tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/afghanistan-613/articlesAfghanistan – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:58:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265702024-03-28T12:58:02Z2024-03-28T12:58:02ZMoscow terror attack showed growing reach of ISIS-K – could the US be next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584987/original/file-20240328-18-qt434b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C270%2C5115%2C3160&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 140 people died in the Crocus City Hall assualt in Moscow on March 22, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-shows-the-burning-crocus-city-hall-concert-hall-news-photo/2097708778?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">deadly attack in Moscow</a> on March 22, 2024, exposed the vulnerability of the Russian capital to the threat of the Islamic State group and its affiliate ISIS-K. But it also displayed the reach of the network, leading some <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/03/26/isis-k-moscow-attack/">terror experts to ponder</a>: Could a U.S. city be next?</p>
<p>There has not been a mass casualty assault in the U.S. carried out in the name of the Islamic State group since 2017, when a truck <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/sayfullo-saipov-be-sentenced-life-prison-2017-truck-attack-isis">mowed down cyclists and pedestrians on a New York City bikeway</a>, leaving eight dead.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-islamic-state-five-years-later-persistent-threats-u-s-options/">five years after the Islamic State group’s territorial defeat</a> in Baghuz, Syria, had prompted hopes that the terrorist network was in terminal decline, a recent spate of attacks has thrust the group back into the spotlight. On the same day as the Moscow atrocity, an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/21/at-least-three-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-afghan-city-of-kandahar">ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan</a>, resulted in the deaths of at least 21 people.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">terrorism expert and a scholar</a> specializing in radical Islamist militant groups and the geographical scope of their attacks, I believe these incidents underscore the growing threat of ISIS-K both within the region it draws support from and on an international scale. </p>
<h2>Amplifying influence</h2>
<p>A successful terror attack on a Western capital is certainly something ISIS-K, or Islamic State Khorasan Province, aspires to. The intent behind the group’s activities is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">bolster its position among jihadist factions</a> by means of audacious and sophisticated attacks.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man sits looking at screens with Tome, Madrid and London on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An image released by pro-Islamic State media outlet Al Battar Foundation reads ‘After Moscow, who is next?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/posters-pro-islamic-state-isis-media-groups-celebrate-moscow-attack-threaten-and-incite-further">Al-Battar Foundation</a></span>
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<p>It is a strategy that showcases ISIS-K’s capabilities for spectacular operations, distinguishing it from potential rival groups. But it also enhances ISIS-K’s appeal, attracting both supporters and resources in the shape of funding and fighters.</p>
<p>By establishing a unique identity in a crowded extremist landscape, ISIS-K aims to undercut its competitors’ influence and assert its dominance in the jihadist sphere of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/25/the-strange-story-behind-the-khorasan-groups-name/">Khorasan region</a> it targets, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other Central Asian countries.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s ambition <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/moscow-concert-hall-attack-will-have-far-reaching-impact">extends</a> beyond territorial control, engaging in a broader contest for ideological supremacy and resource acquisition globally.</p>
<h2>An expanding threat</h2>
<p>This global reach and ambition are evident in ISIS-K’s recent planned operations.</p>
<p>These include a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kerman-us-warning-isisk-bombings-bcb47f04165b3eb7b9bc7b4868c8399c">suicide bombing in Iran</a> in January 2024 and thwarted attacks across Europe, notably <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/4418496-germany-netherlands-arrest-9-over-alleged-plan-attacks-line-isis">the foiled plots</a> in Germany and the Netherlands in July 2023.</p>
<p>And without a doubt, a successful attack in the United States is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-could-be-first-afghan-terror-group-to-put-us-in-its-sights/6241617.html">seen within ISIS-K’s hierarchy as a major goal</a>.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/25/1240780292/us-officials-warn-of-isis-k-threat">officials in the Biden administration have repeatedly</a> warned of ISIS-K’s escalating danger to American interests, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-mocks-us-hysteria">propaganda has persistently framed</a> the U.S. as its principal enemy – a narrative that is fueled by America’s <a href="https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/">extensive</a> military and economic efforts to dismantle Islamic State operations since 2014.</p>
<p>The United States’ involvement, especially in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">collaboration</a> with the Taliban — ISIS-K’s primary regional adversary — has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108344/text">placed America firmly</a> in the group’s crosshairs. </p>
<p>Employing <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CTC-Beyond-the-Caliphate-Belgium.pdf">tactics refined during</a> the period that the Islamic State group was most active, ISIS-K seeks to inspire lone-wolf attacks and radicalize individuals in the U.S.</p>
<p>The 2015 mass shooting in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html">San Bernardino</a>, California, which left 14 dead, and the 2016 shooting at a nightclub in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/index.html">Orlando</a>, Florida, that resulted in at least 49 deaths, were both attacks inspired by the Islamic State group.</p>
<h2>Targeting major powers</h2>
<p>Taking its lead from the Islamic State group, ISIS-K in 2022 <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/09/islamic-state-afghanistan-khorasan-propaganda-russia-ukraine-war/">publicly condemned</a> America, calling it an enemy of Islam.</p>
<p>Of course, ISIS-K had by then already demonstrated its intention to harm U.S. interests, notably in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/us-to-conduct-new-interviews-into-the-deadly-2021-bombing-at-kabul-airport">2021 Kabul airport attack</a> in which 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans were killed.</p>
<p>ISIS-K views the U.S. in much the same way as it does Russia: both as a military and an ideological foe.</p>
<p>Russia became a prime target due in part to its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">partnering with the Bashar al-Assad government</a> in Syria in operations against Islamic State group affiliates. Similarly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/">Washington has worked with the Taliban</a> in Afghanistan in countering ISIS-K operations.</p>
<p>While it is easier for ISIS-K to penetrate Russian territory, given the country’s geographical proximity to major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/islamic-state-recruiting-militants-from-tajikistan-and-other-central-asian-countries">Islamist recruitment centers, such as Tajikistan</a>, the potential for strikes in the United States remains significant. </p>
<p>In 2023, U.S. authorities <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/29/politics/migrants-us-southern-border-smuggler-isis-ties/index.html">investigated</a> a group of Uzbek nationals suspected of entering the country from Mexico with the assistance of traffickers linked to the Islamic State group, underscoring the group’s threat.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The wreckage of a truck under a blue sheet is seen being towed away." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C2314%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eight people died in a truck attack in New York City in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BikePathAttack/c09a4360d6b74c0c968a3897dbfa37f0/photo?Query=hudson%20bike%20%20attack&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38&currentItemNo=27">AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Targeting American interests serve multiple purposes for ISIS-K. By striking against the U.S., ISIS-K not only retaliates against Washington’s counterterrorism efforts but also aims to deter U.S. involvement in regions of interest to ISIS-K.</p>
<p>It also taps into historical grievances against the U.S. and Western interventions in Muslim countries – from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the stationing of U.S. troops in significant Islamic centers in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/osama-bin-laden">notably Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<h2>Countering a persistent threat</h2>
<p>In response to the growing threat of Islamic State group affiliates, the United States has <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf">adopted a comprehensive strategy</a> combining military, intelligence and law enforcement efforts. </p>
<p>Military operations have targeted ISIS-K leaders and infrastructure in Afghanistan, while security cooperation with regional and international <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-uzbekistan-relations/">partners such as Uzbekistan</a> continues to monitor and counter the group’s activities. </p>
<p>On the home front, law enforcement and homeland security agencies remain vigilant, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023-03-28%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Mayorkas.pdf">working to identify</a> and thwart potential ISIS-K plots.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-cia-terrorism-government-and-politics-87fb25aa94f4e4a8a46d82368f907be9">many experts had warned</a>, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has posed new challenges, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/al-qaeda-a-defeated-threat-think-again/">inadvertently transforming</a> that country once again into a safe haven and operational base for terrorist groups.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">retreat has also resulted</a> in a significant loss of on-the-ground intelligence amid <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html">doubts</a> over the efficacy of relying on the Taliban for counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">Taliban are struggling</a> to prevent or counteract ISIS-K attacks within their own borders.</p>
<p>The successful ISIS-K plots against Iran and Russia also reveal another vulnerability: When a country is distracted or <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-k-allowed-slipped-into-moscow-massacre-because-war-zelenskyy-2024-3#:%7E:text=The%20war%20in%20Ukraine%20distracted,in%20his%20Saturday%20night%20address.">preoccupied with other security concerns or conflicts</a>, it can potentially compromise the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>Recent years have witnessed a decrease in high-profile attacks by groups like the Islamic State, leading many to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-sees-islamic-state-effectiveness-decreasing-but-analysts-warn-resurgence-still-possible-/7238289.html">conclude</a> that the threat was waning. As a result, global attention — and with it, intelligence and security resources — has shifted toward escalating power rivalries and conflicts across the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.</p>
<p>Yet, this shift risks underestimating the enduring threat terrorist groups pose, laying bare the dangers of complacency.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack emphasizes ISIS-K’s resolve to expand its influence, raising concerns about the potential threat to Western nations, including the United States. Considering ISIS-K’s track record and clear aspirations, it would be naive to dismiss the possibility of an attack on American soil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spate of terror operations carried out by the Islamic State group affiliate has raised concerns over a potential attack on US soil.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262832024-03-26T17:01:32Z2024-03-26T17:01:32ZHow central Asian Jews and Muslims worked together in London’s 20th-century fur and carpet trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583728/original/file-20240322-20-wzxojh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The praying hall in Bukhara Synagogue, in the Uzbek capital.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bukhara_synagogue_%28south%29_praying_hall.jpg">Ymblanter|Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the late 1920s, London was home to a lively, if small, community of Jewish merchants from Afghanistan and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-eurasias-tianshan-mountains-set-a-stage-that-changed-the-world-102772">central Asia</a>. Most spoke Judaeo-Persian, popularly known as <em>Bukharian Tajik</em>. Many were fluent in Russian.</p>
<p>Hailing from established merchant families in Bukhara, Samarkand, Kabul and Herat, these immigrants <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/A_Political_and_Economic_History_of_the.html?id=BOh5DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">traded</a> in furs, carpets, cotton and wool. They maintained commercial relationships with their Muslim counterparts back home, especially Turkmen sheep farmers. </p>
<p>The many poorer Jews living in the region <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4464446.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A23aa1b755d344264427660c7a59eb3bd&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">worked</a> as distillers, builders, tailors, carpenters, itinerant peddlers and druggists. </p>
<p>In the years following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-was-russias-october-revolution-for-and-does-it-matter-any-more-84533">1917 Bolshevik revolution</a>, many Jewish merchants in central Asia crossed into Afghanistan and travelled on to <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-ordinary-diamond-how-the-koh-i-noor-became-an-imperial-possession-200473">British India</a>. “I am a cloth merchant of Bokhara”, Sewai Hafaiz, aged 35, told the British official who interviewed him in the border city of Peshawar in November 1926, according to the <a href="https://archive.org/stream/dli.pahar.3776/2010%20Guide%20to%20India%20Office%20Records%20relating%20to%20Central%20Asia%20by%20Bond%20s_djvu.txt">India Office records</a>. “I and Abraham have brought 24,000 karakul [lamb] skins for sale. We will sell them here or Bombay, or else take them to London.” </p>
<p>I have interviewed the descendants of these Jewish merchants, who have shared memories of life in post-war London. As I show in a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02757206.2023.2288649">recent article</a>, their knowledge of furs – and close ties with Muslim contacts in Afghanistan and Pakistan – sustained a vibrant international trade for the better part of the 20th century. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An early colour photograph of a group of children and an old man around a table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jewish children with their teacher in early 1900s Samarkand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bukharan_Jews#/media/File:Jewish_Children_with_their_Teacher_in_Samarkand.jpg">Sergei Mikhailovich Prokudin-Gorskii | Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Central Asian trading routes</h2>
<p>Among the most valuable commodities in the post-first world war fur trade were Karakul lamb furs. Flocks grazed in the pastures of central Asia and northern Afghanistan. </p>
<p>As Afghanistan’s foreign reserves came increasingly to depend upon this trade, the government sought a monopoly from the 1930s. Jewish merchants were barred from travelling to the settlements in the north of the country, where they had long conducted business.</p>
<p>In this increasingly antisemitic environment, Jews in Afghanistan, including those who had fled there from Soviet central Asia, became impoverished. </p>
<p>The wealthier, including Hafaiz, left. Some joined relatives in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725886.2022.2090236?casa_token=jZ7pSmWRU4MAAAAA:vZ8QzYJLh3jNbJCl196OyZNacd_I3wBhDQLCBwjrGSmIFbpWp-dBuncHMmSK9sVKkxgjOZK9OG0V">Bukharian quarter of Jerusalem</a>. Jerusalem offered few trade opportunities however and many moved further afield, establishing new offices for family firms in London, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/From_Tashkent_to_Paris.html?id=6EBlxwEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Paris, New York, Montreal and Berlin</a>.</p>
<p>A lively Bukharian community in London was subsequently established. The son of one merchant told me he remembered his parents regularly playing cards with other families. In the 1930s, the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/A_Political_and_Economic_History_of_the.html?id=BOh5DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Association of Bukharian Jews</a> was established in the City of London, providing financial support to Jewish refugees from central Asia living in Iran, India and Afghanistan. It also raised the plight of Afghan Jews in Kabul with British officials in India and London. </p>
<p>After 1945, the UK government worked hard to re-establish London’s status within the fur, carpet and precious stones trades. It was eager to capitalise on the foreign currency that traders could earn through re-exporting their wares to buyers in the US and Europe.</p>
<p>By the late 1940s, Bukharian families had inaugurated a synagogue in Amhurst Park, north London. The daughter of a founding member of the community told me the congregation met in a small house: “Sometime in the mid-1950s I remember being given a gift of sweets on the occasion of the festival of <a href="https://theconversation.com/purims-original-queen-how-studying-the-book-of-esther-as-fan-fiction-can-teach-us-about-the-roots-of-an-unruly-jewish-festival-218677">Purim</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An archival photograph of people in front of a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jewish refugees from Kurdistan in Tehran, Iran, 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/magnesmuseum/">MagnesMuseum|Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<h2>Close Jewish-Muslim ties</h2>
<p>These <a href="https://spitalfieldslife.com/2014/10/02/at-s-festenstein-sons-furriers/">Jewish merchants</a> maintained decades-long connections with Afghan officials and counterparts, who would visit with them in London. “I remember watching with amazement as my father ate the central Asian dish of <em>plov</em> [rice steamed with meat, sesame oil, cumin and carrots] while sitting in the traditional manner around a cloth placed on the floor with a Muslim from Afghanistan,” the son of a merchant from Samarkand told me.</p>
<p>In his 2011 memoir, <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Rumi_Tomato/CgCCZwEACAAJ?hl=en">Rumi Tomato</a>, Muhammad Khan Jalallar, who served as minister of finance in Afghanistan in the early 1970s, recalls how merchants frequently travelled to Kabul and Peshawar. He mentions being visited by several Jewish “friends”, including “a chap by the name of Gabriel, who was a trader dealing in imports, working under another trader’s license”.</p>
<p>Jewish merchants also established close ties to Muslim intermediaries in Pakistan, who completed customs procedures for shipments to the UK. The daughter of a fur merchant in London told me that her father was friends with a “Muslim from Multan”. Her husband too remembered the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Caravans.html?id=-uviBQAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Multani</a> trader, who in turn invited them to Pakistan. “He told us we would be treated like kings,” he said, “because his family held ours in such high respect”.</p>
<p>Until the 1980s, Kabul was home to a small but lively Jewish community, approximately 700 people strong. My research shows they led a <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/global/research/researchprojects/afterlivesofurbanmuslimasia">rich social life</a>, picnicking in the mountains and dining in the city’s restaurants.</p>
<p>This ended with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Most Jewish families departed because of insecurity and economic collapse. Only a few <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/08/afghanistans-last-jew-leaves-country">men</a> remained. London-based carpet merchants from Afghanistan sent items for Jewish rites to their co-religionists in Kabul. </p>
<p>One Muslim carpet dealer I interviewed in London, who travelled regularly between the UK and Afghanistan in the 1990s, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>During the first period of government of the Taliban [1996-2001], a Jewish carpet dealer from Afghanistan in London who was my friend asked me to take matzah bread and kosher wine to the remaining Jewish men in Kabul. I was happy to take the bread, but told him I couldn’t risk travelling in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan with a bottle of wine, even if it didn’t contain any alcohol.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the 1960s, increasing hostility in the west toward the fur trade led to its demise. Traders in London shifted to gemstones and diamonds. Others dealt in carpets designed with central Asian motifs and <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76392801.pdf">woven in Afghanistan</a>. Some families left the city altogether, to join relatives in the US and Israel.</p>
<p>Those who remained mostly encouraged their children to focus on getting a good education. A merchant’s son told me that all he knew of his father’s trading activities was that he “did his calculations on the back of envelopes”. As a result, the institutions established in the early 20th century have largely been forgotten.</p>
<p>Central Asian heritage continuess to inform this community’s cultural life. People visit Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to <a href="https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/cjas/article/view/6783/7233">identify ancestral graves</a>. Their rich culinary traditions – as is evident in cookbooks including <a href="https://www.thebukhariancookbook.com/">Miriam’s Table</a> by London-based author Lilian Cordell – actively preserve the community’s past.</p>
<p>This hidden history of connection and commerce between Britain, Afghanistan, and central Asia serves as a reminder of the possibility of inter-religious coexistence in even the most fraught of times.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Magnus Marsden receives funding from the AHRC and Research England. </span></em></p>A hidden history of connection and commerce between Britain, Afghanistan, and central Asia serves as a reminder of the possibility of inter-religious co-existence in even the most fraught of times.Magnus Marsden, Professor Of Social Anthropology, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264692024-03-24T22:20:44Z2024-03-24T22:20:44ZHow Moscow terror attack fits ISIS-K strategy to widen agenda, take fight to its perceived enemies<p><em>Russia is reeling from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">worst terror strike on its soil in a generation</a> following an attack on March 22, 2024, that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">killed at least 137 concertgoers</a> in Moscow.</em></p>
<p><em>The attack has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/23/islamic-state-khorasan-isis-moscow-explainer/">claimed by the Islamic State group</a>. And <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/24/vladimir-putin-terror-attack-russia/">despite Russian authorities expressing doubt</a> over the claim, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">U.S. officials told The Associated Press</a> that they believed ISIS-K, a South and Central Asian affiliate of the terrorist organization, was behind the assault.</em></p>
<p><em>It comes amid heightened concern over the scope of ISIS-K activities following recent terrorist operations in countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">including Iran</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">and Pakistan</a>. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">Clemson University’s Amira Jadoon</a> and <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch of American University</a> – terrorism experts who have tracked the activities of ISIS-K – to explain what this latest deadly attack tells us about the organization’s strengths and agenda.</em></p>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K, short for Islamic State Khorasan Province, is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">regional affiliate</a> of the larger Islamic State group.</p>
<p>The affiliate group <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">operates primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region</a>, although it has presence throughout the historical “Khorasan” – a region that includes parts of the modern-day nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, along with other Central Asian countries. </p>
<p>Established in 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K aims to establish</a> a physical “caliphate” – a system of governing a society under strict Islamic Sharia law and under religious leadership – in the South and Central Asian region.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s beliefs follow the ideology of its parent organization, the Islamic State group, which promotes an extreme interpretation of Islam and sees secular government actors, as well as non-Muslim and Muslim minority civilian populations, as legitimate targets.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The group is known for its extreme brutality and for targeting both government institutions and civilians, including mosques, educational institutions and public spaces.</p>
<p>Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K’s key objectives <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-k-resurgence">have been to diminish</a> the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">now-ruling Taliban’s legitimacy</a> in the war-ravaged nation, assert itself as the rightful leader of the Muslim community and emerge as the principal regional adversary to regimes it deems oppressive. </p>
<p>Moreover, the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency group to a governing entity left numerous militant factions in Afghanistan without a unifying force – a gap that ISIS-K has aimed to fill.</p>
<h2>Why was Russia targeted by ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K has <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-islamic-states-anti-russia-propaganda-campaign-and-criticism-of-taliban-russian-relations/">long framed</a> Russia as one of its main adversaries. It has heavily featured anti-Russian rhetoric in its propaganda and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">has attacked</a> Russia’s presence within Afghanistan. This includes a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">suicide attack</a> on Russia’s embassy in Kabul in 2022 that left two Russian Embassy staff and six Afghans dead.</p>
<p>The broader Islamic State group has targeted Russia for several reasons.</p>
<p>They include <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">long-standing grievances</a> relating to Moscow’s historical interventions in Muslim-majority regions like Chechnya and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia’s partnerships with regimes opposed by the Islamic State group, notably Syria and Iran, have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/09546553.2019.1657097?journalCode=ftpv20">positioned Russia as a primary adversary</a> in the eyes of the terrorist organization and its affiliates. </p>
<p>In particular, Russia has been a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">key ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad</a> since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, providing military support to the Assad regime against various opposition groups, including the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>This direct opposition to the terrorist group and its caliphate ambitions has rendered Russia as a prime target for retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90584">Russia’s cooperation</a> with the Taliban – ISIS-K’s key nemesis in Afghanistan – adds another layer of animosity. The Islamic State group views countries and groups that oppose its ideology or military objectives <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Criezis_CreateConnectDeceive_09222022_0.pdf">as enemies</a> of Islam, including actors who seek to establish relations with the Taliban.</p>
<p>By attacking Russian targets, ISIS-K in part seeks to deter further Russian involvement in the Middle East. But also, such attacks provide high publicity for its cause and aim to inspire its supporters worldwide.</p>
<p>As such, for the Islamic State brand, the Moscow attack serves as retribution for perceived grievances held against Russia, while also projecting global reach. This approach can provide significant dividends, especially for its South and Central Asian affiliate, in the form of increased recruitment, funding and influence across the jihadist spectrum.</p>
<h2>What does the attack tell us about ISIS-K capabilities?</h2>
<p>The mere association of ISIS-K with this attack, whether it was directly or indirectly involved, bolsters the group’s reputation.</p>
<p>Overall, the attack signals ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">growing influence</a> and its determination to make its presence felt on the global stage.</p>
<p>Being linked to a high-profile attack in a major city far from its base in Afghanistan indicates that ISIS-K can extend its operational reach either directly or through collaboration with like-minded militant factions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People gather around a stretcher with an injured person lying on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in a blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-iranian-emergency-services-arrive-at-the-scene-news-photo/1898125916?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The scale and sophistication of the attack reflect advanced planning, coordination and execution capabilities. This only reaffirms unequivocally ISIS-K’s intent, adaptability and determination to internationalize its agenda. </p>
<p>Similar to ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">attack in Iran</a> in January 2024 that left over 100 dead, this latest atrocity serves to reinforce ISIS-K’s stated commitment to the broader global jihadist agenda of the Islamic State group, and helps broaden the appeal of its ideology and recruitment campaign.</p>
<h2>How does this fit ISIS-K’s strategy?</h2>
<p>The attack in Moscow serves as a powerful recruitment and propaganda tool by attracting international media attention to the group. This allows it to remain politically relevant to its audiences across South and Central Asia, and beyond. </p>
<p>But it also helps divert attention from local setbacks for ISIS-K. Like its parent organization Islamic State group, ISIS-K has been confronted with military defeats, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/25/politics/isis-k-leader-killed-taliban-kabul-airport-bombing/index.html">loss of territory and leadership</a> and diminishing resources.</p>
<p>In the face of such challenges, ISIS-K’s potential links to the attack in Moscow remind observers of its persistent threat and adaptability.</p>
<p>By targeting a major power like Russia, ISIS-K aims to project a broader message of intimidation aimed at other states involved in anti-Islamic State group operations and undermine the public’s sense of security.</p>
<p>Additionally, operations such as the Moscow attack seek to solidify ISIS-K’s position within the broader Islamic State group network, potentially securing more support and resources.</p>
<p>More broadly, the strategy follows a process of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda</a> – something it has pursued with renewed vigor since 2021 by targeting the countries with a presence in Afghanistan, including Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia, marking a deliberate expansion of its operational focus beyond local borders.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack, following the January assault in Iran, suggests that ISIS-K is intensifying efforts to export its ideological fight directly to the territories of sovereign nations.</p>
