tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/zimbabwe-6565/articlesZimbabwe – The Conversation2024-03-13T14:22:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253022024-03-13T14:22:57Z2024-03-13T14:22:57ZFinancial abuse from an intimate partner? Three ways you can protect yourself<p><a href="https://www.divorcelaws.co.za/what-is-financial-abuse.html">Financial abuse</a> occurs when one person takes control over another person’s ability to acquire, use and maintain financial resources. An example is being denied access to your own funds or being forced to deposit your salary into a joint bank account but not having access to the account. It could also take place when large withdrawals are made from joint bank accounts without any explanation. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.isdj.org.za/">Institute for Social Development and Justice</a>, a South African non-profit company, financial abuse can vary and change shape or form but happens when access to economic opportunities is controlled or limited by an intimate partner. </p>
<p>This can happen when your partner withholds financial information or hides money from you. Another example is when your partner refuses to allow you to work, thereby controlling your ability to earn an income. Or being coerced into paying for most of the household expenses when you earn less than your partner. Alternatively, it can happen when the abuser racks up debt on a credit card, knowing the card is not in their name. </p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2021-014.pdf">Domestic Violence Act</a> identifies financial abuse as a criminal act. Several other African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe also recognise it to be a criminal offence. But it remains largely unprosecuted.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, financial abuse is not a new problem. Over the years, my <a href="https://researchprofiles.canberra.edu.au/en/persons/bomikazi-zeka">research</a> has found that the proper use of financial services can help those in disadvantaged situations to turn income into wealth. But when money is entangled with relationships, it can become a tricky situation to navigate. </p>
<p>Financial abuse can happen to anyone, irrespective of age, gender, marital status, employment status or income levels. When financial abuse occurs, it is women who are more likely to see their financial security threatened should the dynamics in a relationship take a turn for the worse. Women are more likely to experience financial abuse since it can happen in tandem with <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10896-023-00639-y">other forms of abuse</a>. </p>
<p>When you know the signs, you can put the following three measures in place to increase your financial safety: prevent, prepare and protect. </p>
<h2>Prevent</h2>
<p>Knowing your partner’s financial history is an important starting point in preventing financial abuse. Ask about how they have managed their debt in the past (and how they got into it in the first place) or whether they are actively saving money. </p>
<p>Broaching the money-talk conversation is difficult but this information should give you insight into their past financial behaviours which could influence and explain future financial behaviours. </p>
<p>Another strategy in prevention is asking about their attitudes towards money in relationships. For instance, do they believe that gender roles influence who manages money? Engaging in this topic early can also help you set boundaries about how money is managed within the relationship. </p>
<h2>Prepare</h2>
<p>Learning the signs of financial abuse can help you be prepared. If you suspect that financial abuse is beginning to emerge then keep close tabs on it by documenting all the evidence. This is important because an abuser may gaslight you into thinking you’re exaggerating, especially when the signs are subtle. Document as much evidence as you can and ensure you have copies of all important legal documents as this will help you, should you require legal assistance. </p>
<p>If you don’t already have one, speak to a financial advisor about how you can protect your finances and assets. </p>
<h2>Protect</h2>
<p>As far as possible, keep an independent source of income as this reduces any likelihood of dependency on a partner. Financial dependency can lead to feelings of isolation and hopelessness, which makes it more difficult to leave an abuser because they control the finances. </p>
<p>Another way you can protect your financial position is by making sure you don’t sign any documents you don’t understand. Often abusers will acquire financial assets in their partner’s name and leave them with the financial burden of the repayments, thereby entrapping them through debt. </p>
<h2>Getting help</h2>
<p>While the measures outlined here are not exhaustive, they are a good starting point to think about when your finances are merged with someone else’s. </p>
<p>If you are concerned about your financial safety, there are ways to get help. FIDA-Kenya, a women’s rights organisation in Kenya, offers <a href="https://www.fida-kenya.org/">free legal aid</a>. In Nigeria, the Women at Risk International Foundation operates a 24-hour confidential toll-free <a href="https://warifng.org/contact-us/">helpline</a>. </p>
<p>You can access free counselling from a social worker via the South African Department of Social Development’s <a href="https://gbv.org.za/about-us/">website</a>, which provides a call centre facility 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The call centre operates an emergency line number on 0800 428 428. You can visit the <a href="https://thewarriorproject.org.za/helplines/">website</a> of the Warrior Project, a non-profit organisation, for more information on helplines and resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225302/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bomikazi Zeka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When money is entangled with relationships, it can often become a tricky situation.Bomikazi Zeka, Assistant Professor in Finance and Financial Planning, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241662024-03-10T06:42:33Z2024-03-10T06:42:33ZHappy smiling African children: why school tourism in Zimbabwe shouldn’t be encouraged<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578562/original/file-20240228-26-doqnyj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children will often sing and dance for visiting tourists.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pascal Deloche/GODONG</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A large, air-conditioned bus draws up outside a school. Tourists, most from Europe and the US, disembark, cameras at the ready. Some have brought gifts: packages of pens and pencils. They distribute these to the children, who spontaneously begin singing and dancing. </p>
<p>This scene and others like it play out in schools around the world. It’s called school tourism. It’s similar to <a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-slavery-and-tourism-when-holidays-and-human-exploitation-collide-78541">orphanage tourism</a> and so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/slumming-it-how-tourism-is-putting-the-worlds-poorest-places-on-the-map-61320">“slum” tourism</a>, in which tourists visit orphanages or “slums” in poor countries to witness poverty and suffering. These sorts of tourism come with several ethical problems: photography of unconsenting children and adults, intrusions on people’s private lives, daily interruptions to children’s routines and issues of child protection.</p>
<p>Tourists visit a school for between two and three hours. They usually enter classrooms, photograph children and sometimes watch cultural displays like singing and dancing. These tours are generally part of an arrangement with a tourism company but exist in a multitude of forms globally. As an example, a school tour often sits within the itinerary of a tour of southern Africa, or alongside wildlife tourism ventures.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, schools have arrangements with tourism companies that enable funding for infrastructure and sponsorship of children. In Matabeleland North, close to Mosi-oa-Tunya (Victoria Falls) and Hwange National Park, for example, 19 out of 20 companies <a href="https://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/view/26974">interviewed by researchers in 2012</a> provided some sort of support, sponsorship or infrastructure to schools in nearby areas. </p>
<p>These partnerships are often in conjunction with an exchange of philanthropic funding for access to their school. This phenomenon has also been reported in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09669582.2019.1643871">Fiji, Zambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160738321000906">Kenya, Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13683500.2010.540314">Mozambique</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-shattered-economy-poses-a-serious-challenge-to-fighting-covid-19-135066">Zimbabwe’s economic troubles</a>, including severe hyper-inflation, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-is-spiking-in-zimbabwe-again-why-high-interest-rates-arent-the-answer-187362">well documented</a>. Schools are poorly resourced and, in government schools, teachers are often unpaid or <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_zimbabwe-teachers-reject-promised-salary-increase-far-too-low/6198233.html">earn below the poverty line</a>.</p>
<p>I am a Zimbabwean-born Australian woman and a trained secondary school teacher. In 2015, I was working with a school in Zimbabwe as part of my university degree and witnessed this tourism myself. In 2019, as part of my doctoral research, I spent one term at a school in Matabeleland North. It received 129 visits from tourist groups that year alone. </p>
<p>During my time there I talked with teachers, tourism workers and NGO staff. I also asked students to draw <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508281.2022.2133812">pictures of their experiences of tourism</a>. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17508487.2023.2286230">a recently published article</a> I contribute to the growing field of research about how schools funded by tourism operate. I offer a critique of how an image of “Africa” is reproduced for the tourist gaze, and the fact that images shared by tourists after their visits further inculcate damaging tropes of the African continent as a place only of extreme poverty and neediness. Schools funded by tourism become a mirror of the tourism industry. </p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17508487.2023.2286230">My research identified</a> the sorts of images involved in marketing of tourism that portray a static and cliched <a href="https://theconversation.com/ordinary-peoples-stories-can-change-the-worlds-views-about-africa-48597">image of “Africa”</a>. This includes landscapes filled with animals, extreme poverty, white women and men dressed for safari and <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-00607-7">images of Maasai men</a> herding cattle. Smiling, happy children are another part of the image.</p>
<p>The tourism workers I interviewed tried to prevent the continuation of these images by presenting counter-narratives of how Zimbabweans live. But they were not always successful. This is partly due to the structured nature of mass tourism initiatives: tourists are sold an itinerary and this must be followed. Since the school tours are part of broader tours of southern Africa, the school and tourism workers felt a need to conform to a particular image – and this involved interactions with happy children. When teachers and schools feel a need to conform to a particular image, their actions and choices are constrained.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/changing-the-african-narrative-through-social-media-platforms-97097">Changing the African narrative through social media platforms</a>
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<p>The school I worked with had different arrangements with three tourism companies. One donated US$200 in cash on every visit. Another had promised to build one classroom block. The third company actually founded the school, providing teachers’ salaries and significant infrastructure development. Some tourists had also donated larger pieces of infrastructure, such as the materials for a borehole and electrical connections to the main grid.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>The school tours are disruptive to students and staff. They are a diversion from the usual routines of the school. One teacher said:</p>
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<p>Sometimes you may be called, maybe you did not know that there are visitors coming and they just want to come in at that particular time … Then you are called off the lesson and the time does not wait for you. It goes and that subject is being interrupted. Then you are no longer going to be able to move onto the next subject now. Since you had already introduced the previous lesson, you will not leave it in the air, you have to finish it, so the next subject now is being disturbed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-close-up-look-at-what-happens-when-tourists-and-maasai-communities-meet-84095">A close-up look at what happens when tourists and Maasai communities meet</a>
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<p>The school in my study found it difficult to balance the perceived needs of the tourists and the institution’s needs. As one of the school leaders put it:</p>
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<p>We have to look at it in the sense that, yes, it is taking time: it is probably asking the kids to do something that they would not just usually do when meeting someone. But you have to look at the guest side of things, and also think, these are the people who are helping us. Potential helpers, some are already helping, what are (the tourists) taking away?</p>
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<p>The children were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508281.2022.2133812">highly aware of the need to please the tourists</a>, whom they saw as fulfilling a particular need. Tawanda, aged 10, said:</p>
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<p>I would prefer to come to school which has visitors because they will be helping us. When there are no books, they will be paying, they will be giving us some money, and we buy some books. </p>
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<p>Teachers worried that some groups would donate less if they weren’t able to interact with children.</p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>Ideally, school tours should not occur at all. However, due to Zimbabwe’s economic instability, schools are becoming increasingly resourceful to find avenues for additional funding. Although they are not a perfect solution, philanthropic partnerships need to exist.</p>
<p>My research does not suggest that people should avoid visiting Zimbabwe as a whole and I do not want to suggest that philanthropic funding of schools is necessarily bad. Rather, it is important to seek out tourism experiences that do not homogenise culture and cultural experiences. Tourists should also consider the itinerary of any tours they book and aim to avoid companies that offer school tours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathleen Smithers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A school tour often sits within the itinerary of a tour of southern Africa, or alongside wildlife tourism ventures.Kathleen Smithers, Lecturer, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249742024-03-05T13:13:04Z2024-03-05T13:13:04ZDry weather hits southern Africa’s farmers, putting key maize supplies at risk: how to blunt the impact<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/south-africa-and-the-region-face-grain-strain-despite-record-harvests-20231128">South Africa</a>, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/drought-national-disaster-emergency-electricity-4cc6a2105f4641efe17e10a5b75f78a5">Zambia</a> and <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240229/c7454e0f49e74fd6b891519993f943b9/c.html">Zimbabwe</a> have recently published reports indicating a potential decline in grain harvest because of intense El Niño-induced dryness. These developments could put the entire Southern Africa maize supply chain at risk, with Zambia and South Africa hard hit by heatwaves and dryness. The neighbouring small producers such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia are also struggling with dryness.</p>
<p>Given that South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/production.pdf#page=29">are among the largest maize producers </a> within the Southern Africa region, a potential decline in the harvest in these countries suggests there could be an increase in the risk of food insecurity. This would necessitate imports to meet the shortfall in the region’s maize supplies.</p>
<p>The dryness in an El Niño event is not unexpected in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/madagascar/southern-africa-el-nino-positive-indian-ocean-dipole-forecast-and-humanitarian-impact-october-2023#:%7E:text=El%20Ni%C3%B1o%2Drelated%20climate%20variability,during%20the%20November%20%2D%20April%20season.">Southern Africa region as this weather phenomenon is typically accompanied by dryness</a>. The year started favourably, with excellent rains. But the dryness intensified from the end of January. Major damage has been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/zambia-declares-national-disaster-after-drought-devastates-agriculture">caused</a> to crops since then. The unusual pattern may be part of the broader climate change challenges.</p>
<p>Based on research into <a href="https://agbiz.co.za/content/open/sa-2023-24-summer-crop-production-forecasts-lowered-notably-72">grains markets</a> in the region, and recent observations from our field work across the summer crop growing regions of South Africa, it is clear that the region faces a difficult time ahead.</p>
<p>While the extent of the impact of the heatwave and dryness on crops changes daily, the pattern thus far is clear that the whole Southern Africa region has taken strain and will see a significant reduction in the volume of the crop produced.</p>
<p>Although the domestic hunger challenges may rise in some countries, as we already see in the forecasts in <a href="https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-01/FAOB-January%202024_1.pdf">Zimbabwe </a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zambia/statement-unicef-zambia-situation-children-following-recent-emergency-declaration">Zambia</a>, the governments in the region must be careful about the response policies and programmes. For example, they should avoid export restrictions and maize price caps. And they should make sure that any government support should be at the household level.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa, <a href="https://www.grainsa.co.za/news-headlines/press-releases/climate-conditions-problematic-for-grain-producers">a recent farmers’ survey</a> by <a href="https://www.grainsa.co.za/pages/about-grain-sa/overview">Grain South Africa</a>, a lobby group for the sector, found that extreme heat and dry conditions had caused the grain and oil-seeds harvest to deteriorate much faster than initially expected. </p>
<p>These challenges have probably worsened since the survey was completed towards the end of February.</p>
<p>The Crop Estimates Committee in South Africa – a grouping of scientists, economists and statisticians from the government, private sector, academia and independent research organisations – also fears the possible decline in the summer grains and oilseed harvest. <a href="https://agbiz.co.za/content/open/south-africas-summer-crop-production-prospects-remain-bleak-363">In its latest production estimate</a> for the 2023/24 season, the Committee placed the summer grains and oilseed harvest at 15.8 million tonnes, down 21% on 2023.</p>
<p>This is primarily a function of lower expected yields rather than a reduction in the acreage planted, thus reflecting a negative impact of the drier weather conditions and heatwave. This is an overall production figure, and the decline varies crop by crop. Still, a positive aspect of South Africa is that the expected harvest will still be enough to meet the country’s domestic consumption, leaving some volume for exports, albeit significantly down from the previous seasons.</p>
<p>There has not been a lot of talk about other value chains outside summer grains and oilseed, primarily because of higher dam levels from the past few years and earlier rains in the season. With all of South Africa’s commercial fruit and vegetable production under irrigation, the improved water levels in the dams assist farmers in coping with the current heatwave. The livestock industry is still in a relatively better place as the grazing veld has generally improved, and there were large maize and soybean supplies from the 2022/23 season. </p>
<p>The field crops are <a href="https://sa-tied-archive.wider.unu.edu/article/climate-uncertainty-and-agricultural-vulnerability-south-africa-0">primarily rainfed</a>, leaving a large percentage at the mercy of the natural rains, which have been scarce since the start of February.</p>
<h2>Zambia under drought stress</h2>
<p>In late February Zambia’s President, Mr Hakainde Hichilema, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/zambia-declares-national-disaster-after-drought-devastates-agriculture">declared Zambia’s severe drought a national disaster and emergency</a>. There is crop damage in the majority of the summer crop-producing regions of the country because of the El Niño-induced drought. </p>
<p>Worryingly, the government reported that the drought <a href="https://apnews.com/article/drought-national-disaster-emergency-electricity-4cc6a2105f4641efe17e10a5b75f78a5">has destroyed nearly 1 million hectares of maize</a>. Given that the overall commercial maize area planting in the country is about 1.9 million hectares, this would mean half of the production has been destroyed. <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Zambia%20Maintains%20its%20Status%20as%20a%20Net%20Exporter%20of%20Corn%20_Pretoria_Zambia_ZA2023-0001.pdf">It could have significant negative consequences on food production</a>.</p>
<p>Zambia is one of southern Africa’s main producers and exporters of maize. This means if the maize harvest is down notably in the country, there will be no volume for exports to neighbouring countries that also need supplies. This happens at a time when South Africa, although potentially with sufficient supplies for domestic consumption, would have a massive decline in the volume of maize available for exports. </p>
<h2>Zimbabwe’s grain production also strained</h2>
<p>At the start of this year, there were reports of roughly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/zimbabwe-hunger-food-aid-el-nino-climate-aa25b4d2ee6405a792d75a0d4d12d505">2.7 million Zimbabweans potentially at risk of hunger</a> because of the drought impact in their summer grain fields. Moreover, Reuters <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/zimbabwe-targets-1.1-mln-tons-of-maize-imports-state-media-reports">reported</a> that “Zimbabwe plans to import 1.1 million metric tons of maize over the next year”.</p>
<p>It is unclear how much of this volume has thus far already been imported into the country. The volume speaks to the pressures of maize supplies in Southern Africa. Typically, when Zimbabwe needs such large maize imports, South Africa and Zambia are the primary suppliers. With Zambia potentially out of the export market this year, the pressure is now on South Africa to supply Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Still, suppose all the required maize is of the white varietal, South Africa may not be in a position to provide Zimbabwe with the total required volume, particularly if we consider that the likes of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Madagascar, and even Zambia will also require maize imports to supplement their domestic annual needs.</p>
<h2>Policy considerations</h2>
<p>There are several key points that policy makers should consider. These include:</p>
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<li><p>Avoiding export restrictions and maize price caps. While restricting exports seems a good approach for cushioning households in the near term, such an intervention disincentivises production for the next year as the farm-level prices would be artificially depressed. This is particularly important as farmers are not protected from higher input costs and pay world prices for all the imported inputs such as fertilisers, agrochemicals and some seeds.</p></li>
<li><p>Ensure interventions are at the household level through various support packages with fiscal space used to implement such programmes.</p></li>
<li><p>The regional governments should also engage with the World Food Programme to prepare to assist the least well-off countries with maize imports from the world market.</p></li>
<li><p>The governments should also engage, collectively with the private sector, the likes of Mexico that produce white maize, to assess if they would have space to export to the Southern Africa region if the need arises.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224974/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p>The whole southern Africa region has taken strain and will see a significant reduction in the volume of the crop produced.Wandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217672024-02-12T14:14:08Z2024-02-12T14:14:08ZThe San people of southern Africa: where ethics codes for researching indigenous people could fail them<p>There is a long and often complicated history of researchers studying Indigenous people. In 1999, the education scholar Linda Tuhiwai-Smith, in her book <a href="https://www.google.nl/books/edition/Decolonizing_Methodologies/Nad7afStdr8C?hl=en&gbpv=0">Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples</a>, emphasised the colonial character of much research. She warned that it</p>
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<p>brings with it a new wave of exploration, discovery, exploitation and appropriation.</p>
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<p>Well into the <a href="https://www.google.nl/books/edition/Anthropology_and_the_Bushman/bUUHEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0;%20https://www.google.nl/books/edition/The_Bushman_Myth/BPZKDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0;%20https://www.google.nl/books/edition/Ethnologists_in_Camouflage/qGhezwEACAAJ?hl=nl">20th century</a>, researchers depicted groups like the Indigenous San of southern Africa in a racist fashion, fixating on their physical characteristics and writing of their “savage” or “primitive” state. </p>
<p>Historically, many researchers did not care about their study participants’ consent or agency, or how they could benefit from the research, for instance through improving their position in society. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-im-righting-the-wrongs-of-my-early-research-and-sharing-my-scientific-data-with-local-communities-191713">Why I'm righting the wrongs of my early research and sharing my scientific data with local communities </a>
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<p>This has gradually shifted over the past 50 years. Global organisations such as the Ethical Research Partnership <a href="https://trust-project.eu/">TRUST</a>, the <a href="https://americananthro.org/about/policies/statement-on-ethics/">American Anthropological Association</a> and most, if not all, credible academic institutions, have created ethical rules and guidelines to protect vulnerable populations from exploitation and promote their role in research.</p>
