tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/border-disputes-18648/articlesBorder disputes – The Conversation2024-02-05T03:40:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223842024-02-05T03:40:54Z2024-02-05T03:40:54ZSovereignty is sacred: in Timor-Leste’s remote Oecusse Enclave, a border dispute threatens to open old wounds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573320/original/file-20240205-17-gb5sa9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C2%2C954%2C715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Rose</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In September, Timor-Leste will mark a quarter century since its vote for independence from Indonesia, the conclusion of a 24-year long struggle that left few Timorese families <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_occupation_of_East_Timor#Number_of_deaths">untouched</a>. </p>
<p>Reconciliation with its giant neighbour stands out as one of Timor-Leste proudest achievements, but as 2024 begins, a long simmering border dispute, in which a border hamlet faces the prospect of its land being transferred to Indonesia, is stirring both political strife and ghosts many hoped were at rest.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/timor-leste-election-offers-an-extraordinary-lesson-in-how-to-build-a-stable-democracy-206421">Timor-Leste election offers an extraordinary lesson in how to build a stable democracy</a>
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<h2>Where is the land?</h2>
<p>The area in question is a hamlet called <a href="https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/Naktuka,+Timor-Leste/@-9.3473574,124.0538669,7268m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m6!3m5!1s0x2c550ea704aafb87:0xb7b71c467eda2f81!8m2!3d-9.3469731!4d124.0617151!16s%2Fg%2F11bx56h2nt?entry=ttu">Naktuka</a>. It’s around 1,000 hectares of rare old-growth forest and rice fields on the western edge of Timor-Leste’s <a href="https://www.google.com.au/maps/@-9.2802797,124.1371103,10.75z?entry=ttu">Oecusse</a> (also spelled Oecussi) Enclave. Oecusse is 800 square kilometres of rugged coast and mountains some 70 kilometres west of the rest of Timor-Leste. </p>
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<p>Although Naktuka is home to only around 60 families, and a four hour drive along a coastal track from the nearest major town, to the people of Oecusse it is anything but marginal. Its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14442210601161732">forests</a> are the domain of Oecusse’s king (<em>usif</em>), and the place he periodically <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ocea.5240">gathers</a> the Enclave’s clans to celebrate their identity as “people of the dry land” (Atoni Pah Meto) and subjects of their legendary forebear, Lord Benu (Ama Benu). For them, Naktuka is <em><a href="https://devpolicy.org/publications/books/MRose_indigenous-spirits-and-global-aspirations-in-a-southeast-asian-borderlandDevPol.pdf">pah le’u</a></em> (sacred land). </p>
<p>However, in the wake of recent border <a href="http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=35443&lang=en&n=1">negotiations</a> between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, concerns have been raised over how much longer they will be free to access it. </p>
<p>At the end of 2023, Naktuka was visited by a team from the Timor-Leste’s government who oversaw the placement of around 76 metal stakes (<em>estaka</em>) along a line some 350 meters inland from the frontier. Suspicions quickly grew it was to be a new border.</p>
<p>Such a border would cede around <a href="https://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2024/01/24/land-border-agreement-with-indonesia-pragmatism-and-high-level-politics-over-sovereignty-and-community-rights/">270 hectares</a> of forest and rice fields to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Subsequent developments didn’t allay concerns. On February 1 2024, the head of the technical team working on the border said the stakes <a href="https://tatoli.tl/2024/02/01/abitante-naktuka-fo-fiar-ba-xanana-luta-too-finaliza-fronteira-terrestre/">did not</a> represent a new frontier, but were being used to assess where one might be placed. </p>
<p>Coupled with an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CNRTMediaCenter/posts/pfbid02X7TdCALJ4MtR1RbYi4opTkfU5R8JZJNmXpNPFbX9KjhcDN9MM3GR8KmApbigmZ1Yl">announcement</a> by the CNRT Media Centre, mouth-piece of Timor-Leste’s ruling party, that a “win-win” solution could involve dividing Naktuka in half and giving away around 500 hectares, this was cold comfort. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cash-for-the-winner-the-loser-for-dinner-cockfighting-in-timor-leste-is-a-complicated-game-131027">Cash for the winner, the loser for dinner: cockfighting in Timor Leste is a complicated game</a>
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<p>They even posted a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=687045866942460&set=pcb.687045883609125">map</a> from the Indonesian <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Land-Boundary-Division-in-Noel-Besi-Segment-Citrana-Source-The-Development_fig1_370053360">Geospatial</a> Information Agency showing how it might look.</p>
<p>In Timor-Leste, this has <a href="https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=naktuka">resulted</a> in an angry backlash. The signing of the border agreement, which was to have <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/5667/berita/indonesia-completes-6-border-agreements-with-neighbouring-countries-in-the-last-9-years">occurred</a> in Jakarta in late January, has been postponed.</p>
<h2>A small hamlet on a divided island</h2>
<p>Recent questions over the ownership of Naktuka stem from unresolved negotiations over the border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, created when the latter regained its independence in 2002. </p>
<p>While Naktuka is governed by Timor-Leste, in 2005, Timor-Leste <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/world/asia/east-timor-and-indonesia-sign-border-pact.html">signed</a> an agreement confirming the status of around 95% of its border with Indonesia, with a small number of areas to be clarified later. Naktuka was one. The reason goes back at least 120 years.</p>
<p>In 1904, when the Dutch and Portuguese moved to finalise the division of Timor, they differed in their interpretation where Oecussi’s borders should be. By 1915 the question was effectively settled. The Portuguese put down <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/the-timor-crisis-and-dom-bonaventuras-plea-for-help-houbens-archival-investigations/">milestones</a> and proceeded to govern <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/Timor_1914.png">Naktuka</a> for 50 years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asean-leaders-give-in-principle-support-for-timor-lestes-membership-what-does-this-actually-mean-194462">ASEAN leaders give 'in-principle' support for Timor-Leste's membership. What does this actually mean?</a>
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<p>With the Indonesian invasion of 1975, Naktuka, along with the rest of Portuguese Timor, became part of the province of <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/97682212/">Timor Timur</a>. In 1999 it voted in Timor-Leste’s independence referendum and was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uti_possidetis">incorporated</a>, as a former part of both Portuguese Timor and Timor Timur, into Timor-Leste. </p>
<p>Indonesia argues that as Naktuka should not (<a href="https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-boundaries-in-the-island-of-timor-the-netherlands-v-portugal-award-thursday-25th-june-1914">arguably</a>) have become part of Portuguese Timor 110 years ago, it should not be part of Timor-Leste now. Suffice to say this is not an argument that makes such sense to the people who live there today, or many of their compatriots.</p>
<p>Naktuka is remote and poor. After independence its people got on with life. Their days revolved around rice farming and their role as caretakers of the land, including the king’s forest, site of the royal feast of <em>‘seu puah</em> (the communal betel nut harvest). The population grew, slowly, and in many ways Naktuka was similar to any other hamlet in Timor-Leste.</p>
<p>And yet, periodic incidents reminded people of their limbo. In 2013, the Timor-Leste Police were <a href="https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/01/naktuka-border-dispute-needs-diplomacy.html">prevented</a> from building a guard-post. Indonesian soldiers would come across the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-ZkjAyCy5I">frontier</a>, often just bored, but an unpleasant reminder of the occupation. In 2012 there was even a <a href="https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/01/indonesian-military-suspected-of.html">murder</a> which local media reported was committed by people from across the border. The Indonesian press carried the occasional article about citizens of Timor-Leste settling <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/01/22/ri-reprimands-timor-leste-over-border-area-violation.html">illegally</a> in an area they called “disputed”, but to residents was simply <a href="https://www.pinterest.com.au/pin/277815870741736776/">home</a>.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt the intentions of Timor-Leste government in seeking a permanent fix on its western border are good, but the idea it can do so by ceding land is surprisingly out of touch with reality. In Timor-Leste sovereignty is sacred, literally, as is the principle of consent and consultation on matters relating to land. Any solution to the situation in Naktuka that ignores this is very unlikely to work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Rose does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On a remote stretch of border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, a dispute over a remote hamlet is stirring memories of conflict many hoped was behind them.Michael Rose, Research Associate, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207862024-01-31T13:35:44Z2024-01-31T13:35:44ZThis course examines how conflicts arise over borders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571637/original/file-20240126-19-g1hl2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C1718%2C1144&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Border conflicts, spanning different time periods and places, are behind many of the big international disputes today</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/december-2023-israel-an-israeli-tank-driving-along-the-news-photo/1878801578?adppopup=true">picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em> </p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>Borders and Battles: The Historical Roots of Geopolitical Conflict</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>I got the idea for the course when I noticed that all of the other history courses I taught – on India, the Middle East and the British Empire – featured major border conflicts. These conflicts arose from a variety of issues, whether the borders were historically <a href="https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/changing-times-and-irish-border">ill-conceived</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/kashmir-the-roads-ahead/">politically disputed</a> or cut across <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/explainer/report-dna-explainer-what-is-the-water-dispute-between-india-and-bangladesh-know-purpose-of-kushiyara-river-pact-2983049">contested resources</a>.</p>
<p>As all of these <a href="https://www.thequint.com/news/world/britain-7-present-day-conflicts-world-communalism-israel-palestine-rohingyas-cyprus-shashi-tharoor-era-of-darkness">borders were drawn by the British</a> in the closing days of the empire, they reflect a critical aspect of decolonization. So I decided to abandon the conventional geographical focus of the history course and instead design a course that examines the theme of embattled borders, across different time periods and places. </p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>The course encourages students to look at how borders impact people’s everyday lives.</p>
<p>For instance, we discuss how, along the U.S. southern border, the U.S. uses <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/c/view?docid=721845">death as a deterrent</a> to migrant border crossing. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Border Patrol began <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf">systematically funneling migrants away from urban areas</a> and into the Sonoran Desert in southern Arizona. There, many <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-770.pdf">succumb to the harsh elements</a>, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/magazine/border-crossing.html#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20Border%20Patrol,of%20the%20last%2022%20years.">temperatures</a> that routinely hit 120 degrees Fahrenheit (49 degrees Celsius), a scarcity of water, and predatory wildlife. </p>
<p>In Israel-Palestine, we examine how the borders between Israel and the occupied territories evolved, why they are contested or enforced and whether they should be redrawn.</p>
<p>The course also explores the <a href="https://exhibits.stanford.edu/1947-partition/about/1947-partition-of-india-pakistan">1947 Partition of India</a>, which led to the creation of Pakistan. We talk about the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan">many wars</a> fought between these two nuclear-armed nations, as well as the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple">interpersonal violence and animosity</a> fueled by Partition. </p>
<p>Finally, students investigate the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9105/#:%7E:text=The%20Northern%20Ireland%20border%20came,Government%20of%20Ireland%20Act%201920.">1921 separation of Northern Ireland from Ireland</a> and how it led to a cycle of violence. </p>
<p>We discuss both <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/ira-irish-republican-army-and-changing-tactics-terrorism">IRA terrorism</a> against British civilians and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-foyle-west-47433319">atrocities committed by the British army</a> in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>For each border conflict, we pay close attention to the imperial and expansionist policies that fueled the formation of borders. Students consider how borders represent historical and imperial legacies. </p>
<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Borders and Battles was first offered during the height of the <a href="https://www.americanoversight.org/a-timeline-of-the-trump-administrations-family-separation-policy">Trump administration’s family separation policy</a>. This policy separated families trying to enter at the U.S. southern border. Parents were held in federal prisons or deported, while children were placed under the care of the Department of Health and Human Services.</p>
<p>I am now teaching the course against the backdrop of war in Israel-Palestine. Students come to understand how and why border disputes like these developed, how they were aggravated or resolved, and how they affect both individuals and wider society.</p>
<p>I find that students are eager to discuss these issues; they do not need to be sold on their relevance. Many students actually tell me how the course helped them make sense of contemporary conflicts.</p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>The most critical takeaway from the course is the dehumanization of the “enemy,” each side by the other. It’s common to all border disputes, no matter where, or when, or why they occur. </p>
<p>This process often involves the politicization of religious, racial and class-based differences. Government officials cast those who defy borders as subhuman, and state policy consistently reflects this bias. Israel’s defense minister, for example, explained that it was necessary to cut off all supplies to Gaza because <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/10/358170/israel-defense-minister-calls-palestinians-human-animals-amid-israeli-aggression">Palestinians are “human animals</a>.”</p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<p>The course material purposefully draws on a variety of formats.</p>
<p>We begin with a book, Jason De Leon’s “<a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/1368216769">The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail</a>.” De Leon chronicles the journeys of migrants across the U.S. southern border.</p>
<p>We also play an interactive game, <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/1304814039">Defining a Nation: India on the Eve of Independence, 1945</a>. This game requires students to reenact the partition of the subcontinent. The outcome can be – and usually is – different than the actual historical outcome.</p>
<p>The course ends with a film, “<a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/945634441">In the Name of the Father</a>,” which looks at the IRA bombing of army pubs in Guildford, England, and the wrongful conviction of the “Guildford Four.” </p>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>Many former students have stated that the course better enabled them to understand news broadcasts and keep up with current events.</p>
<p>The course also prepares students for international travel. Some students took the course before traveling to Israel or the Palestinian territories.</p>
<p>The course material has even inspired students to become involved in causes related to border disputes. As a direct result of knowledge gained from the course, a handful of students have joined organizations assisting refugees at the U.S. southern border.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220786/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nita Prasad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Religious, racial and class-based differences often get politicized.Nita Prasad, Professor of History, Quinnipiac UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116242023-08-22T13:20:05Z2023-08-22T13:20:05ZWhy an EU document mentioning the ‘Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands’ is a big deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543977/original/file-20230822-28-3vjiqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/7ZYA2fEIXyQ">Vijay Chander/Unsplash</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/jul/20/islas-malvinas-brexit-cited-as-eu-endorses-falklands-argentine-name">recent summit</a> of European leaders and their counterparts from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac), the European Union published a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_3924">declaration</a> in which it referred to the “Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands”.</p>
<p>The summit was aimed at re-energising economic and diplomatic relations between Europe and Celac countries and the joint declaration issued at its conclusion was signed by the 27 EU member states and 32 Celac nations. It is not a binding document but the decision to refer to the islands by their <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-falklands-war-40-years-on-why-las-malvinas-are-still-such-an-emotive-issue-in-argentina-181364">Spanish</a> as well as their British name is deeply significant. It happened despite <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-uk-britains-frantic-bid-to-stop-eu-endorsing-malvinas-name-for-falklands/">reported efforts</a> by UK foreign secretary James Cleverly to have the islands kept out of the summit declaration altogether and has left the UK angry. </p>
