tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/cabinet-papers-1990-91-34597/articlesCabinet papers 1990-91 – The Conversation2015-12-31T21:24:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/519882015-12-31T21:24:05Z2015-12-31T21:24:05ZCabinet papers 1990-91: from little things, Australia’s asylum seeker policy grew<p>The Keating government’s decision to introduce mandatory detention of asylum seekers in 1992 has long been recognised as a progenitor of the hardline policies that have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-boats-may-have-stopped-but-at-what-cost-to-australia-30455">increasingly a feature</a> of this fraught area of policy. </p>
<p>Kerry O’Brien asked Paul Keating about this in his <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/programs/keating/">recent interviews</a> with the former Labor prime minister. Keating explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To be honest, it was not a great human rights issue for cabinet at the time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gerry Hand, a Left factional leader, was the immigration minister, Keating said, and it was taken for granted that “he would have the human rights issues covered”.</p>
<p>The National Archives of Australia today released selected key cabinet records for 1990 and 1991. A cabinet document of June 26, 1990, reveals that the journey to Nauru and Manus began several years earlier than 1992. The logic of the policy changes initiated by the Hawke government in mid-1990 has underpinned asylum seeker policy for much of the quarter-century since. </p>
<p>A background attachment prepared for cabinet explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Each applicant who is granted asylum in Australia displaces an applicant for humanitarian consideration overseas. Many applicants overseas are living in tenuous conditions in countries of refuge, have waited patiently in line to be assessed, and have claims for humanitarian resettlement which are far more urgent and compelling than the majority of cases considered in Australia.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The document does not use the term “queue-jumper”, but the concept is well and truly developed. It added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are seeing a growing trend worldwide of the jet-age asylum claimant.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Fears of a perfect storm</h2>
<p>The numbers applying for asylum in Australia had grown in the recent past. From just 564 in 1988-89, applications rose to 3077 in 1989-90, up to the end of May. The backlog was estimated at six or seven years if applications were processed at the current rate.</p>
<p>These delays were likely to stimulate further – possibly frivolous – claims because asylum seekers would be able to continue living in Australia while they waited. A few boat arrivals had come from Cambodia, but most applicants for asylum had arrived with a valid visa.</p>
<p>Changes in the Australian economy, the international order, the ease and cost of transport, and local case law were creating the conditions for what Hand and his advisers saw as a perfect storm.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106849/original/image-20151222-27863-1x045kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Having allowed Chinese students to stay after China had crushed pro-democracy protests, the Hawke government was concerned about students arriving from ‘high-risk’ countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/media/images/cabinet/1990-91/index.aspx">National Archives of Australia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The development of an Australian education export industry was one problem, for international students sometimes claimed asylum. In 1989 the Hawke government had allowed Chinese students in Australia at the time of the suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations to remain in the country. </p>
<p>The government now proposed dividing students into those from high- and low-risk countries. This would be done on the basis of judgements (from the previous behaviour of visitors and students in each national group) about the likelihood that they would claim asylum. </p>
<p>Those from “high-risk countries” – which included Lebanon, Turkey, Poland, South Korea, Pakistan, Iran and China – would be subject to stringent checks and restrictions which did not apply to other applicants.</p>
<p>Developments in the international order were seen as contributing to the problem. These included civil wars in Lebanon and Sri Lanka, as well as the official clampdown in China. Australian officials also looked with concern on the looming end of British rule over Hong Kong in 1997, fearing that it, too, would lead to asylum claims.</p>
<h2>‘Judicial activism’ added to alarm</h2>
<p>Recent “judicial activism” was seen to have compounded the problem. This had made it easier to claim asylum in Australia, a trend that was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… sending ‘beacon’ signals to overseas source areas and potentially disrupting the efficiency of controls over our Migration Program. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The cabinet submission explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The judicial model will certainly ensure justice, but only to those who have the price of a plane ticket and the ingenuity to get an Australian visa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Australia was “reaching a point where most on-shore refugee applicants from a country perceived as politically unstable or possessing a limited commitment to human rights” would secure asylum and residency. This meant people from “at-risk countries” were able “to self-select themselves as de facto migrants”.</p>
