tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/turkish-politics-9707/articlesTurkish politics – The Conversation2024-03-12T21:53:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254422024-03-12T21:53:32Z2024-03-12T21:53:32ZAs Erdoğan hints at retirement, how has his rule shaped Turkey?<p>Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently gave the clearest indication yet about his political future, stating, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-erdogan-says-march-election-his-last/a-68480102">“With the authority that the law confers on me, this election is my last election.”</a> Erdoğan has been in power since 2003, first serving as prime minister before being elected president in 2014.</p>
<p>The statement, made at a meeting for the Turkish Youth Foundation, was not an official announcement by any means. Rather, it was what appeared to be a frank statement communicated to a young party audience. Mincing words is not usually Erdoğan’s style; he can be quite direct and candid, which has been one of the key appeals of his charismatic personality.</p>
<p>Understandably, response to the speech, both within and outside of Turkey, has so far been somewhat muted. Erdoğan still has four years left to serve as the country’s president.</p>
<p><a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/imamoglu,1155253">The Republican People’s Party, the main opposition party,</a> has argued Erdoğan’s statement was nothing more than a strategy to garner support in the upcoming local elections for his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) candidates. That certainly may have played a role; as a seasoned politician Erdoğan is known for his timing.</p>
<p>A lot can change between now and 2028 when Erdoğan’s term ends. The Turkish constitution states that <a href="https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/presidency/power/#">a person can only be president for two terms at the most</a>. However, with enough pressure from his followers and <a href="https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/10032024">political support from the Turkish Parliament to introduce the necessary constitutional changes</a>, Erdoğan may seek another term. At the same time, it appears he is growing tired of political life and is waiting for the right moment to step aside. And Friday’s statement is an indication of that.</p>
<h2>Erdoğan’s legacy</h2>
<p>It is perhaps too early to judge Erdoğan’s political legacy comprehensively. But his impact on the nation’s trajectory, its regional standing, social structures and government institutions has been undeniable.</p>
<p>Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has experienced its most politically stable era since it transitioned to the multi-party system in 1946. The country went through fundamental readjustments and transformations. The dominant secular class and the elite of all upper social strata were largely displaced and replaced by religious conservatives, and to a limited extent, at least in the first decade of AKP rule, by the progressive camp.</p>
<p>One of the most significant structural changes has been the subjection of the military to civilian rule and oversight, an institution that had been for many years the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/16/timeline-a-history-of-turkish-coups">key decision-maker in Turkish politics</a>. </p>
<p>There was a brief power struggle with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1453244">the Gülen movement who had initially played an important role in helping the AKP wrest power from the military establishment</a>. The two sides had a falling out and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-coup-latest-news-blames-us-west-terrorism-gulen-a7168271.html">Erdoğan accused the movement of being behind the failed coup in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>In the economic sphere, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/69a30398-4fd6-4e94-a111-435cc01c3386">Erdoğan’s success has not been consistent</a>. From 2002 until the early 2010s, Turkey’s economy experienced unprecedented growth, fueled by increased foreign investment and large scale projects. The economic success of these years lifted millions into the middle class and led to higher living standards overall. <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkish-economy-under-presidential-system">Since the mid 2010s</a>, however, inflation has skyrocketed, the currency’s value plunged, foreign capital inflow slowed and economic conditions deteriorated.</p>
<p>The country’s foreign policy over the last two decades mirrors its economic ups and downs. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/sor.2021.0014">Erdoğan and his party expected the nation to be more involved in regional politics and to further improve relations with the West</a>. It was successful in doing so in the first decade as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna33253825">relations with neighboring countries</a> improved. But as Turkey’s foreign policy grew more assertive, the strategy faltered and the country found itself surrounded by more enemies and fewer friends.</p>
<p>In the first decade in power, the AKP introduced highly encouraging democratic initiatives supported by liberals and progressives. The country’s Kurdish population was one of the key beneficiaries. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18410596">Albeit limited, the use of the Kurdish language in schools was decriminalized</a>, and many restrictions that were placed on the Kurdish language, politics, and culture were, <a href="https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/redakteure/publications/JEMIE_Datens%C3%A4tze/Jemie-datens%C3%A4tze_2016/Kolcak.pdf">to some degree, loosened</a>.</p>
<p>But these democratic policies came to a standstill and were partially reversed soon after AKP’s poor showing in the 2015 elections. To regain lost votes, Erdoğan adopted a more nationalistic strategy, which resulted in the AKP winning a majority government later that year. This unexpected shift led to the growing rapprochement and eventual coalition alliance with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.a907689">Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies are no secret</a>. The 2017 constitutional referendum <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38883556">gave him sweeping powers over the judiciary and parliament</a>. He commands considerable influence over the media, the business world, the judiciary, the legislative branch, the economy, on foreign policy and so on. </p>
<p>One of the glaring consequences of these tendencies under Erdoğan’s leadership has been the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-using-courts-laws-target-dissent-ahead-votes-human-rights-watch-2023-01-12/#">suppression of political dissent</a>, particularly the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jailed-kurdish-leader-quits-active-politics-after-party-slips-turkey-election-2023-06-01/">imprisonment of members of the Kurdish political party</a>. </p>
<p>While this kind of top-down projection of power has unfortunately become somewhat <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/issues/democracies-decline">of a norm for democracies around the world</a> today, it was more of an anomaly 10 years ago. </p>
<h2>A Post-Erdoğan era?</h2>
<p>So far, there appears to be no heir to Erdoğan on the horizon. His son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, once touted as a clear frontrunner in the race to succeed him, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/11/10/berat-albayrak-erdogan-turkey-economy/">has since left active politics</a>. Erdoğan’s influential <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys-erdogan-appoints-new-cabinet-signaling-economic-shift-e84e3829">former interior minister Suleyman Soylu has also been sidelined</a>. Aside from these once presidential hopefuls there is no emerging leader from AKP’s ranks.</p>
<p>Outside the AKP, the current Istanbul mayor <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbu%20ls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">Ekrem İmamoğlu</a> is often portrayed as someone who could potentially be the next president, but his success will depend on the alliances his party is able to form before 2028.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s recent comments seem to indicate his intentions about his political future. But they are just that, intentions. They can change under certain conditions. What is clear though, he is a far more divisive figure today than he was 20 years ago.</p>
<p>Is Turkey ready for a post-Erdoğan era? Much depends on who and what comes after. </p>
<p>If a new president continues much of the similar policies and has a non-disruptive approach, then a peaceful transition is plausible. But Erdoğan’s party failing to concede a loss, or his voter base failing to recognize the results, may lead to a turbulent transition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasar Bukan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Under Erdoğan, Turkey has seen periods of growth and stagnation.Yasar Bukan, Lecturer in Global Politics & Political Philosophy, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069192023-07-13T12:39:30Z2023-07-13T12:39:30ZMany once-democratic countries continue to backslide, becoming less free – but their leaders continue to enjoy popular support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537135/original/file-20230712-29-v1zm1l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power since 2003 and has tried to strengthen the executive branch during that time. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/d5b62e740a5e46e1a7c134fc8959c0c0/preview/AP17111331555373.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf">is decreasing</a> globally – and has been doing so for the last 17 years, according to 2023 findings published by the nonprofit group Freedom House, which advocates for democracy.</p>
<p>These leaders’ generous public spending on key constituencies and effective promotion of nationalism are two reasons why they remain popular. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Xz968xcAAAAJ&hl=en">political scientist</a> who studies political and economic dynamics in low- and middle-income countries. <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">This phenomenon</a> of societies becoming less democratic after having made progress toward full democracy is known as <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/">democratic backsliding</a>. </p>
<p>In my 2022 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2021.2017891">co-authored research</a>, my colleague, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=h0o27GgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Byunghwan Son</a>, and I identified two key ways that democratic backsliding happens.</p>
<p>First, political leaders weaken democracies when they adopt legal and policy measures that make the executive branch stronger and the other branches of government – such as the judiciary and legislative branches – weaker. This then reduces checks and balances on the executive branch.</p>
<p>Democracy also is weakened when leaders make it difficult for opposition parties to compete in elections. This curtails the citizens’ choice to support candidates who are not the de facto leader, whether it becomes harder to learn about these candidates in the media or because it is dangerous to publicly support their causes. </p>
<p>Political leaders in a range of countries, including China and Nicaragua, are increasingly taking steps to consolidate their power by undermining other branches of government and the opposition. When leaders do so, they are displaying <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism">authoritarian tendencies</a>, meaning they try to create a <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/authoritarianism/">government with a very strong executive branch</a> and little tolerance for dissent. </p>
<p>But despite these trends, some leaders who have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/04/hungarys-authoritarian-leader-no-gift-us-conservatives">gained authoritarian</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/no-erdogan-was-not-authoritarian-all-along">reputations among critics</a> – like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary – <a href="https://pro.morningconsult.com/analysis/tayyip-erdogan-election-turkey">enjoy high</a> <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1191282/hungary-satisfaction-with-viktor-orban/">approval ratings</a> within their countries.</p>
<p>Why do leaders who diminish democracy have such strong public support? </p>
<p>These leaders’ generous public spending on key constituencies and effective promotion of nationalism are two reasons. </p>
<h2>Erdoğan’s endurance</h2>
<p>Erdoğan has been in power for almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">20 years</a>. He first served as prime minister of Turkey in 2003 and then became president in 2014. He was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/28/europe/turkey-president-runoff-polls-erdogan-intl/index.html">reelected president</a> for another five-year term in May 2023. </p>
<p>Opposition parties are able to compete in Turkish elections, but Erdoğan has taken other legal measures over the years to <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/erdogans-winning-authoritarian-populist-formula-and-turkeys-future/">diminish contenders’ chances</a> among voters. </p>
<p>Since Erdoğan’s AKP political party <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Rise-of-the-AKP-in-the-21st-century">came to power</a> in 2002, he has appointed sympathetic judges. This has also enabled him to remove or jail prosecutors and judges and replace them <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-judges/">with loyalists</a>. </p>
<p>Ekrem İmamoğlu, the former mayor of Istanbul and a member of the CHP opposition party, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">considered a formidable challenger</a> to Erdoğan before the 2023 election. But in December 2022, a Turkish court sentenced İmamoğlu to nearly three years in jail for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">calling Turkey’s supreme election council “fools,”</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/istanbuls-opposition-mayor-barred-from-politics-over-insult-to-regime-officials/">barred him from politics</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s control of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48599281">judiciary system</a> helped remove the threat of İmamoğlu’s popularity. Around 2021, Erdoğan himself was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-17/turkey-2023-presidential-election-anger-over-prices-threatens-erdogan">experiencing a dip </a>in popularity. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has taken other steps to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">consolidate his power</a>. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-gulen/turkey-orders-detention-of-82-military-personnel-over-suspected-gulen-links-anadolu-idUSKBN28B3UL">detaining military officials</a> who question his authority, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/turkish-journalist-arrested-on-charge-of-insulting-erdogan">arresting journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-bogazici/turkish-police-clash-with-students-protesting-erdogan-appointed-university-head-idUSKBN2991TT">activists and academics</a> who criticize him. </p>
<p>Despite these actions, people reelected Erdoğan – and his <a href="https://pro.morningconsult.com/analysis/tayyip-erdogan-election-turkey">approval rating</a> continues to be relatively high, even in the face of a weak <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-erdogans-reelection-means-for-turkey">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-inflation-higher-than-expected-nearly-58-2023-02-03/">high inflation</a>.</p>
<p>Public spending is one key way Erdoğan has maintained people’s support. </p>
<p>Leading up to the May 2023 elections, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cdd95bad-8f38-402d-a636-4d27aa20b3cc">went on a spending spree</a> to help consolidate his support. He repeatedly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/23/world/middleeast/turkey-election-economy-president.html">increased the minimum wage</a>, most <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-20/turkey-raises-minimum-wage-by-34-in-second-hike-in-a-year">recently by 34%</a>. He dropped the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-eliminates-age-requirement-retirement-2022-12-28/">retirement age requirement</a>, giving 2 million people the opportunity to stop working and receive pensions. </p>
<p>Erdoğan, who has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">long championed Islamic</a> causes and groups in a secular country, has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/27/erdogan-kilicdaroglu-rally-supporters-before-turkish-election">rallied conservative constituents</a> by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-13/turkey-s-erdogan-looks-to-islamic-fringe-refah-huda-to-boost-electoral-alliance#xj4y7vzkg">positioning himself</a> as a leader who will fight for religious rights. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Viktor Orban salutes to a crowd of people while he stands on a podium, with red, white and green flags around him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, greets supporters during an election rally in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/3e62f6ca15ad49d7a5cbf9aa39a92425/preview/AP22091491809418.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Petr David Josek</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Orbán’s hold on Hungary</h2>
<p>Similar trends are underway in Hungary. Orbán has served consecutive terms as prime minister since 2010. He won his <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">fourth election</a> in 2022.</p>
<p>Since 2010, Orbán has taken measures to strengthen his power. In <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-constitution-idUSBRE92B0OM20130312">2013, he used his party’s majority</a> in parliament to make constitutional amendments that limit courts’ power. One change involved eliminating all decisions courts made before 2012, discarding a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-constitution/hungary-defying-eu-limits-powers-of-top-court-idUSBRE92B0OM20130312">body of law</a> from before Orbán’s time. </p>
<p>More recently in 2018, Orbán tried creating a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-courts/hungary-to-set-up-courts-overseen-directly-by-government-idUSKBN1OB193">parallel court system</a> that would have let a justice minister oversee election-related cases in a separate court system. </p>
<p>However, pressure from the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/31/hungary-scraps-parallel-justice-system-plans-after-eu-failure">European Union</a> – of which Hungary is a member – stopped these planned reforms in 2019. </p>
<p>Orbán has also <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">tried to consolidate his power</a> by weakening independent media. This effort includes <a href="https://www.eurozine.com/viktor-orbans-war-on-the-media/">not renewing news organizations’ broadcast rights</a> and government purchase of media outlets. This, in turn, makes <a href="https://hungarianfreepress.com/2018/07/09/fidesz-holds-budapests-jozsefvaros-in-mayoral-election-amidst-23-percent-turn-out/">it difficult for opposition candidates</a> to get their message out to voters. In some cases, print news outlets have not allowed opposition candidates to place political advertisements, for example. </p>
<p>Despite these developments, Orbán’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/08/03/hungarians-differ-in-their-evaluations-of-democracy-under-orbans-leadership/">approval ratings remain high</a>, hovering around 57% following the 2022 parliamentary election. </p>
<p>Here again, a political leader used high levels of public spending, as well as a nationalist message, to his advantage. </p>
<p>Orbán provided <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d9d736f5-96c6-4b74-a29e-7078390360b9">generous benefits</a> to families, children and armed forces before the 2022 elections. Some of these measures he announced included tax rebates to families with children, additional pay to members of armed forces and canceling personal income tax for workers under the age of 25. </p>
<p>Orbán used <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/viktor-orbans-hungary-populism-election-nationalism/">nationalism</a> – expressed through anti-immigrant rhetoric – as a strategy to garner support during elections, as well. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/viktor-orban-against-race-mixing-europe-hungary">He has discussed</a> the drawbacks of “race mixing” and migration in order to drum up support among Hungarians who are concerned about the influx of newcomers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people, some of whom are wearing headscarves, wave Turkish flags and appear to celebrate." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate his reelection in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/ec312af9c2e14ade9d5dd4e2db4680c0/preview/AP23134852367603.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Ali Una</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Authoritarianism a broader trend</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s and Orbán’s attempts to consolidate power are only two examples of a broader, rising trend of authoritarianism across the world. </p>
<p>A total of 60 countries – <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/11/10/under-daniel-ortega-nicaragua-has-become-a-one-party-state">including Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reorienting-us-policy-toward-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/myanmars-coup-emblematic-regional-democracy-failures">and Myanmar</a> – experienced declines in freedom in 2022, while only 25 improved, according to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule">Freedom House</a>. The U.S. received a score of 83, or “free,” according to this list, which considers political rights and civil liberties and scores countries based on these factors. </p>
<p>Using money to give incentives to voters and invoking nationalism are two ways leaders like Erdoğan and Orbán maintain support. But other factors, like <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism">rising inequality</a>, may also play a role in why people turn to strongmen leaders for answers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nisha Bellinger receives funding from Social Science Research Council (SSRC). </span></em></p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, are two leaders who have consolidated power using a similar playbook.Nisha Bellinger, Associate Professor of Political Science and Global Studies, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063562023-05-29T17:46:23Z2023-05-29T17:46:23ZWhat Erdoğan’s reelection means for Turkey’s political system, economy and foreign policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528911/original/file-20230529-8428-5q7g5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C109%2C5573%2C3623&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate in Istanbul on May 28, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TurkeyElection/7ccdfea232cc4bebb7071e84ed681682/photo?Query=erdogan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=23036&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65743031">reelected as president</a>, ensuring that his term as leader of Turkey will extend to a quarter century.</p>
<p>The electorate returned Erdoğan to power in a runoff vote on May 28, 2023, with 52% of votes. But with 48% of voters siding with opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan will have to govern a divided nation <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">in its centennial year</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ABctik8AAAAJ&hl=en">professor of political science</a>, I have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/democracy-islam-and-secularism-in-turkey/9780231159326">analyzed Turkish politics for many years</a>. The election provided a stark choice for Turkey’s voters: To end or extend Erdogan’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">two-decade-long creep toward authoritarian-style governance</a>. The decision to opt for the latter will dictate the country’s future in key ways, both domestically and in terms of its relationships with Western countries.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Turkey’s political system?</h2>
<p>Turkey had its first <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/made-by-history/2023/05/12/turkey-election-erdoan/">democratic election in May 1950</a>. Since then it has had a multiparty competitive system, albeit one that has been sporadically interrupted by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/16/timeline-a-history-of-turkish-coups">several military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In the last 10 years, Erdoğan has taken Turkey down a more <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">autocratic, one-man-rule style</a> of governance. This has included restrictions on <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/18/turkeys-new-media-law-is-bad-news-but-dont-report-it/">freedom of speech</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-media">freedom of the press</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/turkey-end-abuse-criminal-proceedings-against-selahattin-demirtas">free assembly</a>.</p>
<p>There is a little reason to believe that Erdoğan, enboldened by a fresh mandate, will reverse this trajectory.</p>
<p>Erdoğan won the election without making any promises about restoring or expanding rights and freedoms. Rather, his campaign signaled an intention to continue Turkey’s path toward being a conservative, religious state – a far cry from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">vision of a modern, secular nation</a> of founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the election, Erdoğan presented himself as the leader of religious conservatives – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnyuFMVZ2N8">reciting the Quran in Hagia Sophia</a> and <a href="https://t24.com.tr/video/erdogan-camlica-camii-icinde-cemaate-fetih-cagrisi-yapti,54253">addressing the people in another mosque following the Friday prayer</a>. He also presented himself as a militarist leader, using <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqsshbA3WEA">battleships, drones and other weapons</a> as campaign instruments and uploading a new Twitter profile photo with an <a href="https://twitter.com/RTErdogan">air force pilot jacket</a>. This posturing combined with his accusations that the opposition <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-erdogan-accuses-opposition-of-acting-together-with-pkk-amid-dwindling-support-for-govt-news-59442">was collaborating with the PKK</a> – a Kurdish separatist organization designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey – suggests that Erdoğan continues to promote Turkish nationalism and militarism.</p>
<p>The runoff victory for Erdoğan comes just two weeks after his Justice and Development Party and coalition partners <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/15/erdogans-ak-party-wins-parliamentary-majority-state-media">won a parliamentary majority</a>. It means that the opposition will have no executive or legislative power to restrict Erdoğan’s agenda.</p>
<h2>Future relations with the U.S. and the West</h2>
<p>Another important and consistent characteristic of Erdoğan’s presidential campaign was his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkeys-erdogan-says-wests-provocative-policies-towards-russia-not-correct-2022-09-07/">criticism of the West</a> in general and <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-738657">the United States</a> in particular. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has accused the U.S. of a variety of perceived slights and Washington’s stance on issues affecting Turkey. In the past year, the Turkish leader has criticized over Washington’s <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/us-ignores-turkiyes-concerns-over-ypg-support-in-syria-erdogan">support of the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdish PKK</a> and protested the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/26/turkey-files-protest-with-greece-and-us-as-aegean-tensions-rise">deployment of U.S. armored vehicles</a> on two Greek Islands. Meanwhile, he has pointedly distanced himself from NATO allies on the issue of Russian sanctions, and instead <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/middleeast/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-interview-mime-intl/index.html">talked up Turkey’s “special relationship”</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>In mid-April, Erdoğan framed the election <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-bu-secimle-birlikte-batiya-bir-mesaj-verecek">as a chance for voters to “send a message to the West”</a> which, he claimed, was supporting the opposition candidate. “This country does not look at what the West says, neither when fighting terrorism nor in determining its economic policies,” <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-to-give-message-to-west-on-may-14-president-erdogan-/2870668">he said</a>.</p>
