tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/benjamin-netanyahu-4668/articlesBenjamin Netanyahu – The Conversation2024-03-26T18:10:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266532024-03-26T18:10:35Z2024-03-26T18:10:35ZHow will the UN security council’s call for a Gaza ceasefire affect Israeli politics and relations with the US? Expert Q&A<p><em>Washington’s decision to abstain from voting on a UN security council resolution which calls for a ceasefire and an exchange of hostages with Hamas has angered Israel, which has traditionally counted on the US for unwavering support in international forums. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>The United Nations security council has passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and the return of the hostages held by Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated that Israel’s military campaign will continue. Does he have the full support of his government in this or is there a risk that any of his more moderate coalition partners will break ranks?</strong></p>
<p>UN security council <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931">resolution 2728</a> is a testimony to ambiguous drafting. It calls for an immediate ceasefire but only to cover the rest of Ramadan, which is only about two weeks. It also seems to link the ceasefire to the return of “all hostages” but is silent as to whether this is a condition for the ceasefire. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not mentioned nor are Israeli hostages. At the conclusion of the relevant paragraph there is a reference to all who are detained – again without reference to their identity. It’s also important to note that Hamas and other Palestinian sources refer to all Palestinian prisoners detained by Israel as “hostages”. As a result there are many possible interpretations of the obligations the resolution seeks to create. </p>
<p>Netanyahu <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/world/middleeast/israel-ceasefire-rafah-netanyahu.html">has denounced</a> the US for not vetoing the resolution. Any responsible Israeli leader would have used the ambiguities to say that Israel was already negotiating such a ceasefire and was waiting on Hamas’s reply to their proposals. But Netanyahu’s stance is about keeping his coalition going with the support of the far-right which will enable him to keep his job. </p>
<p><strong>New Hope party leader Gideon Saar has already quit after Netanyahu refused to appoint him to the war cabinet. Obviously this doesn’t bring down the government, but what does it mean in terms of the power dynamic in Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, particularly when it comes to the far-right parties?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gideon Saar</a> is effectively launching his campaign to be prime minister. He has been a long-term opponent of Netanyahu on the right. He stood for the leadership of Likud, Netanyahu’s party, in 2019. Then in 2021 he broke away and sided in the Knesset with the broad anti-Netanyahu coalition that was able to govern for 12 months before being defeated in November 2022.</p>
<p>Saar wanted to be in the war cabinet where the key decisions are being taken. But the far-right minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir, insisted that if Saar was appointed he would need to be as well. But Benny Gantz, one of three voting members of emergency war cabinet had made it a condition that no one from the far-right would be allowed to join.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gaza conflict: Washington's patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine</a>
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<p>Netanyahu is not yet ready to break relations with Gantz whose moderate politics plays well with foreign politicians. Saar knows this but wants to position himself to be the next leader of the right when the Netanyahu era is over. In the medium term it just illustrates how febrile Israeli politics are. </p>
<p><strong>Benny Gantz, who is a member of the war cabinet, has threatened to quit over proposed legislation that would exempt ultra-orthodox Jews from being conscripted into the army. The law would also put the government at loggerheads with Israel’s high court. What are the risks for the legitimacy of Netanyahu’s leadership?</strong></p>
<p>It is quite clear that Benny Gantz is trying to break up to the coalition. The ultra-orthodox parties in the ruling coalition really have one aim, which is to maintain the huge government financing of their communities. This is resented by the majority of Israelis especially given their general exemption from military service. </p>
<p>This is particularly stark when Israel is at war and more than 250 soldiers have been killed in action and thousands injured. Gantz knows that the last thing the Israel Defense Forces needs are thousands of reluctant recruits, but he also knows that it is a question of fairness that appeals to the vast majority of Israelis. Gantz is still <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240308-israel-poll-shows-gantzs-national-unity-party-leading-over-netanyahus-likud/">popular in the polls</a> and undoubtedly sees this issue as a weak spot for Netanyahu’s alliance.</p>
<p>Both the Sephardic and Ashkenazi chief rabbis have said that should the exemption be ended those affected should leave the country. Such statements give Gantz the opportunity of being seen as a patriot and taking the shine off Netanyahu’s nationalist credentials. So Netanyahu faces pressure from the ultra-orthodox, the far right, the more moderate right of Gideon Saar and from Benny Gantz at the centre. But the more these forces circle, the more Netanyahu doubles down on his rhetoric for complete victory over Hamas, seeing the war as his route to political survival. </p>
<p><strong>Netanyahu reacted to the US abstention by cancelling a visit from a high-level Israeli delegation to Washington for talks. But defence minister Yoav Gallant was already in Washington and is reportedly meeting with US officials. How does this affect the Israeli government’s unity?</strong></p>
<p>The Israeli delegation was asked by the Biden administration to discuss in detail the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/israeli-delegation-us-officials-plan-offensive-rafah-gaza-war">plans for the proposed Rafah operation</a> that Netanyahu has been talking about for weeks. The Americans wanted to know how it could be achieved without causing catastrophic civilian causalities among the 1.2 million people – mostly displaced – sheltering there. But instead of sending military experts, the delegation was headed by the minister for strategic affairs <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/07/world/middleeast/netanyahu-dermer-israel-war.html">Ron Dermer</a> (a Netanyahu confidant) and <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tzachi-hanegbi">Tzachi Henegbi</a>, a former right-wing rabble rouser now serving as national security adviser.</p>
<p>Neither are military experts and Dermer has not even served in the IDF. What they could have told the US military team they were there to brief would be interesting to hear. But these armchair generals will now be staying at home. </p>
<p>Gallant, meanwhile, continues his Washington talks as if nothing has happened. Despite being a member of Likud, Gallant has steered his course especially carefully since March last year when Netanyahu tried but failed to sack him over his opposition to the government’s unpopular judicial reforms, which Gallant said would endanger national security. </p>
<p>Having survived in part due to mass demonstrations in his support, Gallant has occupied a unique position in the cabinet, as someone who stood up to Netanyahu and survived. He is liked in Washington and Netanyahu is probably relieved that he is keeping lines of communication open with the Biden administration. But it’s hard to hide the contrast between Gallant’s meetings and Netanyahu’s pique at Washington’s decision to abstain on the security council vote.</p>
<p><strong>What does this say about the future of US-Israeli relations?</strong> </p>
<p>The US has only really seen Israel as strategic ally since the early 1970s. Until then relations had been more problematic. When Israel declared independence in 1948 a US arms embargo was in force. In the 1948 war it was Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia that gave Israel its military advantage. </p>
<p>In the 1950s and 1960s it was mainly France who supplied Israel with arms – <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-us-discovery-israels-secret-nuclear-project">including nuclear weapons</a>. The 1956 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez">Suez affair</a> – in which Israel attacked Egypt in coordination with Britain and France – was denounced by the US. But after the six-day war in 1967, the US became more engaged and interestingly has always promoted normalisation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The 1978 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david">Camp David Accords</a> when Israel and Egypt recognised each other underlined this. </p>
<p>My reading of this is the US entanglement with Israel since the 1970s has been about promoting a particular Middle East order. So we need to understand Israel-US relations in a regional context. </p>
<p>The Biden administration knows you can’t end a war without a peace plan – and that must mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, began his recent Middle East visit to Saudi Arabia, seeing Riyadh as central to a stable Middle East. Saudi recognition of Israel comes at the price of concrete steps to a Palestinian state. </p>
<p>The longer Netanyahu resists paying that price the more the agony of Gaza will continue. And all the while the US will have to ratchet up its pressure on the Israeli government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher on Israeli politics, answers questions about the US decision to abstain from voting on a UN security council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259362024-03-25T12:38:41Z2024-03-25T12:38:41ZIsrael’s ‘Iron Wall’: A brief history of the ideology guiding Benjamin Netanyahu<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583238/original/file-20240320-16-lzg9fz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C3052%2C1932&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of Khan Yunis in Gaza on Feb. 2, 2024, after weeks of continuous Israeli bombardment and bulldozing.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-with-destroyed-buildings-and-roads-news-photo/1973198679?adppopup=true">Abdulqader Sabbah/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled that Israel’s military will soon <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/19/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-rafah-offensive.html">launch an invasion of Rafah</a>, the city in the southern Gaza Strip. More than 1 million Palestinians, now on the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-malnutrition-famine-children-dying-israel-palestinians-2f938b1a82d7822c7da67cc162da1a37">verge of famine</a>, have sought refuge there from their bombed-out cities farther north. Despite U.S. President Joe <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-warns-netanyahu-an-assault-on-rafah-would-cross-red-line-c78677ba">Biden’s warning against the move</a>, Netanyahu appears, for now, undeterred from his aim to attack Rafah. </p>
<p>The attack is the latest chapter in Israel’s current battle to eliminate Hamas from Gaza. </p>
<p>But it’s also a reflection of an ideology, known as the “<a href="https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf">Iron Wall</a>,” that has been part of Israeli political history since before the state’s founding in 1948. The Iron Wall has driven Netanyahu in his career leading Israel for two decades, culminating in the current deadly war that <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Hamas-War">began with a massacre of Israelis</a> and then turned into a <a href="https://hhi.harvard.edu/news/humanitarian-situation-gaza">humanitarian catastrophe for Gaza’s Palestinians</a>.</p>
<p>Here is the history of that ideology:</p>
<h2>A wall that can’t be breached</h2>
<p>In 1923, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Jabotinsky">Vladimir, later known as “Ze’ev,” Jabotinsky</a>, a prominent Zionist activist, published “<a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-iron-wall-quot">On the Iron Wall</a>,” an article in which he laid out his vision for the course that the Zionist movement should follow in order to realize its ultimate goal: the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/timeline-for-the-history-of-judaism#brits2">at the time governed by the British</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a double breasted suit, wearing round glasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=832&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583249/original/file-20240320-20-uluqu0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1045&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vladimir ‘Ze'ev’ Jabotinsky, in Prague in 1933.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1176800">United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of L. Elly Gotz</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Jabotinsky admonished the Zionist establishment for ignoring the Arab majority in Palestine and their political desires. He asserted the Zionist establishment held a fanciful belief that the technological progress and improved economic conditions that the Jews would supposedly bring to Palestine would endear them to the local Arab population. </p>
<p>Jabotinsky thought that belief was fundamentally wrong. </p>
<p>To Jabotinsky, the Arabs of Palestine, like any native population throughout history, would never accept another people’s national aspirations in their own homeland. Jabotinsky believed that Zionism, as a Jewish national movement, would have to combat the Arab national movement for control of the land. </p>
<p>“Every native population in the world resists colonists as
long as it has the slightest hope of being able to rid itself of the danger of being colonised,” <a href="https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf">he wrote</a>. </p>
<p>Jabotinsky believed the Zionist movement should not waste its resources on Utopian economic and social dreams. Zionism’s sole focus should be on developing Jewish military force, a metaphorical Iron Wall, that would compel the Arabs to accept a Jewish state on their native land. </p>
<p>“Zionist colonisation … can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach,” <a href="https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf">he wrote</a>.</p>
<h2>Jabotinsky’s heirs: Likud</h2>
<p>In 1925, Jabotinsky founded the <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/revisionist-zionism">Revisionist movement</a>, which would become the chief right-wing opposition party to the dominant Labor Party in the Zionist movement. It opposed Labor’s socialist economic vision and emphasized the focus on <a href="https://www.knesset.gov.il/vip/jabotinsky/eng/Revisionist_frame_eng.html">cultivating Jewish militarism</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/1947%20UN%20Partition%20Plan.aspx">In 1947, David Ben Gurion and the Zionist establishment</a> <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-202101/">accepted partition plans</a> devised by the United Nations for Palestine, dividing it into independent Jewish and Palestinian Arab states. The Zionists’ goal in accepting the plan: to have the Jewish state founded on the basis of such international consensus and support. </p>
<p>Jabotinsky’s Revisionists opposed any territorial compromise, which meant they opposed any partition plan. They objected to the recognition of a non-Jewish political entity – an Arab state – within Palestine’s borders. </p>
<p>The Palestinian Arab state proposed by the U.N. partition plan <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Resolution-181">was rejected by Arab leaders</a>, and it <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/history/">never came into being</a>.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.gov.il/en/departments/general/declaration-of-establishment-state-of-israel">1948, Israel declared its independence</a>, which sparked <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war">a regional war between Israel and its Arab neighbors</a>. During the war, which began immediately after the U.N. voted for partition and lasted until 1949, more than half the Palestinian residents of the land Israel claimed were expelled or fled. </p>
<p>At the war’s end, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Partition-of-Palestine">the historic territory of Palestine was divided</a>, with about 80% claimed and governed by the new country of Israel. Jordan controlled East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>In the new Israeli parliament, Jabotinsky’s heirs – <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/herut-movement">in a party first called Herut</a> <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Likud">and later Likud</a> – were relegated to the opposition benches.</p>
<h2>Old threat, new threat</h2>
<p>In 1967, another war broke out between Israel and Arab neighbors Egypt, Syria and Jordan. It resulted <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/arab-israeli-war-1967">in Israel’s occupation of</a> East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">Yitzhak Rabin led Israel’s military</a> during that war, called the Six-Day War.</p>
<p>From 1948 until 1977, the more leftist-leaning <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Israel-Labour-Party">Labor Party governed Israel</a>. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Menachem-Begin">In 1977, Menachem Begin led the Likud to victory</a> and established it as the dominant force in Israeli politics. </p>
<p>However in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/24/world/israel-s-labor-party-wins-clear-victory-in-election-ready-to-form-a-coalition.html">1992, Rabin, as the leader of Labor, was elected as prime minister</a>. With Israel emerging as both a military and economic force in those years, fueled by the new high-tech sector, he believed the country was <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-would-rabin-do">no longer facing the threat of destruction</a> from its neighbors. To Rabin, the younger generation of Israelis wanted to integrate into the global economy. <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1994/rabin/facts/">Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict</a>, he believed, would help Israel integrate into the global order. </p>
<p>In 1993, Rabin negotiated <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">the Oslo Accords</a>, a peace deal with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The two men <a href="https://www.npr.org/2016/08/06/488737544/oslo-tells-the-surprising-story-behind-a-historic-handshake">shook hands</a> in a symbol of the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The agreement created a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as part of the pathway to the long-term goal of creating two countries, Israel and a Palestinian state, that would peacefully coexist.</p>
<p>That same year, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benjamin-Netanyahu">Benjamin Netanyahu had become the leader of the Likud</a> Party. The son of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/middleeast/benzion-netanyahu-dies-at-102.html">a prominent historian of Spanish Jewry</a>, he viewed Jewish history as facing <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/2012-04-30/ty-article/benzion-netanyahu-father-of-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-dies-at-102/0000017f-e958-d639-af7f-e9df59c90000">a repeating cycle of attempted destruction</a> – from the Romans to the Spanish Inquisition, the Nazis and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2018-07-05/ty-article/when-netanyahus-father-adopted-the-view-of-arabs-as-savages/0000017f-e00a-d3ff-a7ff-f1aa22770000">the Arab world</a>. </p>
<p>Netanyahu saw the Oslo peace process as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/interviews/netanyahu.html">the sort of territorial compromise</a> Jabotinsky had warned about. To him, compromise would only invite conflict, and any show of weakness would spell doom. </p>
<p>The only answer to such a significant threat, Netanyahu has repeatedly argued, is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-no-full-palestinian-state-no-surrender-in-exchange-for-gaza-hostages/">a strong Jewish state that refuses any compromises</a>, always identifying the mortal threat to the Jewish people and countering it with an <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/no-compromise-on-rafah-operation-israeli-pm-vows-to-continue-fight-despite-global-appeals/articleshow/107792076.cms">overwhelming show of force</a>. </p>
<h2>No territorial compromise</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, Netanyahu’s primary focus has not been on the threat of the Palestinians, but rather that of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/netanyahu-at-war/transcript/">Iran and its nuclear ambitions</a>. But he has continued to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/21/1225883757/israels-netanyahu-rejects-any-palestinian-sovereignty-post-war-rebuffing-biden">say there can be no territorial compromise</a> with the Palestinians. Just as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/22/netanyahu-biden-two-state-solution-palestine-river-to-sea/">Palestinians refuse to accept Israel as a Jewish state</a>, Netanyahu <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68025945">refuses to accept the idea of a Palestinian state</a>.</p>
<p>Netanyahu believed that only through strength would the Palestinians accept Israel, a process that would be <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/22/middleeast/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-cnn-interview-intl/index.html">aided if more and more Arab states normalized relations with Israel</a>, establishing diplomatic and other ties. That normalization reached new heights with the 2020 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Abraham-Accords">Abraham Accords</a>, the bilateral agreements signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and between Israel and Bahrain. These agreements were the ultimate vindication of Netanyahu’s regional vision.</p>
<p>It should not be surprising, then, that Hamas’ horrific attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, took place just as Saudi Arabia was <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-israel-netanyahu-politics-4d07d9fd0413c6893d1ddfb944919ae0">nearing normalization of relations</a> with Israel. In a twisted manner, when the Saudis subsequently backed off the normalization plans, the attack reaffirmed Netanyahu’s broader vision: The Palestinian group that vowed to never recognize Israel <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-07/saudi-says-no-ties-with-israel-unless-gaza-aggression-halted">made sure that Arab recognition of Israel would fail</a>. </p>
<p>The Hamas attack gave Netanyahu an opportunity to reassert Israel’s – and Jabotinsky’s – Iron Wall. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/12/israel-gaza-hamas-biden-netanyahu/">The massive and wantonly destructive war that Netanyahu has led</a> against Hamas and Gaza since that date is the Iron Wall in its most elemental manifestation: unleashing overwhelming force as a signal that no territorial compromise with the Arabs over historical Palestine is possible. Or, as Netanyahu has repeatedly said in recent weeks, there will be no ceasefire until there’s a complete Israeli victory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eran Kaplan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The destructive force that Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu has unleashed in Gaza is rooted in a century-old ideology that says overwhelming power is how Israel should deal with Palestinians.Eran Kaplan, Rhoda and Richard Goldman Chair in Jewish Studies, San Francisco State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262682024-03-21T17:11:46Z2024-03-21T17:11:46ZGaza update: the prospect of mass famine is beginning to change minds in Washington<p>As the casualty count on the Gaza Strip approaches 32,000 people, in itself a terrible and distressing statistic, another number also stood out this week. It <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/19/israels-war-on-gaza-live-israel-holds-al-jazeera-reporter-for-12-hours?update=2784185">is reported</a> that in the past week, more than 100 aid workers <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-gaza-israeli-forces-target-aid-workers-string-killings-imminent-famine">have been killed</a>. Twenty-three on March 19 as they waited at the Kuwait roundabout in Gaza City to receive an aid convoy, but others in raids which have reportedly focused on aid distribution centres and warehouses, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240320-israel-is-targeting-anybody-involved-in-organising-and-coordinating-the-arrival-of-aid-into-the-north-of-gaza/">according to the Middle East Monitor</a>.</p>
<p>In a situation such as the one unfolding in Gaza, with millions facing critical shortages of food, fuel and medicines, aid agency staff are precious frontline workers. They perform the vital – and very dangerous – task of coordinating aid distribution to 2 million desperate people. Like medical staff in a conflict situation, they are protected by the Geneva conventions.</p>
<p>As always against the background of a chaotic and politically sensitive conflict, it should be noted that these reports – like the overall death toll reports – originate with the authorities in Gaza and must be treated with due caution. But UNRWA, the United Nations relief agency for Palestinian refugees, reports that 165 of its workers have been killed in the five months of the conflict. </p>
<p>This is complicated by Israel’s claims that UNRWA workers were involved in the vicious October 7 attacks on Israel by Hamas, leading it to go so far as calling UNRWA an active participant in the conflict on the side of Hamas – although so far it has offered no evidence to support these claims. Despite this, the agency – which has an estimated 13,000 workers in Gaza – has had its funding paused by several countries, including the US and UK.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>All of which makes for distressing viewing on the nightly news. It’s fair to say that in many western countries – judging by the massive and regular protests calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian intervention in Gaza – the views of significant numbers of people are out of sync with the actions of their political leaders. </p>
<p>Which sets up an interesting dynamic in an election year for the US. Last week, a speech by Chuck Schumer, a senior Democrat who is the US Senate majority leader and a vociferous, longtime supporter of Israel – and, until recently at least, friend of its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu – called for Netanyahu to resign and make way for an election, adding:</p>
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<p>Nobody expects Prime Minister Netanyahu to do the things that must be done to break the cycle of violence, to preserve his credibility on the world stage, to work to a two-state solution.</p>
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<p>Schumer’s boss, Joe Biden, commented that he had made “a good speech”, adding that: “I think he expressed a serious concern shared not only by him but by many Americans.”</p>
<p>But, as John Strawson – an expert in Israeli politics at the University of East London – <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">writes here</a>, all indications are that this is highly unlikely. Manoeuvrings inside Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, Strawson believes, have actually shored up the prime minister’s position when compared with his main rival Benny Gantz. </p>
<p>Schumer also called for the Palestinian Authority to make changes at the top to usher in “a new generation of Palestinian leaders who will work towards attaining peace with a Jewish state”. But this looks highly unlikely too, given that the PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, has just appointed a decidedly old-school prime minister: Muhammad Mustafa is a 69-year-old political ally who hardly represents a new generation of leadership.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gaza conflict: Washington's patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine</a>
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<p>Schumer’s speech also bears examination for what it tells us about Washington’s attitude towards the Israeli government – at least on the Democrat side. As Dov Waxman, professor of Israel Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, tells Naomi Schalit, political editor of The Conversation US, Schumer’s speech marks “the culmination of a process that’s been underway for some time, whereby the Democratic Party has increasingly turned against Netanyahu”.</p>
<p>In this <a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-israel-but-anti-netanyahu-democratic-party-leaders-try-to-find-the-middle-ground-226050">illuminating interview</a>, Waxman sets out the nuances in the speech which, he believes, was aimed as much at a domestic audience of Democrat voters as at Israelis, Palestinians or the watching international community, with Schumer deliberately positioning the Democrats as pro-Israel but against the Netanyahu government and what it is doing in Gaza.</p>
<p>Hidden in the speech was a key phrase warning that if this goes on much longer, it will force the Biden administration to “play a more active role in shaping Israeli policy by using our leverage to change the present course”. By this, says Waxman, Schumer means that US military aid to Israel could be on the line. Now that would be a game-changer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-israel-but-anti-netanyahu-democratic-party-leaders-try-to-find-the-middle-ground-226050">Pro-Israel but anti-Netanyahu: Democratic Party leaders try to find the middle ground</a>
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<h2>By sea? By air?</h2>
<p>As you would expect, Biden made Gaza one of the key segments of his recent State of the Union address. With a view to voters on both sides of the spectrum, he apportioned blame carefully, noting that the conflict had begun with the Hamas assault on October 7 but adding that the overwhelming majority of the victims of Israel’s reprisal operation in Gaza have been innocent civilians.</p>
<p>Declaring that “it’s heartbreaking”, Biden announced that he had instructed the US military to build a temporary pier in the Mediterranean to enable the delivery of aid by sea. “No US boots will be on the ground,” he noted, adding that the pier would enable a “massive increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza every day”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘It’s heartbreaking’: Joe Biden’s 2024 State of the Union address.</span></figcaption>
