tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/armed-insurgency-46809/articlesArmed insurgency – The Conversation2023-04-10T07:34:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2013132023-04-10T07:34:07Z2023-04-10T07:34:07ZSecurity in Nigeria: Bola Tinubu will increase tension in some parts of the country and reduce it in others<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519066/original/file-20230403-18-bt8m48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's president-elect, Bola Ahmed Tinubu in Abuja in July 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/1/30/tinubu-nigerias-ailing-kingmaker-aims-for-presidency-in-2023">Bola Ahmed Tinubu</a> will be sworn in as president of the country on 29 May 2023. That’s if the courts uphold his election victory. </p>
<p>Tinubu won the <a href="https://newsone.com/4522401/nigeria-elections/">highly contested</a> 25 February presidential election with 37% of the total votes. At least two leading opposition candidates have filed separate legal challenges to the election results. </p>
<p>The new president will face many challenges, chief of which is insecurity. Multiple armed conflicts, high levels of organised crime and worsening food insecurity persist around the country. </p>
<p>The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that some <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ng/idps">three million</a> Nigerians have been internally displaced by insecurity. The country’s geographical regions are associated with distinct ethnicities and religions. Each has experienced different forms of insecurity:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence">farmer-herder conflicts</a> in the country’s middle belt</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b184-rethinking-resettlement-and-return-nigerias-north-east">insurgency</a> in the north-east </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/01/30/Nigeria-banditry-Zamfara#:%7E:text=There%20are%20believed%20to%20be,Banditry%20is%20profit%2Ddriven.">banditry</a> in the north-west</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://humanglemedia.com/the-different-factions-of-ipob-insurgents-tormenting-nigerias-southeast/">separatist violence</a> in the south-east.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>We have <a href="https://www.sv.uio.no/isv/english/research/projects/resilience-building/">published work</a> on communal conflict in Northern Nigeria, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Kenya and have worked in community development. Based on the lead <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/resilient-communities/nigeria/094121F7DF02F0AD0FD0A4ECFF82766A">author’s work</a> on conflict in Nigeria, we are of the view that Tinubu’s presidency could increase tensions in central and south-east Nigeria, while reducing violence in the north.</p>
<p>Our research indicates that Nigeria’s sociopolitical environment is characterised by strong patronage networks. And that ethnic and religious identities strongly overlap and reinforce political cleavage. The perceived exclusion of one religion or ethnic group can fuel tensions that quickly turn into a violent ethno-religious crisis.</p>
<p>Tinubu’s unprecedented choice of a fellow Muslim as vice-president is likely to increase ethnic and religious tensions in the north-central zone. Allegations of discrimination against Igbos in Lagos could spur Biafra-related activism and violence in the south-east. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://tinubu.ng/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/RENEWED-HOPE-2023.pdf">promises</a> to create more employment opportunities and establish civilian neighbourhood watch groups hold potential for reducing the Boko Haram conflict and banditry in the north-east and north-west.</p>
<p>In the north-central region, Tinubu’s presidency will likely face more <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/11/28/horrors-on-the-plateau-inside-nigerias-farmer-herder-conflict">communal conflicts</a> between farmers and herders. These have long interlinked with <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/ethno-religious-conflict-jos-nigeria-%E2%80%93-executive-summary">ethnic and religious</a> tensions. </p>
<h2>The drivers of violence</h2>
<p>Tinubu, a Muslim from the south-west, won the election alongside another Muslim from the north-east. Thus the new administration is a “Muslim-Muslim ticket”. </p>
<p>Since 1999, all past administrations have semi-officially shared power in religious and ethnic terms to manage sectarian sentiment. Nigeria is a secular country with almost equal Muslim and Christian populations. </p>
<p>The Christian Association of Nigeria <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/muslim-muslim-ticket-it-is-left-for-nigerians-to-reject-apc-can/">denounced</a> the Muslim-Muslim ticket. <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/264709/nigeria-2023-can-support-from-mega-churches-boost-peter-obis-chances/">Religious mobilisation</a> was evident throughout the campaign. </p>
<p>Tinubu received the most votes and met the constitutional requirement of at least 25% of the vote in 25 of Nigeria’s 36 states. This indicates a nationwide appeal. But the “Muslim-Muslim” perception may increase religious polarisation. It may undermine the new government’s ability to address the causes and consequences of communal violence.</p>
<p>In the south-east region, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61354014">Indigenous People of Biafra</a> will likely continue to agitate for independence. The separatist group has been protesting the marginalisation of the ethnic Igbo population. </p>
<p>The presidential candidate <a href="https://www.facebook.com/PeterObiGregory/">Peter Obi</a>, an Igbo, enjoys a <a href="https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/nigeria-obi-presidential-elections-2023/">massive</a> youth following in southern Nigeria. Numerous Igbo elders and Obi’s allies <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/2023-no-sit-at-home-for-february-election-ipob-warns/">dissuaded</a> the group from attempting to sabotage the election. </p>
<p>But Obi’s third-place finish, amid the electoral body’s <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2023/03/05/inec-admits-logistics-technological-challenges-others-in-presidential-nassembly-elections/">logistical challenges</a>, allegations of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/27/1159822850/nigerias-general-election-saw-disorganization-and-violence">voter suppression</a> and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/03/tinubus-silence-over-attacks-on-igbos-in-lagos-dangerous-for-nigeria-lp/">ethnic profiling of Igbos</a> in Lagos, will likely increase Biafra-related activism and violence. </p>
<p>During the campaign, Tinubu <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2022/11/24/nnamdi-kanu-tinubu-promises-to-negotiate-with-southeast-agitators/">pledged</a> to negotiate with Indigenous People of Biafra. In contrast, Buhari had treated it as a terrorist group.</p>
<p>In the north-east region, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a> and the <a href="https://greydynamics.com/islamic-state-west-africa-province-iswap/">Islamic State of West Africa </a> are expected to challenge Tinubu’s administration. They previously challenged Buhari’s and Goodluck Jonathan’s. </p>
<p>Tinubu’s manifesto frames the insurgency as a security problem spawned by a socioeconomic crisis. It outlines the need to create jobs and revamp the nation’s security architecture. But his policy document is silent on reintegrating Boko Haram members into society. </p>
<p>In 2013, Tinubu sparked <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2013/03/21/tinubu-wants-amnesty-for-boko-haram-says-they-are-not-ghosts/">controversy</a> when he advocated amnesty for Boko Haram members. Two years later, the Buhari administration set up “<a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor">Operation Safe Corridor</a>” for those who surrendered. The military claims the programme has <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/operation-safe-corridor-83000-insurgents-surrender-to-nigerian-army-cds/">reduced</a> Boko Haram’s fighting force. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:8245/MEAC_FindingsReport_7.pdf">recent survey</a> shows that people appear to be more receptive to the return of former insurgents than previously thought. Tinubu’s vice-president-elect, Kashim Shettima, has <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/governor-shettima-reiterates-amnesty-call-for-boko-haram/">previously called for</a> amnesty – so Tinubu will likely continue the programme.</p>
