tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/aung-san-suu-kyi-1673/articlesAung San Suu Kyi – The Conversation2024-02-01T17:04:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212972024-02-01T17:04:20Z2024-02-01T17:04:20Z3 years on from coup, economic sanctions look unlikely to push Myanmar back to democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572880/original/file-20240201-21-z6rg6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=39%2C377%2C4427%2C2551&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sanctions have failed to prevent Myanmar's military from obtaining hardware.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/military-hardware-is-displayed-during-a-parade-to-celebrate-news-photo/1249572841?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">Myanmar’s military seized back control</a> of the country in February 2021 after a decade-long democratic interlude, the international community reached for a familiar tool: economic sanctions.</p>
<p>The coup led several countries, <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/burma">including the United States</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/11/myanmar-burma-council-adds-4-persons-and-2-entities-to-eu-sanctions-list-in-eighth-round-of-sanctions/#:%7E:text=The%20Council%20has%20imposed%20restrictive,February%20and%2020%20July%202023.">European Union member states</a>, to impose or reinstate trade embargoes and other financial proscriptions against Myanmar’s military.</p>
<p>On Feb. 1, 2024 – coinciding with the third anniversary of the military coup – the U.S. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-marks-anniversary-of-myanmar-coup-with-new-sanctions/7465629.html">announced a fresh round of sanctions</a>. It comes as the Myanmar government continues to be embroiled in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">grinding civil war</a> with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/burma-myanmar/could-myanmar-come-apart">ethnic minority insurgent groups</a>. But to date, sanctions have not encouraged the ruling generals back toward a democratic path or tipped the war in favor of pro-democratic resistance groups.</p>
<p>Moreover, as experts on <a href="https://cnwillis.com/">East and Southeast Asia</a> and <a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">economic sanctions</a>, we know that the history of Myanmar – and our own research – suggests that economics sanctions are unlikely to have that impact any time soon.</p>
<h2>Current sanctions against Myanmar</h2>
<p>The current sanctions against Myanmar share much in common with those imposed prior to 2010, when the country began a <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/battle-democracy-myanmar_en?s=110">process to restore democratic government</a>. The actions taken since 2021 by the U.S., EU and others – which include targeted and sector-specific sanctions – are aimed at undermining the military junta’s ability to <a href="https://www.state.gov/sanctions-against-the-myanma-oil-and-gas-enterprise-and-concerted-pressure-with-partners/">violently repress the country’s pro-democracy movement</a>.</p>
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<p>At the same time, those imposing sanctions appear to be more cognizant than in previous periods of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.764581">potential negative impacts on the Burmese people</a>.</p>
<p>The sanctions imposed after the 2021 coup are more targeted and designed to affect the military government and its enterprises. In earlier periods, the <a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">financial measures were broader</a> and affected the entire Myanmar economy.</p>
<p>This is by design. The legal basis for post-2021 U.S. economic sanctions on Myanmar, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/12/2021-03139/blocking-property-with-respect-to-the-situation-in-burma">Executive Order 14014</a>, serves as the foundation for a multitude of targeted measures, which include restrictions on individuals and businesses connected to supplying Myanmar’s air force with jet fuel. </p>
<p>Signed on Feb. 11, 2023, the new U.S. sanctions regime reflects changes in how the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-2021-sanctions-review.pdf">Biden Administration intends</a> to use financial penalties to target Myanmar’s generals, not its people. </p>
<p>The U.S. has also made it a priority to work collaboratively with international partners on imposing complementary rather than competing sanctions.</p>
<p>Evidence of this coordination emerged <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-promotes-accountability-for-human-rights-violations-and-abuses/">on Dec. 10, 2021</a>, coinciding with <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/human-rights-day">Human Rights Day</a>, with the U.S. rolling out a package of measures in conjunction with the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union. For example, the EU’s “<a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures_en">restrictive measures</a>” – the bloc’s parlance for economic sanctions – include many of the same sanctions imposed by the U.S., such as restrictions on the export of military and dual-use equipment, asset freezes, visa and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the export of telecommunications equipment.</p>
<p>The U.S. has also imposed targeted sanctions via the <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1631">Specially Designated Nationals list</a>, a blacklist of people with whom U.S. citizens and firms are banned from doing business. Listed entities in Myanmar include military leaders, business people and their families. The idea is to focus the economic pain on individuals and entities involved in the coup and subsequent repression of democracy campaigners, rather than on the country as a whole.</p>
<h2>Past sanctions against Myanmar</h2>
<p>Certainly, history suggests that the U.S. needed to update its sanctions policy. Myanmar observers have long debated the effectiveness of the old Myanmar sanctions regime, with <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/busting-myth-myanmar-sanctions-success-story/">many concluding</a> that it had little impact on the junta’s decision to return to democracy. Rather, Myanmar’s democratic elections <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.764581">were part of the military’s road map</a> and not the result of sanctions pressure.</p>
<p>One reason for this skepticism over earlier sanctions was that they targeted imports from key sectors of Myanmar’s economy, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/9797/chapter-abstract/157012800?redirectedFrom=fulltext">such as garments and textiles</a>, that were not connected to the junta. These economic sanctions harmed private enterprises in Myanmar.</p>
<p>The latest sanctions <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0078?_gl=1*1mmoid*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">target military-owned or -linked enterprises</a>, such as Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company, Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited, Myanma Gems Enterprise, Myanma Timber Enterprise and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. </p>
<p>The post-2021 sanctions, though, are still plagued by some of the same problems of their predecessors. </p>
<p>They lack the weight of the United Nations, which has not called for sanctions against Myanmar. This stands in contrast to sanctions against other countries flouting international norms, like <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-korea-sanctions/">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran">Iran</a>. </p>
<p>The U.N. Security Council is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">unlikely to sanction Myanmar</a> as permanent members <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-myanmar-military-killing-rights-suu-kyi-029f8503bf1eb6ec0e97e8521775184a">China and Russia refuse to condemn</a>, let alone sanction, Myanmar’s military rulers.</p>
<p>As a result, the international community has been split in its response to Myanmar’s democratic backsliding and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar">human rights violations</a>. While Western countries have decided to isolate Myanmar through targeted trade and financial sanctions, countries in East and Southeast Asia have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370600832497">maintained diplomatic and trade ties</a> with the military government. </p>
<p>And there is an incentive for countries in Southeast Asia to not take part in any sanction regime. As we show in our forthcoming book, “<a href="https://poliscikeith.com/">Trading with Pariahs</a>,” Myanmar’s trade ties tend to be strongest within its region. </p>
<p>During the first sanctions regime from 1988 to 2015, Southeast Asian economic ties with Myanmar became stronger as the country’s trade with sanctions-imposing Western states declined. </p>
<p>For countries in East and Southeast Asia, maintaining ties with Myanmar provided not only economic opportunities but also a strategy for monitoring and perhaps ameliorating Myanmar’s internal situation. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, <a href="https://asean.org/asean-10-meeting-the-challenges-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/">admitted Myanmar</a> in 1997 despite the refusal of the junta to allow democratic elections and address human rights abuses. The approach favored by Myanmar’s neighbors was to try and bring Myanmar’s generals in from the cold rather than ostracizing them internationally.</p>
<p>And despite Singapore’s recent declaration that it <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/22/whats-next-for-sanctions-on-myanmar/">will stop arms transfers to Myanmar</a>, ASEAN member countries and those in East Asia continue to refrain from sanctioning Myanmar, preferring engagement to isolation.</p>
<h2>Can sanctions work?</h2>
<p>While U.S. sanctions have the potential to hurt the military, there are reasons to believe that they won’t be able to bring the government to its knees. It is likely that the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080">uneven termination of the United States’ earlier sanctions</a> provided insufficient time for American firms to fully engage and invest in Myanmar’s market, limiting the potential for future leverage now.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in uniform take part in a military parade." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C276%2C5241%2C3228&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572854/original/file-20240201-23-vx77gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Myanmar’s military are bogged down in civil war, but not yielding to sanctions pressure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MyanmarUSSanctions/8798420feac44ad88a7359ff1e70a23f/photo?Query=myanmar%20sanctions&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=346&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Those countries that do have significant leverage are unlikely to sanction Myanmar. And this undermines efforts by the U.S. or the West to isolate the country. </p>
<p>The challenge for the West can be seen in its sanctions on jet fuel trade. Amnesty International’s “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/myanmar-new-shipments-of-aviation-fuel-revealed-despite-the-militarys-war-crimes/">Deadly Cargo” report in 2023</a> highlighted how Myanmar’s military can still secure reliable shipments of jet fuel despite the U.S. sanctions on the product.</p>
<p>The reason is more than 95% of Myanmar’s refined petroleum oils – needed for jet fuel – come from regional trading partners. Since 2021, China, Thailand, Singapore and Russia have <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/11/myanmar-amnesty-aviation-fuel/">provided much of the Myanmar’s military’s jet fuel</a>, enabling it to continue bombing campaigns throughout the country.</p>
<p>Even though the U.S. Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1701?_gl=1*nc1bho*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">has expanded its sanctions on jet fuel</a> to include both military and commercial, the impact of these sector-wide sanctions remains unclear. </p>
<p>While the nature of the current U.S. sanctions is starkly different from prior efforts to pressure Myanmar’s generals, the effectiveness and potential for success appear quite similar. Given the dearth of economic ties between Myanmar and countries outside its region, the potential for change in Myanmar seems unlikely without significant efforts by those countries with an ability to weaponize their extensive economic interdependence: China, Japan and ASEAN member states. </p>
<p>ASEAN is not blind to the erosion of human rights, and it has signaled its awareness of the regime’s atrocities and support for civilians by <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/06/myanmar-wont-be-allowed-to-lead-asean-in-2026-in-blow-to-generals.html">denying Myanmar its turn as ASEAN’s chair in 2026</a>. </p>
<p>However, the regional bloc is unlikely to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in the foreseeable future, casting further doubt on the ability of Western sanctions to improve human rights and democracy meaningfully.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Economic proscriptions by the US and EU are hampered by lack of support among Myanmar’s major trading partners in the region.Charmaine N. Willis, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Skidmore CollegeKeith A. Preble, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111632023-09-19T20:08:53Z2023-09-19T20:08:53ZThe Nobel Peace Prize often reveals how contentious peace can be<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-nobel-peace-prize-often-reveals-how-contentious-peace-can-be" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Leading up to the announcement of the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/">Nobel Peace Prize</a>, there is widespread speculation about who will win. </p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/nobel-peace-prize/nomination/">351 nominees</a> for the 2023 prize, 259 individuals and 92 organizations. Although the list is confidential, there is widespread speculation about who’s on it, including favourites and long shots, repeat and first-time nominees. </p>
<p>This global moment of interest in peace is important, but it doesn’t tell us much other than that peace is elusive. </p>
<p>Looking at the longer history of the Nobel Peace Prize tells us that peace takes many forms, including ending armed conflicts, resisting racial discrimination, standing up for the oppressed and caring for the vulnerable. Peace can also be political and controversial.</p>
<h2>Taking a stand against war</h2>
<p>The early recipients were usually prominent men from Europe and the United States, and their peace work took the form of preventing or ending wars. </p>
<p>The first Nobel Peace Prize was jointly awarded in 1901 to <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1901/passy/facts/">Frédéric Passy</a>, a French economist and politician who founded the French Peace Society and organized a peace congress in 1878. American president <a href="https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/laureates/1906">Theodore Roosevelt</a> received the 1906 prize for “his role in bringing to an end the bloody war recently waged between two of the world’s great powers, Japan and Russia.”</p>
<p>Over time, the list of laureates has expanded to include women and non-elites from all over the world. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Two black-and-white photos of smiling women." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548178/original/file-20230913-21-waipff.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Nobel Foundation Archive)</span></span>
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<p><a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1976/williams/facts/">Betty Williams</a> and <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1976/corrigan/facts/">Mairead Corrigan</a> did clerical work in Belfast and became peace activists after the death of three children in an IRA-related incident. </p>
<p>Corrigan was aunt to the children; Williams witnessed their deaths. They shared the 1976 prize for launching a peace movement to end sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.</p>
<h2>Protecting people, defending human rights</h2>
<p>Humanitarian work that supports people who are in danger or vulnerable has informed the selection of peace laureates from the start of the Nobel Peace Prize. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1901/dunant/facts/">Henri Dunant</a>, a Swiss businessman who had established the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863 to assist wounded soldiers, shared the 1901 prize with Passy. Dunant was selected because of “his humanitarian efforts to help wounded soldiers.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1922/nansen/facts/">Fridtjof Nansen</a>, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, received the award in 1922 for his work to repatriate prisoners of war after the First World War and for creating the Nansen passport for refugees. <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1979/teresa/facts/">Mother Teresa</a> won in 1979 for caring for people who were terminally ill, abandoned and destitute. </p>
<p>In 1992, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1992/tum/facts/">Rigoberta Menchú Tum</a> of Guatemala was recognized for her advocacy of Indigenous rights, social justice and “ethno-cultural reconciliation.”</p>
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<p>Human rights activists have also figured prominently as laureates since the 1960s, starting with <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1964/king/facts/">Martin Luther King Jr.</a> in 1964 for “his non-violent struggle for civil rights for the Afro-American population.” </p>
<p>Other human rights laureates include <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1968/cassin/facts/">René Cassin</a> (1968), a drafter of the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a>, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1991/kyi/facts/">Aung San Suu Kyi</a> (1991) for her efforts to establish democracy and human rights in Myanmar, and <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/ressa/facts/">Maria Ressa</a> and <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/muratov/facts/">Dmitry Muratov</a> (2021) for their defence of freedom of expression. </p>
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<h2>International co-operation</h2>
<p>The prize has also recognized efforts to create internationalist attitudes and improve standards of living as essential contributions to establishing peace among nations and ensuring people live in security and with dignity.</p>
<p>American peace activist and social reformer <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1931/addams/facts/">Jane Addams</a> received the 1931 prize, at the height of the Great Depression, for her efforts to “rekindle the spirit of peace” in the United States and “the whole of mankind.”</p>
<p>U.S. President <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2009/obama/facts/">Barack Obama</a> was selected in 2009 for “his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and co-operation between people,” while <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2006/yunus/facts/">Muhammad Yunus</a>, a South Asian economist, won in 2006 for setting up a bank to provide small long-term loans to people living in poverty so that they could become financially independent.</p>
<h2>Politicizing peace</h2>
<p>But peace can become political when its advocates oppose or try to reform governments and societies that are pursuing hostile foreign relations or promote and perpetuate injustice and oppression at home. </p>
<p>Between the two world wars, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to politicians, diplomats and officials who made substantial efforts to avoid future conflict, even though they were ultimately unsuccessful.</p>
<p>That included those who supported the <a href="https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/overview">League of Nations</a> or negotiated agreements, like the 1925 <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2021667899/">Locarno Treaties</a>, that were supposed to guarantee the borders between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium, and the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg">Kellogg-Briand Pact</a> of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of state policy.</p>
<p>The 1964 prize to King, four years before his assassination, was a timely intervention in the American civil rights movement. The 1983 award to <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1983/walesa/facts/">Lech Walesa</a>, leader of the trade union Solidarity in Poland, made an anti-communism statement. </p>
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<h2>Controversial laureates</h2>
<p>The selection of laureates can be controversial, and several have been criticized for acts and beliefs that are inconsistent with peace. </p>
<p>There was an outcry when <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/facts/">Henry Kissinger</a>, the U.S. secretary of state, received the prize for his part in negotiating a ceasefire in Vietnam. </p>
<p>Mother Teresa was also <a href="https://www.salon.com/2016/01/03/the_wests_big_lie_about_mother_teresa_her_glorification_of_suffering_instead_of_relieving_it_has_had_little_impact_on_her_glowing_reputation/">criticized for denying people in her care pain relief.</a> </p>
<p>As Myanmar’s leader, Suu Kyi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977">was denounced internationally for denying the genocide of Rohingya Muslims</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/30/aung-san-suu-kyi-wont-be-stripped-of-nobel-peace-prize-despite-rohingya-crisis">The Nobel Committee explained that her prize could not be withdrawn after the fact</a>. </p>
<h2>Peace can threaten the powerful</h2>
<p>The pursuit of peace itself provokes opposition because it demands change. </p>
<p>Abolishing war limits the way governments promote national security. Authority and privilege are challenged in the face of calls to eliminate racism, empower Indigenous Peoples, respect freedom of expression and achieve socio-economic equality.</p>
<p>Even though peace might seem unobjectionable, the history of peace is a story of resistance, contesting the status quo and precarious advances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francine McKenzie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Peace can become political when advocates oppose or try to reform governments and societies pursuing hostile foreign relations — or when these societies perpetuate injustice and oppression at home.Francine McKenzie, Professor of History, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2108092023-08-08T02:48:33Z2023-08-08T02:48:33ZMyanmar junta reducing Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence is an empty gesture from a failing state<p>In a general amnesty announced on military television last week, Myanmar’s military junta <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/01/aung-san-suu-kyi-receives-partial-pardon-myanmar">removed six years</a> from the jail term of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 78-year-old leader of the government removed by a coup in February 2021. This came a week after the junta <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66323190">moved her into house arrest</a> following a year in solitary confinement.</p>
<p>But it still leaves Aung San Suu Kyi facing a 27-year jail term on <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/myanmars-kangaroo-courts-hand-aung-san-suu-kyi-another-six-year-term-while-sean-turnell-pleads-not-guilty/">bogus charges</a>.</p>
<p>The junta also lopped four years off former president Win Myint’s sentence, and reportedly released more than 7,000 other prisoners.</p>
<p>But we shouldn’t be persuaded that the junta has changed its stripes. It regularly uses <a href="https://theconversation.com/relief-as-australian-sean-turnell-to-be-released-from-prison-in-myanmar-but-more-needs-to-be-done-194814">mass amnesties</a> in attempts to cultivate goodwill, either at home or abroad. But any major figures released in these amnesties shouldn’t have been locked up in the first place.</p>
<p>The day before the amnesty, the junta <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-01/myanmar-junta-rulers-officially-postpone-election/102672784">extended</a> its state of emergency for a fourth time, further delaying elections, due to relentless opposition to its February 2021 coup.</p>
<p>The coup sparked ongoing and widespread violence, and shredded the military’s last claims to social esteem. This has left Myanmar impoverished, largely friendless, and without any clear plan for a positive future.</p>
<h2>Determined resistance</h2>
<p>The army’s top decision-makers, currently bunkered in the capital, Naypyidaw, struggle to maintain control of enough territory to seriously contemplate even a heavily stage-managed nationwide poll.</p>
<p>Under these volatile conditions, people have been voting with their feet by fleeing abroad or taking up arms in a revolutionary mobilisation.</p>
<p>The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reportedly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/myanmar-military-extends-emergency-postpones-election">told</a> the National Defence and Security Council that elections couldn’t be conducted due to continued fighting in several regions.</p>
<p>The reality for the generals in their fortified compounds is that any poll could further embarrass them – they cannot even reliably rig the national vote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
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<p>Many areas are off-limits to government forces, perhaps as much as half the country – which is Southeast Asia’s second-largest by land area. While aerial bombardments by regime aircraft might set back the resistance, the strategy is hardly a way to win hearts or minds. Inch by inch, the diminution of central government control raises questions about the country’s future. </p>
<p>There’s increasing concern across the Southeast Asian region. An intractable civil conflict presents significant challenges for neighbours Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh.</p>
<p>Diplomatic efforts to maintain Myanmar’s territorial integrity jostle with the discomfort felt almost everywhere about doing business with a blood-splattered regime.</p>
<p>The regime tries to play the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage. But even there, sometimes in the company of other autocrats, Myanmar now faces the ignominy of an “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/asean-foreign-ministers-hold-talks-on-myanmar-crisis/7177251.html">empty seat</a>” at the political level. And almost nobody wants to shake hands with regime representatives.</p>
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<h2>An unnecessary crisis</h2>
<p>It’s a precipitous erosion of what was, until the coup, a relatively positive story for most Myanmar people.</p>
<p>Before the coup, the most problematic issue was the military’s abuses of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">Rohingya</a>, a Muslim ethnic minority living in westernmost Myanmar.</p>
<p>Other issues – such as longstanding ethnic grievances and yawning economic inequality – were, at the very least, subject to open debate in the media and sometimes in the country’s 16 regional and national legislatures.</p>
<p>That political and social infrastructure, and the emerging civil society it helped sustain, has now crumbled. It’s been replaced by violence, mistrust, terror and martial chauvinism.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">Military violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence</a>
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<p>Myanmar’s young talent now banned from universities, bravely disobedient in the faces of tanks and bullets, face dismal options: the mountains, the jungle, the border. Some lie low. Others still seek to fan the revolutionary spark. Many are now in jail, others dead.</p>
<p>The military, of course, blames its opponents for the devastation its coup unleashed. That sad fact hides a tremendous political and cultural miscalculation. </p>
<p>It’s unclear whether Myanmar can recover from the army’s self-inflicted wounds. Some speculate the whole system will collapse, making it impossible for powerbrokers to keep up the increasingly flimsy charade of state power. It has all the ingredients of a failed state.</p>
<h2>No way out</h2>
<p>The decision to abandon the proposed elections, followed by last week’s amnesty, is hardly a surprise. But it does reveal the fragility of the military system and the paranoia of the men in charge.</p>
<p>It’s also further evidence that nobody can trust the junta. Not only has it broken the faith of the Myanmar people, it constantly tests the patience of foreign governments, even those that offer some sympathy for its self-sabotage.</p>
<p>With Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior members of the democratically elected government still locked up, the reality facing the generals is they will never beat her at any election. They are still betting that eventually the world – and, most importantly, their near neighbours – will lose interest and allow some type of partial rehabilitation. Maintaining <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/2/china-russia-india-enabling-myanmars-military-report">links with China and Russia</a> is a key strategy.</p>
<p>Still, there’s no obvious path to fuller inclusion in ASEAN while the generals unleash such violence against their own people.</p>
<p>The extension of the state of emergency and postponement of hypothetical elections will further invigorate resistance forces hoping to steadily weaken the army’s grip on power.</p>
<p>A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country.Nicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaAdam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982972023-01-29T19:09:34Z2023-01-29T19:09:34ZWhy has the West given billions in military aid to Ukraine, but virtually ignored Myanmar?<p>Two years after <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">Myanmar’s coup on February 1 2021</a>, the country’s large and growing resistance forces receive almost no attention outside the country. </p>
<p>The democratic opposition, fronted by the National Unity Government (NUG), but comprising many different groups, armies, militias and individuals, has also struggled to gain awareness, even for its substantial battlefield successes.</p>