<p>But, as I and a group of fellow ethnographers, together with <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/San">San people</a> from all over southern Africa, show in <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-023-02101-0">a recent paper</a>, such ethical guidelines have flaws. </p>
<p>Today there are <a href="https://peabody.harvard.edu/video-traces-and-tracks-journeys-san#:%7E:text=But%20just%20to%20give%20you,%2C%20Botswana%2C%20and%20South%20Africa.">about 130,000 San people</a> in Angola, Botswana, <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/6096/">Namibia</a>, South Africa and Zimbabwe. They were historically nomadic hunter gatherers; in the past century or so their lives have become more settled, based on agriculture and wage labour.</p>
<p>The pitfalls we identified in the guidelines manifest mainly in three ways: by oppressing vulnerable groups; by being ambiguous about potential benefits to the participants; and by being difficult to follow in practice.</p>
<h2>Three issues</h2>
<p>There are several reasons why ethical conduct in scientific research is so important. Ethical rules are there to prevent what’s known as <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01423-6">“ethics dumping”</a>, in which unethical research practices are used in lower-income countries that would not normally be allowed elsewhere. They also guard against <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01423-6">“helicopter research”</a>, when scientists from high-income countries conduct their research without involving local scientists or communities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-ubuntu-can-deepen-how-research-is-done-190076">African ubuntu can deepen how research is done</a>
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<p>In 2017 a <a href="https://trust-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/San-Code-of-RESEARCH-Ethics-Booklet-final.pdf">code of conduct</a> was created by academics and San leaders working with and for the South African San Institute, the South African San Council and TRUST. The <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-023-02101-0">paper</a> discussed in this article, as well as <a href="https://www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/10.3828/hgr.2023.4">one other</a>, analysed problems with this code and similar instruments, and individual contracts unique to a particular piece of research.</p>
<p>These were:</p>
<p><strong>1. Oppression of opinions:</strong> Authorities (often NGOs) sometimes want to push their agenda by keeping unwelcome ideas out of the research. In South Africa, a colleague of mine encountered dubious gatekeepers who claimed to represent the community she hoped to study and who wanted to dictate whom she could interview.</p>
<p>An instrument intended to promote ethical research was used to exclude particular people, or their ideas. </p>
<p><strong>2. An over-emphasis on immediate benefits:</strong> Most codes of conduct and contracts include a clause that research must be “beneficial”. This ignores the essence of what most scientific research is: fundamental and not applied. Fundamental knowledge is not immediately practical but it is crucial to make research potentially beneficial. </p>
<p>I have worked on <a href="https://www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/10.3197/np.2019.230104">research</a> about a land claim by the San in northern Namibia. Knowledge similar to the sort reflected in my research <a href="https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2020.0339">has helped San groups</a> in other parts of southern Africa <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/BieseleJu/1000">regain or retain land</a>. Will my research do the same? I have no idea, because that takes time – the research doesn’t instantly benefit the participants.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-steps-every-researcher-should-take-to-ensure-participants-are-not-harmed-and-are-fully-heard-191430">Five steps every researcher should take to ensure participants are not harmed and are fully heard</a>
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<p>A focus on benefits also ignores different interests and perceptions within communities. A benefit for some may be detrimental to others. For instance, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280233612_Local_impacts_of_community-based_tourism_in_southern_Africa">research</a> can support wildlife management and the creation of tourism jobs for some. But these activities may constrain other livelihoods in the same community. In a <a href="https://journals.lww.com/coas/fulltext/2017/15020/ju__hoansi_lodging_in_a_namibian_conservancy_.2.aspx">Namibian case study</a>, some San complained about restrictions on hunting, small-scale farming, or keeping livestock. </p>
<p><strong>3. Practical limitations:</strong> In southern Africa it is often unclear in advance whom you need to contact to discuss and sign something, and what the legal status of codes and contracts is. In our experiences, e-mails often go unanswered. Many local San do not even know – or, in some cases, care – that these instruments exist. For most, researchers’ needs and aims are not a priority in their ordinary lives. </p>
<p>In such cases research codes and contracts mainly legitimise the researchers’ and gatekeepers’ role in research, but not necessarily that of the people being studied. </p>
<p>This is not an exhaustive list of potential issues. Others include the imposition of a red tape culture, illiteracy among participants and a lack of clear consequences if researchers behave unethically even after signing a contract.</p>
<h2>Paper is no panacea</h2>
<p>We are not opposed to instruments that can empower research participants, but they are not a panacea. Researchers need to scrutinise such codes’ inherent and complex challenges. They also need to put collaboration at the heart of their work.</p>
<p>Examples of such scrutiny and collaboration already exist. Some San groups, such as the <a href="https://anadjeh.wordpress.com/">||Ana-Djeh San Trust</a>, have created initiatives to increase their participation in research, including community training to raise awareness about research. In such cases they like to collaborate with researchers they trust, normally because they have been in contact with them for many years already. Such trust is at the heart of good collaborations and is, we would argue, much more important than paper agreements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stasja Koot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are several reasons why ethical conduct in scientific research is so important.Stasja Koot, Assistant Professor, Wageningen UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218872024-02-08T14:15:43Z2024-02-08T14:15:43ZThe rise of African prophets: the unchecked power of the leaders of Pentecostal churches<p>Over the last 20 years there’s been an unprecedented increase in charismatic Pentecostal prophets – or men of God as they’re called in Pentecostal parlance. Across Africa their unchecked influence has spread into social, economic and political institutions. </p>
<p>Pentecostalism is one of <a href="https://pmu.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Pentecostals-transformation-and-socia_2022_webb.pdf">the fastest-growing</a> strands of Christianity on the continent. In Zimbabwe, for example, the Prophetic Healing and Deliverance Ministry <a href="https://www.phdministries.org/phdministries.php">claims</a> its membership rose from 45 to over a million in just five years. This is a significant number in a country with a population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">16 million</a>. Zimbabwe’s United Family International Church <a href="https://www.ufiministries.org/post/we-are-thanking-god-for-massive-growth-emmanuel-makandiwa-on-anniversary-celebrations">boasts</a> that over 70,000 attend its Sunday services.</p>
<p>Charismatic Pentecostal prophets are known for leading megachurches like these that emphasise <a href="https://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/00023022.pdf">faith healing, health and wealth</a>. They often <a href="https://moodle.swarthmore.edu/pluginfile.php/51999/mod_resource/content/0/Maxwell-_Delivered_from_a_spirit_of_poverty.pdf#page=7">attract</a> youthful and marginalised members of society. Most charismatic Pentecostal churches have an <a href="https://moodle.swarthmore.edu/pluginfile.php/51999/mod_resource/content/0/Maxwell-_Delivered_from_a_spirit_of_poverty.pdf">authoritarian governance structure</a> built around their founding prophets – what one historian calls a “<a href="https://moodle.swarthmore.edu/pluginfile.php/51999/mod_resource/content/0/Maxwell-_Delivered_from_a_spirit_of_poverty.pdf#page=4">personality cult</a>”. </p>
<p>Religious leaders are increasingly trusted in post-colonial African states. A 2017 survey <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/zimbabweans-place-most-trust-religious-leaders-ngos-and-president-mugabe/">found</a> almost 75% of adult Zimbabweans had more trust in religious <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/zimbabweans-place-most-trust-religious-leaders-ngos-and-president-mugabe/">leaders</a> than elected ones. A 2022 study conducted in <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad536-for-religious-leaders-in-africa-popular-trust-may-present-opportunity-challenge-in-times-of-crisis/">34 African countries</a> confirmed this trend: 69% of respondents trusted religious leaders; 51% trusted their president. Many followers believe it would be a demotion for a prophet to run for president because a prophet anoints leaders.</p>
<p>As an anthropologist who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=WysPWb0AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">studies</a> charismatic Pentecostal churches, particularly in Zimbabwe, I’ve carried out <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=WysPWb0AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research</a> on the power exercised by prophets. </p>
<p>Like leaders in other religious groupings, prophets exercise power and authority through control and manipulation of different forms of capital: spiritual, symbolic, human, political and economic. These forms of capital are as important for building religious communities as they are for protecting men of God when allegations of sexual abuse or corruption are levelled against them – as has been seen in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tb-joshua-scandal-the-forces-that-shaped-nigerias-mega-pastor-and-made-him-untouchable-221421">scandal</a> surrounding famed Nigerian prophet <a href="https://theconversation.com/obituary-tb-joshua-nigerias-controversial-pentecostal-titan-162232">TB Joshua</a>. </p>
<p>Political connections and economic resources can be used to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLajyiGz4JeyNQnWs8QEe-flPqe2xqrQAp">intimidate and muzzle</a> victims and survivors. Fear of spiritual retribution or retaliation also silences them. Here I outline how that power is established by prophets, their followers and societies.</p>
<h2>The prophets</h2>
<p>Charismatic Pentecostal churches are built around prophets who are viewed as possessing special gifts to mediate between humanity and God. The prophet’s <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/9780821417386/african-gifts-of-the-spirit/">word is final</a>. Questioning and doubting this word is viewed as the devil’s plot – through human agents – to undermine a man of God’s authority. It’s common practice for charismatic Pentecostal prophets to <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/a-few-musings-on-gumbura/">threaten doubters</a> with eternal condemnation, ailments or poverty. </p>
<p>Charismatic Pentecostal prophets are popular for their ability to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1eKNJi0nXI">heal</a> ailments. They provide an alternative healthcare system for those whose choices are limited by high costs in <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/exch/40/4/article-p336_3.xml">underperforming economies</a> like Zimbabwe’s.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tb-joshua-scandal-the-forces-that-shaped-nigerias-mega-pastor-and-made-him-untouchable-221421">TB Joshua scandal: the forces that shaped Nigeria's mega pastor and made him untouchable</a>
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<p>Prophets, in the eyes of their followers, are messiahs saving sections of society. <a href="https://www.ufiministries.org/testimonies">Testimonies</a> of people who are healed or freed from evil spirits are publicised via <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1eKNJi0nXI">social media</a> and television channels. This draws in more followers and builds further trust in the prophets.</p>
<h2>Big money</h2>
<p>Pentecostal churches are financed through donations from members. Large membership translates into considerable funds. But charismatic Pentecostal movements, in general, lack <a href="http://hdl.handle.net/2263/4090">transparency</a> and <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/makandiwa-wants-65m-lawsuit-dismissed/">accountability </a> in managing “free will” <a href="https://www.forbesafrica.com/focus/2015/11/01/prophets-of-profit/">donations</a>.</p>
<p>Many charismatic leaders have constructed <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/12063312221130241">megachurches</a> with business empires in media, hospitality and mining. In <a href="https://d-nb.info/1269331817/34">most cases</a>, these assets are registered as the personal property of the prophets or their families. </p>
<p>With vast financial resources that aren’t taxed, charismatic Pentecostal prophets’ <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/preaching-power-and-private-jets-nigeria">lavish lifestyles</a> serve as “proof” of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/prosperity-gospel">prosperity gospel</a> they preach – that faith attracts money – while their followers pool resources to finance church operations.</p>
<p>Control of huge financial resources also allows prophets to hire top lawyers or afford <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/law-crime/under-fire-magaya-opts-for-out-of-court-settlement-in-homelink-us23-million-debt/">out-of-court settlements</a> when accused of abuse or corruption.</p>
<h2>Political connections</h2>
<p>Post-colonial political leaders in Africa largely view charismatic Pentecostal prophets as allies. This <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/first-lady-rachael-ruto-hosts-zimbabwes-prophet-ian-ndlovu-n305670">alliance</a> serves both parties.</p>
<p>Pentecostal gatherings are often attended by large numbers of people. Like other religious groupings, these numbers could translate to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/thestandard/news/article/8506/makandiwa-sings-mnangagwa-praises">votes</a>. Several <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCQBqCD7AcY">charismatic Pentecostal Prophets</a> provide sitting and former presidents with (spiritual) advice and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dj0-26gNB0">assistance</a>. In return, politicians provide prophets with political protection. </p>
<p>Relations with political leaders often span <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-03-06-the-stunning-fall-from-grace-of-zimbabwes-vice-president/">several countries</a>, extending the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1558/pent.40930">network and influence</a> of prophets beyond <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtELsu5WhP4">national borders</a>. </p>
<p>As confirmation of their status, many men of God will imitate politicians by travelling in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/news/article/169010/makandiwa-bodyguards-seize-newsday-camera">heavily guarded</a> motorcades. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zCQBqCD7AcY">Imitation and proximity</a> to political leadership help make prophets “untouchable”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/magaya-bombshell">Allegations of rape</a>, <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2014/09/20/synagogue-church-collapse-t-b-joshua-allegedly-offered-journalists-n50000-bribe-alter-reports/">corruption</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47131808">and</a> <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/prophet-angel-sued-over-bentley/">fraud</a> <a href="https://zimmorningpost.com/israeli-businessmen-titans-target-prophet-magaya-for-us2-5-million-theft/">against</a> prophets can be leniently dealt with due to these connections and protection. </p>
<h2>Media empires</h2>
<p>Charismatic Pentecostal prophets have an impact on the Africa media landscape through powerful television and social media presence. Control and ownership of television channels allows men of God to be more visible in the public sphere than other clergies. This presence helps establish credibility, build trust and disseminate indoctrination.</p>
<p>These <a href="https://ezekieltvchannel.com/">media channels</a> are also spaces for <a href="https://www.yadahtv.co">shaping and managing</a> the public image of prophets – and can be used to counter harmful allegations against them. </p>
<h2>Members</h2>
<p>Pentecostal members form an army of foot soldiers who engage in recruiting new followers. They also form the first line of defence when prophets face criticism. Charismatic Pentecostal communities are tightly knit and coalesce around the men of God. </p>
<p>Relations between the clergy and laity are framed around <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2017.1358193">familial</a> bonds, with the prophet as the spiritual father or “Daddy”. His followers are sons and daughters. Relations between powerful spiritual fathers who claim <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/news/article/151730/8216rapist8217-pastor-gumbura-owns-every-woman-in-his-churchcourt-told">ownership</a> of their spiritually weak children reflect the broader patriarchal system common in most African societies. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-starvation-cult-left-hundreds-dead-a-psychologists-view-on-how-to-support-people-as-they-process-tragedy-205135">Kenya’s starvation cult left hundreds dead – a psychologist’s view on how to support people as they process tragedy</a>
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<p>The men of God are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2017.1358193">epitomes</a> of both spiritual and secular authority. Scriptural texts are used to reinforce familial relations: disobeying the prophet is equated to disobeying one’s parents.</p>
<p>So why do charismatic Pentecostals stay in religious communities that “disempower” them? More than other religious groupings, charismatic Pentecostal prophets preside over <a href="https://doi.org/10.30965/27507955-20220002">economies</a> that systemically <a href="https://uficuk.co.uk/hope-and-love-ruth-makandiwa-shares-a-special-moment-with-the-less-privileged/">facilitate the distribution</a> of food, clothes, money and jobs within the church – often in the form of church donations to members considered poor.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, this economy is modelled around an indigenous social welfare system called <em><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6014163/">zunde ramambo</a></em> that’s managed by traditional chiefs. To some extent, charismatic Pentecostal prophets carry out the functions of chiefs who have long been responsible for the welfare of the people under them. </p>
<p>For entrepreneurs and young people with aspirations for a better future, church membership provides business opportunities and connections. Charismatic Pentecostals are obedient to the men of God for continued access to clients, service providers and mentors within the church. Many are, therefore, willing to downplay allegations of abuse levelled against the clergy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Josiah Taru has previously received research funding from the Wellcome Trust and the Andrew Mellon Foundation. </span></em></p>Pentecostalism is one of the fastest-growing strands of Christianity in Africa.Josiah Taru, Postdoctoral associate, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219982024-02-02T10:59:15Z2024-02-02T10:59:15ZSouth Africa needs to manage migrants better. That requires cleaning up the Department of Home Affairs<p>Legal grievances against the South African Department of Home Affairs, including contempt of court cases, are depressingly common. Too frequently the minister has to apologise to a court, or to ask for more time, on behalf of the department. Most of the court cases involve the operations of the department regarding visas and permits for foreign visitors, immigrants and prospective refugees.</p>
<p>Just a few months ago home affairs minister Aaron Motsoaledi said, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-15-minister-motsoaledi-apologises-to-south-africa-for-the-mess-created-by-his-department/">in legal papers</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would like to take this opportunity to extend my sincere apology to the Chief Justice, all judges of the high court and Constitutional Court, the President of South Africa, Minister of Finance, Lawyers for Human Rights and its legal representatives and the people of South Africa for the mess created by officials of the Department of Home Affairs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This particular mess was triggered by the minister’s failure to amend an unconstitutional law which allowed for the detention of irregular migrants for 120 days. </p>
<p>The rotten state of the department is widely known. Two reports released in the last three years, commissioned by the minister and the presidency and led by senior and seasoned individuals, set out the problems in detail. One, released <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Review-Issuance_of_visas_permits.pdf">in 2022</a>, chronicled a backlog of visa, permit and status applications, evidence of fraudulent applications being first rejected, then accepted, and the system being used illegally. The other found multiple failures in the provision of visas to senior business managers and experts.</p>
<p>The issue of migration policy and its implementation has never been more pressing for South Africa. Immigration has grown relatively rapidly in the past 20 years. The proportion of migrants to local people more than doubled from a relatively low level of 2.1% in 2000 to a moderate level of 4.8% in 2020, according to a <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">study</a> drawing on UN data.</p>
<p>The global average immigrant population is around 3.5% but countries like the US (nearly 16% in 2019), Australia and New Zealand are much higher. Côte d'Ivoire is the only country on the continent with a considerably higher percentage of immigrants than South Africa.</p>
<p>Migration policy is likely to be a key issue in South Africa’s forthcoming elections. A <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2023-11-16-is-south-africa-heading-for-an-immigration-election/">leading journalist</a> has argued that 2024 will be an “immigration election”. Populist parties are expected to mobilise around people’s fears, while the government will continue to use immigration as an excuse for poor service delivery and joblessness.</p>
<p>The reality is that the impact of migrants on the circumstances of poor South Africans is marginal, and far less important than the very poor performance of the economy and many governmental institutions. </p>
<p>In a paper <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/south-africa-migration-study-nsi-report/">just published</a> I examine the recent history of immigration policy in South Africa. I argue that the challenges would best be addressed by improvement in the operations of the Department of Home Affairs. This should be accompanied by some modernisation of migration law to encourage the use of regular migration channels and discourage irregularity. </p>
<h2>The problems</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Review-Issuance_of_visas_permits.pdf">first</a> of the two investigations initiated by the minister was headed by Cassius Lubisi, former secretary of the cabinet. The <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/images/PDFs/Report-of-the-Work-Visa-Review-2023.pdf">second</a> was headed by anti-apartheid struggle stalwart Mavuso Msimang. </p>
<p>Their main findings were as follows.</p>
<p>Fraudulent documentation was used in 36,647 applications for visas, permits or status over a 16-year period. Of these, 880 were approved and 288 were pending. 4,160 of the fraudulent applications were first rejected, and then accepted after reconsideration.</p>
<p>Systems that had been replaced were still being used illegally from time to time. The outcomes of such activities were suspicious. In some cases applications were processed in zero days. The investigation found visa expiry dates issued beyond the legal limit.</p>
<p>The department’s databases for naturalisation and population registration didn’t correlate with each other.</p>
<p>The list identifying undesirable immigrants was “fatally flawed due to incomplete and missing crucial data”. </p>
<p>In some cases, files had been inserted illegally into the information system. This process would require “a highly skilled IT user with administrator rights to execute”. </p>
<p>There were multiple cases of “forum-shopping” by applicants. This is when an applicant applies for a range of unrelated permits in the hope that one of them will get through.</p>
<p>The department did not have systems that could identify multiple applications by the same person.</p>
<h2>Possible fixes</h2>
<p>The Department of Home Affairs <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202311/49690gon4061.pdf">recently issued</a> a draft white paper which it said was aimed at addressing the problems that had been identified.</p>
<p>It proposed severely curtailing the rights of prospective refugees, restricting paths to citizenship, and strengthening the Border Management Authority and supportive institutions. </p>
<p>But, based on my findings, it is clear that these changes won’t solve the problems. Experts <a href="https://www.guilford.com/books/The-Age-of-Migration/Haas-Castles-Miller/9781462542895">show</a> that tighter restrictions lead to greater illegality, not less migration.</p>
<p>The most disappointing element of the draft white paper is that it makes no reference to recommendations made in the two reports on the problems at the department. </p>
<p>Recommendations of the reports included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>major investment in and reorganisation of information systems </p></li>
<li><p>the integration of the various population databases </p></li>
<li><p>further forensic investigations to root out corruption </p></li>
<li><p>hiring and training staff with skills and integrity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The draft white paper also does not mention the need to modernise the colonial-style bilateral labour agreements which South Africa maintains with five regional neighbours – Mozambique, Lesotho, Eswatini, Malawi and Botswana. These countries, and Zimbabwe, are the greatest source of regular and irregular migration.</p>
<p>These agreements are no longer fit for purpose. Firstly, they impose tight restrictions on the rights of contracted migrants from other countries. Secondly, they are based on patterns of migrant labour developed during the colonial period to support farming and mining. Thirdly, they’re written up on the basis of an unequal relationship between countries of the southern African region.</p>
<p>Modern bilateral labour agreements have been developed. An example <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_837529.pdf">is the Canadian system</a>. It provides for long term arrangements with full labour and social rights for the duration of the multiyear contract, but no right to permanent residence for the workers or their families. </p>
