tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/anjem-choudary-30423/articlesAnjem Choudary – The Conversation2018-09-26T13:12:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1036402018-09-26T13:12:14Z2018-09-26T13:12:14ZWhy Anjem Choudary’s release from prison won’t necessarily reboot al-Muhajiroun<p>Before the extremist preacher Anjem Choudary was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45911160">released from prison</a> in Britain on October 19, many commentators <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/release-of-hate-preacher-anjem-choudary-sparks-fears-of-terrorist-supergroup-vn9tzsnqs">were getting nervous</a>. It’s hard to fault them for their anxiety. Choudary and his band of al-Muhajiroun (Arabic for “the Emigrants”) fanatics remain among the UK’s most reviled – and marginalised – figures. </p>
<p>For over 20 years, they have tried to establish an Islamic caliphate in Britain. More recently, a number of them have been implicated in political violence and joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).</p>
<p>I know how despised al-Muhajiroun are in Britain because I spent years hanging out with them, researching them for my new book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/research-methods-sociology-and-criminology/islamic-state-britain-radicalization-and-resilience-activist-network?format=HB&isbn=9781108470803">The Islamic State in Britain</a>. Between 2010 and 2015, I visited Choudary and his fellow activists on numerous occasions, breaking bread with them in kebab shops, observing their protests and street preaching, and interviewing them. </p>
<p>Among the many things I learned is that al-Muhajiroun’s most <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_persistent_activist.html?id=IwKPAAAAMAAJ">persistent activists</a>, people like Choudary and Mizanur Rahman, who was also convicted of supporting ISIS and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/21/mizanur-rahman-poses-greater-threat-friend-anjem-choudary-released/">will soon be released</a> from prison too, rarely leave their activism following incarceration. </p>
<p>If anything, prison reinforces their commitment to the cause. They see their “repression” as equivalent to the sufferings of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers when they were persecuted during the early years of Islam. </p>
<p>“I have done nothing compared to the messengers of old,” one persistent activist, who spoke to me on condition of anonymity, told me, after spending years in prison for a protest gone awry. “The Prophet Muhammad and his companions were boycotted for three years … They were killed … So if I’m on their path, then whatever hardships and whatever consequences they faced, my road is the same.”</p>
<h2>A history of rebuilding</h2>
<p>By 2008, this person, and other leading activists were incarcerated for their activism. In response, al-Muhajiroun laid low for a while, avoiding the provocative activism and publicity that made it famous. But the network did not collapse. Instead, led by Choudary, who avoided prosecution at the time, activists continued to meet and indoctrinate each other in small study circles called “halaqahs”. </p>
<p>Within a couple of years, the other leading activists finished their prison sentences, allowing them to reengage with Choudary and their fellows. Their reengagement sparked a revival in al-Muhajiroun. In rebuilding their network, activists minimised their public profile, focusing more on “da’wah” (preaching) than incendiary protests designed to capture media attention. </p>
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<p>But soon they returned to public attention, organising a number of high-profile protests under the banner of new spin-off groups such as <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8453560.stm">Islam4UK</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15678275">Muslims Against Crusades</a>, which have also since been banned by the British government. By autumn 2010, when I began my field work, the activist network was back, stronger than ever. </p>
<p>None of this means that al-Muhajiroun is destined to rise again, phoenix-like after Choudary’s release from prison. Following the group’s ill-advised decision to embrace ISIS in the summer of 2014, which led to Choudary’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/06/anjem-choudary-jailed-for-five-years-and-six-months-for-urging-support-of-isis">imprisonment</a>, British authorities largely dismantled the network. To be sure, al-Muhajiroun’s own history shows it can rebuild. But today it is weaker than it was in 2008, before its first renaissance. </p>
<p>Choudary, Rahman and other persistent activists will remain under close <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/release-of-hate-preacher-anjem-choudary-sparks-fears-of-terrorist-supergroup-vn9tzsnqs">government surveillance</a> following their release from prison, banned from using the internet and subjected to curfew. Without access to the internet, and the ability to meet with their supporters, they will find it harder to rebuild al-Muhajiroun in 2018 than they did in 2009. </p>
