tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/train-safety-24681/articlesTrain safety – The Conversation2023-02-26T15:05:31Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2005062023-02-26T15:05:31Z2023-02-26T15:05:31ZRail accidents: Public safety and accountability suffer because of deregulation<p>The ongoing environmental tragedy in Ohio caused by the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ohio-train-derailment-cleanup-ordered-1.6755181">derailment of a Norfolk Southern train</a> carrying hazardous materials — which sent toxic chemicals into the air and local waterways — will take a long time to clean up. And if a similar rail tragedy in Canada is an example, it could take even longer for residents to get answers about the cause and true damage of the accident.</p>
<p>Almost a decade has passed since a runaway train hauling 72 tank cars laden with highly volatile Bakken shale oil <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42548824">derailed and exploded in Lac-Mégantic</a> — a small Québec town near the border with Maine — killing 47 people, orphaning 26 children, spilling six million litres of toxic material and destroying the town centre. </p>
<p>The accident on July 6, 2013, was the worst industrial disaster on Canadian soil in over a century. A decade later, it has left the community with a legacy of economic, health and environmental effects. </p>
<h2>Prolonged trauma</h2>
<p><a href="https://tc.canada.ca/en/rail-transportation/lac-megantic-rail-bypass">A rail bypass project</a>, originally conceived as means of healing, has prolonged the trauma that has plagued the Lac-Mégantic community since that catastrophic night.</p>
<p>Construction of the bypass still has not begun. The route preferred by Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., which will own the bypass upon completion, and supported by the federal government, has created deep divisions within the surrounding towns. </p>
<p>Citizens of the neighbouring town of Frontenac <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/quebec-town-votes-no-to-lac-megantic-rail-bypass-project-as-expropriations-loom">recently voted overwhelmingly against the proposed route</a>. Voters expressed concern about potential negative environmental and property damage not properly addressed by Transport Canada.</p>
<p>The dispute over the bypass is just one of the ongoing issues for the citizens of Lac-Mégantic. Their latest quest for justice through the courts came to a disheartening end on Dec. 14, 2022. </p>
<p>Justice Martin Bureau of the Superior Court of Québec found that Canadian Pacific Railway <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qccs/doc/2022/2022qccs4643/2022qccs4643.html?resultIndex=1">could not be held liable for damages suffered by the victims of the Lac-Mégantic disaster</a>. The plaintiffs have appealed the decision.</p>
<h2>Raises questions about accountability</h2>
<p>This case raises serious questions about who should be accountable for complex events that result in catastrophic harm. It’s also a reminder that private litigation is an imperfect means of understanding how disasters happen and what should be done to better protect public interest in the future. Only a public inquiry can do that.</p>
<p>The class action lawsuit was brought against Montreal Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. and 25 other defendants. MM&A subsequently went bankrupt. </p>
<p>In 2016, 24 of the defendants settled the claims against them by contributing $460 million to a compensation fund. Among those who settled were Transport Canada, which paid <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/lac-megantic-federal-government-settlement-1.3561924">$75 million into the fund</a>, Irving Oil ($75 million) and World Fuel Services Corp., the U.S. owner of the oil on the train ($135 million). This was not an altruistic gesture, but rather a way to end their legal exposure <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qccs/doc/2016/2016qccs6977/2016qccs6977.html?resultIndex=2">because the settlement released them from the class action</a>.</p>
<h2>CP claimed no wrongdoing</h2>
<p>Canadian Pacific did not join the settlement. From the outset, CP maintained it had engaged in no wrongdoing. It refused to acknowledge any responsibility in connection with the Lac-Mégantic disaster because the derailing occurred after the train was handed off to Montreal Maine & Atlantic in Montréal for the final leg of the journey. </p>
<p>After considering the extensive evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that CP was not liable for what happened at Lac-Mégantic.</p>
<p>The judge ruled that not only did CP have no duty to intervene, it was also not negligent because it followed industry practice. Moreover, even if there was negligent conduct on the part of CP, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9351376/quebec-canadian-pacific-railway-lac-megantic-ruling/">the judgment found there was no evidence</a> the company was “the direct, immediate and logical cause of the prejudice suffered by the victims” because of the derailment.</p>
<p>In finding that CP was not at fault, the judge relied on existing industry practice when determining whether CP had fulfilled its duty to act as a reasonably prudent person according to <a href="https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/fr/version/lc/CCQ-1991?code=se:1457&historique=20230220#20230220">section 1457 of the Civil Code of Québec</a>.</p>
<p>In reaching this conclusion, the court was heavily influenced by the absence of legally binding duties in applicable railway regulations requiring CP to do the things the plaintiffs alleged CP ought to have done.</p>
<h2>No duty to monitor risks</h2>
<p>The judge agreed with CP that it was only required to do a risk assessment on its own track. The court held that since it is the government’s job to ensure that cargo was properly classified and that Montreal Maine & Atlantic met the required safety standards on its portion of the route, CP had no duty to monitor the risks to the public posed by the companies with which it collaborated.</p>
<p>The court found that nothing obligated CP to investigate whether the shale oil in the tank cars was misclassified or more volatile than typical crude oil. Nor was CP negligent in choosing Montreal Maine & Atlantic to transport the fateful cargo through Lac-Mégantic, despite CP’s knowledge of <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/10/lac_megantic_disaster_mma_railway_had_poor_safety_record_in_us.html">Montreal Maine & Atlantic’s practices</a> and the increased risks they created for transport of this oil over MM&A’s line.</p>
<p>The court’s conclusions are based on a view of the regulatory framework that ignores the reality of the power relationship between industry and regulator.</p>
<p>Two railways, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific, effectively determine the laws, rules and regulations — together with complicit bureaucrats and legislators — to serve their interests and protect themselves from liability in the event of a disaster. </p>
<p>The vastly diminished independent oversight capacity of Transport Canada is the product of a decades-long process of deregulation and reduced resources, where the regulator oversees written safety plans prepared by railways rather than inspecting actual safety practices on the ground. </p>
<p>In other words, the railways themselves define “existing industry practice” against which the reasonableness of their conduct is measured.</p>
<h2>A narrow view of causation</h2>