<p>It is a calculated strategy and, as the Moscow attack has exemplified, one that has the potential to strike fear in capitals far beyond ISIS-K’s traditional base.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least 137 people were killed in the Moscow attack – the latest in a a series of ISIS-K operations outside its traditional stronghold.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-should-be-preparing-for-the-end-of-american-democracy-176930">Canada should be preparing for the end of American democracy</a>
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<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
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<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">Why the American technological war against China could backfire</a>
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<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
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<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175322023-11-13T23:40:48Z2023-11-13T23:40:48ZWhy Western countries share the blame for the plight of 1.7 million Afghans being deported from Pakistan<p>On November 1, Pakistan began a nationwide operation to deport over 1.7 million Afghans it says are living in the country illegally. There are now an estimated <a href="https://www.rescue.org/press-release/afghans-returning-pakistan-after-expulsion-order-have-nowhere-go-warn-aid-agencies#:%7E:text=The%20daily%20number%20of%20arrivals,million%20people%20could%20be%20affected.">10,000 people returning to Afghanistan</a> each day.</p>
<p>Pakistan has indicated the deportations are designed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/world/asia/pakistan-deport-afghan-refugees.html">reduce cross-border incursions from Taliban fighters</a> based in Afghanistan. But it is more likely the interim military government is succumbing to populist politics around inflation, housing shortages and cost of living pressures in the country. </p>
<p>There were already over a million Afghans living in Pakistan before the Taliban came back into power in Afghanistan in August 2021. But the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been unable to process all of the estimated 600,000 to 800,000 Afghans who have fled to Pakistan since then. It is estimated only about a third of Afghan refugees in Pakistan are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/pakistan-government-must-not-deport-afghan-refugees/">registered with the refugee agency</a>. </p>
<p>The level of documentation that Afghans in Pakistan have varies extensively. Some entered the country without visas and passports. Some entered on visas and have been waiting indefinitely for renewal, others are on expired visas. </p>
<p>The UNHCR has subcontracted much of the registration of refugees to <a href="https://sharp-pakistan.org/">other organisations in Pakistan</a>. Often, payment to a local broker is the only way refugees are able to get an appointment. This is entirely unreasonable when countries like Australia require UNHCR registration of refugees to <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/help-and-support/afghanistan-update">facilitate priority processing</a>.</p>
<p>Many refugees experience lengthy waiting periods to be registered, formally recognised as refugees and then issued an ID card, let alone referred for onward resettlement. Shelter, food and medical assistance are not even considered. </p>
<p>Refugee identity documents are not even enough to protect people from deportation. There have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-expels-afghan-refugees-concerns-uscirf/32675032.html">reports of police detaining and threatening people with valid Pakistani visas</a>. Activists told me of incidents in which police have torn up valid visas and Afghan passports.</p>
<p>Many Afghans have applied for resettlement in countries that were members of the NATO-led force that maintained security in Afghanistan, such as the US, Canada, Australia and countries in the European Union. But as the world has turned its eye to other conflicts, those countries have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/15/international-community-still-hasnt-fulfilled-its-promises-afghan-refugees">fallen drastically short</a> of their promises to Afghan refugees. It is estimated only <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/12/pakistan-drop-threat-deport-afghans#:%7E:text=While%20200%2C000%20have%20been%20resettled,contributed%20to%20their%20military%20efforts.">200,000 Afghans have been resettled globally</a> since August 2021.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-feel-suffocated-afghans-are-increasingly-hopeless-but-theres-still-a-chance-to-preserve-some-rights-166171">'I feel suffocated': Afghans are increasingly hopeless, but there's still a chance to preserve some rights</a>
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<h2>A trickle of visas approved for Afghans</h2>
<p>Human Rights Watch has also highlighted the unreasonably slow processing times for Afghan refugees in resettlement countries, such as the US, UK, Germany, Australia and other EU countries. This is particularly true for women and girls, the organisation <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/12/pakistan-drop-threat-deport-afghans">says</a>: </p>
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<p>Afghan women and girls have often faced greater barriers to obtaining asylum, as destination countries have often prioritised assisting Afghans – overwhelmingly men – who contributed to their military efforts. </p>
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<p>Since the Taliban returned to power, only 12,200 Afghan applicants <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/language/dari/en/podcast-episode/why-hasnt-australia-announced-its-refugee-quota-for-fy-2023-24/wbir7ft5q">have received a humanitarian visa</a> to enter Australia. During the 2022 federal election campaign, Labor promised to increase the total refugee and humanitarian intake to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.au/campaigns/raising-the-humanitarian-intake/">27,000 people annually</a>. But this hasn’t happened. </p>
<p>Australia has <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022-23-Budget-summary-1.pdf">promised</a> just 26,500 humanitarian and 5,000 family places for Afghans from 2021-26.</p>
<p>Yet, there are more than 147,000 Afghan applicants still <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/help-and-support/afghanistan-update">in the queue</a> waiting to be processed from the 189,000 applications received since August 2021. And earlier this year, the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/help-and-support/afghanistan-update">Department of Home Affairs</a> quietly removed human rights defenders from its list of groups to receive priority visa processing from Afghanistan.</p>
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<h2>A dire situation for women and girls</h2>
<p>Former US President George W. Bush said in the early 2000s that the US went to Afghanistan to <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/20040708.html">liberate the country’s women</a>, but those women have been forgotten now. </p>
<p>Today, Afghanistan remains in one of the world’s most <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-cant-ignore-2023">dire humanitarian crises</a>. </p>
<p>The United Nations has described a system of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2023/07/experts-taliban-treatment-women-may-be-gender-apartheid">gender apartheid</a> under Taliban rule, in which women are prevented from participating in any public life, education or economic activity outside the home. </p>
<p>Infant and maternal mortality rates have skyrocketed because women are not allowed to travel to seek medical attention, female doctors are not allowed to work and male doctors are not allowed to treat female patients. </p>
<p>Leaders of NGOs that work on women’s education and other women’s rights continue to be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/24/afghan-womens-rights-activists-forcibly-disappeared#:%7E:text=The%20Taliban's%20response%20to%20the,through%20unlawful%20use%20of%20force.">disappeared</a>. Women who are brave enough to protest on the street are beaten. Journalists are routinely detained for covering such issues.</p>
<p>Last year, the UN Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1t/k1tuye65yb">launched</a> a new program dedicated to supporting women’s human rights defenders around the world. However, I’ve been told this program is now facing a US$14 million (A$22 million) funding shortfall.</p>
<p>This fund provides small grants to a number of Afghan women’s human rights defenders to fund their ongoing advocacy work and relocate them or help them flee when their lives are in danger. Often, these women need this money to pay exorbitant prices for visa extensions to stay in Pakistan, or for exit permits to leave the country if they are given a resettlement place elsewhere. </p>
<p>If countries like Australia and the US help make up this shortfall, more women will have access to these grants and be able to escape extreme security risks.</p>
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<h2>What now for Afghans living in limbo?</h2>
<p>Western countries must keep their promises to process refugee visa applications for Afghans in a timely fashion. </p>
<p>Australia <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/estimate/26889/&sid=0001">refuses</a> to grant refugee visas to people currently in Afghanistan. Yet, the government is still taking years to process the claims of incredibly high risk individuals outside the country who meet several priority processing criteria. Those people fled to countries like Pakistan and Iran and are now being deported because the process has taken so long. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-taliban-returns-20-years-of-progress-for-women-looks-set-to-disappear-overnight-165012">As the Taliban returns, 20 years of progress for women looks set to disappear overnight</a>
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<p>Similarly, Afghans who are eligible for special immigrant visas to the US can also wait for years. Even if they get an appointment with the US embassy in Islamabad, there is no guarantee of a timeline when they will be sent to the US. </p>
<p>These timelines have to change. Globally, poorer countries shoulder the burden as the hosts of the overwhelming majority of refugees. Pakistan is now deporting Afghans. Iran, host to more than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan">three million Afghan refugees</a>, will likely <a href="https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-185910">follow soon</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217532/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Hutchinson is executive director of Azadi-e Zan, an NGO dedicated to helping Afghan women's human rights defenders. This is an unpaid role. She is also a member of the Australian Civil Society Coalition for Women, Peace and Security.</span></em></p>Some 189,000 Afghans have applied for visas to Australia, but the government has only approved 31,500 refugee spots for the next four years. Women face the biggest hurdles to resettlement.Susan Hutchinson, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161562023-10-27T11:03:49Z2023-10-27T11:03:49ZTaliban: why China wants them as a friend and not as a foe<p>The <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-talibans-economic-dreams/">Taliban’s presence</a> at the massive October jamboree in Beijiing to celebrate the 10th year of China’s ambitious trade plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is part of Beijing’s regional strategy.</p>
<p>This was one of only a handful of foreign <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/2/taliban-fm-to-meet-pakistan-china-foreign-ministers-media">visits</a> made by the Taliban since taking power after Nato’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Interim Afghan minister for commerce Haji Nooruddin Azizi even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-says-plans-formally-join-chinas-belt-road-initiative-2023-10-19/">talked about </a> the Taliban’s desire for Afghanistan to join the BRI.</p>
<p>The idea of an Islamist group such as the Taliban allying with the nominally secular and communist China might appear surprising. But this is a logical outcome of China’s strategic fears over <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/afghan-militants-china-imperialism-islamic-state/">Islamic militancy</a> at home and abroad. </p>
<p>It is also part of a deepening of ties between China and many Islamic nations in recent years. Historically, Beijing has had no problems working with religious groups or religious-led countries, despite its <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/23/10-things-to-know-about-chinas-policies-on-religion/">suspicion</a> of religion at home. </p>
<p>To understand Beijing’s motivations for cementing ties with Taliban-led Afghanistan, one only needs to look to Afghanistan’s recent history. With the conclusion of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan">Soviet-Afghan War</a> (1979-1989) and the collapse of the Moscow-installed Najibullah government in 1992, Afghanistan became a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">hotbed</a> of Islamic radicalism. It <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676">became a magnet for</a> militants from all over the world, from Chechen separatists battling Yeltsin’s Russia to the Islamist Abu Sayaf, based in the Philippines.</p>
<p>China had been one of the biggest <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02634930120095349">supporters</a> of the Mujaheddin, the Islamic group which ran Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992, providing the group with training and weaponry. This was partly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/how-the-1980-laid-the-groundwork-for-chinas-major-foreign-policy-challenges/">motivated</a> by Beijing’s desire to bolster its ties with the United States and to strike a blow against the Soviet Union, its major communist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-relations-2085155/The-Sino-Soviet-split">rival</a>. </p>
<p>Beijing is less worried about Russia these days. Not only does it have Russia as an ally, but is <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-and-xi-beijing-belt-and-road-meeting-highlighted-russias-role-as-chinas-junior-partner-216187">the dominant partner</a> in the relationship. But it was the assistance to the Mujaheddin that provided some of the groundwork for the security challenges that China faces today as it created a breeding ground for extremism, close to its borders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-extending-its-dealings-with-the-taliban-as-it-increases-its-superpower-status-197664">China is extending its dealings with the Taliban as it increases its superpower status</a>
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<p>The threat of Islamic militancy from across the Afghan border has posed a very real challenge for Beijing. This was demonstrated by a wave of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45073494">attacks</a> carried out by Uighur militants in China’s western Xinjiang province throughout the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/world/asia/china-executes-3-over-deadly-knife-attack-at-train-station-in-2014.html">2014 Kunming knife attack</a>, which killed 31 and injured 141 people.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Taliban leaders were in Beijing at the Belt and Road Initiative celebrations.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Attacks such as those at Kunming led to China’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_counterterrorism_byman_saber-1.pdf">controversial</a> and repressive policies used against Uighurs in Xinjiang. They also reinforced Beijing’s fears of <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/25/chinas-reluctant-taliban-embrace/">extremism</a> spilling over the borders from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>These would threaten Chinese interests in central Asia and China’s western border regions, which have become <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/11/29/xinjiang-casts-uncertainty-over-the-belt-and-road-initiative/">pivotal</a> for the BRI. The presence of the Taliban at the BRI summit can be seen as an example of how China hopes to create an ally in an attempt to shore up its political and economic interests.</p>
<h2>China’s ties with Islamic world</h2>
<p>The Taliban’s presence at the BRI summit also demonstrates China’s <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/12/05/ask-the-experts-is-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-middle-east-pushing-out-the-united-states/">growing ties</a> with the Islamic world, which has drawn notable attention in recent years. </p>
<p>Beijing <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/06/iran-saudi-arabia-deal-agreement-china-meeting-beijing/">mediated</a> between Iran and Saudi Arabia over their long-standing rivalry in the region. It was also involved in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/24/analysis-wall-of-brics-the-significance-of-adding-six-new-members">agreement</a> to add several Islamic nations to the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) partnership. </p>
<p>More recently, China’s military ties with the region were further underlined by the deployment of Chinese warships as part of a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237401/chinese-and-saudi-navies-launch-joint-counterterrorism-exercise-against-backdrop-israel-hamas-war">naval exercise</a> with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Muslim nations have been an important source of markets and natural resources for Beijing, with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/china-seizing-us-arms-markets-in-the-middle-east/">moving</a> into Middle Eastern markets that had traditionally been dominated by the United States. There has also been a growth in cultural ties, with <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3233421/mandarin-learning-boom-china-extends-its-soft-power-middle-east">interest</a> in learning Mandarin Chinese growing throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>These developments can also be seen as a wider effort by Beijing to present China as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888248">partner</a> to Muslim nations at a time where the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2022/08/13/the-diplomatic-retreat-of-the-us-in-the-middle-east/">grip</a> of the region’s traditional power bases appears to have weakened.<br>
Such an effort can be seen in the recent tensions over Gaza, where Beijing has taken a more <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/24/israel-hamas-war-china-urges-israel-to-abide-by-international-laws.html">critical tone</a> over Israel’s conduct, which marks a notable change from its more cautious language in the past. This has also been accompanied by a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3237949/israel-hamas-war-chinese-social-media-erupts-war-words-palestine-crisis-divides-opinion">wave</a> of support for Palestine on Chinese social media.</p>
<p>The initial gains from China’s efforts to portray itself as a friend to the Islamic world could be seen in how a UK-led <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/uyghur-news-recap-oct-13-20-2023/7320010.html">statement</a> condemning China’s policies in Xinjiang, mainly attracted the support of western nations, but very few Islamic nations. This shows the diplomatic <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/china-muslim-countries-tilt-uyghur-abuses-ignored-us-influence-fades">influence</a> that China has built in the Muslim world.</p>
<p>Recent developments have shown that China continues to boost its diplomatic clout in Islamic nations, which could pose a further strategic challenge for western nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216156/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing is happy to partner up with religious-led nations if it is in its strategic interests.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162452023-10-26T12:32:16Z2023-10-26T12:32:16ZUN warns that Gaza desperately needs more aid − an emergency relief expert explains why it is especially tough working in Gaza<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555675/original/file-20231024-27-axqx74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Palestinian boy sits in a World Health Organization truck near a hospital in the southern area of the Gaza Strip. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-boy-sits-in-a-truck-of-the-world-health-news-photo/1741639361?adppopup=true">Ahmed Zakot/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>United Nations agencies on Oct. 24, 2023, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-palestinian-refugee-agency-calls-unimpeded-flow-aid-gaza-2023-10-24/">pleaded for more aid</a> to be allowed into Gaza, saying that more than 20 times the amount of food, water and medical supplies and other items that are currently reaching people is needed.</em></p>
<p><em>Egypt first opened its borders for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trucks-enter-gaza-carrying-medical-supplies-food-hamas-2023-10-21/">aid deliveries into Gaza on Oct. 21</a>, and since then, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/third-gaza-bound-aid-convoy-enters-rafah-crossing-egypt-sources-2023-10-23">54 trucks</a> with medical supplies had entered Gaza as of Oct. 23, according to the U.N.</em></p>
<p><em>But the U.N. and other <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/we-desperately-need-more-humanitarian-aid-come-gaza">international aid groups are warning</a> that the 2.3 million people living in Gaza remain in dire need of more clean water, food, fuel and medical care. The U.N.’s relief agency in Gaza, UNRWA, is also saying that without more fuel, it will have to <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-18">stop its work</a> on everything from providing medical care to setting up shelters for displaced people on Oct. 25.</em> </p>
<p><em>Safely delivering aid in Gaza has unique complications – including the fact that the U.S. and the European Union classify Hamas as a terrorist group.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation spoke with <a href="https://publichealth.jhu.edu/faculty/664/paul-b-spiegel">Paul Spiegel</a>, an expert on complex humanitarian emergencies at the Center for Humanitarian Health at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, to better understand the particular challenges this reality creates and how it affects delivering aid to civilians in Gaza.</em> </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People wearing yellow vests wave Egyptian flags at a large white truck." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555676/original/file-20231024-29-xm3ju6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People greet trucks loaded with humanitarian aid preparing to enter Gaza from Egypt on Oct. 22, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/trucks-loaded-with-humanitarian-aid-prepare-to-enter-gaza-news-photo/1740638103?adppopup=true">Ahmed Gomaa/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are the challenges with providing aid in conflict zones like Gaza?</h2>
<p>Providing humanitarian assistance in any sudden emergency, like the one <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-captives-border-aid-f5976ed58ba508f14d45b72b428125ac">currently happening in Gaza</a>, is complex – in terms of security, logistics and financing. </p>
<p>Often, there are simply not enough appropriate supplies available to quickly get into an acute emergency, which might be in a remote area or might be in a restricted area, as is the case with Gaza. There are <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/aid-worker-security-report-2022-collateral-violence-managing-risks-aid-operations-major-conflict">often security issues</a> that may affect an aid group’s access to a population. And there is the risk that <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/syria-attack-humanitarian-convoy-attack-humanity">aid workers will be attacked</a>, as has <a href="https://www.aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report">happened increasingly</a> over the last several years. </p>
<p>Typically, a U.N. agency like the World Health Organization would try to get assurances from all groups that are part of a conflict, so that those providing assistance will not be targets of violence. These assurances do not always happen, and then the agencies need to decide if they deliver <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/aid-worker-security-report-2023-figures-glance">the aid or wait until they get a guarantee</a> they won’t be attacked. </p>
<p>There are also concerns about aid, which is intended only for civilians, being diverted for military purposes. This can vary from combatants secretly taking small amounts of supplies for their troops or stealing large truckloads of goods.</p>
<h2>How do politics affect humanitarian work, which is supposed to be neutral?</h2>
<p>Humanitarians try to follow basic principles of <a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/humanitarian-principles/">humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality</a>. We are not addressing the underlying causal issues related to a crisis. But the politics surrounding an emergency are still often a major, complicating factor in our work. </p>
<p>For example, at the Egyptian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67121372">Rafah crossing into Gaza</a>, various issues needed to be resolved, such as searching aid convoys for weapons, which items Hamas or other groups could divert from civilians and the assurance that refugees would not cross into Egypt. These and other aspects continue to delay much-needed aid for civilians in Gaza.</p>
<p>In this conflict, I have also seen aid workers express concern that the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/interview-israel-palestine-lack-fuel-gaza-now-critical-says-wfp">limited amount of aid</a> currently allowed into Gaza would stay in the south, and consequently be a pull factor for people being displaced from their homes. Or, there is a concern that the aid may not get to where it is most needed, such as all hospitals throughout Gaza. </p>
<p>In other crises, like those in the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/democratic-republic-of-the-congo">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> or in Syria, we have heard concerns from all sides of a conflict about how aid may be unevenly or inequitably distributed, depending on where people live or what particular ethnic or religious group they belong to. This can cause tensions and even fighting among different communities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two children sit on the ground between rows of white tents and clothing hung on white laundry lines." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555677/original/file-20231024-22-hd2tks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children play around tents on Oct. 19, 2023, at a U.N. camp set up for Palestinians who fled to the southern Gaza Strip.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kids-play-around-tents-at-a-camp-set-up-by-the-united-news-photo/1733642681?adppopup=true">Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How does Hamas factor into this planning?</h2>
<p>The U.S. and the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/#applied">European Union</a> have very <a href="https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/">strict rules</a> that will block the financial assets of organizations that give money or support to Hamas, or any other organization they classify as a terrorist group. </p>
<p>These sanctions also prohibit any direct contact between aid groups and a listed <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">terrorist organization like Hamas</a>.</p>
<h2>Can you give an example of what this looks like in practice?</h2>
<p>I arrived in Afghanistan immediately after the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">Taliban took over</a> in 2021 with the World Health Organization. When that happened, the nongovernmental organizations and U.N. agencies – which receive the largest <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs">amount of money from the U.S.</a> than from any other country – were not allowed to officially work with the Taliban and their ministries, or to give any money to them. </p>
<p>Previously, most of the global funding for health, for instance, was given to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health, which then had systems in place to disburse the money and monitor how it was spent. These new restrictions made it harder for aid to be delivered. We needed to find new ways of doing work, in order to bypass the Taliban and the Ministry of Public Health, which the former now controlled. This disruption created challenges in terms of both distributing aid quickly and in terms of sustainability, as many of the employees at the ministry left.</p>
<h2>What are the long-term effects of navigating around governments that are classified by some countries as terrorist groups?</h2>
<p>When international assistance is not allowed to go through local governments because of sanctions, the U.N. and international nongovernmental organizations develop and run parallel services, like schools or hospitals. </p>
<p>While this may work in the short term and save lives, these parallel systems have longer-term, negative effects. Government officials may leave their jobs for higher-paying jobs in the U.N. and with NGOs, for example. </p>
<p>We have seen the negative, long-term effects of this firsthand in numerous countries, like Afghanistan, South Sudan and other places where the U.S. and other governments are concerned about terrorism, and consequently have imposed sanctions. </p>
<p>At this point in time, I think that lifesaving aid desperately needs to be provided to civilians in Gaza. Despite the various challenges I have mentioned in this discussion, I believe that humanity must prevail, over all other aspects. It truly is a matter of life and death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Spiegel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Government sanctions against Hamas, which the US and the European Union consider a terrorist group, mean that aid groups are not able to directly work with Hamas.Paul Spiegel, Director of the Center for Humanitarian Health, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155782023-10-16T12:33:13Z2023-10-16T12:33:13ZA reflexive act of military revenge burdened the US − and may do the same for Israel<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553706/original/file-20231013-15-slni2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C35%2C5982%2C3952&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli tanks gather near the border with the Gaza Strip on Oct. 13, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/graphic-content-israeli-army-merkava-battle-tanks-deploy-news-photo/1722767899">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the wake of the shocking invasion of southern Israel by Hamas militants on Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-gantz-agree-form-emergency-israel-government-statement-2023-10-11/">vowed to destroy Hamas</a>. </p>
<p>“We are fighting a cruel enemy, worse than ISIS,” Netanyahu proclaimed four days after the invasion, comparing Hamas with the Islamic State group, which was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist">largely defeated</a> by U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish forces in 2017. </p>
<p>On that same day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant went further, stating, “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-gantz-agree-form-emergency-israel-government-statement-2023-10-11/">We will wipe this thing called Hamas</a>, ISIS-Gaza, off the face of the earth. It will cease to exist.” They were strong words, issued in the wake of the horrific terrorist attack that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip/card/latest-death-toll-in-israel-and-gaza-eoVPFI8WcXN0mzIR73pY">killed more than 1,300 Israelis</a> and culminated in the kidnapping of more than 150 people, including several Americans. </p>
<p>And in a telling comparison, Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Gilad Erdan compared the attack with the toppling of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon in 2001, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/08/1204579022/u-s-calls-on-countries-with-influence-over-hamas-to-condemn-its-assault-on-israe">declaring</a>, “This is Israel’s 9/11.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://history.osu.edu/people/mansoor.1">scholar of military history</a>, I believe the comparison is interesting and revealing. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaida on the United States, President George W. Bush made a <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html">similar expansive pledge</a>, declaring, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” </p>
