tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/accident-prevention-21431/articlesAccident prevention – The Conversation2022-05-29T14:43:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819922022-05-29T14:43:58Z2022-05-29T14:43:58ZRoadside safety messages increase crashes by distracting drivers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465523/original/file-20220526-12-b3khp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Road signs often display safety messages in an attempt to reduce road crashes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Callum Blacoe/Unsplash)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/roadside-safety-messages-increase-crashes-by-distracting-drivers" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Behavioural interventions involve gently suggesting that people reconsider or change specific undesirable behaviours. They are a low-cost, easy-to-implement and <a href="https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/behavioural-insights.htm">increasingly common tool</a> used by policymakers to encourage socially desirable behaviours. </p>
<p>Examples of behavioural interventions include telling people <a href="https://inudgeyou.com/en/green-nudge-the-classic-social-comparison-experiment-by-opower/">how their electricity usage compares to their neighbours</a> or sending <a href="https://www.bhub.org/project/personalized-text-messages-boost-payment-of-delinquent-court-fines/">text messages reminding people to pay fines</a>. </p>
<p>Many of these interventions are expressly designed to “<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9ea76a8f-en">seize people’s attention</a>” at a time when they can take the desired action. Unfortunately, seizing people’s attention can crowd out other, more important considerations, and cause even a simple intervention to backfire with costly individual and social consequences.</p>
<p>One such behavioural intervention struck us as odd: Several U.S. states display year-to-date fatality statistics (number of deaths) on roadside dynamic message signs (DMSs). The hope is that these <a href="https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/08/21/txdot-signs-to-regularly-display-traffic-death-numbers/">sobering messages will reduce traffic crashes</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries">a leading cause of death of five- to 29-year-olds worldwide</a>. Perhaps because of its low cost and ease of implementation, at least 28 U.S. states have displayed fatality statistics at least once since 2012. We estimate that approximately 90 million drivers have been exposed to such messages.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a road sign saying 1669 DEATHS THIS YEAR ON TEXAS ROADS" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461785/original/file-20220506-24-67j0yw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A roadside dynamic messaging sign in Texas, displaying the death toll from road crashes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Jonathan Hall)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Startling results</h2>
<p>As academic researchers with backgrounds in <a href="https://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/joshua-madsen">information disclosure</a> and <a href="http://individual.utoronto.ca/jhall/">transportation policy</a>, we teamed up to investigate and quantify the effects of these messages. What we found startled us. </p>
<p>Contrary to policymakers’ expectations (and ours), we found that displaying fatality messages increases the number of crashes.</p>
<p>We studied the use of these fatality messages in Texas. The state provides a useful laboratory to study such messages, as it has 880 DMSs, 17 million drivers and, unfortunately, typically over <a href="https://www.txdot.gov/inside-txdot/forms-publications/drivers-vehicles/publications/annual-summary.html">3,000 road-related fatalities per year</a>. The most advantageous aspect of this sample, however, is that from August 2012 until the end of our sample in 2017, the Texas Department of Transportation only showed these fatality messages for one week each month — the week before the Texas Transportation Commission’s monthly meeting. </p>
<p>This institutional feature allowed us to compare, for instance, the hourly number of crashes occurring around a DMS during the week when fatality messages are being shown, relative to crashes on the same road segment during the other three weeks of the same month. Also, we were able to control for time of day, day of week, weather conditions and holidays.</p>
<p>We found that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abm3427">there were two to three per cent more crashes within one to 10 kilometres downstream of each DMS during the week fatality messages were shown</a>. This suggests that this specific behavioural intervention backfired in Texas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a red road sign showing a graphic of a car crash with the words DISTRACTED DRIVING" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465525/original/file-20220526-13-8ydk61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Distracted driving is a leading cause of road accidents, and display signs can actually cause a distraction for drivers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Warning distractions</h2>
<p>We conducted two tests to rule out whether this finding was simply because these weeks happen to be inherently more dangerous. First, we looked upstream of each DMS. In doing so, we limited our sample to those DMSs without another DMS within 10 kilometres upstream. We found no increase in accidents upstream of these DMSs, but still find an effect downstream. </p>
<p>Second, we investigated whether the weeks before the monthly meetings of the Texas Transportation Commission had more crashes in the months before Texas began showing these fatality messages. Looking at data between January 2010 and July 2012, we found no evidence of a change in crashes during the week prior to the Texas Transportation Commission meeting.</p>
<p>Based on our findings, we hypothesized that these fatality messages cause more crashes because they make drivers anxious and distract them. Our research found several pieces of evidence that supported this hypothesis. </p>
<p>First, we found that the larger the displayed number of fatalities (a plausibly more shocking and distracting message), the greater the increase in crashes. Higher fatality counts are associated with significantly more crashes, whereas lower fatality counts are associated with fewer crashes. </p>
<p>Related, fatality messages cause the largest increase in crashes in January, when the display shows the prior year’s total in Texas. Conversely, there are marginally fewer crashes in February, when the fatality count resets and is at its lowest. </p>
<p>Second, the increase in crashes is concentrated in more complex road segments, where focusing on the road is likely more important and the cost of a distraction more severe. We also found that crashes increased statewide during the weeks when messages were displayed, inconsistent with improved driving farther away from DMSs; that the days after a campaign end are no safer than other days; and that these messages continue to affect drivers after more than five years of showing fatality statistics.</p>
<h2>Counterproductive to safety</h2>
<p>Our research shows that displaying fatality messages does not result in safer driving and fewer crashes. Besides the more obvious takeaway that displaying fatality messages may be counterproductive, our findings highlight two broader issues. </p>
<p>First, while behavioural interventions should grab attention, this can be taken too far and have costly consequences. Second, it is vital to evaluate policies and their outcomes over time, as even good intentions may not necessarily lead to the desired outcomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Hall has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, the NET Institute, and via an interagency agreement between the US Department of Transportation and the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Madsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A study of displayed road signs in Texas shows that, surprisingly, safety messages may actually make roads less safe.Jonathan Hall, Assistant Professor, Economics, University of TorontoJoshua Madsen, Assistant Professor, Accounting, University of MinnesotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1099482019-01-31T19:10:57Z2019-01-31T19:10:57ZAustralia’s spike in summer drownings: what the media misses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256024/original/file-20190129-108342-1ns7vdb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C5%2C992%2C727&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Media reports tend to focus on people who drown at the beach. But almost as many people drown in rivers and lakes. Where are the safety messages for them?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/man-floating-down-river-blow-tube-634734599">from www.shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>You’d be hard pressed to have missed the news that there’s been a big spike in the number of drowning deaths this summer – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jan/02/drownings-in-australia-up-51-on-last-summer-after-five-men-die-on-new-years-day">up about 50% since last year</a>. The media’s been full of stories of <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/punjabi/en/article/2018/01/03/migrants-and-tourists-account-third-drownings-australia-lifesavers-want-better">migrants and tourists</a> losing their lives on our beaches.</p>
