which share a long border.</p>
<p>Uganda’s current <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/uganda-ebola-death-toll-3963084">Ebola virus outbreak</a> has a few similarities. The first case was found in Mubende district, located on a major highway to the capital city, Kampala, and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo – putting both at high risk.</p>
<p>Ebola <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html">spreads through</a> body fluids and direct contact. The infectiousness of the virus increases as patients get sicker – when they vomit and have diarrhoea. At death the virus is at its most virulent and thus any communal burial increases the spread.</p>
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<p>In the 2014/2015 outbreak there was widespread disbelief in communities, due to ignorance, distrust and some traditional beliefs. People didn’t cooperate with response teams. Fear and disbelief <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">have also been</a> documented in Uganda as four contacts of the alert case ran away from response workers.</p>
<p>If people doubt they have Ebola – because symptoms of fever or vomiting are similar to other common illnesses like malaria and typhoid – they’ll seek healthcare from a range of places, including traditional healers and religious groups. And they could move to urban centres in search of better care. All of these behaviours increase the risk of a further spread of the virus and more deaths.</p>
<p>On the positive side, Uganda has the <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/how-previous-ebola-virus-disease-outbreaks-helped-uganda-respond-covid-19-outbreak">right basics</a> to mount an effective response: experienced medical staff, knowledge and good infrastructure. The country has responded to four previous Ebola outbreaks. Its health systems are also in better shape than they were in three of the West African countries during the 2014/2015 outbreak. Health systems are as effective as the response and support they can get from the community.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-outbreak-in-uganda-the-health-system-has-never-been-better-prepared-191021">Ebola outbreak in Uganda: the health system has never been better prepared</a>
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<p>But the ability of Ebola to spread must not be underestimated. There’s a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">knowledge gap</a> about the actual start of the outbreak and the index (or first identified) case. This means the actual first human case of this current outbreak, coupled with <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">increasing</a> community <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/five-ugandan-doctors-catch-ebola-3966020">infections</a> and deaths, raises the risk of the outbreak spreading along the major highway to densely populated cities and neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>There’s no approved vaccine for this strain of Ebola – the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/ebola-disease-caused-sudan-virus">Sudan strain</a>. This is due to the focus on Ebola Zaire, the most deadly and infectious strain, which was responsible for the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.</p>
<p>It’s therefore crucial that the region be prepared to work together to contain the spread of the virus. Drawing on my experience in the management of the 2014/2015 outbreak in West Africa, here are the five steps that might help East Africa curb the further spread of the virus.</p>
<h2>1. Set up a robust cross-border surveillance system</h2>
<p>To prevent a further spread, a cross-border surveillance system must be created that can quickly identify, test and isolate cases for treatment. This system must have direct, simple communication lines with minimal bureaucracy. For instance, teams should use mobile applications like WhatsApp.</p>
<p>One of the biggest weaknesses we faced during the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak was that response workers in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea weren’t able to communicate easily with colleagues in other countries. This resulted in the use of intermediaries, like the World Health Organization (WHO) office, which caused delays. We lost the critical element of speed – every hour counts.</p>
<p>Communities along the borders must be part of the surveillance system. Ebola response workers in West Africa created a network along the borders that helped them move with speed. Cross border preparedness meetings and direct communication on the progress of the evolving outbreak in Uganda will be crucial for containment strategies.</p>
<h2>2. Create an army of community contact tracers</h2>
<p>To curb the Ebola outbreak in East Africa a portion of the response funding must be used to create an army of case finders and contact tracers. They must know people within their community well and report cases that families may be trying to hide. Fears, ignorance and cultural beliefs and practices tend to make contacts reluctant to report themselves; or they escape from treatment centres.</p>
<p>A crucial factor in containing the outbreak in Liberia was the payments of monthly stipends from the United Nations Development Fund and WHO to local pastors, imams, community leaders, teachers, university students and high school students. These ranged from US$80 to US$350 a month.</p>
<p>This is key because it can turn communities from being hostile to becoming champions of the effort. It also helps to create trust.</p>
<p>At the height of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia’s Montserrado County – where the capital is situated – we had 5,700 community leaders working with the response teams. They were able to visit 1.6 million households and identify thousands of sick people who were then either classified as suspect or probable cases by the more trained contact tracers.</p>
<p>These volunteers defeated Ebola because communities trusted them. Flying in foreigners at great cost <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/security-challenge-community-distrust-and-resistance">has been less effective</a> because communities don’t have the same level of trust in them.</p>
<h2>3. Recruit trusted messengers</h2>
<p>Misinformation, disinformation and rumours make response efforts difficult. It can create great hostility to response teams. The recruitment of messengers trusted by communities, and armed with the right message, is key.</p>
<p>During the 2014/2015 oubreak, we targeted influential people within a community. They included a former fighter during the Liberian civil war - people respected him because he was a part of group that protected them from armed robbers.</p>
<h2>4. Rapid field testing should be used</h2>
<p>Fast testing and short turnaround times are crucial to isolating cases and preventing further spread.</p>
<p>In the West Africa outbreak, our teams would ask a family to isolate a suspected case in a different room. They would then draw blood and send the sample to the field lab. Within three hours we had the results. If the person was positive we moved them to the isolation centre. If negative, we asked them to self-isolate for 48 hours so we could test them again. This allowed the families to call us as soon as they suspected that one of them had fever.</p>
<p>We also did oral swabs of all dead bodies in the communities. This helped us to pick up cases of silent super spreaders who had spread the virus <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/10/how-bloody-brawl-sparked-fears-new-ebola-outbreak-liberia-318442.html">but were misdiagnosed</a> in the community.</p>
<p>Both of these approaches helped us to restore confidence with the community and gave us much speed.</p>
<h2>5. Increase surveillance of all vehicles</h2>
<p>Since this outbreak is occurring at a major road leading to Kampala and DRC, the surveillance of all vehicles is critical.</p>
<p>In Liberia, we recruited and trained motorbike riders and transport vehicle riders. We gave them ledgers and notebooks and embedded them with our surveillance teams. They tracked all sick people and even took records of drivers who missed work. These were visited at home to see if they were sick.</p>
<p>Tracing – documenting the full address and host – was done on all recent passengers. This helped us to tightly monitor the movements of people from the epicentre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191506/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mosoka Fallah works as the Program Manager for Saving Lives and Livelihoods at the Africa Center for Disease Control</span></em></p>When tackling an Ebola outbreak speed is a critical element - every hour counts.Mosoka Fallah, Part-time lecturer at the Global Health & Social Medicine, Harvard University, and Lecturer at the School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of LiberiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1766982022-02-14T14:48:46Z2022-02-14T14:48:46ZUltra-processed foods: global analysis shows they aren’t well sign-posted<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445621/original/file-20220210-25-ljj0gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Straightforward guidance about ultra-processed foods is rare in national dietary guidelines. Only seven countries refer to “ultra-processed foods” explicitly. They are Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Israel, Maldives, Peru and Uruguay. </p>
<p>The term “ultra-processed food” is <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30744710/">clearly defined in the NOVA framework</a> as “formulations of ingredients, mostly of exclusive industrial use, that result from a series of industrial processes”. The framework puts foods into four categories according to their degree of processing. Ultra-processed food products include many soft drinks, biscuits, processed meats, instant noodles, frozen meals, flavoured yoghurts and bread products. Consumption of ultra-processed food has been linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-ultra-processed-foods-and-why-theyre-really-bad-for-our-health-140537">health and environmental harms</a>.</p>
<p>To better understand how national dietary guidelines communicate advice about ultra-processing, we conducted an <a href="https://www.ijhpm.com/article_4197.html">analysis of 106 guidelines around the world</a> to explore if – and how – they talked about ultra-processed foods. Dietary guidelines are a key component of nutrition policies and are important in transforming nutrition research into policy actions. An example would be informing school meal standards.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Hut with food in it and a food cycle" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445022/original/file-20220208-15-10t0yva.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Food Guides from Benin (2015) and Sierra Leone (2016)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We found dietary guidelines used a range of euphemisms to refer to the presence or absence of processing. These ranged from canned, to frozen, packaged, ready food and instant.</p>
<p>Many guidelines also used the term “processed”. But this captures a vast range of technologies, ranging from basic cooking (such as chopping and boiling), to beneficial processing (such as fermenting for preservation), through to sophisticated forms of industrial processing (such as hydrogenation, a chemical process often used to modify fats, and extrusion, a physical process to shape foods). These do not have the same health or environmental impacts, and conflating them in dietary advice is unproductive. </p>
<p>The absence of clear and actionable guidance is a risk for public health and the environment. Strong guidance around the harms of ultra-processing can help catalyse the development of other food and nutrition policies, such as taxes or restrictions on marketing to children. Collectively, these policies can foster healthier and more sustainable food environments.</p>
<h2>Figuring out healthy from unhealthy</h2>
<p>When trying to evaluate how healthy or sustainable a processed food is, two key considerations are the nature and purpose of processing. Freezing and canning are often used to preserve foods, and this can be beneficial from a food safety and food security perspective. But the use of artificial colours or thickeners can be used to imitate the taste and texture of whole foods, or to mask unpleasant attributes caused by processing.</p>