<p>The U.S. response to 9/11 included the American invasion of Afghanistan in league with the Afghan United Front, the so-called Northern Alliance. The immediate goals were to force the Taliban from power and destroy al-Qaida. Very little thought or resources were put into what happened after those goals were attained. In his 2010 memoir, “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/200372/decision-points-by-george-w-bush/">Decision Points</a>,” former President Bush recalled a meeting of the war cabinet in late September 2001, when he asked the assemblage, “‘So who’s going to run the country (Afghanistan)?’ There was silence.”</p>
<p>Wars that are based on revenge can be effective in punishing an enemy, but they can also create a power vacuum that sparks a long, deadly conflict that fails to deliver sustainable stability. That’s what happened in Afghanistan, and that is what could happen in Gaza.</p>
<h2>A war of weak results</h2>
<p>The U.S. invasion toppled the Taliban from power by the end of 2001, but the war did not end. An interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai took power as an Afghan council of leaders, called a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-loya-jirga-explainer/25174483.html">loya jirga</a>, fashioned a new constitution for the country. </p>
<p>Nongovernmental and international relief organizations began to deliver humanitarian aid and reconstruction support, but their efforts were uncoordinated. U.S. trainers began <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/74-Afghanistan-Army/">creating a new Afghan National Army</a>, but <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW115-Afghanistan-National-Defense-and-Security-Forces-Mission-Challenges-and-Sustainability.pdf">lack of funding, insufficient volunteers and inadequate facilities</a> hampered the effort.</p>
<p>The period between 2002 and 2006 was the best opportunity to create a resilient Afghan state with enough security forces to hold its own against a resurgent Taliban. Because of a <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/easier-get-war-get-out-case-afghanistan">lack of focus, inadequate resources and poor strategy</a>, however, the United States and its allies squandered that opportunity.</p>
<p>As a result, the Taliban was able to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">reconstitute its forces</a> and return to the fight. As the insurgency gained momentum, the United States and its NATO allies <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24910832">increased their troop levels</a>, but they could not overcome the weakness of the Kabul government and the lack of adequate numbers of trained Afghan security forces.</p>
<p>Despite a surge of forces to Afghanistan during the first two years of the Obama administration and the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban remained undefeated. As Western forces largely departed the country by the end of 2014, Afghan forces took the lead in security operations, but their numbers and competence proved insufficient to stem the Taliban tide. </p>
<p>Negotiations between the United States and the Taliban went nowhere, as Taliban leaders realized they could seize by force what they could not gain at the bargaining table. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan">Taliban entry into Kabul in August 2021</a> merely put an exclamation point on a campaign the United States had lost many years before.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/XvGLDUhHOwQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. exit from Afghanistan in July and August 2021 was chaotic and dangerous, and it left the Afghan state at the mercy of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A goal that’s hard to achieve</h2>
<p>As Israel pursues its response to the Hamas attack, the Israeli government would be well advised to remember the past two decades of often indecisive warfare conducted by both the United States and Israel against insurgent and terrorist groups. </p>
<p>The invasion of Afghanistan ultimately failed because U.S. policymakers did not think through the end state of the campaign as they exacted revenge for the 9/11 attacks. An Israeli invasion of Gaza could well lead to an indecisive quagmire if the political goal is not considered ahead of time.</p>
<p>Israel has invaded Gaza twice, in 2009 and 2014, but quickly withdrew its ground forces once Israeli leaders calculated they had reestablished deterrence. This strategy – called by Israeli leaders “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/14/israel-gaza-history/">mowing the grass</a>,” with periodic punitive strikes against Hamas – has proven to be a failure. The newly declared goal of destroying Hamas as a military force is far more difficult than that.</p>
<p>As four U.S. presidential administrations discovered in Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/easier-get-war-get-out-case-afghanistan">creating stability in the aftermath of conflict</a> is far more difficult than toppling a weak regime in the first place.</p>
<p>The only successful conflict against a terrorist group in the past two decades, against the Islamic State group between 2014 and 2017, ended with both Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq <a href="https://time.com/longform/mosul-raqqa-ruins-after-the-war-of-annihilation/">reduced to rubble</a> and thousands of men, women and children <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/05/iraq-syria-al-hol-return/">consigned to detention camps</a>.</p>
<p>Israel has the capacity to level Gaza and round up segments of the population, but that may not be wise. Doing so might serve the immediate impulse of exacting revenge on its enemies, but Israel would likely receive massive international condemnation from <a href="https://penelope.uchicago.edu/%7Egrout/encyclopaedia_romana/britannia/monsgraupius/calgacus.html">creating a desert in Gaza and calling it peace</a>, and thus forgo the moral high ground it claims in the wake of the Hamas attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Mansoor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US response to 9/11 included a declaration that America would destroy its enemies. The effort took decades, and thousands of lives on both sides, and never really succeeded.Peter Mansoor, Professor of History, General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155112023-10-13T15:38:47Z2023-10-13T15:38:47ZAfghanistan earthquakes: Taliban interference in aid efforts is affecting disaster response<p>Over 1,000 people are thought to have been killed in the latest earthquake to hit Afghanistan. Humanitarian aid agencies are scrambling to help the affected villages. But the realities of Taliban rule are starting to have an impact on the ground, as relations between the authorities and NGOs fray.</p>
<p>Two earthquakes <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/eq-2023-000184-afg">struck Afghanistan’s western province of Herat</a> on October 7 and a third on October 11. Zindajan district, 50km west of Herat, was the worst affected area. It is a rural area of scattered hamlets, where most people live in traditional single-storey mud-brick structures. In villages near the epicentre, the damage was total. Mud structures simply collapsed on their occupants. As the October 7 quakes occurred late in the morning, the victims were mainly women and children, who were indoors. Men working in the fields were spared.</p>
<p>Over 1,000 people died <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-flash-update-3-earthquake-herat-province-western-region-afghanistan-10-october-2023">under the falling masonry</a>. More than twice this number were injured or were trapped and had to be dug out and the UN estimates that 12,000 people have been affected. There is a regional tradition of mud domed construction (gombad) which, when well-constructed, is considered to be earthquake resistant. However, many contemporary village houses employ heavy wooden, or indeed concrete, beams to support the roof, especially if they have added an upper storey. Many casualties were probably caught under these beams. </p>
<p>Responders were struck by the intensity of the destruction and the sight of Zindajan villages with barely a single home left standing. About twice as many have been killed as died in the earthquake in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/eq-2022-000232-afg">Paktika province</a> last year. </p>
<h2>The rescue</h2>
<p>Afghanistan’s legacy of decades of conflict and natural disasters means that humanitarian aid agencies, the private sector and even the Taliban authorities are grimly familiar with disaster response. Deputy Prime Minister <a href="https://x.com/afghanistanndma/status/1710955971923644715?s=46">Mullah Baradar visited the affected area</a> on October 8 and promised to help rebuild houses and pledged cash assistance. The Taliban inherited a functional government infrastructure and so their officials from the Disasters Department showed up to survey the area and coordinate.</p>
<p>Businesses active in Herat, including <a href="https://bnn.network/breaking-news/climate-environment/azizi-bank-pledges-aid-to-earthquake-victims-in-herat-amidst-disease-outbreak-in-livestock/">the Azizi Bank</a>, pledged cash and material assistance to the survivors. Humanitarian organisations already active in Afghanistan, including UN agencies, the<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/herat-earthquake-flash-update-4-earthquake-herat-province-western-region-afghanistan-11-october-2023#:%7E:text=On%2010%20October%2C%20ECHO%20announced,Ireland%2C%20%E2%82%AC500%2C000%3B%20and%20Japan"> EU’s humanitarian wing ECHO</a>, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and NGOs deployed personnel and provided essential medical supplies to hospitals overstretched by the influx of injured. </p>
<p>They have delivered tents and non-food items for those who have lost their houses. And they have distributed food and cash, to help people survive until they can go back to work and restart their lives. </p>
<h2>The hunger emergency</h2>
<p>While the Herat earthquakes have brought suffering to those directly affected, the survivors join the much larger numbers of Afghans already struggling to survive in a broader humanitarian crisis. The UN has estimated that over <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-food-aid-cuts/32542537.html#:%7E:text=WFP%20estimates%20that%20more%20than,on%20the%20brink%20of%20starvation.">15 million are affected by the hunger</a> emergency caused by drought and an economic collapse.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Pakistan has threatened to expel <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-intends-deport-17-million-afghans#:%7E:text=Will%20global%20condemnation%20and%20financial,1%20November%20or%20face%20deportation.">1.7 million undocumented Afghan migrants</a> and Iran regularly deports thousands of Afghans which it says have entered the country illegally or overstayed. </p>
<p>Grim as the situation may be today in the Herat hospitals and flattened villages, the aid agencies on the ground have the capacity to respond to Heratis’ immediate needs and appeal for resources to prepare for winter. But responding to the collapse of livelihoods, hunger and mass migration is even more daunting, given the scale of the problem and difficulties inherent in working in Taliban-run Afghanistan.</p>
<p>On the positive side, the earthquake response illustrates that, when both sides are on board, the Taliban and humanitarian agencies can operate alongside each other to deliver for the population. The fact that Taliban leaders are subject to UN sanctions does not prevent pragmatic engagement and coordination on the ground. International agencies meet with Taliban officials of relevant departments such as Public Health. But they avoid handing over aid money to them, instead relying on their own operations and NGOs to deliver resources.</p>
<h2>Strained relations</h2>
<p>The fact is relations between the Taliban authorities and humanitarian organisations have become strained. The Taliban increasingly demand a say in how aid is delivered and to whom. Agencies have experienced a shrinking of “humanitarian space” (the freedom to operate independently according to agreed principles) leading donors to question whether their resources will reach the most vulnerable Afghans. Donor commitments to humanitarian operations in Afghanistan are <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/countries/1/summary/2023">sharply down on last year</a>. </p>
<p>Donor fatigue has probably been exacerbated by both Taliban interference and their persistent opposition to universal norms by restricting girls’ education and women’s employment.</p>
<p>Taliban policies and governance style also directly contribute to the problem by hurting the economy. The <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/210d5f24dc33a3460beff3447fceadcf-0310012023/original/Afghanistan-Development-Update-20231003-final.pdf">World Bank’s latest assessment</a> warns of “economic uncertainty”. </p>
<p>Initial Taliban performance, in funding a national budget, without external support, was impressive. But now the Taliban’s aggressive tax collection is depressing demand. And in a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-taliban-rule-new-shocks-weaken-afghan-economy">replay of the “guns v butter” problem</a>, the Taliban are channelling resources to their security forces leaving little for the civilian population.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the World Bank estimates that more than half the population is in extreme poverty. Continued drought and another poor harvest are compounding the problem of hunger. Climate change vulnerability makes the longer-term outlook even more bleak. </p>
<p>All this drives thousands of Afghans to migrate, dodging border controls and taking their chances in the Iranian labour market or trying to head further west. An inflexible Afghan administration which is isolated at home and internationally is ill-prepared to cope with these burgeoning humanitarian challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Semple does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Taliban is increasingly demanding a say in how aid is delivered and to whom.Michael Semple, Visiting Research Professor, The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace Security and Justice, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151922023-10-07T13:39:47Z2023-10-07T13:39:47ZNobel peace prize 2023: award for Iranian women’s rights protester highlights fight against declining democracy around the world<p>One hundred days after Iranians first protested the killing of 22-year-old Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini for wearing her hijab incorrectly, Narges Mohammadi sat down in her prison cell to <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/politics/111879-nargess-mohammadis-shocking-letter-about-sexual-assault-against-prisoners/">write a letter</a> to the country’s women. She promised: “We shall not back down until the moment of victory, meaning the establishment of democracy, peace, human rights and an end to tyranny”. </p>
<p>In recognition of her indomitable spirit – and the bravery shown by thousands of Iranians at the forefront of the woman-life-freedom movement – Mohammadi has <a href="https://theconversation.com/nobel-peace-prize-narges-mohammadi-wins-on-behalf-of-thousands-of-iranian-women-struggling-for-human-rights-215190">won the 2023 Nobel peace prize</a>. </p>
<p>The Nobel committee recognised her “fight against the oppression of women in Iran and her fight to promote human rights and freedom for all”. But it also pointedly extended the accolade to all of those women who have taken to the streets in protest against the oppressive theocratic government, including <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-protests-death-count-human-rights-report/32224340.html#">more than 500 demonstrators who were killed, thousands injured and 20,000 arrested</a>.</p>
<h2>Women’s fight for rights and justice</h2>
<p>Mohammadi is not the first Iranian woman to win the Nobel peace prize. In 2003, lawyer Shirin Ebadi was <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2003/ebadi/facts/">awarded the distinction</a> for her work promoting human rights which had also seen her imprisoned by the regime. Ebadi gave me this statement after this year’s announcement: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have known Narges Mohammadi for many years. She was the spokesperson for the Defenders of Human Rights Centre which I co-founded. For her activities, Narges has been in prison for a long time. She is still in prison now. I hope that the Peace Prize awarded to Narges for her brave work for women’s and human rights will help to bring more attention to Iran and women’s fight for democracy. Because it is women who will open the doors to democracy in Iran.</p>
</blockquote>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nobel-peace-prize-narges-mohammadi-wins-on-behalf-of-thousands-of-iranian-women-struggling-for-human-rights-215190">Nobel peace prize: Narges Mohammadi wins on behalf of thousands of Iranian women struggling for human rights</a>
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<p>The executive director of the Nobel Women’s Initiative, Maria Butler, <a href="https://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/narges_mohammadi">commented that</a>: “Too often in times of conflict women are seen only as victims, their contributions to justice and peace-building are overlooked, and their voices excluded.” </p>
<p>Since it was established in 1901, the Nobel Peace Prize has only gone to 19 women including Mohammadi, compared to more than 90 men. If Mohammadi is the “symbol of what it means to be a freedom fighter in Iran”, as the chair of the Nobel prize committee <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2023/summary/">Berit Reiss-Andersen has said</a>, she is also a powerful symbol for all women and girls around the world. </p>
<p>It’s also significant that alongside Mohammadi, in the <a href="https://www.prio.org/news/3009">shortlist assembled by Henrik Urdal</a>, the director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) was Mahbouba Seraj, who is fighting a similar campaign for the rights of women in Afghanistan. As Seraj <a href="https://www.prio.org/news/3009">wrote in August</a>, this year about the takeover of her country by the Taliban in 2021: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The women of Afghanistan went from existence – from being part of society, from working, from being part of every aspect of life as doctors, judges, nurses, engineers, women running offices – to nothing. Everything they had, even the most basic right to go to high school, was taken away from them. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Declining democracy</h2>
<p>When she announced the prize winner, Nobel committee chair Berit Reiss-Andersen said that the choice of Nobel peace laureates over the past few years had reflected a decline in democracy around the world. Just as Mohammadi’s 2023 award represents the struggle of all Iranian women against oppression, the 2022 award to <a href="https://theconversation.com/nobel-peace-prize-goes-to-belarusian-russian-and-ukrainian-human-rights-activists-192110">Ales Bialiatski</a> from Belarus was also aiming to represent a broader struggle for democracy in an autocratic country.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Berit Reiss-Andersen, chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, announces the winner of the 2023 Nobel peace prize.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The award to Bialatski, who remains in prison having been jailed without trial in 2021 for his role in pro-democracy protests, reflected the value of civil society against the dictatorial powers adopted by the Belarus president, Alexander Lukashenko, in 2016. Bialiatski shared the award with Russian human rights organisation, Memorial and the Ukrainian human rights organisation Centre for Civil Liberties. As the Nobel committee put it: “Together they demonstrate the significance of civil society for peace and democracy.”</p>
<p>The 2021 award went to two journalists: Maria Ressa in Philippines and Dmitry Andreyevich Muratov in Russia. Ressa, the founder of the investigative news website Rappler, consistently risked her life and liberty to bring to light abuses of power under the authoritarian rule of former president, Rodrigo Duterte. She has spent years <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/12/philippine-nobel-prize-winner-maria-ressa-acquitted-of-tax-charges">fighting multiple charges</a> filed against her by the Duterte government in order to stay out of prison. She and a Rappler colleague are appealing against a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/08/philippines-nobel-laureate-maria-ressa-loses-appeal-against-cyber-libel-conviction#">cyber libel conviction </a> which could have a seven-year prison sentence.</p>
<p>Muratov won for his leadership of the opposition newspaper and website Novaya Gazeta in Russia. He has since been <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-declares-nobel-prize-winning-editor-dmitry-muratov-to-be-a-foreign-agent">declared a “foreign agent”</a> by the Kremlin. He moved the editorial offices and staff of Novaya Gazeta to Latvia soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, but has stayed in Moscow where he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/aug/20/dmitry-muratov-russian-nobel-peace-prize-winner-who-wont-be-silenced-by-putin">faces regular harassment</a>.</p>
<p>International IDEA, an independent organisation which tracks democracy around the world, said that at the end of 2021, “nearly one half of the 173 countries assessed by International IDEA are <a href="https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-report-2022#chapter2.1">experiencing declines</a> in at least one sub-attribute of democracy”. </p>
<p>Whether these are legal clampdowns on public right to protest, as in the new <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/public-order-laws-are-we-losing-the-right-to-protest-12878592">Public Order Laws in the UK</a>, illegal military-backed coups on democratically elected governments as seen in various African countries such as <a href="https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-report-2022#chapter2.1">Gabon and Niger</a> in 2022 or deliberate attempts to exploit religious divisions, such as by <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/30/arundhati-roy-in-india-the-political-thinkers-in-modi-s-party-openly-worshiped-hitler-and-mussolini_6142003_4.html">India’s Modi government</a>, respect for democratic principles is under pressure.</p>
<p>Making the Nobel award to Mohammadi, committee chair Reiss-Andersen said that she hoped that offering solidarity with the jailed human rights activist and the broader woman-life-freedom movement in Iran would spark change.</p>
<p>“But I would also like to remind you that it took three Nobel prizes before apartheid fell in South Africa, she added: "Peace is not a quick fix.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leïla Choukroune does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nobel peace prize committee noted that awards in recent years highlight pressure on democracy which they say is in decline around the world.Leïla Choukroune, Professor of International Law, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1995882023-09-19T12:15:26Z2023-09-19T12:15:26Z3 powerful earthquakes strike Afghanistan in one week – here’s how people around the world prepare for disasters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553577/original/file-20231012-17-685tzv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C34%2C5760%2C3768&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Survivors search through rubble on Oct. 7, 2023, in western Afghanistan, where a series of powerful earthquakes have killed thousands.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/search-operation-for-the-bodies-and-those-who-remained-news-photo/1715818309?adppopup=true">Anadolu Agency/via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Herat, in western Afghanistan, experienced a 6.3 magnititude earthquake on Oct. 11, 2023 – following <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-earthquake-herat-c0181a41ae82e68892f7ba8ff988a07b">two more earlier in the same week</a>. </p>
<p>The mountains of Afghanistan are especially prone to earthquakes, but the truth is that earthquakes, flooding and hurricanes can happen anywhere. Nowhere is the risk zero.</p>
<p>But humans can make good decisions to lower the odds of hazards turning into disasters. Technology can help determine where to make investments to save the most lives.</p>
<p>The terrible devastation caused by the three <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rescuers-race-find-survivors-over-48-hours-after-morocco-quake-2023-09-11/">6.3 magnitude earthquakes</a> in Afghanistan is the result of the presence of centuries-old historic buildings and the continued use of <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2023/09/10/morocco-earthquake-construction/">old construction methods</a>, such as clay bricks and unreinforced masonry. These building materials are <a href="https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/14263">prevalent worldwide</a>, particularly in <a href="https://vividbay.com/concrete-vs-wood-developing-countries-use-concrete/">developing countries</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="In a remote, rural setting, a man searches through the debris of what was once a home." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553110/original/file-20231010-17-j3bviw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mountainous villages in Afghanistan were devastated by a series of strong earthquakes and aftershocks that began on Oct. 7, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Muhammad Balabuluki/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1rRpM1QAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Engineers like me</a> tend to focus on tangible decisions related to how buildings are constructed – for example, the amount and location of steel reinforcement. Over the last several decades, I’ve conducted the world’s largest <a href="http://doi.org/10.1061/%28ASCE%29ST.1943-541X.0000222">shake table tests</a>, placing a full-size apartment building on a platform that simulates seismic activity, and I’ve led teams of experts to investigate earthquakes around the world. But devastation – like <a href="https://miyamotointernational.com/2023-herat-afghanistan-earthquake-preliminary-shelter-and-housing-response/?utm_source=English+Global+List&utm_campaign=aa31d6c71e-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_11_26_05_59_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_544794d98f-aa31d6c71e-33641653&mc_cid=aa31d6c71e&mc_eid=576174da53">we are seeing in Afghanistan now</a> – continues. </p>
<p>Each disaster underlines the need to make our homes, offices and schools safer and more earthquake-resilient. But retrofitting buildings is expensive – and that cost represents a daunting challenge for developing nations like Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/10/358192/historical-sites-in-earthquake-hit-areas-in-morocco-reopen-for-visitors">Morocco</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/turkiye-syria-earthquake-response">Syria</a> – all three of which were devastated recently by major earthquakes. It is also challenging in developed nations like Turkey, Japan and the United States.</p>
<p>And yet, I am optimistic because I know thousands of engineers around the world are working and collaborating to make earthquakes less deadly.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people walk by buildings devastated by the earthquake." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547569/original/file-20230911-8366-vfgz9x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Morocco earthquake in early September 2023 damaged thousands of homes and buildings, including many of the country’s long-standing historical landmarks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/residents-pass-by-damaged-buildings-near-the-epicenter-at-news-photo/1659167845?adppopup=true">Wang Dongzhen/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How earthquakes devastate buildings</h2>
<p>Before we can discuss how to make people safer in earthquakes, it helps to understand the forces at work during these destructive events.</p>
<p>The extent of the damage done by an earthquake is determined by several factors, including magnitude – or how much energy the earthquake releases from its fault; depth of <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-a-fault-and-what-are-different-types#:%7E:text=A%20fault%20is%20a%20fracture,millimeters%20to%20thousands%20of%20kilometers">the fault</a> and how far the building is from the epicenter of the quake. </p>
<p>An epicenter is the location on the surface of the Earth above the fault. Essentially, it is ground zero for the quake, where shaking is most intense and buildings are more likely to collapse.</p>
<p>If the columns and walls of a multi-story building are not stiff and strong enough to resist the forces of an earthquake, gravity takes over. The building usually collapses at the bottom floor level, causing the stories above to follow. Anyone inside can be trapped or crushed by falling debris. Stopping this requires significant investment, <a href="https://www.nist.gov/buildings-construction/understanding-building-codes">modern design codes</a> and code enforcement. There are always challenges – but that doesn’t mean there haven’t been some success stories.</p>
<h2>California plans ahead</h2>
<p>Consider the city of San Francisco. More than a decade ago, this densely populated Northern California city realized it had thousands of apartment buildings with parking at the ground level. These are known as “soft-story” buildings and are more prone to collapse because they lack <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/engineering/structural/soft-story-seismic-retrofitting.htm">the strength and stiffness of reinforcing</a> at the ground level. Many are likely to collapse in a moderate-to-major earthquake, while many more would require months to repair. </p>
<p>Through a self-study <a href="https://sfgov.org/sfc/sites/default/files/ESIP/FileCenter/Documents/9757-atc522.pdf">completed in 2010</a>, San Francisco recognized that even if nobody was killed or injured in an earthquake, damage to these multi-unit residential buildings would result in a significant number of people losing their homes and leaving the city, changing its character forever. In 2013, the city began <a href="https://sfgov.org/sfc/sites/default/files/ESIP/FileCenter/Documents/10118-Legislation_Final.pdf">a mandatory retrofit program</a>. So far, <a href="https://sfgov.org/sfc/esip/soft-story">more than 700 soft-story buildings</a> have been retrofitted. Federal <a href="https://www.californiaresidentialmitigationprogram.com/How-to-Pay-for-a-Seismic-Retrofit/Earthquake-Soft-Story">grants of up to US$13,000</a> that became available in early 2023 are expected to accelerate this progress.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ladbs.org/services/core-services/plan-check-permit/plan-check-permit-special-assistance/mandatory-retrofit-programs/soft-story-retrofit-program">Los Angeles</a> followed suit in 2015, passing a law that required retrofitting of both soft-story wood-framed and older concrete buildings prone to collapse. As of 2023, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-03-22/poll-large-majority-los-angeles-residents-back-earthquake-retrofit">69% of soft-story buildings in LA</a> had been retrofitted. Progress on the concrete structures has been slower but is moving ahead.</p>
<p>Retrofitting a multi-unit apartment buildings in California costs between $60,000 and $130,000 – but the investment for a typical single-family home in the U.S. <a href="https://www.earthquakeauthority.com/Blog/2020/Benefits-Seismic-Upgrades-Why-Retrofit-Your-Home">starts as low as $3,000</a>.</p>
<p>Communities outside the U.S. have also built back better after earthquakes.</p>
<p>In 2005, Kobe, Japan, was rocked by a major earthquake that resulted in more than 5,000 fatalities and $200 billion in damage. As the city rebuilt, officials took the opportunity to improve their building code using updated <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0958-9465(99)00042-6">strengthening and stiffening techniques</a>.</p>