<p>Modern Canadian-style migrant labour agreements would encourage more migrants to choose regular migration routes and fewer would try to evade or abuse the law.</p>
<p>The draft white paper gives the impression that the challenge of migration policy can be solved with tighter laws on refugees and citizenship. In fact the fundamental problem is the corruption and inefficiency in the permits and visa section of the department, which the white paper hardly mentions.</p>
<p>The unfortunate conclusion that can be drawn from a reading of the draft white paper is that it was designed primarily to give the ruling party a narrative for the upcoming election, rather than to reform the migration governance regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute under whose auspices he researched and wrote this article.</span></em></p>Problems identified include a backlog of visa, permit and status applications, fraudulent applications being first rejected, then accepted, and the system being used illegally.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187212023-12-12T19:17:01Z2023-12-12T19:17:01ZChina-Africa relations in 2023: key moments and events to remember<p>In a year when headlines have been dominated by conflict in Europe and the Middle East, and geo-economic tensions between China and the West, China-Africa relations were, in comparison, a steady and stable norm. </p>
<p>Having followed China-Africa relations for two decades, I wanted to flag a few key moments from this year. These reveal that the relations between China and the continent have focused on building momentum and deepening ties, especially when it comes to trade and the promotion of African exports. </p>
<p>They also highlight China’s growing commitment to supporting the development of African countries. </p>
<h2>China-Africa trade and the expo</h2>
<p>In June, the third <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/326222.html">China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo</a> was held in Changsha, Hunan province. </p>
<p>It’s the most intensive China-Africa trade event in the calendar because of its scale and focus. It’s also a chance for small and medium enterprises to be involved. </p>
<p>This year’s expo <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3226366/deals-down-hunans-china-africa-trade-expo-reaps-us10-billion">reportedly recorded</a> some 100,000 visitors and agreed some 120 projects worth a total of US$10.3 billion.</p>
<p>The expo allows face-to-face interaction to happen in the hope of developing commercial partnerships and sales. There were deals <a href="http://www.focac.org/zfzs/202306/t20230630_11106280.htm">around essential oils from Madagascar, gems from Zambia, wood carvings from Zimbabwe</a>, and flowers from Kenya. One Chinese food group <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230627/9efd6c4d936b415598b0632ce4e6d2b4/c.html">displayed</a> its first imported batch of Kenyan anchovies to seafood distributors. This helped catapult demand – on one day in September, <a href="http://www.news.cn/fortune/2023-09/07/c_1129848863.htm">52 tons</a> of dried wild Kenyan anchovies landed in Hunan for distribution across China.</p>
<p>There were a few important take-aways from the event: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>It flagged the emerging role of <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">Hunan</a> in China-Africa relations. Hunan is the source of a sizeable share of China’s own food supply. It’s also home to advanced agricultural processing and heavy industry capabilities. </p></li>
<li><p>There were high-level <a href="https://venturesafrica.com/a-slice-of-opportunity-benin-joins-chinas-fruit-export-market/">“green lanes” dialogues</a> where issues in clearing more African fruits, vegetables, and other African products for export to China were discussed. The aim of these dialogues was to support agricultural modernisation in Africa and increase export revenue. </p></li>
<li><p>The emerging Hunan-based <a href="http://www.enghunan.gov.cn/hneng/Government/Bulletin/202306/t20230608_29370776.html">“Africa Brand Warehouse”</a> project used the event to support the entry of more (106 specificially) African brands into major Chinese shopping malls</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</h2>
<p>In August President Xi Jinping visited South Africa for a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">summit</a> of the five-country bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Brics. </p>
<p>Parallel to the Brics summit the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</a> – a dialogue initiated by China and co-chaired by Presidents Xi and Cyril Ramaphosa – was held. </p>
<p>A couple of things stood out from the dialogue.</p>
<p>First, its emphasis on promoting <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">African integration</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">the participation</a> of African regional organisations that play key roles in fostering intra-African trade. Discussions focused on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and trade-related infrastructure and policy.</p>
<p>Second, Xi <a href="https://www.kzaobao.com/shiju/20230826/145524.html">announced</a> three new plans for Africa relating to agriculture, industrialisation and talent development. The plans aim to address challenges in China-Africa economic relations, such as laggard agricultural productivity, lack of manufacturing and economic diversification, insufficient job creation and educational opportunities. They also aim to address hurdles in Africa’s development. </p>
<p>These actions speak to Xi’s <a href="https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/735319/the-gravity-of-chinas-african-export-promise">promise</a> to create a “new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. </p>
<p>This involved the growth of trade, especially with respect to African exports to China. </p>
<p>It would also see a change in the structure of trade. A long-standing <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.12229">pattern</a> is that Africa sells raw materials and buys manufactured goods, which entrenches the continent’s under-development. China is trying to move past this by buying more processed goods, and fostering services like tourism and finance. </p>
<h2>China’s foreign minister comes to Africa</h2>
<p>As has happened every year for at least the past 30 years, China’s foreign minister visited Africa. Qin Gang’s trip in January included visits to Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, Benin and Egypt.</p>
<p>From my lens, Qin’s visit was conservative in its announcements and continued to demonstrate China’s commitment to the continent. </p>
<p>He cemented important bilateral and multilateral ties, for instance with the African Union and China-Arab relations. </p>
<p>One moment that stood out was the launch of the Horn of Africa Peaceful Development Concept, which aims to bring lasting peace and economic stability to countries of the conflict-afflicted region. This stands out because China has a
<a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/05/11/what-to-make-of-chinas-non-interference-policy-in-africa/">long-held foreign policy doctrine of non-interference</a>, and a much shorter history of US or European-style proactive roles in seeking to foster cross-country peace.</p>
<h2>Infrastructure changes around Lagos</h2>
<p>Various infrastructural developments around Lagos, Nigeria were a milestone in China-Africa relations this year. These will gradually change the scale with which Nigeria can trade with the world. </p>
<p>In April, Lekki Deep Sea Port – Nigeria’s first deep sea port – launched its commercial operations. It’s <a href="https://lekkiport.com/project-overview-structure/">administered</a> by Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise Limited, a joint venture enterprise owned by a group of investors (comprising China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd and Singapore’s Tolaram Group), the Lagos state government and the federal government of Nigeria through the Nigerian Ports Authority.</p>
<p>The port, one of the largest in Africa, will eventually connect to Lagos’ Rail Mass Transit system. <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/lagos-set-to-increase-train-trips-on-chinese-built-metro-rail/">The first phase of the rail system, the Blue Line, was opened in September</a>. </p>
<p>The Blue Line was <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/00L77SUF.html">built by</a> China’s Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation. Its corridor spans 13km and covers five stations. It’s the first rail infrastructure traversing Okokomaiko, a densely populated area of western Lagos, and the Marina district, notable for high-rise commercial offices. </p>
<h2>Into 2024</h2>
<p>Relations look set to keep evolving and growing into the new year. </p>
<p>Later in the year, a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit is due to be hosted by China. Typically the forum leads to announcements of new directions in China-Africa ties by both sides, and commercial deals being agreed. </p>
<p>Otherwise, there are some key bilateral anniversaries to be marked, such as the 60th anniversary of China-Tanzania and China-Zambia relations. In addition, China and Tanzania are expected to launch the flagship <a href="https://dailynews.co.tz/tz-sees-investment-fortunes/#google_vignette">East Africa Commercial and Logistics Centre project</a>. This is expected to expand trade and investment ties between China and other landlocked economies within the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Several key events highlighted the growing ties between China and Africa.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2171112023-11-08T13:53:13Z2023-11-08T13:53:13ZDo you like snakes, lizards and frogs? Why herpetology might be the career for you<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557734/original/file-20231106-23-lkg44h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The author handling a boomslang as part of her work with a conservation organisation.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Cooke</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We are so fortunate to share the world with a huge diversity of creatures. For me, some of the most fascinating are reptiles and amphibians. Collectively called <a href="https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/administration_pdf/0220c4kherps.pdf">herpetofauna</a>, reptiles and amphibians are ectotherms; they rely on external sources to regulate their body temperature.</p>
<p>A person like me who works with these groups of animals is called a herpetologist. Among the reptiles and amphibians, my special interest is in snakes. I’ve always been interested in reptiles, from the days when I would chase common flat lizards in the Motobo Hills in Zimbabwe, where I grew up, and interact with snakes and other animals at our local rehabilitation centre. </p>
<p>Still, if somebody had told my teenage self that my job would entail working with snakes and encouraging other people to appreciate them, I never would have believed them. I didn’t even know you could make a career out of working with reptiles. Today, I’m studying towards my PhD in herpetology (which is technically a degree in ecology and conservation) while also working with a snake conservation organisation in South Africa.</p>
<h2>Learning about snakes</h2>
<p>Most people will be familiar with zoology, the branch of biology that focuses on the study of all animals. Some animals have their own speciality within the discipline of zoology. Herps (a slang term for herpetofauna) are one example.</p>
<p>There are <a href="http://www.reptile-database.org/db-info/SpeciesStat.html">over 4,000 species</a> of snakes around the world. Each species has a unique adaptation to its own environment. Some snakes, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ultimate-in-stealth-puff-adders-employ-camouflage-at-every-level-53316">puff adders</a>, are scentless as a way to camouflage themselves from predators. Others, like southern African pythons, <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-insights-into-how-southern-african-pythons-look-after-their-babies-91276">show maternal care</a>, which is very unusual for snakes and much more common in mammals and birds. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ultimate-in-stealth-puff-adders-employ-camouflage-at-every-level-53316">The ultimate in stealth, puff adders employ camouflage at every level</a>
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<p>These unique adaptations have allowed snakes to thrive in different environments. This makes them a great model in science: herpetologists can ask questions about their physiology, evolution, ecology and biology.</p>
<p>For anyone looking to become a herpetologist, a basic zoology degree will get you started. Most universities will have someone who specialises in teaching herpetology or someone who can point you in the right direction. Volunteering at institutions that have reptiles, like zoos, is also a great way to get some experience working with them. Once you get to postgraduate level, you can specialise in one of many different topics in herpetology and apply different techniques to answer questions that you are curious about. </p>
<p>As a specialist in reptiles and amphibians, you can merge that interest with other disciplines like photography, law or conservation, and this can open up many job opportunities. You can also pursue further research at a university, become a lecturer or school teacher, work at a zoo or become a museum curator. There are many options to explore. </p>
<h2>My research</h2>
<p>I completed my MSc in 2017 and my research focused on the evolution of diet in a group of snakes called <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/2d772155-77f6-4f7c-94db-b3e59fb0b22a">lamprophiids</a>. I loved learning about how diverse snakes are in the food they eat. For my PhD, I wanted my research to have a real-world application, so I waited until 2021 to start after getting some work experience in conservation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-insights-into-how-southern-african-pythons-look-after-their-babies-91276">New insights into how southern African pythons look after their babies</a>
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<p><a href="https://hiralnaik.wordpress.com/contact-info/publications/">My current research</a> focuses on the way that snakes behave (behavioural ecology) to answer some of the bigger question of what leads snakes to bite people. Another year and I will have some answers for you on this. </p>
<p>Snakebite is a <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/snakebite">neglected tropical disease</a> according to the World Health Organization and affects millions of people around the world. When natural spaces are transformed and destroyed, many animals, like snakes, go looking for food and shelter – often in people’s homes. Many people are afraid of snakes, so encounters often lead to conflict as people try to kill the animals and get bitten in the process. </p>
<p>I am also fortunate to work for a non-profit organisation, <a href="https://savethesnakes.org/">Save The Snakes</a>, which allows me to educate people about snakes and do my part to conserve them by applying my research. My job includes researching information on snakes that live in different parts of South Africa and assessing threats to them, like habitat transformation, learning more about the relationship between humans and snakes, conducting fieldwork and running experiments to understand more about the behaviour and ecology of snakes.</p>
<h2>The circle of life</h2>
<p>I’m also passionate about education.</p>
<p>Learning about the world of snakes has allowed me to appreciate the natural world in a unique way. <a href="https://youtu.be/ltQcE0gapIo">As predators and prey</a>, snakes are an emblem of the circle of life. One of my favourite activities is going out at night looking for them (called “herping”) and watching them display different behaviours. After the summer rains, frogs and insects come out and the snake predators follow. When I take these moments to observe the world around me I feel fortunate to appreciate these animals in a way most people don’t. This is the feeling I like to share in my education efforts.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A southern African python being returned to the wild by Save the Snakes.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Some of my favourite moments in my current job have involved seeing the change in people’s perceptions about snakes. Snakes have been feared for many generations because of misinformation. Most snakes are harmless. They don’t chase people, and they stay hidden much of the time. By sharing the correct information about snakes, we show that fear can be changed to curiosity and that creates more motivation to learn about them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217111/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hiral Naik has received funding from the National Research Foundation. She is affiliated with Save The Snakes.</span></em></p>Learning about snakes offers unique insights into the natural world.Hiral Naik, PhD candidate: School of Animal, Plant and Environmental Sciences, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155552023-10-29T10:07:08Z2023-10-29T10:07:08ZShepherd Ndudzo’s celebrated sculptures tell an untold history of southern African art<p>The <a href="https://intethe.co.za/shepherd-ndudzo/">work</a> of award-winning Zimbabwe-born sculptor <a href="https://artafricamagazine.org/shepherd-ndudzo-2/">Shepherd Ndudzo</a> is instantly recognisable. Fluid, elongated black bodies and body parts flow from white rock in a typical work. The bodies are dancing or praying, holding hands or reaching out. </p>
<p>These figurative sculptures, carved out of stone (marble and granite) and wood (ironwood), were recently shown along with his abstract wooden sculptures (titled Seed) at the <a href="https://artjoburg.com/exhibitors/">FNB Joburg Art Fair</a> in South Africa by Botswana’s <a href="https://www.instagram.com/oraloapi_/?hl=en">Ora Laopi</a> contemporary art gallery and research project.</p>
<p>The work by the artist (born in 1978) was displayed as a celebration of the sculpture of Botswana, where he lives and works. The show was <a href="https://www.facebook.com/oraloapi">dedicated</a> to his father, <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/artculture-review/ndudzo-a-patriarch-of-local-sculptors/news">Barnabas Ndudzo</a>, the famed creator of realistic, often life-size sculptures. In a <a href="https://vimeo.com/861254066?fbclid=IwAR1KfPY63fbSjGwOgg3BxVF0fwQ0e0LM7MC-68wtN54O6igXOSoMnQRCcNQ">documentary</a> produced by the gallery, Shepherd tells how he was taught to sculpt by his father. He says that his works speak about migration and help tell his family story.</p>
<p>It’s a tale that spans three neighbouring southern African nations, all known for their sculpture – Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa. It exposes a history of shared traditions and schools of teaching, of colonial-era gatekeeping and art world wars. It’s this history that informs the research for my <a href="https://www.ru.ac.za/artsofafrica/people/doctoralresearchers/barnabastichamuvhuti/">PhD thesis</a> on Zimbabwean art.</p>
<p>It’s my view that Shepherd Ndudzo’s work can only be fully appreciated by understanding his transnational story and how it has shaped his life and career, showing how art traditions are invented and reinvented across borders.</p>
<h2>Kekana school</h2>
<p>His father Barnabas was born in Zimbabwe and attended the Kekana School of Art and Craft in the late 1960s. Early art schools in Zimbabwe were founded and run by white missionaries and expatriates. But the Kekana School was founded by a black artist and teacher. The school was started at St Faith’s Mission near Rusape by South African sculptor <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/job-patja-kekana">Job Patja Kekana</a> in the early 1960s, long before Zimbabwe attained <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zimbabawean-independence-day">independence</a> in 1980. </p>
<p>Kekana had trained at Grace Dieu Mission Diocesan Training College near Pietersburg (Polokwane). The same institution was attended by <a href="https://www.art.co.za/gerardsekoto/about.php">Gerard Sekoto</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ernest-methuen-mancoba">Ernest Mancoba</a>, two of South Africa’s prominent black modernists. (<a href="https://uobrep.openrepository.com/handle/10547/621830">Modernism</a> was an era of experimentation in art from the late 1800s to the mid 1950s. It saw new ideas, new media and the uptake of socio-political concerns.)</p>
<p>Kekana had settled at St Faith’s in 1944 and stayed until he died in 1995, except for the three years (1960-1963) when he attended art college in the UK. When Shepherd enrolled at St Faith’s High School in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s, he briefly met his father’s ageing mentor. </p>
<p>Shepherd mostly learned from assisting and observing his father at work. Like Kekana and all his students, Barnabas mostly carved realistic statues and busts.</p>
<h2>Art war</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe is famous for its <a href="https://artuk.org/discover/curations/shona-sculpture">“Shona sculpture”</a> tradition in which artists use handmade tools, patiently carving human and animal forms from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/serpentinite">serpentinite</a> rocks. UK-born artist, teacher and museum curator <a href="https://africanartists.blogspot.com/2015/04/remembering-frank-mcewen.html">Frank McEwen</a> pigeonholed artists from various ethnic backgrounds and different countries – and not just from the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shona">Shona people</a> – in a single <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3171633?typeAccessWorkflow=login">misnamed</a> cultural basket. Their individual creative styles did not matter. </p>
<p>McEwen was the founding director of the Rhodes National Gallery (<a href="http://www.nationalgallery.co.zw/">National Gallery of Zimbabwe</a>). Although he was celebrated for his efforts at promoting Zimbabwe’s abstract stone sculpture tradition, ensuring that the world accepted it as modern art, his presence was bad for artists who worked with media like wood and were making realistic works, as well as for those stationed at <a href="https://cyrenemission.com/2016/11/08/history/">missionary</a> <a href="https://zimnative.com/blogs/historical-sites-and-ancient-ruins/father-john-groeber-and-st-mary-s-church-at-serima-mission">workshops</a>. (Figurative art represents existing objects. Abstract art usually has no real-life visual reference. Realism refers to accurate depictions usually portraying a sitter or model.)</p>
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<p>McEwen preferred working with sculptors from the National Gallery School and the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-beauty-of-tengenenge-village/">Tengenenge</a> workshop until he had a fall-out with its founder, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/just-in-fare-thee-well-thomas-blomefield/">Tom Blomefield</a>. As reported in the press, Blomefield accused McEwen of stealing artists from his stable. Art historian <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315714465_Patron_and_Artist_in_the_Shaping_of_Zimbabwean_Art">Elizabeth Morton</a> highlighted that when Kekana visited the National Gallery School soon after his return from the UK he was chased away by McEwen, who didn’t want to see him near his students.</p>
<h2>Barnabas</h2>
<p>With McEwen holding the most powerful position at the nation’s central art institution, artists from Kekana’s school found themselves on the periphery of Zimbabwe’s mainstream art canon. They had to rely on church commissions and teaching jobs. This probably explains why Barnabas briefly found himself conducting “ecumenical workshops” for the Methodist Church in 1970 and 1971. Today the national gallery doesn’t have a single piece of his in its collection.</p>
<p>Barnabas headed south, finding a home at the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/federated-union-black-artists-arts-centre">Federated Union of Black Artists</a> (Fuba), an academy in Johannesburg. He settled in Botswana in the mid-1990s. He taught art at Gallery Ann and other institutions before moving to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/thapong.centre">Thapong Visual Arts Centre</a> where he continued to mentor emerging artists. </p>
<p>He gained considerable recognition and respect in Botswana. And it’s in Botswana that his son Shepherd continues to sculpt, having moved to the country initially to assist his father.</p>
<h2>Shepherd</h2>
<p>The younger Ndudzo collects the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/ndafunga-dande-exhibition-opens-at-national-gallery/">hardwood</a> he uses from construction sites, especially from trees bulldozed for road construction. He prefers marble from Zambia and Namibia which comes not only in white, but also in various shades of grey and brown. He highlights how citizens of these countries walk across the countryside on this resource, hardly appreciating its importance. The black granite he combines them with is mostly from Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Recently, Shepherd took me to his home in Oodi village in Kgatleng district. His vast open yard is his studio – where his artist neighbours tolerate the deafening noise of his sculpture making.</p>
<p>Though he <a href="https://vimeo.com/861254066?fbclid=IwAR1KfPY63fbSjGwOgg3BxVF0fwQ0e0LM7MC-68wtN54O6igXOSoMnQRCcNQ">talks</a> about moving away from his father’s realistic style, I still see strong elements of it in his work. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/bas-relief">bas-relief</a> carving in the larger works of wood exhibited at the Joburg Art Fair is a good example. It’s a style inherited from Kekana, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=aXMHEwVL0bgC&oi=fnd&pg=PT44&dq=barnabas+ndudzo&ots=4S2f9dwvF3&sig=QxJZpGay1iqYFxULB93gbd7LuFE&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=barnabas%20ndudzo&f=false">who</a> “taught his students bas-relief carving, and realism and understanding of the wood grain”. </p>
<p>Thus I see Shepherd Ndudzo as an artist sustaining a legacy emanating from the Kekana school. However, his work oscillates between figuration and abstraction. It’s quite conceptual in that it is about ideas and quite experimental in that it blends different elements. The artist points to the likes of <a href="https://chapunguatcenterra.com/team/tapfuma-gutsa/">Tapfuma Gutsa</a> as his greatest inspiration. Gutsa transformed Zimbabwe’s stone sculpture tradition, blending stone with various other elements.</p>
<h2>Lineage</h2>
<p>Shepherd’s decision to dedicate his exhibition to his father and mentor is an important gesture. It highlights the story of a sidelined artist, mostly written out of history, like others from the Kekana school.</p>
<p>Artists do not make art in complete isolation. Highlighting the lineage Shepherd Ndudzo belongs to helps us understand his practice, choice of materials and aesthetic references.</p>