<p>The document declared tartly: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The judicial model appears to accept that it is better for one hundred non-genuine claimants to get undeserved sanctuary in Australia, than for one genuine claimant to be ‘refouled’ to his or her country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is a measure of Hand’s desperation that the minister considered removing from the courts the power of judicial review in asylum seeker cases. Senior law officers, however, thought that there were alternatives to such a drastic step.</p>
<p>The basic direction recommended was instead to detach claims for protection from the issue of permanent residence. It is a distinction that remains a favourite among immigration ministers closer to our own times.</p>
<h2>Asylum-migration policy linkage remains key</h2>
<p>What was seen as at stake here? It was clearly not primarily Australia’s mainly offshore humanitarian program. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106850/original/image-20151222-27863-173o9xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cabinet was alert to concerns about immigration and multiculturalism, which former ambassador to China Stephen FitzGerald had identified in a 1988 report.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Library of Australia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The nation had already experienced divisive debate over Asian migration to Australia earlier in the decade. In 1988, a report handed down by former ambassador to China Stephen FitzGerald had found a lack of public support for multiculturalism and an immigration policy insufficiently geared to national economic interests. </p>
<p>Politicians and officials increasingly recognised support for government policies on migration and settlement as fragile. The cabinet submission declared that any perception “that the government is not master of the inflow” would risk public support for migration policy in general. It might even produce “a dangerous public backlash against overseas-born Australians particularly those with origins outside Europe”.</p>
<p>Certainly, if public rhetoric is any guide, the idea of a nexus between strict government control of the asylum seeker intake and wider public support for migration and settlement policy remains at the heart of political consideration of such matters today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Bongiorno is a member of the Australian Labor Party and the author of The Eighties: The Decade That Transformed Australia.</span></em></p>The logic of the policy changes initiated by the Hawke government in mid-1990 has underpinned asylum-seeker policy for much of the quarter-century since.Frank Bongiorno, Professor of History, ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521532015-12-31T21:23:57Z2015-12-31T21:23:57ZCabinet papers 1990-91: lessons from the recession we didn’t have to have<p>Australia’s last formal recession ended in the September quarter of 1991. Once it sunk in that this was a serious economic downturn, treasurer Paul Keating famously referred to it as “the recession Australia had to have”. This narrative of the recession seemed plausible at the time. A necessary correction for the twin problems of inflation and current account deficits. But it remains a point of contention among political and economic historians and the policy makers involved.</p>
<p>The selected key cabinet papers for 1990 and 1991 released today by the <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/">National Archives of Australia</a> appear to support those who see the recession as <a href="http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/Australian_Public_Policy/WPP07_3.pdf">likely caused and certainly exacerbated by monetary and fiscal policy.</a> Policy that was overly concerned with the current account deficit. The current account is a measure of trade balance and reflects Australia’s net financial position with the rest of the world. It was a measure of genuine importance to governments during the Bretton-Woods era of set exchange rates and the gold standard, but is considered of little importance today. The 1990-91 cabinet papers confirm the focus given to the current account in both budgetary and micro-economic reform considerations:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The Committee noted the need to take action to ensure that fiscal policy and the Budget surplus continue to be a key elements [sic] in demand management strategy, thereby helping reduce the current account deficit and dependence on overseas savings.” - First paragraph of the Expenditure Review Committee’s (ERC) 1990 cabinet submission titled Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategy (7055).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even in the midst of the economic downturn Keating was keen to defend the surplus as it contributed to national savings and kept downward pressure on inflation and exchange rates. The result was policy carefully aimed at increasing national output while holding down domestic demand, thus hopefully spurring exports and balancing the current account.</p>
