tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/the-guptas-26408/articles
The Guptas – The Conversation
2023-07-26T14:31:46Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/210413
2023-07-26T14:31:46Z
2023-07-26T14:31:46Z
Essop Pahad: a diligent communist driven by an optimistic vision of a non-racial South Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539332/original/file-20230725-17-w2ef8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Essop Pahad was a confidant of former president Thabo Mbeki.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bongani Mnguni/Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of South African freedom struggle stalwart <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/essop-goolam-pahad-mr">Essop Pahad</a> (84) <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2023-07-06-essop-pahad-close-confidant-of-thabo-mbeki-dies-aged-84/">on 6 July 2023</a> prompted <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/tribute-chirpy-and-thoughtful-essop-pahads-legacy-will-forever-be-remembered-in-sas-history-20230706">tributes</a> from his former comrades. There were also less respectful obituaries referring to him as Thabo Mbeki’s “<a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/obituaries/obituary-essop-pahad-mbekis-consigliere-would-fight-you-intellectually-too-20230707">consiglieri</a>”, because of his role as the former president’s “right-hand man”.</p>
<p>Any examination of Pahad’s full political record will take you back to the heroic phases of South Africa’s liberation history, when prospects for a democratic South African government seemed very remote. As a teenager in the 1950s he was busy in the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress. This was the equivalent of the youth league of the liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), for Indian South Africans. In those days, reflecting apartheid’s distinctions, even radical resistance to it was racially differentiated.</p>
<p>He was one of a small group of activists who, in the 1950s and early 1960s, made a decisive contribution in pulling the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03465.htm">Congress Alliance</a> – a front of organisations allied to the ANC – leftwards, and encouraging an optimistic vision of a future non-racial South Africa.</p>
<p>In my own <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/red-road-to-freedom/">research</a> on the South African Communist Party’s history, groups like the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress were game-changers. They were influential despite their small organised followings. Understanding Pahad’s political ascent helps to illuminate the history of the South African left and the wider liberation movement in which it immersed itself. He belonged to a political network constituted as much by friendships as shared ideas.</p>
<p>At the congress’s annual general meeting in 1958 he proposed a resolution on sport. Sadly, that is all the meeting’s agenda tells us. I’d like to think it was about cricket and its segregation, a key preoccupation for young Indian activists at that time, for Pahad was a lifelong cricket fan.</p>
<p>In old age he was a regular visitor to the Long Room at the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/wanderers-cricket-stadium-johannesburg">Wanderers Cricket Stadium</a> in Johannesburg, one reward for becoming a notable that he would enjoy. As a student at Sussex University between 1965 and 1970, he once organised a party for the visiting West Indian test side. Inheriting a family ethic of generous hospitality, he provided such a warm reception for the visitors that the following day they were <a href="http://cricmash.com/society-and-politics/mbeki-pahad-and-the-1966-west-indians">so badly hungover they lost their match</a>.</p>
<h2>The early years</h2>
<p>Pahad’s childhood was politically configured. His parents Goolam and Amina Pahad belonged to the group that directed the Indian congresses in the mid-1940s into confrontation with a government seeking to dispossess Indian landowners. Goolam was a successful businessman and he owned property in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/destruction-sophiatown">Sophiatown</a>. Pahad employed ANC leader <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/sisulu-walter-1912-2003/">Walter Sisulu</a>, supporting his efforts to become an estate agent.</p>
<p>Through Sisulu, the Pahads became friendly with the angry young men who would become ANC leaders in 1949, often providing them with food and a place to sleep so they could avoid late <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/pass-laws-south-africa-1800-1994">night pass law</a> arrests for being in town after the curfew.</p>
<p>Even without guests, the Pahads’ apartment would have been crowded. Goolam and Amina Pahad had moved to the inner city of Johannesburg shortly after Essop’s birth in 1939 in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/essop-goolam-pahad">Schweitzer-Reneke</a>, in today’s North West province. They wanted good schooling for their five sons.</p>
<p>Both Essop and his younger brother <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/aziz-goolam-hoosein-pahad-mr-0">Aziz</a> did well enough to obtain entry to the University of the Witwatersrand. This was despite or perhaps because of their participation in one of the Congress Alliance-sponsored “Cultural Clubs” that were set to protest the introduction of the inferior <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/anc-protest-bantu-education-act/">Bantu Education</a> for the black majority.</p>
<p>The clandestine Communist Party’s key theoretician <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/michael-alan-harmel-posthumous">Michael Harmel</a> led the club that they joined. Perhaps through his agency, Pahad joined the party. The Transvaal Indian Youth Congress was led by party members and its political affiliations were very evident in its journal, New Youth. Pahad remained politically animated as a university student, joining the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress’ executive.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-communists-have-shaped-south-africas-history-over-100-years-165556">How communists have shaped South Africa's history over 100 years</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In mid-1962 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safricas-once-exiled-anti-apartheid-veteran-essop-pahad-dies-84-2023-07-06/">he was arrested</a> for trying to organise a strike, a contribution to the ANC’s continuing effort to secure a national constitutional convention. By this time he had formed a friendship with <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki</a>, whom he got to know after they met at the Rand Youth Club, a key assembly point for activists, sponsored by Sisulu. Mbeki was then staying in Johannesburg, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/thabo-mbeki-1942-timeline">completing his A-levels through correspondence</a> after expulsion from Lovedale College for leading a class boycott.</p>
<h2>Exile years</h2>
<p>Pahad’s friendship with Mbeki deepened when he joined him in Britain after his departure from South Africa in 1964, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safricas-once-exiled-anti-apartheid-veteran-essop-pahad-dies-84-2023-07-06/">prompted by a banning order</a>. Mbeki was enrolled at Sussex University and he persuaded Pahad to register. Pahad would complete <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/61351">an MA and a doctorate at Sussex </a> between 1965 and 1971, producing a workmanlike dissertation about the South African Indian Congresses.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539515/original/file-20230726-27-pmd1te.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Essop Pahad addresses a protest meeting in Amsterdam in 1985.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sepia Times/Universal Images Group/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mbeki also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/columnists/guestcolumn/excerpt-while-thabo-mbeki-moved-quietly-essop-pahad-would-stand-up-and-shout-20230707">introduced him to Meg Shorrock</a>, whom he married in 1966. That year with Mbeki he helped establish a non-racial ANC Youth and Student Section. He was immersed in campus student politics as well as organising Vietnam solidarity events. He spent a year in 1973 at the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02626.htm">Institute of Social Sciences</a> in Moscow.</p>
<p>Pahad’s most conspicuous activity during his exile was his deployment in Prague at the <a href="https://www.servantleader.co.za/essop">World Marxist Review</a>; acknowledgement by the Communist Party of his status as a reliable theoretician. He and Meg lived in Prague between 1975 and 1985, and their two daughters were born there, attending Czech schools. I interviewed them in 2018 because I was exploring the South African Communist Party’s Czech connections.</p>
<p>The Pahads remembered a happy period of their life. They found plenty to admire in post-Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, though they both perceived that the Czech party had lost public support. Back in London, Pahad would work closely with Mbeki, acting as an intermediary in the discreet diplomacy that Mbeki was conducting with South African officials and businessmen.</p>
<h2>Right-hand man</h2>
<p>Pahad would return to South Africa in 1990 following the unbanning of the liberation movements, making a new home for his family in Johannesburg. Unlike Mbeki, Pahad remained a communist. One view of his continuing affiliation is that he remained in the party at Mbeki’s behest to watch over its internal affairs, but there is no reason to doubt his continuing commitment to communism. At that time Mbeki’s future succession to the presidency was uncertain and the party was one key constituency. But it is true that Pahad’s subsequent political career would be defined by his status as Mbeki’s trusted friend, his best man as it were, a function he actually performed at Mbeki’s wedding <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/pahad-gives-his-perspective-418057">in 1974</a>.</p>
<p>So, during the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">presidency of Nelson Mandela</a> (10 May 1994-16 June 1999) he served as Mbeki’s “parliamentary counsellor”. He was essentially responsible for keeping the ANC House of Assembly caucus in order, and after Mbeki’s accession to the presidency, Pahad became a <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/essop-goolam-pahad-mr">minister in the president’s office</a>. </p>
<p>These were not posts that would define him as a policymaker. Rather his reputation as a member of government was as an “enforcer” quelling rebellion. “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/23/mbeki.southafrica">Who the fuck do you think you are, questioning the integrity of the government, the ministers and the president?</a>”,
he admonished the ANC members of the Select Committee on Public Accounts who wanted a full inquiry into the corrupt 1999 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006895">multi-billion-rand arms contract</a>.</p>
<p>Subsequently he was a vigorous defender of Mbeki’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mbekis-character-and-his-aids-denialism-are-intimately-linked-54766">positions on HIV and Aids</a>. Pahad himself believed that Mbeki was unfairly characterised as an Aids “denialist”.</p>
<h2>Diligent</h2>
<p>When Pahad was given a job, he did it efficiently. He surprised even his critics with the diligence with which he supported the offices placed under his authority as minister, for example urging municipalities to “mainstream” disability rights. </p>
<p>Characteristically loyal, he resigned when Mbeki was displaced <a href="https://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/events/pahad-briefs-media-cabinet-resignations-24-sep-08">in 2008</a>.</p>
<p>In retirement he presided over the <a href="http://www.sadet.co.za/">South African Democratic Education Trust</a>, the incubator of a remarkably non-partisan multi-volume history of the liberation struggle, founded his own journal, <a href="https://journals.uj.ac.za/index.php/The_Thinker/about/editorialTeam">The Thinker</a>, and remained actively engaged on the editorial board of <a href="https://print.media.co.za/new-age/">New Age</a>, the newspaper funded by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, which stands accused of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-itll-take-for-the-guptas-to-face-corruption-charges-in-south-africa-184952">orchestrating industrial scale corruption</a> under former president Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>He had <a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/guptaleaks-how-ajay-gupta-was-trusted-with-crafting-sas-global-image/">invited Ajay Gupta</a> to join the International Marketing Council in 2000, an appointment that he subsequently regretted. He may have had other personal regrets but unlike many of his comrades, he rarely spoke about his own political journey. </p>
<p>His life had its own integrity, defined by fixed loyalties and enduring friendships; not such a bad epitaph.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Lodge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
When Essop Pahad was given a job, he did it efficiently. He surprised even his critics with his diligence.
Tom Lodge, Emeritus Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Limerick
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/207769
2023-07-02T09:17:26Z
2023-07-02T09:17:26Z
Zondo at Your Fingertips: new book offers an accessible and condensed version of South Africa’s ambitious corruption inquiry
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534104/original/file-20230626-25-j2fluj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Ramaphosa, right, receives the final report of the State Capture Commission from Judge Zondo in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Anti-corruption activist <a href="https://shadowworldinvestigations.org/team_member/paul-holden/">Paul Holden</a> has done South Africa a great favour by summarising the work of the judicial commission that probed massive corruption under former president Jacob Zuma. No one except academics will read the commission’s 4,750 page report, but many will read Holden’s book, <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/zondo-at-your-fingertips/">Zondo at your Fingertips</a>.</p>
<p>Holden is a former director of investigations at <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/">Corruption Watch</a>, the South African corruption watchdog. He has worked with the investigative organisations <a href="https://shadowworldinvestigations.org/">Shadow World</a> and <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/">Open Secrets</a> for many years. He seeks to expose how corrupt individuals, aided by auditors and banks, not only looted the state but came to control it and pervert it into a kleptocracy.</p>
<p>The author, who has also lived in the UK, tells us that the Zondo commission was globally unique:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are only a handful of examples of any state or quasi-judicial inquiry being given the task and resources to delve so deeply into the corruption of the ruling party … something like the scale, importance and independence of the Zondo Commission could never happen in the United Kingdom. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Holden has written a good and solid book, selecting and explaining the significant Zondo findings. It is useful for South Africans in getting a grasp of the commission’s report. Overall, this book is recommended for your bookshelf and every library.</p>
<p>If South Africans are lucky, the multi-volume report will be read through by prosecutors, who have the power to formulate charges and get the courts to issue warrants of arrest.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Book cover with the words: Zondo at your fingertips" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the historical odds are stacked against this. The country has had over a dozen big commissions of inquiry. Not many people landed up in jail as a consequence. </p>
<h2>How the story is told</h2>
<p>Holden starts by telling us that the commission, headed by then deputy chief justice <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/13-current-judges/72-deputy-chief-justice-ray-zondo">Raymond Zondo</a>, heard 1,731,106 pages of documentary evidence, which it summarised in a transcript of 75,099 pages. The commission’s 19-volume report totals 4,750 pages. It heard 300 witnesses over 400 days of hearings, spread over four and a half years between 2018 and 2021. </p>
<p>Only the report of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a>, which probed human rights abuses by both the apartheid regime and the liberation movement during the struggle for freedom in South Africa, has been comparable in <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/">length and scope</a>. It sat from 1996 and submitted its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-South-Africa">final report in October 2003</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-democracy-or-a-kleptocracy-how-south-africa-stacks-up-111101">A democracy or a kleptocracy? How South Africa stacks up</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The book is well structured in 10 parts. These include a chapter on the capture of state institutions such as the South African Revenue Service, the capture of state-owned enterprises such as South African Airways, the failures of the president, the African National Congress, and parliament, and a chapter on what money went where.</p>
<h2>Commissions of inquiry</h2>
<p>The most ambitious commission of inquiry set up in South Africa was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Set up in 1996 after the end of apartheid, it offered amnesty in exchange for information about atrocities.</p>
<p>No one who refused to apply for amnesty, or whose amnesty application was refused by the commission, was in fact prosecuted. A quarter of a century lapsed before the families of some detainees who’d been tortured to death found pro bono lawyers who <a href="https://www.newframe.com/long-read-the-unfinished-business-of-the-trc/">instituted the reopening of inquests and other litigation</a> – with zero support from the government.</p>
<p>The great majority of the recommendations of commissions of inquiry, such as the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/comm-mrk/docs/20150710-gg38978_gen699_3_MarikanaReport.pdf">Farlam Commission</a> into the massacre of striking miners and other killings at Marikana, North West province in 2012, remain unimplemented and ignored by the government. Sceptics argue that commissions of inquiry merely provide governments with a pretext to <a href="https://www.enca.com/opinion/parking-hot-potato-are-commissions-inquiry-ineffective">stall any remedial actions for years</a>, until the politics of the front page has moved onto other issues.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-new-chief-justice-an-introduction-to-raymond-zondo-179315">South Africa has a new Chief Justice: an introduction to Raymond Zondo</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Holden notes that Judge Zondo ordered the government to lay charges with the police against Dudu Myeni, former chair of South African Airways, for revealing the identity of a witness. But no arrest or prosecution has yet occurred. Likewise, the commission’s recommendations to the <a href="https://lpc.org.za/">Legal Practice Council</a>, to explore whether certain lawyers who enabled corruption should be struck off the roll, and to the auditors’ regulatory entity, to do the same with some auditors, have not yet resulted in action.</p>
<p>However, the author concludes, on the positive side, the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/asset-forfeiture-unit#:%7E:text=Empowered%20by%20the%20Prevention%20of,the%20private%20and%20public%20sector.">Asset Forfeiture Unit</a>, which is empowered to seize assets which are the proceeds of crime, successfully froze the Optimum coal mine to prevent it being sold on to cronies of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48980964">Guptas</a>, the Indian family accused of orchestrating mass corruption in South Africa. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.siu.org.za/">Special Investigating Unit</a> took up numerous cases against multinational companies to recoup state funds and got billions of rand refunded. The <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/news/investigative-directorate-move-npa-says-president">Investigative Directorate</a> of the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a> made numerous arrests; prosecutions are pending.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>Holden notes that the Zondo Commission made a number of recommendations. Key among these are to professionalise all appointments to the boards of state-owned enterprises, and prevent cabinet ministers from appointing political cronies and other unqualified or compromised persons. The same applies to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-plan-to-make-its-public-service-professional-its-time-to-act-on-it-187706">professionalising civil service</a>, provincial, and municipal procurement officials.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-are-key-to-fighting-corruption-in-south-africa-it-shouldnt-be-at-their-peril-168134">Whistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn't be at their peril</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Holden also summarises the commission’s enhanced proposed protection for whistle blowers, and to grant them compensation for losses they suffered. He notes that Zondo also flagged the deployment of party loyalists to key state positions as a violation of the constitution’s section 197 (3).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207769/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
The Zondo Commission was globally unique in scope and scale. The book selects and explains its key findings and recommendations.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/186582
2022-07-12T07:27:35Z
2022-07-12T07:27:35Z
Zondo Commission’s report on South Africa’s intelligence agency is important but flawed
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473381/original/file-20220711-14-lesf18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa, right, receives the final State Capture Report from Chief Juistice Raymond Zondo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s judicial probe into state capture and corruption, the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a>, has concluded that the <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a> was integral to the capture of the state by corrupt elements. These included former president Jacob Zuma’s friends, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/how-gupta-brothers-from-india-landed-south-africas-ruling-party-in-its-biggest-crisis-397138">the Gupta family</a>.</p>
<p>The agency has been unstable for some time. <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf">Previous</a> <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">investigations</a> have made findings to improve the performance of civilian intelligence. Yet problems relating to poor performance and politicisation persist. They escalated during <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Zuma_Years.html?id=BwxbDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Zuma’s tenure</a>.</p>
<p>The commission’s <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">hearings</a> were remarkable for an institution that had become <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-26-commission-hears-of-alleged-covert-ops-in-media-judiciary-civil-society-academia-and-unions-costing-taxpayers-hundreds-of-millions/">used to operating secretly</a>. Spies testified in detail, and in public, about what had gone wrong at the agency during the Zuma era (<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2014 to February 2018</a>). Some did so <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-28-security-alert-images-circulating-on-social-media-may-put-state-capture-commissions-unidentified-witnesses-at-risk/">at great personal risk</a>.</p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance, and served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>. In my view, the Zondo report is a globally significant example of radical transparency around intelligence abuses. But it lacks the detailed findings and recommendations to enable speedy prosecutions. It also fails to address the broader threats to democracy posed by unaccountable intelligence. </p>
<h2>Covert operations</h2>
<p>The commission heard evidence pointing to fraud, corruption and abuse of taxpayers’ money at the agency. It also heard how the Guptas benefited from these abuses. The agency shielded them from investigations that indicated they were a national security threat. </p>
<p>The most significant recommendation is that law enforcement agencies should further investigate whether people implicated in the report committed crimes. The commission expressed particular concern about covert intelligence projects that appeared to be “special purpose vehicles to siphon funds”. It made specific reference to three people who should be investigated further.</p>
<p>The first is former director-general <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/arthur-fraser-a-law-unto-himself-helped-by-zuma-to-hide-pure-crime-linked-to-r600m-spy-network-20220624">Arthur Fraser</a>, for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-05-the-principal-agent-network-pan-dossier-zuma-and-mahlobo-knew-about-arthur-frasers-rogue-intelligence-programme/">his involvement</a> in the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-06-the-principal-agent-network-pan-dossier-part-2-bugging-the-auditors-dumb-and-dumber/">Principal Agent Network</a>. This was a covert intelligence collection entity outside the State Security Agency. It has been controversial for over a decade after investigations pointed to the abuse of funds.</p>
<p>The second person is former deputy director-general of counter-intelligence <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-15-confessions-of-a-dangerous-mind-a-divinely-inspired-zuma-spy-thulani-dlomo/">Thulani Dlomo</a>. He was responsible for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/ssa-declassified-i-networks-which-looted-r15bn-from-spy-agency-still-in-place-as-investigations-collapse-20220221">Chief Directorate Special Operations</a>, a covert structure which the report says ran irregular projects and operations that could well have been unlawful.</p>
<p>The most significant of these was <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/ssa-declassified-illegal-operation-mayibuye-allegedly-siphoned-millions-from-ssa-to-jacob-zuma-20220226">Project Mayibuye</a>, a collection of operations designed to counter threats to state authority. In practice, they and others sought to shield Zuma from a growing chorus of criticism of his misrule.</p>
<p>The commission <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202206/electronic-state-capture-commission-report-part-v-vol-i.pdf">found</a> that the project destabilised opposition parties and benefited the Zuma faction in the ruling African National Congress. </p>
<p>The third person is the former minister of state security, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/live-norma-mngoma-david-mahlobo-to-testify-at-state-capture-inquiry-20210409">David Mahlobo</a>. The commission found that he became involved in <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-19-former-state-security-minister-david-mahlobo-distances-himself-from-apartheid-assassin-and-jacob-zuma-poisoning-projects/">operational matters</a> instead of confining himself to executive oversight. It also found that his handling of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-03-09-cash-parcels-to-minister-spying-on-media-and-infiltration-of-anti-zuma-movement-highlighted-in-report-on-sa-spy-agency/">large amounts of cash</a>, ostensibly to fund operations, needed further investigation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-in-south-africa-how-the-rot-set-in-and-how-the-project-was-rumbled-176481">State capture in South Africa: how the rot set in and how the project was rumbled</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>According to the commission, Mahlobo’s predecessor, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/siyabonga-cyprian-cwele/">Siyabonga Cwele</a>, did the same by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-26-how-zuma-and-state-security-minister-cwele-shut-down-2011-investigation-into-the-guptas/">stopping an investigation</a> into the Guptas and their influence on Zuma’s administration.</p>
<p>The commission concluded, based on overwhelming evidence, that Zuma and Cwele did not want the investigation to continue. Had it continued, it could have prevented at least some of the activities that led to the capture of the state by the Guptas and the loss of billions in public money through corruption.</p>
<h2>Recipe for abuse</h2>
<p>The commission also addressed some of the deeper factors that predisposed the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/42/state-security-agency-ssa">State Security Agency</a> to abuse.</p>
<p>One of these was the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/merger-of-spy-agencies-led-to-cabinet-ministers-giving-ssa-operatives-illegal-instructions-20210915">amalgamation</a> of the domestic intelligence branch, the National Intelligence Agency, with the foreign branch, the South African Secret Service, into a new entity, the State Security Agency, in 2009.</p>
<p>The commission found that the amalgamation had disastrous consequences, as it allowed most of the abuses it examined to happen. The two entities were merged in terms of a presidential proclamation. Yet the constitution <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-11.pdf">requires</a> intelligence services to be established through legislation. This meant that until <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/general-intelligence-laws-amendment-act-0">legislation</a> was introduced in 2013, the security agency operated without a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/4715/">clear legal basis</a>.</p>
<p>It was highly centralised, allowing a super-director-general to control all activities. This made abuse easier for an appointee with corrupt intentions. The agency was also based on a state security <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">doctrine</a>, rather than a people-centred doctrine. This doctrinal shift prioritised the protection of the state from criticism, and the president more specifically, rather than the security of society. <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/merger-of-spy-agencies-led-to-cabinet-ministers-giving-ssa-operatives-illegal-instructions-20210915">Ministerial political overreach</a> into operational matters heightened the potential for abuse.</p>
<p>The commission also found that the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/committee-details/169">Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence</a>, the <a href="https://www.oigi.gov.za/">Inspector General of Intelligence</a> and the <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/">Auditor General</a> had failed to exercise proper oversight. This meant the external checks and balances on the State Security Agency were weak to non-existent.</p>
<h2>Weighing the Zondo report</h2>
<p>The struggle for more accountable intelligence has been strengthened through the Zondo report’s exposure of abuses. But many of the findings and recommendations are vague and general. The commission could have been more specific about upgrading the Inspector General’s independence, for instance. Likwewise the Auditor General’s capacity to audit the agency.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">South Africa's state capture commission nears its end after four years. Was it worth it?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The commission could also have made more of the evidence presented to it. And it could have been more categorical about when it thought criminality had occurred. At times, the report does little more than restate the recommendations of previous enquiries.</p>
<p>These include an <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-09-spooks-and-spies-the-pan-progamme-arthur-fraser-and-eight-years-of-investigations/">investigation</a> into the Principal Agent Network programme in 2009, providing prima facie evidence of criminality. </p>
<p>Another is the report of the 2018 <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel</a>, which showed that the agency had been politicised and repurposed to benefit Zuma. </p>
<p>An important gap in the Zondo report relates to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-01-civil-society-organisations-release-boast-report-demand-accountability-for-rogue-spying/">infiltration and surveillance of civil society</a>, and the agency’s broader threat to democracy.</p>
<p>Little is made of the fact that, according to a recently 2017 declassified <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/580662166/Boast-Report#download&from_embed">performance report</a>, the agency claimed to have infiltrated <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/">Greenpeace Africa</a>, the <a href="https://www.r2k.org.za/">Right2Know Campaign</a>, trade unions and other civil society organs.</p>
<p>The spies masqueraded as activists. They reported back to the agency on supporter strengths, main actors, ideology, support structures and agendas. The report’s author, a security agency member, <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/580662166/Boast-Report#download&from_embed">boasted</a> about these and other accomplishments, such as infiltrating the social media networks of the Western Cape <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1753-59132021000400006">#feesmustfall</a> student movement. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>In the preparations to investigate and prosecute wrongdoers responsible for the abuses by the State Security Agency, its infiltration of civil society must not be allowed to fall under the radar. It must receive as much attention as all the cases of grand corruption that are going to keep the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a> busy. </p>
<p>Otherwise, the social forces that could potentially bring deeper and more meaningful changes to society may remain targets of state spying, as <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745337807/activists-and-the-surveillance-state/">has been the case elsewhere</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the Open Society Foundation for South Africa and Luminate. She served on the 2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency. </span></em></p>
The commission could have made more of the evidence and been more categorical about when it thought criminality had taken place.