<p>In addition to finding that CP was not negligent, the Québec court assigned legal blame solely to the last link in the causation chain — Tom Harding, the locomotive engineer. </p>
<p>This is worrying because it blames Harding for his role in a complex event when he had little control over his working conditions and corporate policy. In focusing on Harding’s decision about how many hand brakes to set, the court ignores all the other conditions that helped to set the derailment in motion — including parking the train on the main line uphill from a town with mislabeled cargo of volatile explosive crude oil.</p>
<p>Harding was <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/tom-harding-megantic-trial-statement-1.4498223">acquitted of criminal wrongdoing</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>This case underscores how difficult it is under current legal rules for plaintiffs to prove fault and causation in complex events — particularly when multiple parties are involved, each of which is motivated to limit their legal exposure to liability. </p>
<p>Not only do private parties lack the power to compel evidence, even if they did, the costs of assembling evidence of the factors that contributed to an event on the scale of the Lac-Mégantic derailment is prohibitive.</p>
<p>In light of the failure of a flawed legal system to provide justice for the citizens of Lac-Mégantic, an <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/commissions-inquiry.html">independent commission of inquiry</a> remains the only means of getting to the bottom of what happened, why it happened, who should be held accountable and what policies should be implemented to prevent future disasters. Yet such an inquiry has been rejected by successive governments. </p>
<p>Ten years after Lac-Mégantic, corporate negligence and regulatory failure remain predominant systemic features of the transportation of dangerous goods by rail in North America, evident most recently in the derailment and toxic chemicals spill in East Palestine, Ohio. The status quo cannot be tolerated. Public safety must supersede shareholder value.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200506/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Campbell is affiliated with several nonprofit organizations: The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the Group of 78, the Rideau Institute for international affairs</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Quaid holds research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. She is the Chair of the Legal Committee of Transparency International Canada. </span></em></p>The recent rail accident in Ohio is raising questions about who should be responsible for the aftermath of derailments. Residents impacted by a 10-year-old rail tragedy in Canada still want answers.Bruce Campbell, Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change, York University, CanadaJennifer Quaid, Associate Professor & Vice-Dean Research, Civil Law Section, Faculty of Law, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1122252019-03-05T19:07:11Z2019-03-05T19:07:11ZStudents don’t feel safe on public transport but many have no choice but to use it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262024/original/file-20190305-92301-2d5obn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nearly half of female tertiary students surveyed in Melbourne say they 'rarely' or 'never' feel safe on public transport after dark.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/woman-alone-passageaway-671868">KN/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The worst-case scenario has happened twice for young women using public transport in Melbourne in the past nine months. In June 2018, <a href="https://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/news-life/aussie-womens-fury-after-eurydice-dixons-vile-murder/news-story/41d6923708312ae8a5d3d5f2ee788b65">Eurydice Dixon</a>, 23, was walking from the tram to her home, through a well-used park just north of the central city, when a young man is alleged to have stalked, raped and murdered her. In January 2019, another young man is alleged to have raped and murdered 21-year-old Palestinian exchange student <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-19/man-charged-over-aiia-maasarwe-death/10728836">Aiia Maasarwe</a> 100 metres from the tram she took home from central Melbourne.</p>
<p>Even before these attacks, students reported feeling unsafe when using public transport. In April to June 2018, we undertook a <a href="https://msd.unimelb.edu.au/research/projects/current/public-transport-safety-for-tertiary-students">survey</a>, as part of <a href="https://www.kth.se/abe/om-skolan/inst/som/avdelningar/urbana-studier/forskning/urban-community-sa/trygghet-i-kollektiv">a 17-city global study</a> of tertiary students’ safety on public transport. We received over 500 completed surveys. </p>
<h2>What did our survey find?</h2>
<p>A large proportion of female students report a climate of fear on public transport. Just under half (45.1%) said they “rarely” or “never” feel safe on public transport after dark, compared to 11.3% of men. </p>
<p>Almost three in five women (58.9%) say they try to reduce their risk of victimisation in various ways. These include avoiding certain lines and stops, ensuring they are met at a stop and being constantly on alert. Just under half (45.4%) of female students report fear of victimisation as a reason for not using public transport.</p>
<p>This was not just a matter of perceptions. Almost four-fifths (79.4%) of female students and an equivalent proportion of LGBTI+ students said they had been victims of unwanted sexual gestures, comments, advances, exposed genitals, groping or being followed on public transport in the previous three years. </p>
<p>Over half (51.7%) of men reported having been victimised. These incidents were more likely to be gestures and comments rather than groping or being stalked.</p>
<p>Only 5.7% of those who had been victimised reported this to anyone in authority. This is hardly surprising. The public safety messages from police, transport authorities and tertiary educational institutions do not encourage the reporting of incidents. Instead, they emphasise the responsibility of potential victims to protect themselves.</p>
<p>The immediate response of police to the killing of Eurydice Dixon was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/jun/15/men-need-to-change-anger-grows-over-police-response-to-comedians">this statement</a>: “Make sure you have situational awareness. Be aware of your own personal safety. If you’ve got a mobile phone, carry it; if you’ve got any concerns, call the police.”</p>
<p>But both Eurydice Dixon and Aiia Maasarwe were allegedly carrying their phones and sending messages as to their whereabouts when attacked. </p>
<p>As Change.org executive director <a href="https://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/news-life/aussie-womens-fury-after-eurydice-dixons-vile-murder/news-story/41d6923708312ae8a5d3d5f2ee788b65">Sally Rugg said</a>, these messages “suggest that the police can’t stop men from raping people, so it’s up to the women to take precautions, which is insulting to men, unhelpful and untrue”. </p>
<h2>Counting the cost of student safety concerns</h2>
