tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/umbrella-revolution-12609/articlesUmbrella Revolution – The Conversation2019-07-30T10:16:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1211382019-07-30T10:16:21Z2019-07-30T10:16:21ZHong Kong protests: city workers, expats and unions join clamour, making it ever harder for China to ignore<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286218/original/file-20190730-186819-1r4d1jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The message: a trademark umbrella during the original 2014 protests.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU2NDUwNzUxNSwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMjM0MjExMjg4IiwiayI6InBob3RvLzIzNDIxMTI4OC9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJGWmJUYWM5d2lMSTBHM3BSTzROSERPWElRbFEiXQ%2Fshutterstock_234211288.jpg&pi=33421636&m=234211288&src=zxSRVlizL6PcPokm82lTwA-1-45">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Cathay Pacific Airways Flight Attendants Union <a href="https://www.facebook.com/faucpa/">recently encouraged</a> staff to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0ea4c9b2-af4f-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2">join protests</a> at <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/flight-attendants-airport-staff-join-hong-kong-airport-protest-190726134046007.html">Hong Kong’s international airport</a>. It should be noted that Cathay Pacific itself clarified in a note to <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1159099.shtml">the Global Times</a> that it was not the event’s organiser, and that the protest didn’t constitute industrial action by its employees. </p>
<p>There have now been eight consecutive weeks of <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-on-the-brink-after-chaotic-day-of-protest-its-leaders-now-face-hard-choices-119763">anti-government protests</a> in Hong Kong. They started in opposition to (now suspended) <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/15/hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-extradition-bill-delay-protests-china">extradition legislation</a>, which would have seen suspects in the special administrative region sent to mainland China, but have since grown into a wider movement calling for the <a href="https://time.com/5626145/hong-kong-protests-carrie-lam-resignation/">resignation of Carrie Lam</a>, the leader of Hong Kong.</p>
<p>But while it is attracting global attention now, the movement has a long history that puts the unprecedented move of Cathay Pacific’s flight aviation union in context.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-on-the-brink-after-chaotic-day-of-protest-its-leaders-now-face-hard-choices-119763">Hong Kong on the brink after chaotic day of protest – its leaders now face hard choices</a>
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<p>A student strike in late September 2014 saw the birth of <a href="https://oclphkenglish.wordpress.com">Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP)</a>. The occupation took hold of several key areas of the city that year, with campaigners employing non-violent civil disobedience. It officially lasted for 79 days, although its legacy is still being written.</p>
<p>Back then, the movement was focused on the right to universal suffrage, a fair and transparent electoral system, and ultimately an open democratic process. Pacifist symbols (yellow umbrellas, protective face masks and eye goggles) were deployed against police aggression (pepper spray and tear gas) – and the so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/-sp-hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-pro-democracy-protests">“Umbrella Revolution”</a> was born.</p>
<p>In 2017, 20 years after Britain’s colonial role of the territory came to an end, Lam, Beijing’s favoured candidate, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/26/hong-kong-chooses-new-leader-amid-accusations-of-china-meddling">was appointed Hong Kong’s leader</a>, a move widely criticised by pro-democracy campaigners.</p>
<p>Further controversy followed a year later with the opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuai-Macau Bridge, which was described by independent lawmaker Claudia Mo as an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/04/asia/hong-kong-zhuhai-macau-bridge/index.html">“umbilical cord”</a> to China.</p>
<h2>Resistance</h2>
<p>The mainland, over time, has been tightening its grip. But recent events at Hong Kong’s international airport and across the city show just how strong the resistance to perceived Chinese influence has become. </p>
<p>The well-educated middle classes are also front and centre of this resistance movement. In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24694452.2017.1385379">Annals of the American Association of Geographers</a>, I argued that the mobilisation of professional, politically-oriented Hong Kong Chinese has seen the movement employing the “weapons of the well-educated”.</p>
<p>The phrase refers to political scientist and anthropologist James C Scott’s important 1980s work <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300036411/weapons-weak">Weapons of the Weak</a>, which explored peasant resistance in Malaysia. He described “the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on”.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286210/original/file-20190730-186801-a5jltl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hong Kong: protests are sweeping the city.</span>
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<p>In modern Hong Kong, however, a very different demographic has been taking a stand. There, justice is being called for by locally born, Hong Kong citizens, many of whom were, or are, students at the city’s universities. This makes the movement harder to ignore and more difficult to silence.</p>
<h2>Evolving protest</h2>
<p>But the current protests have led me to revise this thinking further and to conclude that the protests have now become the “weapons of the well-connected”. The protests have been reinvigorated by further support from much of the city’s expatriate community, a topic I am currently researching. As part of this, I interviewed a 20-something half British, half Malaysian Chinese working in Hong Kong. Reflecting on their involvement in the anti-extradition protests earlier this month, they stated:</p>
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<p>I do want to reiterate that these events have completely altered my view of HK [Hong Kong] society – particularly the police. You grow up thinking that the police are on your side and will always protect you … but I no longer trust the police and I don’t like them. The force used was completely unnecessary and an abuse of power and authority.</p>
<p>I also think the way that the bill [the controversial extradition law] was very quickly rushed through the system was a complete abuse of authority by Carrie Lam and her government. When I was tear gassed the second time, I was away from the large crowd that the police were kettling. The riot police were standing in a line and had their backs to me; we were about 200 metres behind them – unmoving and unarmed. It suddenly went silent and then I saw at least five gas canisters beneath my feet. ‘Surreal’ doesn’t begin to cover it.</p>
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<p>They powerfully finished the interview by saying: “As much as I am now anti-police and anti-establishment, I have never felt more proud to call myself a Hong Konger; and I think many people will feel the same way.”</p>
<p>The role of city workers in the protests certainly shows how things have evolved since the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, which was an overwhelmingly local movement. While the political outlook of Hong Kong’s business elite had previously been largely apolitical, the perceived Chinese encroachment is now so great that even organisations are beginning to speak out.</p>