<p>Christchurch, New Zealand, was devastated in 2011 by two earthquakes that destroyed much of the downtown area. While many buildings didn’t collapse – a sign that the building code worked to some degree – many were damaged beyond repair. Demolishing them presented an opportunity to <a href="https://www.atcouncil.org/docman/atc-15-16-papers/188-p4-01-macrae/file">focus on resilient construction</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Amidst the rubble, a team of uniformed firefighters in hard hats search through the debris left by the quake." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547591/original/file-20230911-17-v1m7nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Amizmiz, Morocco, search-and-rescue teams look for survivors trapped beneath the rubble in September 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/firefighters-are-seen-digging-among-the-rubble-in-search-of-news-photo/1659521984?adppopup=true">Davide Bonaldo/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Focusing efforts</h2>
<p>So how can people and governments figure out where best to invest to decrease our exposure to natural hazards?</p>
<p>The center I co-direct brings together specialists from <a href="http://resilience.colostate.edu">14 universities</a> to determine how to measure a community’s resilience to natural hazards to enable them to plan for, absorb and recover rapidly from hazards. A <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil">policy directive</a> during the Obama administration resulted in funds being focused on improving resilience throughout the U.S.</p>
<p>To improve resilience, we have to be able to quantify and measure it. To do this, we’ve developed a computer model called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcns.2023.07.004">IN-CORE</a> that communities can use to measure the short- and long-term effects of “what if” scenarios on their households, social institutions, physical infrastructure and local economy. Each interacting algorithm that makes up the model is based on scientifically rigorous research documented in the teams’ <a href="http://resilience.colostate.edu/publications.shtml">almost 200 peer-reviewed publications over the last eight years</a>. Our system allows stakeholders to make resilience-informed decisions and measure the impacts on vulnerable populations. For example, we know that it is vital that social institutions such as schools and hospitals <a href="https://www.asce.org/publications-and-news/civil-engineering-source/civil-engineering-magazine/issues/magazine-issue/article/2021/03/performance-based-seismic-design-succeeds-in-turkey">remain intact</a> after a disaster.</p>
<p>One example of utilizing IN-CORE is the center’s engagement with Salt Lake County, Utah. The county is planning for a major earthquake – an event that is inevitable <a href="https://earthquake.usgs.gov/cfusion/external_grants/reports/G13AP00003.pdf">according to experts from the U.S. Geological Survey</a>. Understanding where investment will have its biggest impact is critical because time and money are limited. Our system will help Salt Lake County determine which building retrofits will provide the most return on investment based on physical services, social services and economic and population stability.</p>
<p>One goal of the <a href="https://www.in-core.org">IN-CORE Project</a> is to assist communities recently identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, as <a href="https://www.fema.gov/partnerships/community-disaster-resilience-zones">Community Disaster Resilience Zones</a>. These are areas in the U.S. most at risk from the effects of natural hazards and climate change. </p>
<p>More broadly, we plan to partner with communities and regions worldwide, always staying focused on ensuring socially equitable solutions. For example, as recent earthquakes in Morocco and Afghanistan show, it is important to consider not just urban centers, but rural communities that often <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/12/africa/morocco-earthquake-village-atlas-mountains/index.html">suffer a great deal of loss</a>.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated to include details from the Afghanistan earthquakes in October 2023.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John van de Lindt receives funding from the National Institute of Standards and Technology to co-lead the development of IN-CORE mentioned in the article. </span></em></p>One way to prevent the destruction wrought by a devastating earthquake – like the one that hit Morocco in September 2023 – is to construct resilient homes and buildings.John van de Lindt, Professor of Civil Engineering, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116232023-09-19T12:14:56Z2023-09-19T12:14:56ZUS policy of ‘pragmatic engagement’ in Afghanistan risks legitimatizing Taliban rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548369/original/file-20230914-15-hde5rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C29%2C4911%2C3257&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters celebrate the second anniversary of Taliban rule on Aug. 15, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/taliban-supporters-parade-through-the-streets-of-kabul-on-news-photo/1601157436?adppopup=true">Nava Jamshidi/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For two decades, the conflict in Afghanistan <a href="https://theconversation.com/calculating-the-costs-of-the-afghanistan-war-in-lives-dollars-and-years-164588">occupied international attention and U.S. resources</a>. But ever since <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2573268/biden-announces-full-us-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-sept-11/">American troops withdrew</a> in 2021, the conflict has seemingly been viewed in Washington more as a concern <a href="https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/afghanistan-after-us-withdrawal-five-conclusions/">localized to the region of Central and South Asia</a>.</p>
<p>This is due in large part to <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/shifting-priorities-the-us-and-the-middle-east-in-a-multipolar-world/">the U.S.’s shifting global priorities</a>. The invasion in Ukraine and Chinese ambitions in the Pacific have meant that Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the U.S. administration.</p>
<p>Naturally, the U.S.’s exit from Afghanistan has left the Biden administration with weaker leverage in the country. Indeed, some observers are now <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/23/afghanistan-biden-taliban-akhundzada-haqqani/">calling for the U.S. to diplomatically recognize</a> the Taliban government – something the Biden administration has stated it has <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/">yet to make a decision on</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">expert on international relations and Afghanistan</a>, I would argue recognizing the Taliban without pushing for a political road map and guarantees from them would be a mistake. As a partner in the Doha agreement – the peace deal <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">signed by the U.S. and the Taliban in 2020</a> leading to American troop withdrawal – Washington has an obligation to hold the Taliban to account over its side of the bargain: Preventing terrorists from operating in Afghanistan and engaging in intra-Afghan talks to end decades of conflict.</p>
<p>Yet over the past two years, the U.S.’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/">policy of “pragmatic engagement</a>” in Afghanistan – which amounts to working with the Taliban on limited security concerns while urging a course correction on human rights – has done little to discourage Taliban policies that have <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/">degraded the rights of Afghan citizens</a>. Nor has it pushed the Taliban to long-promised talks with other factions and parties in Afghanistan aimed at ending decades of turmoil.</p>
<h2>Evolving US interests</h2>
<p>America was drawn into Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack on the U.S mainland. Its goal was to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">dismantle and destroy al-Qaida</a> and its affiliate groups. But at the same time, it was considered to be in the U.S.’s interest to also assist Afghans in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/17/bush-on-nation-building-and-afghanistan/">creating a more equal and just political system</a> after decades of civil war and instability. The vision was for a government that respected human rights, guaranteed access to education for all and promoted democracy. </p>
<p>Some of those ideals made it into the Doha agreement and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-16/afghanistan-taliban-spokesperson-says-they-respect-women/100298394">public statements by the Taliban delegation before the deal was signed</a>. Yet, more than three years after the agreement was inked in the Qatari capital, the Taliban appears to show no intention of following through on its promises. It has <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/afghanistan-un-experts-say-20-years-progress-women-and-girls-rights-erased">restricted the rights of women and girls</a> to education and <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202308317600">rejected the idea of an inclusive government</a> with input from other Afghans. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/">U.S. government’s policy of pragmatic engagement</a> amounts to combating terrorism through an “<a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/over-the-horizon-counterterrorism-new-name-same-old-challenges/">over-the-horizon” strategy</a> directed from outside the country and intervening in Afghan affairs only through the Taliban itself, an unconventional partner for the U.S. in this effort.</p>
<p>In July 2023, President Biden implied that working with the Taliban in counterterrorism efforts <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/30/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-on-the-administrations-student-debt-relief-program/">had borne fruit</a>: “I said al-Qaida would not be there. I said it wouldn’t be there. I said we’d get help from the Taliban.”</p>
<h2>Taliban failing on pledges</h2>
<p>Yet, after <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf">vowing in the Doha agreement</a> to send a “clear message” to groups such as al-Qaida that “threaten the security of the United States and its allies,” the Taliban <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-after-the-fall-of-kabul-talibans-false-commitments-on-terrorism-have-been-fully-exposed-188132">has yet to publicly sever ties</a> with the group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">or banish militants</a> from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The Taliban has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65382277">killed a few individuals</a> identified as being threats to the U.S., notably by targeting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">terrorist group ISIS-K</a>. But it has been less helpful in cracking down on al-Qaida members. Indeed, <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri</a> was hiding out in Kabul – something that couldn’t have happened without the involvement of high-ranking Taliban officials – until a U.S. operation in July 2022 killed him.</p>
<p>In maintaining contacts with the Taliban for counterterrorism goals without pressuring the group on human rights issues, the U.S. might serve to legitimatize the Taliban’s leadership of the country at times when the group <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/25/taliban-dissolves-afghanistan-election-commission">still lacks an internal mandate</a>.</p>
<p>Despite these concerns, the U.S. is seemingly pushing ahead with this policy of “pragmatic engagement.”</p>
<p>In July 2023, A U.S. delegation led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West and Rina Amir, the special envoy for Afghan women, girls and human rights, <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">met with the Taliban</a> foreign minister in Doha. A State Department press release <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">framed the meeting</a> as a confidence-building exercise, noting positive developments such as growth in trade, a “decrease in large-scale terrorist attacks” and a “reduction in opium cultivation.”</p>
<p>Mention was made of the U.S. urging the Taliban to “reverse policies responsible for deteriorating human rights.” But as <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-meeting-with-taliban-puts-high-gloss-on-dismal-conditions-in-afghanistan/ar-AA1eJzbi?ocid=entnewsntp&pc=U531&cvid=a3af02c159b04490a661e7cb28c5ba85&ei=268">one critic noted</a>, such language “fall(s) atrociously short of describing the Taliban’s vast inhumanity toward Afghans.”</p>
<h2>Lack of regional consensus</h2>
<p>The void left by the U.S. is being <a href="https://www.mei.edu/events/iran-russia-and-china-post-us-withdrawal-afghan-landscape">filled by regional powers and countries that share a border</a> with Afghanistan: China, India, Russia, Pakistan and Iran.</p>
<p>But every one of these countries has its own interests in Afghanistan. Sometimes these are directly conflicting, such as with Pakistan and India, which have <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/01/india-pakistan-rivalry-afghanistan">long been suspicious</a> of the other’s influence in Afghanistan. Historically, all border countries have <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/game-old-empire-return-proxy-wars-afghanistan">looked upon warring Afghan factions as proxies</a> to further their own aims – a tactic that has only added to the instability of the country.</p>
<p>The result is a lack of coordination between regional players on Afghanistan’s path forward and little pressure on the Taliban to continue down the political road map as set out by the Doha agreement.</p>
<h2>Repeating past mistakes</h2>
<p>This failure to hold the Taliban accountable risks repeating past mistakes in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>In the 50 years since the last <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/18/archives/afghan-king-overthrown-a-republic-is-proclaimed-afghanistan-king-is.html">Afghan monarch was dethroned in 1973</a>, the country has been ruled by a succession of single-party governments that have excluded other political groups. In 2001, the international community excluded the Taliban from the <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/693627/a-review-of-the-2001-bonn-conference-and-application-to-the-road-ahead-in-afgha/">Bonn Conference</a>, which set the pathway to governance for the country after the U.S. invasion.</p>
<p>Masoom Stanekzai, a former chief peace negotiator for the Afghan government, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/missteps-and-missed-opportunities-peace-afghanistan">called the exclusion of the Taliban</a> “a strategic mistake” – and for good reason, I believe: History has shown that excluding factions in Afghanistan has led only to civil strife.</p>
<p>Since 2021, the Taliban has been allowed to continue Afghanistan down this path of single-party governance. As Andrew Watkins, senior expert on Afghanistan for the U.S. Institute of Peace, noted, the Taliban <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/one-year-later-taliban-reprise-repressive-rule-struggle-build-state">has shown in its governance one intent</a>: “To establish uncontested and unquestioned authority over Afghanistan’s state and society.”</p>
<p>With such ambitions, the Taliban leaves little room for the intra-Afghan dialogue needed for Afghanistan to move forward. </p>
<h2>The US role</h2>
<p>By signing the 2020 deal with the Taliban, the U.S took on joint responsibility for the delivery of promises made in the agreement. The pledge by Washington to withdraw forces has been fulfilled. But two years on from that, the Taliban has yet to deliver on its commitments. </p>
<p>This leaves the Biden administration with a choice: Try to keep the Doha deal alive by pressuring the Taliban into intra-Afghan talks, or accept that the deal is now dead. Either way, “pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban has shown itself to be wanting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sher Jan Ahmadzai is affiliated with Afghan-American Foundation. </span></em></p>The Biden administration has not ruled out diplomatic recognition of the Taliban. Doing so risks legitimizing the group’s rule without holding it accountable.Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113912023-08-14T13:11:20Z2023-08-14T13:11:20ZAfghanistan: two years after Taliban takeover the west is letting down the democratic opposition<p>The consequences of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghan-government-collapses-taliban-seize-control-5-essential-reads-166131">Taliban takeover of Afghanistan two years ago</a> are bad enough for the people who live there, especially women and girls, but also for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-years-after-taliban-takeover-why-afghanistan-still-poses-a-threat-to-the-region-and-beyond-211052">region and the world</a>, in the flow of migrants and threat of terrorism. </p>
<p>Yet there is little appetite in western capitals to give a platform to opposition groups who want a different and better future for their country, and protect the social benefits achieved at such cost over 20 years of fledgling democracy.</p>
<p>The Taliban administration cannot last – it rules only by fear and violence. It faces internal divisions, with open expressions of dissent by senior figures – some of whom have been sidelined and simmer with resentment. And there is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-assassination-of-al-qaida-chief-reveals-tensions-at-the-top-of-the-taliban-188133">worsening conflict</a> between the Kabul-based Haqqani network and the political centre under the supreme leader Haibatullah Akhunzada, in Kandahar in the south. </p>
<p>In an indication of how serious this is becoming, a <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/051/23/pdf/N2305123.pdf?OpenElement">recent UN survey</a> reported that Haibatullah is now protected by an elite suicide bomber unit, who were brought back from action against Islamic State group in the east of the country.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghan-government-collapses-taliban-seize-control-5-essential-reads-166131">Afghan government collapses, Taliban seize control: 5 essential reads</a>
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<p>There is opposition to the Taliban inside the country – most powerfully from brave girls and women protesting about their total loss of personal freedom and rights. <a href="https://www.weforum.org/people/shaharzad-akbar">Shaharzad Akbar</a>, the former head of Afghanistan’s Human Rights Commission, says that they exist without outside support and <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/event/anthony-hyman-memorial-lecture-2023-repression-and-resistance-struggle-womens-rights">lack political coherence</a>, but continue to channel the anger and frustration of a generation suddenly deprived of opportunity. </p>
<p>Outside Afghanistan it is a similar story. In the more than four decades of conflict since the Soviet invasion of 1979, successive waves of political refugees have washed up on western shores. These include people opposed to the communists, those who lives were disrupted by the civil war of the early 1990s and then those who could not live under the Taliban’s first regime in the late 1990s. Some returned to Afghanistan and have now fled again in the face of the Taliban. </p>
<p>The difference this time is that those have fled the country look back on two decades which – although marred by corruption, foreign mistakes and poor government decisions – opened the door for <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/702579/EXPO_STU(2023)702579_EN.pdf">unprecedented social reform</a>. Many of the key leaders of the potential opposition, who carry the flame of the lost republic, are under 40 years old. They are the first generation of Afghans since the 1970s to know of the opportunities of education and progress.</p>
<h2>Opposition in exile</h2>
<p>After the shock of the collapse two years ago, this new wave of political refugees were <a href="https://www.context.news/socioeconomic-inclusion/a-year-in-exile-afghan-refugees-tell-of-fresh-starts">scattered across the planet</a>. They include former ministers, civil servants, soldiers, spies, women activists, journalists, artists, writers and filmmakers. They took time to settle in new countries, but connected by the internet, they are now organising. They refuse to be called a “diaspora” – they prefer the word “exiles”, barred from their homeland by extremist violence. </p>
<p>The atmosphere at a <a href="https://www.aissonline.org/en/aiss-news">recent conference at King’s College London</a> was buzzing as former ministers, government officials and civil society activists networked and planned for a better future. Meetings in <a href="https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-180946">Dushanbe in Tajikistan</a> and <a href="https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-179895">Vienna in Austria</a> have similarly brought together people who want to write a democratic plan for Afghanistan. The resulting “<a href="https://www.wearenrf.org/publications/declaration-of-the-second-vienna-conference">Vienna Process</a>” is a <a href="https://www.oiip.ac.at/en/news-en/afghanistan-conference/">mechanism</a> to unite Afghan opposition groups to develop a road map for a return to constitutional government.</p>
<p>But all these gatherings are supported only by private foundations. The US has effectively turned its back on Afghanistan. US president, Joe Biden, still believes that the withdrawal was right. He is <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/biden-cant-ignore-the-talibans-terrorist-links-for-ever/">deluding himself</a> that the Taliban are cooperating with the US to prevent terrorism spreading from Afghanistan. Speaking at the King’s College conference, the US’s special investigator general for Afghanistan reconstruction, John Sopko, revealed that he had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/11/us-aid-policies-undermined-success-of-afghanistan-mission-says-watchdog-chief">no cooperation from the Pentagon or State Department</a> when he investigated the 2021 collapse of Afghan forces. They would prefer to forget.</p>
<h2>Mission impossible</h2>
<p>But dialogue with the Taliban is impossible. The “Islamic Emirate” has no concept of a space for other voices. Taliban exceptionalism makes them unique. But still the US is trying to work with the Taliban on a range of issues as well as terrorism, and continues to be the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-taliban-is-not-playing-straight-with-the-west-over-easing-of-sanctions-and-women-and-girls-are-paying-much-of-the-price-199843">biggest aid donor</a> to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>This is “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/19/un-urged-impose-travel-ban-taliban-leadership-oppression-women">creeping recognition</a>”, according to <a href="https://www.interpeace.org/member/afghanistan/">Nasir Andisha</a>, the Afghan ambassador to Geneva – one of a number of envoys still still flying the flag of the former republic. And the US policy of soft engagement comes <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/24/afghanistan-taliban-un-foreign-aid-assistance-development/">despite evidence</a> that the aid is being siphoned off by the Taliban. </p>
<p>But the US is not “the west”. There is an opportunity for other countries – the UK, EU, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – who all gave blood and treasure for Afghan freedom since 9/11. The alternative is that other countries, Russia, China and Iran, fill the vacuum of leadership.</p>
<p>Support for democratic opposition will involve taking a pragmatic view of those who have and will take up arms to take back their country. It is not necessary to support the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-08/scattered-forces-opposing-taliban-need-support-now">armed opposition</a> – but at the same time it would be counterproductive to boycott constitutional opposition groups that have an armed wing.</p>
<p>There are enormous challenges in building a different track. Non-Taliban Afghanistan is riven with ethnic and political disputes – 40 years of conflict has left much unfinished business. But the former MP, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephaniefillion/2022/09/01/one-year-after-leaving-afghanistan-fawzia-koofi-is-determined-to-go-back/">Fawzia Koofi</a>, says that focusing on division misses the point. “It could be that it is the Taliban who are divided,” she says, “while we are actually more united than we think”. </p>
<p>There is very wide agreement on the need to protect women’s rights and oppose the Taliban. But forging a new Afghanistan will not come without cash and support to meet and deliver a different future to what is now on offer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Loyn is an advisor to the Vienna Process, a mechanism to bring together Afghan opposition figures.</span></em></p>Two years after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan the west is not doing enough to help exiled leaders form a unified opposition.David Loyn, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110522023-08-11T16:17:55Z2023-08-11T16:17:55ZTwo years after Taliban takeover: why Afghanistan still poses a threat to the region and beyond<p>The dramatic and rapid Taliban offensive in the spring of 2021 <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_talibans-afghanistan-takeover-timeline/6209678.html">culminated</a> in its takeover of Kabul on August 15. The chaos of the western withdrawal that surrounded the return of the Taliban represented a sad endpoint of two decades of failed US-led attempts to impose a liberal democratic system on a country that had hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and facilitated his masterminding of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>For Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban marked the beginning of a deeply illiberal regime that is particularly <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-talibans-war-on-women-in-afghanistan-must-be-formally-recognized-as-gender-apartheid-210688">hostile to women</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-shiite-persecution-discrimination/32507042.html">minorities</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/swift-taliban-takeover-proves-us-and-uk-analysis-badly-wrong">swiftness</a> of the Taliban takeover <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/swift-taliban-takeover-proves-us-and-uk-analysis-badly-wrong">confounded</a> more optimistic US and UK predictions about the survival of the Afghan government. But most of its consequences were entirely predictable, and indeed predicted – from the worsening <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/13/afghanistan-taliban-takeover-worsens-rights-crisis">human rights</a> situation to an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58328246">economic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Five million Afghans fled the country and over three million were internally displaced, according to the <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/102160">UN refugee agency’s update</a> in July 2023. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is now at an unprecedented critical level: more than 18 million people – just under half the Afghan population – face acute <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/afghanistan">food-insecurity</a>. </p>
<h2>Least peaceful country</h2>
<p>After an initial upsurge, violence <a href="https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard/0B428DC54C4FF4146CBB3EAE58256BCF">has significantly declined</a> in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Yet, Afghanistan remains “the least peaceful country in the world in 2023”, according to the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf">Global Peace Index</a>. </p>
<p>This reflects, in part, the ongoing rivalry between the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group. This branch of the Islamic State remains the most potent domestic challenger to the Taliban. It <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/125/36/PDF/N2312536.pdf?OpenElement">comprises</a> somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters, including former regime officials and members of ethnic minorities opposed to the Taliban regime. IS-K has been <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/06/afghanistan-impact-improvised-explosive-devices-civilians">responsible</a> for the majority of civilian casualties in terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/32460999.html">has established itself</a> firmly in the northern and northeastern provinces of Afghanistan.</p>
<p>From a regional perspective, IS-K poses an equally important security threat to Afghanistan’s <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-taliban-central-asia-attacks/31844898.html">northern neighbours in central Asia</a>. At the end of July 2023 it <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-bajaur-rally-blast/32526408.html">claimed</a> a suicide attack in northwest Pakistan that killed more than 50 people.</p>
<p>IS-K, however, is not the most significant security threat to Pakistan. Rather, the Taliban’s longstanding ally has been afflicted by an upsurge in violent attacks committed by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group allegedly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ap-afghanistan-islamabad-peshawar-shehbaz-sharif-b2385883.html">enjoying safe havens in Afghanistan</a>. According to a recent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/189/74/PDF/N2318974.pdf?OpenElement">UN report</a>, the TTP has reabsorbed several splinter groups and seeks to regain a measure of territorial control along the Afghan-Pakistan border. </p>
<p>Since the Taliban takeover, other, more regionally oriented terrorist groups, such as the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement-uzbekistan">Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</a> and the <a href="https://www.hstoday.us/featured/understanding-the-turkistan-islamic-party-from-global-jihad-to-local-anti-chinese-resistance/">Turkestan Islamic Party</a> (formerly known as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement), have also benefited from a more permissive environment in which to operate. These and numerous other groups are smaller in size – numbering in their tens and hundreds, rather than thousands. But they tend to <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/N2303891.pdf?OpenElement">coordinate and cooperate</a> with each other and increasingly also with IS-K. </p>
<p>This is of particular concern to China. Beijing <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-china-taliban-uyghurs-security/32444038.html">is worried</a> that the Uyghur extremist Turkestan Islamic Party will eventually use Afghanistan as a base for attacks against China and Chinese interests in the wider region. </p>
<h2>Water wars</h2>
<p>Beyond terrorism, competition over scarce water resources is the other major source of conflict. The Taliban’s plan to build the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-canal-water-central-asia/32350996.html">Qosh Tepa Irrigation Canal</a> will <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/taliban-threaten-water-resources-of-uzbekistan-turkmenistan-and-tajikistan-273219/">decrease</a> water available to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan from the transboundary Amu Darya River by as much as 15%. This will have <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/what-afghanistans-qosh-tepa-canal-means-for-central-asia/">major</a> social, economic and public health consequences for both countries. </p>
<p>A similar crisis is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/a-compulsive-embrace-beneath-the-afghanistan-iran-water-conflict/">brewing between Tehran and Kabul</a>. The Taliban is reportedly <a href="https://time.com/6302192/taliban-suicide-bombers-water-dispute-iran/">preparing toops, including suicide bombers</a> for what looks certain to be a conflict with Iran over water shortages caused by the Taliban allegedly <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-taliban-water-dispute-/32435442.html">reneging</a> on a 1973 water treaty. </p>
<h2>Fear and intimidation at home and abroad</h2>
<p>After two years of Taliban rule, Afghanistan, is a different – but not a lesser – problem. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-51689443">deal signed</a> between the Taliban and the US on February 29 2020, after two years of talks pushed by the then US president, Donald Trump, precipitated the withdrawal of western troops but did not bring about intra-Afghan reconciliation. </p>
<p>On the contrary, since the takeover in August 2021 the Taliban has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/afghanistan-one-year-of-the-talibans-broken-promises-draconian-restrictions-and-violence/">ruled with fear and intimidation</a>. And it has failed in its commitment to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. </p>