<p>Finally, in the north-west, militias known as bandits continue kidnapping for ransom, stealing cattle and killing people. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset, bandits killed more than <a href="https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/nigeria/">2,600 civilians</a> in 2021. This is a staggering increase compared with 2020. Bandits have no stated political aim. </p>
<p>The conflict began as a land dispute between Hausa farmers and Fulani herders. It has been partly linked to the <a href="https://nigeriaclimate.crisisgroup.org/">impact</a> of climate change. In January 2022, Buhari (a Fulani) banned the militias as terrorist groups and deployed the military. </p>
<p>Since then, military air raids have repeatedly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/9/6/nigeria-militarys-accidental-airstrikes-keeps-survivors-grievi">killed civilians</a> instead of militants. </p>
<p>Contrary to Buhari’s approach, Tinubu called for engagement with violence-affected communities. His policy document emphasises using civilian neighbourhood watch groups to address banditry. Whether these groups will be limited to non-violent conflict resolution or engage in armed vigilantism is unclear. </p>
<p>Armed vigilantes may increase violence, as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/precariousness-of-protection-civilian-defense-groups-countering-boko-haram-in-northeastern-nigeria/2836A772046FBD70B62EE806D4113E43">research</a> on civilian defence militias in the Boko Haram conflict indicates.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The new administration faces enormous challenges in addressing widespread armed conflict and deep societal divisions. </p>
<p>Lawmaking and law enforcement are critical to dealing with the root causes of insecurity, such as poverty and unemployment. It’s also important to have ethnic and religious balance in the appointment of crucial security positions. </p>
<p>This could reduce tensions and make dialogue possible, particularly with community leaders and religious associations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jana Krause receives funding from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under grant number 852816 for the project 'Resilience Building: Social Resilience, Gendered Dynamics, and Local Peace in Protracted Conflicts.'</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Imrana Buba’s doctoral research is supported by the same grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause). </span></em></p>Once in office, the new president will face a myriad of challenges, chief of which is insecurity.Jana Krause, Professor of Political Science , University of OsloImrana Buba, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of OsloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778842022-02-25T13:34:17Z2022-02-25T13:34:17ZUkraine’s military is outgunned but can still inflict a great deal of pain on Russian forces<p>Ukraine’s ramshackle military <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26532154">offered no resistance to the Crimean annexation</a> in February 2014. Since then the poorly equipped but well-motivated Ukrainian Army has taken <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer">thousands of casualties</a> while fighting separatist forces in the eastern Donbas region. In the meantime, the country has embarked on an often haphazard reform programme of its military which has made it – while still vulnerable in many vital respects – a rather more formidable force.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220120-is-the-ukrainian-military-really-a-david-against-the-russian-goliath">2014-15</a>, Ukraine has tripled its defence budget and attempted to modernise its forces – not only to defend themselves against Russia, but to comply with the standards <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato">demanded by Nato</a> as an entry requirement. </p>
<p>The results <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/22/ukraine-s-toughest-fight-challenge-of-military-reform-pub-75609">have been mixed</a>. On paper their army looks impressive – with 800 or so heavy tanks and thousands of other armoured vehicles protecting and transporting a regular force of about 200,000. These are far better trained troops than in 2014. They have good leadership, especially in the crucial non-commissioned officer cadre – the backbone of any army. Vitally, most observers report high morale and motivation. </p>
<p>But this is only part of the story. Most of their armour and equipment is relatively old and, although factories have been turning out modernised versions of old models such as the T72 tank, these provide little in the way of effective opposition to the far more modern <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/just-defense-russia-getting-over-400-armored-vehicles-2022-198949">Russian tanks and armoured vehicles</a> – some of which are equal or superior to the best Nato stock. </p>
<p>Further, the Ukrainian army is vulnerable both to Russian artillery, traditionally the Red Army’s most formidable arm, and the threat posed by Russian strike aircraft. Recent gifts of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-ukraine-crisis-who-supplies-weapons-to-kyiv/a-60772390">Nato hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft</a> missiles and other weaponry will impose losses on Russian forces – but are not gamechangers.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s air force possesses a considerable fleet of cold war-era aircraft and personnel are well-organised and trained. But Russia has <a href="https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-proving-ground-of-the-future/">configured its “aerospace forces”</a> to gain and maintain crucial control of the air using, among other systems, the fearsome <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/projects/s-400-triumph-air-defence-missile-system/">S400 long-range anti-aircraft missiles</a>. These systems give the most advanced Nato air forces serious pause for thought, let alone the 1990s vintage fighters and bombers of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Advanced Russian fighters and missiles will dominate the sky in due course although the Ukrainians have achieved <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/ukraine-claims-russian-aircraft-losses-as-invasion-begins/147686.article">some successes</a> against the expectations of many. There are credible reports that Ukrainian fighters are still flying and remarkably have shot down several Russian jets. Their old – but in the right hands still effective – anti-aircraft missiles have also <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-shoots-down-several-russian-aircraft-1682211">caused Russian losses</a>, according to Ukrainian sources. </p>
<p>The navy is now militarily insignificant – the more so since much of it appears to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-leaves-black-sea-exposed-russia-invades-ukraine-2022-02-24/">have been sunk in harbour</a> within 24 hours of the beginning of hostilities.</p>
<h2>Strengths and weaknesses</h2>
<p>But this is not a foregone conclusion. Ukrainian generals are highly unlikely to play to Russian strengths and deploy forces to be obliterated by their artillery or air power. They have seen all <a href="http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2017/03/29/the-russian-artillery-strike-that-spooked-the-u-s-army/">too much of that</a> in the past. In July 2014 a formation of Ukrainian troops was destroyed by a rocket artillery strike in eastern Ukraine. What was notable was the way the rockets were guided to their targets by drones operated by Russian-supported separatist troops. </p>
<p>Focusing on equipment quality or quantity alone is always a big mistake. In the UK, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP_0_01_Ed_5_UK_Defence_Doctrine.pdf">military thinking</a> outlines “three components of fighting power”. These are the moral (morale, cohesion, motivation), conceptual (strategy, innovation and military “doctine”) and material (weaponry). It is one thing having the advantage in the material component of war, it is quite another to turn it into success. The Ukrainians will try to exploit Russia’s vulnerability to having to wage a lengthy military campaign with the potential to sustain politically damaging heavy casualties.</p>
