tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/african-development-19186/articlesAfrican development – The Conversation2022-02-22T14:21:06Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1766032022-02-22T14:21:06Z2022-02-22T14:21:06ZHow the migration and mobility pact has helped to reset AU-EU relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447521/original/file-20220221-26-y3xj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Representatives at the AU-EU Summit in Brussels</span> </figcaption></figure><p>At the recent <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/">6th AU-EU summit</a>, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) unveiled five partnerships highlighting their Joint Vision till 2030.</p>
<p>The five partnerships are: green transition and energy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance and migration and mobility.</p>
<p>The genesis of their partnership on migration and mobility goes back to the Joint-Valletta Action Plan that was signed in November 2015 in the wake of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21599165.2015.1129946?journalCode=fjcs21">refugee crisis</a>. That autumn hundreds of thousands of Syrian, Afghan and Eritrean asylum seekers crossed into Greece from Turkey, and into Italy from Libya. The EU called an emergency meeting with African countries to try and find a long lasting solution. </p>
<p>The meeting was attended by countless heads of government, NGOs, international organisations, AU and EU officials. </p>
<p>My colleague Eileen Lamptey and I, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.12953">analysed</a> the content of the Joint Valletta Action Plan and evaluated its implementation until 2021. </p>
<p>We found that the phrase that emerged from the meeting was “shared responsibility”. This highlighted the parties´ recognition of their interdependence. While each party held onto its interests (territorial integrity for the Europeans and economic development for the Africans), there was a new sense, especially on the part of the more powerful Europeans, that both parties needed each other’s help and co-operation to advance these interests.</p>
<p>This policy shift was evident in the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf"> domains of action</a> that were agreed around migration. </p>
<p>We found only a limited gap in policy implementation. The policies on the paper were put in place and their results so far have been mostly positive. We concluded that they constituted a break with the past and progress in the EU-AU migration dialogue.</p>
<h2>The implementation score card</h2>
<p>The domains of action around migration were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>migration and development</p></li>
<li><p>legal migration and mobility</p></li>
<li><p>protection and asylum</p></li>
<li><p>prevention of and fight against irregular migration</p></li>
<li><p>return, readmission, and reintegration.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The first two domains were “African domains” while the last two were “European domains.” The third domain was of equal importance to both parties but advantageous for the Africans. </p>
<p>A funding instrument worth Euro 3,6 billion was <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en">created</a> - the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa.</p>
<p>Africa’s primary domain – migration and development – benefited from sufficient funding from the fund. The 2019 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_report_2019_eng_digital_edition.pdf">Annual Report of the Trust Fund</a> disclosed that its implementation had been “swift and effective” , and less than 2% of the sums disbursed were ineligible. </p>
<p>The main European domain – the prevention of and fight against irregular migration – saw the disruption of illegal immigration networks and a sharp decline in clandestine immigration. According to the <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205">UNHCR</a>, the United Nations’ refugee agency, the numbers dropped from 153,842 in 2016 to 10,565 in 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>In the domain of protection and asylum, more than more than 48 000 asylum seekers were repatriated. This was done under the <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/joint-press-release-meeting-joint-au-eu-un-taskforce-address-migrant-and-refugee-situation-libya">AU–EU–UN Tripartite Taskforce</a> on the Situation of Stranded Migrant and Refugees in Libya which was launched in 2017. </p>
<p>Some areas fell short of expectations. These included regular migration and mobility – an African domain. And the return, readmission and integration – a European domain.</p>
<p>This shows that bolder action is needed. </p>
<h2>A broader paradigm shift?</h2>
<p>In my view the deliberations at the 6th AU-EU summit looked very much like those of the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/">2015 Valletta summit</a>. EU leaders laid the same emphasis on interdependence, concrete immediate actions and a reset of their relationship with the AU.</p>
<p>The tone of the summit suggests that Europeans want to cooperate with Africans with a new mindset based on pragmatism and not pompous announcements. They also want agreement on concrete action based on Africans inputs. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/media-galleries/international-summit/2022-02-17-18-eu-africa/?slide=0">At the opening ceremony</a> of the AU-EU summit, Emmanuel Macron, the president of France and the EU rotating presidency spoke of forging “a new alliance”. </p>
<p>Charles Michel, the EU council president, declared that the summit was not “business as usual” but “the step that cements the renewal of [EU-AU] strategic relation. The example he used was the use, for the first time, of <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf">roundtable sessions</a> at the summit. These were designed to foster frank discussion as well as fast and concrete decisions. </p>
<p>And talking about the partnership on peace and governance he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>security in Africa and in Europe are interdependent. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen announced an investment budget worth 150 billion until 2021 drawn from the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433">Global Gateway initiative</a>, EU’s response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>In his reply, Macky Sall, Senegal president and the current AU chairman requested, as a concrete measure, the use of the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en">European Peace Facility</a>, an off-budget instrument that allows the EU to swiftly support military initiatives in favour of global peace. </p>
<p>Moussa Faki, the AU Commission chairman underscored the need for new monitoring and evaluation procedures, arguing that "the partnership needs visible and tangible results” for Africa cannot content itself anymore with the fashionable label of “being the continent of the future”. </p>
<p>On this point too, the Joint-Valletta Action Plan introduced an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_report_2019_eng_digital_edition.pdf">innovative system of evaluation</a> based on the new EU Evaluation Framework and consisting of regular monitoring on the ground, quarterly or yearly evaluations at regional level (Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North Africa) and timely evaluation of the Trust Fund as a whole.</p>
<p>If the implementation of the other four partnerships follows the same playbook as that of the Joint-Valletta Action Plan, by the time they meet again, AU and EU member states could be talking of the first fruits of their renewed partnership. The EU and AU would do well to use the plan as a template for all the agreements they have struck.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176603/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahama Tawat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bolder action is needed if the African Union and the European Union are to find common ground on migration.Mahama Tawat, Research fellow, Université de MontpellierLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1713082021-11-28T09:09:45Z2021-11-28T09:09:45ZHow African thinkers of the 1980s fed into today’s inequality debates<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431267/original/file-20211110-27-17rw2ib.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inequality within countries is growing globally </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Inequality is an issue that arises everywhere in the world today. </p>
<p>Recent studies by economists such as <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.4159/9780674969797/html">Branko Milanovic</a> and <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674980822">Thomas Piketty</a> have looked at trends in economic inequality on a global scale. Social movements – such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/18/why-south-african-students-have-turned-on-their-parents-generation">Rhodes Must Fall</a>, <a href="https://blacklivesmatter.com/">Black Lives Matter</a> and <a href="https://metoomvmt.org/">Me Too</a> – as well as the COVID pandemic, have emphasised inequalities along lines of institutionalised racism, gender, wealth and health. All these highlight the unequal global power relations that continuously shape the world. </p>
<p>But how have the world’s intellectuals historically thought about inequality? By examining the ideas of earlier thinkers, we can gain perspective which might help us understand why today’s world remains unequal.</p>
<p>This is why a <a href="http://global-inequality.com/project">research project</a>, at Aarhus University in Denmark, is exploring the intellectual history of global inequality. As part of the research team, I have been studying how intellectuals in post-independence Ghana handled the idea of an unequal world. </p>
<p>For Ghanaian postcolonial intellectuals, terms such as development, neocolonialism, self-reliance and indigeneity were central to discussions of global inequalities. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496977.2021.1913390">recent paper</a>, I argue that at the end of the 20th century conceptions of global inequality were hinged on intellectual debates about African development. This was a time shaped by economic decline and crisis discourses. </p>
<h2>Decline and divide</h2>
<p>On the African continent, economic decline worsened after the oil shocks of the 1970s. The continued decline made the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa label the 1980s as ‘<a href="https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/15493">Africa’s lost decade’</a>.</p>
<p>The modernisation projects of the early independence years had not brought about the economic ‘takeoff’ that many African independence leaders had intended. What the first president of independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, had <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/selected-speeches-of-kwame-nkrumah.-volume-1">expressed</a> as the “raging hurricane of African nationalism blowing through the oppressed and down-trodden colonies” was losing air. </p>
<p>Intellectuals in Africa and elsewhere began to ‘diagnose’ the main causes of the economic, political and social problems on the continent and look for solutions. </p>
<p>Their thinking about development <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315761084-31/west-africa-gareth-austin-gerardo-serra">divided</a> opinion. Left-leaning and Marxist inspired scholarship focused on the sustained underdevelopment of poorer nations by foreign powers. On the other hand were neoliberal ideas, based on neoclassical economics, scepticism towards state intervention and confidence in the free market. </p>
<p>Accentuating this divide were two key official blueprints of the early 1980s. Through the Organisation of African Unity, African leaders issued the <a href="https://www.nepad.org/publication/lagos-plan-of-action">Lagos Plan of Action of the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000</a> in 1980. This was arguably the <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/african-development-adebayo-adedejis-alternative-strategies/oclc/23765826">first African ‘home-grown’ development plan for the continent</a>. It stressed African collective self-reliance and resistance to free market economics. The following year, the World Bank published the strategy paper <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/702471468768312009/pdf/multi-page.pdf">Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action</a>. It underlined the managerial incompetence of African governments. This laid the foundation for the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s-1990s. </p>
<h2>Elites and indigeneity</h2>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496977.2021.1913390">article</a>, I show what two Ghanaian-born intellectuals made of the continent’s problems and how to fix them during the 1980s-1990s. They are the South African based social scientist Kwesi K. Prah and the US based economist George N.B. Ayittey. They both left Ghana in the 1970s under the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/421836">Acheampong military regime</a>.</p>
<p>The solutions they offered were shaped by their different standpoints and intentions. </p>
<p>The two fell on different sides of the intellectual divide. Left-leaning Prah looked to language as a solution to development, ending neocolonial tendencies. Liberal Ayittey argued that postcolonial African elites had betrayed the African people through corruption and diasporic rule funded through foreign aid. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24352159?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Prah’s thinking</a> was shaped by language debates taking place in South Africa at the time. It was also shaped by theories of dependency between old colonial powers and their former colonies. He stressed how using indigenous languages had the potential to break the connections between African and foreign countries and their elites. In his view, the mother tongue was the foundation for personal and societal innovation.</p>