<p>The protests have already been aided by UK government support, causing <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-protests-why-chinese-media-reports-focus-on-britains-colonial-past-119917">increased tensions</a> with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jul/03/foreign-office-calls-in-china-ambassador-over-hong-kong-protests">Chinese ambassador in London</a> – and now they have the support of the Cathay Pacific Airways Flight Attendants Union. Hong Kong’s future as a special administrative region of China is unclear, but the connections forged with the international business community have changed the nature of protest in the city. And China will likely find it harder and harder not to listen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Joseph Richardson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong is evolving …Michael Joseph Richardson, Lecturer of Human Geography, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1185392019-06-13T15:44:53Z2019-06-13T15:44:53ZHong Kong protests against extradition bill spurred by fears about long arm of China<p>The dramatic protests unfolding in Hong Kong evoke memories of the most sensational episodes of the country’s “<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-leaders-in-lockstep-against-divided-protesters-32534">umbrella movement</a>” five years ago at the very same sites. At the end of the unprecedented 79 days occupation in 2014, demanding genuine universal suffrage, protesters vowed to be back. Few would have expected that it would be so quick and with such vengeance. </p>
<p>A mass demonstration on June 9 was followed by protests three days later that shut down streets around government buildings as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-48591001">police fired rubber bullets</a> at protesters. The demonstrations were triggered by the decision of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government to propose amendments to its extradition bill. This would allow extraditions to new areas such as Taiwan and Macau, but more importantly the People’s Republic of China. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s chief executive, Carrie Lam, argued that the “loophole” in the law must <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3005942/hong-kong-man-wanted-taiwan-murder-case-could-escape">urgently be closed</a> to allow the transfer of a fugitive wanted for murder in Taiwan before he could leave Hong Kong.</p>
<p>But the “loophole” was deliberately included during the Sino-British negotiations in the 1980s over the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from the UK to China in 1997. After 1997, Hong Kong residents and businesses were guaranteed the rule of law and shielded from the party-controlled judicial system across the border. Fortunately, over the past decades, rule of law has differentiated Hong Kong from the Chinese mainland. Among 125 jurisdictions examined by the World Justice Project in its 2019 <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2019-Single%20Page%20View-Reduced_0.pdf">Rule of Law Index</a>, Hong Kong was ranked 16th and mainland China 82nd.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-in-crisis-over-relationship-with-china-and-there-does-not-appear-to-be-a-good-solution-118591">Hong Kong in crisis over relationship with China – and there does not appear to be a good solution</a>
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<h2>Rushed legislation</h2>
<p>The recent demonstrations are the largest in Hong Kong’s post-1997 history, uniting people of different generations, occupations and interests in a way comparable only to the protests in Hong Kong against the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Anger and despair are widespread and so is a sense of powerlessness at the way the relationship between Hong Kong and China has dramatically changed during the past five years.</p>
<p>The initial details of the extradition proposals heightened fears that the long arm of the Chinese law was reaching further into Hong Kong. It would enter the territory into extradition arrangements with China on a <a href="https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/HKBA%20Observations%20on%20FOMLACM%20Bill%202019%20%28Final%29.pdf">case-by-case basis</a>, in which the chief executive has the sole power to surrender fugitives to China <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/5cc9dcd753450a0e1da5bcab/1556733145217/Broken+Firewall+-+The+Extradition+Law+and+the+rule+of+law+in+Hong+Kong.pdf">without the need to consult</a> Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. </p>
<p>Critics such as Lam Wing Kee, a Hong Kong bookseller targeted by the Chinese authorities, have pointed out the dangers of such a set-up. Lam left <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-26/china-fugitive-escapes-again-as-hong-kong-mulls-extradition-law">Hong Kong for Taiwan in April</a> over fears that once the bill passed, Beijing would demand his immediate extradition. </p>
<p>Fears were further exacerbated by news the government wanted to rush the law through before the Legislative Council session ends in July. The pro-Beijing majority in the legislature pushed the bill quickly through its committee stages in an attempt to avoid proper legislative scrutiny. While the second reading of the bill was postponed by the protests, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/hong-kong-protests-extradition-carrie-lam-riot-police">Lam still plans to go ahead</a> with it. Once the bill reaches the voting stages it will be passed by the pro-Beijing majority.</p>
<p>The legislative process reveals how the government and its pro-Beijing allies are using the non-democratic and partisan nature of Hong Kong’s institutions to give the appearance of democracy. Law-making power is concentrated with the chief executive, who is <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/03/21/how-hong-kong-picks-its-chief-executives">selected by a committee</a> of merely 1,200 of Hong Kong’s 7.4m citizens. Only half of the Legislative Council is directly elected and pro-Beijing legislators enjoy a structural majority. Since the 2014 umbrella protests even previously neutral bodies, such as the well-respected civil service and police force, <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/15/mainlandization-communist-party-works-control-assimilate-hong-kong/">have become politicised</a>. </p>
<h2>China’s growing confidence</h2>
<p>Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre is still of great importance to China and its ruling elite, providing access to crucial financial services unattainable in Shanghai and Shenzhen. But Hong Kong’s role as a model for economic development in China has diminished as the regime grows ever more confident in its own brand of state capitalism. Previous <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/">mass protests in Hong Kong</a>in 2003 and 2004 against national security legislation were partially successful, and a proposed bill was postponed. At that time, the Beijing regime still valued international perceptions and even promised the territory further democratisation. </p>
<p>This has changed as China has also become significantly more confident as a rising global power. Under the leadership of Chinese president, Xi Jinping, Hong Kong has been at the receiving end of this new confidence. Since the umbrella movement, the Hong Kong government has been supported by the Chinese government to gradually shut down various avenues for dissent and opposition. After the umbrella movement, the frustrations of the younger generation over China’s policies towards Hong Kong were channelled into <a href="http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/813308/">a movement, known as “localism” asking</a> for more political, economic and cultural autonomy from China. Yet its proponents were disqualified from office, barred from running in elections or outlawed. The leadership was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/edd3b148-7c32-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560">imprisoned or driven into exile</a>. </p>
<p>The simple act of rallying is now easily interpreted as a criminal act, using Hong Kong’s <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/5ce7d19253450a5fe8fe860a/1558696339084/Public+Order+Ordinance+briefing.pdf">outdated Public Order Ordinance</a>. The Hong Kong police commissioner has already labelled the current protest as a “riot” and justified the escalated use of police force against protesters. It is the same “rioting” charge under which localist leader Edward Leung Tin-kei was sentenced to <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/06/11/localist-edward-leung-sentenced-six-years-jail-mong-kok-unrest-participation/">six years of prison</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>What is being observed in Hong Kong is now a collective expression of anger towards the extradition law and the government, distrust of the Chinese government and, crucially, an unwavering search for hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malte Phillipp Kaeding is affiliated with a charity that researches threats to Hong Kong's autonomy.</span></em></p>Why protests have returned to the streets of Hong Kong.Malte Phillipp Kaeding, Lecturer in International Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/843392017-11-15T02:00:14Z2017-11-15T02:00:14ZHow Hong Kong Umbrella movement was crushed and pro-democracy activists gradually silenced<p>Young Hong Kong democracy activists Joshua Wong, Alex Chow and Nathan Law <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/hong-kong-joshua-wong.html">were released on bail</a> from jail on October 23. They will now appeal against the prison sentence for their role in the 2014 <a href="https://theconversation.com/global/topics/umbrella-revolution-12609">Umbrella Movement</a>.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s version of “Occupy Wall street”, the Umbrella movement against Beijing politics was the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/27/hong-kong-protests.html#">most important protest in recent years</a>, lasting three months.</p>
