tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/ahok-35882/articlesAhok – The Conversation2019-03-25T06:27:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1115372019-03-25T06:27:29Z2019-03-25T06:27:29ZFormer Jakarta governor Ahok tries to reconcile with his enemies by changing his name to BTP. Is it effective?<p>The former Jakarta governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, who is widely known by his Chinese name “Ahok”, has <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190122161818-32-362859/panggil-saya-btp-dan-upaya-pemutihan-nama-ahok">asked the public to call him by his initials, BTP,</a> after being released from jail for insulting Islam, Indonesia’s main religion. </p>
<p>He made the request in a letter uploaded to his personal Instagram account ahead of his release from the prison.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/BsuxNIphG1T","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>The letter did not explain the reason for his decision. Some experts have <a href="https://gaya.tempo.co/read/1169057/ahok-ganti-nama-panggilan-jadi-btp-ini-kata-psikolog/full&view=ok">considered</a> it an effort to establish a new and better self-image. Based on theories on psychology, I think his action might have been an effort to reconcile with his enemies who have been attacking him for his ethnicity. </p>
<p>But its effectiveness remains questionable. </p>
<h2>Reducing frictions</h2>
<p>In 1966, President Soeharto issued <a href="http://journal.ui.ac.id/index.php/jai/article/download/3464/2744">a policy</a> requiring Chinese Indonesians to use Indonesian names. This policy aimed to strengthen their Indonesian identities. As a result, Chinese Indonesians during that time had two names: one Chinese and one Indonesian. Their descendants usually have only one name, either Western or Indonesian. </p>
<p>After then president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) issued a <a href="https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/19054/node/561/keputusan-presiden-nomor-6-tahun-2000">policy</a> to abolish
several regulations that discriminated against Chinese Indonesians in 2000, Chinese names for Chinese Indonesians were not a problem until Ahok recently decided to change his Chinese name.</p>
<p>His new name sparks discussions about frictions in society between the majority Muslim Indonesians and minority Chinese Indonesians.</p>
<p>It is possible he is trying to reduce these frictions by adopting an Indonesian name, hoping that the community will accept him back. Shared social identity can indeed be one of the important factors in conflict reconciliation.</p>
<h2>Common ingroup identity for reconciliation</h2>
<p>In social theory, finding common ground in society can be considered as an effort to form a shared identity – a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10463280701726132?casa_token=CIbcexvrgqgAAAAA:ekU6PLgh0mng3v7Yfbs5HqryRqnUdqs5SWvNV_sIlYdeB1jnPvr5aIGwzniL78OghvX17ch977UpfxHO">psychological concept</a> known as common ingroup identity.</p>
<p>By changing his name, BTP wants to tell people he has shared his identity with those who opposed him because of his ethnicity. </p>
<p>The results of shared identity have been investigated in various countries that have undergone a process of reconciliation. These countries include <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304054451_Social_Identity_Theory_and_Intergroup_Conflict_in_Northern_Ireland">Northern Ireland</a>, <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2010-19890-011">Chile</a> and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00634.x">Bosnia Herzegovina</a>. </p>
<p>These studies show that conflict between groups can be solved if the conflicting parties prioritise their shared identity. This identity includes national identity as it can foster the sense of togetherness that comes from being an entity.</p>
<h2>Is it effective?</h2>
<p>Although adopting the new name of BTP could provide a sense of shared identity, whether it solves his problem remains to be seen. </p>
<p>His new initials are still incapable of eliminating existing religious differences. The Christian Ahok was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/laporan-khusus-39856516">convicted and imprisoned for insulting Islam</a>, the main religion in Indonesia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/project/Political-tolerance-amongst-the-Muslim-majority-in-Indonesia">My latest survey</a>, involving 1,200 respondents nation-wide, shows that Indonesians are more comfortable interacting with people from different ethnic groups than with those from different religions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a <a href="https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2518&context=tqr/">study</a> of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election shows that one of the issues BTP’s rivals used to beat him and send him to prison is his identity as a non-Muslim, not his ethnicity. </p>
<p>In Indonesia, maintaining harmonious relations between religious groups has proven to be a challenge. Indonesians find it difficult to ignore their religious identity because religious identity is essential for them. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10463280701726132?casa_token=cGwCuPbm9n8AAAAA:xL3nyVSrRKMZbZqaFnqo4n5j3SnXNcJzzKdh1jQSMpbT-yAvim6srcYd-MxJjpgM0zmK4TkGrpW2G9mB">In most cases</a>, minorities are reluctant to adopt a shared identity to avoid conflict. This is because shared identity is generally followed by submission to the majority. This will put the uniqueness of minority group identity at risk.</p>
<p>However, in the Indonesian context, it is the majority that is apparently reluctant to adopt this strategy. This is because Indonesian people hold firmly to their religious values. No matter how hard the minority group tries to show they are Indonesians, the majority still does not consider them as part of them. </p>
<h2>Applied both ways</h2>
<p>Like any other interpersonal conflict, it requires two to tango to resolve conflicts. </p>
<p>In the BTP case, we have seen his initiative to resolve the conflict. But, so far, there seems to be no similar effort by his opponents. </p>
<p>This might be because the blasphemy case was only the tip of the iceberg. Underneath, there are more fundamental social tensions to be resolved. Conservative Muslims targeted BTP in <a href="https://theconversation.com/memasarkan-moralitas-dalam-demokrasi-indonesia-89655">a movement</a> that represents solidarity between Muslims to express anger at social inequality under his administration. </p>
<p>Therefore, for me, the solution for Ahok is to encourage reconciliation between Muslim Indonesians as the majority group and Chinese Indonesians as a minority. </p>
<p>It is important to remember that reconciliation requires efforts from both sides, even though Indonesian Muslims may find it difficult to accept the minority.</p>
<p>There needs to be mutual understanding between both sides to resolve the conflict. </p>
<p><em>Jamiah Solehati has translated this article from Indonesian</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Whinda Yustisia tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Creating a shared identity can be one of the most essential factors in conflict reconciliation.Whinda Yustisia, Lecturer in political pyschology, Universitas IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1053572018-10-26T05:05:11Z2018-10-26T05:05:11ZThe secret to the long life of Jakarta’s minibuses<p>With the modernisation of Jakarta’s transportation system, many have predicted that traditional transportation modes will go extinct. The impending operation of Jakarta’s <a href="https://www.jakartamrt.co.id/">MRT</a> and <a href="https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2018/08/07/21202231/lrt-jakarta-diprediksi-baru-beroperasi-penuh-pada-desember">LRT</a> systems is expected to replace Jakarta’s many minibuses such as <em>angkot</em>, <em>Metro Mini</em>, <em>Kopaja</em> and <em>bemo</em>.</p>
<p>My <a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/minibus-and-transjakarta-transport-wars">study</a> has found that Jakarta’s traditional transportation modes are quite resistant to changes. These have existed since the time of the Dutch East Indies until today despite having undergone changes. </p>
<p>Their existence in Jakarta is not simply a matter of meeting the needs of public transportation. Their prolonged existence relates to their social and political functions and the interests of thousands of employers and workers in Jakarta.</p>
<h2>Early history</h2>
<p>I used the term “minibus” for these traditional transportation modes. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0739885908000218//">Transportation experts</a> often use this term to refer to the smaller-sized buses used as public transport. In Jakarta, a minibus refers to medium-sized buses, such as <em>Kopaja</em> and <em>Metro Mini</em>, and small buses such as <em>angkot</em> and <em>omprengan</em>, along with the three-wheeled <em>bemo</em>. All these vehicles are operated individually on a fixed route.</p>
<p>The minibus first appeared in the form of the <em>oplet</em> by the end of the Dutch East Indies era along the electric tram routes that connected the areas of Kota, Weltevreden (which is now the National Monument), Tanah Abang in Central Jakarta and Jatinegara in East Jakarta. </p>
<p>After independence, <em>oplet</em> started to overtake tram services by offering quicker and more comfortable transport. But the minibus only started to rise to its full glory when the tram was ended in 1960 by the order of President Soekarno who considered it old-fashioned when compared to cars, which symbolised urban modernity.</p>
<p>Afterwards, the New Order regime continued the same urban planning and transportation policy that prioritised cars by building highway networks and widening roads.</p>
<p>At the beginning of 1970, even though Jakarta’s governor, Ali Sadikin, planned a public transport scheme that focused on trains and large buses, most efforts were still invested in the development of private vehicles. At that time, the New Order regime had a close relationship with highway and middle-class housing developers, two elements of the city that closely related to the use of cars. </p>
<p>As a result, government-run public transportation could not service the needs of Jakarta’s ever-increasing population.</p>
<h2>Market opportunity</h2>
<p>The lack of mass transportation services became an opportunity for thousands of entrepreneurs to venture into the sector.</p>
<p>The number of minibuses skyrocketed in Jakarta first before they spread to surrounding areas. For Jakarta alone, the number of <em>angkot</em> <a href="https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2016/02/29/bafeb8e753144624121e6123/provinsi-dki-jakarta-dalam-angka-2015.html//">increased</a> from 5,000 units in 1968 to 13,500 in 2015.</p>
<p>For both <em>angkot</em> and medium-sized buses, the <a href="https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2016/02/29/bafeb8e753144624121e6123/provinsi-dki-jakarta-dalam-angka-2015.html//">latest data</a> from 2015 show that there are 47,000 operating units in the Greater Jakarta Area (this includes Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi). That number excludes vehicles that operate without permission, known as <em>omprengan</em>.</p>