Jane Duncan, Professor, Department of Communication and Media, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/184952
2022-06-21T14:02:45Z
2022-06-21T14:02:45Z
What it’ll take for the Guptas to face corruption charges in South Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469780/original/file-20220620-20-84slwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Atul Gupta (pictured) and his brother Rajesh are the alleged masterminds behind state capture in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kevin Sutherland/Sunday Times via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Now that Rajesh and Atul Gupta have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61713832">been arrested</a> in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), there is <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/gupta-brothers-extradition-could-take-years-86fe3f64-e47c-4c5c-b5f6-49df51568bcc">a great deal of speculation as to when</a> the brothers may ultimately set foot on South African soil to face charges of money laundering and other financial crimes.</p>
<p>The brothers are the alleged kingpins behind <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48980964">state capture</a> in South Africa – the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">massive corruption and repurposing of state organs</a> for private gain during the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">ruinous reign</a> of their friend, former president <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma-mr">Jacob Zuma</a>. They fled South Africa for Dubai <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/why-guptas-left-sa-20160409-2">in April 2016</a>.</p>
<p>The judicial commission into state capture and corruption – <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a> – found that the Gupta family had considerable access to Zuma, influencing political decisions, such as ministerial appointments and staffing at the various state-owned enterprises, and rearrangement of the revenue service to advance their financial interests.</p>
<p>The evidence outlined in the Zondo Commission reports offers substantive, chronological and narrative detail. That’ll assist prosecutors in building cases of fraud, money-laundering and a host of other financial crimes against named individuals, including Rajesh and Aptul Gupta.</p>
<p>This means that <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">South Africans are now aware</a>, having been provided with considerable information and in great detail, about the financial malfeasance that had been carried out for over a decade or more.</p>
<p>Despite this, there have only been a few arrests, and even a smaller number of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-05-27-former-transnet-boss-siyabonga-gama-appears-in-court/">prosecutions</a>. Having the Guptas in court will send a strong signal that the days of impunity are over.</p>
<p>The likelihood of the brothers ultimately being forced to face their alleged crimes depends on how strong the case against them is, and how adroit the prosecutors are. So far, it’s clear that there is a very strong case against the brothers. But the jury is still out on the ability of the country’s prosecutors to do a good job.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, it’s important to understand bringing the Guptas to account might take a while.</p>
<h2>A drawn out process</h2>
<p>Arresting a suspect in pursuance of an extradition order usually signals a preliminary legal victory for the requesting country. Once the fugitive is in police custody, formal proceedings may start to have the suspect brought to trial. </p>
<p>But the victory is usually short-lived. This is because the process of extradition is lengthy, often proceeding in fits and starts. It may in fact take years to bring the suspect to justice.</p>
<p>A recent international example is the case of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61839256">Julian Assange’s extradition</a> from the United Kingdom to the United States to face espionage charges, which has been in the works <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/06/17/1105827493/julian-assange-extradition-explained">for over a decade</a>. Assange has used court challenges and extra-legal measures (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/15/julian-assange-ecuador-london-embassy-how-he-became-unwelcome-guest">refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London</a>) to halt his extradition.</p>
<p>One closer to home is the case of Mozambique’s former finance minister Manuel Chang, who is wanted in both Mozambique and the United States for corruption involving $2 billion. The High Court in Johannesburg has ruled that Chang, who has been in jail in South Africa since 2018, be <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/just-in-mozambiques-former-finance-minister-to-be-extradited-to-the-us-20211110">extradited to the US for trial</a>.</p>
<p>It is probable that the Guptas will use the court systems in both the UAE and South Africa to delay their day of legal reckoning. They are also likely to seek political or diplomatic alternatives to facing trial in South Africa. </p>
<p>These could include, for example, seeking intervention from the Indian or UAE governments to pursue a legal settlement that might involve returning their allegedly ill-gained revenue in exchange for withdrawing the charges.</p>
<h2>Strong case</h2>
<p>The first precondition for securing the brothers’ presence in court would be a bulletproof case by South Africa’s <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a>. This must withstand both South African and UAE judicial scrutiny. Such a case would have to be built on an incontrovertible body of evidence including sworn documents, financial records, witness testimony, and an irreproachable timeline of misdeeds. </p>
<p>Such a bulletproof case is mapped out in voluminous detail in the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">reports of the Zondo Commission</a>. The reports outlined how Zuma’s friends and associates diverted billions of rand from parastatals to offshore accounts, mostly at the behest of the Gupta family. </p>
<p>A searing example is the purchase by <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/556244158/Part-2-Vol-1-Trasnet-Report-of-the-State-Capture-Commission-PART-II-Vol-I-010222">Transnet</a>, the transport parastatal, of unsuitable locomotives, in violation of state procurement laws and policies, and with allegedly huge kickbacks to the Guptas. Another example is the slew of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/eskom-gupta-dealings-exposed-2086293">criminal activities at Eskom</a>, the power utility, that were allegedly devised entirely to profit the Gupta family and their enablers in the governing party.</p>
<p>These financial crimes have had several deleterious effects on South Africa. They robbed South Africans of basic social and economic resources (electricity, transport) they need to live a decent life. Even with prosecutions, it may take years (if at all) to recoup the stolen money.</p>
<p>In short, the Gupta footprint is all over the thousands of pages of the <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/january-2022/">Zondo Commission Report</a>. The task is now up to the NPA to develop an unimpeachable case against Rajesh and Aptul Gupta.</p>
<h2>Prosecutors</h2>
<p>The second precondition to ensuring the Guptas return to South Africa to face charges is the adroit handling and ultimate success of the prosecutors in prevailing over the many legal challenges that are certain to be raised by the Gupta brothers.</p>
<p>It helps that the brothers have lost their enormous influence and access to South Africa’s presidency, and other senior ANC politicians with the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as party leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-is-cyril-ramaphosa-a-profile-of-the-new-leader-of-south-africa-89456">in 2017</a>, and national president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-cyril-ramaphosa%3A-profile">in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>The jury is still out as to whether the National Prosecuting Authority, which was hollowed out as part of the state capture project, has the capability to successfully prosecute those implicated in the Zondo Commission reports. </p>
<p>Despite the appointment of <a href="https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/ndpp-appointment-signals-ramaphosas-commitment-to-rule-of-law">new leadership</a> three years ago, and formal support from President Ramaphosa, the agency continues to be underfunded. The record so far does not inspire confidence. </p>
<p>The prosecution of those named in the Zondo Commission reports remain lacklustre. This is so despite the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/other/npa-and-hawks-to-act-against%20-accused-in-zondo-commission-report/ar-AASHr24">public commitment</a> made by the prosecutors in the wake of the Zondo Commission reports. </p>
<p>Yet the expectations of South Africans that the state will succeed in prosecuting those who have committed atrocious financial crimes remain high. Despite its disappointing record, the prosecuting authority has been giving a vital legal lifeline by the Zondo Commission reports, with their detailed listing and description of the crimes committed.</p>
<p>The prosecuting authority has also enlisted some of the country’s leading legal minds from the private sector in efforts to <a href="https://theworldnews.net/za-news/bid-to-extradite-gupta-brothers-back-to-sa-receives-boost">extradite the Guptas</a>, and to prosecute state capture cases. This bodes well for ensuring that the Gupta brothers will face charges in a South African court.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>South Africa’s prosecutors should seize the lifeline provided by the Zondo Commission, and the addition of capable legal talent, to reinvigorate a distressed institution. </p>
<p>Successful prosecution of the Guptas and others implicated in state capture will be good for the prosecutors’ reputation. It’ll also be good for the country – in economic and political terms. Their success will be appreciated not just locally, but could serve as a model for prosecuting corruption in Africa – and globally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Penelope Andrews does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A judicial commission into state corruption found that the Gupta family influenced former President Jacob Zuma’s political decisions.
Penelope Andrews, Professor of Law, New York Law School
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/182898
2022-05-13T10:55:38Z
2022-05-13T10:55:38Z
South Africa’s state capture commission nears its end after four years. Was it worth it?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462516/original/file-20220511-25-iv52kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa testified at the Zondo commission. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Sumaya Hisham/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s judicial commission into state capture, known as the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a>, recently handed over the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/presidency-receives-part-four-state-capture-commission-report-29-apr-2022-0000">fourth part</a> of its voluminous and scathing findings to President Cyril Ramaphosa. As a fact-finding commission, it had to determine if there were facts that were relevant for prosecutorial purposes related to “state capture” and corruption during the reign of former president Jacob Zuma. </p>
<p>The commission was recommended by the former Public Protector <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/world-justice-forum-vi/thuli-madonsela">Thuli Madonsela</a> <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-24-zuma-challenges-public-protectors-recommendation-on-state-capture-report/">in November 2016</a> to complete her <a href="http://www.saflii.org/images/329756472-State-of-Capture.pdf">“State of Capture” report</a>. Now at the end of its four-year long investigation, how can the commission be assessed?</p>
<p>For years many of the leading figures in “state capture” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5EfxgkLZdWw">tried to vilify investigative journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.markswilling.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/SASSA-State-Capture-_2018-07_-A4-report.pdf">NGOs and researchers</a> who exposed their actions. It was, therefore, a contested terrain. The Zondo Commission, however, followed procedures of formal investigations, leading evidence, interrogating the almost 300 witnesses and allowing for responses by the those implicated.</p>
<p>Cross-examination was used to test the evidence. All of this was done under the authority of then <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/13-current-judges/72-deputy-chief-justice-ray-zondo">Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo </a>. Though not a court of law, it is difficult to challenge the credibility of the commission’s procedures and its outcome.</p>
<p>Following the work of the commission, South Africans can no longer claim not to know what happened during former President Jacob Zuma’s <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">ruinous reign</a>, (<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma-mr">May 2009-February 2018</a>). The financial price paid for it, the decay within state institutions and demise of ethical public service are all products of this era.<br>
Those implicated can’t credibly claim that state capture was merely an imagination or a concocted political campaign against them.</p>
<p>The commission has indeed discovered and exposed the truth about corruption in South Africa. Whether or not the implicated persons are prosecuted and sentenced, the commission ensured that morally they will be held responsible for it. Corruption’s devastating effects are now in the open. Hopefully, it is early enough to prevent irreversible disintegration.</p>
<p>Similar to the earlier <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)</a>, which investigated the violence and human rights abuses during apartheid, many South Africans will continue to be sceptical about whether it can make a difference. <a href="https://www.collegesoflaw.edu/blog/2019/01/08/trc-south-africa-study-abroad/">Like the TRC</a>, this commission will probably receive more accolades from outside than inside the country.</p>
<p>The public nature of its processes and daily broadcasts for almost four years <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2018/09/da-requests-sabc-to-broadcast-zondo-commission-of-inquiry-on-terrestrial-platforms">on national television</a>, contributed much to the public now having a much clearer understanding of the nature of corruption in the country.</p>
<h2>Clarifying ‘state capture’</h2>
<p>During <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Zuma-Years-South-Africas-Changing/dp/1770220887">the Zuma years</a>, “state capture” as a concept was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-africas-anc-split-over-state-capture-probe/a-57386213">often discredited</a> by Zuma and his supporters. More recently, Zuma dismissed it as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/zuma-says-state-capture-inquiry-is-a-political-project-against-him-20201217">political campaign against him</a>. It is, therefore, important that the commission’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2018/20180713-gg41772_gen396-SCAPcomms-Rules.pdf">terms of reference</a> included in-depth investigations to reveal the nature and scope of “state capture”.</p>
<p>“State capture”, the commission in the end conceptualised, was not only corruption in the public sector or the relationship between <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture/">Zuma’s family and the Guptas</a>, Zuma’s friends behind the capture of the state. It was also about infiltration of the governing African National Congress (ANC) politicians into state institutions and state-owned enterprises. </p>
<p>It was about how the politicians used their positions in these institutions to develop a corrupt relationship <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/judicial-commission-inquiry-state-capture-report-part-3-viii-1-mar-2022-0000">with the private sector </a> - both local and international - and share the material gains. They included Bosasa, KPMG, McKinsey, Trillian Capital, Bell Pottinger and several South African banks. The commission also exposed how these politicians appointed supporters to key criminal justice, <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/announcements/654/State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_IV_Vol_I.pdf">revenue service</a> and intelligence institutions.</p>
<p>These operatives, police and investigators would protect the politicians against investigations and also be used to discredit Zuma’s opponents in the ANC. Corruption became, therefore, a means towards the political end of state capture. Without the Zondo Commission’s prolonged public hearings, the South African public would not have understood what the capture of their state entailed.</p>
<h2>ANC factions and state capture</h2>
<p>Though the commission did not investigate it intentionally, the evidence it heard confirmed a symbiotic relationship between state capture and the <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2021/04/16/ramaphosa-anc-faction">factions in the ANC</a>. Zuma emerged as the main protagonist. When he was subpoenaed to appear before the commission, his refusal to comply became the rallying point of his <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/kwazulu-natal/radical-economic-transformation-group-rejects-raymond-zondos-state-capture-commission-report-as-a-gimmick-1df604e9-a842-44d1-a56b-ec4fcb87a9ac">“radical economic transformation” faction</a> in the ANC.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A seated, bespectacled man wearning a tie shows a disdainful face" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462517/original/file-20220511-14-koej4w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former president Jacob Zuma walked out of the commission.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It underscored his efforts to politicise the judiciary and claim that it was under the influence of President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/jacob-zumas-political-campaign-against-judiciary-and-state-capture-inquiry-laid-bare-292a7de2-ac13-4b67-b316-a0fe38606130">against him</a>. </p>
<p>Zuma used his incarceration by the Constitutional Court for contempt of court, after his <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/handle/20.500.12144/36786?show=full">refusal to appear before the commission</a>, to present himself as the <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2629180/zuma-says-hes-come-full-circle-as-a-political-prisoner/">sacrificial political prisoner</a>. It might become evident in future that without the commission’s determination, it would have been unlikely for Zuma to be imprisoned at any time.</p>
<p>The legacy of this state capture history is a deeply divided ANC. The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo reports</a> present vivid pictures how it evolved, whether in the form of <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-cabinet-reshuffle-opens-the-door-for-nuclear-deal-in-south-africa-75553">cabinet reshuffles</a>, emasculating the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/sites/default/files/SARS%20Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf">South African Revenue Service</a>, or using the media (such as the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/14/sunday-times-apologises-for-tainted-scoops">Sunday Times</a>, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-03-22-trainspotter-how-the-new-age-ann7-and-the-guptas-have-spun-state-capture/">New Age and ANN7</a>) to discredit political opponents in the ANC.</p>
<h2>Erosion of state capacity</h2>
<p>The commission not only highlighted the key actors in the state capture drama. The daily display on live TV showed how parastatals were systematically infiltrated and milked of their budgets and resources. Critically important infrastructural enterprises like <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/announcements/657/State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_IV_Vol_IV.pdf">Eskom</a>, the power utility, the transport entities <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202202/part-2vol-1transnetstate-capture-commission-1l.pdf">Transnet, Prasa</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202201/judicial-commission-inquiry-state-capture-reportpart-1.pdf">SA Airways (SAA)</a> were eroded of their capacity.</p>
<p>Institutional decay in the form of loss of experienced human capital, decline in services such as passenger and freight rail-transport, unreliable electricity and water supply, erratic revenue collection and the decline of local governments, all meant not only that the state worked for other interests, but also very ineffectively.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bald man wearing a tie and suit walks into a room." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462518/original/file-20220511-15-hj25bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, chair of the commission.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In future it might become clear whether this process and how the Zondo commission exposed it in public, contributed towards a paradigm shift in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/acceleratedagendarestructuringsoe0.pdf">ANC government’s economic philosophy</a>. More recently, South African Airways has become <a href="https://www.ch-aviation.com/portal/news/112955-govt-concludes-51-sale-of-south-african-airways">partly “privatised”</a>. Eskom is unbundling into three companies and power generation in future will include a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/33068/">substantial private component</a>. Transnet will soon allow for private passenger and <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-05-09-mbalulas-high-hopes-for-policy-geared-at-getting-sa-rail-on-track/">freight railway services</a>. Without the public outrage and pressure encouraged by the commission’s hearings, it might have taken longer to reach this point.</p>
<h2>The commission’s remedy</h2>
<p>Part 5 of the commission’s report is still pending. In the first four parts a number of recommendations were made. In the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202201/judicial-commission-inquiry-state-capture-reportpart-1.pdf">first one</a>, procurement procedures in the public sector were addressed and a new dispensation proposed. The result is that government procurement services are now set to become more professional. </p>
<p>Regarding state owned enterprises, the appointment procedures and individual requirements of their board members and senior executives will also be addressed. Numerous recommendations about further investigations or prosecutions of implicated individuals and <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-in-south-africa-how-the-rot-set-in-and-how-the-project-was-rumbled-176481">private business entities are also included</a>.</p>
<p>But is this enough?</p>
<p>South Africans want guarantees to prevent a repetition of state capture or extensive corruption in future. Ideally, the commission ought to present policy and institutional designs as such guarantees. The <a href="https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/analysis/south-africa-anti-corruption-charter-first-step-towards-meaningful-change">proposed national charter against corruption</a> is one such recommendation, but more comprehensive designs are unlikely.</p>
<p>Early-warning systems to detect a possible recurrence, and deterrence to make the risks and cost of corruption too much, could be the starting point.</p>
<p>The Zondo commission has done its work. Was it worthwhile? For an answer, ask if it is possible to imagine a rehabilitated South Africa without the commission. My answer is “no”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Rebuilding South Africa after the devastation of state capture would not be possible without the work of the Zondo commission.
Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/176481
2022-02-08T14:11:46Z
2022-02-08T14:11:46Z
State capture in South Africa: how the rot set in and how the project was rumbled
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445112/original/file-20220208-12-13qr8a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ajay Gupta, left, and Atul Gupta, the masterminds behind state capture in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Muntu Vilakazi/City Press</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It seems the time of reckoning for the massive corruption that has hobbled South Africa’s economy is nigh. Two parts of the three-part report by the judicial commission investigating allegations of <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> under former President Jacob Zuma have now been published. The third is due at the end of February. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325777788_Theoretical_analysis_of_state_capture_and_its_manifestation_as_a_governance_problem_in_South_Africa">“State capture”</a> has become the South African term for what is elsewhere called kleptocracy. </p>
<p>Here I reflect on <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/documents">Part 2</a> of the report.</p>
<p>Ideally, a review of the complex Zondo Commission Report Part 2 requires a team of three co-authors: a chartered accountant, a political scientist, and a jurist specialising in company law. This review cannot do justice to a summary of a report when part 2 alone exceeds 640 pages. Instead, I will focus on some thoughts and analysis.</p>
<p>These opening observations are drawn from my knowledge of politics, informed by what’s in the report.</p>
<p>Firstly, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a> – friends of former President Jacob Zuma’s who, the commission says, orchestrated massive corruption and the capture of the South African state with Zuma’s help – were rumbled by events that caught them off-guard.</p>
<p>They had not, for example, anticipated that their actions in South Africa would result in a media uproar and political backlash. The media’s role in the ultimate demise is recognised in this latest report. The commission praises <a href="https://shadowworldinvestigations.org/">Shadow World Investigation </a> (Zondo,pp.19, 229); <a href="https://amabhungane.org/">AmaBhungane</a> (Zondo, p.260); <a href="https://mg.co.za/">Mail and Guardian </a>; and <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/">Open Secrets</a>, (Zondo,p.261); for investigative exposés of state capture. </p>
<p>These exposes eventually saw the Gupta’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016-04-10-guptas-leave-south-africa/">fleeing to the United Arab Emirates</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>They also never anticipated that South African banks would <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/272357/banks-tell-how-government-threatened-banking-licences-after-closing-gupta-accounts/#:%7E:text=Standard%20Bank%2C%20Nedbank%2C%20FNB%20and,the%20breaking%20state%20capture%20scandal">close down all their corporate and personal accounts</a>. This ultimately pressured the South African branch of India’s Bank of Baroda – their original home base – to reluctantly <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/breaking-bank-of-baroda-sa-closing-gupta-accounts-20170302">follow suit</a>.</p>
<p>These developments indicate that South Africa’s institutional safeguards, civil society NGOs, and democratic culture are more robust than those of some other countries.</p>
<p>The Guptas were also rumbled because they failed to take note of the fact that the most successful parasites never harm their hosts. That’s so they enjoy a lifelong nurturing host environment. The scale of their rapaciousness meant that, within just a few years, the institutions they leeched were in a state of collapse. These included <a href="https://www.transnet.net/Pages/Home.aspx">Transnet</a>, the transport parastatal, <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/just-in-state-capture-inquiry-finds-saa-racked-by-corruption-and-fraud-under-dudu-myeni-20220104">South African Airways</a>, the national carrier, <a href="https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/corruption-watch-turns-focus-to-eskom-in-review-of-zondo-commission-report-2022-01-12">Eskom</a>, the power utility, <a href="http://www.denel.co.za/">Denel</a>, the state defence, security and related technology company.</p>
<p>Aspects of the report show how this happened. </p>
<h2>Zondo Commission report part 2</h2>
<p>The specifics of this part of the Zondo report are that procurement and related crimes cost Transnet, R41 billion (equivalent to US$2,7 billion), which amounts to 72% of all contracts tainted by corruption (p.19). </p>
<p>These losses mounted following successive decisions that were driven by avarice and corruption. One example was the decision over a new chief executive for Transnet. When <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/state-capture-report-zuma-should-be-investigated-for-transnet-corruption-20220202">Barbara Hogan</a>, then a cabinet minister in charge of the state transport company, resisted Zuma’s demands on who to appoint as chief executives, he <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/i-knew-i-was-going-to-be-dismissed-hogan-at-state-capture-inquiry-2018-11-14">fired her from the cabinet</a>, and sought to redeploy her as ambassador to Finland. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man wearing a tie and jacket holds a COVID-19 mask he is preparing to put on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445065/original/file-20220208-17-1pyi0tc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Transnet CEO Siyabonga Gama testified at the State Capture Inquiry in April 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: Luba Lesolle/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The commission found that the man Zuma preferred, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2022-02-06-zondo-is-trying-to-zumarise-me-says-former-transnet-ceo-siyabonga-gama/">Siyabonga Gama</a>, should be prosecuted for transactions involving the Guptas, amounting to billions.</p>
<p>There were other attempts at resistance too. Take the actions of Denel CEO Riaz Saloojee. He refused to take bribes. But his efforts came to nought. The Guptas, through Zuma’s new appointment <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/denel-almost-on-its-knees-over-capture-supported-by-lynne-brown-dan-mantsha-20220201">Lynn Brown</a> to the portfolio of running state enterprises, simply suspended him and appointed a new board of directors that was more pliable to the Guptas.</p>
<p>Beyond detailing how appointments were made, the report focuses a great deal of analysis about highly technical banking techniques and financial transactions. These show how in every case the lowest bid tender, or the most cost-effective solution, was rejected, so as to provide openings for middlemen, Gupta-controlled companies, to profit.</p>
<h2>The fight back</h2>
<p>In the immortal words of one of Nigeria’s heroes against corruption, its former finance minister and current World Trade Organisation president, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/reforming-unreformable">when you fight corruption, corruption fights back</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Corruption is indeed fighting back. </p>
<p>As a result, it has become one major dimension of the factionalism now <a href="https://theconversation.com/factionalism-and-corruption-could-kill-the-anc-unless-it-kills-both-first-116924">wracking the ruling African National Congress (ANC)</a>. It is evidenced by pseudo-populist attacks on “<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">white monopoly capital</a>”, the “<a href="https://blackopinion.co.za/2019/09/22/supra-attacked-by-stellenbosch-mafia-blf/">Stellenbosch mafia</a>”, and on <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/03/30/ramaphosa-distances-anc-from-zuma-attacks-on-judiciary-warns-ret-forces">President Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. </p>
<p>In US slang, this is not grassroots rhetoric, but an <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-astroturfing-definition-and-examples-5082082">Astroturf campaign</a>, referring to a campaign pretending to be populist, but actually waged by a business clique of tenderers and their political clients. </p>
<p>They richly deserve the South African Communist Party witticism denouncing <a href="https://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">“tenderpreneurs”</a> – ‘businesspeople’ who enrich themselves through government tenders, often dubiously.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The Zondo Commission makes useful recommendations. </p>
<p>One is that in future, Cabinet ministers should not have unlimited power to appoint their cronies as chairs or board members to parastatals. Instead, all candidates for board members of state-owned enterprises should be subject to the background checks and procedures akin to those of the <a href="https://www.judiciary.org.za/index.php/judicial-service-commission/about-the-jsc">Judicial Service Commission</a>, which advises the government on any matters relating to the judiciary or administration of justice and adjudicates complaints brought against judges. </p>
<p>In turn the board members, not the minister, should elect their chairs and CEOs.</p>
<p>Zondo also points out that it is not yet a crime in itself to abuse public power for a politician’s private interest. This should be criminalised across the board, from the President down to the lowest official.</p>
<p>Finally, the success or failure of the Zondo Commission Report will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-report-chronicles-extent-of-corruption-in-south-africa-but-will-action-follow-174441">what consequences will result from it </a> for the criminals and corrupt, <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-imperative-that-south-africa-moves-fast-on-state-capture-prosecutions-heres-why-174614">such as prosecutions</a>, and reclaiming illegal and illicit profits from tenderers. </p>
<p>South Africa has witnessed a decade of unimplemented recommendations of commission reports, from the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285846781_The_Khayelitsha_Commission_of_Inquiry_Challenging_the_scope_of_provincial_policing_powers">Khayelitsha Commission</a>, appointed in December 2012 to investigate police inefficiency, to the <a href="https://justice.gov.za/comm-mrk/index.html">Farlam Commission</a> into the 2012 Marikana massacre.</p>
<p>It’s not known if the Zondo Commission reports will fare any better.</p>
<p>What’s clear, however, is that the number of successful prosecutions, and the amount of plundered funds retrieved, will be a key deterrence to future instances of corruption. Crucial here will be to what extent Treasury will increase the budget allotted to the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecution Authority</a>, the <a href="https://www.siu.org.za/">Special Investigative Unit</a>, and the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/asset-forfeiture-unit#:%7E:text=Empowered%20by%20the%20Prevention%20of,the%20private%20and%20public%20sector">Assets Forfeiture Unit</a>.</p>
<p>The country now awaits the third part of the Zondo Commission report, due at the end of February.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176481/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
The scale of the Guptas’ rapaciousness meant that, within just a few years, the institutions they leeched were in a state of collapse.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/164466
2021-07-13T17:47:48Z
2021-07-13T17:47:48Z
South Africa in flames: spontaneous outbreak or insurrection?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411094/original/file-20210713-21-ocu5qe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Private armed security officers take a position near a burning barricade during a joint operation with South African Police Service officers in Jeppestown, Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans spent most of mid-July glued to their news outlets, from established media outlets to TikTok, from streaming news to old-fashioned printed words, to see just one thing: would Jacob Zuma blink? Would the country finally get some taste of revenge for the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture</a>, looting, destruction of institutions and threats to the country’s democracy their former president had enabled and championed? Would the rule of law win? </p>
<p>Zuma blinked, with a few minutes to spare, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-zuma-hand-himself-over-police-foundation-2021-07-07/">handed himself over to police</a>. An hour or so later he was booked into a rather comfy looking <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/estcourt-correctional-centre-inside-the-prison-that-will-house-a-former-president-20210708">“state of the art correctional facility”</a> in Estcourt (which had taken 17 years to refurbish).</p>
<p>The rule of law won. The institutions that had been so assiduously hollowed out under the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Zuma-Years-South-Africas-Changing/dp/1770220887">nine years of his presidency</a> had flexed their new-found muscle. The Constitutional Court had long <a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-moment-as-constitutional-court-finds-zuma-guilty-and-sentences-him-to-jail-163612">held firm</a>, the police were rather more wobbly, but despite much assegai-rattling by family members and the Zuma Foundation, into prison he went. No ANC leader expressed joy, <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-07-07-anc-saddened-by-jacob-zumas-imminent-15-month-incarceration/">only sorrow</a> that <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/zikalala-we-stand-zuma">the man had fallen so low</a>; for people not in such elevated positions, it was a rare <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/zumas-sentencing-has-lifted-the-mood-of-the-country-study-reveals-20210701">moment of jubilation</a> in the midst of a global pandemic that has us locked down, again.</p>
<p>Protests that had been low key since he was <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/07/09/zuma-supporters-intensify-protests-in-streets-of-kzn-causing-traffic-delays">arrested on Wednesday night</a> exploded into an an orgy of looting, marching, xenophobic attacks, arson, truck-burning, stabbing and shooting, and blockading of roads and freeways (among others) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/violence-spreads-south-africas-economic-hub-wake-zuma-jailing-2021-07-11/">by Sunday</a>. It seemed – and Zuma’s allies and (adult) children were quick <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-13-duduzile-zuma-sambudla-from-pampered-diamond-queen-to-armchair-instigator-of-violence/">to preach the word</a> – that he was so popular and such an object of sympathy that a spontaneous outbreak of bloody violence and theft was unavoidable, and a dark portent if Zuma was not immediately released. Prescience seemed to have replaced profligacy.</p>
<p>The stakes were (and remain) exceptionally high. Thanks in part to the commission of inquiry into <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture and corruption</a> Zuma established and later refused to attend, Zuma is now known to have allowed the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/22/world/africa/gupta-zuma-south-africa-corruption.html">Gupta family</a>, using organised crime money-laundering vehicles, to bankrupt the state. As has been noted, fish rot from the head. From the time that he was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-thabo-mbeki-sacks-deputy-president-jacob-zuma">fired</a> by former president Thabo Mbeki (in 2005) to date, Zuma has deployed his infamous <a href="https://www.judgesmatter.co.za/opinions/using-stalingrad-tactics-to-delay-justice/">Stalingrad legal strategy</a>. In effect, he has been fighting every single item in court while adopting the victim stance of a man more sinned against than sinning.</p>
<p>Sadly, Zuma is not a Shakespearian hero, but a man of decidedly clay feet. For nine years as president, he outmanoeuvred pretty much all and sundry – he <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-03-31-zumas-11-cabinet-reshuffles-all-the-graphic-details/">reshuffled cabinets</a> to destabilise opponents; he forced the Whip and faced down multiple votes of no confidence; he allowed <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-24-the-totalish-cost-of-the-guptas-state-capture-r49157323233-68/">R50 billion</a> to be stolen by his friends, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">the Gupta family</a> – all now safely in Dubai – and ran state and party as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/edward-zuma-declares-former-president-jacob-zuma-will-not-go-to-jail-ded5716e-7dd1-4b77-ad26-414e81239c2b">both cash cow</a> and defensive wall. </p>
<p>He met his match in Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">succeeded him</a> as ANC and national president. Ramaphosa has moved with the cold, calculating methodology that proves him to be the real chess master (Zuma has a passion for the game). Ramaphosa has <a href="https://theconversation.com/precarious-power-tilts-towards-ramaphosa-in-battle-inside-south-africas-governing-party-158251">outmanoeuvred Zuma</a> and many of his allies in the ANC (such as secretary general Ace Magashule). He has done this by trying to resuscitate the organs of state, investigation and prosecution that had been severely damaged by his predecessor. </p>
<p>The rule of law – which took a pummelling over the last decade – seems to be out of rehab. Zuma may only be in prison for a contempt charge – but the notion that the first ANC leader in orange overall would be Zuma was not a fantasy that played out as realistic in most imaginations.</p>
<h2>Why the violence</h2>
<p>Many reasons have been offered for the violence, looting, racist bile and bloodshed that erupted. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the pent-up frustration of hungry and cold people facing few prospects for socio-economic improvement; </p></li>
<li><p>inequality and the gulf between the conspicuous consumption of the “made it” compared to others; </p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions within the ANC, with the president representing a “minority” tribe and apparently lacking legitimacy; </p></li>
<li><p>good old stereotypical Zulu nationalist violence was breaking out as it did in the early 1990s; </p></li>
<li><p>internal ANC factional tensions were spilling onto the streets; and more.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>All of these have some truth. Yet none provides a narrative thread that ties together these disparate issues and scattered but clearly organised acts of violence. Part of the gap in our understanding is how a middle-of-the-night incarceration of Zuma – albeit done in the blaze of TV arc lights – led to such a widespread and destructive but apparently spontaneous outbreak. </p>
<p>This narrative suits Zuma and his supporters perfectly: pity for the victimised former president unleashed patriotic fervour that was unstoppable, proving his popularity and victim status. Family, the Zuma Foundation and others all began pumping out the narrative – much as Zuma’s daughter tweeted the video of a gun firing bullets into a poster of Ramaphosa. Subtlety did not play much of a role.</p>
<p>But when the Minister of State Security <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-07-13-looting-and-violence-could-have-been-worse-intelligence-police-ministers/">reported</a> on the morning of Tuesday 13 July that her spies had managed to stop attacks on substations, planned attacks on ANC offices and in Durban-Westville prison, things began to look different. How did they know of the plans, and for how long? Who was doing the planning? How did they stop it?</p>
<p>When “impeccable sources in the intelligence service and law enforcement” <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/cops-fear-gun-battle-as-jacob-zumas-high-noon-approaches-20210707%22">warned</a> of arms caches at Zuma’s home, Nkandla; when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12689342">we recall</a> that the police admitted to “losing” some 20,000 weapons in the 2000s, as had the State Security Agency, we are permitted to ask uncomfortable questions.</p>
<p>Suddenly the acts look rather more organised and rather less spontaneous. </p>
<p>Neeshan Balton, executive director of the not-for-profit lobby group, the <a href="https://www.kathradafoundation.org/">Kathrada Foundation</a>, has suggested that part of the strategy was a wildfire – strike lots of matches and just let them burn whatever is in their path to destabilise the democratic project. </p>
<p>This too is premised on the existence of a plan.</p>
<p>The danger with suggesting that this was not at heart a set of random acts by poor people who were overcome by emotion at the thought of Zuma in prison but rather a (more or less well) planned and executed attempt to destabilise the state is that rather than <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-11-19-statecaptureinquiry-gordhan-connect-the-dots-to-uproot-state-capture/">“joining the dots”</a> as Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan advised, one may be constructing a crazy conspiracy theory. </p>
<p>The definition of insurrection is to rise against the power of the state, generally using weaponry. Conspiracies exist. From <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/as-mpofu-threatens-another-marikana-ngcukaitobi-says-police-must-enforce-zuma-arrest-orders-20210707">dark warnings</a> of another massacre like the one at <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012">Marikana in 2012</a> should Zuma be touched, to planning sabotage against municipal infrastructure, and fanning the flames of xenophobic violence, it seems very difficult to ignore the planned insurrection at hand.</p>
<p>Poor and hungry people exist, and the state should be ashamed. But hungry people do not become violent looters on behalf of better-known looters who are in jail. They may well be available for mobilisation (looting, violence, marching) behind the organisers – but it is the organisers that need to be brought to book, and who must also face the rule of law.</p>
<p>Corruption thrives in a destabilised state with weak institutions. South Africa cannot be allowed back to that space because there will be no turning back.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Corruption thrives in a destabilised state with weak institutions. South Africa cannot be allowed back to that space because there will be no turning back.
David Everatt, Professor of Urban Governance, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/163872
2021-07-06T06:54:51Z
2021-07-06T06:54:51Z
Jacob Zuma: when did erstwhile South African revolutionary lose his way?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409656/original/file-20210705-39677-18fs4vu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African president Jacob Zuma.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Photo by Rajesh Jantilal/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s the small crimes that bring you down. Al Capone went merrily on his murdering way until the FBI <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2005/march/capone_032805">nailed him for tax evasion</a>. Richard Nixon seemed immune to the consequences of lying about Vietnam, Cambodia and Chile but his lies over the silly crime of burgling the Democratic Party’s headquarters <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/richard-m-nixon/">did for him</a>.</p>
<p>So it is with Jacob Zuma South Africa’s former president. He faced <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/jacob-zuma-pleads-not-guilty-to-18-corruption-charges-e5d7fe94-9e4a-4883-ab7f-e6625ab48556">multiple charges of corruption</a>, but, so far, has avoided his day in court. He was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/10/khwezi-woman-accused-jacob-zuma-south-african-president-aids-activist-fezekile-ntsukela-kuzwayo">tried for rape and acquitted</a>. As president he was accused of working with an Indian family, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">the Guptas</a>, in orchestrating <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">“state capture”</a> (seizing control of state organs for corrupt purposes). He is refusing to cooperate with the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">judicial commission</a> investigating the allegations.</p>
<p>In the end it is his contempt of the Constitutional Court’s order that he cooperate with the commission that may send him to jail <a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-moment-as-constitutional-court-finds-zuma-guilty-and-sentences-him-to-jail-163612">for 15 months</a>. He’s appealed for a <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/reprieve-for-zuma-as-concourt-agrees-to-hear-his-contempt-rescission-case-20210703">rescission of the order</a>.</p>
<p>A question that invariably gets asked is whether power changed him. The country’s former foreign intelligence chief Moe Shaik seemed to think so, <a href="https://www.nb.co.za/en/view-book/?id=9780624088967">writing glowingly</a> of the capable “struggle” version of Zuma, suggesting it was only as president that things went awry, although he noted that we will never know when “precisely Jacob Zuma lost his way”.</p>
<p>Perhaps it came rather earlier than Shaik thinks. As with so many fallen revolutionaries, the seeds of venality seem to have been sown in his younger days. It’s just that political power provided the nutrients for spectacular sprouting.</p>
<h2>A taste of Zuma</h2>
<p>My first taste of Zuma came in 1989. The ANC’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/members-anc-and-sacp-are-detained-due-operation-vula">Operation Vula </a> was under way. It involved building an underground insurrectionary network and I belonged to one of its regional leadership structures. We received an instruction to investigate whether <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/peter-mokaba">Peter Mokaba</a>, the leader of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2002-06-14-two-faces-of-mokaba/">was a spy</a>. </p>
<p>Our damning report was presented to Zuma and the ANC’s security chief Joe Nhlanhla who informed us that <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/peter-mokaba">Mokaba</a>, who died in 2002, was an informer whose relationship with the security police <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2002-06-14-two-faces-of-mokaba/">went deeper than we’d suspected</a>. Other ANC leaders got on board to spread this message but we were told that <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a>, who then led the exiled ANC, decided it would be better to rehabilitate Mokaba, which duly happened. </p>
<p>Soon after that I was visited by a senior leader of the South African Communist Party, which was in an alliance with the ANC. He pleaded with me to do a journalistic hatchet job on Zuma. He said his own home in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, was bugged by ANC intelligence and that Zuma was corrupt. </p>
<p>I ignored the request. But it was one of several signs I’d seen that Zuma was despised within the Communist Party. </p>
<p>Zuma had briefly been on the party’s politburo but fell from favour partly because of conflicts between ANC intelligence and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. One conflict involved commander Thami Zulu, who was branded by Zuma’s allies as an enemy agent, <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/how-the-killing-of-thami-zulu-contradicts-zumas-cl">detained for 14 months</a> by the ANC in Lusaka and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-02-15-the-murder-of-thami-zulu-a-call-for-a-formal-judicial-inquiry/">died of poisoning a week after his release</a>. Those who knew Zulu insisted he was innocent.</p>
<p>His death contributed to the hatred for Zuma. It was by no means the only crime attributed to ANC intelligence.</p>
<h2>Steely resolve</h2>
<p>Zuma started life in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal, in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">1942</a>, the son of a policeman and a domestic worker. He received scant formal education but emerged as a lad with a sharp mind and steely resolve. At 17 he joined the ANC and three years on was arrested as part of a group of military recruits, leading to a <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">10-year spell on Robben Island</a>. He went into exile in 1975.</p>
<p>His ambition, prodigious memory and avuncular personality all helped him along and he became the ANC’s chief representative in Mozambique, a member of its political and military committee and its intelligence chief in 1987. Those who backed him tended to overlook his darker side, including his sexual promiscuity. </p>
<p>When Zuma returned to South Africa in 1990 KwaZulu-Natal was in the midst of a territorial war between the ANC and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Zulu nationalist <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/history-in-africa/article/abs/inkatha-and-its-use-of-the-zulu-past/14E0B3C8A767C4811A3A1AD974A1EA77">Inkatha </a> movement. He emerged as ANC leader there after seeing off the ANC warlord <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/harry-themba-gwala">Harry Gwala</a>, using his charm and Zulu credentials to secure the peace. But this came at a cost. The ANC drew some of Inkatha’s most notorious killers into its fold and a new form of violence broke out. </p>
<p>This time it had nothing to do with ideology. Instead, it was all about money – as so much was when Zuma was around.</p>
<h2>Corruption and legal jeopardy</h2>
<p>In 2004, when Zuma was deputy president, his financial advisor Schabir Shaik was arrested for his role in an arms deal and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment (but released after 28 months on <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/thepost/news/schabir-shaik-is-a-free-man-48662347">spurious health grounds</a>). He was found to have solicited bribes of R500,000 a year for Zuma, who was later charged with corruption. This was followed by further charges relating to another arms deal. But procedural irregularities and allegations of political interference meant <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-criminal-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">none of these went to trial</a>.</p>
<p>He faced legal jeopardy from a different source in 2006, tried for allegedly raping a 31-year-old Aids activist whom he knew to be HIV-positive (he said he believed a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/sas-zuma-showered-avoid-hiv-bbc-news-05-april-2006">shower after sex would be adequate protection</a>). Zuma claimed it was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/zuma-i-had-to-oblige-271913">his duty as a Zulu man</a> to have sex with a woman if she wore a short kanga (African wrap), and that he could not leave her <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA20732740_29">“unfulfilled”</a>. </p>
<p>He argued Zulu men have sexual primacy over women and he could therefore not be guilty.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/jacob-zuma-deadly-serious-1667308.html">To deny her sex, that would have been tantamount to rape</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zuma was <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/226198">acquitted</a> while the alleged victim was vilified, with Zuma and his supporters singing his favourite song, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zuma-gets-heros-welcome-20060213">Lethu Mshini Wami</a> (Bring me my machine gun) during and after the trial. The woman, later named as Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo, fled into exile for safety. She returned after a decade and died <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2016/10/09/Zumas-rape-accuser-Khwezi-dies">in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>Thabo Mbeki had dumped Zuma as his deputy <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-axed-243733">in 2005</a> and the long-time allies became enemies. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">paranoid Mbeki</a> lacked the common touch and was oddly devoid of his former gracious charm, while Zuma was the opposite: friendly and humorous. By playing on popular concerns about service provision, crime, and Aids, and being chummy with the unions, the youth and the left, he won the backing of people who should have been more wary.</p>
<p>Zuma defeated Mbeki for the ANC leadership <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/52nd-anc-national-conference-polokwane-2007">in 2007</a> and became president in 2009, remaining in office for <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">nine years</a>. The left hoped he’d curb his excesses, but the opposite happened. The Guptas fed his greed in return for state contracts, to the point that they <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">offered cabinet positions to obedient hopefuls</a>.</p>
<p>Eventually, Zuma over-reached. He dipped into state coffers to upgrade his house <a href="https://theconversation.com/dramatic-night-in-south-africa-leaves-president-hanging-on-by-a-thread-57180">in Nkandla</a>. Then he <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zumas-actions-point-to-shambolic-management-of-south-africas-economy-52174">fired two finance ministers</a> who would <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">not do his bidding</a>. </p>
<p>Cyril Ramaphosa won the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">ANC leadership race in December 2017</a>. Two months later Zuma stepped down as president of the country. The Guptas promptly <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tony-ajay-and-atul-gupta-flee-south-africa-and-denounce-corruption-inquiry-lt5828rxh">fled to Dubai</a>.</p>
<p>Zuma faces jail for contempt, the revival of the original fraud, racketeering and money laundering charges, and possibly further charges, depending on the findings of the Zondo Commission into state capture, whose subpoenas he ignored. </p>
<p>There will be more posturing and more singing of Lethu Mshini Wami by followers who stand to lose from his demise. But at the age of 78 Zuma’s long day in the sun is over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The posturing is bound to continue. But at the age of 78 Jacob Zuma’s long day in the sun is over.