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<p>But Foteini Stavropoulou of Liverpool John Moores University and Sarah Schiffling of Hanken School of Economics – both experts in aid distribution – believe this will fall far short of the capacity required to meet the urgent needs of the starving population of Gaza. Here, <a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-plan-to-build-a-pier-to-get-aid-into-gaza-isnt-enough-here-are-six-issues-needed-for-an-effective-aid-strategy-225369">they outline six steps</a> which could help get the required volumes of humanitarian aid into the besieged enclave.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-plan-to-build-a-pier-to-get-aid-into-gaza-isnt-enough-here-are-six-issues-needed-for-an-effective-aid-strategy-225369">Joe Biden's plan to build a pier to get aid into Gaza isn't enough – here are six issues needed for an effective aid strategy</a>
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<p>There have been airdrops of aid over the past weeks. Stavropoulou and Schiffling believe this is a delivery option of last resort, but for 12 months from 1948, the US and UK maintained an airlift into blockaded west Berlin, feeding more than 2 million people cut off by Soviet forces.</p>
<p>Claudia Milena Adler, an expert in humanitarianism with the University of York, and Abdullah Yusuf, an expert in international relations at the University of Dundee, compare what was achieved during the Berlin airlift with what is required now, and ask whether the west can perform the same miraculous service in Gaza. </p>
<p>They are not optimistic. Feeding Berlin in 1948 took a clear effort of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-if-theres-a-lesson-from-the-berlin-airlift-its-that-political-will-is-required-to-avoid-a-humanitarian-catastrophe-226243">political will</a> and western unity to achieve. It’s far from clear, they write, that the same political will exists today when it comes to Israel and Palestine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-if-theres-a-lesson-from-the-berlin-airlift-its-that-political-will-is-required-to-avoid-a-humanitarian-catastrophe-226243">Gaza war: if there's a lesson from the Berlin airlift it's that political will is required to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe</a>
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<h2>Ramadan in Rafah</h2>
<p>Back in January, the aforementioned Benny Gantz – a member of Israel’s war cabinet – said that unless all hostages were released, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would commence an assault on the city of Rafah by March 10 – which would coincide with the start of Ramadan. This, as the director of the Middle East Institute’s program on Palestine, Khaled Elgindy, said at the time, “adds a layer of distastefulness and outrage to an already pretty horrendous situation”.</p>
<p>In the event, the assault has not begun. Now we have a situation where almost daily, Biden and other senior world leaders warn Israel not to go into Rafah – where more than a million Palestinian refugees from the rest of the Gaza Strip are huddling and close to starvation. Meanwhile, Israel doubles down on its insistence that it still plans to carry out the assault.</p>
<p>Carlo Aldrovandi, a professor in international peace studies at Trinity College Dublin, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-ramadan-brings-fresh-fears-of-escalation-on-both-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-225367">explains the significance of Ramadan</a>, not only to the 2 million Palestinians trapped in Gaza but the wider Islamic world. And he warns that Islam’s holiest month could see increased violence on the West Bank, where tensions remain high.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-ramadan-brings-fresh-fears-of-escalation-on-both-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-225367">Israel-Hamas conflict: Ramadan brings fresh fears of escalation on both Gaza Strip and West Bank</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226268/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict in Gaza from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260502024-03-19T15:56:18Z2024-03-19T15:56:18ZPro-Israel but anti-Netanyahu: Democratic Party leaders try to find the middle ground<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582591/original/file-20240318-24-wbahpo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C8%2C5590%2C3724&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come under unusual criticism from Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-looks-on-as-the-news-photo/1719686694?adppopup=true"> Jacquelyn Martin / POOL / AFP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer <a href="https://apnews.com/article/schumer-netanyahu-israel-palestinians-elections-1ebf21e4c9c0f6f42478bb26e1db7a9b">said on March 14, 2024</a>, “The Netanyahu coalition no longer fits the needs of Israel.” It was an extraordinary public criticism of a longtime ally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, by an American government official.</em> </p>
<p><em>Against the background of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-malnutrition-famine-children-dying-israel-palestinians-2f938b1a82d7822c7da67cc162da1a37">imminent famine in Gaza</a>, Schumer, the top Democrat in Congress and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/us/politics/schumer-netanyahu-israel-elections.html">highest-ranking Jewish elected official in the U.S.</a>, said Netanyahu was “an obstacle to peace” and called for new elections in Israel.</em> </p>
<p><em>Leading <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-15/ty-article/.premium/schumer-clears-path-for-democrats-to-disavow-netanyahu-will-biden-follow/0000018e-425d-d95b-a7bf-e75fd3f40000">Democratic senators praised</a> Schumer’s speech, while <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4532827-republicans-seethe-over-schumer-call-for-israeli-elections/">the GOP panned it</a>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/us/politics/biden-netanyahu-schumer-speech.html">President Joe Biden said it</a> was “a good speech” that raised concerns “shared not only by him but by many Americans.”</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s senior politics and democracy editor, Naomi Schalit, interviewed <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pgpEt8MAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar Dov Waxman</a> about Schumer’s speech. Waxman, an expert on both Israeli politics and the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691181158/trouble-in-the-tribe">American Jewish community’s relationship with Israel</a>, described the speech as a watershed moment in the U.S.-Israel relationship.</em> </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer gives a speech in which he calls for new elections in Israel.</span></figcaption>
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<p><strong><a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-03-17-2024-ab0b75fdd8f0ab51c5e38b1870afecd8">Netanyahu’s response to Schumer</a> was, “The people of Israel will choose when they will have elections, and who they’ll elect.” What does Schumer’s speech mean for Netanyahu, both in the U.S. and in Israel?</strong></p>
<p>I don’t think most Israelis are paying much attention to what Schumer said. They’re focused on the war and especially on the current negotiations to secure a cease-fire and hostage agreement. </p>
<p>But Schumer is right that the vast majority of Israelis have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">completely lost confidence in Netanyahu</a> and his government and want him to be replaced as prime minister. Yet there isn’t majority support for immediate elections. <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/52742">A plurality of Israelis want early elections to take place after the war ends</a>. At the same time, I think the positions Schumer was putting forward – particularly about the need to create a Palestinian state – are not ones that are widely shared by most Israelis. </p>
<p>Schumer’s speech matters more for American politics than for Israeli politics. It marks the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/15/politics/schumer-israel-speech-analysis/index.html">culmination of a process</a> that’s been underway for some time, whereby the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/03/15/schumer-biden-democrats-shift-gaza/">Democratic Party has increasingly turned against Netanyahu</a>. This is not just the progressive wing of the Democratic Party <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/16/1213406754/jewish-voters-biden-israel-hamas-war">but also the moderate wing and the most pro-Israel Democrats</a>. <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-15/ty-article/.premium/schumer-clears-path-for-democrats-to-disavow-netanyahu-will-biden-follow/0000018e-425d-d95b-a7bf-e75fd3f40000">Schumer is one of the most pro-Israel senators</a> in American history. He’s had a long relationship with Netanyahu and was considered a friend of Netanyahu. So, the break between Democrats and Netanyahu is now complete. Netanyahu has clearly become persona non grata for the Democrats.</p>
<p><strong>What was Schumer’s strategy in giving the speech?</strong></p>
<p>What Schumer, and to some extent the Biden administration, are doing is trying to position the Democratic Party as anti-Netanyahu but not anti-Israel. They want to make a distinction that it is possible and indeed necessary to take issue with Netanyahu’s policies, but that doesn’t mean that you’re not supporting Israel. </p>
<p>That’s an attempt to triangulate between the different political pressures that the Democrats are under and the political risks that Democrats now face. President Biden’s strong support for the war in Gaza has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">become a domestic political liability for him</a> and for the Democratic Party as a whole. On the one hand, they need to try to win back support among progressives, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/16/1213406754/jewish-voters-biden-israel-hamas-war">younger Democrats</a> and especially among <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/will-angry-arab-american-voters-swing-michigan-away-from-biden-/7519681.html">the Arab American voters who are outraged</a> over the Biden administration’s support for the war. But they need to do that without alienating Jewish American voters and moderate Democrats who support the war and, broadly speaking, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/12/08/americans-views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/">support Israel</a>. </p>
<p>This is an attempt to find that balance without incurring major domestic political costs.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man holds a sign that reads, 'Chuck Schumer, thanks' during a protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A man expresses his gratitude toward U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer during a protest calling for the release of hostages and against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government on March 16, 2024, in Tel Aviv, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-holds-a-sign-that-reads-chuck-schumer-thanks-news-photo/2089768566?adppopup=true">Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><strong>Schumer can say what he wants, Biden can say what he wants, and Netanyahu keeps doing what he wants. If what Schumer and Biden say doesn’t affect the behavior of the Israeli government, can it be effective domestically in the U.S.?</strong> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-senator-chuck-schumers-speech-israeli-elections-are-the-only-way/">Buried in the speech</a> is a real political bombshell. Schumer said that if Netanyahu and his coalition remain in power and continue to pursue “dangerous and inflammatory policies that test existing U.S. standards for assistance,” then the U.S. will be forced to “play a more active role in shaping Israeli policy by using our leverage to change the present course.”</p>
<p>It’s not the first time that a U.S. senator or policymaker is raising the threat of <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4453366-democrats-propose-amendment-conditioning-aid-to-israel-over-delivery-of-humanitarian-assistance-to-gaza/">potentially conditioning U.S. military aid</a>. But Schumer doing so sends a message to Israeli policymakers that mainstream, pro-Israel Democrats are now willing to consider something that was previously politically taboo, namely conditioning U.S. aid to Israel. That could induce changes in Israeli policy. </p>
<p><strong>What kind of changes?</strong></p>
<p>Specifically, the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza, which has become a major public <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-netanyahu-hot-mic-gaza-885b97a75d15d15ae7f7a47d0125c918">dispute between the U.S. and Israel</a>. But whatever changes it does bring about in Israeli policy toward Gaza and the Palestinians, I don’t think it’s going to be nearly enough to satisfy the left or progressives and others who oppose the Biden administration’s policy. </p>
<p>But there’s a moderate middle, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/u-s-jews-connections-with-and-attitudes-toward-israel/">particularly many American Jews</a>, who don’t want the Biden administration to stop supporting Israel but <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-781227">dislike Netanyahu</a> and his right-wing policies. What Schumer is saying is that the Democratic Party is the party for them, that it is a place for people who, while supporting Israel, have deep concerns about the Israeli military’s conduct in Gaza, and are frustrated with the Israeli government’s refusal to present a real plan for the day after, and its stonewalling on any prospect for a Palestinian state. </p>
<p>Schumer is expressing the sentiments of those voters, who we often don’t hear about because it’s often those on the left and the right whose voices drown out that silent majority in the middle.</p>
<p><strong>Are Schumer and Biden ahead of American public opinion or behind it?</strong></p>
<p>I think they are, as is typical of politicians, behind public opinion. The distinction between supporting Israel while criticizing its government has already been largely accepted for some time now among Jewish Americans. But it hasn’t always been reflected among politicians, who felt that when they supported Israel, they had to uncritically support the Israeli government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
What does it mean when a staunch supporter of Israel in Congress says he no longer supports Israel’s leadership? It’s a new kind of relationship between the longtime allies.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259152024-03-18T17:08:04Z2024-03-18T17:08:04ZGaza conflict: Washington’s patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine<p>The US senate majority leader Chuck Schumer – a Democrat and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/us/politics/schumer-netanyahu-israel-elections.html">highest-ranking Jewish official</a> in US history – has called for the removal of both Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, seeing both as representing the politics of the past. </p>
<p>In an incendiary intervention, Schumer – a longtime and stalwart supporter of Israel – <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-14/ty-article/.premium/senate-majority-leader-calls-for-new-elections-in-israel/0000018e-3d65-d67c-a18e-ff6d1f4a0000">told the Senate</a> that the continuing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is testing US patience and that the lack of vision by both current Israeli and Palestinian leaders for the future beyond the war is also at variance with US policy.</p>
<p>Of the Israeli prime minister, he said: “Nobody expects Prime Minister Netanyahu to do the things that must be done to break the cycle of violence, to preserve his credibility on the world stage, to work to a two-state solution.” </p>
<p>Turning to Netanyahu’s counterpart in Ramallah, Schumer was equally forthright: “For there to be any hope of peace in the future, Abbas must step down and be replaced by a new generation of Palestinian leaders who will work towards attaining peace with a Jewish state.”</p>
<p>Reflecting on his fellow Democrat’s comments, US president Joe Biden said Schumer had made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/15/schumer-netanyahu-speech-biden-reaction">“a good speech”</a>, adding that: “I think he expressed a serious concern shared not only by him, but by many Americans.”</p>
<p>Schumer’s speech came at the end of a week where Israeli and Palestinian politics showed how far away they are from the kind of change that Schumer rightly says is necessary.</p>
<p>Shifting factional politics has made Netanyahu’s position more secure. On March 12, Gideon Saar – a key powerbroker in the ruling coalition and an ally of Netanyahu’s biggest rival Benny Gantz – announced he was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-statesmanlike-right-why-gideon-saar-has-decamped-gantzs-national-unity-party/">pulling out of his alliance with Gantz</a> and demanded that Netanyahu appoint him to the war cabinet. This has weakened Gantz while strengthening Netanyahu’s position. </p>
<p>The last opinion poll taken before Saar’s announcement showed Gantz with a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-finds-44-of-israelis-prefer-trump-over-biden-as-next-us-president/">12-point lead over Netanyahu</a> and the opposition winning 74 seats out of the 120 Knesset seat if there were an election. But, with Saar’s change of allegiance, an election that could bring about the change that Schumer wants to see now appears further away.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Ramallah, the Palestinian president called on Muhammad Mustafa, a close associate, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-14/ty-article/.premium/pa-president-abbas-to-ask-mohammad-mustafa-to-form-new-palestinian-government/0000018e-3cac-d30d-a7de-7cbf89b70000">to be prime minister</a> after the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh in February. </p>
<p>Washington had expressed the hope that Abbas would reach outside his circle and appoint a fresh face, maybe choosing a candidate from the next generation that could project the hope of a revitalised Palestinian Authority (PA). While Mustafa is two decades younger than Abbas, at 69 he hardly qualifies as someone who can relate to a Palestinian population with a median age is <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-11-14/population-religion-and-poverty-the-demographics-of-israel-and-gaza#">21.9 years</a>.</p>
<p>Schumer’s frustration with the regional politics reflects a long-held view in Washington. Many US presidents have found Benjamin Netanyahu difficult to deal with, going back to Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Even Donald Trump had problems with Netanyahu, as the then US president’s <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/deal-of-the-century-what-is-it-and-why-now/">“deal of the century”</a> provided for a Palestinian state – small and weak though it would have been.</p>
<h2>Testing US support</h2>
<p>The Biden administration had thought that its solidarity with Israel after the October 7 atrocities would at least give it some influence over Israel’s response. </p>
<p>It has provided significant financial and human resources to Israel over the past five months. It has been resupplying much-needed military equipment while providing a diplomatic safety net through its veto at the UN security council. </p>
<p>This has been backed by the assiduous efforts of US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to achieve a ceasefire and the return of the Israeli hostages. But Washington has watched in horror as its ally flattened Gaza and exacted a terrible civilian death toll.</p>
<p>Schumer is right when he says that Netanyahu’s alliance with Israel’s far-right is driving the country towards pariah status. The Gaza tragedy is accompanied by a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-occupied-west-bank-since-october-7-movement-restrictions-and-collective-punishment/">vicious conflict in the occupied West Bank</a>, which has seen a rising number of Palestinian civilian deaths as a result of both IDF action and settler violence. All of this is aimed at undermining any moves towards reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians and a two-state solution.</p>
<p>Abbas succeeded Yasser Arafat as the president of the PA on Arafat’s death in 2004. He won the election in 2005 but has not held elections since. His administration lacks legitimacy and is widely seen as corrupt. </p>
<p>The combination of inefficiency and corruption of the PA and the continuing inhumanities of more than five decades of Israeli occupation alienates many Palestinians from any idea of peaceful coexistence with Israel and increases the attractiveness of extremist views. Schumer is right that there are extremists on both sides who want the destruction of the other,</p>
<p>But the US administration and leaders like Schumer are unable to change the politics of either Israel or Palestine, all they can do is call for new leaders. </p>
<p>Indeed, some might argue that all this noise about replacing leaders of other countries not only smacks of colonialism but could have the opposite effect. Netanyahu and Abbas – who are both beleaguered at home – might find it useful to have a foreign adversary as a foil to shore up domestic support. Both will pose as defenders of the nation. </p>
<p>With conflict resolution, the challenge is to bring together leaders who are often deeply flawed and who advance reprehensible policies. If they weren’t so flawed and unable to see the other side’s point there would not be a conflict. Schumer has shone a light on the extremist politics in both Israel and Palestine. The political developments in both countries this week make the vision of a peaceful future look more difficult. </p>
<p>And that’s why the US and the international community need to rise to the challenge. Less rhetoric and more practical peacebuilding would be a good start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>But there is little sign that either side is listening.John Strawson, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253672024-03-12T14:39:29Z2024-03-12T14:39:29ZIsrael-Hamas conflict: Ramadan brings fresh fears of escalation on both Gaza Strip and West Bank<p>Ramadan has begun, but the 2 million or so inhabitants of the Gaza Strip will have little choice about whether they can observe the customary daylight fasting during the month-long festival. The continuing blockade of the 141 square mile enclave has reportedly reduced some people to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68239320">eating cattle feed</a>, and there remains the dire prospect of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146997">widespread famine</a> if there isn’t a massive and rapid increase in the volume of aid getting to people.</p>
<p>A sea corridor <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/12/first-aid-ship-to-gaza-leaves-cyprus-port">has been opened</a> between Cyprus and Gaza and the first shipments of aid are arriving from Europe. But it’s thought that it <a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-plan-to-build-a-pier-to-get-aid-into-gaza-isnt-enough-here-are-six-issues-needed-for-an-effective-aid-strategy-225369">will be difficult</a> to get a sufficient amount of food, fuel and medicine in by sea.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, negotiations between Israel and Hamas have come to a grinding halt. Both sides have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-chief-blames-israel-stalled-ceasefire-talks-leaves-door-open-2024-03-10/">accused each other</a> of hindering the talks, which were meant to secure the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.</p>
<p>Last month Benny Gantz, a member of Israel’s war cabinet, said the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would begin a ground offensive in Rafah, southern Gaza, to coincide with the start of Ramadan. This varies depending on where you are in the Islamic world and depends on the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/11/world/middleeast/ramadan-moon-sighting.html#">appearance of the early crescent moon</a>. So while authorities in Saudi Arabia reported a sighting on Sunday March 10, other countries, including Iran, reported seeing the crescent moon a day later. </p>
<p>The idea of a major Israeli offensive timed to coincide with Islam’s most important festival has drawn <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/ramadan-israel-hamas-war-impact">criticism from around the world</a>. It “adds a layer of distastefulness and outrage to an already pretty horrendous situation,” Khaled Elgindy, director of the Middle East Institute’s program on Palestine, told Foreign Policy. “It adds more pressure on Arab governments to at least look like they’re doing something,” he added.</p>
<p>Ramadan is a central event in the Islamic holy calendar, commemorating Muhammad’s first revelation of what would later become the Qur'an. A duality of emotions characterises the month-long festival.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Ramadan is a joyous religious holiday when Muslim friends and families celebrate by sharing large meals and exchanging presents. On the other, it is a time of profound spiritual communion with Allah and the Muslim Ummah (community). It is marked by disciplined fasting, intense study of the Qur'an and prayer, accompanied by acts of charity towards less fortunate Muslims facing hardship.</p>
<p>A major military offensive would be a serious provocation to Muslims across the world. It could trigger a new wave of anti-Israeli demonstrations, and completely derail the Arab-Israeli normalisation process that began with the signing of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in September 2020.</p>
<p>If it goes ahead, an Israeli assault on Rafah – where more than a million Palestinians have fled to escape the violence – could play into the hands of those in Hamas’s leadership, including the group’s leader in Gaza, Yahyah Sinwar, who said in February that international pressure would force Israel to end the war. The death toll, according to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/12/israels-war-on-gaza-live-2000-medical-staff-starving-in-north-ministry">Gaza health ministry</a>, has topped 31,000 with nearly 73,000 more people injured. </p>
<h2>West Bank</h2>
<p>Reports <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/rising-concerns-tensions-east-jerusalem-ramadan-begins-no-cease-fire-s-rcna142749">from the Old City of Jerusalem</a>, meanwhile, describe how the usual festivities that take place on Ramadan’s eve were replaced by feelings of sadness over the situation in Gaza and apprehension about the future of the Palestinian people. Instead of being bustling with activity, the narrow alleys of the Old City were almost empty, with many local shops closed. The traditional lights and decorations were <a href="https://www.jerusalemstory.com/en/blog/no-public-celebrations-or-decorations-jerusalem-ramadan">not in evidence</a>.</p>
<p>There is apprehension, too, that al-Aqsa mosque on what Jews call the Temple Mount could become a significant flashpoint for further disturbances, which could quickly spiral out of control. According to <a href="https://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=17&verse=1&to=1#">Surah 17 in the Qur'an</a>, Muhammad ascended to heaven from the site of Al-Aqsa after his miraculous night journey from Mecca. The holy site is traditionally visited by tens of thousands of Muslim pilgrims each day as part of their Ramadan celebrations.</p>
<p>Israel’s national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir – a far-right ideologue on whom Netanyahu depends to hold on to his majority in the Knesset – <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gvir-calls-to-bar-palestinian-authority-residents-from-temple-mount-on-ramadan/">proposed a blanket ban</a> on “Palestinian authority residents” from accessing the site during Ramadan. But the war cabinet has ruled this out. Instead the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has ruled that men over the age of 55, women over 50, and children up to the age of ten will be allowed access.</p>
<p>Restrictions on worshippers visiting the holy site could be particularly problematic during the last ten days of Ramadan when Muslims sleep inside the mosque and rise early for morning prayers. </p>
<p>It is still uncertain whether the delicate calm at al-Aqsa will persist throughout the upcoming month. On March 10, despite Netanyahu’s assurances that there would be no restrictions, the Israeli security forces prevented many young Palestinians <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/police-scuffle-with-worshipers-outside-al-aqsa-mosque-compound-on-1st-night-of-ramadan/">from entering the mosque</a> for Ramadan’s opening prayer. </p>
<p>That instantly resulted in scuffles at one of the shrine’s entrances, with Israeli officers using batons on the Palestinian crowd. The situation in the days ahead may become far more challenging as thousands of Muslims are expected at Al-Aqsa for Friday prayers. </p>
<p>A new IDF campaign in overcrowded Rafah, a drastic curtailment of Muslim worship rights at al-Aqsa or an excessive use of violence by the Israeli police in the Old City of Jerusalem could be all it takes to ultimately ignite the fuse and set the whole region on fire.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225367/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Aldrovandi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major ground assault on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip during one of Islam’s most important months could result in a major escalation of violence.Carlo Aldrovandi, Assistant Professor in International Peace Studies, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247122024-03-07T13:03:42Z2024-03-07T13:03:42ZWhy Israel’s economy is resilient in spite of the war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580093/original/file-20240306-18-g3idi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=648%2C0%2C2356%2C2005&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/back-shot-several-soldiers-israel-army-1423050641">Melnikov Dmitriy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s war in Gaza and more limited conflict with Hezbollah on its northern border with Lebanon is taking a toll on the Israeli economy. </p>
<p>In the final quarter of 2023, Israel’s gross domestic product (GDP) – a measure of a country’s economic health – <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/publications/Pages/2024/Monthly-Bulletin-of-Statistics-February-2024.aspx">shrank by almost 20%</a>. Consumption dropped by 27% and investment by 70%.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that these are annualised figures relative to the same period a year ago. The 5.2% drop in GDP from the third quarter was substantial, but it is likely to be a temporary setback unless the war with Hezbollah intensifies.</p>
<p>The outbreak of war disrupted <a href="https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/a09-11-23/">around 18%</a> of Israel’s workforce. In October, 250,000 civilians fled or were evacuated from border communities. Meanwhile, around 4% of the workforce – some 300,000 people – were called up as reservists as Israel mobilised for its military offensive.</p>
<p>Over the next few years, the war will cost Israel an estimated <a href="https://boi.org.il/media/ruuby3mw/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-22124.pdf">255 billion shekels</a> (£56.6 billion) due to reduced economic activity and increased expenses. But the <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Israels-ratings-to-A2-changes-outlook-to-negative-Rating-Action--PR_484801">projected rise</a> in national debt from 60% to 67% of GDP by 2025 is manageable, as is the plan to raise annual military spending from 4% of GDP to <a href="https://boi.org.il/media/ruuby3mw/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-22124.pdf">6%</a> or <a href="https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/s15g7mett">7%</a> by the end of the decade. </p>