<p>Ayittey <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/9780312104009">depicted</a> precolonial Africa as democratic and capitalist. He emphasised that only through indigenous African institutions (such as chieftaincies) and free markets, free trade and entrepreneurship – which he argued were precolonial African values – could the grip of elites on the people be loosened. Provocatively, he called these elites black neocolonialists. </p>
<p>Thus, both Prah and Ayittey critiqued African postcolonial elites and upheld the importance of African indigeneity, but with very different purposes. </p>
<p>The divide among intellectuals – in this case Ghanaian – clearly shaped the debates of the 1980s-1990s. Both thinkers used concepts such as development, indigeneity and neocolonialism to portray different conceptions of the unequal condition of the world – and how to resolve this. </p>
<p>The 1980s also saw a ‘neoliberal turn’ as the World Bank and the IMF rolled out Structural Adjustment Programmes. A focus on ‘internal issues’, such as leadership mismanagement and the need to restructure ‘failed’ African states, shaped economic policies across the continent. This was in line with parts of Ayittey’s controversial criticism. And, in effect, it brought with it a reliance on foreign experts, funds and the free market – still, to some extent, effective today. A reliance on foreign models which both Prah and Ayittey criticised at the time from different angles. </p>
<h2>A lingering problem</h2>
<p>But the desired turnaround has not yet been fully reached. The most recent <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=CjwKCAiA1aiMBhAUEiwACw25McQXvNuL_TvPNRhuqbLAUnaCecsSbPow7676YV4JPUbdIWKxzork5xoCb7oQAvD_BwE">Human Development Index</a> reveals many bottom-ranking countries are in Africa. </p>
<p>Although <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-inequality-may-be-falling-but-the-gap-between-haves-and-have-nots-is-growing-159825">global income inequality</a> between countries has been decreasing recently, within-country inequality is on the rise. According to leading inequality economists <a href="https://wid.world/document/longrunpaper/">Thomas Piketty and Lucas Chancel</a> today’s levels of inequality are similar to those of the early 20th century. </p>
<p>Studying intellectuals like Prah and Ayittey reminds us of ideas which might give us the historical perspective to act on related current issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171308/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mélanie Lindbjerg Guichon receives funding from Independent Research Fund Denmark under Grant 8047-00068B.</span></em></p>Ghanaian postcolonial intellectuals viewed terms such as development, neo-colonialism, self-reliance, and indigeneity as central to discussions of global inequalities.Mélanie Lindbjerg Guichon, PhD Candidate, Aarhus UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874492017-11-23T14:23:03Z2017-11-23T14:23:03ZToothless Pan-African Parliament could have meaningful powers. Here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195557/original/file-20171121-18528-1e0w0q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guests and delegates attend the opening of the Pan African Parliament's second sitting in Midrand, Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Pan-African Parliament was established by the African Union in 2004. Since then it has not passed a single law. That’s because it’s based on a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">Protocol</a> that gives it only an advisory role. The parliament can gather information and discuss it, but can’t make binding regulations to change anything. </p>
<p>Its limited <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">“consultative and advisory powers”</a> hamper the African Union’s ability to achieve a prosperous and peaceful Africa as envisioned in its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/3657-file-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>Is there any point, then, in having this parliament? </p>
<p>The 2001 Protocol envisaged that a conference would be organised to “review the operation and effectiveness” of the protocol five years after the establishment of the Parliament, which was 2009. This provision gave rise to the view that such a conference would explore the possibility of granting the Parliament <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99267/PAPER181.pdf">meaningful legislative powers</a>. But no such review has been carried out so far. </p>
<p>Instead, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government replaced the old Protocol with the new <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2014 PAP Protocol</a>. Nothing much changed. The new Protocol gave the Pan African Parliament powers to submit <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">“draft model laws to the Assembly … for its consideration and approval”</a>.</p>
<p>This still falls way short of meaningful lawmaking powers. By letting things remain as they were, African leaders are showing that the Parliament will remain a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-19-iss-today-does-africa-really-want-a-continental-parliament/#.WglkaluCyUk">nominal platform</a>. It is unlikely to become an effective organ with the mandate to pass the kind of laws that will advance African integration and development.</p>
<p>Denying the continental Parliament reasonable legislative powers <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617709489">undermines its legitimacy</a> and raises <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-19-iss-today-does-africa-really-want-a-continental-parliament/#.WglkaluCyUk">concerns about its relevance</a>. </p>
<h2>New thinking needed</h2>
<p>Yet there is important work that it could be doing. The Pan African Parliament could be advancing <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/3657-file-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf">Agenda 2063 programmes</a>. The agenda outlines seven goals, to be achieved over the next 50 years, that are central to achieving political and economic development in Africa. These include promoting peace and security, good governance, youth development and gender equity.</p>
<p>A Pan African Parliament with real legislative powers could lead the harmonisation of standards and policies across the continent. It could oversee African Union organs such as the Commission, and national parliaments.</p>
<p>This would require a new way of thinking. Some member states or regional parliaments may want to work directly with the Pan African Parliament to draft continental legislation. Indeed, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">2014 Protocol</a> recognises this kind of arrangement. The challenge would be to make it work in practice. </p>
<p>First of all, the political will would be required to make the Pan African Parliament a true legislative assembly. The AU member states are unlikely to transfer power to it all at the same time. </p>
<p>The vast majority of member states have a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-19-iss-today-does-africa-really-want-a-continental-parliament/#.WglkaluCyUk">lukewarm disposition</a> towards African integration and are not likely to support a stronger continental parliament. These include Egypt, Angola and Botswana. Even among the more democratic member states, such as Botswana, South Africa and Ghana, national interests may come first.</p>
<h2>Taking action</h2>
<p>Practically speaking, the AU will need to explore the possibility of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09744053.2016.1186870?scroll=top&needAccess=true">a flexible or differentiated approach</a> to transferring powers to the Pan African Parliament. This rests on the willingness of member states to deepen African integration at a quicker pace. Others may choose to join later. This would be a pragmatic way to strengthen the Parliament’s powers.</p>
<p>The AU will have to identify member states and regional parliaments that are prepared to work directly with the Pan African Parliament and then map out the areas in which <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909617709489">legislative powers could be shared</a>. </p>
<p>The Parliament would then develop model bills to guide willing national or regional parliaments so that every bill proposed would align with continental objectives. In the EU, on which the African Union is modelled, for example, national parliaments have the powers to review proposed legislation and comment on policies to be adopted by the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/relnatparl/en/about/subsidiarity.html">European Parliament</a>. </p>
<p>The final step would be to encourage direct elections to the Pan African Parliament. These could be carried out at the same time as general elections in the member states. In the EU, members of the European Parliament are <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en">directly elected</a>. Similarly in South America, the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) regional body allows for direct election of <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/mercosur-parliament">parliamentary representatives</a>. </p>
<p>Similar to the <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/mercosur-parliament">situation in Mercosur</a>, the AU could at the initial phase allow countries to synchronise the election of Pan-African Parliament members with national or local elections and later provide a uniform timetable for all participating member states. </p>
<p>Participating states would need to provide the AU with electoral schedules, and then allow it to work with their respective electoral management bodies to facilitate the regional poll. Direct elections organised in this manner would enhance awareness of the Pan African Parliament and its activities.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The rhetoric on the need to have a stronger continental Parliament has to be matched with actions. While some member states may be willing and ready to transfer legislative powers to the continental body, others may not. </p>
<p>Its legitimacy ultimately depends on its ability to make laws. The AU will have to invest more time and resources in bringing willing member states to the table. Otherwise the union might as well disband the Parliament and spend its budget elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babatunde Fagbayibo receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. </span></em></p>The limited “consultative and advisory powers” of the Pan African Parliament hamper the African Union’s ability to achieve a prosperous and peaceful Africa as envisioned in its Agenda 2063.Babatunde Fagbayibo, Associate Professor of International Law, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/859422017-11-01T13:19:51Z2017-11-01T13:19:51ZWhy the private sector’s hype about the African middle class isn’t helpful<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192424/original/file-20171030-18683-10ovx28.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Oluwole Urban Market near Marina in Lagos. Being middle class is more than just being a consumer.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African middle class is of huge interest to business. This was confirmed again recently by well attended seminars in South Africa’s big cities to discuss
<a href="http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/">“African Lions: groundbreaking study on the middle class in sub-Saharan Africa”</a>. </p>
<p>The study was motivated by the African Development Bank’s <a href="http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/research/africa/">diagnosis</a> that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(the African middle class) has grown by over 240% in just over a decade, and the bank defines 15 million households as now being middle class.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The narrow focus of the study is guided by a particular interest and echoes a poorly informed narrative about the structure of societies in Africa. It is void of any class related analysis and offers little bearing on reality. People are seen only as consumers with no political relevance. </p>
<p>The study was done by the University of Cape Town’s Unilever Institute of Strategic Marketing and the global market research company <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en">IPSOS</a> over 18 months in ten cities – Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Douala, Dar es Salaam, Kano, Lagos, Nairobi, Luanda and Lusaka. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/english-releases/sub-saharan-middle-class-worth-over-400-million-per-day-300467335.html">It defines</a> as middle class someone who has a daily income of between USD$4 and USD$70. He or she also has a disposable income; is employed or is running a business or studying at college; and has some secondary school education. According to this criteria, a whopping 60% of the urban population surveyed fall into this definition of middle class. </p>
<p>The researchers conclude that those who qualify as middle class have an average income of USD$12 a day and an average household income of USD$17 a day. Of these, a third had a full time job, while many ran mainly informal businesses.</p>
<p>According to the study, an estimated 100 million people outside South Africa have an aggregated spending power of more than USD$400 million a day. </p>