<p>Some of this was campaign rhetoric. And Erdoğan may make some attempts to heal rifts with Western countries, such as approving <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation/">Sweden’s NATO membership bid</a> – something he has to date refused to do over what <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-says-turkey-start-ratifying-finlands-nato-bid-2023-03-17/">Turkey sees as the Nordic country’s harboring</a> of Kurdish terrorists.</p>
<p>But even such a concession would not amount to a transformation of Erdoğan’s deeply critical attitude to Western countries overall.</p>
<p>Indeed, the only factor that may force Erdoğan to <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040128-3.html">return Turkey to a pro-Western position</a> is Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis – which might necessitate the support of wealthy Western states and institutions.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Turkey’s shaky economy?</h2>
<p>Since 2018, the Turkish economy has <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/how-erdogans-pseudoscience-ruining-turkish-economy-1">shown symptoms of a crisis</a>. Turkey’s currency, the lira, has fallen in value precipitously. In March, it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/turkish-lira-falls-record-low-near-19-dollar-2023-03-09/">fell to a new low</a> of 19 to the dollar. Moreover, in 2022, the annual <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">inflation rate surpassed 80%</a>.</p>
<p>In order to win the elections, Erdoğan pursued several policies that appealed to voters but may further stress the economy and bleed national reserves. They include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-eliminates-age-requirement-retirement-2022-12-28/">dropping the retirement age</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-gives-civil-servants-45-percent-pay-rise-in-turkeys-tight-election-race/">giving a 45% pay raise to public workers</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, economic crisis and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/07/world/asia/turkey-inflation-doctors.html">authoritarian policies</a> have resulted in a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42433668">brain drain</a>” with many educated young people moving to Western European countries.</p>
<p>If the election result leads to a further exodus of skilled, educated workers, then it will only weaken Turkey’s capability of confronting its economic crisis. Such thinking could nudge Erdoğan towards a rethink over policies that alienate younger, secular Turks.</p>
<p>It could also force Erdoğan to reevaluate his foreign policy. At present, the Turkish leader has looked to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7I54Dj6Clw">Qatar, Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d1b33e56-2835-4d04-8387-ba1d8dc55646">Russia</a> for financial support. If this appears to be insufficient, Erdoğan may be forced to seek stronger relations with the United States to facilitate financial aid from the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations.</p>
<p>Erdoğan won the election without making any promises of change regarding domestic or foreign policy. But if the economic crisis he faces fails to abate, change may be forced upon him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Long-term Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was reelected with 52% of the vote. Will he push the country further down an autocratic, anti-West path?Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2057192023-05-15T20:33:15Z2023-05-15T20:33:15ZTurkey’s presidential election – how Erdoğan defied the polls to head into runoff as favorite<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526290/original/file-20230515-25944-pv1hhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C51%2C5728%2C3767&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-news-photo/1490199979?adppopup=true">Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Turkey is heading toward a presidential runoff election on May 28, 2023, after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65600585">no candidate won more than half the votes</a> in the first round – the barrier needed to be declared an outright winner.</em></p>
<p><em>Incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has ruled the country for two decades, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-lags-election-rival-closely-watched-poll-2023-05-11/">defied polls</a> by coming closest. He will now face off against opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a second-round vote.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://syasun.com/">Salih Yasun</a>, an <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/graduate-students/yasun-salih.html">expert on Turkish politics</a> at Indiana University, to talk us through the first-round results, and what will come next.</em></p>
<h2>1) What happened in the first round of voting?</h2>
<p>Turkish voters participated in two elections on May 14, 2023: one for the presidency and one for the nation’s parliament. As of writing, 99.9% of ballot boxes have reported.</p>
<p>With 49.6% of the vote, President Erdoğan’s governing coalition – which consists of his own conservative Justice and Development Party, or AKP, the nationalist MHP and smaller Islamist parties – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/may/15/turkey-elections-2023-latest-presidential-and-parliamentary-results">earned a majority of seats</a> within the parliament: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-erdogan-runoff-be8c7b0bcbb32eae7795a2cd84974ee4">322 of the available 600</a>. Although the de jure authority of parliament was curtailed substantively as the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/13/the-turkish-constitutional-referendum-explained/">result of a 2017 referendum</a>, controlling it would enable Erdoğan to govern without worrying about any serious challenge from parliament. If he wins the presidency, he will have a solid legislative support for his agenda.</p>
<p>In the presidential race, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/turkey-presidential-election-heads-to-runoff-as-incumbent-erdogan-surges">Erdoğan earned 49.5% of the vote</a>, which means that he will have a runoff election on May 28, 2023, with Kılıçdaroğlu, who earned 44.9% of the vote. Kılıçdaroğlu is the joint candidate of “the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-turkey-government-recep-tayyip-erdogan-49b2a7d7afa1e476d2eab40f4dbca8e4">table of six” coalition</a> – an opposition bloc that consists of parties that are secular and nationalist as well as conservative – two of which have split from the AKP.</p>
<p>In the second round, whoever reaches 50% will become the president. But Erdoğan is heading into the vote with a clear advantage and momentum, especially given that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/10/recep-tayyip-erdogan-facies-real-chance-of-losing-as-turkey-gets-ready-to-vote">polls before the vote</a> suggested he would come second in the first round. </p>
<h2>2) Why did Erdoğan do better than predicted?</h2>
<p>Multiple reasons can account for Erdoğan’s strong performance. Although Turkish citizens have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-year-end-inflation-seen-46-despite-likely-post-election-rate-hikes-2023-04-24/">suffered from severe inflation</a>, it appears that Erdoğan’s message of <a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/new-end-erdogans-reign-of-20-years-who-done/">putting national security interests</a> above economic challenges convinced a substantial portion of his conservative and nationalist base. </p>
<p>This is despite the fact that Erdoğan’s party, AKP, keeps losing popularity, particularly in metropolitan districts. The percentage of nationwide support for AKP declined from <a href="https://www.sozcu.com.tr/secim2018/">42.5% in 2018</a> to <a href="https://secim.aa.com.tr/">35.6% in 2023</a>. </p>
<p>However, Erdoğan manages to remain afloat by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-13/turkey-s-erdogan-looks-to-islamic-fringe-refah-huda-to-boost-electoral-alliance">adding small Islamist</a> and nationalist parties to his coalition. By doing that, he has allowed his base to vote for coalition parties other than the AKP while maintaining their support for his own candidacy within the presidential race. It is not uncommon to hear people in Turkey complain about corruption and dissatisfaction in the country’s economic performance who keep voting for Erdoğan as national leader. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, regions hit by an earthquake earlier this year did not punish Erdoğan for the poor initial response as severely as many had expected. </p>
<p>I should also add that Turkey’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/12/turkey-election-free-fair-vote-erdogan/">commitment to free and fair elections</a> <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023">has been questioned</a>. Erdoğan uses state resources and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">control over the judiciary</a> and a <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/turkey-erdogans-grip-media-threatens-fair-elections">significant portion of the media</a> for his own advantage. In a few instances, the opposition candidates were <a href="https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/ekrem-imamogluna-erzurum-mitinginde-tasli-saldiri,OR6TkZPX9kSE_cl8T1uGnA">intimidated by vigilantes</a>.</p>
<p>There were also missteps by his main rival that undermined his turnout. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/03/1172704065/turkey-election-candidate-kemal-kilicsdaroglu-erdogan-challenger">Kılıçdaroğlu</a> has been the head of the Republican People’s Party or CHP, since 2010. Under his chairmanship, his party has lost every single election and referendum except for a 2019 local ballot. Kılıçdaroğlu did not allow any public debates on his candidacy <a href="https://www.dw.com/tr/belediye-ba%C5%9Fkanlar%C4%B1-aday-olmayacak-m%C4%B1/a-58812128">and blocked</a> the nomination of two popular mayors, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, early on. </p>
<p>He tasked the “table of six” leaders with the nomination process, which was a means for him to bypass the need for primary elections and earn some mandate for his candidacy. He promised the four small parties various positions, including ministers, vice presidents and the nomination of <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/secimin-kaderini-sagduyu-belirleyecek-kilicdaroglu-ilk-turda-kazanabilir-haber-1614269">77 parliamentarians</a> on CHP’s list, in order for them to nominate him. Meanwhile he used the support of these parties to pressure Meral Akşener, the leader of IYI Party, to accept his candidacy. Although Akşener reluctantly accepted, a substantive base of IYI voted in the presidential ballot for the third candidate, Sinan Oğan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-runoff-potential-kingmaker-draws-red-line-kurdish-consessions-2023-05-15/">who earned 5.2% of the vote</a>.</p>
<p>Over the years, Kılıçdaroğlu has been accused of establishing a patrimonial and hierarchical governance structure, <a href="https://www.tamgaturk.com/chp-nin-secim-guvenligi-yine-onursal-adiguzel-e-emanet-edildi/60907/">rewarding his loyalists</a> and isolating people who <a href="https://www.odatv4.com/yazarlar/orsan-k-oymen/chp-kurultayindan-bosuna-umutlanmayin-2901181200-132216">dared to challenge him</a>. Media outlets that are financially supported by his party have <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yilmaz-ozdil-sozcu-tvden-chpyi-suclayarak-ayrildi-haber-1607029">fired journalists critical of him</a>. As a result, his own media did not critically evaluate his candidacy, and news of his popularity may have been inflated.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the ideological orientation of CHP – social democracy – has, I believe, gradually eroded, with the party becoming more of a catchall organization without a clear direction.</p>
<p>Added to this, a substantial number of voters may have been wary of a coalition government. Turkish citizens suffered substantively during the coalition governments from <a href="https://birartibir.org/uzun-on-yil-1990larin-ekonomi-politigi/">1990s through 2002</a> because of political instability and economic recession. </p>
<p>Finally, turnout in Kurdish-majority cities <a href="https://secim.aa.com.tr/">remained rather low</a>, and nationalist voters wary of any ties to HDP, the Kurdish nationalist party, shied away from voting for Kılıçdaroğluu. </p>
<h2>3) What happens next?</h2>
<p>The better-than-expected performance from Erdoğan <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/turkey-presidential-election-heads-to-runoff-as-incumbent-erdogan-surges">puts him in the driver’s seat</a> heading into the second-round vote.</p>
<p>An Erdoğan win would consolidate his <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">authoritarian style of governance</a>. It could also further weaken the opposition, with indicators that the two main opposition parties may experience a leadership struggle. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Turkish citizens will go to the ballot once again on March 31, 2024, for local elections. The two main opposition parties previously nominated joint candidates, who succeeded in winning mayoral positions in key metropolitan areas. A potential division within the opposition could enable Erdoğan’s governing AKP to expand its control over these major municipalities, such as Istanbul and Ankara. </p>
<p>Moving forward, this would be very bad news for the opposition. Erdoğan has been in power since 2002. He has ruled the country longer than any other Turkish president and even many Ottoman sultans. An additional five years would allow him to consolidate his authority within the state institutions even further.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salih Yasun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkish voters will be heading back to the polls on May 28 after no candidates managed to gain more than half the votes. But incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was boosted by a stronger-than-expected showing.Salih Yasun, PhD Candidate, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999462023-02-21T19:04:26Z2023-02-21T19:04:26ZWill the Turkish earthquakes affect how the country is governed?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511099/original/file-20230220-18-aqzcqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sedat Suna/EPA/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/teenager-rescued-rubble-turkey-10-days-after-quake-2023-02-16/">death toll</a> in the Turkey-Syria earthquakes spirals past a record 46,000 – and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/20/turkey-new-6-point-4-magnitude-earthquake-hatay">fresh earthquake has struck</a> the Turkish region of Hatay – there is mounting criticism of the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for delaying rescue efforts and politicising the disaster. </p>
<p>The aftermath of this catastrophe has ramifications for the critical Turkish presidential elections in May and Turkey’s relations with Syria, Greece and Cyprus.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/2023-turkey-and-syria-earthquake-faqs">earthquake</a> that hit Turkey on February 6 was unusual. The first 7.8 magnitude earthquake was followed by a 7.5 magnitude tremor nine hours later, compounding the damage. </p>
<p>As a result, ten major Turkish cities, scores of large towns and hundreds of villages were affected. The World Health Organization <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/2023-turkey-and-syria-earthquake-faqs">estimates</a> 23 million people have been affected.</p>
<p>With millions on the streets and tens of thousands trapped underneath the rubble in the bitterly cold winter, a swift rescue and aid response was vital. </p>
<p>And this is where politics got in the way. </p>
<h2>The government’s mishandling of the disaster</h2>
<p>There have been four major criticisms of the Erdogan government’s response. </p>
<p>The first is the inactivity in the crucial first 48 hours. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqdSmHdLnHE&t=2134s">Independent reports</a> are surfacing that the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) produced a mandatory earthquake report within 45 minutes of the disaster. The interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, then held an emergency meeting with all relevant response departments.</p>
<p>Within hours, rescue and relief teams were ready to go, waiting only for final permission from Erdogan. Inexplicably, he did not immediately give the orders, while international rescue teams arriving in the country were kept in airport lounges due to bureaucratic obstacles. </p>
<p>The lateness of the response dramatically reduced search-rescue operations to find survivors under the freezing rubble. An estimated one million Turkish people were left homeless and fending for themselves. </p>
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<p>The second criticism relates to the centralisation of disaster relief agencies and the exclusion of the army from the response plans. </p>
<p>The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) centralised disaster operations under <a href="https://www.devex.com/organizations/disaster-and-emergency-management-authority-afad-51317">AFAD</a> in 2009. While this might have seemed a good idea, AFAD’s dependence on government orders <a href="https://twitter.com/yirmiucderece/status/1622880238009982976?s=20&t=37EWhfJCmCA_j8YvA4JRAw">paralysed</a> its response capability. AFAD also performed badly during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/03/anger-in-turkey-grows-over-governments-handling-of-wildfires">2021 wildfires</a>, raising doubt about its competence.</p>
<p>The Turkish army has the biggest resources, heavy equipment and organisational capability distributed across the country. But, perhaps unwilling for the army to steal the limelight, Erdogan removed it from the response plan and gave sole disaster response responsibilities to AFAD in 2022. </p>
<p>With no immediate help arriving, desperate people started to post <a href="https://twitter.com/yirmiucderece/status/1622880238009982976?s=20&t=37EWhfJCmCA_j8YvA4JRAw">tweets</a> demanding to know where the state was and exposing the scale of the disaster. Turkish rock star <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2023/02/17/in-turkey-haluk-levent-is-a-rock-star-with-a-big-heart_6016230_117.html">Haluk Levent</a> launched his own aid and rescue operations, collecting millions and mobilising thousands of volunteers faster than the government. </p>
<p>As criticism of the government mounted, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/09/twitter-restored-in-turkey-after-meeting-with-government-officials.html">Twitter in Turkey was blocked</a>. This move further fuelled the anger as desperate survivors could not use an important communication channel to get help.</p>
<p>Third, there has been anger about poor urban planning and the disregard for building codes. Turkey is notorious for allowing poor building practices. Corrupt developers and council officials routinely allow the construction of cheap buildings that are unable to withstand earthquakes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/earthquake-footage-shows-turkeys-buildings-collapsing-like-pancakes-an-expert-explains-why-199389">Earthquake footage shows Turkey's buildings collapsing like pancakes. An expert explains why</a>
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<p>The Erdogan government periodically declared “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/12/turkey-earthquake-death-toll-suggests-lessons-1999-not-learned">construction amnesties</a>”, where buildings without a safety certificate would be waived for a fee. This generated significant income for the cash-strapped government.</p>
<p>This policy has been responsible for the greatest number of casualties. The city of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/erzin-turkey-earthquake-building-collapse-construction-codes-rcna70733">Erzin</a>, which is in the earthquake zone, did not suffer any major building collapse or significant loss of life because it has implemented zero tolerance of unsafe building practices. </p>
<p>Finally, Erdogan’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/15/turkey-earthquake-how-are-people-reacting-to-state-response">critics accuse him</a> of misappropriating funds collected through the so-called earthquake tax, implemented in 1999 following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/15/turkey-earthquake-how-are-people-reacting-to-state-response">Izmit earthquake</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey is no stranger to earthquakes, being located on the Alpide belt, a seismic zone that stretches from Europe to Asia. The country has experienced numerous devastating earthquakes throughout its history, with the previous large one in Izmit in 1999. The magnitude 7.6 earthquake claimed more than 17,000 lives.</p>
<p>Being dangerously close to Istanbul, the 1999 earthquake exposed the tremendous risks poor building practices posed in densely populated cities. As a result, the government at the time introduced an earthquake tax. </p>
<p>Funds raised through this tax were meant to be used on earthquake-proof buildings and to invest in disaster prevention logistic hubs across the country. An <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64594349">estimated US$4.6 billion</a> (A$6.7 billion) had been collected during the 21 years Erdogan has been in power. <a href="https://www.jagrantv.com/en-show/turkey-earthquake-public-angry-over-turkish-government-about-earthquake-tax-people-asks-about-the-funds-collected-through-tax-rc1038583">People are now asking</a> what happened to all that money. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511254/original/file-20230220-22-arwgqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Money raised by the so-called earthquake tax was to be invested in preventing disasters like the earthquake that has just hit Turkey. Now many are wondering where the money has gone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erdem Sahin/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>How will the earthquake affect Turkey’s presidential election?</h2>
<p>Turkey is scheduled to have presidential elections in May 2023. The mishandling of the earthquake is likely to play a big role in the vote. </p>
<p>The opposition parties have been quick to capitalise on the government’s perceived failures. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has been calling for an <a href="https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Haber/Detay?Id=d0bd1042-46a9-4fe1-95e8-01862be59817">independent commission</a> to investigate the disaster and determine the cause of the government’s delayed response.</p>
<p>The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has also been vocal in its criticism. The HDP <a href="https://medyanews.net/turkeys-pro-kurdish-hdp-pools-sources-to-reach-earthquake-victims-calls-for-civil-mobilisation/">accused the government of discrimination</a> in the distribution of aid, alleging it favoured areas with a higher percentage of AKP supporters. This issue is likely to influence Kurdish voters, who make up about 18% of the population.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s AKP could lose votes in quake zones where Kurdish votes hold the balance of power. Conversely, the disaster and the three-month state of emergency could also affect voter turnout and engagement and work in AKP’s favour.</p>
<p>The massive scale of the destruction and death toll, the inexplicable delay in launching rescue and relief operations and poor public relations have exposed the weaknesses in the <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-presidential-system-after-two-and-a-half-years">presidential system</a> introduced to the country in 2016. </p>
<p>It was thought an all-powerful president would speed up bureaucracy and place the country on a fast trajectory of progress and development. The earthquake and poor government response exposed the fallacy of this contention. </p>
<p>The opposition parties will use the government’s handling of the earthquake as a campaign issue and call for reforms to improve disaster preparedness and responses and for a return to a parliamentary system with separation of powers.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511255/original/file-20230220-18-mv1r3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has come under heavy criticism for the government’s earthquake response, which may have implications for the May elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Turkish Presidency/AP/AAP</span></span>
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<p>The AKP’s mishandling of the earthquake could <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZtgD3AHfWM">fuel existing tensions</a> within the party. Erdogan, who founded the AKP, has been criticised for his increasingly authoritarian tendencies and his consolidation of power.</p>
<p>It is also possible the government’s response to the earthquake could be seen as effective in some quarters, which could enhance the AKP’s standing and improve Erdogan’s chances of winning re-election. The largely government-controlled Turkish media are already glorifying the government’s response, with <a href="https://www.afad.gov.tr/cumhurbaskanimiz-sn-erdogan-deprem-anindan-itibaren-devlet-olarak-tum-kurumlarimizla-sahadayiz-23-merkezicerik">Erdogan posing for cameras</a> next to rescued people and children.</p>
<p>The biggest hurdle for Erdogan is the poor state of the Turkish economy. It has been on the downturn since 2018 when the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/13/turkey-financial-crisis-lira-plunges-again-amid-contagion-fears">Turkish lira collapsed</a>. Since then, Turkish people have endured one of the highest inflation rates in the world at <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/895080/turkey-inflation-rate/#:%7E:text=Turkey's%20inflation%20rate%20was%2085.51,during%20the%20provided%20time%20period.">85.5%</a>. The disaster could further hamper the country’s economic prospects, which could in turn influence the election. </p>
<p>There is a strong possibility Erdogan might <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-earthquake-erdogan-opposition-anger-response/">postpone the elections</a>, citing emergency relief efforts. If he can buy time for another year or so, people might forget about the disaster and his government could hope to improve the economy, maximising its chances of winning the election. A postponement, though, would set an extremely risky precedent for Turkey’s fragile democracy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/secondary-crises-after-the-turkey-syria-earthquakes-are-now-the-greatest-threat-to-life-199682">Secondary crises after the Turkey-Syria earthquakes are now the greatest threat to life</a>
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<h2>How will the earthquake affect Turkey’s foreign policy?</h2>
<p>Rallying nationalistic fervour through military operations has been one of Erdogan’s tactics to win elections. Reading his <a href="https://www.businessdaily.gr/english-edition/70050_eu-turkeys-hostile-remarks-against-greece-raise-serious-concerns">hostile rhetoric towards Greece</a> and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-forces-nearly-ready-syria-ground-operation-officials-2022-11-28/">Turkish army’s preparations</a> near the Syrian border, there was an expectation of some military operation just before the presidential election. </p>