<p>But our unpublished analysis of the coverage of drowning deaths this summer reveals many news outlets don’t present the true picture of what’s happening in our waterways. And that’s putting people most at risk of drowning in even greater danger.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mondays-medical-myth-wait-30-minutes-after-eating-before-you-swim-10653">Monday's medical myth: wait 30 minutes after eating before you swim</a>
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<h2>What the media is not quite getting right</h2>
<p><strong>Are foreigners and migrants more at risk than Australian-born swimmers?</strong></p>
<p>We found that almost half of all stories reported on drownings of migrants and people from overseas. For example, the deaths of three migrants at <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/surf-life-savers-issue-plea-to-families-amid-drowning-tragedy-20181218-p50n2f.html">Moonee Beach</a> in NSW was the most covered incident across stories analysed. Many of these articles suggested solutions such as ensuring tourists are <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-04/spate-of-drownings-in-north-queensland/10459462">informed</a> of water risks and <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/swimmers-urged-to-show-the-water-respect-after-spate-of-festive-season-drownings">providing new migrants swimming classes</a>.</p>
<p>Again, these suggestions are useful, but the idea that more drowning victims are foreign-born is misleading. Only two articles we read pointed out the truth – that only a third of deaths this summer involved people born overseas. This is about the same proportion of the Australian population born overseas at <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/3412.0Main%20Features32015-16?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3412.0&issue=2015-16&num=&view=">28.2%</a>. Although overseas tourists are more at risk of drowning, migrants are not. </p>
<p>All swimmers need to be made aware they are at risk, foreign-born or not. In fact, Australians raised on home soil may actually be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261517704000445">overconfident</a> of their water safety knowledge and swimming ability, and the media needs to be more explicit about this. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255521/original/file-20190125-108370-q9axaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian and foreign-born swimmers are both at risk of drowning.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by zayzayem on Foter.com / CC BY-SA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Are beaches really more dangerous than rivers?</strong></p>
<p>Our analysis showed a clear preference for reporting beach-related drowning deaths over deaths occurring inland, such as in rivers and lakes. This bias perpetuates the idea that beaches are more risky than inland water. </p>
<p>However, this summer, <a href="https://www.royallifesaving.com.au/facts-and-figures/summer-drowning-toll">almost as many deaths</a> occurred in inland waterways than beaches (43% v 47% at the time this was written), and in 2017/18 more drowning deaths occurred in natural <a href="https://www.royallifesaving.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/23197/RLS_NDR2018_ReportLR.pdf">inland waterways</a>. </p>
<p>So most stories emphasise providing beach-related safety tips, emphasising the importance of visiting patrolled beaches and learning how to spot rips. Although this is important advice, it doesn’t apply to inland bodies of water. Where advice is provided, there are statements such as “<a href="https://www.corowafreepress.com.au/@news/2018/12/12/359195/respect-the-river">respect the river</a>”, which provides little practical guidance. </p>
<p>By focusing on beaches, the media may also be missing an opportunity to warn Australians of the dangers of rivers and lakes, which are being greatly underestimated.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255278/original/file-20190124-135142-ccqhqg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rivers may seem safe, but deep water and fast flowing currents can be dangerous.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mr.TinDC on Foter.com / CC BY-ND</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Vague advice</strong></p>
<p>In many stories, safety spokespeople talk about the “think and plan” approach to water safety. This guidance encourages swimmers to choose swimming areas that suit their abilities, assess the risks and consider possible rescue methods. However, little guidance is given on how to assess environments for dangers. And few Australians know what to do when someone is drowning.</p>
<h2>How can we reduce drownings?</h2>
<p><strong>What should governments do?</strong></p>
<p>Governments need to provide education that reflects real risks. This includes identifying dangerous river and lake conditions, and learning what to do if you get stuck in a current. Communication around water safety after storms and heavy rains can also help, such as during news weather reports. </p>
<p>Although many water bodies have safety warning signs, there is <a href="https://www.royallifesaving.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/4046/Water_Safety_Signs_-_Final_July_2008.pdf">limited evidence</a> they work to prevent unsafe behaviours.</p>
<p>What is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956797615569578">well documented</a> is that people follow what other people are doing, especially when they are young, so may ignore signs if others are acting dangerously. As well as signs, more strict enforcement at particularly dangerous spots may be needed, such as random patrolling of rangers and building fences. </p>
<p>A last important action is providing rescue equipment at beaches and popular inland swimming spots, including emergency phones, floatation devices and rope. </p>
<p><strong>What should I do?</strong></p>
<p>Check out <a href="http://www.horsham.ymca.org.au/participate/swimming-pool-aquatics/water-safety-tips/in-the-rivers.html">these tips</a> on how to stay safe around rivers. Tips include checking the depth of the water before swimming, something many Australians don’t do. </p>
<p>You can do this by looking for reeds breaking the surface or using a stick. You can also test current speed by throwing a leaf in the water and seeing how fast it flows. If you get stuck in a current, lie on your back, feet forward, until you reach a shallower area.</p>
<p>It’s also important to be aware of when you need to wear life jackets. Most Australians would be aware that we should wear them on smaller motor boats, but what if you are rock fishing? Or being towed in a tube? <a href="https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/safety-rules/safety-equipment/lifejackets.html">Different states</a> have slightly different guidelines.</p>
<p>Don’t swim if you’ve been drinking. Even a small amount of alcohol <a href="https://www.royallifesaving.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/5815/Swim-Safe-Swim-Sober-Report.pdf">can impair</a> your ability to swim and respond to hazards. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255282/original/file-20190124-135154-14cyrjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Use a floating object to rescue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">christophercjensen on Foter.com / CC BY-ND</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>If someone is drowning, the <a href="https://www.royallifesaving.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/3974/18.-Rescue-Safety.pdf">safest way</a> to save them is to throw a floating object, such as a life ring or life jacket, or the end of a rope or stick. If the person is too far or you have nothing available, don’t try to saving the victim if you have not received proper training or you are not a confident swimmer. Call emergency services and ask others for help.</p>
<p>Lastly, look out for friends and children. Active supervision isn’t about sitting nearby on your phone – it can take as little as <a href="https://www.rch.org.au/kidsinfo/fact_sheets/Water_Safety/">20 seconds</a> for a child to go under. <a href="https://royallifesavingwa.com.au/your-safety/first-aid-and-emergency-care/recognising-a-person-is-drowning">Signs of a person drowning</a> include their head tilted back and mouth at water level, hair over the forehead or eyes, their body in a vertical position, and gasping. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255277/original/file-20190124-135151-15h3y9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Actively supervise children at all times.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">dickdotcom on Foter.com / CC BY-SA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With the right action from governments and individuals, we can save tens of lives from drowning in our waterways. This action can’t just wait until next summer – staying safe is an all-year round endeavour. So, campaign for better safety measures at your local waterways, get yourself educated and trained, and help make sure that Australia’s favourite summer pastime only leaves happy memories.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Migrants are no more at risk of drowning than Australian-born swimmers but you’d never know from media reports.Medhavi Gupta, PhD Candidate, George Institute for Global HealthJagnoor Jagnoor, Senior research fellow, George Institute for Global HealthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757712017-04-12T20:11:53Z2017-04-12T20:11:53ZThe school of hard knocks: driverless cars should learn lessons from crashes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164978/original/image-20170412-26736-1cw5f6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Driverless cars still need to 'learn' how to drive on our roads, especially at busy junctions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Karsten Neglia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Learning how to drive is an ongoing process for we humans as we adapt to new situations, new road rules and new technology, and learn the lessons from when things go wrong.</p>