<p>But three years later, Hong Kong’s democracy is still kept at bay. </p>
<p>As hundreds paid homage to the 2014 protests <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2113263/hundreds-assemble-rally-commemorate-occupy-centrals-third">on September 29 in Hong Kong</a>, the challenges facing the new generation of activists are not how to mobilise mass protests, but how to wrestle with the state’s innovative strategy to manage society.</p>
<p>On 17 August 2017, three leading activists, aged 19 to 24, who had served their community service sentences for civil disobedience, were imprisoned following the Hong Kong government’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/asia/hong-kong-joshua-wong-jailed-umbrella-movement.html">unprecedented appeal of the ruling</a>. Less than a month ago, four pro-democracy legislators, who were elected to office with more than 100,000 votes, were unseated by the Court of Appeal for their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/hong-kong-pro-democracy-legislators-disqualified-parliament">“insincere” oath taking</a>.</p>
<h2>Seeding discord</h2>
<p>Citizens continue to take to the streets to voice their discontent, and strike without support from their union leaders. But the scale of their rallies has diminished, and their targets have blurred.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s liberal autocracy seems to have distanced itself from contention between state and society, while benefiting from conflicts between various groups of people. Some supporting the pro-democratic movements, some forming counter-movements.</p>
<p>Counter-movements have also become increasingly common. Led by pro-regime groups but appearing to be <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Citizenship-Identity-and-Social-Movements-in-the-New-Hong-Kong-Localism/Lam-Cooper/p/book/9781138632950">citizen-based initiatives</a>, the participants can adopt more confrontational tactics than the government and politicians. They protest side by side in peaceful rallies, enter university campuses, and bully activists on social media. These tactics have discouraged citizens from participating in mass protests by intimidation. </p>
<p>Young people are either alienated from politics or favour radical actions, as seen in the so-called <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35529785">Fishball Revolution</a> in 2016. This is when people took part in violent protests to defend local night food stalls and businesses.</p>
<p>According to the sociologist Charles Tilly, states are known to respond to protests by choosing from <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/from-mobilization-to-revolution-by-tillycharles-reading-mass-addison-wesley-1978-pp-xiii-349-no-price-given/34BE8F5F94D5065814D56D086A6E7939">the classic repertoire of repression, concession, or toleration</a>. </p>
<p>But the response in Hong Kong suggests regimes are not adhering to the classic responses; they’re also using case-to-case and adaptive tactics to wear out challenges.</p>
<h2>Nuanced strategy</h2>
<p>Semi-democracies like Hong Kong cannot deploy their repressive apparatuses as readily as autocracies, for they must pay lip service to their “liberal” images. They also lack the representative mechanisms found in democracies, like full-fledged elections, for absorbing protests. Conceding to dissent is seldom an option when the demands are about political change.</p>
<p>During the Umbrella Movement, the state attempted to repress the nascent protest through tear gas, but it backfired when hundreds of thousands of citizens occupied several city centres. The massive mobilisation, which went beyond anyone’s imagination, forced the state to retreat.</p>
<p>So they had to come up with more a nuanced strategy to quell dissent.</p>
<p>The state turned to a smarter strategy, what we call “<a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032321716674024">attrition</a>,” for wearing out the resilient occupation. </p>
<p>Attrition entails an array of defensive and offensive tactics that go beyond simply tolerating or ignoring protests. </p>
<p>These include a progressive effort to maintain cohesion among political elites, such as <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1597637/hong-kong-tycoons-urge-constructive-approach-political-reform-debate">organising summits</a> for elites to openly declare loyalty, or <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1627050/james-tien-faces-cppcc-expulsion-after-calling-cy-leung-resihn">punishing elites</a> who express sympathy for the dissent. Through this effort, the state sent a powerful message to incumbents considering defection.</p>
<h2>Pro-regime movements</h2>
<p>The state also relies on pro-China counter-movements to curb pro-democracy activism. </p>
<p>For instance, during the Umbrella Movement, counter-movement groups such as the <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1217737/membership-pro-government-voice-loving-hk-runs-thousands">Voice of Loving Hong Kong</a> and the <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/11/30/beijing-determined-to-crack-down-on-hk-independence-after-meeting-silent-majority-activists-analysts-say/">Silent Majority for Hong Kong</a> would attack and provoke protesters in the occupied sites. These groups exerted a clear impact on the Umbrella protesters: not only did these “disturbances” constrain the actions of protest leaders, they also created a violent image in the protest sites.</p>
<p>Such counter-protests were likely mobilised or incentivised through money or position. But no clear evidence has yet pointed to the role of the state in orchestrating them.</p>
<p>Three years after the 2014 Umbrella Movement, such counter-movements continue to thrive. Some have become proactive in attacking public figures whom they identify as “<a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/09/18/hundreds-attend-protest-hong-kong-independence-urge-sacking-pro-democracy-hku-scholar-benny-tai/">enemies of the state</a>,” such as by labelling them as stooges of foreign powers on social media or through mass rallies. </p>
<p>Even pop singers who had voiced support for the Umbrella protests, like <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/entertainment/denise-ho-anthony-wong-yiu-ming-and-chapman-to-banned-in-china-for-joining">Denise Ho and Anthony Wong</a>, were not spared from this kind of cultural-revolution-like assault. </p>
<h2>Legal intervention</h2>
<p>The most effective part of this new strategy was legal intervention.</p>
<p>As a highly revered institution in Hong Kong, the legal system gave the government the legitimacy it lacked to scale back the protests. It became a third-party actor and shifted the burden of evicting the protest from the police to the judiciary.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1638381/top-court-judge-questions-odd-injunction">Court injunctions</a> filed by private actors, such as transport companies, helped re-frame the protests from political contention to court disputes and added a touch of unlawfulness to the protests. </p>
<p>Like counter-movements, the judiciary has continued to be featured in <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/08/15/13-activists-stormed-hong-kong-legislature-jailed-following-successful-appeal-justice-dept/">political disputes</a>. The disqualification of popularly elected legislators and the jailing of young activists, such as Umbrella Movement leaders Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Alex Chow, were pertinent examples.</p>