<p>Dietary guidelines can do a better job communicating these nuances to clarify the differences between beneficial and harmful forms of processing. </p>
<p>While seven countries used the term processed or ultra-processed, most referred to food processing euphemistically. Examples include, from South Africa, the phrase:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>eat more…unrefined ready-to-eat cereals, oats, mealie meal, maltabela, muesli</p>
</blockquote>
<p>or from Nepal:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>eat more wholegrain cereal products and less refined cereals. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>We found that advice to reduce consumption of “processed”, “highly processed” or “ultra-processed” foods was more common in low- and middle-income countries. In high-income countries, this was often limited to advice about processed meat.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map with green and red marks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445023/original/file-20220208-21-11d1rro.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Food processing messages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most guidelines followed the advice of the Food and Agricultural Organisation and offered food-based advice. More than half of the examples of discouraged foods were ultra-processed. But some examples were minimally processed foods or minimally processed ingredients. Examples include meat, butter. </p>
<p>These food examples highlight contradictions between processing-focused and nutrient-focused advice. Meat, butter and natural yoghurt, for example, are high in fats, but minimally processed. Whereas diet soft drinks or low-fat flavoured yoghurt are low in “harmful nutrients” but ultra-processed. </p>
<p>We found that the term “processing” was more common than we expected. Nevertheless, we found that dietary guidelines often provoked confusion about ultra-processed foods, discouraging consumption of some minimally processed foods and potentially even encouraging consumption of ultra-processed ones.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph with different colour bars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445024/original/file-20220208-23-120yr2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Food in eat less messages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clear advice about processing was rare. Yet all but one of the 106 guidelines we analysed provided nutrient-focused advice. Take this example from South Africa:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Use salt and food high in salt sparingly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These contradictions in dietary advice risk confusing citizens.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph with eat more and eat less lines" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445025/original/file-20220208-14-1ea84xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nutrient focus and processing focus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Changing the ultra-processed food system</h2>
<p>To avoid consumer confusion, and to facilitate the uptake of evidence about ultra-processed food policies such as school meal guidelines and front-of-pack labelling, we recommend three actions. </p>
<p>First, dietary guidelines can provide examples of less obvious ultra-processed foods. While soft drinks and fast foods are common examples, others include processed breads, flavoured yoghurts, sauces, breakfast cereals and ready meals.</p>
<p>Second, dietary guidelines can provide more explanation about how to identify ultra-processed foods based on the nature and purpose of processing. Beyond a focus on the composition of foods (in other words, their ingredients), ultra-processed foods are often heavily marketed with health claims or colourful cartoon packaging appealing to children. </p>
<p>Powerful food companies, which are often headquartered in high-income countries, are driving the global expansion of ultra-processed foods into industrialising countries such as South Africa and China. Greater scrutiny of the practices used to promote them is an important step towards reducing their consumption.</p>
<p>Finally, policy makers can use dietary guidelines to inform the development of other food policies to support citizens to reduce consumption of ultra-processed foods. This could include restrictions on advertising (especially to children), taxes or front-of-pack labels that discourage consumption. </p>
<p>It is also important to enable consumption of minimally processed foods, such as through subsidies or other initiatives, to make them more affordable and accessible. This could include support for living wages paid to workers in the food system, such as Australia’s recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/closing-the-loophole-a-minimum-wage-for-australias-farm-workers-is-long-overdue-171291">initiative</a> to pay farm workers the minimum wage. </p>
<p>These initiatives are essential to ensure that everyone has an equitable opportunity to access healthy and sustainable foods.</p>
<p><em>Daniela Koios, an author on the academic paper, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Lacy-Nichols has received funding from The George Institute of Global Health. She is a member of the People's Health Movement and the Healthy Food Systems Australia advocacy group. The findings of the research reported in this article, and the views expressed, are hers alone and not necessarily those of the above organisations.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Priscila Machado receives funding from an Alfred Deakin Postdoctoral Research Fellowship provided by Deakin University, and has received funding from the Australian Research Council and Sao Paulo Research Foundation. She is a member of the Nutrition Society of Australia, the World Public Health Nutrition Association and the Healthy Food Systems Australia advocacy group. The findings of the research reported in this article, and the views expressed, are hers alone and not necessarily those of the above organisations.</span></em></p>Dietary guidelines can do a better job clarifying the differences between beneficial and harmful forms of processing.Jennifer Lacy-Nichols, Research fellow, The University of MelbournePriscila Machado, Research Fellow, Institute for Physical Activity and Nutrition, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1697492021-11-07T06:06:48Z2021-11-07T06:06:48ZTargeting disaster management: New research evidence from Sierra Leone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427772/original/file-20211021-27-119kt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The fire at Susan Bay magnified the lack of disaster management in Sierra Leone</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lee Miles</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sierra Leone is prone to climate-related disasters like fires, water shortages, floods and mudslides. It has also seen serious disease outbreaks like Ebola and COVID-19. </p>
<p>On the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2021-world-risk-report.pdf">World Risk Index 2021</a>, Sierra Leone rates 47th among 181 nations, recording high scores for vulnerability, susceptibility and lack of coping capacities. </p>
<p>The situation seems to be worsening. For example, Freetown, the country’s capital, has experienced over 25 major urban fires since February 2021. This included the <a href="https://www.iied.org/fire-disaster-makes-more-1000-homeless-freetown">Susan’s Bay fire disaster</a> that resulted in 7,000 people losing their homes in one night in March 2021. The city has large numbers of informal settlements and slums which are very vulnerable to disasters. </p>
<p>The solution often propagated by international institutions like the United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction or the World Bank has been to develop <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/25/-50-million-world-bank-grant-to-support-urban-development-and-disaster-risk-management-in-sierra-leone">formal disaster risk management programmes</a>.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone also has a new <a href="https://statehouse.gov.sl/sierra-leones-president-julius-maada-bio-launches-disaster-management-agency-expresses-hope-in-the-use-of-science-to-predict-climate-change-adaptation/">National Disaster Management Agency</a>, launched in November 2020.</p>
<p>While promoting better risk reduction is always sensible, it leads to a tendency for disaster management systems to lean heavily on experience and systems designs of other countries. These often require high levels of human, technical and financial resources which are not available at present in countries like Sierra Leone. Learning entirely from examples from abroad does not always mean “building back better”. </p>
<p>Shiny new systems on paper may sometimes remain divorced from the realities on the ground. As I have argued <a href="https://theconversation.com/sierra-leone-faces-coronavirus-as-rainy-season-hits-local-disaster-planning-will-be-key-139604">previously</a>, local disaster management should also be built from the bottom up. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sierra-leone-faces-coronavirus-as-rainy-season-hits-local-disaster-planning-will-be-key-139604">Sierra Leone faces coronavirus as rainy season hits – local disaster planning will be key</a>
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<p>In places like Sierra Leone, disaster management is often conducted by volunteers and with limited funding. There may not be sustained attention or other resources to turn plans into regularly exercised practice. </p>
<p>The ‘air gaps’ between the formal building of disaster risk management systems and practical challenges mean that entire systems will be prone to failures and breakdowns. </p>
<p>But this is not to say that these gaps cannot be filled. There are many fixes that lie within the hands of disaster managers and officials. What is needed –- alongside formal capacity building -– is more concerted attention on those often small, rather specific and manageable challenges that have big consequences for the operation of disaster management. </p>
<p>We call these “single points of failure”. These single points of failure could be deficiencies in working infrastructure, like inoperable communication systems or broken equipment for firefighters. They could be human resources where say over-reliance on or lack of appropriate training of key individuals can lead to overstretch or errors or a lack of awareness of key procedures by local volunteers. </p>
<p>Diagnosing and addressing them is essential in building effective disaster risk management systems. Starting with the specific things that can be resolved, and understanding control measures needed to fix them, is the most effective and direct route to enhancing disaster response where resources are scarce.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://a3d24836-03f1-45ed-8d67-93fc2ef428b2.filesusr.com/ugd/5adef3_7dfc20467ec044e2938dacc29014bcdd.pdf">research project</a>, Driving African Capacity - Building in Disaster Management, was conducted in cooperation with Sierra Leone’s Office of National Security and National Disaster Management Agency as well as local partners, like Freetown City Council. It focused on finding these key points where disaster risk reduction and response can be improved, realistically and affordably.</p>
<h2>Agreed areas for action</h2>
<p>The project’s <a href="https://www.budmc.uk/sierraleone?pgid=ku58e9q1-0025f5d9-56a8-42e4-bc53-755027677a67">final report</a> presents eight thematic areas and 27 immediate action points. The themes are:</p>
<ul>
<li>technical</li>
<li>coordination</li>
<li>communication</li>
<li>capacity-building</li>
<li>procedural</li>
<li>human</li>
<li>physical</li>
<li>economic. </li>
</ul>
<p>To arrive at these, we drew on the experiences of 559 participants over three years of research across Sierra Leone. We also incorporated viewpoints during COVID-19 and the Susan’s Bay fire. Among the participants were national policymakers, workers from international institutions and non-governmental organisations, local authorities, responders, community leaders and disaster management volunteers countrywide, including informal settlements.</p>