<p>Israel entered the war with a relatively low national debt and foreign currency reserves equivalent to about 40% of annual GDP. Its population is young and still growing, and <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2022/def20_1857/h_print.pdf">data</a> reveals that Israel has surpassed current military spending levels before. Between 1967 and 1972, military spending averaged 20.3% of GDP, rising to 28.7% from 1973 to 1975 before stabilising at 20.8% between 1976 and 1985.</p>
<p>The years following the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and through the first Lebanon war (1982–85) are often referred to as “lost years” for Israel’s economy. Per-capita GDP growth averaged <a href="https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en">4.8%</a> in the 12 years before this period; over the following 12 years it dropped to just 0.8%. Inflation gradually rose, <a href="https://www.globes.co.il/finance/indexprice/inflation.asp?Lang=HE">peaking at 445%</a> during 1984.</p>
<p>So the question is not if Israel can weather the current storm, but whether the burden of higher military spending will be offset by budget cuts elsewhere to ensure economic growth resumes and public debt returns to a sustainable trajectory. </p>
<p>So far, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and other members of his coalition have resisted <a href="https://economists-for-israeli-democracy.com/">advice</a> from economists to change the government’s spending priorities. They have done so for fear of upsetting the small but influential constituencies whose votes keep them in power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Benjamin Netanyahu speaking in front of an Israel flag with his right hand outstretched." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Benjamin Netanyahu speaking at a meeting in Berlin, Germany, in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/berlin-germany-20230316-prime-minister-benjamin-2276731307">photocosmos1/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Political opportunism</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has demonstrated a good grasp of market economics. As finance minister between 2003 and 2005, Netanyahu implemented <a href="https://www.nevo.co.il/FilesFolderPermalink.aspx?b=books&r=%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99+%D7%A2%D7%AA%5C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99+%D7%A2%D7%AA%5C%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98+%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94%5C%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%9A+%D7%99">sweeping reforms</a> that lowered tax rates, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/543634">privatised state companies</a> and raised the state pension age. He also used his tenure to curtail the country’s bloated benefits system and introduce requirements for job training.</p>
<p>Yet since the start of Netanyahu’s second term as prime minister in 2009 (the first was 1996–99), many of these reforms have been <a href="https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/government/documents/addCoalition2009_2.pdf">scaled back or eliminated</a>, particularly the cuts to the benefits system. This benefits system disproportionately advantages the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community, whose parties form part of Netanyahu’s governing coalition.</p>
<p>Netanyahu was once again elected as prime minister in November 2022. Though a proponent of a limited role for the state, his new government included a record 34 different ministries. This was to satisfy the appetite for patronage and ministerial salaries among the different coalition partners as well as factions within his own Likud party. </p>
<p>To secure the continued support of ultra-Orthodox parties he also promised unprecedented <a href="https://www.idi.org.il/articles/49642">levels of funding</a> for religious schools and seminaries. In seminaries, grown men spend their lives studying religious texts at the public’s expense and are exempt from military service. Despite the need to fund the war and for more young men in uniform, Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich, the finance minister, have <a href="https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/bkerxsacp">resisted</a> nearly all suggestions that these budget items be reduced.</p>
<p>Here we have a case study where political opportunism easily defeats ideology. We know what Netanyahu believes and what he understands about good economic policy, and we can isolate these from what he is willing to do to remain in office. </p>
<p>Will he choose to defray some of the costs the war will impose on the budget by eliminating wasteful spending on useless ministries? Or will he introduce policies that grow the economy by incentivising higher labour-force participation among the ultra-Orthodox community? The plan for the moment is to borrow more.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two ultra-Orthodox men holding signs written in hebrew." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ultra-Orthodox men protesting for the release of a religious youth who was jailed for refusing to serve in the military in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/safed-israel-oct-19-2017-ultra-1026922030">David Cohen 156/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Strong civil society</h2>
<p>We may also overestimate the role politicians and governments play in ensuring a country’s success. Since its founding in 1948, Israel’s electoral system of proportional representation has yielded weak, unstable coalitions.</p>
<p>Historically, the Likud party has strongly supported the independence of the country’s judiciary. But after the last election, Netanyahu’s government introduced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-65086871">new legislation</a> that, among other things, would have given the Knesset (parliament) the power to override Supreme Court decisions with a simple majority vote. </p>
<p>Had these changes been implemented they would have further magnified the worst properties of the country’s dysfunctional (unwritten) constitution. People do not invest money in countries where court decisions can be overturned by politicians and property rights are not secure.</p>
<p>Yet, despite the weaknesses of its government institutions, Israel has absorbed millions of poor refugees from every corner of the Earth, has fought back when attacked and has defeated far larger neighbours over its 75-year history. It has done so all while transforming itself from an impoverished backwater to a first-world economy and a centre of high-tech innovation. </p>
<p>In the first nine months of 2023, hundreds of thousands of Israelis <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/12/israel-protests-judicial-curbs-supreme-court-challenge">demonstrated</a> in the streets to defend the rule of law and the independence of the country’s judiciary. Many of those same people rushed to join their reserve units on October 7 to defend the country’s borders. Others, acting without any government direction, <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/bjd1lrmlp">organised relief</a> for the survivors and displaced while ministers dithered or disappeared from view.</p>
<p>Countries with strong civil societies and highly engaged populations survive and even prosper not because of their political leaders, but despite them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Ben-Gad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>War is taking a toll on Israel’s economy.Michael Ben-Gad, Professor of Economics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247642024-02-29T12:55:31Z2024-02-29T12:55:31ZWhat is Netanyahu’s plan for a post-conflict Gaza and does it rule out a workable ceasefire? Expert Q&A<p><em>In recent days Joe Biden has been promising that a deal for a ceasefire is very close to agreement. But at the same time the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has revealed his vision for Gaza once the fighting stops, which appears to rule out Palestinian sovereignty on the strip. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>After weeks of wrangling, Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has published his vision for a post-conflict Gaza. How compatible is it with the idea of a two-state solution? To what extent is his tough line influenced by the more hawkish members of his government who take a hardline attitude to Palestinian sovereignty?</strong></p>
<p>Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/27/post-war-gaza-plan-netanyahu-israel-day-after-future-abbas/">plan for a post-war Gaza</a> is simply not practical and does not rise to the political challenges of the times. It is based on two principles: Israeli security control over Gaza and a civil administration run by non-Hamas officials. </p>
<p>But there has been Israeli security control over Gaza in one form since 1967 and it has not brought security for either Israel or Palestinians. There is no reason to think that the Israel Defense Forces can do better now, especially after this catastrophic war. At the same time, it is difficult to see where the non-Hamas Palestinian officials will come from. Hamas has had a tight grip of Gaza since 2007 and anyone with any experience of administration is likely to be a member of Hamas, a sympathiser or someone used to working with Hamas. </p>
<p>While there is opposition to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, there is little organised political opposition that could replace them. Like the US and Britain in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, when they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/29/usa.iraq">banned officials from the Ba'athist party</a> from the administration, chaos will follow. The only realistic option is to extend the power of the Palestinian Authority – presently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/what-is-the-palestinian-authority-and-how-is-it-viewed-by-palestinians">based in Ramallah</a> – into Gaza. But Netanyahu and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-elections-benjamin-netanhayu-set-to-return-with-some-extreme-new-partners-193814">far-right allies</a> think it will advance pressure for a two-state solution – something they are opposed to. </p>
<p><strong>To what extent is this a starting point for Netanyahu? Has he left himself the political space to manoeuvre given pressure from the US and other international allies?</strong></p>
<p>The plan was provided mainly due to international pressure – especially by the Americans. It should be noted that the US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, has been raising the issue of post-conflict Gaza with the Israelis since November and it still took months to produce this flimsy document. </p>
<p>This gives us an insight into how difficult it is in practice for the US administration to use its apparent power over the Israeli government. Netanyahu has much experience of dealing with American politicians and plays the system very well. He knows that Biden needs a calmer Middle East as a background to his re-election bid in November. As a result, the bargaining relationship is quite complex. </p>
<p>Netanyahu clearly thinks he has time on his side. The nearer it gets to the US election the more difficult it gets for Biden to please the progressive Democrats who want a ceasefire and the more traditional Democrats who have Israel’s back. What Netanyahu is doing is the minimum in the hope of hanging on hoping for a Trump win. </p>
<p><strong>Does Netanyahu’s vision reflect the feelings of the Jewish community in Israel? What about Arab voters? The prime minister appears deeply unpopular among most voter groups – is his intransigence more about maintaining his hold on power than on seeking a workable long term solution?</strong></p>
<p>While Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">deeply unpopular</a> with all sections of the Israeli public, we have to be careful in reading the public mood on policies for a post-war dispensation. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/opinion/israel-hostage-negotiations-entebbe.html">Polling suggests</a> that support for a two-state solution is declining. Israelis have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">so traumatised by October 7</a> that there is little support for Palestinian empowerment. </p>
<p>To some extent this is the result of the way that the Israelis view their country’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. It is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/a-decade-later-israelis-see-gaza-pullout-as-big-mistake/2015/08/14/21c06518-3480-11e5-b835-61ddaa99c73e_story.html">often presented</a> as an example of what happens when Israel ceases to occupy Palestinian land. In this account Israel leaves Gaza and Gaza becomes an armed encampment with the aim of destroying Israel – and indeed this <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67039975">remains Hamas’s policy</a>, despite the group releasing an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/doctrine-hamas">amended charter in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>But the 2005 disengagement which included dismantling all Israeli settlements in the strip was not the result of negotiations, but a unilateral act. The then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, did not want to hand over power to the elected Palestinian Authority, thinking it would boost the PA’s for statehood. Instead, Israel just left – and that allowed Hamas, the major political force in Gaza, to claim that Israel has <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/45870/chapter-abstract/400820054?redirectedFrom=fulltext">“retreated under fire”</a>. Hamas then capitalised on the situation and went on to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1">win the Palestinian legislative</a> elections in 2006. </p>
<p>The lesson of this is that Israel needs proper negotiations that can lead to a sustainable future – and that can only mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. That is not merely right for the Palestinians but essential in any plan to defeat Hamas. It’s not only a military operation but a political one and Palestinians need to be offered a peaceful and just alternative.</p>
<p><strong>The US president, Joe Biden, has been talking up the idea of a ceasefire deal in recent days. But Netanyahu’s plan seems to make the deal brokered in Qatar an impossibility. Is Netanyahu serious about bringing an end to the conflict? Or is talk about a possible deal more about Israel’s need to be seen to be playing the game as well as optimism from a US president who needs to be able to show to his own voter base that he is getting results?</strong></p>
<p>Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert argues that Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-02-22/ty-article-opinion/.premium/netanyahus-messianic-coalition-partners-want-an-all-out-regional-war/0000018d-d237-d06c-abbd-daf733870000">dragging Israel into a long term war</a> to save himself. Olmert draws some drastic conclusions from his analysis suggesting that Netanyahu and his far-right allies want a permanent war that would also see Palestinians driven out of the West Bank. That might seem too apocalyptic – but it does convey a sense of the mismatch between US aims and the Israeli political dynamic.</p>
<p>Talks are going on simultaneously in Qatar, in Paris and in Cairo. It is evident that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/what-we-know-so-far-about-the-draft-israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal#:%7E:text=It%20envisions%20a%2040%2Dday,and%20fuel%20to%20start%20rebuilding.">formula for a 40-day ceasefire</a> has been agreed but there is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">wrangling over the details</a>. Much of this focuses on the grizzly trading over how many Palestinian prisoners will be exchanged for which Israeli hostages – both those still alive and those dead. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">Gaza war: Palestinian prisoners will be a key condition of any ceasefire deal – here's why</a>
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<p>What is quite clear is that both Israel and Hamas have been dragging their feet as each thinks it is gaining the advantage by continuing the fighting. But with the arrival of the month of Ramadan (beginning March 10 – the date that Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">plans to begin</a> its ground assault on the city of Rafah) there is some likelihood of a Ramadan truce. </p>
<p>Netanyahu is under <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/19/pressure-building-netanyahu-hostages-hamas-israel">massive popular pressure</a> in Israel to move on the hostages even if that means painful concessions. Hamas is also under pressure by the masses of displaced Gazans who just want a semblance of a bearable existence for their families. So while Washington is exerting maximum pressure on Israel and its Arab allies, it is likely to be factors in Israel and Gaza that will lead to at least a temporary ceasefire. The challenge will then be to use the time to produce something permanent. </p>
<p><strong>Is it even feasible for the Israeli government to continue with its policy of refusing to deal with Hamas?</strong></p>
<p>In effect Israel has been dealing with Hamas indirectly all along. If the Israeli war aims were being successful it would not have to be negotiating with them over the hostage release issue. But I think that it’s now no longer possible for Israel to talk to Hamas politically. In 2009 I thought <a href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/author/michael-walzer-john-strawson-ghada-karmi-donna-rob/">it was still possible</a> At the time it seemed possible that Hamas and Israel could agree a <em>Hudna</em>, an Islamic legal term for a long-term truce. But October 7 and subsequent Hamas statements and actions show that its real policy is the annihilation of Israel. So there is nothing to speak about. The real question is Israel speaking to the Palestinian Authority and having a viable plan for Gaza after the war rather than a renewed occupation. </p>
<p>The key to the next stage is to create a security mechanism that can replace the IDF and ensure the security of both Israel <em>and</em> the Palestinians. The international community – in particular the UN – has to stop being rhetorical and start being practical about peacemaking. What is needed is a security force that will give both Israelis and Palestinians confidence that the situation will change. Both sides must be able to feel secure – no more atrocities like October 7 and the Israeli response which has now killed 30,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians – and a high proportion of which have been women and children. </p>
<p>What is required is a multinational force that combines Arab League and Nato forces under perhaps Saudi command. Unless there is movement on this issue, there is little chance of a framework where any meaningful talks can take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, answers questions about the Israeli prime minister’s plan for Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242062024-02-22T18:01:32Z2024-02-22T18:01:32ZGaza update: Biden ups the pressure on Israel as deadline for Rafah assault approaches<p>Joe Biden’s most senior Middle East adviser, Brett McGurk, has arrived in Israel to push for a deal to halt the war in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. McGurk has served each successive president since joining George W. Bush’s national security team in 2005, and his presence in the region at this increasingly crucial time, as Israel prepares for a ground assault on the overcrowded southern Gaza city of Rafah, is an indication of the urgency with which the Biden administration views the situation.</p>
<p>Thus far, intransigence on both sides has scuppered various initiatives aimed at securing a ceasefire. Last week, after Benjamin Netanyahu pulled Israeli negotiators out of talks in Egypt, blaming Hamas for refusing to budge on what he called its “ludicrous” demands, Israel’s prime minister pledged to press ahead with the Rafah offensive. However, his war cabinet member Benny Gantz said this week that a deal might still be possible.</p>
<p>Failing that, the prospect of an all-out assault on Rafah, where more than a million Palestinians from across the Gaza Strip have taken refuge, on March 10 – the start of Ramadan – is very real. Casualties are likely to be enormous, unless people are given somewhere to escape to.</p>
<p>Biden has repeatedly urged Netanyahu to rethink the assault on Rafah, calling for a “credible and executable plan” for protecting and supporting the Palestinians sheltering there. And as Paul Rogers, an internationally respected expert in Middle East security issues at the University of Bradford, notes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">there is a precedent</a>.</p>
<p>In 1982, during the war between Israel and Lebanon, the then-US president Ronald Reagan telephoned Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to demand he call off the 11-hour bombardment of West Beirut, where thousands of fighters from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were sheltering. “Menachem, this is a holocaust,” Reagan is reported to have said. Begin duly called off his bombers.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ronald and Nancy Reagan with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and his daughter Matt Milo in the White House, Setpember 1981." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Friends in high places: Ronald and Nancy Reagan hosting a state dinner for Menachem Begin and his daughter, Matti Milo, in September 1981.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Collection</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Rogers highlights the long and close association between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In a country where pretty much anyone who is anyone has served in Israel’s military, this counts for a lot. Perhaps, he writes, the IDF could put extra pressure on Netanyahu to reconsider. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-will-israel-respond-to-us-pressure-to-tread-carefully-in-rafah-there-is-a-precedent-224171">Gaza war: will Israel respond to US pressure to tread carefully in Rafah? There is a precedent</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, satellite images and video footage have revealed that Egypt is building what appears to be a large concrete enclosure on its side of the Rafah crossing. Analysts believe this is being prepared as a contingency for dealing with what could be hundreds of thousands of displaced persons pushed out of Gaza into the Sinai peninsula.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Gillian Kennedy, an Egypt specialist at the University of Southampton, has been considering what <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">such an exodus would mean</a> for Egypt’s strongman president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. </p>
<p>Sisi is not popular at home. He may have won an election last year with 89% of the vote, but given the lack of opposition candidates, this was hardly surprising. Egypt’s economy is in a parlous state, with rampant inflation and stubbornly high unemployment, so having to host a huge influx of refugees is not something Sisi will be anticipating with much relish.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Egypt building a large concrete structure on its side of the Rafah crossing.</span></figcaption>
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<p>And the close relations between supporters of Hamas and Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood – Sisi’s implacable foes – make this prospect all the more unpalatable, Kennedy concludes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-israels-assault-on-rafah-approaches-egypt-prepares-for-a-flood-of-palestinian-refugees-224020">As Israel's assault on Rafah approaches, Egypt prepares for a flood of Palestinian refugees</a>
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<h2>Grim in Gaza</h2>
<p>For Palestinians trapped in Gaza, meanwhile, there is the spectre of starvation. The world’s major authority on food insecurity, the IPC Famine Review Committee, estimates that 90% of Gazans are facing acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>Yara M. Asi, a food security expert at the University of Central Florida, writes that people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">resorting to eating cattle feed and grass</a>. They are hunting cats for food. And things are likely to get worse, Asi observes. The UN agency responsible for coordinating aid in Gaza, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), says it will have to cease operations in March after many of its funders withdrew over Israeli allegations that UNRWA staff had taken part in the October 7 Hamas attacks. </p>
<p>And, making matters worse, Israeli bombing has destroyed bakeries, food production facilities and grocery stores. It is now estimated that, of the people facing imminent starvation in the world today, 95% are in Gaza.</p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<p>Of course, food production facilities and shops aren’t the only things that have been reduced to rubble by the IDF during its relentless four-month assault. For decades, the people of Gaza had become used to a cycle of destruction and rebuilding writes Yousif Al-Daffaie, a researcher in the field of cultural heritage and post-war countries at Nottingham Trent University. But this time around, the devastation has been so complete that there is almost nothing left to rebuild.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1738543040560570514"}"></div></p>
<p>Most importantly for the soul of Gaza, nearly 200 sites of cultural importance have been wrecked, including an ancient harbour dating back to 800BC, a mosque that was home to rare manuscripts, and one of the world’s oldest Christian monasteries. This act of what Al-Daffaie calls <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">“urbicide”</a> includes Palestine Square in Gaza City, a popular meeting place, and Gaza’s only public library on Omar Al-Mukhtar Street, one of Gaza City’s two main streets, which has been totally destroyed.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-destruction-of-gaza-s-historic-buildings-is-an-act-of-urbicide-223672">The destruction of Gazaʼs historic buildings is an act of 'urbicide'</a>
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<h2>Israel: hurt, angry and isolated</h2>
<p>All the while, the world is watching. What has become clear since the vicious Hamas attack on October 7 sparked Israel’s brutal military response is the massive disconnect between how most Israelis and much of the rest of the world see this current episode. </p>
<p>Eyal Mayroz, a senior lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, says that while the outside world sees daily reports of death and suffering in Gaza, in Israel much of the media <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">remains focused</a> on the pain of the attack by Hamas and the plight of the 130 remaining hostages and their families.</p>
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<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-israelis-and-the-rest-of-the-world-view-the-gaza-conflict-so-differently-and-can-this-disconnect-be-overcome-223188">Why do Israelis and the rest of the world view the Gaza conflict so differently? And can this disconnect be overcome?</a>
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<p>Ilan Zvi Baron of Durham University and Ilai Z. Saltzman of the University of Maryland highlight the pain and anger of most Israelis since October 7. They write that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">reaction of some on the progressive left</a>, some of whom celebrated the Hamas attack as an act of anti-colonial resistance, is not understood in Israel. This, they say, is a problem for Israel’s peace movement, which now feels more isolated than ever and unable to pressure their government to work harder for a peaceful solution.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">Gaza war: blaming Israel for October 7 Hamas attack makes peace less – not more – likely</a>
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<h2>Listen up: peace polling</h2>
<p>Finally, regular readers may recall <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">an article we published</a> by Colin Irwin, a researcher at the University of Liverpool whose work with “peace polling” played a key role in the negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland. Irwin noted that he was set to reprise his role when Barack Obama won the US presidency in 2008, but a lack of political will and Netanyahu’s refusal to include Hamas put paid to any chance of peace talks succeeding at that stage.</p>
<p>In this week’s episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, Irwin explains how peace polling emerged from his work among Canada’s Inuit minority, and has been used from Sri Lanka to Cyprus.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-how-opinion-polls-used-in-northern-ireland-could-pave-a-way-to-peace-224085">Israel-Gaza: how opinion polls used in Northern Ireland could pave a way to peace</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict in Gaza from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238402024-02-22T17:42:08Z2024-02-22T17:42:08ZTrump is no Navalny, and prosecution in a democracy is a lot different than persecution in Putin’s Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577170/original/file-20240221-28-m21taj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=39%2C23%2C5258%2C3510&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A memorial to Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny laid in Saint Petersburg on February 16, 2024. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flowers-lay-next-to-a-picture-of-late-russian-opposition-news-photo/2008317893?adppopup=true">Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/alexei-navalnys-death-what-do-we-know-2024-02-18/">death of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny</a>, announced on Feb. 16, 2024, lays bare to the world the costs of political persecutions. Although his cause of death remains unknown, the 47-year-old died while serving a 19-year sentence in a Siberian penal colony.</p>
<p>“Three days ago, Vladimir Putin killed my husband,” <a href="https://youtu.be/wx3vHdFRvMo?si=nnodKFrIZSmX7M_0">said Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya</a>, in a Feb. 19 video. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/16/1231980139/alexei-navalny-who-was-he">anti-corruption activist</a> turned opposition leader, Navalny shone a light on the brutal excesses of President Putin’s regime. Like Navalny, Putin’s political opponents are routinely subjected to sham investigations, detained without due process and often die under suspicious circumstances. Navalny <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/chemical-burns-poisoning-prison-alexei-navalny-persecution">survived poisoning in 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Not a week since the death and former President Donald Trump already compared himself <a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111958285847100029">favorably to Navalny</a>. “The sudden death of Alexei Navalny has made me more and more aware of what is happening in our Country,” Trump wrote on social media. Prosecutors, the courts and his political opponents, including President Joe Biden, were “leading us down a path to destruction” in “slow, steady progression.”</p>
