tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/basuki-tjahaja-purnama-41560/articlesBasuki Tjahaja Purnama – The Conversation2020-09-30T10:17:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1451022020-09-30T10:17:38Z2020-09-30T10:17:38ZWhy have candidates in Indonesian elections increasingly been rallying ethnic and religious support?<p>In 2017, a long, divisive campaign for the gubernatorial seat of Indonesia’s capital city Jakarta ended with a victory for <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-governor-election-results-in-a-victory-for-prejudice-over-pluralism-76388">prejudice over pluralism</a>. </p>
<p>The election saw an extraordinarily powerful campaign by Islamic groups to <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/interpreting-jakarta-election/">condemn</a> the ethnic Chinese and Christian incumbent governor, Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama.</p>
<p>Ethnicity and religion often become politicised in elections. Research has found that this is particularly true during a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2000-05-01/voting-violence-democratization-and-nationalist-conflict">transition to democracy</a>.</p>
<p>During these times, fragile democratic rules and practices, coupled with strong ethnic bonds, often motivate aspiring politicians to bolster their support by appealing to voters’ emotional allegiances to their tribe, ethnicity, or religion. </p>
<p>But, Indonesia’s case is puzzling. </p>
<p>After three decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1999 was rapid and violent, triggered by a severe economic crisis, mass demonstrations and riots. </p>
<p>Despite the turbulence of this period, <a href="https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3732&context=soss_research">my research</a> shows that appeals to ethnic and religious groups actually declined during the 1999 election campaign.</p>
<p>But the research also shows that this pattern changed in the 2009 election campaigns, as candidates began to mobilise the support of local ethnic, religious, and community groups — 10 years after Indonesia’s transition. </p>
<p>Indeed, the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race took place nearly two decades since Indonesia’s democratic transition.</p>
<p>So, why have Indonesian politicians increasingly invoked ethnicity and religion in recent years? </p>
<p>In studying why Indonesian candidates politicise ethnicity and religion, I found that legislative electoral reforms instituted in 2009, which allow candidates to win seats based on their individual votes, have played a key role in the rise of ethnic and religious politics.</p>
<h2>Electoral reform</h2>
<p>Before 2009, Indonesia used a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system. </p>
<p>Parties put forward a ranked list of candidates for each multi-member district. Constituents then voted for parties, not individuals. </p>
<p>Parties awarded any seats they won to their candidates according to their ranking, beginning at the top of their list. </p>
<p>In the 2009 election, the candidate lists were changed from closed to fully open. This change was ultimately the result of a December 2008 <a href="https://www.academia.edu/30169302/Indonesias_2009_Elections_The_New_Electoral_System_and_the_Competing_Parties">Constitutional Court ruling</a>. It was supported by non-governmental organisations and media commentators whose aim was to reduce the power of the elites who controlled Indonesia’s political parties.</p>
<p>It meant that people could now vote for individual candidates, and parties had to allocate their seats to their candidates who obtained the highest number of votes. </p>
<p>This change has had a dramatic impact on how candidates campaign.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/biggest-winners-and-losers-in-indonesias-legislative-elections-115720">Biggest winners and losers in Indonesia's legislative elections</a>
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<h2>Election campaigns</h2>
<p>To understand the impact of this rule change on campaigns, I studied hundreds of election newspaper reports published from 1997 to 2004, and compared them with reports from 2009 to 2014. </p>
<p>These reports were drawn from Waspada, a prominent regional newspaper that serves the diverse province of North Sumatra. Each report was coded for references to the types of campaign events held, endorsements, and any explicit appeals to particular groups. </p>
<p>Findings from pre-2009 election reports show that candidates campaigned primarily at large party rallies alongside party leaders and other candidates. </p>
<p>The candidates sought endorsements from regional and national party leaders and made verbal appeals to the party faithful. </p>
<p>Due to the closed-list PR system, candidates were primarily concerned with winning votes for their party and with where they were ranked on the candidate list. </p>
<p>To appease party leaders who controlled the candidate list and help the party get votes, candidates needed to emphasise their loyal connection to their party and campaign on the party’s platform and quality of leadership. </p>
<p>Therefore, campaigns were heavily party-centric.</p>
<p>Since 2009, because constituents can now vote for particular candidates, voters have taken a greater interest in who these candidates are. </p>
<p>To win personal votes, candidates changed tactics. Instead of appeasing party leaders, they began to focus more on voting constituencies — particularly local ethnic, religious, and community groups. </p>
<p>This should not be surprising, as these groups form the fabric of Indonesian society.</p>
<p>Evidence from the news reports reflects this change.</p>
<p>Since 2009, candidates have increasingly attended smaller ethnic, religious, and community groups’ campaign events rather than large party rallies. </p>
<p>They have campaigned with local leaders rather than party leaders, crafted more ethnic and religious appeals, and switched the focus of their messages from party platforms to their traits, experience, and service. </p>
<p>Overall, legislative elections have become more candidate-centric.</p>
<p>From these findings, one might expect that Indonesian candidates appeal only to their own ethnic or religious groups and seek to dominate other out-groups. </p>
<p>This, however, is not the case. </p>
<p>I found that candidate messages were largely positive and that candidates avoided negative appeals or strategies that alienated other ethnic or religious groups. </p>
<p>Moreover, in diverse districts, it was common for candidates to visit, appeal to, and receive endorsements from ethnic and religious groups to which they did not belong. </p>
<p>On the whole, candidate-centric rules have, if anything, strengthened the personal connections between voters and their representatives: Indonesians are provided with more information about candidates now and have more time to engage with them. </p>
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<h2>The 2020 regional elections</h2>
<p>Although my study focused on Indonesia’s legislative elections, there is a strong parallel between the findings in legislative elections since 2009 and regional head elections, which are even more candidate-centric. </p>