<p>And perhaps most notably, the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-civilian-acting-president-demands-international-arms-assistance.html">opposition’s pleas for weapons</a> from the West to fight against an increasingly brutal crackdown by the military junta have gone unheeded.</p>
<p>The difference with the West’s response to Ukraine’s war against Russia could not be more stark. While the two conflicts are not completely analogous, it is nonetheless striking how much Ukraine has galvanised the international community, while Myanmar has almost completely been ignored.</p>
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<h2>No charismatic, wartime figure</h2>
<p>Part of this has to do with the visibility of a central, iconic leader. With <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/30/myanmar-court-jails-aung-san-suu-kyi-for-extra-seven-years-in-final-closed-trial">ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi</a> and other public figures locked up, Myanmar’s resistance forces have no recognisable public face. </p>
<p>The NUG has an acting president, Duwa Lashi La, who makes occasional <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aw59uKsHL30">YouTube</a> and social media appearances. While he enjoys a strong reputation among ethnic Kachin in the country’s north, he is barely recognised on the global, or even national, stage.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">NUG President Duwa Lashi La announcing a people’s defensive war against the military junta in September 2021.</span></figcaption>
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<p>By contrast, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s transformation into a wartime commander has resulted in a huge global profile. He has given carefully scripted speeches to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPfFYvAFlU8">foreign parliaments</a> and rousing addresses to both the Ukrainian people and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64321281">key international meetings</a>. </p>
<p>His constant efforts to refocus attention on the next phase of fighting in Ukraine have inspired his own people, and have made the Ukrainian flag a potent symbol of defiance in the face of tyranny.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky addressing the Australian parliament.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>A lack of a simple narrative</h2>
<p>Ukraine has mastered the digital battlefield, too. Its leaders have simplified the narrative and calibrated it in a powerful way to emphasise a “good” versus “evil” struggle in which Western democracies are compelled to offer both symbolic and material support.</p>
<p>The complexities in Myanmar – ethnic, linguistic, geographic, ideological, historical and more – make such a narrative much harder to muster and sustain. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60820215">genocide of the Rohingya</a> in 2017, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyis-extraordinary-fall-from-grace-104250">took place under the Suu Kyi-led government</a>, also muddied the waters of the previously simplistic tale of a Nobel Peace laureate facing off against a brutal Myanmar military.</p>
<p>Suu Kyi’s government did not have oversight or control over the military that carried out the bloody purge, but this hardly seemed to matter. Suu Kyi’s decision to offer a <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/03/26/the-folly-of-aung-san-suu-kyis-bad-apple-defence/">stubborn defence</a> of the military’s actions at the International Court of Justice in 2019 dramatically shifted international opinion. </p>
<p>Now, with Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya still such a raw issue, it’s unclear whether Suu Kyi – or her democratically elected government – deserves the sympathy and support from the West they once received.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyis-extraordinary-fall-from-grace-104250">Aung San Suu Kyi's extraordinary fall from grace</a>
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<h2>A fringe actor on the global stage</h2>
<p>Geography matters, too. In a global strategic sense, Myanmar has almost always been an afterthought in the West. </p>
<p>In contrast, for a century or more, Ukraine has been a constant site for strategic competition, especially in the duels between Western powers and the government in Moscow. The attacks on Ukraine over the past decade by a nuclear-armed Russia are therefore seen by Western powers as a first-order geopolitical threat.</p>
<p>As such, the US alone <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-will-give-military-tanks-to-ukraine-signaling-western-powers-long-term-commitment-to-thwarting-russia-198555">committed</a> about US$50 billion in total assistance to Ukraine in 2022, about half of which was military aid.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-will-give-military-tanks-to-ukraine-signaling-western-powers-long-term-commitment-to-thwarting-russia-198555">US will give military tanks to Ukraine, signaling Western powers' long-term commitment to thwarting Russia</a>
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<p>With Myanmar a far less important site of conflict, most of the international community (including the regional body of Southeast Asian states, ASEAN) have been reluctant to provide military support for the resistance fighters. </p>
<p>Historically, <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/07/18/myanmar-fighters-improvised-weapons/">weapons smuggled into Myanmar</a> to support anti-government armies have used neighbouring countries, most notably Thailand and India, as the gateways. Today, however, the leaders in Bangkok and New Delhi are reluctant to get too entangled in Myanmar’s mess. They also have their own insurgencies to keep an eye on.</p>
<p>When weapons and materiel do flow into Myanmar today, they are moved quietly, with as much deniability as can be marshalled. With no Western government publicly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-doesnt-the-west-sell-weapons-to-myanmars-anti-junta-rebels/">supplying the resistance with weapons</a>, the fighters are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/8/myanmar-fighters-say-injuries-make-willpower-stronger">resorting</a> to crowdfunding to buy weapons and using explosives pieced together with salvaged metal.</p>
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<p>Meanwhile, the military junta has built up a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/china-russia-arming-myanmar-junta-un-expert-says/a-60868089">huge arsenal of weapons</a> purchased from Russia and China, or made domestically using <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64250674">supplies from companies in countries like the US, Japan and France</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Military trucks loaded with missiles" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506513/original/file-20230126-20-o0bdsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Military trucks loaded with missiles during a ceremony marking Myanmar’s 75th Independence Day anniversary in January.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aung Shine Oo/AP</span></span>
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<p>Geopolitics may also matter when it comes to the international courts, as well. </p>
<p>There are two parallel genocide cases relating to Myanmar and Ukraine winding their way through the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Ukraine case, still less than 12 months old, has received formal interventions by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182/intervention">almost all Western states, 33 in total</a>. </p>
<p>By contrast, the Myanmar case relating to the Rohingya was launched in 2019 and not a <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178">single country</a> has formally intervened, despite several countries indicating they may do so.</p>
<h2>An opportunity to support democracy</h2>
<p>Another reason for the tentative international response to the Myanmar conflict is the expectation, particularly in ASEAN, that Myanmar’s coup-makers will, in the end, hold enough ground and continue to control the levers of power. </p>
<p>But we should ask if this assessment is correct. In early 2023, after two years of protest and violence, the junta looks especially vulnerable. </p>
<p>For example, influential voices within ASEAN, notably from <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/asean-slams-myanmar-for-executions-07262022135128.html">Malaysia</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/indonesian-fm-says-myanmar-military-to-blame-for-countrys-crisis/">Indonesia</a>, have begun strongly rebuking the Myanmar military. </p>
<p>They seemingly no longer want the entire region’s reputation tarred by the junta’s brutal mismanagement of Myanmar. They are also aware that anti-regime forces are taking and holding significant ground.</p>
<p>Under these conditions, the international community needs to move more quickly to consider a future for Myanmar after this war ends. That means dramatically limiting the military’s ability to gain international legitimacy, ramping up efforts to starve the generals of weapons and financial resources, and supporting war crimes prosecutions in international courts.</p>
<p>At the same time, Myanmar’s revolutionary forces need support – both on the battlefield and in civilian efforts to rebuild a traumatised society.</p>
<p>The invasion of Ukraine has clearly demonstrated, for the first time in many years, that Western military force can be successfully used to support a democracy under siege. If only a small fraction of the support to Ukraine was provided to Myanmar’s resistance fighters, they could be given the chance to one day build a thriving democratic state in the heart of Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s two-year resistance to the brutal military regime barely registers in the West. But Ukraine shows that Western military force can be successfully used to support a democracy under siege.Nicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaAdam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1967202023-01-04T20:44:20Z2023-01-04T20:44:20ZBy helping Rohingya women, Canada can do the right thing and demonstrate global leadership<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503105/original/file-20230104-22-6g4jf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=82%2C14%2C4896%2C3426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women display a poster during a rally against the persecution of Rohingya Muslims outside the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Security Council recently adopted its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/22/un-security-council-resolution-demands-end-to-myanmar-violence">first resolution on Myanmar</a> in more than seven decades. The resolution demanded an end to the violence and called on Myamnar’s military junta to release all political prisoners. In 2021, the military seized power in the country in a violent coup that saw thousands killed and jailed. </p>
<p>In 2022, Canada announced its long awaited Indo-Pacific strategy. The strategy focuses on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-launches-new-indo-pacific-strategy-focus-disruptive-china-2022-11-27/">deepening economic ties with Pacific countries and boosting Canada’s military and cyber security in the region</a>.</p>
<p>The strategy also states that Canada will “<a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng">speak up for universal human rights</a>” and defend “human rights in the region, including women’s rights.”</p>
<p>Since 2017, Canada has been providing humanitarian aid to the Rohingya. The <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/myanmar-phase2.aspx?lang=eng">Canadian government</a> has pledged $288 million in humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>A strategy that truly stands up for women’s rights would advance Canada’s global leadership through offering greater support to the Rohingya, who are described as the “<a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/es/content/recognizing-the-rohingya-and-their-horrifying-pers/">world’s most persecuted minority</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman stands in a queue carrying a baby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502449/original/file-20221221-19-qhm714.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Rohingya refugees board a ship as they are ferried to Bhasan Char, or floating island, in the Bay of Bengal, from Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Saleh Noman)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Who are the Rohingya?</h2>
<p>The Rohingya are an ethnic minority group in Myanmar. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/5/humans-are-for-the-grave-karen-face-myanmar-military-violence">Along with other minority groups</a>, they have been the regular target of state violence by the <a href="http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/myanmar">Myanmar military</a>, also known as the Tatmadaw.</p>
<p>In August 2017, the Tatmadaw launched a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/24/myanmar-no-justice-no-freedom-rohingya-5-years">brutal campaign in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state</a>. Many international organizations, including the UN, reported evidence of widespread <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2021.1931136">sexual violence</a> as well as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/">massacres and the destruction of villages</a>.</p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people fled to neighbouring Bangladesh where they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/23/five-years-rohingya-refugees-2017-bangladesh-myanmar-military-crackdown">live in poor conditions</a>. </p>
<p>The government of Myanmar has systematically denied the population the right to education in their own language and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis">discriminated against them based on their religion</a>. Myanmar’s leaders have repeatedly branded the Rohingya as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/10/enemies-of-the-state/">illegal immigrants</a>, denying them fundamental rights to education and to seek employment. </p>
<h2>Sexual violence during the 2017 Rohingya genocide</h2>
<p>Several UN member states, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/canada-accuses-myanmar-of-genocide-against-rohingya">including Canada</a>, have condemned Myanmar’s actions, labelling them genocide. <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/sexualviolence">A 2018 UN report</a> documented how sexual violence was “<a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/sexual-violence-and-genocide-the-international-court-of-justices-ruling-on-rohingya/">strategically deployed</a>” against Rohingya women and girls.</p>
<p>Reports from health-care providers indicate that in 2017, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-022-13038-7">conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)</a> was perpetrated by the Myanmar military. Along with mass rapes, the military would beat and shoot the victims who were predominantly women. Sometimes, they would also murder family members in front of the victims. </p>
<p>Evidence published by the UN and other human rights organizations indicate that the Myanmar militia’s use of <a href="https://restlessbeings.org/articles/genocidal-rape-analysis-of-tools-and-tactics-to-dehumanize-a-community">rape was a tool of genocide</a> to result in the complete and partial destruction of the Rohingya community. Survivor testimonies published by the UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other organizations reveal that sexual violence and rape were meticulously planned. </p>
<p>The military raided Rohingya villages and <a href="https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/weaponisation-of-female-body-the-genocidal-rape-of-the-rohingya-people">forcefully entered households</a> where women were gathering. Survivors recounted how soldiers would take turns raping the women. </p>
<p>CRSV is causing a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-020-00329-2">public health crisis</a> for Rohingya women in refugee camps. While urgent health care was dispatched by human rights organizations, much of it focused on treating infectious diseases and physical trauma. </p>
<p>CRSV can be particularly stigmatizing for the victims, especially in conservative patriarchal societies. Survivors may feel reluctant to report the crime because of the shame that could bring them and their families. </p>
<p>Lack of access to health care is also a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/30/rohingya-refugees-facing-medical-crisis-bhasan-char">major deterrent</a>. Many refugee women often live in conservative environments where the use of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanwpc.2021.100246">contraceptives</a> is frowned upon. Furthermore, pregnant refugee women are <a href="https://www.unicef.org/rosa/stories/ante-and-post-natal-care-ensure-health-rohingya-mothers-and-children">encouraged to stay at home by their families and not seek medical assistance due to superstition and fear</a>. </p>
<h2>What can Canada do for Rohingya women?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/myanmar.aspx?lang=eng">Canadian government’s response</a> to the Rohingya crisis focuses on alleviating the humanitarian crisis and encouraging positive political developments in Myanmar. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photo of a woman with blond hair wearing a beige coat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=649&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=649&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=649&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/502974/original/file-20230103-19747-b7g1y5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly announced Canada’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy in November 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
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<p>This kind of a top-down approach focuses on assisting fragile states with political tools and financial resources to build political stability and prevent violence. But the risk with this approach is that persecuted communities remain at the bottom of the power hierarchy, where they continue to remain vulnerable. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2018/10/bottom-approach-foreign-aid/">bottom-up approach,</a> the focus is on ensuring healing for survivors and empowering them to access resources that aid in their social and psychological rehabilitation. </p>
<p>By applying a bottom-up approach, Canada should engage with local women’s and human rights organizations working with survivors who can also weigh in on post-conflict recovery.</p>
<p>There must be greater understanding of how race, ethnicity and gender relations contribute to women’s vulnerability during genocide and conflict. By addressing the crimes of sexual violence, Canada can work to bring survivors’ lived experience to the centre of humanitarian responses and help to prevent future abuses.</p>
<h2>Localize humanitarian responses</h2>
<p>Canadian policymakers and stakeholders need to understand and engage with historical identities, gender relations and survivors’ everyday lived experiences. </p>
<p>Localizing humanitarian engagements by partnering with grassroots organizations and community-led initiatives can help create healing and inclusive spaces for survivors of sexual violence.</p>
<p>This is a way Canada can ensure that survivors are protected and have access to the resources they need. </p>
<p>Canada needs to follow through on its commitment to combat <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/un-onu/statements-declarations/2020-07-17-VTC_conflict-conflits_visio.aspx?lang=eng">conflict-related sexual violence</a> and lead the international community in seeking justice for the Rohingya people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deeplina Banerjee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada’s new Indo-Pacific strategy must include providing assistance to Rohingya women who have suffered sexual violence.Deeplina Banerjee, PhD Candidate, Gender, Sexuality and Women Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948142022-11-17T08:21:37Z2022-11-17T08:21:37ZRelief as Australian Sean Turnell to be released from prison in Myanmar, but more needs to be done<p>In one of the few positive developments to come out of Myanmar in recent times, the military junta announced on Thursday it would be releasing almost 6,000 prisoners in an <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/australian-economist-former-uk-ambassador-among-thousands-freed-in-myanmar-amnesty">amnesty</a> to mark Myanmar’s National Day. </p>
<p>Included in the announcement were four foreign nationals being held in Myanmar’s jails: Australian academic Sean Turnell; former UK Ambassador to Myanmar and Myanmar resident Vicky Bowman; Japanese documentary filmmaker Toru Kubota; and US citizen Kyaw Htay Oo.</p>
<p>Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong reacted cautiously to the announcement, clearly waiting for further confirmation before celebrating the news.</p>
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<p>Turnell had been in jail for more than 21 months, and in September <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-29/australian-sean-turnell-court-verdict-myanmar/101478440">had been sentenced</a> to three years in jail for violating the country’s official secrets act. He was a close adviser to former Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom the military deposed in a February 2021 coup.</p>
<p>At the time of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-desperate-junta-trying-failing-shore-its-legitimacy">Turnell’s sentencing</a>, Suu Kyi had been sentenced to a total of 23 years in jail. It appeared likely that, with the 77-year old Suu Kyi removed from any role in the military’s next election charade, Turnell would be released soon afterwards. Suu Kyi has since been sentenced to a further <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/12/aung-san-suu-kyi-faces-total-of-26-years-in-prison-after-latest-corruption-sentencing">three years’ detention</a>.</p>
<p>However, the most likely prod towards the amnesty that included the foreign nationals was the politics surrounding the ASEAN-led round of summits over the previous weeks.</p>
<p>The ASEAN leaders statement was suitably bland, due to the need for consensus among all member states. But it did call for “<a href="https://asean.org/asean-leaders-review-and-decision-on-the-implementation-of-the-five-point-consensus/">concrete, practical and measurable indicators with a specific timeline</a>” to achieve the five-point peace plan it has developed to tackle the country’s political crisis. </p>
<p>However, the important messaging came from ASEAN powerhouse Indonesia, outside of the formal channels.</p>
<p>The week before the summit, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated in no uncertain terms that the military junta was solely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-responsible-crisis-says-indonesia-foreign-minister-2022-11-03/">responsible</a> for the failing peace process.</p>
<p>On the sidelines of the summit, Indonesian President Joko Widodo then proposed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/11/southeast-asia-leaders-struggle-with-myanmar-crisis-at-summit">broadening</a> the ban on political representatives at ASEAN events, arguing “we must not allow the situation in Myanmar to define ASEAN”.</p>
<p>The Indonesian proposal drew support from Malaysia and Singapore, but pushback from the more authoritarian member countries Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.</p>
<p>This division in the organisation means statements and actions are necessarily limited in their scope.</p>
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<p>Nevertheless, the unusually strong statements from Indonesia, in addition to the persistence of the empty Myanmar chair at these events, will be causing concern within the junta.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s military – and other militaries in the region such as Thailand’s – can normally count on ASEAN eventually falling into line whenever they supplant elected governments with military regimes.</p>
<p>The fact that this time, 21 months after the coup, powerful ASEAN members seem to be digging in their heels in vehement hostility towards the military may have led the junta to reassess its situation.</p>
<p>As with previous military juntas in Myanmar, the current regime’s playbook is chequered with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/17/myanmar-junta-pardons-releases-more-than-23000-prisoners">amnesties</a> that are deployed strategically to ease diplomatic and domestic pressure, and it appears that is what has happened here.</p>
<p>While we should be extremely thankful that some political prisoners are being released from Myanmar’s jails, we should also recognise they should never have been there in the first place.</p>
<p>As a friend and colleague of Sean Turnell and Vicky Bowman, I will be relieved to see them return to safety.</p>
<p>However, there will remain <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1592838654573293569?s=20&t=qdfwWloCJ4q0GUm-gTS08A">thousands</a> of other political prisoners in Myanmar’s jails even after this amnesty, not including those who have already been <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-killings-beatings-and-disappearances-escalate-whats-the-end-game-in-myanmar-156752">tortured to death</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-killings-beatings-and-disappearances-escalate-whats-the-end-game-in-myanmar-156752">As killings, beatings and disappearances escalate, what's the end game in Myanmar?</a>
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<p>The international community’s focus understandably remains on Ukraine, but we need stronger action from our political leaders on Myanmar.</p>
<p>An inexpensive and relatively risk-free diplomatic manoeuvre would be to formally intervene to support the Gambia in the Rohingya <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/10/05/myanmars-genocide-overshadowed-by-ukraine/">genocide case</a> against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice. </p>
<p>While 23 mostly-Western countries have intervened to support Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182">genocide case against Russia</a>, not a single country has intervened <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/22/genocide-case-against-myanmar-over-rohingya-atrocities-cleared-to-proceed">to support the case</a> against Myanmar. Low hanging fruit indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194814/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While we should be extremely thankful that some political prisoners are being released from Myanmar’s jails, we should also recognise they should never have been there in the first place.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916672022-09-30T05:12:20Z2022-09-30T05:12:20ZA sham sentence after a secret trial for Australian Sean Turnell<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487460/original/file-20220930-16-4vbc24.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C1799%2C921&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ruling-for-australian-nld-economics-advisor-expected-next-month.html">The Irawaddy</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian Sean Turnell, economic adviser to Myanmar’s democratically elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi, has been in prison since the military coup of February 2021, awaiting trial for the supposed crime of stealing state secrets. </p>
<p>This week a puppet court sentenced him <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-court-sentences-suu-kyi-australian-economist-3-years-jail-source-2022-09-29/">to three years</a> in prison, alongside Suu Kyi, who has already been sentenced to 20 years’ jail in other sham court cases.</p>
<p>Both pled not guilty to the charge of holding confidential secret government documents. Turnell has said all he had were economic papers needed for his work as a technical economic adviser to Myanmar’s government. </p>
<p>The trial was held behind closed doors. Australian consular officials attempted to attend but were denied access. Foreign affairs minister Penny Minister <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/sentencing-professor-sean-turnell">has issued a statement</a> rejecting the legitimacy of the trial and calling for Turnell’s release.</p>
<p>The Myanmar regime has agreed to take into account the 20 months Turnell has already spent in prison. So he is due for release in January 2024.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
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<p>It is possible, however, that he could be released and deported early. There is a precedent for this. In November 2011 US journalist Danny Fenster was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/12/myanmar-junta-jails-us-journalist-danny-fenster-for-11-years">sentenced to 11 years</a> with hard labour but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/15/us-journalist-danny-fenster-released-from-prison-in-myanmar">released just a day later</a>. Bill Richardson, a former New Mexico governor and US ambassador to the UN, was appointed as a special envoy and negotiated his release.</p>
<h2>How Turnell ended up in Myanmar</h2>
<p>I’ve known Turnell as a family friend and colleague for many years.</p>
<p>A working-class kid from Macquarie Fields in south-west Sydney, he attended Macquarie University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in economics, then a PhD and ended up as an associate professor.</p>
<p>Turnell went on to become an expert on the links between banking systems and economic performance in developing countries, particularly in South-East Asia. </p>
<p>He wrote some important academic articles on Myanmar discussing how, after decades of isolation under military rule, economic reforms could rebuild the nation’s agriculture and tourism sector. </p>
<p>His work gained the attention of Aung San Suu Kyi. They first met in the early 1990s, before Suu Kyi was sentenced to house arrest. After her release in 2010 the junta (temporarily) allowed democratic reforms and she invited him to become her economic adviser. </p>
<p>Turnell’s economic competence was widely admired. He became a sort of John Maynard Keynes of Myanmar. I witnessed this in 2017 when he gave the keynote address to an <a href="https://aummi.edu.au/conference-2017/">Australian Myanmar Institute</a> conference in Yangon. It was a full house with an enthusiastic audience.</p>