<p>Many Ukrainians have a basic awareness of weapon handling – the several hundred thousand <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/23/ukraine-president-calls-up-reservists-as-russia-moves-troops-into-countrys-east">reservists called up</a> as Russia invaded certainly do. They may be light on modern tanks and sophisticated weaponry, but may well have the edge in the moral and conceptual domains. </p>
<p>There is a strong tradition of partisan warfare in Ukraine where ideas of “territorial defence” – insurgent groups fighting small actions on ground they know well backed up, where possible, by regular army units – are deeply ingrained. In the early days of the cold war after the country had been liberated from German occupation, the anti-Soviet “<a href="https://militaryhistorynow.com/20%20zee14/03/03/stuck-in-the-middle-the-forgotten-and-bloody-history-of-the-ukrainian-insurgent-army/">Insurgent Army</a>” was only finally defeated in 1953. During this time they caused tens of thousands of casualties. It may have been largely forgotten by the rest of the world, but this conflict is well remembered in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The vaunted Russian armed forces <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-army-donbass-troops-b1967532.html">have already deployed</a> a large proportion of their ground troops, and have a very limited capability either to occupy ground contested by insurgents or – even more importantly – to sustain operations beyond the first “break-in” phase of the war. The last thing Putin wants is a protracted war, with bloody urban combat and echoes of Chechnya – which is what Ukrainian forces are likely to give him.</p>
<p>War takes its own course, but the likely and sensible Ukrainian approach will be to trade land for time. They will hope to inflict casualties and draw Russian forces into urban areas where their advantages are less pronounced. In the event of defeat in the field, Ukraine’s defenders could well default to a well-armed, highly-motivated and protracted insurgency, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/10/boris-johnson-ukraine-crisis-most-dangerous-moment">probably supported by the west</a>. This is Putin’s nightmare. </p>
<p>The other side of that particular coin is that western support of such “terrorism” could attract an unpredictable and highly dangerous response. In his “declaration of war” speech Putin threatened “such consequences as you have never encountered in your history” to those who “try to hinder us”, clearly referencing Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal. In the face of defeat or humiliation rationality may be in short supply.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Ledwidge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine can call on a highly motivated citizenry to fight a prolonged insurgency against occupying forces.Frank Ledwidge, Senior Lecturer in Military Capabilities and Strategy, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1580792021-03-30T14:40:38Z2021-03-30T14:40:38ZOffshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: what went wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392531/original/file-20210330-21-1w2h3jg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People displaced by the atacks on the town of Palma, northern Mozambique, flee to safety with meagre possessions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alfredo Zuniga / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent events in Palma, a town in the volatile Cabo Delgado province in the north of Mozambique, have taken bloodshed in the region to new levels. Dozens of people were killed when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56557623">hundreds of Islamist militants stormed the town</a> on Wednesday, 25 March. They <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56563539">targeted</a> shops, banks and a military barracks.</p>
<p>The attack has been devastating for the people living in the area – as well as the country. The escalating violence has already <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/14/mozambique-growing-insurgency-take-strategic-port-mocimboa-praia-islamic-state/">left at least a thousand dead</a> and displaced hundreds of thousands more. </p>
<p>The conflict has put a temporary lid on plans that have been in the making for more than a decade since rich liquefied natural gas (LNG) deposits were discovered in the Rovuma Basin, just off the coast of Cabo Delgado. Western majors like Total, Exxon Mobil, Chevron and BP entered the Mozambique LNG industry as well as Japan’s Mitsui, Malaysia’s Petronas and China’s CNPC.</p>
<p>The gas projects are estimated to be worth <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/10/mozambique-insurgency">US$60 billion</a> in total. Some observers recently predicted that Mozambique could become one of the <a href="https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/mozambique-lng/">top ten LNG</a> producers in the world. </p>
<p>The development of the projects had led to the area becoming a hive of economic activity.</p>
<p>The plan was for Palma to become a LNG manufacturing hub where hundreds of skilled workers would be located. And, more broadly, the hope was that it would drive the rapid advancement of a country that ranks close to the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MOZ.pdf">bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index</a>. More than 70% of the population have been classified as <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MOZ.pdf">“multidimensionally poor”</a> by the United Nations Development Programme.</p>
<p>The LNG projects in the northern Cabo Delgado area represented a silver lining of hope. Since 2012 the major multinational energy companies have spent billions of dollars on developing the offshore gas sites. Today, offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area includes Africa’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">three largest LNG projects</a>. These are the Mozambique LNG Project (involving Total and previously Anadarko) worth <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">$20 billion</a>; the Coral FLNG Project (involving Eni and Exxon Mobil) worth <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">$4.7 billion</a>; and the Rovuma LNG Project (involving Exxon Mobil, Eni and CNPC) worth <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">$30 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Production was <a href="https://constructionreviewonline.com/project-timelines/mozambique-lng-project-timeline-and-all-you-need-to-know/">scheduled to start in 2024</a> but intensifying attacks near the gas site on the Afungi peninsula are now posing serious challenges to the production time lines. </p>
<p>There have been no material benefits for the people of Cabo Delgado thus far. Moreover, many local people feel deeply aggrieved because many <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">were evicted and had to relocate</a> soon after the discovery of gas in Cabo Delgado to make way for LNG infrastructure development. </p>
<h2>History of instability</h2>
<p>Cabo Delgado is Mozambique’s most northern province. Neglected over many years, the people who live there have been politically marginalised. And the area is underdeveloped. </p>
<p>Since independence in 1975 investment, and rising incomes, were largely confined to the capital Maputo in the south as well as the <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/cabo-delgado-and-the-rise-of-militant-islam-another-niger-delta-in-the-making/">southern parts of the country</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the central government in Maputo has only had a fragile and precarious control over the territory and borders of the country. A 16-year civil war that involved <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/the-genesis-of-insurgency-in-northern-mozambique">clashes between the central government</a> and Renamo, a militant organisation and political movement during the liberation struggle and now opposition party, claimed more than a million lives.</p>