<p>In the regional head elections, engaging with local ethnic, religious, and community groups through small events, endorsements, and appeals has been very prevalent.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/21/regional-races-cant-wait-until-the-pandemic-is-over-state-palace-says-amid-criticism.html">upcoming</a> 2020 regional head election campaigns will be quite different due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>First and foremost, the in-person campaign events discussed above will be restricted, so new candidates will have fewer opportunities for face-to-face meetings with ethnic, religious, and community groups, giving an advantage to incumbents. </p>
<p>However, since such events have long been a central part of campaigns, we can expect some violations of this restriction.</p>
<p>The registration phase in early September already saw <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/08/bawaslu-records-243-health-protocol-violations-during-regional-elections-registration.html">hundreds of violations </a> of health protocols. </p>
<p>Second, candidates will more intensively use other media - such as poster campaigns, the regional press, radio, social media, and teleconferencing - to connect with voters. </p>
<p><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00143.x">Research</a> in the United States has found that political media content can inform and mobilise voters who are motivated to seek out political information. </p>
<p>However, it will have less impact on those who are not so interested in politics. </p>
<p>Overall, highly media-driven campaigns tend to have more <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/223956376_The_Effects_of_Digital_Media_on_Political_Knowledge_and_Participation_in_Election_Campaigns_Evidence_From_Panel_Data">limited effects</a> on political knowledge and political participation than we might think. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242496556_Professionalization_of_Campaigns_and_the_Secret_History_of_Collective_Action_Problems">Some evidence</a> suggests they may even foster higher levels of political apathy.</p>
<p>Finally, the democratic nature of these elections will likely be undermined by lower voter turnout due to voters’ health concerns. </p>
<p>For these reasons, we can expect an unusual campaign season. </p>
<p>In an environment that pushes candidates to innovate, well-known candidates who can effectively use traditional and digital media to mobilise their networks of support will have a better chance of success at the polls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work was supported by a grant from The Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation.</span></em></p>A key electoral reform in 2009 shifted the focus of legislative elections from political parties to individual candidates.Colm Fox, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Singapore Management UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/992112018-07-09T02:07:11Z2018-07-09T02:07:11ZIs Indonesia retreating from democracy?<p><em>This is an edited extract from Tim Lindsey’s essay ‘Retreat from Democracy’, which appears in Australian Foreign Affairs #3, published 9 July.</em></p>
<p>For much of the past 20 years, Indonesia has been held up as a model of democratic transition for other countries, particularly those with significant Muslim populations. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s leaders like to present their nation as embodying an exemplary path away from authoritarianism. Their form of government, they say, is tolerant yet enshrines religious practice, offering a political alternative for Muslim communities that is more palatable to the West than the failed Arab Spring and the extremist catastrophes that have engulfed the Middle East since the US intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p>
<p>This view of Indonesia now needs rethinking. The country’s hard-won advances towards liberalism and tolerance may be under threat. This nation of more than 260 million people – over 85% of them Muslim – has often been called the “smiling face of Islam”, but that label may no longer apply.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s recent questioning of its own liberal-democratic aspirations
has been accompanied by growing expressions of intolerance, including violence towards vulnerable minorities. As next year’s presidential election approaches, the temptation to resort to regressive identity politics and opportunistic populism will increase, and Indonesia’s departure from its post-1998 progressive tilt is likely to become more pronounced.</p>
<h2>Sliding towards a ‘Neo New Order’?</h2>
<p>In Indonesia today, reform has stagnated. Although the democratic transition in 1998 was presented as a national consensus, this was never entirely true. It always had opponents, some of whom felt politically constrained to accept democratisation as a necessary evil but never accepted it as a final settlement.</p>
<p>As well as the hardliners, today these include enormously wealthy oligarchs, tenacious survivors of former dictator Suharto’s regime and elements of the armed forces. These disparate forces that together form Indonesia’s revisionist and populist right have little in common and often compete with one another. However, they also create expedient alliances from time to time, motivated by a common desire to roll back at least some of the democratic system initiated by <em>Reformasi</em>, the reform era. </p>
<p>Together they can sometimes intimidate or outflank progressive civil-society leaders. Governments, local and national, seem uncertain about how to respond to these challenges, and vacillate between inaction, opaqueness or endorsement of reactionary policies. As a result, 20 years on from <em>Reformasi</em>, the spirit of reform that drove democratisation seems distant.</p>
<p>Most Indonesian champions of civil society would agree that <em>Reformasi</em> ended long ago – maybe well over a decade ago – but a new label to define what replaced it has not yet emerged. This reflects an uncertainty among many Indonesians about where their country is heading. Many prominent critics of the government believe that while electoral democracy seems entrenched, liberal democracy is under threat from populism, Islamism and renewed conservatism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facing-bumps-but-on-the-right-track-indonesias-democratic-progress-61038">Facing bumps, but on the right track: Indonesia's democratic progress</a>
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<p>For them, Indonesia seems to be sliding towards what some call the “Neo New Order”. Others say this is too harsh, arguing that electoral democracy
is now firmly entrenched and the critical change that marked the end of
Suharto’s system, the retreat of the military from government, has not
been reversed.</p>
<p>However, it is increasingly difficult to argue that all is well with Indonesian democracy. The forthcoming elections aside, rampant corruption is perhaps Indonesia’s single biggest political issue. The courageous Corruption Eradication Commission is under continual attack from politicians and police. The human rights courts are virtually defunct and rarely hear cases. </p>
<p>The National Commission on Human Rights is ineffective; the Constitutional Court has faced its own corruption scandals; the press is confronting increasingly prohibitive defamation laws that assist politicians and oligarchs; and civil society is under pressure from elite push-back and Islamist provocation. </p>
<h2>Indonesia’s alt-right: trolls, hackers and vigilantes</h2>
<p>The tensions over Islam are part of a much older struggle in Indonesia
to determine who controls the interpretation of the religion, and thus
religious power. However, the recent rise of conservative Islamist