<p>The UK and Argentina have disputed ownership of this southerly archipelago since 1833 – a fact promptly underlined by the responses from the respective governments. UK prime minister Rishi Sunak issued a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-66258669">statement</a> bemoaning the EU’s “regrettable choice of words”. Argentina’s foreign minister Santiago Cafiero, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/the-eu-celac-first-joint-motion-on-malvinas-at-a-bi-regional-summit.phtml">reportedly</a> hailed the EU’s willingness to “take note” of his government’s territorial claim as a “triumph of Argentine diplomacy”.</p>
<p>Argentina has long advocated for dialogue and negotiation. Britain, meanwhile, has consistently maintained that the islands are British and <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-argentina-find-a-constructive-way-to-engage-with-the-falkland-islanders-54013">the islanders</a> have voted to endorse that position.</p>
<p>This latest incident highlights the UK’s diminishing influence on EU affairs, post-Brexit. The EU has since clarified that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/68c0efff-31bc-4dd3-81ae-226f9e970733">its position</a> on the islands remains unchanged, implying that it continues to recognise British sovereignty, but the shift in language is still notable. Use of the islands’ dual moniker suggests that each name carries equal validity and the UK government has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2023/08/08/britain-falkland-islands-islas-malvinas-argentina-eu/">pointed out</a> that to use the name Argentina uses is to question British sovereignty. It has also underlined that this <a href="https://batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/the-european-union-used-the-term-malvinas-angered-london-while-cafiero-and-alberto-tweet.phtml">marks a break</a> from the EU’s historical alignment with the UK’s stance. One EU official was quoted as saying: “The UK is not part of the EU. They are upset by the use of the word Malvinas. If they were in the EU perhaps they would have pushed back against it.”</p>
<h2>How the archipelago got its names</h2>
<p><a href="https://research.aber.ac.uk/en/publications/gender-nation-text-exploring-constructs-of-identity">My research shows</a> that the rhetoric of “rightful possession” is at the heart of the territorial dispute. It is embedded in the act of naming. </p>
<p>With the advent of the European age of discovery in the 1500s, territorial naming – or renaming – became central to colonial practices. It was a means, as British writer James Hamilton-Paterson <a href="https://www.europaeditions.com/book/9781933372693/seven-tenths-the-sea-and-its-thresholds">has put it</a>, of taking ideological control of territory. </p>
<p>From the 16th century on, various names for the archipelago – the Sebalds, New Islands, Hawkins Maiden Land –- were used interchangeably, each relating to different European expeditions. Often these involved possible but unconfirmed sightings. Other names –- Falkland Islands; les Îles Malouines –- only later gained traction via their presence on maps, highlighting the strategic importance of cartography. </p>
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<img alt="A historical map of the globe." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=657&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=657&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=657&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543942/original/file-20230822-28-1crsil.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Johannes Schöner’s 1520 globe, showing the western hemisphere.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sch%C3%B6ner_globe_1520_western_hemisphere.jpg">Public domain/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>British accounts of the Falklands, from the 19th century onwards, <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20140402140947/http://www.pcgn.org.uk/Falkland%20Islands-July2006.pdf">credited</a> the Elizabethan navigator, John Davis, with their discovery, after Davis’s vessel, the Desire, was reportedly driven between the two main islands during a storm on August 14 1592. This has since <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/10787">been disputed</a> by, among others, the legal scholar Roberto C Laver. </p>
<p>The first verifiable sighting and precise plotting dates back to 1600 and is attributed to the Dutch navigator Sebald de Weert. In January 1690, English mariner and captain of the Welfare John Strong made the first undisputed landing. Strong sailed down the sound between the two main islands which he named “Falkland Sound”, after Anthony Cary, 5th Viscount Falkland, then Commissioner of the Admiralty. </p>
<p>By the early 18th century, a shift in British terminology had begun. <a href="https://www.rmg.co.uk/sites/default/files/longitude/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/12/Halley-World-chart-1702-G20_0.gif">Maps drawn up</a> by English astronomer Edmund Halley demonstrate how cartographers went from using the name “Seebold de Waerds Isles” to “the Falklands” or “Falkland Islands”. </p>
<p>Eighteenth-century French expeditions, meanwhile, referred first to “les Îles Nouvelles” (the New Islands) and, <a href="https://francearchives.gouv.fr/fr/facomponent/4eaa91317840b9d6d7de86a71d336850c229e139">from 1722</a>, to “les Îles Malouines”, in reference to Saint-Malo, the Brittany port from which French expeditions often departed. It is from the latter that the Spanish name “Islas Malvinas” is <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/9440#tocto2n6">derived</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A historical maritime map." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543955/original/file-20230822-15-4uylzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1717 map by French explorer Amédée-François Frézier showing the Isles Nouvelles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Planche_XXXII.jpg#/media/File:Planche_XXXII.jpg">Public domain/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Beyond geography</h2>
<p>In his landmark 1993 book, <a href="https://ia601203.us.archive.org/17/items/CultureAndImperialismByEdwardW.Said/Culture%20and%20Imperialism%20by%20Edward%20W.%20Said.pdf">Culture and Imperialism</a>, literary scholar Edward Said writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Islands have always had a certain chimerical quality. Many imaginary islands have appeared on and disappeared from maps, including <a href="https://www.iflscience.com/hy-brasil-the-phantom-island-that-hasnt-been-seen-since-1872-64607">Hy-Brasil</a>, long purported to be off the <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/31021">coast of Ireland</a>, and <a href="https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/GeogR/8/1/St_Brendans_Explorations_and_Islands*.html">St. Brendan’s</a>, charted somewhere in the North Atlantic but never found. </p>
<p>Cartographical history shows even real places, like <a href="https://history.stackexchange.com/questions/61592/do-maps-dating-back-to-1489-90-show-ascension-and-st-helena-even-though-these-is">Ascension Island</a>, shifting shape and position because the absolute position and boundaries of an island can be difficult to ascertain. As shown by the cases of <a href="https://www.lonelyplanet.com/articles/mexicos-missing-island">Bermeja Island</a> (dubbed Mexico’s missing island) and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/14/canada-denmark-end-decades-long-dispute-barren-rock-arctic-hans-island">Hans Island</a> in the Arctic, over which Canada and Denmark have held a long-running border dispute, not to mention the numerous <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349">territorial disputes in the South China Sea</a>, this remains true today.</p>
<p>Place names (or toponyms) often carry great <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286121765_Place_Naming_and_the_Interpretation_of_Cultural_Landscapes">cultural significance</a>. They identify. They connect people to their heritage. They provide a sense of belonging – or alienation. They are <a href="https://icaci.org/files/documents/ICC_proceedings/ICC2009/html/nonref/12_2.pdf">emotive signifiers</a>. Some are endowed with a greater <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286121765_Place_Naming_and_the_Interpretation_of_Cultural_Landscapes">symbolic capital or resistance</a> than others. </p>
<p>The case of the Falklands/Malvinas makes this clear. Teslyn Barkman, deputy chair of the Falkland Island’s Legislative Assembly, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-66258669">has urged</a> the EU to “respect the wishes of the Falkland Islanders and refer to us by our proper name”.</p>
<p>However, the very inclusion of this territorial dispute in the EU declaration shows that, post-Brexit, Brussels <a href="https://batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/the-european-union-used-the-term-malvinas-angered-london-while-cafiero-and-alberto-tweet.phtml">no longer</a> feels the need to show partnership with the UK on this issue of sovereignty. It signals that the bloc is open to further discussion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211624/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Wood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mention of the Falklands/Malvinas territorial dispute in an EU document shows that, post-Brexit, Brussels no longer feels beholden to toe the UK’s line on sovereignty.Jennifer Wood, Senior Lecturer in Spanish & Latin American Studies, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996562023-02-16T14:35:57Z2023-02-16T14:35:57ZIlemi Triangle spat: how resources fuel East Africa’s border conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509768/original/file-20230213-19-nq08wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan fishermen demand a say in the country's border conflict with Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyan-coastal-fishermen-carry-placards-during-a-news-photo/1231734423?phrase=Geographical%20Border%20east%20africa&adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peacebuilding</p>
<p>For decades, African states have grappled with numerous interstate <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/44264/edit">border disputes</a>, especially in resource-rich regions. In east Africa, most of these conflicts are as old as independence. The disputes flare up every so often despite interventions by agencies of the African Union and the United Nations. A <a href="https://nation.africa/africa/news/kenya-south-sudan-locked-in-border-dispute-4117296">fresh war of words</a> has erupted between Kenya and South Sudan over the water- and oil-rich Ilemi Triangle border, which was first drawn up in 1914. We asked Al Chukwuma Okoli, a defence strategy scholar, four key questions._</p>
<h2>Why do boundaries matter for nation states?</h2>
<p>The term “boundary” refers to a cartographic (mapped out) line that marks and defines the confines of a state, distinguishing its <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/international-internal-boundaries-definition-function.html">sovereign territory from that of others</a>. It is mutually agreed upon and jointly owned by the countries involved. </p>
<p>Boundaries matter because they determine the area that a country rules. They also assign national identity. </p>
<p>Boundaries are both a bridge and a barrier to international peace and stability. As a bridge, international boundaries have a role in legitimate activities, especially in trade and migration. But as a barrier, they can be a site for criminality and violence. More importantly, boundaries provide a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/boundary-dispute">“fault-line” for international conflicts</a>.</p>
<h2>Which are some of east Africa’s boundary conflicts?</h2>
<p>I took part in a <a href="https://cejiss.org/borderlines-natural-resources-and-conflicts-towards-a-territorial-materialism-of-boundary-disputes-in-east-africa">recent study</a> of several instances of boundary conflicts in east Africa. These include the conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia (ongoing since 1960); Kenya and South Sudan (ongoing since 1963); and Kenya and Somalia (1963-1981). Others are Ethiopia and Sudan (from 1966 to 2002), Tanzania and Malawi (ongoing since 1967) and Uganda-Tanzania (1974–1979). </p>
<p>The various boundary conflicts in the region originated and evolved in different historical and political contexts. But they have been complicated by the changing dictates of international politics. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts have been protracted and intractable. A case in point is the Kenya–South Sudan conflict, which seems to have become more complicated in recent years. It began in 1963 when Kenya claimed the Ilemi Triangle. Ilemi is a region rich in oil and water, lying to the north of a straight border that was drawn in 1914. Kenya’s claim, and de facto control, extends beyond the limit marked in 1938. </p>
<p>Several bilateral and multilateral measures have been taken over the years to resolve the conflict. These include continental initiatives anchored by the African Union. In 2019 Kenya and South Sudan agreed to talks. They have demonstrated commitment to finding a solution by creating a joint boundary commission. But flare-ups and skirmishes still erupt on the disputed borderlines.</p>
<h2>What generally fuels Africa’s boundary disputes?</h2>
<p>A dominant view by scholars holds that boundary disputes are inevitable creations of colonialism. Via the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467">Berlin Conference diplomacy</a> of 1884 to 1885, European imperial powers took control of African territories and carved them up. European maps defined African state boundaries. </p>
<p>This perspective suggests that the imperialist scramble for Africa was a sort of crude territorial grabbing, leading to arbitrary and artificial partitioning of Africa into slices of colonial spheres of interest. By slicing up similar cultural groups and lumping together culturally divergent groups, colonialism created long-lasting disputes.</p>
<p>Other scholars have questioned this view. They say colonial interference cannot fully explain the nature and dynamics of the current boundary conflicts in Africa. These “realist” scholars believe that states fight for <a href="https://cejiss.org/borderlines-natural-resources-and-conflicts-towards-a-territorial-materialism-of-boundary-disputes-in-east-africa">territory for material advantage</a>. The fight is largely about the ownership, access or control of natural resources like oil and water. This implies that the motive behind most present-day boundary conflicts is states’ pursuit of material advantages along their common territorial frontiers. </p>
<p>My view is that what is crucially at issue in most current border-related disputes in Africa is the quest for resources.</p>
<p>Apart from the Ilemi Triangle spat, South Sudan is currently feuding with Sudan over the oil-rich Abiyei region. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are locked in a dispute over the ownership of parts of Lake Albert. The disputed spot has potential for crude oil alongside minerals like diamonds, gold and coltan.</p>
<p>Similarly, Tanzania and Malawi are at loggerheads over the oil-rich area around Lake Malawi (Nyasaland), while Kenya and Uganda have been quarrelling over the waters, fish and possible crude oil of Lake Victoria’s Migingo Island.</p>
<h2>How can these border conflicts be resolved?</h2>
<p>Modern boundary disputes in east Africa have often been largely driven by declared or disguised claims, stakes, motives and interests that are material or economic in essence. Understanding boundary disputes in Africa should go beyond the idea of “colonial causation” and come to terms with strategic and material interests.</p>
<p>Solutions to such conflicts depend on a diplomatic approach that recognises the colonially inherited boundary system and also mediates the interests of affected states.</p>
<p>It is necessary to evolve a regional border management mechanism that can proactively and multilaterally address border-related issues to find an enduring resolution. The joint border commission between Kenya and South Sudan is a step in the right direction.</p>
<p>The spate of boundary conflicts in east Africa poses a huge challenge to regional politics and diplomacy. Apart from creating diplomatic tension among states, the situation has resulted in a loss of lives and livelihoods. It has also destabilised the region – a setback to regional integration. A lasting solution is needed to sustain peace and stability of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Al Chukwuma Okoli teaches Political Science at Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. He has consulted for the UN-Women, African Union, Centre for Democracy and Development, and Open University of Nigeria. He has received funding from the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, Nigeria. He is a Member of Amnesty international and CORN West Africa. </span></em></p>The joint border commission between Kenya and South Sudan is a step in the right direction.Al Chukwuma Okoli, Reader (Associate Professor), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria, Federal University LafiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811332022-04-14T17:55:50Z2022-04-14T17:55:50ZWant to know why India has been soft on Russia? Take a look at its military, diplomatic and energy ties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458180/original/file-20220414-12-8s11rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C68%2C3494%2C2347&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A close relationship based on strategic needs.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-indian-prime-minister-news-photo/1165923211?adppopup=true">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As global democracies <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/04/1090746192/russia-has-drawn-international-condemnation-for-alleged-war-crimes">lined up to condemn</a> the actions of Russia in Ukraine, one country was less forthcoming in its criticism – and it was the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/11/india-russia-ukraine-war-diplomacy/">largest democracy of them all: India</a>.</p>
<p>Throughout the ongoing crisis, the government in India has carefully avoided taking an unequivocal position. It has <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-abstains-6th-7th-time-in-un-vote-on-ukraine-crisis-resolution-122032401586_1.html">abstained on every United Nations resolution</a> dealing with the matter and refused to join the international community in economic measures against Moscow, prompting a <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/mar/31/lavrovs-india-visit-us-warns-against-circumventing-sanctions-against-russia-uk-puts-emphasis-on-i-2436416.html">warning from the U.S.</a> over potentially circumventing sanctions. Even statements from India condemning the reported mass killing of Ukrainian civilians <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61006169">stopped short of apportioning blame</a> on any party, instead calling for an impartial investigation.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/ganguly-sumit.html">scholar of Indian foreign and security policy</a>, I know that understanding India’s stance on the war in Ukraine is complex. In considerable part, India’s decision to avoid taking a clear-cut position stems from a dependence on Russia on a host of issues – diplomatic, military and energy-related.</p>