<p>The report represents perhaps the first comprehensive study of Sierra Leone’s existing disaster management arrangements and practice using this approach in detail. It identifies areas where national and local stakeholders agree that there are resolvable points. </p>
<p>They also agree that if these points are not addressed quickly, they are very likely to have severe consequences across the disaster management system of Sierra Leone.</p>
<p>Most (94%) of the national and local actors expressed concerns in relation to the numbers, provision, availability and training of human resources. And 88% identified missing or weak procedural implementation of plans and standard operating procedures in practice. </p>
<p>Comparable figures (88%) were also recorded for deficiencies in relations between the national agencies and the provinces and districts. Many (69%) of those interviewed also mentioned ineffective coordination between government ministries, departments and agencies as a hindrance to disaster risk reduction and response. </p>
<h2>Basis for action</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, 80% of national and local actors rated comparable single points of failure as resolvable in their ‘top five’ listings. The power to deliver solutions lies in the hands of the existing disaster managers who fundamentally agree on the same things. This provides a strong basis for concerted action in the future.</p>
<p>The report shows that solutions to delivering effective disaster risk management are not entirely about building formal systems. In many ways, formal systems are easiest to create, though expensive in Africa. The challenge lies in integrating and targeting these efforts with informal measures that can address the most pressing points that African disaster managers know from experience. </p>
<p>By endorsing the final report, the government of Sierra Leone acknowledges that there is an urgent need to give national and local actors ongoing support to address these single points of failure. Only by resolving the informal points can the formal – expensive – disaster risk management systems be strengthened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Lee Miles received funding from the UK's Global Research Challenges Fund (GCRF) under the auspices of Driving African Capacity-Building in Disaster Management (AFRICAB) Research Project, based at Bournemouth University Disaster Management Centre (BUDMC).</span></em></p>While promoting better risk reduction is always sensible, it leads to a tendency for disaster management systems to lean heavily on experience and systems designs of other countriesLee Miles, Professor of Crisis & Disaster Management, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1691662021-10-11T15:07:52Z2021-10-11T15:07:52ZPapers show what lay behind Condé regime’s Ebola denialism in Guinea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425254/original/file-20211007-23-g2ijth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Liberia and Sierra Leone actively sought international aid to combat Ebola in 2014, Guinea downplayed the extent of the deadly disease. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 11,300 people died when the Ebola virus ripped through <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/ebola-outbreak-2014-2016-West-Africa">three West African countries</a> – Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia – from 2014 to 2016. It was the worst Ebola outbreak in known history. </p>
<p>But the differences in responses to the outbreak, particularly in its early stages, were puzzling. While the outbreak worsened during the March-October 2014 period, Liberia and Sierra Leone emphatically sought global assistance. They and other states highlighted the danger the virus posed to local, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/25/remarks-president-obama-un-meeting-ebola">regional and global stability</a>. Guinea’s reaction, in contrast, was to downplay the epidemic. President Alpha Condé insisted his government <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X20303026">had the outbreak under control</a>.</p>
<p>As it’s one of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2020.1750136">poorest countries in the world</a>, with little infrastructure, and virtually no health infrastructure, why would anyone believe President Condé’s assertion?</p>
<p>For me, this reaction did not appear to be in line with the severity of the outbreak, its potential economic destruction, the general risks to the population, and Guinea’s overall stability. </p>
<p>I decided to find out why Guinea reacted this way. And I <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X20303026">concluded</a> that the reason was fear that Ebola would panic investors. Condé’s initial response was indicative of a pattern among some leaders to prioritise the perception of political and economic health instead of the health of their citizens. As in the current pandemic, this pattern is not unique to Guinea or <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2020.1819641">to the Ebola outbreak</a></p>
<h2>Behind Guinea’s Ebola denialism</h2>
<p>In October 2014, I filed a <a href="https://www.foia.gov/">Freedom of Information Act</a> request with the US Departments of State and Defense for information and communiqués related to the Ebola outbreak from the US embassies in Conakry, Freetown and Monrovia. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/marburg-in-guinea-the-value-of-lessons-from-managing-other-haemorrhagic-outbreaks-167392">Marburg in Guinea: the value of lessons from managing other haemorrhagic outbreaks</a>
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<p>After three years of prodding and waiting, both agencies delivered sets of documents that showed a blunt assessment of events in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the March-October 2014 period.</p>
<p>But Condé told US embassy officials that Guinea had the outbreak under control. The documents presented a series of communiqués that provided assessments of the Ebola outbreaks in the three countries during the March-October 2014 period. The assessments were provided by high ranking US embassy staff, up to the level of US ambassadors. </p>
<p>What I <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X20303026">found</a> confirmed President Condé’s downplaying of the outbreak. It also revealed one of his potential motives in doing so. </p>
<p>The story these documents told revealed policy failures that had their roots in both Guinea’s underdevelopment and in the <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20141219_R40703_c0408908fa72d1579006812f42d18528c2b0c125.pdf">deeply corrupt relationship</a> between mining interests and the government. </p>
<p>If you want to understand what a government’s priorities are, an examination of its budget spending can help. In 2017, the latest available data indicated that Guinea spent only 4.1% of its government budget <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#">on healthcare</a>. But it spent 10.2% of its budget on its military. That number declined in 2020 to 8.2%, but was still double the healthcare expenditures.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-strikes-west-africa-again-key-questions-and-lessons-from-the-past-155566">Ebola strikes West Africa again: key questions and lessons from the past</a>
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<p>Overall, Guinea ranks 178 out of 189 countries on the World Bank’s <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf">Human Development Index</a>. The index is a composite measure of health, education and income. It’s used as a measure of human poverty and capability that extends beyond just income.</p>
<p>Guinea’s mining interests also played a role. As the Ebola epidemic was unfolding in March 2014 – after the Guinean government acknowledged the presence of the virus – corruption scandals and mining contract issues that had been simmering since Condé took office <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/guineas-deal-century/">finally boiled up</a>. </p>
<p>Condé’s government needed more investors to develop Guinea’s mining sector. The country is home to the world’s largest supply of high-grade bauxite, the key component in the making of aluminium, and one of the world’s <a href="https://www.azomining.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=42">largest untapped iron ore deposits</a>.</p>
<p>For Condé, the opportunity to advance this and other projects came with the first <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit">US-Africa Leaders Summit</a> held in Washington in August 2014. The summit was critical for kick-starting a new round of investment after the previous regime’s mining arrangements collapsed. </p>
<p>The Guinean delegation to the conference – the only one of the three Ebola-stricken countries to attend – <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X20303026">explained</a> that they thought the heightened attention accorded to Ebola in the run-up to the summit would unfairly refuel Guinea’s image as “too risky” and might scare off investors.</p>
<p>While the summit produced help in the Ebola crisis, Condé also conducted high level meetings with mining investors to discuss over US$20 billion in investments. </p>
<p>Ebola denialism in Guinea had its roots in a fear that Ebola would panic investors. On August 14, 2014 after the US summit, Condé ordered a national health emergency, months after the outbreak was declared. The delay in casting Ebola as a national emergency in Guinea <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X20303026">contributed</a> to growing infection rates and deaths in the country. </p>
<h2>Quest for power trumps public welfare</h2>
<p>Condé’s approach to the Ebola crisis and his courting of business and mining interests <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/723809">continued a history</a> of African leaders who employ extraversion strategies. These strategies allow elites to marshal resources and finances that are derived from their external global relationships. Such leaders have opened their economies to investors, letting them <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/723809">divert resources for corrupt purposes</a> that extend their political and economic control in the state.</p>
<p>Such policies provided the basis for Condé to consolidate power through a stronger patrimonial network and tighter personal and familial control over the country’s mining interests. That control gave him confidence when he sought to extend his time in office beyond the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54657359">constitutionally prescribed two terms</a>. </p>
<p>Condé got a third term in office <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54657359">in 2020</a>. But his government was overthrown in a military coup <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58468750">in September 2021</a>. The coup leader, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, cited Condé’s lack of leadership, his corruption, and Guinea’s lack of development as motivation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea coup highlights the weaknesses of West Africa's regional body</a>
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<p>Guinea’s lack of development, though not new, is particularly poignant as the country moves through its current COVID-19 wave, with little or no improvement in its basic and medical infrastructure. Notably, Doumbouya was quick to assure mining investors that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/09/06/1034587283/guineas-military-declared-coup-future-uncertain">their contracts were safe</a>. </p>
<h2>Future uncertain</h2>
<p>Condé’s pursuit of mining interests during the Ebola crisis may have foreshadowed his demise as he tightened his grip over power and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/08/04/guinean-opposition-alleges-largescale-corruption-by-president-alpha-conde//">plundered the state’s wealth</a>, as many before him did.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-has-a-long-history-of-coups-here-are-5-things-to-know-about-the-country-167618">Guinea has a long history of coups: here are 5 things to know about the country</a>