<p>Hostility with Greece may have eased, as Greece was one of the first countries to send a team to help with search-rescue operations. If Erdogan needs European Union support to rebuild the country and its economy, he will not push hostility with Greece too far.</p>
<p>A military operation in the earthquake-ravaged north-western Syria also seems unlikely. Such operations would bring widespread criticism from within Turkey, Russia, the Syrian regime that <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/turkey-syria-2/">Erdogan is warming up to</a> and rebel groups Turkey supports in Syria. </p>
<p>As remote as it sounds, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/erdogan-wants-to-annex-northern-cyprus-top-us-senator-says">annexing Northern Cyprus</a> remains a possibility for Erdogan. A sign of this is the Turkish government’s <a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2023/02/08/earthquake-disaster-turkey-cyprus/">refusal of Cyprus’s offer</a> of assistance. Such a move would bring tremendous nationalistic support for Erdogan within Turkey. Russia may recognise the annexation in turn for concessions over the Ukraine conflict and Syria. </p>
<p>The earthquake in Turkey is a major test for the country and Erdogan. It is likely to dramatically alter the country’s internal political trajectory and its involvement in regional conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and research Academy. </span></em></p>The Erdogan government’s response to the devastating earthquakes in Turkey has been widely criticised. But how it might affect the forthcoming presidential election remains to be seen.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000332023-02-18T11:56:44Z2023-02-18T11:56:44ZTurkish President Erdoğan’s grip on power threatened by devastating earthquake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510881/original/file-20230217-380-gmaubc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2884%2C1899&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Erdoğan is facing criticism over his handling of the disaster.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-tours-the-site-of-news-photo/1246888810?phrase=erdogan%20earthquake&adppopup=true">Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/07/middleeast/earthquake-turkey-syria-why-deadly-intl/index.html">earthquake that struck Turkey</a> on Feb. 6, 2023, is first and foremost a human tragedy, one that has taken the lives of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/teenager-rescued-rubble-turkey-10-days-after-quake-2023-02-16/">at least 45,000 people</a> to date.</p>
<p>The disaster also has major implications for the country’s economy – the financial loss from the damage is <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-earthquake-financial-damage-estimated-staggering-84bn">estimated to be US$84 billion</a> – and its politics.</p>
<p>Analyzing this human tragedy and its long-term implications for Turkey is difficult for me. I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ABctik8AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of Turkish politics</a>. But I also grew up in the affected region and lost relatives and friends in the cities of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/world/middleeast/earthquake-antakya-turkey.html">Antakya</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-growing-despair-in-iskenderun/video-64685720">Iskenderun</a>. Nevertheless, I believe it is important to examine the implications of the earthquake on Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – not for reasons of political intrigue, but because it is crucial in determining how Turkey recovers from the disaster and better prepares itself in the future.</p>
<h2>President Erdoğan deflects blame</h2>
<p>Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections are <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-elections-to-watch-in-2023-whats-at-stake-as-millions-head-to-the-ballot-box-around-the-globe-196840">due to take place in June 2023</a>. Erdoğan had <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">a declining popularity</a> <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-01-08/ty-article-opinion/.premium/erdogan-is-in-deep-trouble-this-is-his-ruthless-survival-plan/00000185-90c2-d9c3-a98d-fdef3d1b0000">even before the earthquake</a>, due in part to an economic crisis and growing popular concern over his autocratic style of governance, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/first-time-voters-weigh-what-theyve-never-known-turkey-without-erdogan-2022-07-05/">especially among younger voters</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan has been at pains to mitigate any political fallout from the earthquake and deflect any blame. His Justice and Development Party, AKP, the media under his control, and the government agency running mosques, called the Diyanet, were quick to define the earthquake as “<a href="https://www.sabah.com.tr/galeri/gundem/deprem-degil-yuzyilin-felaketi-85-milyonun-kalbi-deprem-bolgesinde-bir-atiyor/3">the disaster of the century</a>.” The implication is that Erdoğan couldn’t have done anything to avoid the extent of the human cost.</p>
<p>Erdoğan himself, while <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/08/middleeast/turkey-earthquake-public-anger-intl/index.html">surveying the damage caused</a>, announced that it was “not possible to be prepared for such a disaster.” He also called it “<a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/kahramanmaras-a-giden-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-deprem-icin-yine-kader-plani-dedi,1090738">destiny</a>.”</p>
<p>Yet critics have not been convinced. Analysts have held Erdoğan’s highly centralized one-man rule responsible for both the lack of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/15/earthquake-turkey-corruption-buildings-collapse">sufficient preparations before the earthquake</a> and the <a href="https://time.com/6255634/earthquake-turkey-syria-erdogan-rescue/">failure to provide coordinated help after it</a>.</p>
<h2>Lack of preparation and coordination</h2>
<p>Certainly, Erdoğan’s record makes him vulnerable to claims of culpability over the scale of destruction.</p>
<p>Over the past 20 years, Erdoğan prioritized construction as <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20230213-turkey-s-building-sector-blamed-for-scale-of-devastation-following-quakes">a motor of economic growth</a>. Initially during his time in office, bureaucratic and nongovernmental institutions tried to regulate the construction sector, mindful of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/12/turkey-earthquake-death-toll-suggests-lessons-1999-not-learned">the devastating 1999 earthquake in the country’s northwest</a> that killed over 17,000 people.</p>
<p>Yet after 2017 constitutional amendments, Erdoğan established <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-presidential-system-after-two-and-a-half-years">a new presidential regime</a> with almost no checks and balances. He <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/10/turkey-earthquake-erdogan-government-response-corruption-construction/">hollowed out bureaucratic institutions, placed loyalists in key positions and enriched crony contractors</a>. He did not impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/earthquake-in-turkey-exposes-gap-between-seismic-knowledge-and-action-but-it-is-possible-to-prepare-199379">necessary construction regulations</a>. Instead, he gave amnesty <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6113a9d2-25d4-4329-bb6a-0a50b1cff30c">to the owners of millions of faulty buildings</a> as part of a populist policy that also raised taxation. After the earthquake, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/13/1156512284/turkey-earthquake-erdogan-building-safety">videos of the president bragging</a> about this “amnesty” went viral.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s administration has also faced allegations of being too <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/turkeys-president-faces-scrutiny-after-earthquake-for-construction-standards">slow and disorganized to coordinate</a> the rescue operations after the earthquake.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Rescue workers in red helmets carry a body bag containing a body out of a collapsed building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510913/original/file-20230217-22-3oyh9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The grim search for bodies continues.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-ihh-rescue-workers-carry-a-bodybag-after-news-photo/1467082742?phrase=building%20earthquake&adppopup=true">Burak Kara/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The centralized system has been held responsible by both opposition parties and foreign observers for what is seen as a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-turkey-government-business-earthquakes-0f7d4fb77ea45c94b7b5ecd637a930c7">very ineffective response on the crucial first day</a> after the earthquake. Critics have asked, for example, why <a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/uzmanlar-anlatiyor-deprem-bolgelerinde-tsk-neden-beklendigi-olcude-sahada-degil-askerin-gorunmesi-istenmiyor-mu-neler-yapabilir,1090461">Erdoğan did not allow the armed forces</a> to join the rescue operations as soon as the scale of the disaster was clear.</p>
<p>Despite Erdoğan’s heavy control over the media, these criticisms have been widely shared in Turkey on both social media and among the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cer2e33v3jro">opposition parties and activists</a>. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has responded by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/anger-over-turkeys-temporary-twitter-block-during-quake-rescue-2023-02-09/">temporarily blocking access to Twitter</a> and publicly announcing that he was writing down the critics “<a href="https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-3-ay-sureyle-ohal-karari-aldik-744183.html">into his notebook</a>” to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-earthquake-aid-elections-b2279039.html">prosecute them later</a>. </p>
<p>But this has done little to stem the anger directed at the president.</p>
<p>In power since 2003, Erdoğan has developed a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">reputation as an autocrat</a>, prone to <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-releasing-murderers-but-not-political-opponents-from-prison-amid-coronavirus-pandemic-136466">stifling dissent</a> rather than engaging with critics. In the minds of many political observers, he is unlikely to transform his political attitudes now. </p>
<p>As such, the opposition is now <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cer2e33v3jro">calling on the Turkish electorate to choose a new leadership</a> that can better prepare the country for future earthquakes.</p>
<h2>Will Erdoğan cancel elections?</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s party appears concerned that popular anger over handling of the disaster may affect the upcoming elections.</p>
<p>Bülent Arınç, an AKP founder and former speaker of Turkish Parliament, <a href="https://twitter.com/bulent_arinc/status/1625178179689230339?s=20">publicly called for the postponement of elections</a> for a year. The Turkish Constitution, however, allows the postponement of elections only during a war. Hence, Arınç defined the Constitution “<a href="https://twitter.com/bulent_arinc/status/1625178179689230339?s=20">not sacred</a>” and called for disregarding it.</p>
<p>Erdoğan has a major dilemma. If he allows the elections to take place as planned in June 2023, he is likely to lose them. Even before the earthquake, polling suggested that he would <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/three-figures-beat-erdogan-in-election-survey-shows-news-61689">lose against one of three possible competitors</a> in the presidential race.</p>
<p>Before the earthquake, Turkey was already experiencing a major <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/turkey-inflation-erdogan.html">economic crisis</a>, with an annual inflation rate <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">running above 80% in the past six months</a>. Six opposition parties – including those founded by a former AKP prime minister and a former AKP vice prime minister – have established <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-opposition-desperately-seeks-an-electable-leader/a-63109589">an alliance against Erdoğan</a>.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, Erdoğan may find the idea of postponing the elections beneficial, even if it is unconstitutional.</p>
<p>Yet Erdoğan does not know where these multiple economic and political problems are heading – they could worsen into next year. As such, postponing the elections is risky. </p>
<p>Either way, going forward, Erdoğan will likely find it harder to keep his political hegemony. His grip on power was already under threat, even before the earthquake.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200033/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Disaster-hit Turkey is due to stage a presidential vote in June. Erdoğan’s handling of the earthquake response – and his role in the country’s perceived lack of preparedness – may be his undoing.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1966322022-12-15T21:35:52Z2022-12-15T21:35:52ZWhy Istanbul’s mayor was sentenced to jail – and what it means for Turkey’s 2023 presidential race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501407/original/file-20221215-15-mf4c80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4992%2C3211&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ekrem Imamoglu -- heading to jail or the presidency. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ekrem-imamoglu-mayor-of-istanbul-leaves-amidst-a-crowd-of-news-photo/1245632640?phrase=istanbul%20mayor&adppopup=true">Onur Dogman/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A Turkish court’s decision on Dec. 14, 2022, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">jail Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu</a> for two years and seven months for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/14/turkey-court-convicts-istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu">insulting public officials</a> hung on comments he made three years ago. But its impact will be felt on an event taking place in a few months time: the Turkish presidential election.</p>
<p>If the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/14/turkey-court-convicts-istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu">appeals court upholds Imamoglu’s conviction</a> – based on a 2019 speech in which he allegedly called Turkey’s supreme election council “fools” – the opposition figure will be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/istanbul-mayor-says-conviction-reflects-his-success-ahead-anti-erdogan-rally-2022-12-15/">barred from holding any political office</a>. It hands President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a double win: Not only does it mean Erdogan would retake control of Istanbul, but it also would potentially prevent his strongest challenger from running in the June 2023 election.</p>
<p>Whether politically motivated or not, the court ruling might not work out the way Imamoglu’s rivals hope – as Erdogan should well be aware. The Turkish president’s long road to political dominance began with his <a href="https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/receptayyiperdogan/biography/">election as Istanbul mayor in 1994</a>. The secularist elite, who at that time dominated Turkey’s politics and feared the rise of Erdogan’s religious conservatism, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/turkey-germany-erdogan-bohmermann/479814/">banned him from politics</a> through a court decision that saw him imprisoned for four months over inciting religious hatred in a speech. That sentence, in fact, only bolstered Erdogan’s support. Perhaps similarly, Imamoglu’s sentencing was followed by thousands of supporters’ <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/istanbul-mayor-says-conviction-reflects-his-success-ahead-anti-erdogan-rally-2022-12-15/">taking to the streets in protest</a>.</p>
<h2>Erdogan’s declining popularity</h2>
<p>The long-serving president is a pragmatic politician. For over 25 years, Erdogan has pursued a dual strategy to tighten his power grip: gaining legitimacy by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44596072">winning elections</a> while also consolidating power by employing a long list of authoritarian methods, <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/turkey-under-erdogan/?k=9780300247886">such as jailing journalists</a> and labeling opposition figures as “terrorists.”</p>
<p>But the 2023 election comes as Erdogan’s position in Turkey appears weaker, with polls suggesting he could <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/turkeys-centenary-could-mark-the-end-of-the-erdogan-era">lose to one of a few potential challengers</a>, with the opposition yet to announce who will contend the election.</p>
<p>Istanbul’s <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/istanbul-election-remaking-of-turkeys-new-political-landscape">municipal election in 2019</a> proved a turning point in Erdogan’s political fortunes. Imamoglu, the candidate of his main opposition, the Republican’s People Party, won against the candidate of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. Erdogan did not accept the defeat and supported the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-cancels-istanbul-mayoral-election-won-by-opposition-11557162702">cancellation of the election</a> through a decision of the supreme election council, which prompted Imamoglu’s “fools” comment.</p>
<p>Yet Imamoglu won again <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/27/erdogans-tactical-gamble-in-istanbul-proves-a-strategic-mistake/">with even a bigger margin</a> in the subsequent rerun election.</p>
<p>Since 2019, Erdogan’s popularity has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-17/turkey-2023-presidential-election-anger-over-prices-threatens-erdogan">declined further</a>, according to most <a href="https://twitter.com/ozersencar1/status/1600112278149406720?s=20&t=MoWjIlJIWzgk31vOsmfquw">public surveys</a>. He is now less popular than both Imamoglu and Ankara’s mayor, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-opposition-desperately-seeks-an-electable-leader/a-63109589">Mansur Yavas</a>, from the same opposition party.</p>
<p>A major reason for Erdogan’s popularity problem is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/turkey-inflation-erdogan.html">the ongoing economic crisis</a>. Turkey’s annual <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">inflation rate has soared above 80%</a>. In a nationwide <a href="https://twitter.com/ozersencar1/status/1512416195319943174?s=20&t=DwceTwCj4KHVeC4nA9Dgrg">survey of February 2021, 50% said</a> poverty was leading them to skip meals.</p>
<p>The economic crisis is directly associated with <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-releasing-murderers-but-not-political-opponents-from-prison-amid-coronavirus-pandemic-136466">Erdogan’s rule</a>, which has resulted in a <a href="https://en.qantara.de/content/migrating-to-germany-turks-up-sticks-as-prospects-worsen-at-home">brain drain</a> and misguided financial policies, especially his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/world/middleeast/erdogan-economy-lira-turkey.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article">insistence on lowering interest rates</a> to reduce inflation – a policy that runs counter to what <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/how-raising-interest-rates-helps-fight-inflation-high-prices-recession-rcna33754">most economists would prescribe</a>.</p>
<p>If the opposition pursues a reasonable strategy, Erdogan is <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/turkeys-centenary-could-mark-the-end-of-the-erdogan-era">heading toward defeat at the June 2023 election</a> – should the ballot be fair and free.</p>
<p>But observers fear he will <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/632">try to game the system</a> or <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-06/erdogan-amends-turkey-s-electoral-laws-to-bolster-his-rule?leadSource=uverify%20wall">change the rules</a> to win the election and keep his superpresidential powers for five more years. </p>
<p>Erdogan has already worked to establish a compliant media, through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-media/">confiscation, crony capitalism and repression</a>, including the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/02/free-turkey-media/">arrest and imprisonment of journalists</a>. In October, Erdogan brought in a new “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/14/turkey-dangerous-dystopian-new-legal-amendments">censorship law</a>” passed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/13/turkey-new-disinformation-law-could-jail-journalists-for-3-years">further criminalize journalists and control social media</a>. </p>
<p>He also strengthened ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and normalized relations with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and United Arab Emirates’ Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed in a bid to encourage their <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-plays-up-diplomatic-gains-with-eye-elections-2022-08-09/">financial support in the run-up to the election</a>.</p>
<h2>Will history repeat itself?</h2>
<p>And then there is the direct attack on opposition figures. If Imamoglu is sent to jail, he will not be the only major politician to languish in Turkish prisons. </p>
<p>Selahattin Demirtas, the former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, has been behind bars for over six years. Demirtas <a href="https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/1140875625072402433?s=20&t=D2C26LnOPezUT_vBzCVRzA">supported Imamoglu during 2019</a> municipal elections and <a href="https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/1603061373851901952?s=20&t=SROrrXOakgVOFWqPR0WZrg">has criticized the new court sentence against him</a>.</p>
<p>This demonstrates what makes Imamoglu a potentially potent electoral threat to Erdogan: his ability to appeal to voters from various segments of society. He can get the minority but crucial Kurdish vote while retaining strong relations <a href="https://twitter.com/meral_aksener/status/1602989042785820672?s=20&t=wQknCL1w7juVMgJxuxkGbA">with nationalist politicians</a>. He is from a secularist party, but he is able to <a href="https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/turkiye/ekrem-imamoglu-eyup-sultan-camiinde-yasin-suresini-okudu,8rU_W358yEqry5oCw7wA0w">recite the Quran publicly</a> in an overture to religious voters. What Erdogan fears is an opposition figure who can serve as a “big tent” candidate.</p>
<p>This helped Imamoglu defeat Erdogan’s party in Istanbul twice in 2019. In a few months, we will see whether he can pull off the same achievement on the national stage – but that can only happen if Imamoglu is legally able to run. </p>
<p>The danger for Erdogan is that if the jailing of Imamoglu is taken by Turkey’s population to be politically motivated, it might make his rival more popular. If so, it might prove a case of history repeating itself in Turkey – only this time, to Erdogan’s misfortune.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conviction means popular opposition figure Ekrem Imamoglu is barred from running for office. It comes as incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces dwindling support.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1422042020-07-23T09:48:38Z2020-07-23T09:48:38ZTurkey: how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is using coronavirus to clamp down further on dissent<p>Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian government led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2019.1642662">always made use of crises to consolidate its power</a>. The coronavirus has been no exception. The regime has cracked down on opposition and attempted to undermine its effectiveness, while endeavouring to legitimise the rule of the long-serving president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>Since the AKP was re-elected in 2007, there have been continuous crackdowns on Erdoğan’s opponents, which <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2019.1642662?src=recsys">intensified</a> after a 2016 coup attempt. The coronavirus crisis has now provided the regime with a new angle with which to justify repression.</p>
<h2>Social media crackdown</h2>
<p>During the pandemic, one of the regime’s strategies has been furthering social media crackdowns on opponents. This has been made possible with the pretext of existing <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)011-e#:%7E:text=(1)%20Turkish%20law%20shall%20apply,have%20been%20committed%20in%20Turkey.&text=then%20this%20offence%20is%20presumed%20to%20have%20been%20committed%20in%20Turkey">laws</a> which allow the government to investigate someone for creating “panic and fear”, provoking people to “disobey the law”, or provoking the public to “hatred and hostility”. Since the start of the pandemic, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/turkey-stifling-free-expression-during-the-covid19-pandemic/">over 500 people have been detained under these provisions</a> – most commonly for criticising the government’s handling of the pandemic on social media.</p>
<p>Those targeted are from different backgrounds – ranging from <a href="http://bianet.org/english/labor/222198-briefly-detained-for-stay-home-video-truck-driver-yilmaz-i-think-i-lose-my-job-too">ordinary citizens</a> to <a href="https://www.mlsaturkey.com/en/journalism-and-free-speech-trials-week-of-july-13/">journalists</a> and <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-turkey-prisoners/turkeys-prisoner-release-should-not-exclude-political-detainees-rights-groups-idUKKBN21J666">politicians</a>. According to Amnesty International, lorry driver Malik Yilmaz was <a href="http://bianet.org/english/labor/222198-briefly-detained-for-stay-home-video-truck-driver-yilmaz-i-think-i-lose-my-job-too">detained and interrogated</a> (although later released) for sharing a video in which he declared: “This virus won’t kill me, what will kill me is your system.” Meanwhile, news anchor Fatih Portakal <a href="http://m.bianet.org/english/media/223658-fox-tv-anchor-fatih-portakal-faces-prison-term-over-comments-on-pandemic">is being investigated</a> for posting a tweet about coronavirus economic policies. </p>
<p>Social media platforms remain one of the few outlets in Turkey where people are able to voice their criticism, as the major print and broadcast media are <a href="http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2019/turkey-2019/">heavily under the regime’s influence</a>. Even before the pandemic, there were <a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=internetpolicyobservatory">efforts</a> by the government to curb criticism on social media – mainly through intimidation. </p>
<p>In 2018 and 2019, <a href="https://ifade.org.tr/reports/EngelliWeb_2019.pdf">over 96,000</a> social media accounts were investigated by the Ministry of Interior in an attempt to encourage self-censorship. Although this has been <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2019#B">effective to an extent</a>, a vast amount of criticism still circulates on social media.</p>
<p>In April, a draft law on economic measures to tackle the coronavirus crisis included articles aimed at increasing the regime’s control over social media platforms. Although the articles were <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/human-rights/2020/04/14/turkeys-ruling-akp-withdraws-clause-on-social-media-supervision-from-draft-law/">eventually removed</a>, the regime did not abandon the idea of having a tighter grip over social media. </p>
<p>In early July, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/politics/2020/07/01/erdogan-seeks-to-shut-control-social-media-platforms-in-turkey/">announced</a> he wants “social media platforms completely shut down or controlled” as they “don’t suit this country and our people”. On July 21, the government submitted <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/politics/2020/07/21/turkeys-ruling-party-submits-bill-to-regulate-social-media/">proposed legislation</a> to parliament aimed at increasing state control over social media. If passed, social media companies would be obliged to have representatives in Turkey and respond within 48 hours to requests to remove “offensive” content. </p>