<p>This has not, however, stopped international efforts to engage with the Taliban regime. Central Asian states have been at the forefront of efforts <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/afghanistan-should-be-reintegrated-into-regional-trade-and-security-structures/">to integrate Afghanistan</a> into regional trade and security structures and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-trans-afghan-railway-line-back-on-track/">pushed the idea</a> of a trans-Afghan railway line. In early August, 2023, Kazakhstan hosted a Taliban delegation for a business forum. The two countries signed US$200 million (£157 million) worth of <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-signs-200-million-in-contracts-with-afghanistan">deals</a>, primarily to supply grain and flour to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Afghanistan has vast <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/afghanistan-taliban-mining-resources-rich-minerals/">mineral deposits</a>, including critical <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/rare-earth-afghanistan-sits-1-trillion-minerals-n196861">rare earth</a> minerals. These have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-investment-in-afghanistans-lithium-sector-a-long-shot-in-the-short-term/">attracted Chinese investment</a> in Afghanistan’s lithium sector. Beijing and Kabul also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/afghanistans-taliban-administration-oil-extraction-deal-with-chinese-company-2023-01-05/">agreed a deal</a> in January 2023, enabling a Chinese company to drill for oil in the Amu Darya basin.</p>
<p>While these efforts do not imply recognition of the Taliban regime – even by its closest neighbours – they suggest a slow but inevitable trend in that direction. This all the more likely now that even Washington has begun to re-engage with the Taliban. This has included <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">signalling</a>, at recent high-level talks in Doha, Qatar, an “openness to a technical dialogue regarding economic stabilisation issues”.</p>
<p>Washington is still <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-1-2023/#post-466596-AFGHANISTAN">ruling out</a> recognition “right now for a number of reasons, including the treatment of their own people, including their many flagrant human rights violations”. But this represents a significant shift in US policy. </p>
<p>Two years of Taliban rule have seen the regime in Kabul double down on its repressive domestic policies and do little to assuage its near and far neighbours’ concerns over new and old security <a href="https://osce-network.net/file-OSCE-Network/Publications/OSCE-CA-2023.pdf">risks</a>. So this apparent willingness to re-engage with the Taliban will send all the wrong signals and is unlikely to bring about more security and stability for Afghans and their neighbours. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>When originally published, this article mistakenly carried a photograph of a Palestinian funeral procession instead of an image of girls being turned away from their school. This has now been rectified.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Two years on from taking control of Afghanistan the Taliban continues to rule through fear and threatens the stability of the whole region.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2106882023-08-08T18:31:40Z2023-08-08T18:31:40ZThe Taliban’s war on women in Afghanistan must be formally recognized as gender apartheid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541516/original/file-20230807-23-aa6m4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4992%2C3300&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Taliban fighter stands guard as women wait to receive food rations distributed by a humanitarian aid group, in Kabul, Afghanistan, in May 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi, File)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-talibans-war-on-women-in-afghanistan-must-be-formally-recognized-as-gender-apartheid" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/afghanistan-marks-1-year-anniversary-of-taliban-takeover">second anniversary of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan</a> is fast approaching. Since then, Afghan women have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/18/afghanistan-taliban-deprive-women-livelihoods-identity">denied the most basic human rights</a> in what can only be described as gender apartheid. </p>
<p>Only by labelling it as such and making clear the situation in Afghanistan is a crime against humanity can the international community legally fight the systematic discrimination against the country’s women and girls.</p>
<p>Erasing women from the public sphere is central to Taliban ideology. Women’s rights institutions in Afghanistan, notably the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, have been dismantled while the dreaded <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58600231">Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice</a> has been resurrected. </p>
<p>The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has been dissolved and the country’s 2004 constitution repealed, while legislation guaranteeing gender equality <a href="https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/files/2022/12/Bennoune-Finalized-12.09.22.pdf#page=9">has been invalidated</a>. </p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/07/women-and-girls-under-taliban-rule-afghanistan/">Afghan women are denied a post-secondary education, they cannot leave the house without a male chaperone, they cannot work, except in health care and some private businesses</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/25/taliban-beauty-salon-ban-women-rights/24823d78-2aca-11ee-a948-a5b8a9b62d84_story.html">they are barred</a> from parks, gyms and beauty salons.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A closed beauty salon." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541722/original/file-20230808-17-u58pge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A general view of a closed beauty salon in the city of Kabul, Afghanistan, in July 2023. The Taliban has closed all beauty salons in Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Siddiqullah Khan)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Women targeted</h2>
<p>Of the approximately 80 edicts issued by the Taliban, 54 specifically <a href="https://feminist.org/our-work/afghan-women-and-girls/taliban-edicts/">target women</a>, severely restricting their rights <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/events/2023/afghanistan-under-taliban-state-gender-apartheid">and violating</a> Afghanistan’s international obligations and its previous constitutional and domestic laws. </p>
<p>The Taliban <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/19/afghan-women-suffer-under-taliban/">appear undeterred</a>, continuing where they left off 20 years ago when they first held power. The results of their ambitions are nearly apocalyptic. </p>
<p>Afghanistan is facing one of the world’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/15/hard-choices-afghanistans-humanitarian-crisis#:%7E:text=Afghanistan%20has%20largely%20disappeared%20from,girls%20remain%20most%20at%20risk.">worst humanitarian crises</a>. About <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/afghanistan-entire-population-pushed-poverty">19 million</a> people are suffering from acute food insecurity, while more than <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/04/afghanistan-economic-crisis-underlies-mass-hunger">90 per cent</a> of Afghans are experiencing some form of food insecurity, with <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-afghanistan-situation-report-18-january-2023">female-headed households and children</a> most impacted. </p>
<p>Gender-based violence has increased exponentially with corresponding impunity for the perpetrators and lack of support for the victims, while ethnic, religious and sexual minorities are suffering <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/situation-human-rights-afghanistan-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-richard-bennett-ahrc5284-advance-edited-version">intense persecution</a>. </p>
<p>This grim reality underscores the urgent need to address <a href="https://spia.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2023-02/SPIA_NaheedRangita_PolicyBrief_07.pdf#page=3">how civil, political, socioeconomic and gender-based harms</a> are interconnected.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a blue niqab bottle-feeds a baby. Another fussing baby is in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541521/original/file-20230807-25161-ue4ret.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mothers and babies suffering from malnutrition wait to receive help and check-ups at an international humanitarian clinic in Kabul, Afghanistan, in January 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>International crime</h2>
<p>Karima Bennoune, an Algerian-American international law scholar, has advocated recognizing gender apartheid as a <a href="https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/the-international-obligation-to-counter-gender-apartheid-in-afghanistan/">crime under international law</a>. Such recognition would stem from states’ international legal commitments to gender equality and the United Nations’ <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/">Sustainable Development Goal 5</a> aimed at achieving global gender equality by 2030. </p>
<p>Criminalizing gender apartheid would provide the international community with a powerful legal framework to effectively respond to Taliban abuses. While the <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-01-12/the-secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-the-promotion-and-strengthening-of-the-rule-of-law-the-maintenance-of-international-peace-and-security-the-rule-of">UN has already labelled the situation in Afghanistan gender apartheid,</a> the term is not currently recognized under the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court">Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court</a> as being among the worst international crimes.</p>
<p>Presenting his report at the UN Human Rights Council, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137847">Richard Bennett</a> — the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan — stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A grave, systematic and institutionalized discrimination against women and girls is at the heart of Taliban ideology and rule, which also gives rise to concerns that they may be responsible for gender apartheid.”</p>
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<p>Criminalizing gender apartheid globally would allow the international community to fulfil its obligation to respond effectively and try to eradicate it permanently. It would provide the necessary legal tools to ensure that international commitments to women’s rights in all aspects of life are upheld.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2324266/world">Shaharzad Akbar</a>, head of the <a href="https://rawadari.org/">Rawadari human rights group</a> and former chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, has urged the Human Rights Council to acknowledge the situation in Afghanistan as gender apartheid.</p>
<p>She’s noted that the “Taliban have turned Afghanistan to a mass graveyard of Afghan women and girls’ ambitions, dreams and potential.” </p>
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<h2>South African support</h2>
<p>A number of Afghan women’s rights defenders have also called for the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/06/human-rights-council-opens-fifty-third-session-hears-presentation-annual-report-high">inclusion of gender apartheid in the UN’s Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity</a>. </p>
<p>Most remarkably, <a href="https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/hrc53-un-experts-open-council-session-with-dedicated-discussion-on-the-situation-of-women-girls-in-afghanistan/">Bronwen Levy</a>, South Africa’s representative at the Security Council, has urged the international community to “take action against what (Bennett’s) report describes as gender apartheid, much like it did in support of South Africa’s struggle against racial apartheid.” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1671121452731359232"}"></div></p>
<p>Elsewhere, the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/joint-statement-of-2-february-2023-women/product-details/20230203DPU35201">chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, as well as the head of its Delegation for Relations with Afghanistan</a>, have described the “unacceptable” situation in Afghanistan as one of gender apartheid.</p>
<p>Whenever and wherever apartheid systems emerge, it represents a failure of the international community. The situation in Afghanistan must compel it to respond effectively to the persecution of women. </p>
<p>Recognizing Taliban rule as gender apartheid is not only critical for Afghans, it is equally critical for the <a href="https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/files/2022/12/Bennoune-Finalized-12.09.22.pdf#page=11">credibility of the entire UN system</a>. As Afghan human rights activist <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15222.doc.htm">Zubaida Akbar</a> told the Security Council:</p>
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<p>“If you do not defend women’s rights here, you have no credibility to do so anywhere else.” </p>
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<p>The Taliban’s brutal two years in power in Afghanistan have taught us that ordinary human rights initiatives, while important, are insufficient for addressing gender apartheid. The world needs resolute collective international action to end the war on women. Not in two months. Not in two years. But now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vrinda Narain is affiliated with Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), a transnational research and solidarity network, as a Board Director. </span></em></p>The Taliban’s two years ruling Afghanistan have taught us ordinary human rights initiatives are insufficient to address gender apartheid. We need resolute collective international action.Vrinda Narain, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2081802023-06-21T07:11:53Z2023-06-21T07:11:53ZThe International Criminal Court is unlikely to prosecute alleged Australian war crimes – here’s why<p>For the first time, Australians have been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation into alleged Afghan war crimes. </p>
<p>That <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/jacqui-lambie-asks-icc-to-investigate-adf-leaders-over-alleged-war-crimes-20230620-p5di30.html">Senator Jacqui Lambie</a> has instigated this process is even more extraordinary as it’s the first time any Australian MP has taken that step. </p>
<p>Lambie’s ICC referral focuses on the legal responsibility of Australian Defence Force (ADF) commanders who knew, or should have known, about alleged war crimes committed by their forces in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>This move by Lambie may not lead to any formal action by the ICC, but it does shine a spotlight on how Australia is responding to these claims.</p>
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<h2>Why the ICC is unlikely to act</h2>
<p>The court will no doubt acknowledge receipt of Lambie’s referral, but it is doubtful whether it would commence an active investigation given the ongoing work of the <a href="https://www.osi.gov.au/">Office of the Special Investigator</a> established in 2021, with Mark Weinberg as the lead investigator.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.osi.gov.au/news-resources/director-generals-opening-statement-budget-estimates-2023-24">Senate Estimates</a> hearing in May, Chris Moraitis, the office’s director-general, said up to 40 alleged acts are currently being investigated by his office and the Australian Federal Police. </p>
<p>In March, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/22/first-australian-soldier-charged-over-alleged-war-crime-afghanistan">first charge</a> was brought against a former Australian soldier, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/20/former-sas-soldier-oliver-schulz-arrested-alleged-war-crime-accused-of-killing-afghan-civilian">Oliver Schulz</a>. He was accused of the war crime of murder under the Commonwealth Criminal Code. </p>
<p>No further details have been released as to current and former defence personnel who are under investigation. But the Office of the Special Investigator’s mandate is to consider all ADF conduct in Afghanistan from 2005-16, which will include senior officers and commanders. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">Why investigating potential war crimes in Afghanistan just became much harder – and could take years</a>
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<p>The office is also not limited to the allegations investigated and reported on in the 2020 <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/afghanistan-inquiry">Brereton Report</a>. It has its own mandate and can conduct its own investigations.</p>
<p>The ICC was only ever intended as a court of last resort in these matters. That means it will only investigate and prosecute people for alleged war crimes when a country is unwilling or unable to do so itself. </p>
<p>This may arise if the state is incapable of pursuing prosecutions because of disorder or unrest, or because of the collapse of a national judicial system. None of these situations currently exist in Australia.</p>
<p>The ICC is also incredibly busy with its ongoing investigation into war crimes allegations in Ukraine, which are occurring in real time on a near-daily basis. </p>
<p>This is on top of its other work. To date, the ICC prosecutor has received some <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp">12,000 requests</a> to investigate alleged war crimes committed worldwide over the past 20 years. </p>
<h2>What the ICC is investigating in Afghanistan</h2>
<p>The legal landscape for war crimes prosecutions has radically changed in recent decades due to the creation of the ICC. </p>
<p>The court has jurisdiction with respect to war crimes committed by the nationals of state parties, such as Australia. Its jurisdiction extends to “grave breaches” of the laws of war, which sets a high threshold for the most serious and egregious acts. </p>
<p>Presently, the ICC prosecutor is already investigating alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by various sides in the Afghan conflict including Australian, UK and Taliban forces and the Islamic State - <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-crime-war-crimes-taliban-international-criminal-court-570bfa1f57f912f5ac49df2c1f301144">dating back to the early 2000s</a>. The US is not a member of the court and does not respect its jurisdiction. </p>
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<p>With regard to Australian soldiers, Lambie’s concern is that the Office of the Special Investigator is focused on troops and officers, not ADF commanders. </p>
<p>International criminal law and the ICC recognise “<a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/duty-of-commanders/">command responsibility</a>”, which is the legal responsibility of commanders when their forces commit war crimes. However, commanders must have directed such conduct or had reasonable knowledge that such conduct was being committed. </p>
<p>Australia has been an enthusiastic supporter of the ICC, but its recognition of ICC jurisdiction was contingent on a formal <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12811">declaration</a> in 2002 made by the Howard government which provided, in part, that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>no person will be surrendered to the court by Australia until it has had the full opportunity to investigate or prosecute any alleged crimes. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, Australia would only surrender a person to the ICC for prosecution following the Commonwealth attorney-general issuing a certificate. </p>
<p>The government response to the Brereton Report – with its establishment of the Office of the Special Investigator – means it is taking the lead in prosecuting war crimes allegations. As such, an Australian soldier or commander would only be handed over to the ICC in the most exceptional of cases.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/stripping-medals-from-soldiers-is-murky-territory-and-must-not-distract-from-investigating-alleged-war-crimes-207615">Stripping medals from soldiers is murky territory, and must not distract from investigating alleged war crimes</a>
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<h2>Australia’s experience in war crimes prosecutions</h2>
<p>Over the past seven years, we have gotten a much clearer picture of the alleged actions of Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. Much was revealed in investigative reports by the Nine newspapers, which was highlighted during former SAS corporal Ben Roberts-Smith’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-win-for-the-press-a-big-loss-for-ben-roberts-smith-what-does-this-judgment-tell-us-about-defamation-law-206759">recent defamation case</a>. </p>
<p>The legal system will likely soon be dealing with a wave of war crimes charges arising from the Brereton Report and the work of the Office of the Special Investigator and Australian Federal Police.</p>
<p>Australia has no recent history of war crimes trials involving Australian soldiers. However, following the second world war, Australia was involved in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, which was established to prosecute Japanese war crimes suspects. Japanese soldiers were also prosecuted between 1945 and 1951 in Australian military courts. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-20/nazi-war-criminals-in-australia-and-the-case-of-polyukhovich/9756454">Ivan Polyukhovich</a>, a former Nazi soldier who became an Australian citizen in 1958, was put on trial in Australia for alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine between 1942-43. He was ultimately acquitted by the South Australian Supreme Court in 1993. </p>
<p>Australia may now be on the brink of its first modern war crimes trial, though, with the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/nsw-act/courts-law/exsoldier-has-bail-varied-over-alleged-wartime-murder-of-afghan-villager/news-story/538d440ba3b32c5a826513ba4ae27e46">prosecution of Oliver Schulz</a>. </p>
<p>The Australian legal system is about to be severely tested. As difficult as these legal processes may well be for the nation, the public will have a legitimate expectation these allegations are scrutinised in court. Lambie’s actions have reinforced that expectation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donald Rothwell receives funding from Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>The ICC was only ever intended as a court of last resort, meaning it will only investigate and prosecute people for alleged war crimes when a country is unwilling or unable to do so itself.Donald Rothwell, Professor of International Law, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2076152023-06-14T20:09:13Z2023-06-14T20:09:13ZStripping medals from soldiers is murky territory, and must not distract from investigating alleged war crimes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531833/original/file-20230614-29-dxqwmr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dave Hunt/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It could be years before Ben Roberts-Smith and others are stripped of military awards for their service in Afghanistan and face Australian criminal court on war crimes charges, if in fact that ever happens. </p>
<p>Investigations of war crimes are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">difficult and time-consuming</a>. In the meantime, calls for the Defence Department to continue to address the allegations against Australian Defence Force personnel have grown louder. </p>
<p>In the case of Roberts-Smith, the investigation is now being undertaken by a <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/massive-blow-afp-war-crimes-probe-collapses-over-risk-of-tainted-evidence-20230613-p5dg7c.html">joint taskforce</a> from the Office of the Special Investigator and the Australian Federal Police, rather than the AFP on its own. The decision to move the investigation resulted from issues with how evidence that could be used in a criminal case was collected in the Brereton inquiry. Such problems with evidence are difficult for investigation teams and courts that are not specifically designed to deal with war crimes. </p>
<p>Debate has also arisen in Australia over whether commanders as well as direct perpetrators ought to be held <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">responsible</a> for war crimes, and what the leadership failings in Afghanistan were. Such debates are relevant to the issue of individual and unit awards and honours.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531555/original/file-20230613-21-fkv5cx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Over 26,000 Australian security personnel served in the Afghanistan war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Ellinghausen</span></span>
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<h2>Australia’s obligations under the Rome Statute</h2>
<p>The public debate – and even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/09/australias-military-should-be-held-to-account-but-its-the-individual-soldier-who-pulls-the-trigger">expert opinion</a> – has tended to overlook the fact that Australia’s response to the alleged war crimes in Afghanistan is governed primarily by its international obligations. These obligations outweigh any views about war crimes that may be held within the defence community or the general public.</p>
<p>Administrative measures undertaken by Defence cannot substitute for war crimes prosecutions. Australia is a full party to the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">1998 Rome Statute</a>, which is the cornerstone of international war crimes law and is reflected in Australia’s <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/about-us/publications/attorney-generals-department-annual-report-2017-18/appendixes/appendix-3-international-criminal-court">own domestic law</a> covering war crimes. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">Why investigating potential war crimes in Afghanistan just became much harder – and could take years</a>
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<p>The Rome Statute requires that Australia fully investigate and punish war crimes committed by its forces, at all ranks. Australia has conducted war crimes trials of enemy combatants <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">in the past</a>, in which it has found direct perpetrators, their local commanders and their senior officers guilty of war crimes and has punished them accordingly. </p>
<p>To fail to comprehensively prosecute alleged war crimes now, because the defendants would be Australian, is a morally and politically untenable position. Comprehensive trials also offer the only path to the public understanding where culpability for war crimes sits along the military chain of command.</p>
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<h2>Removing medals and citations</h2>
<p>The prompt removal of medals and citations, however, would provide Defence with an opportunity to condemn war crimes immediately, rather than waiting until formal trials can be held.</p>
<p>Defence honours and awards in Australia are awarded through an administrative process. Though awards have been revoked in the past for dishonourable conduct, it remains an unusual step. The process of conferring or revoking a high-level award needs the support of the government. </p>
<p>The Australian Defence Force has been criticised for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/mar/01/adf-taking-too-long-to-enact-reforms-after-afghanistan-war-crimes-inquiry-watchdog-warns">moving too slowly</a> to address public concerns over its record in Afghanistan. However, some attempts have been made. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/afghanistan-inquiry">Brereton Report</a>, Chief of the Defence Force General Angus Campbell announced the Special Operations Task Group would be stripped of a Meritorious Unit Citation for conduct in Afghanistan. The announcement caused a media and political uproar, and then Prime Minister Scott Morrison <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-30/defence-says-no-decision-yet-on-meritorious-citation-afghanistan/12935302">reversed</a> the decision. </p>
<p>It has since emerged that at least three <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/breretons-unfinished-business/">senior officers</a>, including <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/defence-chief-angus-campbell-tried-to-hand-back-his-afghanistan-medal-but-was-refused-20230612-p5dfs6.html">Campbell</a>, have attempted to return their own medals, awarded for distinguished command and leadership in action. In all three cases, the Coalition government denied this request. </p>
<p>Campbell has reportedly asked a group of former commanding officers to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/jacqui-lambie-fury-over-defence-chief-letters/102423354">return their medals</a>. In Senate Estimates, he stated such a move would represent a step towards accountability for the command failures in the Afghanistan operation.</p>
<p>The Labor government has appeared <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7997036/defence-chief-cleared-to-strip-medals/">more willing</a> for medals and awards to be handed back or stripped than its Coalition predecessor was. </p>
<p>The problems that Campbell has encountered in attempting to revoke honours, and in trying to hand his own back, highlight the fact that commendations have both military and political significance – which makes any decision to revoke honours particularly difficult.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531834/original/file-20230614-21-zdp3hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">ADF chief Angus Campbell has attempted to strip officers of their medals, and to hand back his own, both to no avail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Will the minister strip Roberts-Smith of his VC?</h2>
<p>Ben Roberts-Smith is the public figurehead of Australia’s war crimes saga, so it is no surprise questions have been raised over whether he ought to keep his Victoria Cross. He was awarded the VC for an earlier action that is not connected with allegations of war crimes against him. </p>
<p>No Australian has ever had a VC revoked. </p>
<p>While a number of VCs were revoked in the United Kingdom, mostly during the 19th century, revocation has since been the subject of <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/double-edged-sword/">high-level debate</a>.</p>
<p>In the defamation case, a civil court found on the balance of probabilities that Roberts-Smith had committed war crimes, but these actions do not technically erode the validity of his VC. At the same time, his earlier bravery did not protect him from allegations of war crimes, and there remains a moral and legal obligation for him to face criminal justice.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-defence-force-must-ensure-the-findings-against-ben-roberts-smith-are-not-the-end-of-the-story-206749">Australian Defence Force must ensure the findings against Ben Roberts-Smith are not the end of the story</a>
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<p>At face value, Roberts-Smith and his VC seem to be a different case – the medal was awarded to one soldier, for one action. To some, however, the medal seems also to mark out the recipient as a hero, or at least as a person of superior character. In this light, calls for the VC to be revoked in the wake of the defamation case are understandable.</p>
<p>As Australians reckon with this new and dark chapter of the country’s military history, the public will continue to ask who is most to blame for alleged war crimes committed by Australian forces in Afghanistan, until the question is comprehensively examined in the criminal court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dean Aszkielowicz has previously received funding from the Army Research Scheme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Taucher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The awarding, and revoking, of military medals is more complex than it appears, and is no replacement for the proper investigation of alleged war crimes.Dean Aszkielowicz, Senior Lecturer in History and Politics, Murdoch UniversityPaul Taucher, Lecturer in History, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067492023-06-02T02:53:04Z2023-06-02T02:53:04ZAustralian Defence Force must ensure the findings against Ben Roberts-Smith are not the end of the story<p>On Thursday, Justice Anthony Besanko of the Federal Court dismissed defamation proceedings brought by former Special Air Service soldier Ben Roberts-Smith against several Australian news outlets. </p>