<h2>Moscow as strategic partner</h2>
<p>This stance is not entirely new. On a range of fraught global issues, India has long avoided adopting a firm position based on its <a href="https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement">status as a nonaligned state</a> – one of a number of countries that is <a href="https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement">not formally allied to any power bloc</a>.</p>
<p>From a strategic standpoint today, decision-makers in New Delhi believe that they can ill afford to alienate Russia because they count on Moscow to veto any adverse United Nations Security Council resolution on the <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/conflict-unending/9780231123693">fraught question of the disputed region of Kashmir</a>. Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought <a href="https://theconversation.com/india-and-pakistan-fought-3-wars-over-kashmir-heres-why-international-law-falls-short-to-solve-this-territorial-dispute-164672#:%7E:text=India%20and%20Pakistan%20fought%20the,line%20went%20right%20through%20Kashmir.">three wars over Kashmir</a>, and the region continues to be a source of tension.</p>
<p>Harking back to the days of the Soviet Union, India has <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/six-times-when-the-soviet-veto-came-to-indias-rescue/articleshow/89941338.cms">relied on Russia’s veto</a> at the U.N. to protect itself from any adverse statement on Kashmir. For example, during the East Pakistani crisis of 1971 – which led to the creation of Bangladesh – the <a href="https://hindustannewshub.com/india-news/1957-to-1971-russia-imposed-veto-power-6-times-in-the-security-council-for-india-america-protested-every-time/">Soviets protected India from censure</a> at the U.N., vetoing a resolution demanding the withdrawal of troops from the disputed region.</p>
<p>In all, the Soviets and Russia have used their veto power <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/six-times-when-the-soviet-veto-came-to-indias-rescue/articleshow/89941338.cms">six times to protect India</a>. India has not had to rely on Russia for a veto since the end of the Cold War. But with tension over Kashmir still high amid sporadic fighting, New Delhi will want to ensure that Moscow is on its side should it come before the Security Council again.</p>
<p>In large part, India’s close relationship with Russia stems from Cold War allegiances. India drifted into the Soviet orbit mostly as a counter to <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1901531">America’s strategic alliance with Pakistan</a>, India’s subcontinental adversary. </p>
<p>India is also hopeful of Russian support – or at least neutrality – in its <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2022/02/21/the--lesser-known-border-disputechina-and-india/?sh=70567797192d">long-standing border dispute</a> with the People’s Republic of China. India and China share a border of more than 2,000 miles (near 3,500 km), the location of which has been contested for 80 years, including during <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/17/as-india-and-china-clash-jfks-forgotten-crisis-is-back/">a war in 1962</a> that failed to settle the matter.</p>
<p>Above all, India does not want Russia to side with China should there be further clashes in the Himalayas, especially since the border dispute has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/china-fm-india-surprise-trip-first-since-2020-border-clashes">again come to the fore since 2020</a>, with significant skirmishes between the Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army. </p>
<h2>Russia as supplier of weapons</h2>
<p>India is also acutely dependent on Russia for a range of weaponry. In fact, 60% to 70% of India’s conventional arsenal is of <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/more-than-60-70-of-india-armed-forces-equipped-with-russian-origin-weapons-indian-envoy/articleshow/76903811.cms?from=mdr">either Soviet or Russian origin</a>.</p>
<p>Over the past decade, New Delhi has sought to significantly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/india-diversifying-arms-purchases/">diversify its weapons acquisitions</a>. To that end, it has purchased more than <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-looking-to-ramp-up-arms-sales-to-india-including-heavy-lifting-drones-report/articleshow/77363224.cms?from=mdr">US$20 billion worth of military equipment from the U.S.</a> over the past decade or so. Nevertheless, it is still in no position to walk away from Russia as far as weapons sales are concerned. </p>
<p>To compound matters, Russia and India have developed close military manufacturing ties. For nearly two decades, the two countries have <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/12/new-brahmos-manufacturing-center-in-india-to-produce-up-to-100-cruise-missiles-per-year/">co-produced the highly versatile BrahMos missile</a>, which can be fired from ships, aircraft or land.</p>
<p>India recently received its <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2022/01/28/philippines-signs-deal-for-brahmos-supersonic-anti-ship-missile/">first export order for the missile</a>, from the Philippines. This defense link with Russia could be severed only at considerable financial and strategic cost to India. </p>
<p>Also, Russia, unlike any Western country including the United States, has been willing to share certain forms of weapons technology with India. For example, Russia has <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/03/08/india-signs-3-billion-contract-with-russia-for-lease-of-a-nuclear-submarine/">leased an Akula-class nuclear submarine to India</a>. No other country has been willing to offer India equivalent weaponry, in part over concerns that the technology will be shared with Russia. </p>
<p>In any case, Russia is able to provide India with high-technology weaponry at prices significantly lower than any Western supplier. Not surprisingly, despite significant American opposition, India <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/10/5/india-signs-s-400-deal-with-russia-sidestepping-us-opposition">chose to acquire</a> the Russian S-400 missile defense battery.</p>
<h2>Energy reliance</h2>
<p>It isn’t just India’s defense industry that is reliant on Moscow. India’s energy sector is also inextricably tied to Russia.</p>
<p>Since the George W. Bush administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/23/india.nuclear">ended India’s status as a nuclear pariah</a> – a designation it had held for testing nuclear weapons outside the ambit of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – India has developed a civilian nuclear program.</p>
<p>Although the sector <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx">remains relatively small</a> in terms of total energy production, it is growing – and Russia has emerged as a key partner. After the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement of 2008 allowed India to participate in normal civilian nuclear commerce, Russia quickly signed an agreement to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-russia-nuclear/russia-signs-pact-for-six-nuclear-reactors-on-new-site-in-india-idUSKCN1MF217">build six nuclear reactors in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Neither <a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/why-is-indiainvesting-in-nuclear-energy-when-the-whole-world-is-experiencing-a-nuclearmeltdown/articleshow/58094501.cms">the U.S. nor any other Western country</a> has proved willing to invest in India’s civilian nuclear energy sector because of a rather restrictive nuclear liability law, which holds that the manufacturer of the plant or any of its components would be liable in the event of an accident.</p>
<p>But since the Russian government has said it will assume the necessary liability in the event of a nuclear accident, it has been able to enter the nuclear power sector in India. Western governments, however, are unwilling to provide such guarantees to their commercial companies.</p>
<p>Away from nuclear power, India also has invested in Russian oil and gas fields. India’s state-run Oil and Natural Gas Commission, for example, has long been involved <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB981918172359077235">in the extraction of fossil fuels</a> off Sakhalin Island, a Russian island in the Pacific Ocean. And given that India imports close to 85% of its crude oil requirements from abroad – albeit only a small fraction from Russia – it is <a href="https://newsonair.com/2022/03/18/india-highly-dependent-on-imports-for-meeting-its-energy-requirements/">hardly in a position to shut off the Russian spigot</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61042314">recently noted</a> that India’s “relationship with Russia has developed over decades at a time when the United States was not able to be a partner to India” and suggested that Washington was prepared now to be that partner. But given the diplomatic, military and energy considerations, it is difficult to see India deviating from its balancing act over Russia any time soon.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sumit Ganguly has received funding from the US Department of State.</span></em></p>India has stood apart from other major democracies in failing to offer a full-throated condemnation of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. Here’s why.Sumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1646722021-08-24T12:17:24Z2021-08-24T12:17:24ZIndia and Pakistan fought 3 wars over Kashmir - here’s why international law falls short to solve this territorial dispute<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415876/original/file-20210812-15866-en4zio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C5303%2C3386&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The scene in Srinagar, in Indian-administered Kashmir, after an Aug. 10, 2021, grenade attack by militants that wounded at least nine civilians. Kashmir has experienced sporadic violence for more than seven decades, including three wars.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-government-forces-are-seen-through-a-broken-glass-of-news-photo/1234603051?adppopup=true">Yawar Nazir/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An armed conflict in Kashmir has thwarted all attempts to solve it for three quarters of a century. </p>
<p>Kashmir, an 85,806-square-mile valley between the snowcapped Himalaya and Karakoram mountain ranges, is a contested region between India, Pakistan and China. Both India and Pakistan lay claim to all of Kashmir, but each administers only part of it.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Kashmir." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=689&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=689&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=689&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=866&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=866&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415904/original/file-20210812-14-hduc4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=866&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Kashmir.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/84/Kashmir_map_big.jpg">Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 2002, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the British rule of India, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/kashmir-and-the-forgotten-history-of-indias-princely-states/">Kashmir was a feudal state with its own regional ruler</a>. In 1947, the Kashmiri ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, agreed that his kingdom would join India under certain conditions. Kashmir would retain political and economic sovereignty, while its defense and external affairs would be dealt with by India.</p>
<p>But Pakistan, newly created by the British, <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war">laid claim to a majority-Muslim part of Kashmir along its border</a>. India and Pakistan fought <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan">the first of three major wars</a> over Kashmir in 1947. It resulted in the creation of a United Nations-brokered “<a href="https://unmogip.unmissions.org/background">ceasefire line</a>” that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-263B-8246">divided Indian and Pakistani</a> territory. The line went right through Kashmir. </p>
<p>Despite the establishment of that border, presently known as the “Line of Control,” two more wars over Kashmir followed, in 1965 and 1999. An estimated <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indiakashmir-1947-present/">20,000</a> people died in these three wars.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/international_law">International law</a>, a set of rules and regulations created after World War II to govern all the world’s nation-states, is supposed to resolve <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=dlj">territorial disputes</a> like Kashmir. Such disputes are mainly dealt with by the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0962629895001115">International Court of Justice</a>, a United Nations tribunal that rules on contested borders and war crimes. </p>
<p>Yet international law has repeatedly failed to resolve the Kashmir conflict, as my <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Tpv9XxcAAAAJ">research on Kashmir and international law</a> shows.</p>
<h2>International law fails in Kashmir</h2>
<p>The U.N. has made many failed attempts to restore dialogue after fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which today is home to a diverse population of <a href="https://www.populationu.com/in/jammu-and-kashmir-population">13.7 million</a> Muslims, Hindus and people of other faiths.</p>
<p>In 1949, the U.N. sent a <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip">peacekeeping mission to both countries</a>. U.N. peace missions were not as robust as its peacekeeping operations are today, and international troops proved unable to protect the sanctity of the borders between India and Pakistan.</p>
<p>In 1958, the <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2626-1952-10-K-a-AJG.pdf">Graham Commission</a>, led by a U.N.-designated mediator, Frank Graham, recommended to the U.N. Security Council that India and Pakistan agree to demilitarize in Kashmir and hold a referendum to decide the status of the territory. </p>
<p>India rejected that plan, and both India and Pakistan disagreed on how many troops would remain along their border in Kashmir if they did demilitarize. Another war broke out in 1965. </p>
<p>In 1999, India and Pakistan <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/all-you-need-to-know-about-kargil-war/kargil-vijay-diwas/slideshow/59772216.cms">battled along the Line of Control in the Kargil district of Kashmir</a>, leading the United States to intervene diplomatically, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/24/how-the-1999-kargil-conflict-redefined-us-india-ties/">siding with India</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45877">official U.S. policy</a> has been to prevent further escalation in the dispute. The U.S. government has offered several times to facilitate a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/upload/wanis-third-party-mediation-over-kashmir.pdf">mediation process over the contested territory</a>. </p>
<p>The latest U.S. president to make that offer was <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-07-30/united-states-cant-solve-kashmir-dispute">Donald Trump</a> after <a href="https://theconversation.com/kashmir-conflict-is-not-just-a-border-dispute-between-india-and-pakistan-112824">conflict erupted in Kashmir in 2019</a>. The effort went nowhere. </p>
<h2>Why international law falls short</h2>
<p>Why is the Kashmir conflict too politically difficult for a internationally brokered compromise? </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Newspaper clipping from the Hindustani Times with headline 'KASHMIR ACCEDES TO INDIA'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/414025/original/file-20210731-17-3305gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The maharaja of Kashmir agreed to join India in 1947.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For one, India and Pakistan don’t even agree on whether international law applies in Kashmir. While Pakistan considers the Kashmir conflict an international dispute, India says it is a “<a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kashmir-a-bilateral-issue-india-tells-us-after-trump-offers-help-1639126-2020-01-22">bilateral issue</a>” and an “internal matter.” </p>
<p>India’s stance narrows the purview of international law. For example, regional organizations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation cannot intervene on the Kashmir issue – by convening a regional dialogue, for example – because <a href="http://www.covid19-sdmc.org/sites/default/files/charter.pdf">its charter</a> prohibits involvement in “bilateral and contentious issues.”</p>
<p>But India’s claim that Kashmir is Indian territory is hotly debated. </p>
<p>In 2019, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708">the Indian government abolished</a> the <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c06adb33c3a53e7dfe35baa/t/5e53eb9f1408117e3ba815ef/1582558112461/Mariya+SC+Kashmir.pdf">1954 law that gave Kashmir autonomous status</a> and militarily occupied the territory. At least <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/9/india-soldiers-kashmir-burhan-wani-anniversary">500,000 Indian troops</a> are in Kashmir today.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s government denounced the move as “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/05/article-370-what-is-happening-in-kashmir-india-revokes-special-status.html">illegal</a>,” and many Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control say India violated its 1947 accession deal with Maharaja Singh. </p>
<p>The U.N. still officially considers Kashmir a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/kashmir-and-the-un-security-council/1971039">disputed area</a>. But India has held firm that Kashmir is part of India, under central government control, worsening already bad relations between India and Pakistan.</p>
<h2>Military coups and terror</h2>
<p>Another obstacle to peace between the two nations: Pakistan’s military. </p>
<p>In 1953, Indian Prime Minister <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/did-jawaharlal-nehru-mishandle-kashmir/story-Vvo1NBt6ZMbFT86wJ1dINP.html">Jawaharlal Nehru</a> and Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra agreed in principle to resolve the Kashmir problem through a U.N. mediation or with an International Court of Justice proceeding. </p>
<p>That never happened, because the Pakistani military overthrew Ali Bogra <a href="https://theprint.in/india/governance/as-pakistan-votes-today-theres-hope-that-finally-a-pm-will-complete-a-full-term/87962/">in 1955</a>.</p>
<p>Several more Pakistani military regimes have interrupted Pakistani democracy since then. India believes these non-democratic regimes lack credibility to negotiate with it. And, generally, Pakistan’s military governments have preferred the battlefield over political dialogue. </p>