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<p>While Guinea’s people were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/09/06/guinea-coup-explained/">happy to see him go</a>, the country’s <a href="https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1894">history of corrupt leaders</a> and persistent <a href="https://www.lexafrica.com/2019/08/guinea-emerging-from-the-shadows/">underdevelopment</a> mean hope for real change may be a dream under a new military regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Ostergard, Jr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Alpha Condé’s pursuit of mining interests during the Ebola crisis may have foreshadowed his demise as he tightened his grip over power and plundered the state’s wealth.Robert Ostergard, Jr, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nevada, Reno, University of Nevada, RenoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673922021-09-12T08:22:02Z2021-09-12T08:22:02ZMarburg in Guinea: the value of lessons from managing other haemorrhagic outbreaks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419655/original/file-20210906-15-jcxilr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A photo taken in August 2015 of disinfected gloves and boots at an Ebola treatment centre in Conakry, Guinea. Lessons are being drawn to manage the Marburg virus.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cellou Binani/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the COVID-19 pandemic rages on in Africa amid insufficient vaccination rollout, viral haemorrhagic fever has again raised its head. This adds to public health turmoil on the continent where resources to respond to emerging and re-emerging epidemic prone zoonotic diseases remain limited.</p>
<p>In the first week of August 2021, a Marburg <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/west-africas-first-ever-case-marburg-virus-disease-confirmed-guinea">virus disease outbreak</a> was declared in south-western Guinea. This was the same area in which the recent outbreak of Ebola virus disease occurred and only weeks after the end of the Ebola outbreak was <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/ebola-outbreak-guinea-declared-over">declared</a>.</p>
<p>To date, 14 outbreaks of Marburg virus disease have been reported since 1967. These have been mostly in <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/25-october-2017-marburg-uganda-en">sub-Saharan Africa</a>. The most recent case in Guinea is the first <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/west-africas-first-ever-case-marburg-virus-disease-confirmed-guinea">reported</a> in West Africa. However, evidence of Marburg virus circulation has been reported from countries where Marburg virus disease cases have not been diagnosed to date. These include <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28710694/">Gabon, Zambia, and Sierra Leone</a>. </p>
<p>The first recognised outbreak of Marburg virus disease in Africa occurred <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20407721">in 1975 in South Africa</a>. It was an imported case from Zimbabwe. Imported cases from Uganda were reported in 2008 in the US and the Netherlands and one laboratory infection was diagnosed in Russia in 2004. To date the largest and deadliest outbreak occurred in Angola in 2004–2005.</p>
<p>Recurrent outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers are a major burden on countries such as Guinea where health care systems are already under threat.</p>
<p>Fortunately, many African countries are experienced in managing outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers. Guinean health authorities have been able to respond rapidly and implement measures <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/defeating-ebola-guinea-through-better-experience">learnt during the Ebola</a> outbreak to control the spread of Marburg. This has included rapid deployment of multidisciplinary teams, diagnosis, contact tracing, isolation and treatment of patients. </p>
<p>The existence of treatment centres greatly facilitated rapid treatment of suspected cases and confirmed cases, and medical expertise improved patient care. </p>
<h2>Marburg virus</h2>
<p>Marburg virus belongs to the same family as the Ebola viruses. It causes sporadic, but often fatal disease in humans and non-human primates. Studies implicate the Egyptian rousette bat, <em>Rousettus aegyptiacus (Pteropodidae family)</em>, as the prime reservoir host. Entering the roosting habitats, including caves and mining activities have been associated with Marburg virus transmission to humans.</p>
<p>The virus is transmitted by direct contact with the blood, bodily secretions and/or tissues of infected persons or wild animals, for example monkeys and bats. It can also be transmitted through contact with surfaces and materials like bedding or clothing contaminated with these fluids. </p>
<p>The incubation period varies from 2 to 21 days. Symptoms include fever, malaise, body aches, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, and internal haemorrhaging (bleeding). </p>
<p>Marburg virus can be difficult to distinguish from other tropical common febrile illnesses, because of the similarities in the clinical presentation. Based on the laboratory confirmed cases, infection with Marburg virus can result in death in 23% to 90% of patients.</p>
<p>There is no specific antiviral treatment or preventative vaccine. Supportive care includes intravenous fluids, replacement of electrolytes, supplemental oxygen, and replacement of blood and blood products may significantly improve the clinical outcome.</p>
<p>Marburg virus can spread easily between people if appropriate preventive measures are not in place. These include personal protection, barriers nursing, safe management of funerals, case finding, contact tracing, isolation and treatment of patient.</p>
<p>The virus is potentially prone to cause formidable epidemics with serious public health consequences.</p>
<h2>Important steps</h2>
<p>The area in Guinea where the case of Marburg virus disease was detected shares close borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. The movement of people locally and across borders could lead to the potential spread. That’s why the following steps are key:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the deployment of well-prepared response teams <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/ebola-and-marburg-virus-disease-epidemics-preparedness-alert-control-and-evaluation">at national and district level</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>surveillance and coordinated efforts within and between countries. </p></li>
<li><p>surveillance at points of entry.</p></li>
<li><p>contact tracing and active case finding in health facilities and at the community level.</p></li>
<li><p>investigations aiming at identification of the source of the infection.</p></li>
<li><p>laboratory testing without delay.</p></li>
<li><p>community engagement. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>It is also vitally important to educate the public and raise community awareness about the risk factors and the protective measures individuals can take to reduce their exposure. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>avoiding close physical contact with someone who is thought to have contracted the virus.</p></li>
<li><p>the transfer of any suspected case to a health facility for treatment and isolation.</p></li>
<li><p>the immediate and safe burial of people who have died from the virus.</p></li>
<li><p>the use of infection prevention and control precautions by health-care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed Marburg virus disease. This is to avoid any exposure to blood and/or bodily fluids, as well as unprotected contact with a possibly contaminated environment.</p></li>
<li><p>wildlife to be handled with gloves and appropriate protective clothing to reduce the risk of spread.</p></li>
<li><p>animal products (blood and meat) to be cooked thoroughly before eating. Raw meat should be avoided.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Community involvement is essential to respond effectively and control an outbreak. This must be supported by primary health care systems to gain greater participation and commitment.</p>
<h2>What needs to be fixed</h2>
<p>A number of factors get in the way of researching, responding to and controlling zoonotic diseases in Africa. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>insufficient and un-coordinated surveillance and research programmes. </p></li>
<li><p>limited regional capacity to develop new and improved diagnostic assays. </p></li>
<li><p>shortage of maximum containment facilities.</p></li>
<li><p>lack of strategic biobanks for long-term and secure storage of reference clinical materials, strains and pathogen biodiversity.</p></li>
<li><p>lack of regional External Quality Assurance programmes for dangerous endemic viral and bacterial pathogens.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A timely, streamlined, well-funded and efficient disease reporting and surveillance system is essential to monitor the threat of potential epidemics. To strengthen the efficiency of responding quickly, each nation must improve its own capacity in disease recognition and laboratory competence. </p>
<p>We also need innovative African-driven approaches to make the necessary quantum leap in the development of scientific capacity for surveillance and control of infectious diseases. </p>
<p>Global initiatives aiming at improving health security, emergency preparedness and health systems are also important. However, a great deal of work is needed at the higher level of national governance to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Groome receives funding from the South African Medical Research Council and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Janusz T. Paweska received funding from the CDC Global Disease Detection Program for investigating the occurrence of zoonotic pathogens in South African bat populations, from the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation for experimental infections of bats with Ebola and Marburg viruses and for Marburg virus transmission study by bat-associated ectoparasites, and from the South African Medical Research Council for investigating the molecular epidemiology of Ebola virus disease in West Africa and the development of diagnostic capacity.</span></em></p>Many African countries are experienced in managing outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers and many of the lessons learnt from the Ebola can be applied to the Marburg outbreak.Michelle J. Groome, Head of the Division of Public Health Surveillance and Response, National Institute for Communicable DiseasesJanusz Paweska, Head of the Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases, National Institute for Communicable DiseasesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1641672021-07-14T14:27:46Z2021-07-14T14:27:46ZWe used performing arts to map out gender violence in Sierra Leone. What we found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411203/original/file-20210714-13-13xczmd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">About 62% of Sierra Leonean women aged 15-49 have experienced physical or sexual violence.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been more than two years since Sierra Leone <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47169729">declared a state of emergency</a> over sexual and gender-based violence. The declaration followed a public outcry over a spate of high profile sexual attacks in which minors made up one in three victims. </p>
<p>Though unconstitutional, the state of emergency led to <a href="http://rogee.sl/docs/ROGEE-Sierra-Leone-Act-Sexual-Offences-2019.pdf">significant legal amendments</a>. The minimum sentence for rape was increased from five to 15 years for adults. New provisions also <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-stock-one-year-after-sierra-leones-gender-violence-emergency-130487">criminalised</a> informal out-of-court settlements for sexual assault and rape. </p>
<p>These amendments have generally been welcomed as a positive step. But some have criticised the emphasis on sexual violence, particularly of young girls, at the expense of other types of gender-based violence.</p>
<p>According to the 2019 demographic and health survey, about 62% of Sierra Leonean women aged 15-49 have <a href="https://sierraleone.unfpa.org/en/topics/gender-based-violence-11">experienced physical or sexual violence</a>. Everyday violence within marriage is rife but receives less attention in legislation and political discourse. Women are also quite reluctant to discuss violence in their own marriages for a variety of social and cultural reasons. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FV005480%2F1">project</a> sought to examine how different performing arts mediums can open up discussions about this sensitive issue. While various performing arts techniques have long been used to mobilise social transformation, we simply sought to start conversations about violence. </p>