hardliners also resembles the rise of populism and conservative politics
elsewhere in the world. Islamist conservatives are in many ways
the local equivalent of America’s alt-right – and they are just as adept
at online disruption and manipulation.</p>
<p>Research by State Islamic University Jakarta links the rise of religious
intolerance among young Muslims to their increased access to the internet and social media. Indeed, Jakarta tweets more than any other city in the world, and Indonesians are very big users of Facebook, as well as WhatsApp, Instagram and Telegram, an encrypted-messaging service.</p>
<p>One of the best-known examples of online disruption involves the so-called Muslim Cyber Army, the most prominent of a number of tags adopted by Islamist trolls in Indonesia. Active across all platforms popular in Indonesia, Muslim Cyber Army members enjoy building an atmosphere of mystery, threat and self-importance, sometimes using the Guy Fawkes mask, popularised by the graphic novel and film V for Vendetta, of the hacktivist group Anonymous in their postings. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">Why hundreds of thousands of Muslims rallied against the Jakarta governor</a>
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<p>This is deeply ironic, given the distance between their ideological objectives and the libertarian ambitions of most Western hacktivist groups. The Muslim Cyber Army does, however, share a willingness to exploit online anonymity to enable criminal activity – for example, by hijacking the social media accounts of the dead.</p>
<p>An Indonesian researcher, Damar Juniarto, has shown that Muslim Cyber Army trolls are highly effective, working collectively and using tools such as Twitbots to flood Twitter with coordinated messages. They target their more liberal opponents by “doxing”: publishing their personal information and contact details. This often triggers physical attacks from groups such as the notorious vigilante organisation Islamic Defenders Front, or Front Pembela Islam (FPI), within a few days and, in some cases, police attention on suspicion of blasphemy. </p>
<p>A list of such targets went viral in a video produced by the “Blasphemer Hunter Team”. These groups have attacked President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as “Ahok”), foreigners and LGBTI Indonesians – targets they share with some prominent hardliner “buzzers”, or social media opinion leaders, many of whom are keyboards for hire.</p>
<p>Juniarto also suggests that many of these groups have close ties to politicians and senior military figures. Certainly, social media manipulation and “fake news” hoaxes produced by Islamist groups were powerful factors in the campaign that led to Ahok’s defeat in last year’s Jakarta gubernatorial elections. The winner was Anies Baswedan, a protégé of former general Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi’s possible rival in the 2019 presidential election.</p>
<p>It would be naive to think this won’t happen again in next April’s crucial legislative and presidential races. During the 2014 presidential campaign, Jokowi, a Muslim, endured claims he was a closet Christian and ethnic Chinese (his detractors chose to ignore the fact that his opponent, also a Muslim, has a Christian mother and siblings). </p>
<p>The upcoming presidential election – which may well be a rematch between Jokowi and Prabowo, but for the first time held simultaneously with legislative elections – is expected to see the most vicious cyber campaigning yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99211/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Indonesia has long been held up as a model of democratic transition in the Muslim world. This view of the country now needs rethinking.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/863412017-10-30T10:11:32Z2017-10-30T10:11:32ZIndonesia takes an ultra-nationalist turn against Islamic populism<p>After <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/indonesia-hizbut-tahrir-group-banned-protect-unity-170719050345186.html">banning Islamist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) through a decree in July 2017</a>, Indonesia has now moved to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-islamists/indonesia-passes-law-to-ban-organizations-deemed-against-its-ideology-idUSKBN1CT1JZ">codify in law government power to summarily disband community organisations</a> deemed to be against Pancasila, the country’s state ideology. </p>
<p>On Tuesday, October 24, of 445 lawmakers present, 314 members from seven factions agreed to approve a regulation in lieu of law on community organisation (Perppu Ormas). Some 131 members from three opposition factions objected. </p>
<p>HTI was one of the Islamist organisations that rallied against the former Jakarta governor, Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, for his comments on Islam. Ahok is now in jail after being convicted of blasphemy. </p>
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<p><em><strong>Read also:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">Why hundreds of thousands of Muslims rallied against the Jakarta governor</a></em></p>
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<h2>A battle of extremes</h2>
<p>The Perppu Ormas serves as <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/jokowi-forges-tool-repression/">a political tool for President Joko Widodo’s administration</a>. Jokowi, as the president is commonly called, is wary of the rise of Islamic populism. He has seen how it managed to mobilise large numbers of the Muslim community to bring down Ahok, a Christian Chinese-Indonesian widely seen as clean and competent by the Jakarta electorate. </p>
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<p><em><strong>Read also:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-we-worry-about-islamism-in-indonesia-77480">Should we worry about Islamism in Indonesia?</a></em></p>
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<p><a href="http://www.newmandala.org/jakarta-inequality-poverty-elite-pluralism/">Unable to rely on pluralist or tolerant Islam – which is poorly organised and lacks a large social or political base</a> – it seems that Jokowi’s administration views ultra-nationalism as the answer to rising Islamic populism in Indonesia.</p>
<p>In arguing for the Perppu Ormas, the government used militaristic language: “<a href="http://www.antaranews.com/berita/659587/kemendagri-tegaskan-perppu-ormas-jaga-persatuan-nkri">a threat to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)</a>)”, or “national alert” (<em>kewaspadaan nasional</em>). The military under Soeharto’s New Order regime commonly used these phrases to justify repressive approaches.</p>
<p>At this point, a return to military involvement in Indonesian politics is unlikely and would be unpopular. But the military clearly sees the Perppu as an opportunity to claw back some influence in political life. Several <a href="https://www.rappler.com/indonesia/berita/158618-tni-hadapi-ormas-anti-pancasila">high-ranking military personnel have publicly supported it</a>. </p>
<h2>Pancasila orthodoxy</h2>
<p>Since the declaration of independence in 1945, the relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state has been a constant source of debate. </p>
<p>In June 1945, leaders of the independence movement produced The Jakarta Charter, a document that laid out the first draft of the country’s founding principle, Pancasila. The charter <a href="https://tirto.id/sukarno-dalam-polemik-piagam-jakarta-cq7m">included an obligation for Muslims to follow Islamic law</a>. </p>