<p>It’s clear that the research is motivated by economic interests, targeting the so-called middle class as the object of desire for retailers. As the head of the institute <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/sub-saharan-africa-middle-class-represents-r13tr-a-month-market-2017-05-19">explained</a>, the core of the interest in the estimated ZAR1.3 trillion-a-month market was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a better understanding of the consumer landscape on the continent, (by exploring) aspirations, media consumption, buying patterns, brand relationships and much more (of such middle class).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar interests by the private sector exist in business circles beyond the continent. Large companies paid US$1160 and small ones US$510 to gain insights into the investment opportunities at a recent <a href="http://marketing.business-sweden.se/acton/media/28818/mea-summit-september-2017">“Middle East and Africa Summit”</a> in Stockholm. The second day was devoted to sub-Saharan Africa, which was described as having</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a bulging middle class hungry for inclusion and more sophisticated consumer demands.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such approaches perpetuate the original hype over the discovery of the emerging middle classes in the global South, defined in terms of higher living standards. They are measured on consumption and lifestyle related to Western products and status symbols. But no insights are offered into how being middle class could be understood in a social context. This would include status and awareness as well as the political choices people make. </p>
<p>This would require a different, analytically much more ambitious grasp of the economic and political realities in African cities and indeed wider societies.</p>
<h2>The fight back</h2>
<p>In the meantime, scholars in a variety of academic disciplines have started to critically explore the middle class notion. They properly investigate its meaning and definition. This is important because a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2016.1245183">middle class debate</a> reduced purely to the exploration of consumer habits can only be used for self-serving purposes. </p>
<p>In contrast, the new scholarly efforts put an African middle class debate into more meaningful perspectives. They offer a deeper analysis of cultural factors and identities, consciousness, social positioning and relations to other groups as well as institutions and the state. They are on their way to a proper class analysis and the policy options and implications by the social group or groups in formation. </p>
<p>The challenge is to look beyond the superficial number crunching that defines a middle class in purely income and expenditure figures, void of any further analysis of other <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">relevant factors</a>.</p>
<p>Such apolitical perspectives tend to put an ideological smokescreen around socio-economic processes. These rest on the assumption that relatively high economic growth rates suggest “progress” and “development”. Meanwhile, little changes in the daily lives of most people. Crumbs from the table of the haves don’t lift them out of a fragile socio-economic habitat bordering on poverty. Many urban and rural people continue to exist in utter destitution.</p>
<h2>Social change</h2>
<p>Engaging with such challenges, exploring how being middle class could be understood and mobilised for social change, would require a different analytical grasp of the socio-economic and political realities in African societies.</p>
<p>Presumably, such different research findings would most likely not be of interest to the business. But, the more socio-politically motivated analyses might contribute towards raising awareness of the class structures perpetuated. These are not fundamentally changed by a growing number of consumers, who are able to buy goods in the shopping malls and enjoy a “Western” lifestyle.</p>
<p>Rather, the advocacy and promotion of social justice and equality based on truly transformative social policies with deeper redistributive effects, could in the long run create a much larger and more sustainable market.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is the editor of The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/</a></span></em></p>Scholars have started to investigate what it really means to be middle class in Africa.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/800292017-06-27T14:57:54Z2017-06-27T14:57:54ZAfrica is high on the G20 summit agenda. But will Trump thwart progress?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175817/original/file-20170627-24817-l8pllb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">German Chancellor Angela Merkel addresses G20 health ministers in Berlin in May. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Fabrizio Bensch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When G20 leaders meet in <a href="http://www.hamburg.com/g20-2017/">Hamburg in early July</a> they face a problem not on their formal agenda: how to work around Donald Trump. The US president disdains multilateral financial cooperation, is opposed to US participation in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/time-for-china-and-europe-to-lead-as-trump-dumps-the-paris-climate-deal-78709">Paris Agreement on climate change</a> , has shown little interest in, knowledge of, or desire to partner with African countries.</p>
<p>These core issues frame the 2017 <a href="http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Featured/G20/2017-03-30-g20-compact-with-africa.html">G20 agenda</a> with a proposed <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/161130-agenda.html">“Compact with Africa”</a> slated as the summit’s big initiative. It’s aims will be to encourage private sector investment, support infrastructure development, and greater economic participation and employment in Africa.</p>
<p>In addition to South Africa, the G20’s only African member, the leaders of Guinea, Kenya and Senegal have been invited as guests. </p>
<p>The US convened the first <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2008washington.html">2008 G20 Summit</a> in Washington in response to the global financial crisis and has played a leading and constructive role ever since. Such experiments in informal global governance are an anathema to Trump, although he lacks <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/opinion/donald-trump-poisons-the-world.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-%E2%80%A6">any experience</a> in such matters. </p>
<p>If Africa is to gain the attention in Hamburg the agenda promises, this will have to be without the support and cooperation of the US, at least while Trump is president. But can anything be achieved while this is the case? </p>
<p>If the G20 is to remain relevant in the quest for more inclusive and fair global governance, Africa offers an historic opportunity for collective action, despite US absence. Most urgent is alleviating <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/no-one-is-paying-attention-to-the-worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-world-war-ii/2017/06/25/70d055f8-5767-11e7-ba90-f5875b7d1876_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-e%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.44e26a3031b">the famine in East Africa</a> while China, India, and others among the G20 are showing fresh interest in Africa’s long-term peace and development. </p>
<h2>The Trump factor</h2>
<p>Trump’s first and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/24/politics/trump-nato-brussels/index.html">only exposure to multilateral summit diplomacy</a> was at NATO’s Brussels headquarters on 25 May. Then immediately to a two-day <a href="http://www.g7italy.it/en/the-taormina-g7-summit">G-7 summit</a> in Sicily. Neither went well. More significant than all the negative media coverage of Trump’s performance, was German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/world/europe/angela-merkel-trump-alliances-g7-leaders.html?_r=0">veiled warning</a> that after 70 years, the US under Trump was no longer a credible ally and Europe</p>
<blockquote>
<p>must be ready to take our fate into our own hands.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Merkel’s comments were probably intended for a global and American domestic audience as well. The US foreign policy elite and public continue to support close ties to Europe. Cooperation with Africa also has been generally popular in America. It is one area of foreign assistance that has enjoyed enduring bi-partisan support <a href="https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/01/25/u-s-africa-policy-recommendations-for-president-trump/">since the early 1990s</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=828&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=828&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175823/original/file-20170627-24746-1k3m8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=828&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">shutterstock.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Trump’s antics in Hamburg could detract from the summit and his recalcitrance may complicate setting and slow implementation of the G20 agenda. But, progress on the <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/03/13/view-germany-the-g20-protectionism-and-the-compact-with-africa">Africa Compact</a> is still possible with support from the US private and non-governmental sectors. The same goes for climate change and economic cooperation. </p>
<p>How G20 leaders interact with Trump, and comment publicly on the progress or lack of progress in Hamburg will resonate domestically in the US. In deciding what to say publicly, G20 leaders may want to consider recent and escalating US domestic constraints impinging Trump’s presidency.</p>
<h2>Trump’s domestic constraints</h2>
<p>Trump meets all the definitional criteria of a demagogue. His appeal to popular passions and prejudices rather than reason and facts, secured him a base of support that remains loyal. </p>
<p>He has not broadened his popular appeal, polling favourability ratings around 36%, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/06/20/the-other-number-that-might-inspire-some-panic-among-congressional-republicans/?utm_term=.6d7e2861fbe9&wpisrc=nl_finance202&wpmm%20=1">lowest ever recorded</a> this early in a first term.</p>
<p>Trump has shown <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-leadership-traits-are-bad-news-for-democrats-in-Aafrica-69745%20Among%20G-20">authoritarian traits</a>. And the leaders he appears he will get along with best are those G20 leaders heading authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The US still has the world’s biggest military and economy, but Trump has yet to earn the respect and deference of his G20 peers.</p>
<p>Politicians sometimes lie, but not all to the same degree. The Washington Post’s nonpartisan Fact Checkers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.c1081f9b2c96">recently documented</a> 623 false and misleading claims by Trump in just his first 137 days in office.</p>
<p>Many Americans may be inured to Trump’s off-hand lies, or view it as a cleaver strategy to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/of-course-trump-called-comey-a-liar-thats-his-strategy/2017/06/12/6ff4b4a8-4fa6-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.026ff1a843bf">keep opponents off balance</a>. </p>
<p>Allegations that Trump may now be under investigation by an independent special counsel for obstructing justice in the FBI’s investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, possibly in collusion with the Trump campaign, have put his presidency <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-would-a-real-gop-break-from-trump-look-like/?ex_cid=newsletter-top-stories">in even greater peril</a>. </p>
<p>If his own head of intelligence, and other senior officials of his administration, cannot trust him to keep his word, how can foreign leaders? Whatever Trump says at the G20, has to be discounted in light of this, including concurrence with a final joint statement.</p>
<h2>Referees Matter</h2>
<p>Trump’s mendacity points to a much bigger problem. In an era of big data and contested statistical evidence <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/19/crisis-of-statistics-big-data-democracy">how can opinion be informed</a> by agreed facts to achieve consensus at any political level? </p>
<p>He has ridden rough-shod over decades of research findings regarding the human causes of climate change. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=895&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175827/original/file-20170627-24817-6fstl4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kevin Lamarque</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To inform and help frame democratic debate, about such scientifically complicated contested topics as climate, public health, national security, and a raft of other vital policy issues, the public used at least rely on professional journalists to arrive at the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706498-dishonesty-politics-nothing-new-manner-which-some-politicians-nw-lie-and">best obtainable version of the truth</a>. </p>
<p>This is no longer sufficient. Trump has advanced politically by questioning scientific evidence, those who produce it and dismisses as “fake news” any journalistic reporting he disagrees with. G20 leaders should not be diplomatic in calling attention to this.</p>
<p>And a positive counter-note to Trump’s cavalier claims would be for the G20 leaders to make clear that they believe in evidence based policymaking, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of recommendations. </p>