<p>More recently, since 2017, the militant Islamic movement, <a href="https://institute.global/policy/mozambique-conflict-and-deteriorating-security-situation">Ansar al-Sunna</a>, locally known as Al-Shabaab, has been active in Cabo Delgado. It now poses the biggest security threat in the country, rendering some of the northern parts almost <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/cabo-delgado-and-the-rise-of-militant-islam-another-niger-delta-in-the-making/">ungovernable</a>. </p>
<p>The militants took advantage of the Mozambican government’s failure to exercise control over the entire territory of the country. </p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna <a href="https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/">reportedly</a> pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2018. It was acknowledged as an affiliate of ISIS-Core in August 2019. In view of this, the US Department of State has designated Ansar al-Sunna Mozambique, which it refers to as <a href="https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/">ISIS-Mozambique</a>, as a foreign terrorist organisation. </p>
<p>What makes this armed force so significant is that the movement has orchestrated a series of large scale and targeted attacks. In 2020 this led to the temporary capturing of the strategic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">port of Mocimboa da Praia</a> in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>In addition, the turbulence caused by the militants’ attacks has <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-caring-people-displaced-violence-cabo-delgado">displaced nearly 670,000 people</a> within northern Mozambique. Obviously, foreign companies in the LNG industry with their considerable investments feel threatened, especially at the current stage where final investment decisions have to be taken.</p>
<p>In recent months the situation in Cabo Delgado has gone from bad to worse. In November 2020, dozens of people were reportedly <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-03-23-beheadings-aid-workers-wait-for-visas-as-violence-intensifies-in-mozambique/">beheaded</a> by the militants. Now the bloodshed has spread to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/29/total-chaos-survivors-tell-of-insurgent-attack-in-mozambique-palma">Palma</a>. </p>
<p>Amid the development of an increasingly alarming human rights situation towards the end of last year, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26497&LangID=E">appealed for urgent measures</a> to protect civilians. She described the situation as “desperate” and one of “grave human rights abuses”. Bachelet also stated that more than 350,000 people had been displaced since 2018.</p>
<h2>Growing risk</h2>
<p>There is little doubt that Islamist insurgents are increasing the scale of their activities in Cabo Delgado. A lack of governance and a proper security response by both the Mozambican government and southern African leaders make this a case of high political risk for the LNG industry.</p>
<p>The escalation of the insurgency can potentially jeopardise the successful unlocking of Mozambique’s resource wealth. Until now, the main LNG installations and sites have not been targeted, but the attacks in Palma have brought the turbulence dangerously close to some of the installations. </p>
<p>The Mozambican armed forces are clearly stretched beyond the point where they can protect the local communities. A part of the solution lies in Southern African Development Community or at least South African military support to stabilise Cabo Delgado and restore law and order in the short term. Wider international support might even be necessary. </p>
<p>But this would require the Mozambican government to change its stance by allowing multinational foreign military forces on its soil. </p>
<p>At the same time, a long term solution should be pursued. This will require better governance of the northern areas and the local people in what has been called <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-27.pdf">a forgotten province</a>.</p>
<p>It is clear that Cabo Delgado is an area which the central government in Maputo is unable to control, govern effectively, or even influence. In short, <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-27.pdf">weak state institutions</a> – including weak armed forces – are key to the problems of Mozambique and specifically the turbulence in the northern parts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158079/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The conflict has put a temporary lid on plans that have been in the making for more than a decade since rich liquefied natural gas reserves were discovered in the Rovuma Basin.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1228872019-09-12T10:17:10Z2019-09-12T10:17:10ZWith all eyes on Kashmir, a storm is brewing over India’s longest-running peace process with Naga militants<p>As the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3026308/beijing-gives-pakistan-its-backing-amid-rising-kashmir">fallout</a> from India’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/india-revokes-kashmirs-autonomy-risking-yet-another-war-with-pakistan-121485">decision to revoke the autonomy</a> of Kashmir in early August continues, recent weeks have also seen troubling signs emanating from the oft-forgotten Naga-inhabited regions in the far north-eastern corner of India. </p>
<p>Peace talks with Nagas pushing for independence, which have been going on for more than two decades, recently entered rocky waters. India’s decision to revoke Article 370 and 35A of the constitution that guaranteed Kashmir’s autonomy has added fuel to an existing sense of unease over the peace process to end India’s longest insurgency.</p>
<p>The Naga demand for independence began when the British first arrived in the 1840s, introducing a limited and partial <a href="http://ijless.com/journal%20data/IJLESSJune2015_1_4_Keth.pdf">system of rule</a>. As India’s independence in 1947 loomed, the Nagas feared they would become subsumed within India’s political setup and that their unique local identity and culture would be eroded. This fuelled demands for a Nagaland independent from India, with militants of the Naga National Council (NNC) turning to violence in the mid-1950s. </p>
<p>Since then, there have been decades of bloodshed, factional feuding and failed attempts at striking peace deals, including creating the state of Nagaland in 1963 and granting its citizens a series of special privileges under Article <a href="https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf">371(A) of India’s constitution</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C862%2C857&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290688/original/file-20190903-175705-1o3oxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An NNC memorial on the Kohima-Khonoma road in Nagaland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Waterman</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most notorious of these failed attempts at peace was the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN_751111_Shillong%20Agreement_0.pdf">1975 Shillong Accord</a>. The short agreement contained very little of substance beyond a commitment to negotiations and was widely perceived as the work of a small faction within the NNC. It prompted the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) to break away from the NNC and take up arms again. Despite a major split in 1988 and multiple further breakaways since, NSCN factions continue to play a powerful role in the politics of the region.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kashmiris-are-living-a-long-nightmare-of-indian-colonialism-121925">Kashmiris are living a long nightmare of Indian colonialism</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Push for peace</h2>
<p>The current deadlock concerns talks with the NSCN – Isak-Muivah (NSCN–IM), arguably the most powerful armed group in the region since its formation following the 1988 split. Although the group signed a ceasefire and began talking to New Delhi in 1997, the peace process has been a rocky one. </p>
<p>Efforts to extend the NSCN-IM ceasefire beyond the state of Nagaland in 2001 led to <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1396751.stm">massive riots</a> in the neighbouring states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. This reflected anxieties that extending the peace process into these states – which have substantial Naga populations – would effectively hand over parts of these states to NSCN–IM control, fuelling tensions with the ethnic non-Naga populations in these states. The riots forced a government U-turn in the areas beyond Nagaland, creating a long-term sticking point in the peace talks.</p>