<p>But how does a driverless car learn how to drive, especially when something goes wrong?</p>
<p>That’s the question being asked of Uber after <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/uber-tech-crash-idUSL2N1H20DE">last month’s crash</a> in Arizona. Two of its engineers were inside when one of its autonomous vehicles spun 180 degrees and flipped onto its side. </p>
<p>Uber pulled its test fleet off the road pending police enquiries, and a few days later the vehicles were <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-crash-idUSKBN16Y1WB">back on the road</a>.</p>
<h2>Smack, spin, flip</h2>
<p>The Tempe Police Department’s report on the investigation into the crash, <a href="http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1331542">obtained by the EE Times</a>, details what happened.</p>
<p>The report says that the Uber Volvo (red in the graphic below) was moving south at 38mph (61kmh) in a 40mph (64kmh) zone when it collided with the Honda (blue in the graphic) turning west into a side street (point 1). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164962/original/image-20170411-26710-p0gc2r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uber crash - initial collisions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Hanlon / Sean Welsh based on Tempe Police report</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Knocked off course, the Uber Volvo hit the traffic light at the corner (point 2) and then spun and flipped, damaging two other vehicles (points 3 and 4) before sliding to a stop on its side (point 5). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164961/original/image-20170411-26730-745zd2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uber crash - subsequent collisions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Hanlon / Sean Welsh based on Tempe Police report</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thankfully, no one was hurt. The <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uber-tech-crash-idUKKBN16W0V1">police determined</a> that the Honda driver “failed to yield” (give way) and <a href="http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/tech/2017/03/29/tempe-releases-police-report-uber-crash/99797486/">issued a ticket</a>. The Uber car was not at fault.</p>
<h2>Questions, questions</h2>
<p>But <a href="http://www.linleygroup.com/analyst_detail.php?Mike-Demler-18">Mike Demler</a>, an analyst with the <a href="http://www.linleygroup.com/">Linley Group</a> technology consultancy, <a href="http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1331542">told the EE Times</a> that the Uber car could have done better:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is totally careless and stupid to proceed at 38mph through a blind intersection.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Demler <a href="http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1331542">said</a> that Uber needs to explain why its vehicle proceeded through the intersection at just under the speed limit when it could “see” that traffic had come to a stop in the middle and leftmost lanes.</p>
<p>The EE Times report said that Uber had “fallen silent” on the incident. But as Uber uses “deep learning” to control its autonomous cars, it’s not clear that Uber could answer Demler’s query even if it wanted to.</p>
<p>In deep learning, the actual code that would make the decision not to slow down would be a complex state in a neural network, not a line of code prescribing a simple rule like “if vision is obstructed at intersection, slow down”. </p>
<h2>Debugging deep learning</h2>
<p>The case raises a deep technical issue. How do you debug an autonomous vehicle control system that is based on deep learning? How do you reduce the risk of autonomous cars getting smashed and flipped when humans driving alongside them make bad judgements? </p>
<p>Demler’s point is that the Uber car had not “learned” to slow down as a prudent precautionary measure at an intersection with obstructed lines of sight. Most human drivers would naturally beware and slow down when approaching an intersection with obstructed vision due to stationary cars. </p>
<p>When it comes to <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07274v2">deep reinforcement learning</a>, this relies on “value functions” to evaluate states that result from the application of policies. </p>
<p>A value function is a number that evaluates a state. In chess, a strong opening move by white such as pawn e7 to e5 attracts a high value. A weak opening such as pawn a2 to a3 attracts a low one. </p>
<p>The value function can be like “ouch” for computers. Reinforcement learning gets its name from positive and negative reinforcement in psychology.</p>
<p>Until the Uber vehicle hits something and the value function of the deep learning records the digital equivalent of “following that policy led to a bad state - on side, smashed up and facing wrong way - ouch!” the Uber control system might not quantify the risk appropriately. </p>
<p>Having now hit something it will, hopefully, have learned its lesson at the school of hard knocks. In future, Uber cars should do better at similar intersections with similar traffic conditions. </p>
<h2>Debugging formal logic</h2>
<p>An alternative to deep learning is autonomous vehicles using explicitly stated rules expressed in formal logic.</p>
<p>This is being developed by <a href="http://nutonomy.com/">nuTonomy</a>, which is running an <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/self-driving/after-mastering-singapores-streets-nutonomys-robotaxis-are-poised-to-take-on-new-cities">autonomous taxi pilot</a> in cooperation with authorities in Singapore. </p>
<p>NuTonomy’s approach to controlling autonomous vehicles is based on a rules hierarchy. Top priority goes to rules such as “don’t hit pedestrians”, followed by “don’t hit other vehicles” and “don’t hit objects”.</p>
<p>Rules such as “maintain speed when safe” and “don’t cross the centreline” get a lower priority, while rules such as “give a comfortable ride” are the first to be broken when an emergency arises. </p>
<p>While NuTonomy does use machine learning for many things, it does not use it for normative control: deciding what a car ought to do. </p>
<p>In October last year, a NuTonomy <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/driverless-car-hits-lorry-during-test-drive">test vehicle accident was involved in an accident</a>: a low-speed tap resulting in a dent, not a spin and flip.</p>
<p>The company’s chief operating officer Doug Parker <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/self-driving/after-mastering-singapores-streets-nutonomys-robotaxis-are-poised-to-take-on-new-cities">told IEEE Spectrum</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What you want is to be able to go back and say, “Did our car do the right thing in that situation, and if it didn’t, why didn’t it make the right decision?” With formal logic, it’s very easy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Key advantages of formal logic are provable correctness and relative ease of debugging. Debugging machine learning is trickier. On the other hand, with machine learning, you do not need to code complex hierarchies of rules.</p>
<p>Time will tell which is the better approach to driving lessons for driverless cars. For now, both systems still have much to learn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Welsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We should all learn from mistakes. Driverless cars must do the same when it comes to any accidents they’ve been involved in on our roads, no matter who was to blame.Sean Welsh, Doctoral Candidate in Robot Ethics, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/712792017-03-20T01:14:57Z2017-03-20T01:14:57ZWhen things go wrong in an automated world, would we still know what to do?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161280/original/image-20170317-6130-i7uhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are we losing our skills as we hand more tasks to automated systems?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Michal Staniewski</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We live in a world that is both increasingly complex and <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602747/todays-artificial-intelligence-does-not-justify-basic-income/">automated</a>. So just as we are having to deal with more complex problems, automation is leading to an atrophy of human skills that may leave us more vulnerable when responding to unexpected situations or when things go wrong.</p>
<p>Consider the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html">final minutes of Air France Flight 447</a>, which crashed into the Atlantic in May 2009 after leaving Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for Paris, France. </p>