<p>The Reserve Bank at the time also had a multi-targeted approach to monetary policy with concern not only for inflation but also current account and exchange rates. This meant monetary policy was tighter in the lead-up to the recession than it would have been if inflation was the principal target – as it is today. You can see from the graph below that monetary policy was most conspicuously out of step with inflation in 1989 right before the recession, with a big spike in interest rates despite only a very modest rise in inflation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106397/original/image-20151217-11308-1cc59cb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Interest rates and inflation 1970-2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/Australian_Public_Policy/WPP07_3.pdf">Bell & Quiggin 2007</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Typical of those looking back at their actions during this period, former reserve bank governor Ian Macfarlane doesn’t mention the current account in <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/the-real-reasons-why-it-was-the-1990s-recession-we-had-to-have/2006/12/01/1164777791623.html?page=4">his defence of fiscal policy</a> at the time, even though Reserve Bank documents make it clear this was a major consideration.</p>
<p>The cabinet papers reveal a two pronged approach to dealing with both inflation and the current account deficit; maintaining tight fiscal policy and keeping a lid on wages.</p>
<p>When it came to fiscal policy, proposals from ministers for new money were sorted by the hard-line Expenditure Review Committee into “unavoidable”, “deferrable” or “dispensible” and only those categorised as unavoidable were considered for inclusion in the 1990-91 budget. Of the 219 policies under consideration, only 51 were determined to be unavoidable, the rest being either deferred (55) or binned altogether (113).</p>
<p>In spite of Bob Hawke’s claims that sustainability and environmental protection were key priorities of his government, basically every item of new expenditure for the environment was labelled dispensible or deferrable. There were ongoing internal divisions over continuing the so-far successful strategy of chasing the “green vote”. Of some contemporary interest is the fact that a request for funding for “Climate change policy – Multifaceted Program Initiatives” was dumped into the “dispensible” category. </p>
<p>This hard-nosed attitude to new spending flew in the face of long-standing orthodox supporting Keynesian fiscal stimulus during an economic downturn. The major justification given for this was the state of the current account. Inflation was part of that discussion but it was mentioned less often and given a back seat to the perceived current account problems.</p>
<p>In relation to the second policy focus, that of wage constraint, the cabinet submissions read like a Howard era Liberal party policy. The emphasis was on workforce flexibility, enterprise bargaining, productivity gains and the improvement of Australia’s competitive position; particularly in manufacturing and textiles. Wage constraint was seen as a critical component of restoring international competitiveness and our current account position. As a result, industrial relations reform tended to shift power towards employers while lauding the unions for taking a hit for the common good.</p>
<p>The collapse of Bretton-Woods and the abandonment of the gold standard in the 1970s meant a new paradigm for both fiscal and monetary policy. But such profound changes generally take a long time to be fully understood by bureaucrats, academics and policy makers alike.</p>
<p>The depth of the 1990-91 recession led to a rethink of monetary and fiscal policy. The Reserve Bank shifted focus to prioritising inflation as a target along with economic growth, abandoning consideration of the current account and the exchange rate.</p>
<p>The recession may not have been inevitable but the resulting plunge in inflation, combined with the new Reserve Bank focus, has created a low and relatively stable level of inflation in Australia ever since. This has certainly been a major contributor to our current record streak of uninterrupted economic growth.</p>
<p>Governments no longer take much interest in the current account figures. In fact, it’s hard to find somebody who admits that they (personally) ever did. If private individuals and institutions hold foreign debt it’s considered their own business. We’re yet to encounter a level of current account deficit that is unsustainable or that threatens the national economy (that’s not to say, of course, that such a level doesn’t exist).</p>
<p>While the evidence, with the benefit of hindsight, suggests the recession could have been avoided or ameliorated through looser monetary and fiscal policy, this would have required a level of policy insight that was not available at the time. It was reflection on the recession that created this policy insight. </p>