<p>Facing four criminal indictments encompassing 91 felony counts, Trump has often declared that he is the victim of <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4136508-trump-after-jan-6-arraignment-if-you-cant-beat-him-you-persecute-him/">political persecution</a>. His Republican <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/laura-ingraham-trump-america-real-political-prisoner">allies in media</a> <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4477525-navalny-death-underlines-gop-divisions-in-trump-era/">and government</a> parrot this refrain. </p>
<p>Is there merit to Trump’s claim that the U.S. legal system is little more than the puppet of Putin-like machinations, in which courts are hijacked to knock out political rivals? </p>
<p>I am a scholar who studies the <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-trump-would-inevitably-be-political-and-other-countries-have-had-mixed-success-in-holding-ex-presidents-accountable-174648">prosecutions of political leaders globally</a>. It is true that such prosecutions have become <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-a-president-is-divisive-and-sometimes-destabilizing-heres-why-many-countries-do-it-anyway-188565">increasingly common</a> in the past two decades. Often, distinguishing good faith proceedings from bad faith “witch hunts” is not a fact-based exercise, especially for the targets of investigations and among their supporters. </p>
<p>But the law and evidence help to elucidate some themes that lead any reasonable observer to categorically differentiate Navalny – and other victims of bona fide maltreatment – from Trump.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A screenshot of a social media post by Donald Trump that says in part, 'The sudden death of Alexei Navalny has made me more and more aware of what is happening in our Country.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577173/original/file-20240221-26-9vysi6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After Alexei Navalny’s death, Trump compared his situation being prosecuted with the fate of Navalny.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111958285847100029">Screenshot Truth Social</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Insulating justice</h2>
<p>Legitimate prosecutions involve the rule of law applied, without fear or favor, to alleged violators of statutes or constitutional provisions. Persecutions involve the illegitimate use of law against one’s opponents to gain partisan advantage, also called “<a href="https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/lawfare">lawfare</a>.” </p>
<p>Current and former leaders in democracies with a strong rule of law, including the U.S., have little to fear of persecution, even if more are subject to prosecution. </p>
<p>In corruption trials ranging from former <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/01/972453743/former-french-president-sarkozy-found-guilty-of-corruption-sentenced-to-jail">French president Nicolas Sarkozy</a> to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html">Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-legal-proceedings-crime-jacob-zuma-africa-5107230f76bb2ada8593a285d2a0e12a">South Africa’s Jacob Zuma</a>, democracies young and old have proved capable of conducting robust investigations, trials and even detentions of leaders, without officials overstepping constitutional restraints or generating cycles of recrimination.</p>
<p>Whether this world-wide uptick in prosecutions is due to an increasing propensity for executives to commit criminal acts, or reflects improved tools for judicial investigations, matters little. In these cases, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-cases-counts-charges-strengths.html">as in Trump’s</a>, there was significant evidence of criminal behavior. To ignore that would have undermined, not upheld, the rule of law.</p>
<p>There are safeguards unique to democracies to ensure the impartial application of law, even to current or former heads of government. Under many common law and civil law systems, judicial members are non-partisan and enjoy <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-independence-judiciary">independence from the political</a> – executive and legislative – branches. </p>
<p>Most democracies allow constitutional review by the courts of executive and legislative actions across different jurisdictions and appellate levels. These reviews guarantee checks and balances between branches but also within the judiciary to prevent any one prosecutor or judge from running amok. </p>
<p>Some prosecutors or judges are elected in the U.S. Criminal indictments can be issued by grand juries, as in Trump’s cases.</p>
<p>Democracies are also self-correcting. In Brazil, then-former president Lula da Silva was tried after leaving office in 2011 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10841416">on corruption allegations and subsequently jailed</a>. But the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Luiz-Inacio-Lula-da-Silva">Supreme Court annulled the sentence</a> because they determined a prosecutor in the case demonstrated political bias. Lula was released from prison and won re-election in 2022. </p>
<h2>Advantages to facing prosecution</h2>
<p>Politicians in democracies who are prosecuted will no doubt cry foul and play the victim card. This helps to shore up political muscle, as seen with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/31/monday-briefing-what-does-lulas-victory-mean-for-the-future-of-brazil">Lula’s 2022 victory</a> and <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/2024/national/">Trump’s 2024 polling among Republicans</a> and <a href="https://abc7chicago.com/2024-new-hampshire-primary-election-results-donald-trump-nikki-haley-hampshir/14355069/">early primary victories</a>.</p>
<p>But for the same reasons, it makes little political sense for their incumbent rivals to weaponize prosecutions. If enough voters think Biden is using prosecutions to sideline Trump, they will surely punish Biden in November. </p>
<p>This is one reason Biden has not spoken about the details of Trump’s cases even as he campaigns against <a href="https://apnews.com/article/democracy-threats-biden-trump-2024-pennsylvania-176e42a3877eaf33160c71d1b73c96cd">Trump as a threat to democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, Lula is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-lulas-big-tent-pragmatism-won-over-brazil-again-with-a-little-help-from-a-backlash-to-bolsonaro-223141">not commenting</a> about, or intervening in, prosecutors’ investigation of former President Jair Bolsonaro’s alleged involvement in the 2023 insurrection to prevent the transfer of office to Lula.</p>
<p>But prosecutions can certainly become persecutions in settings where the rule of law is weak, democracy has not taken root or an autocratic ruler feels threatened. </p>
<h2>What persecution looks like</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A police car outside a house." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577176/original/file-20240221-24-d93yvv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A patrol car of the Ugandan police on Jan. 20, 2021, stationed outside the compound of Ugandan opposition leader Bobi Wine, who was under effective house arrest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/patrol-car-of-the-ugandan-police-is-seen-stationed-outside-news-photo/1230687986?adppopup=true">Sumi Sadurni/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today’s world features many petty tyrants of Putin’s ilk, who use the tools of the state to persecute their perceived enemies. Consider Uganda, the focus of the Oscar-nominated documentary “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt21376900/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Bobi Wine: The People’s President</a>,”
which tells the story of Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, known by his stage name “Bobi Wine.” </p>
<p>Wine is a pop star and anti-corruption activist who uses music to rail against the autocratic rule of President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power since 1986. </p>
<p>Uganda’s elections have long been marred by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">intimidation, violence and fraud against the opposition</a>. Nonetheless, after winning a seat in parliament, Wine <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/16/956885988/uganda-election-president-yoweri-museveni-declared-winner-as-bobi-wine-alleges-f">ran for president against Museveni in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>Public officials acting at Museveni’s behest <a href="https://abc7ny.com/uganda-bobi-wine-politics/13553858/">targeted Wine and his voters</a> through arbitrary detentions, physical abuse and even attempted assassinations. Unsurprisingly, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/16/956885988/uganda-election-president-yoweri-museveni-declared-winner-as-bobi-wine-alleges-f">Museveni won an unprecedented sixth term in 2021</a>. Wine
has been put under <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-arrests-40-opposition-supporters-their-leader-arrives-2023-10-06/">house arrest since</a>. </p>
<p>Like Navalny, Wine is the subject of actual political persecution. It is hard to take seriously the contention by Trump and <a href="https://twitter.com/newtgingrich/status/1758549909974794336?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet">his allies</a> that Trump is similarly a victim. There is simply no evidence that Biden and prosecutors are engaging in lawfare. Even while under arrest on federal, New York and Georgia charges, Trump can campaign freely. </p>
<p>What should trouble Americans are Trump’s repeated threats in the current campaign to do just what he accuses others of doing: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/05/us/politics/trump-retribution-presidency.html">retribution” against perceived enemies</a> should he prove victorious in 2024. </p>
<p>Whether Trump wins and follows through on promises of lawfare remains to be seen; but if so, that would undoubtedly risk moving the U.S. away from its established rule of law and closer to Russia and Uganda by opening the door for political persecutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James D. Long does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump says he’s being politically persecuted, like Russian democracy martyr Alexei Navalny, who died while in a Russian prison on Feb. 16. A scholar says there’s no comparison between the men.James D. Long, Professor of Political Science and Co-founder of the Political Economy Forum, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241712024-02-22T17:01:34Z2024-02-22T17:01:34ZGaza war: will Israel respond to US pressure to tread carefully in Rafah? There is a precedent<p>As the deadline for Israel’s ground assault on the southern Gaza city of Rafah approaches on March 10 – the beginning of Ramadan – world leaders are urging its government to rethink its strategy. Casualties from such an assault may even dwarf the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/world/middleeast/gaza-death-toll-israel.html">huge human losses</a> so far of close to 30,000 Palestinians killed and 70,000 wounded. </p>
<p>US president, Joe Biden, has repeatedly urged his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu – in private and public – to hold off on the assault and to come up with a plan to protect civilians. What Biden may or may not do to influence Netanyahu’s decision is unclear – and will, in part at least, be calibrated by Biden’s domestic political requirements in an election year.</p>
<p>But there is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/13/world/reagan-demands-end-to-attacks-in-a-blunt-telephone-call-to-begin.html">important precedent</a> which shows that Israel has been known to heed US pressure in similar situations. In 1982 Israeli jets bombed west Beirut, where fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) were embedded during Israel’s war with Lebanon. </p>
<p>Ronald Reagan, who was then US president, phoned his Israeli counterpart, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and ordered him to to stop the bombardment, reportedly using the words: “Menachem, this is a holocaust.”</p>
<p>A White House statement at the time reflected that Reagan’s approach got immediate results: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The President made clear that it is imperative that the ceasefire in place be observed absolutely in order for negotiations to proceed. We understand the Israeli cabinet has approved a new ceasefire, which is in effect. It must hold.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Special relationship</h2>
<p>One factor that will lend weight to any pressure from Biden is the singularly close and cooperative relationship between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Pentagon.</p>
<p>When Israel won its war of independence in 1948, the US support came primarily from American Jews. But that changed rapidly through the 1950s as the cold war hardened, Arab nationalism emerged and Israel became America’s key ally in the region.</p>
<p>While not supporting Israel’s role in the Franco-British <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/97179.htm#:%7E:text=Although%20the%20United%20State%20was,military%20solution%20that%20involved%20Israel.">Suez Canal disaster in 1956</a>, in just about every other respect military relations with Israel became steadily closer. It is thought to be highly unlikely that Israel could have succeeded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/11/politics/presidents-israel-cnn/index.html#">without US backing</a>.</p>
<p>Through the 1980s and 1990s the two armed forces maintained close relations. Just as important, though, were the <a href="https://www.bits.de/public/briefingnote/bn02-3.htm#:%7E:text=Israeli%20companies%20are%20also%20active,past%20the%20Lavi%20attack%20aircraft.">ever closer links</a> between US and Israeli arms corporations, not just in joint research and development but even in weapons production.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Ronald and Nancy Reagan with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and his daughter Matt Milo in the White House, Setpember 1981." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577334/original/file-20240222-30-681hr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Friends in high places: Ronald and Nancy Reagan hosting a state dinner for Menachem Begin and his daughter Matti Milo in September 1981.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Collection</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even so, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s changed the calculus of interests. For Washington, with the threat from the Soviet Union a thing of the past, the strategic significance of Israel in the Middle East <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/03/world/after-cold-war-views-israel-israelis-worry-that-us-will-need-them-less-new.html">was diminished</a>. This was a matter of serious concern to Israeli governments at the time.</p>
<h2>After 9/11</h2>
<p>That all changed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the start of the “war on terror”. Israel suddenly gained a much greater significance – and this came to a head in late 2003, six months into the war to terminate Saddam Hussain’s regime in Iraq.</p>
<p>The first few weeks of that war, in March and April, seemed to be remarkably successful, but within a couple of months it had gone badly wrong as US troops found themselves faced with a growing urban insurgency with most of their troops inadequately trained or equipped to respond.</p>
<p>By October 2003, the position was getting dire – and one Pentagon response was to turn to Israel with its of experience of urban warfare. In early December, the head of Israel’s ground forces, Major-General Yiftah Ron-Tal, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/article_1655jsp/">hosted a series of meetings</a> with a visiting senior US team headed by General Kevin Byrnes, commander of the US army’s training and doctrine command (Tradoc), to strengthen cooperation and to look at ways the US could benefit from Israeli experience in urban combat.</p>
<p>The Pentagon was particularly interested in how the IDF had operated during the first three years of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13776.10?seq=8">second Palestinian Intifada</a> – especially across the occupied West Bank – and went on to use Israeli equipment and tactics in Iraq.</p>
<p>It may have been useful to the US – but it also presented a valuable propaganda opportunity to the militias fighting the US forces. They were now able to characterise the war as a <a href="https://rebelion.org/us-iraq-israel-zionist-connection/">Zionist/Christian “crusade”</a>.</p>
<h2>Cooperation and collective punishment</h2>
<p>In the event, there were many ways in which US-Israeli military cooperation hardened in the wake of the war. A groundbreaking development was the decision to <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/american-military-aid-to-israel-serves-both-countries-well">station US army personnel</a> permanently in Israel, running an advanced X-Band Radar facility that provided early warning of long-distance missile attacks. </p>
<p>Another was the US Army Corps of Engineers building a complete Arab town, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/israel-fake-city-mini-gaza-baladia-invasion-1835003">Baladia</a>, in the Negev Desert, used by the US, Israel and others for urban warfare training. </p>
<p>With all this cooperation, Israel might well have been strengthened in its ability to control urban insurgencies. But even while the war in Iraq continued, it found that a ground force operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 was going badly wrong, leading to unexpected casualties and recourse to mass aerial bombardment.</p>
<p>Much of this was focused on the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiya district south of Beirut, and that gave its name to the IDF’s current <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/05/israel-disproportionate-force-tactic-infrastructure-economy-civilian-casualties">Dahiya doctrine</a> in which a costly urban insurgency is met with collective punishment against whole communities, not just the insurgents.</p>
<p>Biden has spoken out against this approach and has insisted in conversations with Netanyahu that “a military operation in Rafah should not proceed without a credible and executable plan” for protecting and supporting the Palestinians sheltering there.</p>
<p>Whether or not Israeli will heed this message remains unclear. But the White House will be hoping that – in a society where the armed forces have effectively been a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/former-commandos-dominate-israeli-politics/">breeding ground for political leaders</a> and where all Israeli Jews are required to do army service – the close military links between the two countries can be a factor in Israel’s decision-making.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers has received funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. He lectures regularly at the Royal College of Defence Studies.</span></em></p>History tells us that the White House and the Pentagon have been able to wield a degree of influence over Israel’s decision-making.Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239342024-02-21T14:41:13Z2024-02-21T14:41:13ZGaza war: blaming Israel for October 7 Hamas attack makes peace less – not more – likely<p>The UK Labour party recently withdrew support for one of its parliamentary candidates for making comments that perpetuated antisemitic stereotypes. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-rochdale-israel-azhar-ali-election-b2495351.html">Azhar Ali said</a> that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu “allowed” the deadly Hamas attack on October 7 as a way to divert public opinion away from his political woes and give the Israelis “the green light to do whatever they bloody want [in Gaza]”. Ali went on to make antisemitic comments about Jewish influence in British politics and the media.</p>
<p>Such comments are symptomatic of a wider problem among some, on the progressive left in particular, to ignore the violence against Israelis and exclusively focus on the plight of Palestinian citizens. A minority have even celebrated the attack as a kind of <a href="https://quillette.com/2023/11/18/the-return-of-the-progressive-atrocity/">“progressive atrocity”</a>.</p>
<p>Hamas’s <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:%7E:text=The%20October%207%20attack%20is,sense%20of%20loss%20for%20Israel.">horrific attack</a>, which included physical and psychological torture, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/middleeast/oct-7-attacks-hamas-israel-sexual-violence.html">mass rape</a> and the taking of more than 200 hostages, left Israeli society deeply traumatised. Responses that focus only on Palestinian victimhood and dismiss Israel’s experience of violence and terror are likely to contribute to Israel’s sense of isolation and anger. </p>
<p>The more that Israelis feel abandoned by the international community, the harder it arguably is to bring a workable, lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The situation is dire enough without making things worse, and the situation is bad.</p>
<p>Israel’s military response to the October 7 attack has resulted in the killing of <a href="https://time.com/6696507/palestinian-death-toll-gaza-israel-hamas/">more than 29,000 Palestinians</a> and the displacement of nearly 2 million more. It almost certainly violates <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-a-better-understanding-of-the-violence-on-both-sides-might-give-us-a-chance-at-a-solution-216855">international humanitarian law</a>, as well as Israel’s own military code of conduct. </p>
<p>There is no excuse for this extreme military response, but we need to understand Israel’s perspective if we are to break the cycle of violence. It’s important to consider that the scale of Israel’s response may be the result of anger, fear and trauma as opposed to reasoned strategic thinking. It’s likely a sense of isolation serves to exacerbate these sentiments.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-reacts-surprise-attack-by-hamas-israel-2023-10-07/">world leaders</a> expressed outrage at the attack, with some providing military and diplomatic support. But other reactions were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/we-are-at-war-reactions-to-palestinian-hamas-surprise-attack-in-israel">far less empathetic</a>. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-declares-brazils-lula-persona-non-grata-for-comparing-gaza-war-to-holocaust/">Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</a> even went as far as to compare Israel’s military campaign to the Holocaust. </p>
<p>A similar lack of empathy has been seen in some non-governmental organisations. For example, the United Nations body UN Women took <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eight-weeks-after-oct-7-onslaught-un-women-condemns-brutal-attacks-by-hamas/">eight weeks</a> to issue a statement condemning the gendered violence against Israeli women. </p>
<p>This inability to acknowledge the horror of October 7 is primarily a problem among some on the left. Left-wing antagonism toward Israel <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-and-the-european-left-9781441150134/">is not new</a> and political parties in many countries <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-palestine-war-gaza-left-tearing-itself-apart/">have been divided</a> over their response. </p>
<p>One local politician in California, during a <a href="https://forward.com/fast-forward/571631/oaklands-city-council-considered-condemning-hamas-oct-7-conspiracy-theorists-turned-out-en-masse/">heated debate</a> on calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, reportedly stated: “The notion that this was a massacre of Jews was a fabricated narrative.” In the UK, former Labour MP (and independent parliamentary candidate) <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/article-772775">George Galloway</a>, made disparaging remarks <a href="https://twitter.com/georgegalloway/status/1722961911619145874?lang=en">on X</a> (formerly Twitter) that seemed to justify the killing of Israelis on October 7.</p>
<p>Others have even <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/anti-israel-activists-celebrate-hamas-attacks-have-killed-hundreds-israelis">condoned the attack</a>. They argue it was an inevitable outcome of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land for 75 years and tried to label Hamas’ attack as a legitimate anti-colonialist act of defiance. The US <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/psl-statement-free-palestine-free-all-palestinian-political-prisoners-end-all-u-s-aid-to-the-israeli-apartheid-regime/">Party for Socialism and Liberation</a> proclaimed: “The actions of the resistance over the course of the last day is a morally and legally legitimate response to occupation.” </p>
<p>What many Israelis found even more disconcerting was how some of these messages blaming Israel <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/contextualising-gaza-colonial-violence-and-occupation/">started to emerge before</a> Israel launched its massive military invasion of Gaza.</p>
<h2>Bleak outlook</h2>
<p>The one-sided nature of many responses that unequivocally supported the Palestinians have arguably fed into Israel’s sense of isolation and victimhood, amplifying its preexisting <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791494">siege mentality</a>. This has likely contributed to an ongoing erosion in Israel of any belief in a future peace with a Palestinian state. A poll conducted by <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/547760/life-israel-oct-charts.aspx">Gallup</a> in late December 2023 found that 65% of Israelis now reject the idea of an independent Palestine.</p>
<p>There is no legitimate justification for the scale of death that Israel has unleashed under <a href="https://ict.org.il/operation-swords-of-iron/">Operation Swords of Iron</a>. It is likely to inflame and anger future generations of Palestinians and makes it hard to envisage a hopeful future for both peoples. </p>
<p>Indeed, according to a poll conducted in late December 2023 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), Palestinian support for armed struggle has <a href="https://pcpsr.org/en/node/961">increased significantly</a> since October 7, and the majority of Palestinians believe Hamas’ onslaught was justified. </p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.awrad.org/en/article/10719/Wartime-Poll-Results-of-an-Opinion-Poll-Among-Palestinians-in-the-West-Bank-and-Gaza-Strip">survey</a> found that 98% of Palestinians will “never forget and never forgive” Israel for its actions in the Gaza Strip. Some 90% thought that Israeli-Palestinian coexistence is unlikely.</p>
<p>Yet despite this hardening of views on both sides, this should be an opportunity for the left in Israel. The current government of Benjamin Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-finds-netanyahu-would-be-pummeled-by-gantz-were-elections-held-today/">deeply unpopular</a>. The October 7 attack is widely seen as evidence of the right’s failing security approach led by Netanyahu, who has always been a vocal critic of the Oslo accords and the peace process in the 1990s. </p>
<p>There will almost certainly be an official inquiry about Israel’s failure to protect itself on October 7, and possibly also of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68318856">Netanyahu’s knowledge</a> of an imminent threat or at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/10/world/middleeast/israel-qatar-money-prop-up-hamas.html#:%7E:text=For%20years%2C%20Israeli%20intelligence%20officers,keep%20a%20power%20plant%20running.">his complicity in funding Hamas for years</a>. He is already under indictment on corruption charges and the longer this war lasts the longer he can defer his reckoning. </p>
<p>But regardless of his and his government’s unpopularity, the brutality of the October 7 attack led to a feeling within Israel that a line had been crossed by the Palestinians. An overwhelming majority supports the military campaign in Gaza, according to a survey conducted by the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-war-support/">Institute for National Security Studies</a>. </p>
<p>Consequently, many in the Israeli peace camp who have been advocating for a two-state solution for years appear unable to call on the Israeli leadership for restraint. Those who are still active have noted the increasingly difficult <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231122-israeli-palestinian-peace-camp-shaken-but-determined">circumstances they face</a>. </p>
<p>Many on the left in Israel feel increasingly isolated from their progressive brethren around the world and weakened domestically. With the Israeli public moving <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/world/middleeast/israel-oct-7-left-wing-peace.html">increasingly to the right</a>, this trend is contributing to a sense of despair and loneliness on the part of those who desperately need support in their pursuit of peace.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the resilience and appeal of the Israeli peace camp <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/world/middleeast/israel-oct-7-left-wing-peace.html">may prove to be another casualty</a> of Hamas’s attack. For peace to be possible, it’s vital to recognise that Israelis can be victims too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In addition to his affiliation with the University of Maryland, Ilai Saltzman is a board member with Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies is a think tank based in Israel.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilan Zvi Baron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Israeli peace movement has been demoralised by the lack of support from the progressive left.Ilan Zvi Baron, Professor of International Political Theory, Durham UniversityIlai Z. Saltzman, Professor and Director of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231752024-02-09T00:14:06Z2024-02-09T00:14:06ZIsrael-Gaza war: why did the ceasefire negotiations collapse – and can they be revived?<p>US Secretary of State Antony Blinken looked exhausted at his media conference in Israel this week as he tried to remain optimistic about prospects for a truce in the Gaza war.</p>
<p>Despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu comprehensively <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-mediators-search-final-formula-israel-hamas-ceasefire-2024-02-07/">rejecting</a> Hamas’s ceasefire counter-proposal, Blinken said it “creates space for an agreement to be reached”. He pledged the US would continue to “work relentlessly” to achieve a ceasefire and hostage release deal.</p>
<p>Putting aside the fact the job description of senior diplomats requires them to remain upbeat in the face of negotiating setbacks, does Blinken’s shuttle diplomacy – he has visited the Middle East five times since Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel – have any chance of success?</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Antony Blinken sounded optimistic in a press conference in Israel this week.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Where the negotiations stand</h2>