<p>With 18 tertiary institutions located throughout Greater Melbourne, safe public transport access touches on issues of social justice, environmental sustainability and economic productivity. The situation in most tertiary institutions is one of car dependence. For instance, at the largest Deakin University campus, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259138426_Engaging_higher_education_institutions_in_the_challenge_of_sustainability_Sustainable_transport_as_a_catalyst_for_action">61% of students and staff drove alone to work in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>The outer suburbs fare worst – <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222754050_Quantifying_spatial_gaps_in_public_transport_supply_based_on_social_needs">50% of these areas have “very low” or “low” public transport frequency</a>. Yet these suburbs have very high needs for public transport in terms of the proportion of adults without cars, including many tertiary students – a concept called “transport disadvantage”. Students living in middle and outer Melbourne tend to be <a href="https://atrf.info/papers/2010/2010_Mahmoud_Currie.pdf">more dependent on public transport and more likely to travel in the evenings</a>, two risk factors for victimisation.</p>
<p>Tertiary students have a huge economic impact, through the revenue they generate for their institutions, their role in the workforce, the services they use and the purchases they make. The 2016 census recorded <a href="https://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/australias-universities/key-facts-and-data#.XG3YbLhS82w">1.4 million</a> university students in Australia – 26% of them, or almost 400,000, international students. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262025/original/file-20190305-92301-1q0ov3d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A national survey of university students found public transport is where sexual harassment is most common.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/woman-waiting-train-1043487601">Dennis Diatel/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In <a href="https://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/tertiary-student-education-profile.pdf">2016, the City of Melbourne</a> had 227,000 students living and/or studying within the municipality, with 45,000 students calling it home. A third are international fee-paying students, who <a href="https://www.domain.com.au/news/wave-of-studentonly-skyscrapers-to-hit-melbourne-20160202-gmjd00/">often live in high-priced apartments sold on the basis of safe and convenient access to campuses</a>.</p>
<p>The issues of safety are nationwide. In 2016, <a href="https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/sex-discrimination/publications/change-course-national-report-sexual-assault-and-sexual">a study</a> involving 30,000 students in all 39 Australian universities underscored the high rates of assault and harassment of women and sexual minorities. Public transport was the most common location for sexual harassment – 22% of incidents, as opposed to 14% on university grounds and 13% in a university teaching space. And 57% of perpetrators of sexual harassment were identified as male students from their university.</p>
<h2>We need a better approach</h2>
<p>There are precedents for a better approach. In 2015, Transport for London, in partnership with police, launched its “<a href="http://www.btp.police.uk/about_us/our_campaigns/report_it_to_stop_it.aspx">Report it to Stop it</a>” campaign. </p>
<p>The campaign built on a series of videos encouraging women to come forward in reporting unwanted sexualised staring, remarks, groping and stalking on public transport. The videos also show the consequences of reporting, with a man being identified and arrested for sexual harassment. A reporting hotline can be called or texted 24 hours a day, every day. </p>
<p>In the first year of the campaign, <a href="https://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/inside-tfl-campaign-tackle-unwanted-sexual-behaviour-public-transport/1450533">reports of harassment on public transport increased by 36%, with a 40% increase in criminal charges</a>. An evaluation after the first year found 84% of women respondents agreed the campaign “made me feel more confident to take action against unwanted sexual behaviour if it occurred”.</p>
<p>Our report recommends that the Victorian government work with police, public transport providers and tertiary institutions on a coordinated campaign to encourage better reporting of sexually related crimes on public transport. This would include:</p>
<ul>
<li>investing in a common hotline</li>
<li>creating publicity materials (including posters, videos, ad campaigns) to encourage reporting by both victims and witnesses</li>
<li>employing consistent messaging on all these organisations’ websites that put the onus for safety where it belongs: on offenders not to offend, and on institutions to respond properly to offences. This should include public education on consequences of offences.</li>
</ul>
<p>We also recommend that people who make reports be treated respectfully and their concerns treated seriously. All reports should be immediately followed up and all efforts made to arrest, charge and convict offenders. All public security and authorised officers, drivers and station attendants should be trained in how to respond to complaints and concerns.</p>
<p>Our third recommendation is that tertiary educational institutions have a role to play in cases where offenders as well as victims are students. Very clear messaging is needed on campus that offences on public transport as well as on campus are an institutional responsibility.</p>
<p>Our final recommendation is that state government recognise the impacts of infrequent, unreliable and inadequate transport services on the mobility and safety of people with lower incomes and less access to cars, including tertiary students. Authorities should consider partnering with ride-sharing services to make “the last kilometre” home from some public transport stops safer and more secure. Without a coordinated campaign to tackle the root causes of victimisation and fear, putting more CCTV, lighting and officers on trains is no longer enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Thompson is an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Research Award Fellow (DE180101411)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Whitzman and Rewa Marathe do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As they return to classes, a survey finds nearly half of female tertiary students in Melbourne don’t feel safe using public transport at night. And 79% have been sexually harassed or victimised.Carolyn Whitzman, Professor of Urban Planning, The University of MelbourneJason Thompson, Senior Research Fellow, Melbourne School of Design, The University of MelbourneRewa Marathe, Research Assistant and PhD Candidate, Melbourne School of Design, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1124952019-02-28T22:44:14Z2019-02-28T22:44:14ZWith more oil to be shipped by rail, train derailments show enduring safety gaps<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261434/original/file-20190228-106341-6001f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The recent train derailment in B.C. was one of a rash of high-profile derailments in Canada since the beginning of 2019. While none compares in magnitude with Lac-Mégantic, they evoke disturbing parallels to that tragedy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Jeff McIntosh</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/three-cp-rail-workers-killed-in-massive-derailment-near-field-b-c">runaway</a> CP Rail train in the Rocky Mountains near Field, B.C., highlighted ongoing gaps in Canada’s railway safety regime, more than five years after the <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp">Lac-Mégantic rail disaster</a> that killed 47 residents of the small Québec town.</p>