<p>Terrorism is another critical factor making the Kashmir situation more complex. Several radical Islamist groups, including Lashkar-e-Toiba and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47249982">Jaish-e-Mohammed</a>, operate in Kashmir, based primarily on the Pakistani side. </p>
<p>Since the late 1980s the terrorist groups have conducted targeted strikes and attacks on <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/18/asia/india-kashmir-attack/index.html">Indian government and military facilities</a>, leading the Indian military to <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/army-conducted-surgical-strikes-on-terror-launch-pads-on-loc-significant-casualties-caused-dgmo/articleshow/54579855.cms?from=mdr">retaliate in Pakistani territory</a>. Pakistan then alleges that India has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/14/india-pakistan-repeat-war-of-words-over-cross-border">breached the borderline</a>, defying international treaties like the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/its-time-for-india-and-pakistan-to-walk-the-talk/article28739436.ece">1972 Simla Agreement</a> to conduct its anti-terror attacks. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Soldiers stand in a military truck with big mountains in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415899/original/file-20210812-18-a5vp1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">India has increased its military presence in Kashmir to at least 500,000 troops.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-army-convoy-carrying-reinforcement-and-supplies-news-photo/1228312306?adppopup=true">Yawar Nazir/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Intractable struggles</h2>
<p>In many cases, treaties and international court decisions <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law">cannot be enforced</a>. There is no international police force to help implement international law. </p>
<p>If a country ignores an International Court of Justice ruling, the other party in that court case may have recourse to the Security Council, which can pressure or even <a href="https://www.un.org/en/our-work/uphold-international-law">sanction a nation to comply with international law</a>. </p>
<p>But that rarely happens, as such resolution processes are highly political and any permanent Security Council member can veto them. </p>
<p>And when conflicting parties are more inclined to view a conflict through the lens of domestic law – as India views Kashmir and Israel views the Palestinian territories – they can argue that international law simply does not apply. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Kashmir is not the only contested territory where international law has failed. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-world-stop-israel-and-hamas-from-committing-war-crimes-7-questions-answered-about-international-law-155105">Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a> over the Gaza and West Bank territories is another example. For decades, both the U.N. and the United States have repeatedly and unsuccessfully intervened there in an effort <a href="https://theconversation.com/apartheid-claim-israel-and-the-verdict-of-international-law-160069">to establish mutually acceptable borderlines</a> and bring peace. </p>
<p>International law has grown and strengthened since its creation in the 1940s, but there are still many problems it cannot solve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bulbul Ahmed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kashmir has been in conflict since 1947, despite repeated UN and US interventions. An expert in security studies explains why international law has failed to keep the peace.Bulbul Ahmed, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Security and Strategic Studies, Bangladesh University of ProfessionalsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1493502020-11-13T13:43:01Z2020-11-13T13:43:01ZGenocide claims in Nagorno-Karabakh make peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan unlikely, despite cease-fire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369190/original/file-20201112-13-15vuilx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C29%2C3235%2C2079&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers patrol the mountainous, disputed border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, on Nov. 8.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/servicemen-walk-towards-the-armenian-border-the-fighting-news-photo/1229530009?adppopup=true">Stanislav Krasilnikov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan/russian-peacekeepers-deploy-to-nagorno-karabakh-after-ceasefire-deal-idUSKBN27Q11R">Russian-brokered cease-fire</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan this week halted fighting over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, where long-standing hostilities <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54314341">reerupted on Sept. 27</a>. </p>
<p>The deal leaves Azerbaijan, which was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh">given Nagorno-Karabakh by the Soviets in 1923</a>, largely in control of the majority-Armenian territory. Leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh, located in Western Azerbaijan close to Armenia, continue to demand independence. </p>
<p><iframe id="HD7bv" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/HD7bv/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-russia">Thousands have died</a> and an estimated 100,000 have been displaced in Nagorno-Karabakh since September. As the cease-fire took effect on Nov. 10, Azerbaijanis danced in the streets. But <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54882564">angry Armenians</a> stormed the Armenian parliament and office of the prime minister. </p>
<p>Both sides in the conflict have <a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Azerbaijans_Foreign_Ministry_releases_statement_on_Armenia_missile_attack_on_Barda-1627027">claimed that fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh</a> isn’t just about territorial control – it <a href="https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/31/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Al-Arabiya/">is a fight to prevent genocide</a>, a fight for their lives. These grave accusations, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/11/11/shortly-before-ceasefire-experts-issue-a-genocide-warning-for-the-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh/?sh=53240f94d005">while yet unproven</a>, may make a lasting resolution to the conflict much harder.</p>
<h2>Freedom fighting and genocide claims</h2>
<p>Violence first broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1980s, when the region’s ethnic Armenian leaders sought to gain independence from Azerbaijan. There has been intermittent fighting since then, including a bloody war in the 1990s that ended in another <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-05-17-mn-58811-story.html">Russia-brokered cease-fire</a> giving Azerbaijan legal control of the region. </p>
<p>But Armenian leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh declared themselves an independent republic, and have repeatedly tried to secede. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">research on self-determination</a>, I find that genocide is often invoked by secessionist regions as a last-ditch effort to secure outside intervention in their conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">United Nations</a> defines genocide as the destruction or partial destruction of a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” It is a war crime under international law, and countries are supposed to “prevent and punish” it under a 1948 U.N. agreement.</p>
<p>Secessionist leaders often try to rally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/secessionist-minorities-and-external-involvement/58E0E7DB76EB90039C0581F608304078">foreign powers around their cause</a> with arguments based on geopolitical strategy, economic self-interest, religious bonds or shared ideology. Those reasons broadly explain why <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/kurdish-factor-iran-iraq-relations">Iran supports</a> the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/14519">Iraqi Kurds</a> in their quest for greater autonomy, and why the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/sympathy-for-the-palestinians/">Arab states back</a> the Palestinians’ efforts at statehood. </p>
<p>But when all else fails, freedom fighters will highlight their own repression in the starkest of terms to gain international assistance. In war a global campaign for victimhood is the weapon of the weaker side – and genocide claims are the most powerful weapon in this arsenal. </p>
<p>According to my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">more than two-thirds of members</a> in the <a href="https://unpo.org/">Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization</a>, a nongovernmental organization composed of autonomy-minded minority groups like the Kurds, have alleged genocide.</p>
<h2>Genocide makes peace hard</h2>
<p>Genocide may be, as one scholar puts it, the “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2307/1389562?journalCode=spxb">embodiment of radical evil</a>,” but as a war crime it is incredibly difficult to prove. </p>
<p>Under international law, accusers must show perpetrators acted with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” specified groups. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2003/22.html#The%20requirement%20of%20proving%20the%20specific%20intent%20to%20commit%20genocide_T">Demonstrating intent</a> is a tall order. </p>
<p>Armenia knows this as well as any nation. The 1915 Armenian genocide by Turkey is recognized by fewer than <a href="https://www.armenian-genocide.org/recognition_countries.html">three dozen countries</a>. In terms of both law and politics, declaring a deadly military campaign to be genocide – <a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-genocide-in-myanmar-court-order-tries-to-protect-rohingya-muslims-where-politics-has-failed-130530">versus just the atrocities of a bloody conflict</a> – is tricky indeed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rubble of a cement home and photo of a boy with flowers around it" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A house destroyed in an Oct. 17 rocket attack on Gyandzha, outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, that killed a young boy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/photograph-of-the-deceased-russian-boy-artur-mayakov-is-news-photo/1229548313?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Genocide allegations, on the other hand, are more easily come by. But according to my research they don’t bode well for peace. </p>
<p>Genocide claims turn “the other side” into an enemy bent on the destruction of an entire people. Once the public sees a conflict in these terms, history shows, leaders understandably balk at the prospect of <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49KT-6910-00KJ-D1GC-00000-00&context=1516831">sitting down at the negotiating table</a> with that enemy. </p>
<p>Genocide claims also reduce the likelihood of effective outside mediation by winnowing away the pool of “honest brokers” – that is, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27798500?seq=1">objective intermediaries</a>. Opposing parties can and do reject would-be peacekeepers based on their acknowledgment of – or refusal to acknowledge – genocide accusations, my research finds. </p>
<p>In archived coverage of the <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:605K-2V91-DYRH-01PW-00000-00&context=1516831">South Ossetian</a> region of Georgia, for example, local leaders in the 2000s insisted various European and American troops could not serve as peacekeepers since they had not defended Ossetians from an alleged 1992 genocide. </p>
<h2>Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide</h2>
<p>Genocide claims in the Georgia cases did eventually lead to international intervention and separation from Georgia, but not through peaceful negotiations. Instead, South Ossetia, like another <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030">breakaway Georgian state called Abkhazia</a>, gained de facto independence after a brutal Russian military assault on Georgia in 2008. </p>
<p>This mirrored what occurred in Kosovo nearly a decade earlier when Serbian <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/04/kosovos-push-for-serbian-genocide-tribunal-likely-to-fail/">atrocities</a> prompted Western intervention. Western powers recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859">Serbia</a> continues to contest Kosovo’s separation.</p>
<p>In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, genocide claims on both sides are nothing new. In archival research I found media reports showing that Armenian leaders have repeatedly <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-NCK0-0013-F32T-00000-00&context=1516831">reminded foreign powers of the 1915 Armenian genocide</a> when pressing for <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJ4-DBK0-0007-W0Y8-00000-00&context=1516831">outside intervention</a> in their conflict with Azerbaijan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Parade of cars with men waving Azerbaijani flags out the windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C4929%2C3261&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Azerbaijanis celebrate the end of the military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh on Tuesday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/local-people-celebrate-the-end-of-the-military-conflict-news-photo/1229566072?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Azerbaijanis, for their part, retort it is their citizens who should fear genocide. During a 1992 Armenian military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians committed what is now called the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17179904">Khojaly massacre</a>, when at least 613 civilians were reportedly killed. As <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49NB-0J80-01S8-D0TP-00000-00&context=1516831">newspapers from the era</a> reveal, Azerbaijani leaders declared then that without international intervention, Armenians would finish the job.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>It is impossible to determine whether genocide has in fact occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh without in-depth investigations. But the accusations alone may overpower any truce. And as Armenians’ angry reaction to the recent cease-fire demonstrates, peace between the two nations is fragile at best.</p>
<p><em>A photo caption in this story has been changed to reflect that a rocket attack killed a young boy outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Grodsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Each side in the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accuses the other of war crimes. Such allegations attract foreign attention and possibly intervention, but rarely lead to a peaceful solution.Brian Grodsky, Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1458562020-09-10T06:54:14Z2020-09-10T06:54:14ZShots fired in the Himalayas: a dangerous development in the China-India border standoff<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357352/original/file-20200910-18-k8vclp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mukhtar Khan/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the midst of all the stories about China’s oppression in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">Hong Kong</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014">Xinjiang</a> and its <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-08/bill-birtles-mike-smith-evacuated-china-safety-concerns/12638786">expulsion of foreign journalists</a>, a recent clash on its border with India may pose the greater threat to Asian security. </p>
<p>For the first time in 45 years, shots were fired this week. </p>
<h2>Confrontation on the roof of the world</h2>
<p>During the evening of September 7, Chinese and Indian troops <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-08/china-and-india-disputed-ladakh-border-tensions-increase/12642608">confronted each other</a> along their undefined, de facto border, known as the “<a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-located-and-where-india-and-china-differ-6436436/">Line of Actual Control</a>” (LAC). </p>
<p>This in itself was not unusual. The two sides have been locked in several tense standoffs along the LAC <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-10/high-stakes-in-china-india-himalayan-border-hotspot/12417248?nw=0">since May</a>. </p>
<p>What makes this confrontation stand out is it involved the first known use of firearms on the border in almost half a century. </p>
<h2>What happened?</h2>
<p>China and India have accused each other of provoking this confrontation, which occurred in the <a href="https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/indian-chinese-army-commanders-meet-use-hotline-to-cool-tensions-in-ladakh-138822">Rezang-La heights area</a>, just south of Pangong Lake. </p>
<p>According to Indian <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinese-troops-carried-rods-spears-and-clubs-in-aggressive-approach-towards-indian-post-say-govt-sources/article32554308.ece">reports</a>, there were between 30 and 40 Chinese troops involved. <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/this-is-what-led-china-to-open-fire-in-ladakh-on-monday-for-the-first-time-in-45-years/498363/">Photographs</a> published in Indian media show Chinese soldiers armed with crude <a href="https://www.oneindia.com/india/why-do-the-chinese-use-medieval-weaponry-such-as-the-guandao-at-the-lac-3146251.html">Guandao-style</a> <a href="http://medieval.stormthecastle.com/armorypages/medieval-polearms.htm">polearms</a>, as well as standard issue rifles. </p>
<p>It is unclear how many Indian troops were involved or how they were equipped. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Pangong Lake near the India-China border" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357368/original/file-20200910-16-1bse4gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Border tensions have been building for months between India and China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Manish Swarup/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1813183.shtml">China claims</a> Indian troops crossed the LAC and “blatantly fired shots” when Chinese border troops moved to deter them. India, has strenuously denied this, <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32946/Situation+in+Eastern+Ladakh">saying</a> Chinese soldiers crossed the LAC and were blocked by an Indian forward position, who they then tried to intimidate by firing “a few rounds in the air”. </p>
<p>No troops have been reported injured or killed. </p>
<p>Regardless of which side actually fired the shots, the tactic did not work. Both Chinese and Indian soldiers remain in a stand-off, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-and-chinese-troops-man-remote-border-outposts-just-hundreds-of-metres-apart/articleshow/78019468.cms">reportedly</a> only 200 metres apart. </p>
<h2>Unravelling rules of engagement</h2>
<p>This recent exchange represents a troubling escalation between the two countries.