<p>On February 1 2021 the miltary staged its coup. Turnell was arrested, along with other prominent advisers to Suu Kyi, a few days later. </p>
<h2>Is it time for sanctions?</h2>
<p>It has been suggested that Australia should appoint a special envoy help get Turnell released, just as the US did for Danny Fenster. Former prime minister Kevin Rudd might be suitable given his good relationships in Asia.</p>
<p>In the meantime it is pleasing to see that foreign minister Penny Wong has been more vigorous than her predecessor Marise Payne in advocating for Turnell, and Myanmar generally. </p>
<p>Last month Wong <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/statement-asean-australia-ministerial-meeting">raised the issue</a> of Myanmar at a meeting of ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar is one of ASEAN’s ten members, and its neighbours have been divided over the forum’s longstanding policy of “constructive engagement” versus taking a harder line. </p>
<p>But will the Australian government back up its rhetorical support for Myanmar’s democracy movement with the type of sanctions the movement wants from the international community?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
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<p>Observers <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/will-australia-use-its-amended-sanctions-act-against-myanmar">have suggested</a> Turnell’s fate may have influenced the former government’s lack of enthusiasm for sanctions. </p>
<p>That still appears the case, with Wong adopting a similar stance to Payne in saying only that sanctions against members of Myanmar’s military regime “<a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australia-mulls-sanctions-against-myanmars-military-leaders-after-appalling-executions/bhwe88g6l">are under active consideration</a>”.</p>
<p>But there’s a paradox at play here. If Turnell’s predicament really is behind the government’s reluctance to impose sanctions, that gives Myanmar’s junta an incentive to keep Turnell locked up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Turnell is a family friend</span></em></p>Having already spent 20 months in a prison, Aung San Syy Kyi’s Australian economic advisor is due for release in January 2024.Tim Harcourt, Industry Professor and Chief Economist, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1878682022-07-28T13:52:16Z2022-07-28T13:52:16ZMyanmar: death penalty the latest tactic for military junta’s murderous regime<p>Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s death penalty moratorium has been a myth. The junta has routinely targeted civilians for <a href="https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-2022-03-24/">extra-judicial killing</a>, including using army snipers to callously pick off peaceful protesters. There have been killings of prisoners too, with many of the dead reportedly exhibiting <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/28/new-reports-torture-myanmar">signs of torture</a> on their bodies. What changed this week was that the junta admitted to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/top-democracy-activists-were-executed-in-myanmar-4-key-things-to-know-187671">deliberate killing of prisoners</a>.</p>
<p>Four prisoners, representing different strands of anti-coup resistance <a href="https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/protests-break-out-inside-insein-prison-following-activists-execution">were executed</a> at Yangon’s Insein Prison breaking a decades-old taboo <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123172">against capital punishment</a>. None had received anything resembling a fair trial, instead facing a military tribunal where they were <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/24/asia/myanmar-executions-pro-democracy-figures-intl-hnk/index.html">denied legal counsel</a>. In practice their “guilt” was predetermined by a Myanmar military, known as the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56660483">Tatmadaw</a>, that regards active opposition to its rule as akin to terrorism.</p>
<p>The junta’s <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-executes-four-political-prisoners">choice of victims</a> was guaranteed to provoke domestic outrage. Opposed to military rule and accused of terrorism, Kyaw Min Yu, better known as Ko Jimmy was a Myanmar household name, first coming to prominence as a student leader of the “88 generation” that almost toppled a previous military regime in the 1988 Uprising.</p>
<p>Phyo Zeya Thaw, a <a href="https://coconuts.co/yangon/lifestyle/acid-myanmars-hip-hop-godfathers-reunite-clubhouse-tonight/">wildly popular rapper</a> and hip-hop artist who co-founded youth activist group Generation Wave, was also an ex-law-maker close to Aung San Suu Kyi. He too was accused of terrorism. Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/25/myanmar-junta-executes-four">were accused</a> of killing a Tatmadaw informant.</p>
<h2>Violence as a tactic</h2>
<p>Using ferocious violence to cow resistance to its domination has long been a key Tatmadaw strategy, particularly among the country’s ethnic and religious minority communities. Ongoing popular resistance to their 2021 coup, the growth of People’s Defence Force militias, increasing defections and recruitment shortfalls have weakened the Tatmadaw, and prompted junta bosses to bring tactics more familiar to minorities like the Rohingya to the country’s Buddhist heartland. There has been a marked uptick in military brutality towards members of Myanmar’s Buddhist majority.</p>
<p>The Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgency approach, often described as “clearance operations” are derived from its “<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/tadmadaw-ominous-return-four-cuts-doctrine">Four Cuts</a>” strategy aimed at denying opponents access to food, funds, fresh recruits and intelligence. Resembling total war, scorched-earth tactics and the targeting of civilians for collective punishment are a routine part of these operations. This was how the Tatmadaw labelled its <a href="https://theconversation.com/they-shot-my-two-daughters-in-front-of-me-rohingya-tell-heartbreaking-stories-of-loss-and-forced-migration-86153">forced deportation</a> of the Rohingya Muslim community in 2017 </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/they-shot-my-two-daughters-in-front-of-me-rohingya-tell-heartbreaking-stories-of-loss-and-forced-migration-86153">'They shot my two daughters in front of me': Rohingya tell heartbreaking stories of loss and forced migration</a>
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<p>Now the junta is using similar tactics nationwide. Since the coup, military atrocities have been widespread and frequently stomach-churningly awful. These have included air strikes against rural villages and displacement camps in retaliation for nearby anti-coup activity, driving a truck into a crowd of peaceful protesters, and even burning alive civilians fleeing violence. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/5629/2022/en/">Amnesty International described</a> Tatmadaw air strikes against civilians as “collective punishment” and “a new wave of war crimes and likely crimes against humanity”. </p>
<p>Tom Andrews, the UN special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, painted <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-myanmar-thomas-h-andrews-ahrc4976">a grim picture</a>: “Junta forces have killed at least 1,600 civilians and displaced over 500,000. Half of the population has fallen into poverty. The World Health Organisation is now projecting that there will be over 47,000 preventable deaths in Myanmar this year. Thirteen million people face food insecurity”. Recent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/asia-and-pacific-weekly-regional-humanitarian-snapshot-19-25-july-2022">UN data indicates</a> more than 857,000 have been displaced by violence since the coup was launched.</p>
<h2>Systematic killings</h2>
<p>Even the executions of imprisoned anti-coup leaders mirror a disturbing aspect of the genocide against the Rohingya – the systematic killing of community leaders to undermine the group’s cohesion, capacity and hasten its destruction. Rohingya <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/MM/CXBMissionSummaryFindingsOctober2017.pdf">genocide survivors described</a> how in 2017, community leaders and educated Rohingya were singled out for killing by soldiers, and it seems the junta has adopted the same approach towards anti-coup activists targeting key leaders.</p>
<p>Throughout Myanmar and across the world, the response to the executions, the latest high-profile atrocity from Myanmar, might not be what coup leader general <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Min-Aung-Hlaing">Min Aung Hlaing</a> hoped. Rather than quell opposition to military rule, this escalation has signalled the junta’s vulnerability, highlighting its inability to embed its rule a year and half after launching an unpopular coup.</p>
<p>On the night of the killings, Yangon was filled with the sounds of protesters banging pots and pans – a traditional way to drive out evil spirits that has become a symbol of anti-coup resistance. Rather than being cowed by the murder of her son Phyo Zeya Thaw, Daw Khin Win Tin <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/executed-myanmar-democracy-activists-mother-recalls-last-meeting.html">bravely described</a> her pride that he sacrificed his life for his country.</p>
<p>The international response has been characterised by near universal condemnation. Such was the outrage over the executions, even erstwhile junta supporters China and Russia fell into line with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-says-there-can-be-no-more-business-usual-with-myanmars-junta-2022-07-25/">US demands</a> for an end to “business as usual” and agreed to a UN Security Council statement condemning the executions.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1552404249669148673"}"></div></p>
<p>Malaysia’s foreign minister, Saifuddin Abdullah, <a href="https://twitter.com/saifuddinabd/status/1551871450872573952">indicated</a> he had run out of patience with the junta, describing the executions as “a crime against humanity and clearly shows that the junta is making a mockery” of the <a href="https://asean.org/about-us">Association of Southeast Asian Nations’</a> (ASEAN) agreed <a href="https://asean.org/tag/five-point-consensus/">Five-Point Consensus</a>. This suggests Malaysia will strongly push ASEAN to take a firmer hand with Myanmar’s junta. They need to. </p>
<p>As the regional body, ASEAN’s involvement and agreement to the Five-Point Consensus has provided the junta with a shield, giving world powers like the US and China a plausible excuse to avoid greater engagement with the Myanmar crisis but not requiring the junta to make any changes to its approach.</p>
<p>The US has indicated that all options are now on the table. This should include steps that have the potential to contribute to regime change in Myanmar, such as sanctioning gas revenues and an arms embargo. Otherwise the UN Security Council should prepare to write many more statements of condemnation because the junta has given no indication that words will force it to change its ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronan Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The execution of four activists and opposition politicians is another part of the junta’s campaign of violence and repression in Myanmar.Ronan Lee, Doctoral Prize Fellow, Institute for Media and Creative Industries, Loughborough University London, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876712022-07-26T20:53:43Z2022-07-26T20:53:43ZTop democracy activists were executed in Myanmar – 4 key things to know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476125/original/file-20220726-21-93tuny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists including Myanmar citizens protest in Tokyo on July 26, 2022, against Myanmar's recent execution of four prisoners </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/activists-including-myanmar-nationals-take-part-in-a-rally-to-protest-picture-id1242118205?s=2048x2048">Philip Fong/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The current conflict in Myanmar raised new <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-all-options-on-table-to-punish-myanmar-junta-over-executions-/6673458.html">international concern</a> when the country’s military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/25/world/asia/myanmar-executions.html">announced on</a> July 25, 2022, that it had executed four pro-democracy activists and political prisoners. </p>
<p>The high-profile killings were the latest signal that the civil conflict in the Southeast Asian country is deepening, almost 18 months after the military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">staged a coup</a> and overtook the democratically elected government in February 2021.</p>
<p>The military killed two leading political leaders who opposed the junta – Kyaw Min Yu, a writer and activist known as Jimmy, and Phyo Zeya Thaw, a hip-hop musician turned lawmaker under the old political regime – citing counterterrorism charges. </p>
<p>Two other people – Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-terrorism-democracy-aung-san-suu-kyi-government-and-politics-ca87f032cb6c7407b1d776574f15c5a8">were executed after they were convicted of</a> killing a woman who they reportedly thought was a military informer. </p>
<p>The executions follow a recent report from human rights group Amnesty International that the military is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/20/amnesty-accuses-myanmar-of-war-crimes-over-landmines">laying land mines</a> in residential areas to hurt and kill civilians. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of Myanmar <a href="https://www.niu.edu/clas/world-languages/about/directory/than.shtml">politics and culture</a>. Here are four key points to help untangle the country’s complicated conflict and the meaning behind the executions. </p>
<h2>The military government is sending a message</h2>
<p>The political executions of these activists were the first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/25/myanmar-junta-executes-democracy-activists-state-media">in many decades</a> for Myanmar, which has vacillated from military control to emerging democratic leadership over the past few decades. The military wants to send a message to other citizens – and to the world – that it is in charge. </p>
<p>But behind a thin veneer of control, the military’s fears of public opposition and uprisings can be detected by people in Myanmar and outside observers alike.</p>
<p>Soldiers overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi, the former leader and foreign minister of Myanmar, in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/06/aung-san-suu-kyi-sentenced-to-four-years-in-prison-for-incitement">early 2021</a> and first placed her under house arrest. </p>
<p>The coup <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-s-spring-revolution">sparked a wave of protests</a> across the country – over 4,700 anti-coup events were reported by the end of June 2021. The military responded with conducting mass arrests and killing civilians. </p>
<p>The military then sent Aung San Suu Kyi to prison on multiple corruption charges <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61239881">in April 2022</a> that the nonprofit Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/world/asia/myanmar-coup-trial-aung-san-suu-kyi.html">has called “bogus</a>.”</p>
<p>Executing four revolutionary leaders will likely escalate nationwide resistance to the military.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters in Bangkok hold photos of Aung San Suu Kyi as they march through the streets, with umbrellas and flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476127/original/file-20220726-32598-qs6ath.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in Bangkok hold photos of Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s detained former leader, on July 26, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/protesters-shout-slogans-and-hold-photos-of-detained-myanmar-civilian-picture-id1242117862?s=2048x2048">Manan Vatsyayana/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The conflict’s complicated back story</h2>
<p>When the military staged the 2021 coup, the generals made a miscalculation. </p>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, had won a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54899170">landslide victory</a> against the military-backed opposition in November 2020. Military generals demanded another election, offering little evidence of irregularities, but recognizing that power was slipping from their hands. </p>
<p>Military representatives still held an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-35457290">allocated 25% of parliament seats</a> because of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/10/myanmar-democracys-dead-end">the constitution</a>, but without their allied political parties, their political leverage was limited. </p>
<p>At the time, there was a global pandemic. The <a href="https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/economy">economy slowed down</a>. </p>
<p>The generals likely hoped that the coup would be merely a smooth transition back to the old system – before Aung San Suu Kyi’s party was first elected in 2015 – when the different generations of generals had controlled everything, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya">from 1962</a> onward.</p>
<p>But the National League for Democracy’s ascension to power brought about many positive changes, particularly in the country’s heartland, where a <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-importance-of-ethnic-minorities-to-myanmars-future/">major ethnic group, Bamar</a>, lives. The country’s <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/myanmar/gdp">gross domestic product, an indicator of economic growth</a>, was also at an all-time high in 2020. </p>
<p>Many could see life was improving for them and for their children. The generals did not foresee the outrage that would follow the coup.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An assault weapon and the uniformed legs of a soldier are visible in the back of a truck as seen through the window of a bus on a busy city street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476132/original/file-20220726-34052-r36mpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women look out the window of a bus at armed soldiers patrolling a street in Yangon, Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/two-women-look-out-the-window-of-a-bus-as-armed-soldiers-patrol-a-picture-id1242116402?s=2048x2048">STR/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How political resistance has played out</h2>
<p>Early days of peaceful demonstrations after the coup quickly turned to armed resistance when the army did not respect the people’s demands to return power to the government they elected.</p>
<p>U.N. human rights experts <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120292">have said</a> the military junta is a “criminal enterprise” that is systematically committing murder, torture and forced disappearances. The junta <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/myanmar-un-experts-condemn-militarys-digital-dictatorship">has also blocked access</a> to many social media sites, like Facebook, and engaged in <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120292">widespread human rights violations</a>, including attacks on civilians, according to the U.N.</p>
<p>Many young people joined ethnic revolutionary groups, many of which had been fighting <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-brutal-military-was-once-a-force-for-freedom-but-its-been-waging-civil-war-for-decades-158270">the army since 1948</a>, when Myanmar – then known as Burma – <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Myanmar/The-initial-impact-of-colonialism">became independent</a> from British rule.</p>
<p>Ethnic armies supported the young people who decided to join the resistance, and housed, fed and trained them. </p>
<p>Some Myanmar citizens, meanwhile, have donated their incomes, houses and cars to help support revolutionary groups. It’s become popular for people to visit websites and play <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/video-game-allowing-players-to-shoot-junta-soldiers-online-funds-resistance-efforts-in-myanmar/ar-AAZP7MQ">online games</a> created by Myanmar tech developers – generating money that goes to these groups. </p>
<p>This bypasses the military’s crackdown on mobile <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b167-cost-coup-myanmar-edges-toward-state-collapse">money transfers</a> to members of the armed groups, and the <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/myanmars-military-coup-has-pushed-its-fledgling-digital-economy-to-the-brink-of-collapse/">closure of many banks</a>. </p>
<p>The military is also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/myanmars-military-losing-ground-rebels-and-ethnic-armies-part-1">losing some territorial control</a>, as more and more regions slowly form their own <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/topics/5052">administrations</a>, which the military does not recognize.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cat walks in front of a row of men holding guns. Only their bodies are shown." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476129/original/file-20220726-10345-iwahmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cat walks in front of members of the People’s Defense Force – a armed group in Myanmar that opposes the military government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/cat-walks-in-front-of-the-peoples-defence-force-members-lining-up-picture-id1241835141?s=2048x2048">David Mmr/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Other countries are mostly staying out of it</h2>
<p>The United States and other major powers have largely been absent as Myanmar has experienced a coup and subsequent political and economic crisis. </p>
<p>While the Myanmar army <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/27/holdstronger-togethermyanmarrussiaparademilitary-relationship">continues to get support and military supplies from Russia</a>, other countries have taken a wait-and-see approach. </p>
<p>One reason is that Myanmar’s situation is internal, and its military is not fighting other countries. Now, hundreds of internal groups in Myanmar are fighting over their vested interests, including territory. </p>
<p>I believe no clear winner will walk away from this civil war – and staging little to no interference has been the <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/why-has-the-world-forgotten-about-myanmar/">international community’s general position</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-61243316">People of Myanmar</a> have interpreted this stance as willful ignorance to their plight. </p>
<p>There are, however, some symbolic victories for the opposition by way of international engagement. </p>
<p>Ousted political leaders from the National League for Democracy and others against the junta formed a new shadow government, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/myanmars-national-unity-government-and-its-prospects-military-victory">the National Unity Government</a>, in May 2021. Most of their top members operate “undercover or through members based abroad,” <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/07/asia/myanmar-nug-peoples-war-intl-hnk/index.html">according to CNN</a>.</p>
<p>The U.N. has not formally recognized the National Unity Government but has allowed representatives to speak at the U.N. on behalf of Myanmar.</p>
<p>The U.S. has hosted National Unity Government <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-deputy-secretarys-meeting-with-nug-representatives/">delegations</a> <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/10/myanmars-unity-government-meets-nsa-sullivan-gains-further-traction">several times</a> – but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-usa-fed-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-blocked-myanmar-junta-attempt-to-empty-1-billion-new-york-fed-account-sources-idUSKCN2AW2MD">it has yet to unfreeze</a> the US$1 billion the previous Myanmar government held at a U.S. Federal Reserve bank. </p>
<p>Both the National Unity Government and <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/US-hits-Myanmar-junta-with-1bn-asset-freeze-and-other-sanctions">the military</a> claim rights to this money. </p>
<h2>An uncertain future</h2>
<p>The coup triggered <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-on-brink-of-economic-collapse-one-year-after-military-coup/a-60621514">an economic collapse</a>, plunging Myanmar’s currency to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/myanmars-currency-falls-to-all-time-low-amid-post-coup-turmoil/">an all-time low</a>. </p>
<p>Many Myanmar citizens <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56356213">feel trapped</a> in the entrenched war. </p>
<p>The country is fast-forwarding into the past, when it was <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/04/a-rare-glimpse-into-burma/390567/">deeply isolated</a> from the world. And there is no clear end in sight to the conflict. </p>
<p>The military hosted <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-23/myanmar-s-ruling-military-offers-minorities-new-peace-talks/101010628">peace talks </a> in April and May, but fewer than half of the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/myanmar-leader-begins-peace-talks-ethnic-militia-groups-84861289">country’s major 21 ethnic armed groups</a> attended. </p>
<p>Many of these groups together with the newly formed armed People’s Defense Forces, part of the National Unity Government, have vowed to fight on, especially after the executions. Because of their determination, many people in the country feel that the future is uncertain – but not hopeless.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s military junta is losing some control over the country, but its execution of four high-profile leaders and prisoners sends a warning to Myanmar citizens and the rest of the world.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor, Department of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1759502022-01-31T17:03:04Z2022-01-31T17:03:04ZMyanmar: while the world sits on its hands, people fight military junta with violence and silence<p>A year after a military coup, Myanmar remains mired in conflict. The country’s military, the <em>Tatmadaw</em>, has failed to convince most of Myanmar’s 55 million people of the legitimacy of its rule. Anti-coup resistance continues to be widespread nationwide. </p>
<p>The anniversary will be marked within Myanmar by a “<a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-threatens-silent-strike-participants-with-major-criminal-charges">silent strike</a>”, with participants acknowledging those jailed or killed by the junta during the last year by avoiding public space, leaving Myanmar’s streets empty. The junta has threatened participants with decades-long jail sentences and property confiscations. But if previous calls for anti-coup resistance are an indication, tens of millions of people will stay home and Myanmar’s streets will be spookily empty. </p>
<p>Silent strikers have a lot of people to acknowledge. The junta has <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1488118908112752640">jailed 11,838</a> according to Myanmar’s Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. This included State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and as many of Myanmar’s civilian politicians as the military could round up and have killed – 1,503 – often with appalling cruelty. </p>
<p>In the immediate wake of the coup, hundreds of mostly young, peaceful protesters were killed by army snipers. In ethnic minority areas, soldiers replicated the kinds of scorched earth tactics used when the <em>Tatmadaw</em> genocidally deported the Rohingya <a href="https://theconversation.com/rohingya-crisis-this-is-what-genocide-looks-like-83924">in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>Recent indiscriminate atrocities include the driving of a truck into a crowd of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/5/myanmar-security-forces-ram-car-into-yangon-protest-report">peaceful protesters</a>, the burning alive of <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/burned-12082021213116.html">11 people</a> including four children in retaliation for an attack by anti-junta militia, and the massacre of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/28/myanmar-massacre-two-save-the-children-staff-among-dead">31 people</a> fleeing violent clashes.</p>
<p>Rather than quelling popular opposition to military rule, the junta’s brutality and extreme violence has instead convinced many people of the necessity of removing the military from power for good. Resistance has encompassed a broad range of activities including peaceful protests that drew global attention, and civil disobedience and strikes that have paralysed the bureaucracy and transport sectors. Increasingly this has included violent opposition to the junta. </p>
<p>Resistance is strongly encouraged by the <a href="https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/">National Unity Government</a> (NUG), a shadow government in exile that draws heavily from politicians elected at the 2020 general election. In September, NUG leaders announced a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/07/myanmar-opposition-announces-defensive-war-against-junta">defensive war</a>” against the junta, encouraging the creation of People’s Defence Force militias to target the <em>Tatmadaw</em> and its assets. </p>
<p>These militias have increasingly linked with the armed wings of Myanmar’s ethnic minority groups, of which there are dozens, many of whom have themselves been in conflict with the <em>Tatmadaw</em> for decades. A nationwide united front of militias and ethnic armed groups has the potential to significantly stretch <em>Tatmadaw</em> capabilities. </p>
<h2>Economic shambles</h2>
<p>Creating a further challenge for the junta is the shambolic state of the economy. The World Bank estimated an 18% contraction during 2021 and predicted a paltry 1% growth in 2022, describing the economy as “<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/world-bank-expects-myanmar-growth-of-1-economy-critically-weak">critically weak</a>”. The national currency, the kyat, has fallen to historic lows, losing 60% of its value in September alone. </p>