<p>With the increase in demand for minibus services, the automotive industry has also grown. Small and medium-sized buses are usually assembled from the same frame and machine as conventional cars. This segment makes up a <a href="https://otomotif.kompas.com/read/2016/03/15/165604315/Pasar.Angkot.Menjanjikan.bagi.Tata.Motors">strategic market</a> for Asian car brands.</p>
<p>How minibuses have adapted could also be seen from the changes in its operating area, especially for <em>angkot</em>, <em>omprengan</em> and <em>bemo</em>. Such small vehicles can connect large main roads with rural roads or housing complexes.</p>
<p>The existence of such transportation services is made possible because of capital investment by minibus owners, not because of government support – except for road construction. </p>
<h2>Economic activity is key for marginalised communities</h2>
<p>One fact that influenced the fate of <em>angkot</em> in Jakarta is the number of people whose livelihood depends on it. </p>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the <em>oplet</em> business were still controlled by Chinese owners who had dozens of vehicles. Now <em>angkot</em> has become a business field for entrepreneurs of various backgrounds. </p>
<p>A few <em>angkot</em> cooperatives were established by members of the police or military officers as most of them use the profit as extra income or additional pension fund.</p>
<p>However, the business of minibuses is not limited to state employees. Anyone who can afford to buy a vehicle can register it as public transport.</p>
<p>For example, Ratih (not a real name) owns two <em>angkot</em> cars while working at a coffee shop at one of Jakarta’s main terminals. To protect the identities of my informants, I’ve hidden the name of the terminal. Ratih’s husband controls the gambling world at the same terminal, and the <em>angkot</em> they own provides the family’s side income.</p>
<p>From Ratih’s story, <em>angkot</em> is an essential part of economic empowerment efforts for the community. However, as it is considered a side income, business owners tend to see them only as a capital investment and fail to pay attention to safety and quality of service.</p>
<p>The <em>angkot</em> business provides employment to tens of thousands of drivers. There is yet to be an official record of the number of minibus drivers in Jakarta. However, from the number of minibuses in the Greater Jakarta Area, it could be estimated that there are around 94,000 drivers in total, based on the assumption that every car is driven by two drivers. </p>
<p>However, that number could be greater, because of the existence of drivers who personally know and collect their own earnings every day who are known as <em>“batangan”</em> drivers. These drivers can reach up to three people per car. The numbers have also not taken into account freelance drivers employed by <em>“batangan”</em> drivers. </p>
<p>Now the majority of minibus business owners do not drive their own vehicles but hire drivers instead. The drivers mostly work as freelance workers without getting wages. </p>
<p>The work relationship is based on a lease system. Drivers rent the car from the owner by paying daily fees taken from their earnings. Drivers also bear the burden of paying for fuel.</p>
<p>That working pattern certainly is not balanced. The drivers’ days are exhausting and full of uncertainty. If there are no backup drivers, one person can work 15 hours straight. </p>
<p>From their stories, it is understandable that being an <em>angkot</em> driver is not their first choice for a career. Most of them have changed jobs and experienced unemployment. With such an informal working relationship, being an <em>angkot</em> driver is an accessible option for those who are marginalised from the formal job market, despite receiving no security or protection.</p>
<h2>Survival</h2>
<p>Although the minibus business is deeply rooted in the space and society of Jakarta, the last two decades have brought changes that question its function and fate. </p>
<p>The first challenge came up in the late 1990s when motorcycle drivers had spread to every layer of society. The percentage of families that have at least one motorcycle rose from 34% in 2002 to <a href="https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&ved=2ahUKEwjzgOyR-ZXeAhUDRBoKHVUvD7g4ChAWMAR6BAgFEAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fxa.yimg.com%2Fkq%2Fgroups%2F13372012%2F2070452830%2Fname%2Fjutpi_final_report.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0D7VoNfH8fJecs3KdPbR9e">72%</a> in 2010.</p>
<p>From the perspective of business owners and minibus drivers, motorcycles are cars’ greatest competitor. This is because motorcycles can overtake the market for minibus drivers that comes from weaker economic positions.</p>
<p>Another challenge is transportation policies in an era of reform that focuses on public transport development. </p>
<p>In the last 15 years, public transport in Jakarta has grown exponentially, from the rapid transit bus, <a href="http://transjakarta.co.id/">Transjakarta</a>, to the MRT and LRT networks that are predicted to start operation in 2019. </p>
<p>TransJakarta has stripped the minibus of its title as “king of the roads”.</p>
<p>TransJakarta mostly threatens <em>Metro Mini</em> and <em>Kopaja</em> as most of their routes are now served by TransJakarta buses. <em>Angkot</em> can still monopolise narrower or rural streets and <em>omprengan</em> can adapt more as they are not tied to a route permit.</p>
<p>The government’s attitude towards minibuses has also begun to change.</p>
<p>The waves of protests from drivers and <em>angkot</em> business owners due to the development of the TransJakarta grid have pushed the integration of minibuses with mass transportation networks.</p>
<p>The integration of the <em>Kopaja</em> bus with TransJakarta started in 2015. Such a policy was expanded by the end of former Jakarta governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama’s administration. It was then further extended by the current governor, Anies Baswedan, under his Ok-Trip as well as Jak-Lingko systems. However, those trials are still limited and have met with protests from drivers whose earnings have decreased due to the system.</p>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105357/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rémi Desmoulière has received funding from ENS Lyon, INALCO, CESSMA and the Thiers-Center for Humanist Research Foundation.</span></em></p>Jakarta’s minibuses can survive because of their socio-political functions and relation to the interests of thousands of business owners and workers in the capital.Rémi Desmoulière, Doctorant en géographie, Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (Inalco)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/952142018-05-14T08:34:42Z2018-05-14T08:34:42ZBehind the rise of blasphemy cases in Indonesia<p>Since becoming a democracy that supports freedom of speech, Indonesia, ironically, has seen an increase in people being jailed for blasphemy. </p>
<p>This article aims to explain the reasons for this since the end of the Soeharto era.</p>
<h2>The recent situation</h2>
<p>Under Soeharto’s 32-year authoritarian rule, Indonesia processed only ten blasphemy cases. The number jumped to <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=7wEVAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=law+and+religion+%2Bmelissa+crouch&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiy_abbqLnaAhXJrI8KHWRoAR4Q6AEIMjAB#v=snippet&q=over%20130%20people&f=false">130 cases</a> between 1998 and 2012 after Soeharto’s dictatorship ended in 1998. </p>
<p>This trend continues. In 2017, the nation witnessed a high-profile blasphemy case involving Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, a Chinese Christian who was a strong contender to be elected Jakarta governor that year. Ahok was found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison for defaming Islam with his remarks. </p>
<p>The man who helped send Ahok to prison by sharing on social media the edited version of Ahok’s controversial comments, Buni Yani, faced hate speech charges. He was sentenced to <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/11/14/buni-yani-gets-1-5-years-in-jail.html">one-and-a-half years</a> in prison. </p>
<p>After Ahok and Buni Yani, similar cases emerged.</p>
<p>The recent ones involved <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/04/03/soekarnos-daughter-reported-to-police-for-alleged-blasphemy.html">Sukmawati Soekarnoputri</a>, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president Soekarno, academics <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3966325/ade-armando-dipolisikan-soal-postingan-azan-tidak-suci">Ade Armando</a> and <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3974592/rocky-gerung-dipolisikan-dengan-tuduhan-penistaan-agama">Rocky Gerung</a>, as well as senior politician <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180415171912-12-290953/amien-rais-resmi-dilaporkan-soal-pernyataan-partai-setan">Amien Rais</a>. </p>
<p>The number of blasphemy cases is expected to rise ahead of the 2019 presidential election. Some argue that the increase is due to <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_6.pdf">rising intolerance</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=7QAVAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=melissa+crouch&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjHuKnitrbaAhUcS48KHXBbCQ4Q6AEIKTAA#v=snippet&q=actively%20reporting&f=false">Islamic radicalism</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=uDglDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=stewart+fenwick+%2Bblasphemy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjEhdnD1r3aAhWH6Y8KHXtDCOMQ6AEIMDAB#v=onepage&q=confl%20ict%20between%20liberal%20and%20conservative%20Muslims&f=false">Others</a> claim that the cases represent an incomplete secularisation in Indonesia, where religion is still regarded as an important aspect in public space.</p>
<p>While such views cannot be ignored, it is important to put this issue in a much broader political setting. </p>
<p>I looked at the patterns of the use of blasphemy law since its issuance in 1965 until now. I argue that the rise of blasphemy cases is happening due to a political situation within Indonesia that is <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-predatory-politics-neuter-former-activists-attempts-at-reform-from-within-the-system-94415">predatory</a> in nature. </p>
<h2>The historical patterns</h2>
<p><strong>Soekarno’s era</strong></p>
<p>The blasphemy law has always been political. President Soekarno issued a presidential decree in 1965 to complement the blasphemy article in Indonesia’s Criminal Code. The decree was issued to secure support from Islamic parties following a “<a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=TJptHWc4i1EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=harold+crouch+%2Barmy+and+politics&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjFgLW8273aAhVEN48KHX3BCUIQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=aksi%20sepihak&f=false">unilateral action</a>” by Soekarno’s main ally to that point, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Under the action, the Communist Party seized lands belonging to Muslim landlords. </p>