<p>It’s a lineage that’s transnational in outlook – linking Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe – and his materials are drawn from different countries. This helps us appreciate how artistic practice can feed off art ecosystems across southern African borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. </span></em></p>His work can only be fully understood by observing the shared traditions of Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa.Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti, PhD in Art History, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2133102023-10-24T13:12:46Z2023-10-24T13:12:46ZHIV-positive parents in Zimbabwe struggle to manage their children’s education – study shows how<p>Over the past three decades researchers have explored various aspects of the impact of the HIV pandemic. One focus area has been children who have lost their parents to AIDS. Less attention has been given to children who are raised by parents living with HIV. This group has become much bigger as more people have <a href="https://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2021/september/20210906_global-roll-out-hiv-treatment">access to antiretroviral therapy</a> and are therefore expected to raise their children. </p>
<p>Our research in Zimbabwe looked at the effects the HIV status of parents had on their children’s education. </p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, the current HIV prevalence rate among adults is about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/hivaids">13%</a>. In 1997 it was at its peak at <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20406793/">29.3%</a>. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe still has the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/270209/countries-with-the-highest-global-hiv-prevalence/#:%7E:text=Among%20all%20countries%20worldwide%20those,rate%20of%20almost%2026%20percent.%20**link%20is%20behind%20a%20paywall**">sixth highest HIV rate</a> in the world. Eswatini has the highest rate (19.58%) and South Africa ranks fourth (14.75%).</p>
<p>Our research focused on mothers in Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital city, who had access to treatment. We were interested in the impact of HIV on their investment in their children’s education. We conducted <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">interviews</a> at <a href="http://mashambanzou.co.zw/">Mashambanzou Care Trust</a>, a local non-profit organisation that provides care to about 5,000 HIV-positive low-income individuals in Harare. Thirteen HIV-positive mothers were interviewed to discuss the key reasons behind the disruption of their children’s schooling .</p>
<p>We found that the HIV status of low-income parents in Zimbabwe severely affected their children’s education, in four ways.</p>
<p>Firstly, HIV worsened the financial barriers parents faced when trying to get their children educated. Secondly, children missed school because they needed to take care of sick parents or siblings. Thirdly, sick parents were not involved with their children’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">academic achievement</a> because they were physically, mentally and emotionally incapable of helping. Lastly, children of HIV-positive mothers did not always have birth certificates, a major barrier to school and exam registration in Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Financial barriers</h2>
<p>The research showed that HIV in Zimbabwe is not only a health issue but also a socioeconomic problem that can force people into <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">poverty traps</a>. </p>
<p>HIV-positive women expressed the view that the Zimbabwean economy, their partner’s health and their own health affected how they supported their children’s educational needs. </p>
<p>We found children with parents who could not afford to pay school fees or buy school uniforms could be sent home until the payments were made. Other low income families experienced this too but parents with HIV could not work and so had more difficulty paying school fees.</p>
<p>HIV-affected families could also face the burden of raising other children from deceased or ill family members. Some of the mothers had siblings and close family members who had died of AIDS. In one case, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">single HIV-positive mother </a> had three biological children and three orphans from relatives.</p>
<h1>Missing school</h1>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">Girls</a> were particularly affected because they were expected to care for siblings, help sick parents with daily activities such as eating and toileting, and make sure they had a place to live and food to eat. </p>
<p>Mothers spoke about the heavy burden their daughters had to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">carry</a>. </p>
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<p>My eldest child was the one who took care of me and cooked for me. When I got sick, my daughter stopped going to school. She is the one who took the responsibility of taking care of me. </p>
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<p>Some children were forced to drop out of school to earn an income. </p>
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<p>He dropped out of school after finishing his Form 3. He is currently selling bananas at Mbare and the money he is getting is not enough. Most of the time he brings home some food after selling bananas. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>No time to help</h2>
<p>Most HIV-positive mothers told us that they did not <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">spend time</a> with their children because they spent a lot of time on income-generating activities, attending to their own health, or their husband’s health. These tough conditions led to even more illness and stress.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All my seven children stay at home as none of them is in school right now. Each day of their lives is difficult as in some cases we fail to get some food to eat. After having failed to get food for the family, it then stresses me more as the mother. Given my condition that I am HIV-positive I end up getting continuous headaches and sometimes I get sick as a result of the stress. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Birth certificates</h2>
<p>Some HIV-positive parents were too sick to obtain birth certificates for their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00346764.2023.2214126">children</a>. Without birth certificates, children risk being sent home and cannot benefit from programmes that target poor children. One mother told of trying to get birth certificates for her children in Mutare, almost 300 kilometres away from Harare.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I once went to Mutare to secure birth certificates for my children. I was told to bring my national identification card which was in Harare during that time. I am yet to go back to Mutare and collect birth certificates for my children. I am only being stopped from travelling because I am currently sick and receiving treatment. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Our research highlights a vulnerable group of children who should also benefit from social assistance programmes that target HIV-affected orphans, given that their parents are too sick to care for them. </p>
<p>They should be included in the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajsw/article/view/194113#:%7E:text=Zimbabwe%20adopted%20the%20National%20Orphan,social%20safety%20nets%20for%20OVC.">National Orphan Care Policy</a>, which seeks to provide basic care and protection to orphans and vulnerable children, and the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/11846/file/Unicef_Zimbabwe_Education_Budget_Brief_2022.pdf">Basic Education Assistance Module</a>, which pays school fees for this group of children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213310/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatenda Zinyemba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some children of HIV-positive parents drop out of school to look after their mothers and fathers. Others skip class to earn cash for the family by selling goods.Tatenda Zinyemba, Researcher in Economics, Health and Governance, Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143292023-10-02T15:01:35Z2023-10-02T15:01:35ZNew species of cobra-like snake discovered – but it may already be extinct<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550600/original/file-20230927-23-z2mshp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C0%2C852%2C668&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hemachatus nyangensis in Nyanga National Park, Zimbabwe</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Donald Broadley</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around the world, natural history museums hold a treasure trove of knowledge about Earth’s animals. But much of the precious information is sealed off to genetic scientists because <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/formalin">formalin</a>, the chemical often used to preserve specimens, <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.6828890#:%7E:text=Formaldehyde%20caused%20the%20formation%20of,breaks%20produced%20by%20ionizing%20radiation.">damages DNA</a> and makes sequences hard to recover. </p>
<p>However, recent <a href="https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/43127/1/1446584_Barlow.pdf">advances in DNA extraction techniques</a> mean that biologists can study the genetic code of old museum specimens, which include extremely rare or even recently extinct species. We <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0291432">harnessed this new technology </a> to study a snake from the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe that was run over in 1982, and discovered it was a new species. Our research was recently published in PLOS One. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://zimfieldguide.com/manicaland/manicaland-zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-eastern-highlands">Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe</a>, a mountain chain on the border with Mozambique, <a href="https://www.gbif.org/dataset/1160e07d-3285-403e-8770-8426ef450bbf">create a haven</a> of cool and wet habitats surrounded by savannas and dry forest. They are home to many species that are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23502383?typeAccessWorkflow=login">found nowhere else</a>. </p>
<p>Here, a mysterious population of snakes first drew the attention of scientists around 1920. An unusual snake displaying a cobra-like defensive hooding posture was spotted in the grounds of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-32131829">Cecil Rhodes’</a> (prime minister of the Cape Colony in the late 19th century) Inyanga Estate in Nyanga. </p>
<p>This snake had unusual markings with red skin between its scales, creating the effect of black dots on a red background when its hood is extended. None of the other cobras found in the area match this description. </p>
<p>More snakes like this were reported in the 1950s, but no specimens were collected.</p>
<h2>A rare find</h2>
<p>The mystery surrounding these sightings piqued the interest of the late <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325450946_Donald_George_Broadley_Bibliography_taxonomic_discoveries_and_patronyms">Donald G. Broadley</a>, now considered to be the most eminent herpetologist (<a href="https://www.environmentalscience.org/career/herpetologist#:%7E:text=A%20herpetologist%20is%20a%20zoologist,conditions%20in%20a%20particular%20area.">reptile and amphibian expert</a>) of southern Africa. In 1961, Broadley was given some severed snake heads and identified the mystery snake as a <a href="https://www.africansnakebiteinstitute.com/snake/rinkhals/">rinkhals (<em>Hemachatus haemachatus</em>)</a>, a species otherwise only found in South Africa, Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland) and Lesotho. </p>
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<p>A handful of specimens were observed and measured in later years, but the landscape has been drastically altered by forestry. The rinkhals from Zimbabwe has not been seen in the wild since 1988 and is feared to be extinct.</p>
<p>This population lives 700km away from other, more southerly populations, which made us suspect it may be a separate species. But the genetic material contained within the specimen from Zimbabwe was degraded, meaning we couldn’t do the DNA studies needed to confirm whether it is a different species from other rinkhals. </p>
<h2>New technology</h2>
<p>However, the latest DNA extraction and sequencing methods have been developed over the last ten years to help biologists study the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/1755-0998.13433">remains of ancient animals</a>. We used the new techniques to examine the Zimbabwe rinkhals specimen. Our study showed they represent a long-isolated population, highly distinct from the southern rinkhals populations. </p>
<p>Based on their genetic divergence from the other rinkhals, we estimate that the snakes in Zimbabwe diverged from their southern relatives 7-14 million years ago. Counting a snake’s scales can help identify what species it is. Subtle differences in scale counts, revealed by our analysis of other specimens, provided enough evidence to classify the Zimbabwe rinkhals as a new species, <em>Hemachatus nyangensis</em>, the Nyanga rinkhals.</p>
<p>The scientific name <em>nyangensis</em> means “from Nyanga” in Latin.</p>
<p><em>Hemachatus nyangensis</em> has fangs modified to spit venom, although the behaviour was not reported from the few recorded interactions with humans. The closely related true cobras (<a href="http://reptile-database.reptarium.cz/advanced_search?genus=Naja&submit=Search">genus Naja</a>), some of which are known to spit venom, do so with the same specialised fangs that allow venom to be forced forwards through narrow slits, spraying it toward animals that are threatening them. </p>
<p>Venom in the eyes causes severe pain, may damage the eye, and can cause blindness if left untreated. <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/spitting-cobras-venom-evolved-inflict-pain">Venom spitting</a> appears to have <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.abb9303">evolved three times</a> within the broader group of cobra-like snakes, once in the rinkhals, and twice in the <a href="https://www.inaturalist.org/taxa/30475-Naja">true cobras</a> in south-east Asia and in Africa.</p>
<h2>A connection between human and snake evolution</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/spitting-cobras-may-have-evolved-unique-venom-to-defend-from-ancient-humans-153570">Scientists think</a> this defence mechanism may have evolved in response to the first hominins (our ancestors). Tool-using apes who walked upright would have posed a serious threat to the snakes, and the evolution of spitting in African cobras roughly coincides with when hominins split from chimpanzees and bonobos 7 million years ago.</p>
<p>Similarly, the venom spitting in Asian cobras is thought to have emerged around <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.abb9303">2.5 million years</a> ago, which is around the time the <a href="https://www.nhm.ac.uk/discover/homo-erectus-our-ancient-ancestor.html">extinct human species <em>Homo erectus</em></a> would have become a threat to those species. Our study of Nyanga rinkhals suggests that the third time venom spitting evolved independently in snakes may also have coincided with the origin of upright-walking hominins. </p>
<p>If a living population of Nyanga rinkhals was found, fresh DNA samples would help us to more accurately determine the timing of the split between the two species of rinkhals and how this compares to hominin evolution. Technological advances may be giving us incredible insights into ancient animal lineages but they can’t make up for an extinction. We still hope a living population of Nyanga rinkhals will be found. </p>
<p>The possible relationship between venom spitting and our early ancestors is a reminder that we are part of the Earth’s ecosystem. Our own evolution is intertwined with that of other animals. When animals become extinct, we don’t just lose a species - they take part of our history with them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Axel Barlow has no active funding. He has previously received funding from NERC and Horizon 2020. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wolfgang Wüster receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Major does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nyanga rinkhals can tell us about our own evolution.Tom Major, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Bournemouth UniversityAxel Barlow, Lecturer in Zoology, Bangor UniversityWolfgang Wüster, Reader in Zoology, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063812023-09-28T12:25:56Z2023-09-28T12:25:56ZWe asked 1,000 Zimbabweans what they think of China’s influence on their country − only 37% viewed it favorably<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547831/original/file-20230912-23-7bo64u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China provides billions of dollars in loans and direct investments to African nations each year.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/zimbabwe-and-china-two-flags-together-realations-royalty-free-image/1089915350">Oleksii Liskonih/iStock/Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China has big ambitions in Africa. Between 2000 and 2020, the economic superpower loaned African governments <a href="https://lucid-cari.squarespace.com/data-chinese-loans-to-africa">US$159 billion</a> to build railroads, highways, stadiums and bridges.</p>
<p>Complementing those loans, foreign direct investment by Chinese-owned businesses that operate in Africa and employ Africans have grown from $75 million in 2003 to <a href="http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa">$5 billion in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>China’s investment and influence in the region has garnered both recognition and criticism from scholars as well as <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-africa-the-new-imperialists">Western media</a>. Some see a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2016.1179023">mutually beneficial relationship</a> that improves infrastructure and economic development for African countries. Others warn that China’s presence and noninterference policy is a <a href="https://www.jpanafrican.org/docs/vol10no2/10.2-13-Antwi-Boateng.pdf">guise for its intent to “colonize” Africa</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=_4cjmbUAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">professors of political science</a> who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tMPB70AAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">study Africa-China relations</a>, we’ve seen how the arguments on either side rarely factor in how the African public feels about China’s involvement on the continent. So in March 2023 we asked 1,000 urban professionals in Zimbabwe – 64% were college educated; 94% lived in urban areas – for their opinions on China’s economic and political influence on their country. Our study is currently under journal review.</p>
<p>We found that exposure to Western media led to a more negative view of China’s economic and political activities in Zimbabwe. Exposure to Chinese media, such as the English-language <a href="http://en.people.cn/">People’s Daily</a> and <a href="https://english.news.cn/">Xinhua News</a>, meanwhile, improved Zimbabweans’ views of China’s economic activities – but had little or no effect on their views of China’s political activities. </p>
<p>Our study also shows that the political party that respondents belonged to played a role in how much they were influenced by Chinese or Western media.</p>
<h2>China’s long relationship with Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>During the Cold War, China competed with the Soviet Union to project itself as a force for liberation in Africa.</p>
<p>For example, China <a href="https://africaportal.org/publication/china-and-zimbabwe-the-context-and-contents-of-a-complex-relationship/">trained and supported</a> the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front, or ZANU-PF, which was fighting for the liberation of the Black majority from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/world/africa/20iht-obits.5.8411810.html">white-minority government</a> led by white supremacist Ian Smith. The ZANU-PF has remained in power in Zimbabwe since the country’s independence from the U.K. in 1980.</p>
<p>This relationship has been unshakable since 2003 when then-President Robert Mugabe’s government was <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-10-20-zimbabwe-sanctions-will-stay-until-it-mends-its-ways-says-us/">sanctioned by the West</a>. The sanctions followed a controversial <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/9/20/who-is-to-blame-for-zimbabwes-land-reform-disaster">land reform policy</a> that led to white Zimbabwean farmers losing land to Black Zimbabweans. China responded by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2012.670435">strengthening its economic ties</a> with Zimbabwe – providing loans and increasing investments.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548171/original/file-20230913-29-3mybn6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe’s new parliament building was constructed and fully funded by China as a gift to the southern African country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-interact-in-front-of-zimbabwes-new-parliament-news-photo/1241620100">Shaun Jusa/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Debt-trap diplomacy?</h2>
<p>However, the specter of colonization still haunts Africans, and some politicians and scholars <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2016.1138615">depict China as a colonizing power</a> dressed in a mantle of noninterference. They <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1536710X.2011.555259">accuse China of exploiting African countries</a> to enrich itself. </p>
<p>These critics claim that loans from China trap African countries in debt as China makes further inroads into Africa’s economic landscape. This is a precursor for neocolonization, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898893">some observers claim</a>. </p>
<p>Furthering this argument is the fact that Chinese companies have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jan/07/zimbabwe-china-mines-pollution-evictions">contributed to the destruction of areas of Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/international/south-sudan-pledges-to-clean-up-oil-pollution-after-locals-protests-2715678">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2020.08.004">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.2.301">Ghana</a> through mineral and oil extraction – disrupting natural landscapes, emitting hazardous pollutants and displacing local residents.</p>
<p>On the other hand, proponents of greater Africa-China relations see the economic ties as mutually beneficial. They say the debt-trap narrative <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25988">underestimates the decision-making capacity</a> of African governments who seek to leverage the economic advantages from their relationship with China to benefit their populations. </p>
<p>This vantage point posits that China boosts economic development, that Chinese loans are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1807318">not significant drivers of debt distress</a>, and that there is an <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-dragons-gift-9780199550227">overemphasis on the drawbacks of China’s investment</a> in Africa.</p>
<h2>African perspectives on China</h2>
<p>As to what ordinary Africans think about Chinese influence, survey data collected by the independent research network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> in more than 30 countries between 2019 and 2021 shows that <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad489-africans-welcome-chinas-influence-maintain-democratic-aspirations/">roughly 63% of Africans</a> think China’s economic and political influence is positive. </p>
<p>This public perception of China is on par with public perception of the United States – which <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad489-africans-welcome-chinas-influence-maintain-democratic-aspirations/">60% of Africans view favorably</a> when it comes to economic and political influence. </p>
<p>Our survey respondents in Zimbabwe, however, were far more critical: Only 37% viewed China’s influence positively. </p>
<p>We also examined how foreign media coverage from the West – specifically the U.S. and U.K. – and from China influenced respondents’ views on China’s economic and political influence. </p>
<p>While Chinese media is favorable to China’s involvement in Zimbabwe and <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/26/c_1310334063.htm">emphasizes how Zimbabwe benefits</a> from the relationship, Western media is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/27/africa/zimbabwe-mine-shooting-intl/index.html">critical of China’s economic presence</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/03/chinese-mining-zimbabwe-pose-threat-endangered-species-hwange-national-park">warns about exploitation</a>. </p>
<p>We found that Zimbabweans were more likely to negatively perceive China’s economic and political impact when exposed to critical coverage. Researchers call this a <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.1908369116">negativity bias</a>. We found the effect of positive media coverage was more limited – and affected the perceptions of Chinese economic influence but not political influence.</p>
<p>However, partisanship also played a role in how likely Zimbabweans were to be swayed by foreign media. Zimbabweans who support the country’s China-friendly incumbent party ZANU-PF were more likely to be influenced by foreign media than opposition supporters. Their favorable views of China diminished when exposed to critical news and improved when exposed to favorable news. </p>
<p>Opposition party supporters, meanwhile, already had a critical position toward China and were less likely to be swayed by media. This echoes the opposition party’s critical stance on China. Concerning China’s political influence, we found neither positive nor negative media coverage significantly affected their attitudes. </p>
<h2>Weight of public opinion</h2>
<p>What ordinary Africans think of China has significant implications for China, especially in democracies and in countries where the opposition parties have influence. China, of course, knows this and uses its news media to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02500167.2016.1143853">sway public opinion in Africa</a>. </p>
<p>We believe the discussion surrounding China’s presence in Africa should be democratized by taking public opinion more seriously. Although China might win the hearts of African elites through economic investments, critical voices exist among the public, especially among those negatively affected by China’s presence. The public will ultimately decide the extent of China’s endeavors in African countries through the influence they exert on their elite representatives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The American Political Science Association Summer Centennial Center Research Grants funded this study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This study was funded by the American Political Science Association Summer Centennial Center Research Grant 2nd Century Fund. </span></em></p>Politicians and scholars debate whether China’s economic investments in Africa benefit or exploit local populations. But what does the public think?William Hatungimana, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Oklahoma State UniversityHaruka Nagao, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Oklahoma State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134022023-09-27T13:56:24Z2023-09-27T13:56:24ZMeteorite discovery: unusual finds by South African farmer add to space rock heritage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549742/original/file-20230922-19-t7wiqi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A digital composite of a meteor shower speeding towards Earth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adastra</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Meteorites – fragments of rock that have fallen to Earth from space in spectacularly fiery meteors – have been the subject of public fascination, awe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ancient-cultures-explained-comets-and-meteors-100982">myths</a> and even <a href="https://owlcation.com/social-sciences/The-Worship-of-Meteorites-in-Ancient-Cultures">religious worship</a> for thousands of years. </p>