<p>What we are now observing in Hong Kong is an evolving semi-authoritarianism. The attrition strategy that it used for quelling the Umbrella Movement since 2014 has been extended into some sort of “soft repression” of the pro-democracy movement.</p>
<p>Relying on third party actors such as pro-China movements to crush the actions and hopes of pro-democracy activists, the government avoids direct confrontation and preserves its façade of an impartial arbiter amid growing social polarisation. </p>
<p>Despite featuring the rule of law and civil liberties, Hong Kong’s trajectory steadily echoes the democratic recession worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Hong Kong, challenges for the new generation of activists are not how to mobilise mass protests, but how to wrestle with the state’s innovative strategy to manage society.Edmund W. Cheng, Assistant Professor in comparative politics, Hong Kong Baptist UniversitySamson Yuen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lingnan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/813692017-07-25T01:16:13Z2017-07-25T01:16:13ZHong Kong’s democratic struggle and the rise of Chinese authoritarianism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179543/original/file-20170724-11177-1tuktps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Four pro-democracy Hong Kong lawmakers of the Legislative Council have been ousted.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Kin Cheun</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In July, a Hong Kong court <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/hong-kong-pro-democracy-legislators-disqualified-parliament">purged four pro-democracy politicians</a> from its Legislative Council. </p>
<p>This move comes after two other <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2090736/disqualified-pro-independence-hong-kong-lawmakers-yau-wai">Hong Kong lawmakers</a> were expelled from the Legislative Council earlier this year and at the same time as the recent death of Chinese political activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/21/the-death-of-liu-xiaobo-marks-dark-times-for-dissent-in-china/?utm_term=.544acf1c0b10">Liu Xiaobo</a>. Add to this the growing unpopularity of Hong Kong’s new leader, Carrie Lam. </p>
<p>A new wave of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/world/asia/hong-kong-china-xi-jinping.html">pro-democratic protests</a> has begun in what was once seen as a model metropolitan city. </p>
<p>In a classic David and Goliath scenario, pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong are struggling to stand up to the Chinese mainland’s increasing control over the territory. Unfortunately for Hong Kong’s democratic movement, it looks like Goliath may have the upper hand.</p>
<p>My dissertation research on the 2014 Umbrella Movement shows that despite recent attempts to gain more political momentum, many recent pro-democracy calls to action have struggled in the face of Chinese power and Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing dominated Legislature. In fact, more radical “localist” movements that favor complete separation from China are becoming more common.</p>
<h2>The rise of localism</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-localism-20160428-story.html">localist movement</a>, made up of different and diverse groups, gained popularity in the wake of the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2014.994957?src=recsys">2014 Umbrella Movement</a> in which 100,000 people took to the streets for 79 days to demand universal suffrage. Following the Umbrella Movement, I interviewed the people of Hong Kong on their views on the territory’s political future. A year after the movement, these individuals felt optimistic about the territory’s democratic future. Two years later, people began to lose faith in Hong Kong’s political system.</p>
<p>Many of the people I interviewed on my trips in 2015 and 2016 believed the Umbrella Movement remained peaceful because neither the Chinese government nor the people of Hong Kong wanted a repeat of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03612759.1992.9950736">June 4, 1989 in Tiananmen Square</a>, when the student movement that had lasted for months ended with the deaths of hundreds at the hands of Chinese forces clearing the city square. </p>
<p>And at first, localists seemed willing to work within the political system, so long as their elected officials were able to enact policies under “one country, two systems.” But in 2016, violent skirmishes between Hong Kong police and localist activists took place in what was dubbed the “<a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1911341/mong-kok-riot-how-hong-kongs-first-night-year-monkey-descended-mayhem">Fishball Riots</a>.” Although violence has not been the primary goal of recent protests, activists have expressed willingness to use more forceful action if Beijing continues to increase its control.</p>
<p>I believe this new wave of protests may potentially lead to more violence. As opposed the Umbrella Movement’s call for universal suffrage, localist groups will likely unite under the rallying cry for independence from the unseen influence of Beijing.</p>
<h2>One party politics</h2>
<p>With the expulsion of the six lawmakers this year, the pro-democracy faction of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council no longer has veto power against pro-Beijing politicians. Some of the ousted politicians have announced that they will run for <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/07/24/ousted-lawmaker-edward-yiu-says-may-consider-running-direct-elections-regain-seat/">office again</a>, but it is unlikely that pro-democratic politicians will ever outnumber their pro-Beijing counterparts. Increasingly, Hong Kong’s government seems to be an extension of Beijing’s one-party rule: a political system in which only the Chinese Communist Party makes decisions.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise that China is so eager to reassert its control over the territory. Hong Kong was once considered China’s <a href="http://www.sunypress.edu/p-5665-lost-in-transition.aspx">“Gateway to the World”</a> and “Asia’s World City.” Yet Hong Kong was also one of the few places that kept the memory of democratic ideas alive in the region. That democratic tradition may be nearing its end. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s democratic traditions, remnants of British colonialism, are being challenged. Under Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong’s political system is being pushed in the opposite direction favoring more <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/07/24/hong-kong-democrats-must-get-smart-defending-citys-core-values-creeping-authoritarianism/">authoritarian policies</a>. </p>
<p>The yearly <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/06/06/donations-tiananmen-vigil-organiser-drop-hk340000-reduced-attendance/">June Fourth candlelight vigils</a>, established to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, were once well-attended events. In recent years, interest has dwindled. Younger generations have become more interested in their own causes. A growing number of factions seems to plague Hong Kong’s democratic movement.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s relative autonomy following its 1997 transition out of British rule seemed to signal that the mainland could also experience democratic reform. As both economies flourished, more political freedom seemed possible. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, China’s authoritarian system has continued to exert control, thwarting democratic reform in both territories. If the global community does not pay attention, the prospect of a democratic China will continue to slip away. The more attention that is placed on Hong Kong’s current political crisis, the harder it will be for China to overtake the territory’s weakening democratic movement. Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp cannot stand up to China alone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kelly Chernin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hong Kong’s autonomy and democratic political system are under threat, and pro-democracy advocates are once again ready to act.Kelly Chernin, Lecturer in International Communications, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/525662016-01-08T11:17:47Z2016-01-08T11:17:47ZHong Kong copyright battle tests U.S. candidates’ commitments to free speech<p>Earlier this week, the Hong Kong legislature <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2015/12/18/legco-meeting-on-controversial-copyright-bill-adjourned-debate-to-continue-next-year/">resumed</a> its debate on a new copyright amendment bill, which aims to strengthen protection in the digital environment. The debate <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/01/07/legco-meeting-on-copyright-bill-adjourned-due-to-lack-of-quorum/">abruptly adjourned</a> on Thursday – for an unusual second time – due to a lack of a quorum.</p>