<h2>Cooperation without America</h2>
<p>The leaders, individually and together, need to show their commitment to unbiased, honest, and rigorously informed judgements on such issues as the design, priorities, and implementation of their new “Compact with Africa.” </p>
<p>Doing so without US backing adds to the challenge, but is also an opportunity for demonstrating cooperation <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-leadership-successor-to-america-by-richard-n--haass-2017-06">without America playing a central role</a>. So long as Trump is US president, this is likely to also be popular in most G20 countries. </p>
<p>A just released Pew global survey of public attitudes in 37 countries (including six in Africa - Senegal, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana) toward the US under Trump shows a 15% drop in positive views of the US (64%-49%) <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trumps-leadership/">since Barack Obama left office</a>. Confidence in the US presidency under Trump, however, fell a stunning 41%. Only in Russia, and Israel is Trump regarded more favourably than Obama.</p>
<p>Far more important that thwarting Trump, however, will be gaining public support for the “Compact with Africa” and the rest of the Hamburg agenda. Justifying these costly and complex commitments in positive ways will be a tougher political challenge; but one perhaps rendered easier without Trump or his representative claiming a seat at the head of the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau receives funding from SAIIA 2017 Bradlow Fellowship.</span></em></p>If the G20 is to remain relevant in the quest for more inclusive and fair global governance, Africa offers an historic opportunity for collective action, despite the absence of the US under Trump.John J Stremlau, 2017 Bradlow Fellow at SA Institute of International Affairs,Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763652017-04-23T10:20:43Z2017-04-23T10:20:43ZIt’s time to lift the ideological haze in debates about Africa’s middle class<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166142/original/file-20170420-20050-7nf56g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The middle classes in the Global South gained growing attention since the turn of the century, mainly through their rapid ascendancy in the Asian emerging economies. A side effect of the economic growth during these ‘fat years’ was a relative increase of monetary income for a growing number of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/world-bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-first-time-major-hurdles-remain-in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030">households</a>.</p>
<p>This also benefited some lower income groups in resource-rich African economies. Many among these crossed the defined poverty levels, which were raised in late 2015 from US$ 1.25 a person a day to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/01/global-poverty-is-worse-than-you-think-could-you-live-on-190-a-day">US$ 1.90</a>. As some economists had suggested, from as little as US$2 they were considered as entering the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/4013/WPS4816.pdf">“middle class”</a>. </p>
<p>The ominous term was rising like a phoenix from the ashes to characterise this trend. It added another label to the packaging of a <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2013/11/neoliberal-discourse-learning/">neo-liberal discourse</a>. By emphasising the free market paradigm as creating the best opportunities for all, it suggests that everyone benefits from a <a href="https://global.britannica.com/topic/neoliberalism">laissez-faire economy</a>.</p>
<p>But the middle class concept remained vague and limited to number crunching. The minimum threshold for entering a so-called middle class in monetary terms was critically vulnerable to a setback into impoverishment. After all, one sixth of the world’s population has to make a fragile living on US$ 2 to 3 a day.</p>
<p>The African Development Bank played a defining role in promoting the debate. Using the US$2 benchmark, it declared some 300 million Africans (about a third of the continent’s population) as <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf">being middle class</a> in 2011. A year later it expanded its guesstimates to 300 million to 500 million. It also set them up as being very important.</p>
<p>Such monetary acrobatics aside, the analytical deficit which characterises such classification is seriously problematic. The so-called middle class appears to be a “muddling class”. Rigorously explored differentiation remained largely absent – not to mention any substantial class analysis. Professional activities, social status, cultural, ethnic or religious affinities or lifestyle as well as political orientations were hardly (if at all) considered.</p>
<p>But lived experiences matter if one is in search of how to define a middle class as an array of collective identities. Such necessary debate has in the meantime arrived in <a href="https://globalmiddleclasses.wordpress.com/2017/01/11/the-middle-class-in-africa-comparative-perspectives-and-lived-experiences/#more-259">African studies</a>. And the claim to ownership is also reflected in a just published <a href="http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/%20and%20https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">volume</a> that documents the need to deconstruct the mystification of the middle class being declared as the torchbearers of progress and development.</p>
<h2>Politics, economic growth and the middle class</h2>
<p>As alerted in a paper by <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2014-101.pdf">UNU-WIDER</a>, a new middle class as a meaningful social actor does require a collective identity in pursuance of common interests. Once upon a time this was called <a href="http://study.com/academy/lesson/karl-marx-theory-of-class-consciousness-and-false-consciousness.html">class-consciousness</a>, based on a “class in itself” while acting as a “class for itself”. After all, which “middle” is occupied by an African “middle class”, if this is not positioned also in terms of class awareness and behaviour?</p>
<p>Politically such middle classes seem not as democratic as many of those singing their praises assume. Middle classes have shown ambiguities - ranging from politically progressive engagement to a status-quo oriented, conservative approach to policies (if being political at all). African realities are not different.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the only consistency of the black middle class in historical perspective is its political inconsistency, as political scientist Roger Southall has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0022278X14000445">suggested</a>. They are no more likely to hold democratic values than other black South Africans. In fact, they are more likely to want government to secure higher order needs such as proper service delivery, infrastructure and rule of law according to their <a href="https://theconversation.com/survey-sheds-light-on-who-marched-against-president-zuma-and-why-76271">living circumstances</a> rather than basic, survival needs.</p>
<p>It remains dubious that middle classes in Africa by their sheer existence promote economic growth. Their increase was mainly a limited result of the trickle down effects of the resource based economic growth rates during the first decade of the 21st century since then in decline. This had hardly economic potential stimulating productive investment that contributes towards sustainable economic growth.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166094/original/file-20170420-20093-1h9tmoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Doubt shrouds claims that a growing middle class benefits the poor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There’s also little evidence of any correlation between economic growth and social progress, as a working paper of the IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1353.pdf">concludes</a>. While during the “fat years” the poor partly became a little less poor, the rich got much richer. Even the African Development Bank admits that the income discrepancies as measured by the Gini-coefficient have increased, while six among the ten most unequal countries in the world <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADER%202012%20(En).pdf">are in Africa</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cgdev.org/expert/nancy-birdsall">Nancy Birdsall</a>, president emeritus of the Centre for Global Development, is among the most prominent advocates and protagonists of the middle class. She argues in support of a middle class rather than a pro-poor developmental orientation. But even she concedes that a sensible political economy analysis needs to differentiate between the rich with political leverage and <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/9a5242004ce34374a4d9bf271348019a/Africa%E2%80%99s-rising-middle-class:-time-to-sort-out-fact-from-fiction-20162505">the rest</a>.</p>
<p>She remains nevertheless adamant that the middle class is an ingredient for good governance. This is based on her assumption that continued economic growth reduces inequalities. She further hypothesises that a growing middle class has a greater interest in an accountable government and supports a social contract, which taxes it as an investment into collective public goods to the benefit of <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/full/ejdr20153a.html">also the poor</a>. <a href="http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejdr/journal/v27/n2/pdf/ejdr20153a.pdf">Dream on</a>!</p>
<h2>Time to lift the ideological haze</h2>
<p>It remains necessary to put the record straight and lift the ideological haze. Already the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report">2013 report</a>, which also promoted the <a href="http://d-nb.info/1045939153/34">middle class hype</a>, predicted that 80% of middle classes would come from the global South by 2030, but only 2% from Sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Recent assessments claim that it’s not the middle of African societies which expands, but the lower and higher social groups.</p>
<p>According to a report by the <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/08/a-global-middle-class-is-more-promise-than-reality/">Pew Research Centre</a> only a few African countries had a meaningful increase of those in the middle-income category. </p>
<p>And the Economist, which earlier shifted its doomsday visions of a “Hopeless Continent” towards <a href="https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/how-the-economist-changed-its-tune-on-africa/">“Africa Rising”</a> and the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august">“Continent of Hope”</a>, now concludes that Africans are mainly <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21676774-africans-are-mainly-rich-or-poor-not-middle-class-should-worry">rich or poor but not middle class</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, the debate has created sufficient awareness among scholars to explore the fact and fiction of the assumed <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/africas-new-middle-class">transformative power</a> of a middle class. This also includes the need to be sensitive towards ideological smokescreens which try to make us believe that a middle class is the cure. In reality, little has changed when it comes to leverage and control over social and political affairs. </p>
<p>The current engagement with the African middle class phenomenon is nevertheless anything but obsolete. Independent of their numbers, middle class members signify modified social relations. These deserve attention and analysis with the emphasis on social relations. </p>
<p>Cambridge Economist <a href="https://newleftreview.org/II/78/goran-therborn-class-in-the-21st-century">Göran Therborn</a> stresses that discourse on class is always of social relevance. The boom of the middle class debate is therefore a remarkable symptom of our decade. Social class will remain a category of central importance, and bringing the class back in can do no harm.</p>
<p><em>Henning Melber is the author of <a href="https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-rise-of-africas-middle-class/">The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The middle class concept in Africa has remained vague and limited to number crunching. The minimum threshold for entering it in monetary terms was critically vulnerable to a setback into poverty.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/727522017-02-19T08:10:10Z2017-02-19T08:10:10ZWhy Africa must discard borrowed robes and embrace its rich cultural resources<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156845/original/image-20170214-19613-1kl7a0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A tourist market in Ivory Coast. Africa needs to harness its rich cultural and linguistic diversity to drive its development.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Legnan Koula</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many people in Africa believe that “development” is essentially about embracing a European or North American way of reading and interpreting the world. More recently many have taken an equally unhelpful path of glorifying Asian models. This is often referred to as the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/214035">“Look East Policy”</a>.</p>
<p>From these perspectives “development” is seen in purely economic terms. It’s measured on the basis of GDP, gross national product and similar <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17447143.2016.1277733?needAccess=true">indices</a>.</p>