<p>In recent decades they’ve become a cosmic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rosetta-Stone">Rosetta Stone</a> for scientists investigating the birth throes of our solar system and the organic life it hosts. Meteorites are therefore <a href="https://www.sahra.org.za/archaeology-palaeontology-and-meteorites/">rightly classified</a> by many countries as an integral part of communal natural heritage and are sought after by museums and private collectors.</p>
<p>South Africa, where I research meteorites, is one such country. In late 2021, my colleagues and I were alerted to an exceptional opportunity. Gideon Lombaard, a farmer in the Northern Cape province, reached out to us because he suspected that he had found two meteorite fragments. If proved true, these would be the first meteorite discoveries in South Africa in over 40 years. </p>
<p>After subjecting the fragments to a range of tests, we were able to show that the two fragments, despite being found only a kilometre apart, were unrelated – that is, they must have come from different meteor events.</p>
<p>In August, the <a href="https://meteoritical.org/">Meteoritical Society’s</a> nomenclature committee, which adjudicates all new meteorite submissions, formally accepted our proposal that the two fragments were different meteorites. They approved our suggested names – <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/metbull.php?sea=&sfor=names&ants=&nwas=&falls=&valids=&stype=contains&lrec=50&map=ge&browse=&country=South+Africa&srt=name&categ=All&mblist=All&rect=&phot=&strewn=&snew=0&pnt=Normal%20table&code=79964">Brierskop</a> and <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/metbull.php?sea=&sfor=names&ants=&nwas=&falls=&valids=&stype=contains&lrec=50&map=ge&browse=&country=South+Africa&srt=name&categ=All&mblist=All&rect=&phot=&strewn=&snew=0&pnt=Normal%20table&code=79963">Wolfkop</a> – after landmarks near their discovery sites. </p>
<p>Mr Lombaard’s double discovery raises South Africa’s tally of confirmed meteorites to 51 – the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Namibia has 18 confirmed meteorites, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rare-meteorite-recovery-in-botswana-can-help-reveal-secrets-of-outer-space-99678">Botswana</a> 12, Zimbabwe four, and Lesotho and eSwatini one each. But, compared with the over 14,000 meteorites recovered from the Sahara desert, the number of recovered southern African meteorites is extremely small. A concerted national meteorite education awareness and search programme could thus reap great benefits. </p>
<h2>What is a meteorite?</h2>
<p>A meteorite is a piece of rocky space debris that survives collision with Earth. Meteorites are usually discovered by someone who notices an unusual rock while out walking (called a “find”). However, around 2% of meteorites are classified as “falls” because they are retrieved after witnessed meteor fireball events.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/secrets-revealed-of-dash-cam-meteorite-that-rocked-russia-19923">Secrets revealed of 'dash-cam' meteorite that rocked Russia</a>
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</em>
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<p>The meteorite family comprises several different types of rocks. A very small proportion of the <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/">approximately 72,000 meteorites recovered globally</a> to date are actually pieces blasted off the surfaces of the moon and Mars by giant impacts. The overwhelming majority appear to have originated in the asteroid belt that lies between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. They are the shrapnel from past collisions between some of these asteroids that were ejected into orbits that have ended up crossing Earth’s path.</p>
<h2>Discovery and forensics</h2>
<p>Finding meteorites is not easy, which makes Mr Lombaard’s twin discoveries all the more significant. Because they originate in outer space, meteorites commonly contain iron in either metal or sulphide forms, both of which begin to deteriorate rapidly when they come into contact with free oxygen and water. </p>
<p>It is thus not surprising that nearly 80% of all meteorites have been found where arid climates aid their preservation, namely Antarctica and the Sahara desert. Meteorites typically become coated in a dark fusion crust during their fiery passage through the atmosphere. That makes the white Antarctic ice and the pale-coloured Sahara bedrock and sand perfect backdrops for searchers.</p>
<p>Mr Lombaard discovered the two meteorites during routine farming activities. The Brierskop meteorite is a 21.19g chondrite which he found on 18 September 2018. Chondrites are the oldest rocks in our solar system, dating back 4.567 billion years. It was only after he found the Wolfkop stone (also a chondrite, weighing 90.26g) 1km away from the Brierskop site on 27 August 2021 that he reached out to determine whether these were, as he suspected, meteorites. Contacting an expert is the best approach if you think you’ve found a meteorite.</p>
<p>The initial pictures he sent were very promising; our primary task was then to establish whether they represented two pieces from a single fall or had originated from separate falls.</p>
<p>Our analysis, which involved slicing a small piece from each stone and grinding it down to produce an ultra-thin wafer through which light from a microscope could pass, was able to show that the meteorites have distinct differences.</p>
<p>Brierskop contains less iron metal and less iron in its main silicate minerals than Wolfkop. The chondrules (particles in the rock) are much better preserved in Brierskop, indicating that they experienced less heating in the parent asteroid before the impact collision that liberated it. We then used the greater oxidation (rust) of the Wolfkop stone to suggest that its fall predated that of the Brierskop meteorite.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s meteorite heritage</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-heritage-resources-act">South African Heritage Act</a> No. 25 of 1999 classifies South African meteorites as national heritage items that cannot be damaged, removed, exported or traded without a permit issued by the South African Heritage Agency. The Meteoritical Society also requires that meteorites are properly stored and conserved at accredited institutions such as museums and universities for future research. Wolfkop and Brierskop are now stored at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, which is an accredited repository.</p>
<p>An average of between 10 and 50 meteorites are estimated to hit Earth’s surface every day. Technology will help drive new discoveries. In recent years an increasing number of countries have installed camera networks (such as NASA’s <a href="https://www.seti.org/cams">CAMS</a>) designed to record the trajectories of meteor fireballs that can then be triangulated to try to locate the fall site. The power of citizen science is also being harnessed in many places in the form of volunteer ground searches for fallen meteorites. </p>
<p>Prior to the two recent discoveries, the <a href="https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meteor/">Meteoritical Bulletin Database</a> listed 49 meteorites as having been satisfactorily proved to be from South African sites. Mr Lombaard’s double find takes the country’s meteorite inventory above 50. There’s no doubt that more are just waiting to be found.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Lawrence Gibson receives funding from the NRF. </span></em></p>Meteorites are usually discovered by someone who notices an unusual rock while out walking.Roger Lawrence Gibson, Professor of Structural Geology and Metamorphic Petrology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130852023-09-24T12:02:25Z2023-09-24T12:02:25ZYoung people with sexual or gender diversity are at higher risk of stopping their HIV treatment because of stigma and harsh laws<p>Ending the AIDS pandemic – particularly in eastern and southern Africa – cannot be achieved unless more resources are channelled to meet the needs of key vulnerable populations.</p>
<p>This is one of the themes that emerged during an <a href="https://www.samrc.ac.za/event/11th-sa-aids-conference-2023-20-23-june-2023-durban">AIDS conference in June</a> in South Africa. Prejudice against particular groups – such as men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender communities – interferes with treatment regimes and people’s adherence to treatment. These groups are also at higher risk from HIV due to increased levels of stigma, discrimination, violence and criminalisation. </p>
<p>Our research is part of a three-year <a href="https://www.heard.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/SADC-Symposium-Report_final.pdf">project</a> on HIV-related stigma linked to young people with sexual or gender diversity. The research, conducted in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, involved 156 participants.</p>
<p>The research identified three main findings:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Criminal laws and strongly negative socio-cultural and religious beliefs produced deeply rooted intolerance around sexual or gender diversity. </p></li>
<li><p>Participants spoke about repeated experiences of verbal harassment, being gossiped about and physical violence.</p></li>
<li><p>Other population groups with HIV said their lives had become more tolerable as social awareness and acceptance of HIV had increased over time. However HIV-related stigma regained its potency when linked to sexual or gender diversity, with adverse effects for adherence to antiretroviral treatment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our research provided novel evidence on the deeply rooted fears and anxieties around multiple forms of stigma among young MSM and transgender women in southern Africa. </p>
<h2>Criminalising sex</h2>
<p>Across 13 countries in east and southern Africa, laws and policies criminalise same-sex sexual relations and facilitate the process of stigmatising gay and transgender individuals.</p>
<p>Recently, Uganda passed the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2023, which punishes same-sex conduct with life imprisonment. Several acts considered as “aggravated homosexuality” are liable to the death penalty. </p>
<p>Our study also noted that young people had developed various strategies to manage their lives. For example choosing when to disclose or identify as a person living with HIV or as a member of the sexual minority community in others, but rarely being both at once. </p>
<p>The constant worry and stress of living with HIV, and the fear of being stigmatised, could have a significant impact on health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>The burden of concealing their identities resulted in a range of mental, emotional and physical vulnerabilities. Signs of depression as well as frequent alcohol use were evident.</p>
<p>Overall 42% of participants had contemplated suicide at least once. According to one participant, an 18-year-old:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I feel like I am nothing, I am useless. In the community, looking at HIV, I am a gay, people they isolate me. So, I don’t feel comfortable, even failing to go to work and finding some money, whatever. And, sometimes, I decide if I can die today, I can rest. So, a lot of things come into my mind when I am disturbed … Sometimes my parents try to comfort me but, internally, I am really disturbed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As well as signs of depression, frequent alcohol use was evident. </p>
<p>There were few services available to assist in coping with these multiple stigmas, with those that came closest being provided by “sexual minority friendly” organisations or led by sexual minority peers themselves.</p>
<h2>Fear of being found out</h2>
<p>Being seen taking antiretroviral therapy or having it found in one’s possession signalled that one was living with HIV. Some individuals preferred to miss doses, occasionally or over more prolonged periods, rather than endure actual or feared stigma linked to being “found out” as someone living with HIV.</p>
<p>A 24-year-old told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What made me to delay taking medication is when my partner wants me to visit his home because he stays in Zomba, and I haven’t disclosed my HIV status to my partner yet, and I can’t take the ARVs with me there. As a result, I go there without the ARVs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A 19-year-old said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It affects me sometimes because, if people reject you, you feel like stopping to take the medication. ‘Maybe am just wasting my time, let me just die.’ It affects me a lot.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other findings we made were that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Many participants had had their status disclosed by LGBTIQ+ peers without their consent. HIV-related stigma is still highly prevalent within the LGBTIQ+ community and has many negative impacts. </p></li>
<li><p>Participants continued to experience or fear stigma related to their sexual orientation at health facilities, which also affected their access to healthcare and retention in care.</p></li>
<li><p>Tailored HIV services for key populations, including young MSM and transgender women, were not reaching everyone; rural areas were the least included.</p></li>
<li><p>Through their experiences, gay young men and transgender women were familiar with the harmful consequences of stigma and yet they were often ostracised from planning and decision-making roles. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Key populations in our study faced inequalities in three main areas: access to HIV services; justice and human rights; and investments in programmes geared towards them.</p>
<p>There were few services available to assist in coping with these multiple stigmas. Those that came closest were provided by “sexual minority friendly” organisations or led by sexual minority peers themselves.</p>
<p>There need to be more community-based organisations that are run by members of these key populations. In Cameroon, for example, the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/cameroon/health/hiv-aids">CHAMP</a> programme supports grassroots advocacy to mitigate stigma and violence and trains peers to offer counselling, </p>
<p>We can only achieve progress if we treat everyone as equal partners in fighting this pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaymarlin Govender receives funding from the National Research Foundation and Sida</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Nyamaruze receives funding from HIV/AIDS Special Fund Round III initiative of the Southern African Development Community. </span></em></p>Stigmatised people living with HIV often suffer from fear, depression and abuse. It’s sometimes easier to stop a treatment regime than risk being ostracised or assaulted by the community.Kaymarlin Govender, Research Director at The Health Economics and HIV and AIDS Research Division (HEARD), University of KwaZulu-NatalPatrick Nyamaruze, Post-doctoral research fellow, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2133702023-09-21T13:27:47Z2023-09-21T13:27:47ZZimbabwean names are still haunted by the ghosts of colonialism<p>In African cultures, the <a href="https://www.africarebirth.com/what-is-in-an-african-name-identity-and-naming-ceremonies-in-african-traditional-culture/">names given</a> to children play an important role because they are often laden with meanings. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/5392/professor-tendai-mangena">team</a> of <a href="https://afrikanistik.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/en/people/people/professors/mitchell-alice">professors</a> of literature, linguistics and onomastics (the scientific study of names and naming practices) we have shown in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00219096221141345">our research</a> that the names parents give their children at birth can help us make sense of many things, including a family’s heritage and events in history. </p>
<p>Our most recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2023.2232053">research paper</a> analyses naming practices in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/zimbabwe">Zimbabwe</a>. It shows that Zimbabweans in the former <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe/The-British-South-Africa-Company">British colony</a> in southern Africa still often choose English names like Robert or Oliver over traditional ones like Vulindlela or Ntombenhle.</p>
<p>We conclude that names make it possible to understand the effects of colonialism and, in more recent years, the importance placed on restoring tradition. Embracing traditional practices matters as a way of keeping culture alive so that people can benefit from its knowledge.</p>
<h2>Relics of colonialism</h2>
<p>English-language names are abundant in Zimbabwe today. This could be one of the effects of the introduction of colonial languages and the displacement of indigenous languages. It demonstrates the difficulty of erasing the mentalities acquired in the colonial era. </p>
<p>We argue that British <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/european-missionaries-southern-africa-role-missionaries">missionaries</a> and colonisers “invaded” the “mental” space of the colonised and significantly changed the way Zimbabwean people use English and indigenous languages to name children.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-use-language-as-a-way-to-exclude-children-64900">How schools use language as a way to exclude children</a>
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<p>“Typical” English names maintain a connection to a time when schoolchildren would often be given new, English names to mould them into British-like subjects. </p>
<h2>Names in literature</h2>
<p>Literary works can help us better understand names and naming patterns. Celebrated Zimbabwean author <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/yvonne-vera">Yvonne Vera</a>’s novel <a href="https://www.complete-review.com/reviews/zimbabwe/veray1.htm">Butterfly Burning</a>, for example, shows how names in Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ndebele-South-African-people">Ndebele language</a> were progressively abandoned for English ones. </p>
<p>This change saw the use of abstract English names such as Gilbert instead of meaningful indigenous ones like Vulindlela, a boy’s name meaning “open the way” that expresses the parents’ hope that the child will bring good fortune to the family. </p>
<p>This cultural shift can be considered a form of erasure of a significant component of indigenous cultures. Such erasure is part of the larger-scale losses suffered through colonisation. This cultural loss was never fully recovered even in the decades after <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zimbabawean-independence-day">independence</a> in Zimbabwe in 1980.</p>
<h2>Naming practices in Zimbabwe today</h2>
<p>There’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2023.2232053">evidence</a> that, in the last couple of decades, parents in Zimbabwe use both English and indigenous languages to name their children. Naming practices from colonial times live on.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe these English names fall into different categories. There are typical English names like Ashley and Jean. There are also biblical names, like Isaac and Peter. We also find Africanised biblical names such as Jowero (Joel) and Mateu (Matthew). </p>
<p>And then there are “Zimbabwean English” names like Decent and Choice: English names translated from indigenous names. Zimbabwean English names offer an opportunity to understand the potential of drawing from traditional African knowledge – where names record personal experiences and aspirations – through using English. Colonial entanglements reveal adaptations of traditional forms. </p>
<p>We also notice “religious” names translated literally from indigenous names – like Takomborerwa (We have been blessed). The alterations are clear effects of colonialism, emanating from the establishment of Christianity. Examples of these “vernacular Christian names” include the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shona-language">Shona language</a> names Tapiwanashe (We have been given by God), Tawananyasha (We have found God’s grace) and Anotidaishe (God loves us).</p>
<h2>Biblical English names and Africanised biblical names</h2>
<p>Like the English language, Christianity was <a href="https://africa.thegospelcoalition.org/video/wasnt-christianity-in-africa-a-result-of-colonialism/">at the heart</a> of colonialism in Africa, spread through missionaries. This saw the increased popularity of biblical English names in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>“Africanised biblical” names are related to Christian biblical names, adapted to “fit” indigenous language rules of grammar. Since the translated Bible remains an “English book”, Africanised biblical names do not become indigenous names, rather they remain biblical English names. For instance the Shona name Ruka is adopted from the biblical name Luke. Ruka is simply a Shona version of Luke. </p>
<h2>Zimbabwean English names</h2>
<p>Besides typical English, biblical English and Africanised biblical names, a large category of Zimbabwean English names are popular at present. These have also been called “non-standard” English names to disrupt the dominance of British English that created tropes like <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/strange-sometimes-hilarious-names-of-zimbabweans/">“hilarious names”</a>. Examples of such names are Bastard and Darling – used in Zimbabwean novelist NoViolet Bulawayo’s award-winning novel <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/15852479-we-need-new-names">We Need New Names</a>. </p>
<p>The majority of Zimbabwean English names are literal translations of indigenous personal names, illustrating the enduring power and assumed prestige of the language of Empire. At the same time, translating indigenous names shows a clear interest by Zimbabweans in retaining indigenous values and naming patterns.</p>
<h2>Refashioning imperial debris</h2>
<p>In these uses of English names with and without indigenous equivalents, the long-term effects of the language of colonisation are made visible. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-history-of-zimbabwe-played-out-on-the-countrys-cricket-fields-162035">How the history of Zimbabwe played out on the country's cricket fields</a>
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<p>So, on the one hand, these names tell a story about how indigenous ways of life were looked down on and how this colonial disdain still influences people’s naming choices. This could be a result of an internalised colonial mentality in which the English language continues to index the power and prestige that it accumulated through the violence of the colonial era. </p>
<p>On the other hand, we see how these Zimbabwean English names draw on longstanding indigenous traditions and creatively reclaim the English language for local purposes. From this perspective, we interpret naming trends in Zimbabwe as a creative refashioning of imperial debris that helps keep traditional knowledge alive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213370/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tendai Mangena received funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for the project on Names in Zimbabwe and the diaspora on which this work is based. </span></em></p>Variations of English names reveal the enduring effects of British rule - but there’s also a return to tradition.Tendai Mangena, Professor of African Studies, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137782023-09-21T12:03:56Z2023-09-21T12:03:56ZInvasive alien species are a serious threat to the planet: 4 key messages for Africa<p>Climate change has negatively – and irreversibly, in some cases – affected ecosystems around the globe. Sadly, though, it is not the only phenomenon that’s altering our natural world.</p>
<p>In 2019, the Intergovernmental Science Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) Global Assessment Report <a href="https://www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/inline/files/ipbes_global_assessment_report_summary_for_policymakers.pdf">confirmed</a> invasive alien species as one of the five most important direct drivers of biodiversity loss. The others were climate change, land and sea use, direct exploitation of species, and pollution. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ipbes.net/">IPBES</a>, an independent intergovernmental body, was established in 2012. It now has 144 member countries; Somalia, the newest member, joined in mid-September. Its major objective is to strengthen the interface between science and policy to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity. </p>
<p>The 2019 assessment found that more than 37,000 alien species had been introduced by many human activities to regions and biomes around the world, most in the past 100 years. A <a href="https://www.ipbes.net/IASmediarelease">new report</a> by the organisation, focused on alien invasive species, suggests this number is rising fast, with new alien species being recorded at an unprecedented rate of approximately 200 annually. It also reveals that the global economic cost of invasive alien species exceeded US$423 billion annually. Costs have at least quadrupled every decade since 1970.</p>
<p>But the new report doesn’t just concentrate on problems. It also offers solutions. It outlines key responses and policy options that governments may take for prevention, early detection and effective control of invasive alien species. Doing so will help to safeguard nature and its contributions to people. This will ensure a better quality of life for all.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-true-damage-of-invasive-alien-species-was-just-revealed-in-a-landmark-report-heres-how-we-must-act-211893">The true damage of invasive alien species was just revealed in a landmark report. Here's how we must act</a>
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<p>I am an invasion biologist whose <a href="https://www.ru.ac.za/centreforbiologicalcontrol/people/researchstaff/juliecoetzee/">research</a> focuses on the ecology and management of invasive aquatic plants. Here, I elaborate on the four key messages highlighted by the report that African countries should heed if the continent is to successfully tackle the threats posed by invasive species.</p>
<h2>Key messages</h2>
<p><em><strong>1: Invasive alien species are a major threat to nature, its contributions to people, and good quality of life.</strong></em></p>
<p>In Africa, invasive species threaten food security by negatively affecting fish production, agricultural productivity, grazing and water supplies. </p>
<p>The introduction of the Nile perch, <em>Lates niloticus</em>, into East Africa’s Lake Victoria in 1954 is one of the most extreme examples. Predation by this species caused the extinction of approximately 200 species of cichlids from the lake. It <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2386700">is considered</a> to represent the largest extinction event among vertebrates during the 20th century. </p>