<p>Soekarno issued the regulation to appease Islamic groups. The law prohibited “deviant interpretations” of religious teachings that were strongly affiliated with Communist Party. </p>
<p><strong>Soeharto’s era</strong></p>
<p>In 1968, during the early years of Soeharto’s administration, <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=sW1ZAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA357&dq=HB+Jassin+Langit+Makin+Mendung&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjWu6e59enaAhWDqo8KHX49AS8Q6AEIXDAH#v=snippet&q=Langit%20Makin%20Mendung%20HB%20Jassin&f=false">the first blasphemy trial</a> was held. Prominent writer H.B. Jassin was found guilty for the publication of a short story that not only contained an inappropriate portrayal of God but also criticised Soekarno. Soeharto, however, didn’t raise the case to support Soekarno. He was responding to pressure from Muslim groups and hoping to gain their support.</p>
<p>After that the law went into hiatus for more than 20 years.</p>
<p>Then in the early 1990s, Soeharto began using the blasphemy law as a tool to maintain his political power. This was at a time when Soeharto’s political-economic alliance faced <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=L-HA_EPLiswC&printsec=frontcover&dq=robert+hefner+civil+islam&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi166az3r3aAhVJqI8KHUO7ANUQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=conflict%20with%20military&f=false">frictions</a>, particularly with the military. This internal conflict encouraged Soeharto to seek support from Muslim groups that had previously been the target of constant <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/6966.html">state repression</a>.</p>
<p>Soeharto’s political strategy explains the jump in the number of blasphemy cases to ten cases during his presidency. Soeharto used these cases to gain support from conservative Muslims and to suppress his political opponents. </p>
<p>This was evident in a blasphemy case in Situbondo, East Java, before the 1997 general election. A 28-year-old man was found guilty of defaming Islam and sent to prison for five years. <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100464610">Some reports</a> recorded that the public’s dissatisfaction with the verdict triggered riots that killed five people. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=ReWAAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=porter+%2BManaging+Politics+and+Islam+in+Indonesia.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiantyQs7naAhWC6Y8KHTchBvkQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q=their%20own%20leader%20was%20unable%20to%20control&f=true">Some</a> speculate that it was Soeharto’s strategy to undermine the power of the country’s largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), at one of its supporters’ bases in Situbondo. NU was the main supporter of the United Development Party (PPP), a leading competitor with Suharto’s party, Golkar.</p>
<h2>What are predatory politics</h2>
<p>Indonesian democracy has been tainted by <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=o9oh45hmGzEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Reorganising+Power+in+Indonesia:+The+Politics+of+Oligarchy+in+an+Age+of+Markets&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjw9K2sgPXaAhUG448KHSZ-B98Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=predatory%20politics&f=false">predatory practices</a>, where politicians will use whatever means they can to defeat their rivals. Their strategies include using money, violence, religion and ethnicity to secure public support. </p>
<p>These practices are a legacy of the New Order political regime. The New Order’s depoliticising policy and banishment of the Left, as seen in the massacre of communists, disorganised society. This contributed to the absence of organised political movements that prioritise public interests. </p>
<p>Given the nature of politics that encourages political actors to use the law to secure votes, it will be no surprise if the number of blasphemy cases continues to increase. </p>
<h2>Rising piety</h2>
<p>Australian scholar <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?id=7QAVAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=melissa+crouch+law+and+religion&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjT4vG92-raAhUETY8KHfspClUQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=%22controlled%20public%20or%20political%22&f=false">Melissa Crouch</a> has claimed that the small number of blasphemy cases before the reform era was due to Soeharto’s effective control of public expression. But it’s simplistic to say that the jump in the number of blasphemy cases is because Soeharto no longer ruled.</p>
<p>The number of blasphemy cases has occurred against a background of <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137557209">rising piety in Indonesian society</a>. At the same time, Muslim conservative groups can’t organise themselves as <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/02/25/islamic-parties-impasse-need-reform-avoid-worst.html">a coherent political force</a>. </p>
<p>Politicians see this as an opportunity to mobilise Muslims to support their political interests. Using the blasphemy law is one of the strategies politicians use to mobilise conservative Muslims’ support by <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/identity-politics-mobilising-religious-sentiment-in-democratic-indonesia/">raising religious sentiments</a> or prosecuting their political opponents.</p>
<p>For example, many local political leaders promote the issuance of sharia bylaws to repress minority groups, such as <a href="https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/19959496/Regus_Understanding_18_12_2017.pdf">Ahmadiyya</a>, as part of their strategies to secure votes from conservative Muslims in regional elections. </p>
<p>The recent blasphemy and religious hate speech cases also show how politics play an important role in shaping them. Many of the people who have reported such offences are affiliated with political parties competing in the upcoming 2019 election. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/charges-and-counter-charges-threaten-indonesian-democracy/">charges and counter-charges</a> between political rivals have become rampant, as seen before in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.</p>
<h2>Impossible to revoke</h2>
<p>Hence, the increase in blasphemy cases is neither a result of rising intolerance and Islamic radicalism in society nor a phenomenon typical of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/blasphemy-isnt-just-a-problem-in-the-muslim-world-75026">non-secular state</a>.</p>
<p>Predatory politics that force politicians to seek power by using religious issues for their own interests play a part in the rise of blasphemy cases. </p>
<p>The blasphemy law opens the door for politicians to gain power by capitalising on religious sentiments and the public’s rage that polarise society. As long as Indonesia’s blasphemy law serves the interest of political elites, it is impossible to revoke this law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95214/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>The reasons for the rise in the number of blasphemy cases in Indonesia since the reform era are more than just religious ones.Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun, Lecturer, Department of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, Universitas IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/863412017-10-30T10:11:32Z2017-10-30T10:11:32ZIndonesia takes an ultra-nationalist turn against Islamic populism<p>After <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/indonesia-hizbut-tahrir-group-banned-protect-unity-170719050345186.html">banning Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) through a decree in July 2017</a>, Indonesia has now moved to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-islamists/indonesia-passes-law-to-ban-organizations-deemed-against-its-ideology-idUSKBN1CT1JZ">codify in law government power to summarily disband community organisations</a> deemed to be against Pancasila, the country’s state ideology. </p>
<p>On Tuesday, October 24, of 445 lawmakers present, 314 members from seven factions agreed to approve a regulation in lieu of law on community organisation (Perppu Ormas). Some 131 members from three opposition factions objected. </p>
<p>HTI was one of the Islamist organisations that rallied against the former Jakarta governor, Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, for his comments on Islam. Ahok is now in jail after being convicted of blasphemy. </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Read also:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">Why hundreds of thousands of Muslims rallied against the Jakarta governor</a></em></p>
<hr>
<h2>A battle of extremes</h2>
<p>The Perppu Ormas serves as <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/jokowi-forges-tool-repression/">a political tool for President Joko Widodo’s administration</a>. Jokowi, as the president is commonly called, is wary of the rise of Islamic populism. He has seen how it managed to mobilise large numbers of the Muslim community to bring down Ahok, a Christian Chinese-Indonesian widely seen as clean and competent by the Jakarta electorate. </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Read also:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-we-worry-about-islamism-in-indonesia-77480">Should we worry about Islamism in Indonesia?</a></em></p>
<hr>
<p><a href="http://www.newmandala.org/jakarta-inequality-poverty-elite-pluralism/">Unable to rely on pluralist or tolerant Islam – which is poorly organised and lacks a large social or political base</a> – it seems that Jokowi’s administration views ultra-nationalism as the answer to rising Islamic populism in Indonesia.</p>
<p>In arguing for the Perppu Ormas, the government used militaristic language: “<a href="http://www.antaranews.com/berita/659587/kemendagri-tegaskan-perppu-ormas-jaga-persatuan-nkri">a threat to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)</a>)”, or “national alert” (<em>kewaspadaan nasional</em>). The military under Soeharto’s New Order regime commonly used these phrases to justify repressive approaches.</p>
<p>At this point, a return to military involvement in Indonesian politics is unlikely and would be unpopular. But the military clearly sees the Perppu as an opportunity to claw back some influence in political life. Several <a href="https://www.rappler.com/indonesia/berita/158618-tni-hadapi-ormas-anti-pancasila">high-ranking military personnel have publicly supported it</a>. </p>
<h2>Pancasila orthodoxy</h2>
<p>Since the declaration of independence in 1945, the relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state has been a constant source of debate. </p>
<p>In June 1945, leaders of the independence movement produced The Jakarta Charter, a document that laid out the first draft of the country’s founding principle, Pancasila. The charter <a href="https://tirto.id/sukarno-dalam-polemik-piagam-jakarta-cq7m">included an obligation for Muslims to follow Islamic law</a>. </p>
<p>But the country’s first president, Sukarno, deleted this, restating Pancasila’s first principle as “Belief in God Almighty”. Sukarno moved to embrace other religious communities, particularly in the eastern islands, with the aim of preventing them from making their own demands for independence. </p>