<h2>Undermining the opposition</h2>
<p>Turkey has the world’s 15th highest number of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries">confirmed coronavirus cases</a> at around 221,500, with more than 5,500 deaths. Although the rate of infection slowed down after a peak in April, the virus has been widespread with all of Turkey’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-52185497">81 provinces</a> reporting cases. </p>
<p>The AKP seems keen to claim sole credit for managing Turkey’s response to the crisis. A <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/01/turkish-president-accuses-municipalities-of-forming-parallel-state/">ban was imposed</a> on several municipal donation campaigns run by the opposition, stopping activists launching independent crisis relief schemes. The regime <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/01/turkish-president-accuses-municipalities-of-forming-parallel-state/">announced</a> that these campaigns needed prior approval by the central government, while turning a blind eye to <a href="https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/chpli-belediyeleri-sucluyorlardi-akpli-belediye-de-yardim-toplamis-5718677/">similar campaigns by AKP-run municipalities</a>. </p>
<p>The aid prevention policy appears to be an attempt to undermine the opposition, particularly in municipalities such as Istanbul which came under the control of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48739256">local elections in April 2019</a>. Istanbul’s new mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu is seen as a serious threat to Erdoğan. He continued to organise aid campaigns in Istanbul despite the ban, and now faces an <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-coronavirus/turkeys-interior-ministry-investigating-opposition-mayors-over-covid-19-aid">ongoing investigation</a> by the Interior Ministry. Nonetheless, the AKP’s efforts seem to have backfired, and İmamoğlu’s popularity has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/28d16e9a-538e-44a9-a810-407568851d46">further boosted</a> according to recent polls. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1260210069075042306"}"></div></p>
<h2>Seeking legitimacy</h2>
<p>The pandemic has allowed Erdoğan to improve Turkey’s battered international reputation and shore up the legitimacy of his regime abroad. The government’s widespread distribution of humanitarian aid, despite the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-facing-its-own-coronavirus-crisis-so-why-is-it-sending-medical-supplies-to-the-uk-136784">possibility of domestic shortages</a>, has allowed the regime to <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/can-corona-diplomacy-cure-turkeys-foreign-policy-isolation">mend ties</a> with the US and Europe. </p>
<p>The country has <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/can-corona-diplomacy-cure-turkeys-foreign-policy-isolation">also used aid</a> to shore up its position in the Balkans and improved its relations with regional adversaries. These actions gain Turkey much-needed allies, softening international criticism of Erdoğan’s military interventions in Syria and Libya.</p>
<p>Domestically, Erdoğan’s government is trying to cloak itself in a humanitarian guise following repressive actions towards its opponents, and so shore up its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. By doing this Erdoğan is taking a page from the playbook of authoritarians the world over by seeking to manage his image as a benign ruler.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142204/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balki Begumhan Bayhan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A proposed new law could increase state control over social media, amid an effort to curb criticism of the Erdoğan government.Balki Begumhan Bayhan, PhD Candidate, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014742018-08-16T09:08:32Z2018-08-16T09:08:32ZTurkey’s homemade currency crisis has truly global implications<p>Turkey’s recently reelected president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is blaming the sudden and dramatic decline of the Turkish lira on an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-warns-of-economic-war-as-turkish-lira-carnage-spooks-global-markets/a-45043097">international conspiracy</a>, variously railing against an “economic war” and a “currency plot”. On the surface, this looks like a reaction to US president Trump’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/turkey-tariffs-us-trump-erdogan-lira-andrew-brunson-steel-aluminium-dollar-a8486361.html">steel and aluminium sanctions</a>, which are ostensibly designed to press Turkey to release American pastor <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-court-rejects-us-pastor-brunsons-appeal-for-release-135813">Andrew Brunson</a>, who is in custody on terrorism charges.</p>
<p>But Turkey’s financial crisis has not been caused by its refusal to release an evangelical pastor. The US’s new sanctions have merely inflamed a crisis that’s been a long time coming. And while Turkey’s woes are mostly homemade, they are nevertheless embedded in a fragile global political economy – meaning <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/asia-shares-euro-pressured-turkish-002909714.html?guccounter=1">there is a serious risk of contagion</a>. This is therefore not the time to merely point fingers at the structural deficiencies of Turkey’s political economy; Turkey is just the proverbial <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/business/turkey-lira-crisis.html">canary in the coal mine</a>. This is a local manifestation of global problems and an indication of looming ones as well.</p>
<p>Turkey has for years been a poster child for international investors. Once <a href="https://www.economist.com/node/17309065/all-comments">described</a> as the “China of Europe”, it has long attracted substantial capital from forthcoming global markets. Thanks to solid financial restructuring engineered by the former World Bank executive Kemal Derviş in 2001-2, outside markets had little reason to worry about lending to its well-regulated banking sector. And while many of Turkey’s longstanding structural issues were well known, they weren’t considered noteworthy risks, even when it went into recession after the 2008 global financial crisis.</p>
<p>But while foreign exchange markets are always speculative, the global capital glut that financed Turkey’s growth has dried up. Not only is there less capital going around, but the US’s federal reserve’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-07/fed-on-track-to-raise-rates-regardless-of-emerging-market-woes">rate changes</a> mean that lending to emerging markets is now less attractive. </p>
<p>This problem has only been exacerbated by Erdoğan’s moves to consolidate his personal power. Markets usually don’t have a problem with authoritarianism in principle, but they do get skittish when autocrats make questionable decisions. Hence the worries caused by Erdoğan’s decision to replace the respected economist Mehmet Şimşek with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/turkish-lira-slumps-after-names-son-in-law-as-economy-dzar">his own son-in-law</a>, effectively removing a safety valve that kept Turkey in line with the markets’ expectations.</p>
<p>But this isn’t just about markets and capital; the crisis is more embedded in geopolitics than it might seem.</p>
<h2>Turkey in the world</h2>
<p>Many of Turkey’s problems hinge on relations with the US, and they’re by no means limited to the fate of the pastor. The relationship between these two longtime allies has been deteriorating since the 2011 Arab uprisings, when Turkey began pursuing a leadership position in the Middle East. Seven years later, the two have conflicting stakes in the Syrian Civil War.</p>
<p>On that front, they have fallen out over the US’s support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led by Kurdish factions, which Turkey considers offshoots of the militant PKK movement.</p>
<p>Turkey’s response was to seize control of pockets of territory in northwest Syria, first around the cities of al-Bab and Jarablus and eventually driving Kurdish forces out of the northwestern canton of Afrin. This clear divergence in Turkey-US interests was <a href="http://www.intellinews.com/moscow-blog-turkey-s-crisis-a-golden-opportunity-for-the-kremlin-146777/">carefully maintained and exploited</a> by Moscow while its own relations with Ankara were further improved via energy and arms deals.</p>
<p>The upshot is that Turkey now has a front row seat in discussing the future of its neighbour. That’s useful enough, but it doesn’t solve Turkey’s Syrian problems. Relations with Russia now face a new test: Syrian government forces are starting to move into the Turkish protectorate in the northwest, even as the terms of Turkey’s withdrawal from Idlib, Afrin and al-Bab remain unclear. </p>
<p>To make things even more complicated, the future of the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/un-ask-turkey-keep-border-open-syrians-flee-idlib.html">3.5m Syrian refugee population within Turkey</a> remains an open question. And then came the lira crisis. Large parts of northwestern Syria now <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-09-26-post-isis-governance-jarablus-haid.pdf">directly depend on Turkish services</a>, meaning the currency’s troubles have immediate implications for the Syrian conflict more widely.</p>
<p>While this geopolitical risk exposure was already “priced into” the lira to some extent, the real impact of Turkey’s involvement in Syria is indirect and hard to mitigate. And that makes the country’s various disagreements with the US even harder to resolve.</p>
<h2>Turning away?</h2>
<p>Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro has <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/turkey-erdogan-first-test-will-be-nato-summit.html">called</a> Erdoğan one of the leaders of the “new multipolar world”. In many ways, this is true – at least in aspiration. Beyond its immediate environment, Turkey has long worked to extend its global influence, including via its international development agency, TIKA. Turkey is <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2017/08/19/worlds-2nd-largest-aid-provider-turkey-proudly-marks-world-humanitarian-day">now second only to the US</a> in the percentage of GDP it allocates to foreign aid.</p>
<p>The Trump administration has helped by turning away from many of its traditional commitments, retreating from active military involvement in the Middle East, starting various trade wars, defecting from international accords such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Deal, and generally being erratic and unaccommodating. Its behaviour has opened up spaces for other powers to flex their muscles, most notably <a href="http://www.atimes.com/article/china-will-buy-turkey-on-the-cheap/">China</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey has long aspired to join the <a href="http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a>, a strategic group of Eurasian and Asian powers including China and Russia, and has recently <a href="https://www.atimes.com/explaining-turkeys-interest-in-brics/">lobbied to be formally admitted to the BRICS group</a> of major emerging economies. Having secured close ties with Moscow and a central location on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Turkey is understandably tempted by a full defection from an American-led international order. Turkey has publicly defied the US on Iranian sanctions while moving away from <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/turkey-steps-up-efforts-to-shun-the-dollar.html">dollar denominated trade positions</a> and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/kremlin-wants-to-dump-the-dollar-and-trade-in-national-currencies-1.6367704">inviting others to do just the same</a> – a rare challenge to the dollar’s role as the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9e930bc0-9edd-11e8-b196-da9d6c239ca8">international reserve currency</a>.</p>
<p>Is this enough for the US to launch a rogue economic war against Turkey? Perhaps not. Nonetheless, this dire situation is part of a crisis-ridden transition towards a new, multipolar world order where all powers, and above all the US, will have to carve out a new space.</p>
<p>The lira crisis proves that Turkey is not immune to the fallout from this change, and its location at the flashpoint of various conflicts and competitions has seen it hit the hardest. But it is also actively working to undermine US leadership of the “liberal international order”. Its vital importance to the rest of the world is on full display: as the news of the lira’s demise broke, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-13/turkey-s-currency-carnage-puts-yuan-at-7-per-dollar-back-in-play">Yuan was up</a> and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bbbd6e28-9ed0-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4">Euro was down</a>. Whatever is to blame for this currency crisis, the world has no choice but to take notice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clemens Hoffmann receives funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Can Cemgil receives funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>What looks from the outside like a domestic currency crash is in fact something far more dangerous.Clemens Hoffmann, Lecturer in International Politics, University of StirlingCan Cemgil, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014662018-08-13T13:29:43Z2018-08-13T13:29:43ZTurkey’s lira crisis: ‘economic war’ sees Erdoğan look east for new allies<p>Global markets are on edge once again, this time thanks to the Turkish lira. It crashed more than 15% against the US dollar, euro and pound sterling on August 10 and continued to fall when markets reopened after the weekend on August 13. </p>
<p>The latest trigger was Donald Trump’s <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1027899286586109955">announcement</a> that he would double import tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium. But the lira has been falling consistently over the past year as markets fear for the president’s increasing control over the economy.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1027899286586109955"}"></div></p>
<p>With their mammoth depth and reach, global currency markets reflect big shifts to new economic and political realities. Sterling dropped by more than 10% when it became clear that <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-shock-has-caused-a-sterling-crash-of-historic-proportions-heres-just-how-bad-it-is-for-the-pound-62191">the UK had voted to leave the EU</a> in June 2016. Currency markets can also hasten these shifts, for example in 1992 when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/black-wednesday-20-years-pound-erm">the UK crashed out of Europe’s fixed currency regime</a>, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, after sustained runs on sterling in currency markets. </p>
<p>The lira crisis therefore – at the very least – reflects the political and economic turmoil taking place in Turkey. It could also play a key role in shifting the country from relying on the West to aid its economic development and turning east to Russia and China for growth and investment.</p>
<h2>Crisis and contagion</h2>
<p>The underlying economic cause for the crisis is simply a lack of confidence in Turkey’s economy. Inflation is spiralling (currently <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/inflation-cpi">more than 15%</a>), Turkish companies are saddled with foreign debt and the country has one of the world’s largest current account deficits in proportion to its economic output, heightening fears of a debt crisis. </p>
<p>As an open economy since the late 1980s, Turkey has attracted significant international capital flows. These flows, some of which are highly mobile and short term, also expose Turkey to sudden stops and reversals when international investors fear the worst. The recent history of globalisation in developing countries is full of such crises, including the 2000-01 Turkish <a href="https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/september/the-turkish-2000-01-banking-crisis/">banking and currency crisis</a>. It was the aftermath of that crisis that brought Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AK party to power. </p>
<p>As of August 2018, Turkey has an <a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/IDS-2018.pdf">external debt</a> of US$406 billion, US$99 billion of which is short term. What worries foreign banks and markets is the exposure of some European banks, as direct investors in the Turkish banking sector. According to estimates, this amounts to more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/10/european-officials-reportedly-concerned-about-exposure-to-turkey.html">US$138 billion</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231675/original/file-20180813-2897-197sbdg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish lira to the US dollar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD&view=1M">xe.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Should private Turkish debtors, who owe around 75% of Turkey’s external debt, fail to service their share as a result of the nosediving lira and creditors’ unwillingness to lend any more hard currency, the European financial system might have to absorb significant losses. This is similar to what happened during <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-banks/europes-banks-bleed-from-greek-debt-crisis-idUSTRE81M0LT20120223">the Greek debt crisis</a>.</p>
<h2>Political decisions</h2>
<p>None of these debt figures have emerged overnight. What transforms them into a currency and debt crisis is ultimately political. The presidential election in June gave Erdoğan unprecedented control over all branches of the state and he has made his intention to interfere with the economy <a href="http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/82573/1/SSRN_id2856691.pdf">clear</a>.</p>
<p>Since the new presidential system came into effect, international investors have been trying to understand where Erdoğan would steer the Turkish economy. The signals so far, including Erdoğan’s appointment of his son-in-law as the minister in charge of the economy, suggest a new period of “Erdoğanomics”. This includes a mix of high government spending, politically repressed interest rates <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-turmoil-and-upcoming-election-what-you-need-to-know-97477">and runaway inflation</a>. Such a heady mix has caused a <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/cost-to-insure-turkish-debt-spikes-as-turkey-teeters-on-brink-of-currency-crisis-2018-08-10">surge in Turkey’s risk premium</a>.</p>
<p>The worsening political relationship between Turkey and the US does not help. Over his 16-year rule, Erdoğan has rallied his supporters on a number of occasions against <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-turks-react-so-strongly-against-anti-erdogan-coup-62643">real</a> and purported threats to his rule. He is once again defiant against Western economic and political actors, whom he accuses of striving to destabilise Turkey under his rule, this time via the runs on the Turkish lira. </p>
<p>This defiance seems to have consolidated Erdoğan’s domestic power, but given the country’s considerable economic reliance on Western banks and markets, the country is now more vulnerable than ever to a currency and debt crisis of its own making. Freeing Turkey from this difficult corner will be a feat. If and when Erdoğan achieves it, Turkey will probably have shifted a considerable part of its economic and political allegiances, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-currency-erdogan/turkey-is-a-target-of-economic-war-erdogan-says-idUSKBN1KW08U">from the West to the East</a>, with both Russia and China potential future allies in what Erdoğan <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-12/lira-extends-retreat-as-turkey-heads-toward-a-financial-crisis">has called</a> an “economic war”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emre Tarim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Erdoğan is accusing the West of striving to destabilise Turkey.Emre Tarim, Lecturer in Behavioural Sciences, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/999882018-07-16T14:00:24Z2018-07-16T14:00:24ZCan democracy vote itself out of existence?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227692/original/file-20180715-27036-1enkwcy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Look at the state of the world’s democratic nations, and it is easy to see why so many are <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/american-democracy-on-the-brink-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-2018-06?barrier=accesspaylog">concerned for the future of democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Leaders such as <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/24/europe/turkish-election-results-intl/index.html">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-result-factbox/russian-presidential-election-results-idUSKBN1GU0WZ">Vladimir Putin</a> and Hungary’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/apr/08/hungary-election-victor-orban-expected-to-win-third-term-live-updates">Viktor Orbán</a> have centralised political power by changing their countries’ constitutions, silencing dissent and controlling the media. Since 2016’s coup attempt in Turkey, Erdoğan’s government has used the subsequent state of emergency to incarcerate thousands without trial. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/07/turkey-opposition-party-leaders-mps-jailed">Opposition politicians</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/05/turkey-judges-prosecutors-unfairly-jailed">judges</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/27/turkey-journalists-convicted-doing-their-jobs">journalists</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/11/erdogan-turkey-academics-terrorism-violence-kurdish-people">academics</a> have been thrown in jail – all following a successful referendum that saw the office of president <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/04/15/turkey-is-sliding-into-dictatorship">shed many of the restraints of parliament</a>. The recent presidential elections then <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-snap-election-yields-surprises-on-all-sides-what-next-98865">returned Erdoğan to office</a>, albeit with the slimmest of majorities.</p>
<p>Given this climate of fear and censorship, the people cannot be said to have voted freely. But the fact that they did vote raises a fundamental question: can an electorate vote democracy away?</p>
<h2>The people have spoken … sort of</h2>
<p>First of all, there are important distinctions between general elections and constitutional referendums, and each comes with its own set of democratic dangers.</p>
<p>In Turkey and the UK, narrow referendum results have endorsed fundamental constitutional change. But these referendums are not, like general elections, exercising the democratic right to select leaders. Instead, they are making complex governmental decisions that often require understanding of specialist information, way beyond what could reasonably be expected of an ordinary person. Voting on such questions – usually concerning fundamental long-term change – ought to, and often does require a <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supermajority">super majority</a>. Otherwise, as we can see from the 52/48 split in the UK’s Brexit vote, the results can be highly contentious.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some Turks have heralded the threat to their democracy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/president-turkeys-ruling-justice-development-party-1122337505?src=-2Tjymfa7ydayyweDp1t8g-1-27">shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>General elections do not require super majorities, and the government is formed from whichever party captures enough seats to command the legislative assembly, or, in a proportional system, the opportunity to lead a coalition. Frequently, the popular vote is not reflected in the number of seats a party wins. In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz party won <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-election-2018-viktor-orban-fidesz-jobbik/">49% of the vote</a>, but 133 of the 199 available seats. In the US Hillary Clinton <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2016/nov/11/clinton-won-more-votes-trump-won-the-election-and-its-not-the-first-time">gained more votes overall</a>, but lost the presidency under the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/what-is-the-electoral-college_n_2078970.html">electoral college system</a>. </p>
<p>These divergences are well-established, and when elections are contested between two moderate parties trying to appeal to the middle ground (as has been the case across Europe for many years), such anomalies have not caused too much instability. But in today’s more extreme, divergent political climate, a greater number of governments could emerge that are divisive and extremely unstable. When there is enough support for the extremes, they can be elected against the wishes of the majority of the population, leaving the ordinary voter faced with “democratically elected” leaders whose policies they vehemently oppose.</p>
<h2>Tale as old as time</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Napoleon III was elected in 1848, but declared himself emperor four years later.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/napoleon-iii-aka-louis-bonaparte-18081873-86443465?src=e_KbsZqE8nmwDnY4sMwNOw-1-0">shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The concept of electorate-mandated autocracy goes back as far as the modern democratic state. In his <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/18th-Brumaire.pdf">Eighteenth Brumaire</a>, Karl Marx lamented the election of Napoleon III in 1848 that led to him declaring himself “emperor” in 1852. Marx observed how easy it was for an already centralised power to centralise further, and remove the institutions that might stop it from doing so. He lamented too, how easy it was to adopt a “heroic” personality, and to strategically appeal to the interests of specific groups of people in order to win an election. The appeals are of course hollow, but they can harness the support of those seduced by charisma and strength.</p>
<p>To suggest that electorates deliberately, or consciously vote for autocracy is another matter. The standard explanation is that people know not what they do – that they are swept up in a desire to be part of something greater than themselves. This is partly true, but there are certainly those that support autocracy and hold extreme views. When these elements represent a significant enough minority they can sometimes sweep enough people into their narratives to elect an extreme leader whose views do not represent the body politic.</p>
<h2>More than a vote</h2>
<p>But even in a vote with high turnout, an electorate free of disproportionately powerful minorities, and a legislative assembly aligned entirely with the popular vote, the results of an election could be wholly undemocratic. An election, to hold validity, must be “free and fair”.</p>
<p>Many recent votes have been blighted by constraints on the press, manipulation of social media and data (note the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election">Cambridge Analytica</a> story), and defamatory campaigns that have strangled the free flow of information. Targeted attacks on those representing “the establishment” (such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jul/06/the-george-soros-philosophy-and-its-fatal-flaw">George Soros</a> during the Hungarian elections), destabilise the moderate views and institutions associated with them, and foster a divisive “us and them” mentality.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A float in Prague’s Labour Day procession protests the degradation of Eastern European democracy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/prague-czech-republic-maj-1-2017celebration-634592537?src=Ld9MwCd5ZKc3zCov9LlbwA-1-48">shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The institutions that structure political power and authority can also easily be centralised, particularly in moments of recognised stress, such as war or a state of emergency. These provide a reason or excuse for consolidation of executive power, allowing the governing class to make decisions without having to go through regular legislative channels. And once in place, these can be difficult to reverse. Turkey’s <a href="http://www.intellinews.com/turkey-s-state-of-emergency-to-end-144250/">state of emergency</a>, the US <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm">Patriot Act</a> and Britain’s <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n10/karma-nabulsi/dont-go-to-the-doctor">Prevent legislation</a> are all examples of the power states have acquired to act without regard for due process.</p>