<p>But not everything about development in every society <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-counter-populist-policies-the-world-needs-to-ditch-its-obsession-with-gdp-72746">is economic</a>. Instead, the measures of development must be seen as having multiple dimensions – among them cultural, social, linguistic and religious ones. </p>
<p>The late Ugandan professor <a href="http://link.library.deakin.edu.au/portal/Afrikology-philosophy-and-wholeness--an/-8msxpH2P6E/">Dani Wadada Nabudere</a> reminded us that Euro-North American scientific knowledge and theorisation is unable, on its own, to explain everything. This was because of a</p>
<blockquote>
<p>great deal of uncertainty in the way we understand the world, as well as in the way human beings understand each other in different environments and cultural contexts. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Following on Nabudere, I propose that one of the ways by which Africa can overcome problems of underdevelopment is by using its abundant linguistic and cultural resources. This requires breaking away from perceiving development as being connected to the use of ex-colonial languages such as English, French and Portuguese.</p>
<p>The point is that creativity and innovation are guaranteed when they are communicated in languages that are best understood and widely used by the majority of local populations. In particular, Africa’s diverse linguistic and cultural resources hold enormous potential for creativity and innovation. There are between 2,500 and 3,000 languages spoken on the <a href="http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol17num2/ndhlovu.pdf">continent</a>. These are massive resources. They can and should be the key drivers of sustainable development and social progress. </p>
<h2>What’s missing from development paradigms</h2>
<p>What’s missing from popular conceptions of development is an appreciation of culturally-specific concepts on how to live life and live it well. African people can use the power of their imagination to innovate and to contribute to their own social progress. They can do this by leveraging their diverse linguistic capabilities and centuries old cultural and experiential resources. </p>
<p>Innovation and creativity stem from people expressing their deepest values and thoughts through language, culture and local knowledge systems. It is through language that they form new realities and destroy old ones. This is also known as social progress.</p>
<p>It’s, indeed, through language that people inform identities and transmit senses of being in ways that open up opportunities for them to read and interpret the world on their own terms. They do so using those cultural and communication resources that they understand best. </p>
<p>Development is not only economic and political. It’s also cultural and linguistic. Wherever there’s development it has to show immediately in aspects of people’s every day social and cultural life. This finds expression through their every day lingo, both spoken and unspoken. This is because meaning – like values – is open-ended. It changes. It’s full of complexity and bound up with the historically and <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17447143.2016.1277733?needAccess=true">culturally embedded</a>. </p>
<p>This complex and dynamic nature of culture is the one that forms the basis for creativity and innovation. </p>
<p>For the African people, the cultural embeddedness of development can be seen in the achievements of numerous African states and communities that thrived before disruptions by Euro-North American patterns of thought and biases.</p>
<h2>Africa before the white man</h2>
<p>Several anthropologists, archaeologists and historians of Africa (including European ones) have documented indisputable evidence which indicates that African people had produced hydrologists, prospectors and geologists through their understanding of the material environment. All this happened <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Africa-History-Basil-Davidson/dp/0684826674">prior to European arrival</a>. </p>
<p>On the mining side in particular, Africans – for example, those in the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Africa-History-Basil-Davidson/dp/0684826674">Zimbabwe plateau</a> –- had experts who had a clear idea of where to look for gold and copper in the subsoil. Its craftsmen worked the gold into ornaments with tremendous skill and <a href="http://abahlali.org/files/3295358-walter-rodney.pdf">lightness of touch</a>. </p>
<p>Also as early as the 11th century, the people of the Zimbabwe plateau were already involved in large-scale external trade with Arab and Indian traders at the Mozambican <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2016.1277733">channel of Sofala</a>. There were several other similar pre-15th century civilisations across the African continent. These were in places such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Nubia, the Maghreb, the Western Sudan, and the <a href="http://abahlali.org/files/3295358-walter-rodney.pdf">Inter-lacustrine Zone</a>. </p>
<p>At the turn of the 15th century, their levels of development were comparable to those of <a href="http://abahlali.org/files/3295358-walter-rodney.pdf">many parts of Europe at the time</a>. </p>
<p>These early African societies achieved their high levels of development by leveraging the diversity of local languages, cultures, traditions and philosophies of life. </p>
<h2>Discarding borrowed robes</h2>
<p>No society has ever made significant and meaningful advances in development through the use of borrowed robes. There is no doubt that Africa has much to learn from Northern and Eastern models of development. But the continent stands a better chance of making major progress by not relying solely on imported models. </p>
<p>Rather the solution lies in a smart integration of these with homegrown, Africa-centred philosophies that are rooted in endogenous linguistic and material cultures. This will enhance the unlocking of local creative capabilities and potentials for innovation. </p>
<p>African local knowledge systems should become the growth engine that promotes a new dynamic evolution instead of simply imitating Western or Eastern models of development and social progress. </p>
<p><em>This article is a significantly condensed version of the author’s recent paper <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17447143.2016.1277733?needAccess=true">Southern Development Discourse for Southern Africa: Linguistic and Cultural Imperatives</a> published in the Journal of Multicultural Discourses.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Finex Ndhlovu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One of the ways by which Africa can overcome problems of underdevelopment is by using its abundant linguistic and cultural resources.Finex Ndhlovu, Associate Professor of Language in Society, University of New EnglandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640652016-08-18T20:42:44Z2016-08-18T20:42:44ZApathy among young people stands in the way of Africa’s demographic dividend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134620/original/image-20160818-12312-1amfwk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan youth chant in celebration before the arrival of Pope Francis at the Kasarani stadium in Kenya's capital Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two in three Africans are younger than 35. <a href="http://www.africa-youth.org/">Youth</a> - people between the ages of 15 and 35 - make up more than 35% of Africa’s total population. They have been identified as central to efforts to drive the vast continent’s economic development.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.africa-youth.org/base/wp-content/uploads/resources/African-Youth-Charter_en.pdf">African Youth Charter</a> identifies young people as “partners, assets and a prerequisite for sustainable development and for the peace and prosperity of Africa”. It also outlines their rights and responsibilities, including active citizenship.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/newsevents/30351/commemoration-10th-anniversary-african-youth-charter">African Union (AU) has themed 2017</a> the “year of investment in youth to harness the African demographic dividend”. Regional and national <a href="http://www.africa-youth.org/frameworks/decade-plan-of-action/">youth empowerment policies</a> have also been introduced.</p>
<p>Yet a <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/youth-day-does-less-engaged-mean-less-empowered-political-engagement-lags-among-africas-youth">new survey</a> by Afrobarometer, a non-partisan research network, shows a wide gap between these aspirations and the reality of youth political engagement.</p>
<p>The levels of political engagement and participation in public life are on the decline among young Africans. This trend is worrying. Engagement in the political process is an important avenue for citizen empowerment in democracies worldwide.</p>
<p>Having a voice in economic policies is particularly important for African youth because of the <a href="http://www.ilo.org/addisababa/media-centre/pr/WCMS_413566/lang--en/index.htm">“unemployment crisis”</a> affecting this age group. At 30.5%, North Africa has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world, while 11.6% of young people in <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_412015.pdf">sub-Saharan Africa</a> are unemployed.</p>
<p>Interest in public affairs has declined substantially, from 81% in 2002/2003 to 58% in 2014/2015, in the 16 African countries tracked during this period. Participation rates also decreased on measures of civic engagement, which provide important avenues for representation between electoral cycles.</p>
<p>
<strong>Figure 1: Trends in civic engagement | 18- to 35-year-olds | 16 countries |2002-2015</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Respondents were asked:
1. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member?
2. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. (% “yes”)</em></p>
<p>The report, which was released on <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/youthday/">International Youth Day</a>, is based on almost 54,000 interviews in 36 countries in 2014 and 2015. Included in the surveys were Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe. </p>
<h2>Trends in youth political and civic engagement</h2>
<p>Only slightly more than half (53%) of African youth polled say they are “somewhat” interested in public affairs. Two-thirds (67%) say they discuss these issues “occasionally” or “frequently” with family and friends.</p>
<p>But young citizens report lower rates of political engagement than their elders across a variety of indicators, including voting. These findings are consistent with research on <a href="http://www.idea.int/publications/youth_participation/index.cfm">age differences</a> in political participation in advanced democracies.</p>
<p>As shown in the following infographic, two-thirds (65%) of 18- to 35-year-old respondents who were old enough to vote in their respective countries’ last national election say they did so. That’s compared to 79% of citizens older than 35.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Less than 10% of young people polled said they participated in pre-electoral activities like campaign rallies. The same goes for civic activities such as attending community meetings, joining others to raise an issue, and contacting political or community leaders. A slightly higher number (11%) of those surveyed said they had participated in a demonstration or protest in the preceding year.</p>
<p>Africa is experiencing unprecedented population growth in terms of both scale and speed. The continent’s population is expected to double to <a href="http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Generation_2030_Africa.pdf">2.4 billion</a> by 2050. This is partly because of significant declines in <a href="http://www.unfpa.org/demographic-dividend">child mortality</a> rates. About 10 million young people enter the labour market each year. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w6268.pdf">East Asian countries</a> were able to capitalise on a large youth cohort – the so-called “demographic dividend” – to fuel an “economic miracle” during the 1990s. </p>
<p>The AU aims to replicate this success by 2063 via supportive policies, including the promotion of youth development and <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Final%20Draft%20Agenda%202063%20Framework%20-Formatted%20TOC-1.pdf">empowerment</a>. In May 2016 the organisation held a series of events to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/newsevents/30351/commemoration-10th-anniversary-african-youth-charter">African Youth Charter</a> and to draft activities for its 2017 theme. </p>
<h2>Gender differences</h2>
<p>The youth charter requires its signatories to eliminate laws and practices that are discriminatory toward girls and women. The objective here is to ensure equal access to all spheres of society. But, young women consistently report lower levels of political engagement than their male peers. This is particularly so in West African and East African countries. </p>
<p>This finding indicates that there are persisting social barriers to their participation in the political sphere. On average, disparities between young men and women’s engagement levels are largest for measures of “cognitive engagement” (interest and discussion levels) and smallest for voting (Table 1).</p>
<p>Six in 10 male youth say they are “somewhat” or “very” interested in public affairs, compared to less than half (48%) of young women. Similarly, young men are significantly more likely to discuss politics at least “occasionally” than young women (74% vs. 61%). In contrast, the difference between male and female voting rates (66% vs. 64%) is not statistically significant.