<p>Although this bill normally would not have caught global attention, the government’s active push for new criminal penalties shortly after the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-china-occupy-idUSKCN0RS04O20150928">first anniversary</a> of massive citywide pro-democracy protests has raised free speech and civil liberties concerns. These concerns were heightened when a bookseller of banned Chinese books <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/04/asia/hong-kong-china-missing-booksellers/">mysteriously disappeared</a> two days before the New Year.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s controversial copyright bill also presents <a href="http://variety.com/2016/digital/asia/hong-kong-bill-of-rights-opinion-1201674105/">policy challenges</a> for the U.S. government. Although this former British colony became part of China in 1997, its practice of “one country, two systems” has made it strategically important. How this special administrative region protects freedom and democracy – and, for that matter, intellectual property – will inevitably have serious ramifications on the mainland.</p>
<p>To some extent, the controversy has posed an unexpected test for U.S. presidential candidates. Should they support copyright reform abroad that will help protect American music, movies, TV programs and computer software? Or should they stand alongside the protesters, many of whom were among those demanding democratic reforms a year ago?</p>
<h2>Two strange bedfellows</h2>
<p>When free speech and copyright protection get together, they make strange bedfellows. People tend to assume that copyright protection is in harmony with free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court even <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/471_US_539.htm">declared</a> that copyright is intended to be “the engine of free expression.”</p>
<p>Yet, intent is not the same as reality. Because copyright laws rapidly expanded in the past two decades, they now cover many online activities, including political and quasi-political communication. Whether free speech and the democratic discourse will remain protected will depend on how copyright laws are being enforced.</p>
<p>Indeed, the fair enforcement of these laws is at the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-hong-kong-internet-law-20151217-story.html">heart</a> of the current protests in Hong Kong. Local netizens are protesting not because they want to support large-scale online copyright piracy. Rather, they genuinely worry that many of their communicative and expressive activities will be caught in the net, attracting criminal prosecutions, civil lawsuits and selective enforcement.</p>
<h2>A controversial bill</h2>
<p>The proponents of the copyright bill claim that Hong Kong needs stronger protection to target illegal streaming of movies and TV programs. Yet, they have a <a href="http://variety.com/2015/digital/asia/hong-kong-pushed-back-copyright-debate-1201664724/">tough time</a> explaining why the bill was drafted so broadly to cover all forms of electronic communication. They also fail to alleviate the netizens’ concerns about unnecessary criminal penalties and potential government abuse.</p>
<p>Although the bill includes fair dealing exceptions for parody, satire, caricature, pastiche, quotation and commenting on current events, these exceptions are narrow and laden with conditions. All of them also require prosecutors and courts to do case-by-case balancing.</p>
<p>Considering the strong distrust many Hong Kong people have of their government, it is not difficult to see why they fear that the new law will become just another secret weapon to silence dissent. Their fears are also understandable following the government’s active – and, in their view, selective – prosecution of peaceful protesters of the “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/29/world/asia/china-hong-kong-protests/">Occupy Movement</a>.”</p>
<h2>U.S.-China policy</h2>
<p>Thus far, the controversy surrounding Hong Kong’s copyright bill has presented an unwanted <a href="http://variety.com/2016/digital/asia/hong-kong-bill-of-rights-opinion-1201674105/">policy dilemma</a> for the U.S. government.</p>
<p>On the one hand, stronger online copyright protection in Hong Kong may pave the way for similar reforms in China. Such reforms are important because the Internet has become a crucial entry point for American media products to enter the Chinese market – due largely to censorship over traditional channels, such as cinemas and DVDs. </p>
<p>On the other hand, freedom and democracy are of paramount importance to Americans. Many see freedom as a founding principle of the U.S., and China as the antithesis of the free world. Thus, the more freedom and democracy Hong Kong has, the more likely the region’s reforms are to percolate into other parts of China.</p>
<p>The dilemma between these two very different policy goals was made salient when the local U.S. consulate and the American Chamber of Commerce were <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/1892462/us-consulate-urges-hong-kong-update-its-copyright-law">caught</a> reaching out to pro-Beijing legislators to push for the controversial copyright bill. Not only were the local mass media perplexed by this unusual alliance, pro-democracy legislators also felt betrayed.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given this rather complex and delicate situation, how can the U.S. government promote American copyright interests without dampening the local people’s democratic aspirations?</p>
<p>The easiest way out is, of course, to support a broad, open-ended exception, similar to the U.S. fair use doctrine. Such an exception is already included in a proposal advanced by pan-Democrat legislators in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>As of this writing, both the Hong Kong government and local copyright industries have vehemently <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2015-12/18/content_22740049.htm">opposed</a> this proposal. Yet, the U.S. government has refrained from expressing support, notwithstanding the proposal’s American origin and strong pro-democracy appeal.</p>
<p>An alternative solution is to support the introduction of an <a href="http://www.chinadailyasia.com/hknews/2015-12/19/content_15361047.html">exception</a> that will prohibit civil and criminal actions against individual Internet users for noncommercial copyright infringement.</p>
<p>This exception is similar to existing U.S. copyright law, which <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/1008">prohibits</a> infringement actions involving noncommercial audio recordings. An <a href="http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-42/page-20.html#h-27">exception</a> for the creation and distribution of user-generated content can also be found in the new Canadian copyright act, which further <a href="http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-42/page-41.html?texthighlight=38.1#s-38.1">caps</a> the damage awards for noncommercial infringement.</p>
<h2>A collision course</h2>
<p>When copyright protection collides with freedom and democracy, there is no easy way out. Yet, it is both naïve and irresponsible to assume that the same copyright laws can be enacted anywhere in the world without adjustment regardless of local political conditions.</p>
<p>The Occupy Movement awakened many Hong Kong people more than a year ago. It is high time the region developed a robust, critical and wide-open public debate. As much as the U.S. government needs to enhance intellectual property protection abroad, it should do so without sacrificing democratic advancement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter K Yu has advanced proposals to amend the copyright bill on behalf of the press and internet user communities.</span></em></p>Will they stand with the protestors worried about an erosion of freedoms or with the companies eager to protect their intellectual property?Peter K. Yu, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/434902015-07-03T05:27:57Z2015-07-03T05:27:57ZHow can Hong Kong’s democracy movement get its mojo back?<p>Despite the sweltering heat, once again thousands gathered in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park and marched for universal suffrage and democracy. Organisers of the annual July 1 rally had hoped for a huge crowd – yet this was the lowest turnout of protesters on Handover Day since 2008. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement is suffering from obvious protest fatigue and lack of a clear goal after months of intense political debate and a spectacular vote on the government’s <a href="http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/home/">proposal for introducing universal suffrage</a> in 2017, meant to replace the current system where Hong Kong’s chief executive is chosen by a 1,200-member “election committee”. </p>