<p>Turkey’s presidential elections, and its presidential referendum, were not democratic because the state had already become autocratic. Rather, they were exercises in projecting an image of democracy, since states that run elections are popularly assumed to be democratic. In reality the vote was not free, so the people did not “vote against” democracy.</p>
<p>Democracy is about more than just voting. It is about freedom of speech, the separation of executive from legislative power, judicial independence, and political equality. Democratic institutions exist to keep power from becoming centralised in a single, despotic location. Once these institutions begin to weaken, and the only remaining element of democracy is the pretence of elections, then democracy in its meaningful form is already gone.</p>
<p>Powerless votes perpetuating pre-existing autocracies are barely votes at all. And a democratic vote that votes against democracy, probably wasn’t very democratic in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Manjeet Ramgotra is a member of the Labour Party, and a representative for the SOAS UCU.</span></em></p>Recent elections in Turkey, Hungary and Russia raise a fundamental question about democracy. Can it give autocracy a mandate?Manjeet Ramgotra, Senior Teaching Fellow in Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/988492018-06-26T19:49:07Z2018-06-26T19:49:07ZErdogan’s victory will have far-reaching implications for Turkey and the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224839/original/file-20180626-19404-1mhb7ev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Recep Tayyip Erdogan greets supporters after winning with 52% of the vote in the Turkish election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Turkish president press office handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the incumbent president and main political actor in Turkish politics for the last 16 years, has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44596072">won yet another election</a> with a majority vote of 52%. </p>
<p>The election was held in the climate of a two-year state of emergency, Erdogan’s considerable weight on Turkish media, and his ruling party’s dominance of the election process. This was no ordinary election and will have historic ramifications for Turkey, its relations with the West and the Middle East.</p>
<p>The election has put in effect the terms of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/10/turkish-referendum-all-you-need-to-know">2016 constitutional changes</a> and ended the fragile Turkish parliamentary democracy that has been in place since 1950. As of June 24, Turkey has ventured into a democratic league of its own. </p>
<p>In the new executive presidential regime, there will be elections and multiple political parties. Once elected, though, the system unifies powers in one person, the president, rather than enforcing the all-important principle of separation of powers in a liberal democracy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/stakes-are-high-as-turkey-russia-and-the-us-tussle-over-the-future-of-syria-90454">Stakes are high as Turkey, Russia and the US tussle over the future of Syria</a>
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<p>Erdogan will form the government by appointing ministers from inside or outside the parliament. His presidential decrees will be equal to legislation. As the leader of the ruling AKP party, he will hold the majority vote in the parliament – in effect, he will control the legislative branch.</p>
<p>Erdogan will appoint half of the top council, which appoints judges and prosecutors. The other half will be appointed by the parliament he controls. He will have sweeping powers to abolish the parliament and declare a state of emergency any time.</p>
<p>The new constitution stipulates two five-year terms. If an early election is called during the second term, the incumbent president can be nominated for a third term. This means Erdogan could possibly be in power until 2034.</p>
<p>Erdogan wins elections with an Islamo-nationalistic populism that is a cross between Trump and Putin. Like Trump, he promises to make Turkey great again as a global economic and political power, reviving the past glories of the Ottoman Empire.</p>
<p>Similar to Putin, Erdogan follows a confrontational approach in foreign policy, takes bold military steps in Syria and <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-russia-and-turkey-the-uneasy-alliance-reshaping-world-politics-71079">rallying the population behind him</a> in a nationalistic fervour.</p>
<p>The key lies in Erdogan’s almost <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c4d3c3f0-2d2d-11e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f4">absolute control</a> of the Turkish media. This not only raises questions about the fairness of elections in Turkey, but also explains the diffusion of a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/ilnur-cevik/2017/12/13/data-shows-the-unstoppable-rise-of-turkey">powerful narrative</a> behind Erdogan’s political success.</p>
<p>The formula is simple: undertake large-scale road, bridge and airport building projects and launch them with media fanfare. This makes even the <a href="https://www.aksam.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/yazarlar/caliyorlar-ama-calisiyorlar/haber-321405">reluctant supporters</a> say about the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), “they are corrupt, but they also work”.</p>
<p>Secondly, anything that goes wrong in Turkey is explained as a Western conspiracy. If rating agencies <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/rating">drop Turkey’s credit rating</a>, it is not because of poor economic and political policies <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/turkish-economy-heading-toward-crisis-under-erdogan-a-1141363.html">controlled by Erdogan</a> for the last 16 years. Rather, it is explained as Western subversion to undermine the Turkish economic success.</p>
<p>A case in point in illustrating the appeal of the Erdogan narrative is the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/opinion/erdogan-tv-show-turkey.html">Dirilis</a> (Revival), a state-funded television series that narrates the foundational story of the Ottoman Empire in the 13th century.</p>
<p>The hero of the series, Ertugrul Bey, father of the founder Osman Bey, often clashes and wins against Byzantine and Crusader forces who are determined to pillage Muslim land and kill innocent Muslim populations. It is the Muslim version of Games of Thrones, watched by millions around the world.</p>
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<p>Many see Erdogan as the modern-day personification of Ertugrul Bey, fighting imperialistic forces against all odds to revive Islamic civilisation and become a voice for oppressed Muslims around the world.</p>
<p>His supporters are convinced Erdogan is the greatest leader in Turkish history, one who would make Turkey a world power and bring back pride for Turks and all Muslims. The narrative is intoxicatingly attractive to traditionally religious Turks and masses of Muslims around the world.</p>
<p>This sets the scene for what to expect in Turkey-West relations. The West, the European Union and the US are the antagonists in Erdogan’s narrative, and will continue to be so. He is not likely to mend relations with the EU, let alone make the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/turkey-erdogan-early-elections-eu-report-response.html">necessary reforms</a> to gain EU membership.</p>
<p>Aiming to have a growing influence in the Middle East, Erdogan will intensify his relationship with Russia over Syria. Putin will use Turkey to undermine the NATO alliance. This will further stretch EU-Turkey relations, which are already in tatters over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-foreign-usa-turkey/pompeo-presses-turkey-on-s-400-missiles-purchase-from-russia-idUSKBN1HY2A6">the purchase of</a> Russian S-400 missiles.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-russia-and-turkey-the-uneasy-alliance-reshaping-world-politics-71079">Syria, Russia and Turkey – the uneasy alliance reshaping world politics</a>
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<p>Erdogan’s dilemma is that the EU is Turkey’s largest economic partner and he needs funding from Western banks to service Turkey’s growing <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/external-debt">USD$450 billion foreign debt</a>. This is increasingly <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tusiad-warns-of-huge-external-debt-129865">worrying Turkish businesses</a>. </p>
<p>During his election campaign, <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2017/05/17/president-erdogan-meets-with-40-top-us-investors-in-washington">Erdogan travelled to the US and UK</a> to convince lenders and business investors to continue to fund the <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/turkish-president-erdogan-arrives-in-uk-for-a-threeday-visit-a3837941.html">Turkish government and economy</a>. Erdogan is likely to play out a love-hate relationship with the West.</p>
<p>While Erdogan has no qualms about resorting to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/15/recep-tayyip-erdogan-rails-against-dutch-in-televised-speech-netherlands-srebrenica">anti-Western rhetoric</a>, his supporters forget that it was the same West that hailed Turkey under Erdogan’s leadership as a new hope in the post-9/11 world. Turkey <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/oct/27/turkey-muslim-world-leader-israel">was portrayed</a> as a leader and a model for the Muslim world, where Islam and liberal democracy <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/sami-zubaida/turkey-as-model-of-democracy-and-islam">could harmoniously co-exist</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey could show the world it was possible to stay true to Islamic values and identity while being a first-grade democracy with freedoms and affluence. Other Middle Eastern countries would follow the Turkish success, rising above the seemingly perpetual political turmoil, social discord, economic ruin and inevitable suffering of ordinary Muslim people.</p>
<p>But, 16 years on, Turkey has become just another typical Middle Eastern country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98849/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and research Academy of Australia. </span></em></p>With the Turkish leader winning yet another election, the stage is set for him to consolidate his power at home and in the world.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/988652018-06-25T12:11:56Z2018-06-25T12:11:56ZTurkey’s snap election yields surprises on all sides – what next?<p>It was another surreal night in Turkish politics. That <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/turkey-elections-result-erdogan-amnesty-was-vote-free-and-fair">the elections</a> were suddenly brought forward by more than a year was a surprise in itself – but the standout surprise of the campaign was the sudden rise of opposition candidate Muharrem Ince.</p>
<p>To everybody’s amazement, during a campaign lasting only 50 days, Ince transformed himself from an also-ran into a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muharrem-ince-the-man-who-could-topple-erdogan-xcshhzznm">serious contender</a>. He managed to pull support from all sections of society to his large rallies with an election slogan of “we will make peace, we will grow and we will share”.</p>
<p>While his supporters never thought a second round presidential vote would be anything but a foregone conclusion, they hoped Ince could capture enough of the vote to force one to happen – or even win the first round. But they were sorely disappointed. Instead, the sitting president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, pulled off a surprise of his own: he captured nearly 53% of the presidential vote, heading off a second round, while Ince garnered only 31%. While he accepted his defeat, he looks set to remain a significant opponent to Erdoğan, especially if he becomes the leader of his party, the CHP.</p>
<p>There were many other surprises besides. The HDP, the main pro-Kurdish party, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-passes-electoral-threshold-keeps-seats-in-parliament-133738">managed to enter parliament</a> even though its leader spent the campaign in prison. The nationalist MHP, the AKP’s election ally, managed to get <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/mhp-secures-seats-in-parliament-beating-forecasts-133745">more than 11%</a> even though its leader didn’t organise a single rally. This will deprive the AKP of its outright parliamentary majority, meaning it will be more dependent than ever on the MHP.</p>
<p>At the same time, these results usher in a dramatic realignment of the political system. Turkey’s president will now hold <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-election-factbox/turkeys-powerful-new-executive-presidency-idUSKBN1JI1O1">extensive executive powers</a>, and parliament will be much less significant. There will be no prime ministry, and all ministers will be appointed from outside the parliament by the president.</p>
<p>For those who have been worrying about Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic rule until now, it seems their nightmare is about to enter a new phase. But Erdoğan isn’t out of the woods either.</p>
<h2>Hard times</h2>
<p>The country is facing one of its most serious economic crises of recent times, with the Turkish Lira <a href="http://money.cnn.com/video/news/2018/05/24/turkish-economy-lira.cnnmoney/index.html">worryingly weak</a> and interest rates <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/001fac1c-4872-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb">climbing</a>. Turkey is hosting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/23/what-turkeys-local-leaders-have-to-say-about-the-syrian-refugee-crisis/">at least 3.5m Syrian refugees</a> with no prospect of a peace settlement in the hellish conflict across the border. Erdoğan has only a few friends in the international arena besides Russia’s Vladimir Putin. The prospect of EU membership has evaporated, and the US is now far from a dependable ally.</p>
<p>The Kurdish crisis, too, is still waiting for a political settlement, but the AKP’s increased dependency on the staunchly nationalist MHP will make a political resolution on that front even harder.</p>
<p>More importantly, these elections leave Turkish society all the more polarised and divided. For the 50% that voted for parties other than the AKP in the parliamentary polls, Turkey is a country of fear, mistrust and uncertainty. Erdoğan will need to work hard to win their hearts and minds, though in recent years he has seemed mainly interested in catering to his own 50% of the population.</p>
<p>With the promises made by opposition candidates during the election campaign, Erdoğan has also promised a prosperous new Turkey, a high-quality democracy where the rule of law would be the norm. He promised to lift the state of emergency shortly after the elections, to build his controversial <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2fce38da-4317-11e8-97ce-ea0c2bf34a0b">Istanbul Canal</a>, to open public parks throughout the country, and give every neighbourhood its own state-run cafe where <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/erdogan-promises-free-tea-and-cake-to-salvage-election-gamble-wj2br907f">tea and cake would be free</a>.</p>
<p>Given the state of the economy, these promises sound like a tall order. But having run the country for 16 years, one thing Erdoğan has on his side is experience. Indeed, that’s why many of his supporters voted for him. But promises are all very well; the question now is whether Erdoğan will make good on them – and what will happen if he doesn’t.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has headed off a political humiliation, but making good on his extravagant promises won’t be easy.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Professor of Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/967522018-06-19T13:37:15Z2018-06-19T13:37:15ZTurkey resists Erdoğan on social media as snap election approaches<p>Turkey will soon go to the polls for the fifth time in less than four years. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced them on the same day that parliament <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/state-of-emergency-in-turkey-extended-for-seventh-time-130539">extended the national state of emergency</a> for the seventh time since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">botched coup attempt of July 2016</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan brought these elections forward to June 24 for his own political ends: to pre-empt an expected economic downturn, to take his rivals by surprise, and to ride a surge of nationalism stirred up by the recent military offensive in Afrin, Syria. This will be the first national vote since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">controversial constitutional referendum of April 2017</a>, which resulted in a narrow vote to establish a presidential system without any checks and balances. Should Erdoğan win this latest election, he will consolidate his power futher: the office of the prime minister will be abolished and taken over by a powerful executive presidency.</p>
<p>The election is taking place under the state of emergency’s restrictions, which have greatly distorted the campaign – but there are also signs that this time, Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) may find it more difficult to control events thanks to a highly motivated opposition and a lively social media environment.</p>
<p>Predicting the result is difficult, but the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/turkeys-economy-is-entering-a-slow-burning-crisis-analysts-warn.html">deteriorating economy</a>, an unexpected alliance among <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/02/turkish-opposition-parties-unite-against-erdogan-elections">four opposition parties</a>, and the energy brought by the candidacy of Republican People’s Party’s Muharrem Ince undoubtedly will make life difficult for AKP. </p>
<p>Could Erdoğan ever be beaten? Perhaps – but if only there were a fair election campaign. Instead, the election is taking place under Turkey’s state of emergency, which compromises democratic freedoms and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Before the state of emergency was imposed, the High Electoral Board could penalise TV stations that failed to give opposition parties fair airtime. That provision has now been revoked, and the consequences are already visible: according to a <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2018/05/15/rtuk-uyesi-chpli-ilhan-tasci-rtukun-yetkisi-alindi-trt-bir-kisi-icin-yayinda/">recent report</a>, TRT Haber, the publicly-owned and financed national broadcaster, has covered the AKP-Nationalist Movement Party alliance for 37 hours and 40 minutes, and allotted all opposition parties and their presidential candidates a combined 3 hours and 13 minutes. And to make matters worse, in March 2018, one of Turkey’s leading media groups, Dogan Media, was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/europe/turkey-media-erdogan-dogan.html">sold to a pro-government Turkish conglomerate</a>. </p>
<p>This is all forcing the opposition to take its campaign elsewhere – and in particular, to social media. </p>
<h2>Intimidation and resistance</h2>
<p>None of the parties has done so more effectively than the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and its imprisoned former co-leader, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/jailed-presidential-candidate-of-hdp-makes-landmark-pre-recorded-election-speech-from-prison-133431">Selahattin Demirtaş</a>. In the face of a de facto embargo by mainstream news sources, the HDP depends on social media to announce its parliamentary candidates, to mobilise supporters for its rallies, and to share its policy positions. The internet and the social media in particular also provide a space for many well-known journalists who’ve lost their jobs for criticising the government. They are launching new online newspapers and TV channels to provide alternative sources of information. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, everyday Turks are making a noise on their own, and using Erdoğan’s words against him. The president himself declared a few weeks before the vote that if the nation one day said “tamam” – meaning “done” or “enough” – he would step aside. Seizing upon this statement, the hashtag <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23TAMAM">#TAMAM</a> has been tweeted almost 2m times in various creative ways. The campaign has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22772352">revived the spirit of the 2013 Gezi Park protests</a> – the biggest popular challenge to the AKP’s rule to this day.</p>
<p>Obviously, a single hashtag campaign is hardly a reliable measure of national opinion, especially considering that <a href="http://konda.com.tr/tr/rapor/secmen-kumeleri-ak-parti-secmenleri/">only 20% of the population</a> uses Twitter. But in a country where thousands have been prosecuted for their social media posts, such a visible public campaign may be a harbinger of change. </p>
<p>Civic groups are also using social media platforms to recruit and train volunteers to increase electoral turnout and transparency in vote counting. These volunteers could be critical on polling day; recent changes in electoral law have introduced some <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-passes-controversial-new-voting-law-erdogan-akp/">controversial measures</a>, such as allowing security forces to attend polling stations if they are invited by a voter. Clearly this provision can be abused to intimidate voters, especially in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish south-east – and all experts agree that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-election-kurds/jailed-kurdish-leader-may-hold-key-in-turkish-elections-idUSKBN1JE0LJ">size of the Kurdish vote</a> will be crucial in determining the fate of Erdoğan and his party.</p>
<p>In fact, a <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/leaked-video-showing-erdogan-calling-for-tight-marking-of-hdp-goes-viral-133305">recently leaked video</a> shows Erdoğan instructing AKP’s local organisations to put “tight marking” on voters in every district in Istanbul to push the HDP below the national 10% threshold. The national threshold is the highest in the world, and has been <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/wasglo10&id=351">criticised</a> for many years for disenfranchising millions of voters, as happened most dramatically in 2002.</p>
<h2>The online battle</h2>
<p>Turning to social media is not without its risks. Since the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey has arrested thousands of people for allegedly supporting terrorism or insulting government officials on social media. According to the Turkish Interior Ministry, between January 20 and February 26 2018, authorities <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/27/turkey-crackdown-social-media-posts">detained 648 people</a> over social media posts criticising Turkey’s military operations in Afrin. </p>
<p>But Erdoğan’s distaste for social media dates back to the 2013 Gezi Park protests, when Twitter and other social media platforms were used extensively to bring people into the streets. Realising the potential of these platforms to disseminate information and enable collective action, he <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2013/06/05/social-media-is-worst-menace-to-society-says-turkey-pm-25-twitter-users-arrested/">decried Twitter</a> at the time as the “worst menace to society”, and in March 2014, Twitter was temporarily <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26677134">blocked in Turkey altogether</a>.</p>
<p>But technology has also come to Erdoğan’s rescue before. During the failed coup in 2016, he <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12206304/turkey-coup-facetime">gave an interview via FaceTime</a> to CNNTurk and called on the people of Turkey to take to the streets against the apparent putsch. Through this last-ditch call and harnessing social media, messaging services, as well as the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-erdogan-mosques.html">creative use of mosques</a> calling people on to the streets, he survived the night and continued consolidating his power.</p>
<p>Should an opposition candidate somehow defeat him, Erdoğan might well try to mobilise his supporters to delegitimise the election result. If he does, technology will certainly be one of his most important tools. But equally, all the major challenges to his rule in the last few years relied on social media to some extent. Each time, Erdoğan has managed to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2016.1165404?journalCode=fses20">take control of the information environment</a> and repel his rivals, tightening control on internet users, blocking social media platforms, harassing bloggers, and <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/turkey">manipulating online discussions</a>. But the internet still offers some hope – and this election will be a crucial test of its power to challenge Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rabia Karakaya Polat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A snap poll intended to boost the Turkish president’s power has stirred up online opposition to his increasing authoritarianism.Rabia Karakaya Polat, Visiting Fellow at the Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974772018-06-08T11:03:03Z2018-06-08T11:03:03ZTurkey’s currency turmoil and upcoming election – what you need to know<p>The Turkish lira has dropped more than 15% this year <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ae7cca1e-6a38-11e8-8cf3-0c230fa67aec">against the US dollar</a> and the government is doing all it can to stem the flow. Turkey’s central bank just raised the country’s main interest rate by 1.25 percentage points (to 17.75%) in a bid to stabilise the lira and halt surging inflation. This follows an emergency rate rise on May 23 of three percentage points.</p>
<p>With elections on the horizon, this is a trying time for the Turkish economy – despite the fact that the country’s GDP <a href="http://www.oecd.org/economy/turkey-economic-forecast-summary.htm">grew by an impressive 7.4% in 2017</a>. So what’s going on?</p>
<p>There are two sets of troubles facing Turkey at present. The first arises from a change in international financial markets and the second from domestic politics. With domestic economic conditions also deteriorating steadily, the overlapping of these two new sets of difficulties poses a formidable challenge to Turkey’s policymakers, unlike any other since the early 2000s.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222341/original/file-20180608-191965-7ra36b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Turkish lira has dramatically dropped against the dollar this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD&view=1Y">xe.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The post-2009 global financial crisis period brought happy days for emerging market countries such as Turkey. The dramatic fall in interest rates in the US, UK and eurozone, in response to the crisis, pushed substantial amounts of capital into emerging economies in search of higher yields. Such low – near zero – interest rates in the developed world remained in place for much longer than expected, allowing the emerging market bonanza to go on for a long time. </p>
<p>That era of easy money is now drawing to a close, with the sharply rising US interest rate, on the back of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/01/29/emerging-markets-taper-tantrum/">strengthening global economy</a>, reversing the flow of capital back into developed countries. Naturally, the greater an economy’s reliance on external finance, the worse the consequences of money leaving the country. So Turkey, with its <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/04/30/Turkey-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-45822">substantial current account deficit</a> and need for external finance, has been one of the most vulnerable economies to the tightening in international financial markets.</p>