These results suggest that many citizens, including many young women, continue to see politics as primarily a space for men. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given these trends, greater civic education for all youth – and particularly for young women – may be one strategy for moving toward the AU aspiration of an empowered young citizenry that acts as an agent for prosperity, peace, and development on the continent.</p>
<p>Women’s empowerment is particularly crucial to economic development because Africa’s youth bulge will lead to accelerated economic growth only in countries in which fertility rates are low enough to reduce the proportion of young dependent citizens (children).</p>
<p><a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22036">Better-educated, healthier and empowered women</a> are more likely to have fewer children and to enter the labour market. Greater female political representation is also likely to lead to more supportive policies for gender equality. </p>
<p>Although there are some notable female political leaders, among them Liberian President <a href="https://global.britannica.com/biography/Ellen-Johnson-Sirleaf">Ellen Johnson Sirleaf</a> and AU Commission chairperson <a href="http://www.au.int/en/cpauc/profile">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, women only make up a <a href="http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm">minority of parliamentary representatives</a> in sub-Saharan Africa (23%) and in Arab states (18%).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64065/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rorisang Lekalake does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union has identified youth as critical for development. But, a new survey reveals a wide gap between these aspirations and the reality of youth public engagement on the continent.Rorisang Lekalake, Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR)/Afrobarometer Assistant Project Manager for Southern Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/625762016-07-15T15:06:47Z2016-07-15T15:06:47ZBoris as foreign secretary: the good news for Africa is maybe it doesn’t matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130720/original/image-20160715-2141-1x5w772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Boris Johnson outside Whitehall in London.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Nicholls/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/who-is-boris-johnson-brexit-referendum-uk-prime-minister">Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson</a>, former mayor of London and a member of parliament, has just been appointed the foreign secretary in the new government of British Prime Minister Theresa May. Usually such an appointment would be unremarkable. Boris Johnson is a seasoned politician and has significant governing experience from his time as London’s mayor. He is a person, on paper, who is ripe for such a post.</p>
<p>But what makes this appointment so remarkable is that this is the person who spearheaded the successful campaign for the UK to leave the EU, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/search?q=Brexit">Brexit</a> – a campaign that was largely based on fear, xenophobia and misinformation. </p>
<p>It is a campaign that has caused significant damage to the British economy as well as other states, including countries in Africa. For example, 20% of <a href="http://agbiz.co.za/uploads/AgbizNews16/160624_BREXIT.pdf">South Africa’s</a> trade exports destined for the EU go through the UK. The decision to leave the EU will have significant financial implications for South Africa and will require a real shift away from a traditional partner.</p>
<p>It is also surprising that the UK’s chief diplomatic post be given to a person who has spent a large portion of his career <a href="http://qz.com/731695/britains-new-foreign-secretary-once-referred-to-africas-watermelon-smiles-and-piccanninies/">insulting foreign dignitaries</a> and extolling the virtues of the UK’s colonial past. When <a href="http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/07/boris-archive-africa-mess-cant-blame-colonialism/">talking</a> about a trip he had undertaken to Uganda as part of an official UK delegation in 2002, Johnson noted</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[t]he problem is not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge any more. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But it does not stop there. Johnson has also passed derisive comments about foreign dignitaries like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Barack Obama. He <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/14/maybe-the-brits-are-just-having-us-on-the-world-reacts-to-boris-johnson-as-foreign-minister?CMP=fb_gu">suggested</a> Edogan had had sex with goats. And <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/africans-for-britain-group-quits-anti-eu-campaign-over-boris?utm_term=.rcp79ZBdkY#.ko5dm7AXZE">he referred</a> to Obama’s Kenyan heritage as reason for him to dislike Great Britain.</p>
<p>Such comments stands him in stark contrast to previous British foreign secretaries who appeared far more thoughtful and careful on matters of foreign policy. This includes people like fellow conservatives <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/10/geoffrey-howe-dies-88-margaret-thatcher-former-chancellor">Sir Geoffrey Howe</a>, who played an important role in bringing then Prime Minister <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/timelines/zqp7tyc">Margaret Thatcher</a> and Soviet leader <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/mikhail-sergeyevich-gorbachev-9315721">Mikhail Gorbachev</a> closer together during difficult days of the Cold War, and his more recent contemporary, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-11158667">William Hague</a>, who at least was able to articulate the relationship between human rights and foreign policy.</p>
<p>Instead, the UK now has a foreign secretary who is more prone to <em>ad hominem</em> attacks than finding space for common interests. </p>
<p>What does all this mean for the UK’s relationship with the African continent? It is likely to be minimal in terms of substance. But damaging in perception and tone.</p>
<h2>Not-so-great Britain</h2>
<p>Sadly, it now means that the UK’s foreign policy direction and representation are led by a man who seemingly does not maintain a filter for appropriate comments. It has a man in charge who fundamentally believes that the "Great” in Great Britain stems from its imperial past – a past that has created a huge number of structural challenges and negative effects on African development. </p>
<p>Such an appointment clearly signals a step backward for the UK’s diplomacy on the continent, at least when it comes to the grand questions of international cooperation. It is easy to foresee challenges for the UK in bringing African states along with its position in United Nations decision-making if Johnson is leading efforts.</p>
<p>But his appointment and the potential implications for African states should not be overstated. While he has been given a high profile and important portfolio, a number of the key files that used to give the Foreign and Commonwealth Office much influence and power have been taken away.</p>
<p>For example, both international trade and EU relations were previously under that office. Now they are their own departments with their own ministers reporting to cabinet. Liam Fox has been made the minister of international trade and David Davis has been made the minister responsible for negotiating the UK out of the EU. </p>
<p>Even big international issues that are typically the domain of foreign secretaries, like climate change, have been moved to fall under the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. International aid continues to be its own department with its own minister at cabinet. </p>
<h2>Boris’s job spec</h2>
<p>So all of this invites the question – what will Johnson have to do given that a number of important files are no longer in his office?</p>
<p>Well, he will play an important role in setting the tone for how the UK is perceived and engages with partners on the international stage. In this sense, all the signs read that he will be an ardent advocate for “Britishness” and try to restore a sense of British nationalism into foreign policy through focusing on the UK’s past rather than where it needs to go.</p>
<p>Sadly, Johnson’s appointment, I fear, represents a turn to the exact thing that the liberal international order and institutions like the EU were set up to avoid – unabashed and unreflective nationalism. He will likely try to reinvigorate traditional institutions for doing this like the <a href="http://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth of Nations</a>, which has largely been relegated to obscurity in recent years. </p>
<p>Once an important international institution, the Commonwealth could be an important vessel for promoting cooperation between the UK and African states, but it remains under-funded and under-prioritised by many of its members. But his impact on actual and important policy files – particularly those of relevance to African states will likely be limited. </p>
<p>Assuming that we can all move beyond “the grand old days where the sun never set on the British empire” type of rhetoric of yore, the implications for African states of “The Boris” is likely to be minimal in substance. In perception and tone – that is another question.</p>
<p>Let’s just hope that Prime Minister May has the sense to deploy her less offensive and more competent ministers on matters of import to African states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J Hornsby does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boris Johnson, the man who led the Brexit campaign, has been appointed as the UK’s chief diplomat. It has sent shudders down many spines, but does Africa need to worry?David J Hornsby, Associate Professor in International Relations & Assistant Dean of Humanities, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/529082016-01-26T13:06:52Z2016-01-26T13:06:52ZHow reading fiction can help students understand the real world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109134/original/image-20160125-19657-d302ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian author Chinua Achebe, who died in 2013, wrote stories that offer students from all disciplines valuable insights about the world they want to fix one day.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Frank May</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The real world is often overwhelmingly complicated. Literature can help. This is true at universities too: courses in comparative literature offer students new insights into their chosen disciplines by unlocking new, varied perspectives.</p>
<p>How can those studying political science truly grasp the terror of living under a dictator? Perhaps by reading Mario Vargas Llosa’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/apr/06/fiction.reviews">The Feast of the Goat</a>, a magnificent historical novel about the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/rafael-trujillo">tyrannical Trujillo</a> regime in the Dominican Republic. Students who read it are unlikely to forget the dizzying Cold War political intrigues that led the US to first support Trujillo and then implement sanctions against him.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000596/059694eo.pdf">area studies</a>, students must learn about the politics of postcolonial government. Chinua Achebe’s 1966 novel, <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/37772.A_Man_of_the_People">A Man of the People</a>, explores how rapidly post-independence revolutionary zeal can turn venal as the corrupt, greedy postcolonial elite seizes the reins of power from the coloniser only to further strangle the majority.</p>
<p>I would suggest that teaching these and other subjects - history, economics, sociology, geography and many others - can only be enhanced by including novels, short stories and artistic feature films. Students will also benefit from learning the methods of critical reading that are inherent to literary study. In this article I will explore why this is the case, focusing largely on the important but contested field of international development studies.</p>
<h2>Why development is about more than economics</h2>
<p>International development studies cries out for a literary component precisely because it is such an ideological and normative subject. “Development” is itself a term that should demand ideological evaluation. It is more than economics. This is made clear by the UN’s <a href="http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/">Millennium</a> and <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/">Sustainable</a> Development Goals. These reiterate that “development” also focuses on cultural change, such as gender equity through empowering women and girls.</p>