<p>Its flight recorder revealed <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash">utter confusion in the cockpit</a>. The plane became tilted upwards at 15º with an automated voice repetitively calling “stall, stall”. Yet the pilots were reeling, one exclaiming: “[…] we don’t understand anything.”</p>
<p>This is not the place to go into the ins and outs of that ill-fated flight, other than to note that any system designed to deal automatically with contingencies the majority of the time leaves a degraded skill base for the minority of situations the designers couldn’t foresee.</p>
<p>Speaking to <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash">Vanity Fair</a>, Nadine Sarter, an industrial engineer at the University of Michigan, recalls a conversation with five engineers involved in building a particular aircraft.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I started asking, ‘Well, how does this or that work?’ And they could not agree on the answers. So I was thinking, if these five engineers cannot agree, the poor pilot, if he ever encounters that particular situation … well, good luck.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In effect the complexity of judiciously flying highly intricate high-tech airliners has been outsourced to a robot, with <a href="http://www.airlineratings.com/did-you-know.php?id=21">flight engineers to all intents and purposes gone</a> from cockpits. Only older pilots and ex air force pilots retain those detailed skills.</p>
<p>Back on terra firma, in an autonomous driving world there could be entire future generations with no practical experience whatsoever in <a href="http://www.nature.com/news/technology-use-or-lose-our-navigation-skills-1.19632">driving and navigating</a> a vehicle.</p>
<p>We’re already seeing an indication of <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601822/fatal-tesla-autopilot-crash-is-a-reminder-autonomous-cars-will-sometimes-screw-up/">what can go wrong</a> when humans leave control to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global/video/2017/mar/02/the-guardian-test-drives-a-driverless-car-it-doesnt-go-well-video">autonomous systems</a>.</p>
<p>An investigation into the <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/01/probing-teslas-deadly-crash-feds-say-yay-self-driving/">fatal crash of a Tesla Model S with autopilot</a> noted that the company provided information about “system limitations” to drivers. In that case, it’s still up to drivers to pay attention.</p>
<p>But what chance would a person have of taking over any controls should things start to go wrong in their future <a href="https://theconversation.com/driverless-cars-just-imagine-how-we-could-use-them-72085">fully autonomous vehicle</a>. Would they even know how to spot the early signs of impending disaster? </p>
<h2>Losing our way?</h2>
<p>Driving this is a technological determinism that believes any and all innovation is intrinsically good. While emerging technologies may yet define what it is to be human, the challenge is to <a href="http://www.nature.com/news/technology-use-or-lose-our-navigation-skills-1.19632">recognise the risk</a> and what to do to make sure things don’t go wrong.</p>
<p>That’s getting harder as we’ve been adding to complexity, especially with autonomous driving of <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-05/driverless-trains3a-sydneysiders-get-first-glimpse-inside/6914786">suburban trains</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38967235">air taxis</a> and <a href="http://www.recode.net/2017/1/31/14460734/watch-paper-airplane-drones-darpa-medicine">delivery drones</a>. </p>
<p>System designers have been building bigger and more intertwined systems to share computer processing load even though this makes their creations prime candidates for breakdown. They are overlooking the fact that once everything is connected, problems can spread as readily as solutions, sometimes more so.</p>
<p>The growing and immense complexity of an automated world poses similar risks.</p>
<h2>Danger points</h2>
<p>In hindsight, what is needed is an ability to cut networks free when there are failure points, or at least to seal off parts of a single network when there are failure points elsewhere within it.</p>
<p>This “islanding” is a feature of smart electricity grids providing scope to split the network into fragments that are able to self-sustain their internal power demand. Modelling has shown that <a href="http://www.nature.com/articles/srep34797">fewer connections can lead to more security</a>. </p>
<p>Could emergent complexity science help pinpoint where the danger points might lie in highly interconnected networks? <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/338/6105/344.full">Marten Scheffer and colleagues</a> thought so. He had seen similarities between the behaviour of (his) natural systems and economic and financial systems. </p>
<p>His <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v413/n6856/full/413591a0.html">earlier work</a> on lakes, coral reefs, seas, forests and grasslands, found that environments subject to gradual changes like climate, nutrient load and habitat loss can reach tipping points that flip them into a sometimes irreversible lower state.</p>
<p>Could bankers and economists grappling with the stability of financial markets learn from researchers in ecology, epidemiology and climatology to develop markers of the proximity to critical thresholds and system breakdown? </p>
<p>In February 2016 this all came together in the form of <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/351/6275/818">a paper on complexity theory and financial regulation</a> co-authored by a wide range of experts including an economist, banker, physicist, climatologist, ecologist, zoologist, veterinarian and epidemiologist. </p>
<p>They recommended an online integration of data, methods and indicators, feeding into stress tests for global socioeconomic and financial systems in near-realtime. The former is similar to what’s been achieved in dealing with other complex systems such as the weather.</p>
<p>We can begin to see how our example of an autonomous driving world folds over into questions of network stability. Imagine a highly interconnected network of autonomous vehicles. </p>
<p>There’s a clear need to know how to detect and isolate any potential failure points in such a network, before things go wrong with potentially tragic consequences. This is more than just protecting driver and passenger from any system failure in a single autonomous vehicle.</p>
<p>It’s time to think how we might use those multidisciplinary advances in understanding the stability of such large scale networks to avoid drastic consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Fisher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Machines are taking over many human tasks but what happens when something goes wrong? Would humans still have the skills to react and prevent a tragedy?Peter Fisher, Adjunct Professor, Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/677012016-10-26T09:15:05Z2016-10-26T09:15:05ZDeaths at Dreamworld theme park could lead to safety changes for amusement rides<p>Investigations are under way following the tragic accident at the <a href="https://www.dreamworld.com.au/">Dreamworld</a> theme park on the Gold Coast on Tuesday that <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/large-investigation-into-dreamworld/news-story/a2e6337e39e0f6e2604b17d3f95c64da">left four people dead</a>.</p>
<p>Queensland Police <a href="http://mypolice.qld.gov.au/blog/2016/10/26/update-2-critical-incident-death-investigation-coomera-gold-coast-2/">say initial investigations show</a> that six people were on board one of the rafts on the Thunder River Rapids ride when it “impacted” with another raft. This caused the raft to upturn.</p>
<p>Luke Dorsett, 35, and his sister Kate Goodchild, 32, Dorsett’s partner, Roozi Araghi, 38, and Cindy Low, 42, from New Zealand, died at the scene.</p>
<p>A 10-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl escaped uninjured in what one police officer described as a “<a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2016/10/26/dreamworld-tragedy-victims-identified-major-investigation-underway">miracle</a>”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"790816954315640833"}"></div></p>
<p>There will be a coronial investigation into the four tragic deaths. The coroner has wide powers of investigation and can request additional reports, statements or information about the death.</p>
<p>Additional information may be obtained from investigators, police, doctors, engineers, workplace health and safety inspectors, mining inspectors, air safety officers, electrical inspectors or other witnesses.</p>
<p>Once the coroner has completed these enquiries, he will consider whether to hold <a href="http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/courts/coroners-court/common-questions/inquests">an inquest</a> into the deaths. The coroner will consult with the family about this and the families can also request the coroner to hold an inquest.</p>
<h2>Safe rides</h2>
<p>That the deaths occurred at a place designed for fun and amusement makes it all the more tragic. But statistically, amusements rides are very safe. </p>
<p>Figures <a href="http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.pdf">from the Health Safety Executive</a> in the UK confirm that there is one death in 834,000,000 rides.</p>