Gavin Evans, Lecturer, Culture and Media department, Birkbeck, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/159925
2021-04-28T07:33:57Z
2021-04-28T07:33:57Z
Risks and rewards for South African president as he takes the stand at corruption inquiry
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397515/original/file-20210428-15-18xrubd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's president Cyril Ramaphosa faces a tricky time giving evidence about corruption. He wears two presidential hats: as head of the African National Congress, and the government.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rodger Bosch/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Cyril Ramaphosa’s decision to <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/state-capture-inquiry-ramaphosa-expected-to-cooperate-but-not-to-break-anc-ranks-20210428">appear</a> before the Zondo Commission of inquiry into corruption in South Africa comes at a delicate time. A great deal hinges on it.</p>
<p>When a sitting President appears before a Judicial Commission of Inquiry it is always a significant moment.</p>
<p>Sometimes a Commission will be concerned with a failure or with misconduct that has taken place under the particular head of government’s own watch. But other times, it may be that it is the mistakes of a previous administration or President that are under scrutiny.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s case is unusual as it is neither one nor the other. The Commission’s terms of reference are focused clearly on events that took place while Ramaphosa’s immediate predecessor <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/uploads/Terms_Of_Reference.pdf">,Jacob Zuma, was President</a>, between 2009 and 2018. Ramaphosa was elected president in <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-cyril-ramaphosa%3A-profile">February 2018</a>.</p>
<p>But, from 2012 until his election at the party’s five-yearly national elective conference <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-is-cyril-ramaphosa-a-profile-of-the-new-leader-of-south-africa-89456">in December 2017</a>, he was deputy president of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). And from 2014, Ramaphosa served as deputy president in government, appointed by Zuma.</p>
<p>And therein lies the particular rub of his evidence.</p>
<h2>Major contrast between Ramaphosa and Zuma</h2>
<p>A substantial volume of evidence has been adduced against Zuma. These include allegations of abuse of power and constitutional duty. The allegations are <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2021/2hoa.pdf">summarised over 15 pages</a> in the Zondo Commission’s heads of argument in related constitutional court proceedings.</p>
<p>It is Zuma who must answer to these grave allegations, not Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>The juxtaposition with Zuma is coincidently well-timed for Ramaphosa. In contrast to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-defiance-is-a-grave-moment-for-south-africa-but-its-not-a-constitutional-crisis-155392">slippery Zuma</a>, Ramaphosa has consistently made it clear that he will readily appear in front of the Commission. His original affidavit was sworn and delivered in <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/07/26/zondo-inquiry-releases-ramaphosa-affidavit">mid-2019</a>.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa will be eager to communicate his position that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3erypBHQY6s">no-one should be above scrutiny</a> and that all parts of society, from government to the private sector, and including the ANC, should be examined by Zondo for their role in permitting or enabling the state to be captured.</p>
<p>So unless he departs drastically from character, or unravels under the pressure of the moment or from cross examination, Ramaphosa will come across as a measured, decent and reasonable. And in the light of his strenuous efforts to rebuild state institutions decimated from the Zuma years, an ethical reformer who has steadfastly held his finger on the reset button in both government and the ANC since securing power three years ago.</p>
<p>In short, as a constructive, helpful, open and credible witness – in sharp contrast to many other witnesses from the Zuma era of government.</p>
<p>As if he was limbering up to play this role, at Freedom Day events this week Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/vote-out-councillors-who-steal-money-dont-deliver-services-ramaphosa-on-freedom-day-20210427">spoke bluntly</a> about the failures of the ANC and of government, inviting citizens to vote out councillors who steal money or fail to deliver services.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-is-cyril-ramaphosa-a-profile-of-the-new-leader-of-south-africa-89456">Who is Cyril Ramaphosa? A profile of the new leader of South Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Again, the contrast with Zuma – who on more than one occasion said that the <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2008-09-09-anc-will-rule-until-jesus-comes-back/">“ANC will rule until Jesus comes”</a> – is striking. </p>
<p>Clearly, Ramaphosa is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/precarious-power-tilts-towards-ramaphosa-in-battle-inside-south-africas-governing-party-158251">sufficiently confident</a> of the strength of his position within the ANC to speak over the heads of his troubled and divided organisation to the broader electorate.</p>
<h2>Tricky job for counsel</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa will appear as president of the ANC. He will then return to the commission wearing his other presidential hat, as head of government. </p>
<p>Such has been the electoral dominance of the ANC, winning all six national elections since 1994 with never less than 57% of the popular vote, that it’s internal political machinations have a huge impact on government. When one individual controls both centres of power, they wield vast power. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">Cadre deployment</a>, the ANC policy of appointing party loyalists to key state positions, is likely to be an <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/04/28/watch-live-ramaphosa-maintains-anc-deployment-committee-is-necessary">important topic</a>. Ramaphosa was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/cyril-ramaphosa-must-account-for-anc-cadre-deployment-says-da-9da78c93-f960-4b53-911b-4ebae684ef9e">chair</a> of the ANC’s deployment sub-committee during a critical period of the Zuma administration. </p>
<p>How and why did certain people get appointed to government? Or, on the other hand, how and why did the ANC leadership apparently lose so much control that according to some witnesses, nefarious outsiders – in particular the family at the centre of the allegations of corruption, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">the Guptas</a> – were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-idUSKBN1720PG">driving cabinet reshuffles?</a></p>
<p>And, relatedly, to what extent did the ANC’s top brass – of which Ramaphosa was a part from 2012 onwards – know about the levels of corruption? And what did they – and Ramaphosa specifically – do to stop it?</p>
<p>Next month, when Ramaphosa returns to the Commission, it may get even trickier. Zuma was president. But Ramaphosa was at the cabinet table when at least some of the most dubious and problematic decisions were taken. Moreover, he was head of the “war room” set up to try and stabilise the state power utility Eskom, one of the main centres of corruption.</p>
<p>This is the downside risk for Ramaphosa. That there is no satisfactory or credible answer to such questions, other than ones that either make him look weak and unprincipled, or hapless and ineffective.</p>
<h2>High stakes</h2>
<p>All legal proceedings have inherent uncertainties and unpredictability, although Ramaphosa’s risk is less one of legal liability and far more one of political discomfiture and, perhaps, accountability.</p>
<p>How much did Ramaphosa know and what did he do about it? </p>
<p>Sometimes the best questions in cross examination are the simplest. And it is important that Ramaphosa’s evidence is sufficiently robustly tested. It must ensure that no-one can credibly say Ramaphosa has been given an easy ride.</p>
<p>In this sense, the credibility of the Zondo Commission is as much in the spotlight as Ramaphosa.</p>
<p>The truth is that Ramaphosa, with a few other thick-skinned souls – chief among them the current minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan – made a strategic choice. They decided to stick it out as long as they could, doing everything possible to limit the damage. They did this recognising that if they resigned on principle it would give Zuma even greater freedom to asset strip the democratic state.</p>
<p>In Ramaphosa’s case, his decision was clearly to play the long game. By staying as deputy president he was in pole position to succeed Zuma in 2017 and launch the difficult process of organisational renewal and institutional rebuilding.</p>
<p>But this is probably not an approach that can be easily sold or spun. Nor can he dodge responsibility behind the veil of ‘collectivism’, in the case of the ANC, or demarcated portfolio authority in cabinet.</p>
<h2>Awkward moment, or opportunity?</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa’s best bet is probably to ‘own it’. This would mean presenting himself as South Africa’s version of <a href="https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-10-03-richard-calland-south-africa-needs-a-roosevelt-style-of-leadership/">Franklin D. Rooseveldt</a>, America’s reform-minded president of the 1930s – a level-headed man fit for a time of great national crisis and speaking over and above the ANC to a society lamenting a lost sense of decency in public life.</p>
<p>In this vein, Ramaphosa has an opportunity to turn a delicate and potentially awkward moment into an opportunity. There are potential rewards as well as risks for South Africa’s president.</p>
<p>Rather than duck, dive or divert, Ramaphosa can choose to err on the side of candour and openness, and use the power of presence and the force of example to deliver a compelling narrative about political reform and ethical renewal that may one day come to be recognised as a defining moment in his leadership and a moment of hope for a beleaguered nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a founding partner of political risk consultancy, The Paternoster Group, and a member of the advisory council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution. </span></em></p>
Ramaphosa will be eager to communicate his position that no one should be above scrutiny and that all parts of society,should be examined by the Commission.
Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/156223
2021-03-03T15:00:02Z
2021-03-03T15:00:02Z
How Zuma uses war metaphor to fight allegations of graft in South Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387163/original/file-20210302-21-1kapoft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African president Jacob Zuma at the State Capture Commission in July 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Early in February former President Jacob Zuma issued a <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judgment-heralds-constitutional-crisis-in-sa--jaco">statement</a> defying a Constitutional Court decision compelling him to appear before the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">judicial commission</a> probing grand corruption in South Africa. He used a war metaphor to explain why he would be a victim if he adhered to the court’s decision. </p>
<p>The commission had asked the court to issue an order forcing him to testify before it. Zuma is central to the work of the commission as the allegations that the state had been captured for private benefit happened during his tenure which stretched from <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2009 to January 2018</a>. He has also been implicated by witnesses at the commission as being complicit in the corruption.</p>
<p>The commission sought the intervention of the apex court after Zuma had walked out after his application that its chairperson, Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, recuse himself was <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-11-23-jacob-zuma-scores-a-criminal-charge-for-walking-out-on-zondo-heres-how-he-got-there/">dismissed in November 2020</a>. The court <a href="https://theconversation.com/treating-zuma-with-kid-gloves-has-failed-what-now-for-south-africas-corruption-commission-154571">ruled</a> that he should cooperate with the commission.</p>
<p>Zuma’s defence against the commission is based on metaphorical reasoning. Understanding his key metaphor provides insight into his rhetorical strategy. He has <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judgment-heralds-constitutional-crisis-in-sa--jaco">complained</a> that the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Constitutional Court also mimics the posture of the commission … by suspending my Constitutional rights rendering me completely defenceless against the commission. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>To be defenceless presupposes that someone else is waging war against you.</p>
<p>Metaphors are not used for their own sake <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=wlerDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=political+metaphor+analysis+-+musolff&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjq5fCT3pHvAhU2VRUIHTaODuMQ6AEwAHoECAQQAg#v=onepage&q=political%20metaphor%20analysis%20-%20musolff&f=false">in politics</a>, but as part of a strategy to persuade a particular audience to accept a point of view, and act accordingly. Zuma clearly succeeds in persuading his loyalists to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-02-09-we-will-support-zuma-until-death-do-us-part-mkmva-heads-to-nkandla/">continue to “defend” him</a>. Simultaneously, he uses it as a shield against being held accountable. </p>
<p>The metaphorical language is key to understanding these two contradictory consequences.</p>
<p>We have researched the language of <a href="https://repository.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/33090">South African political propaganda</a> as well as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10228195.2013.868025">metaphors</a> used by post-apartheid South African presidents. Drawing on this analysis, we concentrate on Zuma’s two main statements about the commission: the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/transcript/135/15_July_2019_Sessions.pdf">verbal statement</a> when he appeared before Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo on 15 July 2019, and his <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judgment-heralds-constitutional-crisis-in-sa--jaco">written statement</a> on 1 February 2021. </p>
<p>His verbal statement is his most comprehensive personal account before the commission, and therefore consists of more natural and spontaneous speech than a formal, written account. We have used this statement alongside his 1 February statement, which focuses directly on the commission. </p>
<h2>Zuma’s wars</h2>
<p>Zuma speaks of war in its literal and metaphorical senses. His “narrative” starts with an actual war, the armed struggle for liberation against the apartheid government. When the war ended, the original goal was achieved and the African National Congress (ANC) was elected as the governing party.</p>
<p>Warfare is in general an important metaphor in political vocabulary and it is, therefore, not a surprise that it is an important metaphor in the political vocabulary of the ANC and other parties. For example, former presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki once called on South Africans to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10228195.2013.868025">wage war</a> against the enemies of poverty and hunger, or gender-based violence, racism, sexism and xenophobia. They were calling on South Africans to be warriors, to fight with common purpose to defeat these metaphorical enemies.</p>
<p>Zuma’s purpose is different. As we show in our <a href="http://upnet.up.ac.za/services/it/documentation/docs/004167.pdf">research</a>, <em>Linking the dots: metaphors in the narrative of self-justification by former president Zuma</em>, he uses warfare metaphors to defend himself and persuade his supporters to continue supporting him. </p>
<p>He presents himself as the ultimate warrior for the economic liberation of the poor. In his <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/transcript/135/15_July_2019_Sessions.pdf">oral presentation</a> to the commission in 2019, and his <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judgment-heralds-constitutional-crisis-in-sa--jaco">public statement on 1 February 2021</a>, he identifies his “stance on the transformation of this country and its economy” as the reason why he is the “target” of a campaign of “propaganda, vilification and falsified claims.”</p>
<p>Zuma turned on the heat in his <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judgment-heralds-constitutional-crisis-in-sa--jaco">February declaration</a>, by claiming similarities between himself and <a href="https://theconversation.com/letters-reveal-africanist-hero-robert-sobukwes-moral-courage-and-pain-112439">Robert Sobukwe</a>, the late leader of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The parallels are too similar to ignore given that Sobukwe was specifically targeted for his ideological stance on liberation. I on the other hand am the target of propaganda, vilification and falsified claims against me for my stance on the transformation of this country and its economy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zuma’s defiant stance reached a crescendo when he <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/judgment-heralds-constitutional-crisis-in-sa--jaco">proclaimed</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I do not fear being arrested, I do not fear being convicted nor do I fear being incarcerated. I joined the struggle against the racist apartheid government and the unjust oppression of black people by whites in the country at a very young age.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His language openly suggests that the liberation struggle and his current struggle are equally concrete and historical, pretending that there is nothing metaphorical in his narrative of self defence.</p>
<h2>Hiding behind metaphors</h2>
<p>The metaphor of warfare allows the former president to construct a version of reality that suits his purposes. He highlights incidents that make sense to him and his supporters as evidence of his opponents’ activities. Just like the apartheid security apparatus targeted him and other ANC operatives, his modern day “enemies” – security agencies, <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">“white monopoly capital”</a>, the commission and Constitutional Court – target him as a part of their war against him. </p>
<p>At the same time, the metaphor of warfare, with its familiar role definitions, allows Zuma to evade those aspects of reality that do not fit the narrative. </p>
<p>He is the good warrior for the cause of those in poverty. The idea that he and his associates would do anything to harm the cause of <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a>, does not fit his narrative. His warfare metaphor simply offers no room for conflicting facts or the possibility that he is prosecuted due to alleged violations of the law or the constitution. Like the lonely hero on stage at the end of a Shakespearean tragedy, Zuma told Justice Zondo <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/transcript/135/15_July_2019_Sessions.pdf">in July 2019</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zuma must go. What has he done? Nobody can tell. He’s corrupt. What has he done? Nothing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This “nothing” is the point – in terms of the warfare metaphor – that paints him in the defenceless victim role. There is no rhetorical room for evidence of alleged wrongdoing. Allegations and evidence of wrongdoing are, therefore, strategically excluded from consideration.</p>
<h2>Zuma’s gambit</h2>
<p>Zuma’s narrative of self defence begins with his role in the literal liberation struggle, when he was an actual soldier and freedom fighter. He extends the language of warfare into the present, as a metaphor to make sense of his current persecution. Because the language of warfare is rooted in actual, concrete events, it seems coherent and reliable enough to make it credible and persuasive.</p>
<p>The former president’s metaphorical interpretation of reality excludes the possibility that evidence of his alleged wrongdoing can be incorporated into the same narrative: such evidence must, therefore, be rejected, or be reinterpreted, as falsehoods concocted by his opponents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertus van Rooy received research funding under the Incentive Funding for Rated Researchers scheme from the National Research Foundation from 2008-2018.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ansie Maritz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Metaphors are not used for their own sake in politics, but as part of a strategy to persuade a particular audience to accept a point of view, and act accordingly
Ansie Maritz, Lecturer in Afrikaans linguistics, University of Pretoria
Bertus van Rooy, Professor of English linguistics, University of Amsterdam
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/154571
2021-02-04T14:24:48Z
2021-02-04T14:24:48Z
Treating Zuma with kid gloves has failed. What now for South Africa’s corruption commission?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382186/original/file-20210203-13-1qqlex3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Judge Raymond Zondo, chair of the commission investigating grand corruption in South Africa, has been too polite with former state president Zuma. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Deaan Vivier/Netwerk24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans have witnessed a strong exchange between the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">State Capture Commission</a> investigating corruption, the Constitutional Court and former president Jacob Zuma. Zuma, on whose watch the plunder allegedly took place, refused to comply with a summons from the commission. The commission then applied to the court for a declaratory order that he was obliged by law to cooperate. </p>
<p>The court <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-28-final-order-concourt-rules-jacob-zuma-must-appear-and-answer-questions-at-zondo-commission/">granted the order</a>, condemning Zuma’s uncooperative behaviour. Zuma then issued a <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/02/01/defiant-zuma-says-won-t-abide-by-concourt-order-to-appear-at-zondo-inquiry">public statement</a> that he would defy the court’s ruling. Finally, the commission responded to Zuma’s defiance, announcing it was pressing <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/he-thinks-hes-above-the-law-zondo-commission-slams-zumas-refusal-to-obey-concourt-order-2021-02-03">criminal charges against him</a>. </p>
<p>While many have welcomed the commission’s sharp reaction, we need to ask whether it has gone far enough.</p>
<p>The Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2021/2.html">judgment</a> was, in many respects, easily foreseeable. There could be no doubt that <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Zuma</a> was subject to the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/images/a108-96.pdf">constitution</a> of the country, to the case law which upholds the validity of the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">commission</a>, and to the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/commissions-act-28-may-2015-1055">Commissions Act</a>. There’s also no doubt that he is subject to the regulations which <a href="http://www.saflii.org/content/covid-saflii-0">run the commission itself</a>.</p>
<p>The Act gives commissions of enquiry the powers of courts of law, including the power to issue summons. This means the State Capture Commission had the power to summon Zuma to appear before it. It did so in this case as a last resort, as he had repeatedly avoided appearing and answering its questions.</p>
<p>Zuma was required, by law, to comply with such a summons and was not allowed to refuse to answer questions from the commission. If he wants to refuse to answer a question to protect himself from self-incrimination, he has to <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2021/2.pdf#page=40">make a detailed case</a> for refusing to answer each specific question.</p>
<p>The Constitutional Court described Zuma’s lack of cooperation with the commission as “reprehensible” and ordered him to pay the commission’s legal costs – a highly unusual measure in constitutional litigation against the state. </p>
<h2>State Capture Commission</h2>
<p>Zuma established the commission on <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-president-jacob-zuma-establishment-commission-inquiry-state-capture">9 January 2018</a>, as part of the remedial action required by the then Public Protector, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-public-protector-has-set-a-high-bar-for-her-successor-63891">Thuli Madonsela</a>. This followed her
investigations into alleged improper conduct by the then president and his friends, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, in his appointment of government ministers, and the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">operations of state companies for private benefit</a>. </p>
<p>Zuma established the commission after failing to have Madonsela’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">“State of Capture” report</a> overturned on <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/747.html">review</a>. </p>
<p>When announcing the commission, Zuma <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-president-jacob-zuma-establishment-commission-inquiry-state-capture">noted that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>The allegations that the state has been wrestled out of the hands of its real owners, the people of South Africa, is (sic) of paramount importance and are therefore deserving of finality and certainty.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zuma, who had been president since May 2009, resigned in January 2018 and was <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-cyril-ramaphosa%3A-profile">replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. </p>
<h2>Kid gloves and delaying tactics</h2>
<p>The Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2021/2.html">judgment</a> was not surprising to people who have followed the commission’s two-year effort to get Zuma to testify. </p>
<p>The court sets out these efforts in its judgment. </p>
<p>But what was surprising was that the court had almost as much criticism for the commission as it had for Zuma. Importantly, it overturns Zuma’s claim of <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/397372/why-did-zuma-not-raise-problem-with-zondo-at-the-beginning-of-the-inquiry">victimhood and unfair targeting</a>.</p>
<p>The court found that, far from treating Zuma worse than the other witnesses, the commission had handled him with kid gloves. In doing so, it wasted valuable time and state resources, and imperilled a vital public investigation. </p>
<p>For example, it <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/zuma-invited-to-give-evidence-at-state-capture-inquiry/">“invited”</a> Zuma to give evidence instead of issuing a summons to him. It negotiated with his lawyers when he first walked out of the proceedings <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-07-19-jacob-zuma-pulls-out-of-state-capture-inquiry/">in July 2019 </a>. And it went through an unnecessary process of a hearing on <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-01-17-inquiry-mulls-way-to-get-zuma-to-appear-before-zondo/">whether to issue summons</a> when it could simply have issued the summons. </p>
<p>By giving Zuma the chance to respond to this hearing, the commission opened the door to further <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/breaking-news/2368354/zuma-vs-zondo-commission-will-summons-jz-to-appear-in-november/">delaying tactics</a> on his part. </p>
<h2>Zuma’s perverse argument</h2>
<p>The judgment gives the public a comprehensive finding on how Zuma has frustrated the work of the commission, why that is unacceptable, and why his claims of a witch hunt hold no water.</p>
<p>As for Zuma himself, it is clear that he has <a href="https://protect-za.mimecast.com/s/6B8sCnZmpOtV2mxzC9n8nv">learnt nothing</a>. His <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/492844527/Jg-Zuma-Statement-on-Constitional-Court-Decision-Compelling-Me-to-Appear-Before-State-Capture-Commission-1-February-2021#from_embed">response</a> to the judgment ignores all the carefully substantiated arguments that the court provides. He merely reiterates that the system is stacked against him. </p>
<p>The only change is that he now includes the Constitutional Court among his alleged persecutors. The fact that his evidence is central to the commission’s work because he ran the engine room of all the alleged corruption before the commission (<a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2021/2.html">paragraphs 69-70 of the judgment</a>) is taken as proof of the unfair campaign against him.</p>
<p>Perversely, the fact that the judgment details his legal obligations is taken as proof that the law is aimed exclusively at him, rather than applying equally to all witnesses. This, once again, ignores the court’s point that Zuma cannot be granted better treatment than any other witness before the commission.</p>
<h2>Time for decisive action</h2>
<p>But the most important message from the judgment is for the commission itself, and its chair, Judge Raymond Zondo. And that is that it doesn’t matter what Zuma thinks.</p>
<p>The enquiry cannot be run as an effort to persuade either Zuma or his followers that he is being fairly treated. </p>
<p>The apex court has made it clear that the commission has an essential constitutional duty to fulfil and that, if it does not use the powers given to it by law to carry out this duty, it is failing South Africa. Whatever shortcomings its final report may have, it would be important to know that the commission did its best. </p>
<p>The commission’s <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/he-thinks-hes-above-the-law-zondo-commission-slams-zumas-refusal-to-obey-concourt-order-2021-02-03">response</a> to Zuma’s defiance emphasises that he is not above the law. It shows a growing willingness to use its coercive powers. But laying criminal charges is merely one of its options. </p>
<p>As the commission <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/36743act10of2013a.pdf">enjoys the powers of a High Court</a>, it can also imprison a person who refuses to testify, for up to eight days at a time, without a criminal conviction. That might still not bring Zuma to answer the questions put to him. But politeness will clearly not do so either.</p>
<p>Even an appeal to the highest court in the land has failed to win Zuma’s cooperation. It has, however, handed the commission the clearest statement yet of its duties and the tools it has to fulfil them.</p>
<p>The ball is now in Judge Zondo’s court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathleen Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Constitutional Court described Zuma’s lack of cooperation with the commission as “reprehensible”.