<p>The British Columbia crash resulted in the deaths of three railway workers and the derailment of 99 grain cars and two locomotives.</p>
<p>In the B.C. accident, the train involved had been <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-train-301-switched-from-a-regular-run-to-a-deadly-derailment/">parked for two hours</a> on a steep slope without the application of hand brakes in addition to air brakes. </p>
<p>The practice of relying on air brakes to hold trains parked on slopes was permitted by both the company and by Transport Canada rules. Revised operating rules, adopted after the Lac-Mégantic disaster, had not required the application of hand brakes under these circumstances.</p>
<p>The latest accident was one of a rash of high-profile train derailments in Canada since the beginning of 2019. While none compares in magnitude with Lac-Mégantic, they evoke disturbing parallels to that tragedy. Although <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/communiques/rail/2019/r19c0015-20190205.asp">investigations are ongoing</a>, what we do know raises questions about whether any lessons have in fact been learned from the <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp">2013 disaster</a>.</p>
<h2>Now must apply hand brakes</h2>
<p>Within days of the B.C. runaway, both CP Rail and Transport Canada <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2019/02/08/transport-minister-orders-all-trains-to-use-hand-brakes-when-stopped-on-mountains-in-certain-situations.html">mandated the application of hand brakes</a> in addition to air brakes for trains parked on slopes. This after-the-fact measure parallels the action Transport Canada took days after Lac-Mégantic, prohibiting single-person crews, after having granted permission to Montréal Maine and Atlantic Railway to operate its massive oil trains through Eastern Québec with a lone operator.</p>
<p>Furthermore, like the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, <a href="https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/doomed-train-had-speed-control-problems-hours-before-fatal-plunge-says-railway-source">existing mechanical problems</a> with the locomotives involved reportedly played a role in the CP Rail derailment, raising questions about the adequacy of oversight with regard to equipment maintenance practices.</p>
<p>Like Lac-Mégantic, worker fatigue may have also played a role in the crash. Despite efforts within Transport Canada to force railways to better manage crew fatigue, railway companies have long resisted. Instead they have taken page out of the tobacco industry playbook by denying inconvenient scientific evidence as “<a href="https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/cp-disappointed-with-tsb-chairs-misguided-statements-regarding-latest-watchlist-599563471.html">emotional and deceptive rhetoric</a>.”</p>
<p>The situation has prompted the Transportation Safety Board to put fatigue management on <a href="http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/surveillance-watchlist/multi-modal/2018/multimodal-03.asp">its watchlist</a> of risky practices, stating that Transport Canada has been aware of the problem for many years but is continuing to drag its feet.</p>
<h2>Oil-by-rail traffic explodes</h2>
<p>The implications of the B.C. accident take on additional significance in light of the dramatic growth seen in oil-by-rail traffic in Canada over the past year. <a href="https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/nrg/sttstc/crdlndptrlmprdct/stt/cndncrdlxprtsrl-eng.html">Export volumes</a> reached a record 354,000 barrels per day in December 2018, with the vast majority of the oil going to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast and Midwest.</p>
<p>This development has not gone unnoticed by people living in communities across North America, who are concerned about the growing danger of another disastrous derailment.</p>
<p>The increase in traffic — now bolstered by the <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4976233/alberta-investing-3-7b-to-move-oil-by-rail-leasing-car/">Alberta government’s plan</a> to put another 120,000 barrels per day of crude oil on the rails by next year — is occurring at a time when the Transportation Safety Board reported a significant increase in “<a href="http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/fiches-facts/r16t0111/r16t0111-20180627-03.asp">uncontrolled train movements</a>” during 2014-17 compared to the average of the five years preceding the disaster. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/technology-to-prevent-rail-disasters-is-in-our-hands-85509">Technology to prevent rail disasters is in our hands</a>
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<p>This is despite the board’s Lac-Mégantic investigation report recommendation that Transport Canada implement additional measures to prevent runaway trains.</p>
<p>Two weeks after the B.C. crash, a CN train carrying crude oil derailed near St. Lazare, Man.; 37 tank cars left the tracks, punctured and partially spilled their contents. The cars were a retrofitted version of the <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2019/02/19/tsb-says-improved-tankers-involved-in-manitoba-derailment-that-spilled-crude.html">TC-117 model tank car</a>, developed after Lac-Mégantic, intended to prevent spills of dangerous goods. The train was travelling at 49 mph, just under the maximum allowable speed.</p>
<h2>Budgets chopped</h2>
<p>In the lead-up to the Lac-Mégantic disaster, the Harper government <a href="https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/lac-m%C3%A9gantic-plus-%C3%A7a-change">squeezed both</a> Transport Canada’s rail safety and transportation of dangerous goods oversight budgets. These budgets did not increase significantly after the disaster.</p>
<p>Justin Trudeau’s government pledged additional resources for rail safety oversight. However, <a href="https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/corporate-services/planning-625.htm">Transport Canada’s plans</a> for the coming years show safety budgets falling back to Harper-era levels. It remains to be seen whether these plans will be reversed in the upcoming federal budget.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://sei.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/12/Smart-Regulation-and-Public-Safety-June-23-2016-Working-3.pdf">Safety Management Systems-based</a> approach remains the centrepiece of Canada’s railway safety system. That system been fraught with problems since it was introduced 17 years ago. </p>
<p>It continues to allow rail companies to, in effect, self-regulate, compromising safety when it conflicts with bottom-line priorities. Government officials claim there has been a major increase in the number of Transport Canada rail safety inspectors conducting unannounced, on-site inspections. But the <a href="http://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/TRAN/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=10485745">inspectors’ union</a> questions these claims.</p>