<p>Israel and the US presented a proposal to Hamas via Qatar about a week ago. It was not made public, but Qatar’s Al Jazeera news agency <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/7/blinken-in-israel-to-try-to-seal-gaza-truce-deal">reported</a> sources “close to the talks” as saying it involved an initial 40-day truce, during which Hamas would free the remaining Israeli civilian hostages it holds, followed by Israeli soldiers and the remains of dead hostages.</p>
<p>Hamas’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/07/world/middleeast/netanyahu-hamas-gaza-negotiations.html">counter-proposal</a>, delivered on February 7, offered freedom for all remaining hostages and the return of the deceased in a three-stage ceasefire lasting 4.5 months. In return, Israel would first release all Palestinian women and children held in Israeli jails, as well as 1,500 male prisoners, including 500 serving long sentences. </p>
<p>At the same time, the Israeli military would implement a phased withdrawal of its troops from Gaza, and the ceasefire would become permanent. The obvious implication of the proposal was that Hamas would remain in control of Gaza.</p>
<p>It’s not surprising each set of proposals was unacceptable to the other party. Israel didn’t offer any guarantees that it wouldn’t resume its military campaign after the release of the hostages. And Hamas’s proposal was effectively a return to the status quo before October 7, which would be entirely unacceptable to the Netanyahu government.</p>
<p>Each proposal appeared to represent the maximalist positions of each side. As such, the standard technique of practised negotiators is to examine both proposals and look for – or try to create – common ground for a deal. Can that work now?</p>
<h2>Will Netanyahu keep negotiating?</h2>
<p>Despite Netanyahu’s stern rebuff of Hamas’s counter-proposal, a Hamas delegation has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-785709">travelled</a> to Cairo this week for more ceasefire talks. But whether Netanyahu is prepared to keep talking will depend on his evaluation of the pressures he faces on three fronts:</p>
<p>First, Netanyahu is beholden to prominent hardliners in his right-wing government, particularly Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. Ben-Gvir threatened to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/far-rightist-threatens-quit-israel-govt-over-any-reckless-gaza-deal-2024-01-30/">bring down his government</a> over any attempt to enter a “reckless” deal with Hamas to free the hostages. </p>
<p>If Netanyahu is forced to hold new elections, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/surveys-show-gantz-holds-commanding-lead-over-netanyahu-as-war-approaches-100th-day/">opinion polls</a> show he would have very little chance of forming a new administration.</p>
<p>Second, the families of the 136 hostages still held in Gaza and their supporters hold daily demonstrations demanding the government prioritise negotiating their release over the military campaign against Hamas. </p>
<p>The news that 31 of the hostages <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-chief-military-spokesperson-31-hostages-gaza-are-dead-2024-02-06/">have been confirmed dead</a> can be expected to raise the families’ anxiety levels and increase the tempo of their protests.</p>
<p>And third, Netanyahu faces increasing pressure from the Biden administration, which is suffering <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/07/bidens-support-of-israel-leaves-him-as-isolated-as-russia-on-the-world-stage-analyst.html">reputational damage</a> across the Middle East and in the Global South because of its unconditional support (including <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-approves-emergency-sale-of-weapons-to-israel-bypassing-congress-/7418698.html">providing weapons</a>) for Israel’s Gaza campaign. </p>
<p>Within the US, Biden is also experiencing <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4288202-biden-progressives-anger-over-israel-hamas-conflict/">blow-back</a> from young, progressive Democrats, horrified at the Palestinian death toll, which now stands at over 27,000. That could affect his re-election prospects if they decide not to turn out for him in the November vote.</p>
<h2>For Hamas, pluses and minuses</h2>
<p>By comparison, the pressures on Hamas are of a lower order. Obviously, Israel’s military campaign, particularly its current extension into southern Gaza, is causing enormous suffering to the civilian population. But the degree to which this affects the Hamas leadership is uncertain.</p>
<p>In negotiating through Qatar and Egypt for a ceasefire, an increase in aid and, ultimately, an end to the conflict, Hamas is presumably motivated – at least partly – by a desire to reduce civilian suffering.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-palestinian-conflict-is-the-two-state-solution-now-dead-221967">Israel-Palestinian conflict: is the two-state solution now dead?</a>
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<p>But its main aim is unquestionably its own survival. What would force Hamas to compromise on its demands would be the capture or deaths of its senior leaders, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/400000-for-sinwar-100000-for-mohammed-deif-israel-said-to-place-bounty-on-hamas-leaders/">Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif</a>.</p>
<p>It should be noted Hamas derives some benefits from the continuing conflict. What Biden has described as Israel’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/12/israel-gaza-hamas-biden-netanyahu/">indiscriminate bombing</a>” campaign actually boosts Hamas’s image as a standard bearer for Palestinian rights. The Gaza war, with its horrifying human toll, has brought the Palestinians’ plight to international attention and harmed Israel’s global standing.</p>
<p>Hamas would also be aware that it does not have to defeat Israel militarily in order to win this war. It needs merely to survive. A ceasefire that left Hamas in charge of a Gaza in ruins would thus be a victory.</p>
<h2>Do negotiations stand a chance?</h2>
<p>Unless there is an unexpected development – Israel’s elimination of Sinwar and Deif, or its military locating and freeing the remaining hostages – the war is likely to continue for some months. </p>
<p>Netanyahu probably feels he has no choice, from a political perspective, but to continue prosecuting the war in the same manner, in the hope of a breakthrough. </p>
<p>His history of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahus-unprecedented-snub-of-obama-meeting-defies-explanation/">staring down US presidents</a> means he almost certainly won’t back down under pressure from Biden. And he will continue to tell the hostages’ families that their loved ones can only be rescued by military action alone, even if their demonstrations grow in size and number. </p>
<p>To appease the families, Netanyahu may be prepared to sanction renewed temporary ceasefire offers to Hamas in an effort to win more hostage releases – but not if doing so puts his governing coalition at risk.</p>
<p>Israel also has to bear in mind the interim ruling of the International Court of Justice last month over accusations its military campaign breaches the Genocide Convention. The court has ordered Israel to produce a report by late February on measures it has taken to prevent genocide. </p>
<p>Though Netanyahu has <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">rejected</a> the ICJ’s ruling, he needs to take account of the views of his Western supporters who place high value on the role of the court.</p>
<p>The entrenched positions of the Netanyahu government and the Hamas leadership mean Blinken’s work is nowhere close to being done. That means more trips to the region, more shuttle diplomacy and, likely, more sleepless nights. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">Israel isn't complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu probably feels he has no choice, from a political perspective, but to continue prosecuting the war in the same manner.Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231392024-02-08T17:51:39Z2024-02-08T17:51:39ZGaza update: Netanyahu knocks back Hamas peace plan while the prospect of mass famine looms ever larger<p>The Israeli military is poised to enter what its defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has referred to as the “last centre of gravity that remains in Hamas’s hands: Rafah”. Unfortunately for many of the 1.7 million people reportedly displaced by Israel’s four-month onslaught in Gaza, this is where more than a million of them have taken refuge, according to the latest estimates.</p>
<p>As the Gaza death toll compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) surpassed 26,750 people, with a further 65,000-plus people wounded, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected a peace deal proposed by Hamas and relayed by Egyptian and Qatari negotiators as “deluded”. </p>
<p>The proposed three-part plan was for a staged cessation of hostilities and prisoner-hostage swap, with the aim of ending the war completely via negotiations to be finalised by the time the final hostages had been returned.</p>
<p>Insisting that “the day after [the war] is the day after Hamas – all of Hamas”, Netanyahu said he intended to press on until Israel had achieved “total victory”.</p>
<p>But Anne Irfan, an expert in the history of the modern Middle East from University College London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">believes</a> the Israeli prime minister may be thinking it is in his own interests to keep the conflict going as long as he can. His personal approval ratings are abysmal – only 15% of Israelis in a recent survey said they thought he should keep his job after the war ends.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the latest developments in Israel's war with Hamas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Map of Israel’s war with Hamas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Meanwhile, Netanyahu is increasingly trapped between the clamour from the families of the Israeli hostages still trapped in Gaza, and the intransigence of the far-right members of his own government who won’t consider doing a deal with Hamas. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">Netanyahu's position becoming more uncertain as Israeli PM rejects Hamas deal to end war</a>
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<p>Netanyahu has also resisted international pressure to consider a two-state solution, which would by definition involve a sovereign Palestine, insisting that Israel is the only state that can guarantee regional security in the long term. </p>
<p>Despite Netanyahu’s wholesale rejection of the notion of Palestinian statehood, both the US and UK have said they are considering the possibility of recognising Palestine after the conflict ends. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, said such a move would be “absolutely vital for the long-term peace and security of the region”.</p>
<p>They would be coming into line with much of the rest of the world: 139 of 193 UN members have already recognised the state of Palestine, which has sat in the UN as a “non-member observer state” since 2012, and has already acceded to many of its human rights treaties.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Tonny Raymond Kirabira, an expert in international law at the University of East London, walks us through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">complex issues</a> involved in becoming a state. At the moment, international law dictates that the prerequsites for statehood are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As Kirabira reminds us, questions remains whether Palestine actually possesses a “defined territory” and “effective government”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">UK and US may recognise state of Palestine after Gaza war – what this important step would mean</a>
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<p>So what is the two-state solution? It’s a vexed issue that has been exercising the minds of peacemakers since before the state of Israel was even formally declared in 1948. An early UN partition plan called for what was then known as the “Mandate of Palestine” – under British control – to be divided into separate Jewish and Arab states.</p>
<p>Andrew Thomas, an expert in the politics of the Middle East from Deakin University in Australia, runs through the various iterations of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">two-state solution</a> since 1948 – and recalls the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jan-egeland-remembers-the-secret-negotiations-that-led-to-the-oslo-accords-podcast-213092">Oslo accords</a> in the 1990s, when the then-Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat, got so close to agreeing a solution which would have recognised Palestine as a state while guaranteeing Israeli security. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">Explainer: what is the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?</a>
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<h2>War crime and punishment</h2>
<p>Netanyahu’s pledge to push on to total victory, meanwhile, flies in the face of demands made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) more than a week ago. The ICJ ordered Israel to take steps to prevent genocidal actions in Gaza, to punish incitement to genocide, to allow Gaza’s people access to humanitarian aid, and to preserve and collect any evidence of war crimes committed during the conflict.</p>
<p>It appears Israel has not yet done any of these things, although it has about another three weeks until it is due to report back to the ICJ. Basema Al-Alami, an expert in international law from the University of Toronto, considers how reports of what is happening on the ground in Gaza <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">conflict with the ICJ’s demands</a>, and also what pressure the ICJ rulings will put on Israel’s international donors to reconsider their stance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">Israel isn't complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?</a>
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<p>It didn’t take the international community long to act after Israel raised allegations that some staff from the UN’s Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) had taken part in Hamas’s October 7 massacres. Within days, 18 donor countries including the UK and US had pulled their support for UNRWA, the principal charity supplying aid to Palestinians.</p>
<p>UCL’s Irfan and Jo Kelcey of the Lebanese American University assess the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">fallout from this mass withdrawal of support</a>, concluding that it could be catastrophic for Palestinians in Gaza, 87% of whom are dependent on UNRWA for its services which include food aid, shelter and medical care. They also point out that Israel’s allegations about the involvement of UNRWA staff in October 7 came the day after the ICJ published its interim ruling.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">Gaza conflict: what is UNRWA and why is Israel calling for its abolition?</a>
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<p>Greg Kennedy, an expert in strategic foreign policy issues at King’s College London, believes that Israel is deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">weaponising food supplies</a> in Gaza. He writes that it has been a tactic of war for centuries, and that sieges and blockades remain part of the arsenal of armed conflict.</p>
<p>Starvation, Kennedy adds, can seriously undermine morale and the will to resist. It is also a collective punishment – something explicitly banned under international humanitarian law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">Gaza: weaponisation of food has been used in conflicts for centuries – but it hasn't always resulted in victory</a>
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<h2>There goes the neighbourhood</h2>
<p>Day by day, missile by missile, tensions are ratcheting up around the region as Iran-backed proxies, who have been targeting US military bases for years, have stepped up their campaign of harassment. Taken individually, these attacks are of little significance. As Middle East expert Julie Norman from UCL notes, neither Iran nor the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">wants to wage a major conflict</a> at the moment – but both countries have political reasons for wanting to act tough. </p>
<p>In Iran, the Islamic Republic presides over a parlous economy and considerable public unrest as the “woman, life, freedom” mass protests continue. In the White House, meanwhile, Joe Biden wants a telegenic show of US force without embroiling his country in a major land war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">Middle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained</a>
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<p>George W. Bush once joked to troops in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’” And as Andrew Payne, an international security expert from City, University of London notes, Bush – as well as his successor in the White House, Barack Obama, and even the vainglorious Donald Trump (who said of a recent attack on a US base in Jordan: “This attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance.”) – grew increasingly averse to military action as the next election loomed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">Middle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year</a>
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<p>Christoph Bluth, an expert in international affairs at the University of Bradford, presents a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">cast list of Iran’s affiliates</a> in the region, and explains how Tehran is using them to further its long-term aims in the region – from replacing the US as the dominant power to establishing an “axis of resistance” that could potentially box in Israel.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">How Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231132024-02-08T17:38:34Z2024-02-08T17:38:34ZNetanyahu’s position becoming more uncertain as Israeli PM rejects Hamas deal to end war<p>The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has rejected a ceasefire plan put forward by Hamas, calling the terms “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/07/middleeast/hamas-counterproposal-israel-pullout-ceasefire-hostages-intl/index.html">delusional</a>”. Claiming that an Israeli victory in Gaza is “within reach”, Netanyahu has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/07/middle-east-crisis-live-diplomatic-push-to-secure-gaza-ceasefire-as-hamas-responds-to-plan">vowed to fight on</a> until Hamas is completely destroyed. </p>
<p>But the US, which is involved in negotiation efforts along with Qatar and Egypt, has said that there could still be a path to a deal. </p>
<p>Hamas’s plan came as a counter offer to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68138853">proposal</a> put forward a week ago by Israel, the US, Qatar and Egypt. That framework reportedly involved a six-week truce during which Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners would be exchanged. In response, Hamas proposed a sweeping <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/07/hamas-responds-to-israel-plan-with-three-stage-proposal-to-end-gaza-war">three-stage plan</a> aimed at ending the war completely. </p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68225663">terms of the plan</a>, phase one would see a pause in fighting to allow for the release of Palestinian women and children from Israeli jails. They would be exchanged for Israeli women and males under 19 being held in Gaza, as well as the elderly and the sick. At the same time, Israeli forces would withdraw from Gaza’s built-up areas as the reconstruction of hospitals and refugee camps begins. </p>
<p>During the second phase, Israeli forces would leave Gaza completely as the remaining Israeli hostages are exchanged for Palestinian prisoners. In phase three, Israel and Hamas would exchange bodies and remains. Throughout the process, the pause in fighting would allow for essential aid supplies to be delivered to Gaza. </p>
<p>Hamas’ plan also envisages ongoing negotiations to end the war completely, with a view to these concluding by the end of phase three. </p>
<h2>Netanyahu’s calculations</h2>
<p>Both the content of the Hamas proposal and Netanyahu’s rejection of it are revealing about the current political state of play for both parties. Netanyahu, long a highly divisive figure in Israel and abroad, has seen his <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-14/ty-article/.premium/as-war-rages-israelis-trust-in-netanyahu-hits-rock-bottom-polls-find/0000018b-cd86-dd11-a19f-edf6f2b00000">approval ratings plummet</a> in Israel since the Hamas attacks of October 7 in which <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/haaretz-explains/2023-10-19/ty-article-magazine/israels-dead-the-names-of-those-killed-in-hamas-massacres-and-the-israel-hamas-war/0000018b-325c-d450-a3af-7b5cf0210000">1,200 Israelis were killed</a> and around 240 taken hostage. </p>
<p>A poll last month found that only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">15% of Israelis</a> think he should keep his job after the war ends. Such figures suggest an alternative reason why he may be keen to continue the war for as long as possible. </p>
<p>Netanyahu and his government have also been under increasing pressure from the hostages’ families, who recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-68054982">stormed a meeting of the Knesset</a> to demand more action to release their loved ones. On February 6, five Israeli women who were released from Gaza during the November ceasefire <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/released-hostages-tell-pm-only-saving-remaining-captives-will-be-absolute-victory/">called on Netanyahu</a> to do whatever is necessary to secure the release of the remaining 136. </p>
<p>Similarly, Sharone Lifshitz, whose 85-year-old mother, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/24/freed-gaza-hostages-named-yocheved-lifshitz-nurit-cooper">Yocheved</a>, was freed during the November ceasefire and whose 83-year-old father, Oded, is still being held, has criticised Netanyahu’s rejection of the ceasefire proposal. In a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-palestine-war-hostages-b2492024.html">press conference</a> in the UK, Sharone Lifschitz said: “We need that deal to happen now … I don’t think Israel has another option.”</p>
<p>Yet Netanyahu is also facing pressure from hardliners within his own government. In particular, far-right national security minister, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-10/ty-article/.premium/far-right-israeli-minister-ben-gvir-does-as-he-pleases-rattling-the-netanyahu-government/0000018c-f2b8-d2f9-a3ef-f6ff3a3f0000">Itamar Ben-Gvir</a>, has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d5693fc7-7c13-4509-a45d-db14423dfe77">threatening</a> to dissolve the coalition if Netanyahu makes any concessions to Hamas. </p>
<p>While Ben Gvir is not part of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eebddeb0-9745-45ae-a7fb-55f574bb45b1">Israeli war cabinet</a> – formed as an emergency response to the October 7 attacks – Netanyahu will be conscious of his potential to collapse the government.</p>
<h2>Hamas’ aims</h2>
<p>As for Hamas, there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/06/optimism-fades-over-gaza-ceasefire-amid-rumoured-split-in-hamas-leadership">reports of a deepening rift</a> between the Gaza cadre, led by October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar, and the exiled leadership in Doha, headed up by political bureau chair Ismail Haniyeh. </p>
<p>Sinwar, who has become <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/hamas-twin-power-structure-complicates-gaza-truce-talks">increasingly powerful in Gaza </a> in recent years, is said to back a temporary immediate truce while Haniyeh is pushing for a full ceasefire with major Israeli concessions. </p>
<p>All the while, the war in Gaza continues. With United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reporting <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">a toll of</a> more than 26,000 Palestinians killed, more than 65,000 injured, and 1.7 million displaced, the UN is now warning that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/28/famine-in-gaza-is-being-made-inevitable-says-un-rapporteur">famine is inevitable</a> in the Strip. </p>
<p>As negotiations continue to go back and forth, time is running out for the most vulnerable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223113/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Irfan has received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>Netanyahu has rejected the latest peace deal and vowed to continue until Israel achieves ‘total victory’.Anne Irfan, Lecturer in Interdisciplinary Race, Gender and Postcolonial Studies, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223102024-02-01T14:53:05Z2024-02-01T14:53:05ZGaza conflict: what is UNRWA and why is Israel calling for its abolition?<p>New Zealand has joined the growing number of countries including the US and UK that have suspended funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (<a href="https://www.unrwa.org/">UNRWA</a>), putting the future of the agency in doubt. The decision of at least 17 funders to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/31/unrwa-who-funds-the-un-agency-dedicated-to-palestinian-refugees_6481048_4.html">withdraw support</a> to UNRWA follows <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/world/middleeast/gaza-unrwa-hamas-israel.html">allegations by the Israeli government</a> that 12 of the agency’s employees were involved in the October 7 attacks by Hamas in which <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">1,200 Israelis were killed</a> and more than 200 taken hostage. </p>
<p>While few further details about the allegations have been made public, UNRWA responded swiftly by immediately terminating the employment of nine of the accused staff members (of the other three, two are dead and one is missing). Even so, it is now facing the biggest crisis of its 74-year existence. </p>
<p>The impact of the funding cuts on Palestinians in Gaza will be immediate and catastrophic. UNRWA is the largest aid agency in Gaza; as things stand, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/what-is-unrwa-aid-provider-in-gaza-accused-of-militant-links-/7461159.html">87% of people there</a> are dependent on its services, which include food aid, shelter and medical care. Nearly <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-70-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem">2 million displaced Palestinians</a> in Gaza are currently seeking refuge either in or near UNRWA shelters.</p>
<p>With this in mind, UNRWA’s commissioner-general, Philippe Lazzarini, has used uncharacteristically strong language to describe the suspension of funding as <a href="https://x.com/UNLazzarini/status/1751345422918959147?s=20">collective punishment</a>. The blockaded territory’s 2.2 million residents were already facing imminent famine – now, according to the UN special rapporteur on the right to food, these cuts <a href="https://x.com/MichaelFakhri/status/1751448773790986279?s=20">make that famine inevitable</a>.</p>
<p>The UN has advised that unless funds are restored urgently, UNRWA will not be able to operate past February. Meanwhile, continuing Israeli bombardment and ground offensives since October have killed <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">more than 26,000</a> and injured more than 65,000. The death toll includes at least <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-70-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem">152 UNRWA staff</a>. </p>
<p>With Gaza’s health services <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/19/gaza-war-indirect-casualties-mount-health-service-decimated">already virtually destroyed</a>, dismantling UNRWA would remove one of the last providers of essential medical care in the territory. It would also leave half a million children in Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the West Bank without <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/education?__cf_chl_tk=pal8.2Cyi9YvrxYUH8EIQpnMabGPWWgoeD5LgjTp1c8-1706629875-0-gaNycGzNEXs">an education</a>, as UNRWA runs more than 700 schools across the region. </p>
<p>The Israeli allegations against UNRWA staff were made in the wake of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that Palestinians in Gaza face a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ruling-by-uns-top-court-means-canada-and-the-u-s-could-be-complicit-in-gaza-genocide-222110">“real and imminent threat”</a> of genocide. The ICJ ruling directed Israel to “enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance” to Palestinians in Gaza. It also called on third parties to prevent any further deterioration of the humanitarian situation there. As such, the funding suspensions <a href="https://x.com/FranceskAlbs/status/1751332704056930475?s=20">may violate</a> the court’s orders. </p>
<h2>The political context</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that UNRWA has faced a financial crisis. Chronically underfunded for decades, in 2018 the agency faced a heightened threat to its work when the Trump administration <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-cuts-aid-to-palestinian-refugees-and-throws-their-future-into-doubt-90282">withdrew all US financial support</a>. Although the Biden administration partially <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/apr/08/joe-biden-restores-us-aid-palestinians-donald-trump">restored this funding</a>, the agency has remained in deficit and was making major service cuts even before October.</p>
<p>Yet the current crisis is of a different magnitude. It comes in a wholly different political climate of heightened hostility towards UNRWA from both Israel and the US in recent years. </p>
<p>While tensions have characterised Israel’s relationship with the agency since its 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli government’s recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-elections-benjamin-netanhayu-set-to-return-with-some-extreme-new-partners-193814">shift to the far right</a> has seen new demands that the agency be disbanded completely. The prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, made such calls himself in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/6/11/israel-calls-for-end-of-un-palestinian-refugee-agency">2017</a> and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2018/01/07/netanyahu-shut-down-unrwa-">2018</a>, long before the current war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-elections-benjamin-netanhayu-set-to-return-with-some-extreme-new-partners-193814">Israeli elections: Benjamin Netanhayu set to return – with some extreme new partners</a>
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<p>These calls for the dissolution of UNRWA have increased during the latest conflict in Gaza – even before the allegations of staff involvement in the Hamas attacks were made. In late December, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-hoping-to-push-unrwa-out-of-gaza-post-war-report/">a report</a> from Israel’s foreign ministry revealed the existence of a three-stage plan to eliminate UNRWA from the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>On January 4, a debate in the Israeli Knesset heard arguments for the agency to be <a href="https://x.com/MiddleEastEye/status/1751480836682399772?s=20">“destroyed”</a>.