<p>The invasion also resulted in the shallow lake becoming enriched with nutrients as people came to fish for Nile perch. This resulted in the widespread invasion of the lake by water hyacinth. The plant restricted access to the lake, which prevented transport and fishing. </p>
<p><em><strong>2: Globally, invasive alien species and their impacts are increasing rapidly and are predicted to continue rising in the future. Accurate data is crucial.</strong></em></p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969721003041">2021 research study</a> highlighted that the reported economic costs of invasive aquatic species were unevenly distributed across geographic regions. Africa, the Oceania-Pacific Islands and the Antarctic-Subantarctic, combined, accounted for only 0.6% of the US$345 billion global estimate. That’s not because the costs are really that low. The data simply isn’t being recorded, so we’re not getting the full picture. </p>
<p>African countries need to <a href="https://healthtimes.co.zw/2023/09/19/zim-scales-up-efforts-to-control-invasive-alien-species/">partner with their neighbours</a> in better quantifying the situation. </p>
<p><em><strong>3: Invasive alien species and their negative impact can only be prevented and mitigated through effective management.</strong></em></p>
<p>In 2011 the Convention on Biological Diversity released its <a href="https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/">Aichi Biodiversity Targets</a>. The 20 targets were designed to address and mitigate biodiversity loss across the globe. Target 9 stated that, by 2020, invasive alien species and pathways should be identified and prioritised. Priority species should be controlled or eradicated, and measures taken to block new pathways.</p>
<p>But none of those targets were met. And there has been little or no progress recorded in some African countries. Today, invasive species <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(20)30174-1/fulltext">are reported</a> to be adversely affecting livelihoods in more than 70% of African countries. </p>
<p>Constrained financial resources and the lack of legal frameworks and related operational systems are largely to blame for the lack of progress. For example, there is a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-32394-3_12">huge lack of capacity</a>, mainly at ports of entry – which are the most crucial step in preventing invasions. </p>
<p>Many regions still have to enhance their management plans for effective control of invasive species, starting with identification of common invasive species.</p>
<p><em><strong>4: There are success stories on the continent – lessons should be shared across borders.</strong></em></p>
<p>In South Africa, the management of alien plant invasions has been actively supported by the government’s <a href="https://www.dws.gov.za/wfw/">Working for Water</a> programme since 1995. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/invasive-alien-plants-in-south-africa-pose-huge-risks-but-they-can-be-stopped-94186">Invasive alien plants in South Africa pose huge risks, but they can be stopped</a>
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<p>A study in 2022 <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0006320722002944">estimated</a> that an average of R310 million (adjusted to 2020 values) had been spent every year on work that covered 2.7 million hectares across more than 76,000 sites. This doesn’t mean plant invasions are totally under control. But it is clear that, without this kind of programme, the situation would be far worse.</p>
<p>The study recommended that the programme’s future efforts must focus on clearly defined priority sites, improving planning and monitoring, and increasing operational efficiency. These are all valuable lessons for other African countries.</p>
<h2>An African lens</h2>
<p>Its new report did not focus on any one part of the world, but IPBES has previously been clear about the importance of biodiversity to African nations. In a 2018 <a href="https://www.ipbes.net/assessment-reports/africa">regional assessment</a> on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services For Africa, the organisation wrote that</p>
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<p>biodiversity and nature’s contributions in Africa are economically, socially and culturally important, essential in providing the continent’s food, water, energy, health and secure livelihood, and represent a strategic asset for sustainable development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.</p>
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<p>Most of the data in the newest report comes from the northern hemisphere, as this is where most of the research is conducted, and where the majority of funding comes from. </p>
<p>Different countries and regions will have different needs. That’s where the value of regional coordination and knowledge-sharing becomes clear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie Coetzee receives funding from the National Research Foundation SARCHi and the Natural
Resource Management Programme of the South African Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment. Any opinion, conclusion or recommendation in this material is that of the authors and the NRF does not accept any liability in this regard.</span></em></p>The new report on alien invasive species doesn’t just concentrate on problems. It also offers solutions.Julie Coetzee, Researcher, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2106552023-09-03T07:46:09Z2023-09-03T07:46:09ZZimbabwe’s climate action plan: a win for the environment, health and energy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545067/original/file-20230828-26-s7ub5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C5000%2C3263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Reducing carbon emissions will promote health and development in Zimbabwe. Zinyange Auntony/ AFP/</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/school-children-ride-bicycles-through-a-forest-to-school-on-news-photo/1258934871?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The dumping of billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide and other <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022">greenhouse gases</a> into the atmosphere yearly is already having a devastating impact around the world. This includes <a href="https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg2/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf#page=140">widespread flooding and droughts, raging wildfires, heatwaves and record temperatures</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=22125">Africa</a> is particularly hard hit, with temperatures and sea levels rising faster across the continent than the global average. </p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, unreliable rainfalls and extended droughts are affecting <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/zimbabwe-drought-driving-hydropower-crisis-and-search-alternatives">hydro electricity generation, resulting in rolling blackouts</a>. Food production is also affected. A <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/how-drought-killing-zimbabwe">large fraction of Zimbabwe’s population is at risk of severe hunger</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, almost all countries signed the <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf">Paris Agreement</a>, a commitment to tackle climate change. The intention was to limit global temperature increase to below 2°C, or ideally 1.5°C. To achieve this, countries submitted individual plans, called Nationally Determined Contributions, to reduce their contribution to climate change. They agreed to update them every five years.</p>
<p>The continent of Africa <a href="https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=22125">contributes 2%-3%</a> of the global greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change. Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">contributes less than 0.1%</a>. Despite this small contribution, all African countries submitted their plans to reduce emissions. </p>
<p>In 2015, Zimbabwe committed to <a href="https://unfccc.int/NDCREG">reducing its emissions</a> by 33% by 2030. In 2021, it <a href="https://climatepromise.undp.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/zimbabwe">updated</a> the target to a 40% reduction by 2030 across all sectors. This significant improvement increases the fraction of emissions that Zimbabwe will reduce from all emitting sectors. </p>
<p>The energy sector is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">responsible for about 34%</a> of Zimbabwe’s total emissions. Including other sectors, like agriculture and forestry (58% of total emissions), waste (5%) and industrial processes (3%) will substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions if Zimbabwe achieves its target. </p>
<h2>How Zimbabwe can meet its emission reduction target</h2>
<p>The updated target was informed by an assessment of how greenhouse gas emission could be reduced. The assessment was done by a team of researchers from Zimbabwe and the Stockholm Environment Institute at the University of York (including myself). It provided a clear plan to achieve the targets through the implementation of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">28 specific policies and measures</a>. </p>
<p>We assessed the benefits of these actions to mitigate climate change. We also reviewed other implications of taking each action locally in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">Our research</a> showed that by implementing its climate change plan, Zimbabwe would not only meet its international obligations, but achieve a broad set of health, social and development benefits. </p>
<p>The study assessed and quantified how the 28 actions to achieve Zimbabwe’s climate change plan would contribute to specific <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">Sustainable Development Goals</a>. </p>
<p>The top three benefits identified were improved public health, enhanced biodiversity, and greater access to reliable energy supplies. Each of these benefits is a priority within <a href="https://zimbabwe.un.org/en/153007-2021-2025-national-development-strategy-nds-i">Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy 1 2021-2025</a>. </p>
<p>Good health is a constitutional right in Zimbabwe. Air pollution and unsafe sanitation are among the top 10 <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30752-2/fulltext">risk factors for health</a> in Zimbabwe, and can be reduced by carrying out Zimbabwe’s climate change plan. </p>
<p>Reducing biodiversity losses will not only address an environmental challenge in Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy, but preserve and enhance the tourism industry. </p>
<p>After years of unreliable energy supplies due to drought, and reliance on biomass fuels for cooking for much of the population, providing <a href="https://www.zera.co.zw/National_Renewable_Energy_Policy_Final.pdf#page=9">regular and reliable energy supplies</a> is critical for alleviating poverty and economic growth. </p>
<h2>Counting the benefits</h2>
<p><strong>Public health:</strong> Currently, almost 6,000 infants and over 8,000 adults <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">die</a> yearly from air pollution in Zimbabwe. Almost 1,600 people die from road traffic accidents, and 337 people <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">die</a> from unsafe sanitation. The study estimates that actions reducing greenhouse gases would also reduce air pollutant emissions by between 35% and 45% by 2030. This would lead to lower air pollution exposure, especially indoors where women and girls are most exposed while cooking.</p>
<p>Cleaner energy for cooking, improved transport systems and improved waste management all reduce air pollution. Increasing the use of public transport, or walking and cycling, rather than using cars can reduce road accidents and greenhouse gas emissions from transport. </p>
<p>Expanding access to sanitation systems would reduce the number of people dying from diarrhoeal diseases, and reduce methane emissions if the correct systems were installed.</p>
<p><strong>Improved biodiversity:</strong> Zimbabwe’s climate change actions also include changes to how land is used. It aims to <a href="http://www.envirotourism.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Zimbabwe-Revised-Nationally-Determined-Contribution-2021-Final-1.pdf#page=36">reduce burned areas of forest by 500,000 hectares and add 100,000 hectares</a> of natural forest every year to 2025. The plan would also manage 250,000 more hectares of cropland using sustainable “conservation agriculture” techniques. </p>
<p>These actions were estimated to achieve multiple benefits, including improving soil health and protecting biodiversity, with possible reduction in the losses of both animals and plants.</p>
<p><strong>Access to reliable energy:</strong> Achieving Zimbabwe’s climate change plan is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221146452300091X">built</a> on extending electricity access to 95% of urban households and 75% of rural households. Actions in the plan include the expansion of renewable electricity generation, energy efficiency improvements, and reducing losses from electricity transmission and distribution. These steps can help ensure that access to energy is quick and effective, thereby reducing blackouts and reliance on fossil fuels. </p>
<p>In addition, the study shows that Zimbabwe could increase recycling rates while reducing emissions from waste. The country can equally reduce the time people – predominantly women and girls – spend cooking by switching to cleaner cooking fuels.</p>
<h2>More than a sacrifice</h2>
<p>Tackling climate change is often viewed as a necessary sacrifice, rather than an opportunity to improve lives. </p>
<p>Climate change targets are often focused solely on how they contribute to global, long-term aspirations, rather than the benefits that countries can achieve in the short term.</p>
<p>Our study shows the social, health and development benefits that Zimbabwe could enjoy by tackling its (small) contribution to climate change. This is not unique to Zimbabwe, nor a full list of all possible <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-017-0012-x">benefits</a> from climate change action.</p>
<p>What is notable about the Zimbabwe study is that these local benefits were evaluated and quantified, alongside greenhouse gas emission reductions. They provide a positive case of what countries can gain from taking climate action. </p>
<p>Integrating quantitative assessment of local benefits when countries develop their climate change plans, following Zimbabwe’s example, could help boost national climate plans. This would in turn help the world meet necessary emission reduction timelines and avoid the worst impacts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Malley receives funding from the United Nations Environment Programme, and UK Research & Innovation, . </span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s climate action plan is on track to check emissions and promote development. Other countries can learn from it.Chris Malley, Research Fellow, Stockholm Environment Institute York Centre, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121312023-08-30T12:40:58Z2023-08-30T12:40:58ZZimbabwe’s election was a fight between men – women are sidelined in politics despite quotas<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65775996">2023 harmonised elections</a> have largely been depicted as a battle between the two “Big Men” – President <a href="https://apnews.com/article/zimbabwe-elections-emerson-mnangagwa-president-crocodile-56668e87d9459980b9d38b57175c31ce">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> of the ruling Zanu-PF and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/who-is-nelson-chamisa-can-he-win-zimbabwes-election-2023-08-23/">Nelson Chamisa</a> of the leading opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Significant media attention focused on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/315335/zimbabwe-police-ban-92-ccc-opposition-party-campaign-rallies/">uneven playing field</a> between the ruling party and the opposition.</p>
<p>The election results announced on the 26 August are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-embassy-joins-others-voicing-concern-about-zimbabwe-election/7242392.html">being disputed</a> due to <a href="https://www.sadc.int/slide-item/sadc-electoral-observation-mission-2023-harmonised-elections-zimbabwe-launched">reports</a> of delayed voting, voter intimidation and ballot paper irregularities. <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Mnangagwa</a> has been announced as the official winner of the presidential poll, but the CCC has <a href="https://twitter.com/ccczimbabwe/status/1695576909839487050?s=46&t=knTMoeo4WZETacMv4PIpAw">rejected these results</a>. </p>
<p>Another concern distinct to this election was the stark decline in the number of women candidates nominated by the main political parties for direct election. </p>
<p>We are working on a three year research <a href="https://nai.uu.se/research-and-policy-advice/project/making-politics-safer---gendered-violence-and-electoral-temporalities-in-africa.html">project</a> with a focus on the representation of women in politics in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe as well as gendered electoral violence. This project seeks to explore barriers to women’s participation in politics in Africa and pathways forward, initially researched in the book <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/gendered-institutions-and-womens-political-representation-in-africa-9781913441210/">Gendered Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe ranks low in measures of gender parity in southern Africa. South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique boast <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS">46%, 44% and 42% women’s participation</a> in parliament, respectively. Zimbabwe’s political parties need to field more women for direct election, outside the confines of the quota, in order to reach gender parity. </p>
<h2>Gender quota</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">constitution in 2013</a> introduced a gender quota to ensure the equitable representation of women in parliament. Zimbabwe’s parliament is composed of a National Assembly (lower house) and a Senate (upper house). The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">quota requires</a> that the lower house reserve 60 of its 270 seats (22%) for women representatives. The upper house is to appoint 60 of its 80 senators from a list that alternates between female and male candidates, called the “zebra-list”. </p>
<p>The purpose of the quota is to push the country towards gender parity – 50/50 female/male representation – as directed by the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-rights-women-africa">2003 Maputo Protocol</a> and the Southern African Development Community’s 2008 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Protocol_on_Gender_and_Development_2008.pdf">Protocol on Gender and Development</a>.</p>
<p>However, women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined since 2013, in spite of the quota. <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">In 2013</a> women made up 33% of the National Assembly and 48% of the Senate. Only 12% of these women were elected directly. In <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">2018</a> the numbers in the National Assembly and Senate fell to 31% and 44%, respectively. </p>
<p>There was a significant decline in the number of women nominated to contest the 2023 elections. Only 68 (11%) of 633 aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/women-stand-up-comedians-in-zimbabwe-talk-about-sex-and-the-patriarchy-156052">Women stand-up comedians in Zimbabwe talk about sex - and the patriarchy</a>
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<p>In spite of these challenges, <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/national_assembly/">23 women were elected into parliament</a> (against 26 in <a href="https://www.womenpoliticalleaders.org/women-make-up-more-than-one-third-of-zimbabwe-s-new-parliament-un-women-1447/">2013</a> and 25 in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>). The 23 newly elected women will be added to the 60 women appointed through the quota, making a total of 83, or 30.7% representation of women, in the lower house. After the appointment of senators, as <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zw/zw038en.pdf#page=52">stipulated by the constitution</a>, the number of women in the full parliament will increase. Though commendable, this still places Zimbabwe below average within the region. </p>
<p>These gains may fail to go beyond the 31% representation achieved in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>. The women in the National Assembly will still be less than 50% of parliamentarians and have limited decision making powers. Moreover, there is little indication of the substantive impact these women will have to empower Zimbabwean women, considering their limited numbers. The country’s record of democratic deficits is another important challenge. </p>
<p>The newly elected women MPs may have limited room for manoeuvre to promote gender equality in this political context. But they are still important as decision makers, legislators and role models for other women to enter politics. </p>
<h2>Looking beyond the quota</h2>
<p>A gendered audit of the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download/government-gazette-extraordinary-vol-64-30-06-2023-electoral-act-2/">published list of nominated candidates</a> for direct elections reveals that Zimbabwe’s political parties did not field enough women to reach gender parity in 2023. </p>
<p>Data shows that 633 registered candidates contested 210 seats through direct election. Of these candidates only 68 were women. That is, only 11% of aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. Of these 68, Zanu-PF fielded 23 women (34%), the CCC fielded 20 (29%), and the remaining 25 women were from small minority parties (27%) and independent candidates (10%).</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
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<p>Harare and Bulawayo provinces nominated the highest number of women candidates for election. In Mashonaland Central only one woman was nominated across 18 constituencies. Only two women were nominated in Matebeleland South across 12 constituencies.</p>
<p>It is important to ask why political parties are not fielding more women for direct election. And what this means for the future of representative politics in Zimbabwe. </p>
<h2>Gender bias within political parties</h2>
<p>The data above indicates a bias against woman candidates that permeates across political parties. Apart from the women nominated through the obligations of the quota, neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF fielded enough women to make gender parity a reality in the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>The active exclusion of women from politics is driven by gendered prejudices. These are informed by social, cultural and religious beliefs <a href="https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/29600">rooted in patriarchal values </a> that view women as inherently weak and untrustworthy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/women-bear-brunt-of-political-violence/">threat and use of violence against women candidates</a> continues to be used to coerce and discourage women from contesting elections. As argued by Zimbabwean scholars <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986576?journalCode=jasa">Sandra Bhatasara and Manase Chiweshe</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>patriarchy, intertwined with the increase in militarised masculinities, is producing exclusion with limited spaces for women’s participation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A negative perception is also linked to “quota women” as they were not elected by “the people”. These women are often subjected to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/reader/188770530">elite patriarchal bargaining</a>. They primarily serve the needs of their party, rather than representing Zimbabwean women.</p>
<h2>Gatekeeping</h2>
<p>The presence of a gender quota system provides a facade of progress. This conceals the stark reality that neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF is committed to increasing women’s representation outside the confines of the quota. Political parties function as “election gatekeepers”. They determine the level of women’s inclusion in representative politics, outside the quota system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship</a>
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<p>The number of women elected indicates that, unlike in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">past elections</a>, Zimbabweans seem more willing to vote for women representatives. Political parties should build on these small gains and nominate more women for elections. This will allow the country to move closer to the goals of gender parity, gender equality and democratic plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diana Højlund Madsen is a project leader for the project 'Making Politics Safer - Gendered Violence and Electoral Temporalities in Africa' funded by the Swedish Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shingirai Mtero works for the Nordic Africa Institute on the project Making Politics Safer. This project receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>Women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined in spite of a quota imposed in 2013.Diana Højlund Madsen, Senior Gender Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, The Nordic Africa InstituteShingirai Mtero, Postdoctoral Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116332023-08-20T09:27:25Z2023-08-20T09:27:25ZZimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543031/original/file-20230816-17-eic0p6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.</em></p>
<p>Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">newly published study</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hazel-Cameron-2">genocide scholar</a>, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41917771?seq=6">role of external institutional bystanders</a>. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">analysis of official British and US government communications</a>. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele</a> in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">latest study</a> explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7388214.stm">Operation Gukurahundi</a>. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">British policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice. </p>
<h2>The genocide</h2>
<p>In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27519044">Robert Mugabe</a>, in the newly
independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">both politically and ethnically motivated</a>. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-minister-idUSKCN24U0MK">Perrance Shiri</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Mnangagwa</a> had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/17/could-mnangagwa-be-zimbabwes-comeback-crocodile">Joint High Command</a>. He <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/">reported directly to Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-24-00-gukurahundi-ghosts-haunt-mnangagwa/">denied accusations</a> he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.</p>