<p>If an under-resourced regulator, with a <a href="http://sei.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/12/Case-for-public-Inquiry-into-the-LacMegantic-Disaster-September-22-2017.pdf">long history of deference to the industry</a>, is unable to fulfil its first-and-foremost obligation to ensure the health and safety of its citizens, the lessons of Lac-Mégantic have still not been learned. The B.C. accident highlights that the window for history to repeat itself remains wide open.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112495/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Winfield receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and the George Cedric Metcalf Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Campbell is a Research Associate, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives; Board Member, Rideau Institute for International affairs; Board Member, Public Interest Advocacy Centre; Member/Donor, New Democratic Party of Canada
</span></em></p>The recent B.C. train derailment raises questions about whether any lessons have been learned from the Lac-Mégantic disaster of 2013.Mark Winfield, Professor of Environmental Studies, York University, CanadaBruce Campbell, Adjunct professor, York University, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855092017-10-12T22:01:39Z2017-10-12T22:01:39ZTechnology to prevent rail disasters is in our hands<p>As the trial of the deadly 2013 Lac-Mégantic rail disaster begins, new technologies, and practices and policies that aim to employ them, could help avoid similar disasters in the future.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp">Transportation Safety Board (TSB)</a> found more than 18 distinct causes and contributing factors in the Lac-Mégantic derailment investigation, which makes the likelihood of this type of accident seem nearly impossible. </p>
<p>Yet other derailments in Canada involving dangerous goods would soon follow in 2014 in <a href="http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2014/r14m0002/r14m0002.asp">Plaster Rock, N.B.</a> and <a href="http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2014/r14w0256/r14w0256.asp">Clair, Sask.</a>, and two <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2015/r15h0013/r15h0013.asp">incidents</a> in 2015 in <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2015/r15h0021/r15h0021.asp">Gogama</a>, Ont.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189842/original/file-20171011-27964-7a0ylu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Freight train burns in Lac-Mégantic, Que., in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Transportation Safety Board of Canada)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This suggests that we must be mindful of the connection between human interactions and technology and how each will continue to underlie many causes and contributing factors of future incidents. </p>
<p>As a civil engineering professor who researches transportation infrastructure, dangerous goods and risk, I see several new developments and changes to technology and policy that can help to reduce future accidents.</p>
<h2>Safer tank car standards</h2>
<p>The type of tank cars involved in the Lac-Mégantic accident (“Class 111”) were known to be vulnerable to failure, even in low-speed accidents (e.g., <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/1999/r99d0159/r99d0159.pdf">Cornwall, Ont. in 1999</a>). </p>
<p>After Lac-Mégantic, Canada and the United States developed a more robust tank car standard, Class 117. This new standard features improved puncture resistance, structural strength and fractural resistance. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189838/original/file-20171011-28106-dlfc61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Infographic shows the new, safer TC-117 tank car.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Transport Canada)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite these improvements, Canadian and U.S. regulations will still allow Class 111 tank cars to be used for the transport of certain dangerous goods <a href="http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2015/2015-05-20/html/sor-dors100-eng.php">until mid-2025</a>. </p>
<p>Even so, Canada accelerated the phase-out of the older Class 111 tank cars from being used for crude oil service in Canada as of Nov. 1, 2016, under <a href="https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/tdg/safety-menu-1289.html">Protective Direction 38</a>.</p>
<h2>Enhanced braking</h2>
<p>In addition to new tank car standards, the U.S. is requiring <a href="https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L16353#p1_z50_gD_lLR">enhanced braking standards</a> on trains carrying flammable goods. </p>
<p>Any train with a continuous block of 20 tank cars loaded with a flammable liquid, or 35 or more tank cars loaded with a flammable liquid dispersed throughout a train, must have a functioning two-way end-of-train (EOT) device — an electronic unit that can be mounted on the end of a freight train instead of a caboose — or a distributed power (DP) braking system, which spreads braking across different points throughout a train.</p>
<p>Furthermore, any train with 70 or more loaded tank cars containing flammable liquids travelling at speeds greater than 48 km/h must be operated with an electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking system by May 1, 2023. </p>
<p>In short, these technologies enable more controlled braking behaviour through a more responsive and uniform application of brake pressure. Benefits would include shorter stopping distances, lower risks of derailment and lower pile-up effects in the event of a derailment.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189837/original/file-20171011-28088-strf6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brake signals on trains with conventional, distributed power (DP), and electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(U.S. Government Accountability Office)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>More information sharing</h2>
<p>Technology also allows more information sharing for better decision-making. For example, <a href="http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/tdg/safety-menu-1281.html">Protective Direction No. 36</a> in Canada requires railways to provide municipalities with dangerous goods reports, including information on the number of unit trains, percentage of railway cars transporting dangerous goods, information on their nature and volume and number of trains. </p>
<p>This information is intended to inform emergency planning and responses. </p>
<p>The U.S. is also requiring more <a href="https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L16354">accurate classification of unrefined petroleum-based products</a> to ensure proper classification, packaging and record-keeping through a documented sampling and testing process. This information is to be made available to the Department of Transportation upon request.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=256&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189843/original/file-20171011-5557-uywtji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Under Protective Direction 36, Canadian Class 1 railways must also post a public report on their website with the breakdown of the Top 10 dangerous goods they transport through a province. This 2016 data is for Quebec.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Canadian Pacific)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Human factors</h2>
<p>The technology to prevent rail disasters is in our hands — just as it was in 2013. While these and <a href="https://theconversation.com/shipping-oil-by-rail-is-booming-technology-can-make-it-safer-39165">future technologies</a> are likely to reduce the risks of transporting dangerous goods across Canada and the United States, the interactions between humans and other elements of the system — the “human factors” — will remain predominant. </p>