The current crisis is best understood in the context of this bigger push to disband UNRWA and, by association, to close down conversations on the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to the land from which they have been forced since 1948 – something recognised in <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194">UN resolution 194</a>. </p>
<h2>A move to UNHCR?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/6/11/israel-calls-for-end-of-un-palestinian-refugee-agency">Israeli officials</a> have suggested that UNRWA be replaced by <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/">UNHCR</a> – the UN agency that supports other refugee populations. These calls have been justified through the false assertion that Palestinians are the only population whose refugee status is passed from one generation to the next, whereas UNHCR promotes refugees’ resettlement. </p>
<p>In fact there are many second-generation refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, including <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/protracted-refugee-situations-explained/">Afghans</a>, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2015/10/world/dadaab-refugees/">Somalis</a> and <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/10/jordan-camp-new-generation-syrians-born-exile">Syrians</a>. And only a small fraction of UNHCR refugees are ever resettled – <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/global-trends-report-2022.pdf">less than 4%</a> in 2022. </p>
<p>Although the transfer of Palestinians to UNHCR’s mandate would not negate their rights, the remits of the two agencies differ in important ways. </p>
<p>UNRWA provides services including basic health, food aid, shelter and education to millions of stateless Palestinian refugees. It is not, however, mandated to engage in political discussions regarding their future. </p>
<p>That role was given to the little known and now defunct <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/24260/united-nations-conciliation-commission-palestine">United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine</a>. By contrast, UNHCR provides far fewer services to refugees but is focused on finding durable solutions (voluntary return, resettlement or integration). </p>
<p>As it stands, UNHCR is neither legally empowered to serve Palestinian refugees, nor able to provide the life-saving and life-sustaining services that UNRWA performs. Long-term solutions for Palestinian refugees can only be achieved through good-faith political negotiations that take their rights <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1650054">enshrined in international law</a> – which also established UNRWA’s mandate – as a starting point.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222310/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Irfan has received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jo Kelcey receives funding from the Spencer Foundation</span></em></p>Destroying the main relief agency in Gaza would be a catastrophe for its people, most of whom have been displaced by the conflict and are desperate for food, shelter and medical supplies.Anne Irfan, Lecturer in Interdisciplinary Race, Gender and Postcolonial Studies, UCLJo Kelcey, Assistant Professor, Lebanese American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219652024-01-29T13:36:36Z2024-01-29T13:36:36ZIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a dilemma: Free the hostages or continue the war in Gaza?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571656/original/file-20240126-25-l606eo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Dec. 8, 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends the funeral of a 25-year-old Israeli soldier who was killed in Gaza. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prime-minister-benjamin-netanyhu-attends-the-funeral-for-news-photo/1842633511?adppopup=true"> Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As Israel’s war with Hamas drags into its fourth month, some Israelis are becoming increasingly angry at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s inability to free the remaining <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/22/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-hostages">136 hostages in the Gaza Strip</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Israeli protesters have called for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/24/1226713168/in-israel-anger-at-netanyahu-is-getting-louder">Netanyahu’s resignation</a>, while dozens of <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/22/families-hostages-gaza-israel-parliament-00137069">family members of the hostages stormed</a> the Israeli parliament on Jan. 22, 2024, demanding a deal for the hostages’ release.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pgpEt8MAAAAJ&hl=en">Dov Waxman</a>, a scholar of Israeli politics and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to better understand the public pulse in Israel, and why some experts – including him – are saying that Netanyahu does not want to end the war.</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people, including several women, hold signs and shout in a nighttime shot, in front of tall, lit up buildings. One of the signs says 'Deal now.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Families of Israeli hostages protest in Tel Aviv, calling for the Israeli government to make a deal with Hamas and get the hostages released.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/families-of-israeli-hostages-carrying-photos-and-banners-news-photo/1950955826?adppopup=true">Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>How is Israeli public opinion on the war shifting?</h2>
<p>For the first three months or so of the war, Israelis, specifically Jewish Israelis, strongly supported the war and the government’s declared goal of defeating and dismantling Hamas. That consensus and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/over-half-of-israelis-say-theyre-let-down-by-war-cabinets-handling-of-hamas-conflict/">unity are rapidly fraying</a>.</p>
<p>Netanyahu says continuing the war is the best way to release the hostages, but more and more Israelis, including the families of the hostages, are arguing that with every passing day that the war continues, the lives of the hostages are in greater danger. </p>
<p>There’s also growing doubts about whether Israel <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-777771">can actually decisively defeat and destroy Hamas</a>. More than three months into the war, Hamas is still standing and firing rockets into Israel. While Israel has assassinated mid-level Hamas commanders, Hamas leaders are still alive and able to call the shots. </p>
<h2>You have said that Netanyahu does not want to end the war. Why would that be?</h2>
<p>Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">widely unpopular</a> in Israel. Many Israelis, including some of Netanyahu’s supporters on the right, hold him accountable for the cascade of failures that resulted in Hamas’ massive incursion and horrific attack on Oct. 7, 2023. </p>
<p>To restore his domestic support, Netanyahu’s only hope is to continue the war and try to achieve the “total victory” over Hamas that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/netanyahu-insists-on-fight-until-total-victory-as-israel-marks-100-days-of-war">he has been promising</a>. If he fails to deliver on this, and on the release of the hostages, his Likud party is likely to lose the next election and he’ll be out of office. </p>
<h2>How does this political pressure influence Netanyahu’s response to the war?</h2>
<p>In order for Netanyahu to hold his coalition government together and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/why-is-israel-always-holding-elections-e671cfe22f9b045d2be3e65c5a60be61">avoid an election,</a> he has to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-06/ty-article/.premium/limits-to-surrender-if-pm-placates-haredim-hell-enrage-broad-public/0000018b-0127-d037-a9af-51ff9dc00000">appease the far-right</a> and ultra-Orthodox parties in his government. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, that means ensuring that their constituents receive the generous government subsidies and welfare benefits that they depend on, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2023/11/01/israel-hamas-haredi-idf/#">not requiring them</a> to serve in the Israel military – unlike other Israeli Jews – and maintaining the religious status quo in Israel. For the far-right parties, it means supporting <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-24/ty-article/.premium/israeli-army-weighs-plan-to-arm-west-bank-settlements-with-anti-tank-missiles/0000018d-3b7e-d32b-adcf-ff7e83330000">Israeli settlers in the West Bank</a> and expanding settlements there, and also preventing anything that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority, which the far-right wants to get rid of.</p>
<p>To keep his far-right allies in the government, Netanyahu has to block any post-war plan that gives the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-01-20-2024-ba66b165f3e5d1904d30b591199cface#">Palestinian Authority control over Gaza</a>. Merely discussing the question of post-war Gaza is treacherous for Netanyahu because the far-right is calling for Israel to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-24/ty-article/netanyahus-likud-ministers-far-right-mks-to-attend-gaza-resettlment-confab/0000018d-3b1e-d35c-a39f-bb5e38070000">reestablish Jewish settlements</a> there. The Biden administration opposes any long-term Israeli presence in Gaza and wants a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/revamped-palestinian-authority-should-govern-gaza-west-bank-says-senior-us-2023-12-14/">“revamped and revitalized”</a> Palestinian Authority to eventually return to oversee the territory. </p>
<p>Netanyahu’s way to evade these conflicting pressures is to avoid any discussion of the post-war governance of Gaza as much as possible. </p>
<p>Netanyahu has only said that Israel must have <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/damascus-airstrike-said-to-kill-iranian-revolutionary-guards/7448161.html#">security control over Gaza</a>, but what that actually entails is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/evasive-on-postwar-gaza-netanyahu-risks-saddling-israel-with-full-responsibility/">totally unclear</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier wearing a red beret carries a coffin covered in a blue and white cloth. People stand behind him crying." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners in Tel Aviv cry on Jan. 23, 2024, during the funeral ceremony for an Israeli soldier killed in Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mourners-cry-during-the-funeral-ceremony-of-major-ilay-levi-news-photo/1948671112?adppopup=true">Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are most Israelis increasingly focused on, regarding the war?</h2>
<p>Most Israeli Jews are focused on the fate of the hostages and on Israeli military casualties – these are the stories that dominate Israeli media coverage. The families of the hostages have made sure that their plight is not forgotten. And since some of the hostages who were released back in November are recounting their harrowing experiences in captivity, this is also keeping public attention focused on the hostages still in Gaza. </p>
<p>The deaths of Israeli soldiers in Gaza also receive a lot of attention – on Jan. 23, the Israeli military had its deadliest day since the war began when <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/23/1226305928/israel-military-deadliest-gaza-hamas-war">24 soldiers were killed</a>. Most Israeli Jews have served in the military, and most have family members or friends currently serving. So they are very connected to the military, and military deaths resonate very powerfully in Israeli society.</p>
<p>What most Israelis are not focusing on is the suffering of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-15-escalation-11-17-january-2024%20in%20Gaza">Palestinian civilians in Gaza</a>. Many are not even aware of what is happening to Palestinians in Gaza, because it receives little coverage in the Israeli media. </p>
<h2>Families of the hostages are speaking out against the Israeli government and its inability to free the hostages. What kind of pressure is this creating?</h2>
<p>It has a big effect. There is great empathy for what these families are going through. There is also a strong ethos that the state has a moral obligation to rescue its citizens, including its soldiers. </p>
<p>Many people feel that the state fundamentally failed its citizens on Oct. 7 because it failed to prevent or stop the massacre and abductions that took place. So it is now especially incumbent on the government to bring the hostages home. Even if Israel defeats Hamas but doesn’t free the hostages, it will leave an open wound in Israeli society and damage, if not rupture, the relationship between the Israeli state and its citizens. </p>
<h2>Why is it unlikely that the military can free the hostages?</h2>
<p>The hostages are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/world/middleeast/gaza-hamas-israel-tunnels-hostages.html">kept underground in tunnels</a> that are hundreds of miles long. It’s likely they are frequently moved around, so it is next to impossible to even locate them. And even if they are located, actually reaching them before they are killed by their captors would be very, very difficult. </p>
<p>The only feasible option to free the hostages is to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-rejects-hamas-conditions-hostage-deal-which-include-outright-2024-01-21/">strike another deal</a> with Hamas. But it will be very hard for Netanyahu to accept the terms that Hamas is demanding, particularly ending the war. Netanyahu and his defense minister argue that the more military pressure Hamas is under, the more likely it is to accept a deal on terms that are acceptable to Israel. But the other members of the war cabinet, and growing numbers of Israelis, now believe Israel should make a deal to release the hostages whatever the price, even if that means ending the war without defeating Hamas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Israeli politics explains why Israelis are increasingly turning against Netanyahu and his promise that Israel can quickly defeat Hamas and bring Israeli hostages home.Dov Waxman, Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Professor of Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220272024-01-25T18:34:06Z2024-01-25T18:34:06ZGaza update: Netanyahu calls for ‘total victory’ as International Court of Justice ponders genocide accusations against Israel<p>No sooner were the international media reporting this week that Israel had proposed a pause of up to two months in its assault on Gaza to allow for a prisoner-hostage exchange and the delivery of humanitarian aid, than Benjamin Netanyahu declared there would be no ceasefire and that “we will not stop fighting until total victory”.</p>
<p>The Israeli prime minister was commenting as he paid tribute to 24 soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) who were killed in the fighting with Hamas on January 22. Netanyahu has also rejected out of hand the idea of a two-state solution to the conflict as an “existential danger to Israel”. There will, he says, be no Palestinian state.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the location of fighting in the Gaza Steip, January 24 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=761&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571473/original/file-20240125-21-p6c35t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The state of the conflict on the Gaza Strip as of January 24 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Certainly, there are few signs that the fighting on the ground in Gaza is going to end anytime soon. The Institute for the Study of War, which has been closely tracking developments in the conflict, has identified renewed fighting in the north of Gaza as well as in Khan Younis, which has been the focus of the IDF’s drive south. </p>
<p>As Gaza’s civilians are pushed into ever smaller and more crowded enclaves in the south of the Strip, it seems Hamas fighters have been able to reoccupy some of the areas that Israel had thought were clear of militant activity. And so the killing continues and the death toll, according to reports from the Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry, has risen to 25,700.</p>
<h2>Iran’s regional ambitions</h2>
<p>Apart from the sheer scale of the killing in Gaza, the big fear for many is that the conflict will morph into a regional conflagration. This has seemed to be borne out recently by the US and UK airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels, in response to the Houthi’s attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How would Iran respond? The Islamic Republic already controls Hezbollah, which is harassing IDF units along Israel’s border with Lebanon, and also has a list of proxies doing its bidding in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>James Horncastle, a professor of international relations at Simon Fraser University in Canada, cautions that the western airstrikes in Yemen could have <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">unintended consequences</a>, as seen in Iran’s retaliatory strikes against targets in Iraq, Syria – and even Pakistan.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For Nir Barkat, Israel’s economy minister and number two in Netanyahu’s Likud party, this conflict is a “really big opportunity” for Israel to rid itself of any threat from Iran. He told the Telegraph:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Iran is a legitimate target for Israel. They will not get away with it. The head of the snake is Tehran … And we should very very clearly make sure the Iranians understand that they will not get away with using proxies against Israel and sleep good at night if we don’t sleep good at night.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But many close analysts of the Middle East conflict believe that Iran’s role as “puppetmaster” in the region is overplayed. Simon Mabon, an expert in Middle East security at Lancaster University, thinks this oversimplifies what is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">far more complex set of relationships</a>. Iran has limited control over the groups it supports, he writes, despite offering money and, in some cases, training to militant groups in the region.</p>
<p>However, this could in fact be even more of a concern – in that the more moving parts this conflict develops, the more that unintended consequences of any one player’s actions might spiral out of control.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">Iran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates</a>
</strong>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>Ben Soodavar, meanwhile, believes the threat from Iran remains critical. Soodavar, a researcher in the department of war studies at King’s College London, believes Donald Trump and his foreign policy advisers were seriously misguided when they pulled the US unilaterally out of the nuclear deal signed in 2015 with Iran, the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany), and the EU.</p>
<p>He writes that Iran remains hell-bent on developing a nuclear capability, which it would then leverage to disrupt the Middle East even more, possibly sparking a dangerous arms race with Saudi Arabia. Coming up with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-increased-belligerence-and-nuclear-ambitions-show-why-the-west-needs-a-more-robust-policy-of-deterrence-221137">policy of deterrence</a> to persuade Iranian hawks of the folly of this should be a key focus for the US and its allies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-increased-belligerence-and-nuclear-ambitions-show-why-the-west-needs-a-more-robust-policy-of-deterrence-221137">Iran's increased belligerence and nuclear ambitions show why the west needs a more robust policy of deterrence</a>
</strong>
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</p>
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<h2>Red Sea fears</h2>
<p>Whether or not they are directly doing Tehran’s bidding, attacks by the Houthi rebels on shipping off the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait continue to disrupt one of the world’s most important trade routes. The Suez canal accounts for 12% of global trade. It’s possible to avoid the canal, of course, but this means taking the long way round the Cape of Good Hope, adding two weeks and an estimated US$1 million to the cost of transporting the average cargo.</p>
<p>As if to demonstrate that it never rains but it pours, various other key trade chokepoints are under pressure: drought in the Panama Canal is making that route less accessible while taking goods overland across Russia, always an option in the past, is no longer viable given the war in Ukraine.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the world's biggest trade routes and the various chokepoints that pose a risk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569334/original/file-20240115-19-drcx5u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Global trade can be disrupted at various ‘chokepoints’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GIS/visualcapitalist.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sarah Schiffling of the Hanken School of Economics and Matthew Tickle of the University of Liverpool, both experts in global trade and supply chains, are concerned the conflict could infect shipping going in the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman, through which about 30% of oil shipped by sea must pass and which already has a long history of tensions. Choking traffic through Hormuz could represent a <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-suez-canal-is-not-the-only-choke-point-that-threatens-to-disrupt-global-supply-chains-221144">real disaster</a>, they write.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-crisis-suez-canal-is-not-the-only-choke-point-that-threatens-to-disrupt-global-supply-chains-221144">Red Sea crisis: Suez Canal is not the only 'choke point' that threatens to disrupt global supply chains</a>
</strong>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>Is Israel guilty of genocide in Gaza?</h2>
<p>Sometime in the next 24 hours (on January 26), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague is due to deliver its interim ruling on South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. Carlo Aldrovandi, an expert in international security at Trinity College Dublin, listened in as both sides <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">laid out their cases</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-shaping-up-221048">Gaza war: how South Africa's genocide case against Israel is shaping up</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Meanwhile Victor Peskin, a professor of politics and global studies at the University of Arizona, considers <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">what happens</a> after the ICJ delivers its ruling. Does the court have any powers of enforcement beyond a purely moral obligation to act? As far as Peskin is concerned, the ICJ’s track record gives little cause for optimism that anything will be resolved anytime soon.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-enforcement-power-does-the-international-court-of-justice-have-in-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-220523">What enforcement power does the International Court of Justice have in South Africa's genocide case against Israel?</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<h2>Breeding grounds for terror</h2>
<p>While the eyes of the world are fixed on the rising death toll on the Gaza Strip, the longstanding conflict between militant settlers and residents of the occupied West Bank has continued pretty much unabated through the crisis. The most recent estimates are that nearly 400 Palestinians have been killed in clashes with the Israeli settlers.</p>
<p>Anna Lippman, who researches settler aggression in the West Bank, says that 16 villages have been displaced since October 7, with many farmers now cut off from their crops and livestock. She and her team were <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-scene-in-the-west-banks-masafer-yatta-palestinians-face-escalating-israeli-efforts-to-displace-them-221104">recently in the Masafer Yatta region</a> in the southern West Bank, not only to protest against settler violence directed at West Bank families, but also to ensure that crops are watered and livestock fed, helping out those farmers too terrified to do it themselves.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-scene-in-the-west-banks-masafer-yatta-palestinians-face-escalating-israeli-efforts-to-displace-them-221104">The scene in the West Bank's Masafer Yatta: Palestinians face escalating Israeli efforts to displace them</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>There is no doubt that the continuing occupation and brutalisation of Palestinians has made both the West Bank and Gaza – as well as refugee camps in neighbouring countries – fertile ground for recruiting fighters.</p>
<p>But interestingly, there’s little direct connection between poverty or poor education and terrorism. In fact, as Junaid B. Jahangir of MacEwan University in Canada <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas-221105">writes</a>, a study of the economics of terrorism suggests that those recruited as suicide bombers have tended to have a higher education and economic status than the average Palestinian. </p>
<p>Economic theory has some fascinating insights to offer when considering this long-running conflict, Jahangir believes – and may even provide some ideas about how to tackle the problem over the long term.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas-221105">How economics can shed light on the motivations of extremist groups like Hamas</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Finally, it’s worth remembering that a lot of what we know about what’s happening in Gaza is thanks to the brave journalists who risk their lives to bring reports and footage to international attention. They do so at great risk to their own lives and those of their families.</p>
<p>According to a report by the Committee to Project Journalists published on January 20, 83 journalists and media workers have been confirmed dead in Gaza since October 2023, of which 76 were Palestinian, four were Israeli and three were Lebanese. Colleen Murrell, a professor of journalism at Dublin City University, says the big question is whether Israeli occupying forces are deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-high-numbers-of-journalists-are-being-killed-but-its-hard-to-prove-theyre-being-targeted-221042">targeting these media workers</a>.</p>
<p>But history tells us it’s extremely unlikely anyone will be held to account for the killing of these vital witnesses.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-high-numbers-of-journalists-are-being-killed-but-its-hard-to-prove-theyre-being-targeted-221042">Gaza: high numbers of journalists are being killed but it's hard to prove they're being targeted</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209612024-01-11T17:29:22Z2024-01-11T17:29:22ZGaza update: no end to the killing in sight as extremists on both sides make a peace deal hard to imagine<p>As the death toll from Israel’s assault on Gaza climbed past 23,000 – including nearly 10,000 children – according to the latest figures from the Hamas-controlled health ministry, the Palestinian militant group released a series of videos showing operations in the northern Gaza Strip. Analysts commented that Hamas was keen to emphasise, contrary to claims by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), it still has operational capabilities in the north of the enclave.</p>
<p>Meanwhile attacks by Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militant groups continue in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as against US bases in Iraq and Syria as part of an ongoing campaign to harass and expel US troops.</p>
<p>Antony Blinken returned to the region for another round of shuttle diplomacy, putting on a determinedly optimistic face as he insisted after a meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman that Israel could still normalise relations with Saudi Arabia. Visiting the West Bank this week, Blinken also restated Washington’s commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state.</p>
<p>Of course, a major hurdle to the “two-state solution” is the inconvenient fact that two of the biggest players in any peace agreement along those lines would be Israel and Hamas. Hamas has always refused to recognise the state of Israel, while Israel’s Netanyahu government is being kept in power with the cooperation of the extreme right Religious Zionism party.</p>
<p>Amnon Aran, an expert in Israeli politics at City, University of London, says that the party’s leaders – national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich – flatly reject any cooperation with the Palestinians. But, significantly, Aran also believes that they will also prevent any real progress at other regional peace initiatives. This includes a joint US-French gambit that aims to reduce tensions between Israel and Lebanon by finally realising a deal originally mooted as a way of ending the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. </p>
<p>That would involve a new land demarcation agreement specifying where and how the two sides could deploy forces across the Israel-Lebanon border. It is already backed by UN security council resolution 1701 from 2006, which would replace any Hezbollah troops close to the Israel border with the Lebanese army. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-biggest-problem-in-negotiating-an-end-to-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah-may-be-his-own-government-220736">Aran notes</a>, Netanyahu faces a string of corruption charges and has been marking strenuous efforts to delay his trial. The collapse of his coalition could give his main rival, former defence minister Benny Gantz, a chance to form a government. Gantz is itching to pass legislation to prevent anyone facing criminal charges from being able to lead a government.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-biggest-problem-in-negotiating-an-end-to-war-with-hamas-and-hezbollah-may-be-his-own-government-220736">Benjamin Netanyahu's biggest problem in negotiating an end to war with Hamas and Hezbollah may be his own government</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<h2>In peril on the sea</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to cause chaos in the Red Sea, mounting such regular attacks on shipping there that many ships are opting to take the longer way round the Cape instead of risking access to the Suez Canal. </p>
<p>A US-led taskforce involving Royal Navy ships this week fought off what has been described as the biggest attack by Houthi rebels yet, involving a mix of rockets, drones and cruise missiles. UK defence secretary Grant Shapps did the rounds of the media making appropriately belligerent noises. </p>
<p>But in truth the Houthis are mounting what appears to be a classic example of “assymetrical warfare”, leveraging their limited means to cause major disruption to global supply chains and sending insurance premiums skywards. This will inevitably feed into higher commodity prices. </p>
<p>Noting that the Red Sea accounts of 15% of global trade, Basil Germond, an expert in maritime affairs at Lancaster University, believes that the west has few options for dealing with this. As of the time of writing, the UK is talking up the likelihood of airstrikes against the Houthis on the ground in Yemen. But, as Germond <a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">writes here</a>, this is an entirely different proposition from shooting down the odd drone at sea.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebel-red-sea-attacks-and-the-threat-of-escalation-and-supply-chain-chaos-are-a-major-headache-and-not-just-for-the-west-220787">Houthi rebel Red Sea attacks and the threat of escalation and supply chain chaos are a major headache – and not just for the west</a>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the state of the Middle East conflict by the Institute for the Study of War." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568881/original/file-20240111-23-5sp398.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">How the Middle East conflict stands as of January 10 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<h2>Major escalation unlikely</h2>
<p>As well as pursuing its war aims in Gaza, Israel continues to make good on its promise to find and kill all those involved in planning and carrying out the October attacks. While Israel and its spy agencies rarely claim responsibility for assassinations, it appears to be generally accepted that the decisions to target high-ranking Iranian general Sayyed Razi Mousavi in Damascus on Christmas Day and senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on January 2 were taken in Israel.</p>
<p>Scott Lucas, a Middle East security expert at University College Dublin, says that while the killings were greeted with predictably bloodcurdling threats from Hezbollah and Iran, a close reading of their statements suggests a major regional escalation <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">remains unlikely for now</a>. </p>