<p>We found that people (particularly women) were much more active in discussions around violence when these were linked to a performance. We were able to access information much more quickly, primarily based on audiences seeing themselves in the performances. This approach also helped us to learn about the everyday experiences of women and the different ways they feel and address physical and emotional pain in these communities. </p>
<h2>Performances in rural Sierra Leone</h2>
<p>Traditionally, theatre for development or applied theatre is interventionist. Performance techniques are used to achieve <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-theatre-project-explores-collective-solutions-to-saving-the-ocean-135229">behavioural change</a> and to promote messages around public health or education. </p>
<p>Our project diverged from this approach by using performing arts as a tool for understanding, or creating spaces for discussion, rather than to change behaviour. We explored the extent to which different modes of performance – comedy, theatre and dance – could open up conversations around everyday experiences of sexual and gender-based violence. </p>
<p>We worked across three communities in Bombali District, in northern Sierra Leone. Two different performance workshops – each focused on a different type of performance – were delivered to each community. The goal was to establish whether different performative modes led to different kinds of conversations around sexual and gender-based violence.</p>
<p>Working with local comedians, the comedy workshops created scenes which addressed local gender stereotypes in an overtly humorous manner. For the interactive drama we drew upon participatory performance techniques such as direct address and “hot-seating” – meaning the character could field and respond to questions from the audience. </p>
<p>For the dance workshops, we collaborated with the community Sampa, a female folk dancer. She led dances while women from the community took turns to introduce a childhood favourite song or lyrics they created themselves in the moment.</p>
<p>Following each performance, we conducted focused discussions with small groups of men and women in the audience. Observations and remarks that emerged from the audience in the first workshop then informed the content of the scenes we delivered when returning to that community.</p>
<h2>Findings</h2>
<p>Conversations sparked by the performances confirmed that issues such as domestic violence, infidelity, abandonment and polygamy were all recognisable and prevalent in communities. Both men and women spoke of lack of communication in marriage, tensions over financial strains or sexual dissatisfaction. These ultimately resulted in infidelity and violence. </p>
<p>Many men believed that the payment of a bride price gave them a right to sex freely offered or, if not, taken by force. For women, withholding sex was one of the few acts of power and resistance they felt they had in the marriage. Yet it carried the risk of an unsatisfied husband seeking sex elsewhere. Many women spoke of the rejection and desperation they experienced when their husband took a new wife or girlfriend.</p>
<p>Much of the content and themes discussed were similar across all three of the performing art forms we explored. But we did notice a different quality to the conversations depending on the performance style. The <a href="https://www.nottinghamfreeschool.co.uk/data/uploads/homework/files/Drama_KOs/Theatre_In_Education_Augusto_Boal.pdf">interactive drama techniques</a> we employed are designed to promote critical reflection in the audience. These help to identify social problems and invite participants to work through solutions. </p>
<p>By contrast, the songs that women danced to focused on the emotional and bodily pain of their husband’s betrayal. Women had various reasons for singing in everyday life: to gain the attention of the husband or family members to discuss the issue; general relief for many who felt powerless; or, at times, connection with other women.</p>
<p>The comedy and interactive drama offered an entertaining and engaging way for people to reflect upon situations they recognised. But it was evident the songs provided more immediate access to deeply felt emotions arising from personal experience. While there was a sense the group singing soothed such pains, for many women singing was a way to unsettle or even disturb. </p>
<p>A number of men expressed their unease with these types of songs in the household, referring to them as offensive or provocative. This hints at the capacity for this form of self-expression to underline women’s personal anguish, and the subtle and creative ways women express these feelings. </p>
<p>The most common and pervasive forms of pain in the everyday lives of Sierra Leone women require attention from local officials and policymakers. The insidious nature and general “acceptability” of these acts is precisely what makes them so scary, and in need of being addressed. </p>
<p><em>Juliet Fornah and <a href="https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/users/stella-kanu">Stella Kanu</a> contributed to the research on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aisha Fofana Ibrahim receives funding from the. Arts and humanities Research Council, UK</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Shutt receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura S. Martin receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research council (AHRC). </span></em></p>Theatre is able to create a space for discussion about how and why women experience physical and emotional violence.Aisha Fofana Ibrahim, Assistant Deputy Vice Chancellor 2, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra LeoneHelen Shutt, PhD candidate, University of GlasgowLaura S. Martin, Global Challenges Research Fellow, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1614322021-06-30T15:16:34Z2021-06-30T15:16:34ZThe fight against economic fraud: how African countries are tackling the challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404182/original/file-20210603-27-2nv14z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technology has been key in tackling fraud</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mpedigree</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has stifled many sectors of the global economy. But it has apparently <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/criminal-contagion/">boosted the business of fraudsters</a>. Experts <a href="https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/Fraud%20The%20Facts%202021-%20FINAL.pdf">note</a> that some fraudsters have taken advantage of the new opportunities of the <a href="https://www.teiss.co.uk/covid-19-phishing-scams-sophisticated/">pandemic economy</a> and that they seem to become ever <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/online-scams-go-viral-as-pandemic-gives-fraudsters-new-opportunities-1.4549085">more sophisticated in their methods</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time anti-fraud measures are becoming more sophisticated too, with technology <a href="https://www.unbs.go.ug/news-highlights.php?news=2&read">playing a big part</a>, and more increasingly <a href="https://www.expresscomputer.in/exclusives/neurotags-anti-counterfeiting-ai-solution-is-helping-crack-down-on-fake-products/71649/">artificial intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>In recent years many initiatives have been put forward in the name of fighting and reducing various forms of fraud and other crimes in the economy. But have these measures actually been effective in containing fraud? Will the typical package of anti-fraud measures stop the fraud pandemic? </p>
<p>We did <a href="https://roape.net/2015/12/07/researching-anti-fraud-measures-in-the-global-south/">research</a> into major characteristics of anti-fraud measures in several African countries. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2019.1660156">south</a> we looked at Malawi, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2020.1866524">east</a> we covered Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Madagascar and in the west Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.</p>
<p>We looked at the various fraud responses to identify major dynamics and themes. We used online data from news outlets and reports on websites of private companies and governmental agencies to analyse the characteristics of anti-fraud measures across 11 countries. </p>
<p>We found a diverse set of measures had been introduced. We were able to identify 10 particular characteristics. </p>
<h2>The landscape</h2>
<p>The first notable feature was a remarkable proliferation of anti-fraud agencies and cross-agency alliances and cooperation. This was between government agencies, the government and the private sector, and at times civil society actors such as <a href="https://twitter.com/ucc_official/status/1111564692500164608">consumer protection agencies</a> too.</p>
<p>Agreements, memorandums of understanding and partnerships had been signed to encourage data collection and sharing and knowledge exchange within and across borders as different actors were brought together <a href="https://www.sabric.co.za/media-and-news/press-releases/saps-and-sabric-recommit-to-intensify-fight-against-bank-robberies/">to fight the “common enemy”</a>. </p>
<p>At the state level, new anti-fraud agencies, taskforces, squads and networks were set up regularly. One example was the <a href="https://www.cid.go.ke/index.php/sections/investigationunits/insurance-fraud-investigations-unit-ifiu.html">Kenya Police Insurance Fraud Investigations Unit</a>. We also found that a number of regulatory agencies had been established. These included competition and consumer protection authorities <a href="https://www.ccpc.org.zm/">at</a> <a href="https://www.cak.go.ke/">national</a> and <a href="https://www.arcc-erca.org/">regional</a> <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/eac-competition-authority-to-start-operations-in-july--1351478">level</a>.</p>
<p>Second, outreach, engagement and “empowerment” of consumers played a major role. Here, education, sensitisation and awareness raising – also among business actors – <a href="https://www.genghis-capital.com/newsfeed/kba-launches-the-annual-kaa-chonjo-awareness-campaign-to-boost-security-of-payments-platforms/">emerged strongly</a> as a way to popularise <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=64659&dir=2016/november/16">the anti-fraud fight</a>. This was promoted by a range of actors. Among them were banks, insurance providers, private consultancies, international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and aid agencies, as well as NGOs. Regional organisations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa were also included. </p>
<p>Third, large-scale technology was used extensively in anti-fraud measures. This was particularly the case in financial services and banking. </p>
<p>Anti-fraud software in various forms featured strongly. One example was detecting fraudulent transactions. Additional technological solutions included PIN protection techniques, enhanced chip technology for payment cards and authentication technology. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.securingindustry.com/pharmaceuticals/nigeria-insists-on-mobile-authentication-of-medicines/s40/a2083/#.YJA9m2ZKj9E">Technology</a> was <a href="https://medium.com/innovate4health/mpedigree-battles-counterfeit-drugs-through-innovative-verification-system-50de6f4a4bea">also used</a> to uncover counterfeit or substandard products. </p>
<p>Fourth, anti-fraud measures regularly came with rhetoric and language that was strong in giving a sense of alarm and urgency. The vices of fraud (and corruption) were presented as “weeds” needing to be “rooted out”. They were also referred to as a virus or a disease that needed “eradication”. </p>
<p>At times, warfare-type language was used, that is, fraud needed to be “combated” like an enemy. </p>