<p>But the syllabus of almost any international development studies course contains a heavy dose of development economists: Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs. Or, if the professor is slightly more left-leaning, there will be works by anthropologists like James Ferguson and Arturo Escobar or brilliant political science professor Timothy Mitchell. Why only these? This is an area in which books in the humanities and arts are pertinent, yet one never sees a postcolonial novel on these syllabi.</p>
<p>It is frankly criminal. Development was constituted as a <a href="http://courses.arch.vt.edu/courses/wdunaway/gia5524/kothari.pdf">field of study</a> and area of practice during the years of decolonisation after World War II. This was the very same time period which spawned the birth of what is today called <a href="http://humanities.wisc.edu/assets/misc/What_is_Postcolonial_Literature_.pdf">postcolonial literature</a>. But international development studies courses seldom broach the fundamental question of what is truly meant by development. Developing to what? For whose benefit? Under whose aegis? This question, however, is interrogated in a vast body of excellent fiction.</p>
<p>I have prescribed Nuruddin Farah’s 1993 novel, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/books/99/09/12/reviews/990912.12rutalt.html">Gifts</a> - inspired by Marcel Mauss’ classic ethnography The Gift - to my students. When development aid from powerful countries is donated to impoverished 1980s Somalia, a fine line is walked by both the West which “gives” and the Somalis who “receive.” The book is a long meditation on the tightrope act that teeters between donation and domination. Certainly my students learned more about how it really feels to be the recipient of donor aid from this novel than any of our social science readings, which were mostly written from the donors’ point of view.</p>
<h2>Exploring different points of view</h2>
<p>This isn’t to suggest that such novels are stand-ins for <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410482?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“native informants”</a>, who are perceived to be experts about a culture, race or place simply because they belong to it. Quite the contrary. They should be read as literature, which literary critics like <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Mikhail-Bakhtin">Mikhail Bakhtin</a> describe as a jumble of competing viewpoints depending on language that always struggles to convey actual truth. </p>
<p>Point of view might be an easier concept for students to grasp at first than Bakhtin’s theory. It is a basic narrative technique that is explored in Literary Criticism 101 because it can change the way a story is told or perceived. In the rich 2006 film <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/movies/14bama.html?_r=0">Bamako</a> the people of Mali put the World Bank on trial to determine why their poisoned “gift” of development aid has left the country with such a debilitating <a href="http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/issues/issues34/">debt burden</a>. </p>
<p>From the World Bank’s perspective, development might mean one thing but for those “beneficiaries,” it means something quite different. Art has the power to convey that point of view with visceral impact. Isn’t this essential for international development students who aim to help the “other” to “develop”?</p>
<h2>Room for myriad insights</h2>
<p>The end state of “development,” which is implied but hardly ever explicitly theorised in international development studies, is “modernity” and becoming “modern”. This is a subject on which literature and literary theory can offer myriad insights. </p>
<p>Zakes Mda’s wonderful 2005 novel <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/373967.The_Heart_of_Redness">Heart of Redness</a> depicts the tale of a contemporary village in post-apartheid South Africa. Here, two groups of villagers hold radically different positions on what development means to them. Does it mean street lamps and a casino resort that will bring tourists? Or maintaining a more “traditional,” environmentally-sustainable lifestyle albeit with some “modern” amenities? The villagers’ differing positions are also informed by their different views on their history of colonisation.</p>
<p>History is, of course, essential for understanding any subject. For this reason I’ve not restricted myself to postcolonial literature only in teaching my classes. <a href="http://americanliterature.com/author/daniel-defoe/book/robinson-crusoe/summary">Robinson Crusoe</a>, first published in 1719, is an excellent novel for introducing the study of British imperialism which is a prerequisite for understanding our contemporary global cultural economy. </p>
<h2>Pushing for positive change</h2>
<p>In our globalising world, the stakes could not be higher. Many of our students will end up making policy, allocating aid, driving the global economy. They will change the world. Literature and humanistic thinking enable them to change it for the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52908/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Tandiwe Myambo receives funding from the Fulbright-Nehru scholarship.
</span></em></p>Students of the social and political sciences can benefit enormously from being taught literature, short stories and watching artistic feature films.Melissa Tandiwe Myambo, Fublright-Nehru Scholar, Research Associate, Centre for Indian Studies, Wits University, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/511882015-11-25T19:05:47Z2015-11-25T19:05:47ZMassive road and rail projects could be Africa’s greatest environmental challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103159/original/image-20151125-23833-1bfkiov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Road development for logging in the Congo Basin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Laurance</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s natural environments and spectacular wildlife are about to face their biggest challenge ever. In a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.10.046">paper published today</a> in Current Biology, my colleagues and I assess the dramatic environmental changes that will be driven by an infrastructure-expansion scheme so sweeping in scope, it is dwarfing anything the Earth’s biggest continent has ever been forced to endure.</p>
<h2>People, food and mining</h2>
<p>Africa’s population is exploding - expected nearly to <a href="http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf">quadruple this century</a>, according to the United Nations. With that, comes an escalating need to improve food production and food security. </p>
<p>In addition, Africa today is experiencing a <a href="http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2449005/africas_ecosystems_imperilled_by_mining_frenzy.html">frenzy of mining activity</a>, with most of the investment coming from overseas. China, for instance, is investing <a href="http://static1.squarespace.com/static/51b078a6e4b0e8d244dd9620/t/5379e667e4b05dd13827940d/1400497767573/Edwards+et+al.+2014-Africa+mining.pdf">over US$100 billion annually</a>, with India, Brazil, Canada and Australia also being big foreign investors.</p>
<p>To feed its growing population and move its minerals to shipping ports for export, Africa needs better roads and railroads. When located in the right places, improved transportation <a href="http://www.australiangeographic.com.au/topics/history-culture/2013/03/can-roads-have-a-positive-effect-on-nature">can do a lot of good</a>. It makes it easier for farmers to get access to fertiliser and new farming technologies, and cheaper to get crops to urban markets with less spoilage. It can also encourage rural investment while improving livelihoods, access to health services, and education for local residents.</p>
<p>Improved transportation is especially important for Africa’s agriculture, which is <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v490/n7419/full/nature11420.html">badly under-performing</a>. In many areas, large “yield gaps” exist between what could be produced under ideal conditions and what is actually being produced. With better farming, Africa’s yields could be doubled or even tripled without clearing one more hectare of land.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103154/original/image-20151125-23821-1e4a0gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Using rudimentary methods, small-scale farmers eke out a living in Gabon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Laurance</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Pandora’s box</h2>
<p>However, there is another side to new transportation projects — a dark side, especially for the environment. When located in areas with high environmental values, new roads or railroads can open a <a href="http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as_roads_spread_in_tropical_rain_forests_environmental_toll_grows/2485/">Pandora’s box of problems</a>. </p>
<p>Roads slicing into remote areas can lead to range of legal and illegal human land uses. For instance, in the Amazon, <a href="http://eventos.gvces.com.br/arquivos/Barber-et-al-2014-Amazon-roads.pdf">95% of all deforestation occurs within five kilometres of a road</a>; and for every kilometre of legal road there are three kilometres of illegal roads. In the Congo Basin, forest elephants decline sharply, and signs of hunters and poachers increase, <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.0050111">up to 50 kilometres from roads</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103155/original/image-20151125-23842-9zkat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A forest elephant shot by poachers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ralph Buij</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the wrong places, roads can facilitate <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169534709002067">invasions of natural areas</a> by illegal miners, colonists, loggers and land speculators. In my view, the explosive expansion of roads today is probably the greatest single peril to the world’s natural environments and wildlife.</p>
<h2>Africa’s ‘development corridors’</h2>
<p>Earlier studies that my colleagues and I conducted, including a <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v513/n7517/full/nature13717.html">major study</a> published in Nature last year, suggest Africa is likely to be a global epicentre of environmental conflict. A key reason: an unprecedented scheme to dramatically expand African roads, railroads and energy infrastructure. </p>
<p>In total, we have identified 33 massive “development corridors” that are being proposed or are underway. At the heart of each corridor is a road or railroad, sometimes accompanied by a pipeline or power line. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103156/original/image-20151125-23864-7gyv4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 33 development corridors that are being proposed or constructed in sub-Saharan Afirca.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William F. Laurance et al. (2015) Current Biology.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The projects have a <a href="http://mdpglobal.org/sites/ei.civicactions.net/files/GFS%20mines%20and%20agriculture_0.pdf">variety of proponents</a>, including the African Development Bank, national governments, international donors and lenders, and commercial agricultural and mining interests. They’re intended to promote large-scale development and their scope is breathtaking. </p>
<p>If completed in their entirety, the corridors will total over 53,000 kilometres in length, crisscrossing the African continent. Some individual corridors are over 4,000 kilometres long.</p>
<p>Will these corridors generate key social and economic benefits, or will they cause great environmental harm? To address this question, we looked at three factors, focusing on a 50-kilometre-wide band laid over the top of each corridor. </p>
<p>First, we assessed the “natural values” of each corridor, by combining data on its biodiversity, endangered species, critical habitats for wildlife, and the carbon storage and climate-regulating benefits of its native vegetation.</p>
<p>Second, we mapped human populations near each corridor, using satellite data to detect nightlights from human settlements (to avoid lands that were simply being burned, we included only places with “persistent” nightlights). We then combined the natural-value and population data to generate a conservation-value score for each corridor, reasoning that sparsely populated areas with high natural values have the greatest overall conservation value.</p>
<p>Finally, we estimated the potential for new roads or railroads to increase food production. Areas that scored highly had soils and climates suitable for farming but large yield gaps, were within several hours’ drive of a city or port, and were projected to see large future increases in food demand. </p>
<h2>Costs versus benefits</h2>