<p>To complete the lesson we now need policy makers and academics to understand what the collapse of Bretton-Woods <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-federal-budget-is-not-like-a-household-budget-35498">really meant for fiscal policy</a>. In 25 years’ time commentators and historians will almost certainly be looking back on current cabinet papers and similarly shaking their heads at the unnecessary obsession with fiscal deficits and surpluses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Warwick Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 1990s obsession with the current account looks silly with hindsight, perhaps akin to our current one with fiscal deficits and surpluses.Warwick Smith, Research economist, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/520692015-12-31T21:23:54Z2015-12-31T21:23:54ZCabinet papers 1990-91: the new world order that fizzled<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106772/original/image-20151221-27894-1wqzi0r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gareth Evans, foreign minister in the Hawke government, brought an ambitious vision for Australia's international diplomacy to cabinet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the <a href="http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/photos/fall-of-the-berlin-wall-a-short-history/ss-CC8qY2?fullscreen=true#image=1">fall of the Berlin Wall</a> in November 1989, the reunification of Germany the following year and the winds of change blowing across the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe, it seemed as if a new world order was on the way.</p>
<p>Selected key cabinet records for 1990 and 1991 released today by the National Archives of Australia convey little of that sense of excitement. The language of the cabinet submissions, memoranda and decisions is certainly not that of a government intent on rethinking Australia’s international relationships.</p>
<p>The Hawke cabinet’s approach to foreign affairs, security and defence during this period is well captured by its handling of three issues: relations with China in the wake of the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the response to Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, and the Cambodian peace initiative.</p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>In January 1990, cabinet agreed to lift some of the restrictions it had imposed on official dealings with China in July 1989. Reciprocal visits by some ministers as well as Chinese provincial governors and Australian state premiers could now proceed. Other political and security exchanges could be considered on a case-by-case basis.</p>
<p>More important than the decision’s specifics was its underlying rationale. The submission to cabinet found it reassuring that the downgrading of the bilateral relationship and representations on human rights had not jeopardised “trade and working-level exchanges in most areas”. </p>
<p>Foreign Minister Gareth Evans indicated that it might soon be prudent to resume “a correct relationship with China”. Two national interests were said to be critical:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… encouraging China to be receptive to Western influences;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and Australia’s:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… substantial commercial interests based on the complementarity of the two economies and China’s potential for growth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Pragmatically speaking, the thought that these two interests might have to trump human rights concerns was relatively straightforward. But, in time, Australia’s China conundrum might not be so easily resolved. What if Australia’s future dilemma came down to choosing between its perceived security interests (its alliance with the US) and its commercial links – specifically its economic ties with China? </p>
<p>To this unpleasant prospect, cabinet was – for now – happy enough to turn a blind eye.</p>
<h2>Gulf War</h2>
<p>The first Gulf War was in some ways even more revealing of the drift of Australia’s foreign policy thinking. </p>
<p>In August 1990, Prime Minister Bob Hawke took charge of Australia’s response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. On August 6, he announced a package of sanctions to be imposed on Iraq. On August 10, the government made public its intention to despatch two guided missile frigates and a replenishment tanker involving a complement of 600 sailors to join the US-led blockade of Iraq.</p>
<p>Having duly noted these decisions on August 14, cabinet agreed to review the Australian ships’ future operational role in the light of changing circumstances. </p>
<p>Though cabinet was responding to a submission from Defence Minister Robert Ray, it was left to Foreign Affairs and Trade to offer a more elegant justification for these decisions. It cited Australia’s commitment to international peace and security and the threat Iraq’s actions posed to Australia’s strategic and commercial interests.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most illuminating part of Defence’s submission was the acknowledgement that Australia’s contribution was made in response to a US request, and that US objectives went far beyond enhancing the effectiveness of UN sanctions. These were said to include restoring Kuwait’s government, ensuring the security and stability of the Persian Gulf, protecting American citizens abroad and US vital interests in Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The larger US agenda would in due course be facilitated by further UN Security Council resolutions, in particular <a href="http://i-cias.com/textarchive/modern/un678.htm">Resolution 678</a> (November 1990). This authorised member states “to use all necessary means” should Iraq fail to comply with previous UN resolutions by January 15, 1991. </p>