<p>Fifth, anti-fraud measures were regularly political in nature. Pledges to counter fraud featured in election campaigns. The rising or falling of fraud was used as a metric to determine whether politicians and public servants were effective in their roles. At times, political or business opponents of the government were allegedly targeted by the measures. And some powerful business actors reportedly got around regulations. </p>
<p>Sixth, corruption, as well as in-fights, conflicts, tensions and power struggles within and between state agencies charged with anti-fraud measures, featured too. One example was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2001387385/kebs-staff-in-sh26m-fraud-case">Kenya Bureau of Standards</a>. In recent years, several managing directors of the bureau <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/news/article/2001377377/kebs-boss-arrested-over-graft-allegations">were accused of graft</a>. </p>
<p>The seventh feature was that many anti-fraud measures were carried out by specialised for-profit private actors. They were therefore arguably shaped by business interests, competition for anti-fraud measure contracts, and the dynamics of industries and markets.</p>
<p>We also found that international companies specialising in regulations and standards often played a role. Such commercially oriented actors were particularly active <a href="https://www.sgs.co.uk/en-gb/public-sector/product-conformity-assessment-pca/kenya-pvoc-program">in promoting the proliferation of anti-fraud measures</a>. </p>
<p>Eight, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-revenue-authority-arrests-8-businesspersons-over-vat-offences/">arrests</a>, <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/fake-goods-worth-r5m-seized-joburg">confiscation</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-corruption/kenya-authoritiesarrest-standards-bureau-head-over-fertilizer-imports-idUSKBN1JJ0AO">destruction of items</a> were widespread in reports about anti-fraud activity. </p>
<p>Ninth, we noticed a prevalence of anti-fraud measures in efforts to increase tax revenue and inhibit illicit financial flows. Various initiatives emphasised the need to increase compliance. At times we detected tensions in moves to create an “enabling” business environment to attract foreign investment – such as low taxes – and calls to protect the national tax bases.</p>
<p>We found there was international cooperation and the involvement of civil society actors in efforts to address tax evasion and transnational money laundering. One example was the <a href="https://www.taxjustice.net/">Tax Justice Network</a>. </p>
<p>Tenth, civil society actors seemed to have a limited role – or no role at all – in various anti-fraud measure coalitions. In some cases, however, they seemed to play a larger role. One example was consumer protection agencies.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>A challenge we identified was that anti-fraud measures could be launched and sustained for reasons that went beyond an interest in simply fighting fraud. This included commercial interests of specialised anti-fraud firms. These were often companies that operated globally. Other interests at play included governments that used anti-fraud platforms to seek legitimacy or state agencies that sought government funding as well as new areas of operations and streams of revenues. </p>
<p>We also came across criticisms in some cases of the measures’ design, costs, bureaucracy and impracticality. There were also concerns about the heavy handed way in which some <a href="http://www.psfuganda.org/new/images/downloads/Trade/position%20paper%20on%20pre-inspection.pdf">measures were implemented</a>. There were allegations about:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>bias (for example, against small-scale actors such as traders and against poor sections of costumers) in favour of foreign, large scale multinationals; </p></li>
<li><p>opaqueness and <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/kacita-calls-for-a-two-months-import-boycott-to-protest-pvoc">irregularities</a>; </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=31498:a-year-later-has-pvoc-locked-out-fake-goods">effectiveness problems</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Currently, anti-fraud measures seem largely an affair between state and corporates (including business associations), and consumers. Consumers are mostly on the “receiving” end of anti-fraud measures. They are regularly encouraged to play their role by, for example, calling an anti-fraud hotline, verifying the goods they buy and not contributing to the facilitation of fraud. Aid agencies played a decisive role in some anti-fraud measure cases too.</p>
<p>Anti-fraud measures are mostly initiated and shaped by powerful actors. This includes big business, particularly transnational companies, rather than grassroots or activist organisations. They are uneven across sectors (for example, the financial sector gets significant attention), and they seem to have become a business and revenue generation vehicle in itself. </p>
<p>It is important to acknowledge that some measures certainly <a href="https://www.unbs.go.ug/">make a positive impact</a> and that efforts are made by various agencies to address internal and other shortcomings, thereby improving the effectiveness of measures. But the question remains: how can countries substantially contain “irregularities” in situations where the irregular has become widespread, routine and institutionalised? And the dominant agendas and pressures of the day – such as economic growth, profit and commercialisation – are highly conducive to fraud. </p>
<p><em>Nataliya Mykhalchenko is serving as an intern at the United Nations Population Fund. The views expressed in the article are her own.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nataliya Mykhalchenko has received funding from the University of Leeds ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme, and the Review of African Political Economy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jörg Wiegratz has received funding from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust Fund, the University of Leeds ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme, and the Review of African Political Economy.</span></em></p>Countries have adopted a wide array of measures involving a proliferation of fraud agencies.Nataliya Mykhalchenko, Research Associate, University of LeedsJörg Wiegratz, Lecturer in Political Economy of Global Development, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1610022021-05-27T16:41:49Z2021-05-27T16:41:49ZEbola survivors: their health struggles and how best to support them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402136/original/file-20210521-17-j3c38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rigiatu Kamara (R), 38, who has recovered from the Ebola virus disease poses with her husband Baibai Kamara (L), 40, in Kenema, Sierra Leone, on August 26, 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Mohammed Elshamy/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa’s Ebola outbreak between 2013 and 2016 was the most widespread in the history of the disease. By the end of the outbreak, <a href="https://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-30-march-2016">more than</a> 28,000 people were infected and 11,000 succumbed to the disease.</p>
<p>Despite the high number of deaths, the outbreak also had many survivors. <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204235/WHO_EVD_OHE_PED_16.1_eng.pdf">More than</a> 10,000 of those infected recovered. Various factors led to a better chance of survival, including early access to treatment, innate immunity, severity of symptoms and the number of virus particles in the body.</p>
<p>However, evidence from various studies shows that Ebola survivors continue to suffer even after the outbreak is over. </p>
<p>Sierra Leone, one of the <a href="https://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-30-march-2016">hardest-hit</a> countries during the West African Ebola outbreak, is home to approximately 4,000 Ebola survivors. Today many Ebola survivors suffer from physical symptoms. These include joint and muscle pain, eyesight problems, headaches and extreme fatigue. Ebola survivors also suffer from <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30843627/">numerous psychosocial issues</a> including stigma, depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. Survivors need comprehensive support to address these challenges.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.biomedcentral.com/collections/Ebola">research</a> and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30845141/">interventions</a> in this area, there’s still a lot to learn about improving health and quality of life among Ebola survivors. <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204235/1/WHO_EVD_OHE_PED_16.1_eng.pdf?ua=1">Most research</a> sets out to understand the health problems of survivors. Less is known about their experiences and challenges navigating the healthcare landscape. </p>
<p>We conducted <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S174438811930859X?via%3Dihub">a couple</a> of <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0223068">studies</a> among Ebola survivors in Sierra Leone to better understand how they seek healthcare solutions. We wanted to know why survivors chose to use, or not use, a range of healthcare services options available to them. </p>
<p>Examining this behaviour offers insights into how Ebola survivors take care of themselves. It also highlights critical issues within Sierra Leone’s healthcare delivery system. This allows researchers, policy makers and healthcare providers to create better solutions.</p>
<h2>Multiple options</h2>
<p>Conventional medicine is the main healthcare option in Sierra Leone, though for <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953611005594">many people</a>, it is expensive and can be hard to access. Informal healthcare options – such as traditional medicine – are also popular, especially in rural areas as it’s <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001706X13000788?via%3Dihub">considered</a> less expensive, easily accessible and relatively effective and safe. </p>
<p>We conducted a survey among 358 Ebola survivors and also held focus group interviews. </p>
<p>We found that Ebola survivors used multiple healthcare options to address their needs. These included visiting conventional healthcare providers, pharmacy outlets and traditional medicine practitioners – some of whom were unqualified. Survivors also self-medicated with conventional medicines and traditional medicine products.</p>
<p>Most Ebola survivors initially chose to seek care at conventional healthcare facilities, but almost half eventually turned to informal healthcare. This was due to several factors including the high cost of treatment, formal health facilities being far away, medical or surgical treatments not being available or because treatment did not seem to work. Ebola survivors also struggled with negative experiences with their healthcare providers, including neglect and verbal abuse. </p>
<p>In 2015 Ebola survivors were added to the list of beneficiaries for <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29327367/">a free government healthcare initiative</a>. This entitled them to free healthcare services at public health facilities. However survivors reported a shortage of drugs and lack of equipment. This was largely because the free healthcare initiative was focused on maternal and child health needs and because of corruption.</p>
<p>Finally, we found Ebola survivors used various information sources beyond healthcare professionals – including family or friends and other Ebola survivors – when making healthcare decisions. Most were also unwilling to disclose their use of informal healthcare options to their conventional healthcare providers. </p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>Our findings highlight various challenges when it comes to managing the health of Ebola survivors. </p>
<p>First, because Ebola survivors try many healthcare avenues, it can create problems in managing their health. For instance, natural remedies (which users may believe are safe) can interact with other treatments or cause further health problems. </p>
<p>Second, the reliance on unprofessional sources of information can potentially delay access to essential care and encourage mistrust in the conventional healthcare system. </p>
<p>Finally, the failure of the free healthcare initiative to address Ebola survivors’ health problems may make Ebola survivors less confident in the healthcare system.</p>