<p>This is very small when compared with deaths from aircraft travel, where the HSE reports there is one death for each 125,000,000 passenger journeys, or scuba diving where there is one death for every 200,000 dives.</p>
<p>In Australia amusement rides and devices are controlled by the Work Health and Safety Legislation. </p>
<p>The rules vary between jurisdictions, but have their origins in the old Machinery Acts, as amusement rides are for all intents and purposes potentially hazardous pieces of machinery to which the general public is exposed.</p>
<p>Worksafe Australia <a href="http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/sites/swa/about/publications/pages/guidance-amusement-devices">defines</a> an <a href="http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/sites/swa/about/publications/pages/guidance-amusement-devices">amusement device</a> as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] an item of plant operated for hire or reward that provides entertainment, sightseeing or amusement through movement of the equipment, or part of the equipment, or when passengers or other users travel or move on, around or along the equipment.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Standards of design</h2>
<p>The Dreamworld Thunder River Rapids Ride has been operating since December 1986. At the time of installation there was no Australian Standard specifying the minimum design and construction safety requirements for any amusement rides in Australia.</p>
<p>The first Amusement Rides and Devices Australian Standard was published some two years later, as AS 3533:1988. This Standard has been constantly updated and amended with more and more detail and guidance.</p>
<p>It is worth noting that this Standard is classified as mandatory, as it is called up in legislation. This means that amusement ride operators are breaking the law if they do not <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/legis/qld/consol_reg/whasr2011309/sch5.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=(as3533%20or%20%22as%203533%22%20or%20australian%20standards%20w/3%203533)">comply with its requirements</a>.</p>
<p>There is a separate Australian Standard AS 3533.2:2009 that is dedicated to the operation and maintenance of rides, where Section 5 says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All maintenance, replacements, repairs and inspections of amusement rides and devices, including discrete systems and components within them, shall be carried out by competent persons and shall be —</p>
<p>a) wherever possible, in accordance with the designer or manufacturer’s instructions;</p>
<p>b) fully documented; and</p>
<p>c) recorded in the log with the device or recorded and kept elsewhere for future reference (see also Clause 5.5).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the absence of instructions from the designer or manufacturer, those competent persons involved in the maintenance, replacement, repair and inspection of amusement rides should be able to demonstrate a knowledge of the original intentions of the designer or manufacturer.</p>
<h2>Safety checks</h2>
<p>Planned maintenance programs and inspection routines should be implemented for the moving and load-bearing components and structural members of an amusement device. </p>
<p>This is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity. It is also designed to identify areas where excessive rust, wear, fatigue or any other condition could lead to the failure of such components and compromise the safety of patrons and operating staff.</p>
<p>Maintenance plans should be reviewed based on the results of previous inspections and updated to address any identified needs.</p>
<p>Following major maintenance and repair, and at random intervals on other occasions, a hazard identification and risk assessment procedure should be completed to make sure new hazards are not present and residual risks identified by the designer or manufacturer are not increased.</p>
<p>Provided an amusement ride is adequately maintained in accordance with the relevant Australian Standard, it should be able to operated safely indefinitely.</p>
<p>So what went wrong at Dreamworld yesterday? It’s too early to say what the investigation will uncover.</p>
<p>But it is important to note that it is the norm for the coroner to make recommendations about broader issues connected with the deaths. This could include amendments to the Standards Australia AS 3533 to ensure that a tragedy such as this can never happen again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Eager is a Fellow of Engineers Australia and represents them on the Standards Committee ME-051 Amusement Rides and Devices.</span></em></p>Investigations into the tragic accident which left four people dead at an amusement park could lead to changes in the safety regulations.David Eager, Assistant Student Ombud and Associate Professor, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/647482016-09-07T20:13:52Z2016-09-07T20:13:52ZWhy the ‘Miracle on the Hudson’ in the new movie Sully was no crash landing<p>On January 15, 2009, Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger landed an Airbus A320-214 in New York’s freezing Hudson River following a bird strike-induced loss of both engines. All 155 passengers and crew on board <a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1003.aspx">US Airways Flight 1549</a> survived.</p>
<p>The incident has been dubbed the “<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/miracle-hudson-343489">Miracle on the Hudson</a>” and the story behind it is told in the movie <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3263904/">Sully</a>, out today.</p>
<p>Actor Tom Hanks plays Captain “Sully” Sullenberger, an experienced pilot thrust into the limelight after gliding his disabled plane onto the frigid waters of the river shortly after takeoff. </p>
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</figure>
<p>This was not a crash, more a safe landing. In safety science, the incident represents what is known as a “near miss”. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://uploadsproject.org/training-material/definition-of-a-near-miss/">near miss</a> is defined as a serious error or mishap that has the potential to cause an adverse event but fails to do so because of chance or because it is intercepted. These are events where more adverse outcomes were avoided. </p>
<h2>Seconds from disaster</h2>
<p>In this incident a collision with a flock of geese at low altitude caused both engines of the plane to lose thrust. Captain Sullenberger immediately lowered the aircraft’s nose to optimise glide speed and weighed up his options including turning back to LaGuardia Airport or landing at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey.</p>
<p>Given the total loss of power and time constraints, he ultimately opted to land on the Hudson River. His <a href="https://youtu.be/MSPsrhCPt-0?t=1m55s">final words</a> before losing contact with air traffic control were calm but direct:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We’re gonna be in the Hudson. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>With the support of his crew and copilot he safely landed the plane on the Hudson River. The time between the loss of the engines and landing the plane was 208 seconds, just under four minutes.</p>
<p>The movie details how Captain Sullenberger’s actions were questioned in the days after the incident from air transport authorities for what they saw as a crash landing.</p>
<p>According to the movie, they believed the plane was capable of gliding to the closest airport and that Captain Sullenberger made an error in judgement landing on the Hudson River, ultimately risking the lives of those on board.</p>
<h2>Who’s to blame?</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this tendency to focus on those closest to incidents in <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=KCCdBQAAQBAJ&source=gbs_similarbooks">a search for blame</a> is common in accident and near miss investigations. </p>
<p>With the luxury of hindsight, investigators often focus their efforts on finding a root cause or bad apple, a concept which simply does not exist.</p>
<p>In retrospect, it is easy to say what someone should or could have done to remedy a situation. It is also easy to be perplexed at somebody else’s actions. Why on earth would an experienced pilot fly a fully loaded plane into the Hudson River when there were other landing options seemingly available? </p>
<p>Of course, in reality, accidents and near misses are highly complex. They arise through many interactions between people, technology and their environment, some of these occurring even years before the event itself.</p>
<p>There are typically multiple interacting factors that influence the decisions and actions of the people involved. To understand more about accidents and how to avoid them, their complexity needs to be unravelled systematically.</p>
<p>This provides a better picture of how accidents occur but also allows for changes to be made, preventing future incidents of the same kind. If investigations fail to understand these reasons, the likelihood of accidents reoccurring is high.</p>
<h2>Lessons to be learnt</h2>
<p>In the case of Flight 1549, rather than seek to admonish Sully, it is instead far more valuable to examine what it was about the aviation system that enabled his astonishing feat.</p>
<p>The questions to ask should be: why did it make sense for Sully to ditch in the Hudson, and how was it possible to do so without loss of life? The lessons learned from this viewpoint are far more powerful.</p>