It directly contravenes the rules and norms painstakingly established by China and India to govern behaviour on the border. </p>
<p>Negotiations on the disputed border have always been tough for China and India. The two sides took nearly <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1525/as.2001.41.2.351.pdf?casa_token=hZGF7ooyaHgAAAAA:U7EOJoAM2UZedkMZ0s8somkYSsdLIkdHmN5GsqXW-yES0PjDexGrkg8gSmeF_BgP5LRoJjcZVKRl-UrKPFNRBWTTGHMgYIvwJBO53kVnIGwZgKYWlaUsbw">12 years</a> of tentative negotiations before signing their first treaty in 1993, in which they agreed to “<a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf">maintain peace and tranquillity</a>” along the LAC. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-kashmir-military-lockdown-and-pandemic-combined-are-one-giant-deadly-threat-142252">In Kashmir, military lockdown and pandemic combined are one giant deadly threat</a>
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<p>Subsequent agreements were reached after negotiations in <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-action-violates-1993-1996-and-2013-border-agreements/articleshow/76405795.cms">1996, 2005 and 2013</a>. These govern military conduct on the border and <a href="http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/CH05B0585.pdf">guidelines</a> for a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<p>The prohibition against the use of weapons along the LAC was first laid out in the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindiaconfidenceagreement96">1996</a> agreement.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Neither side shall open fire, cause bio-degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns and explosives within two kilometres from the Line of Actual Control. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Until this week, China and India have upheld this agreement, even when previous border patrol confrontations became heated.</p>
<p>However, both sides have been pushing the limits of what the other will tolerate and have trying to exploit loopholes and technicalities for several years now. </p>
<p>Border confrontations have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-10/high-stakes-in-china-india-himalayan-border-hotspot/12417248?nw=0">gradually escalated</a> from farcical shoving matches to fully-fledged brawls and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/20/india-china-border-brawl-superpowers-throw-stones-tensions-heighten/">stone flinging</a>, which caused injuries in 2017. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-indias-deadly-himalayan-clash-is-a-big-test-for-modi-and-a-big-concern-for-the-world-140930">China and India's deadly Himalayan clash is a big test for Modi. And a big concern for the world</a>
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<p>This year has seen both sides up the ante, with the introduction of makeshift clubs in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-indias-deadly-himalayan-clash-is-a-big-test-for-modi-and-a-big-concern-for-the-world-140930">lethal melee</a> at the Galwan Valley in June and China now seemingly equipping some border patrols with polearms. </p>
<p>Earlier this month, Indian media reported India was using new <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/indian-troops-are-using-new-rules-of-engagement-along-lac-to-counter-chinese-aggression/495543/">rules of engagement</a>. This change allows its border troops to use whatever means are available for “tactical signalling” against the Chinese. </p>
<h2>A dangerous deadlock</h2>
<p>As two of the world’s largest militaries - and two nuclear-armed countries - even a limited border war between China and India would be devastating for regional peace and stability. It would likely ruin what little cooperation there is left and potentially pull in third parties, such as Pakistan or the United States.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Indian leader Narendra Modi points finger during conversation with China's Xi Jinping." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357362/original/file-20200910-16-thuy7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">War between India and China would be devastating.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Manish Swarup/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is clear from the flurry of <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/india-china-work-on-date-for-next-round-of-talks-as-cds-rawat-explores-military-options/488148/">diplomatic activity</a> between China and India over the past months that they feel the gravity of their situation. </p>
<p>But despite both sides proclaiming they seek a peaceful resolution to the ongoing standoffs, a culture of mistrust continues to poison <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indian-chinese-defence-ministers-meet-amid-border-tensions-20200905-p55soj.html">discussions</a>.</p>
<p>China and India’s foreign ministers are <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/preparing-for-moscow-delhi-beijing-work-hotlines-to-dial-down-tensions-6588655/">scheduled</a> to meet in Moscow on Thursday to discuss the border standoff in person for the first time since the crisis began.</p>
<hr>
<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-leaders-are-strong-and-emboldened-its-wrong-to-see-them-as-weak-and-insecure-143830">China's leaders are strong and emboldened. It's wrong to see them as weak and insecure</a>
</strong>
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</p>
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<p>Both countries will now need to engage in some masterful and innovative diplomatic work to find a way to rejuvenate their diplomacy. </p>
<p>And find a mutually face-saving way to disengage before the standoff escalates out of control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Peter Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A confrontation on the India-China border this week saw shots fired for the first time in 45 years.Stephen Peter Westcott, Post-doc research fellow, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1255922019-10-27T07:57:32Z2019-10-27T07:57:32ZNigeria’s border closure has implications for Africa’s economic integration<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298698/original/file-20191025-173548-1z8y5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The border closure has affected goods from other West African countries</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria recently partially closed its border with Benin in an effort to stem the smuggling of rice. It then <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-trade/update-1-nigerias-land-borders-closed-to-all-goods-customs-chief-idUSL5N2706CO">went on to close its land borders</a> to the movement of all goods from Benin, Niger and Cameroon, effectively banning trade flows with its neighbours.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/10/18/why-african-nations-close-borders-nigeria-sudan-rwanda-kenya-eritrea/">Border closures are not new in Africa</a>. But Nigeria’s actions raise important concerns about the seriousness and prospects of regional integration in Africa. </p>
<p>Nigeria acted just three months after it had signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. With 55 member countries, a combined GDP of $2.4 trillion and a total population of 1.2 billion, the agreement will create the world’s largest free trade area. Its aim is to promote intra-Africa trade, which is abysmally low at <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/intra-african-trade-is-key-to-sustainable-development-african-economic-outlook-17022">16%</a>.</p>
<p>To restrict trade flows so shortly after this momentous feat is a major blow to integration efforts. It also shows how unprepared African countries might be for free trade. It’s hard to see how the free trade deal can increase intra-Africa trade to 60% by 2022, as <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf">projected</a> , when it is being undermined from the start. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135">More work lies ahead to make Africa's new free trade area succeed</a>
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<p>These early trade tensions between Nigeria and its neighbours are hardly surprising. They underlie some of the fundamental problems that must be addressed before cordial free trade can succeed on the continent.</p>
<p>In the case of Nigeria, Africa <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/our-resources/13595-nigeria-intra-africa-trade-and-tariff-profile.html">accounts</a> for only 13% of its exports and 4% of its imports. These statistics probably underestimate the true volume of trade between Nigeria and its neighbours. But they show that Africa is a dispensable market. </p>
<h2>Border closure</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s economy declined in 2015 and further <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/NGA">contracted</a> by 1.6% in 2016 . This was largely due to a worldwide drop in the price of crude oil in <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/12/08/why-the-oil-price-is-falling">2014</a>. The country has since fallen on hard times. Foreign direct investment inflows have plunged by <a href="https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics.aspx">55%</a> . There have also been shortages of foreign exchange which have put the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-currency/nigerian-naira-tumbles-30-percent-after-peg-removed-idUSKCN0Z61F7">Naira</a> in a tailspin, causing the government to implement stringent foreign exchange controls.</p>
<p>Crude oil accounts for over <a href="http://www.nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/docs/ERGP%20%20CLEAN%20COPY.pdf">95% </a>of Nigeria’s total exports and <a href="http://www.nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/docs/ERGP%20%20CLEAN%20COPY.pdf">90%</a> of its foreign exchange earnings. This shows that Nigeria has neglected other sectors of the economy.</p>
<p>The recent oil crisis highlighted the need for the country to diversify and restructure its economy. The result was increased attention being accorded the agriculture sector, which had declined significantly since the late 1960s. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s 2017 <a href="http://www.nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/docs/ERGP%20%20CLEAN%20COPY.pdf">Economic Recovery and Growth Plan</a> aimed to deepen investments in agriculture and increase the sector’s contribution to economic growth from 5% in 2017 to 8.4% by 2020. The idea is to revive domestic farming and save on food imports (over $22 billion a year).</p>
<p>It is this national plan that precipitated the border closure. The government wants to protect domestic farmers from cheap imported foodstuff. </p>
<p>While Nigerian rice farmers are happy about their government’s actions, there are concerns about whether domestic food production can meet domestic demand. In 2017, demand for rice in Nigeria reached <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-14/usda-sees-nigeria-rice-imports-increasing-to-3-4m-tons-in-2019">6.7 million tons</a>, almost double the 3.7 million tons produced domestically. </p>
<p>Since the border closure, the price of a 50 kilogram bag of rice has <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/border-closure-leaves-rice-loving-nigerians-steaming/ar-AAHwRo1">increased</a> from 9,000 naira ($24) to 22,000 naira ($61). </p>
<p>This is good for the farmers. But it is hurting consumers.</p>
<h2>Oil exports and fuel imports</h2>
<p>Then there is the bigger problem of government-subsidised petroleum being smuggled out of Nigeria and sold in neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>World Bank <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EP.PMP.SGAS.CD">data</a> show that between 2010 and 2016, the average pump price of petrol was $0.52 per litre in Nigeria, $1.01 in Benin, $1.14 in Cameroun and 1.04 in Niger. <a href="https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/gasoline_prices/">Current data</a> show that petrol is sold at $0.40 per litre in Nigeria and at $0.91 and $1.07 in Benin and Cameroon respectively. </p>
<p>The price difference creates the incentive to smuggle petrol out of Nigeria.<br>
Nigeria’s largest export is crude oil, and its largest import is refined oil. Domestic refineries are reportedly operating well below their capacity, causing fuel imports to average <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN?locations=NG&view=chart">29%</a> of total imports over the past three years. Roughly 90% of fuel in Nigeria is imported, and all of it is subsidised. Last year, the subsidy bill was estimated to reach <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201810150083.html">$3.85 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Smuggling fuel out amounts to the use of public resources to subsidise neighbouring countries. Since the border closure, reports suggest that the delivery of fuel in Nigeria has dropped by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerias-land-borders-closed-all-goods-customs-chief-says">20%</a> and sales by <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-10-22-00-border-closure-has-mixed-impact-for-nigerias-economy">12.7%</a>. </p>
<p>This suggests that the demand for fuel in Nigeria is high because some of it is bought and smuggled out.</p>
<h2>Why the border closure is worrying</h2>
<p>African countries have different economic configurations and strategic priorities. The huge number of diverse countries within the free trade area isn’t going to make things easy.</p>
<p>Indeed, free trade has its benefits, but it also has costs. Nigeria’s bid to protect a declining rice farming industry and save foreign exchange has led to protectionism that defies the principles of a free trade area. </p>
<p>The African Union (AU) has been muted on the issue of the border closures. This might be because it does not yet have detailed institutional arrangements for settling disputes within the free trade area. </p>
<p>Another factor might be that it has been quiet because Nigeria is involved. As Africa’s largest economy, the AU courted it earnestly to sign. The agreement needs Nigeria, arguably at whatever cost. </p>
<p>The regional trade bloc ECOWAS has also failed to bring Nigeria to heel. Both Nigeria and Benin are members of the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/">bloc</a>, created in 1975. All it has done so far is to <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/ecowas-parliament-appeals-to-buhari-to-reopen-borders/513nqmk">appeal</a> for the borders to be opened. It clearly has no enforcement power.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s border closure may be a precursor. More incidents like this can be expected as the realities of free trade kick in. Some countries will lose, others will gain. </p>
<p>The AU needs protocols and measures to manage free trade, as well as programmes to prepare political leaders for the realities that will follow. </p>
<p>The free trade area should not be a mere symbol. It must be fully understood and appreciated for it to succeed.</p>
<p>The Nigeria border closure must be resolved as soon as possible. It is diverting attention and positive energy from matters that can promote the free trade area, such as investments in transport infrastructure, trade data capture and border protection. </p>
<p>More importantly, it is a bad precedent that could reduce other countries’ commitments to economic integration in Africa. The AU must act now, or prepare to bury the free trade deal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Efforts to increase trade within the continent are being undermined from the startTahiru Azaaviele Liedong, Assistant Professor of Strategy, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1128242019-03-04T20:41:43Z2019-03-04T20:41:43ZKashmir conflict is not just a border dispute between India and Pakistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261726/original/file-20190301-110150-tu6era.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indian soldiers arrive at the wreckage of an an Indian helicopter that crashed on the Indian side of Kashmir on Feb. 27, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/The-Week-That-Was-In-Asia-Photo-Gallery/cf3b18ffec9149f881f9ab25289b1812/28/0">AP Photo/Mukhtar Khan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tensions between India and Pakistan have diminished in recent days after <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-pakistan-tensions-latest-updates-190227063414443.html">repeated military clashes in Kashmir</a> led to fear that the two nuclear powers could be on the verge of war. </p>
<p>Kashmir is a disputed territory divided between India and Pakistan but claimed in its entirety by both sides.</p>
<p>The latest Kashmir standoff was triggered by a Feb. 14 suicide bombing by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47249982">Jaish-e-Muhammad</a>, a militant group with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/profile-jaish-muhammad-190215061851082.html">links to al-Qaida</a> and founded by the Pakistan-based cleric Masood Azhar. More than 40 Indian soldiers died. </p>
<p>India blamed Pakistan for providing moral and material support to the terrorist organization, which is banned in Pakistan but <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/pakistan-didn-t-detain-masood-azhar-after-pathankot-attack-report/story-QlXZi7xMlPtaPNF1ZVg1NJ.html">operates openly there</a>. On Feb. 26, India launched <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-says-indian-jets-dropped-bombs-but-caused-no-damage-11551158468">air strikes</a> against Jaish-e-Muhammad’s training camps on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. </p>