<p>The dramatic vote on June 18 saw pro-democratic lawmakers unanimously reject the proposal, while the pro-government parties surprised everyone with a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/18/us-hongkong-politics-vote-idUSKBN0OY1PQ20150618">bizarre, disorganised walkout</a>. Apparently a harebrained attempt to buy more time, their exit meant the proposal was voted down 28-8, with 37 pro-establishment legislators lingering strangely on the sidelines.</p>
<p>With no further constitutional reform proposal to be tabled until at least 2017 or even 2020, it is time to take stock of what caused the strange death of the election reform proposal – and what Hong Kong’s pro-democracy forces can do next.</p>
<h2>Botched</h2>
<p>The issue with the proposal was whether or not the government would actually implement true universal suffrage and democracy in the long run, and the social movements most prominently involved in the Umbrella Movement had already made it clear that they would reject the proposal as written for being too pro-Beijing.</p>
<p>The June 18 vote made it very clear that pro-democratic legislators have realised that any co-operation with the government will do them no favours in the wider pro-democracy movement. </p>
<p>The government’s offer did not propose genuine universal suffrage, and neither Hong Kong nor Beijing was willing to offer any concessions. Yet it was only pressure from activist groups and the unbelievably botched pro-establishment walkout that saved the pro-democracy legislators from a public relations debacle.</p>
<p>Indeed, until the walkout, it looked like the establishment’s plan to manipulate at least some of the pan-democrats into voting for the proposed reforms was working. If they had voted for the proposal in deference to the principle of universal suffrage, the result would have been a chief executive pre-selected by Beijing, and any hopes for future amendments to the electoral process would be depend on the preferences of the Hong Kong and mainland governments.</p>
<p>This is why the walkout was so crucial. If the pan-democrats had been solely responsible for scotching the proposal, the pro-government bloc would have been able to blame them for holding up the democratisation process, opening a line of attack for the upcoming District Council and legislative elections in 2016. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, social movements such as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/joshua-wong-teenager-public-face-hong-kong-protests">Scholarism</a> have dominated the democratisation debate and effectively monopolised support for the pan-democratic parties – making any party or individual who opts for a compromise unelectable. For the time being, at least, that trap has been avoided. </p>
<h2>Loss of face</h2>
<p>That doesn’t mean the debate is over. This year’s July 1 demonstration was the first since the Umbrella Movement protests of autumn 2014, 79 days that changed Hong Kong. While it remains to be seen just how profound that change is, it’s clear that the Umbrella Movement signalled a deep fragmentation of Hong Kong’s civil society. </p>
<p>The coming years will be dominated by the questions the movement raised about Hong Kong’s identity: the city’s economic model, its social classes and its relationship with mainland China are all now under pressure to adapt. Those debates are already well underway in both the pan-democratic and pro-establishment camps.</p>
<p>Both sides have their work cut out for them. The proposal’s failure was a historic loss of face for Beijing and its allies. They will be still able to mobilise traditional pro-Beijing supporters, but will have to work very hard to regain the trust of Hong Kong’s conservative and centrist voters. </p>
<p>The pro-democracy camp, meanwhile, has to figure out how to restart the debate on universal suffrage and try to revive the spirit of the Umbrella Movement’s early days. They also have to find answers to the fundamental questions the movement brought to the fore. </p>
<p>Ultimately, it all boils down to the question of what kind of society Hong Kong’s people want. Even with a lacklustre turnout, the slogan for this year’s July 1 march could not have been more fitting: “Build a Democratic Hong Kong, Regain the Future of Our City.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malte Phillipp Kaeding does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The pro-Beijing proposal Hong Kong’s democracy activists dreaded has been voted down. What now?Malte Phillipp Kaeding, Lecturer in International Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/339662014-11-10T10:39:40Z2014-11-10T10:39:40ZIs Hong Kong China’s future?<p>The media spotlight has shifted away from Hong Kong and toward President Obama’s visit to Beijing, but students and activists remain in Admiralty and Mong Kok, and their demands for political change have not softened. </p>
<p>It seems highly unlikely that they will gain the specific goal they have set for themselves – a more open nominating process for the 2017 election of the region’s Chief Executive – but they might achieve something greater by reminding the rising urban Chinese middle class that human dignity is something more than material comfort, that it resides in an active and autonomous political life. </p>
<h2>The forging of a distinct identity</h2>
<p>There are, of course, significant social and cultural and political differences between Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142143/jeffrey-wasserstrom/no-tiananmen-redux">Hong Kong 2014 is not Beijing 1989</a>. Indeed, it is precisely those differences that have generated a sense of a distinct <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/world/asia/hong-kong-people-looking-in-mirror-see-fading-chinese-identity.html?_r=0">“Hong Kong people” identity</a>. </p>
<p>Since Hong Kong shifted, in 1997, from British colony to “Special Administrative Region” of the PRC, a significant portion of the population has grown more distrustful of the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This suspicion has been produced, in large part, by actions taken by the Hong Kong government, whose Chief Executive is selected indirectly by Beijing. </p>
<p>In 2003, a massive demonstration swept across the supposedly apolitical city, when the Hong Kong government attempted, at the beck and call of Beijing, to promulgate an “anti-subversion law,” which would have eroded the civil liberties Hong Kong people had grown accustomed to. <a href="http://www.vox.com/2014/9/29/6864181/hong-kong-protest-china-wasserstrom">In the face of public pressure, the bill was tabled. </a></p>
<p>In 2012, once again Hong Kong people resisted the efforts of the CCP leadership to rein in freedom of expression and thought, this time in relation to a proposed “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/world/asia/amid-protest-hong-kong-backs-down-on-moral-education-plan.html">moral and national education</a>” curriculum that the local government had attempted to impose on primary and secondary schools. And once again the government had to back down.</p>
<p>Thus, while there is certainly a <a href="http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9329862/hong-kong-vs-china/">cultural component</a> to Hong Kong identity, and <a href="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/10/economic-inequality-underlies-hong-kong-protests/">economic grievances</a> also play a role in the current protests, it is clear that many people there embrace liberal political values as fundamental to their public life. Civil rights and freedoms are central to what it means to be a Hong Kong person.</p>
<h2>Do not mention civil society</h2>
<p>In that regard, Hong Kong people are similar to others in advanced industrial countries around the world, not just in Europe and North America, but also in East Asia. Although political liberalism can take a variety of forms, and give rise to an array of constitutional structures, its core values are reinforced by the dynamism of relatively open and prosperous economies. </p>