<p>So from a safety perspective many things went right following the bird strike. But equally so, many things went right within the aviation system prior to the bird strike.</p>
<p>For Flight 1549, Sullenberger had the experience, skills and competencies to land the aircraft safely on water. Likewise the air traffic controllers were experienced and calm under pressure and the crew were trained to calmly prepare the cabin and passengers for the emergency landing.</p>
<p>The weather conditions were also favourable, the plane was equipped to land on water and emergency response crews were only minutes away. </p>
<p>In this sense, many played a role in the safe outcome: the aircrew, the cabin crew, the air traffic controllers, the aircraft designers, trainers and so on.</p>
<h2>The real miracle</h2>
<p>The miracle was enabled because of an optimal system response comprising many human and non-human parts. As is always the case in such recoveries, the human element was central in holding the system together.</p>
<p>For safety scientists, Flight 1549 provides important lessons. Indeed, the study of <a href="http://erikhollnagel.com/books/resilience-engineering-concepts-and-precepts.html">how things went right as well as how things go wrong</a> is now widely accepted as a critical line of inquiry.</p>
<p>Currently we know a lot about accidents, or unsafe systems, but generally when things are done well and safely <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Safety_I_and_Safety_II.html?id=8naUBAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">we take them for granted</a>. Near misses are just as important as accidents because they provide insight into healthy systems that can create safety or bring systems back from the brink. </p>
<p>As a result of the recent focus on safe as well as unsafe performance, we are beginning to learn more about what safe systems look like. Combined with accident analysis efforts, this is leading to a paradigm shift whereby we will be able to predict complex accidents before they occur.</p>
<p>What transpired on Flight 1549 was not really a “miracle on the Hudson” but rather evidence of a system that had all of the ingredients to operate safely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eryn Grant receives funding through an Australian Postgraduate Award (APA) scholarship </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Salmon receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Stevens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The movie Sully, out today, tells the story of Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger who landed an Airbus A320-214 in New York’s Hudson River. To accident experts, this was no crash landing.Eryn Grant, Research Fellow in Human Factors, University of the Sunshine CoastNicholas Stevens, Lecturer and Researcher, Land Use Planning & Urban Design, University of the Sunshine CoastPaul Salmon, Professor, Human Factors, University of the Sunshine CoastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/624292016-07-28T19:44:14Z2016-07-28T19:44:14ZAutomation can leave us complacent, and that can have dangerous consequences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132289/original/image-20160728-21584-hdj6q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is a hands off approach the right way to go when it comes to automation?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/riopatuca</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-01/tesla-driver-killed-while-car-was-in-on-autopilot/7560126">fatal accident</a> involving a Tesla car while self-driving using the car’s Autopilot feature has <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-teslas-autopilot-cars-be-allowed-on-public-roads-following-accidents-62495">raised questions</a> about whether this technology is ready for consumer use.</p>
<p>But more importantly, it highlights the need to reconsider the relationship between human behaviour and technology. Self-driving cars change the way we drive, and we need scrutinise the impact of this on safety.</p>
<p>Tesla’s Autopilot does not make the car truly autonomous and self-driving. Rather, it automates driving functions, such as steering, speed, braking and hazard avoidance. This is an important distinction. The Autopilot provides supplemental assistance to, but is not a replacement for, the driver.</p>
<p>In a statement following the accident, <a href="https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/tragic-loss">Tesla</a> reiterated that Autopilot is still in beta. The statement emphasised that drivers must maintain responsibility for the vehicle and be prepared to take over manual control at any time.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.teslamotors.com/en_AU/presskit/autopilot">Tesla says</a> Autopilot improves safety, helps to avoid hazards and reduces driver workload. But with reduced workload, the question is whether the driver allocates freed-up cognitive resources to maintain supervisory control over Autopilot.</p>
<h2>Automation bias</h2>
<p>There is evidence to suggest that humans have trouble recognising when automation has failed and manual intervention is required. <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327108ijap0301_1">Research shows</a> we are poor supervisors of trusted automation, with a tendency towards over-reliance.</p>
<p>Known as automation bias, when people use automation such as autopilot, they may delegate full responsibility to automation rather than continue to be vigilant. This reduces our workload, but it also reduces our ability to recognise when automation has failed, signalling the need to take back manual control.</p>
<p>Automation bias can occur anytime when automation is over-relied on and gets it wrong. This can happen because automation was not set properly.</p>
<p>An incorrectly set GPS navigation will lead you astray. This happened to one driver who followed an incorrectly set GPS <a href="http://gizmodo.com/5975787/woman-drives-for-900-miles-instead-of-90-thanks-to-gps-error">across several European countries</a>.</p>
<p>More tragically, <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/31/us/kal-fight-007-anniversary/">Korean Airlines flight 007</a> was shot down when it strayed into Soviet airspace in 1983, killing all 269 on board. Unknown to the pilots, the aircraft deviated from its intended course due to an incorrectly set autopilot.</p>
<h2>Autocorrect is not always correct</h2>
<p>Automation will work exactly as programmed. Reliance on a spell checker to identify typing errors will not reveal the wrong words used that were spelt correctly. For example, mistyping “from” as “form”.</p>
<p>Likewise, automation isn’t aware of our intentions and will sometimes act contrary to them. This frequently occurs with predictive text and autocorrect on mobile devices. Here over-reliance can result in miscommunication with some hilarious consequences as documented on the website <a href="http://www.damnyouautocorrect.com/">Damn You Autocorrect</a>.</p>
<p>Sometimes automation will encounter circumstances that it can’t handle, as could have occurred in the Tesla crash.</p>
<p>GPS navigation has <a href="http://www.theadvance.ca/community/2016/7/12/gps-leads-tourists-to-dead-end-en-route-to-kej-seaside.html">led drivers down a dead-end road</a> when a highway was rerouted but the maps not updated.</p>
<p>Over-reliance on automation can exacerbate problems by reducing situational awareness. This is especially dangerous as it limits our ability to take back manual control when things go wrong. </p>
<p>The captain of <a href="https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19850219-0">China Airlines flight 006</a> left autopilot engaged while attending to an engine failure. The loss of power from one engine caused the plane to start banking to one side. </p>
<p>Unknown to the pilots, the autopilot was compensating by steering as far as it could in the opposite direction. It was doing exactly what it had been programmed to do, keeping the plane as level as possible.</p>
<p>But this masked the extent of the problem. In an attempt to level the plane, the captain disengaged the autopilot. The result was a complete loss of control, the plane rolled sharply and entered a steep descent. Fortunately, the pilots were able to regain control, but only after falling 30,000 feet.</p>
<h2>Humans vs automation</h2>
<p>When automation gets it right, it can improve performance. But <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1071581999902525">research findings</a> show that when automation gets it wrong, performance is worse than if there had been no automation at all.</p>
<p>And tasks we find difficult are also often difficult for automation.</p>
<p>In medicine, computers can assist radiologists detect cancers in screening mammograms by placing prompts over suspicious features. These systems are very sensitive, identifying the majority of cancers. </p>
<p>But in cases where the system missed cancers, <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1076633204003265">human readers with computer-aided detection missed more than readers with no automated assistance</a>. <a href="http://mdm.sagepub.com/content/33/1/98.short">Researchers</a> noted cancers that were difficult for humans to detect were also difficult for computers to detect.</p>
<p>Technology developers need to consider more than their automation technologies. They need to understand how automation changes human behaviour. While automation is generally highly reliable, it has the potential to fail.</p>