<p>Pakistan retaliated, claiming to have <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/27/india/india-pakistan-strikes-escalation-intl/index.html">shot down two Indian fighter jets</a> on Feb. 28. Indian sources said that just one Pakistani jet and one Indian jet had been downed, and an Indian pilot taken hostage by Pakistan.</p>
<p>Pakistan has since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/pakistan-india-pilot-kashmir.html">released the pilot</a>, soothing tempers – for now, at least. </p>
<h2>Why Kashmir?</h2>
<p>The Kashmir issue has caused tension and conflict in the Indian subcontinent since 1947, when independence from Britain <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/asia/india-pakistan-independence-timeline/index.html">created India and Pakistan</a> as two sovereign states.</p>
<p>Jammu and Kashmir – the full name of the princely Himalayan state, then ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh – <a href="https://theconversation.com/kashmir-india-and-pakistans-escalating-conflict-will-benefit-narendra-modi-ahead-of-elections-112570">acceded to India</a> in 1947, seeking military support after <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1947%E2%80%931948">tribal raids</a> from Pakistan into the state’s territory. </p>
<p>The two countries have fought <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/south-asian-history/kashmir-history-politics-representation?format=PB#K7iOgJparKKAsCkw.97">three wars</a> over the region since.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=686&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=686&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=686&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261917/original/file-20190304-92277-1fhmsei.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The internal divisions of Kashmir.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/Kashmir_map.jpg">Central Intelligence Agency</a></span>
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<p>The first, which began in 1947, ended with the partition of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan under a <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unipombackgr.html">1949 United Nations-brokered ceasefire</a>. Wars in 1965 and <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2009/07/26/how-should-we-celebrate-the-kargil-war/">1999</a> ended in stalemate. </p>
<p>But Kashmir is not simply a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan. </p>
<p>As illustrated in my recent <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/south-asian-history/kashmir-history-politics-representation?format=PB#K7iOgJparKKAsCkw.97">edited volume on the history of this contested territory</a>, Kashmir is a multi-ethnic region with several internal subregions, whose inhabitants have distinct political goals.</p>
<p>Pakistani Kashmir consists of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, jurisdictions that want to become formal provinces of Pakistan to gain more political autonomy over their internal affairs. </p>
<p>Indian Kashmir includes Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley. While the first two regions desire to remain part of India, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kashmir-poll/majority-in-kashmir-valley-want-independence-poll-idUSDEL29179620070813">Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley</a> wants independence from it.</p>
<h2>A many-sided conflict</h2>
<p>The desire for autonomy in different areas of Kashmir has led to repeated uprisings and independence movements. </p>
<p>The most prominent is a violent <a href="http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1400">insurgency against Indian rule in the Kashmir Valley</a> that began in 1989 and has continued, in ebbs and flows, over the past three decades. Thousands have been killed.</p>
<p>The Kashmir Valley has become a militarized zone, effectively occupied by Indian security forces. According to the United Nations, Indian soldiers have committed numerous <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/14/india-act-un-rights-report-kashmir">human rights violations there</a>, including firing on protesters and denying due process to people arrested. </p>
<p>The UN also cites Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf">role in the violence in Kashmir</a>. Its government supports the movement for Kashmir’s independence from India by providing <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520274211/body-of-victim-body-of-warrior">moral and material support to Kashmiri militants</a> – allegations the Pakistani government <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/why-pakistan-has-not-been-able-to-rein-in-anti-india-militants/2019/03/01/7c3549a8-3ae1-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html?utm_term=.ba60b89a081a">refutes</a>. Pakistan also <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/india-and-pakistan-arent-ready-for-another-terrorist-crisis/">tacitly supports</a> the operations in Kashmir of non-Kashmiri extremist groups like Jaish-e-Muhammad. </p>
<p>As a result, consecutive Indian governments have managed to write off unrest in the Kashmir Valley as a byproduct of its territorial dispute with Pakistan. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/261972/original/file-20190304-92298-thcsd5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">India’s Kashmir Valley.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/90/Kashmir.Valley.original.11730.jpg">Ishan Singal</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In doing so, India has avoided addressing the actual political grievances of Indian Kashmiris.</p>
<p>An entire generation of young Kashmiris have been raised during the 30-year insurgency. They are deeply alienated from India, research shows, and <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15810.html">view it as an occupying power</a>.</p>
<p>Militant groups in the region tap into this discontent, recruiting young people to use violence in their quest for Kashmir’s freedom. Indeed, the man who under the auspices of Jaish-e-Muhmamad blew himself up in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/14/indian-paramilitaries-killed-in-suicide-car-bombing-in-kashmir">Feb. 14 suicide bombing</a> of the Indian military convoy was a young Kashmiri.</p>
<h2>Ending the conflict</h2>
<p>Tensions in Kashmir may have subsided, but the root causes of the violence there have not.</p>
<p>In my assessment, the Kashmir dispute cannot be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan alone – even if the two countries were willing to work together to resolve their differences. </p>
<p>This is because the conflict has many sides: India, Pakistan, the five regions of Kashmir and numerous political organizations.</p>
<p>Establishing peace in the region would require both India and Pakistan to reconcile the multiple – and sometimes conflicting – aspirations of the diverse peoples of this region. </p>
<p>Only when local aspirations are recognized, addressed and debated alongside India and Pakistan’s nationalist and strategic goals will a durable solution emerge to one of the world’s longest-running conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112824/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chitralekha Zutshi has received funding from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the National Endowment for the Humanities. </span></em></p>India and Pakistan have been fighting for control over Kashmir, an 86,000-square-mile territory in the Himalayas, for seven decades. But the people of Kashmir have their own political goals too.Chitralekha Zutshi, Professor of History, William & MaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1013072018-08-10T13:07:53Z2018-08-10T13:07:53ZWhy Indonesia and Timor Leste should involve indigenous people in border dispute talks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231315/original/file-20180809-30476-mbtgmt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Two land borders separate Indonesia and East Timor.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The governments of Indonesia and Timor Leste should include indigenous people in border dispute negotiations between the two countries. The indigenous community of Ambenu people in Timor Leste has kinship ties with the Amfoang people in West Timor, Indonesia, and they have started their own dialogues to solve problems arising from the border disputes. </p>
<h2>Impact on society</h2>
<p>Two land borders separate Indonesia and East Timor. In the east, a 150km stretch divides the island of Timor in two. In the west, inside Indonesia’s Nusa Tenggara Timor province, a 120km curve creates an East Timorese enclave, Oecusse, within Indonesia’s territory. While the eastern part of the border has successfully been negotiated, the border surrounding Oecusse remains <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste/timor-leste-oecusse-and-indonesian-border">disputed</a>. </p>
<p>The prolonged dispute has stalled development of the area. Worse, it has caused tension among the people occupying the border area. <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/116501/B104%20Timor-Leste.pdf">Conflict and violence</a> emerged as a result of this uncertain situation. </p>
<h2>Stalled negotiations</h2>
<p>Indonesia and Timor Leste <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/arrangement-between-indonesia-and-untaet-establishment-joint-border-committee">began negotiating their borders in 2000</a> following the latter’s vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999. While the eastern border was quickly settled, the border surrounding Oecusse remains unresolved. </p>
<p>Negotiations of the unsettled borders until today have made little progress. The latest meeting of the countries’ foreign ministers in January 2018 did not come up with any tangible solutions. </p>
<p>The two countries based their border negotiations on a 1904 Treaty between the Portuguese and the Dutch, as well as a 1914 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision. But they differ in their interpretations of the 1904 Treaty. Indonesian negotiators insist the border lies in the Noelbesi River, which would shrink Timor Leste’s territory. Timor Leste negotiators say the border lies in the smaller Nonotuinan River. </p>
<p>Indonesian negotiators argued that the basis for setting the border was unreliable. In addition to those unresolved segments, some areas in the sub-district of Bikomi Nilulat in Timor Tengah Utara Regency remain unsurveyed.</p>
<h2>Indigenous people’s dialogue</h2>
<p>Amid the slow negotiations between the two governments, <em>masyarakat adat</em> (indigenous communities) in both countries have promoted a cultural approach to settle the dispute. </p>
<p>Three <em>masyarakat adat</em> meetings between Amfoang people from Indonesia and Ambenu people from Timor Leste have taken place in Oecusse (Timor Leste) in 2012, Kefamenanu, Timor (Indonesia), in 2012 and Oepoli in Amfoan Timor, Kupang (Indonesia), in 2017. </p>
<p>The last meeting in <a href="https://www.liputan6.com/regional/read/3236662/kesepakatan-para-raja-dan-perbatasan-ri-timor-leste-di-naktuka">Oepoli on November 14 2017</a> brought together four major kingdoms of Timor. Three kings – Liurai Wahali, Liurai Sonbai and King Amfoang – from Indonesia met with King Ambenu from Timor Leste. They were united by the spirit of <em>Nekaf mese ansaof mesa Atoni Pah Meto</em> (One Heart One Soul as Dawan People). </p>
<p>The meeting was set in accordance with the tradition of Timor, signified by ceremonies and rituals. </p>
<p>The kings focused on reviving kinship ties and peace among people with the same ancestry. They agreed to solve all problems based on the principles of peace and kinship. They signed an agreement pledging to see the border between Indonesia and Timor Leste as an administrative border that should not limit and separate their kin relations.</p>
<p>The meeting in Oepoli constitutes a unique case in which international relations, a modern social relations, meets tradition. The meeting was not about settling the interstate border dispute. However, its implications for settling the dispute between Indonesia and Timor Leste cannot simply be neglected. </p>
<p>In Indonesia, the inclusion of <em>masyarakat adat</em> in resolving the border dispute has been started by the active support of the local military command. It facilitated a focused group discussion in May between the government of Indonesia and academics. The discussion found that before Portuguese rule in East Timor border agreements existed between Timorese kingdoms, in the form of oaths. </p>
<p>The governments of Indonesia and Timor Leste should begin to involve indigenous leaders in the border negotiations. They should listen to the aspirations of the indigenous communities to help create a sustainable settlement that benefits both states and their peoples.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101307/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fuji Riang Prastowo receives funding from Faculty of Social and Political Sciences UGM</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anggita Triastiwi receives funding from Faculty of Social and Political Science UGM. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fuji Riang Prastowo receives funding from Faculty or Social and Political Science UGM. </span></em></p>Amid a prolonged border dispute between Indonesia and Timor Leste, indigenous groups have signed an agreement to solve problems arising from the dispute.Atin Prabandari, Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada Anggita Triastiwi Harianto, Research assistant, Universitas Gadjah Mada Fuji Riang Prastowo, Lecturer in Sociology, Universitas Gadjah Mada Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/971732018-06-17T18:53:58Z2018-06-17T18:53:58ZChina and India’s border dispute is a slow-moving environmental disaster<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223302/original/file-20180615-32307-1p57oni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Development is peaking in the high country between India and China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India-china_border_and_nathula_peak.jpg">Vinay Vaars/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese and Indian competition on their shared Himalayan border is more likely to create a slow-moving environmental catastrophe than a quick military or nuclear disaster. </p>
<p>The Himalayan plateau plays a crucial role in Asia. It generates the monsoonal rains and seasonal ice-melts that feed rivers and deliver nutrients to South, Southeast and East Asia. Almost <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/07/map-more-than-half-of-humanity-lives-within-this-circle/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ab1ac6b83208">half the world’s population</a> and <a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf">20% of its economy</a> depend on these rivers, and they are already threatened by <a href="https://www.nature.com/news/double-threat-for-tibet-1.15738">climate change</a>. China and India’s competition for their headwaters increases this threat. </p>
<p>Until the mid-20th century, the Himalaya’s high altitude prevented its large-scale development and conserved its environment. But after the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China were created in the late 1940s, these two new states began competing for high ground in the western and eastern Himalayas. They fought a <a href="https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/forgotten-war-himalayas">war over their unresolved border in 1962</a>, and have scuffled ever since. The most recent clash was in 2017, when China built a road into <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-doklam-pass-how-little-bhutan-faced-down-china-over-a-border-dispute-84158">Doklam</a>, an area claimed by Bhutan and protected by India. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-doklam-pass-how-little-bhutan-faced-down-china-over-a-border-dispute-84158">Lessons from the Doklam Pass: how little Bhutan faced down China over a border dispute</a>
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<p>Tensions rose again last week when China unveiled a new mine in Lhunze, near the de facto border with India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, east of Bhutan. The mine sits on a <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2146296/how-chinese-mining-himalayas-may-create-new-military-flashpoint">deposit of gold, silver and other precious metals worth up to US$60 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Most analysis of the Sino-Indian border dispute has focused on the potential for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/asias-cold-peace-china-and-indias-delicate-diplomatic-dance/">another war between these two nuclear-armed neighbours</a>. The environmental impacts of their continued entrenchment are rarely mentioned, despite the fact that they are significant and growing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/223305/original/file-20180615-32316-14um4ti.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The various tracts of the disputed Sino-Indian border are host to many new development projects.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>All of this development along the border is built on the world’s third-largest ice-pack or in biodiversity hotspots. The region was militarised during the 1962 war, and has since been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09584930903108911?journalCode=ccsa20">inundated by troops, roads, airports, barracks and hospitals</a>. These have caused deforestation, landslides, and – if a <a href="http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1659/0276-4741(2002)022%5B0316:ASPPTS%5D2.0.CO%3B2">study on troop movements on other glaciers</a> is any guide – possibly even glacial retreat. </p>