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<p>Meanwhile, after ISIS’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/raqqa-isis-capital-syria-liberate-islamic-state-caliphate-city-a8023801.html">failed reign of terror</a> in Iraq and Syria and the tragic terrorist attacks in the UK in 2017, at least one of which was led by a former al-Muhajiroun activist, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/05/london-bridge-attacker-named-as-khuram-butt">Khuram Butt</a>, Choudary and his companions find themselves even more marginalised from Britain’s diverse Muslim communities.</p>
<p>Choudary’s release from prison underscores the challenges facing British authorities in dealing with a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/03/surge-in-terrorists-eligible-for-parole-poses-threat-to-uk-security">surge of similar cases</a> and in policing al-Muhajiroun’s brand of provocative activism in one of the world’s great democracies. </p>
<h2>Best offence, a good defence</h2>
<p>For all the outrage the network’s activists have generated for marching against British soldiers returning from <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1286784/Muslim-protesters-brand-war-heroes-murderers-homecoming-parade-turns-violent.html">Afghanistan</a>, burning replicas of the poppy flower on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-12664346">Armistice Day</a>, and creating “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/18/muslim-patrol-vigilante-guilty-assault">Muslim patrols</a>” to enforce “shariah law zones” in London, the heart of their activism – preaching and protesting – is legal. </p>
<p>Unless the authorities are willing to stop activists from meeting in small groups and proselytising on city streets, a questionable undertaking that would violate the civil rights of these British citizens, it may not destroy what remains of the activist network. </p>
<p>But there is good news. One of the best “weapons” Britain has in countering this extremist narrative are British Muslims themselves, who overwhelmingly reject al-Muhajiroun’s vision. This includes many former activists who left the network and its radical ideology behind. </p>
<p>I interviewed a number of these former activists. They left for different reasons. Some grew tired of working for the seemingly impossible task of establishing the caliphate in Britain. Others became fed up with Choudary’s dogmatism and leadership. Still others simply matured out of the group through parenthood and other adult responsibilities. </p>
<p>Irrespective of their motives, they were glad to have left. “Thank God I did leave because I’m fairly successful in what I do now,” one of them told me. “After I got out of there, I furthered my career and got married. I have kids and stuff. Life is a lot more interesting now.” </p>
<p>Another common trait among these former members of al-Muhajiroun, one that many authorities have not yet grasped, is that they have the knowledge, and often the desire, to counter the group’s message to vulnerable young Britons – whether that message is conveyed online or in Hyde Park. Sometimes the best offence is a good defence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Kenney's research on al-Muhajiroun received funding from the U.S. Office of Naval Research and the National Institute of Justice.</span></em></p>The extremist network al-Muhajiroun has rebuilt itself before, but that doesn’t mean it’s destined to again.Michael Kenney, Associate Professor of International Affairs, University of PittsburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/790482017-06-12T08:20:00Z2017-06-12T08:20:00ZWannabes, loudmouths, terrorists? A history of al-Muhajiroun<p>As part of <a href="http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/92/81">ongoing research</a> on both radical Islamist and far-right extremism, I spent the best part of 2009 following the activities of one British city’s al-Muhajiroun group. Also known as Islam4UK, this small group led by Omar Bakri and then Anjem Choudary has been a long-term irritant to the government, as well a staging post in the lives of many British terrorists. </p>
<p>Many of those who have committed terrorist violence in the UK and abroad have been part of or connected to the group. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/05/london-bridge-attacker-named-as-khuram-butt">Khuram Butt</a> – one of the three London Bridge attackers – is just the latest. Butt was a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40167432">known follower</a> of the al-Muhajiroun network. </p>