<p>The court found that reporting by Nick McKenzie, Chris Masters and David Wroe had satisfactorily established the truth of several serious imputations against Roberts-Smith. These included claims he committed war crimes during his service in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The judgement is a landmark moment in Australian military history, with implications for the investigation and potential prosecution of other Australians suspected of war crimes. The explosive evidence heard in the case also underlines the need for the Army, the broader defence community and the Australian public to reckon fully with the conduct of Australian forces in the Afghanistan campaign.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-win-for-the-press-a-big-loss-for-ben-roberts-smith-what-does-this-judgment-tell-us-about-defamation-law-206759">A win for the press, a big loss for Ben Roberts-Smith: what does this judgment tell us about defamation law?</a>
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<h2>Standards of proof and evidence</h2>
<p>Roberts-Smith could conceivably face criminal prosecution for the alleged murders at a future war crimes trial. This case was a civil proceeding, meaning the imputations only needed to be proven true on the balance of probabilities, a substantially lower requirement than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which would be required in a criminal trial.</p>
<p>Because of the different standards of proof, it is not certain Roberts-Smith would be found guilty in a war crimes trial, assuming all the same evidence was called. Prosecutors will be concerned, moreover, that the outcome of the high-profile defamation trial might influence a future war crimes proceeding. </p>
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<p>It is likely any criminal trial for Roberts-Smith will be held before a judge, without a jury. It is not unusual for a war crimes trial to be held without a jury; past Australian trials were held before a panel of three to five judges, all of whom were military officers.</p>
<p>Another way to overcome the problem of the defamation outcome poisoning a future criminal trial in Australia would be for the government to hand Roberts-Smith over to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, a court with long experience in dealing with very high profile war crimes cases. However, doing so would probably be deeply unpopular and signal to the world that Australia cannot dispense its own military justice.</p>
<h2>Contextual truth</h2>
<p>Some imputations against Roberts-Smith were not substantiated at the defamation trial. However, Justice Besanko found that these defamatory statements, which concerned threatening a fellow soldier and domestic violence, were nonetheless contextually true. This ruling means the newspapers are not liable for these imputations because the more injurious claims, including war crimes, were found to be true, so the defendant would suffer no further reputational damage.</p>
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<h2>Broader implications</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen what the full reaction to Thursday’s judgement will be. Roberts-Smith still holds the Victoria Cross, the country’s highest military honour. He received financial support for the case from Kerry Stokes – who, from 2015 to 2022, was chair of the Australian War Memorial. Stokes allegedly referred to McKenzie and Masters as “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/seven-billionaire-kerry-stokes-blasts-scumbag-journalists-over-roberts-smith-coverage-20221110-p5bx6g.html">scumbag journalists</a>”. </p>
<p>While the memorial as an institution did not support Roberts-Smith with the case, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/12/kerry-stokes-to-remain-war-memorial-chair-despite-criticism-of-his-support-for-ben-roberts-smith">Stokes remained as chair</a> even after his role was publicly questioned. The interpretation from some quarters that reporting on Roberts-Smith constitutes unfair criticism of a war hero will persist. Others, of course, will see it as exactly the job investigative reporting is meant to do.</p>
<p>The Australian Defence Force has taken the allegations brought forward by journalists and other sources seriously. It commissioned Paul Brereton’s Afghanistan inquiry and appears to accept that the conduct of some Australian personnel was potentially illegal.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-investigating-potential-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-just-became-much-harder-and-could-take-years-171412">Why investigating potential war crimes in Afghanistan just became much harder – and could take years</a>
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<p>While the findings in the defamation case support the ADF’s position that an inquiry was needed, the case was not a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-defamation-court-proxy-war-crimes-trial-nears-judgement-2023-05-30/">proxy war crimes trial</a>”. It does not deliver justice for alleged war crimes. Only properly convened war crimes trials can answer the questions that hover over Australian conduct in Afghanistan, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australian-commanders-need-to-be-held-responsible-for-alleged-war-crimes-in-afghanistan-151030">including the role of commanding officers</a>.</p>
<p>War crimes trials, however, take significant institutional momentum to convene and sustain: they are costly, long-running and controversial. The challenge for the ADF now is to continue to support the thorough investigation of alleged war crimes and to pursue criminal prosecution where it is warranted. </p>
<p>Since the second world war, Australia has positioned itself internationally as a champion of the laws and proper conduct of war. Australian forces have been deployed to many difficult conflicts, where they have largely been trusted operators. </p>
<p>The judgement in this case ought to have minimal impact on Australian forces who are deployed overseas, as following the rules of war is assumed to be part of any mission they undertake. If the case does come as a wake-up call to some, then the ADF will have to further assess its training on the laws of war, its leadership, and its culture. </p>
<p>The Roberts-Smith case, the finding against him and the graphic detail in the publicly available evidence made headlines around the world. If public faith in the ADF is to be restored, together with its international reputation, there must now be an exhaustive process of investigation and prosecution of any war crimes committed in Afghanistan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dean Aszkielowicz has previously received funding from The Army Research Scheme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Taucher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The explosive evidence heard in the case also underscores the need for the Army and the Australian public to reckon fully with the conduct of Australian forces in the Afghanistan campaign.Dean Aszkielowicz, Lecturer, Murdoch UniversityPaul Taucher, Lecturer, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915032023-06-01T08:28:50Z2023-06-01T08:28:50Z‘Dismissed’: legal experts explain the judgment in the Ben Roberts-Smith defamation case<p>Today, Federal Court Justice Anthony Besanko <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jun/01/ben-roberts-smith-loses-defamation-case-with-judge-saying-newspapers-established-truth-of-some-murders">handed down</a> his long-awaited judgment in the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/110-days-41-witnesses-and-15-key-questions-to-answer-what-the-ben-roberts-smith-case-was-about-20230209-p5cjdp.html">defamation case</a> that Ben Roberts-Smith, Australia’s most decorated living former SAS soldier, brought against the Age, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Canberra Times.</p>
<p>The civil trial ended in July 2022 after an astonishing 110 days of evidence and legal submissions. The case was also interrupted by COVID lockdowns.</p>
<p>Besanko determined the newspapers did establish the “substantial truth” of some of the allegations, though not of others. He concluded that in light of these findings, “each proceeding must be dismissed”.</p>
<p>In his judgment, the judge said he was satisfied the most serious imputations were proven on the balance of probabilities, which is the test in such civil cases.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-win-for-the-press-a-big-loss-for-ben-roberts-smith-what-does-this-judgment-tell-us-about-defamation-law-206759">A win for the press, a big loss for Ben Roberts-Smith: what does this judgment tell us about defamation law?</a>
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<p>This included allegations Roberts-Smith, in an area known as Darwan in 2012, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/ben-roberts-smith-under-police-investigation-for-kicking-handcuffed-afghan-off-small-cliff-20190910-p52pys.html">kicked</a> a handcuffed prisoner over a cliff and ordered other soldiers to shoot him.</p>
<p>Justice Besanko also found the papers established substantial truth in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/may/30/the-ben-roberts-smith-allegations-war-crimes-domestic-violence-defamation-case-trial">allegations</a> that in 2009 in the village of Kakarak, Roberts-Smith carried a man with a prosthetic leg to a place outside the Whiskey 108 compound and shot him dead. </p>
<p>Further claims were made that Roberts-Smith had <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/ben-roberts-smith-case-live-updates-commonwealth-application-seeks-to-delay-historic-defamation-judgment-involving-former-australian-sas-soldier-20230601-p5dd37.html">forced</a> a young recruit to execute an unarmed elderly man as a form of “blooding”, which Besanko also found to be substantially true.</p>
<p>All of these allegations were particularly galling to a man who had been awarded the <a href="https://cove.army.gov.au/article/highest-honour-39-ben-roberts-smith-james-rogers">Medal of Gallantry</a> for his actions in Afghanistan in 2006, the <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1270259">Victoria Cross</a> for his bravery in Tizak in 2010, and a <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2087814">Commendation for Distinguished Services</a> for his outstanding leadership in more than 50 high-risk operations in 2012.</p>
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<h2>Substantial and contextual truth</h2>
<p>The legal battle began after a series of articles were published in the Sydney Morning Herald, the Canberra Times and the Age in 2018, alleging that Roberts-Smith, a patrol commander with the Special Air Service Regiment, was a war criminal. </p>
<p>The allegations were based upon witnesses’ accounts of events that took place in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2012. </p>
<p>The newspapers also alleged he had bullied, harassed and intimidated soldiers under his command, and that he committed an act of domestic violence in 2018. </p>
<p>Besanko also found allegations of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jun/01/ben-roberts-smith-loses-defamation-case-with-judge-saying-newspapers-established-truth-of-some-murders">bullying</a> by Roberts-Smith to be substantially true, but did not find that the newspapers had established the substantial truth of the domestic violence allegations.</p>
<p>The allegations of domestic violence and threats were held to warrant the defence of “contextual truth”. That is, given the newspapers had proved the most serious allegations were substantially true, they could rely on the defence of “contextual truth”. This meant Besanko was satisifed the domestic violence allegations would not further harm Roberts-Smith’s reputation, even though the claims weren’t proven to be substantially true.</p>
<p>The “contextual” truth changes came in a push to have uniformity in defamation laws back in 2005.</p>
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<p>According to Australian common law, a statement is defamatory if it exposes a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or would tend to make right-minded observers shun or avoid that person. Saying a decorated soldier is a war criminal invariably drew the papers deep into potentially defamatory territory.</p>
<p>The papers had to establish a defence, and their defence was that all of what they had reported was true. </p>
<p>Under the law, they needed only to show the “substantial” truth of what they had alleged. A defendant is thus given some leeway; they do not have to prove every last item is completely true.</p>
<p>Because the papers were able to establish the substantial truth of key aspects of the reporting, Roberts-Smith’s case failed.</p>
<p>Roberts-Smith’s lawyers, who were <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/stokes-funded-ben-roberts-smith-s-defence-out-of-public-company-funds-20210412-p57iia.html">funded by Seven West Media chairman Kerry Stokes</a>, claimed that some of the witnesses’ testimonies could not be relied upon. </p>
<p>In one case, the lawyers argued this was because the claims were framed in jealousy and based upon an “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-17/soldier-denies-trying-to-blacken-ben-roberts-smith-name/100917076">obsession</a>” with their leader, and in another case that witnesses were “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/hero-or-psychopath-the-stark-binary-at-the-heart-of-the-ben-roberts-smith-case-20210607-p57ywa.html">fabulists</a>” and “fantasists”.</p>
<p>However, the imputations supported by the oral evidence of nearly all the witnesses were held to be reliable by Besanko.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>It will now be up to the judge, in a further hearing, to determine how much the newspapers will be able to claim back from Roberts-Smith for their reasonable legal costs.</p>
<p>The newspapers requested three weeks to consider how much to seek for costs and third-party costs.</p>
<p>There’s little doubt that both sides have each spent millions on their respective legal teams. The issue of costs may prove just as interesting for observers as the defamation case itself.</p>
<p>Roberts-Smith’s barrister has already raised the possibility that <a href="https://twitter.com/Kate_McClymont/status/1664130451869663232">he will appeal</a>.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-why-soldiers-commit-war-crimes-and-what-we-can-do-about-it-185391">Friday essay: why soldiers commit war crimes – and what we can do about it</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rick Sarre is an office bearer with the SA Labor Party.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ricardo Villegas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In his judgment, the judge said he was satisfied the most serious imputations were proven on the balance of probabilities, which is the test in such civil cases.Ricardo Villegas, Senior Lecturer of Law, University of South AustraliaRick Sarre, Emeritus Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056692023-05-22T15:22:13Z2023-05-22T15:22:13ZWomen’s secret war: the inside story of how the US military sent female soldiers on covert combat missions to Afghanistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526309/original/file-20230515-30399-k7swu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C220%2C3573%2C2171&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US marines with a female engagement team in southern Helmand province, Afghanistan, in May 2012.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/654340/aerohunter-aif-iso-rct-5">Cpl. Meghan Gonzales/DVIDS</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A US Army handbook from 2011 opens one of its chapters with a line from Rudyard Kipling’s poem <a href="https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_youngbrit.htm">The Young British Soldier</a>. Written in 1890 upon Kipling’s return to England from India, an experienced imperial soldier gives advice to the incoming cohort:</p>
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<p>When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains, And the women come out to cut up what remains …</p>
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<p>The <a href="https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-u-s-army-commanders-guide-to-female-engagement-teams/">handbook</a>, distributed in 2011 at the height of the US’s counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, invoked Kipling and other imperial <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/professor-nagl-s-war.html">voices</a> to warn its soldiers that:</p>
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<p>Neither the Soviets in the early 1980s nor the west in the past decade have progressed much beyond Kipling’s early 20th-century warning when it comes to understanding Afghan women. In that oversight, we have ignored women as a key demographic in counterinsurgency.</p>
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<p>Around this time, a growing number of US military units were – against official military policy – training and posting all-women counterinsurgency teams alongside their male soldiers.</p>
<p>Women were still banned from direct assignment to ground combat units. However, these female soldiers were deployed to access Afghan women and their households in the so-called “battle for hearts and minds” during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War">Afghanistan war</a>, which began on October 7 2001 when the US and British militaries carried out an air assault, followed by a ground invasion, in response to the September 11 attacks.</p>
<p>And these women also played critical roles in gathering intelligence. Their sexuality – ironically, the basis of the excuse the US military had long given for avoiding integrating women into combat units – was now seen as an intelligence asset, as the army handbook made clear:</p>
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<p>Like all adolescent males, young Afghan males have a natural desire to impress females. Using this desire to interact with and impress females can be advantageous to US military forces when done respectfully to both the female soldier and the adolescent Afghan males. Female soldiers can often obtain different and even more in-depth information from Afghan males than can male soldiers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether collecting intelligence or calming victims of a US special forces raid, female soldiers – often despite a lack of proper training – played a central yet largely invisible role in the Afghanistan war. Their recollections of what they experienced on these tours call into question official narratives both of women breaking through the “brass ceiling” of the US military, and the war having been fought in the name of Afghan women’s rights and freedom.</p>
<p>Since the US’s final withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-single-women-and-widows-are-struggling-to-find-their-next-meal-under-taliban-restrictions-198279">rollback of women’s rights</a> has concluded a brutal chapter in a story of competing feminisms over the past two decades of war.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C71%2C1997%2C1257&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="US female marines crouching with their weapons" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C71%2C1997%2C1257&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526308/original/file-20230515-39291-krcr2g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Members of a US marine female engagement team in combat training before a tour, October 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/480702/fet-practices-live-fire">Cpl. Meghan Gonzales/DVIDS</a></span>
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<h2>Female counterinsurgency teams in Afghanistan</h2>
<p>Between 2010 and 2017, while conducting research at six US military bases and several US <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-college">war colleges</a>, I met a number of women who spoke of having served on special forces teams and in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was surprising as women were then still technically banned from many combat roles – US military regulations only <a href="https://www.history.com/news/u-s-military-lifts-ban-on-women-in-combat">changed in 2013</a> such that, by 2016, all military jobs were open to women.</p>
<p>Fascinated by their experiences, I later interviewed 22 women who had served on these all-female counterinsurgency teams. The interviews, alongside other observations of development contractors on US military bases and the ongoing legacies of US imperial wars, inform my new book <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501767746/at-war-with-women/">At War with Women: Military Humanitarianism and Imperial Feminism in an Era of Permanent War</a>.</p>
<p>By 2017, enough time had lapsed that the women could speak openly about their deployments. Many had left the military – in some cases disenchanted by the sexism they confronted, or with the idea of returning to an official job in logistics having served on more prestigious special forces teams.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<p>In 2013, Ronda* supported a mission deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city. She was one of only two women living on a remote base with the Operational Detachment Alpha – the primary fighting force for the <a href="https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-forces/">Green Berets</a> (part of the US Army’s special forces).</p>
<p>For Ronda, one of the most rewarding aspects of this deployment was the image she carried of herself as a feminist example for Afghan women. She recalled:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Just letting the girls see there’s more out there [in the wider world] than what you have here, that was very empowering. I think they really appreciated it. In full kit I look like a dude, [but] that first instance when you take off your helmet and they see your hair and see you are female … A lot of times they have never seen a female before who didn’t just take care of the garden and take care of the kids. That was very empowering.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=118%2C107%2C3443%2C2091&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Female soldiers talking to a local woman in front of a helicopter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=118%2C107%2C3443%2C2091&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526305/original/file-20230515-23617-4ties.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">In 2012, the US military presented its female counterinsurgency teams as feminist emblems while keeping their combat roles hidden.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/654343/aerohunter-aif-iso-rct-5">Cpl. Meghan Gonzales/DVIDS</a></span>
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<p>Amanda, who had been on a similar mission to Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan a year earlier, also described inspiring local women – in her case, via stories she shared through her interpreter of life in New York City, and what it was like to be a female soldier. Amanda lived alongside the male soldiers in an adobe hut with a thatched roof, and was unable to shower for the full 47 days of the mission. But she recalled going out into the village with pride:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You see the light, especially in the females’ eyes, when they see other females from a different country – [it] kind of gives them perspective that there is more to the world than Afghanistan.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Publicly, the US military presented its female counterinsurgency teams as feminist emblems, while keeping their combat roles and close attachment to special forces hidden. A 2012 army <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/86128">news article</a> quoted a member of one female engagement team (FET) describing the “positive responses from the Afghan population” she believed they had received:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I think seeing our FET out there gives Afghan women hope that change is coming … They definitely want the freedom American women enjoy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the US military’s mistreatment of its female workforce undermines this notion of freedom – as do the warped understandings of Afghan culture, history and language that both male and female soldiers brought with them on their deployments. Such complexity calls into question US military claims of providing feminist opportunities for US women, and of acting in Afghan women’s best interests.</p>
<p>As a logistics officer, Beth had been trained to manage the movement of supplies and people. She said she was ill-prepared for the reality she confronted when visiting Afghan villages with one of the cultural support teams (CSTs), as they were also known, in 2009.</p>
<p>Beth’s pre-deployment training had included “lessons learned” from the likes of Kipling and Lawrence of Arabia. It did not prepare her to understand why she encountered such poverty when visiting Afghan villages. She recalled:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Imagine huts – and tons of women, men and children in these huts … We had to tell these women: ‘The reason your children are getting sick is because you’re not boiling your water.’ I mean, that’s insane. Look at when the bible was written. Even then, people knew how to boil their water – they talked about clean and unclean, kosher, and that they know what’s going to rot. How did Jesus get the memo and you didn’t?</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A female Afghan role-player wraps a headscarf around a female soldier while a third female soldier looks on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526208/original/file-20230515-29-glpwzx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Afghan role-player with soldiers during female engagement training at a US Army base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jennifer Greenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Ambassadors of western feminism’</h2>
<p>By observing lessons in military classrooms, I learned how young US soldiers (men and women) went through pre-deployment training that still leaned on the perspectives of British colonial officers such as <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/who-was-lawrence-of-arabia">T.E. Lawrence</a> and <a href="https://www.rusi.org/podcasts/talking-strategy/episode-2-c-e-callwell-small-wars-and-integrated-sea-land-operations">C.E. Callwell</a>. There was a tendency to portray Afghan people as unsophisticated children who needed parental oversight to usher them into modernity.</p>
<p>US military representations of Afghan women as homogeneous and helpless, contrasting with western women as models of liberation, also ignored Afghan and Islamic feminist frameworks that have <a href="http://signsjournal.org/podcast/jennifer-fluri-discusses-the-gender-politics-of-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-with-sandra-mcevoy/">long advocated for women’s rights</a>. The notion of US female soldiers modelling women’s rights was often linked with representations of Afghan people as backward and needing models from elsewhere.</p>
<p>To skirt the military policy that in the mid-2000s still banned women from direct assignment to ground combat units, female soldiers were “temporarily attached” to all-male units and encouraged not to speak openly about the work they were doing, which typically entailed searching local women at checkpoints and in home raids.</p>
<p>Rochelle wrote in her journal about her experiences of visiting Afghan villages: “Out the gate I went, [with] headscarf and pistol …” Like Beth’s use of a biblical reference to explain the Afghan villages she confronted, Rochelle placed Afghanistan far backward in time. In one diary entry about a village meeting, she reflected:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For years, I have always wondered what it would be like to live in the Stone Age – and now I know. I see it every day all around me. People walking around in clothes that haven’t been washed, ones they have worn for years. Children with hair white from days of dust build-up. Six-year-old girls carrying around their baby brothers. Eyes that tell a story of years of hardship. Houses made of mud and wooden poles, squares cut out for windows. Dirty misshapen feet.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cultural considerations matrix." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526214/original/file-20230515-13823-9gqh6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Cultural considerations’ training material.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">USAID</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When Rochelle was not accompanying the male patrols, she was visiting girls’ schools and holding meetings with Afghan women about how her unit could help support income-generating opportunities for women, such as embroidery or selling food. Her logic, that this would reduce Taliban support and recruitment, echoed <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/policy/countering-violent-extremism">USAID programmes</a> that still today claim targeted economic opportunity can “counter violent extremism”.</p>
<p>Amelia, a female soldier attached to a special forces mission, spoke of how she was an asset because:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We were not threatening, we were just there. For Afghan men, we were fascinating because we were these independent women in a different role than they see for most women there. And we were non-threatening to them, so they could talk to us openly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Strikingly, Amelia admitted that she and other female soldiers played a similar role for their American counterparts too:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For the [male] marines, just having us there helped kind of calm things down. We would do things to try to give back to them – like we baked for them frequently. That was not our role and I don’t want anyone to think that we were a “baking team”, but we would do things like that and it really helped. Like a motherly touch or whatever. We would bake cookies and cinnamon buns. It really helped bring the team together and have more of a family feeling.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Amelia’s clear apprehension at her unit being seen as the “baking team” speaks to how they were incorporated into combat through reinforcement of certain gender stereotypes. These women used “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/11/arlie-hochschild-housework-isnt-emotional-labor/576637/">emotional labour</a>” – the work of managing, producing and suppressing feelings as part of one’s paid labour – both to counsel the male soldiers with whom they were stationed, and to calm Afghan civilians after their doors had been broken down in the middle of the night.</p>
<p>But the women I met also revealed a culture of sexist abuse that had been exacerbated by the unofficial nature of their combat roles in Afghanistan and Iraq. Soldiers who <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2394531-marine-corps-force-integration-plan-summary.html">did not want women in their midst</a> would joke, for example, that CST actually stood for “casual sex team”. Such treatment undermines the US military’s representations of military women as models of feminist liberation for Afghan women.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier stands in front of a mock Afghan village, holding his rifle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526210/original/file-20230515-15-5gvp0g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A provincial reconstruction team deploying to Afghanistan patrols a mock Afghan village on a US military base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jennifer Greenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘It was the best and the worst deployment’</h2>
<p>Beth’s first deployment to Afghanistan in 2009 was to accompany a small group of Green Berets into an Afghan village and interact with the women and children who lived there. One of her strongest memories was figuring out how to shower once a week by crouching under a wood palate and balancing water bottles between its slats.</p>
<p>Beth’s role was to gather information about which villages were more likely to join the US military-supported <a href="https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_22.pdf">internal defence forces</a> – a cold war counterinsurgency strategy with a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/12/06/the-truth-of-el-mozote">history</a> of brutalising countries’ own citizens. To elicit feelings of security and comfort in those she encountered when entering an Afghan home or searching a vehicle, she described adjusting her voice tone, removing her body armour, and sometimes placing her hands on the bodies of Afghan women and children.</p>