<p>Soon after this deadline had passed and US air attacks against Iraq began, Hawke formally committed Australia to the war. He placed the guided missile destroyer HMAS Brisbane and the guided missile frigate HMAS Sydney under the control of the USS Midway carrier battle group and authorised them to use force as required. </p>
<p>Available records suggest the cabinet’s role was limited to receiving and duly noting oral reports from Hawke on January 16, January 29 and February 27.</p>
<p>In the parliamentary debate on January 22, 1991, Labor MP Barry Jones, though reluctantly supportive of the government’s decision to enter the war, <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1991-01-22%2F0009;orderBy=_fragment_number,doc_date-rev;page=0;query=Dataset%3Ahansardr,hansardr80%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221991%22%20Month%3A%2201%22;rec=0;resCount=Default">voiced five misgivings</a>: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the remoteness of the parliament and the caucus from the decision-making process; </p></li>
<li><p>the eagerness and speed with which the government acted; </p></li>
<li><p>the failure to recognise the West’s complicity in building up Hussein’s power; </p></li>
<li><p>the belated recognition of the centrality of oil as an issue in the Gulf crisis; and </p></li>
<li><p>the lack of a clear post-war strategy. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Cabinet submissions and prime ministerial decisions took little account of these concerns.</p>
<p>The war lasted no more than six weeks and the coalition sustained only 166 fatal casualties; none of them Australian. But the war left at least <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/gulf/">100,000 Iraqis dead</a> and set in train a simmering conflict that would trouble the region for the next decade and eventually unleash the second Gulf War, which began in 2003. </p>
<p>Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/abbott-denies-mission-creep-as-more-australian-troops-committed-to-iraq-38304">current involvement in Iraq</a> is very much part of the unfinished business of the first Gulf War.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/106776/original/image-20151221-27884-c0fwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australia’s current involvement in Iraq has roots in its participation in the first Gulf War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Cambodia</h2>
<p>Australia’s international engagement struck a happier note in Cambodia. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1990/130390_fm_ausindochinecambodia.pdf">For Evans</a>, Australia’s activism in promoting the peace initiative reflected its interest in regional security and economic co-operation and the need to stem the flow of refugees. He also saw it as a “humanitarian obligation to help resolve the tragedy”.</p>
<p>Evans’ untiring efforts eventually bore fruit with the Paris agreement of October 1991. In anticipation of the agreement, cabinet approved on October 9 a substantial Australian involvement in the UN peacekeeping force in Cambodia. </p>
<p>Cabinet’s decision to maintain a high profile, seek “to provide the force commander and headquarters staff and observers” and open a greatly enlarged diplomatic mission in Cambodia was a measure of the ambition Evans had brought to Australian diplomacy generally and to global and regional multilateralism in particular.</p>
<h2>Lessons</h2>
<p>Over the two years, cabinet considered a number of other issues, including the relationship with Taiwan, the international terrorist threat to Australia, and nuclear non-proliferation. In these as in most other areas the analysis remained cautious and the initiatives at best modest. </p>
<p>On a somewhat less conventional note, cabinet agreed in May 1991 to introduce legislation to exempt from compulsory military service those with a conscientious objection either to war in general or to particular wars.</p>
<p>The cabinet papers are particularly telling for what is left unsaid. We find here little of Evans’ sweeping analysis of a rapidly changing world order or of his vision of good international citizenship.</p>
<p>Evans often <a href="http://goo.gl/SURbQe">castigated the media</a> for its failure to engage in intelligent debate and informed discussion on global and regional security, the role of the UN system, the changing nature of alliances, the arms control and disarmament agenda, and ways of advancing human rights. One could be forgiven for thinking that much the same criticism could be levelled at a good many of his cabinet colleagues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52069/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Camilleri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is little of Gareth Evans’ sweeping analysis in the cabinet papers of 1990-91 of a rapidly changing world order or of his vision of good international citizenship.Joseph Camilleri, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521432015-12-31T21:23:51Z2015-12-31T21:23:51ZCabinet papers 1990-91: déjà vu? We’re having the same debate about climate as we were then<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/105891/original/image-20151214-23182-w0apgh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Bob Hawke opening the General Assembly of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Perth, November 1990.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives of Australia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/">National Archives of Australia</a> today released selected federal <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/cabinet/index.aspx">cabinet records</a> for 1990 and 1991. They reveal intense battles over Australia’s domestic climate targets and, above all, a palpable determination that Australia not damage its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_payments_of_Australia">coal revenue</a>. Déjà vu? </p>