<p>The stated objective of the campaign was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jocelyn-Alexander/publication/250225505_Dissident_Perspectives_on_Zimbabwe%27s_Post-Independence_War/links/566858c308ae193b5fa0379f/Dissident-Perspectives-on-Zimbabwes-Post-Independence-War.pdf">rid the country of “dissidents”</a>. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.</p>
<p>In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to <a href="https://www.pearl-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/The-Matabeleland-Massacres-Britains-wilful-blindness.pdf">extreme violence</a>. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence
continued. This included the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/df5722c221bf4c5ca894e5e481413ca3">between 10,000 and 20,000</a>. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between <a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">30,000 and 50,000</a> Ndebele may have been killed. </p>
<p>Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/explandict/unity-accord-of-1987/">national unity accord</a>. </p>
<h2>Rape and sexual violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">My research</a> reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> made a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">historic judgment</a> which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II</a>. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.</p>
<p>I gathered data for my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">study</a> from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events. </p>
<p>The patterns I identified include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults</p></li>
<li><p>people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members</p></li>
<li><p>rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing</p></li>
<li><p>forced intrafamilial rape</p></li>
<li><p>forced bestiality</p></li>
<li><p>forced nudity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<p>The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.</p>
<p>One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">shared the cruelty</a> of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">rituals of degradation</a> are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms. </p>
<p>Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Mnangagwa
with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kingston Royal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing the foetuses of pregnant women</p></li>
<li><p>internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)</p></li>
<li><p>forced pregnancies </p></li>
<li><p>genital mutilation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.</p>
<p>These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction. </p>
<p>Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">research</a> establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/gukurahundi-the-election-dilemma-for-undocumented-victims/">to this day</a>. </p>
<h2>Swept under the carpet</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Prosecution for genocide</a> extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/genocide">planning, preparation or execution</a>.</p>
<p>In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/war-crimes-brutality-genocide-terror-and-the-struggle-for-justice-by-aryeh-neier-new-york-times-books-1998-pp-xiv-274-index-25-can35-between-vengeance-and-forgiveness-facing-history-after-genocide-and-mass-violence-by-martha-minow-boston-beacon-press-1998-pp-xiii-202-index-23/47336631C6CF464C84E5226AB62AD274">international political priority</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/revealed-british-diplomats-pressured-bbcs-jeremy-paxman-understand-true-perspective-massacres-zimbabwe-61535">reports had trickled out</a> of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were <a href="https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/16176/Cameron_2017_TIHR_BritainsWilfulBlindness_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">swept under the carpet</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">minimised by British representatives</a> in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">numerous diplomatic cables</a> between Harare and London.</p>
<p>The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts. </p>
<p>Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202304190012.html#:%7E:text=Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%2C%20President%20of%20Zimbabwe%20.&text=President%20Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%20has%20been,ceremonial%20home%20of%20Britain's%20monarchy.">invited</a> to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.</p>
<p>Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 August. The survivors will continue their <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/memory-and-erasure">search for justice and accountability</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron received funding for this research project from Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the British Academy and a Principal’s Special Award, University of St Andrews. </span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not faced official investigation or prosecution over his role in Operation Gukurahundi – 40 years on.Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098412023-08-10T13:39:17Z2023-08-10T13:39:17ZZimbabwe heads to the polls amid high inflation, a slumping currency and a cost of living crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541697/original/file-20230808-17-q9ved7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inflation continues to defy Zimbabwe central bank efforts </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is facing a host of pressing challenges that voters dearly want the next president to address. Persistently high <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/zimbabwe-inflation-back-at-three-digits-after-currency-crashes">inflation</a>, elevated <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-28/zimbabwe-holds-key-rate-after-currency-s-world-beating-streak">interest rates</a>, and a slumping and volatile <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-07/zimbabwe-stops-short-of-free-floating-currency-in-exchange-rate-battle">Zimbabwe dollar</a> have combined to fuel a cost of living crisis for households and battered business activity. </p>
<p>These will be among the key economic concerns weighing on Zimbabweans as they prepare to cast their votes at elections scheduled for late <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-25/zimbabwe-leader-opens-election-bid-as-inflation-battle-continues">August</a>. President Emmerson Mnangagwa is campaigning to secure a second mandate that will extend his <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-25/zimbabwe-leader-opens-election-bid-as-inflation-battle-continues">five-year term</a> in power. He will square off against <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-25/zimbabwe-leader-opens-election-bid-as-inflation-battle-continues">10 presidential candidates</a>, including the opposition’s main candidate Nelson Chamisa.</p>
<p>Inflation remains sticky and jumped <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">175.8</a>% in June from <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">86.5</a>% a month ago. Part of the recent re-acceleration in inflation was triggered by the Zimbabwe dollar’s slide, which plunged <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/zimbabwe-inflation-back-at-three-digits-after-currency-crashes">85%</a> in the two months through May and pushed up import costs. Although inflation <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">edged lower</a> in July, it still remains significantly elevated.</p>
<p>The central bank responded by hiking interest rates to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-06/zimbabwe-liberalizes-foreign-exchange-market-as-it-hikes-rates">150</a>% from a previously elevated level of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-06/zimbabwe-liberalizes-foreign-exchange-market-as-it-hikes-rates">140</a>%. This move intensifies the pullback on business and consumer spending caused by currency weakening. Additionally, the high pace of price growth has outpaced nominal wage growth, leaving many people struggling to afford everyday essentials. Fewer jobs add to these concerns.</p>
<p>Stubbornly high inflation and its negative impact on the value of the Zimbabwe dollar are symptoms of much deeper problems rooted in decades of fiscal and central bank governance weaknesses. That’s why inflation has defied central bank efforts to rein it in with a series of aggressive rate hikes.</p>
<p>The next president will therefore need to push for reforms in governance to tackle deep underlying problems. Otherwise the country will remain locked in a seemingly endless battle to ward off the economic crisis that is being acutely felt by voters.</p>
<h2>Governance vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Governance broadly refers to institutions used to exercise authority by the government. Long-running weaknesses in fiscal and central bank governance institutions have undermined the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound fiscal and monetary policies for many years.</p>
<p>Between 2005 and 2008 for example, the government pursued an expansionary fiscal policy. Public spending averaged <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April">8%</a> of GDP. </p>
<p>However, because of weak budgetary processes, spending was less efficient especially in areas critical for supporting stronger growth such as education, health, and public infrastructure. This meant that the economy could not generate more government revenue. Average government revenue collected was only about <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April">5%</a> of GDP over this period. The budget shortfalls were financed by printing money, which undermined the independence and credibility of the central bank. This impaired the central bank’s ability to fulfill its mandate, including supporting price stability.</p>
<p>The influx of printed cash in the economy fanned domestic demand but did nothing to spur the production of goods and services to meet it. Inflation spiked and drove the value of the currency lower, raising the cost of imported goods and thus amplifying inflation pressures. </p>
<p>This dynamic created a feedback loop in which rising inflation and a weakening currency reinforced each other. The result was hyperinflation. In 2008 inflation reached <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7660569.stm">231 million</a> %, prompting the government to withdraw the weakening Zimbabwe dollar from circulation the following year and to replace it with the US dollar to combat hyperinflation.</p>
<p>In the years following the switch to the US dollar, inflation receded until 2019 when the Zimbabwe dollar was re-introduced. This was done without fixing vulnerabilities in fiscal and monetary governance that had eventually led to the demise of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45523636">Zimbabwe dollar</a> in 2009. </p>
<p>Because of these vulnerabilities, inflation skyrocketed to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April">255%</a> in 2019 – a 23-fold increase from a year earlier as money supply growth quickened from <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">28% to 250%</a> amid a widening government budget deficit which topped <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2023/04/03/fiscal-monitor-april-2023">10%</a> of GDP in 2017. Since then, the central bank has not been able to get a sustained deceleration in inflation despite aggressive rate hikes. </p>
<p>And the negative feedback loop between high inflation and a collapsing local currency was on full display again following the plunge in the currency in recent months. This has made the US dollar more <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/zimbabwe-inflation-back-at-three-digits-after-currency-crashes">attractive</a>, and it is used more widely to pay for everything from food, fuel, school fees, rent and other services. In February the central bank adopted a new inflation gauge that tracks prices in both Zimbabwean and US dollars to capture this reality.</p>
<p>The US dollar is also seen as a haven which has taken on greater importance as inflation remains stubbornly high. In many ways, the return of the Zimbabwe dollar evokes bad memories of the inflation crisis of 2008 which still loom large for many people.</p>
<h2>Weaknesses in governance breed corruption</h2>
<p>Weaknesses in governance also create opportunities for higher levels of government corruption, which can lead to public spending waste, inefficiencies and lower revenue collection. All worsen budget deficits and add to monetary financing pressures on a central bank lacking independence. </p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/zwe">Transparency International</a> ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 180 countries based on perceived levels of public sector corruption, where the lower the rank the higher the perceived corruption. The evidence also showed no significant progress in tackling corruption for more than a decade. Another 2022 survey by <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/">Afrobarometer</a> revealed that a staggering 87% of Zimbabweans believe corruption has increased or stayed the same.</p>
<h2>A path forward</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economy is facing a confluence of challenges: inflation that won’t go away, higher interest rates and a sliding currency. The fallout has included a cost of living crisis, slowing business activity and fewer jobs. These problems are symptoms of deeply embedded structural weaknesses in the economy.</p>
<p>The following reforms are crucial for addressing these structural weaknesses:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Fiscal governance reforms to strengthen the budgetary process. This will enhance revenue collection and increase the efficiency of government spending. These reforms should also aim to boost revenue collection by lowering pervasive informality in the economy.</p></li>
<li><p>Central bank governance reforms to promote autonomy of the bank’s operations, including monetary policy independence which is important for preserving price stability.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, good fiscal governance positively affects central bank governance by reducing the need for central bank financing, which allows a reduction in inflation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo is affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations. He was appointed as an International Affairs
Fellow for Tenured International Relations Scholars for the 2023-24 academic year.</span></em></p>Without governance reforms, Zimbabwe will continue to face an economic crisis.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111302023-08-09T13:20:50Z2023-08-09T13:20:50ZThe fast, furious, and brutally short life of an African male lion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541739/original/file-20230808-30-wgjkzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by DeAgostini/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of a lion in Kenya’s picturesque savannas rarely tugs at people’s hearts, even in a country where wildlife tourism is a key pillar of the nation’s economy. But when one of the most tracked male lions in Kenya’s famous Masaai Mara was <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/jesse-king-of-maasai-mara-dies-in-tragic-rivalry-battle--4316734">killed</a> on 24 July 2023 the world took notice. Known as Jesse, he was killed during a fight with a coalition of three male lions from a rival pride, drawing attention to the brutally risky and dangerous lives of male lions.</p>
<p>Lions are organised in family groups known as a pride. Each pride is comprised of several related lionesses. One or more adult male lions will also be present. In the public imagination, male lions are better known by their popularised image as <a href="https://www.ourendangeredworld.com/are-lions-the-king-of-the-jungle/">kings of the jungle</a>. Their bravery, strength, and size (only tigers are larger) fits this profile.</p>
<p>But in reality, male lions live a life far more vulnerable. One in two male lions die in the first year of life. From the moment a male lion is born it faces a gauntlet of challenges – from snakebite and hungry hyenas to infanticide at the hands of other male lions. </p>
<p>If a male lion makes it out of their first year of life, and then to independence at around 3, they leave their pride for a period of nomadism. Nomads lead a dangerous existence, skirting the territories of established male coalitions. Out there on their own, few will make it to the age of 10. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541939/original/file-20230809-5449-78bb4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A young male lion rests in the branches of a tree in Uganda’s Ishasha sector. This particular cub was the son of a three male coalition of lions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy: Alexander Richard Braczkowski</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At no time, it seems, is the male lion safe. We know from the evidence collected by the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=683919633775825&set=a.642108107956978&type=3&ref=embed_post">Kenya Wildlife Trust</a>, resident guides, and tourists that Jesse administered and received many beatings from other male lions. We also know that Jesse, who lived to the ripe old age of 12, was eventually killed by three younger, stronger lions. Life comes full circle: killers frequently become victims themselves, of younger, brasher lions, or those in larger and thus more powerful coalitions. </p>
<p>We are three researchers with over 50 years of combined experience in big cat <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=hnAe1zYAAAAJ&citation_for_view=hnAe1zYAAAAJ:F2VeH06lQh8C">ecology</a>, <a href="https://www.resilientconservation.org/founder-duan-biggs">conservation</a>, and <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-environ-120920-125536">the complexities of people and wildlife living together</a>. </p>
<p>We base our commentary on the extensive information gathered by conservation organisations, independent scientists and tourism guides working in the Maasai Mara. Information on Jesse has been collected mainly through sightings data compiled by these entities over time. </p>
<p>Often the survival of male lions will be dictated by the size and strength of their coalitions, and the make up of the lion landscape at large. This sometimes has bearing for conservation especially when lions stray out of national parks or <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0073808">when male lions are hunted after leaving the safety of a protected area</a>.</p>
<h2>The trials of a young lion</h2>
<p>A young male lion’s biggest threat is his exposure to other male lions that aren’t their father or uncle. A host of <a href="https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1365-2664.12594">studies from the Serengeti in Tanzania to Zimbabwe</a> show that the most significant single cause of lion mortality in the first year of a lion’s life is attributed to other <a href="https://userpages.umbc.edu/%7Ehanson/Jane'sLions.pdf">male lions that kill them during infanticide</a>. </p>
<p>This involves incoming males seeking out and killing the cubs of other males or driving young males away, and attempting to take over prides. Killing cubs <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.1257226?casa_token=DNGxjnBmO-EAAAAA%3A6peluEktzB8JVLut4SBuIMDVOMsiM_lBAmv-kAQDlDwEllpBWirZ68LnI-c11jzIN5sV3pder_KVf1rO">accelerates the onset of oestrus in pride females</a> and so is likely to increase the reproductive success of incoming males. </p>
<p>Most lions that get <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/oik.01266?casa_token=VqaDeZN7ZI8AAAAA:_vhYFHLGSO1jHTthWAkJaRoitzJrqq_4nMPjeY8xnxJ2yh2qgYfGs1xDOTDJPs8TKcnIFqFLUw-8quTe">pushed out of their pride when very young </a> don’t survive.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/getting-closer-to-a-much-better-count-of-africas-lions-140945">Getting closer to a much better count of Africa's lions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Cubs that survive to independence – around 3 years of age – must leave their pride for a period of nomadism. During this time, they join up with cousins, brothers, and sometimes unrelated males of similar age to form what biologists term ‘coalitions’. The power of coalitions increases dramatically with the size of the group. This power can be defined by the number of different prides these coalitions are likely to rule, the number of offspring they will sire, and the number of times they will successfully be able to defend their prides from violent incursions from neighbouring male lions and their coalitions. </p>
<p>The tradeoff of larger coalitions is a watering down of a male lion’s reproductive opportunities. </p>
<p>Examples of such powerful coalitions include the six-strong <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mapogo_lion_coalition">Mapogo</a>, and <a href="https://secretafrica.com/the-majingilane-lions-of-sabi-sands/">five-strong Majingilane</a> from South Africa. There is also the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dg680YugRtc">Lake Quintet coalition from Ngorongoro Crater in Tanzania</a>. </p>
<p>Contrastingly, Jesse had only one coalition mate, a lion known as Frank. The two were strong enough to kick out the duo of Dere and Barrikoi from the Offbeat pride in May 2014. After his coalition mate Frank disappeared, Jesse left the Offbeat Pride and led a largely nomadic lifestyle except when he unsuccessfully tried to take over the Rakero pride and even fought with his own son Jesse 2. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541450/original/file-20230807-20-8nygn4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Birmingham coalition of five male lions in the Kruger National Park of South Africa. They regularly clashed with other powerful coalitions including the famed Majingilane lion coalition.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three laws of the wild</h2>
<p>Mate, protect, fight. <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9IWaqAOGyt4C&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=what+is+the+purpose+of+mammal+life+on+earth&ots=1GBV4cKe6D&sig=5LtExzK4__-My_ZA5CkytjjIKRA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=what%20is%20the%20purpose%20of%20mammal%20life%20on%20earth&f=false">These are the three tenets most male animals live and die by in the animal kingdom </a> and this could not be truer for male lions. When male lions are in the prime of their lives somewhere between 5 and 9 years of age they will attempt to have as many cubs as they can. And they will do their best to protect and guard over as many prides as possible.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lions-are-still-being-farmed-in-south-africa-for-hunters-and-tourism-they-shouldnt-be-208584">Lions are still being farmed in South Africa for hunters and tourism – they shouldn't be</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But there is a fine line between holding tenure over many different prides, and successfully being able to defend them and their young. When fights do breakout between male lions they are usually over territorial and breeding rights. </p>
<p>At times they are mere squabbles between coalition mates. At other times, the battles are big enough to cause rifts and splits within coalitions. But in most cases fights are between rival coalitions. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Om5nM54a1Wo">During these fights lions engage in a suite of bodily and olfactory engagements</a> including posturing, roaring and growling, swatting, and biting, and even urination and territorial demarcation. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541448/original/file-20230807-15-nodvp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Michael, a male lion sits on the Kasenyi Plains with his two sons in Uganda’s Queen Elizabeth National Park. Michael killed multiple litters of cubs in this area during his takeover after leaving the south of the park.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>For conservation: look to the lionesses</h2>
<p>When it comes to the conservation of the lion species it is important to look to the lionesses. They are the sentinels of a populations health, specifically the number of animals in a group, and more importantly the ratio of lionesses to lions. Healthy populations can expect ratios of roughly <a href="https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2688-8319.12015">2 females for every male, but when under pressure due to poaching, killings by cattle farmers and a loss of prey these ratios invert towards males</a>. </p>
<p>The story of Jesse highlights how, in spite of their status as king of the beasts, lions are vulnerable. While in this instance, the cause of death was another lion, much more commonly, lions die at the hands of humans. This can be through being shot or poisoned to protect livestock, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10531-019-01866-w">being poached for their body parts</a> or being caught as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006320723002483">by-catch in traps and snares set for other animals by bushmeat poachers</a>. </p>
<p>On the plus side, the fascinating pride dynamics and trials and tribulations of individual lions can help capture the public’s imagination and foster a love for the species and other wildlife. Although human pressures are high, Kenya retains a large lion population and a suite of iconic wildlife areas. These assets are a great source of pride for many Kenyans, and rightly so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Richard Braczkowski received funding from Griffith University and the Southern University of Science and Technology when carrying out this study.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Duan Biggs is the Olajos Goslow Chair at Northern Arizona University. Dr Biggs previously received funding from the Australian Research Council and WWF the Luc Hoffmann Institute. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lindsey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From the moment a male lion is born it faces a gauntlet of challenges, ranging from snakebite to infanticide.Alexander Richard Braczkowski, Research Fellow at the Centre for Planetary Health and Resilient Conservation Group, Griffith UniversityDuan Biggs, Professor and Chair, Southwestern Environmental Science and Policy, Northern Arizona UniversityPeter Lindsey, Research associate, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099842023-07-30T11:14:46Z2023-07-30T11:14:46ZZimbabwe’s ‘Patriotic Act’ erodes freedoms and may be a tool for repression<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539472/original/file-20230726-23-fk6s12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's repressive new law will further erode civilian rights.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jekesai Njikizana /AFP/ via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/local-news/article/200012321/parliament-passes-a-bill-that-seeks-to-punish-unpatriotic-citizens">introduction</a> of the controversial “Patriotic Act” in Zimbabwe will contribute to the erosion of political and civil liberties in a country that has been in the grip of one political party since independence in 1980.</p>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa signed the new act, officially called the <a href="https://www.law.co.zw/download/criminal-law-codification-and-reform-amendment-act-2023">Criminal Law Codification and Reform Amendment Act, 2023</a>, into law on 14 July. His government said the law was <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/as-patriotic-zimbabweans-celebrate-occasion/">indispensable</a> to holding accountable those who jeopardised national interests. It allows for monitoring and suppressing of political organisations and journalists who are critical of the government. </p>