<p>This lack of clear acknowledgement in the Constitution of the dominance of Islam became a grievance among some Muslim communities. In 1949, the radical Darul Islam movement emerged in West Java, calling for Islam to be recognised as the basis of the state. It gained popularity in Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. <a href="http://www.war-memorial.net/Indonesia-vs-PRRI,-Permesta-and-Darul-Islam-3.119">Sukarno ordered military operations</a> to dissolve the movement, resulting in an estimated 16,000 to 40,000 deaths. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=bescBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA383&lpg=PA383&dq=Under+Soeharto,+the+military+and+Islamic+groups&source=bl&ots=WofejlTPuR&sig=_iNnJuVS9Glg3XDswccmCCNiz_c&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiKoLSD043XAhWCJZQKHTDwDqIQ6AEIOzAE#v=onepage&q=Under%20Soeharto%2C%20the%20military%20and%20Islamic%20groups&f=false">Under Soeharto, the military and Islamic groups worked closely together</a> once again in the early days of the New Order to kill or imprison alleged communists. </p>
<p>Islamic groups had expectations of being offered political space in the regime. Instead, Suharto’s regime forced Islamic groups to unite in one political party, the United Development Party (PPP), which it tightly controlled. </p>
<p>The New Order also promoted Pancasila as “the single principle” for the country. Political and social organisations, including Islamic organisations, had no choice but to accept Pancasila as their ideological basis. </p>
<p>Religion is compulsory for all citizens, but this, too, followed Pancasila orthodoxy. Pancasila was used as a means to establish control, eliminating both the now banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Islamist movements as sources of contested power. </p>
<p>Suharto continued using the military to suppress dissent. The military was not only in charge of state security from foreign threats but also was involved in socio-political affairs through the so-called military’s dual roles (<em>dwi-fungsi</em>). The military repressed groups it saw as not adhering to Pancasila. This often involved violent means, such as the <a href="https://tirto.id/mengenang-33-tahun-tragedi-pembantaian-tanjung-priok-cwpi">Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984</a>, which resulted in more than 400 casualties. </p>
<p>The fall of Soeharto’s New Order in 1998 ushered in press freedom, multiparty democracy, the end of the military’s role in politics, and the lifting of restrictions on civil rights. </p>
<p>Today, there has been greater expression of Islam in everyday life. Diverse forms of political Islam - from liberal to radical - have emerged. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the past</h2>
<p>While HTI’s platform is considered <a href="http://redaksikota.com/nasional/36026/07/2017/usman-hamid-kita-boleh-tidak-suka-pada-tujuan-hti.php">intolerant and undemocratic</a>, it is still important not to ignore the lessons of the past simply to keep the current administration in power. </p>
<p>It might serve short-term goals for Jokowi. But the Perppu could have serious implications for the future of Indonesian democracy. </p>
<p>The Perppu ignores a legal process that is the base of democracy by giving the government the authority to disband any community organisation without trial. The Perppu as a legal product could be used like a “gun” being pointed to any direction depending on the interest of the “gun holder”. Even human rights defenders could be potential targets as seen in <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170918154027-12-242489/kivlan-zen-usul-pembubaran-lbh-jakarta/">the attempt to disband the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute</a>. </p>
<p>We are going to see these contested power plays at least until Indonesia’s next presidential election in 2019. Brace yourself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>A recently passed regulation in lieu of law allows the government to ban organisations deemed against Indonesia’s state ideology Pancasila. It marks a troubling turn towards ultra-nationalism.Hellena Yoranita Souisa, PhD Candidate Asia Institute - The University of Melbourne, The University of MelbournePrimatia Romana Wulandari, PhD Candidate School of Social and Political Science, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789902017-06-19T03:59:44Z2017-06-19T03:59:44ZBlasphemy is still a crime in Australia – and it shouldn’t be<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173944/original/file-20170615-25000-17d5jks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The crime of blasphemy is about protecting God and Christian doctrine from scurrilous commentary, and Christians from offence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crime of blasphemy has had a bit of publicity lately. British comedian Stephen Fry was recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/may/07/stephen-fry-investigated-by-irish-police-for-alleged-blasphemy">reported to police</a> in Ireland on accusations of blasphemy, for comments made on TV about what he would say to God if he had the chance. </p>
<p>Jakarta Governor Ahok was recently convicted and sentenced to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/jakartas-christian-governor-ahok-jailed-for-two-years-for-blasphemy-20170509-gw0t4y.html">two years in prison for blasphemy</a> in Indonesia.</p>
<p>You might also find yourself reported to police or sent to prison for blasphemy in Australia, where is it still a crime. </p>
<h2>The crime of blasphemy</h2>
<p>Blasphemy is a crime against the common law (the body of judge-made law we inherited from England). Only Queensland and Western Australia have abolished it. But it continues to exist in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, the ACT and Norfolk Island.</p>
<p>The crime of blasphemy is not about vilifying or inciting hatred against people on the basis of their religion. Some states have <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/rarta2001265/s8.html">separate laws</a> against that. </p>
<p>The crime is about protecting God and Christian doctrine from scurrilous commentary, and Christian religious sensibilities from offence. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1987/36.html">Federal Court</a> has described the elements of the offence of blasphemy as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The essence of the crime of blasphemy is to publish words concerning the Christian religion, which are so scurrilous and offensive as to pass the limits of decent controversy and to be calculated to outrage the feelings of any sympathiser with or believer in Christianity. </p>
<p>A temperate and respectful denial of the existence of God is not an offence against the law, which does not render criminal the mere propagation of doctrines hostile to the Christian faith. The crime consists in the manner in which the doctrines are advocated. Whether in each case this is a crime is a question of fact for the jury.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, it is a crime to “outrage the feelings” of Christians in respect of their religious beliefs.</p>
<p>Blasphemy has a loose similarity with Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act, which makes it unlawful (but not a crime) to offend someone on the basis of their race. Federal Liberal MP and former human rights commissioner Tim Wilson has said that extending 18C to cover religion would amount to a “<a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/anne-aly-mark-dreyfus-selfwedge-on-figures-of-speech/news-story/3d1d65e73ccfea6697a00f40fddd3af6">national anti-blasphemy law</a>”.</p>
<p>The crimes legislation in <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/s574.html">NSW</a> and the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/ca190082/s440.html">ACT</a> both set out identical minor limitations on blasphemy prosecutions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No person shall be liable to prosecution in respect of any publication by him or her orally, or otherwise, of words or matter charged as blasphemous, where the same is by way of argument, or statement, and not for the purpose of scoffing or reviling, nor of violating public decency, nor in any manner tending to a breach of the peace.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, it’s a crime in NSW and the ACT to outrage the religious feelings of a Christian, but only if you’re intending to scoff at Christianity. Blasphemy can be committed by speech, writing, art or other form of communication.</p>
<p>The crime of blasphemy is only about Christianity. You are legally free to blaspheme against any other religion. </p>
<p>There have been no recent prosecutions in Australia. The most recent NSW conviction was of <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lawreform/NSWLRC/1994/74.html#R74APPENDIXA">William Jones in 1871</a> who was sentenced to two years’ prison for blasphemy. In 1919, <a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/60905230">Robert Ross</a> was sentenced to six months’ prison under old federal postal laws for attempting to send blasphemous material about communists ransacking Heaven through the post. </p>
<p>However, in 1997 George Pell tried unsuccessfully to get a court injunction to prevent the National Gallery of Victoria <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/1997/52.html">from displaying the Piss Christ artwork</a> on the basis that the artwork was blasphemous. </p>
<h2>Why blasphemy laws are bad</h2>
<p>The crime of blasphemy is wholly inconsistent with a secular and religiously diverse Australian society.</p>
<p>The crime of blasphemy gives official preference to Christianity over other religions, since it is lawful to outrage the religious feelings of adherents of non-Christian religions. The law should not play favourites among religions. </p>
<p>It also involves the state enforcing religious orthodoxy (correct belief) and religious orthopraxy (correct behaviour) and threatening people who do not conform with criminal punishment. This is not a proper role for the law.</p>
<p>Blasphemy laws are also contrary to international human rights norms, which Australia is supposed to uphold. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has said in its <a href="https://www.humanrights.gov.au/text-human-rights-committee-general-comment-34">General Comment 34</a>, outlining its official interpretation of the right to <a href="https://www.humanrights.gov.au/freedom-thought-conscience-and-religion-or-belief">freedom of thought, conscience and religion</a>, that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>When might the crime of blasphemy be abolished?</h2>
<p>New Zealand Prime Minister Bill English recently <a href="http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11852061">promised</a> to abolish the crime of blasphemy after he was told it still exists in NZ, but has said there’s no urgency to do so.</p>
<p>In 1994, the NSW Law Reform Commission <a href="http://www.lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/lrc/lrc_completed_projects/lrc_completedprojects1990_1999/lrc_blasphemy.aspx">recommended</a> abolishing the offence of blasphemy in NSW. The commission also noted that every law reform commission that has considered the offence of blasphemy has recommended it be abolished. Due to lack of political will, NSW has never acted on this recommendation. </p>