Cathleen Powell, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/154387
2021-02-02T14:54:21Z
2021-02-02T14:54:21Z
Presidents who subvert democracies they vowed to protect can hit a brick wall: ask Jacob Zuma
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381719/original/file-20210201-21-1q502rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African president Jacob Zuma says he won't comply with a Constitutional Court order to appear before a commission on corruption. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Yeshiel Panchia </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It can be tough when you are a former president in a democracy you have attempted to subvert, especially when that democracy comes back to bite you. Former South African president Jacob Zuma is finding this out the hard way.</p>
<p>Zuma is holed up in his expansive homestead in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26631460">Nkandla</a>, KwaZulu-Natal, since being ousted from the presidency <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066443">in February 2018</a>. His leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) ended with the election of his nemesis, Cyril Ramaphosa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">in December 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, Zuma (78) has spent his retirement engaged in defensive action to stave off the threat of prosecution for past malfeasance going back two decades.</p>
<p>But he appears to be running out of road on a few fronts. Firstly, he has lost the battle to prevent the National Prosecuting Authority <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-criminal-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">from arraigning him</a> on charges of corruption and racketeering relating to a <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/timeline-of-the-arms-deal/">notorious 1998 arms deal</a>. The deal to equip the military amounted to R30 billion. </p>
<p>Worse may follow. He’s in a tight corner following his refusal to appear before a commission of inquiry into corruption that’s been running <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Analysis/the-state-capture-inquiry-what-you-need-to-know-20180819">since August 2018</a>. The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a> was set up to hear allegations about grand corruption during his presidency between <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2009 and February 2018</a>. </p>
<p>Zuma has been asked to appear before the commission. He did appear – albeit reluctantly. And then he <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-plays-cat-and-mouse-with-corruption-inquiry-it-may-be-a-high-risk-strategy-120695">walked away</a> when confronted with questions he didn’t want to answer. </p>
<p>This decision was taken to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-28-final-order-concourt-rules-jacob-zuma-must-appear-and-answer-questions-at-zondo-commission/">Constitutional Court</a>, where Zuma recently suffered a defeat in his efforts to challenge the constitutionality of having to appear. </p>
<p>He has since said <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/02/01/defiant-zuma-says-won-t-abide-by-concourt-order-to-appear-at-zondo-inquiry">he won’t comply</a> with the court ruling. </p>
<p>He now faces the prospect of being jailed. </p>
<p>Zuma shares this ignominy with his American counterpart, former US president Donald Trump, who, like him, faces legal consequences for his attempts at subverting democracy while in office. Both have demonstrated their contempt for constitutional constraints, using their power as president to destroy institutions of state.</p>
<p>Going to jail for subverting democracy is less than edifying. In Zuma’s case it would be an particularly ignominious final chapter of his life. He has been in jail before, but for reasons that were noble, alongside extraordinary men and women who fought for freedom. </p>
<p>He served 10 years at the Robben Island Maximum Security Prison, <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">from 1963 to 1973</a>, for taking part in the sabotage operations of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">Umkhonto Wesizwe</a>, the military wing of the then banned ANC, against apartheid. He was 21 when he started serving his sentence.</p>
<h2>Similar paths</h2>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/09/04/trump-presidency-spawns-conflicts-of-interest-personal-profits-column/2197263001/">used the presidency</a> to build up his business empire and stave off its mounting debt. Zuma and his family aligned themselves to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, which stands accused of orchestrating the capture of the state for personal profit.</p>
<p>Testimony before the Zondo commission has brought fresh claims to light about how he went about this enterprise, and the extent of it. Even for South Africans who have been provided with a mountain of fresh allegations on his malfeasance since he left office, the latest testimony has <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/sydney-mufamadis-affidavit-to-the-zondo-commission">been shocking</a>. It has included steps he took to <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-01-27-zondo-hears-more-of-ssas-illicit-flow-of-millions/">turn the intelligence services</a> into his personal instrument and use them to undermine those who opposed him within the ANC.</p>
<p>The analogies with Trump might seem distant. But they aren’t. Both men stand accused of subverting democratic processes and institutions they were duly elected to protect. They swore an oath to do so.</p>
<p>For his part, Trump is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/31/politics/trump-new-lawyers/index.html">preparing to face his impeachment</a> by Congress for inciting the storming of the Capitol by his right-wing supporters in a bid to overturn the outcome of an election he lost. If he were to be successfully impeached, he would lose his presidential pension and be banned from running again for federal office. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man with thinning blond hair, wearing a black overcoat and a red tie speaks at a podium." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381900/original/file-20210202-13-19fo18t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former US President Donald Trump’s legal woes are mounting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Stefani Reynolds / pool</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The stakes for both Trump and Zuma are high. Both are focused on the future, rather than trying to rescue their reputations in history. Both represent a major threat to democracy. </p>
<h2>Zuma will play the game to the final denouement</h2>
<p>Oh yes, it can be tough being a former president, but make no mistake, Zuma will play the game in the way he know best, by subordinating the law to politics. </p>
<p>Zuma is skilled at <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-shows-once-again-that-hes-adroit-at-playing-to-the-gallery-120779">playing the victim</a>, reckoning that his best defence is to rally support within the ANC, where he still enjoys support, and raise the political costs of pursuing him through the courts.</p>
<p>He knows well that if he is successfully prosecuted for corruption and sentenced to jail, even if only for a symbolic time, those who backed him during the era of state capture and shared the spoils will fear that the prosecutors will be emboldened to come knocking on their door. </p>
<p>The ANC remains riven with factionalism, and with President Ramaphosa seemingly unable to stamp his authority upon the party, Zuma is likely to play for a political deal which will continue to allow him his freedom, even if he is convicted in court.</p>
<h2>Democracy and accountability</h2>
<p>For Trump, the impeachment process is only a forerunner of charges likely to be filed by New York State relating to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/27/us/donald-trump-taxes.html">his tax returns</a>, very possibly alleging fraud and criminality.</p>
<p>South Africa’s Constitutional Court rebuke to Zuma in its latest judgment reminds him that no-one, not even the president, is above the law. </p>
<p>The apex court is reminding Zuma that the demand for accountability is at the heart of democracy. The US Democrats’ drive to impeach Trump is restating that same principle: that being a former president should not grant any special privileges.</p>
<p>The message is clear. Democracy demands that both Trump and Zuma be held to account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154387/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Zuma shares ignominy with former US president Donald Trump who, like him, subverted democracy while in office.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/146364
2020-09-17T11:32:55Z
2020-09-17T11:32:55Z
Journalism makes blunders but still feeds democracy: an insider’s view
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358415/original/file-20200916-18-1m52ofg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Sunday Times, South Africa's largest weekend newspaper, was used to spread disinformation. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Anton Harber, the veteran South African journalist, editor and journalism professor at the University of the Witwatersrand, has a new book out. <a href="https://www.graffitiboeke.co.za/en/a/Search/0/date_publish%20DESC/Anton%20Harber"><em>So, For the Record: Behind the Headlines in an Era of State Capture</em></a> is a deep dive into the conduct of the media as mega corruption and state capture engulfed and eventually brought down President Jacob Zuma’s administration. Politics editor Thabo Leshilo asked the author to provide the highlights.</em></p>
<h2>What prompted you to write the book?</h2>
<p>For one thing, it is a great story to tell, complete with all the ingredients of a thriller: brothels, spies, brown envelopes and honeypots, all laced with intrigue, deceit and backstabbing. My interest, though, came from a concern that our community of journalists was not dealing properly with the series of journalistic fiascos at the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/">Sunday Times</a>, the country’s biggest and most powerful newspaper. </p>
<p>I was on a panel commissioned to conduct an <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/home?code=bEk4K3BwY1NMOEVqQndtdVNuMEQ0dz09&state=">internal investigation</a> at the paper in 2007, after a similar series of journalistic disasters. Our far-reaching recommendations were not implemented. And so, perhaps inevitably, the paper went off the rails again in 2011-6 with another series of stories that boosted those trying to capture state institutions for corrupt purposes. The paper had to retract and apologise for these disastrous stories. </p>
<p>As journalists, we hold those in power to account and demand full transparency from them. But we also wield public power, so I think it is crucial that we hold ourselves to account when we mess up. If we don’t, the politicians will step in and that would be a disaster. </p>
<p>Media self-criticism is not just important to improve our journalism, it is a political, professional and moral imperative. That is why I thought it important to take a deep dive into what happened at the Sunday Times.</p>
<p>The other reason is that this same period saw some of finest and most effective investigative journalism in this country. The <a href="https://www.gupta-leaks.com/">#GuptaLeaks exposé</a> in particular contributed to bringing down a president. The email leaks provided the evidence of the extraordinary and malign influence the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta brothers</a>– who stand accused of having captured the South African state for their enrichment – had over the president and his family.</p>
<p>Taken together, I thought these parallel tales would provide insight into the highs and lows of journalism, showing its importance and value, but also its limitations and problems. I hope to enable a better public understanding of the work of journalists and the media, as I think that there is confusion over what we do and don’t do in our newsrooms. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jurgen-schadeberg-chronicler-of-life-across-apartheids-divides-145390">Jürgen Schadeberg: chronicler of life across apartheid’s divides</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This was not just a Sunday Times issue, but it was about the nature and state of our media, and hopefully I offer some insight into that.</p>
<p>As someone who was involved in the 2007 report, knew all the characters well, and who had been part of judging panels for the <a href="https://journalism.co.za/tacokuiper/">Taco Kuiper Award</a> for investigative journalism, which recognised the Sunday Times for one of these stories and then <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/sunday-times-taco-kuiper-runnerup-award-revoked--a">withdrew that recognition</a>, I had a rare personal perspective on events.</p>
<p>In a way, the book is a personal account from an insider, and I hope I bring to bear an understanding of journalism derived from 40 years of practice, including my own fair share of journalistic blunders.</p>
<h2>Why do your findings matter?</h2>
<p>I hope that I show how good journalism nourishes and feeds citizenship and democracy, but also that it is an imperfect profession working in imperfect structures in an imperfect society - and we need to face up to the reality of what this means.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1143&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1143&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358561/original/file-20200917-16-a56ee9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1143&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Journalism can do some good, and it can do a lot of harm, and it usually does both. We have to try and understand how to try and do more good and less harm. This is particularly important at a time when the work we do is facing the triple onslaught of political, financial and disinformation storms.</p>
<p>An important element of the story is how state structures, such as the <a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a> and <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/annual_report/2010_2011/6_prg4_crime_intelligence.pdf">Police Crime Intelligence</a>, deliberately and malevolently interfered to distort and harm our journalism for their own purposes. The question to ask is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>what was it about the Sunday Times that made this newsroom fall for these tricks, when others didn’t? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>We have a lot to fix in this country, and as journalists we can start by trying to fix our journalism and our media.</p>
<h2>What are the implications for the media?</h2>
<p>What I highlight is that this is not a problem affecting one newspaper. The problem runs deep in the structure and history of our media. Hopefully, those reading my book will get a better understanding of this and be better equipped for a discussion about what needs to be done to make our media and our democracy work better. </p>
<p>We are facing an onslaught of disinformation, enabled by social media, and we cannot counter it unless we rebuild journalism so that it is a valued and trusted part of our society.</p>
<h2>How can media houses and journalists fix the problems you identify?</h2>
<p>First we need to understand the problem and its causes. That is what I explore in the book. Part of this is to see that this is not a problem for media houses or journalists alone. This is a social, political and economic problem that can’t be solved by the media industry on its own. We have to work with the private sector, the public sector, the philanthropic sector, civil society and the state to ensure we have a media that meets our society’s needs. </p>
<p>We cannot deal with the issues of professionalism and accountability without solving the problems of the fundamental economic structure of the industry. To be a quality industry, we need to be a strong one, and to do this, we need to find a new way to restore its financial foundation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/journalism-of-drums-heyday-remains-cause-for-celebration-70-years-later-142668">Journalism of Drum's heyday remains cause for celebration - 70 years later</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We are in the extraordinary position where philanthropically funded journalism appears to be more sustainable than the traditional advertising-driven model. This is an inversion of what we always accepted as reality. We are caught in a bind: we need citizens to value us enough to pay for our services in some form, but we don’t have the resources to produce the journalism that would show that value. We first have to recognise that this is a national and societal problem, not just a media one, and then we can tackle it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146364/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anton Harber was a member of the internal panel appointed in 2007 to examine problems at the Sunday Times. He was a judge in the Taco Kuiper Award for Investigative Journalism and the Global Shining Light Awards, both of which recognised one of the stories dealt with in the book. The Taco Kuiper Award panel withdrew Sunday Time's 2011 runner-up award in 2018.</span></em></p>
Media self-criticism is not just important to improve journalism, it is a political, professional and moral imperative.
Anton Harber, Caxton Professor of Journalism, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/144973
2020-08-28T09:52:47Z
2020-08-28T09:52:47Z
How corruption in South Africa is deeply rooted in the country’s past and why that matters
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354560/original/file-20200825-22-1jf4r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African government minister Nomvula Mokonyane, a leading member of the ruling ANC, at the commission probing grand corruption.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luba Lesolle/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Africans express shock at corruption, few seem to know that it is perhaps the country’s oldest tradition.</p>
<p>Citizen <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/voices/cyril-ramaphosa-the-anc-is-accused-number-one-for-corruption-20200823">anger</a> about corruption, a constant theme in South African political debate, reacts to a very real problem. This was underlined recently by news that well-connected people had <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/madonsela-and-who-boss-slam-covid-19-corruption-in-sa/">enriched themselves</a> at the expense of efforts to contain COVID-19. What is not real is the widespread belief that corruption is both new and easy to fix.</p>
<p>Reactions to corruption portray it as a product of African National Congress <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/08/anc-corruption-south-africa-failure-polls">(ANC) rule</a> (or majority rule for those who cling to the prejudice that black people cannot govern). In this view, it will disappear when the governing party gets serious about corruption or loses power. </p>
<p>In reality, however, corruption has been a constant feature of South African political life for much of the past 350 years. It is deeply embedded and it will take a concerted effort, over years, not days, to defeat it.</p>
<h2>Colonialism, apartheid and corruption</h2>
<p>Corruption in South Africa dates back to <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-94222017000300062">colonisation in 1652</a>. Jan van Riebeeck, the Dutch East India company employee who was sent to colonise the Cape, got the job because he was given a second chance after he was fired for ignoring the company ban on using his office to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jan-van-Riebeeck">pursue personal financial interests</a>. </p>
<p>The period of Dutch rule he began, which lasted <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africa-1900s-1900-1917#:%7E:text=Increased%20European%20encroachment%20ultimately%20led,South%20Africa%20by%20the%20Dutch.&text=The%20Cape%20Colony%20remained%20under,to%20British%20occupation%20in%201806.">until 1795</a>, was marked by tax evasion and <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/92175">corruption by public officials</a>. Under British rule, which followed that of the Dutch, public spending was <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/103674">directed to serve private interests</a>. The most prominent colonialist of the time, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cecil-john-rhodes">Cecil John Rhodes</a>, was forced to resign after he gave a friend an 18-year monopoly catering contract for the government-run railways (JL McCracken; The Cape Parliament 1854-1910. London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.115). </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Kruger">Paul Kruger’s Transvaal Republic</a>, the Afrikaner-governed state against which the British <a href="https://theconversation.com/concentration-camps-in-the-south-african-war-here-are-the-real-facts-112006">fought</a> at the turn of the century, was riddled with nepotism and <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/site/wp-content/uploads/Apartheid-Grand-Corruption-2006.pdf">economic favours for the connected</a>. The British administration which replaced it served the interests of mine owners on whom it <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/103674">bestowed special privileges</a>. What today is called <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture/">“state capture”</a>, the use of the state to serve private interests, was common to Afrikaner and British rule.</p>
<p>Given this history, it is not surprising that corruption was a constant feature of the apartheid period. Black people were its chief victims, since they had no rights and so no way of protecting themselves against abuse. But they were not the only ones, as politicians and officials used government power for personal gain. </p>
<p>The most corrupt period in the country’s history was the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070500370555">last few years of apartheid</a>, when the attempt to combat the successful international sanctions campaign made corruption, protected by government secrecy, the core government strategy. This was often done with the collusion of private businesses.</p>
<h2>Blurring the lines</h2>
<p>By the time majority rule was achieved <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597239308460952?journalCode=tssu20">in 1994</a>, corruption had become deeply embedded in the way the government operated and in how business related to the government. This directly affected the way South Africa was governed after 1994, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/1324909/Mandela-accuses-ANC-of-racism-and-corruption.html">despite the efforts</a> of Nelson Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354564/original/file-20200825-22-uxuf7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former South African president Jacob Zuma and French arms company Thales, represented by Christine Guerrier, appear at the High Court in Durban on corruption charges.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Felix Dlangamandla/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A particular feature of the last years of apartheid was a blurring of the public and private which was continued into the new order in at least two ways. </p>
<p>The first was obviously corrupt – the illicit networks which operated during the last years of apartheid recruited people in the new government: former enemies quickly became business partners. </p>
<p>The second was more complicated. It was widely assumed that the ANC would soon govern but its senior officials lacked the means to live the lifestyle expected of people of standing. Businesses, for motives both pure and impure, stepped in to help with cars, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files/mark_gevisser_a_legacy_of_liberation_thabo_mbekbook4me.org__0.pdf">homes and private schools</a>.</p>
<p>When businesses realised they would need black business partners, the only candidates they knew were the political activists with whom they negotiated. So, it was to them that they offered the shares and seats on boards which were essential if business was to adapt to new political realities.</p>
<p>The seeds of post-1994 corruption were, therefore, deeply planted in the country’s past. But corruption since then is also a symptom of another way in which the past was carried over into what was meant to be a new society. Before 1994, the groups which controlled the state used it to ensure that they controlled the economy too. </p>
<p>British rule gave English-speaking mine-owners special favours which allowed them to run the economy. After 1948, white Afrikaner rule was used to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/089692059602200309">build the power and wealth of Afrikaans-owned business</a>. But the post-1994 democracy has offered black business at best a role as junior partners of their white counterparts. Corruption has, therefore, become the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-corruption-in-south-africa-isnt-simply-about-zuma-and-the-guptas-113056">means</a> which some black people who want to rise to the top use to seek to achieve the dominant role enjoyed by previous business classes whose group controlled the state.</p>
<p>Corruption is also a symptom of the fact that the settlement which brought democracy left intact an economy which is highly concentrated so that <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-corruption-in-south-africa-isnt-simply-about-zuma-and-the-guptas-113056">new entrants find it hard to make their way in</a>. Some turn to politics to achieve the middle- or upper-middle class life they are denied by an economy they cannot penetrate, no matter how hard-working and enterprising they are. It therefore answers a widespread need, which may explain why the corrupt networks are deep-rooted, particularly at the local and provincial level.</p>
<h2>Tackling corruption</h2>
<p>So, corruption is far more deeply rooted than current accounts would have us believe. Reformers such as <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ramaphosa-promises-corruption-crackdown-at-maiden-sona-20180216">President Cyril Ramaphosa</a> confront a widespread reality which, because it reflects patterns which go back many years and springs from the exclusion of many from the benefits which democracy was meant to bring, is tenacious and can survive shocks.</p>
<p>Removing a few high-profile people will not change much because the networks will survive, as they have done since the departure of former president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43658953">Jacob Zuma</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, who were meant to be the cause of all the problems.</p>
<p>None of this means that sharply reducing corruption in South Africa is impossible. But a successful attempt to do this will need more than the instant cures favoured by the national debate – <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2020-07-30-the-corrupt-must-go-to-jail/">some high-profile convictions</a> and barring people accused of corruption from public office.</p>
<p>Deep-rooted problems created over centuries demand thorough-going solutions which will take time to work. While this requires more patience and understanding than the national debate seems willing to offer, the alternative is many more years of public railing at corruption while the problem remains because its causes have been ignored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Corruption has been a constant feature of South African political life for much of the past 350 years; solutions will also take time.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/134803
2020-03-29T08:32:43Z
2020-03-29T08:32:43Z
‘ANC Spy Bible’: a real-life South African thriller, but too much left unsaid
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323275/original/file-20200326-132969-1yjz7a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Shaik brothers Moe, Schabir and Chippy after Schabir was found guilty of fraud and corruption and sentenced to 15 years.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">.Beeld/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Thirty-five years ago – and five years before the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid organisations and the release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela – a security policeman carrying a batch of documents walked into the optometry practice of a young South African in Durban on the west coast of the country. He was offering his services to the then-banned ANC. The young man he’d approached was Moe Shaik. Over the next six years ‘The Nightingale’ fed Shaik with vital intelligence that helped keep the ANC’s underground activities against the apartheid government alive. Gavin Evans reviews <a href="https://www.nb.co.za/en/view-book/?id=9780624088967">The ANC Spy Bible</a>, Shaik’s story of this relationship – and its sour aftermath in the grubby politics of post-apartheid South Africa.</em></p>
<p>6am, a factory office, Fordsburg, Johannesburg 1988: I’m one of five people at a Transvaal underground leadership committee of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/members-anc-and-sacp-are-detained-due-operation-vula">Operation Vula</a>, a clandestine operation of the banned ANC. We’re being addressed by the ANC’s National Executive Committee member Mac Maharaj who has slipped into the country incognito to set up home-based structures. He’s presenting what he claims is incontrovertible evidence that the prominent struggle lawyer Bulelani Ngcuka is a spy.</p>
<p>I’m doubtful. For one thing, I’m no fan of Mac’s – for all his courage and intelligence, he’s rather too pleased with himself, something of a prima donna and way off the mark in his expectation of an insurrectionary seizure of power. More to the point, when I request evidence, he dismisses the question, insisting he has water-tight intelligence, and instructs us to inform our underground units. Instead, I check this out with struggle-linked lawyers who insist Bulelani is no spy, so I inform my own unit there’s a false rumour along these lines.</p>
<p>Mac’s sole source is Moe Shaik, the ANC spymaster of a mole within the security police who’d supplied top secret files with code numbers. Moe and Mac reached the conclusion that agent “RS452”, an Eastern Cape lawyer, was Ngcuka. Fifteen years on, when Ngcuka was public prosecutions director, this pair again smeared him, repeating the allegation. Thabo Mbeki set up a commission of inquiry which found <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/21/southafrica.rorycarroll">the rumour was false</a>. It then emerged the real spy was a white lawyer from Port Elizabeth, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-spy-from-the-suburbs-how-a-human-rights-lawyer-was-in-the-pay-of-apartheid-92503.html">Vanessa Brereton</a>.</p>
<p>So Moe and Mac got it spectacularly wrong and could have destroyed the life of a struggle lawyer in the process. Moe at least <a href="https://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Mo-apologises-to-Ngcuka-20031124">apologised to Ngcuka</a>, but the passage dealing with this episode is a low point in his generally well-written memoir. He somehow manages to portray himself as the victim in this saga, blames Mbeki and is unable to bring himself to admit the obvious: ‘I made a terrible mistake.’</p>
<p>This book, <a href="https://www.nb.co.za/en/view-book/?id=9780624088967">The ANC Spy Bible</a> starts with a band of brothers – the Shaiks – who would show courage and tenacity in surviving torture and brutality in detention cells in their fight against the apartheid state. But like other South African brothers (the allegedly deeply corrupt <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Guptas</a> and <a href="https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2019-01-22-meet-the-watsons-brothers-in-struggle-often-in-headlines-for-the-wrong-reasons/">the Eastern Cape Watsons</a> come to mind), some would gravitate towards Jacob Zuma and his project of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture/">state capture</a>, with one, Schabir, getting a 15-year prison sentence resulting from his corrupt relationship with Zuma.</p>
<p>Moe had a spell as the country’s foreign intelligence boss. But the Ngcuka affair and his brother’s downfall pushed him to the fringes, giving him the time to write this book.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323221/original/file-20200326-132980-788zjb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=910&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The early years</h2>
<p>Moe was working as an optometrist when he was recruited into an ANC unit headed by an older brother, Yunis (there were six brothers and one sister, all very close, partly because as young children they were abandoned by their mother who died soon after). In 1985 they were tasked with smuggling an ANC leader, Ebrahim Ebrahim, into the country. But the security police got wind of Ebrahim’s presence and were about to raid. It was decided Moe would be the decoy, enabling Ebrahim to escape.</p>
<p>So Moe ended up being detained under section 29 of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/internal-security-act-passed">Internal Security Act</a>, which allowed indefinite detention without trial, at Durban’s security police headquarters, CR Swart Square, where he was beaten and tortured. Yunis was then captured and received an even worse beating, witnessed by a security policeman dubbed the ‘bathroom officer’, who later met their stepmother, Kaye, and liked her. He began to offer Moe useful nuggets of advice.</p>
<p>Nine months and one suicide attempt later, Moe was released, and was visited at work by the bathroom officer who was carrying a wad of documents showing deep state penetration of the ANC at every level. This is where the book becomes thrilling, with the officer, now named The Nightingale, meeting Moe in parking lots to hand over documents, which are rapidly photocopied and returned.</p>
<p>Soon Moe became the controller of a security police spy with a unit of helpers under his command, before being whisked off to London where he met regularly with ANC intelligence chief Jacob Zuma, followed by a spell of training in East Germany. He returned and started to feed Maharaj and Operation Vula with this intelligence.</p>
<p>There were scares along the way, assassinations of key ANC people and spies exposed. Eventually the security police clocked that they’d been infiltrated, causing consternation in their ranks, but, amazingly, The Nightingale was never uncovered.</p>
<h2>Blind spots</h2>
<p>Shaik writes with panache, showing an impressive memory for detail and an ability to keep the pace of the narrative, at least until the last quarter – so much so that it’s easy to miss the caveats. He fancies himself as an analyst who can read people well. And yet, he has a rather large blind spot for his leaders – until they fall out with him.</p>
<p>Not a peep of criticism is ventured for the East Germans, nor for anyone in the exile leadership. For instance, the ANC security chief, Joe Nhlanhla, who struck me as a man of bumbling incompetence, is lavished with praise, as is Zuma, at least until he drops Shaik as an ally, well into his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48980964">state capture</a> programme. Astonishingly, Shaik suggests it is only then that Zuma goes astray, although he notes that he will never know when “precisely Jacob Zuma lost his way”. </p>
<p>And he can find no words of censure for Maharaj, despite his venal descent into the position of Zuma’s yes-man.</p>
<p>And yet for all its flaws, this book is an important addition to the struggle era library. Moe Shaik and The Nightingale played a significant role in ANC fortunes in those <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/people-armed-1984-1990">violent years</a> between 1985 and 1991. Moe has received his rewards. The Nightingale deserves them, and it reflects badly on successive ANC leaders that they have never honoured him.</p>
<p><em>Gavin Evans’ most recent book, <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/skin-deep.html">Skin Deep: Journeys in the Divisive Science of Race</a> is published by OneWorld.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Moe Shaik fancies himself as an analyst who can read people well. And yet, he has a rather large blind spot for his leaders – until they fall out with him.