<p>It did receive a shot in the arm in August 2015, when Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi signed <a href="https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/0hweMukjTJK5ObPc3JbiCM/A-new-phase-in-Naga-peacechess-game.html">a framework agreement</a> with the NSCN–IM that intended to establish the blueprint for a final peace agreement. In the four years since, both parties have continuously released optimistic statements suggesting that a final resolution is imminent and that most of the substantive issues have been resolved. </p>
<iframe src="https://www.google.com/maps/embed?pb=!1m18!1m12!1m3!1d3683047.036354571!2d92.16265959413253!3d25.64723041389998!2m3!1f0!2f0!3f0!3m2!1i1024!2i768!4f13.1!3m3!1m2!1s0x3746210934c63d31%3A0x1f2df33a89cc3efd!2sNagaland%2C%20India!5e0!3m2!1sen!2suk!4v1568028188779!5m2!1sen!2suk" width="100%" height="450" frameborder="0" style="border:0;" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<p>In July 2018, R N Ravi, who oversees the talks on behalf of the Indian government, indicated that even the longstanding question of the Nagas living beyond Nagaland could be resolved by extending <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/details-of-2015-naga-agreement-emerge/article24464239.ece">special rights and privileges</a> to them. In March 2019, <a href="http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=mar0519/at056">Ravi announced</a> that the main outstanding issues were merely symbolic in nature and concerned the NSCN–IM’s demands for a separate Naga flag and constitution. </p>
<p>The talks were, however, suspended in the run-up to India’s 2019 general election. Upon <a href="https://theconversation.com/india-election-how-narendra-modi-won-with-an-even-bigger-majority-117476">Modi’s victory in May</a>, the NSCN–IM welcomed the continuity of national government and expressed hope that the talks would be concluded at the soonest possible opportunity. On August 1, <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/931280/rn-ravi-interlocutor-for-naga-peace-talks-is-new-nagaland-governor">Ravi was appointed governor</a> of Nagaland with a view to expediting the talks and securing a quick resolution, ideally before <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pm-modi-wants-naga-talks-to-conclude-in-3-months-won-t-dilute-state-s-special-rights-nagaland-guv-rn-ravi-1581733-2019-08-17">October or November</a>. </p>
<p>But this initial optimism was short-lived. On August 3, NSCN–IM revealed that the last round of talks it had held with Ravi in Delhi on 26 July, “<a href="http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=aug0419/oth055">did not go well</a>” and accused the interlocutor-cum-governor of being “<a href="https://nagalandpage.com/rn-ravi-has-turned-bossy-nscn-im/">capricious and bossy</a>”. The group also questioned Delhi’s decision to appoint Ravi as governor, expressing concern that the talks had been reduced to the “<a href="https://nagalandpage.com/indo-naga-problem-reduced-to-governors-level-talks-nscn-im/">governor’s level</a>” rather than via an interlocutor answerable directly to the prime minister. </p>
<p>For the NSCN–IM, symbolic concessions, such as holding talks at the highest level of government and a separate flag and constitution remain crucial in communicating to its constituents that it has secured a semblance of “sovereignty”. </p>
<h2>Symbolic issues remain</h2>
<p>Even before the election, frustration was growing at the progress of the talks. In February, leading Naga civil society organisations boycotted a meeting with Ravi, while in March the NSCN–IM general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah, suggested that the government was <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/our-demand-is-greater-nagaland-with-own-flag-constitution-nscn-i-m-leader-119032100702_1.html">delaying a final settlement</a>. The main concern among the NSCN-IM negotiators is that the government may not grant the key symbolic concessions which are crucial to the NSCN-IM if it is to be able to tell its constituents that it has secured Naga sovereignty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291511/original/file-20190909-109939-y6i7g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Khonoma Village in Nagaland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/733512355?src=Nk90H8w2qH2owGwhB6aRHA-1-5&size=medium_jpg">by Vinay Chittora/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the ground, tit-for-tat moves have led to <a href="https://satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-18-No-7">at least five confrontations</a> in 2019 between NSCN–IM personnel and security forces. NSCN–IM is also suspected by security forces of being behind an <a href="https://scroll.in/article/924391/what-led-to-the-ambush-in-arunachal-that-killed-11-people-including-a-sitting-mla">ambush</a> on May 21 on a political convoy in Tirap, Arunachal Pradesh in which 11 people, including a prominent local legislator, were killed. Such incidents have <a href="https://acd.iiss.org/">increased in recent years</a>, underlining the potential for escalation when the understanding between the government and the NSCN–IM leadership shows signs of frailty.</p>
<p>Further complicating matters, the NSCN-IM, although the most powerful, is by no means the only armed group. A separate “Working Committee” of seven other groups is currently <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/naga-peace-talks-konyak-faction-joins-working-committee-of-political-groups/story-hScfA8g3YlN5M2g82xhyOL.html">holding its own talks</a> with the government, meaning the NSCN-IM will need to reconcile with these factions in any peace deal.</p>
<p>Events in Kashmir intersect directly with the central, symbolic questions that are at the heart of the vexed Naga political issue. <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/371998/">Article 371(A)</a> ensures that no parliamentary legislation shall apply if it interferes with customary practices, laws and land ownership patterns, resembling some of the provisions recently withdrawn in Kashmir. </p>
<p>Although Ravi stressed in early August that the sanctity of Article 371(A) would be <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/no-need-to-worry-article-371-a-is-a-sacred-commitment-nagaland-governor-to-people/articleshow/70555596.cms?from=mdr">preserved</a>, the unilateral nature of the revocation process in Kashmir has triggered further <a href="http://morungexpress.com/index.php/nagas-react-development-jk">anxiety</a> within Naga civil society, with many fearing that the same fate awaits them. </p>
<p>New Delhi and its interlocutors in the northeast have now set a deadline of October or November for resolving the peace talks, but have much to do to reassure the Nagas on these symbolic issues if they are to capitalise on this critical juncture and end India’s longest insurgency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122887/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As part of the PhD research partly informing this article, Alex Waterman received funding from the University of Leeds 110 Anniversary Scholarship (2014-2017). He is also a research consultant for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD) programme, providing daily coverage and analysis of conflicts in Northeast India.</span></em></p>In India’s far northeast, tensions are beginning to emerge in the 22-year peace process to end India’s longest insurgency.Alex Waterman, Research Fellow in Security, Terrorism & Insurgency, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1112322019-02-06T11:42:47Z2019-02-06T11:42:47ZViolence and killings haven’t stopped in Colombia despite landmark peace deal<p>A deadly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2019/jan/17/bogota-car-bomb-kills-at-least-eight-people-video">car bomb at a Bogotá police academy</a> claimed by Colombia’s National Liberation Army, or ELN, is the latest sign that Colombia’s civil war is not over. President Ivan Duque called the January attack, which <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombia-asks-cuba-to-arrest-eln-negotiators-for-car-bombing/2019/01/18/b2eb5a2e-1b87-11e9-b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html">killed 21 military personnel</a> and wounded 68, a “crazy terrorist act.”</p>