<p>But this “kinder and gentler” aspect of her work was inseparable from the home raids she also participated in, during which marines would kick down the doors of family homes in the middle of the night, ripping people from their sleep for questioning, or worse.</p>
<p>Women like Beth were exposed to – and in a few cases, killed by – the same threats as the special forces units to which they were unofficially attached. But the teams’ hidden nature meant these women often had no official documentation of what they did.</p>
<p>If they returned home injured from their deployment, their records did not reflect their attachment to combat units. This meant they were unable to prove the crucial link between injury and service that determined access to healthcare. And the women’s lack of official recognition has since posed a major barrier to being promoted in their careers, as well as <a href="https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5ddda3d7ad8b1151b5d16cff/5e67d54e8c296ffede3c4f62_Reference-Guide-2017.pdf">accessing</a> military and veteran healthcare.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Female soldier saluting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526315/original/file-20230515-37865-m00axn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lack of official recognition posed a barrier to some women being promoted in their military careers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-soldiers-salute-us-army-military-1711680580">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Beth said she was “lucky” to have come home with her mental health and limbs intact, many of her peers described being unable to sleep and suffering from anxiety, depression and other symptoms of <a href="https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_veterans.asp">post-traumatic stress disorder</a> (PTSD) as a result of their continued exposure to stressful combat situations such as night raids.</p>
<p>Six months into her deployment, Beth’s female partner was riding in a large armoured vehicle when it ran over an explosive device. “Luckily”, as Beth put it, the bomb exploded downwards, blowing off four of the vehicle’s wheels and sending a blast through the layer of rubber foam on which her partner’s feet rested. She was medevacked out of the combat zone with fractured heels, along with six other men.</p>
<p>Technically, Beth was always supposed to have a female partner when working for a cultural support team, but no replacement came. Her mission changed and she became the only woman assigned to support a group of marines stationed on a remote base. There were only a handful of other women on the base, and Beth lived alone in a repurposed shipping container sandwiched between housing for 80 men.</p>
<p>Beth said the marines spread false rumours about her. Other women I spoke with indicated that there was a widespread culture of degrading women like Beth in the US military at this time – just as its leaders were publicly disavowing the military’s epidemic of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/oct/11/military-sexual-assault-survivors-epidemic">sexual assault and rape</a>.</p>
<p>As Beth described her treatment on the second part of her deployment in Afghanistan, her eyes widened. She struggled to find the words that eventually came out:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It was the best and the worst deployment. On some level, I did things that I will never do again – I met some great people, had amazing experiences. But also, professionally, as a captain in the Marine Corps, I have never been treated so poorly in my life – by other officers! I had no voice. Nobody had my back. [The marines] didn’t want us there. These guys did not want to be bringing women along.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beth described how one of the male soldiers lied to her battalion commander, accusing her of saying something she didn’t say – leading to her being removed from action and being placed under a form of custody:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I got pulled back and sat in the hot-seat for months. It was bad. That was a very low point for me.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘Women as a third gender’</h2>
<p>A narrow, western version of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-liberal/">feminism</a> – focused on women’s legal and economic rights while uncritical of the US’s history of military interventions and imperialistic financial and legal actions – helped <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3318265">build popular support for</a> the Afghanistan invasion in 2001. On an individual level, women like Beth made meaning of their deployments by understanding themselves as modern, liberated inspirations for the Afghan women they encountered.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A female soldier cleans the wound of a child" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526313/original/file-20230515-20222-5gvp0g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A female engagement team member treats a child during a medical aid mission, October 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/337619/female-engagement-team-finds-strength-behind-burka">Staff Sgt. Whitney Hughes/DVIDS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in reality, the US military did not deploy women like Beth with the intention of improving Afghan women’s lives. Rather, special forces recognised Afghan women as a key piece of the puzzle to convince Afghan men to join the internal defence forces. While male soldiers could not easily enter an Afghan home without being seen as disrespecting women who lived there, the handbook for female engagement teams advised that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Afghan men often see western women as a “third gender” and will approach coalition forces’ women with different issues than are discussed with men.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And a 2011 Marine Corps Gazette <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hqiRxoTLeb8C&pg=PA305&lpg=PA305&dq=Julia+Watson+Marine+Corps+Gazette+2011+%E2%80%9CFemale+Engagement+Teams:+The+Case+for+More+Female+Civil+Affairs+Marines,%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=tXO3YJJjBW&sig=ACfU3U0XPU65h1cNLncfpbRLhvXAU4VjRQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjFxObLxaT9AhUPQkEAHbs8A_sQ6AF6BAgGEAM#v=onepage&q=Julia%20Watson%20Marine%20Corps%20Gazette%202011%20%E2%80%9CFemale%20Engagement%20Teams%3A%20The%20Case%20for%20More%20Female%20Civil%20Affairs%20Marines%2C%E2%80%9D&f=false">article</a> underlined that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Female service members are perceived as a “third gender” and as being “there to help versus there to fight”. This perception allows us access to the entire population, which is crucial in population-centric operations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of “third gender” here is surprising because the term more often refers to gender identity outside of conventional male-female binaries. In contrast, military uses of such language reinforced traditional gender expectations of women as caregivers versus men as combatants, emphasising how women entered what were technically jobs for men by maintaining these gender roles.</p>
<p>The female counterinsurgency teams were intended to search Afghan women and gather intelligence that was inaccessible to their male counterparts. Beth had volunteered for these secretive missions, saying she was excited to go “outside the wire” of the military base, to interact with Afghan women and children, and to work with US special operations.</p>
<p>Initially, she was enthusiastic about the tour, describing her gender as an “invaluable tool” that allowed her to collect information which her male counterparts could not. She went on home raids with the marines and would search women and question villagers.</p>
<p>Technically, the US military has strict rules about who is allowed to collect formal intelligence, limiting this role to those trained in intelligence. As a result, Beth explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Just like any other team going out to collect information, we always steer clear of saying “collect” [intelligence]. But essentially that’s exactly what we were doing … I won’t call them a source because that is a no-no. But I had individuals who would frequent me when we were in particular areas … [providing] information we were able to elicit in a casual setting instead of running a source and being overt.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘A completely different energy’</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Recruitment poster for a female engagement team." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=771&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526212/original/file-20230515-5879-9gqh6y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=969&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Female engagement team recruitment poster, 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Army</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cindy deployed with a US Army Ranger regiment to Afghanistan in 2012. Having recently graduated from one of the military academies, an advertisement caught her eye: “Become a part of history. Join the US Army Special Operations Command Female Engagement Team Program.”</p>
<p>She was drawn in by the high physical bar and intellectual challenge of jobs in special operations from which the military technically excluded her. Describing the process of being selected for the female unit as a “week from hell”, Cindy said she was proud of “being where it’s hardest” and “the sense of duty, obligation”.</p>
<p>While she was completing her training, Cindy’s friend from airborne school was killed by an explosion in October 2011, while accompanying an Army Ranger team on a night raid of a Taliban weapons maker’s compound in Kandahar. This was Ashley White-Stumpf, subject of the bestselling book <a href="https://gaylelemmon.com/ashleyswar">Ashley’s War</a>, which is now being adapted into a film starring Reese Witherspoon. She was the first cultural support team member to be killed in action, and her funeral brought this secret programme into a very public light.</p>
<p>Her death cast a shadow on the excitement Cindy had initially felt. To confuse matters, the dangers that White-Stumpf (and now Cindy) faced were publicly invisible, given that women were banned from being officially attached to special forces combat units. When female soldiers did appear in public relations photographs, it was often handing out soccer balls or visiting orphanages.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="US soldiers unveil a monument to their dead colleague" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526231/original/file-20230515-13823-5pl73m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers unveil a memorial to 1st Lt. Ashley White-Stumpf, September 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1023069/nc-national-guard-soldiers-honor-fallen-comrade-with-memorial">Staff Sgt. Kelly Lecompte/DVIDS via Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet once deployed, Cindy was attached to a “direct action” unit – the special forces portrayed in action movies kicking down doors, seizing documents and capturing people. This meant that while special forces carried out their mission, her job was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To interact with women and children. To get information, or [find out] if there were nefarious items that were hidden under burkas and things of that nature.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She explained how “you have different tools as a woman that you can use that I don’t think a man would be successful in” – offering the example of a little boy in a village who her team thought knew something. A <a href="https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/specialty-careers/special-ops/army-rangers.html">ranger</a> was questioning the little boy, who was terrified of how, in her words, this male soldier “looked like a stormtrooper, wearing his helmet and carrying a rifle”. In contrast, Cindy explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For me to kneel next to the little kid and take off my helmet and maybe put my hand on his shoulder and say: “There, there” – I can do that with my voice, [whereas] this guy probably could not or would not. And that kid was crying, and we couldn’t get anything out of him. But you can turn the tables with a completely different energy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Cindy told me proudly how it took her just 15 minutes to identify the correct location of the Taliban activity, when her unit had been in the wrong location. She, like many of the women I spoke to, painted a picture of using emotional labour to evoke empathy and sensitivity amid violent – and often traumatic – special operations work.</p>
<h2>‘I’ve had so much BS in my career’</h2>
<p>The women I interviewed were operating in the same permissive climate of sexual harassment and abuse that later saw the high-profile murders of the servicewoman <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/vanessa-guillens-fort-hood-murder-motive-b2086929.html">Vanessa Guillén</a> at Fort Hood military base in Texas in 2020, and the combat engineer <a href="https://msmagazine.com/2023/04/13/ana-fernanda-basaldua-ruiz-fort-hood-sexual-harrassment-murder-vanessa-guillen/">Ana Fernanda Basaldua Ruiz</a> in March 2023.</p>
<p>Before their deaths, both Latinx women had been repeatedly sexually harassed by other male soldiers and had reported incidents to their supervisors, who failed to report them further up the chain of command. Such cases overshadowed any excitement about the recent <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/01/26/women-combat-military-special-forces/">ten-year anniversary</a> of women formally serving in ground combat roles in the US military.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters carry a poster in memory of murdered US soldier Vanessa Guillén" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526319/original/file-20230515-22982-2iwegm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters march in support of the murdered US soldier Vanessa Guillén, July 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/new-york-yorkunited-states07102020peaceful-march-vanessa-1778387528">Jewjewbeed/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mollie deployed to Afghanistan as part of a female engagement team in 2009. Her career up to then had been chequered with discriminatory experiences. In some cases, there were subtle, judgmental looks. But she also described overt instances, such as the officer who, when told of her impending arrival on his unit, had responded bluntly: “I don’t want a female to work for me.”</p>
<p>Mollie said she saw the FET as a way to showcase women’s skill and value within a masculinist military institution. She felt tremendous pride for the “20 other strong women” she worked with, whose adaptability she was particularly impressed with:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During the FET, I saw such great women. It frustrates me that they have to put up with this [sexism] … I’ve had so much BS like that throughout my career. Seeing how amazing these women were in high-stress situations – I want to stay in and continue to fight for that, so junior marines don’t have to put up with the same sorts of sexist misogynist comments that I did.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mollie said the experience on the FET changed her, describing herself emerging as an “unapologetic feminist” responsible for more junior servicewomen. This encouraged her to re-enlist year after year. But for other women, deploying in capacities from which they were normally excluded, only to then return to gender-restricted roles, was a good reason to quit after their contract was up. As was, for many, the continued background of resistance and abuse from male colleagues.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3162.html">2014 study</a> of the US military found that “ambient sexual harassment against service women and men is strongly associated with risk of sexual assault”, with women’s sexual assault risk increasing by more than a factor of 1.5 and men’s by 1.8 when their workplace had an above-average rate of ambient sexual harassment. In 2022, the US military admitted that the epidemic of sexual assault within military ranks had <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2022/09/01/the-militarys-sexual-assault-problem-is-only-getting-worse/">worsened</a> in recent years, and that existing strategies were not working.</p>
<h2>‘Magnitude of regrets’</h2>
<p>Amid the chaotic withdrawal of US and international forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, marines threw together another female engagement team to search Afghan women and children. Two of its members, maintenance technician Nicole Gee and supply chief Johanny Rosario Pichardo, died in a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/single-suicide-bomber-killed-us-troops-afghans-isis/story?id=82676604">suicide bomb attack</a> during the evacuation that killed 13 soldiers and at least 170 Afghans.</p>
<p>Media <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/08/28/female-marines-killed-in-kabul/">coverage</a> remembered Gee cradling an Afghan infant as she evacuated refugees in the days leading up to the attack, underscoring how female soldiers like her did high-risk jobs that came into being through gender expectations of women as caregivers.</p>
<p>Writing to me in 2023, ten years after her deployment to Afghanistan, Rochelle reflected that the departure of US soldiers could be “a whirlwind of emotions if you let it”. She added: “My anger lies with the exit of our own [US forces]. The magnitude of regrets, I hope, lay heavy on someone’s conscience.”</p>
<p>The experiences of Rochelle and other female soldiers in Afghanistan complicate any simplistic representations of them as trailblazers for equal rights in the US military. Their untreated injuries, unrecognised duties, and abusive working conditions make for a much more ambivalent blend of subjugation and pathbreaking.</p>
<p>And even as their position helped formalise the role of US women in combat, this happened through the reinforcement of gender stereotypes and racist representations of Afghan people. In fact, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tql5uPP0qE">Afghan women had long been mobilising</a> on their own terms – largely unintelligible to the US military – and <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-03-16/the-persecution-of-female-protestors-in-afghanistan-the-taliban-ran-me-over-and-tried-to-kill-me.html">continue to do so</a>, with extraordinary bravery, now that the Taliban is back in control of their country.</p>
<p>It is devastating, but not surprising, that the military occupation of Afghanistan did not ultimately improve women’s rights. The current situation summons feminist perspectives that challenge war as a solution to foreign policy problems and work against the forms of racism that make people into enemies.</p>
<p>Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, US Army female engagement teams have been reassembled and deployed to train foreign militaries from <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/5693812/fearless-females-unite-empower-one-another">Jordan</a> to <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/3252982/24th-meu-female-engagement-team-trains-with-romanian-troops">Romania</a>. As we enter the third decade of the post-9/11 wars, we should revisit how these wars were justified in the name of women’s rights, and how little these justifications have actually accomplished for women – whether in the marine corps barracks of Quantico, Virginia, or on the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan.</p>
<p><em>*All names and some details have been changed to protect the identities of the interviewees.</em></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-my-20-years-in-afghanistan-taught-me-about-the-taliban-and-how-the-west-consistently-underestimates-them-167927?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">What my 20 years in Afghanistan taught me about the Taliban – and how the west consistently underestimates them
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<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/can-wars-no-longer-be-won-126068?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Can wars no longer be won?
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<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-inside-story-of-the-cia-v-russia-from-cold-war-conspiracy-to-black-propaganda-in-ukraine-188550?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">The inside story of the CIA v Russia – from cold war conspiracy to ‘black’ propaganda in Ukraine
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<p><em>To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Greenburg has received funding from the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Association of American Geographers, Stanford University, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, and the Department of Geography and the Graduate Division at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the author of At War with Women: Military Humanitarianism and Imperial Feminism in an Era of Permanent War (Cornell University Press).</span></em></p>Women who served in unofficial combat and intelligence roles during the Afghanistan war offer brutally honest accounts of their experiences.Jennifer Greenburg, Lecturer in International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1998432023-04-14T11:45:23Z2023-04-14T11:45:23ZThe Taliban is not playing straight with the west over easing of sanctions – and women and girls are paying much of the price<p>The economic and political isolation of Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in August 2021 has worsened a humanitarian crisis in the country. The World Food Program <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/wfp-afghanistan-situation-report-18-january-2023">has projected</a> that between November 2022 and March 2023 the number of food-insecure Afghans would rise to 20 million – 3.2 million of them under the age of five. Some 6 million people were classed in urgent need of assistance. </p>
<p>Arguments that the west should attempt to engage more effectively with the Taliban were mounted throughout the US-backed governments in Kabul which were put in place after the 2001 coalition invasion following on from the 9/11 terror attack on New York. </p>
<p>These were the driving force behind the <a href="https://www.usip.org/programs/afghanistan-peace-efforts">Doha peace talks</a> in 2018 which led to a deal in which the US agreed to withdraw its forces by May 2021. The US failed to meet this deadline and as the newly installed Biden administration delayed American forces were forced to make a chaotic withdrawal before the Taliban took control of Kabul in August that year.</p>
<p>The Taliban has been designated a terrorist organisation since 2001. Nevertheless, there have been repeated calls for a degree of engagement by the west. Arguments <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/06/taliban-afghanistan-women-ban-mahbouba-seraj-nobel-diplomacy/">for engagement</a> are twofold. Firstly on purely humanitarian grounds. But also due to the belief that continuing total isolation would lead to the Taliban tightening its already oppressive policies. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/the-worlds-humanitarian-economic-and-political-engagement-with-afghanistan/">advocates</a> are arguing that engagement should progress beyond the current focus of merely providing humanitarian support into the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/let-afghanistan-rebuild">political and diplomatic</a> arena. Washington was even poised to open diplomatic channels for the potential <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/taliban-bar-girls-education-us-plan-diplomatic-recognition">recognition of the Taliban regime</a> back in March 2022. But the plan was shelved when the Taliban banned secondary school for girls. </p>
<p>Many of the US sanctions imposed against the Islamic Emirate (IE) have been <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/afghanistan-related-sanctions">softened</a> over the past 18 months through the issuing of US Treasury General Licences. These are meant to permit broad financial relations between the US and other countries and entities around the world. </p>
<p>Afghanistan-related licenses since December 2021 effectively allow most financial transactions that involve the Taliban and its affiliate, the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html">Haqqani Network</a> (a group that officially remains under the Taliban leadership but has its own chain of command and semi-autonomy). But direct money transfers to these groups, who are still designated as terrorist entities, remain prohibited. </p>
<p>The IE even received an exemption from the US sanctions regime designed to punish Russian businesses following the invasion of Ukraine. Under <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1032">GL28</a>, individuals and corporations can <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1032">continue</a> dealing with Russia’s TransKapitalBank (TKB). </p>
<p>But the 18 months of Taliban rule in Afghanistan indicates that this easing has not been met with any concessions on the part of the Taliban administration. The idea that engagement might be reciprocated by the Taliban appears to have gravely underestimated the group’s determined adherence to its repressive core ideology – even at the cost of ignoring deteriorating realities on the ground. </p>
<p>Afghanistan’s extremist rulers have intensified their repressive policies rather than reacting positively to the easing of sanctions. This has been particularly marked in the case of policies relating to women, as the table below shows: </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Table showing timeline of Taliban reprepssionof women and US concessions on sanctions" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1053&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1053&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520550/original/file-20230412-22-mbl830.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1053&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban decisions curtailing women’s rights parallel to US sanctions waivers through Treasury Department general licenses (GL).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kambaiz Rafi</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kabul has meanwhile received more than <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/countries/1/summary/2022">US$3.7 billion</a> (£2.98 billion) from donor countries during 2022 – close to one-third of it from the US. This is less than half of the more than <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/afghanistan-study-group-final-report-pathway-peace-afghanistan">US$8bn</a> that the former western backed republic received annually before 2021. But it indicates that there is still a degree of international goodwill that any less oppressive regime could make better use of.</p>
<h2>Is the Taliban playing ball?</h2>
<p>Reluctance among the Taliban’s leadership for genuine engagement can be seen in the fact that the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, which was instrumental in negotiating the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/world/asia/us-taliban-deal.html">US withdrawal agreement</a> in February 2020, has been marginalised since the takeover. The man who led the talks from the Taliban side between 2015 and 2020, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sher_Mohammad_Abbas_Stanikzai">Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai</a> – who has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-rifts-exposed-afghanistan/31880018.html">been critical</a> of the way the regime is treating girls – has been downgraded to the relatively obscure post of deputy minister of foreign affairs.</p>
<p>Administration of the Taliban’s government is now firmly in the grip of Hibatullah Akhundzadeh, who has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-leader-akhundzada-oppression-isolation/32234403.html?fbclid=IwAR0Xow9Eoyuc3aBQInMayLTt5sPbG0wVoEqPaDaJ3TKPXUfN6rb0otz-DFc">shifted the group’s power base</a> to southern Kandahar province, where conservative loyalists tend to dominate. He is now seen as having <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/02/14/en-afghanistan-les-talibans-traversent-leur-premiere-crise-de-regime_6161731_3210.html">consolidated his faction’s grip</a> on the IE’s domestic and regional policy.</p>
<p>Akhundzadeh’s attitude to women could be seen in his refusal to meet <a href="https://amu.tv/en/33255/">UN deputy director-general Amina Mohammad</a> – the UN’s highest-ranking woman – <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg/press-encounter/2023-01-25/deputy-secretary-general-amina-mohammed%E2%80%99s-press-conference-upon-her-return-afghanistan">when she visited</a> in January, chiefly to engage the regime’s leadership. </p>
<p>Prominent women’s activist, Mehbouba Seraj – who has been <a href="https://www.prio.org/news/3009">shortlisted for the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize</a> – remains an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/06/taliban-afghanistan-women-ban-mahbouba-seraj-nobel-diplomacy/">advocate of engagement</a> with the Taliban. “If we don’t sit down and talk to them and see what it is exactly that we can do and they can do, the ones who are going to be paying for it, and who are paying a huge price, are the poor people of Afghanistan, the women and children,” she said in February. </p>
<p>But realities on the ground since August 2021 show that ideological extremism cannot be countered by wishful thinking. Any continued western engagement should come with a price tag for the IE, not offered on the cheap. It should be based on clear communication of reforms by the regime, particularly to improve the conditions for women and an entire generation of girls who are being denied an education.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kambaiz Rafi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The west wants to prevent a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. But every move towards engagement with the Taliban is met with further oppression.Kambaiz Rafi, ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2018522023-03-21T12:41:54Z2023-03-21T12:41:54ZA string of assassinations in Afghanistan point to ISIS-K resurgence – and US officials warn of possible attacks on American interests in next 6 months<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516086/original/file-20230317-14-oncfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3407%2C1875&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A suicide attack in early March 2023 killed a Taliban governor in his office and two other victims.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/men-shift-a-wounded-man-inside-a-hospital-in-mazar-i-sharif-news-photo/1247932977">Atif Aryan/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since returning to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban have struggled to contain the Islamic State Khorasan province, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a> – the official Islamic State group affiliate operating in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Now, a fresh wave of assassination attempts on top Taliban officials has rocked multiple regions across the country and prompted fears of the group’s potential to attack targets outside Afghanistan, including U.S. and Western interests. </p>
<p>On March 9, 2023, the Islamic State group claimed responsibility for a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/09/afghanistan-balkh-governor-taliban-blast/">suicide bombing</a> that killed Mohammad Dawood Muzammil, the Taliban governor of Balkh province in northern Afghanistan, along with two others. One day earlier, the group’s fighters carried out a <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230308/9e3080c046c047b09200a297e200adb0/c.html">targeted killing</a> against the head of the water supply department in Afghanistan’s western Herat province. And most recently, on March 15, the group claimed a <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1636492992146993158?s=51&t=QMYqOVuyPsPEZEWrZj4yYA">failed attack</a> on a Taliban district governor in the eastern province of Nangarhar, a former ISIS-K stronghold. </p>
<h2>ISIS-K’s resurgence</h2>
<p>ISIS-K seeks to advance the Islamic State group’s goal of creating a global caliphate based on its own interpretation of Islamic law.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.amirajadoon.net/">scholars who have studied</a> <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">ISIS-K for years</a>, we know that the recent attacks are only a few in a long line of attacks the group has carried out or attempted in Afghanistan since forming in 2015. </p>