<p>The World Food Program estimated a <a href="https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/bef7b4ad672a4b2a82c6c0287696fb33/download/?_ga=2.96528923.580029848.1643602001-1344326272.1643602001">29% rise</a> among a basket of basic foods, and a 71% hike in fuel prices during 2021, contributing to widespread food insecurity and pushing millions towards poverty. </p>
<p>The perilous state of the economy has revived memories of the shockingly poor economic management during previous periods of military rule which saw Myanmar (then Burma), in 1987, designated a “<a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category-myanmar.html">Least Developed Country</a>” by the UN.</p>
<h2>Mixed diplomatic messages</h2>
<p>Internationally, the news for the junta is mixed. Military-ruled Myanmar is isolated diplomatically, the military government has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/26/asean-summit-starts-with-myanmar-junta-excluded-for-ignoring-peace-deal">barred from participation</a> in meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/05/myanmars-un-envoy-accuses-regime-of-township-massacre">Myanmar’s delegate</a> to the UN General Assembly speaks on behalf of the NUG, rather than the junta. But the generals have not had to face foreign intervention, an arms embargo, or even a UN Security Council referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). </p>
<p>Western political leaders have been strong on anti-coup rhetoric and have imposed a range of economic sanctions, but there has been a studied reluctance to go beyond that. Most have been comfortable with Asean taking responsibility for addressing the situation in Myanmar. But the consensus-based regional bloc has proven unable to take decisive action, and its “<a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf">five-point consensus</a>” has been variously frustrated and ignored by the junta. </p>
<p>At the security council, neither the US, UK, nor France, all permanent members who have condemned the coup, has been prepared to force a vote on imposing an arms embargo or referring Myanmar’s generals to the ICC. This might at least encourage Myanmar’s defenders at the UN and its major arms suppliers – China and Russia - to push the junta to moderate its actions. </p>
<p>This situation is reminiscent of the west’s response to the 2017 Rohingya crisis, when soaring rhetoric was not matched with actions to prevent criminality or achieve accountability. This arguably contributed to the <em>Tatmadaw</em>’s sense of impunity which underpinned its decision to launch the current coup, convinced that it might face condemnatory rhetoric but little else from the UN or western governments. </p>
<h2>Edge of collapse</h2>
<p>Military boss Min Aung Hlaing now presides over a crisis-riven country at the edge of complete political and economic collapse. While the junta has unquestionably failed to win hearts and minds and appears to have wildly underestimated the likely domestic opposition to renewed military rule, there are few indications the junta is considering any compromise that might see the <em>Tatmadaw</em> return to its barracks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, held incommunicado for a year, Aung San Suu Kyi, the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/official-results-show-another-election-landslide-myanmars-ruling-nld.html#:%7E:text=By%20The%20Irrawaddy%2016%20November%202020.%20National%20League,affairs%20minister%20posts%2C%20giving%20it%20another%20landslide%20victory.">winner of</a> the 2020 general election, has been recently sentenced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/10/aun-san-suu-kyi-sentenced-to-four-years-in-prison-for-walkie-talkie-and-covid-rule-breaches">six years in jail</a> via an absurd, military-run court process.</p>
<p>All this suggests Myanmar faces a worrying future: a military determined to rule and prepared to use appalling violence to achieve power, and a population equally determined to remove the military from power.</p>
<p>A protracted conflict will have devastating consequences for Myanmar’s people. By imposing an arms embargo on the <em>Tatmadaw</em>, the security council could help to defeat the junta more quickly. In the silent strike, millions of people will bravely risk decades in jail to protest military rule that is as illegitimate as it is cruel. They will be hoping the security council can show some bravery too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175950/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronan Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Millions are expected to stay home in a ‘silent strike’ againt the junta, while the country teeters of the edge of collapse.Ronan Lee, Doctoral Prize Fellow, Loughborough University London, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1734492022-01-12T16:13:39Z2022-01-12T16:13:39ZHopeful signs: How some southeast Asian nations are snubbing Myanmar’s military leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439209/original/file-20220103-19-139ocbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C4068&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An activist holds up a defaced portrait of Myanmar Gen. Min Aung Hlaing during a rally against the military coup in Jakarta, Indonesia in April 2021, as the ASEAN summit was being held.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the urgent meeting in Indonesia of 10 leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN, in April 2021, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing — the architect of Myanmar’s coup two months earlier — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/world/asia/myanmar-asean-general-indonesia.html">was welcomed</a> by his soon-to-be peers. </p>
<p>Everything seemed to be working out for the Myanmar junta regime. Min Aung Hlaing likely believed the international community would soon recognize his seizure of power as an irreversible fait accompli. He probably assumed that based on its history, ASEAN — ostensibly the primary promoter of peace and stability in the region — would treat him as the new legitimate leader of the country and that Myanmar citizens would subsequently stop resisting the new, universally accepted military government. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in an military uniform looks up." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439204/original/file-20220103-21317-ioj2wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is seem at the IX Moscow conference on international security in Moscow in June 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)</span></span>
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<p>After all, tolerating coups and other authoritarian acts had become commonplace for ASEAN. The organization, focused on the non-intervention/consensus principle manifested in the so-called “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00102003">ASEAN way</a>,” doesn’t directly challenge its members for human right violations, let alone coup d’états. </p>
<p>In 2014, in its tepid response to Thai military leaders deposing the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra, the <a href="https://asean.org/statement-on-current-developments-in-the-kingdom-of-thailand/">official ASEAN statement</a> by heads of state called for “political stability” in Thailand while expressing no concern about the coup.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/muted-response-to-thai-coup-hints-at-other-nations-limited-options-27100">Muted response to Thai coup hints at other nations' limited options</a>
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<p>This characteristic timidity is why ASEAN’s refusal to seat Min Aung Hlaing at its biannual leaders’ summit a few months later was so stunning — it represented the harshest <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/10/why-aseans-rebuke-of-myanmars-top-general-matters">diplomatic sanction</a> it’s ever handed down to a fellow member state in more than five decades. </p>
<h2>Significant blow</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf">ASEAN charter</a>, the summit is the “supreme policy-making body,” with the ultimate power to decide upon any “serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance” and other disputes where consensus cannot be reached. </p>
<p>World leaders were invited to the October 2021 summit, including United States President Joe Biden. Barring Min Aung Hlaing delivered a significant blow to his government’s hopes of international recognition.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit sits in front of a blue/green screen that reads US-ASEAN virtual summit" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439218/original/file-20220103-117041-og8dof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">U.S. President Joe Biden participates virtually in the U.S.-ASEAN Summit from the White House in October 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Susan Walsh)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More importantly, it appears this wasn’t just a stunt by ASEAN members — <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.bn/Lists/Press%20Room/news.aspx?id=947">there were clearly disputes</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-meet-discuss-possible-exclusion-myanmar-leader-summit-sources-2021-10-14/">among the ASEAN members</a> on <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/myanmar-opposition-welcomes-aseans-exclusion-of-junta-leader/">whether the military could represent Myanmar at the summit at all</a>. ASEAN’s credibility as a rules-based organization was on the line in the aftermath of the Myanmar coup and the subsequent deadly crackdowns carried out by the military.</p>
<p>Those discussions among members of ASEAN suggest the organization might be evolving.</p>
<p>Before and after excluding Myanmar’s top general from its biannual summit, the language in recent ASEAN literature also hints at sympathies toward the country’s democratic causes.</p>
<p>ASEAN’s initiative to address the Myanmar problem, known as the <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf">Five-Point Consensus</a>, emphasizes its intent to “facilitate mediation of the dialogue process” and “meet with all parties concerned.” It’s one of the few times the organization has ever explicitly offered to work directly with a party that’s not in power amid a member state’s internal conflict.</p>
<h2>Meeting with all parties</h2>
<p>In fact, this ASEAN provision is the main reason why the Myanmar military junta refuses to adhere to the consensus. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a dark suit with a white shirt and yellow tie wearing a mask" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439220/original/file-20220103-50268-j7s7yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Erywan Yusof, the ASEAN special envoy, poses for photographers ahead of a meeting on the sidelines of a G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in London.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Adrian Dennis/Pool Photo via AP, File) CP</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>A visit to Myanmar by ASEAN Special Envoy Erywan Yusof <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/10/why-aseans-rebuke-of-myanmars-top-general-matters">was cancelled</a> after the junta would not allow him to visit the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59544484">detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi or any members of the National League for Democracy</a>, her pre-coup ruling liberal democratic party.</p>
<p>The conclusion of the October summit <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/FINAL-Chairmans-Statement-of-the-38th-and-39th-ASEAN-Summits-26-Oct....pdf">suggested a further evolution</a>. The organization pledged a commitment to “rule of law, good governance, democracy and constitutional government.” The member states promised to “strike an appropriate balance to the application of ASEAN principles” on the situation in Myanmar.</p>
<p>Some experts see no progress. <em>The Diplomat</em> magazine asked if it really mattered that <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/does-it-matter-if-myanmars-junta-leader-is-banned-from-the-asean-summit/">ASEAN banned Min Aung Hlaing from its October summit without a long-term plan on the situation in Myanmar</a>.</p>
<p>What’s more, Myanmar’s junta has yet to adhere to any of the Five-Point Consensus provisions. Snubbing the general came with few costs but produced a big public relations boost for ASEAN. And its decision received support from Brunei, which is where the chair of the organization hails from this year. </p>
<p>It was a close 5-4 ruling of the ASEAN member states to ban Min Aung Hlaing. As soon as Cambodia takes over ASEAN’s rotating chair, progress <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cambodian-pm-says-plans-visit-myanmar-talks-with-military-rulers-2021-12-06/">could be reversed</a>, especially since the Cambodian prime minister has met with and expressed support for Myanmar’s military rulers.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a dark suit points ahead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439235/original/file-20220103-129369-41o6p8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen gestures at a ceremony in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in February 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Heng Sinith)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hope on the horizon?</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, it’s significant that a majority of ASEAN members actively punished and refused to recognize a coup government due to the blatant violations of human rights.</p>
<p>Will we see the day when the ASEAN Charter fully rejects unconstitutional changes of government and undemocratic elections similar to the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/AfricanUnion.aspx">Constitutive Act of the African Union</a> that implicitly condemns authoritarianism? </p>
<p>Probably not any time soon. International law evolves slowly, focusing on universally agreed-upon norms that can require decades to take shape. Nonetheless, it’s a positive step in the right direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Quoc Tan Trung Nguyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Will the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as ASEAN, start taking tougher stances against authoritarian and military regimes? Its recent treatment of Myanmar’s military ruler is promising.Quoc Tan Trung Nguyen, PhD Candidate in Public International Law, University of VictoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1732962021-12-07T11:54:48Z2021-12-07T11:54:48ZAung San Suu Kyi: Myanmar’s democracy figurehead could face life imprisonment in ‘politically motivated’ prosecution<p>Ousted Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to two years in prison over breaches of the country’s COVID restrictions in the first of a number of trials, which – if she is found guilty of all the charges – could bring her a cumulative sentence of more than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-59544484">100 years</a>. She has been under house arrest since the country’s military took control in February. She denies all accusations against her.</p>
<p>The verdict and jail sentence have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/06/aung-san-suu-kyi-sentenced-to-four-years-in-prison-for-incitement">been condemned</a> by several international organisations, including the United Nations, the European Union and the UK government, which described the trial as “politically motivated”. She was originally sentenced to four years, but that was cut in half by the country’s military chiefs, according to state TV. </p>
<p>It’s a long way from 2015, when the world celebrated her party’s landslide election triumph and she assumed the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/06/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-state-counsellor-role-created/index.html">role of state counsellor</a>. She was prevented from occupying the presidency by the country’s constitution put in place in 2008 by the military junta, but was internationally acknowledged as the centre of power in the country’s first civilian government. </p>
<p>Having been under house arrest for most of the period from 1989 to 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi’s <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Myanmar-election/Suu-Kyi-s-NLD-confirms-396-seats-surpassing-2015-landslide-victory#:%7E:text=The%20NLD%2C%20headed%20by%20the%20nation%27s%20de%20facto,victory%20in%202015%2C%20when%20it%20won%20390%20seats.">election success</a> leading the National League for Democracy (NLD) party was widely seen as her crowning moment, and a major opportunity for democracy in Myanmar. But her spectacular rise was matched by the speed of her fall from grace. </p>
<p>Partly as a result of the complex system of government, which effectively preserved a high degree of political power for the military, the pace of change was slow in Myanmar. The authorities were also facing long-term separatist insurgencies and, in 2017, a military crackdown against <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar">Rohingya Muslims</a> in the western Rakhine State, saw thousands fleeing into Bangladesh. </p>
<p>Amid accusations of genocide, international support for the NLD government began to dwindle. It was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23/aung-san-suu-kyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar">major blow</a> to Aung San Suu Kyi’s international standing and prompted widespread calls for her 2001 Nobel peace prize to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977">be revoked</a> due to what was perceived to be her silence over the crisis. International condemnation only increased when she appeared at the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/10/aung-san-suu-kyi-arrives-at-icj-as-myanmar-faces-genocide-case/">International Court of Justice</a> in December 2019 to defend Myanmar against the claims of genocide. </p>
<p>Her party was successful once again in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57144397">November 2020 election</a>, but the military accused the NLD of perpetrating widespread <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_myanmars-military-refuses-rule-out-coup-over-election-fraud-claims/6201316.html">voter fraud</a> – an accusation dismissed by international observers. These claims of illegitimacy laid the foundations for the military takeover that occurred on February 1 this year.</p>
<h2>Army consolidates power</h2>
<p>Since the coup, military leadership have used the legal framework within Myanmar to consolidate their position. This is not an unusual thing to happen after a coup. As research by American political scientist <a href="https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/on-democratic-backsliding/">Nancy Bermeo</a> – among others – outlines, post-coup governments use the pre-existing legal premises and institutions to solidify the coup plotters’ positions and authorities. </p>
<p>The military junta has used the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2008.pdf?lang=en">2008 constitution</a>, as a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/melissa-crouch-on-myanmars-coup-and-the-rule-of-law/">legal basis</a> for the coup itself and the appointment of the new government and Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial is a logical extension of this. By following the letter of the constitution, which criminalises speech or actions deemed to cause “fear or alarm to the public”, the SAC is able to pretend at a semblance of fairness.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-trial-how-myanmars-judicial-system-is-stacked-against-the-deposed-leader-162901">Aung San Suu Kyi trial: how Myanmar's judicial system is stacked against the deposed leader</a>
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<p>But the prosecutions of Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of her party has been heavily criticised both internationally and domestically. Court proceedings have remained closed to the public, and her lawyers have been banned from speaking publicly, so the process has remained highly opaque.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1467853020553793544"}"></div></p>
<p>Suu Kyi’s sentencing has a sense of inevitability about it and does not come as much of a surprise to international observers. What it does reveal, though, is the confidence and self-assuredness of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/myanmar-military-leader-takes-new-title-prime-minister-caretaker-government-2021-08-01/">State Administration Council (SAC)</a>, which has run the country since February in behalf of the army.</p>
<p>China has issued a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/6/world-reacts-to-aung-san-suu-kyis-four-year-jail-sentence">cautious message</a> of support and hopes for “the long-term interests of the country, narrow differences and carry on the hard-won democratic transition process”. Russia has yet to comment but has increasingly backed the SAC junta. </p>
<p>Yet responses to the trial and the coup are notable for their presence, with many international actors choosing to remain quiet or cautious in their official engagement with post-coup Myanmar. However, the international community must be cautious of such silences in the prosecution of the NLD leadership, as well as the thousands of protesters arrested since the coup earlier this year. Coup leaders use pre-existing political and legal structures to secure and legitimise their positions and this is exactly what the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi demonstrates. The legality of all trials is underwritten by the institutions that conduct them. </p>
<p>But post-coup governments tend to be <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/1/3/220/2579897?redirectedFrom=fulltext">highly vulnerable</a> and therefore are cautious of international responses to their actions. By remaining silent, the international community effectively risks giving tacit approval to the consolidation of a government that came to power by force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna B. Plunkett receives funding from the ESRC</span></em></p>Myanmar’s democracy figurehead faces up to 100 years in prison.Anna B. Plunkett, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726192021-12-01T01:55:02Z2021-12-01T01:55:02ZASEAN rebuffs Myanmar’s military junta as Aung San Suu Kyi faces long jail term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434845/original/file-20211130-19-cq3x4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Tuesday the judge in a show trial of Myanmar’s 76-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/29/world/myanmar-coup-verdict-aung-san-suu-kyi">delayed</a> the verdict in the first ruling on 11 charges that could result in cumulative sentences of 102 years in jail.</p>
<p>As this theatre played out in a courtroom in Myanmar’s capital, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consolidated a gradual, but tectonic, shift in its long-held policy of noninterference in member states’ internal affairs.</p>
<p>The Myanmar military arrested Suu Kyi and the president in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">coup</a> in February this year. It then prosecuted them under bogus criminal charges and replaced the elected government with a military junta.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">Myanmar's military reverts to its old strong-arm behaviour — and the country takes a major step backwards</a>
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<p>ASEAN’s history and constitutional documents suggested its response to the coup would likely be <a href="https://theconversation.com/muted-response-to-thai-coup-hints-at-other-nations-limited-options-27100">muted impartiality</a>. However, recent events have demonstrated significant changes are afoot.</p>
<p>For the first time in its 54-year existence, some ASEAN member states are vocally opposing a military coup within the bloc. The result is increasing international isolation for the Myanmar junta and its leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434854/original/file-20211130-15-1sfviox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Myanmar’s junta, led by Min Aung Hlaing, is increasingly isolated within its Southeast Asian bloc.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Diplomatic isolation for military rulers</h2>
<p>On Monday last week, the virtual ASEAN-China Special Summit, a major event to commemorate 30 years of ASEAN-China relations, began with Myanmar’s seat embarrassingly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/22/china-asean-summit-begins-without-a-myanmar-representative">empty</a>.</p>
<p>The governments of Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore joined Myanmar’s <a href="https://twitter.com/cvdom2021/status/1462725272449519617?s=20">civil disobedience movement</a> in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-asean-states-object-china-lobbies-myanmar-junta-join-summit-sources-2021-11-18/">successfully opposing</a> the junta’s attendance at the summit, despite diplomatic lobbying by China.</p>
<p>The following day, the Myanmar representative attending an ASEAN climate and disaster conference was a <a href="https://twitter.com/hkalen/status/1462408646696914950?s=20">minister</a> of the national unity government – <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-governments-claim-to-run-myanmar-so-who-gets-the-countrys-seat-at-the-un-167885">the government in exile</a>, not the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/asean-invites-minister-from-myanmars-shadow-civilian-govt-to-climate-conference.html">military junta</a>.</p>
<p>While this event did not have the prominence of the leaders’ summits, it was hugely significant. A national unity government minister was invited to a formal ASEAN conference for the first time. It was a sign of growing frustration with the military’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-15/envoy-aborts-visit-to-myanmar-straining-asean-relations/100542334">brutality and intransigence</a>.</p>
<p>This was the second time in a month that ASEAN had snubbed the military. The first was when Min Aung Hlaing was <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/asean-finds-its-voice-as-a-military-offensive-looms-in-myanmar/">disinvited</a> to a series of ASEAN-related summits in October, including one with US President Joe Biden. That <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tradition-vs-credibility-inside-se-asian-meet-that-snubbed-myanmar-2021-10-19/">decision</a> was similarly pushed by the more progressive quartet of ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines – and supported by the ASEAN chair, Brunei.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434855/original/file-20211130-24-zqhx7z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The ASEAN-China Special Summit began without a representative from Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">An Khoun SamAun/National Television of Cambodia/AP/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Clutching at straws</h2>
<p>The Myanmar military argued “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-chair-brunei-confirms-junta-leader-not-invited-summit-2021-10-16/">foreign intervention</a>” by the US and Europe caused the ASEAN rejection in October. It also claimed the decision to exclude junta representatives “was against the objectives of ASEAN, the ASEAN Charter and its principles”.</p>
<p>The junta was referring to principles of <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/November-2020-The-ASEAN-Charter-28th-Reprint.pdf">the charter</a>, which came into force in 2008, on “non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States” and “respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion”. </p>
<p>This principle of non-interference was also implicit in the <a href="https://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140117154159.pdf">Bangkok Declaration</a> that created ASEAN in 1967.</p>
<p>However, another principle in the ASEAN charter is “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government”. The military plainly breached all elements of this principle by removing a democratic government via a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-calling-coup-coup">coup</a>. This government had been elected in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-wins-big-in-myanmars-elections-but-will-it-bring-peace-or-restore-her-reputation-abroad-149619">landslide</a> only a few months earlier.</p>
<p>The junta’s claims of ASEAN breaching the charter therefore looked rather thin and hypocritical, having clearly violated it to begin with.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434856/original/file-20211130-27-704mp1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The military junta complains of breaches of ASEAN’s Charter, but it breached it violently in overthrowing a democratically elected government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maung Nyan/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>A changing idea of intervention</h2>
<p>The deepening humanitarian <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b170-deadly-stalemate-post-coup-myanmar">crisis</a> in Myanmar has pushed some ASEAN member states to question the relevance of its principle of “non-interference” in other states’ affairs. </p>
<p>In October, the Malaysian foreign minister raised the previously unthinkable topic by suggesting ASEAN needed to do some “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-should-rethink-non-interference-policy-amid-myanmar-crisis-malaysia-fm-2021-10-21/">soul searching</a>” on the non-interference policy. He argued it had contributed to ASEAN’s inability to make effective decisions quickly.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/two-governments-claim-to-run-myanmar-so-who-gets-the-countrys-seat-at-the-un-167885">Two governments claim to run Myanmar. So, who gets the country's seat at the UN?</a>
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<p>Decisions in ASEAN are made by consensus. In the past, this has stopped the organisation from taking difficult decisions. However, more progressive member states are now using the need for consensus to avoid the embarrassing optics of Min Aung Hlaing joining regional leaders in virtual meetings.</p>
<p>But this consensus decision-making will also make it difficult for ASEAN to formally recognise the national unity government, since member states such as Vietnam, Laos and Thailand have tended to back the military. </p>
<p>Myanmar’s seat at ASEAN leaders’ meetings is therefore likely to remain empty while some states oppose the junta’s participation. Having crossed the Rubicon by vocally rebuffing the military, domestic political pressures may well prevent the more progressive states from reversing their position. </p>