<p>But the country’s first president, Sukarno, deleted this, restating Pancasila’s first principle as “Belief in God Almighty”. Sukarno moved to embrace other religious communities, particularly in the eastern islands, with the aim of preventing them from making their own demands for independence. </p>
<p>This lack of clear acknowledgement in the Constitution of the dominance of Islam became a grievance among some Muslim communities. In 1949, the radical Darul Islam movement emerged in West Java, calling for Islam to be recognised as the basis of the state. It gained popularity in Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan. <a href="http://www.war-memorial.net/Indonesia-vs-PRRI,-Permesta-and-Darul-Islam-3.119">Sukarno ordered military operations</a> to dissolve the movement, resulting in an estimated 16,000 to 40,000 deaths. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=bescBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA383&lpg=PA383&dq=Under+Soeharto,+the+military+and+Islamic+groups&source=bl&ots=WofejlTPuR&sig=_iNnJuVS9Glg3XDswccmCCNiz_c&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiKoLSD043XAhWCJZQKHTDwDqIQ6AEIOzAE#v=onepage&q=Under%20Soeharto%2C%20the%20military%20and%20Islamic%20groups&f=false">Under Soeharto, the military and Islamic groups worked closely together</a> once again in the early days of the New Order to kill or imprison alleged communists. </p>
<p>Islamic groups had expectations of being offered political space in the regime. Instead, Suharto’s regime forced Islamic groups to unite in one political party, the United Development Party (PPP), which it tightly controlled. </p>
<p>The New Order also promoted Pancasila as “the single principle” for the country. Political and social organisations, including Islamic organisations, had no choice but to accept Pancasila as their ideological basis. </p>
<p>Religion is compulsory for all citizens, but this, too, followed Pancasila orthodoxy. Pancasila was used as a means to establish control, eliminating both the now banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Islamist movements as sources of contested power. </p>
<p>Suharto continued using the military to suppress dissent. The military was not only in charge of state security from foreign threats but also was involved in socio-political affairs through the so-called military’s dual roles (<em>dwi-fungsi</em>). The military repressed groups it saw as not adhering to Pancasila. This often involved violent means, such as the <a href="https://tirto.id/mengenang-33-tahun-tragedi-pembantaian-tanjung-priok-cwpi">Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984</a>, which resulted in more than 400 casualties. </p>
<p>The fall of Soeharto’s New Order in 1998 ushered in press freedom, multiparty democracy, the end of the military’s role in politics, and the lifting of restrictions on civil rights. </p>
<p>Today, there has been greater expression of Islam in everyday life. Diverse forms of political Islam - from liberal to radical - have emerged. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the past</h2>
<p>While HTI’s platform is considered <a href="http://redaksikota.com/nasional/36026/07/2017/usman-hamid-kita-boleh-tidak-suka-pada-tujuan-hti.php">intolerant and undemocratic</a>, it is still important not to ignore the lessons of the past simply to keep the current administration in power. </p>
<p>It might serve short-term goals for Jokowi. But the Perppu could have serious implications for the future of Indonesian democracy. </p>
<p>The Perppu ignores a legal process that is the base of democracy by giving the government the authority to disband any community organisation without trial. The Perppu as a legal product could be used like a “gun” being pointed to any direction depending on the interest of the “gun holder”. Even human rights defenders could be potential targets as seen in <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170918154027-12-242489/kivlan-zen-usul-pembubaran-lbh-jakarta/">the attempt to disband the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute</a>. </p>
<p>We are going to see these contested power plays at least until Indonesia’s next presidential election in 2019. Brace yourself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>A recently passed regulation in lieu of law allows the government to ban organisations deemed against Indonesia’s state ideology Pancasila. It marks a troubling turn towards ultra-nationalism.Hellena Yoranita Souisa, PhD Candidate Asia Institute - The University of Melbourne, The University of MelbournePrimatia Romana Wulandari, PhD Candidate School of Social and Political Science, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/783462017-09-05T07:49:48Z2017-09-05T07:49:48ZBeyond fake news: social media and market-driven political campaigns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179157/original/file-20170721-14755-1oj2cwa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Both camps in Jakarta's gubernatorial election this year engaged in post-truth politics. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For better or worse social media have become part of politics everywhere in the world, including in Indonesia. The entanglement of politics and social media is more pronounced in election campaigns as candidates and their supporters are aggressively using the platforms to win elections. </p>
<p>Advancements in communication technology make it easier and more affordable for political parties, politicians and supporters to get their message across. Based on recent developments, as exemplified by the cases of President Donald Trump in the US, “Brexit” in the UK, and the gubernatorial election (<em>Pilkada</em>) in Jakarta, some suggest that <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-100days-lloyd-commentary-idUKKBN15I214">social media campaigns are shaping accounts</a> to such an extent that the democratic process itself is under threat. </p>
<p>Many observers focus on the proliferation of fake news, pointing out that social media have ushered us into the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/post-truth-32226">post-truth</a> era. I, however, see fake news as a logical consequence of market-driven media and political campaigns. Today’s campaigns rely on a commercial framework where <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716206299149">marketing and branding</a> have become integral to campaign strategy. </p>
<h2>Both sides engage in post-truth politics</h2>
<p>During <em>Pilkada</em> campaigns, all candidates had designated social media teams as part of their branding strategy. Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok relied on <a href="https://jasmev.net/">Jasmev</a> and <a href="https://temanahok.com/">Teman Ahok</a>. Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono was supported by <a href="https://twitter.com/karib_ahy?lang=en">KaribAgus</a>, while Anies Baswedan established <a href="http://jakartamajubersama.com/">JakartaMajuBersama.com</a>. </p>
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<p>Although volunteers for all of the campaigns claimed they focused on positive messages, in practice this was not the case. Further, while none of the candidates publicly admitted to doing so, all employed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-indonesia-twitter-idUSBRE97L14T20130822">buzzers</a> who are paid for their tweets. </p>