<p>Demonstrations and media appearances by its leaders have caused outrage time and time again – and led to the forming of the right-wing English Defence League (EDL) in opposition to its ideas. In both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jul/18/terrorism.immigrationpolicy">2006</a> and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8453560.stm">2010</a>, the group was banned on the grounds of glorification of terrorism, only to reappear under other names.</p>
<p>The group was formed in 1996, when Omar Bakri was expelled from Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist group that aims to restore the historic Caliphate to unite all Muslims. Hizb ut-Tahrir works politically and intellectually, and so did not appreciate <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284112">Bakri’s</a> “aggressive populist approach and high media profile … street demonstrations, mass rallies and public conversions”. While al-Muhajiroun shared some of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s long-term goals, it seems its immediate aim was to be visibly disruptive.</p>
<p>A year later, the journalist Jon Ronson made a documentary called <a href="https://vimeo.com/220494752">Tottenham Ayatollah</a>, painting Bakri as a clown. Even in this period, however, there were claims from others, and boasts by Bakri, that the movement <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2000/may/16/highereducation.theguardian1">was also recruiting</a> Britons for military action in Kosovo, Chechnya and Kashmir. </p>
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<p>Pre-empting changes to the law, Bakri announced the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/oct/13/terrorism.religion">dissolution</a> of al-Muhajiroun in 2004. It then reformed under other names including Saved Sect, al-Ghurabaaa (both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jul/18/terrorism.immigrationpolicy">banned in 2006</a>) and Ahl ul-Sunnah Wa al-Jamma, with many other names as “platforms”. After the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005, Bakri left for Lebanon and was barred from returning to the UK. It was then that Anjem Choudary moved to centre stage as spokesman. Choudary was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/06/anjem-choudary-jailed-for-five-years-and-six-months-for-urging-support-of-isis">sentenced</a> to prison for five-years in 2016 for <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-can-anjem-choudary-be-stopped-from-radicalising-other-prisoners-64144">activities</a> supporting so-called Islamic State. </p>
<h2>Watched closely by the police</h2>
<p>I first met the group at a local authority community centre after being given a leaflet for an event on the Khilafah (the Caliphate). Choudary was the guest speaker, and the local activists did talks for an audience of around 30, and showed videos about the victims of war and their view of life in a Caliphate. I then went along to their <em>da’wah</em> (proselytising) stalls two or three times a week, to talk with and occasionally interview them, and to watch as they talked to passersby. </p>
<p>I was not the only person to be taking a long-term interest in them. The police had raided some of the groups’ houses before, and local officers would also turn up to the meetings and the stall to collect samples of the leaflets, CDs and DVDs. These officers knew the activists by name, and would engage in conversation about the Islamists’ ideas and materials. Local politicians and leaders knew of them, too. </p>
<p>The group were not welcome in the larger mosques – although one mosque leader did point out to me that there wasn’t a lot they could do about the group leafleting on the street outside.</p>
<p>Occasionally, local youths would shout racist abuse at them as they drove past. Most of the time, though, their conversations with the general public and the police were calm and polite, even while they were trying to argue that implementing sharia law in the UK was the way to solve problems such as racism, drug abuse, and also to stop homosexuality and promiscuity. </p>
<p>In this, their analysis of the ills of society had some crossover with views held by others, Muslim and non-Muslim. But some of their solutions, like the suggestion that the local football ground could be used for stonings, were extremist. However, it is hard to know how seriously to take this kind of rhetoric when, at the same time, they’d be happy to go to the five-a-side pitch for a kickabout, and they talked about pop music and TV shows. </p>
<h2>Skirting the edges of the law</h2>
<p>What got the group’s spin-offs Islam4UK and Muslims Against Crusades <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/612076/20170503_Proscription.pdf">added</a> to the government’s banned list in early 2010 was not a terrorism plot, but the proposal of a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8453560.stm">march through Wootton Bassett</a>, the Wiltshire town where British military war dead were <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-wiltshire-14726697">repatriated</a>, carrying coffins to symbolise dead Afghan civilians. The event was cancelled a week after the announcement, but again their provocative approach brought them headlines.</p>