<p>Indeed, in the high-level Asia-Europe Meeting hosted by Cambodia last Thursday, Myanmar’s seat was empty once again. The meeting’s strongly worded <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/asem-myanmar-11262021150333.html">final statement</a> indicated impatience with the regime, calling for “the early release of all those arbitrarily detained” and a “return to the path of democratic transition”.</p>
<p>This ongoing diplomatic thrashing would likely be an unpleasant surprise for Myanmar’s military. Its leaders would have expected ASEAN’s acquiescence once they seized the levers of power.</p>
<p>The need to avoid providing a new lightning rod for unrest at home and internationally likely precipitated the postponement of the verdict in Suu Kyi’s trial. </p>
<p>The military may well have anticipated the burgeoning court cases would provide a straightforward path for the political silencing of Suu Kyi. It is now becoming increasingly clear the quashing of these charges will be the only bargaining chip the military has to return to ASEAN’s table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s chair was embarrassingly empty at a recent summit, a rebuff to the military junta that took control of the country in a coup earlier this year.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1678852021-09-24T01:53:35Z2021-09-24T01:53:35ZTwo governments claim to run Myanmar. So, who gets the country’s seat at the UN?<p>As world leaders have gathered for the UN General Assembly in New York this week, there has been uncertainty over who should be representing Myanmar. </p>
<p>Since a coup on February 1, Myanmar’s military has argued it is the legitimate government of the country and should have the power to appoint ambassadors to the UN and elsewhere. </p>
<p>However, a government in exile has also been formed — called the national unity government (or NUG for short) — which is comprised mainly of elected representatives of former leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s deposed government and ethnic minority groups. </p>
<p>It, too, says it’s the legitimate government of Myanmar and should be able to appoint the country’s ambassadors. Civil society groups in Myanmar have <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/burma/open-letter-in-support-of-ambassador-u-kyaw-moe-tun-as-myanmar-s">sent a letter</a> to the General Assembly urging it to retain current UN ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, who opposed the coup and is a vocal critic of the junta.</p>
<p>So, why does it matter who represents Myanmar on the global stage and who currently has the upper hand?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar's ambassador to the United Nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations, shows a three-finger salute shared by opponents of the country’s military coup.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span>
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<h2>What is the national unity government?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/">NUG</a> was formed in April in response to the coup and the junta’s brutal suppression of peaceful protesters, which has now led to over <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1440325025043607559?s=20">1,100 deaths</a>, some 6,600 arrests and hundreds more being forced into hiding or exile.</p>
<p>The NUG’s two main <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/crph-announces-lineup-of-interim-national-unity-government">leaders</a> are Suu Kyi and ousted President Win Myint, but they have both been under arrest since the coup so their roles are largely symbolic. </p>
<p>The rest of the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/whos-myanmars-national-unity-government.html">leadership</a> comprises acting Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann, an ethnic Karen and Christian politician, and President Duwa Lashi La, an ethnic Kachin politician.</p>
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<img alt="Duwa Lashi La of the national unity government" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of the national unity government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Unity Government (NUG) via Facebook/AP</span></span>
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<p>Many NUG ministers were part of the former government led by Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party, but there has clearly been an effort to offer a more inclusive vision of the country’s leadership.</p>
<p>In addition to the NLD, the ministry draws on elected members of parliament from a wide range of political parties and a broad mix of ethnic minorities. Significantly, a <a href="https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/update-on-the-vaccination-drive?e=aa4da994bf">Rohingya activist</a> was appointed an advisor in the Ministry of Human Rights.</p>
<p>Most countries have been reticent to <a href="https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210822/p2g/00m/0na/006000c">recognise</a> the military as the legitimate government of Myanmar, but it has been difficult for the NUG to receive formal recognition, too.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
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<h2>The quest for international recognition</h2>
<p>In addition to forming a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic ministry, the NUG also <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/treating-the-rohingya-like-they-belong-in-myanmar/">reversed</a> a controversial policy on citizenship that excluded the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">long-oppressed Rohingya</a>. </p>
<p>And in a canny strategic manoeuvre, the NUG <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/17/myanmars-exile-government-signs-up-to-icc-prosecutions/">announced</a> it would for the first time accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with respect to all international crimes committed in Myanmar since 2002.</p>
<p>Both the ICC and the International Court of Justice have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/15/icc-approves-probe-into-myanmars-alleged-crimes-against-rohingya">cases underway</a> related to alleged abuses against the Rohingya. </p>
<p>These moves may well be genuine reassessments of the former government’s much-criticised failure to support the Rohingya. Suu Kyi <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-12/myanmars-leader-says-the-world-has-it-wrong-on-the-rohingya/11791338">previously defended</a> the military for driving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from their homes into Bangladesh, denying it was a genocide. </p>
<p>But the NUG’s moves may also be engineered to gain international support. In particular, there was pressure from the <a href="https://twitter.com/tedlieu/status/1390090205986578434?s=20">US Congress</a> to address the Rohingya issue prior to the US providing diplomatic and material support to the government in exile.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic fight shifts to the UN</h2>
<p>The key prize in this battle for recognition is Myanmar’s seat at the UN. The seat is important, as it reflects the will of the international community regarding the legitimate Myanmar government.</p>
<p>The NUG has been assisted by the general assembly’s rules, which dictate the incumbent ambassador keeps the seat if there is a credentialing dispute. </p>
<p>The UN was expected to make a formal decision on recognition in the lead-up to the current general assembly session. However, in a back-room <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/13/myanmar-united-nations-china-biden-general-assembly/">compromise</a> between the US and China (and informally endorsed by the European Union, the ASEAN bloc and Russia), it was agreed the military’s representatives would not be allowed to attend the meeting.</p>
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<p>That means the current ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, was able to <a href="https://twitter.com/DrSasa22222/status/1438433948607004673?s=20">participate</a> in the opening of the general assembly session, although the agreement required him to refrain from using any tough rhetoric against the military. Nevertheless, this was a big win for the NUG.</p>
<p>The nine-member credentialing panel, which includes the US, China and Russia, will now decide in November who formally takes Myanmar’s UN seat. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1437807519137730561"}"></div></p>
<h2>Is civil war inevitable?</h2>
<p>While the NUG is angling for international recognition, it has simultaneously announced a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/myanmar-military-war/2021/09/07/46c14ca2-0f93-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html">people’s defensive war</a>” against the junta, abandoning the nonviolent tactics adopted by Suu Kyi during her years of house arrest. </p>
<p>This overt call for violence has caused unease in some quarters, although criticism from the US and UK embassies in Myanmar is <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/what-has-happened-to-myanmars-tatmadaw.html">relatively muted</a>.</p>
<p>While it is understandable the people of Myanmar are desperate for a solution, it is far from certain that encouraging relatively untrained and poorly equipped civilians to attack the military will produce the desired result. </p>
<p>There is some evidence of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/15/our-only-option-myanmar-civilians-take-up-arms-for-democracy">collaboration</a> between the highly trained ethnic armed groups and more recent recruits from the cities, but given the Myanmar military’s <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2021/08/the-necrometrics-of-myanmars-spreading-war/">long history</a> of absorbing significant casualties without caving in, it does not bode well for a settlement.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, people may feel war is their only option. Indeed, in the short term, the chances of a peaceful resolution to the long-running conflict between Myanmar’s military and its people may have disappeared the moment Suu Kyi and Win Myint were arrested in the early hours of February 1.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-know-how-to-cut-off-the-financial-valve-to-myanmars-military-the-world-just-needs-the-resolve-to-act-158220">We know how to cut off the financial valve to Myanmar's military. The world just needs the resolve to act</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167885/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s government in exile is courting the international community to try to gain recognition over the military junta. The UN seat could be a key prize in that fight.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1665162021-08-26T18:14:01Z2021-08-26T18:14:01ZFate of detained Australian economist Sean Turnell may be tied to Aung Sung Suu Kyi<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417329/original/file-20210823-27-1xmsx1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C208%2C4096%2C1980&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/australian-economic-adviser-held-myanmar-faces-two-charges.html">The Irrawaddy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sean Turnell, an Australian who became a trusted economic adviser to Aung San Suu Kyi, has been in a Myanmar prison for more than six months.</p>
<p>The economics professor was arrested on February 5, four days after the military coup that put a stop to the nation’s slow path towards full democracy and unravelling the economic corruption entrenched by decades of junta rule.</p>
<p>I spoke to him between the coup and the arrest. He was remarkably calm and dedicated to the welfare of the Burmese people despite the situation. </p>
<p>He awaits trial <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/australian-economic-adviser-held-myanmar-faces-two-charges.html">on charges</a> he violated the country’s immigration and official secrets acts by trying to leave the country after the coup with sensitive financial information. </p>
<p>Those familiar with the situation are optimistic he will be released after the trial of Suu Kyi, who is also facing charges widely considered to be trumped up. The judge overseeing that trial has said it should be complete <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/daw-aung-san-suu-kyis-trial-to-be-completed-within-six-months.html">by the end of year</a>. </p>
<h2>An economics star</h2>
<p>I have known Turnell as a family friend and colleague for many years. But it was not until I travelled to Yangon in 2017 that I really saw him in his element.</p>
<p>I had spent the week interviewing prominent Australians in Myanmar for my podcast <a href="http://www.theairporteconomist.com/">The Airport Economist</a>. They included Australia’s then ambassador Nicholas Coppel, Austcham Myanmar chief executive Jodi Weedon, lawyer Chris Hughes (founder of the independent law firm SCM Legal) and Alison Carter (founder of <a href="https://threegoodspoons.com/">Three Good Spoons</a>, which teaches Burmese women cooking and other skills to improve their employment opportunities.</p>
<p>But among all these distinguished speakers, the highlight was definitely Turnell’s presentation at a conference organised by <a href="https://aummi.edu.au/conference-2017/">the Australian Myanmar Institute</a> (the brain child of Christopher Lamb, a former ambassador to Myanmar).</p>
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<img alt="Sean Turnell and Tim Harcourt at the Australian Myanmar Institute's conference in Yangon in 2017." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417323/original/file-20210823-15-wzg9mw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Sean Turnell and Tim Harcourt at the Australian Myanmar Institute’s conference in Yangon in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tim Harcourt</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Turnell explained the Myanmar economy comprehensively, from macroeconomic conditions to microeconomic reform. He drilled down in great detail into fiscal and monetary policy, industrial development and infrastructure needs, financial markets, trade and tourism and, most importantly, education and human capital. </p>
<p>After the conference was formally closed, students milled around Sean like he was a celebrity — a rock-star economist.</p>
<h2>Life before Myanmar</h2>
<p>Turnell grew up in the working-class suburb of Macquarie Fields in south-western Sydney. Showing brilliance from an early age, he gained his bachelor’s degree in economics at Macquarie University in north-western Sydney. Then a PhD. He ended up an associate professor at the university.</p>
<p>“Macquarie is everywhere in both our lives and careers,” his sister Lisa Brandt told me. She also studied economics at Macquarie University and is now a senior manager at the Macquarie Group. </p>
<p>After his undergraduate degree, Turnell worked for the Reserve Bank of Australia. There he was a popular and hard-working member of the central bank’s economics department. </p>
<p>Colleague Sean Aylmer, who went on to become a finance journalist, rising to editorial director at Fairfax Media, remembers Turnell for being both a good applied economist and an extrovert. “Which is most welcome at a place like the RBA,” he told me during a conversation for my podcast. </p>
<p>Professor David Throsby, former chair of the Macquarie University’s economics department, told me he believed Turnell could have been anything at the RBA. “But he was culturally more suited to academia and more at home in a university environment.” </p>
<p>Turnell joined the Macquarie University’s economics department in 1991. He excelled in academia. He wrote a PhD with a brilliant dissertation on John Maynard Keynes. He was also a “Hamiltonian” well before the musical. His deep interest in the life and times of Alexander Hamilton, the first US Secretary of the Treasury, drew him to Washington DC to spend many hours in the national archives and museums looking into the details of his hero.</p>
<h2>Working for Aung San Suu Kyi</h2>
<p>But it was Myanmar that became the centre of Turnell’s professional life, with his research increasingly focused on that country’s political economy and economic history.</p>
<p>He met Aung Sung Suu Kyi in the 1990s, and their professional relationship firmed from there. In 2001 he established the Burma Economic Watch, a blog providing reliable economic data and commentary to make up for the paucity of information available under the military junta. </p>
<p>When democracy was partially restored in 2011, Turnell got to work as a technical economist, covering all aspects of the Myanmar economy. His commitment to this work was shown in his presentation to the Australian Myanmar Institute conference. Though he continued to live in Sydney, he visited Myanmar regularly.</p>
<p>Then came the military coup on February 1. His arrest on February 5 made him the first foreign national <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/myanmar-coup-australian-adviser-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-323801">arrested by the junta</a> as part of the coup. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aung-san-suu-kyi-trial-how-myanmars-judicial-system-is-stacked-against-the-deposed-leader-162901">Aung San Suu Kyi trial: how Myanmar's judicial system is stacked against the deposed leader</a>
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<p>There is no reason for his detention. He has done nothing wrong and has only devoted his time and energy to improving the welfare of the Burmese people. </p>
<p>The Australian government has called for his immediate release. So has the US Congress and others.</p>
<p>Awaiting his return to Australia is his family and wife Ha Vu, also an <a href="https://researchers.mq.edu.au/en/persons/ha-vu">economist at Macquarie University</a> and dedicated to development economics. </p>
<p>Even with Myanmar back under the control of a corrupt and incompetent junta, Sean’s knowledge of the Myanmar economy can still be put to good use, helping to improve the lives of the Burmese people and the rest of South East Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Harcourt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Arrested on February 5, Sean Turnell awaits trial in Myanmar on charges he tried to leave the country with sensitive financial information.Tim Harcourt, Industry Professor and Chief Economist, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1651742021-07-29T20:00:09Z2021-07-29T20:00:09ZHow a perfect storm of events is turning Myanmar into a ‘super-spreader’ COVID state<p>Myanmar is facing a catastrophic health crisis that could have ramifications not just for the country’s long-suffering people, but across the region as well.</p>
<p>The country is experiencing a major spike in COVID cases — what one Doctors Without Borders official referred to as “<a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-07-27/myanmar-covid-crisis">uncontrolled community spread</a>” — fuelled by the military junta’s gross mismanagement of the crisis and a collapsing health sector. </p>
<p>The military regime’s official COVID <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data">statistics</a> are running at around 6,000 cases and 300 deaths per day, but no one believes these are accurate. This is, after all, the junta that staged a military coup in February and then tried to argue it was <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-calling-coup-coup">constitutionally</a> valid.</p>
<p>With only 2.8% of Myanmar’s 54 million people <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57744824">fully vaccinated</a>, there are now concerns the country could become a “COVID superspreader state”. And this could lead to the emergence of new variants, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/28/myanmar-could-become-covid-super-spreader-state-says-un-expert">says the UN’s special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar</a>.</p>
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<p>This is very, very dangerous for all kinds of reasons […] This is a region that is susceptible to even greater suffering as a result of Myanmar becoming a super-spreader state.</p>
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<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1419376339916840970"}"></div></p>
<h2>Doctors being imprisoned</h2>
<p>The UN says a “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27307&LangID=E">perfect storm</a>” of factors is fuelling the deepening health crisis. </p>
<p>Medical staff have been on strike as part of the civil disobedience movement against the coup. Oxygen and other medical equipment are increasingly <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/as-covid-19-surges-prices-of-medical-goods-follow-suit/">expensive</a> and in short supply. Even getting an oxygen concentrator into Myanmar is not straightforward, though Singapore said this week it will rush <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-oxygen-concentrators-myanmar-covid-19-mfa-red-cross-15318092">200 machines into the country</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-coup-how-myanmars-military-used-the-pandemic-to-justify-and-enable-its-power-grab-155350">COVID coup: how Myanmar’s military used the pandemic to justify and enable its power grab</a>
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<p>Most troublingly, at least <a href="https://phr.org/our-work/resources/violence-against-health-care-in-myanmar/">157 medics</a>, including the former head of Myanmar’s COVID-19 vaccination program, have been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-24/myanmar-doctors-arrested-by-military-as-covid-surges/100315904">arrested</a> and charged with high treason. In Yangon, military personnel <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-lures-arrests-community-doctors-by-posing-as-covid-19-patients">have pretended</a> to be COVID patients in need of emergency treatment, then arrested the doctors who came to help.</p>
<p>Reliable figures on the infection rate are impossible to obtain, but civil society groups that assist with cremations and funeral services in Yangon say they are seeing up to <a href="https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/protest-in-insein-prison?e=aa4da994bf">1,000</a> uncounted COVID deaths a day in that city alone. The national total may be several thousand per day. </p>
<p>One reason it’s impossible to get an accurate count of COVID cases is the extremely low rate of testing. There are only around <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data">15,000</a> COVID tests being conducted per day in a country of 54 million people. The tests are, however, returning a <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-testing">positive rate of around 37%</a>, or 370 positives for every 1,000 tests. </p>
<p>It’s also believed <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/prison-07162021211045.html">nearly 50 prisoners</a> at the crowded, notorious Insein Prison are now infected with COVID but are being denied treatment by the military. </p>
<p>These prisoners include top leaders from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, doctors connected with the civil disobedience movement, and foreigners like <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/australian-academic-held-at-colonial-era-insein-prison-released-student-says-20210424-p57m29.html">Australian academic Sean Turnell</a>, an adviser to Suu Kyi who was arrested by the junta after the coup and is being held on bogus charges.</p>
<p>Another adviser and lawyer to Suu Kyi, Nyan Win, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/world/myanmar-nyan-win-covid.html">died</a> last week after being infected with COVID at Insein.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413688/original/file-20210729-27-1aa21xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protesters marching against the junta in the capital, Yangon, in mid-July.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
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<h2>Myanmar’s poor are disproportionatly suffering</h2>
<p>Such a catastrophic health situation is exacerbating Myanmar’s inequalities. Poorer people are less able to socially distance and less likely to get tested and receive meaningful treatment. They suffer invisibly, often in silence.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/07/23/myanmar-economy-expected-to-contract-by-18-percent-in-fy2021-report">report</a> published this week, the World Bank estimated Myanmar’s economy would contract by 18% this year due to the effects of the pandemic and the coup. The share of people living in poverty is also likely to more than double by the beginning of 2022, compared to 2019.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-know-how-to-cut-off-the-financial-valve-to-myanmars-military-the-world-just-needs-the-resolve-to-act-158220">We know how to cut off the financial valve to Myanmar's military. The world just needs the resolve to act</a>
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<p>The ethnic minority regions of the country may well be disproportionately suffering, too. Since the coup, conflicts have intensified across the country between the military and the ethnic armed organisations and pro-democracy advocates that have joined them, causing immense social dislocation. </p>
<p>The UN refugee agency estimates <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/87726">200,000</a> people were internally displaced from February to June, bringing the total of displaced people in the country to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/18/unhcr-urges-action-as-refugees-hit-record-high-of-82-4-million">680,000</a>. These marginalised groups are even less likely to have access to medical treatment.</p>
<p>These figures are also not taking into account the refugees outside the country, such as the million <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">Rohingya</a> languishing in the cramped refugee camps in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government has said it will <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/16/bangladesh-vaccine-rohingya-refugees-covid">begin vaccinating the Rohingya</a> next month. </p>
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<h2>International aid desperately needed</h2>
<p>When Cyclone Nargis killed <a href="https://theconversation.com/10-years-after-cyclone-nargis-still-holds-lessons-for-myanmar-95039">140,000</a> people in Myanmar in 2008, the country’s previous military regime received wide-ranging offers of assistance from ASEAN, the regional bloc, and the wider international community. </p>
<p>But since the coup, <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-coup-might-discourage-international-aid-but-donors-should-adapt-not-leave-154742">Western aid</a> to Myanmar has been redirected through non-government groups, causing hold-ups. The UN says the junta <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27307&LangID=E">has also yet to account</a> for US$350 million in COVID aid the International Monetary Fund sent to Myanmar just days before the coup in February.</p>
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<p>The country <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3142137/myanmar-battles-covid-19-surge-calls-urgent-aid-not-co-opted">hasn’t received vaccine doses since May</a>, though China pledged to send 6 million doses by August, with the first batch arriving <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/batch-of-736-000-chinese-covid-19-vaccines-arrives-in-myanmar-15271828">last week</a>. China may end up being the most proactive donor, since it is worried about a COVID <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/20/china-reports-spike-in-new-covid-cases-on-border-with">outbreak</a> along its shared border with Myanmar. </p>
<p>Optimists say this may be a time for reconciliation and for everyone in Myanmar to unite against the common enemy of COVID. Yet it is hard to imagine that happening right now, when the military’s own mishandling of the pandemic has generated so much outrage from the population. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
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<p>What can be done? Perhaps Australia, which we are told is “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/premier-s-plea-consider-astrazeneca-if-you-are-under-40-20210722-p58c3f.html">awash</a>” in AstraZeneca vaccines, could make rapid moves to send desperately needed supplies to Myanmar via its non-government partners. It would be a bold and impressive diplomatic move.</p>
<p>There is then the need for the international community to confront the Myanmar generals for their appalling mishandling of the country since the coup. By seizing control from elected leaders, they have impoverished their own people, sparked new conflicts and exacerbated the damage done by a global pandemic. </p>
<p>The heartbreaking reality is the people of Myanmar have been left without the prospect of significant relief at the worst possible time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>COVID is running rampant in Myanmar, where the military junta has been accused of arresting doctors and weaponising the pandemic. The result could be catastrophic for the entire region.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaNicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624282021-06-23T20:04:22Z2021-06-23T20:04:22ZWith Aung San Suu Kyi facing prison, Myanmar’s opposition is leaderless, desperate and ready to fight<p>As Aung San Suu Kyi finally <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-15/aung-san-suu-kyi-trial-court-myanmar-unwell/100215214">faced court</a> last week to defend herself against a litany of politically motivated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cases-against-deposed-myanmar-leader-aung-san-suu-kyi-2021-06-10/">charges</a>, Myanmar is continuing its downward spiral into <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-brink-state-failure">state failure</a>.</p>
<p>Suu Kyi was arrested following the February 1 coup by the military and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57424594">charged</a> with alleged corruption, inciting public unrest and other offences. If she is found guilty, which is a near certainty, she may well be imprisoned for the rest of her life.</p>
<p>The popularity of Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party have been consistently <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmars-emerging-landscape-looks-beyond-suu-kyi.html">underestimated</a> by a range of domestic and international analysts, and even by the Myanmar military itself. But her role will now change as her case takes a stop-start journey through the tightly held and persistently manipulated judicial process. </p>