<p>They also took advantage of micro-celebrities, such as Denny Siregar (pro-Ahok) and Jonru Ginting (anti-Ahok), to support their campaigns. Micro-celebrities are politically motivated individuals who use social media in presenting their political and personal selves to gain public attention to their cause.</p>
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<p>It is incorrectly assumed that lies and untruths revolved only around the anti-Ahok campaign, and that the Ahok campaign generally focused on <a href="http://insidestory.org.au/post-truth-politics-in-southeast-asia/">winning over the rational voters</a>. My data show both sides engaged in post-truth politics. They framed information and stories by appealing to emotions with very little or no regard to policy details and objective facts. </p>
<p>Both pro and anti-Ahok campaigns maintained websites that provided one-sided information. Most were created just months prior to the <em>Pilkada</em>. And, yet, some sites, such as seword.com, very quickly gained a popularity that matched or even exceeded mainstream news media. </p>
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<p>Some sites deliberately published fabricated content and disinformation. For example, some pro-Ahok websites were spoofs of Islamist websites, trying to make readers believe they were visiting the original websites. Examples include arrahmahnews.com, which was a spoof of arrahmah.com, voa-islamnews.com instead of voa-islam.com, and pkspuyengan.com instead of pkspiyungan.com. </p>
<h2>Hate groups silence alternative voices</h2>
<p>Ordinary users also played an important role in the campaign. While facilitating freedom of expression, social media also encourage users to practise the freedom to hate as individuals exercise their right to voice their opinions while actively silencing others. These dynamics provide fertile ground for sectarian and racist narratives to flourish. </p>
<p>Conversations and interactions among social media users on <em>Pilkada</em> were generally characterised by the construction of common enemies marked by derogatory labelling. </p>
<p>For example, the anti-Ahok camp labelled Ahok supporters with pejorative terms such as infidel (<em>kafir</em>), immoral (<em>maksiat</em>), forbidden (<em>haram</em>), liar, cheater, stupid, pig and tadpole. </p>
<p>Ahok supporters were not short of labels for their opponents either. They framed their opponents as anti-nationalist and traitors; radical Muslims (deviant Wahhabis, apostates, “robe-wearing thugs” (<em>preman berjubah</em>), terrorists and ISIS supporters), and anti-science (“the idiot tribe”, “camel people”, “flat-earth people”, “short-tempered people” and “angry mobs”). </p>
<p>The polarisation between the two camps was so prominent that it obscured other groups. Many Ahok and Anies voters did not belong to either camp. Some Jakartans voted for Ahok based on his achievements while disagreeing with some of his policies. Some Anies voters were troubled by <a href="https://medium.com/@forumkampungkota/the-invisibility-of-the-poor-83dc8cf18aa">Ahok’s pro-elite and anti-poor policies</a>. </p>
<p>These alternative voices, however, were not expressed on social media. In this polarised environment, any opinion or expression that was complex or nuanced, or simply did not adhere to either camp, was rarely welcome. </p>
<p>Here, we see the manifestation of the <a href="http://noelle-neumann.de/scientific-work/spiral-of-silence/">spiral of silence theory</a>. It suggests those who perceive their opinion group as ascendant, such as members of pro- and anti-Ahok groups, are more likely to express their opinions publicly. Those who perceive their opinions to be in decline choose to silence themselves to avoid threats of social sanctions, isolation and conflict. </p>
<h2>Algorithmic enclaves and digital tribal nationalism</h2>
<p>Studies show users’ exposure to information on social media is driven by <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/theo-priestley/the-algorithm-and-its-ech_b_12376054.html">algorithms</a> presenting information based on their own interests. This potentially puts social media users in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/22/social-media-election-facebook-filter-bubbles">filter bubble</a> that isolates them from a diversity of viewpoints. </p>
<p>I have observed, however, that Indonesian users typically have a large and diverse network of contacts (often more than 1,000 “friends”), which exposes them to varied discussions. For anti- and pro-Ahok social media users, however, disagreeable information just confirmed their own viewpoints. Further, it intensified the antagonistic relationships they cultivated with their opponents. </p>
<p>This dynamic perpetuates the formation of what I term “algorithmic enclaves”. They are formed whenever a group of individuals, aided by their constant interactions with algorithms, attempt to create a (perceived) shared identity online for sharing with each other, defending their beliefs and protecting their resources from both real and perceived threats. </p>
<p>The algorithm itself does not predetermine the formation of enclaves. It is not the information per se that facilitates amplification processes but the sharing and discussion of the information within the enclave, whether negatively or positively, that correlates with their pre-existing opinions. </p>
<p>Using the familiar phrase “NKRI <em>harga mati</em>” (Republic of Indonesia, non-negotiable), a mantra the New Order regime often used to suppress opposing ideologies, social media users claim and legitimise their own versions of tribal nationalism. At the same time, they exclude equality and justice for others. </p>
<p>The <em>Pilkada</em> case shows that social media use in electoral politics further deepens divisions among social groups and amplifies animosity and intolerance of each other.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is an edited excerpt of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188">“Freedom to hate: social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia”</a> in Critical Asian Studies.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78346/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Merlyna Lim tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesian politicians have engaged in post-truth politics, framing information and stories by appealing to emotions with very little or no regard to any policy details and objective facts.Merlyna Lim, Canada Research Chair in Digital Media & Global Network Society, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777202017-05-18T03:09:14Z2017-05-18T03:09:14ZAnti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiment is not new in Indonesia<p>Racial and religious prejudice faced by the outgoing Chinese-Indonesian governor of Jakarta, now imprisoned for blasphemy, is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese and Christians in Indonesia have endured systematic and long-standing discrimination throughout the nation’s history.</p>
<p>Earlier this month, the former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, was sentenced to two years in prison for blasphemy.</p>
<p>This conviction follows his defeat in last month’s Jakarta gubernatorial election to a Muslim candidate, former Indonesian government minister Anies Baswedan. Ahok’s opponents ran a campaign against him based on ethnic and religious grounds. </p>
<h2>The campaign against Ahok</h2>
<p>Ahok acquired the position of Jakarta governor by default. He was deputy governor to Joko Widodo, who vacated the governorship after winning the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. </p>