<h2>A way forward</h2>
<p>It is imperative that Ebola survivors have access to healthcare that is responsive to their health needs and is safe.</p>
<p>A lot of this can be supported by Ebola survivors themselves. </p>
<p>Ebola survivors must disclose their current and future use of informal healthcare options with their healthcare providers. </p>
<p>Ebola survivors also need to be more critical about the information they receive and share with their fellow Ebola survivors. </p>
<p>To achieve this, culturally appropriate, reliable and accessible information resources need to be developed. These include leaflets, wall charts, discussion posters, radio, theatre, and television material. In addition, there can be face-to-face communication through home visits by community health practitioners.</p>
<p>Ebola survivors in our studies felt abandoned, discriminated against, humiliated, ashamed and disrespected by the actions of their healthcare providers. This influenced their decision to seek more informal methods of care. Healthcare providers must be respectful, nonjudgmental and empathetic when interacting with survivors. This would create a relationship based on trust and foster effective communication.</p>
<p>Healthcare providers should also be aware that Ebola survivors may use informal treatment options and take the initiative to discuss this. </p>
<p>Finally, the way in which the current free healthcare programme is being delivered needs to be revised to cater for the health needs of Ebola survivors. This includes providing the necessary resources and training of healthcare professionals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Amie Steel is on the Executive Committee of the Queensland branches of the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) and the Australian Health Promotion Association. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Distinguished Professor Jon Adams is affiliated with the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA), where he is a Co-Convenor of the traditional and complementary medicine special interest group. Jon is also affiliated with the American Public Health Association (APHA), where he is the International Membership Chair of the Integrative, Complementary and Traditional Health Practices Section.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Wardle is affiliated with the Public Health Assocaition of Australia, where he is a convenor of the traditional and complementary medicine special interest group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdulai Jawo Bah and Peter B James do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ebola survivors use multiple avenues to address their health needs, which presents a management challenge.Peter B James, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Southern Cross UniversityAbdulai Jawo Bah, PhD candidate at Queen Margaret University and Lecturer at , University of Sierra LeoneAmie Steel, Senior Research Fellow, University of Technology SydneyJon Adams, Distinguished Professor of Public Health, University of Technology SydneyJon Wardle, Professor of Public Health, Southern Cross UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572182021-05-06T12:30:37Z2021-05-06T12:30:37ZWhat the US can learn from Africa about slavery reparations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396887/original/file-20210423-17-zc24q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=253%2C90%2C5005%2C3391&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists mark National Reparations Day in Washington, D.C., on July 1, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/activists-stage-a-protest-to-mark-the-national-reparations-news-photo/1159502247?adppopup=true">Alex Wong/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The House Judiciary Committee voted on April 14, 2021, to recommend the creation of a commission to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/us/politics/reparations-slavery-house.html">study the possibility of paying reparations to the descendants of enslaved people</a> in the United States. </p>
<p>The measure, H.R. 40, would establish a 15-person commission to offer a “national apology” for slavery, study its long-term effects and submit recommendations to Congress on how to compensate African Americans. </p>
<p>Any federal reparations bill faces long odds of being enacted due to Republican opposition, but this is the furthest this effort has advanced since a similar bill was first introduced over 30 years ago.</p>
<p>Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Democrat from Texas, who introduced H.R. 40, called it a needed step on the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reparations-slavery-commission/2021/04/14/fd421f82-9d2a-11eb-b7a8-014b14aeb9e4_story.html">path to restorative justice</a>.” </p>
<p>As the U.S. <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/07/10/slavery-reparations-bill-spurs-new-debate-other-nations-model/5396340002/">debates reparations</a> for descendants of U.S. slavery, looking to Africa might help clear a path forward, according to my research on <a href="https://www.colgate.edu/about/directory/kkonadu">African history and the African diaspora</a>.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s incomplete reparations</h2>
<p>In the U.S. and globally, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-race-reparations-idUSKBN2BD0B8">arguments for reparations</a> mostly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/us/jesuits-georgetown-reparations-slavery.html">revolve around</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/31/slavery-reparations-seem-impossible-many-places-theyre-already-happening/">financial restitution</a>. </p>
<p>But a closer examination of the actual reparations efforts illustrates the limits of programs solely focused on financial restitution.</p>
<p>In South Africa, Nelson Mandela and his ruling political party, the African National Congress, created a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> in 1995 upon coming to power. The commission investigated human rights crimes during nearly five decades of apartheid, the system of legislation that upheld segregationist laws and perpetrated racist violence. </p>
<p>The commission also established a reparations program, recommending in its <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/">2003 final report</a> that victims of apartheid receive roughly <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/south_african_truth_commission">US$3,500 over six years</a>.</p>
<p>But the commission stipulated that only those who had testified to the commission about apartheid’s injustices – about 21,000 people – could claim reparations. Some 3.5 million Black South Africans suffered under <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/apartheid">apartheid rule</a>. </p>
<p>Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, issued the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/16/world/south-africa-to-pay-3900-to-each-family-of-apartheid-victims.html">one-time $3,900 payments in 2003</a>. South African governments have since made no additional payments to those who testified or other apartheid victims.</p>
<p>Nor have any post-Mandela governments put the perpetrators of the apartheid system on trial. The <a href="https://www.strifeblog.org/2021/02/05/the-struggle-continues-khulumani-support-group-and-reparations-in-south-africa/">power structure</a> that upheld apartheid has remained largely undisturbed.</p>
<p>South Africa is the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/07/africa/south-africa-elections-inequality-intl">world’s most unequal society</a>, according to the World Bank. Whites make up the majority of wealthy elites while half of the Black South African population lives in poverty.</p>
<p>Dismissing the wider <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557322">social and economic damage caused by apartheid</a> – high-income inequality, unreturned lands seized by whites, poor community infrastructure – has kept millions who suffered violence from qualifying as victims. They may never see reparations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An anti-apartheid demonstration in South Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-apartheid demonstration in Soweto, South Africa in 1989.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-anti-apartheid-demonstration-in-soweto-south-africa-in-news-photo/120452893?adppopup=true">Lily Franey/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Sierra Leone’s underfunded effort</h2>
<p>Around the same time that South Africa created its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the West African nation of Sierra Leone undertook a similar effort to <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/43710-reparations-in-sierra-leone-news-from-the-periphery-of-transitional-justice.html">confront the aftermath of its 10-year civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Sierra Leone’s civil war, from 1991 to 2002, killed at least 50,000 people and displaced another 2 million. In 2004, its Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/ecosoc6140.doc.htm">reparation measures for survivors</a>. </p>
<p>It recommended pensions, free health care and education benefits for amputees, those severely wounded, those widowed by the war and survivors of sexual violence.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone governments long ignored these recommendations, but in 2008 pressure from the country’s largest survivor organization, the Amputee and War-Wounded Association, and a $3.5 million grant from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/43710-reparations-in-sierra-leone-news-from-the-periphery-of-transitional-justice.html">restarted reparation efforts</a>. </p>
<p>Instead of implementing the TRC’s more comprehensive reparation measures, however, the Sierra Leone government in 2008 provided each of the 33,863 registered survivors a single $100 payment. The UN later provided some small payments, loans and vocational training to other survivors in subsequent years.</p>
<p>After interviewing survivors of the Sierra Leone civil war, the nonprofit <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif129.pdf">Peace Research Institute Frankfurt</a> concluded in 2013 that Sierra Leone’s reparations program failed. It pointed to the high numbers of victims, limited funding and public health epidemics like Ebola that made reparations less a priority. </p>
<h2>Reparations through the courts</h2>
<p>In other African countries, survivors of colonial atrocities have sought redress through the courts.</p>
<p>In 2013, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mau-mau-british-empire-kenya-rebellion-independence-boycott-2017-election-a7474716.html">Kenyan survivors</a> of British colonial atrocities brought a legal suit to the British high courts demanding reparations. The British government recognized “that Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration” and agreed to pay £19.9 million – $27.6 million – in compensation to some 5,000 elderly survivors. </p>
<p>But the government stalled payments, and <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/42789-colonial-crimes-kenyans-un.html">Kenyans later demanded more than what was offered</a>.</p>
<p>A similar <a href="https://doi.org/10.13169/statecrime.7.2.0369">court case in Germany demanding reparations for</a> the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2018/05/24/the-herero-nama-genocide-the-story-of-a-recognized-crime-apologies-issued-and-silence-ever-since/?sh=5209818b6d8c">Germans’ 1904-1908 massacre of the Herero people</a> in colonial Namibia <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/namibia-germany-reparations/a-54535589">remains contested</a>. And negotiations over payments and other forms of redress continue.</p>
<h2>Rethinking reparations through Africa</h2>
<p>Groups representing African and Caribbean nations have offered alternative ways of thinking about the colonial slavery and racial violence driving such reparations efforts. </p>
<p>In 2019, the African Union – a regional policy body made up of 55 African countries – defined <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36541-doc-au_tj_policy_eng_web.pdf">reparative justice</a> as redress for “losses suffered” under any circumstances where human rights have been violated. </p>
<p>That includes financial reparations – its policy document emphasizes material support for rebuilding homes and businesses damaged by oppressive colonial regimes. </p>