<p>In March 1990 Bob Hawke won, with <a href="http://australianpolitics.com/voting/elections/1990-federal">help from green-minded voters</a>, an unprecedented (for Labor) fourth federal election. </p>
<p>However, all was not well in his cabinet, with the economy in trouble (“<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_1990s_recession_in_Australia">the recession we had to have</a>”) and Paul Keating circling for the top job he’d been promised. </p>
<p>Despite these issues, and others (Saddam Hussein’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War">invasion of Kuwait</a>), the “greenhouse effect”, as it was then known, remained a hot potato, with strong public interest and growing international pressure for a climate treaty. </p>
<h2>Moving targets</h2>
<p>An August 1990 Treasury paper on “Costs and Benefits of Options to Respond to Climate Change” is revealing, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of existing economic modelling. With the Department of Primary Industry and Energy leading the charge, all but one government department wanted to defer the setting of a domestic emissions target for a year. </p>
<p>The lone voice for action was the environment department (then known as DASETT), which was clearly and consistently out-gunned and left out of informational loops.</p>
<p>Led by Ros Kelly, outnumbered in a male-dominated cabinet, the department made an appeal to the testosterone of the Hawke team:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Toronto target [a target of 20% below 1988 by 2005 suggested at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/timeline-un-climate-negotiations-50529">first climate conference ever</a>] has been accepted by NSW, Victoria and ACT. The Commonwealth cannot be seen to be weak by comparison. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This appeal, together with tactical moves by <a href="http://www.futureleaders.com.au/book_chapters/pdf/Climate_Change/Joan_Staples.pdf">prominent environmental groups</a>, succeeded. Australia adopted an interim planning target for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/25-years-ago-the-australian-government-promised-deep-emissions-cuts-and-yet-here-we-still-are-46805">20% cut by 2005, with provisos</a>. </p>
<p>How has that worked out? Well, this graph below tells you all you need to know.</p>
<iframe src="https://charts.datawrapper.de/xkpU1/index.html" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<h2>Doubting the science</h2>
<p>A November 1991 briefing called “Negotiations for a Convention on Climate Change”, written by a clear-eyed diplomat, warned:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The science of climate change is complex and there are still areas of uncertainty: some countries (including the US, China and the USSR) exploit this to negotiate for minimal legal obligations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The briefing counselled that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The dominant ideologists of the South India, China, Malaysia and Mexico - have seized on the Climate Change Convention negotiations as a new opportunity to achieve the Third World objectives of the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The diplomat warned that Australia, as a “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_power">middle power</a>”, was going to need credibility (emphasis added):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Maintaining our willingness to contribute our “fair share”, and strengthening our capacity to enunciate this in practical ways, is very necessary to reinforce Australia’s credentials in the negotiations, <strong>and help to deflect criticism of “special pleading” on fossil fuels.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fortunately,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a cost-effective option for Australia to reduce its emissions may be through technology transfer or projects which reduce emissions in developing countries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Which brings us neatly to the question of “clean coal”.</p>
<p>A September 1991 submission, “Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, put forward by the ministers for primary industries and energy, transport and industry shows that A$105,000 was set aside to “cover airfares, accommodation and a meal allowance for up to 18 Asia-Pacific developing country delegates” to a clean coal conference in Sydney, organised by the Australian Coal Association.</p>
<p>The justification was that, “The Conference and this program of sponsorship will be an important element in the development of new markets for Australian coal and coal use technologies.”</p>
<h2>What goes around?</h2>
<p>What do we learn? The cabinet papers show that the political elite have been talking about selling Australia’s relatively “pure” coal as a contribution to climate mitigation for 25 years. </p>