<p>Demonstrations and conferences, some of which didn’t happen in the end, kept them in the news. These included <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/09/10/sept.11.ukposter/">the “Magnificent 19” event</a> planned for the second anniversary of 9/11, the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/4991313/Lutons-Muslim-extremists-defy-public-anger.html">demo in Luton</a> against returning British soldiers that led to the creation of the EDL, and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-12664346">poppy burning</a> on Remembrance Day 2010. At the same time, many documentaries have been made about the group or individuals within it, and Choudary made multiple TV and radio appearances on Newsnight, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XtUsRyWAcg">The Big Questions</a> and BBC Radio 4’s Today programme. </p>
<p>The al-Muhajiroun leadership has, over the years, attempted to act just within the law, while making statements and events that inflame public opinion. This seems to have helped them recruit new activists – and also recruit for the EDL and other counter-jihad groups. The government has responded by introducing definitions of “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech">non-violent extremism</a>” and “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published">fundamental British values</a>” that attempt to include this group while upholding as much freedom of speech as possible. </p>
<p>However, some of those involved in the group, including some of those who I interviewed, have been convicted of terrorism offences or carried out attacks. It’s possible that some had an interest in committing future violence before getting involved, hence the attraction of the group, and some may have developed it during or after involvement. </p>
<p>It’s very difficult to know who will graduate from controversial but legal activity – such as bragging and bravado about revolution, violence and “doing something” – to actually going out and committing murder. That said, being angry and talking about fundamental change ought not to be a crime. This is one of the difficulties of counter-terrorism policing and the government’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40151991">Prevent strategy</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Bailey received funding from the ESRC for his doctoral research.</span></em></p>One of the London Bridge attackers was linked to the extremist group.Gavin Bailey, Research Associate, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641842016-08-22T16:04:18Z2016-08-22T16:04:18ZPress platform for extremists like Choudary merely feeds unhelpful stereotypes<p>The recent conviction of Anjem Choudary for inviting support for Islamic State triggered a broader reflection on the role of the media in creating a public platform for this dangerous demagogue. The Daily Telegraph <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/16/questions-raised-about-bbc-giving-anjem-choudary-a-platform-for/">raised questions</a> about why Choudary was so often invited to appear in the mainstream media (most notably the BBC) to espouse his extreme views. </p>
<p>During the trial it was revealed that Choudary would “bait” his contacts in the media with tip-offs about his next demonstration or publicity stunt. Others, such as the Muslim Council of Britain, are questioning why Choudary was chosen when he has such little support and is so clearly unrepresentative of mainstream Muslim opinion.</p>
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<p>Wisdom in hindsight is not unusual, but it ignores the serious and ongoing relationship of mutual dependency that has developed between figures such as Choudary and the media – a relationship that extends beyond broadcasting to take in the press too. He has shown considerable acumen in “playing” a media that, in turn, has shown more than a willingness to be played. Choudary is projected as an authentic (albeit extreme) voice of the aggrieved Muslim, and his appearance guarantees controversy, viewers or a likely circulation boost. </p>
<p>In addition to being <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnoZucqZw8s">called on by BBC Newsnight</a> to comment on the Lee Rigby murder in 2013, Choudary also appeared on several other occasions – to laud British suicide bombers in Israel, praise poppy burners protesting on Remembrance Day in 2011 and so on. </p>
<p>One particular incident most clearly demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between Choudary and the media. In 2010 Choudary’s group, Islam4UK – an offshoot of al-Muhajiroun – <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1240044/Outrage-Muslim-extremists-hijack-war-heroes-town-Wootton-Bassett.html">threatened to hold a demonstration in Royal Wootton Bassett</a>, the site of repatriation for the bodies of British soldiers killed in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Predictably, the plan was greeted with howls of outrage from the press for its disrespect to the dead servicemen and their families. </p>