<h2>A watershed moment approaches</h2>
<p>The second source of Turkey’s current headaches are political and snap elections were announced on April 18, to take place on June 24. This signifies far more than just another set of elections. They represent a watershed moment – for the first time the electorate will be voting for an executive president.</p>
<p>This follows a referendum in 2017 in which the electorate voted, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/16/turkey-referendum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-votes-presidential-powers">by a small margin</a>, to end the country’s current parliamentary system in favour of a presidential regime. The new regime will be a specially tailored one, with a president armed with extraordinary powers. </p>
<p>Given the scale of the proposed change in the form of government, the uncertainty arising from the upcoming elections is substantial and has wide-ranging implications. With so much at stake at the polls, the government has put in place an enormous election package, further worsening public finances. </p>
<p>It is a well-known principle in financial markets that the greater a borrower’s financing needs, the greater the premium – interest rates – required in securing funds. When combined with heightened political risk, particularly relevant in international borrowing, the outcome is that borrowing becomes even more costly. Hence, Turkey has been offering substantial interest rates to its lenders for some time now. </p>
<p>It is therefore not surprising that the Turkish lira plunged to its lowest ever value against the dollar in May, following the president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ca856e24-580d-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8">comments that</a> “interest rates are the mother and father of all evil” and that “he would take a more prominent role in monetary policy making” if elected on June 24. </p>
<p>The president also stated his long-held view that “interest rates should be reduced rather than raised to fight inflation” – which is <a href="http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Statistics/Inflation+Data/">currently running at 12%</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>The central bank has acted to control the damage, with two sets of interest rate rises in as many weeks. But Turkey’s challenges extend well beyond the currency markets. The country has been living under state of emergency laws since <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-you-really-pull-off-a-coup-detat-these-days-62600">the coup attempt</a> in July 2016. This allows the president to rule by decree and bypass parliament. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Turkish economy has weakened. The solid growth of 2017 followed a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5374cb5a-6e1f-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa">massive stimulus</a>, which is clearly unsustainable. There is now widespread evidence that the cheap credit that flew in when the going was good did not flow to productive uses. At the same time, it massively raised the foreign currency debt burden of the private sector, making the country increasingly vulnerable to currency depreciation.</p>
<p>Most importantly, the make-up of the new regime – in which the president is expected to be the dominant force – raises serious questions about the separation of power, the rule of law and the independence of the country’s institutions.</p>
<p>The excessive volatility in the currency markets that have followed the president’s threat to interfere with central bank independence, clearly shows that the price of one man rule may just be too high for the country to pay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gulcin Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Turkish lira has dropped more than 15% this year against the US dollar.Gulcin Ozkan, Professor of Economics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/904392018-04-24T03:12:10Z2018-04-24T03:12:10ZGallipoli commemorations of Turkish youth tell us much about politics in Turkey<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215844/original/file-20180423-75100-lf659o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish soldiers in a trench at Gallipoli. The way Turkish youth commemorate the battle tells us much about the country's politics.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/history/conflicts/gallipoli-and-anzacs/locations/walk-around-anzac-battlefield-sites/turkish">Ausstralian Dept of Veterans Affairs</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-19/turkish-president-erdogan-calls-snap-elections-on-june-24/9674472">ongoing political instability</a> and security concerns in Turkey, we are again likely to see a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/anzac-day-2017-numbers-fall-away-for-gallipoli-service-20170424-gvr9ub.html">smaller turnout</a> of Australians and New Zealanders for Anzac Day ceremonies at Gallipoli this year.</p>
<p>But thousands of Turkish youth will be on the battlefields at dawn. They will be re-enacting the march by the 57th Regiment to the highlands, where <a href="http://www.bigskypublishing.com.au/Books/Campaign-Series/The-Ottoman-Defence-Against-The-Anzac-Landing/1107/productview.aspx">Ottoman troops halted the Anzac advance in 1915</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-more-divided-turkey-could-change-the-way-we-think-about-gallipoli-74252">How a more divided Turkey could change the way we think about Gallipoli</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>We undertook fieldwork last Anzac Day on this ritual as part of a proposed larger research project examining how the memory of Gallipoli <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19475020.2016.1234965">has become central</a> to tension between Turkish republicans and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The republicans want to protect and restore the secular pro-Western origins of the republic, while the AKP wants to integrate Islam into the nation’s civil institutions and national imagination. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this memory politics more significant than in this re-enactment ritual, which under AKP rule has been renamed the Loyalty March for the 57th Regiment. </p>
<p>While Islamic influence on remembrance rites at Gallipoli has been growing for more than a decade, its political significance has increased dramatically since the July 2016 <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-failed-coup-explainer/">attempted coup</a>. This has proved to be a <a href="http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/10/political-narratives-and-authoritarian-consolidation-in-turkey/">transformative event for Turkish politics and society</a>. </p>
<h2>The 57th Regiment re-enactment</h2>
<p>In the last two decades, Turkish interest in the history of the Gallipoli campaign has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781317030850/chapters/10.4324%2F9781315557847-16">grown significantly</a>. It was here that the 57th Regiment came to prominence in Turkish collective memory as the military unit led by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Kemal_Atat%C3%BCrk">Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, later Atatürk</a>.</p>
<p>As founding father of modern Turkey and hero of the war of independence, Mustafa Kemal pushed the 57th Regiment to the highlands, preventing defeat in the campaign.</p>
<p>The origins of the re-enactment are closely tied to this mythology – it was originally known as the 57th Regiment March in the Track of Atatürk. Local university students first organised the commemoration in 2006, partly in response to the increasing number of Australian and New Zealand youth on the battlefields for Anzac Day. For the 90th anniversary the year before, the Anzac Day pilgrimage reached its zenith, with <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Gallipoli-stages-memorable-90th-services/2005/04/25/1114281498734.html">about 17,000 participants</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-view-remains-neglected-in-our-understanding-of-gallipoli-38658">Turkish view remains neglected in our understanding of Gallipoli</a>
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<p>The structure adopted for the first 57th Regiment re-enactment largely remains today. It involves an eight-kilometre hike from the regiment’s original base at Bigali village to the highlands of the battlefield. The ritual grew rapidly, with <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/anzac-battlefield/6AD313A2FFC40FF819474721B7C5E200">6,000 participants three years after the first march</a>.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, given the march’s popularity, the AKP assumed some control of the re-enactment through the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The government began funding the cost of travel and living expenses for young participants. It also oversees official registration and program co-ordination to cap attendance.</p>
<p>Such oversight allowed for representation of youth from around the country, including a greater percentage of participants from <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/30/turks-divided-on-erdogan-and-the-countrys-direction/">AKP stronghold areas</a> who would otherwise struggle to fund the travel. It is this “pious generation” that the AKP and its leader, Recep Erdoğan, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2016.1243332">have emphasised as central to AKP’s vision of a new Turkey</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/215852/original/file-20180423-75123-wh7kk0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish youth march in a Gallipoli re-enactment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ayhan Aktar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Cultural contradictions</h2>
<p>Historical re-enactment is about <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11745398.2014.885390">comprehending and experiencing the past</a> as it relates to the ordinary citizen. This commemorative form has proved particularly significant for AKP memory politics by allowing a focus on the martyrdom of 57th Regiment, which suffered heavy casualties. </p>
<p>By providing competition to the traditional heroic saviour narrative of Atatürk at Gallipoli, the AKP has been able to counter the secular pro-Western principles around which he founded the republic. Mandatory prayer sessions have been added at the beginning and end of the march. This has been justified as simulating the actions of the ordinary men who constituted the unit.</p>
<p>This more egalitarian historical focus, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781317122449/chapters/10.4324%2F9781315586632-9">which cultural scholars refer to as memory “from below”</a>, gives religion a place in commemorations of Gallipoli. This can also be seen in the increased recognition of individual martyrs through a focus on firsthand accounts of the religious zeal of Turkish soldiers against an infidel invader of their homeland. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-the-armenian-genocide-and-the-politics-of-memory-20747">Turkey, the Armenian genocide and the politics of memory</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Changes to the memorial landscape on the battlefields have aided this way of telling history while also promoting religious observance at the site. Fallen Turkish soldiers remained in mass graves after the war, a reflection of the stigma of Ottoman history in republican Turkey.</p>
<p>But, since 2005, Turkish authorities have <a href="https://issuu.com/bitsnbricks/docs/gelibolusartname_k_f81894a810a652">built 11 cemeteries for the fallen soldiers</a>. These have become popular sites for prayer by the 1 million-plus Turkish visitors to the battlefields per year, in large part funded as social tourism by municipalities. <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/15-new-martyrs-monuments-to-be-erected-in-turkeys-gallipoli-117822">Another 15 cemeteries are proposed</a>, with plans for accompanying outdoor mosques.</p>
<p>The AKP has a vested interest in advancing re-enactment as a commemorative form at Gallipoli, as it provides an opportunity for increased religious references and contexts. To ensure the re-enactment remains popular, though, the AKP has retained much of its original carnival-like character. Participants still take “selfies” and engage in jokes, laughter and joyful conversations while walking. </p>
<h2>Political opposition</h2>
<p>The recreational character of the re-enactment means participants have a range of motivations for their involvement. </p>
<p>Political chants and song, for example, are often recited by small groups. Some of the most common are the songs of the AKP’s political opponents, the Nationalistic Movement Party.</p>
<p>Other participants engage in religious chants such as <em>Allahu akbar</em> (Allah is the greatest) and <em>Tek yol İslam, tek yol şehadet</em> (Only path is Islam, only path is martyrdom).</p>
<p>Arguably the populist nature of the re-enactment legitimises other tourist and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00905992.2013.770732">unofficial remembrance forms at Gallipoli</a> that work to cap the state’s control over historical interpretation. </p>
<p>The 57th Regiment re-enactment is becoming a popular pilgrimage activity throughout the year. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), for example, had a re-enactment as part of its <a href="https://www.turkishminute.com/2017/08/28/chp-leader-kilicdaroglu-says-president-erdogan-scared-of-him/">four-day Justice Congress</a> at Gallipoli in August 2017. The congress was held to highlight violations of the justice system by Erdoğan following the attempted coup.</p>
<p>Like the main April 25 re-enactment, the success and political outcomes of such ritual displays are highly contingent. In the case of the CHP congress, its ability to challenge the AKP’s symbolic alignment with Gallipoli was hampered by photos appearing on social media of congress members drinking alcohol on the battlefields. The images caused a public scandal. A <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/three-chp-members-who-consumed-alcohol-at-galipolli-justice-congress-will-be-expelled-spokesperson-117265">CHP spokesperson</a> admitted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Such impertinent behavior is completely against the glorious memory of our Gallipoli martyrs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether Australians and New Zealanders will return to Gallipoli en masse for future Anzac Days, and how they will be received if they do, is uncertain. But ritual performances on the battlefields on April 25 are almost certain to remain politically significant in Turkey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90439/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At Gallipoli this Anzac Day, thousands of Turkish youth will re-enact a march that stopped the Anzac advance in 1915. The march has taken on new significance in Turkey since an attempted coup in 2016.Brad West, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, School of Creative Industries, University of South AustraliaAyhan Aktar, Chair Professor, Istanbul Bilgi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/901972018-02-06T13:41:36Z2018-02-06T13:41:36ZIs Turkey really facing an ‘exodus’? It’s not that simple<p>The decline of Turkey’s democracy has become a well-worn theme, and for good reason. The country has now jailed more journalists on charges related to their work than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/world/europe/journalists-jailed-committee-to-protect-journalists.html">any other in the world</a>, and many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/11/erdogan-turkey-academics-terrorism-violence-kurdish-people">academics</a> who’ve criticised the government’s policies towards the “Kurdish question” are now on trial. But recently, media observers have seemingly identified another <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42433668">alarming trend</a>: a “Turkish exodus”. </p>
<p>With the failed coup attempt of 2016, the ensuing crackdown, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s moves to consolidate his power, it seems many Turks are moving abroad to make new lives elsewhere. Some are <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/turkey-turkish-refugee-flow-to-europe.html">suggesting</a> that this amounts to a “new wave” of refugees fleeing the country. </p>
<p>The truth is rather more complicated. It’s too early to call this an “exodus”; many migration concepts, such as refugee, are regularly misused, with “flows” of people often exaggerated and romanticised. But nonetheless, the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-failed-coup-purge-scholars-loses-its-brains/">testimonies</a> of those who’ve left and who’ve stayed, as well as the statistics recorded so far, show alarming signs. It’s clear that years of intensifying polarisation have left a certain segment of Turkish society tired of living in their country. </p>
<p>Many people in the opposition think the rule of law is being eroded, that elections are not fair, that secularism is being replaced by a creeping Islamism (especially in the education sector), and that their lifestyles are in danger. As long as this disaffection persists, more emigration from Turkey to the West seems inevitable. And if the result is a steady outflow of privileged, educated citizens, it might cause a significant brain drain, with severe long-term consequences for Turkey’s society and economy. </p>
<p>Each of Turkey’s various military coups has triggered a surge of conflict-induced emigration, and the events of 2016 fit that pattern. But at the same time, much of this migration was underway before the coup attempt. </p>
<p>While it’s very hard to put a definitive number on how many Turkish citizens have left for political reasons – whether before 2016 or after – a heavy outflow is well underway. Some media outlets claim that more than 1,000 Turkish citizens are <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/12/27/571842458/turks-fleeing-to-greece-find-mostly-warm-welcome-despite-history">seeking asylum</a> in Greece. In Germany, some <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/hundreds-of-turkish-officials-seek-asylum-in-germany-report/a-40949657">600 senior-ranked Turkish officials</a> have sought asylum. </p>
<p>Some <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42433668">news sources</a> also reported the overall migration flows from Turkey to Europe during the last five years: 17,000 to the UK, 7,000 to Germany, and 5,000 to France. Numerous academic and non-academic <a href="https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/darbe-sonrasi-beyin-gocu-133592.html">experts</a> are underlining that many who haven’t left yet are still considering it. </p>
<p>But who are these people who’ve already left? Is Turkey really facing a “brain drain”?</p>
<h2>Why are they leaving?</h2>
<p>Despite the country’s deep polarisation, the 2016 putsch met resistance from all sections of society. It was the first coup attempt in modern Turkish history to be thwarted by masses of citizens pouring into the streets, while secular army officers stayed loyal to the government. And yet, life in Turkey was never going to return to normal afterwards. </p>
<p>The coup attempt left behind a degree of trauma that’s hard to understand from abroad, and which is one of the main reasons for the so-called exodus. The government used the coup attempt as a pretext to impose a never-ending <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-turkey-and-human-rights-is-a-state-of-emergency-the-new-normal-62913">state of emergency</a>, whose provisions it has used not only to fight against putschists, but also to suppress the democratic opposition.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://tr.boell.org/tr/2018/01/10/olaganlasan-ohal-khklarin-yasal-mevzuat-uzerindeki-etkileri">report</a> has shown the damage that emergency decrees are causing to Turkish democracy and discussed its long-term consequences. The impotence of parliament, the lack of judicial control, and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">controversial 2017 referendum</a> to greatly enhance the president’s power, which Erdoğan won by a tiny margin – all these have left a great many Turks hopeless enough to leave.</p>
<p>The emigrants who usually make the headlines are putschists seeking asylum in countries such as Greece. Their applications have caused <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-greece/turkey-says-doesnt-want-greece-to-become-safe-haven-for-coup-plotters-idUSKBN1CT1VM">serious tensions</a> between the Greek and Turkish governments. Some might claim that there is a need to draw a demarcation line between those and the others who are leaving: among the ones who left are very probably people who were members of the Gülen Movement, which is <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12204456/gulen-movement-explained">blamed</a> for the coup attempt, whereas other citizens leaving now have nothing to do with this movement but are obliged to bear the consequences of its activities. </p>
<p>In fact, the Gülen movement’s elite began to leave the country long before the coup, when their relationship with the AKP government began to deteriorate. Some of the ones who stayed are now trying to leave, sometimes resorting desperate measures; at the end of 2017, one <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/11/22/bodies-of-family-fleeing-persecution-found-on-lesvos-turkish-media-says/">family</a> drowned in the Mediterranean. </p>
<h2>Starting again</h2>
<p>Other specific groups are under pressure too. After the government and judiciary cracked down on more than a thousand academics who signed a <a href="http://criticallegalthinking.com/2017/12/11/trials-begin-turkey-academics-peace/">petition </a> to call the government to end its security operations in south-east Turkey, many of the signatories applied for scholarships or found jobs abroad, and they left the country. It is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/01/04/575682505/turkish-government-crackdown-forces-intellectuals-to-flee">claimed</a> that 698 of them applied for scholarships from the international network <a href="https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/">Scholars at Risk</a> in order to find a temporary academic position elsewhere. Some of those academics are also applying for asylum abroad as their passports have been annulled.</p>
<p>There is also an increasing tendency for secular, white collar university graduates to look for job opportunities abroad. Some wealthy citizens purchase property in Spain, Portugal or Greece to obtain European resident permits. It’s now common on Turkish TV to see commercials from estate agents offering so-called <a href="http://www.goldenvisas.com/portugal/">golden visas</a> (a visa through wealth or investment in real estate). Golden visas provide a safe way for the privileged to escape.</p>
<p>Some of the emigrants are finding jobs abroad before they leave; others are testing the waters by immigrating temporarily to try their luck at making a life elsewhere. As the Turkish diaspora grows, it increasingly reflects the contours of the various conflicts at home. </p>
<p>This is not without its complications. Naturally, some who left don’t want to engage with politics at all, preferring to make a fresh start. But for the Gülenists, things aren’t so simple. They are marginalised by the diaspora more generally, as many opposition groups remember how the Gülenists persecuted them when they still had good relations with the government.</p>
<p>It’s crucial not to neglect the dissenting who remain in Turkey, whether or not they have the means to leave. They are resisting the state of emergency while trying to push the government to lift it and restore democratic principles. Their stories matter – and not least since they have more leverage in pushing their country towards a more democratic future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Yes, a lot of Turkish citizens are looking for a chance to start new lives abroad – but not all of them are doing it for the same reasons.Bahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityEmre Eren Korkmaz, Post-doctoral Researcher in Migration and Refugees, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/891122017-12-21T13:54:31Z2017-12-21T13:54:31ZHow Erdoğan subjected Turkey to a year of cynical doublespeak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200220/original/file-20171220-4973-f0p8ja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/referenda-photos/turkish-president-erdogan-tells-turkish-voters-in-germany-not-to-vote-for-cdu-spd-greens-photos-53711952">EPA/Tumay Berkin</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">winning an April referendum</a> to greatly enhance the powers of his office, Turkey’s president, Recip Tayyip Erdoğan, spent 2017 pursuing his ultimate priority: to formally cement and extend his one-man rule, which he can next do at the 2019 elections. This he has done with a mixture of political manipulation, opportunistic populism, and Orwellian doublespeak.</p>
<p>While the Turkish president is officially meant to be politically neutral, there has never been much pretence that Erdoğan isn’t still fighting the corner of his “former” party, the AKP. And over the course of 2017, this has only become more apparent. He is using the AKP and various state institutions under his influence as lighting rods for criticism that might otherwise be directed at him. </p>
<p>He has something to say about anything and everything – from tax policy to window tinting on cars to the number of foreign football players allowed in professional squads, nothing escapes his hawkish pronouncements. The pattern is consistent: a state body or the government comes in for criticism, and then Erdoğan the patriarch steps in to clear up the mess and appease the people. </p>
<p>This year’s most striking example was an autumn argument over tax hikes. The Turkish economy has lately been showing signs of weakness. While growth figures have looked good for the last 15 years, political turbulence coupled with an unproductive consumption- and construction-centric economy has brought the Turkish Lira <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/11/turkey-feuds-lira-falls.html">to sobering lows</a> against the Dollar, Euro and Pound. </p>
<p>In a bid to address this problem, the parliamentary government announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-economy-tax/turkey-to-discuss-motor-vehicle-tax-hike-at-mondays-cabinet-meeting-deputy-pm-idUSL8N1MD0SW">legislation to increase taxes</a> from January 2018, the most controversial of which was a proposed 40% tax on motor vehicles. </p>
<p>After a public outcry, Erdoğan flaunted his influence by publicly suggesting the tax increase be limited to 15-20%. While the net result is an increase in taxes, the public announcements in Turkish are presented as a tax cut brought about by Erdoğan’s influence. This adds to the overall impression that Turkey’s authoritarian drift is taking on distinctively Orwellian characteristics.</p>
<h2>Playing both sides</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">referendum result in April</a> was very narrow and heavily disputed. The upshot is that if Erdoğan wants to secure his position for the long term, he needs to win over the less amenable secular and republican portion of the polarised electorate who voted against his plans.</p>
<p>For years, high-profile figures from the religious AKP controversially did not attend public celebrations of secular-republican events, including key anniversaries: the founding of the Ankara parliament (April 23), the start of the War of Independence (May 19) and the declaration of the republic (October 29). But ever since the party’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/28/turkey.marktran1">Abdullah Gül</a> became president in 2007, the government has downplayed these events and even banned large assemblies commemorating them on public-protection grounds – even as it organises large rallies to mark the opening of bridges and roads, or to celebrate the defeat of <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">2016’s bizarre pseudo-coup</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, Erdoğan long refused to refer to the first president of Turkey by his legal surname, Atatürk, preferring instead Gazi Mustafa Kemal – a name with pre-republican, Ottoman and military overtones. But more recently, Atatürk has been mentioned more warmly in the pro-AKP press and by Erdoğan himself. This is an attempt to appear conciliatory to the secular voter without losing ground with the AKP’s base, who may take a dim view of attempts to build bridges with the “wrong” people.</p>