<p>Abolition in Australia might occur soon. A federal parliamentary committee is currently conducting <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Freedomofreligion">an inquiry</a> into the right to freedom of religion or belief. I recently appeared before that committee and suggested that the committee recommend that federal parliament use its constitutional power to implement Australia’s international human rights obligations to abolish the crime of blasphemy throughout Australia.</p>
<p>As yet there is no indication of when the committee will hand down its recommendations. Let’s hope those recommendations include abolishing the crime of blasphemy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Beck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Laws against blasphemy privilege the feelings of Christians over other religious people, and have no place in a modern, inclusive society.Luke Beck, Senior Lecturer in Constitutional Law, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/785162017-05-31T06:41:50Z2017-05-31T06:41:50ZCaning of gay men in Aceh: not necessarily the exception to Indonesian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171563/original/file-20170531-23660-r8ffi8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Contemporary Indonesia is heading down the path of conservative Sunni Islamism.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Beawiharta</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent events in Indonesia should dispel any doubt about the rising influence conservative Sunni Islamist sentiment is having on the country’s laws. </p>
<p>Just three weeks ago, Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly known as Ahok, was <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-09/jakartas-outgoing-governor-ahok-found-guilty-in-blasphemy-trial/8509936">found guilty of insulting the Qur’an and sentenced to two years in prison</a>. Ahok decided not to appeal the verdict “<a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/ahok-refuses-to-appeal-for-good-of-indonesia/news-story/3509457d99d6f82b28bd0853d35a1969">for the good of the country</a>”, fearing that any attempt to overturn his conviction would divide the nation’s capital even further.</p>
<p>On 30 April and May 21, police raided gay sex parties in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/04/indonesia-gay-porn-arrests-threaten-privacy">Surabaya</a>, Indonesia’s second-largest city, and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/22/asia/jakarta-sex-party-lgbt/">Jakarta</a>. Arrests were made in both instances for alleged violations of Indonesia’s anti-pornography law.</p>
<p>Homosexuality is not illegal in Indonesia – although it is in the autonomous province of Aceh. Police have said several of the men will be charged under the anti-pornography law.</p>
<p>On May 13, in Aceh’s capital Banda Aceh, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-23/gay-men-flogged-in-aceh-after-vigilantes-found-them-having-sex/8551188">two young gay men were caned 83 times</a> before more than 1,000 onlookers. They had been convicted of sodomy. </p>
<p>Distinct from Indonesia’s national criminal code, Aceh’s criminal code, which is known locally as the <em><a href="http://www.jdih.setjen.kemendagri.go.id/download.php?KPUU=30437">Qanun Jinayat</a></em>, prohibits sodomy. Vigilantism is also prohibited and has been denounced by senior public officials. Despite this, the conduct of the vigilante group that arrested the two young men after breaking into their rented room and assaulting them both has not been scrutinised.</p>
<h2>“Moral” crimes</h2>
<p>The caning temporarily shifted international focus from Ahok’s blasphemy conviction to issues of corporal punishment and the policing of “moral” crimes in Indonesia’s sole autonomous province. </p>
<p>While some may find comfort in the fact that Indonesia’s national criminal code is not as draconian and invasive as Aceh’s, the underlying ideological issue remains the same nationwide: contemporary Indonesia is heading down the path of conservative Sunni Islamism. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (<em>Mahkamah Konstitusi</em>) has declared that Islamic law is only <a href="http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan%20perkara%2016-PUU-VI-2008_15%20Agustus_telah%20baca.pdf">one source of law in Indonesia</a>, alongside traditional customary law (<em>adat</em>) and Western law, to name a few. But for many of the country’s Muslim-majority population and judiciary, conservative Sunni Islamic norms are becoming the preferred basis for law and jurisprudence.</p>
<p>Like Indonesia’s blasphemy laws, the Acehnese criminal code has received <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/01/qanun-jinayat-provokes-over-criminalization-of-lgbt-people-vunerable-groups-icjr.html">heavy criticism from human rights groups</a>. The most notable of “moral” offences prohibited under the code include adultery (<em>zina</em>), being in close proximity to a member of the opposite sex out of wedlock (<em>khalwat</em>), lesbian relations (<em>musahaqah</em>) and sodomy (<em>liwath</em>).</p>
<p>The code prescribes a maximum penalty for sodomy of 100 strokes of the cane. Human rights groups have decried the sanctioning and practice of caning in Aceh as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/19/indonesia-stop-public-flogging-gay-men">“medieval torture”</a>. </p>
<p>Caning does, in fact, violate multiple international human rights conventions. Among these are the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf">Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</a>, and the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>. It also contravenes human rights guaranteed in <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174556.pdf">Indonesia’s constitution</a>, including the right not to be tortured or subjected to degrading treatment.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/indonesia-revoke-the-caning-sentence-of-gay-men-in-aceh/">Amnesty International</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/db170523.doc.htm">UN Human Rights – Asia</a>, as well as countless local <a href="http://www.dw.com/id/pasangan-gay-aceh-dihukum-cambuk/a-38867321">pro-diversity civil society organisations</a> condemned the decision to cane the two men, aged 20 and 23. They also called on the Indonesian government to uphold its commitment to universal human rights standards.</p>
<p>But these calls will almost certainly go unheeded, because, from a legal perspective, Aceh’s criminal code is not necessarily unconstitutional. What’s more, international human rights guarantees may, in theory, be legally persuasive but enjoy no concrete legal standing in Indonesia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women in Aceh were publicly caned for spending time with men who were not their husbands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Beawiharta</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Constitutionality of Aceh’s criminal code</h2>
<p>The authority for the statement that Aceh’s criminal code is not necessarily unconstitutional lies in a <a href="http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan%20PUU%20140_Senin%2019%20April%202010.pdf">2010 ruling of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court</a>. That court found that Indonesia’s blasphemy law, the same law under which Ahok was sentenced to two years’ prison, is constitutionally valid. </p>
<p>While the ruling received <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/05/22/un-urges-indonesia-free-jakarta-governor-jailed-blasphemy">broad criticism from human rights groups</a>, it remains the most definitive and recent authority on the status of individual human rights in Indonesia.</p>
<p>The court made <a href="http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan%20PUU%20140_Senin%2019%20April%202010.pdf">several salient points</a>, all of which help explain the implementation of corporal punishment in Aceh and the discriminatory treatment of homosexuals. These were strongly informed by the concept of religion and its exalted status in Indonesian society.</p>
<p>First, the court noted that Indonesia is neither an Islamic nor secular state. It is, rather, a religious state (<em>negara beragama</em>) based on the principle of One Almighty God (<em>Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa</em>). </p>
<p>The priority assigned to One Almighty God was born out of a constitutional compromise between the drafters of the 1945 constitution, some of whom hoped for a secular Indonesian state and others who envisaged an Islamic state. </p>
<p>As Indonesia is a religious state, the court found that “religious values” inform what makes a law good or bad. They also constitute a legitimate reason, the court said, to diminish individual human rights. </p>
<p>But what are “religious values” and who has the authority to define them?</p>
<p>The court’s interpretation of these values, as guaranteed in the 1945 constitution, may seem dubious to some. Rather than interpreting “religious values” as universal principles of brotherhood and humanity, for example, it read the term to mean the fundamental tenets of a state-recognised religion (<em>pokok-pokok agama</em>), as defined by Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesia’s Constitutional Court argues the country is neither an Islamic nor secular state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Darren Whiteside</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shari'a-based values</h2>
<p>Aceh’s criminal code arguably reflects the broader view in Acehnese society that corporal punishment is necessary to uphold local shari‘a-based values. And to discourage contradictory “moral” offences, of which homosexuality is one. </p>
<p>Caning also enjoys historical legitimacy. It has featured throughout the Islamic tradition as a form of punishment for both <em>hudud</em> (crimes against Islamic law contained in the <em>Qur’an</em>) and <em>ta’zir</em> (discretionary punishments for crimes against Islamic law administered by the state) offences.</p>
<p>The second crucial point of the ruling was that while religion may be a private matter to some, the Constitutional Court endorsed a concept of religion forming the identity of a community or society. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520277229">critics have argued</a>, the court’s decision prioritised the rights of religious ideas over the rights of individual adherents. It also legitimised the idea that a person’s religious identity is akin to property and may not be infringed upon. </p>
<p>There are few parts of Indonesia, if any, where Islam is considered more a part of one’s identity than in Aceh.</p>
<p>The Constitutional Court also found that upholding “religious values” was necessary to ensure public order. Again, <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520277229">critics</a> have argued that the court conflated the need to maintain public order with the tendency to pander to general public discontent. </p>
<p>On this point, its stance partially explains why the criminal acts of certain vigilante groups continue to go unpunished where religion is concerned. Vigilantism in Aceh is commonly carried out in the name of the shari‘a.</p>