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<p>This did not stop Choudary from making the rounds of television and radio news studios to discuss the plans. As <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/6929708/Muslim-cleric-Anjem-Choudary-admits-Wootton-Bassett-march-is-publicity-stunt.html">he astutely observed</a>, the proposal had already served its purpose – it generated publicity for him and his cause – and so an actual demonstration would be, to some extent, beside the point.</p>
<h2>Making of a stereotype</h2>
<p>The Wootton Bassett storm has all the ingredients of the media framing of Muslims that <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff32041.php">Amina Yaqin</a> and I <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674048522">discuss in our book</a> Framing Muslims. It pitted the visually distinctive Choudary – copiously bearded and clearly the self-fashioning bogeyman of secular, liberal Britain – against a press keen to have a visible embodiment of the dangers of radical Islam in the midst. Although their standpoints were very different, between them they conspired to create an image of Muslims as fundamentally disloyal and untrustworthy, pushing all other shades of opinion, critical or supportive of Britain, to the sidelines.</p>
<p>Of course, public interest is usually trotted out by journalists as a justification of their coverage of figures such as Choudary, and we ought not to return to some kind of discredited direct censorship of such voices, as <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4409447.stm">was the case with the IRA during the Thatcher years</a>. Nevertheless, it is disingenuous for those same journalists who have profited from partnering Choudary in his antics to now cry foul at the platform they themselves created for him. </p>
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<p>This is how Muslims are politically and culturally framed. Islamist fanatics such as Choudary rely on the oxygen of publicity and vilification to maintain their rebel chic among the impressionable and disaffected; newspapers and the media in turn depend on regular appearances from people with extreme views to remind the rest of us what “we” are fighting against.</p>
<h2>Making matters worse</h2>
<p>The failure to implement the recommendations of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/leveson-inquiry-7469">Leveson Inquiry</a> – which also took evidence from minority groups including Muslims about their <a href="http://www.islamophobiawatch.co.uk/negative-portrayal-of-muslims-in-media-fuels-prejudice-leveson-inquiry-told/">misrepresentation by the press</a> – in favour of light-touch self-regulation leaves unchallenged the interests that led to this situation. </p>
<p>It has been open season on Muslims in some quarters with, as Robin Richardson and Julian Petley showed in their book <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/pointing-the-finger-pb.html">on Islam in the British media</a>, newspapers carrying stories about Muslim self-segregation and special pleading that have little (and sometimes no) basis in fact. </p>
<p>The supposed culture clash between Muslims and the West that began in earnest with the War on Terror after 9/11 is now resulting in a <a href="http://bridge.georgetown.edu/trends-in-islamophobia-focus-on-uk/">rising tide of Islamophobia and hate crime</a> on the one hand and a greater feeling of alienation and vulnerability on the other. In this context, the continued framing of Muslims as some kind of enemy within – bolstered by the Anjem Choudarys of the world – only adds fuel to the fire. </p>
<p>Now more than ever there is a need for critical self-consciousness in print and broadcast media. Journalists and editors need to be more responsible about their reporting of critical inter-community issues, ensuring that the fixation on a small minority does not reflect back on the majority. Yet the psychological utility and durability of stereotypes is deeply ingrained. It provides much of the raw material for modern popular journalism: think of refugees, asylum seekers, the traveller community and so on. </p>