<p>And that is one thing that <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/10/hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement-challenge-all-asias-autocrats">unnerves CCP leaders</a> in Beijing when confronted by Hong Kong’s defense of civil liberties. The PRC has benefitted greatly these past four decades from the “reform and opening” of its economy. Its society and culture are changing at breakneck speed. In some regards, China could follow the democratizing path blazed by South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. But the ruling Party works hard to limit the political implications of economic and social transformation.</p>
<p>“Peaceful evolution,” the idea that modernization will bring Westernization and the gradual transformation of the PRC into a liberal multi-party democracy, has been a target of CCP ideological struggle since the 1980s. <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303755504579207070196382560">The fall of the Soviet Union</a> still haunts Beijing. Last year, the Party warned against the “<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/chinas-political-spectrum-under-xi-jinping/">seven do not mentions,” which include</a>: “democracy, universal values, civil society, market liberalism, media independence, criticizing errors in the history of the Party (‘historical nihilism’), and questioning the policy of opening up and reforms and the socialist nature of the regime.”</p>
<p>All of those things are not only mentioned in Hong Kong, but most are practiced vigorously. </p>
<h2>Single party rule vs. liberalization</h2>
<p>So as the Party leadership in Beijing endeavors to maintain single party rule within an increasingly dynamic and individualizing society and economy on the mainland, Hong Kong activists publicly and dramatically demand greater political liberalization. This was not what Deng Xiaoping had envisioned as “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/world/asia/the-hong-kong-protests-what-you-should-know.html">one country, two systems</a>.”</p>
<p>At its core the “umbrella movement” – so named for the use of umbrellas to ward off pepper spray and tear gas – seeks wider democracy in Hong Kong as a means of popular middle class representation against a political system dominated by tycoons and bureaucrats.</p>
<p>And that is something that could eventually inspire the emerging middle class in China. Political change of some sort is necessary. Growing inequality, continuing official corruption, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/16/china-construction-workers-burn-to-death-land-dispute">violent struggles over land rights</a> and other problems strain the existing authoritarian power structure. </p>
<p>Not too long ago, retiring <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/04/06/wen-jiabaos-reform-push-more-than-just-political-theater/">Prime Minister Wen Jiabao called for “political reform”</a> to avert economic stagnation and social breakdown. </p>
<p>Obviously, that is not happening now. President Xi Jinping is more of a power centralizer than a political reformer. And Hong Kong is not, for many PRC people, an appealing political model . Quite to the contrary, a steady stream of <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/01/in_chinese_mainland_shrugs_and_sneers_for_hong_kong_protesters">commentary in the controlled Chinese media</a> portrays Hong Kong activists as spoiled children, ungrateful for the benefits bestowed upon them by a benevolent CCP leadership.</p>
<p>That could change, however. As economic growth <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/08/us-china-economy-trade-idUSKBN0IS02Y20141108">slows</a> in China, and social problems persist, well-educated yet unemployed and politically frustrated middle class youth there might look again at what their Hong Kong brethren have wrought. </p>
<p>In time, the Hong Kong umbrella might prove to be valuable when the political rain falls in Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Crane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The media spotlight has shifted away from Hong Kong and toward President Obama’s visit to Beijing, but students and activists remain in Admiralty and Mong Kok, and their demands for political change have…Sam Crane, Chair and W. Van Alan Clark '41 Third Century Professor in the Social Sciences, Williams College, Williams CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/322852014-09-30T00:49:12Z2014-09-30T00:49:12ZThe Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong: a second Tiananmen?<p>Are political developments in Hong Kong heading for a second Tiananmen massacre? A fortnight ago, partly to provoke discussion, partly to sound an alarm, I suggested in a <a href="http://www.2ser.com/component/k2/item/11015-the-farce-of-democracy-in-hong-kong">radio interview</a> that unless the Chinese government wisely handled the fast-unfolding dynamics, things in Hong Kong might well come to that. At the time, it seemed a rash remark. Given events of the past several days, it is now the most pertinent consideration, the core driver of the fate of what many Hong Kong citizens are calling the Umbrella Revolution. </p>
<p>The uprising is the deadliest challenge to one-party rule in China since Tiananmen. “The outcome of this battle for democracy,” says <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html?_r=0">Hu Jia</a>, a prominent dissident in Beijing now under house arrest, “will also determine future battles for democracy for all of China.” He is right, but because of a total news blackout the uprising has so far left the rest of China untouched. </p>
<p>China’s foreign affairs ministry spokesman Hua Chunying has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29405576">warned other countries</a> to stay out of Hong Kong’s protests:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I want to emphasise that Hong Kong belongs to China. It is a special administrative region and Hong Kong’s affairs are considered purely for China to handle. I hope other countries do not interfere in Hong Kong’s matters, do not support Occupy Central’s illegal activities, and do not send out the wrong message.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Truth is that Beijing has foolishly picked the wrong fight. It has chosen a showdown with a movement that is difficult to behead. The umbrella uprising is not reducible to Occupy Central.</p>
<h2>Digital protest changes terms of engagement</h2>
<p>The protest is non-violent, decentralised, <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1344068/hong-kong-china-warns-uk-not-to-interfere">equipped with drones</a> and thoroughly media savvy. The Tiananmen uprisings in the spring/summer of 1989 belonged to the era of the typewriter, mass broadcasting television and radio. </p>
<p>The umbrella uprising is digital. Its networked - dispersed and distributed - structures make for flexibility, mobility and experimentation with new social media. Just like the umbrella of a jellyfish, a gelatinous disc which contracts and expands to move it through water, the resistance is paying close attention to the arts of staying alive, and thriving, through “umbrella media”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60284/original/sz595hr6-1411979178.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Hong Kong umbrella, symbol of protest on physical and digital terrain.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>News of the uprising is currently suppressed in mainland China. The picture-sharing site Instagram and messages posted to Sina Weibo, a Chinese microblogging site similar to Twitter, are being blocked in far greater numbers than normal.</p>
<p>Several days ago, with rumours circulating that the Hong Kong government was planning to cut the city’s cellular networks, citizens responded by downloading the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs/trending/">Firechat app</a> (made by the company Open Garden). It allows smartphone users to talk to one another “off the grid”, in the absence of a mobile signal or access to the internet.</p>
<p>By making use of Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, messages are spread in a daisy-chain fashion, jumping from one user to the next. The system is particularly effective when large numbers of people are congregated together. That helps explain why there has been a huge surge in downloads, with more than 100,000 new accounts created in less than 24 hours.</p>