<p>The leftist ELN became Colombia’s largest guerrilla group after the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, disbanded following a <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-makes-strides-in-colombia-but-the-battle-is-far-from-won-83601">peace agreement</a> with the government in September 2016.</p>
<p>As I write in my <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo29202793.html">new book on the counter-insurgency efforts</a> leading up to the peace deal, there were already clear signs that neutralizing the FARC would not end Colombia’s 52-year armed conflict. </p>
<h2>A complex conflict</h2>
<p>What Colombians call “el conflicto” – the conflict – was never a simple two-way fight of everyone versus the FARC. It was, and remains, a set of <a href="https://arts.uchicago.edu/event/violentology-manual-colombian-conflict-stephen-ferry">overlapping and interrelated conflicts</a> involving the government, Marxist rebels, right-wing militias and drug cartels, staggered across the decades from 1964 to today.</p>
<p>The 2016 FARC deal was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-only-now-after-51-years-war-is-ending-in-colombia-48563">historic</a> achievement. After its signing, armed conflict-related fatalities in Colombia dropped from about <a href="http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/acuerdos-de-gobierno-y-farc/el-primer-ano-de-la-paz-en-cifras-GE7745778">3,000 a year to just 78</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Juan Manuel Santos shakes hands with FARC commander Rodrigo Lodoño after signing Colombia’s historic peace treaty on Sept. 26, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://ustv-mrs-prod.ap.org/c252dad242cd4409b95ba59533955502/components/secured/main.jpg?response-cache-control=No-cache&response-content-disposition=attachment%3Bfilename%3DAP_16273806278437.jpg&Expires=1544041737&Signature=CRwY1BLXm99DQCoQbAgLsWlliS52a0f1A5K4FpAUWiewT20lQOEJ0z70Unmd9vQ">AP Photo/Desmond Boylan</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But an ever-changing array of criminal gangs still operate in Colombia, profiting off <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/colombia-peace/">drug production, illegal mining and extortion</a>. The landscape of their territorial control has simply changed, with the ELN, Autodefensa Gaitanista de Colombia and other armed groups spreading into areas once run by the FARC.</p>
<p>Other political violence has <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602">ticked up</a> since the 2016 accord, too, including the targeted killing of <a href="http://www.indepaz.org.co/566-lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-han-sido-asesinados-desde-el-1-de-enero-de-2016-al-10-de-enero-de-2019/">indigenous and Afro-Colombian activists</a>.</p>
<p>The FARC is not entirely defunct, either. </p>
<p>Colombian research groups <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1709">Fundación Ideas para la Paz</a> and <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/farc-dissidents-growing-faster-colombia-can-count/">Insight Crime</a> report that ever more former fighters are dissatisfied with the FARC’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">reincarnation as a political party</a>. Up to 3,000 guerrillas – one-quarter of the roughly 12,000 demobilized after the peace accord – have re-armed alongside their former comrades. </p>
<p>Others have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html">joined the ELN</a>, which has <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/duque-promete-fortalecer-fuerza-publica-en-el-catatumbo-para-combatir-al-eln-317420">doubled in size since the FARC’s disarmament</a>. </p>
<p>January’s car bombing was a show of force. </p>
<h2>Colombia’s tense border</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation CC-BY-ND</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>The attack likely snuffs out any chance of <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-colombias-most-stubborn-rebel-group-agree-to-peace-71835">a peace deal with the ELN</a>, which Colombia’s government has pursued for years.</p>
<p>The ELN is primarily active along the Colombia-Venezuela border. If Colombia’s government cracks down on the group, violence could escalate quickly. </p>
<p>Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro is in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-power-struggle-plunges-nation-into-turmoil-3-essential-reads-110419">power struggle</a> to save his embattled presidency, and the U.S. has threatened military intervention. That would probably involve <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/29/troops-photo-john-boltons-notes-raise-questions-about-military-role-venezuela-crisis/">using Colombian territory as an operations base</a>.</p>
<p>Colombia’s border region is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/08/venezuela-migrants-colombia-brazil-borders">tinderbox of geopolitical tension</a>. A flare-up with the ELN may be the spark that sets it off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111232/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander L Fattal has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Social Science Research Council, and Wenner-Gren Foundation.</span></em></p>A 2016 accord with the FARC guerrillas was supposed to end Colombia’s 52-year civil war. But a deadly car bomb in Bogotá shows that armed insurgents still threaten the South American country.Alexander L Fattal, Assistant Professor, Pennsylvania State University, Departments of Film-Video and Media Studies and Anthropology, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/962842018-05-10T16:11:48Z2018-05-10T16:11:48ZWhy Renamo leader’s death could have a major impact on Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218423/original/file-20180510-34018-189ijxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The funeral of Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Ricardo Franco</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The unexpected <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-09-renamo-leaders-death-a-game-changer-for-mozambique-peace-process/">death of Afonso Dhlakama</a>, the former guerrilla leader and president of Renamo, the main opposition party in Mozambique, might lead to the political cards in Mozambique being reshuffled significantly. </p>
<p>The Renamo leader’s death could affect the progress that’s been made in negotiations to <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/dhlakama-says-will-sign-peace-agreement-with-president-nyusi-in-october-or-november/">end hostilities</a> between Renamo and the Frelimo government. It could also affect the outcome of <a href="http://apanews.net/index.php/en/news/mozambique-sets-date-for-municipal-elections">municipal elections</a> due to be held in October and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-04-11-mozambique-sets-october-2019-for-general-elections/">national elections in 2019</a>. </p>
<p>A great deal will depend on who succeeds Dhlakama. There is no clear successor as he centralised power and went to great lengths to prevent the emergence of one. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-09-renamo-leaders-death-a-game-changer-for-mozambique-peace-process/">argued</a> that this would pose a problem for transition in the party. But the smooth and frictionless nomination of Ossufo Momade as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/mozambique-opposition-names-interim-leader-20180505">transitional leader</a> four days after Dhlakama’s death, suggests that the final succession might be smooth. </p>
<p>The peace negotiations to end the simmering war between Renamo and the Frelimo government were still ongoing when Dhlakama died. They had become very personalised, with Dhlakama and Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi mostly <a href="http://www.folhademaputo.co.mz/pt/noticias/nacional/nyusi-e-dhlakama-alcancam-consensos-por-telefone-vidio/">talking on the phone</a>. </p>
<p>Dhlakama’s death should not put an end to negotiations, but it might delay them and lead to changes to the form they’ve taken. The secret one-on-one negotiations have been <a href="https://zitamar.com/analysis-death-mozambiques-father-democracy-could-usher-new-democratic-era">criticised</a>. And since his death there have been calls for the negotiations to be re-institutionalised and opened up to civil society to enable a broad based sustainable peace agreement to be reached.</p>
<h2>Renamo succession</h2>