<p>At an election campaign event last year, Ahok told his audience that religious leaders who were using an interpretation of a verse of the Quran against him were <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/ahoks-defeat-bodes-ill-for-the-future/">fooling Indonesians</a>. These religious leaders interpreted Verse 51 of Al-Maidah as prohibiting non-Muslims ruling over Muslims. </p>
<p>Large protests demanding Ahok be jailed for blasphemy ensued. These were also laden with anti-Chinese slogans. For example, at a November 16 rally, some protesters <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-jakartas-first-chinese-indonesian-governor-became-an-easy-target-for-radical-islamic-groups-68178">chanted</a> “crush the Chinese”.</p>
<p>The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), an Islamic vigilante group, <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-governor-election-results-in-a-victory-for-prejudice-over-pluralism-76388">organised</a> some of these rallies. At one protest, FPI leader Rizieq Shihab <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2016/s4595491.htm">asked</a> protesters “would you accept an infidel as governor [of Jakarta]?” – a clear reference to Ahok. </p>
<p>Rizieq’s comment is unsurprising. The FPI consistently <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">opposed</a> Ahok serving as Jakarta’s acting governor due to his non-Muslim background. </p>
<p>During the election campaign, anti-Christian posters and banners could be seen in the streets of Jakarta. One such poster <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38942647">read</a> “it is forbidden to pick an infidel leader”. Another banner <a href="http://jakartaglobe.id/news/anti-ahok-banners-fill-streets-jakarta-ahead-run-off-election/">stated</a> that “Muslims who vote for an infidel [Ahok] … do not deserve a funeral prayer”.</p>
<h2>Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians</h2>
<p>Chinese-Indonesians, representing approximately 2% of Indonesia’s population of 250 million, experienced widespread discrimination during the Soeharto era (1966-98). </p>
<p>Soeharto’s regime banned Chinese language, newspapers, schools and cultural expressions. Chinese names were also prohibited. As a result, Chinese Indonesians were pressured to take Indonesian names. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/the-tragedy-of-may-1998">In May 1998</a>, during the devastating Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesians directed their anger against ethnic Chinese who they inaccurately perceived to be universally affluent. Rioters damaged Chinese Indonesians’ businesses in Jakarta’s Chinatown, Glodok, and in some cases burned them. During this period, many ethnic Chinese women were <a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/a-common-destiny">raped</a> and some ethnic Chinese were killed. </p>
<p>Under Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration (1999-2001), Indonesia <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27991754">ended</a> the ban on Chinese language, newspapers, schools and displays of Chinese culture. But discrimination against Chinese-Indonesians remains. </p>
<p>A 1967 decree prohibiting Chinese Indonesians from serving in the Indonesian armed forces remains in place. And, unlike non-Chinese Indonesians, Chinese-Indonesians possess an <a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/never-indonesian-enough">SBKRI</a>, a document that proves their Indonesian citizenship. This document is still sometimes required for Chinese-Indonesians to obtain passports, enrol in schools and acquire business licences. </p>
<h2>Discrimination against Christians in Indonesia</h2>
<p>Ahok is part of two minority groups in Indonesia. Christian Indonesians comprise roughly 10% of Indonesia’s population. They, too, have been discriminated against throughout Indonesia’s history. </p>
<p>Since 2006, 500 Christian churches have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/06/indonesias-growing-religious-intolerance-has-to-be-addressed">shut down</a> in Indonesia. Some Islamists have been using a 2006 government regulation, which requires religious leaders to obtain community support prior to building places of worship, to demand church closures. </p>
<p>Discrimination against Christians also occurred during the Soeharto era. In 1967, Muslim militants <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/28/religions-name/abuses-against-religious-minorities-indonesia">damaged</a> Christians’ properties in Jakarta, South Sulawesi and Aceh on the grounds of fighting Indonesia’s purported Christianisation. </p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>Following his election victory, Anies Baswedan publicly <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/04/19/anies-baswedan-takes-out-jakarta-election-pollsters">pledged</a> as the incoming Jakarta governor to “safeguard [Jakarta’s] diversity and unity”. </p>
<p>However, to ensure Indonesia remains an inclusive democracy, Anies needs to go further than this. He should directly denounce the ethnic and religious campaign mounted against Ahok, notably by the FPI. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Jokowi’s administration needs to dismantle Soeharto-era discriminatory regulations and policies against ethnic Chinese. </p>
<p>If Anies fails to denounce the ethnic and religious campaign against Ahok and Jokowi does not attempt to remove anti-Chinese laws and regulations, Indonesia’s history of discrimination against Chinese and Christian Indonesians will continue to repeat itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivia Tasevski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethnic Chinese and Christians in Indonesia have endured systematic and long-standing discrimination throughout the country’s history.Olivia Tasevski, Tutor in International Relations and Political Science, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/774802017-05-12T03:43:36Z2017-05-12T03:43:36ZShould we worry about Islamism in Indonesia?<p>Anxiety about radicalism and religious tolerance in Indonesia have triggered reactionary responses that could be dangerous for the country’s democracy. Joko Widodo’s administration recently announced <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/09/govt-moves-ban-hti.html">plans to disband Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia</a>, which seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate. The government is looking to implement legal measures to dissolve the Indonesian branch of the global Islamist group. </p>
<p>The move came amid increasing concern <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/ahoks-defeat-bodes-ill-for-the-future/">among some analysts</a> and members of the public about rising Islamic radicalism and religious intolerance.</p>
<p>Several analysts saw the victory of Anies Baswedan in the Jakarta gubernatorial election as an indicator of rising Islamism. This movement seeks to institutionalise certain literal understandings of the Quran in the political system.</p>
<p>Baswedan was supported by conservative Muslims. They had staged enormous protests demanding the jailing of his rival, then-incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better known as Ahok), who was embroiled in a blasphemy case for allegedly insulting Islam.</p>
<p>Even after the election, mass rallies continued to pressure the court to punish the Chinese-Indonesian, Christian non-active governor. The court recently sentenced Ahok to <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/05/09/055873617/Ahok-Sent-to-2-Years-in-Prison-for-Blasphemy">two years in prison</a>. </p>