<p>Finally, the court stated that the Indonesian state had no obligation to ensure the domestic application of international human rights conventions. Rather, it held that Indonesia’s respect for various conventions and international law apparatuses, including human rights, must always be based on the philosophy and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. </p>
<p>In other words, Indonesian “religious values” trump international human rights norms.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There are few parts of Indonesia where Islam is considered more a part of one’s identity than in Aceh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Damir Sagolj</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The exception or the rule?</h2>
<p>Following something as controversial and divisive as the public caning of two citizens for having consensual sex in private, supporters of the LGBT community and opponents of corporal punishment may find it comforting to think of Aceh as the exception to the rule. </p>
<p>The province is, after all, the only one in Indonesia to legislate corporal punishment and to prohibit same-sex relations. But it is not the only one that’s home to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-indonesian-extremists-are-gaining-ground">radical, often violent, Islamist groups and vigilantes</a> who, at times, <a href="https://www.quora.com/Indonesia-What-are-the-real-reasons-why-the-Indonesian-government-doesnt-ban-the-Islamic-Defenders-Front-Front-Pembela-Islam-FPI">appear to enjoy impunity</a>.</p>
<p>Aceh may also not be the only province that prohibits same-sex relations and sex out of wedlock for much longer. In May 2016, a group calling itself the Family Love Alliance (AILA) petitioned the Constitutional Court to conduct a <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/first-blasphemy-now-homosexuality/">material review of the national criminal code</a>. </p>
<p>While the review is still under way, AILA’s primary argument is that the national criminal code is a relic of colonial rule and <a href="https://www.kiblat.net/2016/09/26/aila-ajak-masyarakat-dukung-uji-materi-pasal-kesusilaan-kuhp/">does not reflect Indonesia’s traditional “religious values”</a>. </p>
<p>If the court accedes to the petition, both sexual relations out of wedlock and homosexual relations as such may be outlawed across the archipelago. And this may provide sufficient justification for vigilante groups to carry out similar acts of violence across Indonesia.</p>
<p>So while it may be comforting to dismiss the caning as peculiar to Aceh, if Ahok’s blasphemy conviction tells us anything, it’s that it would be foolhardy to assume that other parts of the archipelago aren’t on a similar, albeit slower, trajectory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Peterson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent events in Indonesia should dispel any doubt about the rising influence conservative Sunni Islamist sentiment is having on the country’s laws.Daniel Peterson, PhD Candidate / Research Assistant, Institute for Religion, Politics and Society, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777202017-05-18T03:09:14Z2017-05-18T03:09:14ZAnti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiment is not new in Indonesia<p>Racial and religious prejudice faced by the outgoing Chinese-Indonesian governor of Jakarta, now imprisoned for blasphemy, is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese and Christians in Indonesia have endured systematic and long-standing discrimination throughout the nation’s history.</p>
<p>Earlier this month, the former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, was sentenced to two years in prison for blasphemy.</p>
<p>This conviction follows his defeat in last month’s Jakarta gubernatorial election to a Muslim candidate, former Indonesian government minister Anies Baswedan. Ahok’s opponents ran a campaign against him based on ethnic and religious grounds. </p>
<h2>The campaign against Ahok</h2>
<p>Ahok acquired the position of Jakarta governor by default. He was deputy governor to Joko Widodo, who vacated the governorship after winning the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. </p>
<p>At an election campaign event last year, Ahok told his audience that religious leaders who were using an interpretation of a verse of the Quran against him were <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/ahoks-defeat-bodes-ill-for-the-future/">fooling Indonesians</a>. These religious leaders interpreted Verse 51 of Al-Maidah as prohibiting non-Muslims ruling over Muslims. </p>
<p>Large protests demanding Ahok be jailed for blasphemy ensued. These were also laden with anti-Chinese slogans. For example, at a November 16 rally, some protesters <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-jakartas-first-chinese-indonesian-governor-became-an-easy-target-for-radical-islamic-groups-68178">chanted</a> “crush the Chinese”.</p>
<p>The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), an Islamic vigilante group, <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-governor-election-results-in-a-victory-for-prejudice-over-pluralism-76388">organised</a> some of these rallies. At one protest, FPI leader Rizieq Shihab <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2016/s4595491.htm">asked</a> protesters “would you accept an infidel as governor [of Jakarta]?” – a clear reference to Ahok. </p>
<p>Rizieq’s comment is unsurprising. The FPI consistently <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">opposed</a> Ahok serving as Jakarta’s acting governor due to his non-Muslim background. </p>
<p>During the election campaign, anti-Christian posters and banners could be seen in the streets of Jakarta. One such poster <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38942647">read</a> “it is forbidden to pick an infidel leader”. Another banner <a href="http://jakartaglobe.id/news/anti-ahok-banners-fill-streets-jakarta-ahead-run-off-election/">stated</a> that “Muslims who vote for an infidel [Ahok] … do not deserve a funeral prayer”.</p>
<h2>Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians</h2>
<p>Chinese-Indonesians, representing approximately 2% of Indonesia’s population of 250 million, experienced widespread discrimination during the Soeharto era (1966-98). </p>
<p>Soeharto’s regime banned Chinese language, newspapers, schools and cultural expressions. Chinese names were also prohibited. As a result, Chinese Indonesians were pressured to take Indonesian names. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/the-tragedy-of-may-1998">In May 1998</a>, during the devastating Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesians directed their anger against ethnic Chinese who they inaccurately perceived to be universally affluent. Rioters damaged Chinese Indonesians’ businesses in Jakarta’s Chinatown, Glodok, and in some cases burned them. During this period, many ethnic Chinese women were <a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/a-common-destiny">raped</a> and some ethnic Chinese were killed. </p>
<p>Under Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration (1999-2001), Indonesia <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27991754">ended</a> the ban on Chinese language, newspapers, schools and displays of Chinese culture. But discrimination against Chinese-Indonesians remains. </p>
<p>A 1967 decree prohibiting Chinese Indonesians from serving in the Indonesian armed forces remains in place. And, unlike non-Chinese Indonesians, Chinese-Indonesians possess an <a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/never-indonesian-enough">SBKRI</a>, a document that proves their Indonesian citizenship. This document is still sometimes required for Chinese-Indonesians to obtain passports, enrol in schools and acquire business licences. </p>
<h2>Discrimination against Christians in Indonesia</h2>
<p>Ahok is part of two minority groups in Indonesia. Christian Indonesians comprise roughly 10% of Indonesia’s population. They, too, have been discriminated against throughout Indonesia’s history. </p>
<p>Since 2006, 500 Christian churches have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/06/indonesias-growing-religious-intolerance-has-to-be-addressed">shut down</a> in Indonesia. Some Islamists have been using a 2006 government regulation, which requires religious leaders to obtain community support prior to building places of worship, to demand church closures. </p>
<p>Discrimination against Christians also occurred during the Soeharto era. In 1967, Muslim militants <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/28/religions-name/abuses-against-religious-minorities-indonesia">damaged</a> Christians’ properties in Jakarta, South Sulawesi and Aceh on the grounds of fighting Indonesia’s purported Christianisation. </p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>Following his election victory, Anies Baswedan publicly <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/04/19/anies-baswedan-takes-out-jakarta-election-pollsters">pledged</a> as the incoming Jakarta governor to “safeguard [Jakarta’s] diversity and unity”. </p>
<p>However, to ensure Indonesia remains an inclusive democracy, Anies needs to go further than this. He should directly denounce the ethnic and religious campaign mounted against Ahok, notably by the FPI. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Jokowi’s administration needs to dismantle Soeharto-era discriminatory regulations and policies against ethnic Chinese. </p>
<p>If Anies fails to denounce the ethnic and religious campaign against Ahok and Jokowi does not attempt to remove anti-Chinese laws and regulations, Indonesia’s history of discrimination against Chinese and Christian Indonesians will continue to repeat itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivia Tasevski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethnic Chinese and Christians in Indonesia have endured systematic and long-standing discrimination throughout the country’s history.Olivia Tasevski, Tutor in International Relations and Political Science, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775652017-05-16T04:56:20Z2017-05-16T04:56:20ZCan support for the jailed former Jakarta governor bring change in Indonesia’s blasphemy law?<p>Across Indonesian cities and abroad, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39906030">candlelight vigils</a> have been held in support of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, the Chinese-Christian former governor of the capital Jakarta. He was recently sentenced to two years in prison for blasphemy for insulting Islam. </p>
<p>Purnama, popularly known as Ahok, is one of many people jailed under this controversial law. In the last 15 years <a href="http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/prosecuting-beliefs-indonesia-s-blasphemy-laws">more than 100 people</a> have been convicted of blasphemy and jailed in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Human rights activists have argued that the laws <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/28/indonesia-religious-minorities-targets-rising-violence">discriminate against religious minorities</a> and promote religious intolerance.</p>
<p>Ahok, a brash politician who enjoyed high popularity among Jakarta’s people, became embroiled in the blasphemy case after an edited video of him criticising opponents who use a verse in the Quran to dissuade people from voting for a non-Muslim went viral. </p>