<p>Momade’s appointment as interim head of Renamo is only temporary and two groups will be competing for the top job – the civilian and the military. The civil branch of Renamo is dominated by its parliamentarians, with Ivonne Soares, Dhlamaka’s niece, at the helm. She is the head of the party in parliament. Should this group win the upper hand it might strengthen the civilian structure of Renamo and possibly help its electoral chances. </p>
<p>The military branch comprises of soldiers and generals from the time of the civil war (1976-1992). It also includes former combatants who resumed fighting in what’s become known as the small war – or <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2017-1-page-153.htm">“proto-war”</a> – of 2013-16. </p>
<p>There are risks either way. There is concern that a civilian might not be able to control the military wing of the organisation. But a military leader as president of Renamo risks keeping it weak as an electoral machine, with consequences for peaceful electoral politics.</p>
<p>As a general cum parliamentarian cum negotiator Renamo’s interim president, <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-who-is-ossufo-momade-renamos-newly-appointed-interim-leader/">Momade</a>could be an ideal compromise. One could also imagine a double ticket with a military as president and a civilian, such as Ivone Soares or Manuel Bissopo, the acting secretary-general, as number two.<br>
Alternatively, some have advanced that Renamo dissidents such as Raul Domingos and Daviz Simango could have a <a href="https://www.voaportugues.com/a/os-desafios-do-p%C3%B3s--dhlakama-para-a-renamo/4384864.html">chance as outsiders</a>. Domingos, at one point seen as Dhlakama’s successor, was expelled from the party in 2000 in the middle of difficult negotiations with the government. Simango was elected for Renamo as mayor of Beira in 2003, but not put forward for reelection in 2008 as he was becoming too independent and influential. He seceded and created his own party, the <a href="http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/proelit/Sergio_Chichava.pdf">Democratic Movement of Mozambique</a>, which now controls several important cities. </p>
<p>More realistically, Renamo might reintegrate these dissidents and their party, or at least align with them, making Renamo a broader church. This could help the party get the electoral victory it has been seeking since 1994. Renamo has come second in all elections since the end of the war in 1992. It almost won in the 1999 elections, possibly only losing then because of fraud.</p>
<h2>What next for peace negotiations</h2>
<p>Dhlakama’s death could tempt both sides to change or withdraw from the negotiations. On May 5, two days after he died, Frelimo’s all powerful political commission, the party’s supreme organ, issued a statement saying that all that remained to be done now was <a href="http://www.frelimo.org.mz/frelimo/index.php/actualidade/noticias/item/1701-mensagem-do-partido-frelimo-pelo-desaparecimento-fisico-do-presidente-da-renamo-afonso-dhlakama">“the disarmament and demilitarisation” of Renamo</a>. It failed to mention the decentralisation agreement which would introduce a system of elections for provincial governors and create district assemblies. The agreement is facing <a href="http://www.dw.com/pt-002/descentraliza%C3%A7%C3%A3o-negocia%C3%A7%C3%B5es-entre-renamo-e-frelimo-num-impasse/a-43692199">difficulties in parliament</a> where Frelimo is arguing that it needs to be amended and put to a national referendum. </p>
<p>Responding in kind, Momade declared that his party would be doing nothing else than finalising the <a href="http://www.verdade.co.mz/destaques/democracia/65673">agreement on decentralisation</a>, as if the reintegration of Renamo soldiers into the Mozambican military was not an issue anymore.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A crowd displays the portrait of Afonso Dhlakama at his funeral service.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Ricardo Franco</span></span>
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<p>If not kept in check these kinds of dynamics could undermine, and even lead to the collapse, of the negotiations. </p>
<p>Political analyst Alex Vines has argued that Dhlakama’s death could, however, also be an <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/afonso-dhlakama-s-death-changes-calculation-peace-prospects-mozambique">opportunity for peace</a>, recalling that the two sides were close to an agreement before he passed away. He has appealed to the goodwill of Renamo and Frelimo and called for greater engagement from the international community and investors. </p>
<h2>Implications for Frelimo</h2>
<p>Dhlakama’s departure could potentially weaken Nyusi, and as a result cause problems for Frelimo. The party fractured under Nyusi’s predecessor President Armando Guebuza. And Nyusi took over at a time of both economic and political crises in the country.</p>
<p>The country’s economic crisis is related to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2018-03-28-no-escape-for-mozambique-as-debt-troubles-mount/">massive secret debts</a> supposedly contracted to fight Renamo. The IMF and the Western international community have <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36158118">suspended cooperation</a> and some investors have <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2016-12-04-once-a-beacon-in-sub-saharan-africa-mozambique-has-been-hit-hard-by-scandal-and-price-cycles/">withdrawn</a>.</p>
<p>On the political front, Nyusi staked his presidency on the resolution of the conflict with Renamo. At the time this was much against the will of his own party. Negotiations are therefore very important to him.</p>
<p>In a strong presidential system, a weakening of the president could lead to more internal divisions. In turn this would weaken him, the party and the government’s hand in negotiations with the IMF, the international community and Renamo.</p>
<p>The elections in October 2018 and in 2019 are looming large in people’s minds. Nobody is sure how they will play out. Renamo might align with other opposition parties while Frelimo might try to use the Renamo leadership transition to undermine its rival, with unknown consequences. There are also fears Frelimo might resort to harsh tactics to win and remain in power. </p>
<p>On the other hand, Dhlakama’s successor could ally more strongly with Nyusi and help him assert his peace agenda. They could work together to ensure a peaceful and constructive environment for the elections as well as widen the negotiations to reach a wide based agreement for a sustainable peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96284/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The death of Mozambican opposition leader Alfonso Dhlakama could affect the progress made to end hostilities in the country.Eric Morier-Genoud, Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876262017-11-28T09:18:40Z2017-11-28T09:18:40ZWhat drives instability in Africa and what can be done about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196470/original/file-20171127-2077-1y8tht6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to French counter-terrorism forces in northern Mali, in May.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Christophe Petit Tesson</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor and young, but also because it is growing and dynamic. Development is disruptive but also presents huge opportunities. The continent needs to plan accordingly.</p>
<p>Levels of armed conflict in Africa rise and fall. Data from the <a href="http://ucdp.uu.se/">Uppsala Conflict Data Program</a>, the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Global Terrorism Database</a> and <a href="https://www.acleddata.com/">others</a> indicate that armed conflict peaked in 1990/91 at the end of the Cold War, declined to 2005/6, remained relative stable to 2010/11 and then increased to 2015, although it peaked at lower levels than in 1990/91 before its most recent decline.</p>
<p>Armed conflict has <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/future-im-perfect-mapping-conflict-violence-and-extremism-in-africa">changed</a>. Today there are many more non-state actors involved in armed conflict in Africa – representing a greater fracturing of armed groupings. So it’s not a matter of “government vs an armed group” but a “government vs many armed groups”. Insurgents are often divided and sometimes even fighting amongst themselves. This greater fragmentation complicates peacemaking.</p>