<p>The court’s decision left many people feeling devastated. They rallied in a show of support for Ahok in front of the prison where he’s detained. Communities concerned by the rising influence of Islamist groups have launched social media campaigns defending the country’s founding principles of <em><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pancasila">Pancasila</a></em>. This promotes pluralism, among other values.</p>
<h2>Opportunist politicians</h2>
<p>There are elements of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/02/indonesias-religious-minorities-under-threat">intolerance and racism</a> in Indonesia. But that does not necessarily mean that an organised Islamic political movement is on the rise.</p>
<p>The problem is not an upsurge of Islamism. Instead, the problem is that political elites are increasingly exploiting religious sentiments and racism, especially as Indonesia approaches the 2019 presidential election. </p>
<p>Analysts have noted that in many Muslim-majority countries, Islamic political movements have shifted <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674291416&content=reviews">toward conservatism</a> rather than maintaining their Islamist tendency. Such movements have become more concerned with Islamisation of society through <em>dakwah</em> (religious outreach) instead of Islamising the state. This is because Islamism has failed to pass the test of power. </p>
<p>Islamist parties such as the PKS (Justice and Prosperous Party) in Indonesia and the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey have abandoned their Islamist agenda to broaden their political support in the contest for power in democratic political systems. </p>
<p>Signs of mainstreaming Islamic conservatism in Indonesia emerged 12 years ago, according to Dutch anthropologist <a href="https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/1806">Martin van Bruinessen</a>. Then, the MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council, a group of clerics) declared that secularism, pluralism and liberalism (<em>sipilis</em>) were incompatible with Islam.</p>
<p>This “Arabisation” of Islam in Indonesia was partly influenced by the transnational Islamic movement and the strengthening of conservative factions within mainstream Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Muhammadiyah and NU’s role in defining the friendly moderate Indonesian Islam was weakened. </p>
<p>Why did the conservative faction of “Indonesian Islam” became dominant in Indonesia’s democratic era and the moderate faction less so? To answer this question, we should put contestation between conservatives and moderates within the context of competition over power and resources.</p>
<p>The MUI has successfully disseminated anti-pluralist ideas since 2005 simply because the state provided the group with the opportunity to gain support from conservative Muslims. </p>
<p>On July 26, 2005, when <a href="http://nysean.org/post/indonesia-battle-over-islam">Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</a>, the sixth Indonesian president, opened the MUI national congress, he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We want to place [the council] in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the government or state should heed the fatwas from the council and ulamas.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This statement shows the state had a vital role in strengthening the MUI’s position, through which the organisation became more authoritative and influential in society. </p>
<p>The MUI’s 2005 fatwa on <em>sipilis</em>, for example, had legitimised vigilante groups to enforce Islamic morality. That same year, MUI also declared Ahmadiyya a deviant sect, prompting persecution of its followers. </p>
<p>In 2006, MUI successfully demanded the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Home Affairs issue a joint decision on regulating the building of places of worship. Following this, violence against the Christian minority increased. </p>
<h2>Remnants of Soeharto’s politics</h2>
<p>Such a state approach toward conservative Muslims is not new. </p>
<p>In the early 1990s, after decades of repressing religious organisations’ political power, Soeharto built an alliance with conservative Muslims to bolster his regime as a response to his rivals in the military. </p>
<p>Yudhoyono reproduced and continued Soeharto’s strategy in accommodating conservative Muslims as part of his alliance. This has allowed Islamic conservatism to gain strength in political and social life.</p>
<p>Such is also the case in 2017 Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. When many of the conservative Muslims organised mass protests against Ahok, Anies and his political supporters saw an opportunity to align themselves with this social force. </p>
<h2>Fragmented <em>Ummah</em></h2>
<p>Although conservatives consider Anies’ victory as theirs, it doesn’t mean that Islamic radicalism will flourish in Indonesian politics or that the state will be Islamised.</p>
<p>Social agents of conservative Muslims are very diverse. There’s a power struggle among them to represent the imagined <em>Ummah</em>, the unified Islamic community. </p>
<p>These agents range from Darul Islam and HTI, which attempt to Islamise the Indonesian state, to Islamic parties such as PKS that accept electoral democracy, and other groups such as FPI (Islamic Defender Front) that use vigilantism to enforce Islamic morality and embrace illiberal ideas. </p>
<p>The incoherent characteristics of the Islamic populist alliance have provided a route for political elites to be able to claim to be advocating Islamism to gain their supports. </p>
<p>Since there is no dominant Islamist agency that could represent a coherent <em>Ummah</em>, any political actors can claim to represent this community. Meanwhile, Islamic groups enjoy political access by building an alliance with powerful elites. </p>
<p>Thus, the proliferation of religious intolerance and racism in contemporary Indonesian politics should be understood as a means to maintain such an alliance for the next presidential election in 2019.</p>
<p>The fragmented nature of this Islamic populist alliance also indicates that conservative Muslims’ capacity to foster their Islamic agenda is weak. </p>
<p>Anies himself has <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/04/21/057868381/Anies-Baswedan-Denies-Plans-to-Issue-Sharia-Bylaws">maintained that his policy</a> will not be directed toward the Islamisation of Jakarta. His campaign team did not make any political contract with the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) for their support of his candidacy, he said. This means conservative groups like FPI will remain marginal, operating at the street level of politics. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, what is worrying is not the rise of Islamism, but the increasing tendency of political elites to mobilise religious sentiment and racism in the contest over power and resources. </p>
<p>Disbanding Islamist groups to supposedly counter rising radicalism is not only misleading but goes against Indonesian democracy’s guarantee of the freedom to organise. </p>