<p>The blasphemy case factored in Ahok’s loss in the recent Jakarta gubernatorial election. His opponents exploited the brewing religious and racial sentiments against the double-minority Ahok. They aligned themselves with hardline Islamic groups that organised a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">massive rallies</a> demanding he be jailed. </p>
<p>Although Ahok lost the race, he received 42.05% of the vote, or 2,351,141 people. The size of his vote presents an opportunity to gather support to challenge the blasphemy law. </p>
<p>It’s not yet clear whether Ahok’s supporters will move to challenge the problematic blasphemy law or not. So far, his supporters are focusing on Ahok’s innocence. The sentence was harsher than prosecutors’ demand of two years’ probation. Some of Ahok’s supporters rally behind him not to protest the blasphemy law, but to save their idol. </p>
<p>In fact, Ahok’s supporters are using the same blasphemy law to report the firebrand Muslim cleric Rizieq Shihab, leader of the Islamic vigilante group Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which organised protests against Ahok. </p>
<h2>Blasphemy law</h2>
<p>Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, introduced the blasphemy ban by decree in 1965, when communists, Islamists and the military were competing for power. </p>
<p>His successor, Soeharto, who rose to power after ordering the rooting out of communists in Indonesia, got the parliament to promote the decree into law in 1969 and insert anti-blasphemy clauses into the penal code. </p>
<p>Blasphemy charges have been laid against people considered to be spreading unorthodox interpretations of religion. Ahmadis have been banned from practising their faith in public and from spreading their belief using this law. In 2012, a Shiite cleric from Madura was imprisoned. </p>
<p>Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah, a syncretist sect, was declared heretical in 2008. Its leader, Ahmad Musaddeq, was sentenced to four years’ jail. He was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/07/indonesias-anti-gafatar-campaign-ends-blasphemy-convictions">convicted again on blasphemy and treason charges</a> in 2017 because of his leadership of the Gafatar, which was presented as a reincarnation of Al-Qiyadah.</p>
<p>The law has also been used to punish people deemed to have insulted religion. Even a poll result could put one in jail.</p>
<p>Arswendo Atmowiloto, the Christian chief editor of a weekly tabloid, served five years in prison. His poll had listed the Prophet Muhammad as the 11th-most-revered figure among his tabloid’s readers – behind Soeharto, who took first place. </p>
<p>Seeing how the blasphemy law has put people behind bars for matters that are highly subjective and private, human rights defenders have twice requested, without success, that the law be reviewed. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s Constitutional Court maintained that the law was needed to prevent instability arising from polarisation and violence. Criminalising blasphemy was believed to deter people from taking the law into their own hands when they felt their religion was being insulted or threatened by unorthodox interpretations. </p>
<p>But it is impossible to try blasphemy without the judiciary being influenced by political and social pressure. Mob protests have prompted many blasphemy cases. </p>
<p>Large-scale riots after a blasphemy trial in 1996 in Situbondo, East Java, also demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the blasphemy law in maintaining public order.</p>
<p>The judges sentenced a man named Saleh to the maximum five-year jail term for insulting the head of a local Islamic boarding school. The mob, which wanted the death penalty for Saleh, was not satisfied. They burned down buildings owned by Christian-Chinese businesses, schools and 25 churches, killing five people. </p>
<h2>Remove or revise?</h2>
<p>Despite the clear problems inherent in the law, it will be difficult to petition the Constitutional Court once again to review it.</p>
<p>The court is unable to review any material substance (paragraphs, articles and/or a section of a law) that has already been subjected to review.</p>
<p>The first petition (2009) used rights issues as an argument to cancel the law. The second (2012) focused on Islam in Indonesian history and tradition. </p>
<p>In its 2010 ruling on the first petition, the Constitutional Court encouraged the petitioners to appeal for a revision, instead of revoking the law. </p>
<h2>Tough middle ground</h2>
<p>Considering the dominance of right-wing politics in Indonesia, it may be tough to amend the law through the parliament. Politicians, even those from the ruling party who supported Ahok’s candidacy as governor, might hesitate to tackle sensitive religious issues. </p>
<p>But unless human rights lawyers can find a different argument from the past petitions, revising the blasphemy law through legislative processes so as to not impinge on people’s religious freedom might be the most possible path.</p>
<p>Consistent pressure from the public will be needed to convince legislators that the law should be revised.</p>
<p>It’s not impossible if enough people stand up for the right of all people to individual freedoms. But this will need more than flowers, balloons, candles or hashtags.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ahok is only one among many people in Indonesia who have been jailed under the country’s controversial blasphemy law.Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun, Lecturer, Department of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, Universitas IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763882017-04-20T06:31:42Z2017-04-20T06:31:42ZJakarta governor election results in a victory for prejudice over pluralism<p>The long, divisive campaign for governorship of Indonesia’s capital city Jakarta is finally over, with unofficial results showing a <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/19/anies-beats-ahok-in-runoff-vote-quick-counts.html">decisive victory for the challenger Anies Baswedan</a> over the controversial incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok).</p>
<p>The election was the most politically significant regional election in Indonesia’s history because it wasn’t just about choosing the chief executive for the city’s 10 million citizens. </p>
<p>Rather, it became a referendum on the future of Indonesia’s ethno-religious diversity and tolerance after unwanted intervention by a number of radical Islamist groups, most notably the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).</p>
<h2>The blasphemy campaign against Ahok</h2>
<p>These groups accused Ahok, a Chinese Indonesian who is Christian, of <a href="http://www.catatansandk.net/2016/10/ini-isi-surat-al-maidah-ayat-51-yang.html">blaspheming last September by mocking a Qur’anic verse</a> that allegedly calls for Muslims to reject non-Muslims as their leaders. Ahok criticised unnamed religious clerics (<em>ulama</em>) for using verse 51 of the Surah Al-Maidah that advises Muslims to avoid aligning with Christian and Jews. </p>
<p>FPI and its allies managed to obtain a religious ruling (fatwa) from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) declaring that Ahok was <a href="http://news.detik.com/berita/d-3318150/mui-nyatakan-sikap-soal-ucapan-ahok-terkait-al-maidah-51-ini-isinya">guilty of committing blasphemy against Islam</a>. They then sponsored a number of anti-Ahok rallies in Jakarta, the largest of which, held in November 2016, <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_id/article/anti-ahok-protests-shrink-as-election-nears-final-stretch">attracted approximately 2.5 million protesters</a>. </p>
<p>Under pressure from these groups, the Indonesian government opened an investigation against Ahok and tried him for blasphemy. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-11/blasphemy-trial-of-jakarta-governor-ahok-delayed/8434290">The trial was adjourned</a> a week before the election.</p>
<p>Anies, a very astute politician, quickly capitalised on anti-Ahok accusations, by <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3385875/habib-rizieq-anies-sejalan-dengan-kita-yang-anti-reklamasi">seeking and receiving an endorsement</a> from Habib Rizieq Shihab, FPI’s supreme leader. He also started to portray himself as an “Islamic candidate” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/asia/jakarta-governor-election.html">to win the support of Jakarta’s Muslims</a>, who comprise 85% of registered voters.</p>
<p>The strategy seems to have worked, as an Indo Barometer poll in February indicated <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/asia/jakarta-governor-election.html">more than half of Jakarta’s voters would not vote</a> for Ahok because they believed he had committed a blasphemous act against Islam.</p>
<p>They reached this conclusion despite a <a href="http://www.beraninews.com/2017/03/Saksi-Ahli-Agama-Dari-PBNU-Kyai-Masdar-F-Masudi-Keluarkan-Dalil-Pamungkas-Soal-Arti-Auliya.html">number of Islamic scholars saying</a> that the Qur’anic verse in question must be seen in the context of warfare between Muslims and non-Muslims during the early Islamic period. And that it had <a href="http://www.netralnews.com/news/megapolitan/read/64493/dipergunjingkan.karena.bela.ahok..ini.surat.terbuka.ahmad.ishomuddin">nothing to do with how Muslims should choose</a> their leader.</p>
<p>The race between the two contenders was very tight, as indicated by a reputable Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) poll, which showed <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/12/religious-sentiment-drives-anies-to-top-place-in-survey.html">Anies leading Ahok</a> with a margin of 1% (47.9% vs 46.9%), with up to 5.2% of voters still undecided. </p>
<p>The campaign took an ugly turn when an elderly woman, who had voted for Ahok during the first round and subsequently died, <a href="https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2017/03/13/078855407/kisruh-jenazah-nenek-hindun-lukman-saya-tak-bisa-menindak-takmir?fb_comment_id=1660600733956646_1662241843792535#f2535531e41e86c">was allegedly denied a Muslim burial</a>. And an Islamist activist <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/17/facebook-user-reported-after-claiming-gang-rape-of-ahok-voters-halal.html">made a Facebook post stating</a> it would be religiously permissible for any women voting for Ahok during the run-off election to be gang-raped. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/07/jakarta-officials-remove-provocative-banners-to-reduce-tension.html">Police had to tear down a number of banners</a> placed in mosques across Jakarta discouraging their members to vote for Ahok during the runoff.</p>
<h2>Implications of the election results</h2>
<p>The election has serious implications for the future of Indonesian politics. Anies’ victory means he is in a stronger position to mount a challenge against President Joko Widodo in 2019, as a candidate of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), or with another opposition party. </p>
<p>A young, telegenic politician who has widely touted his Islamic credentials, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262">Anies is perceived by Jokowi as a more formidable opponent</a> than “old guard” elite figures, such as retired General Prabowo Subianto and former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who are both widely expected to be contenders during the 2019 presidential election.</p>