<p>So far, whitewashing the past and bending the truth appear to have little bearing on voting behaviour by the AKP base. Its members rallied behind the president after he was <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-1.711273">accused of corruption</a> and took his side in the developing rift with exiled cleric and Erdoğan critic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/fethullah-gulen-who-is-the-man-blamed-by-turkeys-president-for-coup-attempt">Fetullah Gülen</a> from 2013 onwards. The AKP’s years of association and alliance with the Gülenists simply were swept under the carpet and replaced with civil, political and military purges; to be labelled a Gülenist today is as good as being labelled a terrorist.</p>
<h2>Having it both ways</h2>
<p>All this doublespeak and electoral expedience does not mask Erdoğan’s march towards further authoritarianism. The Orwellian manoeuvrings are happening in the face of palace diktats which force powerful mayors out of office, among them Ankara’s 23-year leader <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/10/turkey-ankara-mayor-resigns-under-erdogan-pressure.html">Melih Gokcek</a>. Added are issues such as that of Reza Zarrab, the Turkish-Iranian citizen on trial in the US for breaching sanctions to Iran and a central figure in the corruption allegations of 2013.</p>
<p>The Zarrab case brought out the latest example of Erdoğan’s doublespeak. On December 3, he <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-economy-business/turkeys-erdogan-says-businessmen-moving-assets-abroad-are-traitors-idUKKBN1DX0LB">denounced businessmen moving assets out of Turkey as traitors</a>, then followed up the next day with a speech indicating that he was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-04/erdogan-urges-government-to-prevent-smuggling-of-wealth-abroad">against new regulation on capital transfers</a>, and that anyone should be able to move money as they wish. </p>
<p>It’s hard to tell if this was an attempt to rally a broad base of support, or whether the president simply realised that further capital controls might make it harder to clean up Turkey’s reputation for kleptocracy and deep corruption. Either way, the truth is, as ever, opaque and subject to manipulation.</p>
<p>With the aid of a variously muzzled and compliant media, political purges, elections held under states of emergency, and plain old cronyism, Erdoğan is doing everything in his power to achieve the final push towards absolute authority. Superficially, he carefully and selectively accepts blame for the party’s failures and remains open to the secular part of Turkish society – but nevertheless, the whole nation is increasingly identified with one man. And that is nothing short of dangerous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89112/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mustafa Coban does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With his one-man grip on the Turkish state increasingly secure, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has spent a year fighting for every populist cause he can.Mustafa Coban, PhD Candidate, Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/764252017-05-05T15:50:17Z2017-05-05T15:50:17ZKurds brace for an uncertain future in post-referendum Turkey<p>Turkey is still taking stock of its <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">referendum</a> on sweeping constitutional reforms, which delivered a crucial victory for the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – albeit under highly contested circumstances. </p>
<p>The anti-Erdoğan “No” camp, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Kurdish-led, left-leaning People’s Democracy Party (HDP), <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/chp-blasts-election-board-referendum-result-170417034950684.html">claim</a> that about 1.5m ballots in favour of “Yes” were counted despite having no official stamp, which should have rendered them invalid. But their complaints have failed to overturn the result, and the new political reality is taking shape. Turkey’s parliamentary system will be restructured, greatly enhancing Erdoğan’s power.</p>
<p>The new “super-presidency” system is the ultimate realisation of the “New Turkey” rhetoric <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/turkey-erdogan-new-turkey-religious-conservatives.html">long propagated</a> by Erdoğan’s right-wing populist (in a “conservative democrat” discourse) ruling party, Justice and Development (AKP). Whatever the coming years hold, they will be full of surprises. No one, including Erdoğan and the AKP, seems quite sure what to expect – but the implications of this new order are especially unclear for the Kurds. </p>
<p>In the absence of a clear prognosis, the future of the so-called “Kurdish right problem” is the subject of intense debate on all sides. Is New Turkey a renewed Ottoman <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0231.xml">millet system</a> of religious politics, an Islamist project in the style of the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170217-turkeys-erdogan-muslim-brotherhood-is-ideological-not-terrorist-organisation/">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, or a chance to realise the long-held dream of Kurdish self-governance?</p>
<p>The Kurds briefly seemed to have a strong political voice in the form of the HDP. The party is noticeably different to the pro-Kurdish political parties of yore, espousing a leftist populist discourse of equality and liberty for all against the AKP’s growing conservative authoritarianism and neoliberal elitism. It’s also relatively popular among Kurdish movements: its efforts to mobilise the passion stirred up by the 2013 Gezi Park protests seemed to pay off at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">June 2015 election</a>, where it cleared the 10% national vote threshold to win seats in parliament, netting 80 MPs. </p>
<p>The result was a beacon of hope for many in Turkey and beyond, but it faded fast. At a second election later in 2015, Erdoğan <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">won an outright majority</a> and formed a government, while the HDP lost 20 of its hard-won seats. Erdoğan’s approach to the Kurdish issue has since then been more hardline than ever. </p>
<h2>A more muscular approach</h2>
<p>The president accuses previous governments of being “weak” in the face of the militarised Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). He blames their failure on treacherous cadres within the police, military, and intelligence services – the same malign infiltrators he accuses of masterminding the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">failed coup attempt</a> in July 2016. Expunging these factions, he says, will allow him to take a more muscular, highly militarised approach.</p>
<p>When the so-called Kurdish peace process ultimately <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/turkey-kurdish-peace-process-150729074358423.html">broke down</a> in 2015, the AKP government duly turned away from a peaceful path to a military one, <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/09/29/extension-of-state-of-emergency-to-benefit-people-president-erdogan-says">vowing</a> to vanquish the PKK altogether – all this with the zealous support of Turkish ultra-nationalists.</p>
<p>Violence soon returned to south-eastern Turkey. The HDP’s “human security” agenda was overwhelmed by a new armed conflict between security forces and the PKK’s youth branch, the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-kurdish-rebels-new-youth-wing-or-deep-pkk.html">Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement</a>, who are using heavy weapons, digging trenches and erecting barricades down the side streets of cities and towns.</p>
<p>To listen to Erdoğan, you might think none of this was happening. In his post-referendum victory speech, he claimed his support had substantially grown in the east and south-east, even though those regions voted “No” by large margins. The HDP counter-claims that what advances Erdoğan made can be chalked up to fraud, unfairness, and outright coercion. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in 2016, almost all the elected pro-Kurdish municipal authorities were <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/28-mayors-replaced-with-trustees-by-turkish-government.aspx?pageID=238&nID=103784&NewsCatID=341.0">replaced</a> by state-appointed “trustees” and elected mayors <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-kurds-idUSKCN11H065">arrested</a>, while the tough state of emergency law has securitised the region as never before.</p>
<p>Erdoğan seems to be looking for a new political representative for the Kurdish movement, one that will be more likely to toe his line. But as long as he oppresses the HDP, Kurdish politics will have no single mainstream political voice. The non-PKK, secular, socialist or Kurdistani (pro-Kurdish autonomy) political parties have yet to mobilise efficiently enough to carry much weight. The ensuing vacuum might be filled by a new actor – and not necessarily a secular, peaceful one.</p>
<p>One faction vying for the lead role is <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21590595-islamist-party-turkeys-kurds-huda-pars-emergence">Hüda-Par</a>, a radical Islamist party with links to the Hizbullah paramilitary group. But the majority of Kurds still associate Hizbullah with brutal violence, and secular pro-Kurdish factions are still popular, particularly since their <a href="http://aranews.net/2017/01/syrian-kurds-celebrate-second-anniversary-kobane-liberation/">victory against the so-called Islamic State</a> just across the Syrian border.</p>
<p>So long as the Kurds lack a unified political voice, the newly empowered Erdoğan will continue to deal with them violently rather than peacefully – and their future in Turkey will remain out of their control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omer Tekdemir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With President Erdoğan increasingly empowered, the ‘Kurdish question’ is at the forefront once again.Omer Tekdemir, Research Associate, School of History, Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760322017-04-16T20:49:57Z2017-04-16T20:49:57ZErdoğan declares victory in his pursuit of one-man rule<p>After a long and contentious referendum campaign, Turkey has voted to endorse a package of constitutional changes that will turn the country’s long-established parliamentary system into a presidential one. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39612562">declared</a> that his proposals had passed, with just over 51% of votes in favour.</p>
<p>While opposition parties have said they’ll challenge the result, its significance of this result should not be underestimated. This is a watershed moment in Turkish history, and it will fundamentally change the republican system established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923. Many in Turkey and beyond view these constitutional changes as the building blocks of an authoritarian system. </p>
<p>Until now a largely ceremonial role, the presidency will become an executive office. The Turkish president will now have far greater discretion to appoint and remove ministers, judges and other government officials; they will also be able to represent a political party, rather than staying independent from politics as head of state. They will be able to dissolve parliament easily, and will enjoy power over all aspects of Turkish politics and society. </p>
<p>This will dramatically erode badly needed checks and balances that have already been slowly chipped away. While the country’s various opposition parties confront a very uncertain future, Erdoğan will be able to strengthen his power base by appointing a new government, including deputy presidents and senior members of the state bureaucracy. </p>
<p>To understand how Turkey got here and think about what comes next, it pays to remember the conditions under which the vote was taken. Turkish voters made this crucial decision under a <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-turkeys-state-of-emergency-social-media-is-more-important-than-ever-65809">state of emergency</a> that’s been in place since the failed coup attempt of July 2016. Ever since, many Turks have seen their basic human rights violated, with opposition groups – including academics, journalists, public figures and politicians – variously dismissed, silenced or arrested. </p>
<p>One of the strongest opposition parties, the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) has seen its elected members of parliament and mayors in southeastern Turkey arrested and put in jail. Since the coup attempt, many civil society organisations and media outlets have been banned and closed, denying the “no” campaign crucial access to nationwide audiences. </p>
<p>This is the atmosphere in which the vote was conducted – and by almost any important measure, it was far from a level playing field. </p>
<h2>Stacked deck</h2>
<p>The “yes” campaign was supported by the ruling party and Erdoğan, whereas the “no” campaign was supported by the HDP, the Republican People’s Party, and a ragbag group of politicians from the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party. These groups were prevented from organising rallies in various parts of the country, and were <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/Erdogans_Turkey">smeared</a> as traitors and terrorists by the ruling party and president – who was legally meant to stay neutral during the campaign.</p>
<p>As the journalist Patrick Cockburn has <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/turkey-erdogan-referendum-democracy-europe-middle-east-a7673691.html">described</a>, the campaign’s unfairness was plain to see in the airtime the different parties enjoyed on the state television. As of March 30, Erdoğan and his ruling AKP received 4,113 minutes of airtime; the CHP, which received 25% of the vote in the last election, got just 216 minutes. The HDP, which won more than 10% of the vote at the last national elections, got just one minute. If it hadn’t been for social media, the “no” campaign might have had no voice at all.</p>
<p>More depressing still are reports of outright abuse. In an <a href="http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/310646?download=true">interim report</a> from its referendum observation mission, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights described the campaign as far from fair or free, pointing not just to pro-“yes” media bias but to incidents of police harassment and even violence against “no” campaigners.</p>
<p>The referendum result lays bare Turkey’s serious problems. This is a polity polarised and a society deeply divided. Having robbed the presidency of any veneer of neutrality, Erdoğan can make no claim to be a president for all Turks – but from now on, he won’t even need to pretend to be.</p>
<p>The core institutions of Turkey’s once-growing democracy are set to be dismantled. Civil society structures, freedom of speech and assembly, and the separation of powers are all in mortal jeopardy. In their place will arise a new style of government that could be called <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/blog/global-insight/putinism-new-russian-ideology-0">Putinistic</a>, albeit with a distinctly Ottoman flavour. </p>
<p>Erdoğan will continue to flaunt his status as a democratically elected president, governing in the name of the “New Turkey” he claims to be building – and he will now have a free hand to be as undemocratic as he likes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After years of creeping authoritarianism, Turkey’s president is now set up to take the reins in earnest.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityBahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/758192017-04-12T15:46:13Z2017-04-12T15:46:13ZTurkey holds its breath and prepares for an explosive referendum<p>When the Turkish government announced its plans to transform itself into an executive presidency, no-one was particularly surprised. This plan, which has been <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-referendum-recep-tayyip-erdogan-power-grab-constitution/">described</a> as “the most radical political change since the modern republic’s foundation in 1923”, is the culmination of a steady drift towards authoritarianism in Turkey which began a decade ago. </p>
<p>It’s set to come to a head on April 16, when the country will vote on whether to endow its president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with near-total control over the major state institutions – military, financial and political. If Erdoğan wins the day, the nexus of political power in Turkey will become the huge marble encrusted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2014/oct/29/turkeys-new-presidential-palace-unveiled-in-pictures">presidential palace</a> which he ordered built on the outskirts of the country’s capital, Ankara, at a reported cost of US$350m. The whole scenario has much more in common with a central Asian dictatorship than an aspirant EU member.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s camp within the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party or AKP, argues that what’s proposed is nothing more than a typical executive presidency, with the head of state doubling as head of government. They are quick to compare it to the American system – but less eager to highlight the proposed system’s near-total lack of checks and balances, which have been eroded over the past decade by the same president who now wants to be given full control. </p>
<p>It’s been a full decade since Erdoğan lost hope that the EU would let Turkey join it, and began to consolidate his domestic power base instead. Turkey’s long quest for liberal democracy soon went into reverse. Since then, the country’s scrutinising forces – the military, the news media, the judiciary, the academy – have seen their power and independence incrementally pared back to a point where the rule of law, freedom of expression and association are hopelessly compromised.</p>
<p>This semi-authoritarian state of affairs is a great help to the “yes” (evet) camp. Government loyalists have a strong presence on social media and control most news outlets. Yet the referendum seems too close to call, and the campaign has polarised Turkey’s people into two camps: those who believe everything Erdoğan says, and those who believe nothing. </p>
<h2>Nearly there</h2>
<p>In authoritarian regimes where leaders are used to getting their way, close outcomes can be dangerous, and so it goes in Turkey. Erdoğan is a skilful populist operator; he plays to the gallery by demonising anyone who opposes him, whether at home or abroad, as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte found when his Turkish counterpart accused him of <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/7/14844702/erdogan-deniz-yucel-turkey-nazis-germany">behaving like the Nazis</a>. But whereas his foreign targets can lick their wounds at a distance, the consequences are more serious for domestic opponents. </p>
<p>More than 80 journalists are <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2016/12/journalists-jailed-record-high-turkey-crackdown.php">languishing in prison</a> for simply questioning AKP policy. Reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/23/turkish-journalists-solitary-confinement-maltreatment-jail">maltreatment and even torture</a> are commonplace. Many Turks living and working abroad who have criticised the AKP fear they will be arrested if they return home to a country where criticising the president on Twitter is now a criminal offence. </p>
<p>As things stand, Erdoğan already exerts something close to the total control he hopes the referendum will formalise. Turkey has been in a state of emergency since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">attempted coup d’etat of July 2016</a>. The attempted coup has also been the pretext to purge state of opposition voices, particularly followers of exiled Sufi cleric <a href="https://theconversation.com/fethullah-gulen-public-intellectual-or-public-enemy-62887">Fetullah Gülen</a>. </p>
<p>For Erdoğan, this is all the culmination of a ten-year quest to take back control from the <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0440">secular Kemalist elite</a> which dominated Turkey for so long – and he isn’t going to let the chance slip through his fingers now without a struggle. </p>
<h2>Close calls</h2>
<p>If the “yes” camp wins, Turkey can expect further AKP domination. If Erdoğan loses, he may start to play even tougher than he has done already, especially with the progressive Kurdish HDP party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) and the wider Kurdish issue. </p>
<p>The HDP’s leaders are already in prison on terrorism charges, and Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey have seen many civilians killed by government forces. There is always a danger the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/OHCHR_South-East_TurkeyReport_10March2017.pdf">de facto civil war</a> in eastern Turkey could spread westwards.</p>
<p>The international community has said remarkably little to criticise this authoritarian drift – perhaps because Turkey holds serious sway over major problems affecting both the EU and the US. </p>
<p>European leaders worried about anti-migrant populism depend on Ankara to control the number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-jordan-and-lebanon-face-an-uncertain-2017-70747">refugees</a> heading west from Syria. Meanwhile, the US faces the awkward truth that its ostensible NATO ally is mired in the bloody Syrian quagmire, and possibly <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-kurds-have-ended-up-at-the-heart-of-middle-eastern-geopolitics-heres-why-74193">fighting a different enemy</a> – but so long as Washington needs Turkey in the fight against Islamic State and Bashar al-Assad, it cannot publicly scold its president.</p>
<p>If Turkey ends up voting “yes” by a close margin, the lid will stay on these problems for a while yet. But they won’t go away – and nor will Turkey lose its crucial geopolitical position.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75819/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Martin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever the result of Turkey’s long-awaited vote on presidential powers, things will get worse before they get better.Natalie Martin, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/746212017-04-04T02:57:32Z2017-04-04T02:57:32ZTurkey on the verge of democide as referendum looms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160888/original/image-20170315-5324-uym829.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkey may soon become one of the few countries in the history of democracy to vote for the death of democracy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/babasteve/6344040600/">Steve Evans/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The Turkish people will vote in a momentous constitutional referendum on April 16. If adopted, the proposals would drastically alter the country’s political system.</p>
<p>The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) introduced the 18 proposed changes to the constitution, with the support of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Together they secured the minimum 330 parliamentary votes required to launch a public referendum.</p>
<p>Though constitutional referendums are not uncommon in <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/3637">Turkey’s political history</a>, this particular one is extremely important in terms of the very nature of the country’s political regime. The proposed amendments would take Turkey away from its current parliamentary system. In its place, the country would have an executive presidency “a la Turka”.</p>
<h2>What will ‘reform a la Turka’ look like?</h2>
<p>Despite the arguments of the AKP government, the amendments will not strengthen democracy. Quite the opposite. </p>
<p>In the most basic terms, the referendum presents a choice between parliamentary democracy (as weak as it has been in Turkey) and legally institutionalising <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmet-erdi-ozturk-tar-g-zayd-n/turkey-s-draft-constitutional-amendments-harking-back-to-1876">single-man rule</a>.</p>
<p>The amendments will abolish the post of prime minister and make the president the official head of the executive. The president will then name one or more vice presidents who will inherit the same powers for 45 days in the event the president cannot carry out their duties. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160887/original/image-20170315-5350-fw09hs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The proposed constitutional changes were drafted with one person in mind – President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rt_erdogan/18390076314/">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan/flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The president will be able to remain leader of their political party and be given the power to choose cabinet ministers. The president will also be able to appoint these individuals from outside parliament without any vetting processes or being accountable to the public. </p>
<p>Parliament will still be regarded as the legislature, but only in theory. Deputies will continue to draft, discuss and vote on new laws, which will be forwarded to the president for final approval. </p>
<p>However, the president will be able to bypass parliament completely and introduce legislation by issuing decrees with the force of law. The president will also have the power to dissolve parliament and call new elections.</p>
<p>Constitutional law experts like <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/law-experts-criticize-turkeys-proposed-constitutional-amendment/a-36764121">Ergun Ozbudun</a> have strongly criticised the proposed structure, saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What we have here is the weakening of legislation while the president, with full executive powers, forms a parliament under his influence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The constitutional amendments will leave the president in charge of the state budget. As the sole authority to declare a state of emergency, the president will also have complete control over security policy and any decisions related to the deployment of military force. The right to declare war, however, will remain with parliament. </p>
<p>The president will have the power to appoint all senior civil servants, and to restructure ministries and public institutions at his discretion.</p>
<p>Most disturbingly, judicial independence will disappear as the amendments will allow the president to appoint half of the country’s most senior judges. The other half will be elected by parliament. This means that if the president and the majority party in the Grand National Assembly happen to be from one political party (as is currently the case), a single authority will appoint all the members of Turkey’s high judicial bodies.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3sBjE5wbwDg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘I hope this will be good for our country. I hope this will be the beginning of a new era.’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Let not the government and its well-funded army of experts and <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/media-ownership-monitor-government-control-over-turkish-media-almost-complete">media outlets</a> fool anyone. The regime’s amendments have been drafted to personally benefit the current president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-erdogan-becoming-a-turkish-dictator-63294">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>. The aim is to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/turkeys-president-erdogan-approves-constitutional-boost-to-his-powers">consolidate</a> all powers – executive, legislative and judicial – in one office.</p>
<h2>An ironic death</h2>
<p>If the Turkish public votes for the constitutional changes, the citizens will effectively terminate democracy in their country. </p>
<p>With surveys so far indicating a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/elections/2017/03/14/majority-of-polls-predict-yes-result-in-referendum">slight majority</a> for the “yes” vote, Turkey may become one of the few countries in the history of democracy to democratically choose the death of democracy. It would be a vote to commit what <a href="http://www.johnkeane.net/portfolio_page/life-and-death-of-democracy/">John Keane</a> calls “democide”, or democratic suicide.</p>