<p>Automation developers try to combat this risk by placing humans in a supervisory role with final authority. But automation bias research shows that relying on humans as a backup to automation is fraught with danger and a task for which they are poorly suited. </p>
<p>Developers and regulators must not only assess the automation technology itself, but also the way in which humans interact with it, especially in situations when automation fails. And as users of automation, we must remain ever vigilant, ready to take back control at the first sign of trouble.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lyell received a doctoral scholarship from the HCF Research Foundation.</span></em></p>More tasks are being given over to automation, from autopilots in transport to medical diagnosis. But humans are a poor backup for automation, especially when the automation goes wrong.David Lyell, PhD Candidate in Health Informatics, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/501352015-11-04T14:16:46Z2015-11-04T14:16:46ZHow air accident investigators turn disaster into a way of saving lives<p>Throughout aviation’s comparatively brief history, properly investigating the causes of accidents has been essential to improving flight safety, to the point that <a href="https://theconversation.com/air-travel-is-safe-and-getting-safer-whatever-else-you-might-have-read-36271">aviation is one of the safest ways to travel</a>. Looking at the pictures of debris scattered across many square miles of Egyptian desert, or Ukrainian sunflower fields, or floating at sea, the fact we’re able to draw useful lessons from such destruction is testament to the efforts of air accident investigators worldwide. How do they do it?</p>
<p>Aviation rules and practices are governed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (<a href="http://www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/default.aspx">ICAO</a>, a UN agency) and through a document known as Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, under which all signatory nations are obliged to investigate accidents occurring within their borders. Like a coroner’s court inquest, the focus is on learning lessons rather than building a case against a perceived guilty party.</p>
<p>When notified of an accident, the national investigation agency deploys a team to the site – in the UK this is the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/air-accidents-investigation-branch">AAIB</a>) of the Department for Transport. Generally the team includes three investigators: one with a pilot background, one with an engineering background, and another specialising in flight data recorders.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/100752/original/image-20151104-21220-m6406o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Investigators getting their hands dirty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the scene of the accident the investigators’ first vital task is to assess which evidence may be perishable. What could be lost? This could be snow and ice, or witness recollections. Other evidence that can be altered through accident or design must also be prioritised and recorded – for example the position of control switches or wreckage, and documentation.</p>
<p>This is quite a task in itself, and investigators usually start with a rational overall assessment of the accident site. Sometimes there may be more than one area of interest – for example where the aircraft breaks up in flight as happened in the recent crash in Egypt or MH17, and where debris is scattered over many square miles. In other cases, evidence may lie at the departure airport or at the aircraft’s home maintenance hangar. Experienced investigators will say that they let the accident site tell the story, taking in the full picture rather than immediately focusing on the forensic detail. </p>
<h2>Letting the evidence speak for itself</h2>
<p>The investigator’s approach is critical. They need to be led by the evidence at all times, and mindful that things are rarely as they first appear. This is one (of many) reasons why those in the investigation business will often shake their fists at so-called experts whose speculation and hunches fill initial news reports after a crash. A good investigator sets out to test hypotheses with the evidence, rather than collect evidence to support a theory. </p>
<p>This is also the reason why, sometimes, investigations can take many years to complete. The ICAO suggests one year as a target, but many take longer – the complex investigation into <a href="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/fiches-facts/a98h0003/sum_a98h0003.asp">Swissair Flight 111 which crashed over Nova Scotia</a> took five years to complete, for example.</p>
<p>The physical evidence that remains is of great importance and is generally subjected to various types of imaging in situ, such as photography, laser scanning (<a href="http://www.lidar-uk.com/what-is-lidar/">LiDAR</a>), and airborne or satellite imaging. This is especially important if the accident site is remote or scattered, as the pattern of the wreckage and how it is distributed is as important as the debris itself. Minor details such as dents and paint scrapes all provide the investigators with details to help decipher the flight’s last moments. </p>
<h2>Black boxes</h2>
<p>In addition to physical evidence is the in-flight record of the aircraft’s systems – the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-will-mh17s-black-boxes-reveal-29555">black box</a>” comprised of the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). These amazing devices record the last two hours of sound on the flight deck and many hours of essential flight data such as control inputs, heading, speed, altitude, and the status of systems such as engines and cabin air supply. </p>
<p>However, they are only as good as the data that feeds them and those who interpret them. If the data going in is garbage then the recorder will not help. It’s also important to realise that they only record what happened, but not why – this is especially important when trying to understand the human element of accidents, for example the <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanwings-flight-4u9525-a-victim-of-the-deadlock-between-safety-and-security-demands-39386">Germanwings crash in the Alps</a>.</p>
<h2>Technological testing</h2>
<p>Investigation teams can grow very large, with investigation teams from the country in which the aircraft was manufactured, or operated, or designed all having a right to participate. Technical advisers are brought on board for their specialist knowledge or facilities: engine or airframe manufacturers, research laboratories (such as <a href="https://www.qinetiq.com/Pages/default.aspx">QinetiQ</a>), or universities.</p>
<p>For example, Rolls-Royce use <a href="http://serc.carleton.edu/research_education/geochemsheets/techniques/CT.html">X-ray tomography</a> to examine damaged engines, looking for signs of metal fatigue or contamination before they are stripped down to avoid losing precious evidence during dis-assembly. Simulations often play a role: <a href="http://www.cranfieldimpactcentre.com/">Cranfield Impact Centre</a> was asked to examine the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/7194086.stm">Boeing 777 crash at Heathrow in 2008</a> on behalf of the AAIB using computer and physical simulations. This was done under close supervision of the investigators in order to maintain the investigation’s independence.</p>
<p>Often the best way is to physically piece together the wreckage. In doing so, it’s possible to see how the structure broke apart, or to check for residues of explosives or tell-tale impact marks. This task is much easier when reconstructed in three dimensions rather than looking at individual pieces of metal laid out on a hangar floor. The clues gleaned from this process can be corroborated against those from elsewhere, such as post-mortem results of the occupants, closer forensic examination of the wreckage, or flight recorder or radar data.</p>
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<h2>Pulling it all together</h2>
<p>Usually the team has been assembled at zero notice from organisations selected purely by the circumstances of the accident. There is huge pressure on the team – from society and the commercial airline operators and manufacturers who need to know the safety implications as soon as possible. The ability of the investigator in charge to manage the process, by avoiding media leaks and keeping all involved on-side for example, is key.</p>
<p>It’s rare an investigation pivots on a single, Hollywood-style eureka moment. Instead it comes from the un-glamorous, methodical and painstaking work of sifting through a jigsaw of evidence, some of which will be wrong or contradictory. Witness statements, for example, are <a href="http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/01/110125092233.htm">frequently not entirely accurate</a>. The challenge for the investigators is to carefully analyse how the pieces fit together, and whether it’s possible to collect further evidence or conduct tests that fill in the gaps to prove or disprove a theory.</p>
<p>Only with thorough analysis can the team piece together the sequence of events, understand why they occurred, and what changes should be recommended as a consequence. Sometimes accidents occur because of management decisions made many years before, or even less tangible factors like safety culture among flight or maintenance crew - these are difficult problems to pinpoint.</p>