<p>International political upheaval and population movements have meant that many objects of concern in the press today tend to have an Islamic cultural stamp. However, reducing complex global problems to cartoonish personifications of evil – while boosting circulation figures – does not help us to understand the issues better. Stereotypes of Muslims make us no wiser but, for now at least, they will not go away.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64184/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Morey and Amina Yaqin's book Framing Muslims resulted from an international research network of the same name funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK.</span></em></p>The press is giving audiences the wrong idea about Britain’s Muslims when it courts with extremists.Peter Morey, Professor of English and Postcolonial Studies , University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641442016-08-19T13:40:39Z2016-08-19T13:40:39ZHow can Anjem Choudary be stopped from radicalising other prisoners?<p>Anjem Choudary, who <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37098751">has been convicted</a> of inviting support for Islamic State, is not the first Islamist ideologue to spend time in a British prison. He follows in the footsteps of other high-profile preachers such as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11701269">Abu Hamza</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/25/abu-qatada-human-rights-law-secret-justice">Abu Qatada</a>, and like them, he now poses a special challenge for the prison authorities. Can he be de-radicalised? Will he radicalise other prisoners and is he as dangerous in prison as he was outside of it?</p>
<p>Over the past ten years the prison system in England and Wales has completely transformed the way it manages and tries to reform extremist prisoners. Ground-breaking <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Prisons-Terrorism-and-Extremism-Critical-Issues-in-Management-Radicalisation/Silke/p/book/9780415810388">new programmes and systems</a> have been introduced specifically to tackle the problems posed by Islamist extremists. Prison radicalisation is frequently flagged up as a major concern, but terrorist and extremist prisoners actually make up a tiny minority of the prison population. Just 183 prisoners were incarcerated for terrorism-related offences within a prison population of more than 85,000 inmates at the end of 2014. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2014/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-and-searches-quarterly-update-to-31-d">About two thirds</a> of these were connected to extremist Islamist groups, with the remaining third largely composed of far-right extremists. </p>
<h2>Tight security</h2>
<p>The prison system divides terrorist prisoners into three groups: international, domestic and Irish. International terrorists (regardless of nationality) are those connected to a terrorist group that is based outside the UK. This includes all prisoners affiliated to or inspired by groups such as Al Qaeda or Islamic State. It is this category that Choudary will fall under.</p>
<p>In security terms, Choudary will, at least initially, be classified as a Category A prisoner. Category A is applied to those prisoners considered highly dangerous and for whom escape should be made impossible. All terrorism-related prisoners are automatically categorised as Category A on their entry into the system.</p>
<p>Category A prisoners must be held at high-security prisons. There are currently <a href="https://www.justice.gov.uk/contacts/prison-finder/high-security">eight high security prisons</a> in England and Wales and combined they hold more than 3,000 prisoners (but only around half of these inmates are Category A). The last Category A terrorist prisoner escape in England and Wales occurred in 1994 when <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ira-escape-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen-1388101.html">five IRA prisoners escaped from HMP Whitemoor</a>, an incident which prompted a major overhaul in the security surrounding such prisoners.</p>
<h2>Restrictions on prisoners</h2>
<p>One benefit of the tighter security restrictions imposed on Category A prisoners is that it makes it more difficult for them to attempt to radicalise other prisoners. Category A prisoners do not share cells and their interactions with other prisoners are closely monitored. This is particularly the case with extremist prisoners, and an ideologue such as Choudary will be monitored very closely. </p>
<p>But there are significant costs. The enhanced security means that it <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/.../costs-per-place.">costs almost £60,000 a year</a> to hold a Category A prisoner, twice the cost of holding Category B and Category C prisoners. </p>
<p>The rise of Islamist terrorism in the UK in the 2000s brought about further major changes. It was quickly realised the jihadi-inspired terrorists were very different to the IRA prisoners seen in the previous 30 years. There were very few prison staff from Muslim backgrounds and there was a real lack of understanding of the culture and mind-set of the Islamists. There were also real fears that the jihadis would try to radicalise other prisoners and could turn prisons into breeding grounds for violent extremism.</p>