<h2>State’s early moves are ominous</h2>
<p>What are the chances of survival and success of the umbrella uprising? Plain talking is needed: the umbrellas are up because the application of state force has already begun in Hong Kong. Pepper spray and tear gas are violence. So are arrests, agents provocateurs and the slow-down of the Internet. </p>
<p>These all may be signs that the assassins are preparing their slaughter. If they are, then they should be warned. The systematic use of violence - for instance in the form of armed troops and armoured vehicles of the People’s Liberation Army, which has units stationed in Hong Kong - would not just be a spiritual and political catastrophe for the citizens of Hong Kong, or their economy.</p>
<p>Chinese President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29400349">Xi Jinping has reportedly said</a> that the reason the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 was that no-one “had the balls to stand up for it”. For reasons of dealing with his enemies at home and staying on top, he may already have decided that force is now required. </p>
<p>Yet the crushing of the umbrella uprising with violence would be yet another “soft power” defeat and foreign policy disaster for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It would reveal the hypocrisy of its phantom democracy. A violent clampdown would make a mockery of the claim that “the people” are the basis of its authority.</p>
<p>Crushing the protest would prove, if further proof be needed, that force is the fist in the pocket of CCP power, that violence is its ultimate resource. And a second Tiananmen might well spread resistance.</p>
<h2>Fates of Hong Kong and Taiwan are tied</h2>
<p>A crackdown would certainly toughen the resolve of democrats in Taiwan. Hence the verbal acrobatics of President Ma Ying-Jeou, who fears that something similar, possibly something much bigger, will erupt in his country, where local elections are scheduled for the last week of November. During the past day, in a rare interview with <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/09/ma-ying-jeou-an-inexplicable-fear-201492613134516309.html">Al Jazeera</a>, Ma Ying-Jeou acknowledged that thanks to the umbrella uprising, and the stubborness of the CCP, the fates of Hong Kong and Taiwan are tied together as never before.</p>
<p>The Taiwanese leader stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We fully understand and support Hong Kong people in their call for full universal suffrage. In the early 1980s, the ‘one country, two systems’ concept was created for Taiwan, not for Hong Kong. But Taiwan has sent a clear message that we do not accept the concept. If the system is good, then we believe it should be ‘one country, one system’.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes, but which kind of system, exactly? The great fear of the CCP leadership is that elections with integrity would be established in a major city of China.</p>
<p>The crushing of the umbrella uprising is for the CCP mandatory. It has the mandate of heaven. Otherwise, as the Beijing leadership sees things, the virus of democracy will spread, from village-level elections to major urban centres, with incalculable consequences for the CCP and its deeply held conviction that it will rule over China and its people forever.</p>
<h2>World is watching China again</h2>
<p>One striking feature of the umbrella uprising is its rapid development into a global media event. There is the usual telling silence from more than a few foreign governments, Russia included. Some are weighing in, but in contradictory ways. </p>
<p>Three weeks ago, the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/asia/british-response-to-election-limits-upsets-activists-in-hong-kong.html?_r=0">UK Foreign Office</a> urged Occupy Central to calm down and be sensible. During the past day, it has confirmed it is “concerned about the situation in Hong Kong and is monitoring events carefully”. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-monitoring-events-in-hong-kong">In a statement</a>, a spokesman said it was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Britain’s longstanding position, as a co-signatory of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, that Hong Kong’s prosperity and security are underpinned by its fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to demonstrate. It is important for Hong Kong to preserve these rights and for Hong Kong people to exercise them within the law. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Business knows value of open society</h2>
<p>The sentiments are welcome, but they airbrush the past. For the sake of the historical record, it should be remembered that the British never expected things to come to this. The British negotiators who crafted the Joint Declaration (deep insiders reliably tell me) supposed that Hong Kong citizens would be more interested in money, filthy lucre, than democracy. They are being proved wrong. </p>
<p>In matters of lucre, foreign companies and some Hong Kong officials have worried that if things “get out of hand” business will be ruined in Hong Kong. It is just the reverse. Hong Kong’s economic success as the eighth-largest trading economy in the world is tightly linked to its anti-corruption culture and the civil liberties its citizens enjoy.</p>
<p>Marx was wrong. When push comes to shove, intelligent businesses prefer to invest in contexts free from predators. They know there are things more important than money. They need non-violence, honesty, predictability, openness, a culture of trust and co-operation. </p>
<p>That is why the umbrella uprising is for the moment winning support from besuited bankers and business people. </p>
<p>In Hong Kong, everybody is aware that urban geography really matters. They know that if Beijing gets its way, by destroying citizens’ freedoms and weakening their independent judiciary, Hong Kong will bow and kneel to Lee Kuan Yew’s prediction that it is just another Chinese city, a once-dynamic open space, an urban civil society gobbled up by a corrupted Shanghai.</p>
<h2>Hong Kong and China at the crossroads</h2>
<p>Can this developing life-and-death conflict be resolved? The dynamics are dangerously complex, but the political solution is in a way quite simple. </p>
<p>Beijing should back off. The black-shirted riot police should be ordered to withdraw to their barracks. The government of Hong Kong, and their masters in Beijing, should confirm that masked PLA troops will not be used against the occupiers.</p>
<p>Scheduled negotiations with Occupy Central and other public representatives should be announced. The talks should be genuine. The current electoral package - one person, one vote for candidates approved by the CCP - should be scrapped. </p>
<p>The deepest of all matters - the widespread feeling among Hong Kong citizens that slowly but surely they’re being choked to death by Beijing - must also be put on the table, and discussed openly, over tea. </p>
<p>Is this scenario a utopian fantasy? Probably. Will the Chinese Communist Party leadership recognise that this is their Gorbachev moment, a chance for them to discharge the threat of violence and make peace with peacefully inclined citizens who want nothing more, and nothing less, than their personal and collective dignity? Most unlikely.</p>
<p>Will the alternative scenario - a permanently damaged economy, millions of broken hearts, collective humiliation - come to pass? That’s what some now quietly suppose. </p>
<p>Yet might things turn out differently? Could <em>fortuna</em> (Machiavelli) and her bag of tricks and surprises prove to be more powerful than all of the current political actors in this unfolding drama? Yes, without doubt. </p>
<hr>
<p>_
Interviews with the author about the protests can be seen or read <a href="http://www.skynews.com.au/video/program_richo/2014/10/02/john-keane-on-hong-kong.html">here</a>, <a href="http://www.2ser.com/component/k2/item/11015-the-farce-of-democracy-in-hong-kong">here</a> and <a href="http://www.lopinion.fr/30-septembre-2014/john-keane-pekin-a-mal-evalue-situation-a-hongkong-16874">here</a>.</p>
<p>_</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32285/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Keane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are political developments in Hong Kong heading for a second Tiananmen massacre? A fortnight ago, partly to provoke discussion, partly to sound an alarm, I suggested in a radio interview that unless the…John Keane, Professor of Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.