<p>It carries harsh sentences, including death, for acts the government deems to be <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/07/zimbabwe-presidents-signing-of-patriotic-bill-a-brutal-assault-on-civic-space/">“unpatriotic”</a>. </p>
<p>Such a law, in a country with a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/election-violence-in-zimbabwe/FE079C46754D9F31DB5E3D5CE7AC4B38">history</a> of abuses of individual freedoms, will further undermine the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20of%20Zimbabwe%20Amendment%20%28No.%2020%29.pdf">constitution</a>.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ezekiel-guti-revered-zimbabwean-church-leader-who-preached-hard-work-and-morals-over-miracles-209556">Ezekiel Guti: revered Zimbabwean church leader who preached hard work and morals over miracles</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>I have researched post-liberation Zimbabwe’s political economy and noted how the ruling Zanu-PF party has become <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/ejc-afrins-v49-n4-a10">conflated</a> with the state. The party-dominated legislature passes laws that erode political and civil liberties. The new act represents another move by the party to tighten its grip on power.</p>
<p>In my view, the act will enable the government to label legitimate criticism as <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/local-news/article/200012321/parliament-passes-a-bill-that-seeks-to-punish-unpatriotic-citizens%20%22%22">unpatriotic behaviour</a>. It will, for instance, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/zimbabwe-passes-draconian-patriotic-bill-ahead-of-elections-20230601">penalise</a> individuals who hold meetings with foreign diplomats. </p>
<p>As the French philosopher <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=aabd337816cd732dcb43b782fc269daeca4ed67b">Montesquieu</a> stated in 1742, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is no crueller tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of law and in the name of justice.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘National interest’</h2>
<p>Opposition activists have <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/zimbabwe-rights-groups-opposition-furious-over-signed-patriotic-bill-/7184729.html">expressed concern</a> that the law is designed to punish citizens, civil society organisations and political adversaries of the ruling party. Zimbabwe is due to hold general elections <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/4047/">on 23 August</a>. The government could launch a crackdown on dissent. </p>
<p>Some people see the act as a response to the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ99/PLAW-107publ99.pdf%22">sanctions</a> the United States imposed on the Zimbabwean government in 2001 for human rights abuses. The state-owned <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-patriotic-bill-a-necessity-for-vision-2030/">The Herald</a> newspaper said the law was a response to Zimbabweans who advocated for the enforcement of sanctions on Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The government has exploited the sanctions as a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-20-corruption-and-state-capture-not-sanctions-are-the-cause-of-zimbabwes-economic-meltdown/">pretext</a> to suppress dissent and shift the blame for the country’s problems.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-reforms-wont-fix-zimbabwes-economy-ethical-leadership-is-also-needed-170569">Economic reforms won't fix Zimbabwe’s economy. Ethical leadership is also needed</a>
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</p>
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<p>While the Patriotic Act <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6068">amends</a> the criminal law code to include mandatory minimum prison terms for rape sentences, it also criminalises acts it deems as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>wilfully injuring sovereignty and national interests of Zimbabwe. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The problem lies in the broad definition of “national interests”. This can be manipulated to serve political agendas. It could be interpreted in a way that compromises individual freedoms and hinders government accountability. For instance, opposition activists have previously been <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/fadzai-mahere-and-ccc-trying-to-destroy-zimbabwe/">accused</a> of treason and unpatriotic behaviour for expressing concerns about human rights abuses in Zimbabwe at the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Using this law, individuals who express concerns about human rights abuses and corruption could be targeted for unpatriotic behaviour.</p>
<p>For example, the TV news network Al Jazeera recently <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evWEuVR1XIs">exposed</a> a case of gold smuggling corruption involving public officials in Zimbabwe. The revelations could potentially lead to the arrest of journalists behind the revelations. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The Patriotic Act contravenes Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20of%20Zimbabwe%20Amendment%20%28No.%2020%29.pdf">constitution</a>, which upholds the right to freedom of expression. This fundamental right is meant to foster an environment conducive to peaceful demonstrations and the presentation of petitions. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is also bound by international and regional instruments that protect freedom of expression. They include the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>. The Southern African Development Community <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/sadcprinc.htm">principles and guidelines</a> governing democratic elections also emphasise the importance of freedom of expression. Zimbabwe is a member of the grouping.</p>
<p>Sadly, both the African Union and the Southern African Development Community have failed to prevail on Zanu-PF to uphold the human rights of Zimbabweans.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Civil society organisations need to collaborate with media outlets to show the act’s potential impact on society. That way, the public will get a broader understanding of the act’s negative effects. That might spur Zimbabweans to challenge the oppressive act, and defend their individual and collective liberties.</p>
<p>Social media could be pivotal in mobilising resistance to the Patriotic Act. Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp have proven effective in disseminating information and rallying public opinion against oppression in Zimbabwe. There is also a need for active citizen participation to resist the Patriotic Act. The 2016 <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/12/10/569757806/fight-for-rights-will-continue-in-zimbabwe-thisflag-movement-pastor-vows">#ThisFlag</a> resistance movement is an example. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics-121577">Analysis across Africa shows how social media is changing politics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But, given the Zimbabwean government’s history of repression, a stronger solution would be for citizens to use their votes in the upcoming elections in August to choose a new government that would uphold their rights and human dignity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Sithole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition activists have previously been accused of treason and unpatriotic behaviour for expressing concerns about human rights abuses.Tinashe Sithole, Post-doctoral research fellow at the SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089972023-07-11T16:16:46Z2023-07-11T16:16:46ZPainted messages in Angola’s abandoned liberation army camps offer a rare historical record<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535493/original/file-20230704-16-1h6k37.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lilian Ngoyi, one of the leaders of the 1956 women’s march against apartheid, is immortalised on an abandoned building. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Pearce</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Angola’s Malanje province, the buildings of Camalundu stand abandoned amid open fields. On one of them, the fragmented words “IAN NGOYI” recall a figure little-known in Angola but familiar to South Africans: anti-apartheid leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/lilian-ngoyi-an-heroic-south-african-woman-whose-story-hasnt-been-fully-told-188345">Lilian Ngoyi</a>. </p>
<p>These large letters partly hide some words that were painted previously. From the faded letters that are visible, I could make out some words apparently in Spanish. These layers of paint – texts of South Africa’s then liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), on top of Cuban texts painted on Portuguese colonial buildings – illustrate the changing uses of the site over the years. </p>
<p>Over the past three years I have been part of a project called <a href="https://global-soldiers.web.ox.ac.uk/">Global Soldiers in the Cold War</a>. We study the international exchanges of ideas about soldiering and politics that resulted from the interlinked liberation struggles and civil conflicts across southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. As part of this <a href="https://www.sources-journal.org/917">research</a> I visited some of the sites where liberation soldiers were trained in Angola. </p>
<p>The sites provide a rare tangible record of the international solidarity that existed during the Cold War: solidarity that prompted Cuba to provide civilian and military expertise to Angola’s MPLA-led government and to liberation movements from Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The liberation movements looked not only to their own countries’ histories but to earlier struggles in Cuba and Vietnam for ideas and inspiration.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-narrative-unfolds-about-south-africas-protracted-war-in-angola-54575">A new narrative unfolds about South Africa's protracted war in Angola</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>After taking control of independent Angola in 1975, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">MPLA</a>) – still fighting a civil war against its rival, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNITA">Unita</a>) – gave refuge to liberation fighters from Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The apartheid regime in South Africa, determined to undermine the liberation movements, provided military support to Unita in order to weaken the MPLA. Both the MPLA and the exiled movements <a href="https://theconversation.com/fidel-in-africa-how-the-cuban-leader-played-a-key-role-in-taking-on-apartheid-69665">enjoyed the support of Cuban and Soviet military advisers</a>.</p>
<p>Camalundu, established by the colonial government as an agricultural training centre, was used by the MPLA first as a civilian and later as a military training centre, with Cuban personnel.</p>
<h2>Places of learning and solidarity</h2>
<p>Historians have viewed liberation guerrilla training camps as a particular kind of social and political environment. Host countries like Angola allowed exiled movements to act, to a certain extent, like enclave governments with state-like powers over their own members. </p>
<p>Guerrillas, already filled with idealism, absorbed ideas and experiences from their new environment. But they were also at the mercy of national and international strategic calculations, without the immediate prospect of returning home in triumph. </p>
<p>Camps were places where liberation fighters came into contact with officials and soldiers from their host countries, as well as trainers from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The slogans painted at Camalundu provide evidence of how people were taught that they were there as part of a global struggle.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536286/original/file-20230707-23-2owghu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The sixth congress of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana in 1979, commemorated at Camalundu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Pearce</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Facing the building with Lilian Ngoyi’s name was another slogan in Spanish: “VI cumbre un paso mas en la unidade de los no-alineaos” (six completes another step in the unity of the non-aligned), a reference to the <a href="http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf">sixth congress of the Non-Aligned Movement</a>, which was held in Havana in 1979. </p>
<h2>From King Cetshwayo to Ho Chi Minh</h2>
<p>South African history appears again with the name of Cetshwayo, the last Zulu monarch to resist the British Empire before conquest. His name was painted above the entrance of another now-abandoned building. This was likely painted in 1979, the<a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02918/06lv02942.htm"> ANC’s “Year of the Spear”</a>, the centenary of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anglo-zulu-wars-1879-1896">Battle of Isandlwana</a> when Cetshwayo’s army resisted the better-armed British. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535508/original/file-20230704-29-xeht2u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zulu king Cetshwayo, defeated in 1879, commemorated a century later.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Pearce</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On a similar building, the letters “…O C… MI…” point to the commemoration of the Vietnamese revolutionary leader <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/people/ho-chi-minh-ho-chi-minh">Ho Chi Minh</a>. On another building, the remains of his portrait are just about visible, above the English translation of a slogan associated with him:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/40928/nothing-is-more-precious-than-independence-and-freedom">Nothing is more precious than freedom and independence</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>An ANC delegation <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/green-book-report-politico-military-strategy-commission-anc-national-executive-committee">visited Vietnam in 1978</a>, a visit that had a profound effect on its military strategy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535504/original/file-20230704-17-n6i00w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fragments of the name of Ho Chi Minh, painted not long after the ANC sought strategic advice from Vietnam.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Pearce</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of the slogans at Camalundu seem to point to events between 1978 and 1980. Not long after that, the ANC presence there ended when its soldiers were moved to Caculama, further east. Caculama had housed a training camp established by the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25065139">Zapu</a>), which became vacant after Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 and the Zimbabwean soldiers went home. </p>
<p>Around the same time, American president Ronald Reagan and South African prime minister <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/pieter-willem-botha">PW Botha</a> renewed their respective countries’ <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538933">commitment to supporting Unita</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-narrative-unfolds-about-south-africas-protracted-war-in-angola-54575">against the MPLA</a>. The Angolan ruling party had taken a firm stand against apartheid and Washington saw it as a bridgehead for communist influence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/radio-as-a-form-of-struggle-scenes-from-late-colonial-angola-128019">Radio as a form of struggle: scenes from late colonial Angola</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The MPLA began to see the foreign liberation fighters it was hosting as a potentially useful military reserve. The former ANC soldier Luthando Dyasop recalls how ANC leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a> <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-16-luthando-dyasop-journey-of-a-disillusioned-comrade-during-apartheid-south-africa/">told</a> soldiers of the ANC’s army, Umkhonto we sizwe (MK), they needed to “bleed a little” in recognition of Angola’s support for the South African struggle. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535503/original/file-20230704-17-82gfc1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The remains of bunkers and trenches speak to the defensive function of the camp at Caculama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Pearce</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Southern Africa liberation movements and geopolitics</h2>
<p>Whereas Camalundu’s buildings stand in open countryside, Caculama is buried in thick bush. Trenches and the remains of underground bunkers remind us that this was the front line of the MPLA’s war against UNITA. Exiled movements were responsible for their own security within Angola. When the MPLA positioned ANC soldiers somewhere like Caculama, it knew that in defending its own camps, the ANC would also be part of the government’s defensive lines.</p>
<p>In their different ways, Camalundu and Caculama provide historians with evidence of liberation struggles and how they were entangled with the international politics of the time. </p>
<p>A Zimbabwean government delegation, I was told, had visited Caculama shortly before I was there – an acknowledgement at least of the site’s historical significance. Yet so far almost no attention has been given to preserving these sites.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.sources-journal.org/917">A longer article about the training sites with more photos was published by Sources journal</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Pearce received funding from The Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p>The sites provide a rare tangible record of the international solidarity that existed during the Cold War.Justin Pearce, Senior lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2078682023-06-29T13:59:31Z2023-06-29T13:59:31ZElections can lead to conflict if they are not free and fair – what role observers play to make sure they are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534294/original/file-20230627-21-vo6y4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">European Union election observers in Zimbabwe during the 2018 general elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MarcoLongari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>At least two dozen presidential, national, regional and local elections are held across the African continent <a href="https://www.eisa.org/election-calendar/">each year</a>. The sometimes <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65775996">fierce electoral competition</a>, a <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:556709/fulltext01.pdf">history of violence</a> or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">vote rigging</a> make it especially important to know that elections are free, fair and credible. This is where election observers come in. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, spoke to Kealeboga J. Maphunye, a political scientist and <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/people/kealeboga-j-maphunye/">elections expert</a>, about the often difficult, and sometimes even dangerous, work of observers.</em></p>
<h2>What do election observers do?</h2>
<p>There are two kinds of observers: domestic and international. Both may be politically and economically aligned or impartial. Aligned observers usually support their governments, organisations or funding agencies’ policies. All may be from civil society organisations or bodies like the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> (AU), <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> (UN), <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a>, <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> and <a href="https://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a>. </p>
<p>Observers cannot criticise a country’s election practices, electoral body or machinery – except discreetly. They may not stop any electoral process to “rectify” what they see as “discrepancies”. They must document these in their final report. </p>
<p>The terms election “observers” and “monitors” are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/723342">used interchangeably</a>. This often blurs their differences. </p>
<p>“Monitors” normally play an interventionist, robust role such as questioning election outcomes publicly. Unlike traditional observers, they may also lobby or agitate to amend or overturn election results. They may also criticise some electoral practices. </p>
<p>Very few African countries allow “monitors” to oversee their elections. They see them as promoting hostile advocacy against their governments and <a href="https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/report-on-the-election-in-zimbabwe-by-the-wcc/aacc-observer-mission">national interests</a>.</p>
<h2>What do they do? Why do we need them?</h2>
<p>Most election observers assess a country’s pre-election readiness and adherence to its electoral and other laws. They also assess a country’s ability to hold free, fair and internationally accepted elections. They <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/election-observation-in-africa-put-to-the-test">comment on the outcome</a>.</p>
<p>Both international and domestic observers serve as a verification mechanism. They provide an extra layer of accountability to the voters and international community on the conduct and outcome of the election. Their presence may help <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=1944">alleviate disputes</a>.</p>
<h2>How much influence do they have?</h2>
<p>Their presence and reports assure regional and international bodies like the AU, UN, <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth</a> and governments of the legitimacy of electoral processes and outcomes. Their reports may be referred to where disputes or post-election violence arise. </p>
<p>Winners often cite the reports as proof of their electoral victory. Losers, on the other hand, might use them to support their allegations of election malpractices or rigging. These may lead to the questioning or <a href="https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/case-continued-election-observation-africa">annulment of election results</a>.</p>
<p>Different observer missions may contradict each other. When this happens, their pronouncements that elections were “free and fair” are less useful. They can be <a href="https://sites.duke.edu/kelley/files/2012/03/JOD.pdf">challenged</a>.</p>
<h2>What standards are they held to; are there codes to observe?</h2>
<p>Observers rely on international and regional standards and national legislation to do their work. For example, the <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SADC_-Principles-and-Guidelines-Governing-Democratic-Elections.pdf">Southern African Development Community has a set of election principles</a>.</p>
<p>Yet some countries <a href="https://www.arabianjbmr.com/pdfs/RD_VOL_1_6/2.pdf">flout or overlook the standards</a>. This allows unscrupulous incumbents to win unfairly. Endorsing such <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/8/6/how-did-mnangagwa-win-zimbabwes-landmark-july-30-election">illegitimate election outcomes</a> can compromise the integrity of observers and the elections.</p>
<h2>What makes them successful?</h2>
<p>Their success lies in their visibility at polling stations. Also key is their power of persuasion when dealing with contesting political parties, and election management bodies. Their mere presence in a country during an election can assure voters that <a href="https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/publication/Chapter7.htm">someone impartial is watching the process</a>. </p>
<p>This may minimise violence or electoral malpractices. Their reports may also help exert diplomatic pressure or influence on election management bodies, governments and other stakeholders.</p>
<p>Observers rely on innovative tools like taking representative samples of polling stations, and biometric and global positioning system (GPS) technologies. These may convince stakeholders that their <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/introducing-biometric-technology-in-elections-reissue.pdf">coverage</a> of a country’s election was geographically balanced and evidence based.</p>
<h2>Which are the common obstacles?</h2>
<p>Observers can face rough terrain, election-related violence, misinformation, uncooperative governments and unwarranted or illegal internet shutdown. They sometimes face hostile or pessimistic opposition parties. In some countries, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/kenyas-controversial-election-commission-quits-20161006-61">biased election management bodies</a> may undermine observers’ work. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0021909621999402">COVID pandemic</a> showed how viruses and diseases may undermine elections. In volatile countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mozambique, Mali and Nigeria, observers also face rebel attacks, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/09/mozambique-police-linked-killing-election-observer">abductions and killings</a>.</p>
<p>The cost of organising and deploying observers, including providing for their daily needs and welfare, continually poses challenges for observer missions. </p>
<h2>Which are the worst countries in Africa for election observation?</h2>
<p>There are no “best” or “worst” countries for observing elections anywhere in the world. But, in Africa, observers regularly risk dangers arising from political instability, insecurity, violence and other crises in countries like Somalia, Chad, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria, South Sudan and Mali.</p>
<p>Such countries can’t guarantee observer safety and security, nor ensure an environment conducive to free, fair and credible elections. Election related violence in countries like <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">Uganda</a>, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/05/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">DRC</a>, and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/02/cote-divoire-post-election-violence-repression">Côte d’Ivoire</a> undermines election observation. </p>
<p>So does insecurity and terrorism (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230530-at-least-40-killed-in-weekend-terrorist-attacks-in-western-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso</a>) as well as war (<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-sudan-puts-south-sudan-in-danger-too-the-worlds-youngest-nation-needs-a-stable-neighbour-206517">Sudan</a>). In Zimbabwe, Congo Republic and Ethiopia, pre-election instability, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343315626240?casa_token=2ZtAFmaw-IAAAAAA:BvbgxCwjAegHYPxRnpz9V-I489Hc1WTL05T4pWC7yrueR_TD4cBit5d2my8KcsTpyQgg1nCfrvf8LA">post-election violence and other malpractices</a> have affected the quality of election observation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye recently received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Observers regularly face dangers owing to political instability, insecurity, violence and other crises in some countries.Kealeboga J Maphunye, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.