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<p>With Suu Kyi facing another lengthy detention, Myanmar’s diverse democracy movement is now operating independently of the NLD and its ageing leadership. Nearly five months after the coup, opposition to the junta is growing, but it is effectively leaderless and has been de-linked from Suu Kyi’s fate.</p>
<p>Most troubling, the evolving <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2021-06-11/myanmars-coming-revolution">crises</a> facing the long-suffering people of Myanmar are not just framed by political repression and violence. They include the heavy burdens of poverty, food shortages and unemployment, along with the collapse of the healthcare and education systems. </p>
<p>The coup-makers have put their own narrow interests — eliminating the NLD and retaining absolute power — in front of everything else. Even the COVID-19 pandemic receives almost no attention under the current conditions. </p>
<p>It is no wonder millions of Myanmar people are so angry and fed up — and why some are looking for more violent solutions. There is now potential for the country’s smouldering civil wars in its mountainous borderlands to spread into its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/01/rise-of-armed-civilian-groups-in-myanmar-fuels-fears-of-civil-war">major cities</a>.</p>
<h2>Increasing violence on both sides</h2>
<p>The ongoing reign of terror by the military junta includes the recent burning of more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/17/myanmar-village-destroyed-clashes-military-anti-junta">200 homes</a> in a village in central Myanmar and the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/tortured-to-death-in-myanmar-regime-custody.html">tortures and deaths</a> of at least 21 detainees. </p>
<p>Altogether since the start of the coup, some 900 people have been <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/world/myanmar-un-special-envoy-decries-violence-says-900-civilians-already-killed-11624059887693.html">killed</a> during protests or other activities and almost 5,000 others are <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1405493461365653505">currently detained</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407831/original/file-20210623-27-1aecsc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Smouldering houses in Kinma village after military troops burned it the night before.</span>
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<p>In response, there is a growing <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/06/20/myanmar-sinks-deeper-into-civil-war-as-anti-army-groups-multiply">militancy</a> among some civilians, with the establishment of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/01/rise-of-armed-civilian-groups-in-myanmar-fuels-fears-of-civil-war">people’s defence forces</a> across Myanmar.</p>
<p>In addition, ethnic armed groups in Myanmar’s periphery, some of which have been at war with the military since the 1940s, have joined forces with the protest movement. For the first time since the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2013/08/08/209919791/as-myanmar-opens-up-a-look-back-on-a-1988-uprising">1988 uprising</a> against the military, civilians from the Bamar (Burman) ethnic majority are now being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/15/our-only-option-myanmar-civilians-take-up-arms-for-democracy">trained by these groups</a> or have enlisted with them.</p>
<p>Attacks on government forces include <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/myanmar-hit-more-300-bombing-attacks-february-1-coup">bombings</a>, targeted <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/ward-administrator-in-hlaing-tharyar-shot-dead">assassinations</a> of village administrators and those seen to support the junta, and the killing of 25 alleged “<a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/only-myanmar-regime-undercover-soldiers-murdered-not-civilians-kndo.html">undercover soldiers</a>” by an ethnic armed group in Kayin (Karen) State. </p>
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<p>The United Nations has expressed <a href="https://twitter.com/UNinMyanmar/status/1405506354115141638">alarm</a> at the “recent acts of violence that illustrate a sharp deterioration of the human rights environment across Myanmar”.</p>
<p>Some seasoned analysts have <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-terrorism-and-demands-international-politics">argued</a> the increasing militancy of the military’s opponents may cause problems for the protest movement, with the junta better able to paint them as terrorists and the international community becoming uncomfortable supporting a violent “terrorist” movement. </p>
<p>A pragmatic response is for the political wings of the opposition, including the exiled <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/19/recognising-myanmars-national-unity-government/">national unity government</a>, formed by the NLD and ethnic minority representatives, to ensure there is adequate distance between themselves and any violent operations. </p>
<p>This is a standard model in Myanmar’s long decades of conflict, as seen with the separation of the civilian and military wings of various ethnic minority organisations such as the Karen National Union and Karen National Liberation Army. </p>
<p>The model obviously presents risks, however, as civilian leaders can expect to be held to account for the activities of their militant peers.</p>
<h2>Some faint hopes of reconciliation</h2>
<p>In the hope of rehabilitating the patchy reputation of Myanmar’s democrats as a force for human rights, the national unity government announced a seismic shift in official policy toward the Muslim Rohingya community in early June.</p>
<p>The government pledged to implement a new citizenship act that bases “citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens”. This should effectively offer Rohingya and some other ethnic minorities full citizenship for the first time.</p>
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<p>This statement is part of a broader shift in public sentiment regarding the Rohingya across most of Myanmar. Until recently, they have been largely friendless in the country, enduring decades of discrimination and repression. This included the brutal <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">clearance operations</a> in 2017 that led to 740,000 refugees fleeing into Bangladesh in a matter of months.</p>
<p>The coup has resulted in a reassessment of the treatment of the Rohingya. A recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/14/myanmars-pro-rohingya-social-media-campaign-shows-mass-support">social media campaign</a>, for instance, featured people wearing black and adopting the three-fingered salute of the opposition under the “Black4Rohingya” hashtag. </p>
<h2>International response must be stronger</h2>
<p>These positive developments come at a time when the international community appears increasingly powerless to effect positive change in Myanmar.</p>
<p>Calls to ban arms exports and economic engagement with the military are growing much louder. But direct material support for the Myanmar’s democrats will be just as important, as will the creation of a viable model of regional diplomacy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-goes-on-trial-asean-indecision-enabling-military-rampage/">Association of Southeast Asian Nations</a> (ASEAN) has again proved too slow and inept when faced with a serious test of its mandate.</p>
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<p>An important UN General Assembly <a href="https://twitter.com/UN_News_Centre/status/1406054125716992002">resolution</a> on June 18 calling on “<a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/75/L.85/Rev.1">all member states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar</a>”, meanwhile, passed with an overwhelming majority. However, several ASEAN members, along with Russia and China (<a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-embraces-Russian-arms-to-offset-China-s-influence">Myanmar’s major arms suppliers</a>), abstained. </p>
<p>The courage and creativity of the protesters and the civil disobedience movement have already won them much credit with Myanmar’s desperate population. But in the months ahead, this alone will not be enough to succeed.</p>
<p>A genuinely pan-ethnic, society-wide coalition is needed, along with well-timed and properly targeted support internationally, to have any chance of ending military dominance in Myanmar once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for Myanmar-focussed work. He is on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council, which is an Australian government body. These are his personal views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With hundreds now killed since the coup and civilians increasingly taking up arms against the junta, there are fears the country could be headed toward civil war.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaNicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1629012021-06-17T12:55:28Z2021-06-17T12:55:28ZAung San Suu Kyi trial: how Myanmar’s judicial system is stacked against the deposed leader<p>Concern for the future of Myanmar’s deposed leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, is mounting after her appearance in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/10/aung-san-suu-kyi-faces-fresh-corruption-charges-in-myanmar-as-trial-nears">purpose-built</a> courtroom in the country’s capital Naypyidaw at the start of what is expected to be a seven-week trial. Since the coup on <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-coup-how-myanmars-military-used-the-pandemic-to-justify-and-enable-its-power-grab-155350">February 1</a>, little has been seen of Aung San Suu Kyi, and her future appears uncertain after the initial court proceedings. </p>
<p>Initially charged with the illegal possession of walkie-talkies, charges against the pro-democracy leader have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57449884">escalated dramatically</a>. She now stands accused of various counts of corruption that, if she is found guilty, could result in what is effectively a life sentence.</p>
<p>On February 1, at what should have been the opening of the new parliament, the military detained Aung San Suu Kyi alongside the leaders of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The coup sparked outrage across the world – but curiously, the military claims the putsch was legal. Sections of the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/melissa-crouch-on-myanmars-coup-and-the-rule-of-law/">2008 constitution allow the military</a> to declare a state of emergency if there is an insurgency or an attempt at taking over power unlawfully and by force. </p>
<p>If the coup can be legal, questions must be raised over the fairness of Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial.</p>
<h2>An independent judiciary?</h2>
<p>Since 2008, Myanmar has been struggling through a transition to democracy after more than <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-coup-how-the-military-has-held-onto-power-for-60-years-154526">60 years of military rule</a>. Landslide victories for the NLD <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-asia-34806439">in 2015</a>, and again <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-54899170">in 2020</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-election-reflected-peoples-will-monitoring-group-says-2021-05-17/">were both assessed as free and fair</a>. But the transition has been far from linear and one of the core causes for concern has remained the issue of rule of law, which should be providing checks and balances and enshrine citizen rights at the centre of the government.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-coup-how-the-military-has-held-onto-power-for-60-years-154526">Myanmar coup: how the military has held onto power for 60 years</a>
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<p>But the 2008 constitution in Myanmar has instead enshrined and <a href="https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/the-constitution-of-myanmar-9781509927371/">protected the military</a>, which remains in control of key departments and has a quota of reserved seats in all houses of parliament. As already noted, it also provides for the army to assume power legally in a sufficiently severe crisis. Crucially, the constitution leaves it for the military to be the judge of what constitutes a crisis.</p>
<p>The judiciary is nominally independent, but almost all of the lawyers, judges and court officials were trained under the military – and many have a military background. Corruption has remained a consistent feature at all levels of the court system. My PhD research shows that few citizens are able to access court services or progress court proceedings until the relevant bribes are paid. Meanwhile, courts <a href="https://aappb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/nee-urgent-reform-eng.pdf">are overwhelmed</a> with the number of cases, prisoners and proceedings brought by the military. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663918807739">Research suggests</a> the law is seen as an undesirable profession in Myanmar and those that do pursue it are rarely able to effectively support their clients through the court for various reasons, including a lack of funding and arbitrary practices such as prisoner transfers and random changes of trial dates. The judiciary remains highly reliant on the military, which will often <a href="https://www.icj.org/cijlcountryprofiles/myanmar-introduction/judges/independence-and-impartiality-judicial-integrity-and-accountability/">outline the outcome of cases</a> for the judges before the case is heard. It was nominally provided with independence in the 2008 constitution, but in practice, it is anything but. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38788669">murder Ko Ni</a> is widely seen as an indication of what can happen to lawyers who defy the will of the military.</p>
<h2>The trial of Aung San Suu Kyi</h2>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi faces seven separate indictments, ranging from the initial charge of illegally importing walkie-talkies to the much more serious charges of breaking <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/14/myanmars-detained-aung-san-suu-kyi-to-face-naypyidaw-court">the Official Secrets Act</a> and committing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/10/myanmar-targets-aung-san-suu-kyi-with-new-corruption-charges">corruption using her rank</a> for allegedly accepting over US$600,000 (£430,000) and 11kg of gold in bribes, based on allegations by the detained former chief minister of Yangon. </p>
<p>It is these more recent charges that pose the greatest concerns, as they hold sentences of up to 14 and 15 years, respectively. The former leader turns 76 on June 19, so if found guilty on these counts she will be effectively sentenced to life in prison. Her lawyers claim such charges to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/11/un-decries-myanmar-catastrophe-as-aung-san-suu-kyi-trial-looms">bogus and politically motivated</a> and are aimed at keeping her out of politics and the public eye. </p>
<p>The pre-court proceedings – as well as the first week of the trial – suggest she is very unlikely to have a fair trial. Though she does have a legal team, she has only met with them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/14/trial-of-aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmar">three times</a> since she was arrested. Public and media access <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/14/trial-of-myanmars-suu-kyi-gets">has been restricted</a> and the only attendees permitted are court officials, judges, prosecution and Aung San Suu Kyi and her defence team. The police and security presence has been increased around Naypyidaw.</p>
<p>What is really concerning is the way charges against Aung San Suu Kyi have mounted over the past few weeks. It feels reminiscent of her period of incarceration between 1989 and 2012, when she was held in almost continual house arrest after her party won elections in 1990. Each time she was released, there would be a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/13/burma-chronology-aung-san-suu-kyis-detention">new reason to return her to detention</a> in her Yangon home. </p>
<p>This suggests two things. First, that the regime has form for using the constitution to “legally” silence opposition. And, second, that while there may be nominal rule of law under Myanmar’s 2008 constitution, it exists as a tool for – rather than a limit on – the military.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162901/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Plunkett receives funding from the ESRC. </span></em></p>Myanmar’s constitution provides for an independent legal system. In practice it is anything but.Anna B. Plunkett, PhD Candidate, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1595072021-05-12T12:46:42Z2021-05-12T12:46:42ZMyanmar’s anti-coup protesters defy rigid gender roles – and subvert stereotypes about women to their advantage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399051/original/file-20210505-15-19rn8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C44%2C4958%2C3256&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young women are on the front lines of the anti-coup protesters in Myanmar, defying traditional gender roles. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-make-the-three-finger-salute-during-a-news-photo/1232553837?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the first signs of the military coup that overthrew Myanmar’s democratically elected civilian government was a Facebook Live <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DxNQM1SU4QI">video</a> of regional lawmaker <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-politics-int/myanmar-military-seizes-power-detains-elected-leader-aung-san-suu-kyi-idUSKBN2A11W6">Pa Pa Han</a> being arrested, which was posted by her husband. </p>
<p>Soldiers stormed Pa Pa Han’s home around 3 a.m. on Feb. 1, 2021. While her young daughter wailed and her husband pleaded to see an arrest warrant, Pa Pa Han stalwartly grabbed her handbag and a coat and left with the soldiers. </p>
<p>Other parliamentarians were simultaneously being roused from bed and arrested across Myanmar by soldiers who claimed election fraud had occurred in the November elections. By daybreak, Myanmar was under military rule.</p>
<p>Ever since, thousands of people in Myanmar – most of them young, many of them women – have been protesting the coup daily and demanding the restoration of democracy. <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/at-least-710-killed-in-myanmar-since-coup-rights-group/2207349">More than 770 civilians</a> had been killed and over 3,738 detained as of May 6, according to the nonprofit <a href="https://aappb.org/">Assistance Association for Political Prisoners</a>. </p>
<p>Myanmar, formerly called Burma, is a conservative country with rigid gender roles. A <a href="http://www.asianbarometer.org/pdf/MyanmarReport2016.pdf">2015 survey</a> rated it Southeast Asia’s most traditional society when it comes to family structure, deference to elders, respect for authority figures and conflict avoidance.</p>
<p>Yet Myanmar’s Generation Z activists, born between 1997 to 2012, are defying many of these social norms with their protests – and busting gender stereotypes while they’re at it.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers in fatigues stand behind barriers near big military vehicles" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399054/original/file-20210505-17-k2ad6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers are seen near makeshift barricades set up by those protesting the military coup in Yangon, Myanmar, on March 14, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soldiers-are-seen-near-makeshift-barricades-set-up-by-news-photo/1231708804?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A very traditional society</h2>
<p>One act of creative resistance on March 8 involved hanging women’s sarongs on clotheslines above streets across Yangon. The young protesters suspected that many soldiers would avoid going underneath the clotheslines for fear that doing so would diminish their “<a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/03/05/asia-pacific/longyi-power-myanmar/">hpon</a>” – a kind of mojo that belongs to only men. </p>
<p>They guessed right: <a href="https://twitter.com/thaungsunyein/status/1367695777632428033">Soldiers sent to arrest the protesters</a> climbed atop their army trucks to clear the clotheslines before passing underneath, giving protesters extra time to avoid arrest. </p>
<p>Such beliefs around “hpon” reflect a pervasive concept in Myanmar that men are superior to women and born with special spiritual protection. In a 2015 Asia Barometer survey, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-020-00266-z">60% of Myanmar respondents</a> agreed that if they could have only one child, a boy would be “preferable,” compared with 46% in the Philippines and 30% in Cambodia.</p>
<p>Having grown up in Myanmar, I was raised to believe in these same gender roles and sexist superstitions. After being exposed to a U.S. liberal arts education, I came to question the gender inequality buried in traditions and Burmese culture. Now, as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=p5J2qdkAAAAJ">psychologist</a> who teaches about sex and gender, among other topics, I am tracking how Myanmar’s young protesters are rejecting sexism and subverting gender norms to their advantage.</p>
<p>After the sarong tactic, some of those activists questioned whether using sarongs to deter the soldiers might itself have been sexist because it played into old misogynistic superstitions. Shortly after the March 8 protest, activist Thinzar Shunlei Yi wrote on Twitter that women’s clothing should be flown proudly as “<a href="https://twitter.com/thinzashunleiyi/status/1368768788288712705">our flag, our victory</a>” – not used as a weapon. </p>
<h2>Gender violence in Myanmar</h2>
<p>Spousal rape and domestic violence is <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-debates-womens-rights-amid-evidence-of-pervasive-sexual-and-domestic-violence-104536">still legal and pervasive in Myanmar</a>, and when it occurs people often blame the victims rather than the perpetrators.</p>
<p>On April 20, a 17-year-old coup protester named Shwe Yamin Htet, who had just been released from jail after six days, <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/shwe-yamin-htet-04222021181201.html">reported on social media</a> that a 19-year-old female protester detained with her had been “beaten with a metal pipe” and “kicked in her groin” and that her “vagina was bleeding due to the kicking.”</p>
<p>Rather than express outrage at the assault, some on social media worried that publicizing the young women’s sexual abuse would bring shame to her and asked Shwe to remove the post. She did not oblige. </p>
<p>A few women have defied the odds to obtain power in Myanmar – including the country’s deposed leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who came to power in 2012. Rather than seeing her as an inspirational symbol of women’s leadership, however, researchers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-020-00266-z">Mala Htun and Francesca Jensenius reported in their 2020 study</a> that most people in Myanmar view Aung San Suu Kyi simply as an exception. </p>
<p>Before the coup, women held <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-exclusion-of-women-in-myanmar-politics-helped-fuel-the-military-coup-154701">15% of political posts in Myanmar’s civilian government</a>. Now, just one woman sits on the coup regime’s 17-member state administration council.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aung San Suu Kyi, in a green dress, walks alongside many men" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399308/original/file-20210506-13-h8d8zk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aung San Suu Kyi with other top-ranking civilian leaders of Myanmar after her party won elections in March 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/newly-elected-myanmar-president-win-myint-myanmar-state-news-photo/1232338179?adppopup=true">Myat Thu Kyaw/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The military’s history of oppression</h2>
<p>The military <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-brutal-military-was-once-a-force-for-freedom-but-its-been-waging-civil-war-for-decades-158270">has run Myanmar as a dictatorship on and off since 1962</a>. In addition to airstrikes and attacks with heavy artillery, it is known to use <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/world/asia/myanmar-military-tatmadaw-violence.html">sexual violence</a> as a weapon in its long-standing effort to crush separatist movements in the border regions of Myanmar. </p>
<p>Self-identifying ethnic Burmese make up 32% of the population. For nearly six decades, several ethnic minority groups – the Kachin, Karen and Karenni – have been fighting for autonomy and self-determination. For just as long, the Myanmar army has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-karen/myanmar-army-launches-air-strikes-in-karen-state-group-says-idUSKBN2BJ0IZ">violently suppressed</a> them. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/kwo_shatteringsilences_april2007_0.pdf">Human rights groups report</a> widespread and systematic rape in Karen state, in southwest Myanmar, over many decades. When women are captured by the military, soldiers use them as porters to carry shells during the day. At night, they may be gang-raped. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12119">Kayah state</a>, another conflict zone north of Karen, women generally do not go out alone even for basics like groceries, because the military is known to target women. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56501871">military oppression</a> and gender violence so familiar to rural Burmese in conflict zones is now <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-security-forces-loot-destroy-civilians-property-amid-crackdown.html">affecting the urban middle and working classes</a> – groups that were long sheltered from the country’s borderland conflicts. On April 24, soldiers were reported to have physically abused a <a href="https://twitter.com/LeZicky/status/1386296713380466689">transgender woman who spoke out against the coup online</a>, forcing her to change into “male” clothing before arresting her. </p>
<h2>Women’s political future in Myanmar</h2>
<p>Despite the risks, <a href="https://womeninjournalism.org/interview-with-ei-thinzar-maung">women continue to participate in the front lines</a> of Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/12/asia/myanmar-protester-angel-democracy-martyr-intl-hnk/index.html">fight for democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Some have been arrested, including <a href="https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/7/20210/Stop-Represession-in-Myanmar-Release-Journalist-Thin-Thin-Aung-and-Others">Thin Thin Aung</a>, co-founder of a leading independent news site called Mizzima, and union leader <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/daw-myo-myo-aye-solidarity-trade-union-of-myanmar-stum/">Myo Myo Aye</a>. Others were shot dead, like <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/myanmar-killing-of-ah-khu-and-arbitrary-detention-of-thin-thin-aung?fbclid=IwAR110-cjB8mX882VggFqf55Cv-_IdRvqNbSlofXsDPBo_pwC1jhZevEoTy0">Khukhu Cilena</a>, of the women’s rights group Women for Justice.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>After the coup, a group of pro-democracy advocates formed a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-parallel-government-pressures-junta-ahead-of-ASEAN-meeting">parallel government</a> called the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/whos-myanmars-national-unity-government.html">National Unity Government</a> led by the elected lawmakers, which is financially supporting the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/how-myanmars-civil-disobedience-movement-pushing-back-against-coup">civil disobedience movement</a>. Myanmar’s opposition lawmakers are also busting glass ceilings: Ethnic minority party affiliates make up 25% of its <a href="https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/">32 members</a>, women make up 28%, and one member identifies as LGBT – a first in Myanmar.</p>
<p>The National Unity Government and Generation Z offer Burmese society a vision of a more equitable, inclusive future – should democracy prevail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ei Hlaing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s culture values men over women – and the military, which staged a Feb. 1 coup, brutally enforces the patriarchy. But Gen Z democracy activists are busting stereotypes with their struggle.Ei Hlaing, Assistant Professor of Psychological Science, University of LynchburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1589092021-04-14T12:32:24Z2021-04-14T12:32:24ZMyanmar: could defecting security forces bring down the military regime?<p>Just over ten years ago there were hopes that Myanmar might become a fully functioning democracy. Today there are concerns that the country may disintegrate into civil war. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-memes-and-mantras-of-a-new-generation-of-democracy-protesters-155223">widespread opposition</a> to the military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters also includes possibly as many as three-quarters of the soldiers in Myanmar’s army, according to an officer who has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/myanmar-defector-says-most-soldiers-willing-to-oppose-regime-kqkzrqvp9">recently defected</a>. If this is accurate, there could be large-scale defections in the near future. </p>
<p>But what does this mean for the future of democracy in Myanmar? And is Myanmar on the precipice of civil war? </p>
<p>Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-coup-will-test-loyalty-security-forces">security apparatus</a> is large, consisting of an army of about 350,000-400,000, most of whom are ethnic Bamar Buddhists, another 80,000 police (who have been relied on heavily to confront protesters), as well as state intelligence service members.</p>
<p>Defections from the military have happened from time to time, such as after <a href="https://www.npr.org/2013/08/08/209919791/as-myanmar-opens-up-a-look-back-on-a-1988-uprising">pro-democracy uprisings in 1988</a> and during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43133778">Saffron revolution</a> in 2007. But over the past 60 years the military has remained a fairly cohesive unit, supported by a system of rewards and punishments and a rigorous indoctrination process.</p>