<p>As we now know in the Lac-Mégantic accident, the train carrying 7.7 million litres of crude oil sped toward the small Quebec town at 104 km/h before derailing, killing 47 people in the resulting fire and explosions on July 6, 2013. </p>
<p>Hours before derailing, the train was parked and left running on the main track in Nantes, Que., awaiting departure. But shortly after the engineer parked the train, a locomotive engine caught fire and was turned off by the Nantes fire department. </p>
<p>Without power from the running locomotive engine, air slowly leaked from the air brake system. An insufficient number of handbrakes were applied and the train eventually began rolling downhill on its final journey toward Lac-Mégantic.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wVMNspPc8Zc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Lac-Mégantic MMA Train Accident visualization. (Transportation Safety Board)</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some of the causes and contributing factors in the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster were not technical failures so much as they were failures of humans to properly interact with technology: To properly maintain a locomotive engine, to have knowledge of interactions between locomotive engines and air brake systems and to properly set and test the effectiveness of handbrakes. </p>
<p>Although technical standards were less stringent in 2013, technology did not fail us. In many of the causes and contributing factors of Lac-Mégantic, it is evident that we failed to understand and interact with our technology.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189844/original/file-20171011-28088-1ge26e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Positive train control (PTC) is an advanced system designed to automatically stop a train before an incident occurs. Deployment on U.S. railroad networks has been delayed from 2015 to Dec. 31, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Handout)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85509/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Bachmann has received funding from Transport Canada, the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario (MTO), Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) Canada, and the National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). He is a member of the TRB’s Standing Committee on International Trade and Transportation (AT020). </span></em></p>As the Lac Mégantic rail disaster trial begins, here’s how technology can help prevent a repeat of the tragedy that killed 47 people.Chris Bachmann, Assistant professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/663292016-09-30T01:18:10Z2016-09-30T01:18:10ZDéjà vu: Positive train control could have prevented Hoboken accident as officials run out of track on excuses<p>On the morning of Sept. 29, a packed New Jersey Transit commuter train crashed into the Hoboken Terminal where other commuters were waiting at the platform at the busy transit hub. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/nyregion/new-jersey-transit-train-crash-hoboken.html?_r=0">Initial reports</a> indicate that at least one person has been killed and over 100 injured.</p>
<p>Sadly, but also tellingly, the majority of the following paragraphs comes verbatim from a <a href="https://theconversation.com/positive-train-control-could-have-prevented-amtrak-derailment-but-its-not-quite-on-track-41916">previous article</a> I was asked to write on Positive Train Control (PTC) following the Amtrak 188 crash where, on May 12, 2015, northbound Amtrak Northeast Regional Train 188 carrying 238 passengers to New York from Washington, D.C. derailed near Philadelphia. In that accident, eight people were killed and more than 200 injured when the train entered a curve at almost twice the designated speed limit. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the train engineer lost <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2016-Amtrak-BMG.aspx">situation awareness and that PTC could have prevented the accident.</a> </p>
<p>Similar to the Amtrak accident, the NJ Transit train engineer survived, and the NTSB will surely investigate the accident. While it will be a long time before the exact cause of the Hoboken accident is determined, it seems that PTC could have again prevented the loss of lives, injuries, and chaos on Sept. 29. </p>
<p>Therefore, there are serious questions about why the technology has not been implemented on these trains and tracks despite an ongoing federal mandate and when, at the same time, companies are developing, testing and operating much more sophisticated and effective technology in autonomous vehicles traveling on city streets.</p>
<h2>Crash behind the mandate</h2>
<p>Positive train control (PTC) may have been able to prevent this accident, and it is not the first time this sentiment has been echoed. In 2008 a similar accident prompted federal action. I coauthored a <a href="http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=gpridocs">study on PTC</a> for Congress in 2012.</p>
<p>On Sept. 12, 2008, a passenger train collided with a freight train, resulting in 25 fatalities and 135 injuries in California. The engineer of the passenger train was distracted due to texting, and the <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RAR1001.aspx">NTSB specifically stated that PTC could have prevented this accident.</a> </p>
<p>Within a month the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08) became law and mandated that PTC must be implemented on about <a href="http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=gpridocs">60,000 miles</a> of track “providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger transportation” by the <a href="https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0395">end of 2015</a>. The abnormally fast response can be attributed to support from Sen. Barbara Boxer of California, who was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works at the time.</p>
<p>The federal government granted an extension for some railroads, including New Jersey Transit, until 2018. Unfortunately, the recent accident came before that deadline, and <a href="http://newjersey.news12.com/multimedia/kiyc-fed-reports-show-no-nj-transit-trains-equipped-with-ptc-1.12385094?firstfree=yes">none of the New Jersey Transit lines have PTC</a>. </p>
<p>While implementation of PTC is moving forward in some places, system-wide implementation continues to face significant barriers due to high costs, interoperability requirements and communication spectrum availability. </p>
<h2>What is Positive Train Control?</h2>
<p>PTC from a functional perspective is a system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.</p>