<p>More recently, Coalition politicians have emphasised the vital role of Australian coal in development. These sentiments echo Peabody Energy’s “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/27/peabody-burson-marstellar-coal_n_5044962.html">Advanced Energy for Life</a>” campaign. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The then prime minister, Tony Abbott, opening BMA’s Caval Ridge mine, proclaiming “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tony-abbott-says-coal-is-good-for-humanity-while-opening-mine">coal is good for humanity</a>”.</p></li>
<li><p>Energy Minister Josh Frydenberg claiming a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-there-really-a-moral-case-for-coal-the-answer-is-about-far-more-than-money-49832">strong moral case</a>” for Adani’s Carmichael coal mine</p></li>
<li><p>Environment Minister Greg Hunt defending approval of Adani’s Carmichael mine because Australia is not “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/02/australia-approved-coalmine-because-it-isnt-a-neo-colonialist-power-greg-hunt-claims">neo-colonialist</a>”.</p></li>
<li><p>Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/dec/10/australia-wins-fossil-of-the-day-for-julie-bishops-coal-speech-at-paris-climate-talks">award-winning speech</a> at Paris, claiming that “coal will remain critical to promoting prosperity, growing economies and alleviating hunger for years to come”.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>However, it hasn’t just been the Coalition. </p>
<p>As a <a href="http://www.crikey.com.au/2008/07/30/greenpeace-coal-exports-undermine-rudd-climate-case/">Greenpeace campaigner pointed out</a> in 2009: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>On the eve of the announcement of the CPRS [Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, an emissions trading scheme], painted as the big policy solution to Australia’s carbon emissions, Queensland Premier Anna Bligh unveiled plans for a $5.3 billion expansion of her state’s export coal capacity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While spruiking that ill-fated CPRS package, <a href="http://christine-milne.greensmps.org.au/content/media-releases/rudd-turns-coal-sods-fails-hunter-valley-jobs">the then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, found time to get his shovel out</a> for a photo-op at an export-infrastructure expansion in the Hunter Valley.</p>
<p>And one of the first acts as prime minister by Julia Gillard, the one person who succeeded in shepherding through legislation that <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-year-on-from-the-carbon-price-experiment-the-rebound-in-emissions-is-clear-44782">briefly made a minor difference to energy emissions</a>, <a href="http://environmentvictoria.org.au/media/greens-slam-gillard-brown-coal-export-deal">was boosting the export of brown coal</a>. </p>
<p>Politics is, after all, the art of the possible. And the only possible climate frame for most Australian politicians, for a generation, has been maintaining the appearance of ambition on climate change without damaging Australia’s coal industry. That hasn’t changed, but our chances of avoiding the consequences of climate change have.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc Hudson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The National Archives of Australia today released selected federal cabinet records for 1990 and 1991. They reveal intense battles over Australia’s domestic climate targets and, above all, a palpable determination that Australia not damage its coal revenue.Marc Hudson, PhD Candidate, Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/519012015-12-31T21:23:49Z2015-12-31T21:23:49ZCabinet papers 1990-91: leadership scrutiny distracts from historic Hawke reforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/107010/original/image-20151224-27851-1uxtj1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hawke said his government passed more legislation in 1990 and 1991 than any other since federation.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives of Australia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>We have become accustomed to the corrosion leadership uncertainty brings to Australian politics. Selected key cabinet records for 1990 and 1991, released today by the <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/">National Archives of Australia</a>, highlight the enduring tensions generated by perhaps the first in the modern cycle of such contests, and also reveal the distortions they introduce into our sense of government. </p>
<p>At a December 2015 media briefing before the release of those records, Bob Hawke urged reporters of the need </p>
<blockquote>
<p>to destroy the myth that has been peddled in some quarters that this was a period of do-nothing government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hawke dismisses arguments that his government was paralysed in the period from its re-election in March 1990 and Paul Keating’s second, successful leadership challenge on December 19, 1991. </p>
<p>That “myth”, however, is well entrenched, especially in the biographies and autobiographies that have increasingly shadowed the recent past of Australian politics. </p>
<h2>Behind the Punch and Judy show</h2>
<p>There is, no doubt, an interdependence between the appetites fed by the itch of leadership unrest and the bullish market for personalised accounts of politics.</p>