<p>The fundamental challenge for democracy is that everything is open to challenge and repeal when supported by enough numbers.</p>
<p>In fact, the inclusive nature of this political system necessarily exposes it to diverse views and competing ideas. There are few mechanisms to prevent ideals capable of ending democracy from entering its midst.</p>
<p>So actors who reject democracy are able to slip into the system. And when large enough numbers support these individuals and groups, they can mobilise to topple the very system that enabled their accession. </p>
<p>Simply stated, the difference between democracy and authoritarianism can be a matter of popular choice.</p>
<h2>Democracy at the mercy of its own frailty</h2>
<p>We must be awake to democracy’s fragility. Once constituted, it is not guaranteed to progress on a smooth, linear path. </p>
<p>The nature of democracy ensures it remains susceptible to ending its own life. If the public supports it, its existence can be brought to a decisive end as much as it may be allowed to flourish.</p>
<p>Turkey’s proposed presidential system will remain multi-party, still holding regular elections every five years. Yet the relatively powerless parliament, faced with a presidency that has the constitutional mandate to form government, influence the legislature, control state institutions, issue a state of emergency and dissolve parliament almost unimpeded, offers little protection to a democracy in the face of serious attack and popular repeal.</p>
<p>If the “yes” vote wins, the Turkish people will not have to wait long to see the end of their <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-coup-erdogans-tightening-grip-will-test-relations-with-the-west-62706">long-troubled</a> democracy. The AKP is fervently pushing for the presidential system with one person in mind – Erdoğan. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-tragedy-of-turkish-democracy-in-five-acts-62678">Turkey’s decline</a> into authoritarian rule under Erdoğan’s leadership certainly does not provide any hope that he would, given these extraordinary powers, abide by any democratic principles. </p>
<p>Taking advantage of his electoral <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-new-ataturk-turkey-coup-eu/">popularity</a>, the regime change is the AKP and Erdoğan’s attempt to institutionalise and legitimise the creeping in of one-man rule that has long been occurring under their reign.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160890/original/image-20170315-5321-19ez72q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkey’s uncertain future proves that democracy remains susceptible to ending its own life.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Steffen Kamprath/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If Turkish citizens grant unrestrained power to Erdoğan, they will have done so with full knowledge of the illiberal and repressive character of his rule. There will be no pleading innocent. Nevertheless, the average citizen will not have played as significant a role as the political elite in bringing about democracy’s demise in Turkey.</p>
<p>The elites, after all, are the mass mobilisers, the agenda setters and the visionaries of their societies. All too often, participation in modern representative democracy is reduced to the casting of a single ballot. </p>
<p>But, even with this in mind, it will be true to say that, by giving their consent, the Turkish people were complicit in committing democide.</p>
<p>With Turkey’s impending democide, we can perhaps begin to understand just how precarious a thing democracy is, and how easily it can be lost. The open plain of democracy means that there is nothing that cannot be reworked, contested or cancelled. Even democracy itself, when backed by sufficient numbers, can be made to walk the plank. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>The author dedicates this article to the amazing faculty of academics who became family during his nearly year-long stay in Istanbul in 2016, and to every academic in Turkey who lives with the constant threat of jail, dismissal, beatings and public slander.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tezcan Gumus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the ‘yes’ vote prevails in this month’s constitutional referendum, the Turkish people may be in the rare position of democratically approving the death of their own democracy.Tezcan Gumus, PhD Candidate, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744692017-03-16T12:14:40Z2017-03-16T12:14:40ZWhy Erdoğan is chasing Turkey’s overseas voters so hard<p>Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is campaigning to greatly expand his presidential powers in an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38883556">impending constitutional referendum</a>. To win, he needs votes from the huge Turkish diaspora. His government is going after them with gusto – and in the course of just a few days, those efforts threw up a fully-fledged diplomatic fracas. </p>
<p>The Netherlands, staging an election of its own, stopped political campaigning by Turkey’s officials on its own territory, used dogs and water cannons to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/turkey-summons-dutch-envoy-rotterdam-police-action-170313102534967.html">disperse Turkish demonstrators</a> in Rotterdam, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/12/netherlands-bars-turkish-ministers-as-nazi-remnant-dispute-escalates">barred Turkish ministers</a> from addressing rallies. </p>
<p>The Erdoğan government was livid. Ministers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/erdogan-brands-dutch-nazi-remnants-for-barring-turkish-mp">called the Dutch</a> “Nazi remnants”, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-netherlands-rotterdam-protests-recep-tayyip-erdogan-president-dutch-election-geert-wilders-a7625196.html">threatened to retaliate</a> in the “harshest ways”, including with sanctions, and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-referendum-netherlands-idUSKBN16I0RI?il=0">sealed off</a> the Dutch embassy and consulate in Turkey. </p>
<p>The stand-off dragged in other countries, too: Germany, Denmark and France all expressed their strong support for the Dutch, and NATO officials intervened to demand respectful relations among its members. </p>
<p>This is not a normal turn of events. Turkey has been campaigning for several years among the Turkish diaspora in Europe, including on Dutch territory, without any incidents like this. So why did this stand-off take place, and why now?</p>
<p>Part of the reason was of course the overlap with the Netherlands’ own parliamentary elections, which were already in the international limelight before the Rotterdam incident. Populist candidate Geert Wilders and his Party of Freedom (PVV) have for years been campaigning against what they call the “Islamisation of the Netherlands”, railing against immigrants and open borders. The sight of Erdoğan’s authoritarian, nationalistic politics playing out on Dutch streets handed Wilders an opportunity to rail against the Dutch government’s supposed weakness, and to decry its support for migrants and the EU. </p>
<p>In the end, Wilders’s party <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39287689">underperformed</a> at the polls, and the incumbent prime minister won a resounding victory – but the spectacle of the days before the election was sobering nonetheless. And leaving the Dutch election aside, something else is happening, too: while Erdoğan has been stirring up foreign voters to win elections for years, the way he is using them is changing.</p>
<h2>Home and away</h2>
<p>Large-scale voting from abroad is a relatively new political phenomenon. Its effects are still poorly understood, and it is more associated with the “low politics” of party dynamics than with the “high politics” of inter-state relations. In countries that allow dual citizenship and voting from abroad, parties often develop “extraterritorial” campaigns to harness the diaspora vote. </p>
<p>Many countries solicit emigrants for votes all over the world, and for many reasons. Latin American countries lead the charge. Mexican politicians, for instance, sometimes <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-mexico-leftist-idUSKBN15S0K7">campaign in California</a>, home to millions of emigrants. Even where they are not fully enfranchised, or where casting an absentee vote is difficult, Latino diasporas are considered important for the resources they can lend to political campaigns, or for the influence they wield over family members who can indeed vote domestically.</p>
<p>Overseas voters are also important for democracies that have emerged from conflict (<a href="http://www.europeancitizensabroad.eu/croatia.html">Croatia</a>, <a href="http://www.aweb.org/eng/wiki/kaw05_02_view.do?menuNo=300100&countrySn=70">Kosovo</a>), or which have seen many citizens disperse across the EU (<a href="http://www.europeancitizensabroad.eu/romania.html">Romania</a>, <a href="http://www.balkaneu.com/record-34-000-apply-vote-bulgarias-2016-elections/">Bulgaria</a>). </p>
<p>This is all a matter of “low politics” – the nitty-gritty of campaigning and electoral calculation. Turkey’s efforts to get its diaspora voting began in a similar vein. Although Turkish leaders were for years interested in maintaining the Sunni Islam religion among emigrants, the diaspora vote really came to the fore with the rise of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development party (AKP) at the turn of the 21st century. </p>
<p>Once in government, the AKP began taking the Turkish diaspora very seriously as an electoral bloc; it not only granted citizens abroad the right to vote in parliamentary elections, but also opened a special agency dedicated to the needs of Turks abroad, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities. The diaspora vote has duly been a priority in the various elections held since the AKP first took the helm.</p>
<p>But just as Erdoğan’s style of government morphs into something more authoritarian, the role of disapora voters is changing too. His government’s pursuit of Turks abroad is moving into the realm of “high politics”. This is no longer a purely domestic political matter, but a part of Turkey’s increasingly contentious foreign relations.</p>
<p>The new era of creeping Turkish authoritarianism sits at odds with the country’s aspirations to join the EU, a project that seems more implausible by the day. Erdoğan is also now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/turkey-summons-dutch-envoy-over-riot-police-tactics-in-rotterdam">threatening</a> to break a deal with the EU to accept refugees from the Syrian crisis, in the process both reducing people to bargaining chips and dialling up international tension. </p>
<p>The countries with whom he is sparring cannot have forgotten that they are host to millions of Turks, many of them citizens with the right to vote for a Turkish president. By taking his domestic referendum campaign abroad and getting into rows with foreign governments, Erdoğan has not only fired up the Turkish diaspora, but also turned the relatively simple business of getting emigrants to vote into an incendiary foreign policy weapon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Koinova receives funding from the European Research Council, Starting Grant "Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty" <a href="http://www.diasporacontest.org">www.diasporacontest.org</a></span></em></p>A diplomatic row with the Netherlands over campaigning abroad shows how the Turkish government is changing its strategy.Maria Koinova, Reader in International Relations, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/710792017-01-19T19:08:31Z2017-01-19T19:08:31ZSyria, Russia and Turkey – the uneasy alliance reshaping world politics<p>The end of the Aleppo crisis and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/29/russia-calling-shots-middle-east-syria">Syrian ceasefire</a> has produced an unlikely alliance. The relationship between Russia, Turkey and Syria is pivotal not only for the Middle East but also for global geopolitics.</p>
<p>The leaders of all three countries – Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad – rose to prominence unexpectedly at around the same time, accompanied by a level of optimism. But over the past 16 years, they have joined the growing club of populist and authoritarian leaders.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin first became president of Russia in 2000 – young, energetic and promising to raise Russia from the ashes of the failed Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Erdogan rose to prominence in 2003 after a major economic crisis catapulted him to Turkey’s prime ministership, carrying with him the hopes of the Turkish people. His first two terms of government were marked by attempts to join European Union, liberal reforms and economic growth.</p>
<p>Bashar al-Assad replaced his dictator father in 2000. His older brother, who had been expected to take the presidency, died in a car crash in 1994. His youthfulness and Western education gave the impression that he would make Syria more liberal and democratic. However, behind a friendly and liberal facade, Assad continued to run a police state.</p>
<p>At this time Erdogan built a personal friendship with Assad. Erdogan would invite him to have holidays in Turkey, referring to him as “my brother Assad”.</p>
<p>By 2010, Turkey was heralded as a model country where democracy and Islam co-existed. Encouraged by his political success and growing popularity in the Arab world, Erdogan started to show ambitions for the leadership of the Muslim world. He began emulating an EU-like policy, establishing visa-free travel and economic partnerships with other Muslim countries, starting with Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Between 2004 and 2011, Putin also intensified Russia’s relationship with Syria, at the crucial time of the US and international coalition’s invasion of Iraq. By 2011, Iraq was destabilised and polarised along Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian lines. </p>
<p>Unhappy with the increasing US and Western influence over Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Putin increased Russia’s presence in Syria by developing and enlarging its Tartus naval base and reinforced his ties with Assad.</p>
<p>Then came the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a> of 2011.</p>
<p>The strategy for Putin was clear: support the Assad regime and from there build up a challenge to the Western dominance over not only the Middle East, but the geopolitical world order. At the same time, this would conveniently divert attention from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/15/observer-profile-vladimir-putin?CMP=soc_568">growing unrest and protests at home</a> and Russia’s aggression in places like Georgia. </p>
<p>In the course of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868">Syrian civil war</a>, Putin has become the custodian of the Shi’ite alliance between Iran, Syria and Shi’ite political forces in Iraq and Lebanon.</p>
<p>For Erdogan, the Arab Spring meant an acceleration of his ambition to gain leadership of the Sunni Muslim world. His “brother Assad” became enemy number one, as a potential Islamist take-over of Syria suited his leadership vision more than the Shi'ite and secular nature of the Assad regime. Erdogan actively supported a number of Syrian opposition groups with logistical presence in Turkey and a constant flow of resources.</p>
<p>For Erdogan, being anti-Assad also meant being anti-Russian – until four of Erdogan’s ministers were hit with <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign.html">serious corruption charges in 2013</a>. In response, Erdogan chose a path of authoritarianism, purging and sacking members of the police and judiciary responsible for the corruption probe. </p>
<p>The narrative was simple: foreign powers (that is, the West) do not want a growing Turkish influence in the region, so they have collaborated with internal forces to overthrow the government. Crucially, this stance signalled Erdogan’s departure from the Western bloc.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s relationship with Putin dipped to a new low in 2015 when the Turkish military shot down a Russian fighter jet in Syria. Putin responded with economic sanctions and promoted an international bid <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-releases-proof-turkey-is-smuggling-isis-oil-over-its-border-a6757651.html">to label Erdogan’s government</a> as active supporters of Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p>But an alliance with Russia was essential for Erdogan as he slowly abandoned the Western bloc. In June 2016, Erdogan apologised to Putin and the two men quickly struck a deal that included a partnership to manage the Syrian conflict.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s erratic foreign policy and growing authoritarianism were met with a <a href="http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/43/the-roots-of-the-turkish-crisis/">coup attempt</a> in July 2016. Erdogan survived the attempt and declared it “a gift of God” to cleanse the army and the state of dissidents. </p>
<p>The result was the purging of thousands of government employees, seizing of billion-dollar companies and jailing of more than 120 journalists. This meant <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/opinion/sunday/turkeys-relentless-attack-on-the-press.html?smid=tw-nytopinion&smtyp=cur">Turkey had jailed more journalists</a> than any other country.</p>
<p>Erdogan swiftly plunged the Turkish army into the Syrian conflict, signalling he was a player in Syria and the region. It was an act that would have been impossible without the Russian alliance. And an alliance with Putin in Syria means support for Assad as Erdogan’s relationship boomerang returns to “my brother Assad” mode.</p>
<p>It seems that the fall of Aleppo and the ceasefire is a victory for Putin, Erdogan and Assad, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-16/syrian-rebels-to-attend-kazakhstan-talks/8186300">at least in the short term</a>. For Assad, simply being at the international negotiating table is a win. But even if he <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-10/assad-says-ready-to-discuss-everything-vows-to-take-back-syria/8171436">regains control of Syria</a>, he will have to fight a long battle with Islamic State, similar to the ongoing battles with the Taliban in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Putin will use his expanding influence in the Middle East to weaken Western political and economic influence globally. He will use his relationship with Erdogan’s Turkey to weaken NATO and make it irrelevant in a new world order, or disorder, of populist leaders.</p>
<p>Most interestingly, Erdogan will claim to have brought peace to Syria as the Sunni representative of the trio. His bold efforts <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-constitution-idUSKBN14U0IB?utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_content=587495b104d3013eef214849&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=twitter">to change Turkey’s constitution</a> to bring in an executive presidential system during a state of emergency could only be understood in terms of his strong desire to lead the Muslim world. He wants an uninterrupted rule with no critical dissidence or political challenge so that he can channel all his energy into the greater Middle East.</p>
<p>As the caliphate concoction of IS leader Abu-Bakr Baghdadi wanes, the world may have to come to terms with a caliphate of Erdogan in 2017, the 500th anniversary of Ottoman acquisition of the caliphate from Egypt in 1517. </p>
<p>If Erdogan takes that step, it will throw the region and the world into uncharted territory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71079/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with ISRA (Islamic Sciences and Research Academy), a not-for-profit educational organisation. </span></em></p>Bashar al-Assad, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have a long history as leaders of their countries and players in the Syrian war.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/694412017-01-06T12:33:09Z2017-01-06T12:33:09ZWhy Istanbul is struggling to become an international financial centre<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151931/original/image-20170106-18656-1gum2dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The prospect of Brexit has many wondering whether or not London <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-london-wont-lose-its-crown-as-europes-financial-capital-63362">will remain Europe’s main financial centre</a>. Yet, for all the talk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-soft-brexit-is-in-the-interest-of-both-london-and-brussels-67722">Zurich or Frankfurt</a> stealing London’s crown, Istanbul is a city that’s doing its utmost to move up the food chain of financial rankings. </p>
<p>It may be an outsider in the contest – and is currently reeling from recent terrorist attacks – but the Turkish government is intent on boosting the city’s potential as a financial centre.</p>
<p>In an era of worldwide financial liberalisation and integration, international financial centres have significantly increased in number and geographical span since the late 1970s. These centres can be seen as the key points in the global financial system, mediating credit and debt for public and private actors across borders. </p>
<p>With numbers come rankings. The biannual Global Financial Centres Index (<a href="http://www.zyen.com/research/gfci.html">GFCI</a>) is arguably the most famous. It ranks 87 cities according to a large number of criteria within regulatory standards, business environment, human capital, infrastructure, and reputational factors. In doing so, it actually relies on numerous global indices related to these domains, and on international finance professionals’ opinions. London has consistently topped the GFCI in recent years.</p>
<p>London’s performance as a financial centre makes it clear why politicians and businesses take these indices seriously and want their business capitals to be highly ranked. London makes a significant contribution to the UK’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/london-three-reasons-why-calls-for-more-autonomy-should-be-taken-seriously-61621">economic growth, employment, and government revenues</a>. It is therefore not surprising that there have been various state-led initiatives to increase the status of world cities such as <a href="http://www.islamicfinance.com.my/index.php">Jakarta</a>, <a href="http://www.qfc.qa/en/news-and-events/Pages/the-New-Financial-City.aspx">Doha</a>, <a href="http://www.casablancafinancecity.com/en/content/about-us-0">Casablanca</a>, and <a href="http://en.sjr.sh.gov.cn/financial-centre/basic-situation/201.shtml">Shanghai</a> in the global financial system. </p>
<p>Istanbul is among them. Since 2007, the Turkish state has had the vision of making Istanbul first <a href="http://www.ifm.gov.tr/Shared%20Documents/Strategy%20and%20Action%20Plan%20for%20IFC%20Istanbul.pdf">a regional, and then a global financial centre</a>. For this, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has put in place a range of initiatives to hoist Istanbul into the <a href="http://www.ifm.gov.tr/Shared%20Documents/IFC-Istanbul%20Program%20Action%20Plan%20(2015-2018).pdf">GFCI’s top 25</a> by 2018. But careful examination of its policies indicates that they are more about securing political power than achieving real economic success.</p>
<h2>State control</h2>
<p>The AKP seems to have prioritised two initiatives for Istanbul as a prospective global financial centre: rebuilding parts of an already functioning infrastructure, and shifting Istanbul’s financial services to focus on Islamic finance. </p>
<p>The first priority has been to relocate the state-owned banks and market regulators from the political and administrative capital Ankara to a <a href="http://www.e-architect.co.uk/istanbul/atasehir-district">more upmarket area</a> of Istanbul. The second focuses on Islamic finance to <a href="https://www.islamicfinance.com/2015/04/istanbul-positioned-global-islamic-finance-gateway/">attract pious savers and investors</a> to the Turkish financial system.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151928/original/image-20170106-18644-n930lz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Istanbul’s financial district.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yavuz Sariyildiz/shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Neither policy will help Istanbul climb up the ranks in the GFCI any time soon. In an age of instant communication and decreasing importance of physical proximity, the relocation to Istanbul will not necessarily increase Istanbul’s score in the GFCI’s <a href="http://www.longfinance.net/images/gfci/20/GFCI20_26Sep2016.pdf">16 instrumental infrastructure factors</a>. And Turkey will be hard pressed to compete with existing Islamic finance centres such as London, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-finance-goes-global-but-malaysia-still-leads-the-way-27347">already offer comprehensive services</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, these policies can be better understood as part of the AKP’s policies of helping sustain economic growth by grand infrastructure and building projects, while shifting the Turkish economy to a more Islamic-oriented one. They sit in a context of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview">sluggish economic growth</a> and the ascendancy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/secular-turks-may-be-in-the-minority-but-they-are-vital-to-turkeys-future-63979">Islamic conservatism</a> in Turkey in recent years.</p>
<h2>Improving in the rankings</h2>
<p>Istanbul is the business and finance capital of Turkey. It generates almost a quarter of the Turkish GDP and accommodates almost a fifth of Turkey’s population of 79m people. In September 2015, Istanbul was <a href="http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI18_23Sep2015.pdf">profiled by the GFCI</a> and marked as an “established transnational” financial centre alongside the likes of Chicago, Munich and Tokyo. It has earned this profile in the GFCI thanks to the speciality, diversity and connectivity of its financial services and markets. </p>
<p>But, despite being associated with such developed cities, Istanbul’s overall ranking in the GFCI dropped <a href="http://www.longfinance.net/images/gfci/20/GFCI20_26Sep2016.pdf">12 places to 57th in September 2016</a>. This was put down to political uncertainty, terrorism and armed conflict in and around Turkey. The GFCI’s rankings methodology is sensitive to such adverse events (so expect a drop in London’s top ranking in 2017 thanks to <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-is-on-britain-votes-to-leave-the-eu-experts-respond-61576">Brexit</a>).</p>
<p>If Istanbul is to reach the top 25 in the rankings any time soon, Turkey also needs to improve its financial regulatory standards, business environment and labour quality. It is not clear how the AKP’s immediate focus on building work – which is estimated to cost several billion dollars in an already densely populated and built-up Istanbul – can help. Instead, it might actually worsen <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/istanbul-revealed-as-the-most-congested-city-in-the-world-10149543.html">Istanbul’s infamous traffic congestion</a> and undermine the quality of life – another measure in the GFCI rankings. </p>
<p>The new focus on Islamic finance will surely help Istanbul by broadening the city’s financial offering. Yet, Islamic finance should not be promoted as a replacement for <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/borsa-istanbul-chair-says-all-stocks-exchanges-should-be-run-in-islamic-way.aspx?pageID=238&nID=88282&NewsCatID=346">secular financial services</a> that are already provided in the city. </p>
<p>After all, Turkey has for a long time cultivated business, trade and financial relationships with the rest of the world on the basis of its secular principles. It would profit from continuing in this tradition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emre Tarim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Does the Turkish government have ulterior motives in its attempt to make Istanbul a global financial centre?Emre Tarim, Lecturer in Behavioural Sciences, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.