<p>The buildup of troops on the border has displaced local ethnic groups, and they have been encouraged to give up their land to make way for <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248903596_Agriculture_in_central_Tibet_an_assessment_of_climate_farming_systems_and_strategies_to_boost_production">intensive farming</a>. Animal habitats have decreased and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bjhs-themes/article/studying-the-snow-leopard-reconceptualizing-conservation-across-the-chinaindia-border/992F367FE853AA276EB4B229FE71A716">clashes with tigers and snow leopards have increased</a>. Population transfers and agricultural intensification have even heightened the risk that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-antibiotic-pollution-of-waterways-creates-superbugs-38046">antibiotic-resistant superbugs and other toxic pollutants</a> will seep into the world’s most diffused watershed.</p>
<p>During the past 20 years, first China and then India have increased this degradation by building large-scale mines and hydroelectric dams in this sensitive region. These projects have <a href="https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4509-Tibet-s-mining-menace-">not been profitable or environmentally sound</a>, but they have solidified state control by entrenching populations, upgrading transport networks, and integrating these fringes into national economies. The tightening of state control along the border has been further complicated by calls from the Tibetans and other ethnic groups for greater autonomy.</p>
<p>Many of the projects have been developed within the transnational Brahmaputra River basin. This river’s headwaters are in China, but most of its catchment is in Arunachal Pradesh, which is controlled by India but claimed by China. It then flows through Assam and Bangladesh, where it joins the Ganges River. Some 630 million people live in the Ganges-Brahmaputra River catchment.</p>
<p>China and India’s geopolitical resources rush threatens the safety of this entire river system. The new Lhunze mine’s position among the Brahmaputra’s headwaters is so precarious that its owner, Hua Yu Mining, was only allowed to mine there under strict environmental conditions. To its credit, Hua Yu has agreed to be a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=7&v=EeBprffFbic">“green” miner, limiting emissions, water use and minimising “grassland disturbance”</a>. But even if the company does not inadvertently leak acid and arsenic into the environment like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/tibetans-in-anguish-as-chinese-mines-pollute-their-sacred-grasslands/2016/12/25/bb6aad06-63bc-11e6-b4d8-33e931b5a26d_story.html?utm_term=.d260cc80defa">other mines in Tibet</a>, the mine is still liable to be damaged by the region’s frequent earthquakes. Any toxic leak from Lhunze will flow straight into the Brahmaputra and then into the lower Ganges.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-growing-footprint-on-the-globe-threatens-to-trample-the-natural-world-88312">China’s growing footprint on the globe threatens to trample the natural world</a>
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<p>On its side of the border, India has concentrated on dams rather than mines. Between 2000 and 2016, the Arunachal Pradesh government approved the <a href="https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2016/02/25/private-dam-builders-back-out-of-brahmaputra-dams/">construction of 153 dams</a>, before realising that it had overextended itself. </p>
<p>So far only one dam is complete, and all the other projects have stalled. One of these stalled dams is on the Subansiri River, the same river from which the Lhunze mine draws water. India is racing to build these dams <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-indias-race-to-dam-the-brahmaputra-river-puts-the-himalayas-at-risk-65496">without community consultation or environmental studies</a> because it sees itself as competing with China for the region’s water. China has already built four dams in the upper Brahmaputra River basin. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4799-Fighting-India-s-mega-dams">Indian strategists argue</a> that they can stop China building more dams by building hydroelectric projects whose need for water will be recognised under international law. Given China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/13/china-damns-international-court-after-south-china-sea-slapdown">dismissal of previous rulings by the International Court of Justice</a>, and its <a href="https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2018/05/17/china-resumes-sharing-brahmaputra-water-flow-data-with-india/">recent refusal to share water-flow data</a> with India after the Doklam incident (data that India needs to plan flood controls), this strategy seems unlikely to succeed. </p>
<p>Even if it does, it is hard to see how building large hydropower projects in an earthquake-probne region will ultimately help India. It won’t stop China developing the borderland, and it could cause more problems than it solves. </p>
<p>To keep Asia’s major rivers flowing and relatively non-toxic, both nations need to stop competing and start collaborating. Their leaders understand that neither nation would win a nuclear war. Now they need to realise that no one will benefit from destroying a shared watershed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Gamble does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For decades, China and India have clashed over their disputed Himalayan border. This clash is also playing out via a development boom that threatens the health of one of the world’s biggest river catchments.Ruth Gamble, David Myers Research Fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841582017-09-20T12:54:05Z2017-09-20T12:54:05ZLessons from the Doklam Pass: how little Bhutan faced down China over a border dispute<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186798/original/file-20170920-932-7hqyo3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bhutan-buddhist-kingdom-on-eastern-edge-711723511">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In one of the less reported stories of the summer, India and China came to a stand-off over a plateau in the Himalayas called the Doklam Pass.</p>
<p>This small strip of land separating the Indian state of Sikkim from its neighbour <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12480707">Bhutan</a> is one of several areas disputed by China and Bhutan. After the Chinese started <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4649640/Bhutan-protests-China-border-road-dispute.html">building a road</a> on the controversial territory in June, India, with its own interests at stake and as Bhutan’s former representative on external relations, stepped up to engage with China.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2103601/bhutan-can-solve-its-border-problem-china-if-india-lets-it">Border disputes</a> between Bhutan and China have a long history dating back to the Chinese <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-16689779">occupation of Tibet</a> in the 1950s. The recent episode arose on May 18, when China objected to two concrete observation bunkers built by the Indians in the disputed area. Three weeks later Chinese troops destroyed one of the bunkers with a bulldozer, leading to scuffles with local Indian patrols. India responded by sending more troops to the area, escalating tensions.</p>
<p>The incident acts as a reminder of the unsettled border between Bhutan and China as well as the areas of direct border <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-40478813">disputes</a> between India and China. Under the original terms of Article 2 of the <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4d620.html">1949 Treaty of Friendship</a> between India and Bhutan, Bhutan agreed to be “guided” by India in its “external relations”.</p>
<p>As a result, in the 1950s, India asserted its right under the 1949 treaty to negotiate border disputes with China – a stance that the Chinese authorities rejected. The disastrous 1962 <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/historys-hostage-china-india-and-the-war-of-1962/">Indo-China conflict</a> further worsened relations between the two countries with Bhutan firmly held by India.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186799/original/file-20170920-19168-12ccjrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Xi of China and prime minister Narendra Modi of India have both acquiesced in border issues with Bhutan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/treaties-organisations-photos/brics-bimstec-summit-in-goa-photos-53070474">epa</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<h2>Restraint vs rhetoric</h2>
<p>This grasp was loosened, slightly, to allow Bhutan to begin a series of private talks with China in 1984. Unfortunately, although the talks appeared to be moving towards a settlement in 1997, Bhutan <a href="http://www.bhutannewsservice.org/bhutan-china-border-mismatch/">revised its claims</a> on its position. Observers and indeed many Bhutanese thought that this change in position was due to India’s strong influence on Bhutan.</p>
<p>Bhutan surprised many observers in 2007 when it secured Indian agreement to changes to the 1949 Treaty. In a <a href="http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/2007/2.html">new treaty</a> signed that year, India’s right to “guide” Bhutanese foreign affairs was removed. The amended Article 2 provides that the two countries will “cooperate closely with each other … Neither … shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.” The change effectively gave Bhutan control of its foreign policy.</p>
<p>The Doklam incident is noteworthy for the nationalistic rhetoric that flowed from the main protagonists India and China, and the remarkable restraint of Bhutan. There are important lessons to be learned from this recent incident. </p>
<p>In July, as the conflict escalated, the Tibetan historian, <a href="http://iar.ubc.ca/persons/tsering-shakya/">Tsering Shakya</a>, voiced his belief that Bhutan could handle its own affairs. His belief was well founded for Bhutan did, after a tense eight weeks, secure <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/doklam-standoff-bhutan-welcomes-troops-withdrawal-by-india-china-4818960/">Chinese withdrawal</a> from the disputed area. Bhutan managed to assert itself despite its diminutive size. But there are wider lessons from the Doklam incident.</p>
<h2>Political potential of social media</h2>
<p>The online debate in Bhutan highlights the importance of modern social media. Online newspapers and discussion forums were used by ordinary Bhutanese to express their <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/with-two-bellicose-neighbours-noble-silence-was-the-only-option-for-bhutan-karma-phuntsho/articleshow/60341157.cms">concerns and views</a> on this incident. In a country that only allowed television in 1999, this shows the remarkable change that has occurred. Indeed, with the exception of leading newspaper <a href="http://thebhutanese.bt/giving-bhutan-its-due/">The Bhutanese</a>, the mainstream media in Bhutan barely mentioned the stand-off, reflecting the government’s restrained handling of the Doklam incident.</p>
<p>As Bhutan approaches its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Bhutan/Government-and-society">10th anniversary</a> as a parliamentary democracy next year, the Doklam incident appears to suggest a new phase of political discussion and engagement emerging. Many of the views expressed throughout were deeply <a href="http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/jul/27/who-is-bullying-bhutan-bhutanese-youth-take-to-facebook-on-china-india-face-off-over-doklam-1634510.html">critical</a> of the Indian media. More worrying for the Bhutanese government, which has close ties with <a href="http://www.elections.in/political-leaders/narendra-modi.html">prime minister Modi</a>, is the widely expressed <a href="http://thebhutanese.bt/more-than-the-doklam-issue-bhutan-worried-about-hydropower-projects-and-trade/http://example.com/">view</a> that India continues to seek to control Bhutan.</p>
<p>Bhutanese blogger Sonam Tashi openly suggests in an <a href="http://www.bestchinanews.com/International/11529.html">online post</a> that there is “an unwritten ‘no go zone’ in Bhutanese politics and media”. The focus of Tashi’s post is on India and its economic influence over Bhutan. However, what his post reveals is a new emerging aspect of Bhutanese political discourse – a challenge to existing political taboos.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186800/original/file-20170920-961-yq91e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=957&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prime minister of Bhutan Tshering Tobgay showed great political acumen in dealing with the two superpowers on Bhutan’s doorstep.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/diplomacy-photos/tshering-tobgay-prime-minister-of-bhutan-visits-assam-photos-53429551">epa</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Bhutan and its current government, led by the prime minister, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/bhutan-prime-minister-business-gross-national-happiness">Tshering Tobgay</a>, have emerged from this recent border dispute enhanced by restraint and a display of political acumen. The Bhutanese may now wish finally to settle the ongoing border disputes with China. The rhetoric of the superpowers undoubtedly is seen for what it is – mere rhetoric. Yet the Doklam Pass incident ought to provide an incentive to <a href="http://www.tourism.gov.bt/map/thimphu">Thimphu</a> to reflect on its long-term relationships with its neighbours.</p>
<p>The maturity displayed by the Bhutanese government in its dignified handling of the Doklam incident deserves respect. Following the <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/As-Brics-Comes-to-a-Close-India-and-China-Hold-Bilateral-Talks-20170905-0003.html">first bilateral talks</a> since the incident, India’s prime minister Modi and China’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11551399">president Xi</a> both <a href="https://thewire.in/173989/modi-xi-bilateral-meeting-doklam/">agree</a> it should not happen again.</p>
<p>The Doklam incident may boost support for Tshering Tobgay’s ruling party next year in the National Assembly elections. What is certain is that the democratising effect of social media will make the 2018 elections distinctly different from the first and second elections held in 2008 and 2013.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard W Whitecross has received funding from:
The Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland
ESRC
Royal Society of Edinburgh
The Frederick Williamson Trust
The University of Edinburgh
Edinburgh Napier University. </span></em></p>The world has much to learn from the maturity, restraint and negotiation skills of one small country facing two superpowersRichard W Whitecross, Associate professor, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/569562016-03-29T22:06:49Z2016-03-29T22:06:49ZFalklands row adds up to much ado about not much in the South Atlantic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116682/original/image-20160329-18939-ql0kko.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Falkland Islands (Las Islas Malvinas): a rocky outpost at the centre of a centuries-long dispute.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Falkland_Islands_topographic_map-en.svg">Eric Gaba</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Has a United Nations international boundary committee really “sided with Argentina” by expanding its maritime limits in the South Atlantic by a third to include the disputed Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, as <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/argentina/12206179/Argentina-celebrates-UN-decision-to-expand-its-maritime-territory-to-include-Falkland-Islands.html">has been widely reported</a>?</p>
<p>In fact, the announcement from a subcommittee of the <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm">Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf</a> (CLCS) does no such thing. The CLCS was established by the <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm">1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> to do one thing: verify the scientific data that a state submits to determine the limits of its outer continental shelf, and therefore the extent of the area to which it has exclusive access to seabed resources. </p>
<p>A state’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) runs from 12-200 nautical miles from shore, and beyond that lies the outer continental shelf, extending as far as 350 nautical miles or potentially even further. Because the scientific basis for making such claims is highly technical, the UN established the CLCS to assess states’ submissions. Right from the beginning it was recognised that in many cases states’ claims could legitimately overlap. </p>
<h2>Claim and counter-claim</h2>
<p>For instance, imagine a situation where Country A and Country B are 500 nautical miles apart from each other. Country A makes a submission proposing that there is a contiguous seabed that goes all the way to Country B. In such a case, the 200 nautical miles closest to Country A would clearly be part of Country A’s EEZ, the 200 nautical miles closest to Country B would clearly be part of Country B’s EEZ, and the 100 nautical miles in the middle would seemingly be awarded to Country A.</p>
<p>However, while disputes over territory on land or in territorial waters near the coast are zero-sum games – where one country’s gain is necessarily another’s loss – in this case the science that supports the geological contiguity of the seabed backing Country A’s claim is very likely to also support the same claims made by Country B. </p>