<iframe src="https://player.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/episodes/myanmars-collective-fury?theme=default&cover=1&latest=1" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="110px" allow="autoplay"></iframe>
<p>Yet today’s military in Myanmar has had more exposure to the outside world since the country opened up in 2010. While it is still very brutal, it is not an organisation that is as blindly obedient as it was in the past.</p>
<p>Defections from the army or other elements of the security apparatus are important, because the success of any revolution is dependent on this – though this would need to be on a wide scale. The police and the military are the only organs of the state that can use tools of violence to enforce the will of an authoritarian regime. </p>
<h2>Why soldiers change sides</h2>
<p>There are several factors that are important for understanding what drives military defection. Not surprisingly, military cohesion is important to preventing revolution, as a cohesive military that stays firm in its support of the regime is near impossible to overcome. The worst-case scenario for Myanmar is if some of the military defects, but not enough to overturn the regime peacefully, which could lead to a protracted civil war, as in Syria. </p>
<p>Typically, militaries that consist of one ethnic or sectarian group are more cohesive but considered less legitimate in the eyes of the public, and are usually less professionalised as they are not recruited on the basis of merit. Militaries that are professionalised and not ethnically recruited tend to be more likely to <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Failed_States_and_Institutional_Decay/tozFAgAAQBAJ?q=natasha+ezrow&kptab=overview#f=false">side with their citizens</a> in the face of sizeable protests. </p>
<p>The role of the ethnic composition of the military is illustrated by the Arab Spring. Both Egypt and Tunisia did not have ethnically recruited militaries, and in both countries the military ended up siding with protesters – although in Egypt’s case this was ostensibly to oust the then president, Hosni Mubarak, and rule behind the scenes.</p>
<p>In contrast, both <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343313476529">Bahrain and Syria</a> had militaries where recruitment was based on sectarian ties to some extent. In the case of the former, foreigners were also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/bahrain-security-forces-sunni-foreign">widely recruited</a> to decrease the chances of members of the security apparatus siding with any public protests.</p>
<p>Other drivers of military defection are how the military is being treated (mostly financially) and the political influence and social status that it has acquired. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095327X17708194">popularity and legitimacy</a> of the military are also important. </p>
<p>Connected to this point is how popular and widespread the protests are. Notably, the current protests in Myanmar are very different from the past – they are widely popular and involve different ethnicities, religions and occupations. Due to the large volume of people taking to the streets, important institutions – <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/banks-closed-myanmar-anti-coup-protests-financial-chaos-continue">including banks</a> – have been closed due to lack of staff, causing financial chaos. </p>
<p>Military personnel are also increasingly aware that the regime’s use of violent tactics to maintain power, such as shooting at everyone, including children, tarnishes any legitimacy it may have had. </p>
<p>This all affects the calculations of military defectors. There has also been a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/police-breaking-ranks-amid-rising-unrest-in-myanmar/2165936">rise in defections</a> among police, which is usually under the military’s control. </p>
<h2>Chances of revolution or war?</h2>
<p>But is there much chance of a successful revolution? Revolutions are often hyped as a common way of ending authoritarian regimes. But in reality, they take place infrequently. In the 1960s and 1970s, <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/twq/v37i1/f_0030502_24672.pdf">fewer than 5%</a> of autocrats were ousted through public revolt, with more than half ousted through military coups. That number more than doubled in the 2010s, but revolution is no more likely to oust a dictatorship than a civil war.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s chances of war are amplified by the presence of various ethnic armed organisations. Technically Myanmar has faced <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/06/peace-and-war-in-myanmar/">continuous conflict</a> since the country gained independence in 1948, making it one of the longest ongoing insurgencies. A ceasefire took place in 2008, but calls for greater federalisation and increased autonomy of ethnic states have never dissipated. </p>
<p>Some of these ethnic groups are able to rule in de facto zones (through funds from drug trafficking) without much government interference. Though the military is well trained and experienced in combat, it does not have the capacity to fight simultaneously in the north, east, west and centre of the country.</p>
<p>In addition to being unpopular with its citizens, General Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has not gained much international support either. Though Russia and China are major arms suppliers to Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – there are <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/can-myanmars-protesters-win/">serious international concerns</a> that the regime’s actions are causing too much instability. At a UN Security Council briefing, an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-brink-state-failure">expert warned</a> that Myanmar was “on the brink of state failure”.</p>
<p>The crisis is taking place in a context of dire poverty, economic chaos, a raging pandemic, and where few political elites (including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy) are truly committed to democracy. Thus, even though the increase in military defections might seem promising to protesters, Myanmar appears more likely to collapse than to democratise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History tells us that the stability of a country’s security forces is key to the success or failure of a popular uprising.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1567522021-03-10T19:08:56Z2021-03-10T19:08:56ZAs killings, beatings and disappearances escalate, what’s the end game in Myanmar?<p>Myanmar’s military appears to be testing out a range of vicious tactics in the hope something will stem the protest movements that have embroiled the country since the coup in early February. </p>
<p>The military crossed a grim threshold last Wednesday when security forces fired live rounds at protesters across the country, resulting in what the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086352">UN said</a> were at least 30 deaths and hundreds of critical injuries.</p>
<p>Then, on Saturday, security forces beat and took away <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/09/myanmar-urgently-investigate-nld-officials-death-custody">Khin Maung Latt</a>, a Muslim ward chairman for the former ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The next morning, the family recovered his tortured and mutilated body from the hospital.</p>
<p>That night, the father of MP Sithu Maung, who is one of only two Muslim politicians elected to represent the NLD last year, was <a href="https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/a-night-of-terror-in-yangon?page=1">beaten and dragged away</a> by security forces. He has not been heard from since. </p>
<p>And this week, another NLD official, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/9/myanmar-party-official-dies-in-custody">Zaw Myatt Linn</a>, died in custody less than a day after being arrested.</p>
<p>These brutal attacks appear designed not only to terrorise the NLD, protesters and others taking part in the civil disobedience campaign, but the Muslim community, in particular. </p>
<p>Myanmar’s Muslim minorities have a history of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">persecution</a> by the military and other nationalist groups. Brutalising Muslims now may be an attempt to bolster support within the few remaining parts of society that still back the military. </p>
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<h2>A history of self-delusion and miscalculations</h2>
<p>There have now been more than <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1369320179776315392">60 protesters killed and almost 2,000 arrested</a>, but nothing has stopped the popular rage against the coup makers and their ill-considered plans. </p>
<p>Any grudging respect the military may have retained for its role in guiding the <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2021/02/measure-of-the-man-who-stole-myanmars-democracy/">political transition</a> over the past decade has now well and truly evaporated.</p>
<p>The military has a reputation for self-delusion, and it certainly miscalculated the public mood prior to <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">launching the coup</a> that ousted the NLD from power just weeks after it won an overwhelming majority in national elections.</p>
<p>The military’s commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, may have convinced himself that Thailand could be a model for how to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-politics-military-analysis-idUSKCN1T62AS">transition from the coup to semi-democratic elections</a>. If so, he is likely to be severely disappointed. </p>
<p>Thailand’s military seized power in 2014, and five years later, the coup leader, Prayuth Chan-ocha, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/05/thailand-military-backed-pm-prayuth-chan-ocha-voted-in-after-junta-creates-loose-coalition">won</a> a compromised election to retain his position as prime minister.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-care-of-business-the-coup-in-myanmar-is-partly-about-protecting-the-economic-interests-of-the-military-elite-154727">Taking care of business: the coup in Myanmar is partly about protecting the economic interests of the military elite</a>
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<p>But Thai society is much more divided between liberal and nationalist monarchist movements, giving the military there a sizeable support base. In Myanmar, the military doesn’t enjoy the same popular backing, which was why its proxy party suffered a humiliating defeat in the 2020 election.</p>
<p>A further escalation of violence against unarmed protesters in Myanmar is likely to undermine support from the military’s few international allies, including China. It seems there are no good options left for the military to resolve this entirely self-inflicted crisis.</p>
<h2>A fragmented but effective opposition movement</h2>
<p>The bruising standoff between the military and opposition is now a war of attrition. No one knows for sure who will last the longest.</p>
<p>The opposition movement is comprised of many interlocking parts, of which the protests are not the only — or even the most important. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/striking-government-workers-say-they-are-ready-to-face-the-worst/">civil disobedience movement</a>, mostly made up of striking or uncooperative workers, is paralysing major parts of the economy. Large numbers of civil servants remain at their desks, but are not doing any work, bringing government activity to a halt. </p>
<p>The country’s largest trade unions <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-unions-nationwide-strike-14355502">launched</a> an indefinite, nationwide strike this week, as well.</p>
<p>The loose, anarchic structure of the opposition movement — with few leaders and highly decentralised modes of organisation, funding and operations — means the military cannot easily decapitate the movement. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388719/original/file-20210310-21-1m1zedx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A protester throws part of a banana at the police during a protest in Yangon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The military tried to silence the most symbolic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, by placing her under arrest, but it hasn’t affected the opposition’s ability to organise or tap into public anger against the military.</p>
<p>Sources inside the country suggest the civil disobedience movement has been energised by Myanmar’s UN ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/world/asia/myanmar-protests-un-ambassador.html">defied</a> the military and declared its rule illegitimate. His courage has proved a lightning rod for the millions of angry protesters looking for inspiration and moral clarity.</p>
<p>These protesters now seem committed to the confrontation. The best approach may be to foment division within the military and police in the hopes of undermining Min Aung Hlaing’s authority. </p>
<p>Security forces haven’t rebelled in great numbers in the past, even when <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/saffron/">ordered to crack down on the Buddhist monks</a> leading the Saffron Revolution in 2007. But after a decade of political and economic liberties, Myanmar has changed profoundly. Some in the military and police have <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-coup-will-test-loyalty-security-forces">changed along with it</a> and might not be amenable if a major crackdown is ordered against their own citizens.</p>
<p>If so, there are likely to be increased <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-politics-india-idUSKBN2B204W">defections</a> of security forces to the opposition.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-coup-might-discourage-international-aid-but-donors-should-adapt-not-leave-154742">Myanmar's coup might discourage international aid, but donors should adapt, not leave</a>
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<h2>What can the world do?</h2>
<p>This conflict will be resolved one way or the other by the duelling groups within Myanmar. The outside world has few levers left to pull. </p>
<p>The UN Security Council, for one, remains largely deadlocked on the issue, with China and Russia <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20210203-china-russia-block-un-security-council-condemnation-of-myanmar-coup">unwilling</a> to deliver strong statements or endorse any serious action against the military.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-coup-how-china-could-help-resolve-the-crisis-156524">Myanmar coup: how China could help resolve the crisis</a>
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<p>The US and other Western nations have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-11/biden-announces-new-sanctions-against-myanmar-generals/13143132">implemented sanctions</a> on members of the military and military-linked companies, but many of these were already in place in response to the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis">violence against the Rohingya</a> in recent years.</p>
<p>Australia has also <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-07/australian-government-condemns-myanmar-protest-violence/13225334">suspended</a> its cooperation with the military and directed all aid funds through non-state actors. This is a welcome measure. </p>
<p>If real external pressure is to be applied on the Myanmar generals, it may have to come from the ASEAN countries — specifically Singapore, one of the biggest investors in Myanmar. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1368044010917359620"}"></div></p>
<p>Singapore’s political and commercial leaders are now <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3122254/myanmar-protesters-pressure-singapore-stand-justice-and-compel">facing pressure</a> to take a stronger stand. Soon after the coup, a prominent Singaporean businessman <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/singaporean-withdraws-from-myanmar-military-linked-tobacco-venture/">divested</a> from a Myanmar tobacco company, which is majority-owned by a military conglomerate.</p>
<p>Kirin, a giant Japanese brewer, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55944643#:%7E:text=Japanese%20beer%20giant%20Kirin%20said,Senior%20General%20Min%20Aung%20Hlaing.">pulled out</a> of its joint venture with the same conglomerate.</p>
<p>If other companies can similarly suspend their deals with the military, it will certainly help to strangle the key sources of revenue keeping Myanmar’s top brass in power. </p>
<p>The bravery of the protesters on the streets needs to be matched by a clear international message that Myanmar’s coup-makers cannot expect a financial lifeline to maintain their homicidal rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Farrelly previously received funding for Myanmar research from The Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The military is escalating its pressure on protesters in Myanmar, but it’s running out of options for resolving the crisis. Bullets may not be enough to quash the opposition this time.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaNicholas Farrelly, Professor and Head of Social Sciences, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1552092021-02-21T19:07:11Z2021-02-21T19:07:11ZMyanmar’s military coup is a blow to democracy, and the nation’s stunning biodiversity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385223/original/file-20210219-23-wtbsz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C14%2C4931%2C3200&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489">military takeover</a> in Myanmar this month is a serious setback for democratic reform. But the coup also threatens to permanently damage the Southeast Asian nation’s precious environment, and harm the people who rely on it.</p>
<p>Myanmar is <a href="https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/myanmar-announces-national-environment-and-climate-change-policies">renowned</a> as a biodiversity hotspot, and supports <a href="https://europepmc.org/article/med/23868440">more than 230</a> globally threatened species. </p>
<p>But the nation’s natural resources have been heavily exploited in pursuit of economic growth. In particular, logging, hunting and fishing have created serious environmental problems.</p>
<p>The transition to civilian rule in 2011 meant conservation efforts could be deployed. It allowed researchers and practitioners such as ourselves to work in Myanmar, from the village to government level, to help manage protected areas. But the coup means this vital work may not continue.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Mountain vista" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385230/original/file-20210219-21-qc58q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Work to conserve Myanmar’s natural places has long to run.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>An ecological gem</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s forested valleys <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2013/10/myanmar-faces-new-conservation-challenges-as-it-opens-up-to-the-world/">are home to</a> <a href="https://myanmar.wcs.org/wildlife/tiger.aspx">tigers</a>, <a href="https://elephant-project.science">elephants</a> and other <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/adventure/article/150305-birds-extinct-rediscovered-myanmar-burma-animals-science">rare animals</a>. The country hosts the largest tiger reserve <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=qnFID5-2z-kC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=jcDXOIhjel&sig=uyP3hb1KgSgoQo_3-xXVGrWVyyU#v=onepage&q&f=false">in the world</a> and is home to newly described primates such as the <a href="https://www.neprimateconservancy.org/myanmar-snub-nosed-monkey.html">Myanmar snub-nosed monkey</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-worlds-newest-monkey-species-was-found-in-a-lab-not-on-an-expedition-150598">Popa langur monkey</a>. </p>
<p>The mighty Ayeyarwady River is the nation’s lifeblood. It flows from north to south, feeding a vast floodplain that forms the country’s agricultural heart.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s coasts, marine islands, seagrass beds, coral reefs and mangrove forests are considered <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0184951">globally important</a>. Mangroves, for example, are nursery grounds for fish and crabs, protect the coast from storms and store carbon dioxide, helping <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0184951">mitigate climate change</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-coup-might-discourage-international-aid-but-donors-should-adapt-not-leave-154742">Myanmar's coup might discourage international aid, but donors should adapt, not leave</a>
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<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tiger" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385227/original/file-20210219-14-a21emj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Tigers are among Myanmar’s vulnerable species.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/DAVID LONGSTREATH</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>A nation plundered</h2>
<p>From the time of independence from British rule in 1948, Myanmar’s many ethnic groups were plunged into civil war. The struggle for control over natural resources has been central to these ongoing <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/11/conflict-resource-economy-and-pathways-peace-burma">armed conflicts</a>. </p>
<p>After the previous military coup, Myanmar was isolated from 1962 until 2011. During this time, the military and other armed groups over-exploited natural <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/myanmar-ceasefire-regime-two-decades-unaccountable-natural-resource-exploitation-kirk-talbott-yuki-akimoto-katrina-cuskelly/e/10.4324/9780203109793-16">resources</a>. Social welfare was <a href="https://silkwormbooks.com/products/living-silence-in-burma">neglected</a>, meaning vulnerable citizens were forced to further exploit natural resources to survive.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-country-environmental-analysis">According to</a> the World Bank, between 1990 and 2015 (part of which covers the period of civilian rule), Myanmar’s forest cover declined at an average rate of 1.2% a year. Over-fishing meant fish stocks have declined by as much as 90% since 1980. </p>
<p>Mass destruction of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/14116/myanmar_cyclonenargis_case_study.pdf?sequence%3D1%26isAllowed%3D&sa=D&source=editors&ust=1613872674392000&usg=AOvVaw2I5ZnQmlgzib29ql6sd4_x">mangrove forests</a> along Myanmar’s coastline increased its vulnerability to storms. This exacerbated the damaging effect of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, which killed about 150,000 people and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2700587/">devastated</a> the nation.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dams-on-myanmars-irrawaddy-river-could-fuel-more-conflicts-in-the-country-84386">Dams on Myanmar’s Irrawaddy river could fuel more conflicts in the country</a>
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<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Farmers crouch in a field" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385229/original/file-20210219-26-1lyd3gq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Much of Myanmar has been cleared for agriculture.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The bumpy road of civilian rule</h2>
<p>Under the civilian rule of democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, some environmental gains were made. However they were at the rudimentary stage and major challenges persisted. </p>
<p>For example, the opening up of Myanmar allowed bodies such as the United Nations, the World Bank and aid organisations to provide financial and technical support for community development projects. These projects are vital, because environmental destruction in Myanmar, as in other developing nations, is closely <a href="https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pan3.10098">linked</a> to poverty. </p>
<p>The democratic transition also meant non-government organisations could establish programs to document, understand and support biodiversity conservation, working in close collaboration with local communities.</p>
<p>These discussions led to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14888386.2018.1467793?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=tbid20">initiatives</a> such as Locally Managed Marine Protected Areas. These areas integrated conservation and sustainable development and were managed by the community.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-coup-how-myanmars-military-used-the-pandemic-to-justify-and-enable-its-power-grab-155350">COVID coup: how Myanmar’s military used the pandemic to justify and enable its power grab</a>
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<p>However systemic social and political <a href="https://spectrejournal.com/keep-the-streets-coup-crisis-and-capitalism-in-myanmar/">issues</a> in Myanmar meant such gains were often undermined. For example, even under civilian rule, <a href="https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/myanmar/2019/06/fisheries-crime/story.html">persistent corruption</a> in Myanmar’s fisheries sector meant fishery crime flourished, <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781785361197/9781785361197.00015.xml">undermining</a> conservation efforts.</p>
<p>The Meinmahla Kyun Wildlife Sanctuary in the Ayerwaddy Delta is another good example of the complexities involved under democratic rule. The sanctuary was legally protected to preserve its significant mangrove habitats, as well as crocodiles, fishing cats, bats, crabs and birds. </p>
<p>But the restrictions were weakly enforced and at odds with the needs of locals to earn a livelihood from fishing and logging. To address this, we helped develop a <a href="https://www.authorea.com/doi/full/10.22541/au.160391057.79751584">five-year management plan</a> which included sanctuary patrols and small-scale income-generating activities such as horticulture and eco-tourism. </p>
<p>But without sufficient resourcing and effective law enforcement, the plan was not fully implemented and unsustainable illegal activity in the sanctuary continued.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Coup protesters hold poster of Aung San Suu Kyi" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385232/original/file-20210219-21-dg8jyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The transition to Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership did not solve Myanmar’s environmental woes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDAP/PL KYODO</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Much work to be done</h2>
<p>Many Myanmar people want to earn livelihoods that don’t harm nature. But achieving this requires large amounts of funding that, to date, have not been made available.</p>
<p>Countries that provided aid to Myanmar are <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-coup-might-discourage-international-aid-but-donors-should-adapt-not-leave-154742">reconsidering</a> their aid programs in the wake of the coup.</p>
<p>It’s understandable that the international aid community wants to distance itself from the military regime. But it’s important that development and conservation programs continue to be funded.</p>
<p>The military rulers have declared a one-year state of emergency, and it’s unclear when, or if, Myanmar will return to civilian rule.</p>
<p>If the coup is defeated, short-term measures will be needed. This might involve cash transfers, conditional on sustainable livelihood practices, similar to those used in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/sd.2013">disaster relief programs</a>.</p>
<p>In the longer term, funding for community-based conservation and scientific partnerships in Myanmar should be prioritised.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Myanmar people resting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385233/original/file-20210219-20-1wtdg33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Myanmar’s vulnerable population needs support to transition to sustainable livelihoods.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">SENG MAI/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hope for the future</h2>
<p>Even if Myanmar returns to a democratic government, significant change would be required before the nation completes the <a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/the-hidden-history-of-burma/">transition</a> – one that empowers vulnerable people and protects the environment they depend on.</p>
<p>Myanmar is clearly at a troubling crossroads. But under the right political conditions, and with adequate international support, Myanmar could set a precedent for developing nations the world over: showing how a biologically diverse, resource-rich nation can conserve nature while providing a livelihood for its people. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>SiuSue Mark, a political economist and development practitioner, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Aung San Suu Kyi’s government did not have a perfect environmental record. But at least things were starting to change.Narissa Bax, Marine Biologist, University of TasmaniaZau Lunn, PhD candidate, University of New BrunswickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1547012021-02-21T12:05:48Z2021-02-21T12:05:48ZThe exclusion of women in Myanmar politics helped fuel the military coup<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385371/original/file-20210219-13-e7hj4x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5760%2C3664&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anti-coup protesters flash the three-fingered salute during a rally in downtown Yangon, Myanmar on Feb. 19, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Feb. 1, 2021, Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070">military seized power</a>. While a dramatic event, the coup was a continuation of old power structures. </p>
<p>Myanmar’s decade-long period of political transition, peace-building and democratic elections fell short of freeing the country from military control. Despite its female leader, the exclusion of women throughout the failed transition to democracy is partly why Myanmar was unable to create deep institutional change. </p>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi’s image as “mother of the nation” depicted her as a caring matriarch. This image stood in contrast with the harsh patriarchy of military rule. But politics in Myanmar defy stereotypes and simple classifications. </p>