Gavin Evans, Lecturer, Culture and Media department, Birkbeck, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/122652
2019-09-02T12:47:19Z
2019-09-02T12:47:19Z
Politician who turned down a bribe offers a recipe to end South Africa’s malaise
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290322/original/file-20190830-165977-1dizvg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mcebisi Jonas appears at a commission probing grand corruption in South Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alon Skuy © Sunday Times.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A book whose author has <a href="https://qz.com/africa/825869/state-capture-report-south-africas-deputy-finance-minister-mcebisi-jonas-turned-down-a-44-million-dollar-bribe-from-the-guptas/">refused a R600 000 000 bribe</a> is a <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/08/14/euphoria-around-ramaphosa-s-new-dawn-quickly-dying-says-mcebisi-jonas">book that comes highly recommended</a>. But be warned. The book, After Dawn: Hope after State Capture, is devoid of all autobiography, except one page mentioning Mcebisi Jonas’s feeling of loss when being offered that bribe.</p>
<p>The book contains no biographical details. They are, nevertheless, <a href="https://www.gibs.co.za/news-events/events/forums/Pages/deputy-finance-minister-mcebisi-jonas.aspx">fascinating</a>. For example, he became politically active at the age of 14, and went on to leave South Africa for military training in Angola and Uganda. On his return from exile, his task was to play a crucial role to set up the African National Congress (ANC) and Communist Party structures in the Eastern Cape province.</p>
<p>The book is written to be readable: each chapter starts with a half-page box summary of its main points. After Dawn repeatedly stresses:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>None of the ideas put forward in this book are new, in fact they echo our existing policy … what is required is to put these ideas into action (page 202)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>“These ideas” turn out to be a passionate advocacy from cover to cover of the almost forgotten <a href="https://nationalplanningcommission.wordpress.com/the-national-development-plan/">National Development Plan</a>. This was a comprehensive policy document drawn up by a special ministerial body first constituted in 2009 by then-President Jacob Zuma. It was, however, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-national-development-plan-can-be-resuscitated-heres-how-84707">never implemented in full</a>.</p>
<p>Jonas has two overarching themes. The first is one of structure. That South Africa’s state-owned enterprises, national, provincial, and municipal bureaucracies must be purged of kleptocrats and incompetents to become meritocratic. The <a href="http://www.psc.gov.za/">Public Service Commission</a> – which was designed to keep the public service honest – must regain its powers to hire and to fire. Political appointees must be confined to the ministries, not departments.</p>
<p>Jonas’s second theme is agency. The task of these meritocratic bureaucracies should be to enable entrepreneurship, and to become entrepreneurial themselves. State-owned enterprises must once again pay their own way, be partly or wholly sold off, or re-absorbed into the line functions of a department.</p>
<p>All this is no less fascinating in its implications for being familiar, well-trodden ground. John Kane-Berman, veteran policy fellow of the Institute of Race Relations, regularly churns out blogs warning all and sundry that the ANC and its communist National Democratic Revolution is steering South Africa directly to communism.</p>
<p>It is clear that Jonas – an ANC leader so senior as to have formerly been a deputy minister of finance – has a communist party history which has left him on economic policy as post-Marxian as the current Communist Parties of China and Vietnam. </p>
<h2>Morale booster</h2>
<p>This book is definitely a booster to morale. Jonas reminds South Africans that their country achieved 5.3% economic growth in 2005. And that he believes it can do it again. </p>
<p>Another point worth boasting about is that the annualised returns on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are, over the long term, the highest in the world. (p.30) </p>
<p>Jonas argues that South Africa does not lack ideas. Where it falls short is implementation. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>….unlike Singapore, our focus in South Africa has too often been on the plan, rather than on what needs to be done and how to get it done. We stumble at the point of implementation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Jonas is clearly sympathetic to the concept of a German or Swedish style class compact to facilitate a return to economic growth. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290299/original/file-20190830-165981-15oyg2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Jonas holds up Singapore as a model for South Africa to strive to emulate. He concedes that every country has its own idiosyncrasies and that not everything that works in one will work in another. Nevertheless, he expounds the virtues of the island nation’s early obsession with making sure that the majority of the population felt a sense of belonging. And making Singapore relevant to the world. This required absolute clarity of vision about what the country stood for. </p>
<p>Jonas’s favourite economists are <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/ricardo-hausmann">Ricardo Haussman</a>, César Hidalgo, and Sebastián Bustos (p.155). He particularly admires the way the three academics have developed the concept of economic complexity. As Jonas explains, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>this is a measure of the knowledge in a society (as measured by the notion of ‘person bytes’) as expressed in the products it makes. This, in turn, is closely linked to a country’s level of development and is predictive of its future economic growth</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This, they argue, makes it possible to calculate the economic complexity of a country based on the diversity of exports, their ubiquity, or the number of countries able to produce them. He notes that South Africa has failed to undergo complexity-led transformation. In fact, its portfolio of exports has declined since 1994.</p>
<p>Many of Jonas’s recommendations are in the National Development Plan. One central theme is: remove constraints to competitiveness. </p>
<p>South Africa needs a comprehensive push to higher job productivity because it cannot compete against low-wage countries. It needs to incentivise innovation and double its spend on research and development. Human capacity needs to be expanded. And it shouldn’t hesitate to import skilled persons. </p>
<p>The country’s vision must be to accelerate economic inclusion. To this end it needs a corruption-free, high-performance state. This in turn requires the nature of politics to change, including reform of the ANC.</p>
<p>This is a recurring theme for Jonas. He repeatedly emphasises the need for the ANC to reform itself. He believes strongly that this is vital if South Africa is to move onto a faster growth path.</p>
<h2>Quibbles</h2>
<p>I have some minor quibbles. The parsimonious publisher has not used colour, meaning that all the tables have lines in confusing shades of blurred greys. </p>
<p>As far as the substance is concerned, I disagree with Jonas that digital voting systems can prevent ballot fraud (p.215). A desktop search turns up numerous examples of error or fraud that have occurred in the US and other digital voting countries. </p>
<p>After Dawn deserves the media exposure it is getting. Popularising the ideas and arguments in the book will help them gain traction, and help marginalise the conspiracy theories and smears being pumped out by the kleptocratic fight-back campaign trying to derail efforts to clean up the country’s political and economic systems.</p>
<p><em>After Dawn, by Mcebisi Jonas. Picador Africa, imprint of Macmillan. Johannesburg. 2019. 277pp. Foreword by Cyril Ramaphosa.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
This book is a booster to morale. It tells South Africans they can enjoy the impressive economic growth they once achieved.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/121461
2019-08-05T14:02:28Z
2019-08-05T14:02:28Z
Why new South African law won’t end the toxic mix of money and politics
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286951/original/file-20190805-36390-hof6ek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa led the African National Congress to victory in May. A new law on political funding covers parties, not politicians.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The grip of money on South African politics may be so tight that it could be impossible to govern – or seek to govern – unless you are beholden to private money. </p>
<p>Can a new law change that?</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201901/42188gon63politicalpartyfundingact6of2019.pdf">Political Party Funding Act</a> was signed into law by President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-finally-set-to-know-who-funds-their-political-parties-110843">early this year</a>. It forces parties to disclose donations of R100 000 (US$6700) or more and sets up a <a href="http://www.casac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Annexure-3.pdf">Multi-Party Democracy Fund</a> to which donors who want to support a range of parties can donate. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/default.aspx">Independent Electoral Commission</a>, which will implement the law, decided that it would not come into force until <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/party-funding-act-5-mar-2019-0000">regulations</a> on how it will operate are drafted. It has now concluded hearing evidence from “interested parties” – mainly political parties and non-governmental organisations – on <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/conclusion-of-public-hearings-into-political-party">how to word the rules</a>.</p>
<p>Democracy campaigners have been pressing for this law for years. Until it was signed, South Africa had no laws governing <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africas-new-political-party-funding-bill-is-good-news-for-democracy-99034">donations to parties</a>: the wealthy could give huge amounts to parties and were not obliged to reveal this.</p>
<h2>Toxic relationship</h2>
<p>In any democracy, such secrecy should trigger fears that government decisions will reflect not what voters want but what large donors require. In South Africa, the fear is particularly justified because the relationship between money and politics is close and toxic.</p>
<p>This is a product of the past and the transition to a new political order. Apartheid ensured that whites owned the large companies and so <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-can-do-better-at-reversing-apartheids-legacies-116600">most of the wealth</a>. When black parties were allowed to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/fw-de-klerk-announces-release-nelson-mandela-and-unbans-political-organisations">operate freely from 1990</a>, their only source of significant money (apart from aid donors and government funding <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-14-what-the-historic-party-funding-bill-means-for-sa-politics">from 1994</a>) was business. </p>
<p>This created huge openings for companies or their owners to <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-exclusion-feeds-the-politics-of-patronage-in-south-africa-69996">buy cooperation</a>. The new law is meant to control this by forcing large donors to make their donations public. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-exclusion-feeds-the-politics-of-patronage-in-south-africa-69996">Economic exclusion feeds the politics of patronage in South Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The democracy fund may be partly inspired by corporations which donate openly to several parties as a social investment project. Public funding is allocated mainly in proportion to parties’ support at the last election, which favours big parties: the corporates use criteria which advantage smaller parties in the hope that this will “level the playing field”. The fund is meant to offer a larger vehicle for this democracy support.</p>
<p>Campaigners have welcomed the law as a step forward but are concerned that loopholes may make it possible to continue to buy party support: R100 000 is a generous ceiling. Ways are also needed to stop big donors giving multiple donations of just under R100 000 to circumvent the law; the Independent Electoral Commission was asked at the hearings to draft regulations to <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/356635/cosatu-wants-r100k-political-party-donation-threshold-loophole-rescinded">curb this</a>.</p>
<p>They are right to be concerned about the limits of the law – but equally right to expect that, when it is enforced, voters will know more about who is funding parties, even though South Africa’s law offers less control than similar laws in some other democracies. But this may make little difference to the really toxic influence buying: the greatest threat to democracy is the money which buys politicians, not parties. And the law does not regulate this.</p>
<h2>Buying influence</h2>
<p>South Africa is trying to emerge from a decade in which private interests made deals with politicians and officials to make government work for them alone. The hearings of the commission of inquiry into <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">“state capture”</a>, chaired by deputy chief justice Raymond Zondo, regale the country with evidence of abuse of public money and trust. </p>
<p>But party funding has been a minor player at the hearings – private interests mostly gained control of government by buying people, not parties. The much-reviled Gupta family, former President Jacob Zuma’s friends accused of having captured his administration for their own ends, did donate to parties. These <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zille-explains-Gupta-donation-20130130">included</a> the official opposition, the DA. But, it allegedly gave far more to individuals.</p>
<p>Internal party elections are at least as much a problem as the national contest – black-owned companies in particular are repeatedly approached to fund contests for party office.</p>
<p>The problem has been emphasised by <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/explosive-cr17-leak-hits-ramaphosa-30347834">“leaked” emails</a> from within Ramaphosa’s ANC Presidency campaign, which are currently receiving media coverage. Ramaphosa’s opponents say they show he misled Parliament when he told it he was unaware of a donation from a company named at the commission. Whether or not this is true, the emails show an attempt to <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/cyril-ramaphosas-r440m-presidential-price-tag-20190722">raise very large sums</a> from private donors whose identity was not revealed because the law does not require this.</p>
<h2>Murky links</h2>
<p>These links between politicians and money are another product of past inequities. In the early 1990s, anti-apartheid activists emerged as a government in waiting. But they had no money and could not afford the lifestyle which matched their future role. Businesses and business people – some to help, some because they wanted influence – provided them with houses, cars and other passports to the middle class. </p>
<p>At the same time, white-owned businesses recognised that they needed black partners; the only candidates they knew were the political activists who exhorted them to end racism – and so activism became a route to company boards.</p>
<p>The pattern this created survives today. Links between politicians and private money are murky and raise perpetual doubts about whether political decisions respond to voters or patrons.</p>
<p>So pervasive is this mix of private wealth and public office that it is open to question whether it is possible to achieve a senior position in government without being beholden to private donors. Ramaphosa is a wealthy man and so are some of his political allies. If they cannot run a campaign which does not rely on wads of money from people who are never voluntarily named, why believe that anyone else can?</p>
<p>If Ramaphosa’s campaign funding were to cost him his presidency, he would no doubt be replaced by someone else who received large donations about which voters know nothing. This would apply even if the replacement led an opposition party. </p>
<p>The two next biggest parties are the DA, which is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/political-party-funding-act-we-are-seeking-to-cure-what-is-being-exposed-before-the-zondo-commission-20190801">sceptical</a> of the Party Funding Act because it says its donors want anonymity to avoid reprisals. The other is the Economic Freedom Fighters, one of whose key funders owns a cigarette company which has been accused of improper <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-12-11-mazzottis-smoke-n-mirrors-a-matter-of-taxes-fraud-smuggling-and-cigarettes/">influence on the tax authorities</a>. </p>
<p>So, South African voters are likely to find that whoever governs them relies on donors whose names they do not know.</p>
<h2>Uphill battle</h2>
<p>The link to money will continue to damage South African politics unless the flow of undisclosed money to politicians ends. This depends far more on what parties do than on law. The ANC has told the Independent Electoral Commission it is determined to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-on-party-funding-we-are-destroying-one-another-through-influence-of-money-20190802">find ways of fixing its problem</a>, but it faces an uphill battle. Other parties, including the DA and Inkatha Freedom Party, which are in government in provinces and municipalities, have yet to acknowledge that they have a problem.</p>
<p>Given all this, South Africans will not know soon who pays for the politicians who are meant to serve them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Secrecy over who funds political parties should trigger fears that government decisions will reflect the wishes of large donors.
Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/120779
2019-07-23T11:20:35Z
2019-07-23T11:20:35Z
Zuma shows, once again, that he’s adroit at playing to the gallery
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285299/original/file-20190723-110191-19ors8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former President Jacob Zuma is fighting a batttle for political capital.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If there’s one thing South Africans can agree on, it’s that former President Jacob Zuma has always been adept at putting on a show. This has historically served him well – even since he was <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/jacob-zuma-resigns-as-president-of-south-africa-20180214">ousted in 2018</a>. But lately his performance repertoire (and powerful stage) have both been significantly diminished. </p>
<p>It comes as no surprise therefore that he’s resorted to long-standing strategies in his appearance at the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a> of inquiry into corruption. </p>
<p>These days, Zuma is fighting a battle for political capital. To maintain popular support he needs media coverage: he needs to stay visible to stay relevant. It’s a canny calculation: Zuma knows he won’t change his critic’s minds, but he does stand to lose his supporter’s fervour if he is invisible for too long. </p>
<p>To that end, he has deployed a wider strategy. To date, this has mostly taken the form of his infamous December 2018 “Twitter comeback” – taking control of the online narrative through his <a href="https://twitter.com/presjgzuma?lang=en">own social media account</a>. </p>
<p>Starting with a <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1073474576334635008">curious video post</a> in which he slowly and repeatedly declared himself to be “the real Jacob Zuma,” he announced that he had</p>
<blockquote>
<p>decided to move with the times, to join this important area of conversation because I hear many people are talking about me.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since then, his account has rapidly grown in popularity, swiftly amassing a sizeable 318k followers to the Presidency’s 1.1 million (on Twitter, of course, controversy pays off: Helen Zille has 1.3 million). </p>
<h2>Twitter strategy</h2>
<p>Zuma has used his account seemingly tamely, rarely giving any overt political commentary on charges, accusations or machinations of state. Rather, he uses the platform to release video “statements” wishing his followers well over <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1077432929649901573">holidays</a> or telling lengthy, often rambling, personal anecdotes. </p>
<p>Typically, these video messages are low-tech and filmed from a living room. This serves up both a veneer of authenticity – a lack of high tech production value intimates we are getting the “real” Zuma – and a faux intimacy. While these messages may seem random and clumsily executed, they strategically portray Zuma as an elder but not elderly: here’s Zuma <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1122864484752732161">mock sparring</a> with his son, and here he posts a <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1129091438283808770">clip</a> of his daughter’s graduation. </p>
<p>Playing the benign “<em>Baba</em>” (father in isiZulu) serves him well –- an elder statesman and grandfather demands respect, is accorded a certain allowance. Certainly, to critics – often termed “enemies” –- he becomes the butt of a joke. Yet to supporters, he offers an insider look – quite literally, in some videos, a place at his own table. </p>
<p>Some of his most popular <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1085511230041870338">Twitter posts</a> include <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1093477277038530560">“throwback” photos</a> of his struggle years and current affairs are often used to pointedly recall past exploits. A <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1143217537762676738">post</a> on June 24 says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>That Mabana video reminded me of the time we were detained at Hercules Police Station.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It’s accompanied by an armchair anecdote of how the police used racial racial slurs against him. The story itself ends on a cliffhanger: “I will have to finish this story soon” – eliciting storms of follower requests to “Please do, Baba”.</p>
<p>By tying himself to a narrative of past struggle hero and recalling apartheid-era espionage, Zuma doubles down on painting himself as a survivor of a hostile system, a servant of the struggle. </p>
<p>This tactic was on full display during the Zondo testimony at the Zondo commission. His memory was impeccable when it came to regaling the commission with asides about his role in the struggle and history of coup <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/zuma-suicide-bombers-were-brought-into-the-country-to-assassinate-me-20190715">plots against him </a>, but remarkably vague with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-07-17-jacob-zumas-amnesia-has-social-media-up-in-arms/">recollection</a> of any activity relating to corruption. </p>
<p>Such selective memory proffers a winking nod to his supporters, while avoiding being pinned down by all others: a verbal form of his sparring video clips. </p>
<p>This interest in presenting a deep history of alternate Zumas – Jacob the struggle hero, or the trade unionist – is a play that’s being picked up by his Foundation. Currently, they’re <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1134341542917881856">requesting essay submissions</a> from ordinary South Africans on the “impact and influence of the former President.” </p>
<p>One can only imagine the potential contributions, which is perhaps why they stipulate that submissions must include a one-paragraph resume.</p>
<h2>Stricken hero</h2>
<p>In line with the frequent references, both on social media and during the Zondo testimony, to his <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1085511230041870338">struggle hero credentials</a> and various plots he has survived, Zuma has also been at pains to frame himself as a poor man – his wealth reduced and sucked dry by his service to the cause. Who, after all, is not feeling the pinch in these trying times? The fact that the times are almost uniformly attributable to Zuma himself is a wrinkle conveniently left unironed. </p>
<p>Despite this newfound humble presentation, spectacle is never far from Zuma’s core repertoire. At Zondo, this was outsourced to full effect to a vocal supporter gallery, including the deployment of a <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/state-capture/2154719/zuma-gets-standing-ovation-as-he-arrives-at-zondo-commission/">chillingly effective slow clap and chant</a>. The facts against Zuma may well stubbornly remain, but the performance must go on.</p>
<p>Much more effective than mere “yes men”, the militant public show of loyalty is what carries Zuma’s public relations momentum from his curated Twitter feed. As he is well aware, the Zondo Commission will be reduced to headlines, grab quotes and iconic images of many South Africans. For most, it will simply be represented by viral clips and memes. Nothing translates as well as a catchy entrance and, once again, Zuma got his takeaway moment. </p>
<h2>Laugh or cry</h2>
<p>This brings us to Zuma’s second performance strategy: above all else, keep them laughing. </p>
<p>Zuma is infamous for deploying a chuckle: the hollow sound of his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvHVkFvecT4">parliamentary laughter</a> still haunts much of the South African consciousness. His ability to laugh off even the most gruesome accusations has continued in his social media performance. Referencing The Sunday Times accusation of him having a secret property in Dubai, he <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1115524279821635584">tweeted</a> no April 9th:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sigh! …I owe millions in legal fees… I’ve asked you to assist with that one title deed in order for me to sell the house.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Before commencing his Zondo testimony (during which his Twitter account has strategically fallen silent) he <a href="https://twitter.com/PresJGZuma/status/1150364378941837312">posted a video </a> captioned, simply:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I thought I should brighten up your day.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In it, we see a jovial Zuma outside a door, pantomiming the protest slogan “Zuma must fall” in time to a short, improvised dance. Immediately, the tweet went viral (over 590 000 views to date), aided by media personalities such as “The Kiffness”, a social-savvy comedian, who remixed it into a <a href="https://twitter.com/TheKiffness/status/1150674369187913728">catchy music video.</a> </p>
<p>Zuma’s surefire knowledge of providing the base for viral content ensures his continued relevancy in public discourse. In this, he’s aided and abetted by SA media, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/07/16/cartoon-jz-s-many-cards">cartoonists</a> and comedians, who can’t resist the chance to make him the butt of their own jokes. </p>
<p>By positioning himself as a loveable granddad “Baba” to supporters and the punchline of a joke to his opposition, Zuma adroitly defangs the very serious charges against him. </p>
<p>After all, the joker can say anything, so long as he keeps you laughing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120779/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carla Lever does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
By positioning himself as a loveable granddad to supporters and the punchline of a joke to his opposition, Zuma adroitly defangs the very serious charges against him.