<p>Our concern and energy instead should be directed at the opportunistic political elites in the context of predatory democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are elements of intolerance and racism in Indonesia. But that does not necessarily mean that an organised Islamic political movement is on the rise.Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, PhD Candidate in Politics at the Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/729722017-02-16T01:13:09Z2017-02-16T01:13:09ZJakarta governor’s race a litmus test for Indonesia<p>Yesterday, Jakartans went to the polling stations to choose between a <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakartas-first-ethnic-chinese-governor-takes-indonesia-forward-30708">Chinese-Indonesian incumbent</a> accused of blasphemy by <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">conservative Muslims</a>, <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/29/they-may-look-down-at-me-but-i-will-prove-them-wrong-agus.html">a former president’s son</a>, and <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/22/anies-may-challenge-ahok.html">a former education minister</a> as the next governor of Indonesia’s capital. </p>
<p>Incumbent <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN15T2TG?il=0">Basuki Tjahaja Purnama leads the race</a> with 42.87% of votes, followed by former minister Anies Baswedan with 39.76%, according to a quick sample count of votes by <a href="http://pilkada.kompas.com/dki/">Kompas daily’s research and development team</a>. The election commission’s deadline to tally the votes is February 27. The commission is expected to announce the result by March 4. Based on pollsters’ quick count results, the election seems set to head for <a href="http://www.dw.com/id/jadwal-putaran-dua-pilkada-dki-jakarta/a-37559740">a second round in April</a>. </p>
<p>The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election may be one of the most important local elections in Indonesia’s history. </p>
<p>This election will influence whether reforms to transform Indonesia’s politics from an oligarchic system to a stronger democracy prevail. It will also determine the future path of Indonesian political trajectory in its relation between religion and the State.</p>
<h2>A stepping stone</h2>
<p>The Jakarta governor seat is coveted for its heightened political implication. Since president Joko Widodo won 2014 presidential election after his two-year stint as Jakarta governor, observers and individual politicians perceive the position as a stepping stone to the presidency. </p>
<p>It wasn’t always the way. Before 2012, individual politicians viewed the Jakarta governor post primarily as an administrative position. But, political parties covet it for its enormous budget. Jakarta’s projected annual budget this year is approximately Rp 62 trillion (or US$4.6 billion). The governor controls local state owned businesses (BUMD) worth Rp 82 trillion (or US$ 6.1 billion) in total assets in 2015. </p>
<p>Now, after Widodo, popularly called Jokowi, won the presidency, the race for the Jakarta governor’s post gives nation-wide exposure for every candidate. It also draws international attention. </p>
<p>It is now seen not only as a source of funding for political parties, but also a strategic position for a political career.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/156733/original/image-20170214-25992-1cxm5hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jakarta governor candidate former education minister Anies Baswedan (right) and his running mate businessman Sandiaga Uno.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Antara Foto/M Agung Rajasa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economic motives</h2>
<p>But that’s not the main reason this election is so important.</p>
<p>The Jakarta election has been marked by a strong resistance against the Christian Purnama, Jokowi’s former deputy who replaced him as governor. Popularly known as Ahok, he is backed by the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Jokowi’s ruling party.</p>
<p>Ahok is currently on trial for religious blasphemy after criticising his opponents for using Koran verses to warn against voting for him. In November and December, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hundreds-of-thousands-of-muslims-rallied-against-the-jakarta-governor-68351">Jakarta saw large rallies demanding his imprisonment</a>.</p>
<p>The resistance to Ahok’s nomination is greater than the political interests of his opponents.</p>
<p>The major players who were involved in <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/31/mui-recommendation-on-ahok-the-councils-strongest-kind-of-document-chairman-tells-court.html">building a narrative against Ahok</a> and mobilising the masses are those whose resources had been cut off by the “new wave politicians”, spearheaded by President Joko Widodo. </p>
<p>These politicians, including Ahok, Bandung mayor Ridwan Kamil, and Surabaya mayor Tri Rismaharini, who come from outside of the political cartel, are pushing for reforms, cutting off lucrative resources to political-religious actors.</p>
<p>This certainly has stepped on many interests, including quasi-religious organisations such as Indonesia’s top Muslim clerical body, the Council of Indonesian Ulema (MUI). For instance, <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/28/mui-govt-wrangle-over-halal-certification.html">the Jokowi government has cut MUI’s monopoly for religious certifications</a>. </p>
<h2>Religion-State relations</h2>
<p>Another key issue is the effect it would have on religion-state relations in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Ahok’s opponents’ camps have approached radical Muslim groups that organised rallies against Ahok. </p>
<p>A country of more than 400 ethnic groups, 700 languages, and six religions (that are officially acknowledged), Indonesia by nature and historical memory is open and pluralistic. </p>
<p>A Muslim majority, ethnic and religious issues in Indonesia have caused some tension. But never as volatile as that of the Middle East. Indonesia saw violent conflicts in Moluccas islands’ capital Ambon and in Poso, Central Sulawesi. But those were also against the characteristic of inter-ethnic and religious relations in Indonesia. Extremists from Java fuelled the conflict that lasted between 1999 and 2001. </p>
<p>In the past ten to 15 years, religious issues have become hot buttons. Indonesians have seen hardline Muslims, often with government support, attack the Ahmadiya and Shia Muslims, and shuttered churches in Indonesia. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s social fabric is mostly tolerant. The majority of the country’s different ethnic and religious groups have managed to live peacefully side by side. But the legal framework and politicians <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/01/27/regulating-religious-intolerance.html">thrive on religious and ethnic conflicts</a>.</p>
<h2>A litmus test</h2>
<p>The Jakarta election is a litmus test of the true feelings of Indonesians represented in Jakarta. Would religious and ethnic narratives be effective at swaying voters? </p>
<p>The result of this election will not necessarily answer whether Indonesian Muslims are tolerant or intolerant. But it will be a steep learning curve for politicians. </p>
<p>If religion and ethnic primordial lines make or break this election, politicians and Islamist groups will continue to destroy Indonesian pluralistic and tolerant Islam for political gains.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tobias Basuki receives funding from Knowledge Sector Initiative for a Policy Impact Study of the 2008 ITE Law.</span></em></p>Would religious and ethnic narratives be effective at swaying voters?Tobias Basuki, Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.