<p>Terrorism has also <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/violent-islamist-extremism-and-terror-in-africa">increased</a>, but depending on how one defines it, it has always been widely prevalent in Africa both as a tactic to secure decolonisation as well as between and among competing armed groups. The big question for 2017 is: is violent political extremism going to move from the Middle East to Africa? Put another way, is it in Africa that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State will find solid footage as they are displaced from the Middle East?</p>
<p>Anti government <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/less-armed-conflict-but-more-political-violence-in-africa">turbulence</a> has also increased in recent years. In Africa, this has led to disaffection and violence around elections that are often rigged rather than free and fair. Generally this is because governance in many African countries present <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-democracy-in-africa">a facade of democracy</a> but don’t yet reflect substantive democracy. </p>
<p>Seven relationships lie behind patterns of violence on the continent, and provide insights into whether it can be managed better.</p>
<h2>Relationships explaining violence</h2>
<p><strong>Poverty</strong></p>
<p>Internal armed conflict is much more prevalent in poor countries than in rich ones. This is not because poor people are violent but because poor states lack the ability to ensure law and order. The impact of poverty is exacerbated by inequality, such as in <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/economics-governance-and-instability-in-south-africa">South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Updated forecasts using the <a href="http://pardee.du.edu/understand-interconnected-world">International Futures forecasting system</a> indicate that around 37% of Africans live in extreme poverty (roughly 460 million people).</p>
<p>By 2030, 32% of Africans (forecast at 548 million) are likely to live in extreme poverty. So, while the portion is coming down (around 5% less), the absolute numbers will likely increase by around 90 million. It’s therefore unlikely that Africa will meet the first of the Sustainable Development Goals on <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/reasonable-goals-for-reducing-poverty-in-africa-targets-for-the-post-mdgs-and-agenda-2063">ending absolute poverty</a> on a current growth path of roughly 4% GDP growth per annum. </p>
<p><strong>Democratisation</strong> </p>
<p>Democratisation can trigger violence in the short to medium term, particularly around <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-insights/turbulent-elections-in-africa-in-2016-the-need-for-truth-telling-from-the-au">elections</a>. Recent events in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenya-grapples-with-domestic-and-foreign-security-threats">Kenya</a> are an example. Where there is a large democratic deficit, as in North Africa before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-vibrant-civil-society-is-central-to-democratic-consolidation-in-tunisia-55525">Arab spring</a>, tension builds up and can explode. </p>
<p>And a democratic deficit – where levels of democracy are below what can be expected when compared to other countries at similar levels of income and education – often leads to instability. </p>
<p>Instability is also fuelled by the manipulation of <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/elections-in-2017-can-the-au-up-its-game">elections</a> and constitutions by heads of state to extend their stay in power. Examples include <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/think-again-can-burundi-bury-the-ghosts-of-its-troubled-past">Burundi</a>, the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/without-elections-the-drcs-economy-will-continue-to-slide">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> (DR Congo) and Uganda.</p>
<p><strong>Regime type</strong> </p>
<p>The nature of the <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html">governing regime</a> is another structural factor. Most stable countries are either full democracies or full autocracies. But most African countries have mixed regimes with some elements of democracy mixed with strong autocratic features. They present a façade of democracy but lack its substantive elements. Mixed regimes are inherently more unstable and prone to disruptions than either full democracies or full autocracies.</p>
<p><strong>Population structure</strong></p>
<p>Africa’s <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html">population is young</a>, with a median age of 19. By comparison, the median age is 41 in France (a relatively young country by European standards). So 22% of adult French are in the youth bulge of 15-29 years compared to 47% of Africans.</p>
<p>Young countries tend to be more turbulent because young men are largely responsible for violence and crime. If young people lack jobs and rates of urbanisation are high, social exclusion and instability follow. </p>
<p><strong>Repeat violence</strong></p>
<p>A history of violence is generally the best predictor of future violence. Countries such as <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/malis-electoral-cycle-fraught-with-obstacles-and-instability">Mali</a>, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/challenges-ahead-for-au-in-ending-car-conflict">Central African Republic</a> and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/in-sadc-the-interests-of-ruling-parties-come-first">DRC</a> are trapped in cycles of violence. This is very difficult to break. It requires a huge effort and is very expensive, often requiring a large, multi-dimensional peace mission that only the UN can provide. But, scaling peacekeeping back rather than scaling it up is the order of the day at the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-trumps-stance-on-africa-means-for-continental-security-efforts">UN</a>.</p>
<p><strong>A bad neighbourhood</strong> </p>
<p>Where a country is located can increase the risk of violence because borders are not controlled and rural areas not policed. Most conflict in Africa is supported from neighbouring countries. Violence spills over national borders and affects other countries while poorly trained and equipped law and order institutions generally cannot operate regionally.</p>
<p><strong>Slow growth and rising inequality</strong> </p>
<p>Africa is quite unequal, so growth does not translate into poverty reduction. In addition, the world is in a low growth environment after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, with average rates of growth significantly lower than before. Africa needs to grow at average rates of 7% or more a year if it is to reduce poverty and create jobs, yet current long term forecasts are for rates significantly below that.</p>
<h2>Opportunity amid challenges</h2>
<p>These seven related factors indicate that the notion that Africa can somehow “silence the guns by 2020”, as advocated by the African Union as part of its <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> is unrealistic. Violence will remain a characteristic of <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/assessing-long-term-state-fragility-in-africa-prospects-for-26-more-fragile-countries">a number of African countries</a> for many years to come and Africa should plan accordingly. </p>
<p>In the long term only rapid, inclusive economic growth combined with good governance can chip away at the structural drivers of violence. It is also clear that middle income countries are making progress in attracting foreign direct investment but that poor countries will remain <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/africa-in-the-world-report/fertility-growth-and-the-future-of-aid-in-sub-saharan-africa">aid dependent</a>. </p>
<p>Much more international and regional cooperation will be required as part of this process, including substantive and scaled up support for <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/turning-point-for-the-au-un-peacekeeping-partnership">peacekeeping</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jakkie Cilliers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some African countries present a facade of democracy. The absence of substantive democracy is contributing to instability on the continent.Jakkie Cilliers, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.