<p>But it also called for member countries to think beyond money to consider reparations measures aimed at healing trauma and establishing broad social justice.</p>
<p>Much of the African Union’s thinking aligns with the Caribbean-based Caricom Reparations Commission’s <a href="https://caricomreparations.org/caricom/caricoms-10-point-reparation-plan/">10-point reparation plan</a>, established in 2013. It includes debt cancellation for Caribbean countries built on colonial slavery and the right of African descendants worldwide to return to an African homeland, should they wish to, via an internationally supported resettlement program.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>For these groups, reparations isn’t just about money – it’s a plea for collective restoration, to retrieve something on behalf people who lost their labor or life to powerful white governments and institutions.</p>
<p>Through slaving and colonial rule, Africa lost people. But the continent also lost skilled labor, creativity and innovations. Those benefits were transferred to colonial societies – and their recovery remains at stake for Africa and African descended people worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kwasi Konadu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the US debates reparations for descendants of slavery, cases in Africa help illustrate the limits of programs focused solely in financial restitution.Kwasi Konadu, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Endowed Chair and Professor, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1579812021-03-31T13:34:35Z2021-03-31T13:34:35ZHas ECOWAS made West Africa a safer place? Yes, but its track record is lumpy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392569/original/file-20210330-19-1na56za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's president Buhari chairing the 55th ordinary session of the ECOWAS.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Adam Abu Bashal/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In an article published in 1994 titled <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/">The Coming Anarchy</a>, the American journalist Robert Kaplan predicted an impending Armageddon for West Africa due to what he considered its notoriety for breeding crime, coups and tyrannical regimes. Twenty-six years later, it bears examining whether the region has measured up to this grim forecast.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615570951">paper</a>, I examined how the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had fared in the context of some emerging and recurring security threats in the region. These included jihadist terrorism, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">drug trafficking and piracy</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/">unconstitutional changes of government</a>. </p>
<p>ECOWAS was <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/">formed in 1975</a> by West African states to accelerate economic growth and development in the region. Its member states include Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Nigeria. The adoption of the Accord on Non-aggression and Defence in 1978 marked the inroads of ECOWAS into security <a href="https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/sesay.pdf">regionalism</a> as a prerequisite for the attainment of economic integration. </p>
<p>I assessed the progress of ECOWAS in resolving the main security challenges in the region. I concluded that there are reasons to be optimistic. But recent conflict trends have reignited a great deal of concern about the political stability of the region. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615570951">concluded</a> that ECOWAS is limited in what it can achieve. Nonetheless, it needs to be decisive in enforcing its protocols and policies and sanctioning member states and governing elites who flout them. </p>
<h2>Democracy landscape</h2>
<p>I reviewed the period between 1989 and 2020. </p>
<p>One of the categories of political instability I looked at was trends in constitutional coups. </p>
<p>Within this period, unconstitutional changes of government accounted for a high percentage of the conflicts in the region. These <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26295349?seq=1%22">included</a> Liberia (1989–2005), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), Cote d’Ivoire (1992–2002; 2010–2011), Guinea Conakry (2007–2010), and Guinea Bissau (2005–2009). </p>
<p>Only <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/38961785.pdf">Cape Verde and Senegal</a> were spared a military coup. Even so, the erstwhile president of Senegal, the then 86-year-old Abdoulaye Wade, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/1/28/controversy-of-abdoulaye-wades-presidential-bid">did attempt a constitutional coup in 2012</a> to run for a third term. </p>
<p>In response to many of these developments, ECOWAS deployed both military and diplomatic tactics at different times. For instance, ECOWAS deployed the military in the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts and recorded a modicum of success, but this intervention was controversial because of alleged <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/">human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>Diplomacy was deployed in 2012, when a festering <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087813515979">terrorist challenge and Tuareg rebellion</a> in Mali led to the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Touré in a putsch. ECOWAS initiated a <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/52122968.pdf">mediated</a> settlement with the junta to restore constitutional order while granting them amnesty. It failed to deploy a military tactic due to lack of capacity and disagreements by member states. </p>
<p>However, the use of Blaise Compaoré as mediator in the Mali intervention contradicted the organisation’s protocols given his despotic tactics at home. Compaoré was eventually <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/blaise-compaore-burkina-faso-president-resigns-after-violent-protests-1.2819254">toppled by a popular protest</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>After a military coup in Burkina Faso in 2015, ECOWAS returned the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">interim president</a>, Michel Kafando, to office. And it facilitated a political transition in the Gambia in 2017. </p>
<p>Yet it has been ineffectual in dismantling the Gnassingbé dynasty in Togo. And it failed to deplore the move by Alpha Condé of Guinea to push through a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/defusing-political-crisis-guinea/">constitutional referendum</a> in March 2020. This saw him return to power for a third term as president.</p>
<p>Similarly, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire capitalised on a new constitution and ran for a third term in 2020 amid some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/7/ivory-coast-president-alassane-ouattara-to-run-for-third-term">violent protests in the country</a>. According to Adam K. Abebe in the Africa Report, the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/34674/cote-divoire-ouattaras-bid-for-3rd-term-opens-up-a-can-of-worms/">new constitution</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“retains the two-term limit on presidential aspirants but says nothing about terms served prior to its adoption”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2020, Mali was back in the spotlight when a popular <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54134614">uprising and coup</a> ended the administration of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This time, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/62698/mali-a-whos-who-of-bah-ndaws-transitional-government-cabinet">ECOWAS imposed</a> economic sanctions and gave a deadline for the military to hand over to a transitional government.</p>
<p>Overall, I found that ECOWAS’s achievements in responding to the crises of governance wrecking the region have been strained by the non-compliance of its own leaders with its <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf">good governance protocol</a>. </p>
<h2>Drugs, piracy and terrorism</h2>
<p>One of the major security threats in the region is drug trafficking. Coastal states of Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Senegal have become major transit routes for <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/abstract/10.5334/sta.df/">drug traffickers</a>. And <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_COCAINE.pdf">substantial seizures of drugs</a> were made between 2005 and 2007. This challenge has been coupled with alarming <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">kidnappings at sea</a> in the Gulf of Guinea.</p>
<p>ECOWAS tried to address the drug crime through <a href="https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/ecowasresponseactionplan.html">the adoption of a policy in 2009</a> and a year later agreeing <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/November/new-initiative-to-improve-airport-intelligence-sharing-on-drug-trafficking-in-west-africa.html">the Dakar Initiative</a>. Most of its efforts have focused on <a href="https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/WACD_En_Report_WEB_051114.pdf">restricting the flow of drugs, strengthening borders, and prosecuting culprits</a>. </p>
<p>Then there is the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/world/africa/terrorism-west-africa.html">ongoing terrorism of Boko Haram</a> and its splinter sects in Nigeria. This has become a normalised phenomenon with seismic reverberations in neighbouring states. The challenge is compounded by the activities of armed bandits and kidnappers.</p>
<p>ECOWAS adopted a counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan in 2013. This outlined <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN-CT.pdf">three main pillars: prevent, pursue, reconstruct</a>. </p>
<p>The priority of member states has been to pursue culprits, with little investment in addressing the ideological and political conditions of violence. </p>
<p>There are also major shortfalls when it comes to the organisation’s military unit. The most pressing are corruption and a lack of sustained and improved training.</p>
<p>And, despite its measured progress, ECOWAS still has the critical challenge of resource scarcity. There is also the lack of will to follow through on the implementation of protocols, non-compliance with the protocols, a lack of leadership by members, the brutality of state forces and a general disconnect with the realities of people on the ground. </p>
<h2>The way ahead</h2>
<p>The decline of interstate violence and civil wars in West Africa, and the greater prominence of ECOWAS in conflict management, are perhaps indications that the security situation of West Africa didn’t turn out to be as gloomy as Kaplan forecast two decades ago. But there are important lessons that have been learnt. </p>
<p>The organisation should support and safeguard the rights of its citizens to stage peaceful protest as a way of balancing the excesses of politicians.</p>
<p>The people should use their rights granted by <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5546&context=faculty_scholarship">Article 4 of the 2005 revised protocol</a> under the ECOWAS Court to seek justice in situations where they have been abused by the state or other oppressive groups.</p>
<p>ECOWAS should appoint individuals who are not former heads of state and do not hold political office as regional mediators. Given Nigeria’s mammoth internal challenges and weakened political clout, other countries within the region must step up and drive the organisation to achieve its mandate of becoming a <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/vision-2020/">community of people</a> rather than an institution that enhances the status and profile of <a href="https://gup.ub.gu.se/file/119483">subversive regimes</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Maiangwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ECOWAS needs to be decisive in enforcing its protocols and sanctioning members that flout the provisions of its protocols and policies.Benjamin Maiangwa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lakehead UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.