<p>But more importantly, Anies’ victory is another sign of the growing Islamisation of Indonesian politics, which has been on the rise since the country made its democratic transition in 1998. </p>
<p>This phenomena can be seen throughout Indonesian society, from the promotion of Islamist prayer groups (<em>pengajian</em>) and study circles (<em>halaqah</em>) in public university campuses throughout the country; the proliferation of Indonesian women wearing Islamic veils (hijab); and the rapid increase in local regulations restricting alcohol consumption and the rights of religious minorities.</p>
<p>There seems to be an <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/the-missing-middle/">ideological and political convergence</a> between Islamist groups such as FPI (an association of approximately 100,000 hardline Islamists with close ties to the Indonesian security apparatus) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This latter is known for its advocacy for a global caliphate. </p>
<p>Members of both groups are developing a close relationship with the conservative elements of the Nahdlatul Ulama NU) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organisations with generally moderate political leanings. They claim membership by 60 million and 30 million people respectively. </p>
<p>The MUI fatwa against Ahok was signed by Maaruf Amin, who, apart from being the council’s general chairman, is also NU’s supreme leader (<em>rais aam</em>). </p>
<p>The groups have also cooperated to demand the implementation of shari’a regulations (<em>perda shari’a</em>) by local governments throughout Indonesia. And there are now <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1206453?journalCode=ctwq20">442 such regulations in place in over 100 cities and districts</a>. </p>
<p>These regulations require women to wear hijab in public, prohibit the consumption of alcohol and prostitution, and declare a number of Islamic minority sects, such as Ahmadis and Shiites, to be illegal within their respective localities. The groups have <a href="https://ari.nus.edu.sg/publication/detail/1370">also encouraged acts of violence</a> against both minorities over the past decade or so. </p>
<p>Rising Islamism and the renewed prejudice against ethnic and religious minorities pose a danger to the pluralist outlook enshrined in Indonesia’s official founding principles, which are collectively known as <em>Pancasila</em>. Made from the Sanskrit word for “five”, <em>panca</em>, and the Javanese for “principles”, <em>sila</em>, <em>Pancasila</em> states: “The one God system (monotheism), just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy and social justice for all.”</p>
<p>These principles have underpinned equality for all Indonesia’s ethnic and religious groups since the country’s founding in 1945. Indonesian founding fathers who created <em>Pancasila</em> meant to give equal political and economic opportunities to all Indonesians irrespective of their ethnic and religious background. </p>
<p>Unlike Indonesia’s neighbour Malaysia, <em>Pancasila</em> grants no special status to Muslims and instead gives official religions status to a number of religions (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). It gives them equal legal recognition, and grants their members full religious freedom. Most significantly, adherents of all religions are free to run for and occupy any public office.</p>
<p>By creating these accusations against Ahok, the Islamists have refused to recognise the legal rights of Indonesia’s ethnic and religious minorities to run for public office. Ahok’s loss means that Indonesia’s ethno-religious diversity is the biggest casualty of this highly polarising election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander R Arifianto does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The election was a referendum on the future of Indonesia’s ethno-religious diversity and pluralism.Alexander R Arifianto, Research Fellow, Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/729722017-02-16T01:13:09Z2017-02-16T01:13:09ZJakarta governor’s race a litmus test for Indonesia<p>Yesterday, Jakartans went to the polling stations to choose between a <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakartas-first-ethnic-chinese-governor-takes-indonesia-forward-30708">Chinese-Indonesian incumbent</a> accused of blasphemy by <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">conservative Muslims</a>, <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/29/they-may-look-down-at-me-but-i-will-prove-them-wrong-agus.html">a former president’s son</a>, and <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/22/anies-may-challenge-ahok.html">a former education minister</a> as the next governor of Indonesia’s capital. </p>
<p>Incumbent <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN15T2TG?il=0">Basuki Tjahaja Purnama leads the race</a> with 42.87% of votes, followed by former minister Anies Baswedan with 39.76%, according to a quick sample count of votes by <a href="http://pilkada.kompas.com/dki/">Kompas daily’s research and development team</a>. The election commission’s deadline to tally the votes is February 27. The commission is expected to announce the result by March 4. Based on pollsters’ quick count results, the election seems set to head for <a href="http://www.dw.com/id/jadwal-putaran-dua-pilkada-dki-jakarta/a-37559740">a second round in April</a>. </p>
<p>The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election may be one of the most important local elections in Indonesia’s history. </p>
<p>This election will influence whether reforms to transform Indonesia’s politics from an oligarchic system to a stronger democracy prevail. It will also determine the future path of Indonesian political trajectory in its relation between religion and the State.</p>
<h2>A stepping stone</h2>
<p>The Jakarta governor seat is coveted for its heightened political implication. Since president Joko Widodo won 2014 presidential election after his two-year stint as Jakarta governor, observers and individual politicians perceive the position as a stepping stone to the presidency. </p>
<p>It wasn’t always the way. Before 2012, individual politicians viewed the Jakarta governor post primarily as an administrative position. But, political parties covet it for its enormous budget. Jakarta’s projected annual budget this year is approximately Rp 62 trillion (or US$4.6 billion). The governor controls local state owned businesses (BUMD) worth Rp 82 trillion (or US$ 6.1 billion) in total assets in 2015. </p>
<p>Now, after Widodo, popularly called Jokowi, won the presidency, the race for the Jakarta governor’s post gives nation-wide exposure for every candidate. It also draws international attention. </p>
<p>It is now seen not only as a source of funding for political parties, but also a strategic position for a political career.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jakarta governor candidate former education minister Anies Baswedan (right) and his running mate businessman Sandiaga Uno.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Antara Foto/M Agung Rajasa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economic motives</h2>
<p>But that’s not the main reason this election is so important.</p>
<p>The Jakarta election has been marked by a strong resistance against the Christian Purnama, Jokowi’s former deputy who replaced him as governor. Popularly known as Ahok, he is backed by the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Jokowi’s ruling party.</p>
<p>Ahok is currently on trial for religious blasphemy after criticising his opponents for using Koran verses to warn against voting for him. In November and December, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">Jakarta saw large rallies demanding his imprisonment</a>.</p>
<p>The resistance to Ahok’s nomination is greater than the political interests of his opponents.</p>
<p>The major players who were involved in <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/31/mui-recommendation-on-ahok-the-councils-strongest-kind-of-document-chairman-tells-court.html">building a narrative against Ahok</a> and mobilising the masses are those whose resources had been cut off by the “new wave politicians”, spearheaded by President Joko Widodo. </p>
<p>These politicians, including Ahok, Bandung mayor Ridwan Kamil, and Surabaya mayor Tri Rismaharini, who come from outside of the political cartel, are pushing for reforms, cutting off lucrative resources to political-religious actors.</p>
<p>This certainly has stepped on many interests, including quasi-religious organisations such as Indonesia’s top Muslim clerical body, the Council of Indonesian Ulema (MUI). For instance, <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/28/mui-govt-wrangle-over-halal-certification.html">the Jokowi government has cut MUI’s monopoly for religious certifications</a>. </p>
<h2>Religion-State relations</h2>
<p>Another key issue is the effect it would have on religion-state relations in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Ahok’s opponents’ camps have approached radical Muslim groups that organised rallies against Ahok. </p>
<p>A country of more than 400 ethnic groups, 700 languages, and six religions (that are officially acknowledged), Indonesia by nature and historical memory is open and pluralistic. </p>
<p>A Muslim majority, ethnic and religious issues in Indonesia have caused some tension. But never as volatile as that of the Middle East. Indonesia saw violent conflicts in Moluccas islands’ capital Ambon and in Poso, Central Sulawesi. But those were also against the characteristic of inter-ethnic and religious relations in Indonesia. Extremists from Java fuelled the conflict that lasted between 1999 and 2001. </p>
<p>In the past ten to 15 years, religious issues have become hot buttons. Indonesians have seen hardline Muslims, often with government support, attack the Ahmadiya and Shia Muslims, and shuttered churches in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s social fabric is mostly tolerant. The majority of the country’s different ethnic and religious groups have managed to live peacefully side by side. But the legal framework and politicians <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/01/27/regulating-religious-intolerance.html">thrive on religious and ethnic conflicts</a>.</p>
<h2>A litmus test</h2>
<p>The Jakarta election is a litmus test of the true feelings of Indonesians represented in Jakarta. Would religious and ethnic narratives be effective at swaying voters? </p>
<p>The result of this election will not necessarily answer whether Indonesian Muslims are tolerant or intolerant. But it will be a steep learning curve for politicians. </p>
<p>If religion and ethnic primordial lines make or break this election, politicians and Islamist groups will continue to destroy Indonesian pluralistic and tolerant Islam for political gains.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tobias Basuki receives funding from Knowledge Sector Initiative for a Policy Impact Study of the 2008 ITE Law.</span></em></p>Would religious and ethnic narratives be effective at swaying voters?Tobias Basuki, Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.