<p>The technical aspects of these systems can vary but generally include a positioning system on each train, information on movement authorities on sections of track (e.g., speed restrictions) and a way of communicating these data throughout the network. For example, PTC would override manual control if it sensed that the train was entering a section of track at double the posted speed limit.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139832/original/image-20160929-27058-1fauhjv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Meteorcomm LLC, ETMS Wireless Network, 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Meteorcomm LLC, ETMS Wireless Network, 2011</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Interest in PTC dates back to at least 1990, when the NTSB first placed it on its <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/default.aspx">“Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements,”</a> where it is still regularly featured up to the most recent list in 2015. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/19990908.php">FRA estimated</a> that between 1987 and 1997 an annual average of seven fatalities, 55 injuries, 150 evacuations and over US$20 million in property damage could have been prevented by PTC. To put this in the context of the entire transportation network, <a href="http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_02_01.html">there were 33,782 fatalities on the road network in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Although PTC is on NTSB’s “Most Wanted List” and many serious incidents due to human error could be prevented, the monetized safety benefits are significantly less than the costs. The FRA estimates the annual monetary value of the safety benefits from PTC to be about $90 million. The safety benefits may be slightly larger today considering several serious accidents stemming from a <a href="http://www.westerncity.com/Western-City/February-2015/A-Growing-Risk-Oil-Trains-Raise-Safety-and-Environmental-Concerns/">boom in oil shipped via rail</a>. </p>
<h2>The costs</h2>
<p>The law is an unfunded mandate, which means the costs of meeting the requirements are borne by the railroad operators. The <a href="http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/2009_RIA_Positive%20Train%20Control%20Systems_RIN%202130-AC03_0.pdf">Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) estimates</a> that the total capital cost for full PTC deployment according to law would be about $10 billion (about one year’s worth of capital investments for the major U.S. railroads) and annual maintenance costs of $850 million. </p>
<p>While this investment might be feasible for major U.S. freight rail companies, local and state governments with tight budgets will have a much more difficult time allocating funds for PTC. This could be a huge issue and reason that the New Jersey Transit does not currently have any PTC systems. The infrastructure cost alone for just two of the five largest transit agencies operating on the corridor, Metro-North in the New York area and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority in the Philadelphia area, is estimated at $350 million and $100 million, respectively. Commuter railroads’ cost for installing PTC is likely to be borne primarily by state or local governments. </p>
<p>The FRA established an annual $50 million grant program to help support the development of PTC, but the grant has been funded by Congress for only $3 million – well short of the total required cost of $2.75 billion <a href="http://www.apta.com/gap/letters/2015/Pages/150313_diaz-barlart_price_house.aspx">estimated by the American Public Transportation Association</a>. </p>
<p>Regardless of the federal mandate and possible future benefits, the costs of implementing PTC is cited as a significant barrier.</p>
<h2>The systems integration barriers</h2>
<p>In addition to costs, PTC has faced barriers in technical implementation, namely system interoperability, and allocation of communication spectrum.</p>
<p>Interoperability is key in successful implementation of PTC. For example, in the case of the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak operates on both Amtrak owned-track as well as track owned by regional transit authorities and vice versa. Elsewhere, Amtrak operates on track owned by freight railroads. It is necessary to ensure that the systems developed by the freight railroads, Amtrak, and regional authorities all communicate with one another. While interoperable systems have been developed, <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-03/pdf/2012-10706.pdf">some issues persist</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81847/original/image-20150515-25417-1vh1l4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Track ownership and rail operations in the Northeast Corridor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06470.pdf">Government Accountability Office - Amtrak</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another system integration issue is the acquisition of radio spectrum to support the communication demands of PTC. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) generally holds auctions for spectrum, but allocates some for emergency services and government agencies. However, the FCC so far has not addressed the needs of PTC. </p>
<p>A consortium of railroad companies exists to purchase appropriate spectrum, but the amount of spectrum and frequency are still uncertain - especially in highly congested areas in major cities where choices in spectrum may be scarce. Without guidance from the FCC, obtaining spectrum and ensuring its interoperability is time-consuming and costly.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Congress will take immediate action following the New Jersey Transit accident as it did with the 2008 accident in California. </p>
<p>Congress did little in response to the Amtrak incident. For instance, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/650">a bill</a> was introduced in the Senate in March of 2015 to extend the PTC deadline to 2020 to help accommodate the cost, interoperability and spectrum barriers the railroads are facing. A year and a half after S. 650 was introduced, it was placed on the Senate legislative calendar. The future of the federal PTC mandate is unclear.</p>
<p>It is also worth mentioning that the original PTC legislation was passed in 2008. Perhaps at that time the concerns about technology and cost had some merit; however, there is ample room for skepticism on the estimates today. Since 2008, companies like <a href="http://phys.org/news/2016-03-autonomous-cars-safe.html">Google</a>, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-08-18/uber-s-first-self-driving-fleet-arrives-in-pittsburgh-this-month-is06r7on">Uber</a> and others have developed, tested and currently operate autonomous vehicles on American roads where complexity far exceeds a train on a fixed track. There are obvious differences in terms of these companies and government-funded transit programs, but arguments centered on cost and complexity are beginning to sound much more like gripping and foot-dragging than legitimate concerns.</p>
<p><em>This article is an updated version of one that originally ran on May 15, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey C. Peters does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The New Jersey Transit train that crashed in Hoboken didn’t have a mandated auto-stopping safety system. Why not?Jeffrey C. Peters, Systems thinker in energy, electricity, and transportation, Stanford UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/544922016-02-10T17:30:38Z2016-02-10T17:30:38ZGermany train crash: ways in which rail safety systems can fail<p>Whenever we hear of an accident such as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35530538">the head on train collision</a> that occurred in Bavaria on Tuesday our first thoughts must be with the victims who were killed or injured, and their friends and families. But as with all accidents an investigation is now underway, which should bring answers to how such a tragedy can happen. </p>
<p>In recent decades, there has been significant investment in safety systems to prevent incidents occurring, or to mitigate their impact. These include: developing new materials and structures to strengthen rail carriages to make sure that in the case of a crash, the damage is limited; Automatic Train Protection (ATP), which asks drivers to acknowledge that they have seen an oncoming red signal, and automatically applies brakes if a signal has been passed at danger; and physical interlocking which prevents signals allowing two trains to occupy the same section of track, and which maintains distance between them. </p>