<p>ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Islamic_State_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_Strategic_Alliances_and_Rivalries">tried – often successfully – to kill</a> government and military officials, media influencers, religious leaders and other civil society figures. The group is also responsible for the bombing that left <a href="https://apnews.com/article/europe-france-evacuations-kabul-9e457201e5bbe75a4eb1901fedeee7a1">13 U.S. service members and scores of Afghans</a> dead in August 2021, following the collapse of the former government and the U.S.-led withdrawal from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Some of ISIS-K’s ambitious plots have failed. Notable examples include claimed attempts against <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/27/16374772/mattis-afghanistan-kabul-airport-attack-taliban-isis">NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis</a> in 2017, former Afghanistan vice president <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-dostum-claim/islamic-state-claims-suicide-bombing-targeting-afghan-vice-president-amaq-idUSKBN1KC0Q4">Abdul Rashid Dostum</a> in 2018, former Afghanistan president <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/dueling-presidential-inaugurations-planned-in-kabul/2020/03/09/f3b71a14-61ba-11ea-8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.html">Ashraf Ghani</a> in 2020 and former U.S. diplomat in Kabul <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/13/middleeast/isis-assassination-attempt-us-intl/index.html">Ross Wilson</a> in 2021. </p>
<p>Despite both being Islamist organizations, ISIS-K and the Taliban are strategic rivals locked in a battle that has <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">persisted since ISIS-K’s inception</a>. Targeted assassinations of Taliban security and political officials, across multiple ranks and levels, have been a consistent feature of <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">ISIS-K’s resurgence</a>. The recent killings are simply a continuation of the group’s attack priorities.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man wearing combat vest over traditional Afghan clothes and holding assault rifle looks through door of heavily damaged building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516137/original/file-20230317-4809-hu3ken.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan security forces stormed a hideout used by ISIS-K militants in Kabul in January 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-afghan-security-force-member-stands-guard-near-the-site-news-photo/1246031900">Zahir Khan Zahir/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Aim of assassinations</h2>
<p>Assassinations are a fundamental pillar of the Islamic State group’s <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The_Long_Jihad.pdf">insurgency doctrine</a>, which is adopted by its affiliates and serves multiple purposes. </p>
<p>For one, they’re a way to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221126080">retaliate against heavy losses</a>. Just days before the latest string of attacks, ISIS-K <a href="https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1632741455419650050?s=51&t=QMYqOVuyPsPEZEWrZj4yYA">threatened to amplify its violence</a> after <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-forces-kill-top-is-commanders-in-afghanistan-/6981441.html">Taliban raids</a> in January and February killed key Islamic State leaders and attack planners. </p>
<p>For another, assassinations can whittle away key leaders in the enemy’s ranks, as well as foreign influence. The latest issue of the Islamic State group’s <a href="https://jihadology.net/">weekly newsletter, Al-Naba</a>, claimed that Gov. Muzammil was not only a significant player in the Taliban’s campaign against ISIS-K in Nangarhar, but that he was also acting on behalf of Iran. Countering actual or perceived foreign state influence in Afghanistan – even the lifesaving work of <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/Islamic-State-anti-humanitarian-campaign-Afghanistan">international humanitarian groups</a> – has been a consistent feature of ISIS-K propaganda and violence. </p>
<p>In addition, assassinations of high-profile opponents serve to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068">raise morale among fighters, prevent defections and boost recruitment</a>. The ability to assassinate top Taliban leaders and commanders showcases ISIS-K’s strength to potential recruit, including from within the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-rivalry">Taliban’s ranks</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, high-profile attacks signal to the Islamic State’ group’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria that its affiliate in Afghanistan deserves continued support and investment. ISIS-K leaders have frequently <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Islamic_State_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_Strategic_Alliances_and_Rivalries">sent letters</a> to Islamic State group leadership boasting of their successful assassinations and other operations. After the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">attack on the Kabul airport</a> in August 2021, ISIS-K <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/416/14/PDF/N2141614.pdf?OpenElement">received new cash payments</a> from top Islamic State group leaders – either as a reward, investment or both. </p>
<h2>Consequences for the US</h2>
<p>How successful ISIS-K is in rebuilding its insurgency and replicating the caliphate model in Iraq and Syria will depend on a number of factors. </p>
<p>Most important is its continued ability to leverage its <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Islamic_State_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_Strategic_Alliances_and_Rivalries">strategic alliances and rivalries</a>. Partnering with <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/allied-lethal-islamic-state-khorasans-network-organizational-capacity-afghanistan-pakistan/">other jihadist groups</a> in the region helps ISIS-K sustain its capacity for violence. And <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/iskp-criticizes-talibans-acceptance">accusing the Taliban of apostasy</a> for accepting foreign investment and humanitarian aid from “infidel” or enemy governments – including China, the U.S., Iran, Turkey and others – helps distinguish ISIS-K’s own brand from its rivals. Targeting killings of such opponents further reinforces this distinction.</p>
<p>A strengthened ISIS-K insurgency in Afghanistan has direct consequences for U.S. and Western security interests. A February 2023 <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email">U.S. intelligence report</a> warned of ISIS-K’s desire to attack the West. And on March 16, U.S. CENTCOM commander <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html">Gen. Michael Kurilla testified</a> that ISIS-K will be able to attack American and Western interests outside Afghanistan in less than six months.</p>
<p>Whether or not this assessment is accurate, the recent claimed assassinations by ISIS-K are one of many indicators that point to its growing threat in Afghanistan – a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-after-the-fall-of-kabul-talibans-false-commitments-on-terrorism-have-been-fully-exposed-188132">threat that we believe</a> the Taliban <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">can’t take on alone</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ISIS-K’s recent killings of Taliban brass are part of the extremist group’s long-term strategy. Will Taliban leaders contain the resurgence of violence?Andrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982552023-02-07T20:48:04Z2023-02-07T20:48:04ZDespite the Taliban’s pledge to eradicate opium, the poppy trade still flourishes in Afghanistan<p>The Taliban have always had a complicated relationship with the opium trade. As a narcotic, opium is haram, or <a href="https://azislam.com/prohibition-of-drugs-in-islam">forbidden under Islamic law</a>. But at the same time opium production has <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/sa/facts_taliban_drugs.html#:%7E:text=Since%201997%20over%2096%20percent%20of%20the%20opium-poppy,decrees%20from%20the%20Taliban%20leadership%20banning%20poppy%20cultivation.">tended to increase</a> in areas they have controlled, where local leaders reportedly raise money to fund their operations by imposing “taxes” on poppy farmers and others involved in the trade.</p>
<p>When it retook power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban leadership said it would <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/03/asia/taliban-bans-drug-cultivation-opium-afghanistan-intl/index.html">prohibit the production of opium</a> and duly announced the ban in April 2022. Islamic law notwithstanding, this was <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/talibans-poppy-ban-afghanistan/">widely interpreted</a> as part of the regime’s push for international recognition and the unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign assets – which remain subject to international sanctions.</p>
<p>But recent figures released by the United Nation’s <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Opium_cultivation_Afghanistan_2022.pdf">Office on Drugs and Crime</a> (UNODC) suggest that – thus far – the ban has been ineffective. By 2022, the area of land under opium cultivation had increased by 32%, or 56,000 hectares, compared to the previous year. The 2022 crop was the third-largest area under cultivation since UNODC began monitoring in 1994, as the graph below shows.</p>
<p>Previous efforts to control cultivation have had limited success in persuading farmers to stop growing poppies. The <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-52-LL.pdf">failure of the US-led eradication</a> effort that took place from 2003 to 2009 highlighted the difficulty of physically destroying crops before harvest as a means of reducing cultivation. The total campaign cost almost US$300 million (£245 million), representing more than $31,000 per hectare of eradication. </p>
<p>This effort had little impact, in part because of the scale of cultivation across Afghanistan (<a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Opium_cultivation_Afghanistan_2022.pdf">UNODC estimates</a> 20% of arable land in Helmand is used to cultivate poppies) and a lack of viable alternatives for farmers. It was also difficult for the eradication teams to operate in hostile areas. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506169/original/file-20230124-366-nteg99.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Total area of opium cultivation for Afghanistan between 1994 and 2022 from the UNODC’s annual opium surveys. Taliban bans opium in July 2000 and April 2022.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Programmes to promote alternatives to the poppy crop have also had a limited overall effect in areas where opium growing is concentrated. Afghanistan’s southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar are the source of the majority of the world’s opium and its production dominates the agricultural system. </p>
<h2>Cash crop</h2>
<p>My colleagues and I research technological ways of monitoring illicit crops. Security issues make doing this from the ground difficult in Afghanistan so, in 2005, we started work that aimed to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01431161003713028">address gaps</a> in generic knowledge of how to measure poppy, poppy yield and poppy eradication from satellite imagery. This resulted in an integrated application of high, medium and coarse spatial resolution satellite data to provide critical information on cereal and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Our research between 2005 and 2010 identified areas in Helmand where up to 30% of the cultivated area was used for growing poppy, with the rest mostly wheat. At this time, prices were decreasing and pressure on opium production in the more established areas caused an expansion of cultivation into areas of former desert. Growers in these new areas use water drawn from deep wells for irrigation, which is a source of concern for future water security. </p>
<p>Afghan farmers are now more than ever <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/when-water-runs-out-rise-and-inevitable-fall-deserts-southwest-afghanistan-and">dependent on opium for their livelihoods</a> as there are no viable alternatives for generating income. These marginal areas require investment in higher-cost farming techniques, such as pumps to draw water for irrigation, which only cash from opium can provide.</p>
<p>Despite the lack of success in reducing opium cultivation, there has been an expectation that the Taliban might succeed where others have failed. This is not just wishful thinking. Their previous ban <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395904000945">halted cultivation in 2001</a>, as the graph above shows, although from a lower level of overall opium production than now. </p>
<p>The widespread effectiveness of their ban on opium cultivation was the result of brutal enforcement in areas under their control. Individual farmers were first warned and those violating the ban were forced to destroy their crops alongside corporal punishment and prison.</p>
<p>One of the difficulties in measuring the impact of the new ban is the inevitable lag between any enforcement and the release of official figures. The Taliban’s April 2022 ban came when the growing season was already well underway so it’s still too early to properly assess the extent to which it has been obeyed. The ban announced in July 2000 halted production in the 2021 season.</p>
<h2>Time will tell</h2>
<p>Opium cultivation in the south effectively starts each October, when farmers decide on what they are going to plant. The poppy seedlings remain dormant over winter and begin growing as temperatures rise in the spring. They <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01431161.2014.951099">flower in March or April</a> and are harvested shortly afterwards. </p>
<p>The UNODC’s annual survey measures the area of poppy cultivation when the crops are still green, at a time when they are distinct in the satellite images used to detect them. But the final results come much later because of the huge effort required to <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/drug-cultivation-production-and-manufacture.html">produce robust estimates</a>. These surveys require extensive data collection, mapping of fields at sample locations, and thorough quality control before countrywide results can be released.</p>
<p>It is possible that we have not yet seen any impact of the current policy and that the 2023 growing season might be a better test of the Taliban’s ban.</p>
<p>Conditions on the ground have also changed since 2001. The <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Opium_cultivation_Afghanistan_2022.pdf">UN’s analysis</a> points to the growth in the illicit economy since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover as the legitimate economy has shrunk, alongside an increase in the price of opium (tripling 2022 incomes), as reasons to be cautious about the effect of any new policy. </p>
<p>With no sign of any reduction in demand, much will depend on how the ban has been enforced in late 2022 and early 2023. The Taliban’s long-term commitment to their previous ban was not tested as they were toppled by the US in 2001. So we will have to wait until the UNODC publishes its next set of figures to assess how committed the Taliban has been to eradicating opium cultivation – and how successful they have been in a country that remains riven with conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Simms does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The area of land under opium cultivation increased by 32% last year.Daniel Simms, Lecturer in Remote Sensing , Cranfield UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982792023-02-03T12:23:34Z2023-02-03T12:23:34ZAfghanistan: single women and widows are struggling to find their next meal under Taliban restrictions<p>Jamila*, a widow living in Herat, lost her husband in a suicide attack about eight years ago. She has an 18-year-old daughter who is blind and a 20-year-old son who lost both legs in a mine blast. </p>
<p>Jamila used to be a housemaid and bake bread for people in their homes. With this income she was able to feed her daughter and son, according to research carried out by Ahmad*, a former lecturer at the University of Herat and shared with me. </p>
<p>Since the Taliban gained control of the country, Afghanistan has been on the brink of universal hardship. As many as <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/97-percent-afghans-could-plunge-poverty-mid-2022-says-undp">97%</a> of people are now estimated to be living <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/millions-afghan-lives-and-livelihoods-danger-without-support-says-un-development-programme-chief">in poverty</a>, up from 72% in 2018. </p>
<p>The recent Taliban ban on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-64086682?at_medium=RSS&at_campaign=KARANGA">women working</a> in international and national organisations and women moving about <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/Gender-alert-2-Womens-rights-in-Afghanistan-one-year-after-the-Taliban-take-over-en_0.pdf">public spaces</a> has also affected women being able to find employment. </p>
<p>Because of the current situation Jamila has lost her clients and is now struggling to cope. She could not pay her rent and the landlord asked her to leave her home. She now lives in a small room that a kind family gave her in their yard. She has no source of income. </p>
<p>Previously about 10% of educated women <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/Countries/Country-Main.cfm?ctry_id=71">in Afghanistan</a> worked in national or international organisations to support their children. If less educated, they had a range of formal and informal jobs including working as housemaids, baking bread, washing clothes, cleaning bathrooms and babysitting, and in <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0059-0">rural communities</a> rearing small livestock and growing wheat, maize and vegetables. </p>
<p>Jamila said that previously under the former government her family received a monthly salary from the state ministry of martyrs and disabled affairs, which pays families of military veterans or those killed in the fighting, and that gave them enough money for bread. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The new government (the Taliban) has now stopped this salary … they don’t believe our lost ones are martyrs.</p>
<p>My son also had a job with the municipality office in a city parking lot, taking care of vehicles and collecting money from people parking their vehicles there. There were many handicapped people doing this kind of job. But now all of them, including my son, have lost their jobs. </p>
<p>The Taliban has appointed their own personnel in these parking areas. We have very few options left. A neighbour now drops my son near a bridge in the city where he begs people to help him with coins. He brings him back here in the evening. With the coins he brings, we can get only bread to survive until the next day.</p>
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<p>Jamila is not an exception. She is one of thousands of women who have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/11/a-year-of-taliban-takeover-the-missing-women-in-afghan-workforce">lost their jobs</a> as a result of the new decrees. Many are acutely malnourished and don’t know where their next meal is coming from. </p>
<p>Single women and widows have practically no way of earning money. On-the-ground reports reveal that many households are supported by women as male members of their family were either killed or injured in the ongoing conflict.</p>
<p>It is not just food, but also shelter, water, fuel and warmth that contribute to survival, especially in bitterly cold temperatures. Ahmad, the former lecturer in Afghanistan, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since COVID-19, my wife and I have tried to raise funds from friends to help poor families (especially widows). Very <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/more-than-160-afghans-die-bitterly-cold-weather-2023-01-26/">cold weather</a> has been forecast for the western zone of Afghanistan in February. </p>
<p>There has been snow and the temperature has dipped to -25°C at night early in 2023. One of my friends, who is in the US, helped us with some money locally to buy charcoal to help poor widows like Jamila cook food and warm up their rooms. My wife is also very frustrated and helpless in the current situation. </p>
<p>But, the plight of women-headed households, lacking adult males, is especially dire. In the absence of any social connection, they are increasingly food insecure, with few options to feed and care for their children.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This follows Taliban decrees banning women from education at the secondary and university level and not allowing them to travel without a <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/Gender-alert-2-Womens-rights-in-Afghanistan-one-year-after-the-Taliban-take-over-en_0.pdf"><em>mahram</em></a> (male close relative as chaperone). The Taliban also ordered the closure of all beauty salons, public bathrooms, and <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2023/01/10/afghanistan-authorities-ban-women-working-malls-close-beauty-salons-females-10-days">sports centres for women</a>, important sectors of employment for women. </p>
<p>Overall, the dire situation in Afghanistan has increased the incidence of <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2021.pdf">extreme hunger</a> and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8733523/">malnutrition</a> for both men and women, but women without husbands are being pushed into even more extreme poverty.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-taliban-shifts-tactics-in-its-determination-to-control-and-oppress-women-188411">The Taliban shifts tactics in its determination to control and oppress women</a>
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<p>According to UN resident and humanitarian coordinator Ramiz Alakbarov, “a staggering 95% of Afghans are not <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8733523/">getting enough to eat</a>, with that number rising to almost 100% in <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113982#:%7E:text=Afghanistan%3A%20Food%20insecurity%20and%20malnutrition%20threaten%20%E2%80%98an%20entire%20generation%E2%80%99">female-headed households</a>”. </p>
<p>The January 2023 high-level UN delegation led by Deputy Secretary-General <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/un-deputy-secretary-general-amina-mohammed%E2%80%99s-press-conference-upon-her-return-afghanistan">Amina Mohammed</a> called on the Taliban authorities to reverse the various decrees limiting women’s and girl’s rights for the sake of peace and sustainable development. While the backlash against women’s rights needs to be urgently addressed, the crisis of food and nutrition security facing single women, widows and separated women, is not being recognised by many outside the country.</p>
<p>According to the 2015 Demographic Health Survey, only <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.HOU.FEMA.ZS?view=chart&locations=AF">1.7%</a> of Afghan households were headed by women. The January 2022 report from the UN World Food Programme places this at <a href="https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000136715/download/">4%</a>.</p>
<p>As a former employee of the Afghanistan Central Statistical Organisation, responsible for population data collection in four districts of Bamiyan province, told us: “It is very difficult to collect accurate population data.” She said that previous data concerning women-headed households was now likely to be invalid. </p>
<p>While women’s rights are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2022.2107172">under attack in Afghanistan</a>, the full effect of the ban on women’s work and mobility on single women, widows and separated women, is yet to be fully recognised. While appeals for help to the United Nations by teachers, professionals and civil society activists are rising by the day, negotiations are not progressing, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance is becoming increasingly challenging. </p>
<p>It’s difficult to estimate how long local communities, themselves struggling to survive, can keep women-led households and their families alive.</p>
<p>**All names in this article have been changed for security reasons</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nitya Rao has received funding from DFID for a project entitled 'Leveraging Agriculture for Nutrition in South Asia (LANSA)' between 2014-18.. </span></em></p>Widows and single women are losing their homes, after being told they can no longer work by the Taliban, and are living on the poverty line.Nitya Rao, Professor of Gender & Development, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976642023-02-02T05:49:49Z2023-02-02T05:49:49ZChina is extending its dealings with the Taliban as it increases its superpower status<p>China is one of the few countries that is committed to expanding its dealings with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, where it hopes to expand its use of the vast natural resources while also improving its own geopolitical security. </p>
<p>In mid-2021 <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/afghanistan-the-west-fails-a-win-for-china-and-russia">China welcomed a Taliban delegation</a>, showing its willingness to recognise the Taliban government as the US signalled <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/withdrawal-of-United-States-troops-from-Afghanistan">its planned withdrawal</a>. In early January 2023, a Chinese firm agreed to sign a 25-year contract for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64183083">oil extraction in Afghanistan</a>. There is also the possibility that a Chinese state-owned company will be contracted to operate <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64183083">a copper mine</a> in the country. </p>
<p>It is unsurprising that as western countries withdraw almost all their links with Afghanistan, China is willing to increase its commercial presence in the country. Although traditionally its Afghan policy has not been a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845228">diplomatic priority</a>, it now sees opportunities.</p>
<p>Despite being one of Afghanistan’s <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/1/1/article-p133_8.xml?language=en">largest foreign investors</a> in the past and its strategic partner, China’s involvement in the country has previously been relatively limited when compared with others such as Russia and the US.</p>
<p>Arguably, its policy in regard to Afghanistan has been driven <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/1/1/article-p133_8.xml?language=en">by domestic economic interests and security issues</a>. However, in the last decade or so, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy. At the same time, commercial interests have also led to increased Chinese involvement in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Useful natural resources</h2>
<p>Greater active engagement with Afghanistan will enable China to benefit in several ways. Afghanistan is one of the world’s most <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/afghanistan-taliban-mining-resources-rich-minerals/">resource-rich countries</a>, but its security conditions have constrained the development of the sector.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.payam-aftab.com/images/docs/files/000054/nf00054424-1.pdf">Some estimates</a> set the value of Afghanistan’s untapped mineral deposits, such as copper, iron and lithium, at £811.5 billion. In terms of crude oil, it has 1.6 billion barrels. As for natural gas, Afghanistan possesses 16 trillion cubic feet, and has access to 500 million barrels of natural gas liquids.</p>
<p>However, in the past, Chinese activities in Afghanistan’s mineral sector have stalled. In the late 2010s, for example, security concerns <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-has-vast-mineral-wealth-but-faces-steep-challenges-to-tap-it-166484">hindered the activities of Chinese enterprises</a> tapping into the country’s mineral resources.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">China is becoming an ally of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Useful Afghan resources</h2>
<p>There is another related gain in working with the Afghan natural resources sector. China’s domestic <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/chinas-energy-security-realities-and-cop27-ambitions/">energy supply </a> is limited both by geology and <a href="https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Energy_density">energy density</a>, and its dependence on other countries leads to “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/chinas-energy-security-realities-and-cop27-ambitions/">energy security anxieties</a>”.</p>
<p>Access to Afghanistan’s natural resources, then, not only provides economic incentives for China to increase its commercial presence in the country. It also has the potential to help ease its growing demand for energy.</p>
<p>Increasing involvement in Afghanistan falls within China’s <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-prioritizes-short-term-energy-security-implications-sino-middle-east-relations">prioritisation of short-term energy security</a>. But it can become a fundamental strategic element for its long-term energy requirements.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-population-decline-is-a-result-of-decades-of-botched-family-planning-measures-and-will-have-global-implications-198017">China's population decline is a result of decades of botched family planning measures and will have global implications</a>
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<p>Afghanistan’s fragile internal security has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845228">affected China in two ways</a>. First, it worried that years of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845228">instability in Afghanistan</a> would spill over into China’s Xinjiang autonomous territory, where there is a long history of religious and ethnic tension with Beijing. This has included <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22278037">crackdowns</a> by Beijing on the Muslim Uyghur people, and widespread accusations of extensive human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Second, the instability that stems from Afghanistan negatively affects the development of China’s <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI), which is building trade routes with the rest of the world, because two of its fundamental corridors run adjacent to Afghanistan. As a global infrastructure and development investment plan encompassing over 60 countries (although there is no official count), including some from east Asia and Europe, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">the initiative</a> is a vehicle to expand China’s global economic and political influence. Such an expansion is paramount for China’ superpower aspirations.</p>
<p>Trade frictions with the US and other countries have increased the pressure to open other markets for China’s goods. The BRI is an effective channel to <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">develop new export markets</a> which can alleviate trade pressures. And although the Afghan consumer market is small, it is <a href="https://www.payam-aftab.com/images/docs/files/000054/nf00054424-1.pdf">an untapped market for Chinese goods</a> – particularly those produced in China’s western regions.</p>
<h2>Building superpower status</h2>
<p>An additional gain is geopolitical. After decades of hegemonic presence “next door” but a degree of reluctance to get involved in Afghan affairs, China seems to be somewhat ready to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of western countries.</p>
<p>Greater presence in Afghanistan provides China with an opportunity to strengthen its regional power and influence. In doing so, it can contribute to the stability of Afghanistan. In turn, such a role will improve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2347798916638209">China’s image</a> as a responsible rising power.</p>
<p>So far, China has been <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/afghanistan-view-china">reluctant to take on a security role</a> in Afghanistan, because this could have led to friction with other countries and increased its exposure to threats by international terrorists networks. However, a change in strategy to increase the economic stability of Afghanistan can contribute to the reduction of China’s own security vulnerabilities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is expanding its relationship with the Taliban as a way of addressing its needs for increased energy supply.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.