Carla Lever, Research Fellow at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/120695
2019-07-19T14:56:23Z
2019-07-19T14:56:23Z
Zuma plays cat and mouse with corruption inquiry: it may be a high-risk strategy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284974/original/file-20190719-116586-8zwm12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Jacob Zuma recanted his decision to walk out of the Zondo Commission. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Wikus de Wit/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s former President Jacob Zuma threatened on Friday to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/07/19/zuma-to-continue-testifying-at-zondo-inquiry">walk away </a> from a judicial <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">commission of inquiry into corruption</a>, throwing the process into temporary confusion and uncertainty. </p>
<p>An agreement was later <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-07-19-hlaudi-motsoeneng-sighted-as-jacob-zuma-arrives-at-state-capture-probe/">cobbled together</a> that will maintain Zuma’s participation in the process. But it may be a short-lived truce as he is likely to continue to use the threat of a walk-out as leverage over how his evidence and its truthfulness are tested. </p>
<p>For those that have attentively followed the former President’s legal and political strategy over the past two decades – referred to in some quarters as his <a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/stalingrad-defense/">“Stalingrad” strategy</a> – this will have come as no great surprise.</p>
<p>Over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-probe-into-corruption-features-star-witness-jacob-zuma-120194">past months</a>, the commission headed by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, has heard chapter and verse about the systematic abuse of public and private power that wreaked havoc with numerous key state institutions in the country. These included the National Prosecuting Authority, the South African Revenue Service as well as several state-owned entities vital for development and public service delivery, such as power utility Eskom.</p>
<p>According to numerous witnesses Zuma was the central protagonist. Several large files of witness statements were presented to his legal team in the run up to Zuma’s extraordinary appearance before the commission this week. They contain myriad accusations against him.</p>
<p>The responsibility of a commission of inquiry is to uncover the truth. Hence it has a duty – as Justice Zondo made absolutely clear to Zuma as he began his testimony – to make findings on all material matters. This is the case even though the commission is not a court of law and cannot hold any individual civilly or criminally liable.</p>
<p>Herein lies the dilemma and the risk for Zuma. He will have been advised that in the absence of counter-evidence, preferably from himself, the grave danger is that the commission will prefer the evidence of others and so make adverse findings against him.</p>
<p>That is probably why he was advised to appear before the commission. And why, having walked out, he returned. </p>
<p>But the strategic and tactical dilemma for Zuma and his legal team is this: by putting him on the witness stand, there is a risk that he would be found wanting, especially in terms of the details of any matter.</p>
<p>As every lawyer learns sooner or later in their career, the devil really is in the detail: the more detail you get into, the more likely that any discrepancy in the evidence is likely to emerge. And, in turn, the more likely that a dishonest witness will be exposed.</p>
<p>Hence, Zuma’s lawyers were very anxious to protect him from any scrutiny and, therefore, from any detailed questioning of his version of events.</p>
<p>This is why the quarrel between the legal teams – Zuma’s on the one hand, and the commission’s, on the other – ended up being about the pivotal issue of “cross-examination”.</p>
<h2>Unpacking the process</h2>
<p>Laymen watching events unfold this week may well have been greatly puzzled by this dispute. They could be forgiven for thinking that given that the whole point of a commission of inquiry is to find the truth this would, by definition, entail asking questions, difficult ones if needed.</p>
<p>My colleague Professor Pierre de Vos <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-07-17-zondo-inquiry-is-fully-within-its-rights-to-question-zuma/">explained</a> – with his customary thoroughness – the process as thus: the rules of the commission permit “examination” of any witness, including to “examine” the witness to try and establish whether he or she is being truthful. </p>
<p>Helpful as this legal analysis is, those of us who have practised at the Bar will know that in an adversarial court proceeding the distinction between “examination in chief” and “cross examination” is very clear. One side to the proceedings will lead evidence “in chief”. And then the other side (or sides) will cross examine the witness in order to limit the damage being done to their client’s interests. Or to undermine the credibility or veracity of it.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284981/original/file-20190719-116596-1njt3ne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Counsel for the Inquiry, Advocate Paul Pretorius.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in an inquisitorial proceeding, such as the Zondo Commission, the distinction is rather less clear and far more subtle. This is because there are no competing parties. Instead, what you have is a commission armed with a legal team whose job it is to assist it in making findings of fact by adducing relevant evidence.</p>
<p>Often, in this context when a witness is being forthcoming, the need to test the plausibility of evidence may be reduced. But when a key witness, such as Zuma, comes to the stand and time and again, as he did this week, says he cannot remember the detail – or otherwise deflects or obfuscates – then the need to probe deeper and ask more difficult questions is likely to be greater.</p>
<p>Zuma’s team protested that when Counsel for the Inquiry, Paul Pretorius SC, started to do so, he was “cross-examining” the witness and that this was “unfair”. Putting aside the semantics of whether it was “cross examination” as opposed to “mere examination” for a moment, it is difficult to understand the point from a legal perspective. But it’s easy to understand it from a political perspective.</p>
<h2>All about survival</h2>
<p>Legally, it would have been inappropriate if Zuma had been treated as a hostile witness from the beginning, as is often the case in an adversarial court proceeding. </p>
<p>So, when Zuma was able to give <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/analysis-undisputed-winner-from-zumas-train-wreck-testimony-is-ramaphosa-20190718">detailed accounts</a> of events in the 1970s, as a part of his bizarre story of intrigue that was clearly designed to create a counter-narrative in which he is the victim of a devious and dangerous international crusade to eliminate him, rather than the perpetrator of state capture, but is unable to recall details of conversations from a few years ago when he was president, real cross-examination would be to put a question like this to the witness:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Mr Zuma, can you really expect the commission to believe that you can remember details from 40 years ago but not from seven years ago? That’s not credible is it? You’re not being frank or honest with the commission, are you?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, somewhere along the spectrum of possible types of questioning, there is a middle ground in which the witness’ account could and should be tested by tougher questions. Otherwise, how else is Zondo to assess the evidence before him and make findings, especially if there are competing versions?</p>
<h2>The game’s not yet over</h2>
<p>Zuma and his legal team may think they have played a smart hand. Having volunteered to give evidence, having presented an alternative narrative that deflects from the core subject of state capture, and having avoided detailed questioning on the sort of detail that may have tripped their client up, they then walked away only to return within a few hours.</p>
<p>Had Zuma not returned, the risk would have been that in the absence of detailed evidence from him to set alongside that of the witnesses who gave evidence against him, Zondo may have no choice but to make damaging findings that are severely adverse to a former head of state whose legal and political options appear to be narrowing by the day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is Associate Professor in Public Law at the University of Cape Town, a partner in political risk consultancy The Paternoster Group and a member of the Advisory Council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution.</span></em></p>
The dilemma for Zuma and his legal team is this: by putting him on the witness stand, there is a risk that he would be found wanting, especially in terms of the detail of any matter.
Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/120599
2019-07-18T14:37:20Z
2019-07-18T14:37:20Z
Zuma and Trump: half a world apart, yet similarly paranoid and dangerous
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284759/original/file-20190718-116596-lrq15j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Jacob Zuma at the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within the space of a few days, we have been subjected to bizarre but carefully staged performances by US President Donald Trump and former South African President Jacob <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Zuma</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-house-of-representatives-condemns-racist-tweets-in-another-heady-week-under-president-donald-trump-120425">spewed racist hate-speech</a> against four Democratic Party Congress women of colour, telling them to “go back home” to their “broken” and “crime infested” countries of origin. Zuma, appearing before the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a> probing allegations of grand corruption during his tenure, has played the victim of a 30-year conspiracy. He has sought to “out” former ministers of his cabinet as <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2155687/zumas-apartheid-spy-claims-worry-anc/">spies of the apartheid regime</a>. </p>
<p>Both Trump and Zuma will disown any intent to foment violence, verbal or physical, against those they pillory. But, they know that their words constitute a dangerous incitement. They may be half a world apart in ideology, yet Trump and Zuma inhabit a similar world of conspiracy, lies, threats and paranoia. </p>
<p>Their world seeks – and to an alarming extent succeeds – in providing explanations of their misfortunes to the socially insecure and economically vulnerable.</p>
<h2>The outsider and the conspiracist</h2>
<p>By common consent, Trump’s assault on the four Congress women is an early salvo of his campaign for reelection as president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/us-elections-2020">in 2020</a>. He is making it plain that he will use much the same formula as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/2020-election-trump-support-rural-midwest-190717132153126.html">in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>He will run as the outsider against established elites, claiming to voice the concerns of the little man, but simultaneously positioning himself as an insider, a white male citizen, who promises to reclaim the US from the clutches of unwanted, unchristian and unpatriotic immigrants to restore the country to unsullied whiteness. Those against him he will denounce as unAmerican, as enemies of the people, and as the vanguards of foreignness and of hostile ideologies. Those against him will be criminalised.</p>
<p>Zuma’s fate is what Trump fears – being removed from the presidency. Zuma’s explanation for what has happened to him is to blame an opaque, near shadowy campaign against him. He alleges a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-07-15-zondo-inquiry-is-part-of-intelligence-plot-to-get-rid-of-me-jacob-zuma-says/">plot by intelligence agencies</a> of foreign powers and the former apartheid regime to remove him from any position of influence within a democratic South Africa. </p>
<p>To his mind, this explains his displacement as head of intelligence for the African National Congress (ANC), which now runs the country. It also explains his removal as deputy president by Thabo Mbeki <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-axed-243733">in 2005 </a>, on what he regards as specious allegations of corruption. </p>
<p>Despite the best attempts of these hostile forces, he eventually rose to be President – only to be eventually forced out by his enemies in February 2018 – <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/02/19/why-jacob-zuma-resigned">before the end of his term</a> – as a result of trumped up charges of corruption.</p>
<h2>A world without morality</h2>
<p>Both Trump and Zuma inhabit a world devoid of morality. It is a world which subordinates any sense of right and wrong to their political survival. Both identify what is right with their persons; both identify themselves not just with, but as the very embodiment, of their parties. </p>
<p>Trump has vanquished the old guard in the Republican Party, and has twisted its conservative, neo-liberal ideology into a neo-fascist populism which other Republican politicians repudiate at their peril. Republicans in Congress have reduced themselves to fawning acolytes, desperate to retain the favour of Trump’s popular base. </p>
<p>In his pomp as President, Zuma acted likewise. The ANC in parliament and the country acting in craven subordination to his will, the liberation movement glued together by the material interest of his cronies and their patronage. Now out of power, he continues to identify himself as the “real” ANC, and those who ejected him from the presidency as counter-revolutionaries. </p>
<p>Both Trump and Zuma depict their opponents as enemies. Former US President Barack Obama was depicted as a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/09/michelle-obama-ill-never-forgive-trump-for-birther-conspiracy-theory.html">“foreign Muslim” </a>, foisted on the American people by unAmerican forces. Former South African ministers <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-is-ngoako-ramatlhodi-29368263">Ngoako Ramotlhodi</a> and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-is-general-siphiwe-nyanda-29371058">Simphiwe Nyanda</a>, who have implicated Zuma in state capture, are denounced as apartheid spies.</p>
<h2>Narcissistic and paranoid</h2>
<p>Trump’s racist taunts are deliberately calculated to fire up his base. Zuma’s allegations of spies and conspiracy are equally deliberately calculated to raise the political costs of prosecuting him by convincing his supporters that they too are victims of injustice and falsehood. </p>
<p>The campaign of both comes at cost to the constitution, the rule of law and – let’s not forget it – common decency. </p>
<p>Trump has embarked on his own campaign of “state capture”, his most famous prize having been his appointment of two right-wing appointees to the Supreme Court. This, backed up by systematic appointment of conservatives to judges to lower courts, all to appease the white Christian right and to roll back civil rights for blacks, Latinos, the LGBT community and others for a generation to come. </p>
<p>Zuma’s campaign of “state capture”, structured around the interests of his friends, the Gupta family and other shady mafia-style bosses, is now being steadily undermined by the Zondo Commission and other investigatory commissions, yet came at massive cost to the economy, ordinary people and continues to fire destabilising political factional struggles within the ANC.</p>
<p>Trump and Zuma are both narcissistic and paranoid leaders, for whom the world of politics revolves around self. </p>
<p>Interestingly too, the politics of both is driven by the need to stay out of jail. Trump could face impeachment and prosecution for financial, tax and fraud offences once he is out of office. Zuma’s need is more immediate, and his present bluster and his threat to unmask yet more spies within the ranks of the ANC is designed to dissuade further criminal charges being laid against him.</p>
<p>But, the most frightening thing is how, from prime ministers Narendra Modi in India, through to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, and Viktor Mihály Orbán in Hungary, the behaviour of both Trump and Zuma is becoming the new normal. And now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/18/gordon-brown-boris-johnson-could-be-uk-last-prime-minister-">Boris Johnson</a> is waiting in the wings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120599/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>
Trump and Zuma seek to sell explanations of their misfortunes to the socially insecure and economically vulnerable. To an alarming extent they succeed.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/118655
2019-06-25T13:45:25Z
2019-06-25T13:45:25Z
How Pentecostalism explains Jacob Zuma’s defiance and lack of shame
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280941/original/file-20190624-97766-3k8xqd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Jacob Zuma sings to his supporters outside the High Court. He faces corruption charges.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Phil Magakoe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s former president, has long been known as a man who lives beyond his means. Interestingly, this has made him a much-admired figure in the country’s neo-Pentecostal circles. </p>
<p>Media exposés have laid bare <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/schabir-shaik-on-those-zuma-charges-20180316">Zuma’s massive debts</a> and the financial burden of his large family. Taxpayers footed a multi-million Rand bill for unlawful upgrades to his <a href="https://dc.sourceafrica.net/documents/8074-final-report-21h00.html">private residence</a>. Zuma has featured prominently in a number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-removal-of-south-africas-tax-boss-is-key-to-ramaphosas-chances-of-success-106455">state inquiries</a>. One of them is a commission probing the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">“capture”</a> of the South African state for the financial gain of his family and his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">associates</a>.</p>
<p>While Zuma has avoided any convictions, his detractors have been outraged at his <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1341554/zuma-must-pack-bags-leave-mathews-phosa/">lack of shame</a>. He’s also been defiant in the face of <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/20/arms-deal-saga-will-high-court-grant-zuma-stay-from-prosecution">various criminal charges</a>. Instead of shame, Zuma has often boasted of God’s divine support when matters went his way and complained of dark plots when <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-ten-commandments-according-to-jacob-zuma">they did not</a>. </p>
<p>While mainline Christian churches were uncomfortable with <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318495303_All_Answers_On_the_Phenomenal_Success_of_a_Brazilian_Pentecostal_Charismatic_Church_in_South_Africa">such claims</a>, neo-Pentecostal church leaders generally <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/churches-to-continue-supporting-zuma-spiritually-but-not-financially">supported Zuma</a>. Whenever he faced political scrutiny for a growing number of scandals, they offered their pulpits as his political platforms. They also held protest marches to show their support.</p>
<p>Zuma’s religious utterances presented a conundrum for scholars. That’s because many poor South African Christians supported his moral claims, and celebrated his defiance. Outside the courts where Zuma faced criminal charges, supporters often likened him to Jesus, decried his “crucifixion” and convened <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-05-prayers-for-zuma-ahead-of-court-appearance">prayer vigils</a>. </p>
<p>What lies behind such adulation? And why were these supporters not outraged at Zuma’s private extravagance, profligacy and brushes with the law?</p>
<h2>Zuma and the prosperity gospel</h2>
<p>While academics have looked at various dimensions of Zuma’s public support, few have taken its religious dimensions seriously. A number of critics have dismissed his religious utterances as mere political populism; another shameless tactic to avoid taking responsibility for his supposed moral decrepitude. </p>
<p>My chapter in the newly published <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/conspicuous-consumption-in-africa/">book</a>, “Conspicuous Consumption in Africa”, deals with Zuma’s “shamelessness” and his continued political support. It takes a closer look at the <a href="https://www.gafcon.org/resources/the-prosperity-gospel-its-concise-theology-challenges-and-opportunities">prosperity gospel</a> to which he has so often referred. </p>
<p>Zuma is well versed in this gospel. Apart from his longstanding membership of various neo-Pentecostal churches, he was ordained as an honorary pastor in the Full Gospel Church <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/pastor-zuma-raises-eyebrows-351761">in 2007</a>. I make no judgements about his personal commitment to neo-Pentecostal values. Nevertheless, my research shows that members of these churches recognised in Zuma’s reckless spending behaviour, his uncompromising fight against dark “enemies” and his political invincibility, the marks of a “blessed” man.</p>
<p>A very specific neo-Pentecostal religious ethic can be recognised in Zuma’s unapologetic conspicuous consumption and how he and his supporters have reacted to his travails. Unlike the Puritan (productionist) ethic that often informs critiques of conspicuous consumption, the neo-Pentecostal ethic is consumerist in its focus. </p>
<p>It’s an ethic that demands of its subscribers that they consume conspicuously and without “shame” as <a href="https://witspress.co.za/catalogue/a-church-of-strangers/">“blessed” Christians</a>. At the same time, they have to wage spiritual war on those who undermine their “good fortune”.</p>
<p>Neo-Pentecostalism found enormous traction in many African countries from the late 1970s onwards. It’s also popular <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-aspects-of-pentecostalism-that-shed-light-on-scott-morrisons-politics-117511">beyond Africa</a>. But it was only after apartheid that South Africans started flocking to these churches. Precise figures are lacking, but a <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2006/10/05/historical-overview-of-pentecostalism-in-south-africa/">Pew Forum poll in 2006</a> suggested that over 30% of urban South Africans subscribed to neo-Pentecostalism. Thirteen years later, that figure is much higher.</p>
<h2>A Pentecostalised public space</h2>
<p>As Zuma increasingly fudged the lines between his political and spiritual struggles, his fellow politicians responded in increasingly “religious” ways. Political lackeys sympathised with his “persecution” and saw it as the dark work of invisible forces and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-03-14-demons-cast-out-of-protectors-office-by-pro-sabc-church-leaders">evil conspirators</a>.</p>
<p>Even Zuma’s political enemies increasingly claimed that his continued rule was due to <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2018/01/the-lame-duck-president">occult powers</a>. Thus the public space in South Africa, as in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286978616_Going_and_making_public_Pentecostalism_as_public_religion_in_Ghana">other African countries</a>, became increasingly “Pentecostalised”. </p>
<p>As African studies scholar, Adriaan van Klinken, has <a href="https://adriaanvanklinken.wordpress.com/2014/03/17/the-pentecostalisation-of-public-spheres/">noted</a>, charismatic Pentecostal Christianity is a “public religion par excellence”. As it engages with social and political issues, it reshapes the public sphere as the scene of a spiritual battle between God and the Devil.</p>
<h2>Neo-Pentecostalism in Africa</h2>
<p>Zuma’s public life has much in common with flamboyant political leaders and former leaders on the continent who have publicly declared their membership, leadership or support of Neo-Pentecostal churches. These leaders <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/African_Christianity.html?id=SDS45RNq6ZkC&redir_esc=y">include</a> Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, of Equatorial Guinea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Jerry Rawlings, Ghana’s former long-term military ruler.</p>
<p>On the close alliance between some African leaders and neo-Pentecostal churches, Paul Gifford, a professor of religion and philosophy, has remarked that this “domesticated Christianity”, was not <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=geg7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA203&lpg=PA203&dq=Paul+Gifford+(1998:+339)&source=bl&ots=LjQwiviR2p&sig=ACfU3U3ZabbJupok3WzMr-lSY8fLI-JxLA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijyZStloTjAhVNSRUIHRZMBYIQ6AEwCXoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=Paul%20Gifford%20(1998%3A%20339)&f=false">“concerned with a renewed order</a> or a ‘new Jerusalem’”. </p>
<p>Neo-Pentecostals are thus unlike previous Christian movements such as <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2305-445X2015000100009">black liberation theology</a> that advocated for social justice and the alleviation of poverty. Instead, they individualise the causes of material and political suffering. Followers are urged to fight the Devil rather than push for radical reform. This makes them deeply conservative political subjects.</p>
<p>In the case of Zuma, a specifically neo-Pentecostal ethic has emboldened him to celebrate his conspicuous consumption and political invincibility. This, as scores of his religious followers aspire to similar feats of spiritual accomplishment.</p>
<p><em>Conspicuous Consumption in Africa is edited by Ilana van Wyk and Deborah Posel. Published by <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/conspicuous-consumption-in-africa/">Wits University Press</a>, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilana van Wyk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Jacob Zuma’s religious utterances present a conundrum for scholars, as many poor South African Christians support his moral claims and celebrated his ill-gotten riches.