<p>Suu Kyi may have been the face of the era of democratic reforms, but in reality, the transition was initiated and controlled by the military. Suu Kyi’s legacy as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/02/01/aung-san-suu-kyi/">permanently stained by her handling of the Rohingya genocide</a>, and her projected femininity and democratic idealism should not be confused for feminism or inclusive democracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Aung San Suu Kyi stands before a podium and speaks." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385035/original/file-20210218-20-ijjhjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aung San Suu Kyi addresses judges of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands, in December 2019. She was defending Myanmar against allegations of genocide in its campaign against the Rohingya Muslim minority.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Peter Dejong)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gender can still help us understand politics in Myanmar, however — just not along these lines. Instead, a different story emerges by looking at the exclusion of women in key stages of the transition process. It is a tale of the persistence of patriarchal power throughout the decade of democratization.</p>
<h2>Constitution kept men in charge</h2>
<p>The governing patriarchy is on full display in the 2008 constitution that spurred Myanmar’s decade of democracy. According to one provision of the constitution, <a href="https://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/B15Burma2010_eng.pdf">certain positions are suitable for men only</a>. Women are excluded from key ministerial positions, and a major government agency, the Union Civil Service Board, regularly uses this clause of the constitution to block applications from women for both mid- and junior-level positions. This caps decades of extreme repression of women. </p>
<p>The Myanmar army is infamous for its <a href="https://womenofburma.org/reports/if-they-have-hope-they-would-speak">systematic targeting of ethnic minority women and girls for sexual violence</a>, and the militarization of the country has contributed to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-020-00255-2">widespread discriminatory practices</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-blackouts-in-myanmar-allow-the-military-to-retain-control-154703">Internet blackouts in Myanmar allow the military to retain control</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The peace process (2011-15) between the Tatmadaw — Myanmar’s military — and ethnic armed groups that have long challenged its hold on the country <a href="https://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/WP_5_2014.pdf">was a deal involving men</a>. Only four women <a href="https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Womens-Inclusion-in-Myanmars-Nationwide-Ceasefire-Agreement.pdf">served inconsistently</a> on senior negotiation delegations (less than six per cent). <a href="https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1758&type=publicationfile">Women were also largely excluded</a> from ceasefire structures and monitoring teams.</p>
<p>Other important institutions also failed to modernize during the transition. Instead, they generally mirrored <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-020-00266-z">conservative and traditional attitudes</a>. Women’s <a href="https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=1&year=2021">representation in parliament</a> gained roughly five per cent in both the 2015 and 2020 elections, growing from less than five per cent in 2014 to just over 15 per cent in November’s contested election. <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/election_reports.html#myanmar">Important as this progress was</a>, equality was ultimately handcuffed by the embedded patriarchy of the military. </p>
<p>The military <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-019-00247-x">orchestrated the democratic transition</a> according to rules designed to give them continued influence. In so doing, they hamstrung women’s political inclusion. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A row of police in riot gear stand behind barbed wire." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385044/original/file-20210218-14-wkbfoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police stand guard behind barbed wire as they attempt to stop protesters outside Union Election Commission office in November 2020, in Naypyitaw, Myanmar after the military said it did not accept the election results.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Tatmadaw also retained the right to appoint 25 per cent of legislative seats. A military background is required for certain ministerial positions. Since women were only recently allowed to serve in the military, the requirement effectively makes them ineligible to hold these offices. </p>
<p>There were only two women among the 166 military appointees following the 2015 elections. The military appointed only 10 per cent of women to national, state and regional legislative chambers in 2020. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) only elected one woman to both the 2015 and 2020 parliaments. The military quota makes reform unlikely because any constitutional amendment to address discrimination requires 75 per cent approval.</p>
<p>The patriarchy of the military is reflected in the non-military political parties, notwithstanding Suu Kyi’s leadership. The parties are gatekeepers to women’s representation. But <a href="https://www.emref.org/sites/emref.org/files/publication-docs/gender_and_political_in_myanmarenglish_online.pdf">they have generally not taken steps to improve women’s political participation</a>.</p>
<h2>No quick fix</h2>
<p>We are not arguing more women in Myanmar politics would have prevented the coup. There is no such thing as a quick fix to eliminate the country’s history of militarization. </p>
<p>But we do suggest that women’s relative absence from positions of influence helped enable the military to maintain its grip on power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women in masks carry placards as they sit in a boat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385048/original/file-20210218-20-81ld12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ethnic Entha women display placards during a protest against the military coup in Inle Lake, Taunggyi, Myanmar, on Feb. 11, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Aung Ko San)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Understanding this connection is important for three reasons. First, giving women a seat at the table makes a difference. Research shows that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386">equality and inclusion foster sustainable peace</a>, meaning that <a href="https://fba.se/contentassets/46391654ca6b4d8b995018560cb8ba8e/research_brief_bjarnegard_et_al_webb.pdf">the attitudes of the participating men are also required</a>. Rather than just armed organizations, <a href="https://fba.se/contentassets/c44814eb02b04124960629d864fa6b04/research_brief_nilsson_svensson_webb.pdf">civil society groups and women’s organizations should be included in transitions from war to peace</a>.</p>
<p>Second, <a href="https://asia.fes.de/news/feminism-in-myanmar">the women’s movement in Myanmar offers new models for collaborative governance</a>. Relegated to the shadows, women’s groups nonetheless organized to contribute to the peace process through informal channels, including back-channel negotiation. They have shown a path for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2018.1472030">bridging ethnic differences</a> to work towards common goals. </p>
<p>Finally, by tracing the path of patriarchy in Myanmar, we can better understand what brought about the coup. As we grapple with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-coup-in-myanmar/">why the military staged a coup at this particular moment in time</a>, it should be seen in light of the country’s militarized recent history and the power dynamics of the transition. Women’s rights organizations are currently mobilizing and are putting it out there quite simply: <a href="https://www.genmyanmar.org/update_news/112">a militarized Myanmar is a threat for women</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Bardall has consulted for The Carter Center Myanmar project in the past.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elin Bjarnegård receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>Despite having a woman leader, women are largely excluded from key positions of influence and leadership in Myanmar — a situation that helped the country’s military succeed in its recent coup.Gabrielle Bardall, Research Fellow, Centre for International Policy Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaElin Bjarnegård, Associate Professor in Political Science, Netherlands Institute for Advanced StudyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1555232021-02-18T13:54:14Z2021-02-18T13:54:14ZMyanmar: trial of Aung San just the latest in a long line of unlawful prosecutions by illegal regimes<p>Myanmar’s military coup leaders have reportedly put the country’s lawfully elected leaders <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/world/asia/myanmar-trial-aung-san-suu-kyi.html">on trial</a>. It is understood that the proceedings, apparently held in secret and without giving the defendants the benefit of legal representation, could last for up to six months. </p>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s state counsellor and de facto leader, faces charges of illegally importing two walkie talkies and of contravening a natural disaster management law by interacting with a crowd during the coronavirus pandemic. These carry a maximum penalty of six years in jail. Win Myint, the country’s deposed president, has been charged with breaching the natural disaster restrictions, which – if he is found guilty – could mean up to three years imprisonment.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can hear more about the events which led up to Myanmar’s military coup in the second episode of our new podcast, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> – the world explained by experts. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.</em> </p>
<iframe src="https://player.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/episodes/myanmars-collective-fury?theme=default&cover=1&latest=1" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="110px" allow="autoplay"></iframe>
<p>The worrying developments in Myanmar echo political or show trials of the past, raising fundamental questions about what “law” actually is. How does an unlawfully established government legitimately use the law against its opponents? Indeed, can any rules adopted or imposed by a dictatorship be said to be “laws” at all?</p>
<h2>Nuremberg trials</h2>
<p>This question has bothered legal theorists and human rights lawyers for a very long time. For example the German theorist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gustav-Radbruch">Gustav Radbruch</a> argued that actions authorised by abhorrent Nazi “law” were <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228229762_Gustav_Radbruch_vs_Hans_Kelsen_A_Debate_on_Nazi_Law">not, in fact, lawful</a> and so the post-war prosecution of people for their actions in Nazi Germany would not be unfair. </p>
<p>Similar issues arose at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/nov/15/the-slate-will-never-be-clean-lessons-from-the-nuremberg-trials-75-years-on">Nuremberg International Military Tribunal</a> in 1945 because the trial of senior Nazis there was the first time anyone had ever been put on trial for “crimes against humanity” and “waging aggressive war”. The defence argued that those crimes were not clearly established in international criminal law when they were said to have been committed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Former high-ranking Nazi officials in the dock at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 1946." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384990/original/file-20210218-28-9fgiel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Natural law’: high-ranking Nazi officials on trial at Nuremberg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">US National Archives</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The judgment at Nuremberg made the not entirely convincing claim that it should have been obvious that these categories of international crime already existed, but it also stated that the rule against retrospective prosecution might not apply in the face of the scale of Nazi atrocities in any event.</p>
<h2>Arguments and amnesties</h2>
<p>More recently, the communist regimes of central and eastern Europe toppled and the newly democratic states joined the Council of Europe and signed the European Convention on Human Rights. Many of these states were, for the first time, now able to embark on the prosecution of people for their actions under communism, such as suppressing the failed <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6069582.stm">1956 uprising</a> in Hungary, or killing people seeking to cross the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/the-berlin-wall/zdphd6f">Berlin Wall</a> to flee communist East Germany. </p>
<p>Defendants have argued not just that their prosecution was unfair because a prosecution was unforeseeable when they carried out the alleged crimes – but also that it violates the European Convention, which confirms that people can only be convicted of offences that existed at the time they were allegedly committed. The European Court of Human Rights has tended to take the <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_7_ENG.pdf">position</a> that where the actions were clearly contrary to international law, it does not matter if they were permitted by a state’s national legislation under communism.</p>
<p>This does not mean, however, that globally we are free of the notion of show trials and political trials that, like those in Myanmar, claim to be lawful but are anything but. Even in Europe, the hastily convened and poorly organised military “trial” and resulting execution of <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trial-and-execution-the-d_b_401497">Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu</a> and his wife on Christmas Day 1989 is a clear example. </p>
<p>The trial of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/044/2006/en/">Saddam Hussein</a> at the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, an Iraqi national court, came close: it has been alleged that there was political interference and that the potentially very strong case against him was inadequately set out. Moreover, defence witnesses and lawyers were intimidated – and several were murdered. But even a weak trial was probably at least a step up from extrajudicial targeted killing, for example by <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/trump-war-terror-drones/567218/">drone strikes</a>, that we have seen ordered by presidents and prime ministers of all political persuasions throughout the “war on terror”. </p>
<p>At the other extreme, there are examples of crumbling regimes attempting to provide themselves with an amnesty against prosecution – such as when military dictatorships established in Argentina and Chile in the 1970s came to an end in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/06/14/argentina-amnesty-laws-struck-down">1983</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/chile-justice-anly.htm">1990</a>, respectively. Indeed, the Argentine Supreme Court only struck down their amnesty law in 2005. That ruling took inspiration from the case law of the <a href="https://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?lang=en">Inter-American Court of Human Rights</a>, which has ruled that such amnesties violate the human rights of surviving victims and dead victims’ next of kin.</p>
<p>There are, however, more democratic conditional amnesties, such as those granted in South Africa during the process of “Truth and Reconciliation” after the fall of apartheid: the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a>, led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, accepted over 1,000 applications for amnesty – in return for the applicant agreeing to testify to the Commission.</p>
<p>Back to the issue of Myanmar, it can only be hoped that the military government shows some restraint in its use and abuse of “the law”. But, given the country’s track record of violence, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56094649">the growing protests against its coup</a>, it is questionable for how long even the pretence of acting according to the law will last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155523/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Sweeney is a Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/">https://fpc.org.uk/</a></span></em></p>‘Show trials’ by dictatorships have repeatedly been shown to have no basis in law.James Sweeney, Professor, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1547032021-02-17T13:49:27Z2021-02-17T13:49:27ZInternet blackouts in Myanmar allow the military to retain control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384514/original/file-20210216-15-1i6ks19.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C3300&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protester holds up a placard with an image of deposed Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi during an anti-coup rally in Mandalay, Myanmar, on Feb. 15, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Myanmar citizens have been living under military control for weeks after the country’s military <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070">staged a coup</a>. Citing issues of electoral fraud in the November 2020 general elections, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-reverts-to-its-old-strong-arm-behaviour-and-the-country-takes-a-major-step-backwards-154368">military detained elected officials</a>, including civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and implemented a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55889565">national internet shutdown</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aung San Suu Kyi shares a laugh with Justin Trudeau." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384513/original/file-20210216-21-fjmer7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aung San Suu Kyi, the civilian leader of Myanmar and an honourary Canadian citizen, shares a laugh with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in his office in Ottawa in June 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Internet shutdowns in Myanmar represent a serious threat to democracy, but these actions aren’t entirely surprising — many Myanmar citizens have experienced all this before.</p>
<p>During the country’s history of military rule from the 1960s to 2011, the military employed many of the same tactics to gain control. The ongoing national internet shutdowns and social media bans highlight a continued cycle of anti-democratic repression and censorship employed by Myanmar’s military — although there are ways internet service providers can help the country’s censored citizens. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1361032747763007488"}"></div></p>
<p>The path to democracy in Myanmar has been slow and laborious. The election of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2015 and 2020 represented significant progress and suggested democracy was finally taking hold in the country. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the coup has halted the country’s progress once again. </p>
<p>The military has been Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/2/2/analysis-why-is-myanmar-military-so-powerful">most powerful institution</a> since its independence from Britain in 1948. The military-led coup in 1962 was followed by nearly five decades of military rule. Following general elections in 1990, the military refused to hand over power and placed the winning candidate, Aung San Suu Kyi, under <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/13/burma-chronology-aung-san-suu-kyis-detention">house arrest for more than 15 years</a>.</p>
<h2>Military still has might</h2>
<p>In 2008, democracy proponents were hopeful that a new constitution would finally bring democratic norms and institutions to Myanmar. But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/21/asia/myanmar-military-the-real-power/index.html">the constitution</a> was drafted by the military regime and maintained its privileged position. For example, it gives the military “the right to take over and exercise state sovereign power” if there are any threats to national unity. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Soldiers stand next to a military truck" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384523/original/file-20210216-13-16uowkn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers stand next to a military truck in Yangon, Myanmar on Feb. 15, 2021. Security forces in Myanmar have intensified their crackdown against anti-coup protesters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-reconstruction-insig/rude-and-insolent-fraught-talks-preceded-myanmars-army-seizing-power-idUSKBN2A9225">fraught discussions</a> with the civilian government this month about the election, the military specifically cited provisions in the constitution to justify the coup and declare a state of emergency. </p>
<p>Internet shutdowns are a common tool of repression used by governments to halt the flow of web-based communication and information. Since 2019, more than 36 countries have used internet shutdowns for a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global-5#">variety of reasons</a>. Recent shutdowns have occurred in India, Egypt, Ethiopia, Belarus and other countries.</p>
<p>Myanmar has become a frequent user of internet shutdowns. In 2007, the military junta <a href="https://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013">escalated their information warfare tactics</a> and ordered a national internet shutdown to maintain complete control. </p>
<p>In June 2019, the Myanmar civilian government initiated the world’s <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/myanmar-one-blackout-ends-another-begins">longest internet shutdown</a> at the behest of the military, citing issues of instability and the use of internet services to co-ordinate illegal activities in Rakhine and Chin states. Lasting almost a year, the regional shutdown raised serious concerns that many citizens had been left in the dark <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/06/24/882893419/parts-of-myanmar-unaware-of-covid-19-due-to-internet-ban-advocates-say">about the global COVID-19 pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>On Jan. 31, 2021, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication — controlled by the military — <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-myanmar-amid-apparent-military-uprising-JBZrmlB6">ordered a nationwide internet shutdown</a> to prevent citizens from reporting on the military coup. The move was similar to actions taken by the military in neighbouring Thailand during its 2014 coup, which focused on information control and <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2014/07/information-controls-thailand-2014-coup/">blocked more than 56 URLs</a>.</p>
<p>Following orders to both state-run and foreign internet providers, the initial shutdown in Myanmar began around 3 a.m. Connectivity levels declined 50 per cent by 8 a.m. As access to the internet was severely restricted, the military successfully executed their coup, detaining key political leaders and NLD supporters. </p>
<h2>Using the internet ‘kill switch’</h2>
<p>Instead of a consistent network shutdown, internet shutdowns and social media bans have come in waves over the past two weeks in Myanmar. A partial internet shutdown was initially observed, shielding coup efforts. Once the military seized power, connection was restored. </p>
<p>Citizens turned to Facebook, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/04/myanmar-coup-army-blocks-facebook-access-as-civil-disobedience-grows">the main source of news and communication</a> for 50 per cent of the population, to protest the coup and demand a return to democracy. On Feb. 3, the military ordered a <a href="https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-bans-facebook-temporarily.html">social media ban</a>, primarily focused on Facebook. Telenor Myanmar (part of Norway’s Telenor Group) restricted Facebook, while <a href="https://www.dica.gov.mm/en/link/myanmar-posts-and-telecommunications">Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications</a> restricted Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Since Feb. 1, millions of people in Myanmar have participated in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/14/world/asia/myanmar-military-crackdown.html">civil disobedience campaigns and protests</a> on the streets and online. Although social media bans have remained in place, protesters have <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-protests-protesters-getting-around-internet-blackout-14159342">found ways to co-ordinate</a> through encrypted messaging services and virtual private networks, known as VPNs. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/civil-disobedience-myanmars-new-normal.html">mass protests continue</a>, the military is responding with further internet shutdowns and social media restrictions. A second nationwide shutdown was ordered on Feb. 6, but connectivity was mostly restored by Feb. 7. On Feb. 14 and 15, citizens experienced <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-experiencing-near-total-internet-shutdown-14198398">two consecutive nights of internet shutdowns</a>, allowing the military to carry out further crackdowns. </p>
<p>The military has changed its censorship technique to <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/iraq-introduces-nightly-internet-curfew-JAp1DKBd">curfew-styled internet blackouts</a> that seriously affect the ability of citizens to communicate and verify information. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1361152641645035520"}"></div></p>
<h2>Will shutdowns continue?</h2>
<p>The various tactics used in Myanmar to quell <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/10/myanmar-protesters-streets-naypyitaw-yangon-police-coup-violence">growing protests against the coup</a> are different from previous shutdowns in 2007 and 2019, but they have a similar effect. </p>
<p>On Feb. 15, in Mandalay, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmar-protests-resume-after-second-night-of-internet-shutdown/">soldiers broke up a group of 1,000 protesters</a> at the Myanmar Economic Bank using slingshots, sticks and a number of warning shots. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A policeman aims a slingshot into the air." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384562/original/file-20210216-13-pydf7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A policeman aims a slingshot towards an unknown target during a crackdown on anti-coup protesters holding a rally in front of the Myanmar Economic Bank in Mandalay, Myanmar on Feb. 15, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The military has also recently put forward a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-internet-idUSKBN2AB0WK">new cyber-security bill</a> that could give it sweeping control over online data and allow the collection and monitoring of citizens online. This bill would <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmars-military-has-used-surveillance-draconian-laws-and-fear-to-stifle-dissent-before-will-it-work-again-154474">severely affect privacy</a> and freedom of speech. </p>
<p>If the military regime is unable to prevent citizens from mobilizing, Myanmar will almost certainly experience continued cycles of internet shutdowns. Citizens may also be met with extreme force and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/04/dozens-countries-governments-rely-internet-shutdowns-hide-repression/">government-sanctioned violence</a>, similar to the current situation in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The situation in Myanmar should be a point of international concern. Internet shutdowns prevent citizens’ ability to document violence and hold perpetrators accountable, leaving them at risk of extreme violence. </p>
<p>But the international community, including foreign ISPs, governments and <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-internet-shutdowns-during-covid-19-will-help-spread-the-virus/">advocacy networks, can help</a> end shutdowns in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Given the vast changes to the telecommunications landscape in Myanmar, the growing number of ISP providers could undermine social media bans and internet shutdowns. Telenor Myanmar, for example, seems to have recently intentionally delayed a Twitter ban amid <a href="https://www.telenor.com/media/press-release/myanmar-authorities-orders-nationwide-shutdown-of-the-data-network">public outcry</a>. Delaying the execution of an order is one way for ISPs and telecommunication operators to resist shutdown orders, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10_dictators_digital_network.pdf">as they’ve done in Egypt</a>. </p>
<p>Telenor Group has attempted to provide details of the military’s directives, but it was <a href="https://www.telenor.com/sustainability/responsible-business/human-rights/mitigate/human-rights-in-myanmar/directives-from-authorities-in-myanmar-february-2021/">recently ordered to stop</a>. Nonetheless, the company’s actions have helped raise awareness about the situation in Myanmar, and ISPs should develop clear policies around forced shutdowns in the future in countries experiencing political upheaval.</p>
<p>Governments should also regularly denounce the use of internet shutdowns and pressure ISPs to take a stronger stance against them — in Myanmar and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cassandra Preece receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Beny receives funding from the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program.</span></em></p>Internet shutdowns and social media bans in Myanmar have helped the military retain control after the Feb. 1 coup. Here’s why ISPs should develop clear policies around forced internet shutdowns.Cassandra Preece, PhD Student, Political Science, McMaster UniversityHelen Beny, PhD Student, Political Science, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.