<p>As Lucas points out, both Iran and Lebanon, where Hezbollah comprises a state within a state, face severe economic problems. They are more likely to harass Israel, or in Iran’s case, use its proxies including the Houthis to do it for them.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-israeli-assassinations-draw-fiery-rhetoric-from-iran-and-hezbollah-but-regional-escalation-is-unlikely-220489">Gaza war: Israeli assassinations draw fiery rhetoric from Iran and Hezbollah – but regional escalation is unlikely</a>
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<h2>A post-Palestinian Gaza?</h2>
<p>Another of the factors making a durable peace deal more difficult to imagine is the vision that many high-ranking Israeli politicians have for a post-conflict Gaza – without any Palestinians living there. Both Smotrich and Ben Gvir have talked up the idea of Gaza’s population being farmed out as refugees around the world, while Gaza is reoccupied by Israeli settlers. </p>
<p>But it isn’t just the extreme right in Netanyahu’s government that have proposed moving Palestinians out of Gaza. As Leonie Fleischmann, a Middle East expert at City, University of London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-government-riven-with-division-over-future-of-gaza-after-far-right-calls-to-expel-palestinians-220602">writes</a>, more moderate voices have criticised the international community for a moral failure to help Palestinian civilians. For example, former Israeli ambassador to the UN Danny Danon and the centre-left politician and former deputy director of Mossad Ram Ben-Barak have proposed that countries around the world should accept some of Gaza’s population who “have expressed a desire to relocate”.</p>
<p>On the other side is the settler movement, which is already making ever larger and more aggressive inroads into the West Bank. One of the movement’s leading lights, Daniella Weiss, appeared recently on mainstream Israeli television to describe her longing for a Gaza where “there will be no homes, there will be no Arabs”, adding that Gaza City had always been “one of the cities of Israel. We’re just going back. There was a historical mistake and now we are fixing it.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-government-riven-with-division-over-future-of-gaza-after-far-right-calls-to-expel-palestinians-220602">Israeli government riven with division over future of Gaza after far-right calls to expel Palestinians</a>
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<h2>Peace polling</h2>
<p>One of the great tragedies in all this is the way that ideas and opportunities which might have provided a pathway to peace have been squandered over the years. Colin Irwin, now a research fellow at the University of Liverpool, has been involved in peace negotiations in various conflicts over several decades. Perhaps the most conspicuous success was his involvement in the negotiations which led to the signing of the Good Friday agreement in 1998. Irwin was working with Bill Clinton’s peace envoy, Senator George Mitchell, conducting peace polls.</p>
<p>As Irwin <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">explains</a>, the principle of polling as a part of peace negotiations is absolute inclusivity and public buy in. He developed relations with eight political parties across the spectrum of Northern Irish politics, including those that represented the Irish Republican Army, Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Freedom Fighters. His team commissioned polls on the many different political positions held by the parties, who then used this information to negotiate a peace deal they knew would receive support.</p>
<p>Irwin writes that he was all set to repeat this process with Mitchell in 2009, who Barack Obama had appointed as his Middle East envoy. But several things got in the way – including, most significantly, the election of Netanyahu as prime minister in the spring of 2009. Unlike his predecessor Ehud Olmert, Netanyahu did not want to include Hamas in any talks. The process collapsed. And so the killing has continued to this day.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israel-failed-to-learn-from-the-northern-ireland-peace-process-220170">How Israel failed to learn from the Northern Ireland peace process</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207362024-01-09T11:25:09Z2024-01-09T11:25:09ZBenjamin Netanyahu’s biggest problem in negotiating an end to war with Hamas and Hezbollah may be his own government<p>Three months since Hamas launched its murderous October 7 attacks, Israeli foreign policymakers remain far from achieving their goals. </p>
<p>The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) military campaign in the Gaza Strip has been unrelenting. According to data provided by the Hamas-run health ministry, more than 22,000 thousand Palestinians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-months-deaths-mount-diplomats-vie-stop-gaza-wars-spread-2024-01-07">have been killed</a>, the majority of them civilians. Meanwhile the physical destruction in the Gaza Strip has been catastrophic. </p>
<p>But despite the massive use of military force, the strategic goals Israel needs to achieve if it is to meet its aim of dismantling Hamas’ military capabilities and its ability to govern the Gaza Strip, remain elusive. </p>
<p>Apart from <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67866346">Saleh al-Aruri</a>, a key member of Hamas’ politburo, who was assassinated in Beirut on January 2, Hamas’s senior leadership remains intact. </p>
<p>In addition, Hamas’s command and control systems stay operational. While its military capabilities have been weakened, Hamas retains the capacity to launch missiles on Israeli communities and exact casualties from the IDF. </p>
<p>What’s more, the hope of the Israeli war cabinet that the military pressure inflicted by the IDF on Hamas will yield a second deal to free Israeli hostages has yet to materialise.</p>
<p>Across its northern border with Lebanon, Israel faces an even more formidable challenge. Since the October 7 attacks, border skirmishes with Hezbollah have become routine. These have posed a continuous threat to Israeli towns, villages and kibbutzim situated along the border with Lebanon. </p>
<p>Consequently, at least 70,000 residences south of the border <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/05/israel-north-evacuees-hezbollah-lebanon/">have been evacuated</a>, which has brought the overall tally of Israeli evacuees to at least 125,000 people. They have been living in hotels and temporary accommodation funded by the state. </p>
<p>As Israeli military deterrence has failed to keep Hezbollah out of the Israel-Hamas war, the government has yet to announce when the evacuees will be able to return to their homes, many of which have been destroyed by Hezbollah attacks.</p>
<p>The challenges Israel has encountered in its war with Hamas and conflict with Hezbollah have underscored the limits of what it can achieve with military force alone. It has become clear that Israel will have to rely on a multilateral diplomatic-political framework if it is to achieve its aims vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah.</p>
<h2>International efforts</h2>
<p>Only an international coalition can restore the Gaza Strip into a habitable place that does not pose a renewed security threat to Israeli communities. This will need to include a credible Palestinian partner, backed politically and financially by Arab and western countries and international organisations. </p>
<p>Similarly, averting a full blown Israel-Hezbollah war rests for now on American and French diplomacy producing an agreement that will prevent the outbreak of a full blown conflict. In this context the US, with the support of France, has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/07/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-blinken/">exploring a deal</a> that would tend to some “unfinished business” following the war Israel and Hezbollah fought in 2006.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/07/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-blinken/">framework being explored</a>, negotiations would commence upon a new land demarcation agreement that could delineate where and how the two sides deploy forces across the Israel-Lebanon border. </p>
<p>In addition, in line with the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701">United Nations Security Council resolution 1701</a>, which was part of the agreement that ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the Lebanese army rather than Hezbollah would be deployed in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah would, in turn, redeploy to an agreed point north of the border with Israel.</p>
<h2>Will diplomacy succeed?</h2>
<p>But Israeli domestic politics constitutes a serious obstacle. The political and personal future of the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who is standing trial on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-47409739">several corruption charges</a>, depends upon a coalition of 64 members of the Israeli parliament. This includes the extreme right Religious Zionism party. </p>
<p>Its leaders, national security minister, Itamar Ben Gvir, and finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, flatly reject any cooperation with the Palestinians. They are also unlikely to support even minute territorial adjustments across the Israeli-Lebanese border that they would perceive as concessions to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>As a result, they are poised to reject the multilateral diplomatic formulas being explored in relation to the “day after” in the Gaza Strip and the efforts to avert a war with Hezbollah.</p>
<p>This uncompromising stance presents Netanyahu with a serious dilemma. He can resist the diplomatic initiatives towards the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah to keep his political base and government intact. This could <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231220-netanyahu-seeks-to-postpone-his-trial-due-to-war-on-gaza-claims-tv-channel/">enable him to delay</a> and perhaps even stop his trial. </p>
<p>But catering for his political base, which is likely to scupper diplomacy, may prolong Israel’s military presence in the Gaza Strip. It could also lead to an extremely costly war with Hezbollah and erode the crucial support the US has provided Israel since October 7. </p>
<p>The alternative would be to try to replace the far-right elements of the government via a deal with a centrist party, which could accommodate the diplomatic initiatives being explored. But this is personally and politically extremely risky for Netanyahu. It also seems unviable since the leader of the Israeli opposition, Yair Lapid, has already <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/lapid-calls-on-netanyahu-to-quit-says-government-isnt-functioning-during-war/">called for Netanyahu’s resignation</a>. </p>
<p>The quip by the late Henry Kissinger, that <a href="https://users.ox.ac.uk/%7Essfc0005/Israeli%20Politics%20and%20Middle%20East%20Peacemaking.html">Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics</a>, seems to be playing out yet again. And, as so often in the past, it’s presenting the country’s leaders with an acute foreign policy predicament.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220736/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amnon Aran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Facing opposition to a peace deal within his own cabinet, Israel’s prime minister will find it difficult to agree an international peace deal and hold on to power.Amnon Aran, Professor of International Relations, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206022024-01-05T16:14:35Z2024-01-05T16:14:35ZIsraeli government riven with division over future of Gaza after far-right calls to expel Palestinians<p>After more than 90 days of war in Gaza, in which at least 22,000 Palestinians <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/1/5/israel-war-on-gaza-live-israel-attacks-bombard-khan-younis-rafah#">are reported</a> to have been killed, Israeli officials have shifted their attention to what happens once the fighting has ceased.</p>
<p>There has been considerable controversy over proposals from far-right members of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-780229">Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich</a>. The pair, who Netanyahu needed to include in his coalition to form a government last year, have advocated for Palestinians in Gaza to be resettled in countries around the world, making space for Israeli civilians to reoccupy the area.</p>
<p>Israel’s allies, who have thus far supported its war aims, have been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-uk-slam-inflammatory-call-by-israeli-minister-smotrich-voluntary-emigration-of-gaza/">quick to condemn the proposal</a>. The United States released <a href="https://www.state.gov/rejection-of-irresponsible-statements-on-resettlement-of-palestinians-outside-of-gaza/">a press statement</a> on January 2 rejecting the plan as “inflammatory and irresponsible”. Washington confirmed its support for Gaza as Palestinian land. The statement further claimed that Netanyahu had reassured the US that the proposal does not reflect government policy.</p>
<p>But while Smotrich and Ben Gvir represent the most extreme factions of Israel’s ruling coalition and were frozen out of the war cabinet, it would be unwise to dismiss their comments as merely another <a href="https://theconversation.com/death-in-jenin-israels-biggest-attack-in-the-west-bank-in-20-years-is-down-to-netanyahus-political-weakness-heres-why-209164">incident of incitement against Palestinians</a>. </p>
<p>The pair have the power to bring down the ruling coalition and Netanyahu if their demands are not heeded. And they have considerable support within the settler movement, which has been influential in the policy and practice of settlement building throughout Israel’s history.</p>
<p>And it is also important to note that proposals to relocate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip were initially proposed by Israeli lawmakers considered to be more moderate. </p>
<h2>‘West should welcome Gaza refugees’</h2>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-should-welcome-gaza-refugees-asylum-seekers-hamas-terrorism-displacement-5d2b5890">op-ed in the Wall Street Journal</a> on November 13, 2023, two Israeli lawmakers – former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations Danny Danon and centre-left politician Ram Ben-Barak, formerly deputy director of Mossad, wrote that countries around the world should accept some of Gaza’s population who “have expressed a desire to relocate”. </p>
<p>They criticised the international community for not fulfilling “their moral imperative” to “help civilians caught in the crisis”.</p>
<p>Intelligence minister, Gila Gamliel – who represents Likud, the mainstream conservative nationalist party led by Netanyahu – reiterated this proposal in an <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-773713">article in the Jerusalem Post</a> on November 19, 2023. She referred to Gaza as “a breeding ground for extremism” and called for the “voluntary resettlement” of Palestinians outside the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>Both these proposals suggested humanitarian concerns for Palestinians alongside security concerns for Israelis. But others who also support the plan do so out of strong religious ideology.</p>
<h2>Return of the settlers?</h2>
<p>As documented by political geographer <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30245772">David Newman</a>, the Israeli settler movement mainly comprises religious Zionists who believe the greater land of Israel was promised to the Jewish people by God. In light of this, many believe that settling the land is an opportunity to fulfil God’s promise.</p>
<p>Following the 1967 and 1974 wars, they rejected those who believed returning land to the Arab countries would secure peace. Instead they advocated for the establishment of Israeli settlements to ensure the land was never relinquished. They have had <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/israeli-settler-movement/40C60D52DD841AB3D3A07F234654B84C">significant influence</a> on Israeli policy and practice and now find themselves represented in the corridors of power by Smotrich and Ben Gvir. </p>
<p>The movement was dealt a severe blow following the decision by former prime minister Ariel Sharon’s <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israels%20Disengagement%20Plan-%202005.aspx#:%7E:text=Israel's%20plan%20of%20unilateral%20disengagement,peace%20negotiations%20with%20the%20Palestinians.">disengagement plan</a> in 2005. Sharon evicted about 8,000 Israeli settlers from 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip. </p>
<p>Settlers have been quick to respond to the current conflict, seeing it as an opportunity to fulfil the religious promise. At the end of December last year, the leader of the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/settler-group-openly-planning-establishment-of-3-illegal-outposts-next-week/">Nachala Israeli settlement movement</a>, Daniella Weiss, appeared on mainstream television calling for Palestinians to be cleared from Gaza. </p>
<p>This was so that Israeli settlers “can see the sea … There will be no homes, there will be no Arabs – it’s just an elegant way of saying, I want to see the sea.” She declared that Gaza City had always been “one of the cities of Israel. We’re just going back. There was a historical mistake and now we are fixing it.”</p>
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<p>What these positions fail to fundamentally understand is the deep connection Palestinians have to the land and their steadfastness in remaining there. </p>
<h2>Deep divisions</h2>
<p>Weiss’s position – and the aspirations of the settler movement – appear to have been dealt a setback by Israeli defence minister, Yoav Gallant, who has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallants-post-war-gaza-plan-palestinians-to-run-civil-affairs-with-global-task-force/">presented his plans</a> for Gaza after the destruction of Hamas. </p>
<p>On January 5, he said: “Gaza residents are Palestinian, therefore Palestinian bodies will be in charge, with the condition that there will be no hostile actions or threats against the State of Israel.” Gallant further proposed that there should be no Israeli civil presence in Gaza. </p>
<p>An account in the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/meeting-on-post-war-gaza-ends-in-fracas-as-ministers-snipe-at-idf-chief-over-probe/">Times of Israel</a> said that the cabinet meeting at which Gallant outlined his proposal ended in acrimony, exposing the deep divisions in Netanyahu’s government.</p>
<p>Gallant’s proposal comes days before US secretary of state Antony Blinken is due to visit to discuss “transitioning to the next phase” of the war. The proposal has been presented to the US administration, although it does not yet form <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/05/israel-defence-minister-yoav-gallant-gaza-plan-after-war-hamas-palestine-control-antony-blinken-visit">official policy</a>. </p>
<p>As attention turns towards the end of the hostilities, Netanyahu will have a difficult juggling act in placating the different factions of his coalition and the Israeli public, as well as satisfying demands from the US. What is missing from the discussions thus far is the voice of the Palestinians – which must be put at the centre of any future solutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Fleischmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel’s settler movement, which is already sparking sectarian violence in the West Bank, is laying claim to the Gaza Strip – with support from some senior politicians.Leonie Fleischmann, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201702024-01-03T17:41:24Z2024-01-03T17:41:24ZHow Israel failed to learn from the Northern Ireland peace process<p>There is no peace in the Middle East because there is no effective peace process. This isn’t because the Palestinians and Israelis do not know how to make peace. They do. The Good Friday agreement which brought peace to Northern Ireland a quarter of a century ago, provided a <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/peacepolls/documents/002903.pdf">clear guide</a>. They have to do what the negotiating teams, of which I was a part, did in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The problem is Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his ally, the United States of America, who have failed to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland to Middle East peacemaking.</p>
<p>To fully understand the tragedy this represents, it’s necessary to go back in time to the negotiations that achieved the Good Friday agreement in 1997. At the time I was working, together with two other Northern Ireland-based academics, <a href="https://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/NBE/Research/research-centres-and-institutes/CentreofCanadianStudiesCCS/AffiliatedStaff/">Fred Boal</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/tom-hadden-1397964">Tom Hadden</a>, developing a range of public polls to gauge opinion about how to achieve peace. </p>
<p>As the principal investigator on the Peace Building and Public Policy in Northern Ireland project – independent of government and funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT) – my role was to develop relations with all the parties to the Northern Ireland peace process and act as an informal negotiator and manager of public opinion and public diplomacy. The public was kept informed through reports and articles in the local newspaper, the <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/cgi-bin/generic?instanceID=10">Belfast Telegraph</a>. It was key to the process that people of all shades of political opinion were not only involved, but were fully informed at all times.</p>
<p>Critically, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were democratically elected to participate in the peace negotiations there, including the Irish Republican Army represented by Sinn Féin, and the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Freedom Fighters represented by their political leaderships, the Progressive Unionist Party and Ulster Democratic Party respectively. </p>
<p>In all, I had to work with eight political parties negotiating and agreeing questions for public opinion polls designed to resolve issues in the formal negotiations that had yet to be settled.</p>
<h2>How ‘peace polls’ work</h2>
<p>These <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/peacepolls/documents/008880.pdf">“peace polls”</a> were unlike “partisan polls” designed to underline the public’s support for a particular policy favoured by one party or another (most commonly a government). Instead, the polls – which I developed with a partner from each of the eight political parties elected to the formal negotiations – aimed to fairly and objectively measure the public’s support, from both sides, for every possible policy option across the political spectrum. The objective was to determine the precise points of common ground, where they existed, or effective compromise where it was needed for peacemaking. </p>
<p>Public opinion polls are an American invention and, fortunately for me, Bill Clinton’s special envoy to Northern Ireland and the “talks” chairman, Senator George Mitchell, took the polls very seriously and gave me every possible support. </p>
<p>When the British offered to run the polling project for the parties, the parties rebelled and insisted on working with me with JCRT funding. So I always made a point of hand delivering the reports to Mitchell and the parties the day before they were published. And each time the polling reports were published, deals got done until we reached an agreement that we knew could <a href="https://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm">pass a referendum</a>, which was eventually held on May 22 1998.</p>
<p>The legitimacy of the Good Friday agreement was ensured by the full democratic participation of all the parties to the agreement and the people of Northern Ireland. Through public opinion polls the people gained a seat at the negotiating table, and through a referendum the deal was made.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Colin Irwin explains peace polls and how they might have affected the Brexit referendum.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Tragically, the peoples of Israel and Palestine have been prevented from learning and applying these same peace lessons to the resolution of their conflict.</p>
<h2>When it all went wrong</h2>
<p>In January 2009, the newly elected US president, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/hillary-clinton-obama-israel-palestine">Barack Obama, appointed Mitchell</a> as his special envoy for Middle East peace, in the hope he could bring the success of the Good Friday agreement peace process to Israel and Palestine. Expecting Obama to appoint Mitchell to this post following his successful election in 2008, I was invited to run a <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/peacepolls/documents/000571.pdf">peace poll in Israel and Palestine</a>.</p>
<p>I was flown to Washington in June 2009 along with my Israeli and Palestinian polling team. Presentations were arranged for us in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K6q2hyaKjs0">US House of Representatives and Senate</a>, and various thinktanks to brief all the politicians and experts with an interest in Middle East peace.</p>
<p>I had been in touch with Mitchell and met him in his office at the State Department. At that time I had also been running peace polls in <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/cgi-bin/generic?instanceID=18">Sri Lanka</a> with support from the Norwegians. They were a generous and reliable funder and had indicated they would be willing to support my work in Israel and Palestine if Mitchell wanted them to. </p>
<p>Mitchell welcomed the Norwegian offer, arrangements were made to take it up, but it all fell through – my gut feel was that the State Department wanted to have control of the research to meet their own agenda. So I did not get the funding and Mitchell eventually resigned his post without achieving peace in May 2011.</p>
<p>Of course, it can be argued that even if I had brought the lessons of the Northern Ireland peace process to Israel and Palestine I would have failed. But I had made all necessary preparations and contacts with all the parties to the conflict to make it work. I knew what I was doing – as did Mitchell when he accepted his appointment from Obama.</p>
<p>Over a period of two months of interviews to develop the questionnaire in November and December 2008 I had private meetings with all the relevant stakeholders including the then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and president, Shimon Peres, on the Israeli side. My pollster Mina Zemach was a good friend of Peres and had been his pollster when he led the Labour party.</p>
<p>On the Palestinian side, the non-governmental organisation organising the project, <a href="https://www.onevoicemovement.org/">OneVoice</a>, had close connections with Fatah, the political party founded by Yassir Arafat and others in the 1950s, which was at that stage dominant within the Palestinian Authority. So I arranged to meet with Hamas via an introduction from <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/ghassan_khatib/">Ghassan Khatib</a>, an independent Palestinian politician and director of the <a href="http://www.jmcc.org/index.aspx">Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre</a>. </p>
<p>Speaking with Hamas was like speaking with Sinn Féin. They had an extreme negotiating position but that is all it was: a negotiating position. Like Sinn Féin they had a legitimate grievance and said they would be happy to cooperate with the peace polls. Of course the impact of the Hamas attack of October 7 and Israel’s assault on Gaza has profoundly reshaped public opinion on all sides.</p>
<p>Violence on both sides of the Troubles that continued <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2023/04/02/how-murder-of-two-best-friends-spurred-final-push-for-peace-in-north/">even as the talks were progressing</a> meant that at times many thought we would never achieve a peace agreement in Northern Ireland. But such tragedies can either doom negotiations or inspire renewed effort. People have a choice. We carried on. </p>
<p>Significantly, the one key interlocutor who refused to meet with me in December 2008 was Netanyahu. He only consented to send his chief of staff. Zemach said this was because he would refuse to compromise on sharing Jerusalem as part of any peace agreement. And when he became Israel’s prime minister in March 2009 he also refused to include Hamas in any peace negotiations.</p>
<p>My experience told me that excluding Sinn Féin and the other paramilitary organisations from peace negotiations in Northern Ireland had only brought failure, while their inclusion had enabled the peace settlement. </p>
<p>Other parties essential to the success of the Northern Ireland peace process had been the centre <a href="https://www.allianceparty.org/peace_process_papers?locale=en">Alliance Party</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/1/northern-ireland-peace-deal-womens-role-finally-recognised-says-activist">Women’s Coalition</a>. </p>
<p>The politically equivalent party in Israel was Meretz, a left-wing socialist party and strong supporter of the <a href="https://peacenow.org.il/en">Peace Now</a> movement. When I met with them, like Alliance, they told me they would be pleased to be part of a fully inclusive peace process but they were excluded from negotiations as they were not part of Netanyahu’s coalition government.</p>
<p>The establishment in Washington did not have a problem with my contacts with Hamas. In 2009, I had also been working on a <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/cgi-bin/generic?instanceID=22">project in Sudan</a> with the US Institute of Peace. Although Hamas was a proscribed terrorist organisation, the Institute for Peace lawyers said it was OK for me to meet and talk with them providing I did not give them any assistance. They advised me “not to even buy them a coffee”. I took this advice. Hamas provided the coffee.</p>
<p>But without inclusive negotiations that also drew on the public’s desire for an end to the bloodshed, peace was not achieved. </p>
<p>In 2013, when I was in New York for meetings at the UN I took the opportunity to visit Mitchell at his law office and asked him why he had resigned. He said it was because he was not getting sufficient support from the State Department. I had planned to reveal this in a <a href="http://www.peacepolls.org/peacepolls/documents/008880.pdf">book I was writing</a>. But a trusted colleague and friend advised me against it, as it could reflect badly on the former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, when she was campaigning to be president in the run-up to the 2016 election.</p>
<p>Accordingly, I watered down the quote to saying something about the lack of sufficient support in Washington. It was not untrue, but it was not the whole truth.</p>
<h2>Misplaced optimism</h2>
<p>In my optimism at the time, I thought perhaps that Clinton – if she became president – would send her husband to the Middle East as her special envoy. Bill Clinton had got very close to making an agreement some years earlier with the “<a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Peace%20Puzzle/10_Clinton%20Parameters.pdf">Clinton parameters</a>”, but he ran out of time. And then Hillary Clinton lost the 2016 election to Donald Trump – and so we are where we are.</p>
<p>It is just as likely that my optimism was misplaced and that Clinton and possibly Joe Biden – who has always been a very strong supporter of Israel – did not want to oppose Netanyahu for domestic political reasons.</p>
<p>When the Good Friday agreement was struck 25 years ago, both Mitchell and I thought Israel and Palestine would be our next challenge. But Al Gore, who we had hoped might set his sights on a peace deal, lost to Bush and then 9/11 happened, and the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq took all the political oxygen out of peacemaking. </p>
<p>Then, 15 years ago, we thought it would happen when Obama was elected. It should have. Another opportunity may well arrive when the present war is over, the Hamas’ attack on October 7 and Israel’s response have raised the stakes for peace considerably. Elections in the US, Israel and Palestine may also put the peace process on hold yet again. But this must not prevent people of goodwill from talking peace. And it can work, history tells us as much.</p>
<p>Sadly, Israel and Palestine are not alone in their cycles of violence and grief. All over the world the lessons of the Northern Ireland peace process are ignored. Frozen conflicts remain frozen at best and with increased frequency become unstable and violent. Over centuries, the cost of war has often been measured in “blood and treasure”. It’s fair to say that since 2009 in the Middle East and elsewhere we’ve seen “blood” in thousands of lives lost and “treasure” in billions of dollars wasted, again and again.</p>