Ilana van Wyk, Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/113056
2019-03-07T13:36:49Z
2019-03-07T13:36:49Z
Why corruption in South Africa isn’t simply about Zuma and the Guptas
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262419/original/file-20190306-100799-1p74up8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The collapse of VBS Mutual Bank in South Africa shows that corruption is endemic.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tiso Blackstar</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Corruption in South Africa isn’t simply a matter of bad morals or weak law enforcement. It’s embedded in processes of class formation – specifically, the formation of new black elites. This means corruption is primarily a matter of politics and the shape of the economy.</p>
<p>In a recently published <a href="https://www.swop.org.za/single-post/2019/02/18/Working-Paper-10-The-Political-Economy-of-Corruption-open-access">paper</a>, I attempt to shed fresh light on the unconvincing narratives that have been presented in the media, NGOs and academic circles about the events of the past 10 years. </p>
<p>These narratives generally depict events as a struggle between two opposing forces. On the one side are a network of politicians, officials, brokers and businessmen centred on former President Jacob Zuma and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>. All are bent on looting, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">state capture</a> and self-enrichment. On the other are a band of righteous politicians and citizens. This group is seen as drawing together the “old” ANC, activists, “good” business and citizens in general. They are intent on rebuilding institutions and good governance, the rule of law, international credibility and fostering growth and development.</p>
<p>I argue that a much deeper set of social forces underlies and shapes the struggles within the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), and the society more broadly. These political struggles are inseparable from struggles over the shape of the economy. </p>
<h2>Limited access</h2>
<p>The primary process to change the economy has been the drive to accelerate the emergence of new black elites. But institutional interventions, such as <a href="https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee_sector_charters.jsp">black economic empowerment</a>, have been insufficient.</p>
<p>Already, during the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki period</a> as well as the presidency of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/nelson-mandela-presidency-1994-1999">Nelson Mandela</a>, an alternative informal political economic system was emerging at national, provincial and local levels. Through this, networks of state officials, ambitious entrepreneurs as well as small time operators, were rigging tenders or engaging in other kinds of fraud so as to sustain or establish businesses, or simply to finance self-enrichment.</p>
<p>Because of a number of factors there was little alternative for channelling the aspirations and burning sense of injustice of black elites and would be elites in post-apartheid South Africa. These factors include the <a href="https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/on-the-right-to-property/">property clause</a> in the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>, the conservative strategies adopted by the ANC government and the fact that large corporations and white owned businesses dominated the economy. </p>
<p>This means that opportunities are few, demand is high and competition is fierce. In this context, the state is where people who are locked out are most likely to gain some access.</p>
<p>This links to the issue of violence. The emergence of new elite classes is often a ferociously contested, ugly and violent affair. South Africa is no different from many other post-colonial countries – or indeed the histories of the Euro-American elites that currently dominate the globe.</p>
<p>In South Africa this violence takes the form of burning down homes and state facilities, intimidation, assault, the deployment of the criminal-justice system to protect some and target others, and, increasingly, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/fewer-political-killings-in-kzn-this-year-18649806">assassination</a>.</p>
<p>I argue that this set of practices constitutes an informal political economic system. By a system I don’t mean a structure which is centrally coordinated or planned. What I’m referring to is a pervasive and decentralised set of interlocking networks that reinforce and compete with one another in mutually understood ways, and include the use of violence as a strategic resource.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262420/original/file-20190306-100805-1u9p8rm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former South African president Jacob Zuma in court on corruption charges.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Rogan Ward / Pool</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This system preceded Zuma’s presidency, and extended far beyond the Zuma-Gupta network. The recent revelations about corruption at the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">Zondo commission</a> into state capture, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2018-12-21-scandal-of-the-year-vbs--a-most-unsophisticated-bank-heist/">VBS mutual bank</a> or in the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/How-Steal-City-Mandela-Account/dp/1868428206">book</a>, <em>How to steal a city</em> by Crispian Olver, make this abundantly clear.</p>
<p>It should also be abundantly clear that the informal political-economic system necessarily entangles President Cyril Ramaphosa’s core network of institution builders.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s challenge</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa’s key challenge is to build a stable coalition within the ANC so as to embark on his project of institution building. His trajectory, and the future shape of corruption in South Africa, will be determined by the character of the coalition he can forge – or that will be forced on him – among party barons within the ANC.</p>
<p>For the purpose of building institutions and attracting investment, it will be necessary to establish as stable a coalition as possible. This means it will have to be a broad coalition. One thing is sure: the coalition will include corrupt figures. It already does. The informal system of patronage politics will remain pervasive. </p>
<p>Even so, Ramaphosa’s power is <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/anc-top-six-to-handle-plot-to-unseat-ramaphosa/">precarious in the ANC</a>. The odds are stacked against success in establishing stability. For the medium-term the trajectory of politics is likely to be characterised by multiple contestations over material opportunities, political power and symbolic representation. This will give rise to an increasingly volatile, unstable and violent political space.</p>
<p>To return, then, to the prevailing narrative and its misreading of the politics of corruption. </p>
<h2>Deep structural issues</h2>
<p>The problem with the narrative is that it assumes it’s possible simply to remove some “rotten apples”“, and it sets standards Ramaphosa cannot possibly match. </p>
<p>Perhaps, though, it is a useful fiction for the mobilisation of civil society, journalists and judges, which at the very least may contribute to containing corruption?</p>
<p>There is some validity in this. Yet it fails to direct attention to the deep structural issues which give rise to corruption as an aspect of class formation. </p>
<p>The only long-term and stabilising solution would be to draw into the formal system some of the purposes of the informal system. This would require a much more fundamental redistribution of assets and wealth, which could be deployed in the large-scale formation of a new black business class, primarily located in manufacturing and agriculture, as well as to fixing the education crisis. The result would be the formation of professional, scientific and technical middle classes.</p>
<p>This kind of solution will not emerge from the Ramaphosa administration, which is much more fixed on reproducing the policies of the Mbeki era. The problem is that these were what created the opportunity for the rise of Zuma in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl von Holdt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment. </span></em></p>
Much deeper social forces underlie the struggles within the governing ANC and society over the shape of the economy.
Karl von Holdt, Senior Researcher, Society Work and Politics Institute, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/112622
2019-02-28T14:32:44Z
2019-02-28T14:32:44Z
South Africa gets help tracking down social media predators ahead of poll
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261200/original/file-20190227-150702-15xlxhl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man makes his mark in South Africa's general elections on May 7, 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Ihsaan Haffejee</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can South Africa really hold a general election on the 8th of May in a way that it really represents the views of its people? One might have thought this was an academic question. The Electoral Commission of South Africa is well respected and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-electoral-body-has-its-work-cut-out-to-ensure-legitimate-2019-poll-103643">legal system is robust</a>. There are certainly enough political parties – <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-01-10-84-new-political-parties-hoping-for-your-vote-in-may-elections/">around 285 are registered</a> even if most are unlikely to participate in the May elections – for the national and nine provincial legislatures. </p>
<p>But there have been worrying signs about the use of disinformation during previous elections and these need <a href="https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/06/south-africa/">to be heeded.</a></p>
<p>Google is deploying some of its vast resources to train political parties, journalists and editors how to spot and fight fake news. This is part of a <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/20/17142788/google-news-initiative-fake-news-journalist-subscriptions">$300 million international initiative</a> it announced in March last year that has three objectives. To “highlight accurate journalism while fighting misinformation, particularly during breaking news events, to "help news sites continue to grow from a business perspective”, and finally to “create new tools to help journalists do their jobs.” </p>
<p>Mich Atagana, communications manager of Google South Africa, says their work will involve protection against attacks on websites of political parties, but will also find ways of preventing the spread of disinformation. The company works through a system of “flaggers”, she <a href="https://youtube.googleblog.com/2016/09/growing-our-trusted-flagger-program.html">explained</a>, who are trained to spot misinformation. If they do, they can contact Google which then takes action. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We can easily de-monetise the website and take away the ranking. We can make sure it does not show up on Google search</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Google will have up to nine staff working on their programme in the run-up to the election. They will be working with sites like <a href="https://africacheck.org/">Africa Check</a> to allow the public to assess which news is true and which is not. </p>
<p>These initiatives are far from a perfect solution. But they are a start, and they are badly needed.</p>
<h2>Disinformation</h2>
<p>During the 2016 local elections the country’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), ran a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/exclusive-the-ancs-r50m-election-black-ops-20170124">“black ops room”</a> to push out disinformation. The party spent R50 million (£2.75 million) on the operation. Its work included putting out fake posters, purportedly from opposition parties, news sheets delivered door-to-door and planted callers on radio phone-ins.</p>
<p>The party also <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/21/flooding-viewers-anc-propaganda-sabc">controlled the state broadcaster</a> – the SABC – through its political appointees. This is critical during elections. No other media organisation comes close to reaching the millions of voters in rural areas – particularly in vernacular languages.</p>
<p>More covert tactics have been used in the past. A carefully orchestrated disinformation campaign was ruthlessly deployed by the British PR company, Bell Pottinger against anyone who stood in the way of former President Jacob Zuma. Working for his Indian backers, the Gupta brothers, they popularised the term <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html">“white monopoly capital”</a>, to attack his opponents.</p>
<p>The agency was largely the brainchild of Tim Bell, who earned his <a href="https://www.thegentlemansjournal.com/article/lord-bell-pottinger-spin/">reputation helping Margaret Thatcher win three elections</a>. It was only after the internal workings of the agency were exposed in the South African media that the firm was finally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/05/bell-pottingersouth-africa-pr-firm">driven out of business and forced into administration</a>.</p>
<h2>The tip of an iceberg</h2>
<p>Google will train about 100 journalists by the time of the election. </p>
<p>South African freelance journalist Carien du Plessis said when I interviewed her recently that even if websites are brought under control it will not be halt the problem.</p>
<p>Three South African editors <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-05-21-sa-editors-launch-defamation-claim-against-bell-pottinger-over-wmc-campaign">launched a defamation claim</a> against AIG Europe, the insurer for now defunct Bell Pottinger. Richard Meeran, the lawyer representing the editors, made this comment:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This case highlights the increasingly worrying menace of social media backed by sophisticated technology being used to manipulate public opinion with fake information.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>South Africa is by no means the only African country suffering from cyber-attacks. Russian and Ukrainian firms are said to have targeted several governments and private companies, in search of <a href="https://www.intelligenceonline.com/international-dealmaking/2018/05/02/moscow-kiev-security-firms-make-beeline-for-africa%2C108309064-art?utm_source=INT&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PROS_EDIT_ART&did=108257887&eid=381093">lucrative contracts</a>.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwean government is reported to have used <a href="https://qz.com/1325485/zimbabwe-elections-whatsapp-sms-spam-data-privacy-concerns-for-mnangagwa-chimasa/">private data</a> to target citizens with Tweets and text messages. And <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries/">five operators</a> have been identified using Spyware to try to influence the public from Morocco to Mozambique.</p>
<p>If Africa’s fragile democracies are to survive they will need all the help they can get to resist aggressive predators on the internet and social media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>
Concern at the role of fake sites in influencing South African public opinion has been growing over time.
Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/111372
2019-02-08T14:00:22Z
2019-02-08T14:00:22Z
Data shows South Africans will welcome Ramaphosa’s tough talk on graft
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257973/original/file-20190208-174861-1e34npt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa putting final touches to his state of the nation address in which he took a hard stance on corruption.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans have been shocked by the tidal wave of corruption testimony emerging from the <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">commission</a> tasked with probing allegations of state capture by private business interests. </p>
<p>Claims of systematic and widespread corruption involving patronage networks built around former President Jacob Zuma are <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/how-bosasas-bribes-mutilated-south-africas-constitution-20190122">testing the public’s faith</a> in the country’s Constitution, democratic system and public representatives. Government ministers, senior civil servants and politicians from the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) have also <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-21-bosasas-agrizzis-testimony-from-tashas-to-fishmonger-bribe-payments-are-as-detailed-as-they-are-devastating/">been implicated</a>.</p>
<p>It is clear from the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2019-state-nation-address-7-feb-2019-0000">2019 state of the nation address</a> delivered by President Cyril Ramaphosa that the penny has dropped and that the government will finally take a hard stance against corruption. Speaking at length about state capture, Ramaphosa described the commission’s revelations as “deeply disturbing”. </p>
<p>He called for swift action to be taken, saying prosecutions against those accused must proceed and state funds must be recovered. He then announced that an investigating directorate would be established in the office of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions. The investigator would report directly to the head of prosecutions, taking action without fear, favour or prejudice. </p>
<p>The new directorate resembles the old <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/batohi-and-npa-to-get-more-teeth-with-scorpions-like-anti-corruption-unit-20190207">Scorpions</a>, which was disbanded under President Zuma. It has the potential to make a real difference in fighting corruption.</p>
<p>Taking into consideration expert and public opinion – and based on our own analysis of 15 years of data about corruption – it’s our view that Ramaphosa’s apparently decisive actions should be welcomed. Corruption has, over the past decade and a half, become one of South Africans’ biggest concerns. </p>
<h2>A growing problem</h2>
<p>Recently, Transparency International ranked South Africa 73 out of the 180 countries surveyed in its <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018">Corruption Perceptions Index for 2018</a>, based on a score of 43 out of 100 provided by local experts. An index score below 50 reflects a tendency towards the “highly corrupt” end of the scale; it classifies the country as a “flawed democracy”. These critical evaluations are increasingly being mirrored in mass opinion.</p>
<p>Our analysis of trend data from the Human Sciences Research Council’s <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/departments/sasas">South African Social Attitudes Survey</a>, shows that public concern with corruption has grown appreciably over the last 15 years.</p>
<p><em><strong>Table 1: Percentage mentioning corruption as a national priority for the country, by party identification (2003-2017, cell %)</strong></em></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257967/original/file-20190208-174864-18oy89l.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In late 2003, only 9% of the adult population cited corruption as a pressing challenge facing the country. This figure rose to 18% in 2009, 24% in 2014 and 30% by the end of 2017. This means that over the period between 2003 and 2017, corruption moved from being the eighth ranked societal concern among South Africans to the third highest ranked concern (after unemployment, crime and safety). </p>
<p>Concerns with corruption cut across political parties (Fig 1). In late 2017, 27% of those supporting the ANC cited corruption as a national priority. This compared with 38% of supporters of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the main opposition party. The figure among supporters of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the country’s third largest political party, was 35%. Concern with corruption among supporters of other parties was 23%. The share of ANC supporters mentioning corruption as a priority rose from 6% in 2003 to 15% in 2009 and 27% in 2017. </p>
<p>Given this groundswell of concern with corruption, it is unsurprising that only a modest share of citizens are satisfied with the government’s efforts to fight corruption. </p>
<p><em><strong>Percentage satisfied with government efforts to address corruption, by party identification (2017,%)</strong></em></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257971/original/file-20190208-174864-c78f44.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: HSRC SASAS 2017.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2017, only 10% of South Africans were content with measures to curb corruption. There is, again, a broad consensus in this regard across party support lines. Only 9% of ANC supporters, 12% of DA supporters and 13% of EFF supporters believed the government was performing commendably in fighting graft.</p>
<h2>Calling for ethical government</h2>
<p>Alongside their general unhappiness with government efforts to address corruption, South Africans are strongly opposed to corruption. About 90% of adults want politicians found guilty of bribery or other corrupt practices to immediately step down – voluntarily. </p>
<p>This is a resounding message that South Africans want accountability to characterise the country’s politics and governance. ANC supporters were shown to hold some of the strongest anti-corruption opinions. It remains to be seen whether trust in government will improve over the next few years if Ramaphosa’s promises are kept. </p>
<p>It is clear from this data that South Africans across the board strongly favour urgent measures being taken to combat the scourge of corruption. This points to high expectations that the evidence before the state capture commission – and its final recommendations – should result in decisive action being taken against those implicated.</p>
<h2>Action at last?</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa committed in his state of the nation speech to strengthening the capacity of institutions and government to deal with corruption. While not making a direct link, his focus in the speech on investment, coupled with measures against corruption seem to be an long overdue acknowledgement that perceptions of corruption are bad for investment and economic growth. </p>
<p>Finally, the nation has been assured of action. A failure to swiftly and effectively address corruption will not only have far-reaching consequences for the well-being of citizens, especially the poor and vulnerable. It is also likely to strain democratic legitimacy in the country and scare off investors who could make a real difference. </p>
<p><em>Advocate Gary Pienaar, research manager at the HSRC, contributed to this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111372/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Narnia Bohler-Muller receives governmental and non-governmental funding to lead large research porjects through means of a tender system and in accordance with the PFMA.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Roberts receives governmental and non-governmental funding to lead research various social research projects relating to public attitudes in South Africa. This funding is awarded in accordance with the PFMA.</span></em></p>
Corruption has, over the past decade and a half, become one of South Africans’ biggest concerns.
Narnia Bohler-Muller, Executive Director of the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Programme at the Human Sciences Research Council and Adjunct professor of law, University of Fort Hare
Benjamin Roberts, Chief Research Specialist and Coordinator of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), Human Sciences Research Council
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/111101
2019-02-06T14:26:28Z
2019-02-06T14:26:28Z
A democracy or a kleptocracy? How South Africa stacks up
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257252/original/file-20190205-86213-uvn9y7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The commission chaired by Justice Raymond Zondo has heard shocking testimony on the extent of corruption in government.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans have been held spellbound by the torrent of evidence of corruption emerging from two parallel commissions of inquiry – into <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture</a>, and the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-23-mokgoro-inquiry-on-hold-after-over-jibas-fair-trial-rights">fitness to hold office</a> of two senior officials of the National Prosecuting Authority.</p>
<p>These strengthen perceptions that South Africa under former <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/jacob-zuma-presidency-2009-2017-march">President Jacob Zuma</a> – from May 2009 to March 2018 – <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-turned-sa-into-mafia-style-lawless-kleptocracy-saftu-20170805">transformed</a> from a democracy into a <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/search?q=kleptocracy&searchBtn=Search&isQuickSearch=true">“kleptocracy”</a>: a country ruled by thieves.</p>
<p>The country scored only 43 out of 100 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2018 <a href="https://www.transparency.org/country/ZAF">Corruption Perceptions Index for 2018</a>, down from 47 in 2009. </p>
<p>So the question is: is it indeed the case that South Africa has become a kleptocracy? Has it travelled far along the road to joining states such as Russia and Equatorial Guinea, notorious for being ruled by authoritarian leaders in league with corrupt oligarchs at the expense of ordinary people? If this is so, is that condition reversible?</p>
<h2>Understanding kleptocracy</h2>
<p>Derived from the Greek words for thieving and ruling, the word “kleptocracy” entered the modern social science lexicon through the work of the Polish-British sociologist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2007/nov/20/guardianobituaries.obituaries">Stanislav Andreski</a> in the 1960s. His book <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/3139053/the-african-predicament-a-study-in-the-pathology">The African Predicament</a> identified post-independence African regimes as kleptocratic. </p>
<p>Basically, he presented kleptocracy as government by corrupt leaders who use their power to exploit the people and national resources of their countries to extend their personal wealth and political powers. But, the notion of kleptocracy didn’t gain much leverage until the present decade. This reflects a widespread belief that corruption is <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-dark-side-globalization">gaining ground</a> at an unprecedented rate in the world.</p>
<p>Key to contemporary understandings is that kleptocracy now extends beyond the boundaries of the countries that kleptocrats plunder, and is becoming a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-challenge-democracy">danger to democracy globally</a>. </p>
<p>Whereas there was previously a strong tendency to see kleptocracy as primarily a pathology of countries in what used to be referred to as the <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/de46/c4490c84d705062c389dd8a60633e3c43786.pdf">“third world”</a>, today it is recognised that the scourge has <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-challenge-democracy">gone global</a>.</p>
<p>President Vladimar Putin’s Russia is widely cited as leading the pack of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-power-and-plunder-putin%E2%80%99s-russia">kleptocrats</a>. It is strongly followed by other “emerging market economies” (such as Turkey and Malaysia), with African countries (such as Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria) continuing to feature strongly. Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest scoring region – that is, the most corrupt – in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018">Transparency International’s index</a>.</p>
<p>The most distinctive development of the contemporary era is that advanced capitalist democracies are viewed as under <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-challenge-democracy">threat from kleptocracy</a>. For instance, there are accusations aplenty that the presidency of the US is being systematically used to <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/31/15959970/donald-trump-authoritarian-children-corruption">enrich the family and companies</a> of President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>Also, it is widely recognised that despite the virtuous platitudes of the British government, London has become a major centre for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/london-is-now-the-global-money-laundering-centre-for-the-drug-trade-says-crime-expert-10366262.html">money-laundering</a>. So what has changed? </p>
<p>Simply put: globalisation and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-world">neo-liberalism</a> have hugely increased the capacity of rulers, corporations, oligarchs and criminal networks to obscure their movements of money through the international financial system,</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257237/original/file-20190205-86228-k0rxy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Retired Judge Yvonne Mokgoro is probing the fitness of two powerful national prosecutors to hold office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thulani Mbele/Sowetan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A combination of neoliberalism and globalisation has led to the development of a massive industry servicing kleptocrats. This spreads outwards from London and New York to offshore jurisdictions and real estate hotspots, often arranged by Western financial services providers. Offshore finance has become critical. Untraceable shell companies are being used to shift money <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-kleptocracy-laundering-cash-whitewashing-reputations">from one country to another</a>.</p>
<p>Once money has been “cleansed”, it is increasingly invested in luxury housing and valuable real estate. Amid this, the laundering of reputations becomes critical. This often requires the hiring of politicians and lobbyists to re-brand kleptocrats as philanthropists and engaged global citizens. </p>
<h2>The case of South Africa</h2>
<p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa recently referred to the years of his predecessor Zuma as <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/ramaphosa-backtracks-on-nine-wasted-years-under-zuma-20190202">“wasted”</a>. But, typical of his style, this was an understatement. South Africa under Zuma advanced far down the road to becoming a kleptocracy.</p>
<p>Corruption became increasingly organised, politicians and parastatal managers being bought by <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/28/gordhan-says-anti-graft-efforts-face-dangerous-fightback">external private interests</a>. The Jacob Zuma Foundation appears to have served as a front for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-01-29-zuma-got-r300k-per-month-from-bosasa-says-agrizzi/">outright theft</a> and appropriation of public monies. Intermediaries like <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/262921/new-report-highlights-the-scale-of-kpmgs-losses-in-south-africa/">KPMG</a> and other auditing companies were used to hide the private appropriation of state resources from public gaze.</p>
<p>The London-based <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-pr-giant-bell-pottinger-made-itself-look-bad-83529">Bell Pottinger</a> public relations company was used to explain away the scandals of the Zuma regime. While by its nature money laundering is obscure, there can be little doubt that money has been squirrelled away in offshore accounts.</p>
<p>Revelations emanating from the two commissions of inquiry indicate that South Africa stands in great peril of falling prey to kleptocracy. Under Ramaphosa, the government of the African National Congress (ANC) has taken important steps to reverse the trend. These include the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/12/04/president-appoints-shamila-batohi-as-new-ndpp-head">appointment</a> of a highly respected advocate to be the country’s chief prosecutor. But much will depend on the political will of the ANC to rid its ranks of its in-house kleptocrats for this promise to bear fruit.</p>
<h2>Battle to defeat kleptocracy</h2>
<p>Tackling kleptocracy is enormously complex. Eliciting information from myriad international (often reluctant) sources takes time, money and patience. Legal action is time consuming and costly. Kleptocrats and their allies fight back strongly.</p>
<p>The good news is that South Africa has made a good start with the establishment of the commissions of inquiry. </p>
<p>The bad news is that the ANC government’s pursuit of the country’s kleptocrats may drop off once it has won the national elections in May. It will be up to opposition parties, the media and civil society to ensure that that doesn’t happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>
Corruption in South Africa became increasingly organised under former President Jacob Zuma.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.