<p>When we compared the conservation value of each corridor with its potential agricultural benefits, we found huge variation among the corridors. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/W5cI_yGnFZw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A two-minute video summary of our study’s main findings.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A half dozen of the corridors look like a really good idea, with large benefits and limited environmental costs. However, another half dozen seem like a really bad idea, in that they’d damage critical environments, especially rainforests of the Congo Basin and West Africa and biologically rich equatorial savanna regions. </p>
<p>In the middle, there are 20 or so corridors that appear “marginal”. These tend to have high environmental values and high potential agricultural benefits, or vice versa. </p>
<p>We argue that these marginal projects should be evaluated in detail, on a case-by-case basis. If they do proceed, it should only happen under the most stringent conditions, with careful environmental assessment and land-use planning, and with specific measures in place (such as new protected areas) to limit or mitigate their impacts.</p>
<h2>Dangers for Africa</h2>
<p>There’s no such thing as a free ride. For Africa, <a href="http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822%2815%2900219-5">the dangers of the development corridors are profound</a>. Even if well executed, we estimate that the current avalanche of corridors would slice through over 400 protected areas and could easily degrade another 2,000 or so. This bodes poorly for Africa’s wildlife and biodiversity generally.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103157/original/image-20151125-23837-120sh3d.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Wild zebras in the Serengeti.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Laurance</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beyond this, the corridors will encourage human migration into many sparsely populated areas with high environmental values. The wild card in all this is the hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign investments pouring into Africa each year for mining. Even if a corridor is likely to yield only modest benefits for food production, it may be very difficult for governments and decision makers to say no to big mining investors. </p>
<p>The bottom line: it could be a fraught battle to stop even ill-advised development corridors, though not impossible. If we shine a bright light on the corridors and argue strongly that those with limited benefits and large costs are a bad idea, we may succeed in stopping or at least delaying some of the worst of them. </p>
<p>This is unquestionably a vital endeavour. Africa is changing faster than any continent has ever changed in human history, and it is facing unprecedented socioeconomic and environmental challenges. </p>
<p>The next few decades will be crucial. We could promote relatively sustainable and equitable development — or end up with an impoverished continent whose iconic natural values and wildlife have been irretrievably lost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51188/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Laurance receives funding from the Australian Research Council and other scientific and philanthropic organisations. He is the director of the Centre for Tropical Environmental and Sustainability Science at James Cook University and founder and director of ALERT--the Alliance of Leading Environmental Researchers & Thinkers.</span></em></p>More than thirty gigantic infrastructure projects threaten Africa’s environment without offering economic benefits.Bill Laurance, Distinguished Research Professor and Australian Laureate, James Cook UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/451782015-08-12T04:37:18Z2015-08-12T04:37:18ZTrust lies at the heart of making economic recovery more equitable for Sierra Leone after ebola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91422/original/image-20150811-14995-mzw0jq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sierra Leone has made significant progress in the fight against ebola and is grappling with economic recovery. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Baz Ratner</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the number of new ebola cases decreases in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419">Sierra Leone</a>, the west African country can now start looking to the future.</p>
<p>The ebola crisis, which <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28755033">started in March 2014</a>, saw more than 13,000 people infected and left <a href="http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-5-august-2015">almost 4000 dead</a> in the country. Trade became difficult, household costs rose sharply and many jobs were lost. </p>
<p>Although the country is not yet officially <a href="http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-5-august-2015">ebola-free</a>, there are signs showing significant improvements. Economic recovery discussions have therefore also started.</p>
<p>Institutions, researchers, government ministries, consultants, companies, journalists, international donors and local civil society bodies are <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/12/live-qa-where-should-sierra-leones-post-ebola-economic-recovery-start">discussing</a> the country’s future outlook. </p>
<p>Exemplary for these discussions is a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/12/live-qa-where-should-sierra-leones-post-ebola-economic-recovery-start">recent online debate</a> hosted by The Guardian, which identified a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/25/sierra-leone-needs-a-marshall-plan-not-a-multitude-of-micro-initiatives">20-step approach</a> to economic recovery. Broadly, these steps mainly proposed ideas about economic growth through investment, the role of the private sector and accountability of the government, companies and NGOs in facilitating local entrepreneurship and education. </p>
<p>These suggestions are crucial and need to continue. But we need to ask how they can contribute to broader sustainable change. To do so, challenges in the social domain at individual and interpersonal level need to be actively factored in.</p>
<h2>A fragile economic recovery</h2>
<p>If there is one thing that ebola has proven, it is that Sierra Leone’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094194">development</a> over the last five to ten years was very fragile. Materially, the country has changed. When I visited Lunsar, a town in the Northern Province, in 2003, it was in ruins after more than a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/armed-conflict-sierra-leone">decade of war</a>. </p>
<p>But, during the last ten years, it had slowly come back to life and even turned into <a href="http://www.sv.uio.no/sai/english/research/projects/overheating/overheating-blog/lunsar-expectations-in-a-changing-environment.html">a place of hope</a> when iron-ore mining started again in 2006. There is electricity and water supply and roads are better than a decade ago.</p>
<p>Yet, in many ways the country is facing a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094194">similar situation</a> as it was right after the 11-year long war which ended in 2002: a broken economy in a devastated, disillusioned and socially fragmented society. </p>
<p>If the post-ebola period aims to produce change that is sustainable and lasting, social change from below is crucial. In this respect, there are two important aspects that need to be addressed.</p>
<p>First is the issue of trust. Initially, there was widespread local scepticism towards the disease when it first broke out. The solutions proposed by a spectrum of agencies pointed to a structural problem of endemic mistrust among the population. So deep is the problem of mistrust that one often hears being said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is no trust in Sierra Leone.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The pervasive lack of trust in systems, institutions and individuals are the result of past experiences where people have been deceived and cheated. It often makes society react in ways that are unpredictable, as shown by <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ebola-outbreak-burial-team-attacked-in-sierra-leone-amid-3-day-lockdown-1.2772813">attacks</a> on health workers and facilities in the fight against ebola. Such attacks are <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29256443">not unique</a> to Siera Leone.</p>
<p>Second, the role and abuse of power – often hard to distinguish from money – is a resource for exercising domination and control in unfair ways. As a result, new opportunities – in particular jobs in companies or development projects – are appropriated by those in power. They, therefore, serve individual, rather than societal interests.</p>
<p>A case in point was the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201503301971.html">missing ebola-funds</a>. But less public instances also occur, such as teachers forcing students to pay them for the grading of assignments or mandatory extra lessons.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91413/original/image-20150811-11062-1ucva7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest against Sierra Leone President Ernest Bai Koroma while he attends an IMF meeting on ebola in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Gary Cameron</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Naturally, this unpredictability of society, lack of trust and frequent abuse of power makes long-term commitments – whether to another person, a state institution or a commercial or development project – risky and difficult.</p>
<p>To change this, power structures need to be contested and adjusted. Several of the proposed economic recovery approaches could facilitate this. During my ongoing research into economic and social change in Sierra Leone, I have seen how large-scale investments and NGO projects, for example, can open up spaces of power contestation. </p>
<p>For example, I witnessed how the resettlement of a village by a mining company did not only create new challenges, but also allowed marginalised villagers to speak up, demanding equal participation in village life.</p>
<p>Yet, while contesting power is a good first step, the result is often consolidation instead of change.</p>
<p>These issues are not new. In 2008, the office of President Ernest Bai Koroma set up structures to facilitate <a href="http://www.statehouse.gov.sl/index.php/component/content/article/34-news-articles/204-address-by-the-chancellorhis-excellency-the-president-ernest-bai-koroma-at-the-congregation-of-the-university-of-sierra-leonefourah-bay-college-saturday-22nd-december-2007-">attitudinal change</a> in society. This was geared to fight the negative attitudes, often generally labelled as corruption, that prevented Sierra Leone´s development.</p>
<p>But despite material and economic improvement throughout the country, little has really changed at the social level. “The same things that led to the war are happening again, in third gear,” a friend of mine living in rural Sierra Leone commented on the local situation of power abuse. Such perspectives are widespread, and also acknowledged in policy circles, as <a href="http://news.sl/drwebsite/exec/view.cgi?archive=9&num=21817">a statement</a> by the national co-ordinator of the Attitudinal and Behavioural Change Secretariat underscores. </p>
<p>To be absolutely clear, this does not indicate that another war is waiting. It emphasises that abuse of power is still rampant and the lack of trust and loyalty continue to cause structural problems in society.</p>
<p>Arguably, Sierra Leone needs to implement a great many of the recommendations set out in the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/25/sierra-leone-needs-a-marshall-plan-not-a-multitude-of-micro-initiatives">20-step suggestions</a>. This includes improved infrastructure, increased investments with benefits for the local population through employment or local procurement, and an improved educational system. </p>
<p>But for these approaches to succeed and socioeconomic transformation to be fair, equal and sustainable, trust must be developed and power structures changed so that people can participate equally and confidently in society. </p>
<p>This is not a simple, short-term process. It covers widely divergent issues such as the rule of law, fair participation in the economy, achieving a decent living standard, access to information and a feeling of inclusion. Above all, it is a process that is – and should be – fundamentally intrinsic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert J. Pijpers is part of a research project funded by the European Research Council</span></em></p>Although Sierra Leone is not yet officially ebola-free, there are significant improvements. Economic recovery discussions have also started. Care needs to be taken to ensure broader societal benefit.Robert J. Pijpers, PhD Researcher, University of OsloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.