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<p><em>This article originally stated that the author’s work had been funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. This was incorrect. Colin Irwin received funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, which is a separate entity. The error was introduced in the editing process and has now been corrected.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin John Irwin receives funding from: Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe, Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, OneVoice, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (now FCDO), Economic and Social Research Council (UK ESRC), United Nations, InterPeace, Health and Welfare Canada, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), British Academy, Norwegian Peoples Aid, The Day After, No Peace Without Justice, US Department of State, Local Administrations Council Unit (Syria), Asia Foundation, Department for International Development (UK DFID), OpenAI, Atlantic Philanthropies, Universities: Dalhousie, Manitoba, Syracuse, Pennsylvania, Queens Belfast, Liverpool. Also member of the World Association of Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) which promotes freedom to publish public opinion polls and sets international professional standards.</span></em></p>The main stumbling block to Middle East peace is the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.Colin John Irwin, Research Fellow, Department of Politics, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204452024-01-02T18:41:08Z2024-01-02T18:41:08ZIsrael’s highest court protects its power to curb government extremism − 3 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567606/original/file-20240102-15-z4y79r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C5%2C3976%2C2335&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Israeli Supreme Court assembled in September 2023 to hear arguments to strike down a controversial judicial overhaul limiting the power of the court to review and overturn government decisions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-of-the-israeli-supreme-court-esther-hayut-and-all-news-photo/1659537878?adppopup=true">Debbie Hill/Pool/AFP viaGetty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the midst of Israel’s fierce war against Hamas in Gaza, the country’s highest court on New Year’s Day drew attention back to a previous conflict within the country. In a narrowly divided decision, the justices <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-supreme-court-judicial-overhaul-78733a94428b8b9f2c311ee6779eba23">struck down a significant part of the contentious judicial reform</a> passed in July 2023 by the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. </p>
<p>That reform would have taken away from the Supreme Court the ability to review and limit the government’s actions. Netanyahu and his cabinet – the most religious and politically conservative in Israel’s history – claimed the court had become too powerful, vetoing government policies. Opponents of the legislation said it was an attack on democracy, aimed at neutering the judicial system so that government had nearly unfettered power. </p>
<p>Demonstrations against the reform began in January 2023 and grew over several months into massive expressions of opposition featuring hundreds of thousands of protesters in the streets. The public opposition grew so large and emphatic, attracting figures previously uninvolved in politics – such as members of the military and 18 former Supreme Court justices – that it was seen as unprecedented in Israel’s history.</p>
<p>The Conversation followed the path of the legislation in Israel’s parliament, as well as the demonstrations that accompanied its debate and passage. Here are three stories from our archives that can help readers understand what was at stake.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A protester raises a 'Scales of Justice' symbol while other protesters hold a banner and placards during a demonstration" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510166/original/file-20230214-28-8u12ky.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A protester raises a ‘scales of justice’ symbol during a demonstration on Feb. 11, 2023, in Tel Aviv, where 130,000 people marched against Israel’s right-wing government and its controversial legal reform.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protester-raises-a-scales-of-justice-symbol-while-other-news-photo/1247124896?phrase=Netanyahu&adppopup=true">Matan Golan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>1. Unchecked majority power</h2>
<p>In an early analysis of the Netanyahu cabinet’s legislative moves, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=K47kws8AAAAJ&hl=en">Boaz Atzili</a>, a scholar of international relations at American University School of International Service, wrote that there were a number of ways Israel’s democratic institutions, customs and practices <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-netanyahu-facing-off-against-the-supreme-court-and-proposing-to-limit-judicial-independence-and-3-other-threats-to-israeli-democracy-197096">were endangered by the new government</a>. Among those threats were the government’s hostility to freedom of speech, dissent, equal rights – especially for the LGBTQ community – and “the new government’s intention to de facto annex the West Bank.” </p>
<p>“Perhaps the most important front in the battle is the Israeli Supreme Court,” wrote Atzili. “The courts are the only institution that can check the power of the ruling parties and uphold the country’s Basic Laws, which provide rights in the absence of a formal constitution. But the new government wants to erase this separation of power and explicitly aims at weakening the courts. … This would, in effect, remove all barriers placed upon the power of the majority.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-netanyahu-facing-off-against-the-supreme-court-and-proposing-to-limit-judicial-independence-and-3-other-threats-to-israeli-democracy-197096">Israel's Netanyahu facing off against the supreme court and proposing to limit judicial independence - and 3 other threats to Israeli democracy</a>
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<h2>2. Perception isn’t reality</h2>
<p>As the protests grew in Israel, we interviewed political scientist and Israel expert <a href="https://www.international.ucla.edu/israel/person/2520">Dov Waxman</a>, the director of UCLA’s Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies, about the proposals to limit the independence and power of the judiciary. He said that there was a perception that the Supreme Court had overstepped boundaries. </p>
<p>“Since the 1990s, Israel’s high court has become <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-enters-a-dangerous-period-public-protests-swell-over-netanyahus-plan-to-limit-the-power-of-the-israeli-supreme-court-199917">very involved in Israeli politics</a>, something it did not do in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s,” Waxman said. “It has intervened, overridden and disqualified many government decisions and laws. So the perception, particularly by those on the right, that this is an activist court, that it has been too active, is reasonable.”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man marching in a protest wearing a military uniform raises his fist." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510168/original/file-20230214-26-72elpe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An Israeli reserve soldier raises his fist as he marches during a demonstration on Feb. 13, 2023, in Jerusalem to protest proposed judicial reform.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-israeli-reserve-soldier-raises-his-fist-as-he-marches-news-photo/1247124493?phrase=israel%20protest&adppopup=true">Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But, Waxman said, “This perception among the right that the court has really restrained Israeli governments isn’t actually accurate. I think many people would accept that there could be an argument for some kind of judicial reform, at least passing a law to clarify the role and powers of the Supreme Court. But what’s being presented in this reform is actually a revolutionary attempt to essentially take away the independence and power of the Supreme Court.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-enters-a-dangerous-period-public-protests-swell-over-netanyahus-plan-to-limit-the-power-of-the-israeli-supreme-court-199917">Israel enters a dangerous period – public protests swell over Netanyahu's plan to limit the power of the Israeli Supreme Court</a>
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<h2>3. Secular power vs. settlers and the Orthodox</h2>
<p>Behind the judicial reform effort by Netanyahu’s government was the move to wrest state power away from the liberal, secular interests that had long dominated Israel’s politics. </p>
<p>“A country once known for left-leaning politics now has a right-wing government dominated by Jewish religious nationalists who spearheaded the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-contentious-judicial-reform-becomes-law-in-israel-netanyahu-cements-his-political-legacy-210043">efforts to curb judicial checks on executive power</a>,” wrote <a href="https://www.umass.edu/jne/member/david-mednicoff">David Mednicoff</a>, a scholar of Judaic and Near Eastern studies at UMass Amherst. </p>
<p>“This reform appeals to important sectors of Netanyahu’s supporters who see the Supreme Court’s power as an inappropriate secular check on Israel’s increasingly pro-settler and pro-Orthodox government,” Mednicoff wrote. </p>
<p>At the center of this battle, wrote Mednicoff, is the man who has played a leading role in Israeli politics since the 1990s, Benjamin Netanyahu. He did this in part by allying himself increasingly with the country’s settler population, many of them Orthodox Jews.</p>
<p>“Today’s Israel is marked by growing splits between secular, urbanized citizens near the Mediterranean coast and Orthodox and other settlers in or near the West Bank. The two groups have different visions for Israel’s future, with the latter citizens pushing the country in a more theocratic direction.”</p>
<p>“This divisive battle over Israel’s nature owes a great deal to Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership,” wrote Mednicoff.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-contentious-judicial-reform-becomes-law-in-israel-netanyahu-cements-his-political-legacy-210043">As contentious judicial 'reform' becomes law in Israel, Netanyahu cements his political legacy</a>
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<p><em>This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220445/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Israel’s highest court has struck down the government’s law limiting its power. Three scholars look at why the law was proposed, what it aimed to do and who supported – and opposed – it.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199582023-12-18T03:20:04Z2023-12-18T03:20:04ZIsrael-Hamas war: a ceasefire is now in sight. Will Israel’s prime minister agree?<p>The mistaken killing of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-12-16/israel-kills-hostages-mistakenly-in-gaza/103237282">three Israeli hostages</a> by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) at the weekend has substantially increased pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire in the war against Hamas.</p>
<p>The Biden administration is exerting maximum pressure to convince the Israeli government that the downsides of its prosecution of the war, particularly the shockingly high Palestinian civilian death toll, now outweigh the potential gains.</p>
<p>During a visit to Israel earlier this month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Netanyahu and his cabinet they would have to <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/12/14/israels-current-large-scale-operation-is-the-last-one-in-gaza">end the offensive</a> by the new year. </p>
<p>National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Israel on the weekend to deliver the same message, emphasising that the US wanted to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna130070">see results</a> on its demands to Israel to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza.</p>
<p>Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin is currently on a trip to the Middle East, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna130070">including a stopover</a> in Israel to discuss the “eventual cessation of high-intensity ground operations and air strikes”. </p>
<p>Earlier in the month, Austin <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4339335-lloyd-austin-israel-risks-defeat-if-civilians-not-protected/#:%7E:text=Defense-,Israel%20risks%20'strategic%20defeat'%20if%20civilians%20aren',t%20protected%2C%20Pentagon%20chief%20says&text=Secretary%20of%20Defense%20Lloyd%20Austin,group%20Hamas%20in%20the%20region.">warned</a> that Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians risked driving them into the arms of the enemy – replacing “a tactical victory with a strategic defeat”.</p>
<p>Finally President Joe Biden, who won enormous kudos in Israel for his visit in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks on October 7, has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/12/politics/biden-israel-losing-support-netanyahu/index.html#:%7E:text=Rifts%20between%20the%20United%20States,plans%20for%20post%2Dwar%20Gaza.">publicly warned</a> that Israel’s “indiscriminate bombing” of Gaza is losing it international support.</p>
<p>The US, if not Israel (which regards the UN as biased against it) will be concerned at the UN General Assembly vote on December 12 demanding a ceasefire. Though the resolution is non-enforceable, the large majority – 153 of the 190 members – was a clear indication of growing international opposition to the war. </p>
<p>The majority in favour of a similar resolution in October was 120. The US stood out as the only UN Security Council member to vote against the December resolution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-us-israel-relationship-is-in-period-of-transition-as-biden-says-israel-is-losing-support-219571">Gaza war: US-Israel relationship is in period of transition as Biden says Israel is losing support</a>
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<h2>Israeli forces credibility reduced</h2>
<p>To underline these messages, a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/13/politics/intelligence-assessment-dumb-bombs-israel-gaza/index.html">leaked US intelligence assessment</a> has claimed 40-45% of the 29,000 air-to-surface ground munitions Israel has used in Gaza have been “dumb” (unguided) bombs. This disclosure effectively undercuts the Israel Defense Force’s claim that its strikes have been only at <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-hamas-engage-in-fierce-battles-in-gaza-s-biggest-cities-/7389468.html">proven Hamas targets</a>.</p>
<p>Details of the accidental killing of the three hostages, as they have emerged at the weekend, further reduce the credibility of the Israeli forces’ claims to be operating with full regard to international humanitarian law. The three were holding <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/israeli-army-says-it-mistakenly-shot-and-killed-three-hostages-20231216-p5erwi.html">a white cloth</a>, had their hands in the air and were calling to the soldiers in Hebrew.</p>
<p>An Israeli Defense Force official has said the case was “against our rules of engagement” and an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67738111">investigation was happening</a> at the “highest level”.</p>
<p>The tragedy has given renewed impetus to the campaign by families of the more than 100 remaining hostages and their numerous supporters. They want the government to prioritise negotiations for the release of the captives over the war against Hamas. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/video/hundreds-protest-in-tel-aviv-after-idf-mistakenly-kills-3-hostages-200358981517">Demonstrations took place</a> in Tel Aviv after news of the three hostages’ deaths.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-history-of-the-us-israel-special-relationship-shows-how-connections-have-shifted-since-long-before-the-1948-founding-of-the-jewish-state-215781">A brief history of the US-Israel 'special relationship' shows how connections have shifted since long before the 1948 founding of the Jewish state</a>
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<p>So far Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, are holding firm that the operation to destroy Hamas must continue. Gallant has said that only <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-war-puts-pressure-on-hamas-to-free-more-hostages-gallant-tells-families/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CWhen%20the%20military%20operations%20advance,%2C%E2%80%9D%20Gallant%20told%20the%20families.">intense military pressure</a> on Hamas will create conditions for release of more hostages.</p>
<h2>Netanyahu likely to continue the conflict</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has a number of reasons for continuing the war. </p>
<p>In the inevitable postwar inquiry into the security lapses that led to the horrific Hamas attack on October 7, major blame is certain be laid on him. That inquiry won’t be held while the war proceeds. </p>
<p>But Netanyahu will be aware that his only chance of avoiding the sort of withering criticism that would force him from office is to make good on his pledge to totally eliminate Hamas, and to find and recover the remaining hostages. That will take much more time than Biden seems willing to allow him.</p>
<p>Unfortunately for Netanyahu, he cannot yet claim victory on the basis of decapitating the Hamas leadership. The movement’s political ruler in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, and its military leader, Mohammed Deif, are still at large. They’re probably somewhere in the vast tunnel network beneath Gaza. If Israel were to capture or kill these two, Netanyahu would be able to claim substantial vindication.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s pressure is of less concern to Netanyahu. He is practised at staring down US presidents, particularly Democratic ones. In <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1157889/">2009</a> he defied President Barack Obama’s call for a freeze on settlement building in the West Bank.</p>
<p>In 2015 he even <a href="https://time.com/3678657/obama-netanyahu-washington/">breached protocol</a> by accepting a Republican invitation to visit Washington to address a joint sitting of Congress without calling on Obama.</p>
<p>Within Israel, Netanyahu is helped by the fact that Israelis have only a partial picture of the human toll their country’s campaign is having on Palestinian civilians. </p>
<p>The ABC Global Affairs Editor, John Lyons, who was based in Jerusalem for many years and understands Hebrew, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-12-10/israel-gaza-media-watching-a-sanitised-war/103206528">reported</a> after a recent visit to Israel:</p>
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<p>[…] most Israelis do not see pictures (on their televisions) of injured Palestinian women and children or the destruction of Gaza into kilometre after kilometre of rubble […] Israelis are watching a sanitised war […] They are bewildered at why the world is increasingly uncomfortable at the high civilian casualty rate.</p>
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<h2>Resumption of hostage negotiations</h2>
<p>That said, Netanyahu has bowed to the hostages lobby by reversing a decision that the head of Mossad, David Barnea, should cease negotiations in Qatar for more hostage releases. Barnea met Qatar’s prime minister in Europe <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/benjamin-netanyahu-hints-at-new-hostage-negotiations-with-hamas/cfjriz264">last week</a>. No details were available at time of writing. </p>
<p>But Hamas continues to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/17/israel-faces-new-calls-for-truce-after-killing-of-hostages-raises-alarm-about-its-conduct-in-gaza.html">make demands</a> that Israel would find hard to accept: no further hostage releases until the war ends; and insistence that a deal would involve release of large numbers of Palestinian prisoners, including high-profile militants.</p>
<p>In the background, a worry for both Israel and the US is that support for Hamas has risen substantially in the West Bank since the war started. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/under-pressure-netanyahu-agrees-to-a-ceasefire-and-hostage-deal-with-hamas-are-his-days-now-numbered-218348">Under pressure, Netanyahu agrees to a ceasefire and hostage deal with Hamas. Are his days now numbered?</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/961">Polling</a> between November 22 and December 2 by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research indicated that backing for Hamas had risen from 12% in September to 44% at the beginning of December. This is shown also in the number of green Hamas flags in evidence when Palestinian prisoners were freed during the pauses in fighting in late November.</p>
<p>The polling even showed that support for Hamas in Gaza over the same period had risen from 38% to 42%.</p>
<p>Netanyahu may get lucky if his forces find Sinwar and Deif. In the meantime, a decision on continuation of the war rests with him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mistaken killing of three Israeli hostages by the Israeli Defense Forces at the weekend has substantially increased pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire.Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194542023-12-14T13:11:40Z2023-12-14T13:11:40ZIs Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565012/original/file-20231211-25-msxpy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=42%2C0%2C4644%2C3070&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Palestinian militant rides on the back of a motorcycle near a crossing between Israel and the northern Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-at-the-erez-crossing-also-known-as-the-beit-news-photo/1713407740">Ahmed Zakot/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of Hamas’ bloody raid into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, many Israelis and people around the world equated the newly ultraviolent and audacious Palestinian militant organization with the world’s deadliest terrorist group, ISIS – the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, linked the two groups directly on Oct. 25, 2023, stating: “<a href="https://twitter.com/SkyNews/status/1717233019876966485">Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas</a>.” President Joe Biden and <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4254371-lloyd-austin-hamas-israel-atrocities-isis/">Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin</a> made similar comparisons. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Hamas killing families “<a href="https://www.newsnationnow.com/world/war-in-israel/idf-isis-flag-hamas-massacre/">brings to mind the worst of ISIS</a>.”</p>
<p>There are plenty of reasons for Israel to want the world to think Hamas is ISIS – including the hope of marshaling the sort of overseas support that led to the 2014 creation of the 86-member <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-counterterrorism/the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis/">Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-really-defeated-the-islamic-state-obama-or-trump-148066">fighting between 2014 and 2019</a>, the coalition reclaimed all the territory the Islamic State group had seized in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>And it is true that the Oct. 7 attack displayed tactics that are remarkably similar to those of the Islamic State group. But as <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">a scholar</a> of ISIS specifically, and Middle Eastern militants in general, I am inclined to agree with those who say the comparison between the two terrorist groups overlooks their underlying differences. The similarities are on the surface, in methods and tactics – but their goals and ideologies remain vastly different.</p>
<h2>Fundamental differences</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/11/21/hamas-isis-are-not-the-same-00128107">various news articles</a> have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/25/hamas-isis-islamic-state-israel-terrorism-analogy/">pointed out</a>, the Islamic State is a Sunni group <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">militantly opposed to the Shia branch of Islam</a> and calls Shiites “<a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">rafida</a>,” which means “rejecter of Allah.” While it is true that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/11/1218145466/israel-hamas-war-shia-sunni-iran-backed-militants">most Palestinians in Gaza are Sunni</a>, Shia-led <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-needed-a-new-way-to-get-money-from-iran-it-turned-to-crypto-739619aa">Iran is Hamas’ primary benefactor</a>.</p>
<p>And Hamas and ISIS have even met in battle. Bloody <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-affiliates-press-hamas/">clashes between ISIS and Hamas</a> in 2015 resulted from efforts by <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/isis-supporters-throw-down-gauntlet-hamas-gaza-n385006">Islamic State supporters to establish ISIS affiliates in the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip</a> and the neighboring Sinai Peninsula.</p>
<p>In January 2018, leaders of the Islamic State group in the Sinai declared war on the “Hamas tyrants” via a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/world/middleeast/isis-hamas-sinai.html">lengthy online video</a> that included the execution of a Hamas member.</p>
<p>The two groups’ differences also include their divergent goals. The Islamic State group aims to create a global theocracy based on the principles of fundamentalist Sunni Islam, <a href="https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/isis-rejection-nation-state">with no national or territorial borders</a>.</p>
<p>Hamas, by contrast, is narrowly focused on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/8/what-is-the-group-hamas-a-simple-guide-tothe-palestinian-group">constructing a Palestinian national state</a> by “<a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3416">armed resistance to the occupation</a>” of the Palestinian territories by Israel.</p>
<p>So it’s pretty clear that Hamas is not ISIS. But it’s not that simple either.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Smoke trails in the sky over an urban scene show where rockets have been fired." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Hamas fired rockets into Israel as part of the Oct. 7, 2023, attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/006937a3e5424b1cad4cd35b853349c5/photo">AP Photo/Hatem Moussa</a></span>
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<h2>Interconnections and exchanges</h2>
<p>Despite their differences, there are several similarities, including the fact that both groups are on the <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations</a>. The two organizations have on occasion also shared common strategic, if not necessarily ideological, goals. And, as became obvious on Oct. 7, their tactics have become similar, though in service of different objectives.</p>
<p>My long study of Islamic State fighting tactics, including <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/iraqi_kurdistan/field_iraqi_kurdistan.html">field research</a> in Iraq, leads me to believe Hamas has recently undergone a radical ISIS-inspired transformation that has not yet gotten widespread public attention. Prior to its Oct. 7 blitz, Hamas’ actions were limited to lobbing imprecise rockets and digging tunnels into Israel to kidnap or kill small numbers of Israelis.</p>
<p>But as University of Miami professor and expert in the study of jihadism Nathan S. French has noted in El Pais, “Hamas operatives – like other Islamist and jihadist groups – <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">borrow, steal and appropriate tactics and strategies</a> from other similar political, guerrilla, or militant movements.” And it seems that Hamas has borrowed tactics from ISIS.</p>
<p>It’s likely that Hamas learned from the hundreds of Palestinians who <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/isis/2015-11-19/ty-article/isis-in-israel-and-the-palestinian-territories/0000017f-e2cc-d568-ad7f-f3efca2d0000?lts=1699816485685">joined both the core ISIS caliphate</a> in Syria and Iraq and the ISIS affiliate in the Sinai. </p>
<p>And despite their differences, Hamas officials have in the past <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-and-islamic-state-growing-cooperation-sinai">met directly with leaders of the Islamic State in the Sinai</a>. Those meetings were likely linked to <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-affiliates-press-hamas/">collaboration between the two groups</a> for specific actions that benefited their respective goals, such as weapons smuggling, undermining Egyptian government influence in the Sinai and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/elite-hamas-fighters-defecting-to-islamic-state/">transporting injured Islamic State fighters to Gaza</a> for medical treatment. </p>
<p>In October 2023, an article in the U.K. newspaper The Times cited an intelligence official who said, “<a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/what-are-the-connections-between-hamas-and-isis-0db9rnlg3">It’s clear that the two movements have worked together</a> close enough over the past few years to copy each other’s methods, learn tactics and train on weapons they have procured together.”</p>
<h2>Tactical similarities</h2>
<p>In many ways, Hamas’ Oct. 7 surprise attack <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/fact-why-toyota-yes-toyota-dominates-today%E2%80%99s-battlefields-158581">resembled ISIS attacks</a>, such as a June 2014 blitz in which Islamic State group fighters burst out of secret desert bases to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27778112">conquer much of northern Iraq</a>, including the country’s second-largest city, Mosul.</p>
<p>Both groups’ attacks took their opponents by complete surprise, indicating a high degree of secrecy and advanced preparation. And both assaults utilized “technicals” – pickup trucks with machine guns mounted in their cargo beds and carrying squads of fighters. Both attacking forces <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/ctc-publishes-new-report-islamic-state-drones/">used commercial drones</a> to provide air support for their troop movements. And both organizations deployed <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hamas-fighters-bodies-israel-toll-gaza-ground-invasion-rcna119640">suicide-attack fighters</a> known as “inghimasi,” Arabic for “plungers into battle.” </p>
<p>On Oct. 7, Hamas fighters reportedly left <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shows-foreign-press-raw-hamas-bodycam-videos-of-murder-torture-decapitation/">black ISIS war banners</a> at the scene of several attacks. There were also videos posted online that appeared to show Hamas fighters <a href="https://talk.tv/news/38068/hamas-video-fighters-singing-isis-songs-october-7">singing popular ISIS war songs as they stormed into Israel</a>.</p>
<h2>Made for the media</h2>
<p>An additional notable similarity is that Hamas released ISIS-style videos of the horrific atrocities it inflicted on Israelis. The Islamic State group’s media approach involved disseminating videos of <a href="https://www.vox.com/videos/2015/7/6/8886461/isis-videos-burning">mutilation, rape, amputation, slavery, suicide warfare, torture and mass murder</a>.</p>
<p>On and after Oct. 7, Hamas fighters similarly uploaded videos and images of their <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/18/israel/palestine-videos-hamas-led-attacks-verified">executions of cowering Israeli civilians</a> and other atrocities to a Telegram channel. These visuals made their way to X – formerly known as Twitter – and TikTok and other platforms. </p>
<p>Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari has specifically said those videos are part of why Israel has been <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shows-foreign-press-raw-hamas-bodycam-videos-of-murder-torture-decapitation/">equating Hamas with the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>The Times of Israel came to a similar conclusion, noting: “<a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/hamas-and-islamic-state-two-faces-of-jihadi-terror-same-contempt-for-human-life/ar-AA1ifNoR">Looking at images of the Hamas assault</a>, it is fair to assume that Hamas learned a lesson from the ISIS terror playbook.”</p>
<h2>Rape as a weapon</h2>
<p>Another tactic new to Hamas, but not to ISIS, was the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/17/world/israel-investigates-sexual-violence-hamas/index.html">alleged rape and mutilation of girls and women</a>. Hamas has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sexual-assault-hamas-oct-7-attack-rape-bb06b950bb6794affb8d468cd283bc51">denied the allegations</a>. Islamic State religious scholars have previously <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1711590">sanctioned violence against women</a> and told fighters to rape non-Muslim women “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/middleeast/isis-rape-theology-soldiers-rape-women-to-make-them-muslim/index.html">to make them Muslim</a>.”</p>
<p>Similarly, Israel Defense Forces officials have said the Hamas religious leaders gave their fighters ISIS-like religious texts based on extremist interpretations of traditional Islamic jurisprudence telling them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/10/israel-womens-groups-warn-of-failure-to-keep-evidence-of-sexual-violence-in-hamas-attacks">captives were “the spoils of war</a>.”</p>
<p>All these developments indicate that ISIS has had an influence on Hamas, even if their goals remain quite different – or in direct opposition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Glyn Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of the Islamic State group says Hamas has undergone a radical ISIS-inspired transformation that has not yet gotten widespread public attention.Brian Glyn Williams, Professor of Islamic History, UMass DartmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.