<p>The basic principle of signalling which is used in most parts of Europe at present is the <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/moving-block-vs-fixed-signalling-which-better-naeem-ali">“fixed block” system</a>, where trains are kept a number of blocks apart. A signaller will set a route, and the engineering within the rail system will ensure that the signals display the correct instructions to the train driver. So if a route is set for a train, a signal will display as green; once the train has passed that signal, it will revert to red, the next signal behind will be amber, and the one behind that, double amber. </p>
<p>This fixed block system is gradually being replaced in parts by the <a href="http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/12275.aspx">European Rail Traffic Management System</a>, which operates on a moving block principle, but the idea is still that engineering and technology will maintain a safe distance between trains. In the case of the Bavaria rail crash, it is not yet completely clear exactly which type of technology was implemented on the stretch of track where the accident occurred. The incident occurred on a single track part of the line, which would normally operate using a <a href="https://www.safety.networkrail.co.uk/Services/Jargon-Buster/R/RA-RE/RETB">“token block”</a> system which only allows one train on a particular section of track. </p>
<h2>Search for a cause</h2>
<p>Modern railways are well-engineered systems that allows many of the previously human tasks involved in train driving to be supported, or in some cases replaced by technology. Train drivers are expected to be familiar with routes, to enable them to anticipate the performance of the train at particular points in the journey, and apply the brake and throttle at points that deliver the most fuel efficient and comfortable journey. </p>
<p>Reports suggest that the trains in the Bavaria crash not only <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/train-collision-in-germany-kills-several-people-police-say-1455006633">had ATP technology</a>, but also had technologies which <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35530538">help drivers to manage the speed of the train</a>. It is these systems that <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2016/02/10/germany-train-crash_n_9200696.html">some have jumped on</a> in the search for a cause – but which we will have to wait for the investigation to reveal. </p>
<p>However, an <a href="https://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Bainbridge_1983_Automatica.pdf">“irony of automation”</a>, as noted by Lisanne Bainbridge in 1983, is that if we introduce a large amount of technology into a previously manual system, the nature of the work task changes, and there is a danger that drivers can becomes less able to intervene and to problem solve quickly when incidents occur.</p>
<p>We are still in the early days of investigation of the Bavaria incident. But in many cases, after major accidents, the cause of incidents are often reported as “human error”. In the case of the Bavaria crash this possibility will certainly form a part of the investigation. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110986/original/image-20160210-12185-2jdvms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The great train wreck of 1918 in Nashville, Tennessee, that resulted in 101 lives lost.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1918trainwreck.jpg">Unknown staff photographer, The Tennessean/Kaldari</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With the exception of deliberate sabotage or acts of aggression such as terrorism, post-incident analyses often highlight not only the human actions that may have contributed to an accident, but also the factors surrounding that human behaviour. As someone who studies human factors, I am interested not only in which actions occurred, but also why and how they could be prevented or mitigated in the future. The factors that cause an incorrect action might be whether a person was distracted or stressed for example. We should also ask whether routine behaviours were practised that were strictly speaking against the rules but were culturally accepted as the standard way to complete a task – perhaps to ensure that a system is efficient, or to overcome limitations in a system’s design. And most importantly, how can we ensure that complete systems, where people and technology work together, are designed in a way that minimises the likelihood of incidents occurring? Working out if any of these questions apply in the German case will take some time.</p>
<h2>Human intervention</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110989/original/image-20160210-12165-c9d7nn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There to intervene.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-278259866/stock-photo-train-driver.html?src=Qr_jmS23IC0wYUl09FaS3g-1-16">Driver by Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the things that I say when I’m teaching ergonomics, which aims to understand the interactions of humans and systems, is that “humans are fallible, but humans are also brilliant”. Humans do get tired and distracted, or make mistakes when they are trying to solve complex problems, and engineers and scientists have made great advances in developing and deploying technologies that do many tasks to a much greater level of performance than humans could ever achieve. But humans are also able to come up with new, innovative solutions to problems quickly and effectively, and a well-designed complex system will take advantage of this knowledge-based behaviour – supporting basic, repetitive tasks with technology, but allowing humans to problem solve.</p>
<p>Sadly, the two drivers of the trains in the Bavaria incident were among those killed. It is likely that the investigations into the crash will be lengthy and detailed. Whatever the cause of this particular incident, it is important to remember that all rail systems are complex, and involve collaboration between humans and technology, whether those humans are active operators, monitors, maintainers or even designers of the system elements. Very rarely are accidents solely caused by a single instance of “human error” but instead are a complex combination of multiple factors and influences. </p>
<p>And for each accident, there are likely to be many occasions when effective human intervention has prevented an incident occurring or lessened its impact – our jobs as engineers and human factors professionals is to ensure that we take advantage of the brilliance of humans and technologies working together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Sharples is affiliated with the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors, and is a Non-Executive Director of the Transport Systems Catapult. She receives funding from EPSRC, EU, Network Rail and Innovate UK. </span></em></p>Investigators will be probing what caused a train collision in Germany and while ‘human error’ will be a key line of enquiry, having humans in the system is a good thing.Sarah Sharples, Professor of Human Factors and Associate Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Research and Knowledge Exchange, President of Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.