<p>In order to combat this threat, prisons in England and Wales developed one of the best funded and organised prison Imam systems in the world. The prison Imams provide religious support and guidance for all Muslim prisoners and help ensure that extremists cannot takeover the role of religious leader on the wings (something which happened <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-014-9183-x">in French jails</a> in recent years). </p>
<h2>De-radicalisation tools</h2>
<p>The imams play a key role in educating prisoners on the true tenants of mainstream Islam. A religious de-radicalisation programme, Al Furqan, <a href="https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publications/psj/prison-service-journal-203">was also developed</a> in 2011. This targeted the beliefs of extremist prisoners in particular and tried to work with them to embrace a more moderate faith. To the great surprise of many, however, this important programme was scrapped by Michael Gove in 2015 shortly after he <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/justice-committee/news-parliament-20151/radicalisation-in-prisons-evidence-16-17/">assumed control of the Ministry of Justice</a>. </p>
<p>A programme that thankfully survived the Gove era is Healthy Identity Intervention (HII). <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Fa3mAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT105&lpg=PT105&dq=The+Healthy+Identity+Intervention:+The+UK%E2%80%99s+development+of+a+psychologically+informed+intervention+to+address+extremist+offending,&source=bl&ots=A_fsdsDF-O&sig=aTFM7tEhu9lZpTTzOOwRCi9dLTs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOmbbHlMvOAhVJI8AKHcfbBasQ6AEILjAC#v=onepage&q=The%20Healthy%20Identity%20Intervention%3A%20The%20UK%E2%80%99s%20development%20of%20a%20psychologically%20informed%20intervention%20to%20address%20extremist%20offending%2C&f=false">This involves</a> specially trained psychologists or experienced probation staff working one-to-one (or sometimes two-to-one) with an extremist prisoner. Over a series of weekly sessions, which can continue for several months, the programme focuses on helping prisoners to disengage from an extremist group or ideology.</p>
<p>Another important tool developed within prisons is Extremism Risk Guidance 22+. This is the assessment framework used for terrorist and extremist prisoners. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-offender-management-service">National Offender Management Service</a> recognised that the existing risk assessments used for ordinary prisoners were a bad fit for terrorist prisoners. Launched in 2011, <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/tam/2/1/40/">ERG22+ assesses offenders</a> on 22 factors which are theoretically related to extremist offending. Staff use the model to assess an individual’s mindset and capability for terrorism. They will try to interview the prisoner as part of this assessment, and for example, an individual’s progress on the HII can feed into it. </p>
<p>Choudary will certainly be assessed using the ERG framework and in time he will also be given the chance to take part in the HII programme. Whether he accepts that opportunity or not is another matter. A third of extremist prisoners <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Prisons-Terrorism-and-Extremism-Critical-Issues-in-Management-Radicalisation/Silke/p/book/9780415810388">have refused to take part</a> and among the recalcitrants are many senior figures. I suspect that Choudary will follow their example and turn down involvement in HII or similar programmes.</p>
<p>In February 2016, the former prime minister, David Cameron, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prison-reform-prime-ministers-speech">announced</a> that mandatory de-radicalisation programmes would be introduced for extremist prisoners. This was before Britain’s vote to leave the European Union and when Gove was still in charge at the Ministry of Justice. Nothing further about these mandatory programmes has been announced and I wonder if this is really a feasible option anyway. There is general <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Prisons-Terrorism-and-Extremism-Critical-Issues-in-Management-Radicalisation/Silke/p/book/9780415810388">international consensus</a> that prison de-radicalisation programmes do not work with hardline prisoners who are deeply committed to the cause.</p>
<p>Nevertheless this does not mean that Choudary will leave prison unchanged. Prison does provide a time for contemplation. Ultimately, in prison Choudary will be forced to reflect on his life, his priorities, and crucially what will he do after release. As the years pass by, change in some form could come from within or outside of official de-radicalisation programmes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Silke has received funding from the National Offender Management Service. </span></em></p>The Islamist ideologue will be closely monitored, but is unlikely to cooperate with prison de-radicalisation initiatives.Andrew Silke, Head of Criminology and Director of Terrorism Studies, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.