<p>But those appetites can foster a disconnect between the public narrative of a government’s performance and the policy agenda that fundamentally shapes the life of the nation. This disconnect is particularly marked in relation to the events of 1990-91.</p>
<p>As Hawke reminded journalists, in those years his government passed more legislation - 144 acts in 1990, 204 in 1991 – than any other since federation. While the press focused on what Keating called “the Punch and Judy show”, this government was working at an astonishing pace on reforms that are still felt today: cutting tariffs, privatising state assets, reforming telcos, breaking industrial orthodoxies in moving to enterprise bargaining, introducing the “activity tests” of Newstart, ramping up targeted policies on child care and aged care, and much else.</p>
<p>In May 1990, Keating as treasurer congratulated colleagues on returning to their offices “unencumbered by costly and unnecessary campaign promises”. Many ministers might have doubted their prospects of re-election, but now was the opportunity to press harder into the reconstruction agenda the government had pursued since 1983.</p>
<p>More than ever, the government’s mantra was micro-economic reform: broad-brush deregulation of financial and industrial sectors was to be focused down onto the workers, employers and institutions that had increasingly to play their part in transforming the world of work in Australia. Bargains were struck over workforce participation, workplace culture, occupational transformation and flexibility and investment. </p>
<p>Cabinet submissions emphasised that the pressure of market exposure should be increased and public spending restrained. Even with the first signs of recession, the drive was to break through the last barriers to efficiency. </p>
<p>Car manufacturers needed the discipline of “more than gradual adjustment pressure”. Clothing manufacturers, proving resistant to regimes of “restructuring pressure”, needed “accelerated” strategies. </p>
<p>Hawke’s drive to recast federalism around a more co-operative approach to providing services gained early support and bureaucratic action. The Building Better Cities agenda of 1991 coupled a fresh approach to the spatial dimensions of disadvantage while emphasising the micro-economic goals of “enhancement of access to employment, education and training”.</p>
<h2>Unforgiving leadership scrutiny</h2>
<p>But critics outside the government found the focus on process in such policies less interesting than the programs with which the government had once held their attention. Economic downturn also sapped these initiatives of resources and strained administrative systems. As leadership divisions deepened within the government, these elements were readily seized upon by those wanting change at the top. </p>
<p>In this context, some changes, such as the introduction of a Medicare co-payment for visits to the doctor, played into intensifying factional jockeying as much as they challenged Labor Party principles. </p>
<p>And, with a fix on economic outcomes, there was less tolerance for the values of special interests, as Hawke found when he effectively staked his leadership on preventing mining on a <a href="http://www.jawoyn.org/governance/history">site sacred to the Jawoyn people</a> in Kakadu National Park.</p>
<p>The coupling of the government’s micro-economic agenda with this leadership scrutiny was unforgiving. But that agenda was integral – and these years perhaps decisive – to consolidating the transformations we are told made Australia more resilient through the economic crises to come. </p>
<p>However unguarded, Keating’s reference to the “recession we had to have” runs through much of the government’s actions through 1990 and even well into 1991. The decision was made not to “throw money at the problem” by stimulating recovery through public investment. </p>
<p>The treasurer assured cabinet in May 1991 that his intent was not “keeping the economy comatosed” by maintaining restraint, but guaranteeing that when business picked up it would be on better foundations for the future. </p>
<h2>A changing world</h2>
<p>By then, however, cabinet submissions were reflecting an awareness that the recession of 1990-91 was not only forcing through necessary changes. It was also hitting a society – and especially a labour market – that had not fully recovered from the 1982-83 recession and was less able to adapt to change. </p>
<p>Cabinet papers began to document a world that was being lost as much as promises of a world to come. Soon after becoming treasurer with Keating’s departure to the backbench in July 1991, John Kerin delivered a budget conceding that the past year had been one of “lost jobs, squeezed profits, and dashed hopes”. Kerin, too, would quickly become a victim of the disconnect between reality and message.</p>
<p>And in ushering in elements of the revolution in telecommunications, this period of government was also on the cusp of an age in which leaders are judged on their performance in an unforgiving 24-hour media environment as much as by their longer-term policy outcomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51901/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Brown receives funding from the ARC.</span></em></p>While the press at the time focused on what Keating called “the Punch and Judy show”, cabinet papers reveal that the fourth Hawke government was working at an astonishing pace at reforms still felt today.Nicholas Brown, Professor in History, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.