<p>Perhaps the least exciting aspect of the investigation is the most important – that of writing up the final report. It must be written with care, without allocating blame and knowing that it will be read by both relatives and regulators. If a poorly worded recommendation is rejected then all their hard work may be in vain, so each statement must be thoroughly supported. But good regulators know well to act on sound recommendations, and it’s largely because this system works so well that aviation is as safe as it is today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graham Braithwaite does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Air accident investigations are meticulous, thorough, and are the reason air travel is as safe as it is.Graham Braithwaite, Director of Transport Systems, Professor of Safety & Accident Investigation, Cranfield UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/488962015-10-13T19:27:30Z2015-10-13T19:27:30ZImproving safety in horse racing: it’s all in the data<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98034/original/image-20151012-17831-bx2dt4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">So much data is collected from horse racing that could be used to prevent accidents.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/58847482@N03/8009067661/in/photostream/">Flickr/Matthew Kenwrick</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is one year since the tragic deaths of jockeys <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-14/jockey-carly-mae-pye-dies-in-hospital-after-fall-at-rockhampton/5813534">Carly-Mae Pye</a> and <a href="http://www.news.com.au/sport/superracing/racing-industry-in-shock-over-death-of-jockey-caitlin-forrest/story-fndpqu3p-1227092114604">Caitlin Forrest</a> in Australia. Since then, horse racing has claimed two more lives – track work riders English-born <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-31/english-jockey-rice-dies-after-caulfield-fall/6059934">Lizz Rice</a> and German-born <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-01/jockey-killed-in-fall-at-caulfield-racecourse/6587938">Friederike Ruhle</a>.</p>
<p>When it comes to safety, a lack of initiative or leadership from high ranking regulators and administrators seems to be the common thread.</p>
<p>The racing industry remains reactive to the deaths, and catastrophic or career-ending injuries suffered by both jockeys and racehorses. It is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-prevent-further-jockey-deaths-in-horse-racing-34003">inevitable part of racing</a> they say.</p>
<p>These are the same justifications a decade on since the deaths that both occurred over a long-weekend in 2005, that of <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/news/Horseracing/Racing-toll-Jockey-dies-after-fall/2005/03/15/1110649201472.html">Gavin Lisk and Adrian Ledger</a>. Their deaths prompted a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-03-16/jockey-deaths-to-prompt-safety-review/1534668">safety review</a>, but what evidence-based solutions has the industry implemented since <a href="http://jockeysroom.racingnsw.com.au/Links/National%20Jockey%20Safety%20Review.pdf">recommendations</a> were released to address these safety concerns?</p>
<p>Following the deaths last year, research commissioned by the Chief Executive Officer of the newly formed <a href="http://racingaustralia.horse/">Racing Australia</a>, Peter McGauran, shows that 16 of the last 22 jockeys killed in Australian racing <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4155927.htm">died from massive head injuries</a>.</p>
<p>But the report from this research has not yet been released to the public, and has not undergone peer-review (like several of the commissioned reports by the ARB). </p>
<p>Where is the transparency and control of bias that could result from an industry commissioned study? Where are the insights that tell us something that we did not already know? Why are there not public reports issued by the regulators?</p>
<h2>Recent studies</h2>
<p>Previous studies in Australia have described the <a href="https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2009/190/2/incidence-race-day-jockey-falls-australia-2002-2006">incidence of falls, injuries and fatalities</a> and <a href="http://oem.bmj.com/content/67/10/693.abstract">risk factors</a>, and studies on the effectiveness of <a href="http://pip.sagepub.com/content/226/3-4/237">jockey helmets</a> and <a href="https://rirdc.infoservices.com.au/items/14-037">safety vests</a>. But up until recently, there had been no comprehensive study of the costs of horse-related workplace injuries to jockeys in Australia.</p>
<p>Part of a research programme into insurance costs of jockeys, funded by WorkCover Tasmania and led by Professor Andrew Palmer and myself, <a href="http://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/5/3/0390">one study</a> published last month was based on data from all WorkCover authorities nation-wide. We found that the incidence of insurance claims between 2002 and 2010 was about 2 per 1,000 race rides, costing A$9-million a year.</p>
<p>With about 180,000 race rides a year, this translates to almost one claim per day. </p>
<p>Although race-day incidents were associated with fewer insurance claims than non-race day incidents, they made up a larger proportion of the total costs, reflecting the severity of incidents that occur during races.</p>
<p>Fractures were the most common injury (30%), but head injuries resulting from a fall from a horse had the highest mean cost per claim. This data has also been combined with incidence and risk factor data from previous studies to <a href="http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/21/2/109.abstract">demonstrate</a> that the incidence and costs of jockey falls and injuries can be significantly reduced through the implementation of policies aimed at improving safety. </p>
<p>But there is little evidence of action on such evidence-based policies.</p>
<h2>Racing’s social licence</h2>
<p>The success of racing is highly dependent on the public’s perception of the industry. Major threats to the industry include the adverse publicity resulting from the deaths of jockeys and racehorses, particularly those that are high-profile.</p>
<p>The industry needs to meet (and preferably exceed) the community and other stakeholders level of approval. There needs to be a focus on programs that transparently lead to a better understanding of strategies that improve racehorse welfare and rider safety, which in turn leads to policy changes that will enhance the confidence of the community in the industry.</p>
<p>If the racing industry wants to keep its support, it needs to bring its safety strategies into the current century. The simple fact is that racing can’t improve what it doesn’t measure. But safety in racing can be measured and benchmarked. It is the only way to confirm which safety strategies and practices are working.</p>
<p>Horse racing is, after all, about big business, big money and big data. The latter because of the vast amounts of data generated for use by the betting public to predict race winners.</p>
<p>I feel like a broken record here when I say that stewards’ inquiries into individual incidents are unlikely to result in <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-prevent-further-jockey-deaths-in-horse-racing-34003">findings that are useful</a>.</p>
<p>Regulators should be using the industry’s aptitude at data collation and analysis to detect patterns and to monitor the effects of rule, policy and practice changes in order to improve safety and welfare to both jockeys and racehorses alike.</p>
<p>This model has been successfully demonstrated overseas, for example, by the California Horse Racing Board (<a href="http://www.chrb.ca.gov/">CHRB</a>), which publishes its <a href="http://www.chrb.ca.gov/veterinary.html">report</a> on racehorse deaths and results of post-mortems annually.</p>
<p>Over the past five years the CHRB has seen a 30% reduction in the number of racehorse fatalities. Further, the number of fatalities in 2013/14 was the lowest number of fatalities of the past 19 years. This reduction has been attributed, in part, to a targeted racing safety program.</p>
<p>Racing in Australia needs leaders that understand that data collection and analysis can lead to faster uptake of evidence-based safety strategies and that this information needs to be widely disseminated. Only then will the culture change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Peta L. Hitchens has previously received funding from the California Horse Racing Board, WorkCover Tasmania, TOTE Tasmania, Betfair Australasia, and Tasmanian Thoroughbred Racing Council (now Tasmanian Racing Board) for research on racing safety. Peta is a member of Women in Racing, the Racing Equipment and Safety Committee of the Grayson-Jockey Club Research Foundation, WelRisk - leading competence centre for animal welfare risk assessment and surveillance, and a Board Member of the Nordic Society for Veterinary Epidemiology. Additionally, Peta holds a share in a racehorse currently running in NSW. </span></em></p>It’s a year since the tragic death of two Australian jockeys and the sport has claimed two more lives since then. So what is being done to imprve safety in horse racing?Peta Lee Hitchens MVPHMgt PhD, Researcher, Animal Welfare & Epidemiology, Swedish University of Agricultural SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.