<p>This is acknowledged under the Law of the Sea through separating the verification of the science from the actual drawing of boundaries. Having certified the scientific basis for any claims, the CLCS turns the matter to arbitration or to a tribunal that then can divide up the shared space between the states with legitimate claims to it. Often this involves just drawing a line down the middle. However, that line may be adjusted – due to differences in the competing states’ populations or historic factors, for example. Or the two states may decide to administer their overlapping seabeds jointly and share resource revenues equitably.</p>
<h2>Share and share alike: it works in the Arctic</h2>
<p>Despite popular conceptions of an ongoing rush for Arctic territory, states with competing claims have recognised their shared interest in <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-truth-about-politics-and-cartography-mapping-claims-to-the-arctic-seabed-46043">establishing scientific data universally agreed by all</a>. So although Canada, Denmark, Russia, and the US are all ultimately competitors for what lies beneath the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, they generally recognise that acknowledgement of each state’s claim – including their own – is dependent on universal recognition of scientific data. They have therefore been working closely together to map the ocean floor, sharing costs, exchanging specialised expertise and equipment, and uploading data to an openly accessible website: the <a href="http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/bathymetry/arctic/arctic.html">International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean</a>.</p>
<p>A similar situation could exist in the South Atlantic, but for the long-running dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands which has at times broken into open military conflict, most recently during the Falklands War of 1982. There is no equivalent dispute over land, rather than ocean, territory among the Arctic nations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/116680/original/image-20160329-13679-5s0nmy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Competing South Atlantic territorial claims by Argentina and the UK.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/south_atlantic/">IBRU/Durham University</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>No end in sight yet</h2>
<p>Well aware of the dispute, the CLCS has moved carefully in the South Atlantic. In 2009 the UK and Argentina both made submissions to the CLCS with significant overlap, as demonstrated by this map produced by <a href="https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/">IBRU, the Centre for Borders Research</a> at Durham University. </p>
<p>This is a case where shared scientific research could support both sides’ claims. When the CLCS empowered a subcommittee to make a preliminary determination on Argentina’s claims in 2012 it noted that a final determination could not be made until the Falkland/Malvinas sovereignty dispute was settled. So even while this subcommittee has now endorsed Argentina’s science, and regardless of the fact that it’s been promoted as a “win” for the Argentine government (and, by implication, a “loss” for the UK), it doesn’t, in fact, move the process forward. There can be no progress until the sovereignty issue is settled. </p>
<p>Indeed, the CLCS finding that Argentina’s science is sound is also likely to strengthen the UK’s claim to the contested seabed around the islands. Should the UK’s claim to the islands be recognised, the CLCS finding makes it more likely than ever that the seabed between the islands and the Argentine mainland will need to be shared.</p>
<p>In the long run the UK and Argentina will have to move toward finding a shared interest – perhaps even the two states can achieve <em>détente</em> through science (and the hope of a share of the region’s oil and mineral wealth). Unfortunately in the short term the ruling has invoked only passions and political posturing that does nothing to move towards a solution for the South Atlantic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Steinberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A UN committee has agreed with the science underpinning Falklands boundary claims, but without solving the sovereignty issue the dispute is no closer to a solution.Philip Steinberg, Professor of Political Geography; Director, IBRU: Durham University's Centre for Borders Research, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/442642015-07-14T04:31:41Z2015-07-14T04:31:41ZAfrica’s border disputes are set to rise – but there are ways to stop them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/88232/original/image-20150713-11795-19vf23y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A wooden boat sails on the Congo river against the backdrop the Democratic Republic of Congo's capital Kinshasa. The river flows through both the DRC and Republic of Congo which are in dispute over territory.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Katrina Manson</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><strong>Foundation essay</strong>: This article is part of a series marking the launch of The Conversation in Africa. Our foundation essays are longer than our usual comment and analysis articles and take a wider look at key issues affecting society.</em></p>
<p>African national borders are afflicted by a multitude of troubles that straddle villages and communities. These can include military skirmishes, cattle rustling, terrorism, secessionist movements, smuggling, ethnic violence, people trafficking, irredentism and agrarian revolts.</p>
<p>Border disputes have been a reality on the continent through the millennia. Precolonial Africa was hardly a setting of harmony and bliss between African peoples. Most kingdoms paid attention to territorial control and did adapt some precise boundaries. But border disputes are not the preserve of Africa, as the recent conflict between the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-borders-chinese-sympathy-for-moscow-will-only-stretch-so-far-37243">Ukraine and Russia</a> attests.</p>
<p>But Africa certainly has its own peculiar set of problems, most by dint of the <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467">Berlin Conference</a> which partitioned the continent into lucrative pieces for the colonisers. But the conference never meant to achieve a meaningful delimitation of Africa. As Lord Salisbury admitted not only was the delimitation <a href="https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1CHWA_enZA634ZA634&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Territoriality+and+Identity+in+International+Law%3A+The+Struggle+for+Self-Determination+in+the+Western+Sahara%2C%E2%80%99+Millennium%3A+Journal+of+International+Studies+28+(3)">largely arbitrary</a>, but the mapping exercise was far from a precise art.</p>
<p>Pre-independence Africa watched Europeans:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet ever trod.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Today, close to 100 active border disputes exist <a href="http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415838924/">across the continent</a>. Rising nationalism, population and environmental pressures mean that the situation is likely to get worse. Unless, that is, an army of indigenous peace practitioners work closely with available pan-Africanist leaders and statesmen to douse and resolve tensions.</p>
<h2>Tensions abound - north, south, east and west</h2>
<p>In East Africa there are tensions between a number of countries. They include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>conflict over the Ilemi Triangle between Sudan and Kenya;</p></li>
<li><p>the Nadapal boundary dispute between Kenya and South Sudan;</p></li>
<li><p>the dispute over Lake Malawi between Tanzania and Malawi;</p></li>
<li><p>the dispute over the Mingino Islands between Kenya and Uganda;</p></li>
<li><p>the Badme territory dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and</p></li>
<li><p>border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Recent West African boundaries and borders disputes include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>land and maritime disputes between the Cameroon and Nigeria;</p></li>
<li><p>territorial disputes on the Island of Mbanié between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea;</p></li>
<li><p>the frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and Niger frontier dispute; and</p></li>
<li><p>the Benin–Niger frontier dispute.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In North Africa, boundary disputes and contested territories abound. Examples include Moroccan claims over Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla. There is the long-lasting Morocco and Mauritania struggle against the <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sahara-s-polisario-front-threatens-new-armed-struggle-against-morocco-44497520">Polisario Front</a>, while Libya and Algeria have intervened in favour of the Saharan national liberation movement.</p>
<p>Algeria and Morocco <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/523680?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">accuse each other</a> of harbouring militants and condoning arms smuggling. Libya appears to claim about 32,000 sq km that apparently is under Algerian control. Sudan claims, but Egypt <em>de facto</em> administers, security and economic development of the <a href="http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/fl/The-Halayeb-Triangle.htm">Halaib region</a> north of the 22nd parallel boundary.</p>
<p>Southern Africa has its own set of disputes. The contestation between Namibia and South Africa over the Orange River has been described as one of the oldest boundary disputes in the world. There are tensions between Swaziland and South Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accuses Angola of shifting monuments on their common boundary.</p>
<p>Namibian exploitation of the Okavango River has been a source of disagreement with Botswana. Unresolved boundaries afflict portions of the Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia borders.</p>
<p>Central African states’ ongoing boundary problems include location of the boundary in the broad Congo River between the Republic of Congo and the DRC. Uganda and the DRC continue to dispute the Rukwanzi Island in Lake Albert and other areas on the Semliki River with hydrocarbon potential.</p>
<p>As though dispute over territories and boundaries is not challenging enough, separatist tendencies aiming at the creation of more independent states are rife.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=z7MBCgAAQBAJ&pg=PR1&lpg=PR1&dq=Gbenga+Oduntan,+International+Law+and+Boundary+Disputes+in+Africa&source=bl&ots=JceIQdgyzW&sig=ja1xSJ-Y7dCCGLuuLc_C4-5bEfw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YbCfVfniHYHcUOCci8AL&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Gbenga%20Oduntan%2C%20International%20Law%20and%20Boundary%20Disputes%20in%20Africa&f=false">research</a> shows that currently there are approximately 58 potential secessionist territories in 29 out of the total 57 independent states of Africa. These phantom states are championed by at least 83 political associations and pressure groups.</p>
<p>Such statistics are understandably alarming. They unfortunately portend an increase in civil conflicts.</p>
<h2>Dispelling the pre-colonial harmony myth</h2>
<p>Precolonial Africa was very sensitive to migration tensions and territorial conflicts – perhaps even on a wider scale than today. African cultures relied on city walls and other strict boundary markers. This is reflected both in oral and written literature.</p>
<p>Recent satellite imagery as well as archaeological studies provide overwhelming <a href="http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415838924/">evidence</a> that ancient Africa relied on precise boundary markers separating states and political groups. For instance, there were about 10,000 town walls, 25% or more of them on presently deserted sites, between Lake Chad and the Atlantic Ocean.</p>
<p>There were also the 160km-long Sungbo’s Eredo wall, the 45km-long Orile Owu wall and walls completely surrounding the pre-European infuence <a href="http://apollo5.bournemouth.ac.uk/africanlegacy/kano_walls.htm">cities</a> of Kwiambana, Old Ningi and Gogoram.</p>
<h2>African Union efforts to find a solution</h2>
<p>Commendably, the <a href="http://www.au.int/">African Union</a> (AU) has been committed to an audacious <a href="http://www.aborne.org/african-union-border-programme.html">border programme</a> since 2007. This may go down as one of the most significant legal events on the continent. The declaration demands an Africa-wide exercise to demarcate international land and maritime boundaries.</p>
<p>But, in line with the “run before you walk” reputation of the AU, it has set an overly ambitious timetable and several deadlines have already been missed. Participation in the initiative has been patchy at best. It is scandalous that the programme, originally envisaged to have been completed before 2015, has arguably not achieved more than one-quarter of its objectives.</p>
<p>The complete delimitation and demarcation of Africa is a herculean task. We are talking about an area of approximately 6.1 million square km and 28,000 miles of international boundaries.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/88241/original/image-20150713-11798-q253zn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An armed boy herds cows in northwestern Kenya inside the disputed Turkana region of the Ilemi Triangle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In many cases the issue is what exactly was owned and passed over to African states from the colonial powers. Hence, fancy legal doctrines that lawyers like to throw about, such as the so called <em>uti possidetis juris</em>, are no more than a <a href="http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm">logical tautology</a>. This seeks to freeze all territories to a snap shot of the area states were given on the day of independence.</p>
<p>African states have been making liberal use of the <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/">International Court of Justice</a> (ICJ) and the <a href="http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=363">Permanent Court of Arbitration</a>. Of the 18 contentious cases between African states submitted to the ICJ, 13 concern territorial or boundary disputes.</p>
<p>Cogent criticisms have been levelled at both courts. These include the accusation that they have been applying Eurocentric international law in a way that compromises the interest of African countries. The composition and staffing of both is also largely unrepresentative of Africa.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there are examples of good practice among African states to deal with boundary problems. In theory, boundary tensions could be addressed through various indigenous mechanisms. These include the <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55663">Councils of Elders</a> and the use of peace radios and peace newspapers by East Africa’s <a href="http://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a> and by the <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (ECOWAS).</p>
<p>The AU itself has a <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/29-panel-of-the-wise-pow">Panel of the Wise</a> capable of dealing with crisis arising over boundaries. There are also unique early warning systems in place, including one for <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/?s=Early+warning+Situation+room">ECOWAS</a> and the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/cews-handook-en.pdf">AU</a>.</p>
<h2>What to do when a dispute matures</h2>
<p>Appreciation of local realities is one of the strong points to opt for resolution by indigenous means.</p>
<p>When a dispute matures enough for political attention, governments should ideally follow the following steps:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Declare an open dispute;</p></li>
<li><p>Involve pertinent interstate commissions;</p></li>
<li><p>Seek the help of a neutral study group to discover and delineate the issues;</p></li>
<li><p>Initiate technical studies and hold seminars;</p></li>
<li><p>Initiate direct negotiations;</p></li>
<li><p>Involve the appropriate regional economic commission;</p></li>
<li><p>Seek, or allow, the intervention by the AU;</p></li>
<li><p>Implement an <em>ad hoc</em> African arbitral mechanism;</p></li>
<li><p>Resort to judicial mechanisms such as the African Court of Justice or the ICJ.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>There is also scope for increasing the participation of indigenous experts, civil society organisations as well as more systematic use of plebiscites in dealing with territorial disputes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gbenga Oduntan is a member of the Support and Technical Advisory Group (STAG) established to support the Africa Forum / High Level Mediation Group (HLMG) established to mediate in the boundary dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over Lake Nyasa/Malawi.
He is author of International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa Routledge -2015 -Series: Routledge Research in International Law <a href="http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415838924">http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415838924</a>
</span></em></p>Africa has had border disputes through the millennia. But the continent has its own peculiar problems, most because of colonialism. Luckily, there are examples of good practice to deal with problems.Gbenga Oduntan, Reader (Associate Professor) in International Commercial Law, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.